

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

May 1985

I

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

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Assembly Documents

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PARIS

The proceedings of the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume I : Assembly documents.

Volume II : Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM.	ADRIAENSENS Hugo	SP
	BOGAERTS August	SP
	DE DECKER Armand	PRL
	DEJARDIN Claude	PS
	MICHEL Joseph	PSC
	NOERENS René	PVV
Mrs.	STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP

Substitutes

MM.	BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
	BONNEL Raoul	PVV
	DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
	LAGNEAU André	PRL
	PECRIAUX Nestor	PS
	STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP
	VAN DER ELST Frans	VU

FRANCE

Representatives

MM.	BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
	BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
	BEIX Roland	Socialist
	BERRIER Noel	Socialist
	BOURGES Yvon	RPR
	CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
	President of the Assembly	
	FOURRE Jean-Pierre	Socialist
	JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
	JUNG Louis	UCDP
	LAGORGE Pierre	Socialist
	MAYOUD Alain	UDF
	PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
	RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.
	SENES Gilbert	Socialist
	VALLEIX Jean	RPR
	VIAL-MASSAT Théo	Communist
	WILQUIN Claude	Socialist
	WIRTH Frédéric	UCDP

Substitutes

MM.	BARTHE Jean-Jacques	Communist
	BOHL André	UCDP
	CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
	DELEHEDDE André	Socialist
	DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
	DREYFUS-SCHMIDT Michel	Socialist

MM.	GALLEY Robert	RPR
	GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
	HUYGHUES des ETAGES Jacques	Socialist
	KOEHL Emile	UDF
	MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist
	MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left
	NATIEZ Jean	Socialist
	OEHLEER Jean-André	Socialist
	PROUVOST Pierre	Socialist
	ROSSINOT André	UDF
	SOUVET Louis	RPR
	VERDON Marc	Socialist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM.	AHRENS Karl	SPD
	ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
	BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
	ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
	GERSTL Friedrich	SPD
	HAASE Horst	SPD
	HORNHUES Karl-Heinz	CDU/CSU
Mrs.	KELLY Petra	Die Grünen
MM.	KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
	MÜLLER Gunther	CDU/CSU
	NEUMANN Volker	SPD
	REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
	RUMPF Wolfgang	FDP
	SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
	SCHWARZ Heinz	CDU/CSU
	SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
	UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU
	ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

MM.	BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
	ERTL Josef	FDP
Mrs.	FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM.	GANSEL Norbert	SPD
	GLOS Michael	CDU/CSU
	HACKEL Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
	HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
	HORACEK Milan	Die Grünen
	JÄGER Claus	CDU/CSU
	KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
	LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
	LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
	SCHEER Hermann	SPD
	SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
	SCHMITZ Hans Peter	CDU/CSU
	SOELL Hartmut	SPD
	STAVENHAGEN Lutz	CDU/CSU
	WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM.	AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
	ANTONI Varese	Communist
	BIANCO Gerardo	Chr. Dem.
	CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
	CIFARELLI Michele	Republican
	FERRARI AGGRADI Mario	Chr. Dem.
	FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
	FRASCA Salvatore	Socialist
	GIANOTTI Lorenzo	Communist
	GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
	MEZZAPEZA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
	MILANI Eliseo	PDUP
	PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
	RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
	RUBBI Antonio	Communist
	SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
	SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
	VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM.	ACCILI Achille	Chr. Dem.
	ALBERINI Guido	Socialist
	BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
	COLAJANNI Napoleone	Communist
	FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs.	FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM.	GORLA Massimo	Prol. Dem.
	LAPENTA Nicola	Chr. Dem.
	MARCHIO Michele	MSI-DN
	MARTINO Guido	Republican
	MASCIADRI Cornelio	Socialist
	MITTERDORFER Karl	SVP
	PALUMBO Vincenzo	Liberal
	POLLIDORO Carlo	Communist
	RIZZI Enrico	PSDI
	RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
	SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
	TEODORI Massimo	Radical

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM.	BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
	GOERENS Charles	Dem.
	HENGEL René	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

Mrs.	HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
MM.	KONEN René	Dem.
	LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM.	AARTS Harry	CDA
	van den BERGH Harry	Labour
	BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
	de KWAADSTENIET Willem	CDA
	STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
Mrs.	van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA
Mr.	van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal

Substitutes

Mr.	EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
Mrs.	den OUDEN-DEKKERS Greetje	Liberal
MM.	van der SANDEN Piet	CDA
	van TETS Govert	Liberal
	TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
	de VRIES Klaas	Labour
	WORRELL Joop	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Sir	Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr.	Thomas COX	Labour
Sir	Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
Sir	Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Mr.	Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir	Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr.	James HILL	Conservative
Lord	HUGHES	Labour
MM.	Toby JESSEL	Conservative
	Russell JOHNSTON	Liberal
Mrs.	Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr.	Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr.	Maurice MILLER	Labour
Sir	John OSBORN	Conservative
Sir	John PAGE	Conservative
Lord	REAY	Conservative
Sir	Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr.	John WILKINSON	Conservative

Substitutes

Mr.	David ATKINSON	Conservative
Sir	John BIGGS-DAVISON	Conservative
MM.	Robert BROWN	Labour
	Donald COLEMAN	Labour
	John CORRIE	Conservative
	Robert EDWARDS	Labour
	Reginald FREESON	Labour
	Edward GARRETT	Labour
Earl of	KINNOULL	Conservative
MM.	Bruce MILLAN	Labour
	Michael MORRIS	Conservative
	Christopher MURPHY	Conservative
Lord	NEWALL	Conservative
MM.	Robert PARRY	Labour
	Stephen ROSS	Liberal
	John STOKES	Conservative
	John WARD	Conservative
	Alec WOODALL	Labour

AGENDA

of the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session
Paris, 20th-23rd May 1985

I. Report of the Council

Thirtieth annual report of the Council to the Assembly

II. Political Questions

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|--|---|
| 1. The new outlook for WEU – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 2. East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Haase on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 3. Cyprus and European security | <i>Report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |

III. Defence Questions

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| 1. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Scheer on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 2. State of European security – the central region | <i>Report tabled by Dr. Miller on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 3. Emerging technology and military strategy | <i>Report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |

IV. Technical and Scientific Questions

The military use of computers – reply to the annual report of the Council	<i>Report tabled by Mr. Fourré on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i>
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V. Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure	<i>Report tabled by MM. Eysink, Jessel, Spies von Büllesheim and Unland on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges</i>
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VI. Relations with Parliaments

Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments – Parliamentary debates on the evolution of WEU	<i>Report tabled by Mr. Giust on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments</i>
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ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session
Paris, 20th-23rd May 1985

MONDAY, 20th MAY

Morning

Meetings of political groups.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business of the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session.
7. Action by the Presidential Committee:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Ferrari Aggradi on behalf of the Presidential Committee.

TUESDAY, 21st MAY

Morning 10 a.m.

1. East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Haase on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
2. Cyprus and European security:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
3. Military use of computers – reply to the annual report of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Fourré on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Emerging technology and military strategy:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.

3.30 p.m.

2. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
3. Emerging technology and military strategy:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
4. State of European security – the central region:
presentation of the report tabled by Dr. Miller on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

WEDNESDAY, 22nd MAY

Morning 10 a.m.

1. New outlook for WEU – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.
2. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the annual report of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Scheer on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Thirtieth annual report of the Council:
presentation by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
2. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the annual report of the Council:
Resumed debate.
Votes on the draft recommendations.

THURSDAY, 23rd MAY

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure:
presentation of the report tabled by MM. Eysink, Jessel, Spies von Büllenheim and Unland on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
Debate.
Votes on the draft resolutions.
2. Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments – parliamentary debates on the evolution of WEU:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Giust on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.
Debate.

CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE THIRTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION

*Thirtieth annual report of the Council to the Assembly
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period
1st January to 31st December 1984*

In implementation of Article IX of the Brussels Treaty modified and completed by the protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954, the Council of Western European Union hereby transmits to the Assembly the thirtieth annual report on its activities, covering the period 1st January to 31st December 1984.

In view of the important developments which have taken place during the year, it was considered appropriate to make some changes to the traditional layout of the Council report in order to highlight, in a separate section, the future prospects for the organisation.

It has also seemed more rational to refer to the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly throughout this document rather than in a separate opening chapter as in previous years. (However, for convenience, the various aspects of this dialogue have been brought together in a table at the end of the report.)

This rearrangement of the contents will also avoid the repetitions and cross-references to other chapters that the previous presentation entailed. These changes should facilitate the reading of the report.

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PART TWO

Examination by the Council, in conjunction with the Assembly, of the future prospects for Western European Union

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- II. Production and procurement of armaments for the forces of WEU member countries stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1984
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- IV. Report on the reactivation of WEU published by the Foreign Ministers on 12th June 1984 in Paris
- V. Declaration and document on the institutional reform of WEU published by the Foreign and Defence Ministers on 27th October 1984 in Rome

Introduction

1. During 1984, the Council met at ministerial level on 12th June in Paris under the chairmanship of Mr. Cheysson, the French Minister for External Relations; on 26th and 27th October in Rome, the Foreign and Defence Ministers met in extraordinary session to mark the thirtieth anniversary of Western European Union, under the chairmanship of Mr. Genscher, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

It held seventeen meetings at permanent representative level in London.

The Council was assisted in its work by the working group made up of assistants to the permanent representatives, which met thirty times, by special working groups (eight meetings) including delegates from the respective national administrations – to prepare for the ministerial meetings of the Council – and by the Secretariat-General.

2. During this anniversary year, the Council gave thorough consideration to the future of Western European Union. At its extraordinary meeting on 26th and 27th October, it decided to make fuller use of the organisation and to adapt its institutions accordingly. Its decisions were set forth in the declaration and in the document

on the institutional reform of WEU, published in Rome and transmitted to the Assembly.

3. The Council has held consultations on a number of political and defence questions concerning European security.

It has also ensured that the commitments entered into by the member states of WEU under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols were observed.

4. The Council has noted with interest the reports drawn up by the Assembly committees and has closely followed the Assembly's discussions during the two parts of its thirtieth ordinary session and at its extraordinary session on 29th October in Rome.

The Council has maintained a close dialogue with the Assembly, through official exchanges between the two organs and by informal contacts, covering all the questions relating to the implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty the Assembly has examined. In cooperation with the Assembly, whose contribution was much appreciated, the Council pursued its deliberations about the future prospects of WEU, and the decisions taken in Rome are very much in line with the proposals put forward by the Assembly.

PART ONE

I. The Council and political and defence questions concerning European security***A. Consultations held by the Council***

At their meeting of 12th June 1984 in Paris, the Foreign Ministers had an exchange of views on East-West relations. They confirmed that their respective governments were resolved to continue to work for the establishment of a more constructive dialogue between East and West and for arms control and disarmament along the lines set out in the conclusions to the meeting of the North Atlantic Council from 29th to 31st May in Washington and the declaration published after the meeting.

Certain aspects of the Mediterranean situation which lack of time prevented the ministers from discussing in Paris were raised in the Permanent Council on the basis of a communication from the Italian Delegation.

At the extraordinary session of the Council on 26th and 27th October in Rome jointly attended – for the first time in the history of the organisation – by both the Foreign and Defence Ministers, a number of political and defence questions concerning European security were examined. The Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Genscher, briefed the Presidential Committee of the Assembly after this meeting and addressed the Assembly at its extraordinary session on 29th October. In his address to the Assembly, he stated:

“...We considered East-West relations and their implications for European security. The dividing line between the two alliances runs through Europe. Changes in the balance between East and West directly affect Europe. Europe’s specific security situation calls for a specifically European contribution to the dialogue between East and West. The states of Western European Union, together with the other European members of NATO, make a substantial contribution to defence within the Atlantic Alliance. We are prepared to accept the responsibility this entails. But we also want to be heard. Europe’s voice will be duly heard in the transatlantic dialogue if the Seven adopt a common stance. WEU is the appropriate forum for the alignment of their positions on security issues.

The ministers spent some time discussing ways of improving armaments co-operation within WEU. They took the view that the development of today’s advanced

technologies imposes a fresh and extremely costly burden on the armaments industries of all the member states. The Europeans must accept this technological challenge together, or they will lag behind in international competition. They must therefore pool their resources and co-operate more closely in the armaments sector.

WEU will provide the necessary political impetus. It is also the appropriate body for the co-ordination of European interests in the spheres of defence technology and associated basic research.”

B. Dialogue between the Council and the Assembly

During 1984, the Assembly was kept informed of the position of WEU member countries on all the subjects dealt with by the Assembly. In this connection, it was given information on the progress of work within various international fora to which the member countries contribute.

1. Replies to Assembly recommendations and written questions

The Council would like to reiterate the main points of its replies to the following recommendations and written questions: Recommendation 396 on European security and burden-sharing in the alliance, Recommendation 400 on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields, Recommendation 401 on economic relations with the Soviet Union, Recommendation 403 on the situation in the Middle East and European security, Recommendation 404 on the state of European security, Recommendation 405 on AWACS and Nimrod aircraft, Recommendation 408 on the control of armaments and disarmament, Recommendation 410 on the military use of space and Written Question 240 on European co-operation on armaments.

(a) European security and burden-sharing in the alliance

In its reply of 5th June 1984 to Recommendation 396, the Council stated that while the commitment of the United States and Canada is vital for the security of Western Europe it is equally essential that the European members of the Atlantic Alliance, and especially the coun-

tries of WEU, make a determined contribution to the common effort.

The Council drew attention to the fact that the contribution of the European countries is considerable. Of the alliance's ready forces in Europe, they provide about 90% of the ground forces, 80% of the combat aircraft, 80% of the tanks and 90% of the armoured divisions; at sea, in European waters and in the Atlantic, they provide 70% of the fighting ships. Moreover, the United States forces deployed to strengthen Europe in time of tension would receive a great deal of help through host nation support, secure lines of communication and means of transport.

The Council noted that during the 1970s the European allies who are members of the integrated military structure of NATO increased their real defence spending by over 2% each year, while United States real defence spending declined on average by just over 1% per year. The extent and value of the European defence effort is recognised in Mr. Weinberger's reports to Congress on burden-sharing of 1982 and 1983.

Whereas the record does therefore appear to be fairly satisfactory, it was the Council's opinion that the European allies must maintain and even strengthen their contribution to the common effort. In view of the present budgetary constraints called for in all the member states, it is clear that these efforts should, inter alia, concentrate on improved co-ordination. To this end, the WEU members of the integrated military structure of NATO approve the measure for maintaining and improving NATO's defence effort detailed in the Assembly recommendation.

In its reply to the Assembly, the Council underlined the need to put across the European position on security and defence in an appropriate and more effective way in the United States. Useful work in this direction has already been started within the framework of the Eurogroup.

Likewise, public opinion and European political circles must be clearly aware of the United States contribution to the security of our countries.

The Council stated that the competent European organisations have an important responsibility in this regard, in particular WEU, which has a complete institutional structure suited to this task. The Eurogroup and the IEPG also have an important rôle.

The Council pointed out that the Assembly should play a vital rôle in putting across to the European and American public the scale and effectiveness of both the European defence effort

and transatlantic co-operation. The North Atlantic Assembly, for its part, could contribute to this work of explanation and presentation.

State of European security

Since Recommendation 404 on this subject related essentially to the structures of the integrated military organisation of NATO, the Council deemed it advisable to inform the competent authorities of the Atlantic Alliance of the recommendation and of the specific ideas that it contained.

In its reply of 17th October 1984, the Council stated that it shared the Assembly's belief on the advisability of formulating a European view on defence policy within WEU, in close consultation with all the other allies.

Like the Assembly, the Council was convinced that the security of the WEU member countries continues to be assured by the Atlantic Alliance to which WEU is linked by virtue of the modified Brussels Treaty. Accordingly, every effort must be made to stress the overriding importance of solidarity among allies and of the strengthening of the contribution of WEU member countries to the transatlantic dialogue, as well as the necessity for all the member countries to assume their full responsibilities within the alliance.

AWACS and Nimrod aircraft

The Council welcomed the Assembly's interest in the development of a new airborne early warning force based in Western Europe. As indicated in its reply of 30th November to Recommendation 405, the Council considers that this system will contribute greatly to the enhancement of the air defences of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance. With this goal in mind, the United Kingdom has selected Nimrod; other countries have opted for the E-3A and France, which has decided to procure an equivalent system, is currently evaluating the various possibilities. The Council has noted the Assembly's views on the adoption by individual member countries of the alliance of different AEW systems, but considers that all these systems will make a major and valuable contribution to the goal stated by the Assembly.

The Council understands that:

- Interoperability between different components of the AEW force has been a priority concern of the various NATO authorities responsible for the co-ordination of operational planning and procurement; the degree of interoperability is intended to be very considerable (including for example software to common NATO standards) although it

will not be practicable to introduce literally the same type of hardware and software for a number of tasks.

- The E-3A component, like the Nimrod, already has an air-to-air refuelling capability, and crews are now being trained in its operation.
- The question of training staff officers, and the likely benefit accruing therefrom, must be examined in the light of the requirements and preoccupations of the member states.
- The extension of a mixed force concept to other applications and the development of a set of general rules for such requirements is something which needs to be explored in the light of experience, when the AEW force is fully operational.

The Council noted that the French Government's decision to procure for its forces, under its 1984-88 programme law, an airborne early warning system has not been changed. The study relating to the type of aircraft and equipment has entered its final phase and the choice should soon be made. Interoperability with other alliance forces will make it possible to increase, where necessary, the volume of exchanges of air-defence data.

(b) *Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields*

In its reply, dated 29th May 1984, to Recommendation 400, the Council expressed its full agreement with the Assembly on the need to strengthen co-operation between member countries in the field of high technology, considering that the joint development of these advanced technologies and the industrial-scale production of the resultant components was one of the prerequisites for co-operation in respect of future weapons systems and hence for the maintenance of a credible defence by the western countries. The Council added, however, that it believed that co-operation could take place not only within the context of WEU but also on a wider European basis.

The Council observed that industry had, unquestionably, an important part to play in any form of co-operation. The governments of the member countries, it pointed out, fully accepted the idea that the interests of industry should be taken into account since this, after all, was the key to the success of any programme in this field. Contact should therefore be encouraged and diversified with a view to promoting the establishment of a European industry for advanced military technology. Such considerations could provide the framework for a symposium for the industries concerned, and could be

modelled on the one on international aeronautical consortia held in London on 9th and 10th February 1982 under the auspices of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

The Council noted that the member states of WEU generally recognised the essential nature of European preference. It agreed that the spirit of solidarity must constitute a very important factor in the national armaments planning and decision-making process, thus enhancing the European contribution to the common defence effort.

Status of and prospects for European arms co-operation

The information given by the Council in its reply of 17th September 1984 to Written Question 240 was as follows:

At their meeting on 21st September 1983, the Defence Ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United Kingdom made a general survey of the situation and noted with interest the status of armaments co-operation, reaffirming their interest in the following: the European development of an advanced combat aircraft in the mid-nineties; the production in Europe of a multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS); third-generation anti-tank missile programmes.

The ministers also confirmed their strong interest in the development of emerging technologies in Europe as well as closer European industrial links.

Within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the European countries agreed to encourage co-operation on technologies and components, this being the only means of achieving increased collaboration on weapons systems in the future. This would involve the transfer of technologies among European countries and between the United States and Europe.

With respect to the NATO frigate programme for the nineties, a memorandum of understanding for starting the feasibility studies has been signed between France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. These studies will enable the satisfactory level of standardisation to be achieved.

As for guided anti-tank weapons, the Defence Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and France have signed a memorandum of understanding relating to the definition phase of the third-generation anti-tank weapons systems, including two concepts - one medium-range and the other long-range (with a land-transported version and

a helicopter-launched version). The development phase will begin around the middle of 1985. Wider co-operation is being discussed to include Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece and Spain.

As regards tactical combat aircraft, the Assembly was informed by the Council (reply to Written Question 239) of the procedure set in motion for intra-European co-operation in this area.

With respect to operational specifications, note should be taken of the particularly important work of the FINABEL group, which will allow work to be done on common bases as regards military requirements.

(c) *The control of armaments and disarmament*

In its reply of 27th November 1984 to Recommendation 408, the Council expressed the following views and gave the following information to the Assembly:

The Council fully shares the importance the Assembly attaches to maintaining and improving the East-West dialogue in the interest of peace, security and stability in Europe. The WEU member states will continue to pursue their efforts to achieve, within the framework of an extended political dialogue, balanced, equitable and verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and its allies. It is important that this dialogue should include meetings at high political level. In fact, quite frequent talks between members of WEU governments and the leadership of the Soviet Union and other East European states have already taken place on a bilateral basis and in the margins of multilateral fora such as the United Nations.

The Council shares the Assembly's view that arms control is one of the important elements in the relationship between East and West. It recalls that at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 31st May this year the WEU member countries adopted, together with the other members of the Atlantic Alliance, the Washington statement in which they reaffirmed their offers to improve East-West relations, made most recently in the declaration of Brussels of 9th December 1983. At the same time they restated their aim of achieving security at the lowest possible level of forces through balanced, equitable and verifiable agreements on arms control, disarmament and concrete confidence- and security-building measures.

The WEU member states have welcomed, on various occasions, the readiness of the United States to resume bilateral negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and

strategic arms reduction (START) with the Soviet Union without preconditions and have called on the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating table. They welcome the announcement that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to hold high-level talks in Geneva on 7th and 8th January 1985.

Major individual and collective proposals have been put forward by western countries at the existing arms control and disarmament fora as further proof of western determination to make every effort to ensure progress. It is regrettable that no positive Soviet response to these proposals has been forthcoming.

The WEU member countries hope that in a first stage of the Stockholm conference agreement can be reached on a set of militarily significant and verifiable confidence- and security-building measures covering the whole of Europe and designed to diminish the risk of military confrontation there. This will pave the way for further stages of the conference where the participating states would continue their efforts for security and disarmament in Europe with a view to concrete and verifiable results.

Together with the other western states, the WEU members have made every effort to ensure a sustained negotiating pace in Stockholm. At the beginning of the first round of the conference, they tabled detailed proposals for a set of concrete confidence- and security-building measures. On a number of important points the proposals tabled by the neutral and non-aligned countries at the end of the first round are in line with the western proposals. The Soviet Union tabled proposals only at the beginning of the second round, which gave comparatively little attention to the kind of concrete measures that are the aim of the conference, in accordance with the mandate defined in Madrid in 1983. The Soviet negotiators have so far proven reluctant to engage in a substantive discussion of such measures.

The WEU member countries are determined to seek ways to achieve progress. The Council hopes that intensive efforts to set up a work structure will lead to a result.

The WEU member countries concerned recall that the NATO countries participating in the MBFR initially favoured a two-phased approach and proposed, in an effort to speed up agreement, a simplified interim phase I in 1979.

The East, however, insisted on a strong link between the two phases in order to ensure the continuity of the reduction process. To meet this concern and at the same time to do away with complicated discussions on how to link the two phases, western participating countries proposed in 1982 to seek a single compre-

hensive agreement. The East agreed to the concept of a single treaty, but proposed initial United States-Soviet reductions followed by a freeze prior to signature of the actual treaty. These introductory steps would, according to the East, have the character of a political commitment. These proposals for phasing the reductions, however, could not be pursued further with the East because of lack of agreement on the fundamental and interrelated issues of data and verification which remain crucial and cannot be evaded or circumvented.

In April 1984, the western delegations in Vienna, with full participation of the WEU member countries involved, tabled new and open-minded proposals which specifically address these issues and at the same time portray how the "data impasse" could best be overcome. The WEU member countries concerned regret that, hitherto, eastern reactions to these proposals have not been encouraging.

The Council would also underline the importance of the rôle of the United Nations, especially the Assembly's First Committee on Disarmament and Security and the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), as well as the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD), in all of which the WEU member countries play an active rôle. The Council welcomes the efforts made by the Conference on Disarmament to achieve, among other things, a complete and worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

Military use of space

In its reply of 27th November 1984 to Recommendation 410, the Council gave the following information to the Assembly:

The member countries of WEU consider it of the utmost importance to prevent a destabilising arms race in outer space.

They therefore encourage bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States, the two main space powers, on verifiable steps to avert this danger, and hope that significant progress can be achieved also through multi-lateral work at the Conference on Disarmament.

Also, the existence and potential further development of anti-satellite systems pose a problem of immediate concern and developments in the field of anti-ballistic missiles raise new questions about the future relationship between offensive systems and ABM technologies.

In view of the inseparable link between offensive and defensive systems, a resumption of negotiations on the limitations and reductions of offensive nuclear weapons is as important as ever.

WEU member countries have regretted that bilateral talks between the two leading space powers have until now not taken place. They have, however, been encouraged by recent statements by the leaders of those two powers that both sides recognise that a dialogue to deal with these questions is needed. They welcome the announcement that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to hold high-level talks in Geneva on 7th and 8th January 1985.

WEU member countries stress the continuing importance of the 1972 ABM treaty between the United States and the USSR and the 1967 outer space treaty.

As far as the implications of developments in space for European industry are concerned, the Council would point out that opportunities already exist in this field for European industries. Moreover, two important conclusions may be drawn from the Assembly recommendation in this connection. Firstly, the European space industry is a reality; its achievements are considerable and its potential is far from insignificant. Secondly, it is clear that Europe's international influence, and to some extent its security, will, in the long term, also depend on what position it will occupy in the field of space activities. In this connection the Council underlines the importance for the WEU member states to strengthen and improve their collaboration in the field of space technology. Generally speaking, it should be borne in mind that the principle of co-operation between the United States and Europe raises no difficulties and can be mutually profitable.

(d) Economic relations with the Soviet Union

In its reply, dated 27th March 1984, to Recommendation 401, the Council gave the following information in particular:

A concerted, realistic and cautious approach towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in economic matters has long been a major concern of the WEU member countries. In this regard, the Council attaches high importance to continuing western co-operation and consultation. Western countries have met in various fora in order to discuss a common approach consistent with their political and security interests. Since 1982, a study dealing with these aspects of East-West economic relations has been undertaken within the Atlantic Alliance. The outcome of this and other studies was reflected in the terms of various communiqués adopted at the conclusion of ministerial meetings such as those of the North Atlantic Council on 9th-10th June and 8th-9th December 1983.

The WEU member states consider that their security interests are best served by stable

economic and political relations with the Soviet Union. The benefits of East-West trade to the Soviet and Eastern European economies must be weighed against this consideration, and against the advantages which such trade brings to western businesses and economies.

As they have already stated, the WEU member countries undertake to manage financial relations with the Warsaw Pact countries on a sound economic basis, including commercial prudence also in the granting of export credits.

The studies and consultations referred to above have been undertaken in a constructive and co-operative spirit. They have led to a clarification of national views and interests and to a greater common understanding of the issues at stake, thereby contributing to western unity and security. The Council stated that the member countries of WEU will therefore continue to seek ways of strengthening and intensifying this process within various bodies and at various levels.

(e) *Situation in the Middle East and European security*

In its reply to Recommendation 403, dated 4th November 1984, the Council stated:

The member countries of WEU have made all possible efforts, with the competent international agencies as well as in bilateral contacts with the parties concerned, in favour of a negotiated solution to the conflict between Iran and Iraq, in order to avoid it spreading. Moreover, they have supported the action of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in this direction which has brought about as a first result the suspension of the bombing of civilian targets.

Confirmation of the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf conflict has underlined the urgency of reaching agreement at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament on a total worldwide ban on the manufacture, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. It is only through a comprehensive and effectively verified global ban that these odious weapons can be removed once and for all. Neither strengthening of European controls under the aegis of WEU nor a regional ban in Europe as a first step would be a substitute.

The member countries of WEU have always maintained that a peaceful solution to the Lebanese question can only be achieved by safeguarding the unity, independence and nation-

nal integrity of the country, and they have stressed the importance of the withdrawal of all foreign forces whose presence is not authorised by the Lebanese Government.

On several occasions, individually and in the context of the EEC, member countries of WEU have expressed themselves in favour of the recognition of the right to existence and to security of all the countries in the region, including Israel, and justice for all. This implies the association of the representatives of the Palestinian people and consequently of the Palestine Liberation Organisation with a future peace process. Such a process must be based on the recognition of the right to self-determination of the Palestinians, with everything which this entails. In the same context, the member states of WEU have repeatedly affirmed their belief that Israel's settlement policy on the occupied territories constitutes a negative factor as far as the commencement of the peace process is concerned.

*2. Joint informal meeting
with the General Affairs Committee
and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*

During this meeting, held on 12th June 1984 in Paris, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council replied to questions put by the members of the committees on the problems of defence, arms control and disarmament, the situation in the Near East and relations between Europe and China.

3. Statements by ministers to the Assembly

The ministers who took part in Assembly debates in 1984 gave their views on the main items on the Assembly agenda in the speeches they delivered and in the replies they gave to questions from members of the Assembly¹.

C. Council visit to SHAPE

On 29th March, the Council visited SHAPE at the invitation of SACEUR. Topics on which views were exchanged included: a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and WEU's rôle, promotion of public awareness of western security interests, increased coherence in long-term defence planning, improvements to western consultations on arms control questions, regular contacts between the Council and SHAPE.

1. See Annex I.

II. Implementation of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty on forces of Western European Union

A. Level of forces of member states

The Council has undertaken its customary tasks concerning controls of forces (and of armaments for these forces) during 1984.

1. Forces under NATO command

The maximum levels of ground, air and naval forces which member states of WEU place under NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty. Article III of the protocol provides for a special procedure, if necessary, to enable these levels to be increased above the limits specified in Articles I and II.

So that it may satisfy itself that the limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II are not exceeded, the Council receives information every year concerning the levels in question, in accordance with Article IV of that protocol. This information is obtained in the course of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and is transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking officer designated by him to that end.

The information, as at the end of 1983, was conveyed at the appropriate time. It was presented to the Council on 4th April 1984 by SACEUR's representative to the Council.

Information giving the status of these forces as at the end of 1984 was requested in December.

Furthermore, the Council takes the necessary steps to implement the procedure laid down in its resolution of 15th September 1956 whereby the levels of forces under NATO command are examined in the light of the annual review.

For the year 1983, the permanent representatives (or their substitutes) to the North Atlantic Council of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, at a meeting held on 12th January in Brussels, examined the levels of forces of WEU member states and reported to the Council.

The Council, at its meeting of 28th February, noted that the level of forces of the member states of WEU, as set out in the NATO Force Plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II, as at present in force. It also took note of a declaration on French forces made by the representative of France.

The same procedure is under way for the year 1984.

2. Forces under national command

The strength and armaments of forces of member states maintained on the mainland of Europe and remaining under national command – internal defence and police forces, forces for the defence of overseas territories, and common defence forces – are fixed each year in accordance with the procedure specified in the agreement signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 in implementation of Article V of Protocol No. II.

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By means of the methods set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the Council has been able, in 1984, to carry out its obligations under Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty concerning levels of forces.

B. United Kingdom forces stationed on the mainland of Europe

1. In accordance with the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 331, the Government of the United Kingdom have informed the Council that the average number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1984 in accordance with the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty was 56,467. The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty there. In 1984 there were on average 972 men in Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated, these units would be speedily returned to their duty station in an emergency affecting NATO.

Furthermore, in accordance with the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 348, the Government of the United Kingdom have informed the Council that the strength of the United Kingdom's contribution to the Second Allied Tactical Air Force in 1984 was:

<i>Rôle</i>	<i>Aircraft/Equipment</i>	<i>Squadrons</i>
Strike/Attack	Jaguar	1
	Tornado	4
Offensive support	Harrier	2
Reconnaissance	Jaguar	1
Air defence	Phantom	2
	Rapier surface-to-air missiles	4
Air transport	Puma	1
	Chinook	1
Ground defence	RAF regiment	1

2. In addition, in her June address to the Assembly, Baroness Young referred to the substantial numbers of British ground and air forces on the mainland of Europe who make an essential and effective contribution to the forward defence of the alliance in Germany, and to the security and cohesion of Western Europe.

Furthermore, Mr. Luce in December, in making the same point about the British Army of the Rhine, stated that the United Kingdom saw WEU as firmly integrating it with its other European allies on the one hand and with the transatlantic alliance on the other.

III. Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments

The Agency continued to carry out the tasks assigned to it under the terms of Article VII of Protocol No. IV.

It performed its control activities in 1984 in accordance with the same methods and essentially at the same level as the previous year.

A. Situation concerning the control of atomic, chemical and biological weapons

1. Atomic weapons

Since the situation has remained the same as in previous years, the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of atomic weapons.

2. Biological weapons

All the member countries again gave their agreement, for 1984, on the renewal of the list of biological weapons subject to control as accepted by the Council in 1981. The Council noted the fact.

As in previous years, however, the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of biological weapons.

3. Chemical weapons

The Agency asked member countries for their agreement to renew in 1984 the list of chemical weapons subject to control. This agreement was given and the Council noted the fact.

The Agency therefore continued to use this list for its control activities in 1984.

The competent authorities of the country concerned provided the Agency with a detailed, precise and complete reply to the request for information aimed at facilitating the control of non-production of chemical weapons which was sent to them by the Agency in accordance with the resolution approved by the Council in 1959 and with the directive received from the Council in 1960. In addition, the procedure applied with these authorities since 1973 was again used.

The agreed non-production controls carried out by the Agency in 1984 are referred to under point C.2(b) of this chapter.

In application of Article III of Protocol No. III, which lays down conditions to enable the Council to fix levels of chemical weapons that may be held on the mainland of Europe by those countries which have not given up the right to produce them, and in accordance with the Council decision of 1959, the Agency asked the countries concerned, in its questionnaire, whether production of chemical weapons on their mainland territory had passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage. As in the past, all these states replied in the negative.

In addition, the Agency asked the member states, in the covering letter to its questionnaire, to declare any chemical weapons that they might hold, whatever their origin. Since all the member states replied in the negative, the Agency carried out no quantitative controls of chemical weapons in 1984.

B. Controls from documentary sources

The main aim of the Agency's work in this field of its activity has been to compare, by studying the relevant documents, the quantities of armaments held by the member states with the levels fixed by the Council, in order to establish whether these constituted appropriate levels within the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty.

1. Information processed by the Agency

Under the usual procedure, the Agency studied the member states' replies to its annual questionnaire, and the information given by the state concerned in reply to its annual request for information concerning the non-production of certain types of armaments. It compared this information with: the data supplied by NATO; the information received, through the Council, from the Governments of the United States and Canada concerning their programmes of external aid in military equipment to the forces of

member states stationed on the mainland of Europe (since 1966, no aid has been provided by these countries to the forces concerned); the conclusions of its budgetary studies; the information culled from open sources (specialised press) and the detailed statistics arising from its controls in previous years.

2. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments

(a) *Appropriate levels of armaments for forces placed under NATO command*

After receiving and processing the member states' replies to the annual questionnaire and studying the statistical reports furnished by the authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Article VII, 2(a) of Protocol No. IV) and, in particular, by the NATO international staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, for the annual consultations with the NATO military authorities called for by Article XIV of Protocol No. IV.

These consultations included a joint study session at Casteau on 13th November 1984 attended by Agency experts and the appropriate officers from SHAPE, and concluded with a meeting in Paris on 29th November 1984 which was attended by representatives of the Agency, SHAPE, SACLANT and CINCHAN and the international military staff of NATO. The meeting concluded that the quantities of armaments declared by the member states for their forces placed under NATO authority and stationed on the mainland of Europe corresponded to the appropriate levels for the control year 1984 within the terms of Articles XIV and XIX of Protocol No. IV, in respect of those armaments over which the Agency has hitherto been able to exercise its mandate of controlling stock levels.

(b) *Appropriate levels of armaments for forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe*

In accordance with the procedure in force for the implementation of the agreement of 14th December 1957, the Agency supplied the Council with the information relating to the armaments of this category of forces which had been supplied by the member states in response to the Agency's annual questionnaire. The Agency, having received from the Council the statements by the member states on force levels, analysed on the Council's behalf the data for armaments and forces, having regard to the rôles of their forces.

The Council subsequently accepted or approved for 1984 the maximum levels of arma-

ments of these forces and notified the Agency accordingly with a view to drawing up the final tables of the abovementioned forces.

C. Field control measures

The aim of this aspect of the Agency's activities was to verify, physically, the accuracy of the information obtained from documental controls.

1. Preparation of the programme of field control measures

(a) *Initial studies*

The accumulated experience, information received and the results of its controls in 1983 led the Agency to draw up a provisional programme for 1984 on the same scale and lines as those of previous years, i.e.:

- for non-production field control measures, a limited programme was considered adequate for verifying the undertaking of a member state not to manufacture specified armaments. The Agency was again aided in this task by the reply to its request for information from the member state concerned;
- for the quantitative field control measures, the sampling methods were again thought adequate to provide an acceptable level of confidence in the Agency's documental control.

(b) *Programme definition*

No factor has emerged to prompt the Agency significantly to vary the distribution of field control measures either between member states or between the armaments of their land, sea and air forces.

The system of joint Agency/SHAPE inspections at depots under NATO authority, introduced in 1957 and used each year since, was again authorised in 1984. Some depots were programmed for inspection by an Agency/SHAPE team.

On the basis of these considerations and of the information already available to it, the Agency was able to draw up its 1984 programme with sufficient confidence early in the year. In keeping with the usual procedure, this provisional programme was later modified following analyses and reviews of the member states' replies to the Agency's questionnaire, and some minor changes were made.

2. Type and extent of field control measures

The total number of field control measures was sixty-six.

These measures fall broadly into the following categories:

- (i) quantitative control measures at depots;
- (ii) quantitative control measures at units of forces under national command;
- (iii) factory control measures:
 - agreed quantitative control measures;
 - agreed non-production control measures.

Most of the quantitative control measures related to land matériel and ammunition (all services), others related to air matériel and naval matériel; a significant number of these measures related to missiles.

The agreed quantitative control measures at manufacturing plants related to land matériel, missiles, rockets, aircraft engines, warships and ammunition. The agreed non-production control measures were carried out at chemical plants.

D. Other activities

1. Documentation and studies

(a) In the context of the Council's examination of the future tasks of WEU and of its specialised organs, the Agency, which maintains a collection of open sources of information - also made available to the SAC - has developed its documentary activity in the main general areas of defence and security, i.e. defence, industrial, economic and financial policies; East-West negotiations; developments in international organisations and the associated legal aspects.

(b) The Agency has continued to update the "overviews" which summarise the way in which the armed forces in each of the WEU member countries are organised.

One of the other studies carried out by the Agency related to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

2. Technical information visits

Technical information visits designed to keep the Agency experts up to date on weapons technology and military thinking were again

organised in 1984, although on a much reduced scale in order not to exceed the previous years' expenditure levels.

At the invitation of the German authorities, the land force experts visited the Federal Republic of Germany to observe the Flinker Igel exercise. The experts concerned with naval problems visited the naval expositions at Genoa (Italy) and Le Bourget (France).

The air and naval experts visited the air shows at Hanover (Federal Republic of Germany) and Farnborough (United Kingdom) and the Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment at Boscombe Down (United Kingdom).

3. Production and procurement of armaments

The information gathered by the Agency in 1984 concerning the procurement and construction of armaments for the forces of the WEU member countries stationed on the mainland of Europe is set out as Annex II to this report.

E. General conclusions

In accordance with Articles VII and XIX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency was able to report to the Council that, as a result of the control exercised in 1984, the figures obtained in accordance with Article XIII of Protocol No. IV:

- for armaments of forces under NATO command under the terms of Article XIV of Protocol No. IV, and
- for armaments of forces maintained under national command under the terms of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of Protocol No. IV and the agreement of 14th December 1957, concluded in execution of Article V of Protocol No. II,

represented the appropriate levels of armaments subject to control for each of the member states.

As required by Article XX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of field control measures carried out at force units and military depots and during agreed control measures at production plants, it did not detect for the categories of armaments which it controls:

- either the manufacture of a category of armaments that the government of the member state concerned had undertaken not to manufacture (Annexes II and III of Protocol No. III);

- or the existence, on the mainland of Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of Protocol No. IV) or not justified by export requirements (Article XXII of Protocol No. IV).

As in previous years, the help and co-operation given to the Agency by the national and NATO authorities, the directors and staff of the military establishments and private firms which the Agency visited played an important part in the accomplishment of its mission.

IV. Activities of the Standing Armaments Committee

In 1984, the Standing Armaments Committee met four times, on 27th January, 17th April, 28th September and 7th December. On 14th February, it took part in the meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on the joint production of armaments.

The main items on the agenda of its meetings were: the study of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU; the study on the development of the armaments industry in Japan and its possible repercussions for Europe; the updating of the WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 on trials methods for wheeled vehicles; the activities of Working Group No. 8 on operational research and the reconvening of Working Group No. 9 on possible hindrances to enemy action.

A. Study on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU

1. The Standing Armaments Committee, which was instructed by the Council to carry out a simplified annual updating of the classified version of the first section of the economic part of the study on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU, has prepared a 1984 revision - based on data supplied by the member countries - covering the period 1975-82.

At the Council's request, it has also prepared a declassified version, which the Council forwarded to the Assembly on 14th November.

2. With regard to the preparation by the SAC of the second section of the economic part of its study - which will give an analytical description of the armaments industries based on the information supplied by them - the Committee abided by its decision to await the replies to the questionnaire sent out by the IEPG, to avoid duplicating the work of this body.

B. Study on the development of the Japanese armaments industry and its possible consequences for Europe

Work on the preparation of this study was continued by the international secretariat, which collected the documentation available from several countries, particularly the United States

and Japan itself. Experts and specialists were also consulted in Europe and in the United States where detailed studies on Japan in general and its advanced technologies in particular are being carried out by government, industry and the universities.

C. WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 on trials methods for wheeled vehicles

In the light of the conclusions reached by the group of experts responsible, which met in December 1983, the Standing Armaments Committee gave its agreement that this group should update WEU Agreement 4.FT.6.

The Committee also noted the intention of a NATO committee to use this updated agreement when drafting a NATO standardisation agreement on combat vehicle testing.

D. Activities of the working groups

1. Working Group No. 8 on operational research

The remit of this working group is to exchange the findings of national operational research studies, to organise symposia on operational research methods and techniques and arrange visits to national operational research centres.

In 1984, the group held two meetings, the first of which was coupled with a seminar on methodology and the second to a visit to the *Industrieanlagen Betriebsgesellschaft* and to the Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm company at Ottonbrunn (Federal Republic of Germany).

(a) Exchanges of information

During the year, the delegations presented a number of information forms concerning new studies and datings.

(b) Seminar on methodology

The theme of the seminar was "Operator/computer interface and related subjects". Papers were presented by the German, Belgian, French and Netherlands Delegations and were followed by discussions.

(c) Visit to Ottobrunn

At the invitation of the German authorities, the group visited the IABG and the MBB company. Talks were given on the implications of new weapons technology and on anti-tank warfare by engineers from the two establishments and these were followed by a demonstration.

(d) Lexicographical activity

Following completion of the pilot study to assess the time needed to produce a second improved and extended edition of the five-language glossary of operational research terms, the Standing Armaments Committee gave the go-ahead to produce the new edition.

2. Working Group No. 9 on possible hindrances to enemy action

The request for a contribution to a study on anti-tank obstacles made by FINABEL was not taken up by the Standing Armaments Committee as there was no consensus.

E. Meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on the joint production of armaments

The aim of these meetings is to supply technical information on the SAC's activities to representatives of the Assembly.

At the request of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly and with the Council's agreement, the sub-committee met on 14th February 1984 in Paris.

The Chairman-in-Office of the Standing Armaments Committee read out the SAC replies to the written questions submitted in advance by the Assembly committee; he replied, within the limits of his competence, to the supplementary questions put at the meeting.

*V. Activities of the Public Administration Committee**A. Meetings of the committee*

In 1984, the Public Administration Committee held its two annual meetings, which take place in each of the member countries in turn, in Spoleto (Italy) from 11th to 13th April and in Louvain (Belgium) from 25th to 27th September.

F. Activities of the international secretariat

1. The international secretariat has assisted the SAC and Working Group No. 8 in their work.

2. On 22nd May 1984, the Assistant Secretary-General, head of the international secretariat, presented an oral report to the Council on the SAC's activities. On this occasion, the Council continued to discuss the future work of the Committee, inter alia, on the basis of this report.

3. As a follow-up to each part of the thirtieth ordinary session of the WEU Assembly and to the extraordinary session held in Rome to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the organisation, the international secretariat distributed to SAC members a document containing extracts of any speeches, reports, debates and recommendations dealing with armaments questions.

4. Relations between the SAC international secretariat and the FINABEL secretariat have continued in accordance with the provisions for co-operation laid down in 1973.

5. Acting on the Council's instruction, the head of the international secretariat forwarded to the IEPG presidency the classified version of the 1984 revision of the SAC economic study on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU.

6. As regards contacts with NATO, the head of the international secretariat attended the thirtieth annual session of the North Atlantic Assembly, and was represented by his assistant at the April and October meetings of the Conference of National Armaments Directors, which took place at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

An observer from the international secretariat was present at the June and December meetings in Brussels of the NATO Naval Armaments Group.

7. In reply to a request from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in December, the Council gave its agreement for the international secretariat to collaborate in preparing the next report of this committee on emerging technology and military strategy.

The meetings were mainly devoted to exchanges of information on significant administrative developments in the member countries during the preceding six months and to the preparation of the multilateral seminar for government officials, held in the autumn of each year under the auspices of the committee.

During the year under review, the delegates kept abreast of the various changes taking place in the machinery of government and administration in their respective countries following government changes or realignments. The main new items of legislation having a significant bearing on the administration were reported and, where appropriate, texts distributed.

The committee also discussed a number of administrative problems common to the majority of the member countries. As has been the pattern now for several years, many of these problems are directly linked to the conditions created for all the countries – and hence for their administrations – by a difficult economic and financial situation, e.g. the fight against unemployment through a variety of measures used in different ways depending on the country concerned (part-time employment, early retirement, shorter working week, etc.); the policies pursued in most of the member countries in order to limit public expenditure. As regards the administration, the concern to save public funds has manifested itself in a number of ways: efforts to limit the area and scope of government intervention, measures designed to increase the efficiency of the administrative machinery. Attempts are being made to reorganise the civil service in order to improve the level of management. New qualities are being expected of officials in positions of responsibility, for example: knowledge of and aptitude for business and staff management, budget management and cost control; capacity to introduce the requisite changes; concern for quality and performance in the face of a better informed and more demanding public.

In order to improve management capability and enhance efficiency, increasing reliance is being placed on the development of data-processing and office automation systems, and on better training. In several countries, for example, courses or seminars have been organised for senior officials. At the same time efforts are being made to improve the selection procedures to meet the new requirements. Emphasis is also being placed on greater mobility within the civil service to broaden civil servants' experience and give them a clearer perception of government policy as a whole. In short, serious efforts are being made by all the member countries, to varying degrees, to reorganise, modernise and rationalise their administrations.

B. Seminars for government officials

As stated in the last annual report, the 1983 seminar for government officials was held in Ostend from 16th to 22nd October. Its

objective was to allow senior civil servants from the member countries to examine the stage reached, as at the end of 1983, in introducing office automation into the public services in the seven countries and also to investigate the changes brought about by the introduction of office automation systems.

The chosen topic proved to be of great interest, in view of the rapid developments taking place in office automation technology and the need for a detailed study of its impact on government departments. The participants especially appreciated the opportunity for an exchange of views with representatives of other European countries, given the uneasiness felt in the civil service about the administrative problems likely to arise from the widespread introduction of information technology.

The participants' comments, culled after the seminar, testified to the excellent way in which the seminar had been organised from both the practical and intellectual points of view; they also revealed that the seminar had highlighted both the many-sided aspects of office automation and the different ways in which it is perceived, the differences being attributable more to the character of the people responsible or to the particular government department involved than to nationality.

The 1984 seminar for government officials was held in Paris from 22nd to 27th October and brought together eighteen senior civil servants representing all the member countries of WEU. The topic under discussion was "The rôle of national service or short-term voluntary enlistment in fitting young people for active civilian life". In other words, the aim was to assess how the armed forces utilised the skills acquired by young people during their schooling and to evaluate whether and how the training acquired during military service was or could be used to facilitate their entry or return to civilian life.

An appraisal of the course will be made at the next meeting of the Public Administration Committee, once all the findings and comments of the various national delegations are known; this will be reported in the next annual report of the Council.

C. Study visits

Each year, the Public Administration Committee organises, through its members' own initiatives, a number of carefully prepared study visits, the results of which are embodied in a report and communicated to both the committee

and the host government concerned. These visits enable an official to spend one or two weeks in the administration of another member country studying in his own specialist field.

Examples of visits organised during the year are: the administrative arrangements for implementing the Seveso directive on major accident hazards; influence of part-time farming

on farm management (subject studied in the Federal Republic of Germany); methods used to train the officers who administer the social security benefits (subject studied in Belgium); administration of sea fisheries statistics; assessment and collection of social security contributions from people employed in casual agricultural employment (subjects studied in the Netherlands).

VI. Budgetary and administrative questions

A. Budget

(a) The economic situation in the member countries has continued to exert a strain on the budget and a policy of utmost discipline in expenditure was again pursued in 1984.

The approved budgets for 1985 of the three ministerial organs combined show an increase of the total net expenditure, including the cost for pensions of 4.53% over the 1984 budgets. If the total net cost for pensions were to be excluded, then the total increase would be 1.63%.

The average of the forecast rates of inflation for the United Kingdom and for France is slightly more than 4%. The increase for 1985, therefore, is well in line with zero growth.

A summary table of the budget is attached as Annex III.

It should be recalled in this context that approximately 80% of the ministerial budgets consists of expenditure relating to salaries and allowances, pensions and travel. Pensions represent 15% of this percentage.

(b) The costs resulting from the increased activities in the second half of 1984 of the Permanent Council, working groups as well as from the special additional meeting of the Council in Rome, concerning the reactivation of WEU, could only be met with the co-operation of the Secretariat-General and the skilful management of its budget.

The relatively considerable extra costs have been fully met by the savings from vacancies in the Secretariat-General. These vacancies have been maintained, whenever possible, pending the outcome of the reactivation and its associate reorganisation. They have been filled on a temporary and intermittent basis as and when the increased activities have demanded this.

B. Activities in the framework of co-ordination

The Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts held ten meetings. In addition there were fifteen meetings of the Heads of Administration, twelve joint meetings of the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General and the Standing Committee of the Staff Associations, as well as two meetings of the Secretaries-General.

The main subjects dealt with, some of which are still under review, were:

- the improvement of staff participation in the framework of co-ordination;
- a reconsideration of the amount of wage restraint in the remuneration of A and L grade staff by amending the temporary levy on the basic salary;
- a reconsideration of the amount of wage restraint in the remuneration of B and C grade staff by way of amending the compensation for fringe benefits;
- the periodic adjustment of salary and allowances;
- the tender for contract and selection of a suitable institution/firm to carry out a feasibility study on comparisons of duties, grades and levels of remuneration in the co-ordinated organisations, international organisations, certain civil services and certain private sector firms;
- the problem of retention or discontinuation of the use of international indices for salary comparisons;
- a comparison between the children's allowances in the international organisations and a number of reference countries.

PART TWO

*Examination by the Council, in conjunction with the Assembly,
of the future prospects for Western European Union*

A.1. Responding to the initiative taken by the French Government, the Council began in the early months of 1984 to reflect on the future of the organisation. The French and Belgian Governments submitted memoranda to the Council on this subject.

A special working group was instructed to draw up a report on the prospects for reactivation of WEU. It studied the question from three different angles, i.e. Why reactivate WEU now? What content would such a reactivation have? What would be the implementing procedures?

Its report, together with the French and Belgian memoranda, provided the basis for an initial consideration of this question by the ministers on 12th June in Paris. This document was distributed to the representatives of the Assembly after the ministerial meeting².

2. In his address given at the luncheon meeting between the Council and the Presidential Committee of the Assembly and when opening the joint meeting held in the afternoon with the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly, the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Cheysson, set out the main reasons for and objectives of the Council's initiative, emphasising that it was to be seen as a contribution to the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and not as an attempt to create a substitute for it. He stated that the study of the measures required to make better use of WEU would be considered in greater detail with a view to the decisions to be taken by the ministers at their next meeting. He answered questions from the members of the committees on this subject.

At the Assembly session of 18th-21st June, Mr. Genscher, speaking as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Baroness Young, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and Mr. van Houwelingen, the Dutch Secretary of State for Defence, confirmed their governments' interest in the efforts being made by the member countries to reactivate WEU and stated their positions on the subject.

B.1. In accordance with the views expressed by ministers in Paris and in conformity with the procedure laid down in Article II of Protocol

No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, the Council, in a unanimous decision taken on 27th June 1984, cancelled the remaining restrictions considered to have become outdated which – under Articles IV and VI of Annex III to this protocol – concerned the manufacture of conventional weapons by the Federal Republic of Germany.

This decision follows what the Assembly has been recommending since 1982, and most recently at its June session.

2. At the ministers' behest, the following four points were examined with the help of a special working group:

- activation of the Council (subjects to be dealt with and procedures);
- relations between Council and Assembly;
- future activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and of the Standing Armaments Committee;
- contacts with non-member states.

The proposals put forward by the Assembly, particularly in Recommendations 406 and 407 and in the memorandum which the Assembly President, on his visit to Bonn in mid-September, handed to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, have been studied extensively. Mr. Genscher also received Mr. Caro and certain members of the Assembly on 9th October in Gymnich for discussions with a view to the ministerial meeting in Rome.

C.1. At this anniversary meeting on 26th and 27th October, the Foreign and Defence Ministers took a number of important decisions concerning the organisation and how to make better use of it.

Thus the ministers decided to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in particular:

- defence questions;
- arms control and disarmament;
- the effects of developments in East-West relations on the security of Europe;

2. See Annex IV.

- Europe's contribution to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance, bearing in mind the importance of transatlantic relations;
- the development of European co-operation in the field of armaments in respect of which WEU can provide a political impetus.

It was noted that they might also consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world.

The Chairman-in-Office of the Council outlined the ministers' conclusions to the Presidential Committee of the Assembly prior to the publication of the Rome declaration and the document on the institutional reform of WEU³.

The Permanent Council was instructed to prepare reports on the following topics for submission to the ministers at their next meeting:

- structural reform of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the Standing Armaments Committee and its international secretariat;
- ways of improving WEU public relations activities;
- how the experience of military experts can be used for the work of the WEU Council of Ministers.

The Council was also invited to submit a proposal on the recent application by Portugal for membership of WEU.

Furthermore, as stated in the document on the institutional reform of WEU, the Secretary-General was instructed to prepare a report as soon as possible on the work carried out by the Secretariat-General and to consider what measures might be needed to strengthen its activities.

2. On 29th October, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council addressed the Assembly at its extraordinary session to report on the outcome of the ministerial meeting in Rome. He pointed out that the decisions taken by the Council were, on many points, in line with the Assembly's proposals to the Council.

In his concluding remarks, he said that:

"...Western European Union has made considerable progress since the beginning of this year. The decisions taken by the

ministers at the meeting held in Rome to mark WEU's thirtieth anniversary are constructive and forward-looking. The great success of our meeting is highly encouraging for us all and for Europe. We must continue our work with the same vigour, with the Council of Ministers and the Assembly collaborating as closely as possible. I am convinced that the Assembly will play an active part in the achievement of our goals.

The sign that has been given in the Rome declaration shows that European defence policy is assuming definite shape. Greater European solidarity within WEU will strengthen the solidarity between Europe and North America. It will encourage the process of European unification and fortify the European pillar of the alliance. We shall thus all be making a major contribution to the maintenance of peace."

The Italian Foreign and Defence Ministers, Mr. Andreotti and Mr. Spadolini, also addressed the Assembly and reiterated the importance they attached to the revival of WEU.

D.1. Immediately after the Rome meeting, the Permanent Council began the work of implementing the ministers' instructions. It set about this task actively, intent on working diligently and making the best use of all the appropriate help available (assistance of experts from the capitals, the Secretary-General and the heads of the specialised agencies of WEU).

2. Contact with the Assembly has been maintained by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Genscher, who again received the Assembly President and certain members of the Assembly on 19th November in Gymnich.

Furthermore, Mr. Genscher and three other ministers, namely Mr. Spadolini, the Italian Defence Minister, Mr. Cheysson, the French Minister for External Relations, and Mr. Luce, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, addressed the Assembly during the second part of its thirtieth ordinary session. They underscored their governments' determination to see the decisions taken in Rome implemented rapidly and clarified their views on this subject.

The Council has begun a careful study of the proposals put forward by the Assembly in the recommendations it adopted at the beginning of December.

3. See Annex V.

ANNEX I

*List of the various aspects of the dialogue between
the Council and the Assembly in 1984*

1. Twenty-ninth annual report of the Council on its activities for the period 1st January to 31st December 1983, communicated to the Assembly pursuant to Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty.
2. Council replies to Recommendations 396 to 410 adopted by the Assembly during the second part of its twenty-ninth ordinary session and the first part of its thirtieth ordinary session.
3. Council replies to Written Questions 240 to 248 put by members of the Assembly.
4. Contacts between the Council and Assembly bodies:
 - (i) Luncheon meeting between the Council of Ministers, under the chairmanship of Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External Relations, and the Presidential Committee of the Assembly on 12th June 1984 in Paris.
 - (ii) Joint informal meeting between the Council of Ministers, under the chairmanship of Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External Relations, and the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly on the afternoon of 12th June 1984 in Paris.
 - (iii) Presentation of the conclusions of the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers to the Presidential Committee of the Assembly on 27th October in Rome.
5. Informal contacts between the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Genscher, and the Assembly President, Mr. Caro, and certain members of the Assembly on 9th October and 19th November respectively at Gymnich.
6. Documents transmitted by the Council to the Assembly:
 - rules of access to the archives of the Brussels Treaty Organisation for research purposes, approved by the Council on 1st February 1984;
 - document on the prospects for the reactivation of WEU, published by the Foreign Ministers on 12th June 1984 in Paris;
 - Rome declaration and document on the institutional reform of WEU, published by the Foreign and Defence Ministers on 27th October 1984;
 - resolution concerning Annex III to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, adopted by the Council on 27th June 1984;
 - declassified version of the 1984 revision of the economic study by the Standing Armaments Committee of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU, communicated to the Assembly on 14th November 1984;
 - resolution concerning Annex IV to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, adopted by the Council on 23rd January 1985.
7. Statements by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and other ministers to the Assembly:
 - (i) During the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session of the Assembly in Paris:
 - Mr. Genscher, speaking as Chairman-in-Office of the Council in presenting the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council to the Assembly and as Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, on 20th June;
 - Baroness Young, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, on 19th June;
 - Mr. van Houwelingen, State Secretary for Defence of the Netherlands, on 20th June.
 - (ii) At the extraordinary session of the Assembly in Rome on 29th October:
 - Mr. Genscher, as Chairman-in-Office of the Council reporting on the outcome of the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers and as Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany;

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Mr. Andreotti, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs;- Mr. Spadolini, Italian Minister of Defence. <p><i>(iii)</i> During the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session of the Assembly in Paris:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Mr. Genscher, as Chairman-in-Office of the Council and as Foreign Minister of | <ul style="list-style-type: none">the Federal Republic of Germany, on 5th December;- Mr. Spadolini, Italian Minister of Defence, on 5th December;- Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External Relations, on 5th December;- Mr. Luce, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, on 4th December. |
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ANNEX II

***Production and procurement of armaments for the
forces of WEU member countries stationed
on the mainland of Europe in 1984***

1. Armaments for land forces

(a) The Federal Republic of Germany has continued to improve its strength of battle tanks and APCs. Leopard II and TPZ-1 (transport Panzer) wheeled transport vehicles have been introduced.

An increased number of Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft gun tanks have been brought into service.

Considerable quantities of ammunition for tank guns, 155 mm heavy artillery, anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems have been delivered.

(b) The Belgian army has continued to improve its anti-tank capability by further adding to its holdings of Milan missiles. Belgium has also purchased some M-113 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and has increased its munition stocks for heavy mortar and 155 mm artillery.

(c) The French army has continued to re-equip its forces with modern high-performance armoured vehicles such as the main battle tank AMX-30 and APCs including VAB (*véhicule de l'avant blindé*) and AMX-10 variants.

The artillery has taken delivery of 155 mm howitzers, most of which are the GCT version (*grande cadence de tir*) and Roland anti-aircraft systems, with considerable quantities of appropriate missiles.

The anti-tank capability has been steadily increased through the purchase of Hot systems. With regard to munitions, large quantities of 155 mm howitzer, 105 mm tank gun, 120 mm mortar and anti-tank missiles Hot and Milan have been acquired.

(d) Italy has continued to modernise its tank and anti-tank potential by procuring Leopard I tanks in several variants and through the purchase of Tow launchers; ABCs of the VCC-1 type (*veicolo corazzato da combattimento*) have been delivered. In the field of munitions, small quantities have been ordered for 105 mm tank guns and 155 mm artillery; larger quantities of modern anti-tank missiles of the Milan and Hot type have entered the inventory.

(e) No change in the Luxembourg army's holding of Milan guided-weapon systems has been reported.

(f) The Netherlands has continued to increase ammunition holdings with deliveries of rounds for tank guns, rounds for artillery and mortars, and Tow anti-tank missiles.

(g) The BAOR has continued to modernise its tank and anti-tank potential by introducing new Challenger battle tanks and Milan and Tow anti-tank missile launcher systems. Holdings of rounds for the aforementioned systems and for 155 mm artillery have been increased.

2. Naval armaments

(a) In the Federal Republic of Germany the following have been procured: the Köln and Karlsruhe, thus completing the series of the F-122 class frigates; the Dachs, Ozelot, Wiesel and Hyäne, the last four units of the type 143 fast attack craft; Tornado aircraft; a number of Sidewinder AIM 9L (for Tornado) and Seasparrow missiles (for F-122 frigates).

The production of Tornado aircraft has continued.

(b) In France, the Jean de Vienne, of the type C-70 anti-submarine destroyers, and the Saphir, a SNA 72 nuclear attack submarine, were commissioned in the fleet. Five Super-Étendard AM-39 air-to-surface missiles have been delivered.

SNA 72 type nuclear submarines, C-70 type destroyers (anti-submarine), C-70 type destroyers (anti-aircraft) and a Durance-class under-way replenishment tanker are under construction.

(c) In Italy, the Euro and Espero frigates of the Maestrale class were commissioned.

The light aircraft-carrier Garibaldi is in its final stage of construction.

(d) In the Netherlands the Jacob van Heemskerck and the Witte de With, two anti-air frigates, and two submarines, the Walrus and the Zeeleeuw, are under construction.

Orders have been placed for four M-type frigates and an option has been taken out for four additional M-type frigates.

3. Air force armaments

(a) The German air force has continued to procure Tornado aircraft as well as new generation Sidewinder 9L air-to-air missiles.

The production of Tornado and RB-199 engines destined for the naval and air forces has continued.

(b) The Belgian air force has continued its programme of modernisation through the acquisition of F-16 aircraft.

(c) The French air force has continued its modernisation through the introduction into service of new Mirage 2000 aircraft (attack version) and Mirage F-1-CR (reconnaissance version). Crotale (S/A) and Matra Super 530-R (A/A) have been procured, as well as a second holding of Thomson Brandt 100 mm rockets.

The production of Mirage 2000, Mirage F-1, Mirage 5 and the Alpha-Jet has continued.

With regard to engines, besides the normal production of units for aircraft under construction, mention must be made of the appearance of the very modern M-88 engine (whose first model made its initial run at the beginning of January).

The production of missiles has continued normally and has concentrated especially on Crotale, Matra Super 530, Magic and AS-37 anti-radar.

(d) The Italian air force has procured Tornado aircraft, which have already equipped two squadrons soon to be operational. The Kormoran air-to-surface missiles, which will equip Tornado aircraft in the anti-shipping rôle, and the first Sidewinder 9L (new generation) air-to-air missiles have also been procured.

Production in Italy has continued to concentrate on the Tornado and its RB-199 engine. The light AM-X fighter, whose flight trials have already started, should also be mentioned.

With regard to missiles, the production of the multirôle missile Aspide, which will soon be used in the air-to-air, ground-to-air and surface-to-air rôles, is worthy of mention.

(e) Delivery to the Netherlands air force of F-16 aircraft and their production in the Netherlands have continued. Ground-to-air Patriot missiles have also been procured.

(f) As regards the air force of the BAOR, the Buccaneers and half the Jaguars have been replaced by Tornado aircraft.

In the field of missiles, the Bloodhound and Sidewinder 9B systems have been replaced by the Skyflash and the Sidewinder 9L.

ANNEX III

Summary of WEU main budget for 1984

	A*	B*	C*	Total B + C
	£	F. frs	F. frs	F. frs
Salaries and allowances	1,276,880	10,417,800	22,105,300	32,523,100
Pensions	111,935	1,507,130	3,802,300	5,309,430
Travel	30,305	180,600	747,900	928,500
Other operating costs	202,730	720,950	1,068,850	1,789,800
Purchase of furniture, etc.	12,030	31,000	61,500	92,500
Buildings	-	25,000	45,000	70,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	1,633,880	12,882,480	27,830,850	40,713,330
WEU tax	475,490	3,560,100	7,612,200	11,172,300
Other receipts	42,530	182,000	396,500	578,500
Pension receipts	46,670	301,000	696,000	997,000
TOTAL INCOME	564,690	4,043,100	8,704,700	12,747,800
NET TOTAL	1,069,190	8,839,380	19,126,150	27,965,530

National contributions called for under the WEU main budget for 1984

	600ths	£	F. frs
Belgium	59	105,137.02	2,749,943.78
France	120	213,838.00	5,593,106.00
Germany	120	213,838.00	5,593,106.00
Italy	120	213,838.00	5,593,106.00
Luxembourg	2	3,563.96	93,218.44
Netherlands	59	105,137.02	2,749,943.78
United Kingdom	120	213,838.00	5,593,106.00
TOTAL	600	1,069,190.00	27,965,530.00

*A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Agency for the Control of Armaments.

ANNEX IV

***Report on the reactivation of WEU published by the
Foreign Ministers on 12th June 1984 in Paris***

The working group instructed by the Council and the political directors to examine the prospects for reactivating WEU considered that this question could be approached from three different angles as follows:

- Why reactivate WEU now?
- What content would such a reactivation have?
- What would be the implementing procedures?

The replies to each of these questions were as follows:

1. WEU is at present the only European organisation empowered by treaty to discuss defence and security matters. It has a well-developed institutional structure, in particular a Council and a parliamentary Assembly. Its reactivation is prompted by the following *considerations*:

1.1. Consultation and joint in-depth reflection by the member countries of WEU are needed on the problems liable to affect their security, together with a more assertive European presence in the field of defence and security.

1.2. The international situation and especially the continuing build-up of Soviet military forces deployed against Western Europe are a matter of major concern.

1.3. As partners in the Atlantic Alliance, the member states of WEU are aware of the need to step up their contribution to the transatlantic dialogue.

1.4. It is important that public opinion be involved in the debate about defence and security, principally through an improved dialogue between the WEU Council and the Assembly and by raising the profile of the activities of those bodies.

In these circumstances, a better utilisation of WEU would demonstrate that the member countries have the will to reflect jointly and in depth on the conditions of their security in the face of the threat they have to meet. This will, however, require a determined effort to adapt and revive the organisation.

Such reactivation must, and perfectly well can, be achieved with due regard for the areas of competence of the other existing Atlantic and European institutions. This will require an exchange of information, taking into account the activities of these institutions:

As regards the Atlantic Alliance, with which WEU has very close links for co-operation under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty (Articles IV and VII), the proposed reactivation should be seen as a contribution to the cohesion of the alliance itself and not as an attempt to create a substitute for it. It is along these lines that the other members of the alliance, who are not members of WEU, would be kept informed; the ambassadors of the Seven to the alliance could play a useful rôle in this respect.

Whereas the Ten, as they declared at Stuttgart, are called upon to discuss the political and economic aspects of security, this does not at present extend to the field of defence. A reactivation of WEU would serve as an example of what can be achieved through co-operation on the European plane and as a device to keep this important area of European co-operation active which the Community and the Ten are at present unable to exploit to the extent that some of them would wish.

2. As to the *content*, a reactivation of WEU should lead to a fuller dialogue on topics of common and major interest, taking into consideration the European dimension of security questions.

2.1. An urgent topic is the growing threat to Europe in its various guises, i.e. military, political and psychological. This is a problem which, unquestionably, can profitably be discussed within the Seven without duplicating work and studies carried out elsewhere. Such a discussion among Europeans is even complementary as it may be conducted from a different and specific angle. Moreover, European public opinion expects its leaders to give thought to the problem and to present reasoned arguments which meet its preoccupations and worries.

2.2. The discussions could, as provided for by Article VIII.3 of the treaty, also focus on the effects of the international situation on European security. Even if the Seven have no special interests to express on all these problems, they at least have specific viewpoints and ideas.

2.3. Another topic could be ways of strengthening the transatlantic dialogue in all its forms.

2.4. In the field of arms co-operation, the magnitude of the tasks to be accomplished in Europe – in particular as regards the use of new technologies to strengthen conventional defence – demands that no opportunity for consultation at European level be overlooked. Without encroaching on bodies such as the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) or the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), which have their own structure and responsibilities, WEU could play a useful rôle as a forum for discussion and a source of political impetus.

3. As regards *implementing procedures*, this reactivation of WEU should lead to greater use of the existing institutions, with a number of changes. Special attention should be directed to the pair formed by the Council and the Assembly.

3.1. The *Council* has an essential rôle to play.

It fulfils this rôle more particularly when it meets at ministerial level. These meetings thus provide the required political impetus and at the same time enhance the work of the Permanent Council. They could be held twice a year.

The Permanent Council could, in turn, meet more frequently, these meetings being

expanded, as appropriate, to include senior central government staff (political directors, experts on politico-military and defence questions, ...).

3.2 Any reactivation of the Council will have implications for its subsidiary bodies – the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

3.3 The *Assembly* has a vital rôle to play as the link with public opinion on such an important issue as security. To this end, it would appear that a dialogue of greater substance should be established between the Council and the Assembly, independently of the work done by each.

In this context, it might be envisaged that:

- the exchange of views between the Assembly and the Council should be directed primarily to the reactivation of WEU and how this is to be brought about. The value of earlier Assembly studies and reports on the subject should be borne in mind;
- the procedure for answering Assembly recommendations and written questions should be improved.

Quite clearly the work of the Council and that of the Assembly interact and the debates in one of them cannot fail to stimulate discussions in the other.

ANNEX V

Rome declaration

1. At the invitation of the Italian Government, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the seven member states of Western European Union met in extraordinary session in Rome on 26th-27th October 1984 to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the modified Brussels Treaty.

2. The Ministers stressed the importance of the treaty and their attachment to its goals:

- to strengthen peace and security;
- to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe;
- to co-operate more closely both among member states and with other European organisations.

3. Conscious of the continuing necessity to strengthen western security and of the specifically Western European geographical, political, psychological and military dimensions, the Ministers underlined their determination to make better use of the WEU framework in order to increase co-operation between the member states in the field of security policy and to encourage consensus. In this context, they called for continued efforts to preserve peace, strengthen deterrence and defence and thus consolidate stability through dialogue and co-operation.

4. The Ministers recalled that the Atlantic Alliance, which remains the foundation of western security, had preserved peace on the continent for thirty-five years. This permitted the construction of Europe. The Ministers are convinced that a better utilisation of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and to greater solidarity among its members.

5. The Ministers emphasised the indivisibility of security within the North Atlantic Treaty area. They recalled in particular the vital and substantial contribution of all the European allies, and underlined the crucial importance of the contribution to common security of their allies who are not members of WEU. They stressed the necessity, as a complement to their joint efforts, of the closest possible concertation with them.

6. The Ministers are convinced that increased co-operation within WEU will also

contribute to the maintenance of adequate military strength and political solidarity and, on that basis, to the pursuit of a more stable relationship between the countries of East and West by fostering dialogue and co-operation.

7. The Ministers called attention to the need to make the best use of existing resources through increased co-operation, and through WEU to provide a political impetus to institutions of co-operation in the field of armaments.

8. The Ministers therefore decided to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in particular:

- defence questions;
- arms control and disarmament;
- the effects of developments in East-West relations on the security of Europe;
- Europe's contribution to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance, bearing in mind the importance of transatlantic relations;
- the development of European co-operation in the field of armaments in respect of which WEU can provide a political impetus.

They may also consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world.

9. The Ministers recalled the importance of the WEU Assembly which, as the only European parliamentary body mandated by treaty to discuss defence matters, is called upon to play a growing rôle.

They stressed the major contribution which the Assembly has already made to the revitalisation of WEU and called upon it to pursue its efforts to strengthen the solidarity among the member states, and to strive to consolidate the consensus among public opinion on their security and defence needs.

10. In pursuance of these goals, the Ministers have decided on a number of specific measures with regard to the better functioning of the WEU structure and organisation, which are set out in a separate document.

Institutional reform of WEU

At their meeting in Rome on 26th and 27th October 1984 to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the signatory states decided to make fuller use of the institutions of WEU and, accordingly, to bring the existing institutions into line with the changed tasks of the organisation.

I. Activation of the Council

The Ministers regard activation of the Council as a central element in the efforts to make greater use of Western European Union. In conformity with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, which allows the Council to decide on the organisation of its work and to consult or set up subsidiary bodies, the Ministers decided the following:

1. The Council would in future normally meet twice a year at ministerial level. One of these sessions could take place in a small group with no formal agenda. These meetings would bring together the Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers. Separate meetings of the Foreign Ministers and/or Defence Ministers could also take place, if the member states considered it necessary, to discuss matters lying within their respective area of responsibility.
2. The presidency of the Council will be held by each member state for a one-year term. Meetings of the Council will in principle take place in the country holding the presidency.
3. The work of the Permanent Council will have to be intensified in line with the increased activities of the Council of Ministers. The Permanent Council, mandated to discuss in greater detail the views expressed by the Ministers and to follow up their decisions, will, pursuant to the second paragraph of the abovementioned Article VIII, make the necessary arrangements for this purpose, including as appropriate the setting-up of working groups.
4. The Secretariat-General should be adapted to take account of the enhanced activities of the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council.
5. The Ministers have asked the Secretariat-General to submit, as soon as possible, a report on the work done by the secretariat and to consider what measures might be necessary to strengthen its activities. In this connection, the Ministers stated that any reorganisation in the staffing of the Secretariat-General should take account of the adjustments made elsewhere in the other WEU institutions. They stressed that any proposed

adjustments should not result in an overall increase in the organisation's establishment.

II. Relations between Council and Assembly

The Ministers supported the idea of greater contact between the Council and the Assembly.

Recalling that, under Article IX of the treaty, the Assembly is expressly required to discuss the reports submitted to it by the Council of Ministers on matters concerning the security and defence of the member states, and considering that the practice adopted has enabled the Assembly to widen the topics of its discussions, the Ministers wish to see the Assembly playing an increasing rôle, particularly by contributing even more to associating public opinion in the member states with the policy statements of the Council, which expresses the political will of the individual governments. Accordingly, the Ministers submit the following proposals to the Assembly:

1. In order to improve the contacts between the Council and the Assembly, the Ministers believe there are a number of options, noteworthy among which are:
 - A substantial improvement in the existing procedures for giving written replies to Assembly recommendations and questions. On this point, the Ministers consider that a leading rôle should be given to the presidency, making the best use of the services of the Secretariat-General.
 - The development of informal contacts between government representatives and the representatives of the Assembly.
 - If appropriate, a colloquium involving the presidency of the Council and the committees of the Assembly.
 - The improvement of the contacts that traditionally take place after the ministerial meetings of the Council, and more generally, the improvement of the procedures under which the Assembly is kept informed by the presidency, whose representatives could - between the Assembly sessions - keep the various committees up to date with the work of the Council and even take part in their discussions.
 - The possibility that the Assembly might make use of contributions from the technical institutions of WEU.

2. Convinced that greater co-operation between the Council and the Assembly is a key factor in the enhanced utilisation of WEU, the Ministers underscored the importance they attach to the recommendations and work of the Assembly.

3. Without wishing to pre-empt the decision of the members of the Assembly, the Ministers also stress the value, in their eyes, of developing a dialogue between the Assembly and other parliaments or parliamentary institutions.

4. The Ministers also stated that the member states were always ready to inform their national delegations of their governments' attitude to questions dealt with in Assembly reports and were prepared to offer information to their rapporteurs.

III. Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee

The Ministers also considered the activity of the Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA) and the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC).

1. In connection with the Agency, which was set up in 1954 to monitor compliance with the voluntary arms limitations agreed by the contracting parties, the Ministers underlined the exemplary nature of these commitments, which had instilled confidence among the signatory states and for this reason they acclaimed the work that the Agency had done.

Noting the value of the experience thus gained, the Ministers emphasised the interest that they attached to the development by the WEU member states of reflection on arms control and disarmament questions.

2. As regards the SAC, the Ministers recalled the importance of the tasks defined in the decision of the Council of 7th May 1955 which established this body.

In this connection, they emphasised that the existence of an effective and competitive European armaments industry was a fundamental aspect of Europe's contribution to the Atlantic Alliance. In this context, it seemed very important to them that the seven member states of WEU should be able to harmonise their positions in this sphere and co-ordinate their efforts with a view to increasing the effectiveness of co-operative activity in the various multilateral fora.

3. With the aim of better adapting the institutions of WEU to present and future requirements, the Ministers reached the following decisions.

(a) Noting that the control functions originally assigned to the ACA have now become, for the most part, superfluous, the Ministers decided, in accordance with Article V of Protocol No. III, which allows the Council to make changes to the ACA's control activity, to abolish gradually the remaining quantitative

controls on conventional weapons. The Ministers agreed that these controls should be substantially reduced by 1st January 1985 and entirely lifted by 1st January 1986. The commitments and controls concerning ABC weapons would be maintained at the existing level and in accordance with the procedures agreed up to the present time.

(b) The Ministers have instructed the Permanent Council to define, in consultation with the directors of the ACA and the SAC, the precise modalities of an overall reorganisation affecting both the ACA, the international secretariat of the SAC and the SAC which could be structured in such a way as to fulfil a threefold task:

- to study questions relating to arms control and disarmament whilst carrying out the remaining control functions;
- undertake the function of studying security and defence problems;
- to contribute actively to the development of European armaments co-operation.

(c) As regards the first two functions indicated above, the intention would be to have available a common basis of analysis which could form a useful point of reference for the work of both the Council and the Assembly and also for informing public opinion.

This reorganisation will have to be carried out taking into account, on the one hand, changes in duties resulting first from the reduction and then from the abolition of the control tasks and, on the other hand, the need to have the appropriate experts available.

(d) As regards armaments co-operation, WEU should be in a position to play an active rôle in providing political impetus:

- by supporting all co-operative efforts including those of the IEPG and the CNAD;
- by encouraging in particular the activity of the IEPG as a forum whose main objective is to promote European co-operation and also to contribute to the development of balanced co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance;
- by developing continuing concertation with the various existing bodies.

(e) In this general context, the Permanent Council will also take into account the existence of the FINABEL framework.

(f) In carrying out this overall reorganisation the Permanent Council will have to:

- propose a precise organisation table which will make it possible to define and give a breakdown of the posts required for carrying out the three functions referred to above;
- ensure that the various arrangements proposed remain within the present limits in terms of staff and the organisation's budget, without weakening WEU's ability to play its rôle.

The Ministers asked the Permanent Council to complete its work before their next session. They expressed the wish, however, that

in the meantime a start should be made on all or part of the new tasks as soon as possible.

IV. Contacts with non-member states

1. The Ministers also attached great importance to liaison with those states in the alliance which are not members of WEU.
2. Invoking the relevant provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty, and in particular Article IV, the Ministers pointed out that it was the responsibility of the presidency of WEU to inform those countries on either a bilateral or multilateral basis.

*The military use of computers –
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council*

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions²
by Mr. Fourré, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Lenzler (Chairman); MM. Wilkinson, Bassinet (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Adriaensens, Böhm, Colajanni, Fiandrotti, Fourré, Garrett, Sir Paul Hawkins, MM. Hengel, McGuire (Alternate: Sir John Osborn), Mezzapesa, Rizzi (Alternate: Sarti), Schmidt, Souvet, Spies von Bülesheim, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Valleix, Worrell.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

***on the military use of computers -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the preponderant importance of computers for the defence of the western world, whether they are incorporated in weapons systems or used for command, control, communications and intelligence ;
- (ii) Considering the importance of military computers which have been prime movers for the development of civil computer industries for the last twenty years ;
- (iii) Considering also that, since the failure of Unidata - Philips, Siemens and CII - Western Europe has had no common co-ordinated policy and is only now starting the Esprit programme which covers no military use ;
- (iv) Considering the United States and Japanese challenge in the world computer market and Western Europe's backwardness that involves serious drawbacks owing to excessive dependency on the United States and Japan and which, on the one hand, requires a common European policy and, on the other hand, co-operative action with American and eventually Japanese firms ;
- (v) Considering the extremely fast development of computer technology ;
- (vi) Considering the need to face up to this phenomenon and, to this end, instructing its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to prepare a supplementary report on this important question in order to keep the Assembly informed of the evolution of the situation in the economic, technological and military sectors,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge the member governments to stimulate and co-ordinate research and development of basic technologies for manufacturing very-high-speed integrated circuits and provide the funds necessary to encourage the industries concerned ;
2. Draw up a common policy in a Western European framework based on a co-ordinated strategy to be worked out by the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU for the military applications of computer systems ;
3. Prepare the ground for the next generation of military computers in weapon systems which will be interchangeable and interoperational between units of European forces assigned for the common defence ;
4. Promote a single European market for military computers, and particularly supercomputers, which will stimulate the civil market ;
5. Advocate a common computer language to facilitate the interoperability of all systems used by the armed forces of Western Europe ;
6. Call for the standardisation of computer components such as very-high-speed integrated circuits ;
7. Reflect on the impact on European computer industries due to the research and development to be undertaken in connection with the American strategic defence initiative and European-American co-operation on the space station.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Fourré, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. A crucial question affecting the production of computers which will have to be answered in the next few years is whether a technology gap is developing between Europe on the one hand and Japan and America on the other. The lead achieved by the United States and Japan in information technology is undoubtedly one of the main reasons why this question is uppermost in the minds of many politicians and industrialists. They are very much aware that information technology has been a major factor in the spectacular economic growth in recent years in the United States and Japan and that the lack of it largely explains Europe's economic difficulties.

2. Europe's performance in the information industry is the more disturbing because the high dollar should have sent Europe's balance of electronic strength in the right direction. This poor performance is the more regrettable as the production side of information technology is already one of the world's biggest industries.

3. For instance, it is estimated that the annual 30% drop in cost performance in microelectronics and optical telecommunications is reflected at least to the same extent in the prices of new products and processes. It also accelerates and encourages product changes.

4. A question directly related to the one above and no less fundamental is can Europe overcome its backwardness and, if so, how should it proceed?

5. The EEC countries' overall balance of electronic strength was already more than \$9 billion in deficit last year. Most information technology is now being bought for incorporation into other products or for use in processing information. The use of electronics has important repercussions on some 80% of industrial production in an advanced country.

6. The best example is the American defence budget: in 1970, 20% of the Pentagon's procurement was in electronics. This will be 40% at the end of the 1980s. In 1985, \$6.5 billion will be spent on the promotion of industrial research and development. In his report (Document 992) on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology, Mr. Hill wrote:

"Computers have the highest priority. Research and development is being

conducted first in very-high-speed integrated circuits which provide the capability for massive and fast data-processing, second, in stealth aircraft, third in advanced software and fourth in microprocessors.

For software technology, \$9 billion is earmarked for development and maintenance. Up until the year 1990, \$13 billion will be spent on several software programmes with the help of a software engineering institute. The software technology for adaptable reliable systems (STARS) programme will improve the United States ability to develop and support software for mission critical systems. This tri-service effort, built up on the Defence Department's ADA computer language programme, will deal with critical problems in the cost transportability, reliability and survivability of computer software in weapons systems."

7. Another example of Europe's lack of progress is its consumption of semiconductor chips which are the foundation for all other electronic production and which has fallen in the past ten years from 30% to 19% of the world's total. Per head consumption is only one-third of that in the United States and one-quarter of that in Japan. European production of chips has fallen in ten years from 14.5% to 9.5%.

8. The life-cycle of microelectronic-related products has shrunk from eight to ten years to three years on average which means that the high investment funds which are required must be recouped within two years. This does not make those who develop new technology eager to license it to anybody else. It should also be noted that European computer companies cannot launch their next generation systems until much later than their competitors.

9. In the Economic Community, the Esprit plan was adopted at the beginning of 1984 and an agency has been set up to promote information technology. This agency has concluded that technology has a considerable impact on Western Europe's overall economic activity.

10. Information technology companies in Europe have only between 35 and 40% of their own domestic markets. IBM sells as much in Europe as its nearest nine competitors combined and these include other United States as well as, to an increasing extent, Japanese companies.

11. The agency considers that by 1986 the balance of trade specifically in information technology products will show a deficit of some \$5 billion.

12. Here, your Rapporteur wishes to point out that the technology gap between Europe and its main overseas competitors has a direct influence on employment in Western Europe. The agency considers that the nineteen million jobs created in the United States in less than a decade is twenty-five times the Community's performance over the same period. In the second half of 1983, the United States created more jobs than the Community in ten years.

13. One of the main reasons why European firms do not have an even chance of competing with their American and Japanese rivals is the existence of semi-independent national markets which is of course a political problem. One of the main goals of the new Chairman of the European Community Commission, Mr. Jacques Delors, is the expansion of the Common Market internal market through intra-community trade measures covering goods and services. It should be realised however that an open and unified market will automatically also mean that some European electronics companies will be forced out of business.

14. The purpose of the Esprit plan, which has a five-year budget of \$1.1 billion, is to enhance the competitiveness of the ten member states, especially vis-à-vis the United States and Japan. Its work is concentrated on five major information technology sectors: advanced microelectronics, software technology, advanced information processing, office automation and computer-aided manufacturing.

15. This Community programme is parallel with those of individual nations. Thus, France has *Télématique* – the fusion of telecommunications and data-processing. The United Kingdom has a £350 million information technology programme and the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology has a DM 3.5 billion four-year plan to support microelectronic development in the Federal Republic.

16. Europe's fragmented markets have caused an appalling waste of resources. Japan, North America and Western Europe are similar sized markets. Japan's total research and development expenditure for instance on the latest generation of public digital switches in traditional telecommunications was \$1.5 to \$2 billion, North America's some \$3 billion and Western Europe's more than \$10 billion for ten different switching systems. Why can Europe not capitalise and commercialise what is developed in scientific laboratories? Is not one of the reasons that there is a lack of venture capital in Europe?

17. With regard to human resources, the estimates are that Europe used three times as many hardware and software engineers as either North America or Japan in developing its switches. 25% of all European software engineers, the people most in demand in the computer business, were kept busy designing public switches compared with 10% in Japan. There is no doubt that the Western European states should reconsider their telecommunications monopolies in equipment and business services and, if they fail to do this, the European telecommunications industry will be in trouble.

18. Collective action and a new technological policy will be necessary if Europe is to keep its own telecommunications industry alive and competitive.

19. The leading European firms, Philips and Siemens, have gone into partnership to develop jointly a new generation of chips.

20. The French and German PTTs supported by major companies such as CIT-Alcatel and Thomson-CSF of France are planning standardisation and collaboration in their communications networks. One might wonder, however, whether this will not be too little and too late.

21. The top European supplier of chips, Philips, just managed to be included in the world top ten chip suppliers, but its production is only one-third that of Motorola from the United States. Western European manufacturers account for less than 9% of world sales compared with the United States' share of 62% and Japan's 26.3%.

II. Military aspects

22. In the military area, computers have become an essential part of weapons systems. In addition, there is defence-related information technology.

23. Computers may be used for:

- (i) logistics, supplies, planning and maintenance of weapons systems;
- (ii) preparation of strategy and adapting it to various types of threat – nuclear, conventional or both;
- (iii) miscellaneous uses: detection, classification and guidance of weapons systems;
- (iv) communications systems;
- (v) simulation processes;
- (vi) training staff to use weapons systems;
- (vii) research and development of military equipment.

24. On 29th April 1980, Mr. Brasseur submitted a report (Document 840) on this subject and

stated that communications, command, control and intelligence (abbreviated 3 C + I) were essential elements in the long-term NATO defence programme.

25. The NATO-wide integrated communications system is the largest infrastructure programme financed on a fourteen-power basis that the allies have ever undertaken. The capital cost will be some \$2 billion and the programme should be fully operational in 1995. The system is primarily used to provide commanders-in-chief and lower level commanders with all the information necessary to enable them to take decisions. The main difference with civilian usage is the speed with which the military have to take decisions due to the speed of aircraft and missiles. There is no doubt that interoperability between the NATO and national systems is essential for having effective operational command forces in times of emergency or war.

26. In the recommendation included in the report by Mr. Brasseur, he regretted that Europe had not so far exploited the fact that it was a continental size market and had not pursued a coherent policy and commercial strategy to capture part of the world market.

27. On 24th October 1980, the Council replied as follows :

“ 1. The Council share the concern expressed by the Assembly that European firms have so far failed to capture a satisfactory share of the European and world markets for microelectronic and associated equipment. The Council favour practical international action which offers the prospect of assisting European firms to win a larger share of the international market. They also welcome the recent initiatives of the European Commission but take the view that, while the main impetus for change must come from the industries in question themselves, new initiatives will be necessary in order to co-ordinate national action to support these industries in achieving a competitive position in the world market.

2. In the defence field considerable progress has been made in bringing together national requirements ensuring compatibility of national systems. The defence world, indeed, has a particularly acute awareness of the benefits of common standards. Considerable effort in CNAD and in Eurogroup is being devoted to agreeing common parameters for systems intended to be brought into service. As the volume of such equipment destined for introduction with allied services grows the need to work to agreed standards – which might also apply to the civil

sphere – increases in proportion. It should be noted however that the standards which will best contribute to the efficiency of the alliance and those which will help European industry in the world-wide market are world standards rather than exclusively European standards. For this reason Eurogroup's work is being channelled through scheme-wide institutions. The Assembly has rightly drawn attention to these matters, which it can be assured the WEU governments intend to take into account.

3. Defence accounts for a large share of the public purchasing of information equipment. Interoperability of the equipment – especially communications equipment – with that used by allied forces is a high priority for all WEU governments. A large proportion of the alliance's spending on communications equipment is indeed funded through the NATO infrastructure budget and provided as a facility which more than one nation can use. It should not be assumed that there is advantage in ensuring interoperability of equipment for civil and military use. Whilst this may be the case in most circumstances, it does not follow a general rule.”

28. The military computer should produce accurate results and assessments which should be repeatable allowing the commander in the field to carry out a strategy agreed upon by the competent higher authorities. To take smart bombs for example, these weapons are filled with electronics and reach their goals automatically once the direction has been slotted into the system's computer. All weapon systems have miniaturised information stored which cannot be jammed. They include systems which the Americans call “fire and forget”. Ever since space launchers and ballistic missiles have been used there has been this built-in capacity for self-regulation.

Requirements of a military system

29. These are :

- timing – the system must operate at a rhythm very close to real time ;
- reliability – breakdowns are unacceptable ;
- interoperability ;
- security – all-round protection ;
- operating security ;
- survivability – ability to survive nuclear explosions, for instance.

Requirements specific to each of the armed forces

30. The *army* is mainly concerned with :
- improving tactical liaison ;
 - protecting communications against jamming, pin-pointing and interception ;
 - miniaturising and reducing the electricity consumption of portable systems ;
31. The *navy's* main requirements are :
- long-distance liaison with submarines and surface vessels ;
 - secrecy of communications ;
 - coexistence of many transmitters and receivers on the same vessel ;
 - interoperability with navies of other allied nations.
32. The *air force* has the following requirements :
- improving infrastructure liaison between fixed air bases dispersed throughout the territory ;
 - improving air-to-air and air-to-surface VHF links with due secrecy and protection ;
 - improving the HF network for long-distance tasks and interventions.

Military communications

33. There are two complementary techniques :
- long-distance communications techniques ;
 - techniques for protecting communications.
34. Long-distance communications techniques vary according to actual requirements :
- tactical communications for links between mobile units dispersed throughout the territory ;
 - infrastructure communications for basic fixed links forming the backbone of communications at national or regional level ;
 - communications by satellite, differing from other types because of their transit points in space.
35. Each area requires very specific and increasingly expensive means when one passes from tactical requirements to space applications.
36. Much work has recently been done on techniques for protecting communications (safety, security) against natural or man-made interference (jamming, tapping, etc.), to which military communications are exposed.

Computers for weapon systems

37. There is a great difference between computers installed on board ships, aircraft, tanks, etc. or integrated in weapon systems and the large computers used to mastermind nuclear weapons, etc. However, contrary to the position in the United States, computers on board French vehicles or ships and incorporated in weapon systems such as missiles are all derived from computers for civil use specially modified and reinforced to meet military requirements but with specially developed software. The military computer is rather more expensive than the civil one as they are needed only in limited series.

38. Computers to be used in weapons systems are part of the arms systems and are normally built and inserted by the manufacturer of the weapon system.

39. For detection and guidance of weapon systems, etc. specially modified civil computers are used or models derived from computers for civil purposes.

40. For communications purposes between headquarters and troops, protection has, of course, to be extremely efficient in order to prevent leakage and breaches of security. The characteristics of this type of computer are prescribed by the armed forces.

41. Civil computers are being used for simulation and training personnel. The army has special training courses and military personnel are detached to special schools for learning to programme and use the computers.

42. For military computers, the civil industry manufactures both the hardware and the software. Military software depends on the type of armaments to be used as well as the requirements of the three services. A great effort is now being made in the French armed forces to standardise software.

43. In the United States, the Defence Department has made an effort in the same direction but has not succeeded in co-ordinating the requirements of the army, the navy, the air force and the marines. This might not be surprising as first of all these services are much larger than services in France and there are far more industrialists in the United States than in Europe.

Computers for logistics

44. Computers used for logistic reasons - supply, planification and maintenance of arms systems - are civil computers with special modifications to adapt them for the military as is done for any important client. Contrary to the United States, in France the military were the

first important clients for computers. This was linked with nuclear weapons especially and also with space activities.

Supercomputers

45. The future of the technological evolution lies in the fifth generation computer which will be able to execute many different orders at the same time and at a speed many times that of present speeds. Computer technology is in the sixth generation. The seventh generation is expected in the near future: Cray III in mid-1988, ETA-10 in late 1986.

46. The very large computers needed to carry out digital simulation work, now essential for the design of sophisticated weapons, are of American origin. Japan may also be producing them soon.

47. In the United States, many supercomputer programmes are now actively under way. The Cray Company has announced its plans for multicomputers which, in the second half of the decade, should be ten to fifty times more powerful (depending on the process) than present equipment.

48. Control Data is planning similar development of Cyber 205. Finally, NASA has started research on a very ambitious multicomputer programme, NASF (numerical aerodynamics simulation facility) which should by the end of the decade allow the resolution of large equation systems with partial derivatives with a real power (average speed obtained on application) of about 1,000 million floating point operations per second.

49. IBM changed its supercomputer policy significantly at the end of the seventies by planning to market equipment in 1986-87 which would be competitive with that of other manufacturers, particularly the Japanese. Two types of supercomputer are planned. IBM 3090-200 and 3090-400 computers, announced last month, are considered to be Class V machines.

50. In Japan, research is also to be started in the framework of a major fifth-generation computer programme on parallel machines (multicomputers and vectorials) capable of carrying out more than 1,000 million effective floating point operations per second by the end of the decade.

51. In view of this critically dependent situation, the Ministry of Defence is studying the possibility of developing a large scientific installation on a national basis. This decision was taken following the conclusions of a working group, under the chairmanship of Professor Lions, which showed the great similarity between processes carried out by potential users of

this type of machine. It was therefore possible to consider developing specialised computers adapted to this type of processing.

52. The French Government has invited three computer industrialists to make a collaborative effort to meet the future computer requirements of the armed forces. The procurement office has invited the three services to submit their requirements for computers and has found acceptable characteristics for computers which can be used by all three services. Similarly, the same computer language can be used and therefore the same type of software.

53. To achieve the standard of performance required by users (a processing power of about 200 million floating point operations per second and a storage capacity of more than 100 million 64-bit words, to quote only these two figures), the only technical solution now possible is the parallel link-up of basic machines which are themselves already very powerful.

54. To meet this type of requirement, the government has launched a large vectorial computer programme whose code name is Isis which will be used by the military and civil departments and, if this project succeeds, it will be possible to use the same type of software everywhere. This is extremely important as the software of computer systems represents about 80-85% of the price. The reason is that software is still produced on a case-by-case basis and is not an automatic production process.

55. As your Rapporteur has already noted, this policy of the French Government is based on a report submitted in 1980 by a study group under Professor Lions which describes the needs of the French civil and military authorities for the second half of the 1980s. The users of large computer systems are ministries or industries which have to deal with the problems of aerodynamics, hydrodynamics, detonics, nuclear questions, structural calculus, acoustics and meteorology.

56. This study led to the decision to ask Bull to build a large prototype computer called Isis. Bull started the development of this computer in 1981 and will produce the first prototypes at the end of 1986. If successful and if there are government orders, it will build four large computers of this type each year between 1986 and 1990 with a total of twenty which would practically cover the needs of the French market for this type of computer by 1991.

57. In order to build the prototype, Bull has found an associate in Siemens in the Federal Republic which handles the technological aspects whereas Bull has design leadership. The industrial purpose of Bull and Siemens might be to develop a large computer for a series after Isis.

58. The planned prototype is jointly financed by the Ministries of Defence, PTT (industrial and international affairs), and Research and Technology, the Ministry of Defence having a majority share. Industry is therefore funding nothing.

59. One condition under which Bull would build this large computer is that the ministries needing such a computer would place orders. These large computers generally process a large mass of data, so the capacity of the main memory must, for each programme, be in the region of tens or even hundreds of millions of bytes. The output of this memory must be sufficient to feed the calculating device correctly.

60. Finally, for many applications they require a high working speed particularly for vectorial and matrix calculations (full and hollow matrices), changes of co-ordinates, etc.

61. This speed of carrying out instructions is no longer calculated in MIPS (million instructions per second) but in MFlops (million floating point operations per second) and the number of MFlops needed varies from 100 to 1,000 according to the type of processing required. Moreover, the input and output must be fast so as not to penalise operating time by unduly long delays.

62. Isis would be in advance of the American Cray I large computer, of which one hundred have been installed in the world, including eight in France.

63. The Cray II computer is six to twelve times as fast as the Cray I and the Cyber 207 (Control Data) now corresponds to the smallest ETA-10 (two processors).

64. Competition for the Isis computer will come from the United States and Japan. In the United States, the Defence Department has earmarked large sums for developing computers for military purposes and once the research and development costs have been amortised by the military user, the same type of computer will be transferred to the civil market. In Japan, the method is the opposite. Computers are built for the civil government market, the ministries and state industries, but the ultimate purpose is to conquer the world market with subsequent systems to be offered to the general public.

65. In this sector, it will be of special importance to protect large computers of this type against leakage of their knowledge to the Soviet Union. It is well known that the latter is very keen to gain access to western computers, especially large ones. Military security means that they must not be accessible to unqualified persons but, if these Isis computers are also transferred to civil use or to scientific centres, how can one ensure that the knowledge they contain will not be tapped ?

66. As in industry, the security of the computer language has to be ensured and here again techniques are no different from those used by industry or for instance the banking system. Communications between computers can of course be intercepted and it is clear that this security aspect of computer language between headquarters and troops has to be solved. At the same time computers require a certain automatism and the confidential nature of communications has to be protected.

Software

67. The military authorities are trying to standardise software language ; the French system to be used is LTR (*langage temps réel*).

68. The military authorities of large industrialised countries such as the United States and France have had to start real-time software reliability programmes (ADA for the Department of Defence, LTR for the French defence authorities) and research on software engineering (programme testing, optimisation, etc.).

69. Military applications have in fact now reached a stage previously reached in civil applications, i.e. software development costing more than hardware. Investment made in LTR in France is so high that it is more expensive to update systems than to replace old equipment by a new generation.

70. However, it must be realised that a strategy of evolution based on no change in software has limits which should be extended after about ten years.

71. This is the aim of the development of ADA in the United States (available industrially this year) and the new-version LTRV3 in France.

72. The specific nature of military computers necessarily implies high costs and relatively limited performances by military computers (by performance is also meant the central memory capacity, the peripheral capacity, output and operational speed). The use of software tools and increasingly sophisticated high-level languages makes it necessary to develop programmes on high-performance compatible machines which work in normal conditions.

73. It is not possible to imagine a family of military computers which is not compatible with a family of commercial systems, any more than it is possible to imagine developing a new aircraft without computer simulation and without developing the man-machine interface also through computerised simulation.

74. In many cases linked with the development of software, the impetus of military bodies

has opened the way for civil applications and a language such as ADA might become a standard for industry.

75. Progressive attempts to improve security have naturally helped commercial data-processing and opened the way for civil applications which are proving increasingly vital for a country's economy and health. It is easy to understand that the need for reliability, security and integrity in a computerised communications system for banks or hospital networks is almost as important as for defence-related systems. The success of so-called non-stop redundant computers on the commercial market is an illustration of this phenomenon.

United States

76. In his report (Document 992, paragraphs 17 and 18), Mr. Hill stated that the Defence Department was spending \$4.4 billion a year to be increased to \$6.5 billion in 1985 in order to promote industrial research and development, the highest priority being given to computers.

77. The Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency deals with research projects which are carefully selected to maintain the United States technological lead and avoid potential adversarial technological surprises. While the Agency's projects are high-risk, they have high potential payoff in military utility and are frequently applicable to multiservice use. Maturing technology is often taken into the field for feasibility demonstration with the services, which are then in a position to advance the technology through the development process.

78. The Agency's research programmes cover a broad spectrum of technologies, one of which concerns strategic computing. This programme is developing a class of super-intelligent computers for application to advanced defence systems by the end of the decade. These new machines will be capable of "vision" for autonomous vehicle navigation, "understanding natural language" (English), and "speech recognition" for use in a fighter cockpit and command centre. In addition, advanced expert systems will be developed that can store and manipulate knowledge in any of these fields to allow machine-reasoning and inferencing. Small-scale feasibility demonstrations of these concepts have been carried out in the laboratory, but they need to be engineered for application to practical defence systems. High performance computers will be needed to carry out these functions to meet the real-time demands of field operations. A new family of computers, 1,000 times faster than existing equipment, is being pursued using multiprocessor computer architectures and state-of-the-art VLSI (very large scale integration) components.

79. One other programme concerns very-high-speed integrated circuits (VHSIC). The Defence Department wishes to increase the United States lead in integrated circuit technology deployed in weapons systems by minimising the time delay between technology development and deployment.

80. The six contractors involved in the VHSIC technology programme are Honeywell, IBM, Texas-Instruments, Hughes Aircraft, TRW and Westinghouse.

81. The VHSIC technology provides some devices as the basic building-blocks, which could be used to construct hierarchical multifunctional systems which could be used in different combinations to create a wide variety of signal processor types of radar, image processing, electronic warfare and communications, spread-spectrum and frequency agility, navigation and identification sub-systems.

82. A start has been asked for with research and development of computer technology even more advanced than VHSIC. This "super" computer, still to be developed, would offer computational speeds 1,000 times greater than those used in military systems today.

83. The first insertion of VHSIC into an operational system will occur this year. Thirty-seven weapons systems have been scheduled for VHSIC technology insertion. In addition, the Defence Department has begun the development of second generation VHSIC chips, which will provide another hundredfold improvement in processing power. These new chips will greatly increase the war-fighting capability of weapons systems in the 1990s.

84. Many of the United States military systems are dependent upon computers and software for their effective operation. Over the past two years, the Defence Department has initiated two very important tri-service programmes to improve United States ability to produce and support operational software for mission-critical systems. The first of these, the software technology for adaptable, reliable systems (STARS) programme will create a system of computer-aided techniques and methods for the development and support of mission-critical software. The objective of this programme is to provide a tenfold reduction in the cost of software development and evolution and in the number of latent defects in software systems.

85. The second programme involves the creation of a software engineering institute, the purpose of which is to overcome the traditional fielding lag in maturing new technologies and to accelerate the application of new software technology to military systems. The institute will combine advanced methods emerging from the

private research community with an integrated computer-aided software development system and technology produced by STARS to demonstrate their application in weapon systems programmes.

Soviet Union

86. Within the Soviet Union, all research and development for computers has been primarily directed to military applications. The civil line of computers has been almost completely left aside with the result that the Soviet forces now have great problems in training their military personnel who, apart from a few experts, have absolutely no experience in the use of civil microcomputers. Only now is the government starting an effort to fill this lack of vulgarisation and trying to buy material for microcomputing material in Europe and the United States. However, this backwardness will not be easy to overcome.

87. It should also be noted that if research and development laboratories work at international level, the problems increase significantly once production is launched on an industrial basis.

France

88. As your Rapporteur had only a limited time in which to prepare this report, he has had most of his contacts with the French national authorities and industrialists. He intends to come back to the subject of military computers at a later date describing the developments in other European countries and the United States.

89. For daily communications, France has a system called Rita (*Réseau Informatisé Transmissions Automatiques*) destined for the army. It is a fully-integrated communications system directed by a giant computer.

90. The Rita system is a mobile, highly versatile command system to be used by all levels of command from the highest to the lowest echelons and even platoons in the field.

91. In this connection and referring to the report by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (Document 974), mention should be made of the fact that the French purchase of the E-3A AWACS is being tied to the United States' purchase of the Rita military tactical communications system proposed by France's Thomson-CSF, with GTE Corp. and Raytheon Corp. The United States army is considering the communications network, based on Thomson-CSF's Rita. France believes the United States is not offering sufficient offset for the French purchase of the AWACS, and a United States acquisition of the Thomson-CSF/GTE/Raytheon communications system would help balance the deal.

92. In France, the Pluton tactical nuclear missile, the Exocet anti-ship missile and the Crotale and Roland ground-to-air missiles could reach their targets without computerised direction. Requirements for these systems are that they be immune to countermeasures, miniaturised and easy to maintain.

93. France, like other countries, is now at a crossroads in computer systems and will have to take decisions on the production of new nuclear or conventional weapon systems with a new range of computers which will be in service up to the year 2000. The question is whether France alone should bear the technological and financial burden or whether it should be shared by all member states of Western Europe and of WEU in particular.

The lack of European co-operation

94. There is hardly any collaboration at all within the European framework. It is difficult to ensure European collaboration within NATO because of the preponderant position of the United States. Nevertheless, Europe has joint requirements which could and should be met. This would mean funding joint research but joint characteristics would also have to be defined. Moreover, a computer is only a small part of a weapon system and it would be very difficult to have joint research on a small part and not procure the complete weapon system. Here progress has to be made step by step. There would have to be a joint strategic concept, far greater standardisation of armaments and a collaborative effort by European industries.

95. For European co-operation, it would be extremely useful to study first the problems of interoperability to find a common solution. This is certainly a problem which will not be easy to solve without progress in European unification. In the meantime, it would nevertheless be possible to achieve a common European research effort, especially in communications and fifth generation computers with artificial intelligence. Much joint research could and should be undertaken. However, the defence ministries should be willing to provide the necessary funding.

96. For new weapons systems, such as the European combat aircraft, collaboration could lead also to joint research on computers for arms systems for such an aircraft as well as on communications between the aircraft and headquarters.

97. As far as software is concerned, European companies, such as Bull, Siemens, ICL, Nixdorf, Philips and Olivetti have now announced that they will unite to promote Unix software which has been developed by the American firm, ATT.

This is directly related to competition with IBM which still has by far the biggest civil market share in the world.

98. Bull, Siemens and ICL have a common research centre for software. The result will be that with the Unix system the computers of the different firms can be more easily interchanged and connected with each other. Unix software might become a worldwide software system to be used for scientific and other applications.

III. Reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council

99. The Council having indicated that a change was being made to the traditional layout of the Council's report, your Rapporteur had hoped that this would mean real answers to questions and recommendations from the committees and the Assembly. Now, as in earlier years, however, the answers are superficial and incomplete.

100. On the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology, an initiative from the Council would have been appreciated. It recognises the shortcomings and discusses institutional frameworks but no real progress is announced. Everyone knows that the NATO, IEPG and WEU frameworks are not ideal for a great variety of reasons but why not choose an existing framework for certain activities and a different one for others? The WEU countries are the most important for armaments industries in Western Europe. If a clear choice was made, industry would know to whom to turn. In this way the organisation could envisage industrial contacts with a view to promoting the establishment of a European industry for advanced military technology.

101. It is all very well to recognise the importance of preference for Europe but the technological development of Europe should not lag too far behind that of the United States equipment.

102. Only co-operative European efforts in research and development can prevent the gap widening but impetus should be given by the Ministries of Defence. The same is true if Europe is to keep abreast of emerging technologies. In his report, your Rapporteur has underlined this with regard to computers but the Council's reaction to this serious situation is hardly more than a description of a few facts. The Assembly should have received an answer to the real questions and a detailed description of the state of armaments co-operation now that WEU is to be reactivated.

103. The situation with regard to the advanced combat aircraft, the multiple-launch rocket sys-

tem, the third generation of anti-tank missile programmes and the NATO frigate programme remains very vague and ill-defined.

104. With regard to AWACS and Nimrod aircraft, the Council's report is more precise but does not mention the cost overruns in the United Kingdom on the Nimrod AEW programme. Air Chief Marshall Sir John Rogers, controller of aircraft in the Ministry of Defence, informed the House of Commons Defence Committee that the cost of this project has jumped from the original estimate made in 1975 of approximately \$500 million to more than \$1.3 billion and that the aircraft, originally expected to be in service in 1983, now will not be ready until at least 1987.

105. This example shows once again that going it alone in high technology projects does not strengthen the Western European defence position.

106. The military and civil use of space will be discussed during the colloquy which is being organised by the committee and which will be held in Munich on 18th-20th September 1985. Your Rapporteur should also mention the satisfying conference in Rome on 30th and 31st January 1985 and the important decision taken at that conference on future European space programmes for scientific purposes, space transportation and application satellites. A special information document will be circulated on this development.

IV. Conclusions

107. In spite of the little time available to your Rapporteur for examining such a vast subject and for meeting military and civil authorities capable of providing information on European capability in computers for military use, it emerges from this first study that everything remains to be done where co-operation is concerned.

108. Sometimes through ignorance of the computer phenomenon, political leaders limit their views on co-operation to the actual systems, neglecting the rôle of sub-assemblies or even of basic components. Technical and hence economic dependence is linked with the political attitude towards the United States (and perhaps tomorrow Japan), and its authorisation to export certain equipment. For instance, under the 1966 McMahon Act, the United States Government forbade France to export computers which might be used for research and development of nuclear weapons, and this was in General de Gaulle's time. Although in 1976 American policy became far more liberal, there are still a number of restrictions which some regret. American monopoly in a number of areas is

declining with the emergence of Japanese competition and its co-operation with European industry (Nippon Electric with Bull, Fujitsu with Siemens); co-operation with American industries also seems to be looking up. However, in this, as in many other fields, Europe has common requirements which might and should be solved. Although the problems of co-operation on military computers are discussed in various agencies of the Atlantic Alliance such as the allied data system interoperability agency (ADSIA) and the tri-service group on communications and electronic equipment, sub-group 9, the dominating position of the United States calls for the development of European co-operation extending beyond bilateral relations. This means joint funding of research and the definition of joint specifications and clearly-specified aims. For components, Europe must therefore co-operate far more actively in research and development work.

109. For basic software, in addition to the standardisation of products, to be technically competitive co-operation requires joint support in three areas :

- improvement of operating systems ;
- research on data structure ;
- development of software with new methods and better instruments.

110. Europe has become aware of this need for co-operation in face of the two computer giants : the United States and Japan. However, few initiatives have been taken. While welcoming

support for the Esprit programme (a particularly important initiative), it should be pointed out that this will not enable European industry to make up for lost time, particularly as it means co-operating on military uses. Greater investment, joint strategic defence concepts and the political will for independence are probably decisive factors in ensuring Europe's future in these matters. Then comes the joint definition of priorities such as :

- training engineers and technicians ;
- study and development of powerful instruments of computer-assisted design ;
- development of large-capacity integrated circuits ;
- study and development of future super-microcomputers ;
- development of software engineering technology.

111. When thinking of defence now and in the future, one simple notion should be borne in mind : *without computers, no force can be truly deterrent.*

112. Your Rapporteur trusts he has been able to throw some light on the stake involved in the computer phenomenon on the basis of information obtained mainly in France (administration and manufacturers). He suggests that a fuller report be prepared for a future session taking account of the views of the other WEU member countries and of the American authorities.

*The military use of computers -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Standing Armaments Committee" and insert "the Agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments".

Signed : den Ouden-Dekkers

1. See 4th sitting, 22nd May 1985 (amendment agreed to).

Cyprus and European security

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur*

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on Cyprus and European security

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submitted by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy, van der Werff (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier, Bianco, Bogaerts, Burger, Hill (Alternate: Mrs. Knight), Johnston, Koehl, Lagneau, Lagorce, Martino, Masciadri, Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf (Alternate: Haase), van der Sanden, Spitella, Vecchietti, Vogt, de Vries.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation***on Cyprus and European security***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the situation in Cyprus is a serious threat to the maintenance of the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean ;
- (ii) Considering that the association of the Republic of Cyprus with the European Community, its participation in the Council of Europe and that of Greece and Turkey in the Atlantic Alliance give the member countries of WEU the right and duty to do their utmost to promote the establishment of lasting peace on the island ;
- (iii) Considering that the conclusions drawn by the Secretary-General of the United Nations from the inter-community negotiations held between 1977 and 1982 are the best possible basis for the restoration of peace in Cyprus ;
- (iv) Welcoming the decision taken by the two Cypriot communities to pursue their negotiations in spite of the initial setback,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Express its support for the proposals by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and use all the influence it may have with the Greek, Turkish and both Cypriot authorities to promote the conclusion of a final agreement on this basis.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. When the General Affairs Committee proposed including a report on Cyprus in the agenda of the first part of the thirty-first session of the Assembly and the Presidential Committee decided to do so at the beginning of December 1984, this matter seemed to be a serious threat to Europe's security and the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance not only because of the island's strategic importance but to a much greater extent because of the extremely tense atmosphere which it fostered between Greece and Turkey. Those two countries form NATO's south-east flank.

2. Turkey has a direct frontier with the Soviet Union, its straits are the latter's only maritime access to the Mediterranean and it has for many years been subject to internal subversion encouraged by the Soviet Union with the aim of destabilising it. In other words, its government cannot remain indifferent to a national problem such as that raised by the Cyprus affair.

3. Greece for its part, thanks to the fact that it possesses almost all the Aegean islands, Rhodes and Crete and is a peninsula, is in a position to exercise real control over the Eastern Mediterranean and communications between Western Europe and Turkey. Its present government is also being strongly contested at home, admittedly from a legal, parliamentary opposition, which does not encourage it to pursue a policy of concessions in regard to Cyprus.

4. This did not prevent the head of the generally accepted Cypriot Government, Mr. Kyprianou, holding negotiations with the head of the régime set up by the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr. Denktash, with a view to solving the problem under the aegis of Mr. Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General of the United Nations. As long as these negotiations are under way with a chance of success, this Assembly must not interfere in the internal affairs of a non-member country of WEU nor do anything which might make the negotiations between the two parties more difficult. Your Rapporteur will therefore simply review, as objectively and neutrally as possible, the elements of the situation in Cyprus and propose a draft recommendation which takes no position on the substance of the solution of the problem but merely welcomes the

current negotiations. He makes a firm suggestion that the General Affairs Committee go no further at the present stage.

II. Cyprus before independence

5. Cyprus, which covers an area of 9,250 sq.km., is one of the largest Mediterranean islands, slightly smaller than Sicily and Sardinia and a little larger than Corsica and Crete. It stretches 224 km from south-west to north-east, with an average width of 70 km. But what makes its position special is that it lies very close to the coasts of Asia Minor: 70 km from Anatolia, 120 km from Latakia (Syria) but 400 km from Port Said and Rhodes and 800 km from Athens.

6. Hence it is not surprising that since ancient times it has been strongly marked by the contact between Hellenic civilisation, dominating the Eastern Mediterranean, and influences from Asia and achieved an original synthesis of the two, testified to by its particularly rich architecture. Eastern and Western influences then dominated in turn: Greeks and Persians, Romans and Byzantines, Arabs and Franks, until in 1571 it fell into the hands of the Ottoman Empire for three centuries.

7. Cyprus is rather poor, arid and mountainous and its reserves of copper, a metal to which the country gave its name, were exhausted a long time ago. Having no good harbours, the island was relatively sparsely inhabited and was of only slight economic and strategic interest until the Suez Canal was opened in 1869. The ensuing boom in Mediterranean trade made Cyprus relatively more active again and on 4th June 1878 the Ottoman Empire signed a defensive alliance convention with the United Kingdom which entrusted the latter with the military occupation and administration of Cyprus in exchange for its support in the event of any Russian attempt to lay hands on Turkish Asiatic provinces. The Ottoman Empire had just been defeated by Russia and the Berlin Congress was on the point of meeting to settle the outcome of the conflict. Cyprus nevertheless remained part of this Empire until the end of the first world war. The United Kingdom guaranteed the religious freedom of the Moslems living on the island and undertook to pay Turkey a rent equivalent to the surplus of Cyprus's revenue.

8. The very day it came into the war against Turkey on 5th November 1914, the United Kingdom annexed the island unilaterally. This action was subsequently confirmed by the Sèvres Treaty of 10th August 1920 and the Lausanne Treaty of 24th July 1923, as a result of which Turkey relinquished all rights to Cyprus which was given the status of Crown Colony by letters patent on 10th March 1925. It retained this status until the Zurich and London Agreements made it an independent republic on 16th August 1960.

9. The population of the island increased considerably during the British period, rising from 186,000 in 1881 (when the first census was taken) to 600,000 in 1964 which, in view of the area of the island, gave it a moderate average density of almost 60 inhabitants per sq.km. The birth rate remained high (26 per thousand in about 1965) while progress with the health of the people guaranteed it one of the lowest death rates in the world (6 per thousand), i.e. an annual surplus of births over deaths of 20 per thousand, a high figure. However, this population, like almost all those of the Ottoman Empire's provinces, belonged to two quite separate communities, one Greek-speaking and of Orthodox religion, consisting of nearly four-fifths of the population, and the other Turkish-speaking and Moslem, which accounted for the remaining fifth, the number of foreigners being only about 19,000, i.e. 3.7% of the total.

10. While at the end of the nineteenth century the Greek Cypriot majority willingly accepted British military occupation and administration, which protected it against any interventions by the Turkish state, the emancipation of Greece and the emergence of an independent Greek nation to which all the Aegean and Ionian islands eventually became attached, including Rhodes and the Dodecanese in 1945, made the Greek majority in Cyprus call for Enosis, i.e. union with Greece.

11. The Greek population was spread throughout the island but like many Greek communities it was firmly attached to the Orthodox Church and first and foremost the ethnarch elected from among the island's bishops. On 18th October 1950, this dignity fell upon the young Bishop of Kitium who took the name of Makarios III, until his decease in 1977. Among Greek Cypriots, the Ethnarch's authority was contested only by the local communist party, AKEL, which never had a country-wide majority but was strong in only a few towns, with the exception of the capital.

12. It was AKEL which started agitating for Enosis during the second world war but in 1950 the new Ethnarch took over the leadership of the protest movement and gave it new impetus and

in 1955 an armed opposition organisation, EOKA, was set up on the island. At its head was a hero of the Greek resistance and civil war, General Grivas, who conducted operations against the British forces in Cyprus from 1955 to 1958. This rebellion did not become generalised, although EOKA was supported by the majority of the Greek Cypriot population, thus in four years 400 persons fell victim to it, divided fairly evenly between British forces and EOKA supporters.

13. On the British side, as soon as the Greek Cypriot population's desire for independence became clear, an attempt was made, inter alia through a referendum by signature organised in 1950 by the Ethnarchy, to find a statute for the island which would guarantee both the maintenance of British forces (particularly the air force) near the Middle East oil region where the United Kingdom had continuing important responsibilities, maximum possible independence for the population and guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots.

14. The Turkish minority was in fact very unfavourable to the cause of Enosis. Poorer than the Greek population, it occupied a relatively large place in the administration and police and several of its members fell victims to EOKA attacks. There is no doubt that it wanted the status quo ante to be retained, as this made the United Kingdom the arbitrator in all intercommunal disputes, and it was afraid of a Greek or predominantly Greek administration, suspecting the prospect of partiality in such disputes. Moreover, Greek nationalism on the island easily assumed anti-Turkish undertones which did nothing to reassure it. Furthermore, Turkey and Greece each took sides for the community with which it had affinity and the Cypriot conflict assumed an increasingly international dimension.

15. The search for a solution acceptable to the various parties concerned took a long time and only in 1960 did it lead to the Zurich and London Agreements establishing the Republic of Cyprus and making it an independent state, although limiting several aspects of its full sovereignty.

(i) The broad lines of the future constitution had been the subject of prior agreement between Greece and Turkey which had together decided upon the "basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus" which was to be incorporated in the constitution, and this in advance made any revision of the constitution subject to agreement between the two powers.

(ii) These structures included guarantees to the Turkish Cypriot minority (supreme court responsible for ensuring the constitutionality

and non-discriminatory nature of laws, organisation of justice on a "communal" basis, right of veto for the (Greek) President and Turkish Vice-President, allotment of 30% of government posts and seats in parliament to the Turkish community and the requirement for certain laws to be passed by a majority of the votes of representatives from each community.

(iii) Although they included no territorial partition, the Zurich and London Agreements institutionalised the existence of two separate but equal communities, each having its own institutions, including separate communes, which sadly led to the two communities clashing even more and hampering their merger in a Cypriot nation.

(iv) The three guarantors, the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, retained a continuing right to intervene in Cypriot internal affairs, under certain circumstances.

(v) Two British military bases remained enclaves under United Kingdom sovereignty, which in no way hindered the foreign policy of the new republic which was able to insist on refusing alignment with any alliance system. These bases ensure the presence of a NATO force close to the troubled Middle East regions.

16. It can therefore be seen that faced with the need to take account of diverging positions, those of Greece, Turkey and western security, not to speak of those of the two communities on the island, the London and Zurich Agreements had the disadvantage of not establishing the basis for a stable sovereign state. This left Cyprus a possible area of confrontation between the guarantee powers, and strengthened communal feelings without giving the communities a sufficient territorial basis for them to be able to maintain a necessarily federal structure. The agreements bore the seeds of subsequent crises in the Cypriot state.

III. The Republic of Cyprus

17. Under the London and Zurich Agreements, a Republic of Cyprus was set up on 16th August 1960 and Ethnarch Makarios made President. It was admitted to the United Nations on 21st September and subsequently to the Commonwealth and the Council of Europe. The situation was more or less satisfactory until towards the end of 1963. However, friction very soon occurred between the two communities, particularly about the apportionment of posts in the civil service and army, which could not be formed, each of the two communities setting up its own clandestine militia. But the main problem stemmed from the formation of separate communes against the wishes of the

Greek Cypriots, who feared that these foreshadowed partition of the island, while the Turkish Cypriots considered them to be a guarantee of their survival as a community. They used their right of veto to prevent a fiscal law being passed and, on 30th November 1963, President Makarios proposed a draft revision of the constitution to the guaranteeing powers, which aimed at unity and could but be refused by Turkey.

18. Bitter clashes occurred between the two communities on 21st December 1963 and led on 4th March 1964 to a decision by the Security Council, which had met at the request of the British Government, to appoint a mediator to promote agreement between the parties and to send a United Nations peacekeeping force to the island. Nevertheless, bloodshed increased and the two communities' militias were supplied with arms and military advisers by Greece and Turkey respectively. The Turkish air force intervened directly in August 1964 and on several occasions, particularly in November 1967, it was feared that the affair might degenerate into an armed conflict between Greece and Turkey. To ensure its security, the Turkish community grouped itself in a number of enclaves which were subject to a sort of siege by the forces of the legal government, which no longer had any authority there but made their supplies precarious. In fact, this already amounted to partition of the island, but on a basis which paralysed internal communications and the economy.

19. However, inter-community talks were held between the Ethnarch's government and Mr. Fazit Kutchuck and Mr. Raouf Denktash, leaders of the Turkish community. The talks were long and difficult but agreement seemed near in summer 1974 when the Greek Government, then in the hands of a junta of officers who had taken over on 21st April 1967, attempted to overthrow the Ethnarch on 15th July. The Ethnarch had asked for Greek officers in the Cypriot National Guard to be recalled. The Greek military junta probably wished to make up for the setbacks in its internal policy by carrying off an external success by bringing about Enosis. On 17th July, Makarios was in flight, and the Greek forces were in charge of the island following an encounter which caused several hundred victims. But Turkey retaliated in a rapid military action which led to the Turkish army occupying about 37% of the territory of Cyprus, i.e. the north-eastern area. The Turkish Cypriot population was brought together there and the Greek population, about 180,000 persons, driven out, after the operations had made many victims among both communities and considerably worsened the feelings of insecurity of both. Nevertheless, this setback led to the fall of the military junta in Athens and

on 31st July Mr. Caramanlis's democratic government, immediately restored, signed a provisional agreement on Cyprus with Turkey. The cease-fire was not properly respected and only in December was Ethnarch Makarios able to resume leadership of the government in Nicosia. The fighting in summer 1974 left a total of more than 4,000 victims from the two communities, not including 1,600 persons who disappeared.

20. In 1975, negotiations were resumed between the two communities represented by Mr. Glafkos Clerides and Mr. Raouf Denktash respectively, under the aegis of the United Nations. But at the same time both sides took measures which could only make agreement more difficult. For instance, the Ethnarch handed the Greek Cypriot National Council a proposal for a "cantonal federation" on 9th February 1975, while on 13th February the Turkish Cypriots proclaimed an independent state which was to be secular and federated with Turkey. In such circumstances, the negotiations could hardly succeed any more than could those that followed between Greece and Turkey in February 1976.

21. The sudden death of Ethnarch Makarios on 3rd August 1977 and his replacement at the head of the Cypriot state by Mr. Spyros Kyprianou and the fact that the economy of the Greek part of Cyprus recovered sharply as it was able to take over a number of international business activities which had hitherto been carried on in Lebanon did not facilitate the search for a negotiated solution. However, at the beginning of 1977 the leaders of the two communities were able to reach agreement on the bases of a future Cypriot constitution: there was to be a federal republic, divided into two independent, non-aligned zones. In 1978, Mr. Kyprianou and Mr. Denktash resumed their talks on this basis.

22. However, in view of the slowness of the negotiations, the Cypriot Government, which had in fact since 1963 been representing only the Greek community, appealed to the United Nations General Assembly. The Turkish community retorted by interrupting the inter-community negotiations and, on 15th November 1983, proclaimed the independence of the federal Turkish state of Kirbis, consisting of the part of the island occupied since 1974 by the Turkish armed forces. To date, only Turkey has recognised this state, the proclamation of which was declared invalid by the United Nations Security Council.

23. In 1980, this state had a population of 150,000 - including 80,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees from the zone which remained Greek and 50,000 Turkish settlers who had arrived since 1974 - not to speak of 35,000 Turkish military personnel. Only about 1,200 Greeks and

500 Maronites were left. The new state covered a little more than 38% of the area of the island but contained a large proportion of its resources, including 50% of its industrial potential, 56% of its mineral deposits, 83% of its harbour facilities, 65% of its tourist potential and 70% of its pre-1974 livestock.

24. The constitution of a Turkish Cypriot state was approved by referendum on 6th June 1975 and Raouf Denktash was made President in 1976. A forty-member assembly is elected by universal suffrage every five years, the last elections having been held on 28th June 1981. The five parties represented there are all in favour of this constitution.

IV. The situation in 1985

25. Since the beginning of 1984, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, has been trying to bring the representatives of the two communities closer together to allow them to resume the negotiations interrupted in 1983. Because of the large-scale military deployment on both sides of the demarcation line, further clashes are to be feared which will necessarily pit two well-equipped Turkish divisions, close to their bases in Anatolia, whence they can quickly receive reinforcements, against a Cypriot army of 10,000 men from the National Guard plus 1,500 Greek troops. Any armed conflict would thus immediately involve Greece and Turkey, and the 2,311 members of the United Nations force, from seven different countries, are neither numerous enough nor well enough armed to be able to resist them. Moreover, this is not their rôle. Nor is it the rôle of the British and American NATO forces stationed on the two British sovereign bases on the island.

26. The present situation is not necessarily unfavourable to such negotiations, provided they remain solely in the hands of Mr. Kyprianou and Mr. Denktash. Everything indicates that the two Cypriot communities are hoping for a peaceful settlement to the conflict and the establishment of a Cypriot state which would protect their communal existence and at the same time restore peaceful coexistence on the island. The Greek community fears Turkish military domination and the repercussions it may have on its security. The Turkish community moreover seems to be aware of the economic failure of the new state which only Turkey recognises. Whereas, since 1976, the Greek part of Cyprus had made great economic strides, marked above all by the development of small industries and trade and was hardly affected by fairly serious inflation, the Turkish part declined very noticeably. The value of its currency fell very quickly,

trade deteriorated, tourism was mostly limited to Turkish citizens and, in 1985, per capita GNP was little more than \$1,000, while it was over \$4,000 in the Greek part, in spite of Turkey's financial efforts in the Turkish part of Cyprus.

27. In August 1984, the Secretary-General of the United Nations proposed that the representatives of the two communities reopen negotiations under his auspices with a view to drawing up a draft agreement based on what had been agreed upon during the Makarios-Denktash talks in 1977 and the Kyprianou-Denktash talks in 1979. The purpose was to establish as early as possible a federal republic which would be independent and non-aligned, bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspect and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspect. This would mean ensuring equal political status for the two communities and defining the functional requirements of a government capable of fulfilling effectively the powers assigned to it within the context of the country's unity.

28. The two parties accepted this basis of discussion and "proximity talks" were held in New York from 10th to 20th September and from 15th to 26th October 1984, and on 27th November Mr. Perez de Cuellar submitted a draft agreement. This was a package deal consisting of all the elements which could give the two communities the guarantees of security which were essential if they were to accept the agreement.

29. The Turkish Cypriot Delegation accepted the text proposed by the Secretary-General immediately and without amendment. Ten days later after Mr. Kyprianou had consulted his own and the Greek Government, the Greek Cypriot Delegation also gave a favourable reply but had certain reservations which required further negotiations. On 12th December, the Secretary-General considered that points of view were sufficiently close for him to be able to call a meeting of the heads of the two communities with a view to the final conclusion of the agreement. It was decided that they should meet on 17th January 1985.

30. According to reliable sources, the draft agreement reaffirmed that the aim was an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal and bi-zonal federal republic, as agreed upon by the representatives of the two communities in 1977, 1979 and 1982. It defined the powers of the federal government, the constitution and responsibilities of a bi-communal federal legislature, the constitutional guarantees to be given to the two communities, the equal political status of the two communities in the federal government, the principle of territorial adjustments at the expense of the territory of the Turkish Cypriots which was apparently to be reduced from 38%

to 29% of the surface of the island, the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the island and the establishment of international guarantees of the application of the new statute. A transitional government was to be established and two funds set up, one to facilitate economic equilibrium between the two parts of the island, the other to assist the resettlement of persons who had to be displaced. Certain parts of the territory were to be placed under interim United Nations administration and Nicosia airport was to be reopened to both communities. Finally, working groups were to be set up to work out the details of the agreement, particularly those relating to the boundaries of the two zones and the time to be allowed for implementing the agreement.

31. At the summit meeting on 17th January, Mr. Kyprianou nevertheless appears to have raised fundamental objections to the very nature of the text before him which he considered to be a basis for agreement and not the text of a fixed agreement. He asked for a stricter definition of the principles of "equal political status" and "bi-zonality" and questioned the legislative, executive and territorial aspects of the agreement. He is also believed to have opposed the establishment of a transitional federal government and to have put forward demands with regard to international guarantees and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the island. Finally, he is believed to have refused to abide by time limits, provisionally laid down and to have working groups set up.

32. In such conditions, it was impossible to sign the agreement and the Turkish Cypriot Delegation, not wishing to be considered unilaterally bound by a text which did not commit its partner, withdrew its earlier unconditional acceptance of the Secretary-General's text. However, it was agreed to resume negotiations with a view to holding a further meeting of the heads of the two communities in spring 1985.

33. The Greek Cypriot population was far from unanimous about the uncompromising attitude adopted by President Kyprianou since on 22nd February the Cypriot Parliament adopted, by 23 votes (conservatives and communists) to 12 (democrats and socialists), a resolution urging the head of state to sign the agreement presented by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, while maintaining its reservations on points which it found insufficiently clear. The resolution asked the President to withdraw if he did not accept this resolution so that the Greek Cypriot population could hold new presidential elections. Such a clause was however not mandatory for a President elected directly by the people.

34. This internal crisis, when added to the closeness of the legislative, communal and pre-

sidential elections in the Turkish part of the island between 15th June and 15th July 1985, makes very unlikely the signature of an agreement before summer 1985, although perhaps a further meeting of the leaders of the two communities is still feasible.

35. The conclusion of a lasting agreement on the bases agreed in the inter-community negotiations and included in Mr. Perez de Cuellar's proposal, seems to meet the wishes of a large majority of members of both the communities on the island. It is therefore also considered desirable by the member countries of the EEC, of which Greece is a member and Turkey and Cyprus associates. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Eleven, meeting in Brussels on 29th January 1985, confirmed this fact in a statement on Cyprus which urged the parties concerned to resume the negotiations under the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and invited them to refrain from any action liable to endanger a continuing positive dialogue.


36. This recommendation also obviously applies to Turkey and Greece. The former keeps an army of 140,000 men on the shores of the Aegean, with a marine infantry division, an air and helicopter-borne division and all its parachutists, as well as 127 landing craft. Greece for its part is implementing a new defence doctrine providing for most of its forces to be deployed in the east at the expense of those formerly deployed in the north against the Soviet Warsaw Pact threat. This means Greece disengaging itself from some of its commitments to NATO and in particular the end of the integration of Greek forces and territory, an aim which seems to have been pursued continuously since the arrival of Mr. Papandreou at the head of the government. The deteriorating situation in Cyprus can but lead those involved to disengage themselves further from NATO or even, in the event of a serious crisis, clashing as they did in 1974. Such a clash would be fatal to Europe's security in the Eastern Mediterranean.

V. Conclusions

37. The draft agreement proposed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations implies a serious political reassessment of the situation by both partners. For the Greek Cypriots, it must mean clear, outright and permanent renunciation of Enosis. For the Turkish Cypriots, it would mean renouncing the guarantee afforded by the presence of the Turkish army, as well as giving up more than a quarter of the territory they now occupy. These sacrifices are acceptable only if the new Cypriot state is capable of giving the two communities guarantees of security and promises of peace, civic equality and economic development. Because it is based on a federal system in a state in which each community would have widespread rights over its own territory, Mr. Perez de Cuellar's proposal at least seems more viable than the situation brought about by the Zurich and London Agreements. The only alternative would be the maintenance of the status quo with, in the long run, a de facto partition of the zones now controlled by the two communities, implying the perpetuation of tension which would be dangerous for both Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, there is little chance of such a development remaining peaceful because any tension which might also emerge between Greece and Turkey would inevitably have repercussions in Cyprus and because it is not possible to consider a United Nations force remaining on the island indefinitely.

38. Hence, the European allies of Turkey and Greece should use all their influence to induce these two countries to renounce all claims to Cyprus and the two communities to agree on the basis proposed by the Secretary-General. The process of returning to peace will probably still be a long one, but if it does not start soon there is every reason to fear that it never will.

39. These are the reasons why your Rapporteur, while refraining from interfering in the current negotiations, asks the WEU Assembly to adopt a draft recommendation appealing to all the parties simply to endorse the view expressed in the proposal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.



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MEDITERRANEAN SEA

Cape St. Andreas

Rizokarpaso

Cape Plakoti

KARPAS PENINSULA

Kyrenia

MORPHOU BAY

FAMAGUSTA BAY

NICOSIA

Famagusta

Cape Arnauti

Cape Greco


MOUNT
TRIOODOS

LARNACA BAY

Paphos

Limassol

Territories under Turkish control
British sovereign base



Cape Gata

Cyprus and European security

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

1. Redraft paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows :
“ Considering that the conclusions drawn by the Secretary-General of the United Nations from the negotiations held between 1977 and 1984 are the best possible basis for the restoration of national unity in Cyprus ; ”.

Signed : Cavaliere

1. See 3rd sitting, 21st May 1985 (amendment negatived).

Cyprus and European security

AMENDMENTS 2, 3 and 4

tabled by Mr. Rubbi

2. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “ to the maintenance of the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean ” and insert “ to the country’s sovereignty and the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of Europe ”.
3. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “ the restoration of peace in Cyprus ” and insert “ re-establishing the integrity and independence of a neutral, non-aligned Cyprus ”.
4. Redraft paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows :
“ (iv) Wishing the two Cypriot communities to pursue their negotiations in spite of the initial setback, ”.

Signed : Rubbi

1. See 3rd sitting, 21st May 1985 (amendments negatived).

Cyprus and European security

AMENDMENT 5¹

tabled by MM. Beix and Pignion

5. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out “the Greek, Turkish and both Cypriot authorities” and insert “the parties concerned”.

Signed : Beix, Pignion

1. See 3rd sitting, 21st May 1985 (amendment negatived).

Replies of the Council to Recommendations 411 to 416

RECOMMENDATION 411 ¹

on deterrence and the will of the people ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling its Recommendations 383 and 388 and welcoming the positive replies received from the Council ;
- (ii) Considering that fear of the devastating effects of any armed conflict in Europe is still a prominent and justified concern of the peoples of Europe ;
- (iii) Recalling that, until more progress has been made in disarmament, the security of Western Europe will be ensured only by deterrence ;
- (iv) Underlining however that while nuclear weapons are an essential means of deterrence, a major contribution is also made by governments and nations showing their determination to defend their freedom ;
- (v) Regretting that the failure of the Geneva conference and the Soviet Union's continued deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons together with its refusal to hold negotiations on these weapons on a reasonable basis have compelled the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance to start deploying missiles of similar range in Western Europe in application of the twofold decision of December 1979 ;
- (vi) Noting that the need to apply this twofold decision has been recognised by all the democratically-appointed governments of the WEU member countries ;
- (vii) Hoping that constructive proposals will soon be made to allow negotiations to be opened on the limitation of nuclear weapons of all kinds ;
- (viii) Noting that the security of Western Europe forms an inseparable whole ;
- (ix) Deploring that this de facto solidarity is not expressed in more intensive consultations on external and defence policies ;
- (x) Considering that the improvement of relations between the countries of Western and of Eastern Europe in the context of the CSCE can be a significant help to negotiations on disarmament ;
- (xi) Considering that while effective deterrence is still, as matters now stand, essential for the West's security, this cannot in the longer term be ensured without a radical transformation in the standard of living in the developing countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue to keep European public opinion informed of the dangers to which the world is exposed, of the measures available to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance for countering them and of the type and level of weapons deployed in Europe ;
2. Show the cohesion of the alliance and of its European members by making optimum use of the organs of WEU and of the Atlantic Alliance ;
3. Concert its views inter alia on the implications of the modified Brussels Treaty for the defence policy of each member and for working out a joint position on the limitation of armaments or disarmament ;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1984 during the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session (7th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Lagorce on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 988).

4. Continue to apply the NATO twofold decision of 1979 while seeking, with the Soviet Union, ways and means for negotiating balanced and controlled disarmament, particularly in intermediate-range nuclear weapons ;
5. In the appropriate frameworks, seek to develop exchanges of all kinds between Western Europe and the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union ;
6. Do its utmost to promote the success of current negotiations on disarmament, to encourage the opening of further negotiations on the limitation of nuclear missiles of all ranges and on banning the use of space for military purposes and to develop the North-South dialogue.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ³

to Recommendation 411

1. The Council has noted with great interest Recommendation 411 on deterrence and the will of the people. It shares the Assembly's concern to ensure that European opinion is informed as completely as possible about the threats to our continent and about the security and defence policy adopted by the member countries of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance to counter these threats.
2. This effort is essentially the responsibility of each member state which provides regular information using the methods that it considers the most appropriate.
3. Parallel to this effort, in the context of joint reflection on this matter, the Council, which met at ministerial level in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April, approved a document entitled "WEU and public awareness". This document is annexed to the present reply.
4. As the Assembly is the only European parliamentary body empowered by treaty to discuss security and defence questions, the Council attaches particular importance to the reflections on the preoccupations of European public opinion which the Assembly can convey to the Council. The enhanced dialogue between the Assembly and the Council should enable public opinion to be even better informed of the basis of the defence policy of WEU member states. Whilst assuring the security interests of the member states and maintaining closer co-operation between them, this policy makes it possible to preserve peace and to seek genuine dialogue with the countries of Eastern Europe. This position has been approved by all the member states of the alliance and frequently reaffirmed, in particular in the Washington declaration of 31st May 1984 which demonstrates the full agreement and unity of the WEU member states with their allies on the principles underlying their security.
5. Inspired directly by these principles, the members of the integrated military structure adopted the dual-track decision of December 1979. It aimed at restoring a balance in Europe which had been distorted by the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles.

At the same time the dual-track decision again demonstrated the alliance's readiness for dialogue with the countries of the East. This decision advocated negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States aimed at achieving balance at the lowest possible level of forces and stressed that western deployment could be reversed, halted or modified if the talks succeeded.

Hence the allies regretted the breaking-off of talks by the Soviet Union in November 1983 and the WEU Council can but welcome the opening of a new round of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva on 12th March 1985.

6. The member states maintain regular in-depth consultations – multilaterally in the appropriate fora, but also bilaterally – on all the problems relating to the various arms control questions. In this connection, the member states of the integrated military structure hold regular consultations with the United States on the negotiations in Geneva. Furthermore, the United States regularly inform the NATO Council about these negotiations.
7. At its meeting in Bonn, the Council of Ministers requested the Permanent Council to implement rapidly their decisions on restructuring the Paris agencies and to submit to the next meeting of the Council of Ministers a report on the progress achieved by then and on the new tasks attributed to these agencies, which include, inter alia, studies in the field of disarmament and arms control. The Council takes the view that these studies should provide a useful contribution to its reflections in this field.
8. The continuation of the North-South dialogue clearly goes beyond the competence of WEU. The Council wishes to point out, however, that the seven member states have already made substantial efforts to expand their co-operation with the developing countries at both bilateral and multilateral level and specifically at European level within the framework of the Lomé Convention, recently renewed for a second time.

3. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th May 1985.

WEU and public awareness

Introduction

I. (i) WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers at Rome agreed that a study should be made of WEU public relations activities and a report submitted by the Permanent Council for the next ministerial meeting. The Chairman-in-Office of WEU referred to this in his speech to the WEU Assembly on 29th October :

“ The Ministers commissioned the Permanent Council to prepare reports that are to be deliberated at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers. The Permanent Council will submit proposals... on ways of improving WEU public relations activities. ”

I. (ii) In considering how best to develop WEU public relations activities, thought should be given to the *themes* WEU wishes to address in presenting its activities, and to the *means* by which this presentation is to be made. This paper aims to address these points.

Themes

II. (i) Ministers at Rome stressed the importance of the modified Brussels Treaty and their attachment to its goals of maintaining peace and security, of promoting unity, and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation both among its member states and with other European organisations. They emphasised :

- the indivisibility of security within the North Atlantic Treaty area ;
- the vital and substantial contribution of all the European allies ;
- their conviction that a better utilisation of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and to greater solidarity among its members.

II. (ii) Ministers therefore decided to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe. They agreed on six main areas for discussion, as indicated in paragraph 8 of the Rome declaration.

II. (iii) Drawing on this mandate, the themes which the WEU might address in its public relations, with the aim of informing public opinion on security and defence policies, became clearer. The following could fulfil the expectations set at Rome :

- (a) to explain the need to maintain adequate defences, that security has to be won, and that it should never be taken for granted ;
- (b) to explain that the need for security and defence measures is greater than hitherto in view of force imbalances and the present threat ;
- (c) to reiterate that the members of WEU are determined to ensure their defence and solidarity whilst seeking more stable relationships with the countries of the East through constructive dialogue and co-operation ;
- (d) to demonstrate the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty as the foundation of our security, while underlining the defensive nature of its policies ; and to highlight the importance of the European contribution to the alliance and to western security ;
- (e) to draw attention to the proposals of western countries, including the Europeans, to seek balanced and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements at the lowest possible level of forces, explaining that allied unity increases the chances for progress ;
- (f) to draw attention to the importance of developing European co-operation in the field of armaments ;
- (g) to draw attention to the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world ;
- (h) in general, to encourage a better-informed public debate about defence and security policy.

II. (iv) In view of the continuing quantitative and qualitative development of Soviet military forces, European governments should focus the attention of their publics on the central importance of deterrence in maintaining peace and security. The WEU must also aim to

develop public understanding of the transatlantic relationship as fundamental to the alliance, and of the irreplaceable nature of the United States commitment to Europe and the American nuclear guarantee.

II. (v) It will be especially important for WEU to demonstrate the well-established commitment of the alliance (cf. Harmel report) to work for constructive and stable East-West relations and a productive dialogue. In the coming months, it may also be important to explain the complexities of arms control negotiations in order to help increase public understanding of why early results cannot always be achieved.

Means

III. (i) There are three avenues through which WEU public relations activity could be channelled :

- WEU Assembly ;
- WEU Council/Secretary-General/Agencies ;
- WEU member governments.

Assembly

III. (ii) The Rome declaration and document on institutional reform indicate the importance Ministers attach to the Assembly in the revitalisation of WEU and to the rôle it might play in striving "to consolidate the consensus among public opinion" on the security and defence needs of the member states. In this context, Ministers at Rome express the hope that the Assembly might play a part in achieving greater public understanding of the defence and security options open to the Council which expresses the political will of the individual governments in its policy statements. To help in this, the Rome institution document calls *inter alia* for the development of informal contacts between government representatives and representatives of the Assembly, and for better means of keeping the Assembly informed of the work of the Council so that the two bodies can operate together in an even more complementary fashion.

III. (iii) The Assembly is the only European parliamentary body empowered by treaty to discuss defence and security issues. It attracts considerable public attention during its biennial sessions.

III. (iv) Individual Assembly sessions are addressed by Ministers from various member states on subjects of topical interest. This provides an opportunity to put across to a wider audience the commonly agreed themes. Other speeches which provide a platform for the discussion of defence and security issues (see paragraph III. (x) below) might also incorporate these ideas.

III. (v) It will be important to give maximum publicity to such speeches. This will to a large extent be a national task ; but WEU institutions can also play a rôle by helping to spread information from Assembly sessions and disseminating the texts or extracts of speeches by Ministers of member states. Consideration should be given to the arrangement of press briefings, the production of broadsheets, information on Assembly debates, and the distribution of reports suitable for use by the press. It would be helpful in this respect if in future Ministers making speeches at WEU Assembly sessions could include a press conference in their itinerary. Between Assembly sessions, the press section should try to arrange greater contact between members of parliament of member states and the media.

Council/Secretary-General/Agencies

III. (vi) Ministerial sessions provide an opportunity to further develop good and comprehensive relations with the press. This task is primarily the responsibility of the presidency and national governments. Delegations should include officials responsible solely for this function. They should aim also to assist in promoting the image of a revitalised WEU.

III. (vii) There may also be scope for using the office of the Secretary-General to promote WEU, to explain its purpose and functions within the framework of European security, and to press themes agreed by the Council. The Council could also charge the Secretary-General to relay information to the press through independent briefings to journalists or, if appropriate, speeches.

III. (viii) There is probably a rôle for a public relations and information unit within the Secretariat-General. This could take responsibility for developing contacts with the press and disseminating information about WEU. It could arrange briefing sessions for the press before the major sessions of the Council and Assembly and as necessary in between them. It would be for the Permanent Council to decide on the substance and nature of any material distributed by the unit.

Agencies

III. (ix) The Council may commission the Paris agencies of WEU to contribute to information activity in the following ways :

- (i) preparing material specifically for public relations use ; such material could be distributed as directed by the Permanent Council through the secretariat unit in London. If budgetary resources permitted, the Council might request preparation of small publications about the work of WEU in pamphlet or brochure form for distribution ;
- (ii) preparing material of topical interest for publication and dissemination to the press. A list of press contacts should be drawn up and kept with the new unit in the Secretariat-General in London.

National governments

III. (x) As previously indicated, the most effective way of authoritatively reaching a wide audience is through the public statements of politicians and Ministers in the national governments of member states. Considerable attention is regularly given to them by the media. Use should be made of the major ministerial speeches, parliamentary debates, and media appearances of WEU Ministers to put across the agreed themes.

III. (xi) Government Ministers and officials in all WEU member countries regularly discuss defence and security issues with members of parliament, journalists, church leaders, non-governmental organisations, research institutes, academic bodies, and others. These contacts should be used to explain the agreed themes and the rôle of WEU in the context of European security.

III. (xii) Other national information channels should also be used more effectively to generate greater public awareness of policies which the alliance and WEU members follow. The Permanent Council will be instructed to look at this problem periodically during its regular sessions. When the Permanent Council considers it appropriate, such national information activities could be co-ordinated in order to enhance their effect. The overall aim of this work by the Permanent Council will be to improve the image of the WEU member countries in the field of defence and security questions.

Conclusion

IV. (i) Success in achieving the objectives of the Rome declaration will depend on many factors, a major one of which will be the stimulation of public interest in WEU and the generation of greater public awareness of policies which WEU members follow. Maintenance of the higher political profile of WEU will enable the organisation to play a part in helping the cause of European security and transatlantic unity.

RECOMMENDATION 412 ⁴
***on the consequences of the Gulf war* ⁵**

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the war between Iran and Iraq is a serious threat to peace throughout the Middle East ;
- (ii) Considering that a decisive victory by one or other of the belligerents would involve serious dangers for the stability of the area ;
- (iii) Noting that no individual power outside the area seems in a position to exert decisive influence in favour of peace ;
- (iv) Considering however that the supply of arms to the belligerents by some of these powers is liable to prolong the war ;
- (v) Noting that both belligerents have already gravely violated the laws of war several times ;
- (vi) Fearing that the war may be accompanied or followed by renewed and aggravated international terrorism ;
- (vii) Considering that while Europe's supplies are not yet seriously threatened by the war, an intensification of hostilities might disturb the oil market and hence the security of Western Europe, as would the internationalisation of the conflict,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Afford its full support to any initiative by the United Nations, by Middle Eastern countries or by other countries to restore peace between Iran and Iraq and instruct its Chairman-in-Office to do all in his power to foster such an initiative ;
2. Seek agreement between member countries and all other arms-exporting countries on curtailing arms supplies to the belligerents ;
3. Afford its support to all humanitarian organisations concerned with the conditions of prisoners of war, particularly the ICRC ;
4. Gather the maximum information on possible violations of the laws of war by the belligerents and object in the strongest terms whenever such violations are proved ;
5. Plan the measures to be taken jointly by member countries in the event of an extension of terrorist operations in the Middle East or Western Europe ;
6. Have a study made of the lessons which Europe might draw for its own security from the Gulf war ;
7. Encourage member countries to keep large stocks of oil and continue the efforts they started in 1973 to diversify their sources of energy.

4. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1984 during the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session (8th sitting).

5. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 994).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ⁶***to Recommendation 412***

The policy pursued by the WEU member states with regard to the Iraq-Iran conflict, whether individually on a national basis or jointly in the context of European political co-operation, is largely consistent with the spirit of Recommendation 412 of the WEU Assembly.

It should be recalled, in particular, that the member states have been unanimous in backing the various United Nations initiatives taken with a view to achieving a peaceful solution to the conflict or, at least, mitigation of its tragic consequences in human terms, and in supporting the Secretary-General's efforts to obtain a commitment on the part of both sides to suspend bombing of civilian targets. For this purpose, the Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions which have been supported by the member states of WEU.

Similarly, the governments of the member states have not failed to censure the infringements of the law of war committed during the conflict, whilst giving their full support to the International Committee of the Red Cross in its endeavours to protect prisoners of war.

They also supported the United Nations Secretary-General's initiative to send to Baghdad and Tehran a mission to look into the treatment of prisoners of war. The members of the Assembly are undoubtedly aware of the report which the experts have drawn up on the position of prisoners in Iraq and Iran. The experts have also submitted unanimously-agreed recommendations, in particular: the abolition of corporal punishment, the improvement of living conditions in the camps, respect for freedom of thought, religion and conscience for all prisoners and the advisability of governments of the belligerent countries examining seriously the possibility of freeing their respective prisoners on a jointly-agreed basis or by unilateral measures.

The Council endorses the appeal by the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council to the belligerents to uphold the international obligations which they undertook on 12th June 1984 and thus safeguard the agreement to refrain from attacks on civilian population centres in Iran and Iraq.

The possibility of achieving an agreement between all countries exporting armaments to reduce the supply of weapons to the two sides is a complex question. For their part, WEU member countries continue to follow with concern the development of a conflict which, if it were to spread, would further endanger the security of the whole region.

The member countries of WEU are very conscious of the gravity of the problem created by the acts of terrorism, which are increasing and taking on new and varied forms. They take this into account in their approach to this problem.

The Council will consider carefully the suggestion of the Assembly for a specific study on the diverse implications of the Gulf conflict in relation to European security, with particular reference to the link between security and oil supply.

The member states of WEU are aware of the risks that the escalation and extension of the Gulf conflict would entail with regard to the oil supply to Western Europe and the possible consequences for her security. Therefore, they are guided by the above consideration in keeping the energy situation under close scrutiny and in updating their policies in this field.

The Council deems it appropriate to draw the attention of the Assembly to the progress so far accomplished in the member countries in order to safeguard themselves in case of emergencies in the oil supply and to increase the diversification of supply sources. In the framework of the International Energy Agency and the European Community arrangements have been made with regard to the maintenance of adequate oil stocks so as to enable the nations concerned to cope with emergency situations.

6. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th March 1985.

RECOMMENDATION 413 ⁷

on the military use of space

Part II ⁸

The Assembly,

- (i) Determined to pursue its consistent interests in the strategic implications for Western Europe of present and future applications of space technology ;
- (ii) Eager to exploit the specialist expertise of the revitalised organs of WEU, namely the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments, to concert industrial collaboration in the military space field and to evolve a Western European policy on arms control that takes into account current and projected developments in military space technology ;
- (iii) Welcoming the announcement made on 22nd November 1984 in a joint communiqué issued by Tass and the United States Department of State of the probable opening of negotiations on all problems relating to nuclear and space weapons ;
- (iv) Welcoming the steady progress of the European space effort under the aegis of the European Space Agency and in particular the validation of Spacelab and the Ariane launcher and success in the fields of telecommunications and remote sensing ;
- (v) Appreciating the French Government's commitment as expressed by President Mitterrand to a full realisation of Europe's strategic potential in space and its publicly stated concern that the consequent deductions for European security policy should be drawn and acted upon ;
- (vi) Confident that WEU can offer the best forum for parliamentary debate and analysis about the United States Government's strategic defence initiative and the prospects for an effective space-based defence against ballistic missiles ;
- (vii) Supporting efforts through the European Space Agency and through national governments to obtain, in the framework of possible co-operation on the proposed NASA space station, full guarantees regarding the conditions of this co-operation, thus leaving open the possibility of developing an independent European space station,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Act as the primary political instrument for intergovernmental concertation of a unified Western European policy towards the military use of space ;
2. Commission the restructured and more appropriately staffed Standing Armaments Committee and Agency for the Control of Armaments to provide expert advice on the defence and industrial aspects and implications, for arms control and confidence-building measures between states, of current developments in military space technology ;
3. Maintain the closest liaison with the United States Government to prevent divergencies of view between the American and Western European partners of the Atlantic Alliance ;
4. Support for industrial, technological and strategic reasons an expanded European space programme and promote enhanced dialogue on related policies and objectives both with the European Space Agency and national governments ;
5. Give impetus to a joint European response to the NASA space station proposals which builds on existing European capabilities, is complementary to the modules, elements and systems of the space station as a whole and enhances Europe's technical capacity for autonomous developments in this field including manned space missions ;
6. Provide a clear lead and direction to parliamentary and public opinion in favour of a major European effort to meet the challenge of the space age in the fullest sense through increased scientific space experimentation, commercial applications and security-enhancing space developments ;

7. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1984 during the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session (8th sitting).

8. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 993).

7. Ensure that the reorganised office of the Council of Ministers of WEU can draw on adequate specialist space expertise to inform its consideration of the increasingly important implications for Western European security policy of developments in space technology ;
8. Take into account the proposal made by France at the disarmament conference held in Geneva in June 1984 that negotiations be held on the military use of space leading to commitments which are limited with regard to anti-satellite systems, progressive with regard to a test ban and verifiable with regard to improving the existing system for notifying the launching of objects into space.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL⁹***to Recommendation 413***

1. The Council agrees with the Assembly that concertation among WEU member countries on military space matters and their implications for European security is desirable. The Council considers the developments with regard to the military use of outer space to be a subject which merits analysis within the framework of the revitalised WEU. How discussions on the subject within WEU could be structured depends on the outcome of the current institutional reform. The Council itself will give its attention to this important subject.

2. As stated in the Rome Declaration, the Ministers of the Seven are convinced that a better utilisation of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and to a greater solidarity among its members. The most substantial consultations possible between allies on problems affecting their security are therefore important. Consultations on these questions are already taking place in NATO ; they are designed to foster unity of views between the members of the alliance and can but contribute to their cohesion. The Council believes that the discussions within WEU on the impact of military space matters on European defence and security would make a positive contribution to these consultations.

3. The Council welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have begun global negotiations, i.e. dealing with strategic weapons, INF missiles and defence and space weapons. It hopes that these negotiations will achieve security at the lowest possible level of forces through substantial, balanced and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons. The Council notes that the strategic defence initiative (SDI) announced by the United States is no more than a scientific research programme and hence does not contravene the provisions of the 1972 ABM treaty. The Council also takes the view that laboratory research does not lend itself to arms control measures. On the other hand, relevant tests or deployments will have to be a matter for negotiation, under the terms of the ABM treaty. In view of the contribution of this treaty to stability, the Council stresses the importance of preventing its erosion.

The discussions the western countries have proposed in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on the question of the prevention of an arms race in space may be of assistance to the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

4. The member countries of WEU are fully aware of the need to pool their efforts in space projects in order to confirm Europe's place in this field and keep abreast of developments. In its reply to Recommendation 410 last November, the Council stated that it considered co-operation in the field of space technology with the United States "mutually profitable". The European Space Agency, of which all WEU countries as well as a number of other European countries are members, is the focal point for European co-operation on the use of space for peaceful purposes. A number of important projects are already being carried out in this organisation. Within this framework the Ministerial Council of ESA recognised at its meeting in January that the present scope of the overall Agency's programmes has to be enlarged with a coherent, complete and balanced long-term European space plan to cope with the challenges of the next decade and beyond. The text of the resolution on the long-term European space plan, as unanimously adopted by the ESA Council on 31st January 1985, is attached.

In addition, the Ministerial Council of ESA decided to adopt at its meeting on 31st January 1985 the text of the resolution on participation in the space station programme (also attached) in which it responded positively to the United States offer to participate in the development of a manned space station. It will be up to ESA and its American counterpart, NASA, to work out the modalities of this participation.

9. Communicated to the Assembly on 11th April 1985.

Council resolution on the long-term European space plan

(adopted on 31st January 1985)

The Council, meeting at ministerial level,

CONSIDERING that the Agency's activities and programmes have proved to be valuable to its members and associated states and have contributed to satisfy the objectives assigned to the Agency by its convention,

CONSIDERING the evolution in space activities and their fast expansion both in scope and volume throughout the world,

RECOGNISING that the present scope of the overall Agency's programmes has to be enlarged within a coherent, complete and balanced long-term European space plan to cope with the challenges of the next decade and beyond,

CONSIDERING the offer made to Europe by the President of the United States to participate in the space station programme,

HAVING REGARD to the Director General's proposal on the long-term European space plan (ESA/C-M(85)2),

HAVING REGARD to the proposed level of resources to be made available to the Agency for the coming five-year period 1985-1989,

CHAPTER I

(Objectives)

REAFFIRMS its commitment to maintain and develop European independent capabilities in space,

AGREES to orient the European space programme :

- towards a coherent whole, in which the spending on the tools needed for space activities, and on the activities themselves, such as science and applications, are appropriately balanced ; and
- in a direction so that all sectors utilising space techniques are adequately covered, ensuring that they are developed in such a way that advances in one field can be taken advantage of by others.

APPROVES the objectives set out below as guidelines for the Agency's activities during the next decade ; these objectives are based on the need for Europe to maintain and build on the achievements of the first two decades of European space co-operation, and to expand Europe's autonomous capability and Europe's competitiveness in all sectors of space activity.

These objectives are in particular :

- to enable the European scientific community, via an expansion of the scientific programme, to remain in the vanguard of space research;
- to develop further the potential of space in the areas of telecommunications and meteorology ;
- to prepare a substantial contribution of space and ground techniques to earth observation science and applications and prepare for the setting-up of operational systems and of user-oriented organisations to operate them, as required ;
- to improve the competitiveness of European industry in applications areas by means of advanced developments of space systems and technology ;
- to pave the way, via a substantial research programme (materials and life sciences), for practical application of microgravity in space ;
- to strengthen European space transportation capacity, meeting foreseeable future user requirements within as well as outside Europe, and remaining competitive with space transportation systems that exist or are planned elsewhere ;

- to prepare autonomous European facilities for the support of man in space, for the transport of equipment and crews and for making use of low earth orbits ;
- to enhance international co-operation and in particular aim at a partnership with the United States through a significant participation in an international space station.

CHAPTER II

(Programmes)

Taking into account the abovementioned objectives,

II. 1. AGREES to a balanced long-term European space plan for the next decade along the lines proposed by the Director General leading to a comprehensive autonomous European capability in space and containing the following major elements : in-orbit infrastructure programme, space transportation systems programme and programmes for earth observation, telecommunications, microgravity, space science and technology.

II. 2. WELCOMES and ENDORSES the proposal to undertake, as an optional programme in the field of in-orbit infrastructure, the Columbus programme, as a significant part of an international space station programme, as proposed by the United States of America ; the Columbus programme, whose detailed content will be defined in the course of its preparatory phase and will also depend on the terms and conditions of the partnership agreement to be concluded with the United States, is at present estimated to cost 2,600 MAU* until 1995 including a three-year period of operation and initial utilisation ; and ENDORSES the agreement to undertake the Columbus preparatory programme.

II. 3. WELCOMES and ENDORSES the proposal to undertake, as an optional programme in the field of space transportation systems, the development of the Ariane 5 launcher, equipped with the large cryogenic engine HM-60, with a view to completing it by 1995 and at a cost currently estimated at 2,600 MAU ; and ENDORSES the agreement to undertake the large cryogenic engine preparatory programme.

II. 4. TAKES NOTE with interest of the French decision to undertake the Hermes manned spaceplane programme and the proposal by France to associate her European partners interested in this programme in the detailed studies and INVITES France and associated partners to keep the Agency informed of progress of these studies with a view to including this programme, as soon as feasible, in the optional programmes of the Agency.

II. 5. WELCOMES the proposal to bring forward and incorporate in the Agency's optional programmes, in due time, additional elements of a European autonomous capability in automatic and manned orbital operations comprising in particular a manned space transportation capability, a fully independent Columbus complex including polar orbiting platforms, an operational data relay system, and the development of the necessary technology along with its in-orbit demonstration ; to prepare for these future activities, a funding of some 50 MAU per year is envisaged.

TAKES NOTE of the studies underway in the United Kingdom of the future generation HOTOL project and following Annex IV of the convention invites the United Kingdom to keep the Agency informed. A similar invitation is also extended to other member states undertaking studies in this area.

II. 6. WELCOMES and ENDORSES the proposal to pursue vigorously the Agency's activities in the fields of earth observation, space telecommunications and microgravity, to maintain its activities in space transportation through an Ariane 3 and 4 support programme and to complement its activities in space technology by an in-orbit technology demonstration programme, and REQUESTS the Director General to proceed with the execution of already agreed optional programmes and the preparation of new ones for :

- (i) earth observation, centred around the ERS-1 project already agreed and around future elements, i.e. the ERS-1 follow-on missions on oceanographic and meteorological applications, a land applications project, participation in the development of the second generation meteorological satellite and studies aiming at solid earth, atmospheric and climatology missions. The funding level for the earth observation activities would rise from 150 MAU in 1985 to a level corresponding to a yearly average of 190 MAU over the period 1985-95 ;

* All figures are expressed in 1984 economic conditions.

- (ii) space telecommunications, building on the achievements reached and centred around the development and the in-orbit testing of advanced payload systems. The funding level for the telecommunications activities would move from 180 MAU in 1985 to around 150 MAU over 1988-95, corresponding to a yearly average of 170 MAU ;
- (iii) microgravity, centred around an enhanced utilisation programme of Spacelab and Eureka leading to the utilisation of Columbus and the international space station for microgravity research and development. The funding level for microgravity activities would increase from about 30 MAU in 1985 to 80 MAU per year over the period 1988-92, the funding for the following years being included in the Columbus programme.

II. 7. AGREES, in order to reinforce in the next decade space science activities in Europe, progressively to increase the level of funding of the mandatory scientific programme to reach 162 MAU* by 1989 ; and REQUESTS the Director General to submit to Council the level of resources for the period 1985-89 accordingly.

INVITES the Director General to study a possible extension of the scope of the mandatory scientific activities to other scientific disciplines without reducing the effort on the scientific disciplines presently covered, as well as the possible inclusion into the mandatory scientific programme of financial support to groups of experimenters.

II. 8. TAKES NOTE that the execution of this long-term European space plan will require a substantial increase in the Agency's resources and that in particular the overall funding level will progressively increase to reach about 1,650 MAU per year by 1990.

AGREES that the rise in the general budget included in the above amount and expected to accompany this expansion in the volume of the Agency's activities, will lead to a level of contributions of 90 MAU per year by 1989 ; this increase will be assigned, by priority, to technology research programme and investments ; and REQUESTS the Director General to submit to Council the level of resources 1985-89 accordingly, to be followed by proposals for the possible improvement of the financial system of the Agency not later than mid-1985, so that the Council may decide on them in parallel with the approval of the 1986 budget.

CHAPTER III

(Industrial policy)

III.1. REQUESTS the Director General actively to pursue an industrial policy in line with the objectives defined in the convention and its Annex V, and in particular :

- to study how the present imbalances in the geographical distribution of contracts have developed and to propose to Council before mid-1985 remedies for the future ;
- to study what is the degree of specialisation desirable in industry and the methods of achieving it, as well as the industrial structures capable of meeting European needs, of improving the cost-effectiveness of ESA programmes, and of being competitive on the world markets, while striving to a sufficient complementarity between the space firms of the major contributors and the others ; and to make proposals to the Council in the near future.

III. 2. REAFFIRMS that the objective in the distribution of contracts is to reach an overall return coefficient as near as possible to the ideal value of 1 for all countries ; and REQUESTS the Director General to take the necessary measures to achieve a substantial reduction by the end of the next three-year period (1985-1987) in the current imbalances of the geographical distribution of contracts, with the aim of bringing, by the end of 1987, the cumulative return coefficients of all states above 0.95, on the understanding that the appropriate additional measures will be taken from 1988 onwards if this objective is not achieved by the end of 1987.

REQUESTS that correction measures be aimed in the first place at increasing the industrial participation, in particular in the mandatory programmes, of the countries whose overall return coefficient is below the ideal target of 1.

III. 3. DECIDES that for the following three-year period (1988-1990) the lower limit for the cumulative return coefficient below which special measures are to be taken to redress the situation and referred to in Article IV, paragraph 6, of the Annex V to the convention, is fixed at 0.90.

* The 162 MAU figure corresponds to a yearly increase of 5%.

DECIDES that for the next three-year period (1985-1987) the preference clause for the states participating in optional programmes (Article II of Annex V to the convention) will be waived in favour of the non-participating states whose overall return is below 0.90.

III. 4. ACCEPTS, in order to enable the Director General to redress the current situation and thereafter to maintain a balanced geographical distribution of contracts, and when all possibilities for reallocation of work in the optional as well as in the mandatory programmes have been exhausted, the principle of applying to optional programmes financial compensation measures, such as decreasing for a limited time-period the contributions of states whose cumulative return is below 0.90.

III. 5. NOTES that, to this end, states, when participants in optional programmes, will include appropriate provisions in relevant declarations for such measures to be applied for limited time-periods, according to a procedure to be defined.

Council resolution on participation in the space station programme

(adopted on 31st January 1985)

The Council, meeting at ministerial level,

CONSIDERING the offer made by the President of the United States in January 1984 to the friends and allies of the United States of America to participate in the space station programme which he has instructed NASA to carry out within the next decade,

CONSIDERING that the availability of an orbital station represents a decisive phase in the exploration and use of space for peaceful purposes,

RECALLING the implementation of the Spacelab programme and the first Spacelab flight which took place in 1983,

RECALLING that a number of member states have undertaken, within the framework of the Agency, a Spacelab follow-on development programme and a long-term space transportation systems preparatory programme (ESA/C/LIV/RES.1 (Final)),

HAVING REGARD to Resolution ESA/C/LXIV/Res. 4 (Final) of 28th June 1984 on the execution of a space-station-related Columbus preparatory programme and the corresponding declaration,

CONSIDERING that participation in the space station programme constitutes one of the elements of the long-term plan of the Agency (ESA/C-M/LXVII Res. 1 (Final)),

CONSIDERING that the object of participation in this programme is to expand the horizon for space research and exploitation, to master the new technology needed for carrying out manned and unmanned orbital operations in low earth orbit and thus to permit the future development of a European in-orbit infrastructure,

NOTING the drawing up by NASA and the Agency of a memorandum of understanding determining the modalities of their co-operation with a view to harmonised conduct of their respective detailed definition activities for the space station,

HAVING REGARD to the document on negotiations with the United States (ESA/C-M(85)3),

I. WELCOMES the offer by the President of the United States of America ;

II. ACCEPTS that offer - with a view to continuing and strengthening a genuine partnership in the space field with the United States of America and within the framework of the European long-term space programme and the objectives defined in it - subject to the achievement of the following fundamental objectives :

- to seek an appropriate European participation by the Agency in the space station programme ;
- to give Europe responsibility for the design, development, exploitation and evolution of one or several identifiable elements of the space station together with the responsibility for their management with the aim of increasing overall capability of the space station ;
- to ensure that Europe may have access to and use, on a non-discriminatory basis, all elements of the space station system on terms that are as favourable as those granted to the most-favoured users and on a reciprocal basis ;

- to reach a satisfactory agreement on the share of the operation costs of the station ;
- to reach a satisfactory agreement on the level and on the conditions for the appropriate transfers of technologies ;
- to ensure that supplies and services provided by the United States industry and NASA for European requirements are offset by European supplies and services ;
- to ensure maximum legal security and an identical level of the commitments entered into by the European governments and the United States Government ;
- to guarantee the availability of the American transportation and communication facilities required for the programme and the possibility of using the European facilities as they become available for the programme.

III. INVITES the member states and the Director General to set up suitable machinery under Council authority for drawing up and negotiating the legal instruments with the United States Government and with NASA for the development and utilisation phases of the space station.

IV. AGREES that the ESA Council will review the progress of the negotiations in order to reach a decision with regard to the undertaking of the development, production and utilisation phases of the space station programme before the end of 1986.

RECOMMENDATION 414¹⁰

***on United States-European co-operation
in advanced technology***¹¹

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering this report to be a follow-up of earlier reports on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology and especially Documents 773 of May 1978 and 889 of October 1981 ;
- (ii) Considering that the Council, in its reply to the Assembly on 7th April 1982 to Recommendation 376 stated that the WEU member governments were well aware of the need to contain equipment costs and that the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) is the central focus for multinational European equipment co-operation and is actively engaged in identifying opportunities of this type ;
- (iii) Aware that, in 1985, the United States will order the development of a new advanced tactical fighter aircraft and that five countries in Europe – plus the Netherlands which has applied to join – are co-operating in a new European fighter aircraft project with an estimated development cost of \$4 billion ;
- (iv) Considering American willingness to share its nuclear power plant experience with European countries ;
- (v) Considering that the space station was one of the subjects on the agenda of the economic summit conference in London in June 1984 but that no endorsement of European collaboration in the United States space station was given ;
- (vi) Considering that an international co-operative space station programme is in the interests of both the United States and Europe and would strengthen Atlantic ties considerably during the research and development phase as well as during the operational activities of the station ;
- (vii) Conscious of the need to inject new life into American-European collaboration in many fields of high technology,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

- I. Inform the Assembly of the achievements of the Independent European Programme Group since 1978 in multinational European equipment co-operation, specifying which opportunities for savings in weapon supplies have been identified and which two-way street programmes with the United States have been concluded or might be concluded in the near future ;
- II. Use more actively the Standing Armaments Committee as a technical body of WEU to harmonise the positions of the seven member states in matters concerning the European armaments industry and to co-ordinate their efforts in order to improve the efficiency of co-operative work in the various multilateral forums ;
- III. Invite member governments :
 - 1. To submit a plan to the United States Government for discussion on how to collaborate in new military programmes such as fighter aircraft, helicopters, other weapon system platforms and under water weapon systems about to be developed so as to stop the spiral of ever-increasing costs within military budgets ;

10. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1984 during the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session (9th sitting).

11. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Hill on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 992).

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2. To promote a common policy on the first space station project, taking into account the need for Europe to receive definite guarantees, such as :
- (a) information access to the entire space station system ;
 - (b) equality between European and American companies exploiting the research and manufacturing facilities on the space station ;
 - (c) access of European crews in order to operate the space station and not just to visit it ;
 - (d) European industrial and operational responsibility for a primary item of space station hardware ;
3. To foster a common European programme for exchanging information with the United States on future nuclear energy plants, drawing on individual up-to-date experience in Europe and the United States ;
4. To invite the United States and other governments to reconsider their attitude with regard to the draft convention on the law of the sea.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹²***to Recommendation 414***

I. The Council fully recognises the importance of collaborative activities in the framework of the Independent European Programme Group and the progress in the so-called transatlantic dialogue on equipment co-operation with the United States.

However, the Council cannot provide detailed information on current or planned activities of the IEPG as this information involves a number of non-WEU members. The Chairman of the IEPG has addressed the Assembly directly and will probably continue to do so in the future. Members of the Assembly wishing to receive additional information should direct their request either to the Chairman of the IEPG or to their national government.

II. The Council appreciates the rôle which the Standing Armaments Committee can fulfil in matters concerning the European armaments industry. As the Assembly is aware, the Council is at present working out more detailed proposals as to the future structure of the existing institutions of WEU. The subjects mentioned in the Assembly's recommendation will certainly be taken into account when these proposals are considered.

III. 1. The dialogue between Europe and the United States on how to collaborate in new military programmes embraces inter alia the report of the United States Defence Science Board on transatlantic industry-to-industry co-operation and the proposals by Secretary Weinberger on emerging technologies. The IEPG has concerted the responses of member states to both the Defence Science Board report and Mr. Weinberger's initiative; further discussions are taking place within the framework of the Conference of National Armaments Directors. IEPG ministers have decided to intensify the transatlantic dialogue at the political level and have underlined the need for Europe to speak with one voice.

One of the main purposes of these discussions is to work towards the establishment of a balanced two-way street in arms procurement between the United States and Europe.

III.2. A common European policy with regard to the space station has been initiated within the European Space Agency. As is mentioned in the reply to Recommendation 413, ESA has decided to respond positively to the United States offer to participate in the space station project and is discussing the terms with NASA. Individual WEU countries played an important rôle in reaching this decision and will in fact be carrying the bulk of the costs involved. Subject to further discussions with NASA, ESA would be willing to carry responsibility for the design, development, exploitation and evolution of one or several identifiable elements of the space station together with the responsibility for their management with the aim of increasing the overall capability of the space station.

Naturally ESA will seek access to and use of other elements of the space station and will try to secure as much participation by European industry in the various aspects of the project as possible. The text of the resolution on participation in the space station programme as adopted unanimously by the ESA Council on 31st January 1985 is attached.

III. 3. The Council notes the Assembly's recommendation that wider co-operation between Europe and the United States in the field of nuclear energy be established. As the Assembly is aware, Europeans have acquired considerable experience and skills in this field. Co-operation and an exchange of information already exist in the framework of the agreement between Euratom and the United States and also in the framework of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD.

III. 4. The WEU member countries view the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea as a major accomplishment in the development of international law relating to the oceans. However, certain provisions lead to reservations on the part of certain WEU member countries which question, for example, their impact on free trade and cost-effectiveness of possible deep-sea mining by their companies. For these very reasons two member countries decided not to sign the convention.

The WEU member countries are aware of the position of the United States. They consider it desirable that a satisfactory and universally-acceptable deep-sea mining régime be established.

12. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th March 1985.

RECOMMENDATION 415 ¹³

on the control of armaments and disarmament ¹⁴

The Assembly,

(i) Endorsing the Council's view expressed in the Rome Declaration that increased co-operation in WEU will also contribute to the maintenance of adequate military strength and political solidarity and, on that basis, to the pursuit of a more stable relationship between the countries of East and West by fostering dialogue and co-operation ;

(ii) Believing that negotiations on arms control and disarmament, such as those conducted in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, are too important for the security of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance to be made dependent entirely on the state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union ;

(iii) Welcoming, therefore, the inclusion of arms control and disarmament among the specific conditions of security in Europe on which the Council of Ministers will hold comprehensive discussions and seek to harmonise their views ;

(iv) Reiterating its view that it is impracticable, and indeed undesirable, to seek to establish a separate East-West balance in different categories of nuclear weapons – strategic, intermediate- or short-range – and that any such nuclear balance can be assessed only globally ;

(v) Believing, however, that actual negotiations on reducing present levels of nuclear weapons may best be pursued by such categories,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Seek agreement on the extent of verification measures necessary to provide adequate assurance of compliance with arms control agreements, in particular a chemical weapons ban, a comprehensive test ban, and MBFR reductions ;

2. Agree common instructions to the representatives of those WEU countries participating in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva with a view to securing the early conclusion of agreements on a chemical weapons ban ; a ban on space weapons, including anti-satellite systems or new ABM systems ; and a comprehensive test ban ;

3. Call simultaneously on the United States to ratify the threshold test ban treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty, and with the United Kingdom to resume the tripartite negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty ;

4. Examine any constructive proposals from the Soviet Union linked with the quick resumption of INF and START negotiations, not excluding a possible mutual temporary freeze on further deployments of INF and short-range nuclear weapons, and further aim its efforts to achieve intensive consultations between the United States and the European allies during new United States-Soviet negotiations ;

5. Remind the Warsaw Pact states that WEU during the thirty years of its existence has never prepared or taken any aggressive and hostile measures against the Warsaw Pact but on the contrary has paved the way for the policy of détente and aims at peaceful interaction and reduction of tension among the European peoples ; and call upon the states of the Warsaw Pact to take into account this position of WEU, which is also in conformity with the position of the United States and Canada as well as of the NATO member states, when taking a decision on the confirmation of their treaty beyond June 1985 and to draw consequences from this position for the continuation or shaping of the Warsaw Pact ;

6. Instruct the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out specific studies to assist it in the foregoing tasks, and those identified in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

¹³. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1984 during the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session (9th sitting).

¹⁴. Explanatory memorandum: see report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 998).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹⁵**to Recommendation 415**

1. The Council strongly endorses the Assembly's emphasis on the need for proper verification of arms control agreements in order to ensure compliance. There is already wide agreement on the extent of verification required to achieve this, although there can be no single universal verification scheme applicable to all arms control agreements irrespective of content. With regard to the United States-Soviet arms control negotiations, the Council recalls President Reagan's statement on 9th January that, while absolute verification might be impossible, adequate verification is a very necessary feature. The Council notes that the mandate for the Stockholm conference provides that all confidence- and security-building measures should be verifiable.

2. As is the case with negotiations in other arms control fora in which joint efforts by western countries are made to seek agreement with the Soviet Union, verification is the most sensitive aspect of a global chemical weapon ban. Without adequate on-site verification, there can be no guarantee of adherence to the provisions of a possible treaty. And without that assurance, a treaty banning chemical weapons could diminish rather than enhance international security.

3. In the case of MBFR the western participants tabled a comprehensive package of associated measures as part of a 1982 draft treaty. The allied countries participating are currently discussing how this should be enhanced in the context of the flexibility on prior data agreement in the West's variation of its 1982 treaty tabled in April 1984. Those WEU member governments and their Atlantic Alliance allies participating in the MBFR agree that the basic provisions of an adequate verification régime for an MBFR agreement should include on-site inspection, permanent exit/entry points, detailed exchanges of information on force levels and non-interference with national technical means. Notification of movements into the zone and notification and observation of military exercises are also necessary. The Warsaw Pact made some steps towards the western position in 1983, particularly in accepting in principle the possibility of on-site inspection, but their corresponding proposals are still very faulty and inadequate. The western delegations proposed on several occasions that the two sides should conduct a detailed examination of their respective positions on verification, but without result. On 14th February, the eastern countries tabled a new initiative, largely made up of elements of existing proposals. The western countries are now considering this.

4. The WEU countries represented at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament attach great importance to close consultation on key issues under discussion :

- (i) on chemical weapons, this has resulted in a series of detailed proposals on which we await a proper response from the Soviet Union ;
- (ii) on the military use of outer space, the Council favours the achievement of either multilateral or bilateral constraints which would truly enhance international security and stability ;

The Council supports the objective agreed between the United States and the Soviet Union of working out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and welcomes the opening of United States-Soviet negotiations on this subject. The Council also believes that the existence of, and adherence to, the 1972 ABM treaty by the two signatory parties constitutes an important element in the present strategic context. In the circumstances, the Council believes that any measures that might be taken by one party or the other, lying outside the provisions of this treaty, such as ballistic missile defence deployment, would have to be the subject of negotiations.

- (iii) on the comprehensive test ban, the Council notes the view of several governments that outstanding problems of verification will need to be resolved, hopefully at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, with a view to negotiation of a treaty on the subject.

5. The Council is aware of the wish of the United States to discuss with the Soviet Union ways of improving the verification provisions of the United States-Soviet treaties on nuclear testing. The Council hopes that the Soviet Union will consider favourably the United States proposal for exchanges

15. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th May 1985.

of test-site observers. This would represent a step towards progress in achieving the aforesaid treaties' aim of formally constraining nuclear testing.

6. With regard to START and INF, WEU member governments have in the past urged that all constructive and mutually acceptable proposals in this area be taken into account in negotiations. These should, however, be aimed at increasing the chances of progress in negotiations. A moratorium on deployment of long- and short-range INF weapons would alter the context of the negotiations. It would perpetuate the Soviet Union's superiority in long-range INF and could act as a disincentive to the Soviet Union to negotiate reductions.

7. The policy on INF, as regards their deployment as well as their limitation, rests upon the 1979 dual-track decision. In this connection, the countries concerned have repeatedly made clear their readiness to halt, reverse or modify their deployments of cruise and Pershing missiles, including the removal and dismantling of missiles already deployed in Europe, in accordance with the terms of a balanced and verifiable agreement. The United States have given firm assurances that they will consult the countries concerned on the course of future negotiations. This process has already begun. INF issues, which particularly affect the European allies concerned, are handled through the Special Consultative Group.

8. The Council recalls that, like the Atlantic Alliance, WEU is a defence organisation and that its policy and that of its member countries is designed to contribute – as noted by the Assembly – to their security whilst attempting to reduce tensions on the European mainland.

9. At their meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April, the Ministers agreed to establish the following new structures under the collective title "Agencies for Security Questions": an agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions; an agency for the study of security and defence questions, and an agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments. As advocated in the recommendation, these agencies will carry out specific studies to assist the Council in the accomplishment of its tasks.

RECOMMENDATION 416 ¹⁶*on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance* ¹⁷

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling Recommendations 406 and 407 ;
- (ii) Endorsing the initiative taken by its President when he handed a memorandum to the Chairman-Office of the Council on 20th September 1984 ;
- (iii) Considering that a concerted approach by the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to matters relating inter alia to the alliance's defence policy and the action those countries pursued outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty is essential for Europe's security ;
- (iv) Welcoming therefore the decision of the Ministers to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in particular on the six points listed in paragraph 8 of the Rome Declaration ;
- (v) Welcoming the wish expressed by the Council to give new life to WEU so as to adapt it to the present requirements of European security and the maintenance of international peace and to develop the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly for these purposes ;
- (vi) Considering that giving WEU a new and wider rôle first implies that the Council effectively assume its obligations under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty ;
- (vii) Noting that the increase in informal procedure may help the Council's work but might diminish the commitments of member countries in intergovernmental consultations and relations between the Council and the Assembly ;
- (viii) Welcoming the deletion of the list of armaments in Annex III to Protocol No. III ;
- (ix) Noting that giving the Council a new and wider rôle means that it must obtain different means of information from those afforded so far by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, in particular to allow it to tackle questions of disarmament and the balance of forces ;
- (x) Considering that the joint production of armaments by WEU member countries is progressing only slowly ;
- (xi) Considering that the Assembly's activities can be based only on a continuing dialogue with the Council ;
- (xii) Welcoming the decisions taken or guidelines adopted by the Council and communicated to the Assembly on 27th October 1984 and the fruitful exchanges of views in Rome on 29th October, but recalling the urgency of reorganising the structure of WEU to allow it to meet the new requirements ;
- (xiii) Welcoming the fact that the Rome Declaration introduced the question of disarmament into the Council's work,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Abide by its decision to convene the Ministers of Defence and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of member countries at least twice a year, particularly prior to meetings of the North Atlantic Council ;
2. Give the Permanent Council the means to act in application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, and to this end :
 - (a) ask member countries to appoint a permanent representation to the Council in the framework of the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty ;

¹⁶. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1984 during the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session (11th sitting).

¹⁷. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Masciadri on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 990).

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- (b) give the Secretary-General powers of initiative allowing him to assume responsibility for applying Article VIII ;
3. Ensure the existence and operation of the WEU technical bodies in order to obtain the necessary assistance and information to allow it to examine matters relating to the security of Europe in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, events concerning Europe's security which occur outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, problems relating to disarmament and the control of armaments, the prospects of European armaments co-operation and an active policy for improving relations between East and West ;
 4. Progressively adapt the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee to these new requirements ;
 5. While developing an informal dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, as proposed by the Council, retain formal procedure for exchanges between the two WEU organs ;
 6. Follow closely the expected resumption of international negotiations on disarmament and prepare the necessary measures to allow Europe to play an active part therein ;
 7. Develop co-operation between WEU and the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly in the joint production of armaments, bearing in mind that the aim is their accession to WEU as soon as circumstances permit.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL***to Recommendation 416***

1. The Council considers the Assembly's Recommendation 416 on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance as support for its Rome decisions to reactivate WEU.

2. The Council proposes to translate the Rome decisions into action without delay. This also applies to the decision that the Council will in future normally meet twice a year at ministerial level. The next meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers will be held on 22nd and 23rd April 1985.

3. The Council of Ministers decided in Rome, in line with its increased activities, to intensify the work of the Permanent Council. The Permanent Council, which prepares ministerial meetings and is mandated to discuss in greater detail the views expressed by the Ministers and to follow up their decisions, will, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty make the necessary arrangements for this purpose, including as appropriate the setting up of working groups.

With a view to giving effect to the extensive decisions of Rome, the Permanent Council has increased the frequency of its meetings.

Member countries are represented on the Permanent Council by their ambassadors in London and a representative of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The rôle of the presidency as emphasised in the Rome documents, the participation of capitals and the assistance of members of embassies in London will ensure the efficiency of the work of the Permanent Council in pursuit of the aims set out in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.

It was decided in Rome that the Secretariat-General should be adapted to take account of the enhanced activities of the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council. The Ministers asked the Secretariat-General to submit, as soon as possible, a report on the work done by the secretariat and to consider what measures might be necessary to strengthen its activities.

4. The Ministers instructed the Permanent Council in Rome to define, in consultation with the directors of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee, the precise modalities of an overall reorganisation affecting both the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Standing Armaments Committee, which could be structured in such a way as to fulfil a threefold task :

- to study questions relating to arms control and disarmament whilst carrying out the remaining control functions ;
- to undertake the function of studying security and defence problems ;
- to contribute actively to the development of European armaments co-operation.

The Permanent Council appointed a working group to study these questions. In carrying out the reorganisation mandate, the Permanent Council also takes careful note of the Assembly's views.

5. In the document on the institutional reform of WEU (Section II,1), the Ministers made concrete proposals for improving contacts between the Council and the Assembly. This section of the ministerial decisions contains proposals both for the development of informal contacts and for the establishment of formal consultations.

6. In the Rome Declaration the Ministers decided to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe. Among other topics, this applies also to arms control and disarmament.

Addressing the Assembly on 5th December 1984 in his capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, reiterated that the Foreign and Defence Ministers would be discussing current problems in detail at their next meeting.

18. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th March 1985.

7. Another of the topics referred to in paragraph 6 above is "the development of European co-operation in the field of armaments in respect of which WEU can provide a political impetus". The pooling of technological, economic, industrial and financial resources will also be conducive to the joint production of armaments. Equipment interoperability and standardisation of procedures are guiding principles for the European members of the North Atlantic Alliance also.

The revitalisation of WEU will also have an impact on European co-operation in the field of armaments. In this respect, WEU support for the work of existing institutions such as the IEPG is to be intensified. Another purpose of closer European co-operation is to promote balanced co-operation between Europe and the United States of America in this field.

In the spirit of the Rome discussions and declaration, the Council will continue to examine attentively any suggestions which the Assembly may make concerning better use of WEU.

*Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments -
parliamentary debates on the evolution of WEU*

INFORMATION REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Relations with Parliaments
by Mr. Giust, Rapporteur*

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INFORMATION REPORT

submitted by Mr. Giust, Rapporteur

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Information Report

(submitted by Mr. Giust, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The purpose of the present report is to inform parliamentarians about the committee's general activities between November 1984 and May 1985 and to give an initial summary of debates in the parliaments of member countries on the evolution of WEU following the Rome Declaration. A first sign of the reactivation of WEU is to be found in an intensification of the discussion at national level. An analysis of this discussion is essential if the Assembly is to be able to draw appropriate conclusions in regard to subsequent procedure.

II. Activities of the committee

2. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments met in Paris on 5th November and 6th December 1984. In accordance with Rule 42*bis*, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Procedure, it selected from the texts adopted by the Assembly at the second part of its thirtieth ordinary session those which, in its opinion, should be debated in the parliaments, i.e. :

- Recommendation 413 on the military use of space - Part II ;
- Recommendation 415 on the control of armaments and disarmament ; and
- Recommendation 416 on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance.

3. These recommendations were transmitted officially by the President of the Assembly to the presidents of member parliaments in the hope that they would be of interest and provide subject matter for speeches or questions to ministers.

4. At the committee meeting on 7th December 1984, the Chairman urged all members to put questions as soon as possible on the basis of the model questions prepared by the Office of the Clerk.

5. So far, the secretariat has recorded two questions put by Mr. Frasca on 4th February 1985 on Recommendations 411 and 413 and two put by Mr. Masciadri on 23rd January 1985 on Recommendations 414 and 415. The Italian Government's answers are not yet known.

6. On 23rd January 1985, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges put a question in the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies on Recommendation 415.

7. In his answer, Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was rather vague about the next meeting of the Council in April 1985. On the harmonisation of the views of WEU countries participating in the Geneva Disarmament Conference, the Minister said :

“As a logical follow-up to the Rome Declaration, the Seven will certainly also endeavour to harmonise their views on the matters being discussed at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.”

8. On 23rd January 1985, Mr. Masciadri and Mr. Hengel put questions on Recommendation 416 but only the Luxembourg Government's answer is known. On the future rôle of the Secretary-General, Mr. Hengel asked whether, in the Council, his government would advocate giving the Secretary-General powers of initiative allowing him to assume responsibility for applying Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, providing for consultations on any situation which might constitute a threat to international peace. In his answer Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, said :

“With regard to the rôle of the Secretary-General, a special working group of experts from the capitals is in the process of preparing firm, detailed proposals on the overall operation of WEU and its specialised agencies. These proposals will also take account of the future rôle of the Secretary-General.”

9. In accordance with Rule 42*bis*, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure, the Committee for Relations with Parliaments is empowered to “make all necessary arrangements with a view to calling the parliaments' attention to the work of the Assembly and inviting them to follow up this work”.

10. It is clear that the importance of this task can but be enhanced in the context of the reactivation of WEU. At its meetings on 6th November and 5th December 1984, the committee considered the consequences of reactivation for its future activities and for the preparation of its programme of work.

11. As a first step, it therefore decided to take special action to organise a series of information meetings in member countries attended, in each country, by representatives of the national parliament and the press. Committee members would make brief five- to ten-minute statements

informing parliamentarians of the rôle and work of WEU. There would then be a working luncheon for the participating parliamentarians and journalists.

12. The first information meeting was held at the French Senate, Paris, on 17th April 1985, when the committee met representatives of both chambers of the French Parliament and of the press. At this meeting, briefings were given by members of the committee as follows :

- the revival of Western European Union (by Mr. Enders) ;
- the WEU organs and their duties (by Mr. Giust) ;
- the Assembly: its activities and how they are followed up in parliaments (by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges) ;
- the present activities of the Assembly (by Mr. Noerens) ;
- relations between Western European Union, NATO and other Western European organisations and countries (by Mr. Stoffelen).

There then followed a discussion in which the importance of the reactivation of WEU for the entire western world was strongly emphasised by all speakers. Mr. Poher, President of the Senate, Mr. Caro, President of the WEU Assembly, and Mr. Pignion, Chairman of the French Delegation to the WEU Assembly, took part in the discussion. Similar meetings are to be held in Italy in June 1985 and in Germany in November 1985.

13. On the future evolution of WEU, the Council and the Assembly are now at the discussion and reflection stage. The Council and governments have been given the memorandum prepared by the President of the Assembly on 20th September 1984 setting out a few specific proposals for the future operation of the Council and its organs.

14. As for the Council, the Rome Declaration issued on 27th October 1984 remains the basis on which the Assembly and all its members will have to adopt a position. To be able to examine the Council's intentions in depth, it is essential for each representative to be fully cognisant of the contents of this text. On the initiative of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, a copy of the Rome Declaration was sent to all members of the WEU Assembly. At the meeting on 6th November 1984, the Chairman asked all committee members to put questions on this declaration in their national parliaments.

15. To obtain a more complete picture, the Assembly must be informed of the explanations and comments of the governments in member

countries and of views expressed by representatives in their national parliaments. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments is also responsible for keeping the Assembly informed of current discussions at national level on the future rôle of WEU. The next chapter therefore analyses this national debate in member countries.

III. Analysis of parliamentary debates on the evolution of WEU

16. The manner in which governments informed parliaments about the Rome decisions is of particular significance.

17. In the *Netherlands*, a written report in the form of a letter was sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Second Chamber of the States-General on 16th November 1984. The text was published by the States-General. Moreover, the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs took the opportunity of informing the Second Chamber of the States-General of their position on 12th December 1984, 31st January 1985 and 5th and 6th March 1985 following the tabling of motions on Netherlands membership of WEU, establishing a joint WEU naval patrol and a joint European position towards the strategic defence initiative.

18. In *Germany*, the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs made an oral report to the Bundestag on 8th November 1984 which was followed by speeches by Mr. Gansel, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Vogt and Mr. Rumpf, all members of the WEU Assembly.

19. In the *United Kingdom*, Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, gave an oral report in the House of Lords in answer to a question put by Lord Gladwyn and a speech by Lord Mulley. The debate in the House of Lords was resumed on 7th November 1984 with Baroness Young and speeches by Lord Reay and Lord Ardwick. On 6th and 9th November 1984, Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, addressed the House of Commons during a debate on WEU in which speakers included Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Wilkinson. In addition, the United Kingdom Government answered fourteen oral and written questions put by Sir John Biggs-Davison, Sir Anthony Meyer, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Hill, Mr. Johnston, Mr. Stokes, Mr. Denzil Davies, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Deakins, Mr. Dykes, Mr. McNair-Wilson and Mr. O'Neill.

20. In *Belgium*, the main debate was in the Chamber of Representatives on 20th November 1984 when the 1985 budget was discussed. Speakers included Mr. Dejardin and Mr. De

Decker. In the Senate, Mr. Adriaensens spoke about WEU on 20th December 1984. Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations, answered questions for the government.

21. In *France*, the debate in the National Assembly on the 1985 budget also provided an opportunity for considering matters relating to WEU. On 8th and 9th November 1984, there were speeches by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations, Mr. Hernu, Minister of Defence, and, among the parliamentarians, Mr. Couve de Murville, Mr. Daillet and Mr. Lagorce. On 31st October 1984, the government answered a question put by Mr. Fourré on the extraordinary session in Rome.

22. In *Italy*, considerable activity has been recorded, particularly among parliamentarians. On 24th October 1984, i.e. on the eve of the ministerial meeting in Rome, the Defence Committee of the Chamber of Deputies adopted a resolution urging the Italian Government to promote, among the other members of WEU, several specific steps in security policy, the content of which will be examined later in this report. On 23rd January 1985, Mr. Masciadri put a question on the reactivation of WEU.

23. In *Luxembourg*, the government answered three questions put by Mrs. Flesch, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges and Mr. Hengel.

24. As for the substance of the debate, it is interesting to compare the principal points stressed in member states, which were not always the same.

25. It was mainly in France and the United Kingdom that the governments gave a few significant details on the prospects and future rôle of the organisation in general.

26. Answering a question put by Mr. Fourré, the French Government expressed the wish that the institutional machinery of WEU be better used for a debate by the Seven on their specific security concerns.

27. During the debate on the 1985 budget, Mr. Daillet asked: "Why has consideration not also been given to holding meetings of chiefs-of-staff?" In his answer, Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations, said:

"However, this does not allow us to have strategic discussions, *conclusive* discussions in WEU. Why? Because our strategy cannot be limited to conventional and must necessarily include nuclear means. The very reasons why France does not belong to the integrated system of the Atlantic Alliance apply to WEU and prevent us from attending meetings of chiefs-of-staff. Furthermore, WEU could not discuss global strategy since the Fed-

eral Republic of Germany cannot and does not at present wish to have responsibilities in this area.

This also means that bilateral Franco-German strategic meetings are of considerable importance."

28. On 9th November 1984, Mr. Hernu told the National Assembly that: "WEU cannot be a forum for military decisions". On 4th December 1984, he told the Senate: "The development of this European co-operation is the rôle that must be played by WEU, which is not a forum for decision-making nor a body for defence planning or co-ordination."

29. In the United Kingdom, government representatives stressed that:

"Reactivation (of WEU) does not change two essential realities: our national defence can be assured only through NATO, and European co-operation in defence equipment is best pursued through Eurogroup and the IEPG:

.....

Our objective in supporting the rebirth of WEU is to strengthen and explain the European pillar of the alliance and to improve European defence co-operation.

.....

WEU has a function to act as a ginger group.

NATO remains the foundation of our security, the treaty organisation responsible for defence, with appropriate military staff and forces. WEU can play none of these rôles and does not wish to. Indeed, it is expressly stated in the Brussels Treaty that WEU will not have such functions, and that it should work in close co-operation with NATO. What it can do - promote deeper consultation among ministers on politico-security issues - is complementary to NATO, and open to NATO.

.....

WEU has three particularly valuable features for the United Kingdom. First, it is bound to the North Atlantic Alliance Treaty. Second, ... it provides the legal basis for our commitment of substantial land and air forces to the mainland of Europe - a vital element both in our common defence and in our relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, to which I attach so much importance. Third, the WEU Assembly is the only European parliamentary forum empowered by treaty to discuss security and defence questions."

30. On relations between WEU and NATO, the German Government stated on 8th November 1984: "The treaty instituting WEU stipulates that close relations shall be established with NATO. The Federal Government considers this close link between WEU and NATO to be essential."

31. On 12th December 1984, Mr. De Ruiter, Netherlands Minister of Defence, said:

"All European frameworks should be taken at their own value, we should use each of them according to their own possibilities. This is true for European political co-operation as well as for the Eurogroup of NATO. They all have their own limits. For that reason, I consider it a good thing to use WEU for discussions on European defence and security policy. For the practical side of co-operation in defence equipment, we should use the IEPG. Of course, there may be overlapping, but we should consider it in a practical manner and avoid having different organisations dealing with the same problems..."

I want to outline that it is a misunderstanding to think that WEU should deal especially with matters outside Europe or outside the NATO area. This is surely not the case. The only question to be discussed is what will be the repercussions, if men and material are used outside the WEU or NATO area, on tasks within this area. There is, however, no discussion on how one or more WEU member states should act outside the treaty areas..."

32. The Luxembourg Government underlined the importance of strengthening the link between WEU and the other NATO member countries.

33. Because of the special situation of Germany, the consequences of the removal of the last controls on conventional weapons played an important rôle in the debate in the Bundestag. On 8th November 1984, the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs clearly recalled that the Council's decision had no connection with any firm armaments programmes the Federal Republic might have. The Federal Government had no intention of producing or exporting long-range missiles or strategic bombers.

34. The Federal Government repeated its proposal for setting up a European research institute to study security policy. This proposal was criticised by Mr. Vogt, who called for the creation of a European disarmament agency.

35. In Italy, the Defence Committee of the Chamber of Deputies advocated, in the resolution already mentioned, setting up "a European agency responsible for security and defence

industrial policy which, acting in accordance with directives from the Council of Ministers and in consultation with the WEU Assembly, would promote the co-ordination of the policies of WEU governments in research, development and production of defence means and in procurement and sales, possibly in relation with other similar European or NATO bodies".

36. With regard to the new tasks of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, Mr. Cheysson, then French Minister for External Relations, said in November 1984:

"Since the Agency for the Control of Armaments has lost its initial task, that of controlling our own armaments, we think there is room here for joint reflection on the major problems of the limitation and control of armaments."

37. In Germany, Mr. Rumpf suggested that the Agency deal with disarmament and restrictions on the export of armaments. Mr. Gansel raised the question of future controls of A, B and C weapons in member countries, these controls being provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty. He also asked how WEU could contribute to ending the division of Europe.

38. Mr. Dejardin tackled the question of the future of FINABEL during a debate in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives on 20th November 1984, when he said:

"Not much is said about it, but the members of the WEU Assembly, who are accustomed to the intricacies and mysteries of WEU, know the rôle sometimes played by this forum of private armaments manufacturers called FINABEL. What is its position in the context of the Rome Declaration?"

39. Answering the question about whether he knew the FINABEL group, Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations, said: "I know it by name, but no more. I am not in touch with that group."¹

40. Among those who raised the question of relations between the Council and the Assembly were Mr. Genscher, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, who reminded the Bundestag of the Council's proposals on this matter, and Mr. Reddemann, who asked the Assembly and the Council to meet again to discuss WEU's new tasks. The question was also raised in the resolution of the Defence Committee of the Italian

1. In the context of their examination of the future tasks of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee, the Ministers said in the document appended to the Rome Declaration that "the Permanent Council will also take into account the existence of the FINABEL framework".

Chamber of Deputies which recommended establishing "closer co-operation between the parliamentary Assembly and the Council".

41. Four representatives raised the question of the status of the Secretary-General, i.e. Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Daillet, Mr. Hengel and Mr. Adriaensens. The governments did not give very detailed answers.

42. The question of the seat of the organisation was raised by Mr. Reddemann.

43. In the House of Lords, Lord Mulley raised the question of dual representation in the Council of Europe and the WEU Assembly.

44. Three governments - in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom - referred to the importance of improving public understanding of the rôle of European defence in the alliance.

45. Enlargement of the organisation was a factor in the resolution adopted by the Defence Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. This resolution asked the government "to promote ... initiatives which seek to promote the accession to WEU of all the other Community countries or European members of NATO, or at least an appropriate form of co-operation". Speaking in the House of Lords on 7th November 1984, Lord Reay adopted a different position, saying "that member states should think very carefully before they issue any invitations to accede to the treaty". In France, Mr. Hernu, Minister of Defence, said it was "perhaps not desirable for the time being to extend the WEU circle without taking certain precautions".

46. Finally, it is worth noting the following proposal by the Defence Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, which advocates submitting "to WEU countries for study the idea of setting up military combat units with an integrated command".

47. It is interesting to note that ministers of defence still play little part in these national debates.

48. The participation of representatives varies from country to country. In some parliaments, interest in the evolution of WEU is not confined to members of national delegations.

49. In the United Kingdom, for instance, it may be noted that eleven of fourteen parliamentarians who spoke on this subject between October 1984 and January 1985 were not members of the WEU Assembly. In Italy, the resolution which has been quoted was signed by thirty-eight members of parliament, five of whom were members of the Italian Delegation to the WEU Assembly. In France, two out of four speeches were by non-members of the Assembly.

50. Conversely, in Germany, the attribution of responsibilities in parliament seems to be regulated far more strictly. Consequently, only very infrequently does a parliamentarian not on the delegation adopt a position or put a question on WEU in a plenary sitting of the Bundestag. The debate on the report by Mr. Genscher, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the Rome meeting was entirely between members of the delegation. On the same day, the Bundestag considered a motion tabled by the majority on a total ban on chemical weapons and a motion tabled by the SPD Group on a treaty to limit the military use of space. The debate on the latter motion was opened by Mr. Scheer, a member of the WEU Assembly, and three parliamentarians, including one member of the delegation (Mrs. Kelly) then spoke. None of the speakers mentioned the work of the WEU Assembly on this question. No members of the delegation spoke in the debate on chemical weapons and WEU was not mentioned, although the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs announced in his report that the Council would be discussing chemical weapons and the military use of space at its meeting in April 1985.

IV. Conclusions

51. Discussion at national level of matters relating to the evolution of WEU has increased significantly in the past year, which is most welcome. Several governments presented detailed reports and gave useful explanations of their interpretation of events in Rome.

52. Nevertheless, the information governments have given parliaments hardly helps one to obtain a clearer idea of the future rôle of WEU and its organs, and this is not at all surprising in view of the fact that the results of the studies conducted by the working groups set up following the Rome Declaration are not yet known or have not yet been assessed by the Council.

53. However, it seems that in general the methods and intensity of information policy vary from one member country to another. Consideration should be given to ways of improving this information.

54. Governments should rather be asked to report regularly to parliaments on the activities of the Council and its agencies. It would also be desirable for such reports to indicate the attitudes and positions of the governments towards WEU's present problems. These reports should be made available to all parliamentarians.

55. At present, the German Government is the only one to submit a half-yearly report to the Bundestag on the activities of WEU and its organs, which may be discussed by the appro-

appropriate committee. This is a very useful practice and your Rapporteur suggests that each delegation be asked to recommend that its government follow suit.

56. As regards the extent to which members and non-members of the Assembly participate in national debates on matters relating to WEU, our committee's meetings with parliamentarians from member countries will provide an opportunity for encouraging non-members to increase their participation. Moreover, members of each delegation should see how far they can improve the information they give their colleagues and enhance the latter's interest. Four delegations already submit half-yearly reports on the work of the Assembly, i.e. the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands. In the United Kingdom, information on the work of the Assembly is transmitted regularly to non-members in the political groups. In Luxembourg, after each part-session the President of the Chamber of Deputies makes a statement in public sitting on the work of the Assembly. This statement is published in the verbatim report of debates in public sitting.

57. The resolution adopted by the Defence Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies on 24th October 1984 is a unique example of the participation of a number of parliamentarians in action relating to WEU. If other member countries could take similar joint initiatives, they would provide proof of the greater importance of WEU. But the increase in the number of questions put, most noticeable in the case of the United Kingdom, is also an encouraging sign.

58. Every opportunity should be taken of sustaining public interest in the evolution of WEU. Each member is asked to continue to speak and put questions on the basis of the Rome Declaration in connection with the comments of government. It is therefore essential to follow attentively all statements and explanations by governments and to examine whether they concord with the Assembly's intentions. It is recommended that all members concentrate on putting questions such as the following :

- Does Article VII.1 of the modified Brussels Treaty not allow " strategic discussions or conclusive discussions " ?
- Are nuclear questions excluded ?
- How can it be ensured that the Council's discussions will finally give political impetus to the alliance or that WEU will give the lead if the Council takes no decisions ?

- How is it possible to avoid Council meetings consisting only of exchanges of views involving no commitments ?

59. Your Rapporteur considers that some of the ideas and proposals put forward in parliaments are worthy of examination by the appropriate Assembly committees if they can be incorporated in recommendations, particularly the proposals by the Defence Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies :

- to submit to WEU countries for study the idea of setting up military combat units with an integrated command ;
- to set up a European agency responsible for security and defence industrial policy.

60. In regard to the latter proposal, it would be useful for the appropriate committee to consider whether it could be harmonised with the German proposal for a European research institute to study security policy. Perhaps the Assembly could propose some means of combining them.

61. For the future activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, the importance of making European public opinion aware of European security problems means the committee being given appropriate powers for fulfilling its new tasks in the context of the revival of WEU. An outward sign might be to change its name to " Committee for Relations with Parliaments *and the Public* " and make it officially responsible for submitting appropriate proposals for drawing the attention of public and press in member countries to the work of the Assembly.

62. For it to be able to carry out its new duties, the Committee for Relations with Parliaments must always be kept immediately and fully informed of developments in WEU. One member therefore underlined that it would be desirable for the Chairman of this committee to be a permanent member of the Committee for Relations with the Council set up by the Presidential Committee on 19th February 1985 to maintain regular contacts with the Council.

63. Finally, it must be borne in mind that in the context of a possible enlargement of WEU and in view of the need to inform parliaments and public - in non-member countries too - of the work of the Assembly, the committee should be authorised to organise information meetings in other European countries and elsewhere in the world, possibly in conjunction with other WEU Assembly committees.

*Communiqué issued at the close of the ministerial meeting
of the Council of Western European Union*

Bonn, 22nd-23rd April 1985

1. Foreign and Defence Ministers of the Western European Union met in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985.

2. The Ministers recalled the importance of the decisions taken at their extraordinary meeting in Rome in October 1984 to permit better use to be made of the framework and institutions of WEU and harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe. They reaffirmed their determination to strengthen their solidarity and that which links them with their allies of the Atlantic Alliance, which remains the only body for implementing common defence and the expression of the fundamental bond between the security of Europe and that of North America.

3. Reviewing questions relating to security in Europe, the Ministers noted that their countries are confronted with a continuing quantitative and qualitative development of Soviet military forces which cannot be justified solely by security interests. They emphasised the indispensable nature of deterrence based on credible nuclear and conventional forces. The Ministers reaffirmed the determination of each of their countries to pursue the efforts necessary, whether nationally or within the integrated military structure of the Atlantic Alliance, to strengthen their joint security.

4. In this context, the Ministers underlined the substantial defence effort of the European countries of the alliance. Their contribution in this respect, whatever form it may take, is fundamental to the strength of the alliance as a whole, and to the defence of European interests. They recalled the contribution that WEU can make in particular to achieve wider consensus among public opinion on these questions.

5. On the question of East-West relations, the Ministers welcomed the resumption of the United States-Soviet negotiations in Geneva – an important event for the security of the Atlantic Alliance in general and for that of Europe in particular. They reaffirmed their firm support for, and their confidence in, their American ally in its efforts to achieve a more stable strategic relationship at the lowest possible balanced level of forces and called on the Soviet Union to display a positive attitude.

6. The Ministers expressed the hope that the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union will make possible radical reduc-

tions in their strategic and medium-range nuclear armaments and agreements aimed at ending the arms race on earth and preventing an arms race in space. They underlined in this regard the importance which they attach to respect for existing treaty obligations.

7. The Ministers also examined questions associated with research efforts concerning strategic defence. They agreed to continue their collective consideration in order to achieve as far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their governments to the invitation of the United States to participate in the research programme and instructed the permanent Council accordingly. In this context they underlined the importance of the continuing bilateral consultations with their partners in the Atlantic Alliance as an essential element of allied cohesion.

8. The Ministers reaffirmed their countries' determination to continue to work for better East-West relations on a realistic and long-term basis, and for the full realisation of the CSCE commitments established at Helsinki and Madrid. They also recalled the multilateral negotiations in the field of confidence-building measures and conventional disarmament and underscored the significance of these negotiations for Europe. The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to continue contributing towards progress in the negotiations on a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons being conducted at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

9. The Ministers also held a detailed exchange of views on questions relating to armaments co-operation and research and agreed that closer co-operation and the harmonisation of their efforts are fundamental in maintaining in the longer term a competitive and advanced defence industrial base in Europe and in achieving a more cost-effective defence. The Ministers instructed the Permanent Council to present proposals in time for the next meeting to help provide the necessary political impetus for, and practical contributions to, the various efforts undertaken in this field, including those carried out by bodies such as the IEPG and the CNAD.

10. Noting the increasing importance of technology, the Ministers also affirmed the member states' determination to take the necessary measures within the European Communities to

strengthen Europe's own technological capacity and thus achieve the creation of a technological community.

11. As regards the reorganisation of WEU institutions, the principle of which was agreed at the Ministerial Council in Rome, the Ministers decided that the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee, and the Standing Armaments Committee would be comprehensively reorganised. They agreed to establish the following new structures under the collective title "Agencies for Security Questions":

- an agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions ;
- an agency for the study of security and defence questions ; and
- an agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments.

The Ministers endorsed the recommendations of the Permanent Council on this subject. They requested the Permanent Council to implement

rapidly their decisions and to submit to the next meeting of the Council of Ministers a report on the progress achieved by then and on the new tasks attributed to these agencies.

12. The Ministers also considered suggestions made by the Secretary-General on the strengthening of the WEU Secretariat-General in London. They also discussed ways and means of improving WEU's public relations activities. The Ministers underlined the important rôle of the WEU Assembly and paid tribute to its active contribution to the revitalisation of WEU.

13. The Ministers recalled the importance which they attach to their non-member allies being informed as fully as possible of their work. In this context, they considered that the special interest expressed by certain states is an appreciable encouragement to the efforts which they have undertaken within WEU.

14. The Ministers decided to appoint Mr. Alfred Cahen as the new Secretary-General of WEU. They expressed their warm appreciation for the services rendered by the retiring Secretary-General, Mr. Edouard Longerstaeck.

*The new outlook for WEU –
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council*

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 16 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy, van der Werff (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Sir Frederic Bennett (Alternate: Atkinson), MM. Berrier, Bianco, Bogaerts, Burger (Alternate: Hengel), Hill, Johnston, Mrs. Kelly (Alternate: Horacek), MM. Koehl, Lagneau, Lagorce, Martino, Masciadri, Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spitella (Alternate: Amadei), Vecchietti, de Vries.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

*on the new outlook for WEU -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) Taking cognisance of the thirtieth annual report of the Council, the Rome Declaration of 27th October 1984 and the Bonn communiqué of 23rd April 1985 ;
- (ii) Noting that the information the Council has thus given to the Assembly regarding its activities is incomplete and inadequate ;
- (iii) Noting that the activities organised by the presidency of the Council have been developed significantly, that the treaty makes it incumbent on the Council to inform the Assembly but that present procedure is inadequate ;
- (iv) Underlining that the Assembly's activities make a major contribution to the cohesion of the European peoples for their joint security and therefore help to deter destabilising operations against the western defence system ;
- (v) Recalling that the Assembly can play the rôle assigned to it in the Rome Declaration only if it has precise information and satisfactory co-operation from the Council, the material means it needs for its work and if it remains totally independent from the Council, particularly when involving public opinion ;
- (vi) Welcoming the initiative taken by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments for making the consequences of the reactivation of WEU better known in the parliaments of member countries ;
- (vii) Recalling that only the national delegations are in a position to give this work the necessary continuity ;
- (viii) Welcoming the fact that the Council for its part has decided to inform the public about its activities but recalling that the Assembly alone is responsible for information about its own work ;
- (ix) Welcoming the endeavours to reactivate WEU because they promise to provide a forum for European countries to discuss among themselves matters affecting their own security and defence ;
- (x) Welcoming the decisions taken by the Council to support the efforts of the United States to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of armaments, to pursue its own efforts to give the United States a co-ordinated answer from the seven governments on the strategic defence initiative and to stress the importance it attaches to respect for commitments set out in the treaties in force ;
- (xi) Recalling that Portugal's application for membership of WEU is in complete conformity with the joint interest of the Western European countries and the guidelines decided by WEU in the Rome Declaration,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue its work until it obtains a collective answer from the seven governments to the American invitation to take part in the United States research programme relating to the strategic defence initiative ;
2. Ensure the full participation of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council throughout the parliamentary debate on the Assembly's reply to the annual report of the Council so that he may, in particular, make known his opinion on the report of the General Affairs Committee examined by the Assembly ;
3. Submit to the Assembly a report by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council on the activities of the presidency at the same time as the report on the organisation adopted by the Permanent Council ;
4. Ensure that the Assembly is effectively informed of all joint activities by the Seven, including meetings of Ministers of Defence and meetings organised by the presidency of the Council ;

5. Inform the public and press about its own activities ;
6. Define without delay the attributions of the three agencies which it has decided to set up, particularly so as to allow the Assembly to act accordingly ;
7. Take a favourable decision as soon as possible on Portugal's application for membership of WEU in application of Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty.

Draft Order

***on the new outlook for WEU -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Anxious to show its support for Portugal's application for membership of WEU,

INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENT

1. To invite the Portuguese Parliament to send its delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to the Assembly of WEU as observers ;
2. To have this delegation attend all plenary sessions ;
3. To invite this delegation to send observers to meetings of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The annual report of the Council for 1984 reached the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly on 1st March 1985. However, before finalising his report, your Rapporteur preferred to await the results of the WEU Council's ministerial meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985 since he wished to be able to assess the action taken so far on the decisions reached by the ministers and included in the Rome Declaration.

2. Generally speaking, your Rapporteur thinks it of great importance for WEU to pay due attention to the European dimension of our security, without weakening the political solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance. This would help to make the general defence policy of the WEU member countries more widely accepted by public opinion. But your Rapporteur wishes to underline once more that he considers western security to be indivisible. He welcomes the fact that the Rome Declaration and the Bonn communiqué concord with this opinion, and any anxiety he may have about the action taken, or above all, not taken by the Council, is about the implementation of the principles defined in Rome rather than the aims the governments intend to attribute to WEU.

II. Activation of the Council

3. According to the Rome Declaration, activation of the Council is "a central element in the efforts to make greater use of Western European Union". For this purpose, it includes five decisions:

- (i) To hold two ministerial meetings each year. The meeting of ministers in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985 conforms to this decision. According to the Rome decisions, the Ministers of Defence took part together with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs. However, the communiqué gives no clear indication of the rôle the Ministers of Defence played at this meeting.

Your Rapporteur wishes to stress the fact that the Ministers of Defence of the WEU member countries had never met in this framework through-

out the thirty years' existence of the treaty until the meeting held in Rome in October 1984. The modified Brussels Treaty itself establishes a direct link between individual and collective defence and Protocol No. II relates entirely to the forces of WEU. While acknowledging that the aim of peace should be achieved by political means and not by the use of force, WEU would have no meaning without the determination of member countries to defend themselves, if necessary, by all the military means at their disposal. Your Rapporteur does not deny that important military questions have been or will be discussed at ministerial meetings, so he cannot see why meetings like the one in Rome should be exceptional. However, active participation by Ministers of Defence in the WEU Council means keeping the Assembly informed of the specific activities of the Ministers of Defence and the representatives of their ministries in WEU.

- (ii) To give the presidency of the Council to each member state for a one-year term. In fact, the German presidency has been prolonged until June 1985 so as to last a year. Moreover, when addressing the Assembly on 6th December 1984, Mr. Genscher announced that he intended to invite disarmament experts of member governments to a meeting in Bonn to examine the possible repercussions for European security of current negotiations on the limitation of armaments. This meeting was held on 11th February under the chairmanship of a German civil servant. As far as your Rapporteur knows, the Secretary-General and the Agency for the Control of Armaments did not take part.

This meeting was an innovation in several respects. It was the first time such an initiative had been taken in exactly to what the Assembly wished the Council to do. However, the fact that the meeting was organised by the country holding the presidency of the Council of Ministers and with a

representative of that country in the chair makes one wonder about the respective rôles the Council intends its presidency and Secretariat-General to have. It is quite possible for WEU to adopt a form of organisation more closely linked with its presidency, thus facilitating certain initiatives such as that of Mr. Genscher. But this would raise the question of the rôle of the Secretariat-General, the continuity of action not emanating from the Permanent Council and the way in which the Assembly would be informed of the results of such talks. This can but give greater weight to Order 58 adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1984 on a report submitted by Lord Reay on behalf of the General Affairs Committee calling for the creation of an Assembly body specialising in relations with the Council of Ministers.

In any event, no information has been communicated to the Assembly about the meeting on 11th February since it was announced by Mr. Genscher. All your Rapporteur has been able to learn about it has come from rumours which could not be confirmed at the meeting between certain members of the Assembly and the Council at the close of the ministerial meeting in Bonn on 23rd April. According to one of these rumours, little time was devoted to questions raised by current or future negotiations on the limitation of armaments and disarmament but the officials meeting in Bonn concentrated on matters relating to the structure of WEU. If these rumours are confirmed, they would make one wonder about two passages in the annual report.

(a) In Part One, Chapter I.A, the report quotes the following passage from Mr. Genscher's address to the Assembly on 29th October 1984 :

"Changes in the balance between East and West directly affect Europe. Europe's specific security situation calls for a specifically European contribution to the dialogue between East and West. The states of Western European Union, together with the other European members of NATO, make a substantial contribution to defence within the Atlantic Alliance. We are prepared to

accept the responsibility this entails. But we also want to be heard. Europe's voice will be duly heard in the transatlantic dialogue if the Seven adopt a common stance. WEU is the appropriate forum for the alignment of their positions on security issues."

Does the de facto renunciation of an exchange of views on disarmament and the control of armaments at the Bonn meeting on 11th February conform to this declaration? Does it conform to Part One, Chapter B.1, in which the Council recalls "the need to put across the European position on security and defence in an appropriate and more effective way in the United States"? Or does it consider that matters relating to disarmament do not concern security and defence?

In this connection, according to Atlantic News of 19th April 1985, Mr. Burt, United States Under-Secretary of State, is reported to have said at a press conference on 17th April that he had sent a letter to the members of WEU asking them not to take separate decisions on arms control policy since such decisions should be taken by NATO. This point of view cannot be gainsaid, but the question is how far the WEU Council is prepared to examine such matters in preparation for Euro-American discussions in the NATO framework. Mr. Burt seems to have accepted this interpretation since he emphasised that his country backed efforts at European level to co-ordinate security policy in WEU in order to strengthen the Atlantic link.

(b) Part Two of the annual report says that "the Permanent Council was instructed to prepare reports... for submission to the ministers at their next meeting", i.e. on 22nd April 1985, with a view to making proposals on a number of points relating to the structure of WEU. How does the Council see the relationship between the Permanent Council and intergovernmental meetings such as the one on 11th February? Are these two parallel procedures? How are they connected?

(iii) To intensify the work of the Permanent Council. As far as your Rapporteur knows, the only sign as yet is

to be found in the activities of the working group on the reactivation of WEU. So far, the Permanent Council has taken only one step to "discuss in greater detail the views expressed by the ministers" or "to follow up their decisions" apart from what concerns WEU itself: it raised "certain aspects of the Mediterranean situation which lack of time prevented the ministers from discussing in Paris".

- (iv) To adapt the Secretariat-General to the enhanced activities of the Council. The Assembly has indicated several times that it considered the best way to adapt it to this rôle would be to appoint a political personality to the Secretariat-General. The Council had to take a decision in this connection since the present Secretary-General had reached retiring age and would soon be leaving. This could have provided an opportunity for the Council to show that it really intended to give the Secretariat-General the means of exercising the new duties which the Council says it should have.

In several countries, there have been press reports that steps were being taken in this connection, and that consideration had been given to the candidature of a former minister of defence from a member country. But this was not to be so and finally the appointment of Mr. Alfred Cahen, a very senior Belgian diplomat, was announced in the Council's communiqué of 23rd April. The Assembly must be told why the Council dismissed its views on the need, in the interests of the true reactivation of WEU, to appoint a politician Secretary-General. It is entitled to wonder whether, in view of the need confirmed in the Rome Declaration and the annual report of the Council to give "political impetus" to certain WEU activities, the Council's refusal to appoint a politician to this post, as the governments have done in the case of a number of international organisations, is not in fact tantamount to renouncing the wish to make WEU really active.

However, it has obtained some encouraging explanations in this connection and welcomes the initiative taken by Mr. Cahen before taking up his duties when he described in a long article in the French newspaper *Le Monde* of

24th April 1985 how he intended to exercise these duties. Such action is unusual in WEU, thus showing that the new Secretary-General intends to give real impetus to WEU.

- (v) To examine a new structure for the Secretariat-General. Your Rapporteur has no information about action taken on this decision, and the annual report contains little. Nevertheless, assigning duties to it which relate more closely to defence policy and disarmament would mean the Secretariat-General recruiting officials with experience in such matters.

III. Relations between the Council and the Assembly

4. Contrary to what is said in this connection in the Rome Declaration, Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty setting up the WEU Assembly does not limit the reports which the Council – and the treaty does not stipulate that they should be submitted only by the Council of Ministers as stated in the Rome Declaration – has to submit to the Assembly to "matters concerning the security and defence of the member states" but says they shall concern "in particular... the control of armaments". In view of the now very limited amount of control work carried out, the latter indication, which is in no way limitative, now has little significance. However, because of the very wide responsibilities the treaty accords to WEU, the Assembly has always considered that they cover many matters well outside the defence and security area and the Council has fully accepted this, particularly by agreeing to answer Assembly recommendations on matters for which the organisation is responsible even if they are actually handled in another framework. Your Rapporteur notes with pleasure that in his article in *Le Monde* the new Secretary-General specifically pays tribute to the rôle played by the Assembly in not sharing the Council's somnolence and taking initiatives which largely prompted the reactivation of WEU.

5. This being so, your Rapporteur wonders why the Assembly should continue to work on reports on subjects extending well outside the defence and security areas. The direct political influence of the Assembly would be enhanced if it produced less recommendations and otherwise worked harder to reactivate WEU as an organisation oriented towards defence policy.

6. Apart from this reservation, the Assembly can but take due note of the fact that the ministers wish it to play "an increasing rôle". It also takes account of the fact that Part One,

Chapter I.B, indicates that "the Council pointed out that the Assembly should play a vital rôle in putting across to the European and American public the scale and effectiveness of both the European defence effort and transatlantic co-operation". But it goes without saying that the Council cannot anticipate the course the Assembly will follow and that "associating public opinion in the member states with the policy statements of the Council, which expresses the political will of the individual governments" also means accepting the fact that the Council must take account of guidelines defined by the Assembly which represents this public opinion vis-à-vis the governments. There can be no question of trying to turn the Assembly into a sound box for the Council which, moreover, does not keep it properly informed of its own work.

7. The most important factors are found in the proposals adopted by the Council. In this connection, the great novelty in the Rome Declaration is the place attributed to the presidency in replies to recommendations and questions, possible meetings with committees, keeping the Assembly informed or arranging for representatives of the presidency to take part in committee meetings. These are entirely new procedures since hitherto it has been the Secretariat-General that has served as an intermediary between the Council and the Assembly and in most cases the Permanent Council has been the Assembly's interlocutor. This was one of the reasons why the Assembly, dissatisfied with its exchanges with the Council, had said several times that it wished a politician able to assume responsibilities in the dialogue with the Assembly to be appointed Secretary-General.

8. The Council proposes another solution by giving the presidency a decisive rôle in this dialogue. The Assembly can but note this decision with satisfaction and, in Order 58, it has made arrangements which allow it to maintain the necessary contact with the Council during the reorganisation of the institution. On 19th February, the Presidential Committee of the Assembly set up a Committee for Liaison with the Council, consisting of the members of the Bureau of the Assembly and representatives of political groups not represented in the Bureau. It is this group, accompanied by the Rapporteurs of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, that met the Council in Bonn at the close of its meeting on 23rd April 1985.

9. What the dialogue with the presidency will produce in practice remains to be seen. But it must already be noted that since the Council decided to hold its spring 1985 ministerial meeting on 22nd and 23rd April, i.e. during the

session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe which all members of the WEU Assembly are, under the treaty, to attend, contacts between the Council and Assembly bodies would this time have been reduced to a minimum if the authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany had not arranged for the parliamentarians concerned to be transported rapidly from Strasbourg to Bonn and back. Moreover, the Council cannot be unaware that the development of its dialogue with the Assembly, like that of "a dialogue between the Assembly and other parliaments or parliamentary institutions" which it advocates, will have budgetary repercussions which in fact it is not authorising the Assembly to meet. In 1984, the Assembly had to give up some of its activities in order to cover the additional expenditure involved in its dialogue with the Council. In 1985, it is being forced to take even more drastic steps to reduce its activities.

10. Logically speaking, it is difficult to see why the Permanent Council should henceforth be responsible for submitting an annual report on the activities of the Council when the presidency will be responsible for relations between the Council and the Assembly and for the operation of WEU. Since the presidency is henceforth to rotate on an annual basis, would it not be desirable for each Chairman to report to the Assembly on his year in office at the end of this period? Two reports should then be presented to the Assembly, one mainly administrative like the one already prepared by the Permanent Council on the activities of the Permanent Council and its dependent organs, the other more political prepared under the responsibility of the Chairman-in-Office who, unable to shelter behind a possible absence of effective consultations, should be able to speak on behalf of the Council as a whole. This would moreover conform fully to Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, which provides for the Council to submit an annual report to the Assembly. The emphasis laid by the Rome Declaration on the rôle which should be played by the presidency is contrary neither to the treaty nor to current procedure and the Permanent Council has only a subsidiary rôle compared with the Council composed of ministers. A report by the presidency would be a partial remedy for the disadvantages inherent in the Council's refusal to appoint a politician as Secretary-General.

11. The Rome Declaration gives the Assembly a number of pointers of which it must take account, particularly in regard to the direction in which the governments intend WEU as a whole to move and also the relationship they wish to be developed between the Assembly and the European Parliament. The Assembly should concentrate its activities on matters relating to

every aspect of security policy and the defence of Europe. But this means that the Council too must adapt itself to this change, *inter alia* by developing more intensive direct contacts with the Assembly, especially on these matters. In this connection, more frequent participation by ministers of defence in Assembly sessions and their inclusion in the dialogue between the committees and the Council would be both positive and necessary since, as the Assembly has continually claimed, there cannot be active parliamentarianism or interest by the press and the public in the work of a parliamentary assembly if the latter has no true dialogue with the executive. While in autumn 1984 this dialogue seemed to be starting in connection with the reactivation of WEU, it is to be feared that since the Rome Declaration the Council has stopped listening to the Assembly and the thirtieth annual report of the Council gives little indication of a real desire for dialogue. This applies in particular to the rôle which the Council wishes the Assembly to play in accordance with the account given in the annual report of the reply to Recommendation 396 when, after describing the growing part played by Western Europe in its own security in the framework of NATO, it adds:

“ The Council pointed out that the Assembly should play a vital rôle in putting across to the European and American public the scale and effectiveness of both the European defence effort and transatlantic co-operation. The North Atlantic Assembly, for its part, could contribute to this work of explanation and presentation.”

12. It is clear that the Assembly cannot play this rôle unless the Council does so too. But the Council should not consider the Assembly as a sound box designed to echo governmental schemes which the Council has neither the courage nor the authority to make known itself. While the Assembly may play a constructive rôle, particularly when the purpose is to give political impetus to an undertaking for which it obtains a majority which decides it to act, as in the case of the colloquies it organises insofar as the Council allows it the necessary material means, its rôle with regard to the Council is one of criticism rather than of execution. It must be careful to remain entirely independent of the Council and can but express its astonishment when the Council tries to give it such directives.

13. The Assembly welcomes the Permanent Council's intention to provide itself with the wherewithal to publicise its work. It will also be happy that the future Secretary-General has told the press about his views on his rôle, asserting in particular that he will have to make sure that the movement which has just been

launched does not slow down, set up the necessary structures for this purpose and guide them in the desired direction. This should imply the creation of a Council information and press service. By saying that his task is undoubtedly above all to be the loyal servant of member states and their Council, the future Secretary-General makes his rôle perfectly clear and demonstrates that there is no question of he himself or the services dependent upon him being confused with those serving the Assembly.

14. Finally, the Assembly pays tribute to the departing Secretary-General, Ambassador Longestaey, who had the difficult task of presiding over the Permanent Council at a time when the governments were most undecided about using WEU. The Assembly has often been irritated by this attitude of member countries but has always had understanding contacts with the Secretary-General. In spite of the differences between the Council and the Assembly, it records that relations between the two WEU organs improved considerably during his term of office.

IV. The WEU ministerial organs

15. The Rome Declaration was not very explicit about what the Council intends to do with the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee and its international secretariat. The Permanent Council was instructed to prepare an overall reorganisation programme with the assistance of the two secretariats for submission at the ministerial meeting in Bonn. Your Rapporteur has learned that the two organs were asked to give the Council their views on the matter at the beginning of 1985 and that they have effectively done so.

16. With regard to the SAC and its international secretariat, relatively clear indications were given in the Rome Declaration following the lines of its past work and thus involving no fundamental change of course. It had already been decided before the Rome meeting that it should continue its work on updating a WEU agreement on trials methods for military vehicles as requested by NATO, updating its study on European armaments industries, conducting the study which the Council had asked it to make on the problems for European industries arising from the development of military production in Japan and, with the agreement of the Council, having members of the international secretariat assist the Assembly in some of its work. At the Rome meeting, the work of the SAC was not questioned and it was even decided to expand it, if we are to believe Mr. Genscher's address on 29th October, quoted in the annual report :

"The ministers spent some time discussing ways of improving armaments co-operation within WEU. They took the view that the development of today's advanced technologies imposes a fresh and extremely costly burden on the armaments industries of all the member states. The Europeans must accept this technological challenge together, or they will lag behind in international competition. They must therefore pool their resources and co-operate more closely in the armaments sector.

WEU will provide the necessary political impetus. It is also the appropriate body for the co-ordination of European interests in the spheres of defence technology and associated basic research."

17. The question raised by this declaration of principle is merely from which WEU organ this "political impetus" will come: from the Council of Ministers, perhaps, thanks to the presence, at least once a year, of the ministers of defence. Your Rapporteur has every reason to fear that neither the Permanent Council nor the members of the SAC can be relied on for this and the Council has just shown that it was no more anxious for the Secretary-General, and hence the WEU officials under him, to be empowered to inject political impetus, whereas "the co-ordination of European interests in the spheres of defence technology and associated basic research" is clearly within the terms of reference of the SAC. However, its secretariat should be adapted to this requirement, particularly where basic research is concerned.

18. According to the Bonn communiqué, the WEU technical organs will be reorganised as three "agencies for security questions", including "an agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments" which will clearly take over from the present SAC. However, little idea is given of its duties or, above all, of the part to be played by the SAC proper, which groups representatives of national armaments directors, alongside the international secretariat of the SAC, which depends on the WEU Secretariat-General.

19. Half of the Agency's duties came to an end on 1st January 1985, with the prospect of the other half being taken away at the beginning of 1986, apart from the verification of A, B and C weapons, which the annual report shows to be very limited. The Rome Declaration is not very precise about how the governments intend to use this body for studying disarmament, the limitation of armaments, security and defence matters. The Bonn communiqué announces the establishment of "an agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions" and

"an agency for the study of security and defence questions", but gives no idea of how these bodies are to operate.

20. Your Rapporteur merely wishes to set out here a few of the questions which seem to be raised by the Rome Declaration and to which the Council should give a clear answer before the WEU technical organs can be asked to plan their future activities:

(i) Is continuation of the traditional work of supervising A, B and C weapons compatible with using the Agency for other tasks which would make it subordinate to the Council or even to the Assembly? The conditions of independence and secrecy implied by the former obviously do not apply to the latter.

(ii) A complete overhaul of WEU structures is therefore essential, but it is hard to see why the Council began by defining organs before giving any real idea of what they are intended to do, particularly in the case of the new agency for the study of defence questions. Nor is it very clear what the Council means by arms "control": does it mean the remaining controls within WEU or the limitation of armaments in the sense now accepted for the negotiations and agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union?

(iii) The ministers specify that these organs will be required to work for the Assembly as well as for the Council. How this can be done remains to be defined. One possibility is for the Council, at the request of the Assembly, to ask the ministerial organs to finalise studies which it would examine before transmitting them to the Assembly in a declassified form. This was done for the SAC's study on European armaments industries. It is a logical procedure which respects the governmental nature of the ministerial organs but has the disadvantage of being slow and cumbersome. A second possibility is to instruct a member of the international secretariat of the SAC to assist the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly in the preparation of reports. A disadvantage here is to create confusion of responsibilities and powers within the organisation. For instance, in connection with the preparation of a report, the Council recently insisted that the Assembly pay the expenses of members of the international secretariat of the SAC travelling on its behalf, which was not unreasonable, but it means limiting, for budgetary reasons, the assistance which the Assembly may request. Without being radically opposed to such procedure, your Rapporteur notes that it can be used in only a few very specific cases.

(iv) The Permanent Council has been instructed "to propose a precise organisation table which will make it possible to define and give a breakdown of the posts required for carrying out

the three functions" assigned to the ministerial organs (disarmament, security and defence matters, co-operation in armaments) while remaining "within the present limits in terms of staff and the organisation's budget". This is obviously a very wise measure but means that one needs to know exactly what is meant by "present limits". Since 1982, certain vacant posts have not been filled, the purpose being to retain greater flexibility for the expected reorganisation. Is it to be considered that the limits set for the Council are the staff and, consequently, the WEU budget prior to these provisional measures or that the ministers consider the number of staff of the organisation in October 1984 to be a maximum not to be exceeded? Here too it is difficult to express a wish until there is more information about the tasks really attributed to the ministerial organs.

21. It is in regard to the definition of the rôle and structure of the WEU ministerial organs that the Council seems to be finding the greatest difficulty in taking decisions. The Rome Declaration was not very explicit on this point, the annual report goes no further and the Bonn communiqué gives the titles of three agencies but no details of their rôle or how they are to operate. The impression is that, after referring to the course to be followed in a European security policy in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the Council is in fact refusing to say how to act in order to implement such a policy. It seems to be haunted by structures inherited from a past which it wished to abolish, particularly that of the Agency for the Control of Armaments. At the same time it is unable to translate what was outlined in Rome into a policy and cannot remodel its dependent institutions. If confirmed, the failure of the meeting in Bonn on 11th February would be most disturbing.

22. The Assembly has on several occasions made recommendations intended to strengthen the political rôle of the Council, as shown in the collection of documents published by Mr. Masciadri, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, in December 1984. The Council does not seem very ready to follow them, but what is it offering instead?

V. Contacts with non-member states

23. The Rome Declaration refers to the importance of contacts with states of the Atlantic Alliance which are not members of WEU and once again the presidency is to be responsible. However, the declaration does not tackle the question of the possible enlargement of WEU which has now arisen with Portugal's application for membership. The Permanent Council has been asked to examine the answer to be given to

this application and, according to what the General Affairs Committee learned during its visit to Lisbon on 7th and 8th March 1985, it apparently gave the Portuguese Government a fairly negative answer. The joint answer announced in the Bonn communiqué apparently postpones the decision. It may seem normal to postpone an answer until the ministers have decided on the organisation's new structure, but it would be equally normal to examine the reorganisation of the institution with the applicant country. It is difficult to find justification for a negative answer in view of the resolutely political character the Rome Declaration gives WEU. It was difficult to admit new members to the system of declaration and control of armaments which existed in the past, but this obstacle has now been removed.

24. On the Portuguese side, the question is in no way seen to be one of enlarging WEU to all the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, but it was obviously from this angle that the Council tackled the matter. It is evident that the accession to the modified Brussels Treaty and its Article V of countries, even if members of NATO, whose external disputes are not confined to the threats which the Atlantic Alliance has to face is rather undesirable, and here Turkey and Greece come to mind. It is also clear that accession to WEU must not result in certain countries being dispensed from remaining in NATO by offering them a sort of alternative solution, which might be the case of Spain whose continued membership of NATO is to be the subject of a referendum.

25. But these considerations do not apply in the case of Portugal, whose Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jaime Gama, summed up the reasons for his country's application for membership in an address to the General Affairs Committee on 7th March:

"Portugal fully shares the concern of the WEU member countries about the need to increase the defence aspects of European co-operation - particularly in research, technology and defence-related industries - and also European solidarity, this being moreover only one way of underlining the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance in our country. There is no reason why Portugal should be refused the right to join WEU. We therefore rely on your understanding, support and even encouragement. We hope your governments will examine our claims attentively and take a positive decision in regard to the reorganisation and enlargement of WEU."

26. Your Rapporteur thinks he is right in saying that the members of the committee present in Lisbon expressed a most favourable opinion on this point of view.

27. It is clear that, insofar as WEU must, as the Rome Declaration says, form the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, it is logical for it to aim at grouping all the European member countries of the alliance when the time comes. It is also logical that the wish of the ten member countries of the European Community to found a European union should lead them to seek the accession of all of these ten countries to the European security organisation. That some wish enlargement to be accomplished in one go is probably a rational view but it is to be feared that, here as elsewhere, to allow the right time to pass for each of the countries whose candidature would be acceptable may lead to the indefinite postponement of an enlargement which there is no reason to oppose.

28. The resolutely political and non-military character accorded to WEU by the Rome Declaration, moreover, precludes the idea sometimes expressed in the past, inter alia by Mr. Cheysson, then French Minister for External Relations, that WEU should correspond to NATO's central zone of deployment to the exclusion of the northern and southern flanks. This concept, while valid from a strategic standpoint, is not at all so politically.

29. For these reasons, your Rapporteur proposes a draft order which clearly informs the Council and the Portuguese authorities of the Assembly's attitude towards Portugal's application for membership.

VI. The seat of WEU

30. In December 1984, Mr. Cavaliere tabled an amendment to the draft recommendation presented to the Assembly by Mr. Masciadri on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, underlining "the need to have a single seat for all the WEU organs in the same city in order to facilitate the development of the dialogue between the Council, the Secretariat-General and the Assembly and to ensure that the WEU technical organs are able to carry out their duties of assisting and informing the Council and the Assembly more efficiently". This amendment was negated.

31. It is clear that Mr. Cavaliere is absolutely right and it would be both logical and economical to bring the various parts of WEU together. There are valid reasons for thinking that this aspect has not eluded the Council which nevertheless did not feel it had to be mentioned in the Rome Declaration. The Chairman of the General Affairs Committee received confirmation of this when he met the Chairman-in-Office of the Council in 1982. The latter warned him of the danger of stressing this problem of the seat which might clash with national interests and

susceptibilities before the fundamental problems had been settled. While fully sharing the views expressed by Mr. Cavaliere, your Rapporteur therefore suggests leaving the question of the seat to the ministers when the time comes to take a decision, bearing in mind the interests at stake, which the Assembly cannot do in its stead. But he recalls that from both the standpoint of the proper financial management of WEU and the smooth running of the organisation, including the rational use of the ministerial organs and the development of relations between the Council and the Assembly, this is an aim which should not be lost from sight.

VII. The thirtieth annual report of the Council and the reply to Recommendation 416

32. In the thirtieth annual report of the Council, some changes have been made to the layout "in order to highlight, in a separate section, the future prospects for the organisation". Your Rapporteur would have every reason to welcome this if the future prospects were in fact highlighted. Unfortunately, he has to note that these changes concern only the layout of the report and in no way its content which, as the first communication from the Council to the Assembly since the December 1984 session, hardly forms an instrument of dialogue between the two WEU organs but merely a convenient reminder of what happened in 1984. Reading such a text can but confirm your Rapporteur's idea that, in view of the rôle exercised by the presidency, it should report on the ministerial activities of WEU in addition to the administrative report communicated by the Permanent Council.

33. Your Rapporteur has also received the Council's reply to Recommendation 416 on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance, adopted by the Assembly in December 1984, on a report by Mr. Masciadri on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. He wishes to thank the Council for having communicated this reply early enough for the Assembly to be able to prepare its own reaction in time for a debate at the May 1985 session. This is in fact an essential condition for the pursuit of a dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, which is not materially able to examine replies to recommendations when they are received just before sessions, as is usually the case.

34. Moreover, it is gratifying that "the Council proposes to translate the Rome decisions into action without delay" and your Rapporteur duly notes the action referred to by the Council:

- (i) meetings to be held "at ministerial level" "normally" twice a year. He trusts this twofold standard will effectively be respected;

- (ii) "the necessary arrangements" for the preparation of ministerial meetings to be made by the Permanent Council, the views expressed at these meetings to be discussed in greater detail and their decisions to be followed up and to this end the frequency of its meetings to be increased ;
- (iii) "the rôle of the presidency as emphasised in the Rome documents, the participation of capitals and the assistance of members of embassies in London" in pursuit of the aims of Article VIII of the treaty ;
- (iv) the Secretariat-General to be adapted "to take account of the enhanced activities of the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council" ;
- (v) the ministerial organs to be reorganised as they "could be structured in such a way as to fulfil a threefold task :
- to study questions relating to arms control and disarmament whilst carrying out the remaining control functions ;
 - to undertake the function of studying security and defence problems ;
 - to contribute actively to the development of European armaments co-operation. "
- It should be noted, however, that the working group set up by the Council is not studying these matters in depth, as the reply indicates, but is dealing only with the reorganisation of the ministerial organs ;
- (vi) contacts between the Council and the Assembly to be improved. The Assembly for its part has taken the necessary steps to assist such an improvement ;
- (vii) holding "comprehensive discussions" and seeking "to harmonise ministerial views on the specific conditions of security in Europe" which include arms control and disarmament ;
- (viii) confirmation that the ministers are to discuss "current problems in detail" at their meeting on 22nd and 23rd April 1985 ;
- (ix) political impetus to be given to European co-operation in armaments, including "the pooling of

technological, economic, industrial and financial resources" and "equipment interoperability and standardisation of procedures". These two indications would give an excellent idea of the Council's guiding principles for the activities of the SAC and its international secretariat if these injunctions were in fact given to it, which is not clear from the text of the Council's reply. Similarly, the Council does not specify how WEU support for the work of the IEPG and the promotion of balanced co-operation between Europe and the United States in these matters can be carried out in the framework of WEU.

35. In short, the reply to Recommendation 416 takes up the Rome Declaration in the main but gives no further information about the Council's intentions. The most that can be said is that this reaffirmation is welcome at a time when doubt is emerging about its intentions.

36. However, the reply to Recommendation 416, while indicating that the Council considers the recommendation "as support for its Rome decisions to reactivate WEU" does not in fact answer any specific points in the recommendation, including those asking that :

- (a) the Council meet prior to meetings of the North Atlantic Council ;
- (b) member countries appoint a permanent representation to the Council ;
- (c) the Secretary-General be given new powers of initiative ;
- (d) the Council prepare the necessary measures to allow Europe to play an active part in disarmament negotiations ;
- (e) the Council seek the accession to WEU of the European countries members of the Atlantic Alliance "as soon as circumstances permit".

37. Your Rapporteur fears that the Council, while asserting its intention to pursue the aims it set itself in Rome, is in fact doing nothing to attain them. He notes that in 1984 the Council was less strict than in the past about answering Assembly recommendations and written questions point by point. Its answers were often vague and imprecise when it did not simply shirk its obligations by denying them. Thus, in answer to Written Question 250 put by Mr. Wilkinson, who asked whether the passing of a Soviet attack submarine through the Straits of Gibraltar under water conformed to the 1958 Geneva Convention, the Council wrote: "It is

not for the Council to take decisions about the interpretation and application of the four Geneva conventions on the law of the sea in such circumstances". How can the Council reconcile this answer with Article VIII, which makes it responsible in the case of any threat to international peace? Does violation of a law not imply such a threat? Your Rapporteur for his part considers that such matters are the very reason for the Council's existence.

38. Moreover, having had an opportunity to note that the proposal referred to by Mr. Genscher in his address to the Assembly on 5th December 1984 on establishing "a research institute for security and defence matters" had aroused considerable interest in both military and university circles, your Rapporteur is surprised that the annual report makes no reference to the action the Council intends to take on this proposal. He wished to add a suggestion that this institute also be made responsible for organising courses for persons from member countries exercising various defence responsibilities so as to promote understanding of the European dimension of security and defence questions in all our countries.

VIII. Conclusions

39. While the Rome Declaration certainly transformed WEU as it was before that date, your Rapporteur fears the Bonn communiqué did not show what the new WEU will be. In any event, it is a long way from proving unfounded the fears arising from the thirtieth annual report of the Council, the reply to Recommendation 416 and rumours which have reached his ears about the progress of discussions in the Permanent Council and the meetings organised by the presidency in recent months, particularly the meeting of experts on 11th February.

40. In this respect, the way paragraph 7 of the Bonn communiqué, i.e. the nature of the coordinated reaction to the United States invitation to participate in the strategic defence initiative and the preparation of a European position on disarmament in NATO, is applied will throw light on the true intentions and possibilities of WEU, which are already limited by the very understandable decision to handle the civil aspects of "Eureka" technology in the European Community.

*The new outlook for WEU -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 1 ¹
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after “ collective ” insert “ and positive ”.

Signed : Cavaliere

1. See 5th sitting, 22nd May 1985 (amendment withdrawn).

*The new outlook for WEU –
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 2¹

tabled by Mr. Blaauw

2. In the draft order, leave out paragraph 3 and insert :

“ REQUESTS

The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to consider inviting observers from this delegation to attend their meetings. ”

Signed : Blaauw

1. See 5th sitting, 22nd May 1985 (amendment agreed to).

*The new outlook for WEU -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENTS 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8¹

tabled by MM. De Decker, Blaauw and Wilkinson

3. After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph :
“ (iv) Noting that the United States invitation to the European states to take part in the research programme relating to the strategic defence initiative is raising many questions in Europe ; ”.
4. After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph:
“ (v) Stressing that Europe must make every effort to ensure its technological independence whilst safeguarding its strategic interests; ”.
5. After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph :
“ (vi) Stressing that only by collaborating in the research stage of the SDI can Europe influence this programme whilst ensuring that account is taken of the specifically European aspects and requirements of its security ; ”.
6. After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph :
“ (vii) Stressing that it is essential for the European states to respond collectively as a political entity to the American SDI proposals ; ”.
7. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph :
“ 2. Make every effort to protect Europe’s strategic interests while maintaining its technological independence, in particular by developing a European space defence programme in conjunction with the SDI ; ”.
8. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph :
“ 3. In co-operation with the United States Government, study every aspect of the consequences for Europe’s security of the deployment of an SDI system ; ”.

Signed : De Decker, Blaauw, Wilkinson

1. See 5th sitting, 22nd May 1985 (amendment 3 agreed to ; amendments 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 negatived).

*The new outlook for WEU –
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 9¹

tabled by Mr. Verdon

9. Leave out paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :
“ 7. Consider Portugal becoming a member of WEU once the latter has effectively embarked upon the process of revitalisation. ”

Signed : Verdon

1. See 5th sitting, 22nd May 1985 (amendment withdrawn).

*East-West relations ten years after
the Helsinki final act*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Mr. Haase, Rapporteur*

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on East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act

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submitted by Mr. Haase, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted in committee by 9 votes to 0 with 8 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy, van der Werff (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens (Alternate: Haase), Sir Frederic Bennett (Alternate: Atkinson), MM. Berrier, Bianco, Bogaerts, Burger (Alternate: Hengel), Hill, Johnston, Mrs. Kelly (Alternate: Horacek), MM. Koehl, Lagneau, Lagorce, Martino, Masciadri, Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spitella (Alternate: Amadei), Vecchiotti, de Vries.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on East-West relations
ten years after the Helsinki final act

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that close co-operation between the American and European members of the Atlantic Alliance is the basis of Western European security and the maintenance of peace ;
- (ii) Considering that Western Europe's security means protecting it against local or global attacks ;
- (iii) Considering that in many cases in Eastern Europe human rights have not been respected and that this has not facilitated efforts for peace ;
- (iv) Welcoming the meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union with a view to reaching agreements to terminate the armaments race ;
- (v) Considering that the development of exchanges between East and West is likely to contribute to the reduction of tension ;
- (vi) Considering that the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, signed in Helsinki on 1st August 1975, is the essential charter for the reduction of tension in Europe, but that the principles it defines are still far from being applied everywhere, particularly where human rights are concerned ;
- (vii) Considering that the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki final act provides an opportunity to review its effectiveness as a contribution to peaceful coexistence in Europe ;
- (viii) Considering that WEU's rôle is to take the necessary steps to make the voice of the European pillar of the alliance heard on matters relating to security, as specified in the Rome Declaration ;
- (ix) Considering that a dialogue with members of the United States Congress is essential for the information and deliberations of members of the WEU Assembly on matters of this kind,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Regularly examine the state of all negotiations on disarmament and the limitation of armaments with a view *inter alia* to achieving through joint action :
 - (a) agreement with the eastern countries to specify the implications of the principles set out in the final act of the Helsinki conference ;
 - (b) more confidence-building measures, particularly through the presence of observers at military manoeuvres, in the context of the negotiations now being held in Stockholm ;
 - (c) the definition of a joint position on matters discussed by the United States and the Soviet Union at the Geneva conference with a view to agreement on the conditions for limiting the armaments race ;
2. Make use of the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki conference to obtain confirmation by all the signatory powers of their determination to apply effectively all the principles contained in the final act, particularly those relating to :
 - (a) respect for human rights ;
 - (b) the inviolability of frontiers ;
 - (c) the territorial integrity of states ;
 - (d) non-interference in the internal affairs of another state ;
 - (e) equality of treatment between nations and their right to self-determination ;
 - (f) co-operation between states ;
 - (g) the establishment of confidence-building measures ;

-
3. In the appropriate forums, actively promote :
- (a) the development of trade between eastern and western countries ;
 - (b) the adaptation of Cocom practice and lists to an increase in trade which does not jeopardise the West's security ;
 - (c) in agreement with the United States, the participation of Europe in space research of a scientific nature ;
 - (d) agreement between Western and Eastern European countries on improving protection of the environment ;
4. On the occasion of the renewal of the Warsaw Pact, seek agreement between the Atlantic Alliance and WEU countries on the one hand and the Warsaw Pact countries on the other in order to define the principle of non-recourse to the threat or use of force as set out in the Helsinki final act.

*Explanatory Memorandum**(submitted by Mr. Haase, Rapporteur)**I. Introduction*

1. Three reasons induced the WEU Assembly to pay particular attention this year to East-West relations which, in any event, have been a central theme of its activities and of those of the Council ever since WEU has existed :
2. (a) The will to give WEU new and broader activities, shared by the seven governments and expressed in the Rome Declaration, directs it more towards security and defence policy, which itself is very largely governed by the state of East-West relations.
3. (b) Ten years ago on 1st August, all the European countries, including the Soviet Union, its allies and the neutral countries, adopted a final act in conclusion to the conference on security and co-operation in Europe held in Helsinki which was supposed, for the first time since the second world war, to organise a peaceful order in Europe. Many events have since aroused fears that this order might again be disrupted and that the Helsinki final act is destined to remain an expression of good intentions to no effect. To mark this anniversary, the Assembly wished to study the outcome of this conference ten years later and, through it, the state of relations between the two blocs.
4. (c) The Warsaw Pact is to expire on 4th June 1985 and it will most certainly be extended. The question is whether the text will then be renewed as it now stands or whether it will be changed. This is perhaps the time to exert some influence in this matter. It might at least be possible to spark off public debate which might have repercussions on both sides. In the case of the Soviet Union and its allies, which, a priori, do not seem to be of the same mind about the wording of the treaty, a proposal might help some of these countries, even if not made by a member of the pact provided it corresponded to their own intentions and particularly if it appeared to consolidate peace in Europe. A condition would be for the West, for its part, to agree to equivalent wording in the North Atlantic Treaty and the modified Brussels Treaty, which would therefore have to be rectified, at least in the preambles, or completed by a declaration. If, on the other hand, the proposal to draft the preambles of the three treaties together, or at least to make a joint declaration in this sense, were to fail, the responsibility of each party would be evident and western opinion would see clearly that the Soviet Union is not really prepared to face up to détente.

5. It should also be emphasised that the change at the head of the Soviet Communist Party offers some hope of a new basis for peace which the President of the United States has endorsed. This probably applies more to the application of the Helsinki final act than to the disarmament negotiations, in which both the Soviet and the United States Governments are expected to adhere to interests which are unlikely to change very much. The WEU Assembly will have to follow very closely any move by the Soviet Union towards greater respect for human rights including liberalisation of penal law. Any such move would be revealing and mean that respect for human rights in the context of the Helsinki final act had made decisive progress.

6. In the past decade, it might admittedly have seemed that détente was soon to take over from the arms race and tension in East-West relations. It could have been thought that such a trend, thanks to the application of the Helsinki final act of July 1975, would lead to a liberalisation of the Eastern European régimes, a growth in exchanges of all kinds between East and West and the restoration of mutual confidence which could but help progress towards disarmament.

7. Since then, a series of events has seriously jeopardised past gains. The various negotiations on the limitation of armaments were broken off between 1980 and 1983, or at least were held in abeyance. The invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and then the establishment of a state of emergency in Poland in 1981 raised doubts about the will of the Soviets to apply the Helsinki final act. The results of the CSCE meetings in Belgrade in 1977-78 and Madrid in 1983 were disappointing, apart from the decision taken in Belgrade to open a conference on disarmament in Europe in Stockholm in 1984, a meeting on security in the Mediterranean in Venice and two meetings on human rights in Ottawa in 1985 and Bern in 1986. The Soviet Union's deployment of SS-20 continental-range missiles in Eastern Europe, followed by NATO's twofold decision in December 1979, Soviet refusal of the zero option proposed by President Reagan in November 1981 and the rejection by the two great powers of the compromise proposals made in July 1982 by Mr. Paul Nitze and Mr. Yuri Kvitsinsky following their "walk in the woods" started off the arms race again, to which President Reagan was to give a new dimension by announcing in March 1983 that he had decided to carry out a far-reaching

programme for promoting the use of space for defending the United States against Soviet nuclear missiles.

8. In the last months of 1984 there was admittedly some hope that it would be possible to make further progress towards détente thanks to the agreement reached by Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko in Geneva on 7th January 1985 to reopen negotiations on the limitation of armaments in the coming months. Signs of a return to a lawful situation in Poland with the end of the state of emergency and the freeing of most political prisoners then gave hope of greater respect for the Helsinki final act, while contacts were established between Americans and Soviets early in January 1985 to pave the way for the resumption of trade between the two countries.

9. However, the results achieved to date in these various areas are still too slender and it may be wondered whether it is not too soon to speak of an effective return to détente. Experience in the last ten years already allows certain conclusions to be drawn. First, East-West relations form a whole and it is impossible to expect any real progress for instance in any of the sectors covered by the Helsinki final act if the nuclear arms race continues. Nor is meaningful progress possible in the limitation of armaments without renewed confidence, increased exchanges and respect for certain principles in external relations and in the internal policies of all sides. But this does not mean global bargaining is either possible or desirable. Certain factors such as those relating to security and human rights cannot be called in question to offset advantages in other areas.

10. However, although generally speaking Europe and the United States are equally interested in détente it is natural that there should be differences in their approach to this interest. For instance, the United States, because of its worldwide responsibilities, has a global view of international relations and peace, whereas Europe tends to have a more regional view of its security, although it cannot separate the security of the area from the maintenance of peace which, to date, has been ensured mainly by reciprocal deterrence. It is not at all surprising that Europeans are anxious to take every opportunity to build up exchanges of all kinds within their own continent whereas the Americans look rather for direct agreement with the Soviets on strategic questions. It is gratifying that the seven WEU member countries indicated in the Rome Declaration of 27th October 1984 that they considered East-West relations should remain permanently on the agenda for their consultations in WEU.

11. In taking note of this joint decision by the Seven, the aim of the present report is to try to

examine what might be the content and results of talks in WEU on East-West relations. In view of the priority all our countries give to joint security and the close link between security and disarmament policy your Rapporteur will first examine the limitation of armaments before turning to other questions raised by a policy of détente.

12. But he must first recall Europe's guidelines in this respect :

13. (i) Europe cannot consider subjecting its security to the risks of a war which would very probably be nuclear. First and foremost, it must therefore avert any threat of war. So far, deterrence, mainly in the form of the American strategic nuclear force, has been the sole basis for its security. There are many reasons for thinking that it will not be able to enjoy this advantage indefinitely and the European members of the alliance should now start examining what the ratio of forces should be between East and West if they are to continue to ensure their security if the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is called in question.

14. (ii) Nor can Europe separate its defence from that of the United States which alone is capable of guaranteeing Europe's security in face of Soviet military strength. It cannot therefore have a policy towards Eastern Europe which is not concerted with that of its American allies.

15. (iii) Although there is at present no question of the reunification of Europe, divided for forty years by the iron curtain, the Western European countries cannot ignore the fate of Eastern Europe and this gives Western Europe a natural goal of endeavouring to develop relations between the two parts of the European continent.

16. The Rome Declaration on 27th October 1984 not only confirmed WEU's long-standing rôle of developing relations between Eastern and Western Europe, it also showed the governments' determination to give priority to this course. While, at the outset, controls on the armaments of member countries were an essential part of the modified Brussels Treaty because they guaranteed mutual assistance among European countries nine years after the end of the second world war, the main part is now the security of Europe from every angle. This admittedly includes defence but also disarmament and all matters covered by the Helsinki final act. But while, where defence proper is concerned, NATO is responsible for Europe's security through the integration of forces of the European and American members of the alliance which ensures that Western Europe has an American guarantee, more truly European cohesion is possible and desirable on the political but not the military level so that Europeans may

make their voice heard when their American allies have to take direct action, as in the case of negotiations on the limitation of armaments, and when the Western European countries themselves play a direct part, as in the CSCE. It should be recalled that the modified Brussels Treaty has a very broad concept of European security and that its Article VIII explicitly includes economic matters.

17. It therefore seems both natural and desirable for the Assembly to make a political and critical contribution to the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki final act on 1st August 1985. This contribution will carry even greater weight in that it will have followed the major Warsaw Pact meeting at which its members took important measures regarding the future of the organisation. These measures will obviously depend on the state of East-West relations and possible future prospects, which explain the importance the positions the Assembly adopts may have.

II. Negotiations on the limitation of armaments

18. Limitation of armaments is a vital element in any policy of détente whatever other aims there may be. In spite of the inevitable difficulties encountered in negotiations to this end, there are certain positive aspects for the superpowers, other countries and non-aligned countries as well as those of the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.

19. However, it is most important that any political or military measures the West might take to reduce armaments or the risk of war should not upset any part of the balance or leave open the possibility of Soviet military intervention. They must not be unilateral concessions made in the hope of pacifying the Soviet Union. Nor must they seek to stir up opposition to the organisation of society lest the Soviet Union find this intolerable and thus increasing tension. Your Rapporteur therefore considers that the negotiations on the limitation of armaments should conform to a number of principles:

20. (i) The limitation of armaments is destined to end the armaments race, quantitatively at least, and, consequently, free the budgets of the countries concerned of a fairly heavy unproductive burden. This is no small thing, be it for the United States, which has a large budget deficit, or the Soviet Union, whose productive investments are steadily diminishing since the state's investment possibilities are increasingly strained by expenditure on defence. Any guarantee that neither superpower will take advantage of a

reduction in the military expenditure of the other to try to gain dominance in an important sector of defence can but redirect investment towards areas more profitable for its economy and people. Other states too would be encouraged to restrict their defence efforts in favour of other activities.

21. (ii) Insofar as limitations extend to nuclear armaments, they would promote application of the non-proliferation treaty which includes an undertaking by the nuclear powers to offset other powers' renunciation of nuclear weapons by reducing their own nuclear capability. It is recalled that new members of the nuclear club justify their decision on the grounds that the nuclear powers do not respect the non-proliferation treaty and already have an advantage with their acquired rights.

22. (iii) While moderate nuclear armament by the two great powers ensured enough mutual deterrence to guarantee peace, the accumulation of nuclear weapons in no way enhances deterrence but increases the risk of accident or of someone gambling that a limited nuclear war is possible.

23. (iv) Although there is no direct link between expenditure on armaments and assistance to the third world, the disproportion between the two types of expenditure is particularly scandalous in a world marked by hunger in so many areas. This disproportion fuels revolt in public opinion, and in particular among the younger elements, against the injustice of society and some resort to violence to demonstrate their objection and opposition to western defence policy.

24. (v) Finally, even before negotiations achieve tangible results, the very fact that they are being held helps to reassure public opinion about the potential opponent's intentions in reducing tension and the risk of armed conflict.

25. The fact is that the negotiations which had been conducted by the two great powers for more than twenty years have been broken off in recent years. In 1980, the United States Senate refused to ratify the SALT II agreement on intercontinental nuclear missiles signed in Vienna on 18th June 1979 because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The START negotiations on nuclear warheads had begun on 30th June 1982, but the Soviet Union decided to suspend them in November 1983 because of the new situation arising from the deployment of American Euro-missiles in Europe. For the same reason, on 22nd November 1983 they halted the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).

26. This break led to the further development of several types of nuclear armaments by the two great powers:

27. (a) For intercontinental-range weapons, the United States had announced before beginning the START negotiations that it would conform to the SALT II provisions, even though this agreement had not been ratified, by not increasing its stock of strategic missiles above a ceiling of 2,250. However, both the United States and the Soviet Union continued their efforts to perfect their armaments, in particular by increasing the number of nuclear warheads carried by each missile and by improving the latter's specifications.

28. (b) Faced with a speed-up in the deployment of Soviet SS-20 Euromissiles, in autumn 1983 the United States began, in application of NATO's twofold decision of December 1979, to prepare for the deployment of 464 cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II missiles in Western Europe as from January 1984. The United Kingdom, the Federal Republic, Italy and finally Belgium have authorised deployment on their territory while the Netherlands has not yet followed up its decision of principle to allow deployment if the Soviet Union does not reduce its SS-20s deployed in Europe.

29. (c) On 23rd March 1983, President Reagan referred in a speech to a strategic defence initiative consisting of a long-term research programme designed to allow space to be used for defence against enemy strategic missiles. When work was complete, installation of laser systems on satellites was to allow the destruction of any ballistic missile in flight towards United States territory and ensure protection of American territory. \$26,000 million was earmarked for this programme over a period of five years. Congress has voted the first two annual instalments of \$1,500 million and \$3,500 million.

30. In fact, President Reagan's speech was just a step in a movement already started by the two great powers for the military use of space. Here reference is made to research to take account of the treaty of 27th January 1967 banning nuclear weapons in outer space, the convention of 26th May 1972, prolonged in 1977, linked with the SALT I agreements to halt the deployment of anti-missile missiles round certain centres, the possibilities afforded by the development of space technology in the two countries and the development of new weapons, particularly through laser technology. The decision then announced to earmark a large sum for such research was followed by the adoption in 1984 of a budget of about \$1,500 million for this purpose, increased in 1985 to about \$3,500 million. It can thus be seen that most of the budget effort should be concentrated on the last years of the programme, which makes one wonder whether the President of the United States did not deliberately choose to announce this programme in order to encourage the Soviet

Union to agree to overall negotiations on the limitation of armaments.

31. As Mr. Atkinson stressed in his report on East-West economic relations (Document 958) in 1984, it might seem that at a time when the United States has fully recovered its economic dynamism after a period of stagnation and when its growth rate is rising rapidly the Soviet Union can no longer increase the proportion of its gross domestic product earmarked for armaments without risking very serious economic difficulties. Although some Americans believe that a new stage in the arms race might give their country the upper hand once and for all and hence something of a victory without war, there is every indication that the Department of State's true aim in this matter was to lead the Soviet Union to the negotiating table to discuss the various aspects of the limitation of armaments. It may thus be claimed that it was President Reagan's speech on 3rd March 1983 that was behind the resumption of negotiations in 1985.

32. The world was therefore on the verge of a rapidly accelerating escalation of the arms race when, in autumn 1984, it was decided that the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two great powers should meet in Geneva on 7th and 8th January 1985. Since it already seemed certain in September that President Reagan would be re-elected and it seemed unlikely that a democrat candidat, considered a priori an easier partner for a dialogue, could win, the Soviet Union was no doubt encouraged not to wait for confirmation before reaching agreement with President Reagan. Certainly the very firm attitude so far adopted by President Reagan now places him in an easier position for negotiating both in the eyes of his Soviet partners, who will have to take account of this firmness, and in those of American and European public opinion which will not be tempted to suspect him of weakness.

33. The meeting between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko did not mark the opening of negotiations but was simply intended to prepare for a resumption on matters and in conditions which had to be defined. In fact, it produced positive, specific results. The major achievement was to define the three areas to be covered, namely strategic missiles, Euromissiles and the military use of space. Moreover, it is to be hoped that the opening of these three vital negotiations will introduce a new spirit into East-West relations and allow the other ongoing multilateral negotiations to move more quickly towards satisfactory solutions. These include the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, the conference on disarmament in Europe being held in Stockholm in the context of the CSCE and the Geneva negotiations in the special committee on chemical weapons of the Disarmament Conference.

34. (i) *The START negotiations*, which were opened on 30th June 1982 following the signing of the SALT II agreement, cover intercontinental-range nuclear weapons, i.e. carried by ballistic missiles with a range of at least 5,500 km. These negotiations had been broken off by the Soviet Union on 9th December 1983 and on 8th January 1985 Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko decided to reopen them. In 1982, the aim was to reduce the number of nuclear warheads of each of the two great powers by one-third. The United States, anxious above all to maintain its deterrent capability while protecting its strategic nuclear force against a Soviet first strike, had proposed the destruction of two old missiles each time one of the parties deployed one missile of a new type, which could have reduced the number of warheads deployed by each side to about 5,000, while allowing the progressive introduction of mobile launchers.

35. (ii) *The INF talks* cover intermediate-range weapons, i.e. with a range of less than 5,000 km. In November 1981, President Reagan proposed the zero option, i.e. the United States would not deploy Euromissiles if the Soviet Union agreed to dismantle the SS-20s it had already deployed. The Soviet Union refused this solution under which it would have had to dismantle weapons already deployed while the Americans would have merely had to refrain from introducing new weapons. In July 1982, the two negotiators, Mr. Paul Nitze and Mr. Yuri Kvitsinsky, seemed to have agreed on a compromise solution: the United States would have deployed only 300 cruise missiles and no Pershing IIs if the Soviet Union kept to only 75 SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe, but in the end neither government endorsed this solution.

36. The Soviet Union must then have felt it could be rather uncompromising in this respect because of the concern and unrest caused in 1982 and 1983 by the prospect of the deployment between January 1984 and 1990 of 464 cruise missiles and 108 Pershing IIs in five Western European countries in face of the 330 Soviet SS-20s, each carrying three nuclear warheads. This unrest might well have led the European countries, which had initially accepted NATO's twofold decision of December 1979 providing for such deployment, not to fulfil their undertakings when the time came. However, in autumn 1983 the first preparatory measures were taken and in January deployment of American Euromissiles began in the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic and Italy. Deployment began in Belgium early in 1985. The Soviet Union was therefore able to see that it could no longer hope to take advantage of the concern of the peoples of Western Europe to separate their countries from NATO and that it was in its own interests as well as those of the Western European countries to terminate the

Eurostrategic arms race. Based in Western Europe, these weapons could in fact reach a vital part of the Soviet Union while, although the whole of Western Europe was threatened by the SS-20s, the United States was out of range. Mr. Gorbachev's proposal in April 1985 to freeze the deployment of Euromissiles at their present level could not, at the present stage of deployment on both sides, be endorsed by the West as it would have finalised an imbalance tipped sharply in the Soviet Union's favour.

37. (iii) *President Reagan's speech* on 23rd March 1983 in which he referred to a strategic defence initiative, soon dubbed "star wars", immediately worried the Soviet Union, although the latter had already been conducting research for military purposes in space for several years. This initiative was admittedly a long-term programme, but it was seen as a threat by the Soviet Union because, if successful, it would give American territory almost total protection against Soviet ballistic missiles and thus deprive Soviet nuclear weapons of all deterrent credibility. Agreed, the Soviet Union could also embark upon military space research. Although in certain areas such as electronics it seems to be trailing behind the United States, in others, such as ballistics or astronautics, it is holding its own. However, the American research programme calls for the enormous investment of \$26,000 million in the first five years and it seems that the United States is capable of shouldering this burden in view of its economic and monetary recovery since 1983. Conversely, the Soviet Union already seems to be having serious difficulty in maintaining the present pace of its armaments effort and, for the past ten years or so, has managed to do so only at the expense of its civil investment. To embark upon such a costly new operation might be disastrous for its entire economy.

38. It is not therefore surprising that the Soviet Union has done its utmost to induce the Americans to halt their research into the military use of space. On 24th June 1984, it proposed holding negotiations on the subject in Vienna. Without rejecting this proposal, the Americans made it conditional on reopening the START and INF negotiations, which the Soviets refused.

39. The meeting between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko allowed both sides to adjust their positions. The Soviets made real concessions since the Americans did not go back on their decision to continue their research nor did they agree to a moratorium on weapons tests. There were no prior conditions to the joint decision to hold negotiations. But it is difficult to foresee how these negotiations will be able to proceed since they are to deal with weapons many elements of which do not yet exist, and this should make the dialogue rather difficult.

40. (iv) *The Geneva communiqué* specifies that the three negotiations will be conducted by a single delegation from each side divided into three groups. This is probably designed to ensure the independence of each series of negotiations and their obvious interdependence, since it is only the concessions made by the Soviets in regard to nuclear weapons that allowed them to obtain a no less important concession from the Americans, i.e. that space weapons too be subject to negotiation.

41. (v) Finally, the communiqué specifies that the aim of the two countries is to limit and reduce armaments and adds that their efforts "should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms", which probably goes further than the hopes one might nourish for the negotiations. However, the Geneva communiqué had hardly been issued before very serious differences of interpretation emerged between the American and Soviet negotiators. Speaking on television in the presence of Soviet journalists on 13th January, Mr. Gromyko said he considered that :

- (i) the continued deployment of American Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe would call in question the future negotiations ;
- (ii) negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons must be linked with negotiations on the military use of space ;
- (iii) French and British nuclear forces must be taken into account in disarmament talks ;
- (iv) it was not possible to separate research into the military use of space from the deployment of new weapons in space ;
- (v) the Soviet aim was to achieve equality in security.

42. There was an immediate response from Mr. Shultz and Mr. Weinberger, United States Secretary of Defence, who asserted that :

- (i) the United States would pursue deployment of Euromissiles in Europe as planned ;
- (ii) they saw no link between talks on space weapons and the limitation of nuclear weapons ;
- (iii) preparatory work on space defence would continue.

43. Furthermore, the British and French Governments stated that they would not agree to their nuclear forces being included in the negotiations, at least as long as the two great powers had not considerably reduced their own arsenals.

44. Undue importance should probably not be attached to remarks made before the opening of such significant negotiations. It is normal for each participant to adopt extreme positions now so as to be able to make concessions later. The fact that the United States has since appointed its representatives for the three areas of negotiation implies that it by no means considers the result of the Geneva meeting jeopardised by Mr. Gromyko's demands which were perhaps not discussed in Geneva but which were in any event already known in the West, just as the refusal of the Americans and their allies was well known to the Soviet Union. The initial stages of the negotiations were again accompanied by such statements which are largely a matter of tactics.

45. Thus, although French and British nuclear weapons, which moreover represent only about 3% of the nuclear potential of the Atlantic Alliance, had not been officially taken into account, the SALT I agreement provided for slightly more means of delivery for the Soviets than the American entitlement which means that the negotiators of the agreement had not overlooked this British and French contribution to the military strength of the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, it would be difficult to insist on France and the United Kingdom conforming to the results of negotiations in which they have not been asked to take part. Truly successful negotiations would most probably bring all the nuclear powers to review their armaments position but Mr. Gromyko must well realise that such a count cannot be a prior condition to the opening of American-Soviet negotiations.

46. It should probably also be borne in mind that the American refusal to modify the programme for the deployment of Euromissiles or to delay its research programme into the defensive use of space is also a matter of tactics. There is every reason to expect that the negotiations which have just started will be lengthy and neither side has any interest in the intervening years being used to speed up the development of their defence systems since this might change the ratio of forces during the negotiations and slow down and render even more difficult the final outcome, not to mention all the tension and misunderstanding that the deployment of new weapons and the ensuing reactions against agreement that might be aroused among public opinion. But possibly one of the first questions which the negotiators will have to solve will be the measures to be taken during the negotiating period for slowing down the deployment or development of new weapons. This will be especially tricky in space matters since the military use of space for observation and verification purposes will still be essential and, although instruments of war should not be placed in orbit,

means of control in space will, on the contrary, have to be encouraged.

47. Successive statements by the two governments directly concerned by President Reagan's initiative show some convergence. The Soviet Union made it clear that it would not react radically to American research into space defence until the testing stage was reached but, on 14th February, Mr. Israelyan, Soviet representative at the United Nations disarmament conference, said the first tests would put an immediate, permanent end to the American-Soviet negotiations which are to be opened in Geneva on 12th March. It is indeed evident that research cannot be verified effectively but tests are far easier to detect although the distinction between research and testing is not clear-cut. The negotiations on the use of space for defensive purposes will very probably go into this point.

48. A more overall view of Western Europe's interests in this matter shows that the first is obviously the success of the negotiations as a whole, which should ensure Europe's security while reducing the armaments of the two great powers and their direct or indirect threats to Europe. This is clearly the case for Euro-missiles which are targeted solely on Europe whereas Europeans have only a very small say in their use. It is also so for the use of space for defending American territory against intercontinental nuclear weapons because the result would be to separate Europe's fate from that of the United States and consequently pave the way for the possibility of a limited war in which Europe would inevitably be the battlefield. To a lesser degree, it is also the case for strategic missiles because the excessive number of such weapons held by the two great powers makes no real contribution to mutual deterrence but involves a multiplication of useless expenditure and perhaps too a risk of war through misunderstanding or accident.

49. European views have not been neglected by the two great powers. Even before the Geneva meeting, the Soviet Union instigated exchanges of views with Western European countries, in particular thanks to Mr. Gorbachev's visit to the United Kingdom. The United States for its part informed its allies of the Geneva negotiations in NATO and the American negotiators visited several European capitals for this purpose.

50. However, there is room for consultations between Europeans to try to ascertain the implications for Europe of the Geneva negotiations, in particular, to determine Europe's reaction to President Reagan's decision on the use of space for the defence of the United States and possible European proposals on measures to be taken for the use of space for disarmament.

51. On 20th February, during her visit to Washington, Mrs. Thatcher, United Kingdom Prime Minister, expressed a position which corresponds to that of several European governments. She guaranteed her government's full support for the American research programme but reserved it support for everything relating to tests and, a fortiori, deployment. Consideration should be given to these stages only in the light of the results of the negotiations. Mrs. Thatcher was also reported as wishing British firms to be invited to take part in the work and benefits arising from President Reagan's initiative, which endorses a proposal made to European firms by the President himself.

52. The Federal German Government for its part considers President Reagan's initiative likely to enhance the security of the West as a whole insofar as it helps to protect the United States' second strike capability which is, in the last resort, the guarantee of deterrence, but it too asks the United States to confine its activities to research as long as the Geneva negotiations continue.

53. However, the proposals by Mr. de la Gorce, French representative at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, on 12th June 1984, and published by the French Ministry for External Relations on 7th January 1985 differ fairly significantly from the positions adopted by the other European members of the Atlantic Alliance. The main points are :

"... international consultations must be held without delay on the following matters :

- (a) very strict limitation of anti-satellite systems, including a ban on those which might reach satellites in high orbit whose protection is most important from the standpoint of the strategic balance ;
- (b) a five-year renewable ban on the deployment on the ground, in the atmosphere or in space of guided energy weapons capable of destroying ballistic missiles or satellites at a great distance and, as a corollary, a ban on the corresponding tests ;
- (c) strengthening the existing declaration system introduced by the convention of 14th June 1975 for registering objects in space, each launching state or organisation undertaking to provide more detailed information on the features and rôle of objects launched so as to improve verification possibilities ;
- (d) an undertaking by the United States and the Soviet Union to extend to the satellites of third countries pro-

visions relating to the immunity of certain space objects which they have already agreed at bilateral level ... ”.

54. These proposals, which seek to reserve the prospects of progress offered by space research for peaceful purposes and for instruments of observation, communication and control which may contribute to international stability, all-round security and hence peace, might apparently be considered carefully by all the European members of the alliance, even though differences may still remain regarding their attitude in the immediate future towards Euromissiles and, in the longer term, towards British and French nuclear weapons. In any event, such differences should not prevent the representatives of the Seven meeting at the appropriate level and in WEU to try to overcome them and to be as united as possible in presenting the essential requirements of Europe's security to their American allies.

55. It also seems that the opening of the Geneva negotiations will give new impetus to other negotiations, some of which have been continued for many years, such as the *MBFR* talks in Vienna. For instance, on 14th February 1985, the Soviet Union tabled a proposal at that conference, which had been sitting since 1973 without producing any noticeable results, for reducing Soviet land forces by 20,000 men and American land forces by 13,000 men in Central Europe. This agreement would be valid for three years during which the countries in the area would undertake not to increase their own forces. The reductions would be verified by observation posts on both sides. Finally, all forces of the two alliances in the area would be limited to 900,000 men of which 700,000 in the land forces. Admittedly, these proposals do not wholly meet western requirements since the West wants prior agreement on the basis for calculating troop levels on each side, but they may allow the negotiations to be revived.

56. Finally, the *Stockholm conference*, which started at the beginning of 1984 in the framework of the CSCE, might advance in two areas, i.e. renunciation of the use and hence the threat of force in European conflicts and, above all, the prior announcement of manoeuvres and the obligation to invite observers from the other side. Some of the decisions of this type taken at Helsinki were tending to lapse.

III. Economic relations

57. One intention voiced by the signatories of the Helsinki final act in 1975 was to promote exchanges of all kinds between Eastern and Western European countries and, first of all, trade. Many considerations were behind this

intention, starting with the fact that more trade is good in itself because it stimulates the economy. It was also based on the idea that détente has to be a many-sided process ; if disarmament is to be encouraged mutual confidence must prevail in public opinion and here trade is a help. Finally, each side probably held different views about the possible interest for the Soviet Union and the western allies of developing trade. There were schools of thought on both sides which considered that there was real danger in such trade, in the West because it might increase Soviet military strength or even make the western countries dependent on the Soviet Union and in the East because it might lead to a dismantling of the socialist economic system and subject the eastern countries, through their debts for instance, to too much western influence. Although on both sides Helsinki was heralded as a victory for those who advocated more trade, the other side has made its influence felt strongly since 1980, in the United States and the Soviet Union more than among the European partners of the two great powers.

58. However, during his 1984 election campaign President Reagan asserted that he would endeavour to have more constructive relations with the Soviet Union during his second term of office and there are good reasons for thinking that he does not intend to confine these relations to the limitation of armaments. In any event, this seems essential if there is to be better understanding between the United States and its European allies for although differences in armaments questions between the two sides of the Atlantic are limited, they are far greater in terms of East-West economic relations. While the proclamation of martial law in Poland was met with relative unanimity among the western countries at the Versailles summit meeting in 1982 in regard to the political language to be used with the Soviet Union and its allies, the economic measures then taken by the United States were strongly criticised by the European members of the Atlantic Alliance.

59. (i) The most serious crisis related to the conclusion of long-term agreements between the Federal Republic, France and Italy on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other for building a pipeline linking the natural gas-producing areas of northern Siberia with Western Europe and delivering Soviet gas to these countries. The United States criticised the Western Europeans for providing the Soviet Union with a stable flow of foreign currency and above all for making their energy supplies dependent on the Soviet Union. Fear of such steps was further strengthened by the threat mentioned on Soviet television in October 1984 of suspending deliveries of oil to the United Kingdom because of the miners' strike.

60. It is difficult to assess to what extent these three countries depend on the Soviet Union. In terms of the percentage of gas imported, it would be between 28% and 35%. As a percentage of energy consumed it would fall to 5% or 6%. Moreover, by acquiring Soviet gas, these countries are trying to become less dependent on their usual suppliers, the Maghreb and the Middle East, thereby diversifying their imports. One way or another there is at present over-production of natural gas throughout the world, which further reduces Western European dependence on the Soviet Union.

61. Since the United States was unable to make its views prevail with its allies, it then imposed an embargo on providing the Soviet Union with know-how under licence from the United States which would allow the gas pipeline to be built and operated. This made it difficult for the European firms concerned to continue operations. The question was settled in November 1982 when the embargo was lifted. The International Energy Agency was at the same time asked to conduct a study on energy. According to information obtained by your Rapporteur, this study, without calling for restrictions on imports of Soviet gas, advocated certain measures to limit the dependence of each purchasing country: build-up of stocks, interconnecting distribution networks, equipment able to run on both oil and gas. No collective action is envisaged.

62. (ii) The problem of restrictions on exports of advanced technology to the Soviet Union also brings out differences between the United States and its European partners in the Atlantic Alliance. All agree to ban exports of technology directly usable for defence purposes, but they cannot agree on a definition. Some American experts tend to consider that anything the Soviets import is, in the long run, destined to increase that country's military strength in view of the high level of investment in defence in the Soviet economy. Moreover, modern weaponry involves the use of increasingly varied technology in the concept of weapons systems, particularly electronics. The lists drawn up by the Co-ordinating Committee for controlling exports of the Atlantic Alliance (Cocom) were therefore revised and increased in 1984. These are lists of products banned for export to Eastern European countries until 1988 to which were added computers and communications equipment. This hampered the completion of current contracts between firms in the Federal Republic, France and the United Kingdom on the one hand and the Eastern European countries on the other for telephone equipment. Moreover, it appears that the United States believes these measures, taken for a five-year period, should be prolonged from year to year, which would make these contracts lapse permanently.

63. (iii) At the beginning of 1982, western loans to the eastern countries were practically stopped. However, while European bankers were in no hurry to grant loans to countries as heavily in debt as Poland and Romania, there was no hesitation for better-placed countries such as Hungary in 1982 and the Soviet Union which, after having tried to avoid debts with the West, reappeared on the loan market in 1984. Since 1982, the United States, on the other hand, had been trying to reduce export credits to the eastern countries and above all to withhold public support for them. Thus, not without good grounds, it has seen that the OECD includes the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia among the "wealthy countries" to which member countries have agreed to grant credit only at a high rate of interest (13.6% since June 1984) in cases where such credits had state backing. This decision is obviously a handicap for Western European countries which, because of the weakness of their currencies, have to maintain very high domestic rates of interest. The United States for its part grants no more guaranteed credits to the Soviet Union.

64. (iv) Another obstacle to the development of East-West trade is that it is unbalanced and the West has either to lend the eastern countries much of the cost of their purchases from the West or to trade on a barter basis for which western firms are not well equipped. In other words, the development of East-West trade needs to be organised on a basis which cannot be improvised because of the nature of the Soviet economy.

65. (v) The practice of economic sanctions against certain eastern countries for political reasons also leads to restrictions on international trade and to differences between the allies. This for instance is so for Poland which, in November 1981, applied for membership of the International Monetary Fund in order to alleviate its financial situation by using special drawing rights to pay back some of its debts. This move was also in the interests of the Western European countries to which Poland owed money and, after agreeing to Poland's application being suspended when martial law was introduced, they subsequently agreed that the application should be accepted when the amnesty law was passed in July 1984, whereas the United States continued to oppose it until the end of the year.

66. Generally speaking, the United States seems to wish to encourage trade with Hungary and Romania, which appear to be pursuing a policy which is more independent of the Soviet Union, but to limit trade with the Soviet Union, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, in particular by

refusing to sell them advanced technology, whereas for economic reasons the European members of the Atlantic Alliance are more interested in trade with the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic. Furthermore, the Federal Republic attaches special importance to the maintenance or even development of trade between the two German states because it fosters better relations between the two parts of Germany and hence between the two blocs.

67. The policy of opening up trade with the East advocated by Mr. Shultz is certainly not unanimously endorsed by American public opinion and Congress. Although approval is certain when, as with sales of grain, a large part of the electorate is concerned, it is far less certain for industrial products and it is difficult to foresee to what extent American-Soviet trade might be liberalised.

68. But Western Europe's objections to the development of trade with the Eastern European countries are not so serious as the United States', first because Europeans have always been more sceptical than Americans about the effectiveness of economic sanctions and second because they have always believed that the development of trade between the two halves of Europe furthered détente and might have an effect – admittedly difficult to assess – on other aspects of East-West relations, be it the limitation of armaments or evolution within the Eastern European countries.

69. There is another area in which all the European countries in both East and West have a major interest in developing economic co-operation, i.e. ecology, which is now a major concern of Western Europeans because of the threats to their environment. Here, interests are shared and there is no reason to limit exchanges to elaborate, develop and improve techniques to protect the environment. On the contrary, the joint definition of ecological standards can but foster trade in end-items between the two parts of Europe and at the same time improve the protection of nature since there is no iron curtain in this context.

70. In recent years, concerned not to provoke conflict with their American partners, the European members of the Atlantic Alliance have probably been too acquiescent to American requirements. Certainly nothing could be more detrimental to Europe's security than a confrontation between them on trade matters. However, the greater flexibility the United States administration is now showing in trade should allow the Europeans to make their views better known, if they are convergent.

71. External trade is obviously the responsibility of the Community rather than of WEU, although the modified Brussels Treaty also

requires consultations between its members on economic matters, thus recognising the importance of the economic aspects of European security. In any event, insofar as trade is part of overall relations which dominate Europe's joint security, it must not be overlooked by the WEU Council, if only in order to promote effective consultation with the United States which, for its part, has considered setting up a committee of wise men appointed by heads of state to work out proposals for an allied summit meeting at which every aspect of East-West relations would be examined, including the bilateral aspects of economic relations. The United States worked out several like proposals in 1984 but Europe, although it had everything to gain, has so far done little to promote its views on which there is almost unanimity.

72. Moreover, the Soviet Union and its allies have shown little interest in trade relations with the West in recent years. The huge debts incurred by Poland and Romania possibly seemed to threaten their economic structure and perhaps their exclusive dependence on Moscow. Between 1981 and 1983, the eastern countries' imports from the West fell by more than 30%. The Soviet Union has therefore tried to limit its trade with the West to essentials and to avoid accepting credit. Thus, its purchases of grain from the United States, which rose sharply during the same period, were paid for in cash.

73. Now that the United States and the Soviet Union are preparing to reopen negotiations on the limitation of armaments, a thaw is already starting in economic relations. For the first time in six years a delegation from the United States Department of Commerce, led by Mr. Olmer, visited the Soviet Union from 8th to 10th January 1985 to promote a resumption of trade between the two countries. Furthermore, the ten-year Soviet-American agreement on economic, industrial and technical co-operation, which expired in June 1984, was renewed until 1994 and the United States administration made no secret of the fact that it was prepared to encourage exports of non-agricultural products too, including non-strategic equipment items, to the Soviet Union, and even remove import restrictions on a few items from the Soviet Union, some of which date back to the Korean war. In a speech at the University of Los Angeles in October 1984, Mr. Shultz remarked that these restrictions had not furthered the United States economic interests any more than they had gained political concessions from the Soviet Union, and he advocated reviving economic co-operation between the two countries.

74. On 30th November 1983, the Assembly adopted Recommendation 401 on economic relations with the Soviet Union. It recommended that the Council "adapt these principles

accordingly in the light of results obtained in international negotiations on the limitation of armaments". Your Rapporteur believes these principles are still fully valid but circumstances in 1985 should allow them to be applied flexibly. One aspect of President Reagan's initiative is that American defence policy calls on a large number of new technologies in which the military aspect is not always the principal one. Consequently, "to ban all exports of advanced technology which might be used for armaments purposes" would be more or less tantamount to banning any development of trade with the East and in recent months the United States has brought strong pressure to bear on its Cocom partners to lengthen the list of equipment banned for export. Your Rapporteur considers that, while taking account of American views, the European partners should cautiously continue to try to develop their trade with the East, avoiding any unnecessary extension of the Cocom lists.

IV. Political aspects of East-West relations

75. It is obviously the political aspects of the Helsinki final act which have been the least respected and political differences largely account for difficulties with other aspects. For instance, it was the invasion of Afghanistan that led the United States Congress to refuse to ratify the SALT II agreement.

76. Generally speaking, the West considered it had made a major concession to the Soviet Union in the recognition of states and frontiers, although the Helsinki conference involved a real concession by the Soviet Union which had finally accepted the presence of the United States and Canada at a meeting which it had wanted to be exclusively "all-European". The firmness of the western powers in this matter had been extremely successful and, above all, had shown the Soviet Union that it could not hope to divide the West on such an important question. An undertaking to respect the sovereignty of all states was to the advantage of both sides. The Soviet Union and its allies had made serious concessions to western views on personal freedom and exchanges of all kinds. However, the concessions each side made were different because by recognising states and frontiers the West was merely acknowledging a situation which it had in fact accepted for a long time and it reserved the right, moreover, to call this situation in question by peaceful means, whereas the concessions made by the Soviet Union concerned the future. But there are many signs that in 1975 the Soviet Union was surprised by the extent of claims in its own country, and above all in the people's democracies, which invoked the Helsinki final act in calling for far-reaching changes in the communist régime.

77. The fact that the Helsinki final act made no provision for registering violations of commitments nor, a fortiori, for sanctions obviously weakened considerably the act's stipulations since everyone was free to interpret it on a case-by-case basis.

78. The invasion of Afghanistan, the maintenance of arrangements to protect the inhabitants of the eastern countries against information from the West and finally the repressive measures taken in the Soviet Union itself against dissidents and in the people's democracies – particularly in Poland since 1981 – against persons and organisations calling for greater freedom were violations of the final act and led to retaliatory measures in East-West trade and the limitation of armaments. Representatives of Poland were even boycotted.

79. The Soviet Union presented many events which seemed to challenge Soviet domination as being the result of western intervention which would also have been contrary to the Helsinki provisions since it would have constituted interference in the internal affairs of certain states and would have called in question régimes and frontiers recognised at Helsinki. Thus, the invasion of Afghanistan was presented as justified retaliation to agitation against the Afghan communist régime which the West was accused of having provoked and kept aflame. Similarly, the crisis in Poland with the activities of Solidarity was denounced as a challenge to the Polish régime from external powers. The absence of freedom of information in the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union makes it difficult to ascertain the credence to be given to interpretations thus circulated.

80. Consequently, contrary to the hopes of its signatories, the Helsinki final act laid no solid foundation for understanding between East and West on their political differences. Subsequent verification conferences in Belgrade and Madrid have done little to allow these difficulties to be overcome.

81. However, examination of the state of East-West political relations at the end of 1984 shows not a clear turning point, as for disarmament and economic relations, but a number of factors favourable to the redevelopment of détente, provided the facts are seen in their historical context and not in relation to principles or articles in international conventions.

82. Indeed, although the last decade produced many conflicts in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the two great powers have carefully avoided direct involvement and consequently confrontation. The most serious conflict is certainly the war between Iraq and Iran. The former is a major customer of the Soviet Union, for arms at

least, but the Soviet Union has avoided giving it direct military assistance. It has sent only a very limited number of advisers whose sole task is believed to be the training of Iraqi experts in handling arms bought in the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Union is believed to have started delivering arms to Iran in 1984. The United States for its part made it abundantly manifest that it did not wish to supply Iran with the wherewithal to prolong the war and finally opted for Iraq in spite of Soviet support for that country. Thus, with the coming to power in Iran of the most fundamentalist factions of the Moslem world, the United States and the Soviet Union considered that the most serious danger for them, for international balance and for the maintenance of peace in the world came from Iran's threats to the stability of the entire Moslem world. Neither used the means at its disposal to take advantage of this war for the purposes of East-West rivalry.

83. It is more difficult to assess the attitude of the Soviet Union in other conflicts in the Middle East, particularly because it is very difficult to analyse the relationship between the Soviet Union and certain countries such as Libya. Libya is certainly well armed thanks to its purchases from the Soviet Union. But there is no indication of a Soviet hand behind the attacks on the multilateral buffer force in Lebanon in 1983 or behind the attacks organised since then by terrorist organisations established in Libya or behind the latter's aggression in Chad. Even if the Soviet Union supplied arms, it remained well behind the scenes in regard to all the dubious operations of countries claiming to be its allies, probably to avoid confrontation with the United States, just as the United States has been very cautious in its activities abroad since the end of the Vietnam war, particularly where Afghanistan is concerned. Finally, at the end of 1984, there was no direct conflict between the two great powers and both could consider resuming a proper relationship without disturbing its relations with its allies.

84. Moreover, the trend of the freedom of the population in the Soviet Union and the people's democracies is not altogether negative. Some eastern bloc countries now seem to have a certain degree of freedom, mainly but not solely economic, of which they had been deprived in the past. This is the case of Hungary. Repression is still widespread, particularly in the Soviet Union, but it seems to have diminished since the Helsinki conference, although information on the matter is not very reliable.

85. The circumstances of the Polish question itself were different from the crises in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, since it was the Polish Government itself that took repressive measures to try to curb the develop-

ment and action of Solidarity. It was the government that had recourse to a state of emergency, numerous arrests and various repressive measures. But the state of emergency has been terminated. However, there is still considerable uncertainty about developments in Poland where repressive measures alternate with measures of détente for reasons which evade us. Between the condemnation of the murderers of Father Popieluszko after a public trial with a full hearing and the arrest the following week of the principal Solidarity leaders, the conduct of the Polish authorities is far from clear and points at the intention, imposed by the Soviet Union or not, not to tolerate true free trade unionism or even, perhaps, religious freedom.

86. The Soviet Union still exercises pressure on the countries it dominates. In September 1984, Mr. Honecker, Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic, had to cancel the visit he was to have made to the Federal Republic following Soviet pressure intended to put a brake on the development of relations between the two German states which nevertheless conformed fully to the Helsinki final act. But pressure is not the same as in the past and leaves a wider margin for the adaptation of states' internal policies to what the people want, which allows them, in repressing any political opposition, to avoid availing themselves of the means they had no hesitation about using in 1956.

87. Finally, it should be recalled that although the Belgrade meeting to verify application of the Helsinki final act was a complete failure this was not so for the Madrid meeting which, even before the two great powers had agreed to resume negotiations on the limitation of armaments, allowed the East-West dialogue to continue on a number of important matters in specialised meetings. Although renunciation of the use of force is still a very precarious element of stability and peace in an over-armed world, proceedings at the Stockholm conference allow it to be hoped that meaningful progress will be made towards definite measures to limit the level of armaments in Europe and to consolidate mutual confidence, just as recent events in Poland perhaps indicate that the Helsinki decisions on human rights have not remained a dead letter.

88. It may therefore be thought that a resumption of negotiations on the limitation of armaments, accompanied by a reactivation of trade, will also lead to an improvement in East-West political relations. Conversely, if the West adopted uncompromising positions because the eastern countries failed to apply the Helsinki final act, the consequence might be to block progress towards disarmament and the liberalisation of trade and, in the long run, to heighten political tension. The international situation at the beginning of 1985 places the West before a

choice on which will depend the future of East-West relations and probably also the future of western society itself, which is finding it increasingly difficult to understand the need for the effort it has to make to ensure its security which it considers to be threatened just as much by the build-up of nuclear weapons or prospects of an extension of defence systems in space as by Soviet policy.

89. East-West meetings planned for the coming months, including the Ottawa meeting on human rights, must be used to reach a realistic agreement on these matters, i.e. one which takes account of what the Soviet Union considers essential for its security, even if this is far from satisfactory from a western point of view. It is better to have a minimum definition of the rights which the parties involved will really respect than a more satisfactory definition of commitments which would be flouted, as were the undertakings the Soviet Union accepted in Helsinki. But the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states must not be used as an excuse for not respecting rights thus defined.

V. Conclusions

90. The President of the Assembly informed your Rapporteur that he sent the following telegram to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council on 3rd January :

“ Welcoming the opening of American-Soviet talks on the control of armaments, I count strongly on the Council of WEU, in pursuance of the Rome Declaration, to examine without delay the guarantees

necessary for the security of Western Europe in the new conditions that might be created by a significant reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons and to make known the importance all its members attribute to an international agreement reserving the application of space research to peaceful uses. In conveying my best wishes for the new year to you and the members of the Council I can do this in no better way than by expressing on behalf of the Assembly the hope that WEU will have an even more active rôle to play in efforts for peace, as you yourself expressed the wish when addressing the Assembly. Signed: J.-M. Caro, President of the WEU Assembly ”.

91. It is to be hoped that an answer will be soon received to this message since the disarmament experts of the WEU member countries met in Bonn on 11th February in accordance with the proposal made by Mr. Genscher, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, when addressing the Assembly on 6th December 1984. There is every reason to believe that the experts will have taken account of the letter from Mr. Burt, United States Under-Secretary of Defence, asking the members of WEU not to take separate decisions on arms control policy. This does not seem to exclude consultations in WEU, but leaves the United States a free hand in negotiations.

92. Moreover, since the Warsaw Pact is due for renewal, your Rapporteur proposes that the Council be invited to ask the countries of the Warsaw Pact and of the Atlantic Alliance to include in the two treaties the principle of the renunciation of the threat of recourse to force as defined in the Helsinki final act.

East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act

AMENDMENT 1 ¹

tabled by Lord Reay

1. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add :
“ while bearing in mind that any reaffirmation of the non-use of force should be accompanied by an agreed confirmation of the need to respect human rights. ”

Signed : Reay

1. See 3rd sitting, 21st May 1985 (amendment consolidated with amendment 3 and agreed to).

East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act

AMENDMENT 2 ¹

tabled by Mr. Lagorce

2. After paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph :
“ Considering that WEU’s action should allow the CSCE process to be strengthened and in particular the views of the European pillar of the alliance to be heard at the Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe ; ”.

Signed : Lagorce

1. See 2nd sitting, 21st May 1985 (amendment agreed to).

East-West relations tens years after the Helsinki final act

AMENDMENT 3¹

tabled by Mr. Lagorce

3. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add :
- “ while preparing and implementing specific mutual measures of confidence and confirming by common agreement the need to respect human rights. ”

Signed : Lagorce

1. See 3rd sitting, 21st May 1985 (amendment consolidated with amendment 1 and agreed to).

East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act

AMENDMENT 4¹

tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and Lord Reay

4. In the draft recommendation proper, at the end of paragraph 2(d), add “ with immediate application to Afghanistan ”.

Signed : Bennett, Reay

1. See 3rd sitting, 21st May 1985 (amendment agreed to).

*Written Questions 249 to 256 and replies of the Council
to Written Questions 249 to 252 and 254 to 255*

QUESTION 249

*put by Mr. Hill
on 17th October 1984*

Is the Council aware that the Belgian Government is examining a contract for the sale of \$1 billion worth of nuclear equipment to Libya ?

Why should Libya, with vast reserves of gas and oil and a small population, need a nuclear power plant ?

Will the Council give the Belgian Government assurances that, if it decides not to accept this contract, no other Western European country will accept such a contract from Libya ?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 19th April 1985*

The Council is aware of negotiations that have taken place between Libya and a private Belgian firm which related to the non-sensitive part of two nuclear power stations, namely the industrial architecture and part of the conventional hardware. It is to be noted that the Libyan authorities have stated that their aim is to prepare for the " post-oil " era.

As far as the Council knows, no decision has yet been taken as to the follow-up to this matter.

QUESTION 250

*put by Mr. Wilkinson
on 22nd October 1984*

Is the Council aware of the passing of a nuclear attack submarine of the Soviet Union hidden behind a Soviet freighter through the Straits of Gibraltar on 19th September 1984 under water instead of surfacing and showing the flag ?

Is such a passage acceptable to the coastal states of Spain and Morocco and according to the 1958 Geneva law of the sea convention ?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 18th March 1985*

1. The Council has seen reports about an incident involving a Soviet submarine in the Straits of Gibraltar on 18th September 1984 and a Soviet merchant vessel.

2. The Council considers that it would be inappropriate to comment on the attitude of non-WEU member governments to such incidents. It is for the governments of the countries concerned to make their views known if they so desire. Similarly, it is not for the Council to take decisions about the interpretation and application of the four Geneva conventions on the law of the sea in such circumstances.

QUESTION 251

*put by Mr. Lenzer
on 27th October 1984*

Further to Written Question 240 of 17th October 1983 and the Council's reply of 19th September 1984, will the Council inform the Assembly on :

- (a) the progress of the proposed European fighter aircraft ;
- (b) the bi- and trilateral plans of member governments on joint helicopter projects ;
- (c) the development of new military transport aircraft ;
- (d) the development of the second generation of European missiles ;
- (e) the planning of " emerging technologies " in Europe, as adopted by the Conference of National Armaments Directors.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 17th April 1985*

1. In its reply of 19th September 1984 to the written question of 17th October 1983, the Council stressed the significance of European

armaments co-operation and transatlantic collaboration. This was underlined with particular clarity by the decisions taken on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the modified Brussels Treaty by the Foreign and Defence Ministers at their extraordinary meeting in Rome on 26th and 27th October 1984. On this occasion it was recognised that Western European Union could provide a political impetus with regard to the IEPG.

2. In the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) Defence Ministers met for the first time in The Hague on 22nd-23rd November 1984. On this occasion they took decisions to intensify above all European armaments co-operation.

3. Participating nations have succeeded in achieving further progress on the projects mentioned in the written question. Further to the reply to Written Question 240 the following is stated :

As regards a common European fighter aircraft (EFA), France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Spain are currently conducting a joint industrial and technological feasibility study. The studies, which are essentially carried out in the industries of the five nations, are based on the harmonised requirements of the air forces (European staff target) signed jointly in Rome on 10th October 1984. The ministers are following the programme very closely and intend to take a decision on its continuation in the summer of 1985. The Netherlands are considering participation in the EFA project.

With regard to a multilateral joint helicopter programme, which is designated " NATO helicopter for the 1990s " and includes a helicopter for the NATO frigate and a tactical transport helicopter, a memorandum of understanding for a feasibility/predefinition study between France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom is under preparation. As for a future transport aircraft, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have established, in an IEPG study group, common requirements to be met by such an aircraft. At the IEPG ministerial meeting mentioned above, it was decided to explore jointly the possibilities of co-operation and an investigation has been set in hand.

At a bilateral level, mention should be made of the Franco-German anti-tank helicopter programme (HAP/HAC). Moreover, full development of the Anglo-Italian EH-101 helicopter, which has ASW, civil passenger transport, and utility transport (civil or military) variants, is now well in hand.

4. The IEPG programme for anti-tank guided weapons of the new generation - the

second generation being already in service - is currently in its definition phase, which is jointly conducted by France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. In the meantime, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece, and Spain have declared their readiness to participate in the programme under agreed arrangements beginning with the development phase.

Concerning new generation systems, mention can also be made of the future medium surface-to-air missiles referred to in the ministerial declaration of the IEPG meeting on 22nd and 23rd November 1984.

With regard to possible use of emerging technologies in the short and medium terms, the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) has identified during 1984 thirteen projects which are given first priority by at least four member nations. For nine of these thirteen projects special measures are being taken to monitor progress so as to help achieve introduction into service according to existing military requirements at the beginning of the nineties. Reports on these projects are submitted half-yearly to the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) and the North Atlantic Council. In the long term it is planned in the CNAD to evaluate the military and technological-economical aspects of key emerging technologies which are to be given special attention within NATO. In the IEPG it is planned also to intensify European technological co-operation as a basis for transatlantic co-operation and to define " co-operative technology projects " (CTPS).

QUESTION 252

*put by Sir Dudley Smith
on 3rd December 1984*

As the Council, in its reply to Recommendation 404, states that the competent authorities of the Atlantic Alliance have been informed of the specific ideas contained in the recommendation, but does not itself reply to them, will it ensure that an adequate reply prepared by NATO is communicated to the Assembly as it did on similar occasions in the past, in particular in reply to Recommendations 83 and 288 ?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 14th May 1985*

The Council has apprised the competent NATO authorities of the question put by the honourable member. The information given in

reply to the Council confirms that the member governments of the integrated military structure have not formally adopted any joint positions on the specific problems raised in Recommendation 404.

QUESTION 253

*put by Mr. Goerens
on 6th December 1984*

Many estimates in the defence budgets of the various WEU and NATO countries do not always have a direct connection with military expenditure proper.

The question which I have the honour to put therefore refers to sums earmarked for technological research in the defence budgets of the various WEU countries and the United States.

What percentage of the military budgets of the WEU countries and the United States respectively is earmarked for technological research?

What percentage of defence budgets of the WEU countries and the United States is earmarked for advanced technology?

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No reply has yet been received from the Council.

QUESTION 254

*put by Mr. Blaauw
on 14th January 1985*

In view of the statements by many ministers of WEU governments concerning the need to prevent, through equitable, verifiable and balanced arms control agreements, an arms race in outer space, and in the light of paragraph 2 of Recommendation 415 of the Assembly, will the Council explain why, in paragraph 4 of the North Atlantic Council communiqué of 15th December 1984, there was no specific reference to the need to ban such weapons, although that paragraph calls specifically for nuclear weapons to be substantially reduced?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 14th May 1985*

The Council has noted the honourable parliamentarian's question and wishes to draw his attention to its replies to Recommendations 413 and 415 which express the position of the seven member countries of WEU on current issues in the field of arms control and disarmament.

QUESTION 255

*put by Mr. Baumel
on 5th February 1985*

In view of the threat posed by concerted terrorist actions in Western Europe, has the Council considered co-ordinating the struggle by member countries against groups which attack persons and organisations dealing with defence?

Does it plan to strengthen the protection given to WEU and its staff?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 28th March 1985*

The terrorist threat is of the utmost concern to WEU and other western countries. At a number of WEU meetings held recently, the protection of its staff and premises were discussed as a matter of urgency. The necessary steps are being implemented.

The honourable member will appreciate that it is not the usual practice to make known details of such measures.

QUESTION 256

*put by Mr. Masciadri
on 14th March 1985*

What measures does the Council intend to take to ensure that the A-129 helicopter (Mangusta) produced by the Italian group Agusta is adopted by the armed forces of the WEU countries in view of the fact that a Franco-German consortium is at present planning to produce a

new combat helicopter with specifications similar to those of the one being produced by Agusta? Does the Council not think it would be more logical to choose the Italian helicopter, and what possibilities are there for industrial co-production between the countries concerned so that economic forces are not dispersed?

Production will start on Agusta's multi-purpose light combat helicopter at the end of this year and prototype tests have given exceptional results; moreover, the Franco-German

project is still at the simple prefeasibility study stage.

Production of two similar helicopters would be contrary to the goal of standardising the armaments of Western European countries.

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* *

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

Budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1985

MOTION FOR AN ORDER ¹

*tabled by Mr. Ferrari Aggradi
on behalf of the Presidential Committee
further to the decision taken on 15th April 1985*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering it essential that its needs be considered in the context of the revision of the budget of the whole organisation ;
- (ii) Taking account of the urgency of the problems facing the Assembly and the time necessary for the work of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration ;
- (iii) Noting that the measures which need to be taken cannot be long delayed,

DIRECTS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

To submit these comments to the Council.

1. See 1st sitting, 20th May 1985 (order amended and agreed to).

Budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1985

AMENDMENT 1 ¹

tabled by Mr. Ferrari Aggradi

1. Redraft the motion for an order proper as follows :

“To invite the Council, in the light of the above, to give favourable consideration to the proposals the Assembly is soon to make for improving its conditions of work.”

Signed : Ferrari Aggradi

1. See 1st sitting, 20th May 1985 (amendment agreed to).

*Methods of work of the Assembly
The Assembly's new conditions of work*

MEMORANDUM

*by Mr. Jean-Marie Caro, President of the Assembly,
adopted by the Presidential Committee on 15th April 1985*

I. New basic facts

The measures already taken by the Council to turn WEU towards new activities and those it is now preparing to adapt the institutions to the tasks which have thus been re-defined imply a review of relations between the Council and the Assembly and also re-examination of the Assembly's own methods of work. Your President has learned from his talks with the Ministers and with the members of the Permanent Council that all are quite prepared, in parallel with the transformation of the activities of the Council and of its organs, to seek a definite improvement in their relations with the Assembly and in particular to hold effective consultations with the Assembly, especially during this period of reflection and preparation of decisions which will commit the future of WEU.

It is already certain that the very elaborate procedure which governed relations between the Council and the Assembly when matters relating to the control of armaments and the enlargement of the European Community dominated the Council's activities needs to be changed now that these activities are more politically-oriented. Conversely, more informal, frequent and confident relations can be established since the Council has shown that it intends to keep the Assembly better informed of its activities and the latter has every interest in obtaining a more accurate idea of the Council's views on essential matters so that its voice may be heard more clearly by the Council and by public opinion. Efforts on both sides to give the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly more substance should not, however, lead to a confusion of responsibilities which both wish to avoid.

Furthermore, insofar as the matters which the Council is henceforth to handle should be of greater interest to public opinion and the press, it would increase its audience by becoming the true, politically active partner which is essential for the Assembly.

II. Relations with the Council

1. By adopting Order 58, the Assembly decided to set up a body for liaison with the Council. This body, adapted to the requirements of the informal talks which are now being held, should, at times when decisions have been prepared but not yet adopted, be able to meet either the Council of Ministers or its Chairman-in-Office or the Permanent Council.

The Presidential Committee should form this liaison group with the seven members of the present Bureau and, on the basis of their present numbers, one (in the case of the communists and liberals) or two (in the case of the christian democrats or socialists) representatives of each of the political groups not represented in the Bureau. Each of them might arrange for a replacement to be appointed. Replacements would be convened only in the event of the titular member of the liaison group announcing that he could not attend a meeting so as to guarantee the limited numerical composition of this group.

2. Where the Assembly committees are concerned, it will be particularly important for each of them, in accordance with its own point of view, to maintain and develop the dialogue with the Council.

3. The Assembly maintained and developed its activities at a time when the Council was curbing its own. It must retain this essential aspect of its autonomy, i.e. the freedom to choose its own agenda in accordance with the provisions of Article I of the Charter. It is therefore legitimate for the Assembly and its committees to examine matters not tackled by the Council but which are discussed in other bodies. This is current practice and the Assembly has always asked the Council to be kept informed of these discussions (particularly in NATO) and its wishes have generally been met. Hence the dialogue between the committees and the Council should not be confined to matters actually handled in the framework of WEU.

4. Under Article IX of the treaty, the Assembly discusses all the Council's activities which the latter has to describe in its annual report.

The Assembly, its Presidential Committee and its committees have to take account of the very broad range of matters covered by the Brussels Treaty and ensure co-ordination with the activities of the other European organisations.

Conversely, Article I of the Charter and Rules 16, 17, 28 and 43.1 of the Rules of Procedure together allow the Council to submit to the Assembly matters for an opinion, to address reports and communications to the Assembly and to ask the Assembly to discuss a matter which was not on its agenda.

In view of the wide range of options thus available to the Assembly, the governments should therefore be urged to play a far more active part in the Assembly's deliberative work.

5. In the new situation, the committees might take greater account of the Council's agendas when drawing up their programmes of work and the Council might be invited to bear the Assembly's intentions in mind when preparing its agendas. A continuing exchange of information between the Office of the Clerk and the Secretariat-General should facilitate co-ordination. The committees' programmes of work could then be transmitted to the Council in due time and on a reciprocal basis.

6. Some members of the Permanent Council have expressed a wish to see committee rapporteurs. Such meetings can obviously only be held at the rapporteurs' request.

7. The Council knows that the Assembly wishes to ensure the continuous presence of a minister during sessions. Such ministers might speak in debates without necessarily having to make a speech or answer questions. The Council seems in favour of such practice but believes it would mean limiting the number of reports submitted at each session and sending them to the Council early enough for it to take the necessary measures. This would mean reports being adopted by the committees at least two weeks before each session.

The Chairman-in-Office of the Council can obviously not be expected to attend a whole session but the draft order of business should be sent to the Council long enough before each session for it to arrange to be represented at each debate by the minister best able to respond to the Assembly. This would also require stricter compliance with and respect of the order of business. Account should be taken of the value of the dialogue between the Council and parliamentarians, particularly when it allows the latter to put questions to a minister from a country other than their own.

8. Since the principle of an annual report is imposed on the Council by treaty, the Council should be asked to report at each part-session, through its Chairman-in-Office, on its current work and plans, as was done in 1984.

9. Procedure for formal joint meetings admittedly has its advantages. Conversely, procedure for informal meetings might be improved.

(a) First, the Council's decision to hold at least two ministerial meetings each year implies the need for prior meetings between the Council and the liaison group. The liaison group must also hold consultations with the Permanent Council.

(b) Again, on the occasion of these two ministerial meetings each year, consideration might be given to following them up with informal consultations with one or other committee particularly interested in the Council's agenda in accordance with the proposal under paragraph II.2.

(c) Such forms of consultation should allow representatives of all the governments, and not only the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, to play an active part.

10. The next shape of the Council's agendas and co-ordination of its agendas with those Assembly sessions should allow the Council to answer written questions and recommendations from the Assembly far more quickly than in the past.

III. The Assembly's methods of work

During the second part of the thirtieth session of the Assembly we were all able to see that certain difficulties hampered the smooth running of our work and I wish the Presidential Committee to examine the causes and above all to consider remedies. For the Assembly, implementation of the Rome declaration is liable to make several of these problems worse, particularly if the Assembly is to follow up the Council's suggestion to develop significantly its relations with other parliamentary assemblies and with the Council. In this connection, your President had a useful discussion with the Permanent Council on 13th December 1984.

This twofold undertaking not only raises questions of efficiency and budgetary questions but also the question of the necessarily limited time at our disposal during sessions. These two aspects of the problem are closely linked since the temporary staff who ensure the smooth running of sessions could not continue to cooperate if we are not able to guarantee acceptable working hours for them, which means that more

staff will henceforth be required for those tasks. I would add that the permanent staff is extended to the limit of its possibilities for several weeks on the occasion of each session. Yet the number of matters considered by the Assembly has not increased and speaking time has had to be sharply reduced for everyone.

I believe there are several ways these problems might be alleviated :

1. Holding a third annual session seems rather unrealistic as long as the Assembly continues to be composed of parliamentarians who are members of the Council of Europe and already overburdened by the activities of that assembly. It would require budget resources which WEU does not have. The most that might be done would be to prolong the two part-sessions by a half day or even a whole day but even then we should run into the obstacle of the availability of parliamentarians, plus that of budget constraints.

2. If we are to remain within the present framework, it will be necessary to examine the organisation of the debates. This would mean :

(a) Ensuring that conditions for the conduct of debates are known beforehand :

- the recently introduced rule that speakers put their names down and that amendments be tabled before the end of the sitting preceding the opening of a debate should be confirmed ;
- numbering all amendments after dividing them into as many parts as is useful for the clarity of the debate would allow a little time to be saved when voting ;
- the participation of ministers should be arranged in accordance with the procedure referred to in paragraph II.7 ; in the event of a ministerial address followed by questions, the hearing might be organised and limited in time.

(b) In political debates of general interest in which many speakers always put their names down, speaking time should be limited. Priority should be given to :

- fifteen minutes for the rapporteur when presenting his report ;
- ten minutes for the committee chairman and rapporteur to wind up the debate ;
- ten minutes for the spokesman of each political group if it has so requested.

The rest of the time earmarked for the debate would be shared between the other speakers who have put their names down.

(c) The presidency would inform the Assembly in due time before the opening of each session that debates are to be organised in this way.

3. Like many members of the Assembly, the Council has expressed the wish that parliamentary observers from member countries of the Atlantic Alliance not members of WEU be invited to attend Assembly sessions. Several of these countries have shown keen interest in participating. Hitherto, it has been the practice of the Presidential Committee to invite observers from countries directly concerned by the subjects on the agenda of each session.

4. Furthermore, there should be more meetings between Assembly committees and committees from the parliaments of member countries of the alliance. The committees should be urged to hold ad hoc meetings with parliamentarians from those countries.

5. It would be desirable for several committees, including the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, to group their meetings in the same place and during the same week. The value of holding such meetings when reports are being adopted should be borne in mind :

- (a) to make it easier to obtain a quorum and to limit the number of journeys which parliamentarians have to make ;
- (b) to make it easier to communicate the results of the committees' discussions to the press ;
- (c) to facilitate contacts with representatives of the government and parliament of the host country, the presence of observers from third countries and, possibly, the presence of members of the Council ;
- (d) to allow political groups to hold working meetings in appropriate conditions ;
- (e) to limit the budgetary implications of meetings held away from Paris.

The Office of the Clerk would be responsible for planning such "committee sessions" when preparing the programmes of work which the committee chairmen submit to their respective committees for each session. The latter should be asked to take full account of such plans.

Generally speaking, strong political, operational and budgetary reasons militate in favour of giving priority to the organisation of "committee sessions".

6. The importance that might be accorded to questions of disarmament and the limitation of armaments in the work of the Council might

make it necessary for the Assembly to reorganise its activities. While it is obvious that the budgetary implications of such an initiative and its repercussions on the length of sessions make it impossible at the present juncture, it is nevertheless certain that it deserves to be examined in depth with the governments. It seems certain that a large part of the Assembly's work will be devoted to the question of disarmament. This option corresponds to the political step just taken by the Council in deciding to direct its work more particularly towards matters relating to the controlled limitation of armaments. Consideration of this matter will be resumed as soon as the budget permits.

7. One way or another, any extension of the work of the Assembly, and in particular any participation of representatives of non-member countries, will have budgetary repercussions. The Assembly cannot hope to obtain the necessary funds if it is not unanimous in adopting its draft budget.

8. It is with these prospects in mind that it seems wise to base the Assembly's budget proposals on political aims whose broad lines should be laid down by the Presidential Committee in good time. Rules 16 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure do not limit its rôle to drawing up the agenda of the next session. It also has to prepare the register of the Assembly, which allows it to envisage a longer-term programme of work. It will be for the Presidential Committee, on the basis of proposals by the committees which it will consult for this purpose, to define the choice of political options.

9. The Presidential Committee would thus be better placed to give its views in full knowledge of the facts on requests from committees to hold meetings away from the seat of the Assembly or to authorise journeys by rapporteurs.

The opinion of the Presidential Committee must be based on a twofold consideration: (i) the political expediency of any journeys on behalf of WEU outside member countries; (ii) the financial implications of any journeys involving expenditure by WEU.

It might be agreed that journeys by a rapporteur within member countries not exceeding two days should not require discussion by the Presidential Committee. But any larger commitment of funds, be it for a journey by a rapporteur or by a committee meeting away

from Paris, would require the prior authorisation of the Presidential Committee. Committees should therefore submit their requests to the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in time for him to be able to inform the Presidential Committee of the financial implications of the proposals.

IV. Parliamentary participation

The growing rôle of WEU and the requirements of its political audience also mean promoting parliamentary participation in the work of the Assembly.

Shortcomings for the moment are limited to two facts:

First, many members of national parliaments interested in European defence policy lack the motivation or are not approached to become members of their country's parliamentary delegation to the WEU Assembly.

Second, the dual mandate of members of the WEU Assembly and of the Council of Europe will not improve their availability. Since the different vocations of the two assemblies make it necessary to cover a wide spectrum of interests in forming national delegations, this sometimes reduces the numbers of participants whose priority interest is in WEU.

Can these shortcomings be overcome? Here are two suggestions:

First: (a) the presidents of national parliaments might be informed and asked to urge political groups in their parliaments to attach greater importance to the participation of parliamentarians interested in WEU matters when appointing members of their country's parliamentary delegation; (b) to this end, the interest of chairmen of defence and foreign affairs committees should be aroused.

Second, consideration might be given, when forming national delegations to the Assembly of the Council of Europe, to appointing a relatively large number of parliamentarians who would be required to give priority to meetings of the WEU Assembly.

In view of the political aspects of this matter, the General Affairs Committee should be asked to submit a proposal to this end as soon as possible.

Action by the Presidential Committee

REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee
by Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly*

For the first time, a report is being presented to the Assembly on the activities of the Presidential Committee. This innovation deserves some explanation.

We all believe the Assembly must not only be informed but also heard. As the parliamentary body of the Western European Union political organisation, it is indeed essential for it to be able to express its options based on a general strategic view and propose courses of action to the governments. It will thus be able to make a particularly important contribution to the reactivation of Western European Union since this raises highly complex problems for the governments.

In a period of intensive activity, however, the Assembly cannot confine itself to communicating recommendations and criticism to the Council twice a year and waiting for the latter to answer. It must be associated intimately with the Council's deliberations and, where appropriate, its decisions. This is the spirit in which the Assembly in Order 58 instructed the Presidential Committee at the last session :

“ To establish permanent liaison arrangements with the Council or its presidency and to see that the Assembly is enabled to bring to a successful conclusion its mission in working out a new and more important rôle for WEU. ”

To be able to carry out this mission, which is not merely one of supervision but also of encouragement, the Assembly needs to be organised, like the Council, in such a way as to be able to exercise its duties continuously. This is indeed the rôle of the Presidential Committee which, under Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure, must “ take all such measures as it considers necessary for the activities of the Assembly to be properly carried on ”.

While endeavouring to give more political substance to the dialogue with the Council, the Presidential Committee is trying to give the Assembly the means it needs to conduct its work effectively. The committee's action has already produced positive political results. It is to be

hoped that the same will be true in budgetary matters.

Since the ministerial meeting in Paris on 12th June of last year, Western European Union has entered a period of reactivation and restructuring, the Council having at last followed up the recommendations so often formulated by the Assembly.

It was above all essential for the Assembly to be directly associated with the examination of the reform of Western European Union. For that reason, and to provide food for thought prior to the Rome meeting, the President of the Assembly transmitted a memorandum to the Council setting out his views on the rôle of WEU in the establishment of a European pillar of the alliance and as an instrument for harmonising views on defence matters.

In the context, the Presidential Committee took part in a meeting with the Council at the close of the Rome ministerial meeting and convened an extraordinary session of the Assembly to start an immediate dialogue on the results of the Council's work and on the future of our organisation. This session was possible thanks to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, who agreed, in spite of many difficulties, to present the Council's conclusions. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Italy, by answering questions and remarks made by members of the Assembly, allowed a particularly searching study to be made of the results obtained at the Rome meeting.

This extraordinary session had been prepared by a meeting at Gymnich on 9th October 1984 between the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and a liaison group appointed by the Presidential Committee composed of the members of the Bureau of the Assembly and representatives of political groups not represented in the Bureau. A similar meeting was held on 19th November 1984 in preparation for the December session at which the Assembly drew conclu-

sions concerning the reactivation of WEU. On this occasion, the Assembly, in Order 58, instructed the Presidential Committee to institutionalise as it were the liaison group, which had been set up more or less on a trial basis. By approving the memorandum on the Assembly's methods of work, the Presidential Committee defined the membership and terms of reference of the Committee for Relations with the Council which henceforth has the status of a subcommittee of the Presidential Committee, to which it will report.

This new body had hardly been set up before having to tackle a new problem: the time fixed for the ministerial meeting of the Council coincided with the spring session of the Assembly of the Council of Europe. This year, therefore, it has not been possible to organise the traditional meetings with the Presidential Committee, Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and General Affairs Committee. The Committee for Relations with the Council thus seemed to be the most appropriate instrument for consultations with the Council in exceptional circumstances.

The President of the Assembly had prepared this meeting by discussing with the Chairman-in-Office of the Council the main topics on which we consider an attempt should be made to harmonise European positions.

The agenda of the meeting of the Committee for Relations with the Council covered the principal subjects of concern to the Assembly. Particular mention is made of problems relating to the strategic defence initiative and Europe's possible response to the United States, the French proposal for co-operation in advanced technology, the various problems connected with the future of the organisation, its enlargement and external reactions to its reactivation, particularly in the United States. It will be for members of the Assembly to question the Chairman-in-Office of the Council about the positions adopted at the Bonn meeting. It might merely be said here that the answers received to our questions are not yet very specific, but this is perhaps not so much a lack of trust in us on the part of the Council as an indication of the rather tenuous nature of the conclusions reached by the Ministers.

It must be recognised that we are still far from a decision on the fundamental problem of strategic defence. We do not really understand whether all the states are in favour of it or not; we have no very clear view of what strategic defence really represents, nor what it will cost. No agreement has been reached on the participation of European states and we do not know whether they are to participate on a collective or individual basis.

These problems should be taken as an invitation to continue our efforts to induce the Council to forge ahead with its task of harmonising the views of members on the questions now arising which are crucial for Europe's security. The Assembly should therefore express the wish, and the Presidential Committee ask the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, that a further meeting be organised with the Committee for Relations with the Council to prepare for the next meeting in Rome in November. The Council should be further encouraged, after completing its restructuration work, at last to make meaningful progress towards union and to assign tasks to the ministerial organs commensurate with the problems raised.

At the Bonn meeting, it was not possible for the committees to hold a meeting with the Council. The obstacles which arose last April should not recur this autumn. The committees concerned should decide how they wish their participation in the meeting with the Ministers to be organised and inform the Presidential Committee of their views.

The Assembly's work on defence matters and the dialogue with the Council are set in a European and Atlantic context. The Presidential Committee therefore considered it necessary to associate other parliamentary bodies with the Assembly's deliberations in an appropriate manner. According to an already well-established tradition, observers from the parliaments of member countries of the alliance have been invited, at their request, to attend our debates. They should be thanked for their interest in our work. We are particularly happy to welcome a delegation from Portugal since that country has applied to join our organisation and a draft resolution presented by the General Affairs Committee proposes that the participation of a delegation of Portuguese observers in the work of the Assembly should be made permanent. Denmark, Norway and Turkey have also asked to be represented by parliamentary observers. The Norwegian Parliament has also expressed the wish that, in future, members of its Defence Committee be invited to attend certain meetings of our Defence Committee as observers. It will be easy to meet these wishes since the Presidential Committee has authorised committees which consider it useful to organise ad hoc meetings with representatives of parliaments of non-member countries if they so request. I would add that following a talk between the President of our Assembly and the President of the European Parliament the principle of an exchange of observers between our Defence Committee and a subcommittee of the Committee on Political Affairs of the European Parliament has been agreed upon and a start has been made with implementing it. Relations

with other parliaments are a complex matter because of the different position of each of the parliamentary bodies concerned. They should therefore be studied in detail in the light of experience and the conclusions of the study submitted to the Assembly in a future report.

This part of the report on the promotion of the dialogue with the Council will be concluded with a mention of the financial implications of the Assembly's political ambitions. To carry out its tasks, the Assembly needs the assistance of a specially qualified, duly equipped, secretariat and the assistance of experts from the agencies of the Council of Ministers. It should also have the resources needed for organising its meetings, journeys by committees and public relations. We hope the Council will adopt a favourable attitude towards the proposals which the Assembly will soon be making with a view to solving these problems.

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Statutorily, the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration work together in establishing the Assembly's budget. It had been agreed with the latter committee that a minimum interim draft budget would be presented at the session last December. This budget, which simply renewed the previous one, left outstanding the question of adapting the Assembly's means to the tasks assigned to it in the context of the reactivation of WEU. At the beginning of the year, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration underlined the need to reconsider the means available to the Assembly and planned to request an increase in budgetary appropriations.

The Presidential Committee was informed of the wish expressed by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and decided to submit a motion for an order to the Assembly instructing it to impress upon the Council the urgency of the measures to be taken for the Assembly to carry out its work in less precarious conditions. It is therefore hoped that it will be possible to bring home the truly disturbing position of the Assembly, whose budgetary problems are different from those of the Council.

The new structures of the ministerial organs were defined on 23rd April 1985 and specific tasks should be assigned to them in the near future. The financial implications of reforming WEU will become evident. Due to a reduction in the duties of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, resources are available for new tasks without any increase in the organisation's overall budget.

The Assembly for its part has increased its activities without changing the number of its staff. Like the Council organs, it will have to re-examine its budget. It would indeed be paradoxical to consider that only the Assembly's tasks remain unaffected by the reactivation of WEU. In the Rome declaration, the Council itself recognised that the Assembly "is called upon to play a growing rôle".

But the Assembly's action is hindered by the inadequacy of its secretariat for the tasks incumbent upon it and by the reduction in real terms of its operating budget.

In Rome, the governments decided by common agreement to give their support to the Assembly. The Assembly is in fact encountering growing difficulties and is liable to have to reduce its activities because of the reduction in its financial resources. Its staff is working harder and harder but is finding it increasingly difficult to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it.

The Council laid down the principle of zero growth, but the way it has been applied has led to a considerable reduction in resources in real terms:

- (i) for several years, the level of inflation has been higher than expected;
- (ii) the cost of services and equipment has increased more than the average rate of inflation;
- (iii) the incidence of the cost of pensions on the budget has increased sharply, thus reducing resources available for running the organisation;
- (iv) over the years, the cumulative effect of these reductions has considerably reduced the funds available to the Assembly.

A particularly troublesome aspect of the matter, which seems to correspond to no rational reasoning, stems from the desire to impose on the Assembly the way it should use the resources allocated to it and, further, to interfere in the use of means available and the choice of equipment which it considers it should procure.

For all these reasons, the Assembly is forced to limit projects which it considers politically essential. This year, the General Affairs Committee's visit to the United States has had to be shortened. The Assembly has even found it impossible to apply its own Rules of Procedure, which provide that speeches in committee may be made in the official languages of member states. In committee, it is no longer possible to ensure the oral translation of speeches in Dutch because of the cost of bringing in interpre-

ters who cannot be found in Paris. The Scientific Committee is obliged to visit Canada without interpreters. A fortiori, it is hardly possible for the Assembly to carry out, in the requisite conditions, projects to which it attaches great political importance and in which it has been encouraged by the Council, such as establishing closer links with other assemblies.

The Council should therefore respond favourably to the revised draft budget which the Assembly is to submit to it in accordance with procedure soon to be fixed so as to remove the obstacles still obstructing the attainment of the aims it has set itself.

The Assembly's dialogue with the Council will be even more productive if the Council is more active politically. The Presidential Committee for its part will continue to foster this aim. It considers that after fixing the principles for the reactivation of WEU in Rome last year and the necessary supporting structure in Bonn this year, the Council should make full use of the

vast possibilities of the organisation at its meeting in Rome next autumn.

WEU, which is a vital part of Europe's identity, is not a military organisation but it is incumbent upon it to bring about the political conditions for asserting a European personality in the various bodies contributing to Europe's security and, to this end, to harmonise views and co-ordinate efforts.

The parliamentary Assembly wishes to give the Council its full support in this fundamental task and expects the Council to give it the wherewithal to pursue fruitful co-operation with it.

In this spirit, the Presidential Committee submits to the Assembly the motion for an order in Document 1015, instructing it to draw the Council's attention to the problems just mentioned and, in the light of the views set out above, to ask it to give favourable consideration to the proposals the Assembly is soon to make for improving its conditions of work.

*State of European security -
the central region*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Dr. Miller, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Pignion (Chairman); MM. Blaauw, Kittelmann (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alberini, Amadei, van den Bergh, Bonnel, Bourges, Brown, Cox (Alternate: *Dr. Miller*), Dejardin, Ertl (Alternate: *Rumpf*), Galley (Alternate: *Jung*), Gerstl, Giust (Alternate: *Martino*), Sir Anthony Grant (Alternate: *Lord Newall*), MM. Huyghues des Etages, Konen, de Kwaadsteniet, Lemmrich, Natiez, Pecchioli Sarti, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Steverlynck, Stokes (Alternate: *Wilkinson*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Introductory Note

In preparing this report *the committee as a whole* met in the Federal Republic of Germany from 15th-17th October 1984, where it was briefed by :

Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty

Mr. William Mahoney, Office of Public Affairs ; Mr. Keith Bush, Director of Research, Radio Liberty ; Ms. Elizabeth Teague and Dr. William Murphy, Radio Liberty Research and Analysis Department.

Ministry of Defence, Bonn

Dr. Manfred Wörner, Minister of Defence ; Brigadier General Oppermann ; Colonel Bromeis ; Lt. Colonel Keller ; Colonel Kellein.

Fighter-Bomber Wing 33, Büchel Air Base

Colonel Helmut Borchers, Commander ; Lt. Colonel Jürgen Stehli, Deputy Wing Commander ; Major Schröder ; Major Becker ; Lt. Colonel Christoph Keitel, Commander Flight Support Group.

Headquarters Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), Brunssum, Netherlands

General L. Chalupa, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe ; Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Beavis, Deputy Commander-in-Chief ; Lt. General H. Depoorter, Chief-of-Staff ; Lt. Colonel. L. Denniston, Intelligence Division ; Major R. Boryer, Operations Division.

The committee as a whole met subsequently at the Palais d'Egmont, Brussels, on 15th February 1985, when Lt. General Huitfeldt, Director of the NATO International Military Staff, addressed it on "Emerging technology and military strategy". It then held a joint meeting with the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly.

The committee then met in Strasbourg on 12th March 1985 where it was briefed by General Charles de Lamby, Commander First French Army and members of his staff ; and at Headquarters French Forces in Germany, Baden-Oos, where it was briefed by Lt. General Houdet, Commander-in-Chief and Commander 2nd French Army Corps, and his staff.

The committee met at the seat of the Assembly the following day and was received by Mr. Charles Hernu, Minister of Defence, and then visited the French Defence Staff command post where it was briefed by Vice-Admiral Louzeau, Major General of the Joint Defence Staff, and by General Guichard, Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Operations.

The committee met subsequently at the seat of the Assembly on 16th April, 7th May and 20th May when it discussed and adopted the present report.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of parliament, officials, senior officers and experts who met the committee and replied to questions.

The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation***on the state of European security - the central region***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that the long-standing Warsaw Pact superiority in numbers of men, tanks, guns and aircraft in the central region has not diminished ;
- (ii) Aware however that with the improved defence effort made by most NATO countries in the last five years more modern equipment is now reaching NATO forces which still enjoy some qualitative advantages in training and equipment ;
- (iii) Stressing that the European countries provide some 80 to 90% of the ready forces and equipment in place in Europe ;
- (iv) Welcoming the important contribution to allied defence made by the French conventional forces stationed in Germany and in France which in the event of hostilities, should the French President so decide, could be placed under the operational control of NATO commanders ;
- (v) Noting that a referendum on continued Spanish membership of NATO is expected to be held in March 1986 ;
- (vi) Recognising that the stationing of over 400,000 allied troops on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany represents a considerable social burden borne by that country in the interests of allied defence ;
- (vii) Recalling that considerable further improvement in the effectiveness of the allied defence effort can be made at no additional cost through standardisation and interoperability of equipment, and that logistic arrangements are still in need of improvement,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge in the North Atlantic Council :

1. That a renewed effort be made to establish a genuine European defence industry with a view to improving standardisation and interoperability ;
2. That advantage be taken of any opportunities to reposition forces stationed in Germany to alleviate the present unsatisfactory deployment ;
3. That published NATO force comparisons take account of French and in due course of Spanish forces ;
4. That Spain be requested to assign to SACEUR a modern mobile force of at least one division as an early reserve for the central region, and that Spain be asked to respond to the NATO annual review questionnaire as is the custom of all other NATO countries.

*Explanatory Memorandum**(submitted by Dr. Miller, Rapporteur)**I. Introduction*

1.1. The committee called for a report to examine the forces deployed in the central region, taking account in particular of information obtained during the committee's fact-finding visits to Germany and to headquarters Allied Forces Central Europe in October 1984 and to French land forces headquarters in March 1985.

1.2. The report concentrates on the land forces in the central region; the status of the air commands in the central region was described in the committee's previous report on the state of European security¹.

II. Warsaw Pact forces - central region

2.1. The land responsibility of headquarters Allied Forces Central Europe, with its headquarters at Brunssum, Netherlands, extends from the Swiss frontier in the south to the River Elbe in the north, leaving the land area of Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark between the Elbe and the Baltic Sea under the Northern European command with its headquarters outside Oslo. Assessments of Warsaw Pact land forces facing the central region are not so neatly divisible into those that might be engaged against the Central Europe command and those that might be engaged in the Baltic approaches. A briefing given to the committee assumes that the Warsaw Pact's western theatre of military operations (Western TVD), after a few days' preparation, would be able to deploy some 40 active divisions against the central front, organised in a first and second echelon. These are the forces based in peacetime in the forward area comprising the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Poland. After mobilisation a further 30 divisions would be available as theatre reserves and after thirty days it is assumed that ground forces could be built up to over 90 divisions, drawing for this purpose on forces stationed in peacetime in the western military districts of the Soviet Union.

2.2. A summary of assessments of force balance from various sources is shown at Appendix I. Some of these estimates make global comparisons for the whole of the central and northern region - i.e the area between the Alps and the Arctic Ocean - others attempt to assess the balance in the central region alone.

1. Document 971, 15th May 1984, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith, paragraphs 3.16 et seq.

2.3. Allied Forces Central Europe has available in peacetime some 20 divisions of "in-place forces" which within ten to twelve days could be increased by a further eight divisions, coming in part from the United Kingdom. Further reinforcement by United States third corps would be slower but the positioning of equipment in Europe has improved the rate at which these forces can arrive.

2.4. These figures take no account of French forces, referred to in Chapter III, because they are not assigned to NATO command. Nevertheless there are three French armoured divisions stationed in Germany and a further ten in France, not counting two light armoured divisions which can be formed from training schools.

2.5. The assessment of levels of air forces, as far as the Warsaw Pact is concerned, is much more conjectural because of the high mobility of air forces which can be redeployed very rapidly to other regions entirely. Headquarters AFCENT assumes however that there would be over 3,000 combat aircraft available in the Warsaw Pact western theatre which could be rapidly increased to 4,500 by aircraft from western military districts of the Soviet Union. These air forces have over 200 main and dispersal airfields available in the forward area.

2.6. Aircraft available to Allied Air Forces Central Europe - the air defence responsibility of which extends as far as the Baltic - amount to some 1,300 immediately-available combat aircraft which can be increased by a further 1,000 aircraft, mostly from the United States, within about thirty days, but there are insufficient airfields available fully to support all these reinforcements. French aircraft are not stationed in Germany, but France operates some air defence radar stations in the country. The French tactical air force based in France could add some 270 combat aircraft to the above numbers. Almost as valuable could be access to airfields on French territory if authorised by the French Government.

2.7. For air defence, the central region has some 240 air defence aircraft as well as a further 200 multirôle aircraft. With the entry into service of half of the planned airborne early warning aircraft, surveillance especially against low-flying aircraft has been greatly improved. The Nike long-range surface-to-air missiles will be phased out and replaced in due course with Patriot missiles which will also replace some of the shorter-range Hawk units.

2.8. The overall force comparisons presented to the committee have shown a 2 to 1 advantage for the Warsaw Pact in air forces, with a NATO position in proportional terms improving only slightly after reinforcements. The land forces in division equivalents are in the ratio of about 2 to 1 initially, increasing in favour of the Warsaw Pact until United States reinforcements could arrive or, possibly, French forces, if committed in support of NATO.

2.9. Warsaw Pact numerical superiority is most marked however in tanks, armoured personnel carriers and artillery. German estimates for Central Europe show 7,600 NATO main battle tanks compared with 25,500 for the Warsaw Pact; some 19,000 other armoured vehicles for NATO compared with 43,000 for the Warsaw Pact and in the case of artillery 4,050 for NATO compared with 17,500 for the Warsaw Pact.

2.10. The corresponding figures in British defence white papers are significantly different – the two are compared at Appendix I.

2.11. As far as the hardware is concerned however, the latest models of tanks comprise less than half of the Warsaw Pact totals but a somewhat higher proportion of the NATO total in view of the more recent modernisation effort.

III. Allied forces in the central region

3.1. The concentration of ground and air forces on each side of the NATO-Warsaw Pact boundary is far greater in the central region than on any other part of that boundary. Forces from more different allied countries are stationed in West Germany than in any other NATO country²:

Netherlands	8,000
Belgium	30,000
United Kingdom	67,500
United States	243,000
Canada	5,500
France	49,000
TOTAL	403,000

3.2. Whereas Warsaw Pact forces have unrestricted access to the lines of communication area and air space behind the East-West boundary, stretching back through the territory of Poland and Czechoslovakia to the frontiers of the Soviet Union, NATO lines of communication rely on the German North Sea ports and the Benelux countries. Since the withdrawal of France from the integrated structure in 1966 the use of French territory for allied lines of communications is limited to the NATO fuel pipeline

system which traverses French territory and has its headquarters in Versailles. France grants clearance for overflight of its territory by allied military aircraft on a case-by-case basis.

3.3. Thus the territory available for the deployment of ground and air forces and their logistical support in the southern half of the central region, between the Moselle and the Swiss frontier, is seriously lacking in depth. At its narrowest part the territory of West Germany is only 300 kilometres wide.

3.4. The in-place NATO ground forces assigned to conduct a forward defence of the territory are described by army corps, from north to south of the central region.

Netherlands

3.5. The first Netherlands corps is assigned the most northerly part of the central front. It comprises two armoured brigades and four mechanised infantry brigades but of these only one armoured brigade is stationed in Germany in peacetime. Of the main battle tanks 135 are Leopard II but over 300 are still the obsolescent Centurion.

First German corps

3.6. The first German corps which is assigned the next sector to the south of the Netherlands corps has some of its units stationed in peacetime in the sector allocated to the neighbouring Netherlands and British corps; they would have to act as screening forces while the main units of the Netherlands corps and some units of the British corps moved up into the forward defence position in a period of alert. Equipment is described in paragraph 3.13.

United Kingdom

3.7. The first United Kingdom corps with its headquarters in Bielefeld is assigned the next sector to the south of first German corps. It is organised in three armoured divisions comprising seven armoured brigades and one air mobile brigade. During a period of alert it would be reinforced by a further infantry division which is stationed in the United Kingdom in peacetime. Main battle tanks in the British army include 70 of the new Challengers, which will eventually equip four tank regiments in Germany, and over 800 Chieftain tanks. It is not clear how many of these are stationed in Germany at present.

Belgium

3.8. The Belgian corps comprising two divisions is assigned the sector to the south of first British corps. The corps totals one armoured

2. Sources: MOD Bonn.

brigade and three mechanised infantry brigades of which one armoured brigade and one mechanised infantry brigade and reconnaissance battalions are stationed in Germany in peacetime. Belgian forces are equipped with 330 Leopard I main battletanks.

3.9. Together the foregoing four corps comprise the forces available to Northern Army Group which covers the area from the Elbe as far south as Aachen to about Koblenz.

Third German corps

3.10. The third German corps comprising five armoured brigades organised in two divisions occupies the next sector, the most northerly of the Central Army Group. Like first German corps in the north it has units deployed forward near the East German boundary which would have to provide screening forces while other allied troops moved to their forward locations in an alert. Equipment is described in paragraph 3.13.

United States

3.11. The fifth and seventh United States corps are assigned sectors in southern Germany and represent the bulk of the United States ground forces in Europe. They comprise two armoured and two mechanised divisions and the equivalent of a further four brigades. Including stock-piled tanks for the strategic reserve, United States forces have 5,000 main battletanks in the central region, mostly the M-60. Advanced units of the United States third corps are now deployed in the Bremen area in north Germany with one brigade which forms an in-place reserve in Northern Army Group area.

Second German corps

3.12. The second German corps is assigned the extreme south of the central region in the neighbourhood of the Austrian and southern Czechoslovakian border. It comprises three divisions including a mountain division and, like the other two German corps in the central region, it has elements deployed well forward in peacetime, partly in the area assigned to United States seventh corps, which would act as screening units during a period of alert while United States forces moved to their wartime positions.

3.13. Collectively the German ground forces provide six armoured, four armoured infantry, one mountain and one airborne division, equipped with about 2,500 Leopard I and 800 Leopard II main battletanks as well as 1,000 older M-48 tanks. These forces include the division in Schleswig-Holstein assigned to the northern region.

Canada

3.14. Canada maintains a mechanised brigade group with 59 Leopard I main battletanks in the rear area in Germany near Baden-Baden where the French forces are stationed.

French forces in Germany

3.15. The committee was gratified to be able to visit at its request headquarters First French Army in Strasbourg and headquarters French forces in Germany (which constitute second French corps) near Baden. The committee had not previously visited French forces in Germany, and indeed since 1966 when France withdrew its forces from the integrated military structure, it had not proved possible to arrange such a visit.

3.16. The committee was impressed by the briefings, not only because of the emphasis placed on the important defence rôle of modernised and reorganised conventional forces, but also by the importance of the contingency plans which, if the President of the Republic so decided, would enable French forces to operate in support of NATO forces in the event of hostilities in the central region. The committee is grateful to the French Minister of Defence for authorising such a visit for the first time, and examines the conditions in which it is intended that French forces might co-operate.

3.17. The area in which French forces in Germany are stationed with divisional headquarters at Trier, Landau and Freiburg corresponds to their position when assigned to NATO prior to 1966 when their status was covered by the NATO status of forces agreement of 1951 supplemented in 1959. The 1966 decision of the French Government to withdraw its forces from the integrated NATO structure led at first to disagreement with Germany which at the time felt that the French forces in Germany had lost the legal basis for their presence on German territory. France maintained its thesis that the legal basis flowed from France's rights as an occupying power under the 1945 agreements. The outcome in 1966 was an exchange of letters between France and Germany in which the latter expressed the wish that the French forces should remain on its territory. This exchange remains the legal basis on which French forces are stationed in Germany today.

3.18. Since then several agreements have been concluded, both between French and NATO commanders, and between the French and German Governments, the former covering co-operation between French and NATO forces in time of war, and the latter for the most part

logistic support for French forces in Germany. These agreements are :

22nd August 1967: General Ailleret, General Lemnitzer,
French Chief of Defence Staff SACEUR

3rd July 1974: General Valentin, General Ferber,
Commander First French Army CINCENT

These have been supplemented by more detailed agreements with headquarters CENTAG signed in 1978, 1979 and 1981. With German commanders there are two agreements on logistical support signed in 1978 and 1980, and a number of technical arrangements between the ministries of defence were concluded in 1979 and two in 1982.

3.19. The three French armoured brigades in Germany comprise some 436 tanks both AMX-30 and AMX-10P. The improved AMX-30 B2 is entering service with the French army, and at present accounts for some 165 of the 1,100 AMX-30 tanks, but it is not clear how many of these are in Germany. Altogether French forces in Germany account for some 46,000 men, not counting the Berlin garrison.

3.20. The location of the French forces in Germany makes them an ideal reserve for NATO commanders, and the committee heard in some detail of the contingency plans which, if the President of the French Republic so decided, would enable second French corps to operate under the operational control of the NATO commander of Central Army Group, and for French forces in their turn to be supported by other NATO forces including air defence forces. The plans provide for French Government decision at various stages to permit the initial movement of French forces prior to their commitment to a battle.

3.21. As mentioned above, other forces of First French Army, stationed in France in peacetime, can be made available as reserves for NATO. Under a recent reorganisation the rapid action force (FAR) has been created which includes the fourth aeromobile division stationed just west of the Rhine as well as the sixth light armoured division and the ninth marine division all of which are air-transportable. The rapid action force also includes the eleventh parachute division and the twenty-seventh alpine division. The fourth aeromobile division is a newly created division equipped with some 200 anti-tank helicopters which have been withdrawn from the army corps to which they were previously assigned. The whole of the rapid action force is designed specially to be able to be deployed overseas in an emergency or alternatively to be used in support of NATO forces in the event of a conflict in Europe. The new aeromobile division is an especially welcome reserve for NATO which could be deployed very rapidly on government decision to counter a Warsaw Pact armoured breakthrough.

Conclusion on French forces

3.22. The committee has no reason to doubt that French forces (and not only those stationed in Germany in peacetime) would be available for allied defence in the event of hostilities, or even in a period of tension and alert. No doubt too the Soviet Union sees them in that light and these forces therefore add to the deterrent. Because of their geographical location they could provide a very useful reserve force for NATO commanders. The committee therefore welcomes the contingency plans which would enable French forces to operate "under the operational control" of NATO commanders.

3.23. The distinction between the conditions under which French and other NATO forces might operate under NATO command in the event of hostilities is probably more political and juridical than real. No forces (except certain air defence forces) are under NATO command in peacetime. Assigned forces - which are mostly the air and ground forces on the central front - would pass under NATO command only when the governments of the various NATO countries concerned take an autonomous decision that they should do so. This decision however would be expressed collectively within the North Atlantic Council or Defence Planning Committee and forces thereafter would operate "under command" of the various NATO commanders (although their logistic support remains under national control). The equally autonomous decision which might be taken by the French Government to commit forces to the defence of Europe would be expressed nationally and not in the collective councils of NATO; the forces would then be "under the operational control" of NATO commanders, and not "under command". What the distinction would be in practice is not clear to the committee.

3.24. All NATO commanders who have briefed the committee at various times have expressed their confidence in the readiness of French forces to support the alliance; at the same time they have stressed the uncertainties which the "separateness" of the French decision-making procedure implies for NATO commanders. If NATO defence plans ever had to be implemented following an attack by Warsaw Pact forces NATO commanders would assume command of assigned forces at the same time as they were instructed to implement their plans. But they continue to rely on two separate operational plans to provide for the possibility that French forces were not ordered to co-operate at the same time as other allied forces were placed under command. If other NATO countries adopted the same attitude to national autonomy as France, there could be no NATO command structures or military infrastructure in place

around which collective defence could be organised in the event of a crisis. Speaking in Paris on 10th April 1985, Lord Carrington, the Secretary-General of NATO, said :

“ The French have produced an answer which is in many respects a very good one. It ensures in particular that the French defence budget is seen by the French taxpayers as money to be spent for the defence of France... but I do not think that you would expect the Secretary-General of NATO to commend it as an example to others. The integrated military structure is, as you know, integrated by consensus, not by command ; and there are areas where I would very much like to see that consensus further developed by the Defence Planning Committee. Both for the political signal that this would give ; and because we cannot afford not to get the best value for the money which we spend on defence. ”

“ Maldeployment ”

3.25. The peacetime locations of forces assigned to NATO in the central region are unsatisfactory – they still reflect to a large extent the locations they occupied when the defence of NATO was based on the Rhine, in a period before the German armed forces had joined their allies in NATO. The present NATO strategy of forward defence requires these forces to take up defence positions in a period of alert in close proximity to the East-West boundary. Apparently with the only exception of the first United States armoured division and another United States regiment, only elements of the various German corps are located in forward positions in peacetime today. This again is partly for historical reasons because at the time the German forces were created all appropriate accommodation for military units in areas further west was already occupied by the forces of the other allies.

3.26. A consequence of this situation is that even the M-day NATO forces in the central region, which are supposed to be deployed in accordance with SACEUR's requirements, would take up to two days to reach their forward defence positions. Once these forces arrive, the German screening forces have to move sideways to their own alert positions.

3.27. One consequence of this situation is that several days' warning time is essential for NATO. Confidence-building measures such as those agreed in the Helsinki final act, and under discussion in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm, can contribute to providing warning time.

3.28. The deplorable incident which led to a United States army officer, a member of the United States military liaison mission in East Germany, being shot by a Soviet sentry on 24th March has recently drawn attention to the rôle of military liaison missions maintained by the United Kingdom and the United States in East Germany, and by the Soviet Union in West Germany, under the terms of the immediate post-war three-power agreement. These liaison missions are allowed freedom of movement within the two countries with the exception of specific military zones. The British and United States missions in East Germany would certainly be in a position to observe any Warsaw Pact preparations for an offensive, or unusual activities if military zones closed to them were to be suddenly enlarged. United States State Department on 16th April announced that the Soviet Union had agreed not to permit the “ use of force or weapons ” against United States military liaison personnel in East Germany³. The statement followed a meeting in Potsdam on 12th April between General Otis, Commander-in-Chief United States Army Europe, his counterpart and the Soviet General Zaystsev. It was understood that the ground rules governing the activities of these liaison teams in the two Germanies would be clarified in future meetings. This would obviously be a welcome development, but the accuracy of the State Department's version of the agreement between the two commanders was challenged by the Soviet Embassy in Washington on 22nd April 1985.

IV. Conclusions

4.1. Most NATO countries have increased their defence effort over the last five years. While not all have achieved the agreed NATO target of 3% real increase per annum for five years, the United States defence expenditure from 1980 to 1985 increased by over 50% – equivalent to an average 8.5% per annum growth in real terms. Despite the large numerical superiority of Warsaw Pact forces on the central front in tanks, guns and aircraft the relative position of NATO conventional forces has improved somewhat over that period. But adequate warning time remains essential for NATO forces to achieve their maximum defence capability, particularly because of the unsatisfactory deployment of these forces in peacetime.

4.2. The committee welcomes the emphasis being placed by France on the rôle which its conventional forces could play in support of NATO forces in the event of hostilities, and recommends that NATO include French forces

3. International Herald Tribune, 8th April 1985.

in its periodical publication "NATO and the Warsaw Pact - force comparisons". The latest (1984) edition of this publication notes: "France and Spain are members of the North Atlantic Alliance but do not participate in its integrated military structure. At their request therefore no account of French and Spanish forces is taken in this comparison, although full statements of these forces are available in documents published nationally". The exclusion of French forces from official force comparisons is anomalous. France has always replied to the NATO annual review questionnaire on the defence effort, and French statistics are included with those of the other NATO countries in the official NATO defence statistics published each year and which, as in the past, are annexed to the present report. French ground forces, because of their geographical location, make an invaluable contribution to defence on the central front as a reserve available to commander CENTAG.

4.3. The committee notes that the referendum on Spanish membership of NATO is due to be held in March 1986. It suggests that Spain be encouraged to provide a modernised air-transportable force which could be available as a further reserve on the central front. The Spanish defence effort should similarly be included in NATO official statistics and Spanish forces included in the NATO force comparisons.


4.4. The committee expresses its appreciation of the invaluable contribution which United

States forces make to defence on the central front and welcomes in particular the efforts which have led to an improvement in potential United States reinforcement capabilities which amount to 95 aircraft squadrons and 15 divisions. Contrary to the impression in some United States quarters however, the committee points out that the great part of combat forces in Europe are provided by the European countries. In Europe as a whole European forces account for 90% of the ground forces, 80% of the combat aircraft, 80% of the tanks and 70% of the ships in European waters. Of the ground and air forces actually stationed in the territory of Western Germany in peacetime, 71% are provided by the European countries. The improved infrastructure programme recently agreed of some \$9 billion for the next six years will in particular provide shelters for some of the United States reinforcement aircraft squadrons.

4.5. In the long term considerable improvements in defence capability can be achieved with no greater expenditure through standardisation and interoperability of equipment, and through improvements in the stationing of forces in peacetime. The committee has frequently drawn attention also to the problem of logistics. Emphasis is now being placed on improving sustainability by increasing stocks of ammunition, but other proposals for improving the logistic posture of NATO forces remain to be implemented as recommended in the study on collective logistical support by General Dijkstra⁴.

4. Document 966, 20th December 1983.

APPENDIX I

**Force comparisons from various sources
Central region (or central and northern regions)****(a) NATO and Warsaw Pact - force comparisons, NATO, spring 1984¹****Defence of northern and central regions**

<i>Northern and central regions - in-place air forces</i>			
	Fighter/Bomber Ground/Attack	Interceptors	Reconnaissance
NATO	1,345	500	145
Warsaw Pact	1,555	2,635	390

N.B. : Some interceptors can be used in ground attack rôles.

1. Excludes French forces.

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1980-1984

A. FINANCIAL EFFORT

Country	National currency unit	Defence expenditure (national currency, current prices) <i>d</i>					Defence expenditure (current prices - US \$ million) <i>a</i>					GDP in purchasers' values (current prices - US \$ million) <i>a b</i>					Population (thousand)					Defence expenditure as % of GDP in purchasers' values					Defence expenditure per head (current prices - US \$) <i>a</i>					Defence expenditure as % of total WEU				
		1980	1981	1982	1983	1984 <i>f</i>	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984 <i>f</i>	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984 <i>f</i>	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984 <i>f</i>	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984 <i>f</i>	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984 <i>f</i>	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984 <i>f</i>
(0)	(1)	(-5)	(-4)	(-3)	(-2)	(-1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
Belgium	Million B. Frs.	115,754	125,689	132,127	136,853	147,496	3,958	3,385	2,892	2,676	2,669	116,936	95,725	84,251	80,087	79,278	9,847	9,852	9,856	9,866	9,876	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.4	402	344	293	271	270	4.01	3.84	3.38	3.17	3.16
France (c)	Million F. Frs.	111,672	129,708	148,021	165,029	175,770	26,425	23,867	22,522	21,654	21,130	655,305	572,516	543,079	519,208	518,970	53,714	53,963	54,219	54,468	54,740	4.0	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.1	492	442	415	398	386	26.76	27.05	26.31	25.65	24.99
Germany	Million DM	48,518	52,193	54,234	56,496	58,141	26,692	23,094	22,350	22,127	21,486	814,986	682,920	659,482	652,567	648,485	59,667	59,790	59,753	59,538	59,324	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.3	447	386	374	372	362	27.03	26.18	26.11	26.21	25.41
Italy	Milliard Lire	8,203	9,868	12,294	14,400	17,100	9,579	8,681	9,090	9,481	10,246	395,543	353,254	348,532	352,824	365,105	56,416	56,502	56,639	56,825	56,995	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.8	170	154	160	167	180	9.70	9.84	10.62	11.23	12.12
Luxembourg	Million L. Frs.	1,534	1,715	1,893	2,104	2,296	52	46	41	41	42	4,547	3,842	3,388	3,302	3,297	365	366	366	367	367	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	144	126	113	112	113	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Netherlands	Million Guilders	10,476	11,296	11,921	12,149	12,757	5,269	4,527	4,464	4,257	4,185	169,378	141,412	137,724	131,993	128,966	14,150	14,247	14,310	14,362	14,448	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	372	318	312	296	290	5.34	5.13	5.22	5.04	4.95
United Kingdom	Million £ Sterling	11,510	12,144	13,849	15,952	17,506	26,776	24,627	24,242	24,198	24,783	534,115	483,834	455,400	458,690	458,690	56,304	56,379	56,335	56,377	56,377	5.0	4.8	5.0	5.3	5.4	476	437	430	429	440	27.11	27.91	28.32	28.66	29.32
TOTAL WEU							98,752	88,228	85,601	84,434	84,541	2,690,810	2,363,742	2,260,290	2,195,382	2,202,790	250,463	251,099	251,478	251,803	252,127	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.8	394	351	340	335	335	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Canada	Million C. \$	5,499	6,289	7,655	8,086	9,273	4,703	5,245	6,205	6,561	7,278	259,117	290,745	298,052	325,142	343,444	24,070	24,366	24,659	24,907	25,206	1.8	1.8	2.1	2.0	2.1	195	215	252	263	289	4.76	5.95	7.25	7.77	8.61
Denmark	Million D. Kr.	9,117	10,301	11,669	12,574	..	1,618	1,446	1,400	1,375	..	66,322	57,638	56,419	56,776	57,076	5,125	5,122	5,119	5,114	5,107	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.4	..	316	282	274	269	..	1.64	1.64	1.64	1.63	..
Greece	Million Drachmas	96,975	142,865	176,270	193,340	248,418	2,275	2,578	2,639	2,195	2,372	40,147	36,724	37,898	34,460	34,979	9,642	9,730	9,792	9,870	9,949	5.7	7.0	7.0	6.4	6.8	236	265	269	222	238	2.30	2.92	3.08	2.60	2.81
Norway	Million N. Kr.	8,242	9,468	10,956	12,395	13,209	1,669	1,650	1,698	1,699	1,712	57,711	57,091	56,277	54,997	56,298	4,087	4,100	4,116	4,130	4,142	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.0	408	402	412	411	413	1.69	1.87	1.98	2.01	2.03
Portugal	Million Escudos	43,440	51,917	63,817	76,765	92,211	868	844	803	693	679	24,670	23,928	23,365	20,668	20,386	9,935	9,978	10,016	10,096	10,177	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.3	87	85	80	69	67	0.88	0.96	0.94	0.82	0.80
Turkey	Million L.	185,656	313,067	447,790	556,738	803,044	2,442	2,815	2,755	2,469	2,441	56,917	57,669	52,951	49,425	48,796	44,737	45,747	46,788	47,864	48,965	4.3	4.9	5.2	5.0	5.0	55	62	59	52	50	2.47	3.19	3.22	2.92	2.89
United States	Million US \$	143,981	169,888	196,390	217,154	250,011	143,981	169,888	196,390	217,154	250,011	2,606,625	2,933,460	3,052,088	3,288,411	3,625,144	227,738	230,019	232,309	234,496	236,841	5.5	5.8	6.4	6.6	6.9	632	739	845	926	1,056	145.80	192.56	229.42	257.19	295.73
TOTAL NON-WEU							157,555	184,466	211,889	232,146	265,893*	3,111,508	3,457,254	3,577,050	3,829,878	4,186,122	325,334	329,062	332,799	336,477	340,387	5.1	5.3	5.9	6.1	6.4*	484	561	637	690	781*	159.55	209.08	247.53	274.94	314*
TOTAL NATO (d)							256,306	272,694	297,490	316,580	350,434*	5,802,318	5,820,996	5,837,340	6,025,259	6,388,913	575,797	580,161	584,277	588,280	592,514	4.4	4.7	5.1	5.3	5.5*	445	470	509	538	591*	259.55	309.08	347.53	374.94	415*

Note a: GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States \$ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency conversion.

For the period 1980-1984, the following rates of exchange have been applied:

Country	National currency unit	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984 <i>f</i>
(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Belgium	Million B. Frs.	29.24300	37.13100	45.69100	51.13200	55.26300
France	Million F. Frs.	4.22600	5.43460	6.57240	7.62130	8.31870
Germany	Million DM	1.81770	2.26000	2.42660	2.55330	2.70600
Italy	Milliard Lire	0.85640	1.13680	1.35250	1.51890	1.66890
Luxembourg	Million L. Frs.	29.24300	37.13100	45.69100	51.13200	55.26300
Netherlands	Million Guilders	1.98810	2.49520	2.67020	2.85410	3.04810
United Kingdom	Million Pound Sterling	0.42987	0.49312	0.57127	0.65920	0.70636
Canada	Million C. \$	1.16930	1.19890	1.23370	1.23240	1.27410
Denmark	Million D. Kr.	5.63590	7.12340	8.33240	9.14500	9.89510
Greece	Million Drachmas	42.61700	55.40800	66.80300	88.06400	104.75000
Norway	Million N. Kr.	4.93920	5.73950	6.45400	7.29640	7.71510
Portugal	Million Escudos	50.06200	61.54600	79.47300	110.78000	135.70700
Turkey	Million Turkish Lira	76.04000	111.22000	162.55000	225.46000	328.94000
United States	Million US \$	1.00000	1.00000	1.00000	1.00000	1.00000

Note b: GDP (p.v.) = Gross domestic product in purchasers' values, current prices.

Note c: France is a member of the alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure; the relevant figures are indicative only.

Note d: The corresponding statistical data for Spain are not available.

e = Preliminary estimate.

f = Forecast.


.. = Not available.

* = WEU Office of the Clerk estimates.


Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(84)28.

(b) *White Paper 1983 - The security of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ministry of Defence, Bonn, October 1983*

Balance of forces in Central Europe



(c) *Statement on the defence estimates 1985, Ministry of Defence, London, May 1985*



1. Includes French forces in the Federal Republic of Germany which are not declared to NATO. Excludes the Berlin garrison.
 2. Excludes Warsaw Pact tanks in storage and training units, some of which were included last year.
 3. Corresponds to a balance of 57 Warsaw Pact to 33 NATO divisions. Warsaw Pact divisions normally consist of fewer personnel than many NATO divisions, but contain more tanks and artillery.
 4. Crew served systems and vehicle or helicopter mounted systems.

B. MANPOWER EFFORT - 1984

	Period of compulsory ¹ military service (months)			Total in armed forces ² military personnel (thousands) (e)	Total armed forces ² (military and civilian) as percentage of active population (e)
	Army	Navy	Air force		
Belgium	10 ³	10 ³	10 ³	108	2.7
France	12 ⁴	12 ⁴	12 ⁴	571	3.1
Germany	15	15	15	495	2.4
Italy	12	18	12	507	2.4
Luxembourg		voluntary		1	0.9
Netherlands	14-16	14-17	14-17	103	2.2
United Kingdom		voluntary		336	2.1
TOTAL WEU				2,121	2.5
Canada		voluntary		83	1.0
Denmark	9	9	9	31	1.6
Greece	22	26	24	177	5.1
Norway	12	15	15	39	2.4
Portugal	16	24	21-24	94	2.3
Turkey	20	20	20	815	4.5
United States		voluntary		2,269	2.9
TOTAL NON-WEU				3,508	3.0
TOTAL NATO				5,629	2.8

Sources:

1. IISS, Military Balance, 1983-84.
2. NATO press release M-DPC-2 (84) 28.
3. Eight months if served in Germany.
4. Eighteen months for overseas.

e = estimate.

State of European security - the central region

AMENDMENT 1 ¹

tabled by Mr. Verdon

1. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed : Verdon

1. See 6th sitting, 23rd May 1985 (amendment negatived).

*Application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur*

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- III. Resolution relating to Annex III to Protocol No. III – 27th June 1984

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Pignion (Chairman); MM. Blaauw, Kittelmann (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alberini, Amadei, van den Bergh, Bonnel, Bourges, Brown, Cox (Alternate: *Dr. Miller*), Dejardin, Ertl (Alternate: *Rumpf*), Galley (Alternate: *Jung*), Gerstl, Giust, Sir Anthony Grant (Alternate: *Lord Newall*), MM. Huyghues des Etages, Konen, *de Kwaadsteniet*, Lemmrich, Natiez, Pecchioli, Sarti, *Scheer*, *Sir Dudley Smith*, MM. Steverlynck, Stokes (Alternate: *Wilkinson*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Introductory Note

In preparing this report *the Rapporteur* had interviews as follows :

4th March 1985 – Paris

Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville, former Prime Minister (RPR) ;
Mr. Pierre Morel, Political Director, Ministry for External Relations.

5th March 1985 – London

Foreign and Commonwealth Office :

Mr. Michael Jenkins, Assistant Under-Secretary ;
Mr. John Barrass, WEU Affairs in Defence Department.

German Embassy

H.E. Baron Rüdiger von Wechmar, German Ambassador.

6th March 1985 – London

Western European Union :

H.E. Mr. E. Longerstaeey, Secretary-General ;
Dr. J. Diesel, Deputy Secretary-General ;
Mr. Peter Fraser, Assistant Secretary-General.

RIIA, Chatham House :

Mr. William Wallace, Deputy Director, advisor to the Liberal Party.

House of Commons :

The Rt. Hon. Denis Healey, MP, Labour Party spokesman.

18th March 1985 – Rome

Communist Party :

Mr. Tullio Vecchietti, Senator ;
Mr. Ugo Pecchioli, Senator.

Christian Democrat Party :

Mr. Gerardo Bianco, Chairman of the Italian Delegation to WEU.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs :

Ambassador Bruno Bottai, Political Director ;
Mr. Paolo Andrea Tralbalta, WEU Affairs.

Ministry of Defence :

Mr. Olcese, Under-Secretary of State.

The committee as a whole met at the Palais d'Egmont, Brussels, on 15th February 1985, when Lt. General Huitfeldt, Director of the NATO International Military Staff, addressed it on "Emerging technology and military strategy". It then held a joint meeting with the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly.

The committee then met in Strasbourg on 12th March 1985 where it was briefed by General Charles de Lamby, Commander First French Army and members of his staff, and at Headquarters French Forces in Germany, Baden-Oos, where it was briefed by Lt. General Houdet, Commander-in-Chief, and Commander 2nd French Army Corps and his staff.

The committee met at the seat of the Assembly the following day and was received by Mr. Charles Hernu, Minister of Defence, and then visited the French Defence Staff Command post where it was briefed by Vice-Admiral Louzeau, Major General of the Joint Defence Staff, and by General Guichard, Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Operations.

The committee met subsequently at the seat of the Assembly on 16th April, 7th May and finally on 20th May when it discussed and adopted the present report.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of parliament, officials, senior officers and experts who met the committee and replied to questions.

The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation

***on the application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the recent steps taken by the Council to implement the Assembly's demand that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s ;
- (ii) Expressing its appreciation of the successfully completed work of the Agency for the Control of Armaments over the last thirty years, which has contributed to the present solidarity of Europe ;
- (iii) Welcoming in particular the Rome Declaration of 27th October 1984 providing for all aspects of European security to be discussed in the WEU Council and for the ministerial organs of WEU to be reorganised to provide institutions, available to the Council and to the Assembly, to study these questions ;
- (iv) Welcoming the references in the communiqué of the Bonn ministerial meeting of the Council on 22nd and 23rd April which show that Ministers discussed questions of European security, disarmament, armaments co-operation and research and the creation of a technological community within the European Communities ;
- (v) Welcoming in particular the emphasis placed in the communiqué on the need for " agreements aimed at ending the arms race on earth and preventing an arms race in space " and the importance attached " to respect for existing treaty obligations " ;
- (vi) Welcoming the establishment of the three agencies for security questions as evidence of the Council's determination to continue active study of all the foregoing questions ;
- (vii) Calling for the provisions of the Rome Declaration to be fully and continuously implemented,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Keep under continuous study at permanent and ministerial level all major problems affecting European security ;
2. In particular continue to keep under continuous review all outstanding East-West arms control and disarmament questions, attaching equal importance to those negotiated in a multilateral and in a bilateral framework, with a view to reaching a common position on :
 - (a) President Reagan's strategic defence initiative and a reply to Secretary Weinberger's invitation for allied participation, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space and ensure respect for existing treaty obligations ;
 - (b) the treaty to ban chemical weapons being negotiated in the forty-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva ;
 - (c) General Secretary Gorbachev's declaration of a six-month unilateral freeze on the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Europe ;
 - (d) a comprehensive nuclear test ban and the reported Soviet offer to accept a moratorium on all nuclear testing from the fortieth anniversary of the Hiroshima bomb ;
3. Entrust the new WEU agencies for security questions with the tasks identified in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, including an urgent study of the cost of the joint production by Western European Union of observation satellites to provide independent intelligence relevant to arms control and security ;
4. Subject to reciprocity by Warsaw Pact countries, declare the levels of forces, and in the future the levels of nuclear weapons, stationed on the territory of all WEU countries, as a contribution to confidence-building measures ;
5. Make material provision to ensure that the new agencies for security questions will be able to provide more fully effective assistance to Assembly committees than the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee has been in a position to provide in the past ;
6. Make adequate budgetary provision to enable all WEU organs to carry out their respective tasks.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. It is in a very constructive atmosphere that your Rapporteur is able to introduce this year the committee's report on the application of the Brussels Treaty, which replies to those parts of the annual report of the Council for 1984 which are referred to the committee :

- defence questions ;
- Agency for the Control of Armaments ;
- Standing Armaments Committee.

The Council, particularly in the decisions incorporated in the Rome Declaration, adopted at the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Defence in October 1984, has now gone a long way towards meeting the Assembly's suggestion "that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s", first formulated in the historical Recommendation 380 adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1982¹. The task now is to ensure that the Council duly applies the decisions set forth in the declaration.

1.2. Successive reports of the committee on the application of the Brussels Treaty during the last seven years pointed the way to the adaptation of WEU which is now in progress. These reports began with those by Mr. Tanghe (Documents 777, 31st May 1978, and 808, 22nd May 1979), continued with the two reports by Mr. Prussen (Documents 908, 20th April 1982, and 948, 18th May 1983), culminating in the report by Mr. De Decker last year (Document 973, 15th May 1984). These reports called first for the removal of the remaining restrictions on the production of conventional weapons in Germany and later for the removal of quantitative controls on conventional weapons in all member countries on the mainland of Europe. The Assembly in Recommendations 320 (June 1978), 348 (June 1980), 365 (June 1981), 380 (June 1982), 397 (November 1983) and 406 (June 1984) endorsed the committee's views. Recommendation 320 (June 1978) on the committee's report (Document 777) first called for "a European centre for defence studies at the disposal of intergovernmental defence bodies and the Assembly, making use of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments and its Standing Armaments Committee". Finally, in

¹. Adopted on the committee's report : application of the Brussels Treaty, Rapporteur : Mr. Prussen, Document 908, 20th April 1982.

its report on the control of armaments and disarmament last December (Document 998, Rapporteur : Mr. Blaauw), the committee suggested specific tasks which might be assigned to the Agency for the Control of Armaments now that the internal controls on conventional weapons previously carried out by that Agency have been largely abolished by the Council in accordance with the recommendations of the Assembly.

1.3. In the Rome Declaration the Council announced three broad decisions :

- (i) to use the WEU Council for active ministerial discussion of specified issues affecting European security ;
- (ii) to abolish completely by 1st January 1986 the internal controls on conventional weapons hitherto applied in the Brussels Treaty framework ;
- (iii) to reform the institutions of WEU, within an overall zero growth framework, to meet the new requirements of the organisation in the light of the two foregoing decisions.

In the following chapters the report describes these decisions in more detail and examines the extent to which the Council has so far implemented them.

II. WEU and European security

2.1. In the Rome Declaration adopted on 27th October 1984 and the attached document on the institutional reform of WEU, the Council decided, *inter alia*, that in future it would normally meet twice a year with Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers and that the presidency of the Council would be held by each member state for a one-year term. While the "indivisibility of security within the North Atlantic Treaty area" was stressed, ministers decided :

"to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in particular :

- defence questions ;
- arms control and disarmament ;
- the effects of developments in East-West relations on the security of Europe ;

- Europe's contribution to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance, bearing in mind the importance of transatlantic relations ;
- the development of European co-operation in the field of armaments in respect of which WEU can provide a political impetus.

They may also consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world."

2.2. The declaration stressed the importance of liaison with states in the alliance which were not members of WEU, and the presidency of the Council was specifically made responsible for informing those countries.

2.3. As far as armaments co-operation was concerned, the declaration called attention to the need "to provide a political impetus to institutions of co-operation in the field of armaments".

2.4. As far as institutions of WEU are concerned, the declaration stated that the Secretariat-General should be adapted to take account of the enhanced activities of the Council, while the Permanent Council was to reorganise the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Standing Armaments Committee itself:

"in such a way as to fulfil a threefold task:

- to study questions relating to arms control and disarmament whilst carrying out the remaining control functions ;
- to undertake the function of studying security and defence problems ;
- to contribute actively to the development of European armaments co-operation."

2.5. Most interesting for the Assembly are various proposals concerning relations between the Council and the Assembly - the committee is already glad to note that, for the first time in many years, the annual report of the Council for 1984 was received by the end of February this year. The Rome Declaration mentions the improvement of contacts that take place after ministerial meetings of the Council. In this connection the Rapporteur believed it essential that the committee should have exercised its traditional right of meeting with the Council at ministerial level at the end of the ministerial meeting held in Bonn on 23rd April. Ministerial Council meetings are, in practice, the only occasions when the committee can hope to find

ministers from all seven countries present at a meeting. This particular date raised a difficulty in that it coincided with a meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe which concerns all representatives. This conflict of dates raises the issue of the composition of the Assembly itself - a subject at present being studied by the General Affairs Committee.

2.6. Future committee reports must keep under review the extent to which the Council has succeeded in holding substantive discussions on the items listed in paragraph 2.1. The present annual report covering the period up to 31st December 1984 makes no reference to any subsequent Council activity, and there was some evidence that the Permanent Council had become bogged down in discussing organisational and administrative details arising from the institutional decisions taken in Rome, and had devoted insufficient time to preparing the political and security items which should be on the agenda of the ministerial meeting.

2.7. The committee particularly welcomes however the meeting of arms control experts from national capitals which met in Bonn on 11th February 1985 under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ruth, commissioner for arms control and disarmament problems in the German Ministry of Defence. This meeting was called specifically to study arms control aspects of European security with particular reference to negotiations on a chemical weapons ban and on the control of weapons in space, the object being for the WEU countries to be able to establish a common position on these matters. The Rapporteur has been given to understand that certain representations were made by the United States, which appears to have misunderstood the purpose of the meeting. Recent press reports have even referred to an unpublished letter sent to WEU governments by Mr. Richard Burt, the United States Assistant Secretary of Defence for European Affairs, cautioning that attempts to co-ordinate a European position on arms control should not be allowed to cut across existing procedures within NATO². The committee considers it essential that the WEU countries should be able to take a common position on arms control questions which affect the security of Europe. The committee welcomes the call by the Italian Minister of Defence, Mr. Spadolini, at the end of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Luxembourg on 27th March, for a common response to be given to the United States concerning the strategic defence initiative³ and for the matter to be discussed at the WEU Council on 22nd-23rd April:

2. The Times, 3rd April 1985.

3. The committee considers the SDI in another report on emerging technology and military strategy, Rapporteur: Mr. van den Bergh.

“Europe must not act as individual units on matters which concern its very survival. On this point I received a unanimous opinion from my British and German colleagues.”⁴

2.8. In the event, the success of the ministerial meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April shows that Ministers have so far implemented the Rome decisions. The meeting was duly attended by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence. Paragraphs 2 to 4 of the communiqué show that security questions were discussed; paragraphs 5 to 8 deal with various aspects of current arms control negotiations, both those that are the subject of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and those that are the subject of multilateral negotiations in which all or most WEU countries participate directly.

Levels of forces

2.9. Under the terms of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty and two subsequent texts⁵, the *maximum* levels of forces and armaments which WEU countries are permitted to maintain on the mainland of Europe have to be approved by certain procedures according to the category of forces concerned:

<i>Category of force</i>	<i>Authority required to approve maximum permitted levels</i>
(i) Forces committed to NATO command	WEU Council ⁶
(ii) Forces for the common defence NOT committed to NATO command	North Atlantic Council
(iii) Forces for the defence of overseas territories	National government
(iv) Internal defence and police forces	WEU Council

These arcane routines are followed each year and duly recorded in the Council's annual reports. Since French forces on the mainland of Europe were withdrawn from NATO command in 1966 their status under Protocol No. II has become unclear. The Council's report records under the heading “Forces under NATO command” that on 28th February 1984 the Council “noted that the level of forces of the member states of WEU, as set out in the NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II, as at present in

4. Atlantic News No. 1706, 29th March 1985.

5. Resolution concerning the level of forces of the seven WEU powers placed under NATO command, WEU Council 15th September 1956, and agreement drawn up in implementation of Article V of Protocol No. II of the Brussels Treaty, Paris, 14th December 1957.

6. Or by consent of WEU members expressed in the North Atlantic Council.

force. It also took note of a declaration on French forces made by the representative of France.”

2.10. For some years the procedures for approving maximum levels of forces have had no point. NATO communicates relevant information concerning current force plans and the Council duly notes that the levels specified in Protocol No. II of the Brussels Treaty as at present in force are not exceeded. Verification of the levels of conventional weapons, discussed in the next chapter, is limited to a sampling method of inspection based on budgetary studies, a questionnaire, and information from NATO.

2.11. For the future the important point will be to preserve the fruits of the WEU experience for the purpose of military confidence-building measures in East-West relations such as those discussed in the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe. The committee therefore proposes that controls on force levels which have hitherto been internal WEU controls should, as a confidence-building measure, contribute to multilateral controls in the East-West framework. An official declaration of the levels of forces covered by Protocol No. II could be envisaged, subject to an agreement on reciprocity on the part of the Warsaw Pact countries. This concept could be extended to include a declaration concerning the levels of all national and allied forces stationed on the territory of all WEU countries (Protocol No. II covers only national forces on the mainland of Europe). The concept could be further extended to a declaration on the levels of all nuclear weapons stationed on European territory in the area of the Stockholm conference – the Atlantic to the Urals – in the framework of confidence-building measures covering nuclear weapons.

III. Agency for the Control of Armaments and the residual arms control provisions of Protocol No. III

(a) Residual functions of the Agency under the treaty

3.1. In application of the decision announced in the Rome Declaration, the Council on 23rd January 1985 adopted a resolution⁷ reducing by about half, from 1st January 1985, the quantitative controls applied to conventional weapons on the mainland of Europe, and abolishing these from 1st January 1986. The few remaining restrictions on the production of conventional weapons in Germany (Annex III to Protocol

7. Text at paragraph 3.9.

No. III) had previously been removed by the Council resolution of 27th June 1984⁸.

3.2. In this latter connection the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Genscher, stated in the Bundestag that the Federal Republic did not intend to make use of the removal of these last restrictions as it did not intend to produce the weapons concerned. The statement was made in response to anxiety expressed in the Bundestag as to whether deletion of the last items would arouse the mistrust of the Warsaw Pact if, for example, the Federal Republic were now to develop and produce long-range missiles. This matter deserves particular attention in connection with a policy of confidence-building measures which, with the Helsinki final act and the Stockholm negotiations, is only in its initial stage.

3.3. As far as emerging technology and conventional weapons are concerned, the question of its political impact on East-West relations has to be examined. The possibility could be considered of both sides renouncing the production of weapons with offensive capability so as to enhance the credibility of the defensive character of defence policy. The committee's important conclusions on this subject are contained in another report⁹.

3.4. The Rome Declaration also states that "the commitments and controls concerning A, B and C weapons would be maintained at the existing level and in accordance with the procedures agreed up to the present time." As Council reports have always pointed out that controls on nuclear (atomic) and bacteriological weapons have never in fact been applied, the extent of the remaining internal controls which will be applied under the Brussels Treaty from January 1986 are thus very few. The Council has an accepted list of biological agents, last updated in 1981, which would be the basis of any controls on such weapons if they were to be applied. The Council renewed this list for 1984 and will presumably continue to do so in 1986. The same applies to chemical weapons in respect of which the Council has a list of chemical agents subject to control.

3.5. As in the past, the annual report for 1984 states that the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of atomic or of biological weapons. As far as chemical weapons are concerned, the Agency in its questionnaire asks the six countries which have not renounced the right to produce such weapons whether effective production has started and whether they hold any stocks of chemical weapons whatever their

origin. As in the recent past all the countries concerned replied in the negative, the Agency carried out no quantitative controls of chemical weapons in 1984. The committee suggests that the Council make a more public declaration concerning the non-production and non-possession of chemical weapons, as a confidence-building measure as proposed in paragraph 2.11.

3.6. As far as non-production controls of chemical weapons in the seventh country are concerned, annual reports of the Council prior to that for 1983 have contained the reservation of that for 1982:

"As the convention for the due process of law¹⁰ has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1982, as in previous years, to take the form of agreed control measures.

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' notice. Since this agreement has never been withheld, the 1982 programme of control measures at privately-owned plants was therefore drawn up with full confidence that it could be implemented as in previous years."

With that reservation the Agency each year conducts agreed verification visits to chemical plants in the country concerned, but is not permitted to take samples because the convention referred to is not in force. It has been ratified by six countries but not by France.

3.7. The Council has now established a new agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions while the present Agency for the Control of Armaments will lose most of its staff to become a largely token body. It thus appears that as from 1st January 1986 the sole activities of the token agency, the residual arms controls prescribed by Protocols Nos. III and IV of the Brussels Treaty, will consist of the foregoing agreed verification visits to a chemical plant and the circulation to member countries of its annual questionnaire henceforth limited to the questions concerning chemical weapons mentioned in paragraph 3.5. The Council each year will merely agree to renew the lists of chemical and bacteriological agents theoretically subject to control.

10. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957).

8. Text at Appendix III.

9. Emerging technology and military strategy, Rapporteur: Mr. van den Bergh.

(b) Activities of the Agency in 1984

3.8. During 1984 the Council's report makes clear that the Agency for the Control of Armaments carried out its activities fully in verifying from documentary sources and spot checks that the quantitative levels specified for certain

conventional weapons for troops under national command on the mainland of Europe were not exceeded. The number of inspections conducted are listed in the table hereafter.

3.9. The conventional weapons concerned are those listed at Annex IV to Protocol No. III of

Numbers and types of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments - 1961-84

	Quantitative control measures				Non-production control measures		Total control measures (all categories)
	at depots	at units under national command	at production plants	Sub-total	at production plants	(of which non-production of chemical weapons)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1961	29	15	12	66	7	(2)	63
2	26	20	11	57	7	(2)	65
3	35	13	13	61	10	(4)	74
4	39	19	13	71	9	(4)	80
5	26	16	11	53	7	n.a.	60
6	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	78
7	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
8	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	79
9	*	*	*	*	*	(3)	77
1970	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>		<i>a</i> <i>b</i>
1	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	82 72
2	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	82 72
3	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	- 66
4	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	- 66
5	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	- 71
6	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	- 72
6	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	- 71
7	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	- 70
8	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	- 68
9	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	- 70
1980	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	- 70
1	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	- 70
2	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	- 69
3	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	- 72
4	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	- 66

Notes *a, b*: From 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of figures (old and new style - *a* and *b*) for the years 1970 and 1971.

n.a.: Information not available.

Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from published annual reports of the Council. With regard to the various categories of controls (columns 1 to 6), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the published annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the committee. Those for 1970 to 1984 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permission to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without significance.

* Confidential information available to the committee deleted from the published report.

the Brussels Treaty. The Council on 23rd January 1985 took the following decision :

“ Resolution

The Council of Western European Union,

In implementation of the decision contained in paragraphs 3(a) of section III of the document on the institutional reform of WEU adopted in Rome on 27th October 1984, and having regard to the relevant provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty of 23rd October 1954,

Article 1

HAS DECIDED that, with effect from 1st January 1985, the controls shall be lifted on the following types of armaments in the list contained in Annex IV to Protocol No. III, signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954: the elevating mass referred to in paragraphs 5, 6(a), 6(b), 7, 8(c), 9, 10, 11(b) and 11(c).

Article 2

HAS DECIDED that, with effect from 1st January 1986, paragraphs 2 to 11 inclusive of the abovementioned list shall be cancelled.”

The effect is to remove from the list about half of the conventional weapons subject to quantitative controls. The original text of the list, with the items removed underlined, is at Appendix I. It is anticipated therefore that Agency activities under the treaty will be reduced to about one half during 1985.

3.10. The Committee has welcomed the inclusion in the Council's reports of a section on the production and procurement of armaments for the forces of WEU countries stationed on the mainland of Europe. It is included in the 1984 report at Appendix II. In the light of the new tasks to be assigned to the new Agencies and the phasing out of the tasks of the old Agency, the committee recommends that this list be extended to cover armaments for all the forces of all allied countries stationed in Europe.

3.11. At the conclusion of the first phase of the Agency's work, the application of controls provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty, the committee records its great appreciation of the diligent yet discreet way in which the Agency has carried out its task over the last thirty years, in difficult conditions created largely by the Council's early decision that controls provided for in the treaty should not be fully applied, and those on A and B weapons not at all. The very effectiveness of the Agency has contributed in no small

part to the present cohesion and unity of Western Europe which has finally made unnecessary the very controls the Agency was intended to apply.

IV. Future rôle of the agencies

4.1. Much more important for the adaptation of WEU to the requirements of the 1980s is the future rôle of the three agencies for security questions which the Council has established to enable it to carry out the new tasks referred to in the Rome Declaration :

“(b) The Ministers have instructed the Permanent Council to define, in consultation with the directors of the ACA and the SAC, the precise modalities of an overall reorganisation affecting both the ACA, the international secretariat of the SAC and the SAC which could be structured in such a way as to fulfil a threefold task :

- to study questions relating to arms control and disarmament whilst carrying out the remaining control functions ;
- to undertake the function of studying security and defence problems ;
- to contribute actively to the development of European armaments co-operation.

(c) As regards the first two functions indicated above, the intention would be to have available a common basis of analysis which could form a useful point of reference for the work of both the Council and the Assembly and also for informing public opinion.

This reorganisation will have to be carried out taking into account, on the one hand, changes in duties resulting first from the reduction and then from the abolition of the control tasks and, on the other hand, the need to have the appropriate experts available.

(d) As regards armaments co-operation WEU should be in a position to play an active rôle in providing political impetus :

- by supporting all co-operative efforts including those of the IEPG and the CNAD ;
- by encouraging in particular the activity of the IEPG as a forum whose main objective is to promote European co-operation and also to contribute to the development of balanced co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance ;

- by developing continuing concertation with the various existing bodies.

(e) In this general context, the Permanent Council will also take into account the existence of the FINABEL framework. ”

4.2. In application of the Rome Declaration the Council, at the ministerial meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April, announced in the communiqué that the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee, and the Standing Armaments Committee itself would be comprehensively reorganised, three agencies for security questions being established in their place :

- an agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions ;
- an agency for the study of security and defence questions ;
- an agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments.

The Permanent Council is to report to the next ministerial meeting of the Council on the new tasks attributed to these agencies.

4.3. At appendix the committee lists¹¹ those specific tasks which it suggests should now be entrusted to the agencies. The most important aim should be the constitution of a European data base on all issues concerning arms control. Of particular importance is the Council's recognition that the Assembly might make use of contributions from the technical institutions of WEU. The Council has already authorised the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee to assist Mr. van den Bergh in the preparation of his report on emerging technology and military strategy. Co-operation of this type should continue in the future. The committee must be enabled to call on the services of the three agencies in appropriate circumstances.

4.4. The committee also recommends that the new agencies should undertake urgently a study of the cost involved in the joint acquisition by WEU of observation satellites to provide European countries with an independent source of intelligence relevant to arms control and security, and recalls in this context its earlier proposals for the acquisition of such a system by the United Nations. It welcomes the continued support of France for such a project, evidenced by the reply of Mr. Curien, French Minister of Research and Technology, to a written question in the National Assembly on 4th February 1985 :

“ The creation of an international satellite controls agency was proposed by France in the United Nations in 1978 and continues to be supported by the French Government... The possibility of designing such a system in the framework of the European Space Agency remains to be defined. Disarmament control satellites inevitably have military implications. The project could be relaunched when one or several European states have reconnaissance satellites serving both for defence and crisis control... ”

In the view of the committee such reconnaissance satellites should be acquired by WEU collectively ; the high cost involved alone should recommend a joint approach.

4.5. In order for these agencies to be able to assist Assembly committees effectively, material resources must be provided. Where Rapporteurs undertake missions of enquiry in preparing their reports, budgetary provision must be made to allow expert staff of the agencies to accompany them. This did not prove possible in the case of the report mentioned above because the Council did not authorise travel costs of SAC staff assisting Mr. van den Bergh to be borne on the SAC budget, and the Assembly's own travel budget is already too small. Full use could not therefore be made of the invaluable expertise of the SAC staff.

4.6. The comprehensive reorganisation of the WEU ministerial bodies, with the establishment of these three new agencies in Paris provides an opportunity to further improve material co-operation between the agencies and the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly. Cost-effectiveness can be improved and unnecessary duplication eliminated.

4.7. With the universal introduction of automatic data-processing equipment, in particular word processors, it is essential that all material be compatible throughout all offices of WEU in London and Paris, both in the agencies and in the Office of the Clerk. This will permit the transmission of all texts in machine-readable form and eliminate costly retyping.

4.8. The new agencies it is understood will be staffed in part by analysts on short-term contract or secondment, who will require wider sources of data than their predecessors. The comprehensive public documentary resources of the Office of the Clerk, based on the collection of official texts of all kinds supplemented by systematic press cuttings, should be expanded and made available to the new agencies. With larger staff and premises it should incorporate the present small library of the Agency for the Control of Armaments based mostly on the technical press.

11. At Appendix II.

V. Conclusions

5.1. The Ministerial Council at its Bonn meeting on 22nd and 23rd April established three new agencies for security questions.

- an agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions ;
- an agency for the study of security and defence questions ; and
- an agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments.

The Permanent Council is to define these tasks more closely, but the agencies must assist not only the Council, but also the Assembly. The committee's proposals are set forth in paragraphs 4.3 to 4.8.

5.2. The committee is glad to note that the fears raised last year by the decision to restructure WEU, lest within WEU there should be a two-speed security policy - possibly because of Franco-German co-operation for example - have not materialised. Co-operation on the basis of equality between the seven WEU members, with the possibility of welcoming new European countries to the fold, is essential.

5.3. Thus the Assembly has a leading rôle to play. It is then unacceptable that the Council of Ministers should attend Assembly debates only sporadically. The Assembly should insist on the presence of a representative of the Council of ministerial rank throughout the duration of its two annual half-sessions.

5.4. The Assembly, which promulgated its own Charter, will not of course limit its debates to the subjects listed in the Rome Declaration. That

means that the Assembly as in the past will continue to examine strategic questions, which still cause controversy between the WEU countries, with a view to finding a new and wide consensus.

5.5. This applies equally to arms control and disarmament questions. Discussion of this subject is essential in order to reach agreement on a common policy which takes account of European interests. The Council should attach equal importance to multilateral arms control negotiations and to bilateral negotiations. Six of the WEU countries participate directly in the forty-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva where three main topics are on the agenda : a ban on chemical weapons, a comprehensive test ban and prevention of an arms race in outer space. The committee in the draft recommendation makes specific recommendations on all three, reiterating the points already adopted by the Assembly in Recommendation 415 adopted on 4th December 1984 on the committee's last report¹² and drawing attention to the reported offer by the Soviet Union to accept, provided other nuclear powers do also, a moratorium on all nuclear testing from 6th August 1985 - the fortieth anniversary of the Hiroshima bomb. On this subject of disarmament so vital for Europe it cannot be claimed that the United States should have exclusive competence.

5.6. Studies undertaken by WEU agencies - and perhaps also in the future WEU initiatives on arms control and disarmament - suppose autonomous sources of information, hence the need for common means of satellite reconnaissance so that WEU countries will not be solely dependent on information supplied by others.

¹². Control of armaments and disarmament, Document 998, Rapporteur : Mr. Blaauw.

APPENDIX I

Annex IV to Protocol No. III to the modified Brussels Treaty

*(Items removed from the list by the Council resolution of
23rd January 1985 are printed in italics)*

LIST OF TYPES OF ARMAMENTS TO BE CONTROLLED

1. (a) Atomic,
(b) biological, and
(c) chemical weapons,

in accordance with definitions to be approved by the Council of Western European Union as indicated in Article I of the present protocol.

2. All guns, howitzers and mortars of any types and of any rôles of more than 90 mm. calibre including the following component for these weapons, viz., the *elevating mass*.

3. All guided missiles.

Definition : Guided missiles are such that the speed or direction of motion can be influenced after the instant of launching by a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile ; these include V-type weapons developed in the recent war and modifications thereto. Combustion is considered as a mechanism which may influence the speed.

4. Other self-propelled missiles of a weight exceeding 15 kilogrammes in working order.

5. *Mines of all types except anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.*

6. Tanks, including the following component parts for these tanks, viz :

(a) *the elevating mass ;*

(b) *turret castings and/or plate assembly.*

7. *Other armoured fighting vehicles of an overall weight of more than 10 metric tons.*

8. (a) Warships over 1,500 tons displacement ;

(b) submarines ;

(c) *all warships powered by means other than steam, diesel or petrol engines or gas turbines ;*

(d) *small craft capable of a speed of over 30 knots, equipped with offensive armament.*

9. *Aircraft bombs of more than 1,000 kilogrammes.*

10. *Ammunition for the weapons described in paragraph 2 above.*

11. (a) Complete military aircraft other than :

(i) all training aircraft except operational types used for training purposes ;

(ii) military transport and communication aircraft ;

(iii) helicopters ;

(b) *airframes, specifically and exclusively designed for military aircraft except those at (i), (ii) and (iii) above ;*

(c) *jet engines, turbo-propeller engines and rocket motors, when these are the principal motive power.*

APPENDIX II

Specific tasks suggested for the Agencies for Security Questions*(with some comparison with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency)*

Europe should have its own source of comparative factual information on defence capabilities of various countries and arms control issues. At present, the United States is the principal source of much public information.

A. Studies

1. Study extent of verification measures necessary to provide adequate assurance of compliance with arms control agreements, in particular a chemical weapons ban, a comprehensive test ban, and MBF reductions.

2. *Arms control impact statements.* The United States ACDA reports annually to Congress on the possible effect on disarmament negotiations of the introduction of any new weapon system being considered in the United States. A similar assessment should be available to European governments and parliaments.

3. *World military expenditure and arms transfers.* United States ACDA published this statistical data each year. It covers all countries of the world, as well as regions and major alliance (NATO and Warsaw Pact). There should be an independent European source, not open to accusations of political manipulation.

4. In the above context, there should be an independent European assessment of the level of the Soviet defence effort, based both on rouble costs and dollar (or other convertible currency) costs.

5. *Threat assessment.* On the basis of statistical data and value judgments concerning intentions, the Agency could assist in preparing a European threat assessment. It could contribute also to the NATO publication NATO and the Warsaw Pact - Force comparisons, two editions of which have not been published by NATO - they are far more objective than the popularised United States publication, Soviet Military Power.

B. Operational activities

6. The Agency could conduct field exercises by sending observers to allied manoeuvres to investigate the extent of facilities which observers would require in the context of any MBFR agreements if they were to be able reliably to detect the size and extent of movements of troops and military equipment.

7. The Agency could also train and coordinate the activities of observers sent by European allied countries to observe Warsaw Pact exercises under the terms of the Helsinki agreements.

C. Urgent study

8. The committee recommends that an urgent study be undertaken of the cost involved in the joint acquisition by Western European Union of observation satellites to provide an independent source of intelligence relevant to arms control and security.

APPENDIX III

Resolution
relating to Annex III to Protocol No. III

27th June 1984

The Council of Western European Union,

Having regard to Article II to Protocol No. III of the Brussels Treaty modified by the Agreements signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954, and Annexes I and III to that protocol ;

Having regard to the recommendation dated 8th June 1984 of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe relating to the cancellation of paragraphs IV and VI of Annex III to Protocol No. III ;

Having regard to the request to this effect submitted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in a letter dated 15th June 1984 ;

DECIDES :

Single article

Paragraphs IV and VI of Annex III to Protocol No. III, entitled respectively " Long-range missiles and guided missiles " and " Bomber aircraft for strategic purposes ", are cancelled.

N.B. The committee has published the texts of Annex III to Protocol No. III, as originally agreed, and as amended by the Council prior to the cancellation of paragraphs IV and VI referred to above (see Document 973, Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty, 15th May 1984, Appendix II). The above resolution has the effect of cancelling all remaining items on the list of (conventional) weapons which the Federal Republic of Germany further undertakes not to manufacture on its territory.

*Application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 4¹

tabled by Mr. Verdon

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ attaching ” to the end of the paragraph, and insert :
“ underlining the importance the Council attaches to respect of commitments under existing bilateral treaties and endorsing the determination of the countries participating in the CSCE to bring about an East-West rapprochement in the long term so that the WEU member countries adopt a co-ordinated reaction to : ”.
2. Leave out paragraph 2(a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert :
“ (a) President Reagan’s strategic defence initiative in response to the invitation from Mr. Weinberger, Secretary of Defence, to take part, while confirming that the growing importance of technology should lead to Europe’s own capability being strengthened, with a view to creating a European technological community ; ”
3. Leave out paragraph 2(c) of the draft recommendation proper.
4. Leave out paragraph 2(d) of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed : Verdon

1. See 5th sitting, 22nd May 1985 (amendments negatived).

Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure
Terms of reference of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges ²
by Mr. Jessel, Rapporteur***

Draft Resolution

***on the amendment of Rule 42 bis to enlarge the competence of
the Committee for Relations with Parliaments***

The Assembly,

DECIDES

To amend Rule 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure as follows :

1. *Title*

Leave out “ Committee for Relations with Parliaments ” and insert “ Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations ”.

2. *Paragraphs 3 and 4*

Leave out paragraphs 3 and 4 and insert :

“ 3. The committee shall :

- (a) select from the texts adopted by the Assembly those which, in its opinion should be debated in national parliaments ;
- (b) make all necessary arrangements with a view to bringing the work of the Assembly to the attention of national parliaments and inviting them to follow it up ; and
- (c) make all necessary proposals with a view to bringing the work of the Assembly to the attention of the public and the press in member countries. ”

3. *Paragraph 5*

Leave out “ It ” and insert “ In the exercise of its functions under paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b), the committee ”.

4. *Paragraph 6*

At the end add “ including any draft orders or resolutions ”.

5. Renumber the paragraphs accordingly.

1. Adopted in committee by 8 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions.
 2. *Members of the committee* : Mr. *Schulte* (Chairman) ; MM. *Eysink* (Alternate : *van der Sanden*), *Woodall* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Antoni*, *Antretter*, *Coleman* (Alternate : *Jessel*), *Corrie* (Alternate : *Earl of Kinnoull*), *Delehedde*, *Sir Geoffrey Finsberg*, Mr. *Gorla*, Mrs. *Hennicot-Schoepges*, MM. *Koehl* (Alternate : *Caro*), *Lapenta*, *Marchio*, *Michel*, *Péciaux*, *Spies von Büllenheim*, *Unland*, *Vial-Massat*, *van der Werff* (Alternate : *Stoffelen*), *Wilquin*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Jessel, Rapporteur)

1. The Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges has been instructed by the Presidential Committee to study the terms of reference of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. The latter committee has expressed a desire that :

- (i) the rules should be changed so as to permit it to present a draft recommendation or order to the Assembly ; and
- (ii) it should be renamed the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Present Rule 42 bis

2. The present constitution and scope of the committee is set out in Rule 42 *bis*. The committee is composed of fourteen members, two from each member country, unlike the five permanent committees which are larger and where national representation is not equal. Secretaries of national delegations may be invited to the committee's meetings. The duty of the committee is (a) to select from texts adopted by the Assembly those which it considers should be debated in national parliaments, and (b) to make all necessary arrangements to call the work of the Assembly to the attention of national parliaments, and to invite them to follow up the work. A report on these activities is submitted twice a year.

3. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments should not be considered as empowered to lay recommendations before the Assembly for approval unless it has been formally instructed by the Presidential Committee, under Rule 17 on the settlement of the agenda, to present to the Assembly a report in the sense of Rule 42 (which is different from a report on its activities).

Case for and against change

4. In the course of consideration of the committee's request, first made in December 1982, a number of arguments have been put forward for and against amending the rules as the committee wishes. In favour of a change, it was argued that the existing rule deprived the Committee for Relations with Parliaments of any possibility of taking substantive parliamentary action, and thus arguably of its *raison d'être*. The change sought conferred on the committee no wider powers than those enjoyed by the corresponding committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Article VII of the Charter permits the Assembly to create new committees,

and the Assembly has in fact used this power to create the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

5. On the other hand, the committee's production of reports and substantive texts might (it has been argued) cut across the functions and responsibilities of the policy committees and impinge on the Budget Committee's rôle in the allocation of funds. There might be conflict with the Presidential Committee over the organisation of the work of the Assembly. The participation of secretaries of national delegations is important and should be safeguarded. Members of the committee have other individual or collective means of influencing the work of the Assembly. The phrase "relations with... the public" was thought to be too vague.

Proposals

6. It is not for the Committee on Rules of Procedure but for the Assembly to take a definitive decision on whether or not to accede to the request of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. The purpose of this report is therefore only to make proposals for the amendment of the rules which would make possible Assembly agreement to the request. At the same time, the Committee on Rules of Procedure has made its suggestions with three considerations in mind.

7. The first is that the Rome Declaration of October 1984 and the consequent efforts to reinvigorate WEU have substantially changed the background against which the decision is taken. The Assembly ought to be able to consider how best to play its part in making known the work of WEU to a wider public than has so far been reached. It also has a separate responsibility for drawing public attention to its own unique and democratic rôle within WEU. The amendments proposed will permit the Assembly to discuss these matters and (if the changes are agreed) the committee can then work out details.

8. Secondly, the form of the amendments proposed does not impose a mandatory duty on the committee, but permits it to make up its own mind whether to make proposals on the "public relations" aspect of its duties.

9. Finally, the amendments proposed try to take account of the objections to the change which have previously been voiced. All of these are important, but none is necessarily fatal

to the proposal. Attention is drawn to the following aspects of the proposed amendments :

- (i) The attached alterations to Rule 42 *bis* do not give the committee power to bring forward draft recommendations or opinions addressed to the Council, which might cut across the proper concerns of the permanent committees. The committee would be limited to suggesting resolutions and orders, which tend to concern the affairs of the Assembly itself or its external relations. These should allow it to carry out its functions without becoming involved in substantive political issues. It is not suggested that the committee should be added to the number of permanent committees. The committee's draft resolutions or orders must in any case be within the scope of paragraph 3 and its reports within paragraph 6. If on any occasion the committee should go beyond its remit of parliamentary or public and press relations, it would be proper for any member to move to recommit a report as *ultra vires*.
- (ii) There is no suggestion in paragraph 3 that the committee has any direct concern with the organisation of the work of the Assembly or responsibility for the allocation of funds. Draft resolutions or orders may on occasion be agreed to by the committee which may, for example, have financial effects. But such proposals will be open to comment by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and could not in any event be implemented except with the agreement of that committee.
- (iii) No change is made in the practice of inviting administrative secretaries of national delegations to meetings, though their participation is (as before) restricted to the business arising from the committee's work *vis-à-vis* national parliaments.
- (iv) The powers and duties of members in influencing the work of the Assembly individually or through committees remain untouched. The committee is being given an extra and very specific task, for which no individual member or group of members now bears any responsibility - the determination of the Assembly's policy on how to present to best effect the work which it collectively does.

- (v) By proposing to add the words "and the press" to paragraph 3(c) the Committee on Rules of Procedure is making clear how, within the discretion of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, the amended rule might operate. Of course the public at large are a body too amorphous even in a national context to be regarded as a target for Assembly publicity. The problem is exacerbated if seven member countries are involved. Nevertheless, to regard the seven parliaments and governments as the sole (or at least the predominant) audience for the Assembly's views is to neglect the logic of democracy itself, and the popular basis on which parliaments rest. The *means* of communicating with the public at large is the same on a European as on a national stage - through the press. Individual members will no doubt continue to draw press attention to Assembly texts or speeches : but press relations are also a matter of *common* concern. For that reason, it is right that procedures should be devised which will allow the most effective presentation to be made in all countries. No doubt the Assembly's Press Counsellor will be ready both to advise the committee and to act on any of its proposals which the Assembly may accept without limiting his responsibility to assist individual members who may ask for his help.
- (vi) If the foregoing arguments are accepted, the change in the committee's title seems consequential. At the same time, there seems to be no need to alter the present composition of the committee, because its work will continue to be distinguished by its breadth and non-partisan character.

Conclusion

10. If these proposals are adopted, they will not hinder or devalue the work the Committee for Relations with Parliaments now does in encouraging colleagues in national parliaments to take up and develop work begun by WEU. Nor will they force on the committee any particular course of action which it may be reluctant to adopt. By agreeing to the amendments to the rules, members would be clearing the way for the committee to advise on how WEU in general and the Assembly in particular can develop an important aspect of reinvigoration - deepening public understanding of WEU's contribution to the maintenance of peace and security.

Withdrawal of a report from the agenda

MOTION FOR AN ORDER ¹

tabled by Dr. Miller and others

The Assembly,

(i) Regretting that the vote in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments will defer consideration of Mr. van den Bergh's report on emerging technology and military strategy, dealing inter alia with the strategic defence initiative, since this decision denies to the Assembly an early opportunity of discussing matters of great importance and prevents the only European assembly specifically empowered by treaty to discuss defence and security issues from fulfilling its obligation ;

(ii) Believing that the decision calls in question the meaningful reactivation of the organisation,

INSTRUCTS THE COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS

To report on this subject without fail to the second part of the thirty-first session.

Signed : Miller, Woodall, Cox, van den Bergh, Stoffelen, Brown, Hardy, Hughes, Tummers, Fourré

1. See 5th sitting, 22nd May 1985 (order agreed to).

Iran-Iraq war

MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION ¹

tabled by Mr. Hardy and others

The Assembly,

Aware of the continued crisis arising from the Iran-Iraq conflict which presents a threat not only to regional stability, but to global security ;

Concerned at the aggressive character of the Khomeini régime, which has already cost enormous numbers of lives ;

Noting the apparently increasing concern of many Iranian people that a cease-fire should be arranged and that negotiations for peace should commence,

URGES member states to express further their desire for peace and to use their diplomatic, political and economic influence to secure this end.

Signed : Hardy, Cox, Hughes, Woodall, Miller, Pignion, Stoffelen, Pécriaux, Bogaerts, Brown

1. See 4th sitting, 22nd May 1985 (motion included in the register of the Assembly).

Situation in Lebanon

MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION ¹

*tabled by Mr. Martino and others
with a request for urgent procedure*

The Assembly,

- (i) Alive to the cry of anguish coming from the martyred territory of Lebanon disrupted by civil war accompanied by killing, bloodshed and genocide ;
- (ii) Considering that the indifference shown by member states and European organisations makes them bear heavy responsibility in the crimes against humanity committed in Lebanon,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Call upon its Chairman-in-Office and all member governments to use all the means at their disposal to help to restore peace by acting directly, or in the framework of international organisations, so as to exert an influence in favour of peace ;
2. Instruct its Chairman-in-Office to make a solemn appeal to the Government of Lebanon and to those of neighbouring countries to respect human rights for all the Lebanese people, whatever their race or creed ;
3. Urge the United Nations to undertake immediately an examination of the situation in Lebanon with a view to promoting a transitional solution guaranteeing the population against a resumption of the massacres ;
4. Ask all member countries of the Council of Europe to endorse these steps.

Signed: Martino, Ferrari Aggradi, Cifarelli, Cavaliere, Milani, Amadei, Sarti, Mezzapesa, Michel, Vecchiotti, Sinesio

1. See 4th sitting, 22nd May 1985 (urgent procedure agreed to).

*Organisation of the work of the Assembly
and of its committees*

MOTION FOR AN ORDER ¹

in implementation of a proposal by the Bureau

The Assembly,

- (i) Having noted the proposal by the Bureau communicated at the beginning of the morning sitting on 21st May 1985 ;
- (ii) Recalling its commitment to the reinvigoration of WEU and particularly its recent agreement to the report on action by the Presidential Committee ;
- (iii) Concerned to improve the efficiency of its operations, so as to ensure that committee reports are available for a reasonable period before the Assembly comes to debate them, and that the order of business agreed by the Presidential Committee should not normally need serious adjustment at the first sitting of the Assembly,

INSTRUCTS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

To consider and discuss with the chairmen of the permanent committees the organisation of a mini-session of committee meetings to be held before the December part-session, in sufficient time to allow reports to be circulated two weeks before the Assembly first sits.

1. See 4th sitting, 22nd May 1985 (order agreed to).

Situation in Lebanon

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Martino, Rapporteur***

Draft Recommendation

on the situation in Lebanon

The Assembly,

Greatly disturbed by the situation in Lebanon, which is disrupted by internal warfare accompanied by killing, bloodshed and genocide,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Call upon its Chairman-in-Office and all member governments to use all the means at their disposal to help to restore peace by acting directly, as well as in the framework of international organisations likely to exert an influence in favour of peace ;
2. Instruct its Chairman-in-Office to make a solemn appeal to the Government of Lebanon and all the internal parties concerned and to the governments of neighbouring countries to respect human rights for all Lebanese, whatever their race or creed ;
3. Urge the United Nations to undertake immediately an examination of the situation in Lebanon with a view to promoting a transitional solution guaranteeing the population against a resumption of the massacres ;
4. Ask all member countries of Western European Union to associate themselves with these steps.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee* : Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy, van der Werff (Alternate: *Blaauw*) (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Sir Frederic Bennett (Alternate: *Sir Paul Hawkins*), MM. Berrier, Bianco, Bogaerts, Burger (Alternate: *Hengel*), Hill, Johnston, Mrs. Kelly (Alternate: *Horacek*), MM. Koehl, Lagneau, Lagorce, Martino, Masciadri (Alternate: *Cavaliere*), Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spitella (Alternate: *Giust*), Vecchiotti, de Vries (Alternate: *Tummers*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Institutional connection of the Assembly
with other organs of WEU*

MOTION FOR AN ORDER ¹

tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim and others

The Assembly,

Endeavouring a closer co-ordination of the defence policies of its member states,

INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE


To ask the competent committee for the preparation of a report on the possibilities, conditions and consequences of a closer institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU. The report should consider also the following possibilities :

- (a) responsibility of the Secretary-General of WEU also with respect to the Assembly ;
- (b) responsibility of the different expert secretariats for both the Assembly and the other organs of WEU ;
- (c) one single budget for all WEU organs including the Assembly ;
- (d) centralisation of all WEU organs in one place ;
- (e) consideration of all other possibilities suitable further to promote the cause of WEU.

This report should restrict itself to a presentation of the factual conditions and legal possibilities as a basis for the necessary political follow-up and an eventual decision by the competent bodies according to the Brussels Treaty.

Signed: Spies von Büllenheim, Stoffelen, Blaauw, Schulte, Eysink, Miller, Fischer, Finsberg, Enders, Woodall, Antretter

1. See 6th sitting, 23rd May 1985 (order agreed to).

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