

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-SIXTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1990

II

Minutes
Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

754.1.7

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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FIRST PART

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II

Minutes
Official Report of Debates

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PARIS

The proceedings of the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume I : Assembly documents.

Volume II: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	SP
BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
CHEVALIER Pierre	SP
KEMPINAIRE André	PVV
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
Mr. UYTENDAELE René	CVP

Substitutes

MM. CAUWENBERGHS Frans	CVP
COLLART Jacques	PS
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
EICHER Bernard-J.	PS
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
NOERENS René	PVV

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BEIX Roland	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
DURAND Adrien	CDS
FILLON François	RPR
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GOUTEYRON Adrien	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PONTILLON Robert	Socialist
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
THYRAUD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	PC

Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRÉ René	RPR
BALLIGAND Jean-Pierre	Socialist
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
BOHL André	UCDP
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAUULT Xavier	UDF (App.)
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
LE GRAND Jean-François	RPR
LEMOINE Georges	Socialist
MASSERET Jean-Pierre	Socialist
PISTRE Charles	Socialist
ROGER Jean	RDE
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
WORMS Jean-Pierre	Socialist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTET Robert	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
EICH Tay	Die Grünen

MM. HITSCHLER Walter	FDP
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUUK Dagmar	SPD
MM. MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
NIEGEL Lorenz	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU
WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

Mr. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
Mrs. BEER Angelika	Die Grünen
Mr. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
MM. BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
Mr. HÖFFKES Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. HOFFMANN Ingeborg	CDU/CSU
MM. KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
PFUHL Albert	SPD
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
SCHMITZ Hans-Peter	CDU/CSU
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TIMM Helga	SPD
MM. ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU
ZYWIETZ Werner	FDP

ITALY

Representatives

MM. BENASSI Ugo	PCI
CACCIA Paolo	Chr. Dem.
FILETTI Cristoforo	MSI-DN
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
GABBUGGIANI Elio	Communist
INTINI Ugo	Socialist
KESSLER Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MALFATTI Franco Maria	Chr. Dem.
MARTINO Guido	Republican
MEZZAPESA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
NATALI Antonio	Socialist
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PIERALLI Piero	Communist
RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.

Substitutes

MM. ANDREIS Sergio	Verdi
CANNATA Giuseppe	Communist
CAPANNA Mario	Profl. Dem.
CARIGLIA Antonio	PSDI
COLOMBO Vittorino	Chr. Dem.
FASSINO Giuseppe	Liberal
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM. GIAGU DEMARTINI Antonio	Chr. Dem.
GRECO Francesco	Communist
PASQUINO Gianfranco	Ind. Left
RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
RUBNER Hans	SVP
SCOVACRICCHI Martino	PSDI
STAGAGNINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
TEODORI Riccardo	Radical
TRIGLIA Riccardo	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG**Representatives**

Mr. GOERENS Charles Dem.
 Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE Marcelle Soc. Chr.
 Mr. REGENWETTER Jean Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM. DIMMER Camille Soc. Chr.
 KOLLWELTER René Soc. Workers
 Mrs. POLFER Lydie Dem.

NETHERLANDS**Representatives**

MM. AARTS Harry CDA
 EVERSDIJK Huib
 Mrs. HAAS-BERGER Regina Maria PVDA
 MM. STOFFELEN Pieter Labour
 TUMMERS Nicolas Labour
 van VELZEN Wim CDA
 VERBEEK Jan Willem Liberal

Substitutes

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth Labour
 MM. DEES Dick VVD
 DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob CDA
 EISMA Doeke D66
 VAN DER LINDEN Pierre CDA
 MARIS Pieter CDA
 Mrs. VERSPAGET Joséphine Labour

PORTUGAL**Representatives**

MM. CANDAL CARLOS Socialist
 ESTEVES Antonio Socialist
 FERNANDES MARQUES Soc. Dem.
 MOREIRA Licinio Soc. Dem.
 SILVA MARQUES José Soc. Dem.
 SOARES COSTA Manuel Soc. Dem.
 VIEIRA MESQUITA José Soc. Dem.

Substitutes

MM. AMARAL Fernando Soc. Dem.
 BRITO Rogério Communist
 CONCEIÇÃO Fernando Soc. Dem.
 MOTA TORRES José Socialist
 PINTO Carlos Soc. Dem.
 ROSETA Pedro Soc. Dem.
 VARA Armando Socialist

SPAIN**Representatives**

MM. ALVAREZ Francisco People's Party
 BORDERAS Augusto Socialist
 CUATRECASAS Llibert C.i.U.

MM. CUCO Alfons Socialist
 DIAZ Lorenzo Soc. and Dem.
 Centre
 FABRA Juan Manuel People's Party
 LOPEZ HENARES José Luis People's Party
 MARTINEZ Miguel Angel Socialist
 MOYA Pedro Socialist
 PERINAT Luis Guillermo People's Party
 de PUIG Lluís Maria Socialist
 ROMAN Rafael Socialist

Substitutes

Mr. GAMINDE Ignacio Basque nat.
 Mrs. GARCIA MANZANARES Blanca Socialist
 Mr. GARCIA SANCHEZ Daniel Socialist
 Mrs. GUIRADO Ana Socialist
 MM. LOPEZ VALDIVIELSO Santiago People's Party
 NUÑEZ Manuel Socialist
 PALACIOS Marcelo Socialist
 PEDREGOSA José Manuel Socialist
 ROMERO Antonio Communist
 RUIZ Alberto People's Party
 SAINZ José Luis People's Party
 SOLE Jordi Socialist

UNITED KINGDOM**Representatives**

MM. COLEMAN Donald Labour
 COX Thomas Labour
 EWING Harry Labour
 Dame Peggy FENNER Conservative
 Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG Conservative
 MM. GARRETT Edward Labour
 HARDY Peter Labour
 HILL James Conservative
 JESSEL Toby Conservative
 Sir Russell JOHNSTON Liberal
 Earl of KINNOULL Conservative
 MM. MORRIS Michael Conservative
 PARRY Robert Labour
 Sir William SHELTON Conservative
 Sir Dudley SMITH Conservative
 Mr. SPEED Keith Conservative
 Sir John STOKES Conservative
 Mr. WILKINSON John Conservative

Substitutes

MM. ATKINSON David Conservative
 BANKS Tony Labour
 BOWDEN Andrew Conservative
 FAULDS Andrew Labour
 HOWELL Ralph Conservative
 Sir John HUNT Conservative
 Lord KIRKHILL Labour
 MM. LAMBIE David Labour
 LITHERLAND Robert Labour
 LORD Michael Conservative
 Lord MACKIE Liberal
 Lord NEWALL Conservative
 MM. RATHBONE Tim Conservative
 REDMOND Martin Labour
 Lord RODNEY Conservative
 Mrs. ROE Marion Conservative
 MM. THOMPSON John Labour
 WARD John Conservative

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FIRST SITTING

Tuesday, 5th June 1990

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Re-enrolment on the agenda of reports of committees.
7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session (Doc. 1214).
8. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1220).
9. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
10. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1225).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Lagorce, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Address by the Provisional President

The Provisional President addressed the Assembly.

4. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 1, with the exception of Mr. Perinat, a member of the Spanish Delegation, had been ratified by that Assembly.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of Mr. Perinat, subject to their subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

5. Observers

The Provisional President welcomed the observers from Denmark, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

6. Election of the President of the Assembly

Only one candidate was proposed for the post of President, namely Mr. Pontillon.

In accordance with Rule 10 (4) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the President by acclamation.

Mr. Pontillon was elected President by acclamation.

At the invitation of the Provisional President, Mr. Pontillon took the Chair.

7. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

8. Election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

Six candidates had been proposed for six posts of Vice-President, namely, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Soares Costa, Mr. Soell and Mrs. Staels-Dompas.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Soares Costa, Mr. Soell and Mr. Martinez were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

9. Address by Mr. Martinez, leader of the Spanish Delegation

Mr. Martinez, leader of the Spanish Delegation, addressed the Assembly.

10. Address by Mr. Soares Costa, leader of the Portuguese Delegation

Mr. Soares Costa, leader of the Portuguese Delegation, addressed the Assembly.

Speakers: MM. Caro, Stoffelen and De Decker.

11. Re-enrolment on the agenda of reports of committees

In accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Procedure, the Political Committee, the Technological and Aerospace Committee and the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations requested the re-enrolment on the agenda of their reports not agreed within the prescribed time.

The following reports were re-enrolled on the agenda:

WEU in the Atlantic Alliance – report presented by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Political Committee;

The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and Western European Union – report presented by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee;

Observation satellites – a European means of verifying disarmament – guidelines drawn from the symposium – report presented by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee;

Developments in command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I) – report presented by Mr. Hill on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee;

WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations concerned with security and European defence – report presented by Mr. Stegagnini on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations;

The new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly – report presented by Sir John Hunt on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

12. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session

(Doc. 1214)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business.

The draft order of business for the first part of the session was adopted.

13. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1220)

The report of the Presidential Committee was presented by Mr. Goerens, former President of the Assembly.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Caro.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly ratified the action of the Presidential Committee.

14. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU

Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. van Eekelen answered questions put by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Speed.

15. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1225)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Reddemann, Lagorce, Tummers, Maris, Morris, Wilkinson, De Hoop Scheffer, Lord, Sarti, Caro and Brito.

The debate was adjourned.

16. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

Two candidates had been proposed for the two last posts of Vice-President, namely Mr. Aarts and Mr. Sarti.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

Mr. Aarts and Mr. Sarti were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

The President informed the Assembly that the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents according to age was as follows: Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Sarti, Mr. Aarts, Mr. Soares Costa, Mr. Soell and Mr. Martinez.

17. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees:

Defence Committee

Belgium

- Mr. Chevalier as a titular member;

Netherlands

- Mr. Dees as a titular member;

Portugal

- Mr. Fernandes Marques as a titular member and Mr. Moreira as an alternate member;
- Mr. Mota Torres as a titular member and Mr. Esteves as an alternate member;
- Mr. Vieira Mesquita as a titular member and Mr. Conceição as an alternate member;

Spain

- Mr. Borderas as a titular member and Mr. Cuco as an alternate member;
- Mr. Moya as a titular member and Mr. de Puig as an alternate member;

- Mr. Perinat as a titular member and Mr. Lopez Valdivielso as an alternate member;
- Mr. Romero as a titular member and Mr. Gaminde as an alternate member.

Political Committee

France

- Mr. Lemoine as an alternate member in place of Mr. Pontillon;

Netherlands

- Mrs. Verspaget as an alternate member;

Portugal

- Mr. Brito as a titular member and Mr. Mota Torres as an alternate member;
- Mr. Candal as a titular member and Mr. Soares Costa as an alternate member;
- Mr. Roseta as a titular member and Mr. Silva Marques as an alternate member;

Spain

- Mr. Cuatrecasas as a titular member and Mr. Diaz as an alternate member;
- Mr. Fabra as a titular member and Mr. Ruiz as an alternate member;
- Mr. Martinez as a titular member and Mr. Moya as an alternate member;
- Mr. de Puig as a titular member and Mr. Sole as an alternate member.

Technological and Aerospace Committee

Portugal

- Mr. Conceição as a titular member and Mr. Vara as an alternate member;
- Mr. Moreira as a titular member and Mr. Soares Costa as an alternate member;

Spain

- Mr. Lopez Valdivielso as a titular member and Mr. Romero as an alternate member;
- Mr. Palacios as a titular member and Mr. Borderas as an alternate member;
- Mr. Pedregosa as a titular member and Mr. Lopez Henares as an alternate member.

Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

Netherlands

- Mr. van Velzen as an alternate member;

Portugal

- Mr. Silva Marques as a titular member and Mr. Roseta as an alternate member;
- Mr. Vara as a titular member and Mr. Esteves as an alternate member;

Spain

- Mr. Alvarez as a titular member and Mr. Roman as an alternate member;
- Mr. Diaz as a titular member and Mr. Fabra as an alternate member;
- Mr. Garcia Sanchez as a titular member and Mr. Pedregosa as an alternate member.

*Committee on Rules of Procedure
and Privileges*

Belgium

- Mr. Chevalier as a titular member;

Italy

- Mr. Benassi as a titular member;

Portugal

- Mr. Silva Marques as a titular member and Mr. Amaral as an alternate member;
- Mr. Vieira Mesquita as a titular member and Mr. Brito as an alternate member;

Spain

- Mr. Cuco as a titular member and Mrs. Guirado as an alternate member;
- Mr. Gaminde as a titular member and Mr. Ruiz as an alternate member;

- Mr. Sainz as a titular member and Mr. Pedregosa as an alternate member.

*Committee for Parliamentary
and Public Relations*

Netherlands

- Mr. Dees as an alternate member;

Portugal

- Mr. Amaral as a titular member and Mr. Fernandes Marques as an alternate member;
- Mr. Esteves as a titular member and Mr. Candal as an alternate member;

Spain

- Mrs. Garcia Manzanares as a titular member and Mr. Perinat as an alternate member;
- Mr. Lopez Henares as a titular member and Mr. Cuatrecasas as an alternate member;
- Mr. N  nez as a titular member and Mr. Roman as an alternate member;

United Kingdom

- Sir Russell Johnston as a titular member and Mr. Hardy as an alternate member.

**18. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 6th June 1990, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.55 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Soell Unland <i>Höffkes</i> (Wulff)	Portugal
MM. Adriaensens <i>Noerens</i> (Biefnot) <i>De Decker</i> (Chevalier) Kempinaire <i>Eicher</i> (Pécriaux) Uyttendaele	Italy	MM. <i>Brito</i> (Esteves) <i>Roseta</i> (Silva Marques) Soares Costa Vieira Mesquita
France	MM. Benassi <i>Stegagnini</i> (Caccia) Fioret Gabbuggiani <i>Fassino</i> (Intini) Malfatti Mezzapesa <i>Rubner</i> (Parisi) Pieralli Mrs. <i>Francesca</i> (Rubbi) Mr. Sarti	Spain
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Caro Durand <i>Pistre</i> (Fillon) <i>Lagorce</i> (Forni) Fourré <i>Valleix</i> (Galley) Jeambrun <i>Lemoine</i> (Jung) Oehler Seitlinger Thyraud Vial-Massat	Luxembourg	MM. <i>Lopez Valdivielso</i> (Alvarez) <i>Palacios</i> (Borderas) Diaz Fabra Lopez Henares Martinez Moya Roman
Federal Republic of Germany	Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette Mr. Regenwetter	United Kingdom
MM. Ahrens <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) Kittelmann Mrs. Luuk MM. Müller Reddemann	Netherlands	MM. Coleman Ewing Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Hardy Hill <i>Bowden</i> (Jessel) Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Lord <i>Newall</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) MM. Morris Parry Sir William Shelton Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Sir John Stokes Mr. Wilkinson
	MM. Aarts Eversdijk Mrs. Haas-Berger MM. Stoffelen Tummers <i>Maris</i> (van Velzen) Verbeek	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Irmer Niegel Scheer von Schmude	Portugal
Mrs. Staels-Dompas		MM. Candal Fernandes Marques Moreira
France	Italy	Spain
MM. Collette Gouteyron	MM. Filetti Kessler Martino Natali Parisi Pecchioli Rodotà	MM. Cuatrecasas Cuco Perinat de Puig
Federal Republic of Germany		United Kingdom
MM. Antretter Böhm Büchner Eich Hitschler		MM. Cox Garrett

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

SECOND SITTING

Wednesday, 6th June 1990

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council. | 2. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance (<i>Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1225</i>). |
|--|--|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Observer

The President welcomed as an observer Admiral Sir Benjamin Bathurst, NATO Commander-in-Chief Channel.

4. Address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council

Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Eyskens answered questions put by Mr. Caro, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Cetin

(Observer from Turkey), Valleix, Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Ewing, Klejdzinski and Ahrens.

5. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance

(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1225)

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Baumel and Stoffelen.

Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Müller, Wielowieyski (Observer from Poland), Bowden, Lopez Henares, Hardy, Antretter and De Decker.

The debate was adjourned.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.50 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	MM. Moreira Vieira Mesquita
MM. Adriaensens Biefnot <i>De Decker</i> (Chevalier) Kempinaire <i>Eicher</i> (Péciaux) <i>De Bondt</i> (Mrs. Staels-Dompas) Uyttendaele	MM. Benassi Caccia Fioret Gabbugiani <i>Fassino</i> (Intini) Kessler Martino Mezzapesa <i>Rubner</i> (Parisi) <i>Cannata</i> (Pecchioli) Pieralli Mrs. <i>Francesca</i> (Rubbi) Mr. Sarti	Spain MM. <i>Lopez Valdivielso</i> (Alvarez) Borderas Cuatrecasas Cuco Diaz Fabra Lopez Henares Martinez Moya <i>Palacios</i> (de Puig) Roman
France	Luxembourg	United Kingdom
MM. Baumel Caro Durand <i>Lemoine</i> (Forni) <i>Valleix</i> (Galley) <i>Lagorce</i> (Vial-Massat)	Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette Mr. Regenwetter	MM. Coleman <i>Thompson</i> (Cox) Ewing Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Garrett Hardy Hill <i>Bowden</i> (Jessel) Sir Russell Johnston Lord <i>Newall</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) MM. <i>Ward</i> (Morris) Parry Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Sir John Stokes Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands	
MM. Ahrens Antretter Böhm Büchner <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) <i>Feldmann</i> (Irmer) Mrs. Luuk Mr. Müller Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Niegel) Mr. Reddemann Mrs. <i>Blunck</i> (Scheer) MM. Soell <i>Höffkes</i> (Wulff)	Mr. Aarts Mrs. Haas-Berger MM. Stoffelen Tummers <i>Maris</i> (van Velzen) Verbeek	
	Portugal	
	MM. <i>Mota Torres</i> (Candal) <i>Brito</i> (Esteves) <i>Roseta</i> (Silva Marques)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands
MM. Bassinet Beix Collette Fillon Fourré Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Oehler Seitlinger Thyraud	MM. Eich Hitschler Kittelmann von Schmude Unland	Mr. Eversdijk
	Italy	Portugal
	MM. Filetti Malfatti Natali Rodotà Sinesio	MM. Fernandes Marques Soares Costa
		Spain
		Mr. Perinat
		United Kingdom
		Sir William Shelton

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

THIRD SITTING

Wednesday, 6th June 1990

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance (<i>Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1225</i>). | 2. Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1223</i>). |
|---|--|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance

(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1225)

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Soell, Lopez Valdivielso, Veryvakis (*Observer from Greece*), Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*), Spiliotopoulos (*Observer from Greece*) and Ward.

The debate was closed.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur, and Mr. Ahrens, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 480)¹.

4. Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1223)

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Lord Newall, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. Soares Costa, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Mezzapesa, Speed, Fioret, Sir John Stokes, MM. Fassino, Kosutic (*Observer from Yugoslavia*), Feldmann, Martino, de Puig, Sole, Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*), Meisel (*Observer from the German Democratic Republic*) and Kiraly (*Observer from Hungary*).

The debate was closed.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 7th June 1990, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 5.45 p.m.

1. See page 21.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. <i>Rubner</i> (Parisi) <i>Cannata</i> (Pecchioli) Pieralli	MM. Borderas Cuatrecasas Cuco Diaz Fabra Lopez Henares Martinez Moya Perinat de Puig Roman
MM. <i>Noerens</i> (Adriaensens) Biefnot <i>Eicher</i> (Péciaux)		
Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Uyttendaele	Luxembourg	
	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette Mr. Regenwetter	
France		
Mr. Bassinet		
	Netherlands	
Federal Republic of Germany	Mr. Aarts Mrs. Haas-Berger MM. Stoffelen Tummers <i>Maris</i> (van Velzen)	United Kingdom
MM. Ahrens Böhm <i>Feldmann</i> (Hitschler) <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) Müller Reddemann Scheer Soell Unland		MM. Coleman Cox <i>Thompson</i> (Ewing) Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Hardy Hill <i>Bowden</i> (Jessel) Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Earl of Kinnoull MM. <i>Ward</i> (Morris) Parry Lord <i>Newall</i> (Sir William Shelton) Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Sir John Stokes Mr. Wilkinson
Italy	Portugal	
MM. Benassi Caccia Fioret <i>Fassino</i> (Intini) Kessler <i>Stegagnini</i> (Malfatti) Martino Mezzapesa	MM. <i>Mota Torres</i> (Candal) <i>Roseta</i> (Fernandes Marques) <i>Conceição</i> (Silva Marques) Moreira Vieira Mesquita	
	Spain	
	MM. Lopez Valdivielso (Alvarez)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg
MM. Chevalier Kempinaire	MM. Antretter Büchner Eich Irmer Kittelmann	Mr. Goerens
France	Mrs. Luuk MM. Niegel von Schmude Wulff	Netherlands
MM. Baumel Beix Caro Collette Durand Fillon Forni Fourré Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Oehler Seitlinger Thyraud Vial-Massat	Italy	MM. Eversdijk Verbeek
	MM. Filetti Gabbuggiani Natali Rodotà Rubbi Sarti Sinesio	Portugal
		MM. Esteves Soares Costa
		United Kingdom
		Mr. Garrett

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 480***on WEU in the Atlantic Alliance***

1. THE ASSEMBLY recalls that Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty closely associates WEU's activities with those of NATO and that NATO is still the essential guarantee of Europe's security because it is the only framework in which the deterrent power of the United States can be used for the benefit of Europe.

It recognises the progress made towards limiting armaments but notes that the Soviet Union has not yet taken any decisive steps to reduce its forces and armaments and still remains the leading military power on the European continent.

It considers that the security situation in Europe has been fundamentally changed through the democratisation processes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe and the opening of borders, including the one between the Federal Republic and the GDR.

It wishes the CFE negotiations to be concluded rapidly, a new mandate to be drawn up by the CSCE for a subsequent reduction in the level of armaments, exclusively defensive military systems to be established and negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons to be started immediately.

It welcomes the development of the CSCE and the efforts made in that framework to establish a new peaceful order in Europe.

It considers that in the context of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures, the Vienna negotiations and other forums significant steps are being taken to improve the security situation in Europe.

It considers that, with the increasing pace of European developments and the changing nature of security problems, planning for European security co-operation must be accelerated.

It considers that, in the new circumstances, Western European countries will have to play a larger rôle in this planning process, which will require closer co-operation between WEU member states.

It therefore **RECOMMENDS** that the Council do its utmost to facilitate the United States Government's action to maintain and strengthen the association of the United States with the organisation of European security by:

- (a) asserting itself as the European pillar of the alliance, inter alia by moving the seat of its ministerial organs closer to that of NATO;
- (b) asking those of its members which do not participate in the NATO integrated commands to examine to what extent the new situation and the new rôle to be played by NATO allow them to associate their armed forces more closely with joint deployment;
- (c) keeping the Assembly constantly informed of the discussion that is to be held on the reorganisation, rôle and future of NATO in the context of the transformation of the military pacts into political alliances following arms reduction agreements;
- (d) tightening its links with the European members of the Atlantic Alliance which are not at present members of WEU;
- (e) ensuring that member countries make a military effort sufficient to guarantee a balance of conventional forces between the West and the Soviet Union;
- (f) for this purpose, fixing the troop levels that each of them undertakes to place at the service of joint defence and providing for these undertakings to be revised in conformity with future CFE agreements;
- (g) ensuring maximum security in Western Europe with a minimum deployment of forces and urgently studying the conditions in which multinational units might be set up;
- (h) organising, in the framework of a general reduction in military expenditure and the level of armaments, fair burden- and responsibility-sharing in the alliance and between WEU member countries.

2. THE ASSEMBLY considers it necessary for a reunified Germany not to be neutral and that it be integrated in the European Community and play a full part in an all-European security system as soon as it is set up by the CSCE and, during a transitional period, a search be made for solutions acceptable to all concerned with maintaining balance and peace in Europe.

It also considers that reunified Germany must formally recognise the frontiers with its neighbours resulting from the second world war and recognised by the Helsinki agreements.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council facilitate the search for a status for reunified Germany which ensures that it participates in the collective security of Western Europe while giving the Soviet Union and the Central and Eastern European countries the political and military assurances necessary for maintaining a balance of forces and advancing future negotiations on peace and disarmament.

It also RECOMMENDS that the Council ensure consultations between its members on matters on the agenda of the negotiations on the status of Germany between the two German states and the four powers directly concerned.

3. THE ASSEMBLY considers that recent developments in certain non-European countries, particularly in the Near and Middle East, are a new danger to international peace and the security of Europe. It notes that the Atlantic Alliance is making no provision for the necessary guarantees against such threats but that any initiatives Europe may take to counter them help to strengthen American confidence that the alliance is operating correctly.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council make regular assessments of all possible threats to European security and inform the public of the results of its work on security in the Mediterranean.

4. THE ASSEMBLY hopes that the difficulties now arising in the CFE negotiations, in particular over the level of air forces, will be rapidly overcome, that an agreement will be concluded in 1990 and that further negotiations will be started before the end of the year to speed up the reduction in the level of forces and armaments in Europe.

It welcomes the steps taken by the Council to co-ordinate member countries' action for applying an open-skies agreement and for ensuring the effectiveness of verification operations.

It RECOMMENDS that the Council contribute to the success of the disarmament negotiations and enable member countries to play an active part in verifying and implementing future agreements by:

- (a) taking an early decision on the joint production and use of observation satellites;
- (b) widening the decision taken in Brussels on 23rd April in order to organise a permanent exchange of information between its members on the results of each one's verification operations;
- (c) organising co-operation between member countries and, possibly, other European members of NATO for training the staff necessary for carrying out these operations.

5. THE ASSEMBLY notes that Western European security continues to be guaranteed through implementation of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council fulfil that guarantee by ensuring that member states make an effort to facilitate the rapid conclusion of the first phase of the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament and urge the immediate commencement of Vienna II negotiations.

6. THE ASSEMBLY notes that the limitation of forces and armaments in Europe will lead to a reduction in arms production and troop levels in national armies.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council exercise its mandate and at last give the necessary impetus to the establishment of interoperability of armaments used by NATO and the standardisation and joint production of armaments by member countries by:

- (a) assessing the requirements of European security in this area during the period of implementation of the CFE agreement;
- (b) fostering understanding between arms-producing firms in member countries, inter alia through harmonisation of relevant national legislation, as suggested in the study conducted by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee in April 1982;
- (c) having the WEU Institute for Security Studies give priority to studying the economic and social consequences of a potential reduction in the activities of the arms industries and the number of persons employed on defence work.

It RECOMMENDS that the Council take steps to prepare for changing military strategies and doctrines and to adjust to the new situation in Europe: whilst retaining defensive capabilities, the present

strategy of forward defence and flexible response in Europe will have to be re-examined and in this context the deployment of the armed forces may have to be changed.

It welcomes the decision of President Bush and the NATO Nuclear Planning Group to terminate the follow-on to Lance programme and to cancel any further modernisation of United States nuclear artillery shells deployed in Europe which indicates the willingness and ability of the alliance to take the initiative in a rapidly changing situation.

7. THE ASSEMBLY welcomes the fact that the Soviet Union and its allies are now open to exchanges of views and information with the West on defence and security matters.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council help to restore mutual confidence between Eastern and Central European countries and Western European countries by holding, together with the WEU Institute for Security Studies, exchanges of information with appropriate bodies in the Soviet Union and the Eastern and Central European countries on matters relating to security, disarmament and verification, as decided on 23rd April 1990.

8. THE ASSEMBLY welcomes the Council's efforts to help to inform the public about its work. It notes with satisfaction that, for the first time, the Council has given it a document in which the IEPG gives it information about its activities. It considers, however, that this policy of openness is still inadequate, which is detrimental to the cohesion of NATO.

It therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council provide the public with more information about the work of its dependent organs and the results they obtain. It also recommends that it ask the presidency of the IEPG to report regularly and directly to the Assembly on its activities.

9. THE ASSEMBLY notes that the decisions taken by the Council on the abolition of arms control and of the Standing Armaments Committee have in fact impaired the WEU ministerial organs' relations with NATO. It welcomes the steps taken by the Council to develop other forms of contact.

However, it RECOMMENDS that the Council resume the practice of asking the NATO authorities for an opinion on matters within their purview raised by Assembly recommendations or written questions from members of the Assembly.

FOURTH SITTING

Thursday, 7th June 1990

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. Coëme, Minister of Defence of Belgium.
2. Address by Mr. Jeszenszky, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary.
3. Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union (*Replies to speakers and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1223*).
4. Observation satellites – a European means of verifying disarmament – guidelines drawn from the symposium (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1230*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Coëme, Minister of Defence of Belgium

Mr. Coëme, Minister of Defence of Belgium, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Coëme answered questions put by Mr. Eicher, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Soell, Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*), De Decker, Jessel, Wilkinson and Eisma.

4. Address by Mr. Jeszenszky, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary

Mr. Jeszenszky, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Jeszenszky answered questions put by MM. Rathbone, Speed, Lord Mackie, MM. Martinez, Sole, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. Fioret and Brito.

5. Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union

(Replies to speakers and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1223)

Lord Newall, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 481)¹.

6. Observation satellites – a European means of verifying disarmament – guidelines drawn from the symposium

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1230)

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Klejdzinski and Fourné.

1. See page 27.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stegagnini, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 482)¹.

7. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees proposed by the French Delegation:

Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations

- Mr. Lemoine as a titular member in place of Mr. Pontillon.

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges

- Mr. Worms as an alternate member in place of Mr. Barrau.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.

1. See page 28.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	MM. Soares Costa Vieira Mesquita
MM. Adriaensens Biefnot Kempinaire <i>Eicher</i> (Pécriaux)	MM. <i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Caccia) Fioret Gabbuggiani <i>Fassino</i> (Intini) Kessler <i>Stegagnini</i> (Malfatti) Martino <i>Rubner</i> (Parisi) <i>Cannata</i> (Pecchioli) Pieralli	Spain
Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Uyttendaele	Mrs. <i>Francesce</i> (Rubbi)	MM. <i>Lopez Valdivielso</i> (Alvarez) Borderas Cuco Diaz Fabra <i>Sainz</i> (Lopez Henares) Martinez Moya de Puig Roman
France	Luxembourg	United Kingdom
MM. Bassinet Baumel Caro Durand <i>Pistre</i> (Fillon) <i>Lagorce</i> (Forni) Fourré <i>Valleix</i> (Galley) Vial-Massat	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette Mr. Regenwetter	MM. Cox Ewing Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Garrett Hardy Hill Jessel Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Earl of Kinnoull MM. <i>Howell</i> (Morris) <i>Thompson</i> (Parry) Sir William Shelton Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Sir John Stokes Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands	
MM. <i>Steiner</i> (Ahrens) Antretter Böhm Büchner <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) <i>Feldmann</i> (Irmer) <i>Zierer</i> (Müller) <i>Lenzer</i> (Niegel)	MM. <i>Eisma</i> (Aarts) Eversdijk Stoffelen <i>Maris</i> (van Velzen) <i>Dees</i> (Verbeek)	
Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (von Schmude)	Portugal	
MM. Soell Unland <i>Höffkes</i> (Wulff)	MM. <i>Mota Torres</i> (Candal) <i>Brito</i> (Esteves) <i>Conceição</i> (Fernandes Marques) <i>Roseta</i> (Silva Marques) Moreira	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg
Mr. Chevalier	MM. Eich Hitschler Kittelmann	Mr. Goerens
	Mrs. Luuk	Netherlands
France	MM. Reddemann Scheer	Mrs. Haas-Berger Mr. Tummers
MM. Beix Collette Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Oehler Seitlinger Thyraud	Italy	Spain
	MM. Benassi Filetti Mezzapesa Natali Rodotà Sarti Sinesio	MM. Cuatrecasas Perinat
		United Kingdom
		Mr. Coleman

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 481

on Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the recent developments in Europe which promise a dramatic reduction in East-West tension;
- (ii) Considering, however, that the establishment of lasting security greatly depends on decisions which have to be taken forthwith;
- (iii) Aware that the democratic evolution in the countries of Central Europe faces growing problems of internal argument and traditional nationalism;
- (iv) Convinced that progress in the Vienna talks, both on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) and on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM), is an essential prerequisite for stability and security in Europe;
- (v) Stressing the necessity to continue arms control negotiations immediately after the signing of the first CFE treaty;
- (vi) Certain that further cuts in weapons and force levels in Europe are desirable but that they must be agreed collectively and not decided unilaterally;
- (vii) Noting the convergence of views on arms control between WEU member countries and a growing number of Warsaw Pact countries;
- (viii) Recognising that few nations, in the East or the West, continue to have the financial means to maintain defence spending at former levels;
- (ix) Determined that there must be greater European co-operation in the field of defence and security, especially over arms control in general and verification of agreements in particular;
- (x) Pleased that the NATO nations have tabled a series of measures in Vienna which are setting the pace for the forthcoming CFE treaty;
- (xi) Saddened that the French Prime Minister's proposal of 7th September 1989 that WEU should start a specific programme of immediate co-operation with regard to verification and disarmament has not yet been taken up by the Council;
- (xii) Encouraged, however, by the proposal on 23rd March 1990 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany to create a centre for verification in Europe, which echoes previous French ideas on the necessity for transparency and reciprocal openness;
- (xiii) Recalling that Recommendation 465 proposed the creation of a European observation satellite agency to assist in the verification measures agreed by each member country;
- (xiv) Welcoming the fact that the Council is studying a possible WEU contribution to the CFE verification system based on the enhancement of European capabilities and the pooling of all member country's assets;
- (xv) Convinced of the urgent need for a *European verification centre* and struck by the fact that the ideal nucleus for such a body is WEU, plus those other states (signatories of the forthcoming CFE treaty) desiring to take part;
- (xvi) Suggesting that the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, together with the Secretary-General, should immediately begin consulting not only member states but other interested nations from both East and West which meet the necessary requirements with a view to their participation in the work of this centre,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Take the action necessary to create, under WEU auspices, a *European verification centre* in which all states which meet the necessary requirements, from both East and West, be invited to participate.

RECOMMENDATION 482***on observation satellites – a European means of verifying disarmament –
guidelines drawn from the symposium***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE), now taking place in Vienna, are likely to lead to an agreement within a year's time;
- (ii) Considering that European nations have played a substantial rôle in these negotiations and will also be signatories to a future CFE treaty in their own right;
- (iii) Aware that a future CFE treaty will also include extensive arrangements for verification and exchange of information considered as confidence-building measures by all parties concerned;
- (iv) Conscious that, apart from co-operative measures of verification, national or international technical means of verification, in particular satellites which can be employed without the co-operation of the contracting party whose territory is under investigation, are of perennial importance in the entire verification process;
- (v) Taking into account that verification satellites can also be employed to monitor territories in the world where new security threats might arise;
- (vi) Stressing the need for Western European nations to develop an autonomous European verification satellite capability in order to meet their responsibilities in a changing security situation while at the same time strengthening the alliance as an equal partner;
- (vii) Aware that all the technological and industrial capabilities required for the establishment and operation of a full-scale verification satellite system are available in the WEU member states;
- (viii) Aware of the plans for a research and technology project on satellite surveillance technology in the framework of the Independent European Programme Group's Euclid programme;
- (ix) Recalling that the European Space Agency has gained invaluable competence and experience in managing complicated international space programmes including earth observation,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Decide as a matter of urgency on the establishment of a WEU satellite image-processing and interpretation agency;
2. Reach decisions on further steps for establishing a full-scale European verification satellite system without delay, taking into account the time necessary for developing the various segments, such as optical satellites, ground stations and, in a later phase, synthetic aperture radar satellites and data-relay satellites.

FIFTH SITTING

Thursday, 7th June 1990

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States.
2. The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and Western European Union (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1228 and amendments*).
3. WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations concerned with security and European defence (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1226*).
4. The new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1227*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States

Mr. Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Atwood answered questions put by Sir Dudley Smith, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Lord Mackie, MM. Hardy, Speed, Soell, Gabbuggiani and Zierer.

4. Tribute to a former Vice-President of the Assembly

The President notified the Assembly of the death of Mr. Robert Edwards, a former Vice-President of the Assembly of WEU.

The Assembly paid tribute to his memory in observing a minute's silence.

5. The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and Western European Union

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1228 and amendments)

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur.

Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Garrett, Klejdzinski and Speed.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stegagnini, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Fourré:

1. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after "cross-frontier competition" and insert "and transnational collaboration between defence companies".

Speakers: Mr. Klejdzinski, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Stegagnini and Wilkinson; (point of order): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Speed, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Wilkinson, Klejdzinski and Stegagnini.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Fourré:

2. In paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "developing defence industry" and insert "member".

Speakers: MM. Klejdzinski and Stegagnini; (point of order): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. Stegagnini, Chairman, proposed that the amendment be amended to read:

2. In paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, insert "member" before "developing defence industry".

The amendment as amended by the Chairman was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 483)¹.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Jessel.

**6. WEU, research institutes
and non-governmental organisations
concerned with security
and European defence**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations
and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order,
Doc. 1226)*

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Mr. Stegagnini, Rapporteur.

Sir William Shelton, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, spoke.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 484)².

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 76)³.

**7. The new rôle of national delegations
in the activities of the WEU Assembly**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee
for Parliamentary and Public Relations
and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1227)*

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Sir John Hunt, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Sir William Shelton, Mr. Caro, Sir Dudley Smith, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Kosutic (*Observer from Yugoslavia*), Moya, the President, Lord Mackie and Mr. Tummers.

The debate was closed.

Sir John Hunt, Rapporteur, and Sir William Shelton, Vice-Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution.

The draft resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This resolution will be published as No. 82)⁴.

8. Change in the order of business

The President proposed a change in the order of business.

The proposal was agreed to.

**9. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Friday, 8th June 1990, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.25 p.m.

1. See page 32.
2. See page 33.

3. See page 34.
4. See page 35.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Kessler <i>Stegagnini (Malfatti)</i> <i>Rubner (Parisi)</i> <i>Cannata (Pecchioli)</i> Pieralli	Spain
MM. Adriaensens <i>Eicher (Pécriaux)</i> Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Uyttendaele		MM. Borderas <i>Palacios (Cuco)</i> Diaz Fabra <i>Sainz (Lopez Henares)</i> Moya de Puig Roman
France	Luxembourg	United Kingdom
MM. Caro <i>Lagorce (Forni)</i>	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette Mr. Regenwetter	Mr. Ewing Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Garrett Hardy Hill Jessel Lord <i>Mackie (Sir Russell Johnston)</i> Earl of Kinnoull Mr. <i>Howell (Morris)</i> Sir William Shelton Sir Dudley Smith MM. Speed <i>Lord (Sir John Stokes)</i> Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands	
MM. Antretter <i>Klejdzinski (Holtz)</i> <i>Zierer (Niegel)</i> Soell <i>Höffkes (Wulff)</i>	MM. Stoffelen Tummers	
Italy	Portugal	
MM. <i>Giagu Demartini (Caccia)</i> Fioret Gabbuggiani	MM. <i>Mota Torres (Candal)</i> <i>Brito (Esteves)</i> <i>Conceição (Fernandes Marques)</i> Moreira Soares Costa Vieira Mesquita	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Büchner Eich Hitschler Irmer Kittelmann	Netherlands
MM. Biefnot Chevalier Kempinaire	Mrs. Luuk MM. Müller Reddemann Scheer von Schmude Unland	MM. Aarts Eversdijk Mrs. Haas-Berger MM. van Velzen Verbeek
France	Italy	Portugal
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Collette Durand Fillon Fourré Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Oehler Seitlinger Thyraud Vial-Massat	MM. Benassi Filetti Intini Martino Mezzapesa Natali Rodotà Rubbi Sarti Sinesio	Mr. Silva Marques
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	Spain
MM. Ahrens Böhm	Mr. Goerens	MM. Alvarez Cuatrecasas Martinez Perinat
		United Kingdom
		MM. Coleman Cox Parry

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 483***on the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG)
and Western European Union***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling that, in the Rome declaration of October 1984 revitalising WEU, the Council stated that WEU should provide political impetus to European co-operation in armaments matters and reiterated that this is a key rôle for WEU;
- (ii) Believing that reductions in East-West military confrontation in Europe should lead to a necessity for rationalisation, diversification and, where appropriate, specialisation so as to manage overcapacity in defence-related industries;
- (iii) Aware that the possibility of substantial troop reductions on the part of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as of withdrawals of United States military manpower from Western Europe will heighten the significance of weapon effectiveness and sophistication in deterrence at a lower level of in-place forces;
- (iv) Conscious that reductions in defence budgets must be anticipated which will put a premium on the benefits of arms co-operation to secure value for money and on the utilisation of the most economic productive and maintenance capacities for defence equipment;
- (v) Anticipating that, whilst the United States' political and nuclear guarantees to the security of Western Europe will remain, pressures of public opinion in the United States will induce congressional initiatives for reductions of transatlantic co-operative equipment programmes in favour of procurement from United States domestic sources;
- (vi) Mindful that the IEPG operates in a political vacuum sustaining no significant information programme on its work and winning no European constituency of support for its activities;
- (vii) Convinced that the IEPG can offer, through the harmonisation of operational requirements and re-equipment timescales as well as through a concerted European military research programme, cost-effective defence equipment programmes to meet the challenges of a rapidly evolving security situation in Europe, and that its work merits more substantial backing,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Arrange for the presidency of the IEPG to address the Assembly once a year to inform it about developments in European armaments co-operation and to answer questions from members;
2. Organise the regular circulation of progress bulletins to the Committees on Technology and Aerospace and Defence of the Assembly of WEU to sustain a better appreciation of the work of the IEPG among key political opinion formers in Europe;
3. Ensure that the Commission of the EEC is formally informed on a regular basis of the work of the IEPG so as to sustain a beneficial dialogue on issues of mutual interest such as the maintenance of Europe's industrial base, technical capability and competitiveness;
4. Build on the welcome creation of a small permanent secretariat of the IEPG in Lisbon by concentrating the support of the presidency there and by establishing a strengthened corpus of specialist expertise through longer detachments of procurement experts to the secretariat;
5. Pursue vigorously the initial stages towards more integrated European military research under the auspices of the Euclid programme by increased joint funding and the rationalisation of existing national defence research establishments;
6. Explore with the Commission of the EEC possibilities for some acceleration of harmonised European company law to facilitate fair cross frontier competition and the processes of transnational merger, acquisition and collaboration between defence companies;
7. Maintain efforts to secure a more genuinely open defence equipment market in Europe by universal distribution of contract bulletins and data collection and exchange whilst ensuring that the interests of the member defence industry countries are secured.

RECOMMENDATION 484***on WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations
concerned with security and European defence***

(i) THE ASSEMBLY is aware that it is important for WEU to take full advantage of the work of the various research institutes concerned with security and defence and which are capable of exercising considerable influence on public opinion and politicians, thus contributing to the enlargement of the public debate on these questions;

(ii) It welcomes therefore the fact that the organisation of relations with such institutes in and beyond Western Europe and the development of greater public awareness of European security questions are among the tasks of the newly-created WEU Institute for Security Studies;

(iii) It is gratified that according to the Council's reply to Recommendation 474 the institutes's unclassified work will be widely available to the public;

(iv) It is happy that one of the tasks of the institute will be to establish and keep up-to-date a data bank for research and information purposes;

(v) It recalls that its services have so far no means of access to computerised documentation systems established in various research institutes and documentation centres;

(vi) It considers the advantages WEU could derive from closer collaboration with appropriate non-governmental organisations capable of giving maximum publicity to the organisation's aims, initiatives and achievements and promoting a public awareness of European security questions in all countries concerned.

THE ASSEMBLY therefore RECOMMENDS that the Council:

1. Grant the WEU Institute for Security Studies the broadest possible independence for its work, including the development of fruitful relations with parliamentarians, the media and the public and for establishing an active information policy;
2. Allow the Assembly appropriate access to the institute's documentation data base for its own work;
3. With the help of the institute, develop closer co-operation with those international non-governmental organisations which are particularly representative within the organisation's sphere of competence and, by their activities, are capable of contributing to promoting a European security identity and inform the Assembly of the action taken.

ORDER 76***on WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations
concerned with security and European defence***

THE ASSEMBLY considers the advantages to be derived from closer collaboration with non-governmental organisations capable of giving maximum publicity to the Assembly's aims, initiatives and achievements and promoting public awareness of European security questions in all countries concerned.

THE ASSEMBLY therefore instructs its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations:

To examine how to organise a working relationship between the Assembly and appropriate non-governmental organisations concerned with European security and defence and report on this matter.

RESOLUTION 82***on the new rôle of national delegations in the activities
of the WEU Assembly***

- (i) THE ASSEMBLY recalls the importance of taking full advantage of a European parliamentary system provided by the modified Brussels Treaty in which the existence of delegations formed in national parliaments ensures their full participation in decisions to be taken with regard to future European security;
- (ii) It regrets that for some time most WEU member governments prefer to avoid public statements stressing the options offered by this treaty;
- (iii) It is convinced therefore that the question of establishing a new peaceful and secure order in Europe requires enhanced efforts by national delegations to disseminate the Assembly's views and proposals and to urge member governments to use the means offered by WEU to respond to all expectations;
- (iv) It welcomes recent initiatives taken by several delegations and their members to intensify the public dialogue with governments on the rôle WEU can play in this matter;
- (v) It stresses, however, that the rapid communication of information and co-operation between all delegations, political groups and the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations should be improved.

THE ASSEMBLY THEREFORE INVITES THE CHAIRMEN OF NATIONAL DELEGATIONS:

1. To organise insofar as possible joint delegation initiatives in their parliaments when matters within the Assembly's competence are being debated, and to ensure that the Assembly's voice is heard in these debates;
2. To request the governments to report regularly to parliament on the evolution of WEU as is already done by the German Government and to organise debates on those reports in plenary sitting;
3. To organise regular meetings with the press as is done by the French Delegation and to endeavour to have articles published in the international press or appropriate specialised periodicals;
4. To ensure that the relevant information concerning any WEU related initiatives made by members in parliaments, committees, political groups or in the press, are transmitted without delay to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

SIXTH SITTING

Friday, 8th June 1990

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The future of low flying (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1222*).
2. Developments in command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I) (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1229*).
3. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1989 (revised) and 1990 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1218*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. The future of low flying

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1222)

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mr. Klejdzinski, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Maris, Zierer, Tummers, Jessel, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Steiner, Stegagnini and Lord Mackie.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Klejdzinski, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Jessel.

Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

A correction to paragraph 2 (*e*) to leave out "after 10 p.m." and insert "between 10 p.m. and 8 a.m.", proposed by Mr. Jessel and accepted by the committee, was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 485)¹.

4. Developments in command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I)

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1229)

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur.

Mr. Soares Costa, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Fourré and Caro.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Hill, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stegagnini, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

A correction to paragraph 1 of the French text of the draft recommendation to leave out "sans réserve", proposed by Mr. Fourré and accepted by the committee, was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 486)².

1. See page 39.

2. See page 41.

5. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1989 (revised) and 1990

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1218)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Lord, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Caro.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Lord, Rapporteur, and Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 487)¹.

6. Adjournment of the session

The President adjourned the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly.

The sitting was closed at 12.10 p.m.

1. See page 42.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Luxembourg	Spain
MM. Adriaensens <i>Eicher</i> (Pécriaux)	Mr. Regenwetter	MM. <i>Lopez Valdivielso</i> (Alvarez)
Mrs. Staels-Dompas		Borderas
Mr. Uyttendaele		Cuco
	Netherlands	Diaz
France	Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Aarts)	Fabra
MM. Caro	Mr. Eversdijk	<i>Sainz</i> (Lopez Henares)
Fourré	Mrs. Haas-Berger	<i>Palacios</i> (Martinez)
	MM. Stoffelen	Moya
Federal Republic of Germany	Tummers	de Puig
MM. Ahrens	<i>Maris</i> (van Velzen)	Roman
<i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz)		
<i>Zierer</i> (Niegel)		United Kingdom
<i>Steiner</i> (Soell)		Dame Peggy Fenner
	Portugal	MM. Hill
Italy	MM. <i>Brito</i> (Esteves)	Jessel
MM. Gabbuggiani	<i>Conceição</i> (Fernandes Marques)	Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston)
Kessler	Moreira	Sir Dudley Smith
<i>Stegagnini</i> (Malfatti)	Soares Costa	MM. Speed
<i>Rubner</i> (Parisi)	Vieira Mesquita	<i>Lord</i> (Sir John Stokes)
Pieralli		Wilkinson
Sarti		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Hitschler	Netherlands
MM. Biefnot	Irmer	Mr. Verbeek
Chevalier	Kittelmann	
Kempinaire	Mrs. Luuk	Portugal
	MM. Müller	MM. Candal
France	Reddemann	Silva Marques
MM. Bassinet	Scheer	
Baumel	von Schmude	Spain
Beix	Unland	MM. Cuatrecasas
Collette	Wulff	Perinat
Durand		
Fillon	Italy	United Kingdom
Forni	MM. Benassi	MM. Coleman
Galley	Caccia	Cox
Gouteyron	Filetti	Ewing
Jeambrun	Fioret	Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
Jung	Intini	MM. Garrett
Oehler	Martino	Hardy
Seitlinger	Mezzapesa	Earl of Kinnoull
Thyraud	Natali	MM. Morris
Vial-Massat	Pecchioli	Parry
	Rodotà	Sir William Shelton
Federal Republic of Germany	Rubbi	
MM. Antretter	Sinesio	
Böhm	Luxembourg	
Büchner	Mr. Goerens	
Eich	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 485***on the future of low flying***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling the motion for a resolution on the banning of low-altitude military training flights, tabled by Mr. Büchner and others¹ on 5th December 1988 (Document 1169);
- (ii) Aware that the effects of low-altitude flying are suffered in all member states of WEU, as well as in most other European countries, including those of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation;
- (iii) Considering the easing of tension between East and West;
- (iv) In view of the prospect of agreement in Vienna to make substantial reductions in certain categories of conventional weapons including combat aircraft;
- (v) Convinced that it should be possible to make greater use of simulation in preparing pilots for low-altitude flight;
- (vi) Stressing that there should be greater consultation and agreement between member states to share the burden of low-altitude flight training;
- (vii) Recalling that in the past the Council has forwarded certain recommendations of the Assembly to the NATO authorities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Include the subject of low-altitude flying and attendant problems in its own agenda and urge the NATO authorities to do likewise, with the aim of making an urgent study of the ways in which the universal European problem of low-altitude flying may be attenuated in the future, including research into public knowledge of and attitudes to the problem;
2. Ensure that the general and specific points made in the present report are taken into account and, in particular, fully examine the following suggestions with a view to their adoption by NATO and national governments as norms for the future:
 - (a) in peacetime, minimum heights for low-altitude flights over urban areas to be not less than 300 metres;
 - (b) interception exercises and formation flying at low altitude to be banned in the vicinity of heavily populated areas;
 - (c) aircraft speed to be limited to 420 knots maximum, so that noise is reduced;
 - (d) very low-altitude flights (i.e. those at less than 75 metres) to be authorised only over training areas of sufficient size and consideration to be given to suppressing the use of all such areas in peacetime, to be reactivated only in time of tension;
 - (e) all low-altitude flying to be banned between 10 p.m. and 8 a.m. (even in training areas) and generally on Sundays and bank holidays;
 - (f) the authorisation of night low-flying routes to be subject to agreement by national authorities;
 - (g) all necessary training for flights at low and very low altitude in "real" conditions to take place in areas where geography allows such flights without causing considerable disturbance to the population;
 - (h) although the current state of simulation techniques cannot completely replace actual low-altitude flying, consideration to be given to further research and development with the aim of improving low-altitude flying simulation (the high financial cost would be more than justified);

1. MM. Biefnot, Holtz, Eicher, Pécriaux, Stoffelen, Schmidt, Mrs. Luuk, Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Scheer.

- (i) consider, in addition, ways in which the unsocial aspects for aircrews of training in areas overseas or remote from home bases might be alleviated;
- (j) the standard of the equipment of various types of aircraft should not be the only factor for determining low-altitude training techniques and conditions;
- (k) whereas, formerly, low-altitude training flights in potential zones of action were desirable for making use of geographical data and for tactical reasons, the greater perfection of navigational aids has virtually removed the need for visual contact, thus allowing such training to be carried out in other more sparsely populated areas;
- (l) units of the air forces of WEU member countries must be able to conduct low-altitude training with realistic advance warning, after an analysis of the actual threat, which at the present time does not justify exercises based on the hypothesis of a few hours' warning time.

RECOMMENDATION 486***on developments in command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I)***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising the tightening of defence budgets in all allied countries;
- (ii) Conscious of the serious intentions of both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to reduce their conventional armed forces;
- (iii) Considering that a combination of reduced conventional forces and limited defence budgets calls for improved co-operation between allied forces in order to employ troops and equipment most efficiently;
- (iv) Convinced that an integrated allied command, control and information system as it is now being planned by NATO will act as a force multiplier and will greatly improve the performance of the lesser-armed forces that will be available in the future to guarantee peace and security for Europe;
- (v) Convinced that some systems for command, control, communications and intelligence, in particular those for airborne early warning and control and for stand-off surveillance and targeting, could also play an important rôle in the process of verification of conventional arms reduction agreements;
- (vi) Convinced that the systems mentioned in paragraph (v) could greatly contribute to building confidence about military matters if members of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO agree to open their skies for unarmed aerial surveillance flights over their territory as proposed by President Bush in May 1989,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge member governments to endorse NATO's planning for an integrated command control and information system for Allied Command Europe and to provide the required financial means;
2. Study the possible rôle of European and multinational aerial systems for stand-off surveillance and targeting and of airborne early warning and control in the process of verifying the implementation of a CFE treaty, and in the framework of a future open skies agreement.

RECOMMENDATION 487***on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial years 1989 (revised) and 1990***

The Assembly,

(i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for 1989 (revised) and 1990, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;

(ii) Considering that:

(a) the budget of the Secretariat-General for the financial year 1990 may be considered provisional insofar as the proposals to create seven new posts, withdrawn at the request of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee, will be considered subsequently on the basis of a management survey to be conducted by a specialised body;

(b) in doing this, the Budget and Organisation Committee has relinquished responsibility for organisation, which is part of its attributions;

(c) the "liquidation" version of the 1990 budget of the Paris agencies is based on a wholly theoretical assumption and is therefore liable to be changed significantly;

(d) the operating budget of the WEU Institute for Security Studies has not yet been drawn up;

(e) the Assembly is consequently unable to express an opinion on the abovementioned budgets;

(iii) Regretting that:

(a) the Council has decided not to pay additional indemnities to officials not recruited by the WEU Institute for Security Studies;

(b) the participation of representatives of the staff of the co-ordinated organisations in negotiations on procedure for adjusting salaries does not appear to correspond to their legitimate expectations;

(c) there is no agreement between the secretaries-general of the co-ordinated organisations to facilitate the movement of staff from one organisation to another, which would have been very useful on the occasion of the winding up of the Paris agencies,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Reconsider the composition and mandate of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee, in particular its responsibility for organisational matters;

2. Support the action taken by the staff associations of the co-ordinated organisations with a view to playing a more effective part in negotiations on staff employment conditions;

3. Ask that the question of the movement of staff from one organisation to another be included in the agenda of a forthcoming meeting of the Committee of Secretaries-General of Co-ordinated Organisations in order to work out means of fostering and facilitating such movement.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

FIRST SITTING

Tuesday, 5th June 1990

SUMMARY

1. Opening of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Address by the Provisional President.
4. Examination or credentials.
5. Observers.
6. Election of the President of the Assembly.
7. Address by the President of the Assembly.
8. Election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
9. Address by Mr. Martinez, leader of the Spanish Delegation.
10. Address by Mr. Soares Costa, leader of the Portuguese Delegation.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Caro, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. De Decker.
11. Re-enrolment on the agenda of reports of committees.
12. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session (Doc. 1214).
13. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1220*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Goerens (*Former President of the Assembly*), Mr. Caro.
14. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
Replies by Mr. van Eekelen to questions put by: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Speed.
15. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1225*).
Speakers: The President, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Maris, Mr. Morris, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Mr. Lord, Mr. Sarti, Mr. Caro, Mr. Brito.
16. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
17. Changes in the membership of committees.
18. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Lagorce, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Address by the Provisional President

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, it is the inescapable reality of my birth certificate which decrees that I have to

open this session today and affords me a privilege that I greatly appreciate.

The examination of credentials with which I am about to proceed will signal the participation of the Portuguese and Spanish Delegations in our work for the first time. I am particularly happy to welcome our colleagues from these two countries which have been members of WEU since 27th March 1990, and whose representatives, in accordance with Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, are taking their seats for the first time today in our Assembly. I am sure that with their firm European convictions and their imagination and enthusiasm, they will contribute a major input to our work, particularly by pointing it in certain directions that up to now have not always been given the place they deserve in our concerns. I am, of course, thinking mainly of questions concerning security in the Mediterranean.

WEU's membership is now more in tune with its objectives, composed as it is of the European countries that are members of both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community and that have not only entered into the particularly

1. See page 16.

The President (continued)

binding military assistance commitments of the modified Brussels Treaty but have also decided that their security and defence policy shall comply with the principles laid down in 1987 in the Hague platform. It is thus able to perform its full rôle as the European pole of the Euro-American alliance and as the foundation of a security and defence organisation in the European union that is now taking shape.

It is of particular importance at the present time that we should think about European interests in the field of defence and agree together on ways and means of protecting those interests.

The passing of 1989 has seen the collapse of régimes based on coercion in Europe. The underground forces of freedom that have long been active have suddenly brought to the surface a new landscape rising above the ruins of the dictatorships. One by one, democratic institutions are being set up. In Luxembourg last March we had the privilege of being addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Mr. Skubiszewski. The day after tomorrow, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Mr. Jeszenszky, will be speaking to us and we shall be particularly pleased to welcome the representative of the first freely-elected Hungarian Government only a few days after the formation of that government. However, it is at this present session, which is decidedly breaking new ground, that we shall be joined for the first time in the long history of the Assembly by a member of the United States Government, Mr. Donald J. Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defence, who will set out for us his government's views on relations between Europe and the United States within the Atlantic Alliance.

We particularly look forward to these contributions to our own discussions in that our habits and certainties and our policies and strategies need now to be reconsidered and our institutions adapted accordingly.

The threat implicit in the confrontation of the two blocs is being replaced by that represented by the emergence of an area of instability in the East. In the USSR the end of the communist monopoly is apparent in the signs of a crumbling empire whilst the partial liberalisation of the economy is emptying markets instead of filling them and may well generate considerable unemployment. The combination of political uncertainty and military might is inevitably a matter of serious concern.

In the south, population growth and the intensification of national passions and religious fanaticism, with the arms race that is part of the process, present a new type of threat.

In the circumstances, how can we ensure that Western Europe is the nucleus of a greater Europe unifying all the countries it consists of in order to provide them with the security and material and moral conditions making up the quality of life? At what minimum level of both nuclear and conventional armament can the deterrence that is still needed be secured?

Is the principle of minimum deterrence the solution to Europe's security problem? Should the reunification of Germany be accompanied by measures to bring about a climate of confidence in the countries of Central Europe? Within which framework should these measures be defined? Should not WEU have a major part to play in this area? All these are problems that are going to come up in our future discussions. Our task then is to make our contribution to the thinking that will find the solution. This is how we can define the ways and means whereby Western Europe can best play its part within the alliance in building its own security. But I am quite sure that the most fundamental contribution that Western Europe can make to the Atlantic Alliance, in the new distribution of burdens and responsibilities, will be to strengthen its own unity so that its solidarity carries its full weight.

Which is why it seems to me that the primary vocation of WEU, enlarged at long last, is to promote the European spirit without which no European policy can succeed. To my mind the great lesson to be drawn from the events in Eastern Europe is that tomorrow's world is taking shape, not in laboratories or army barracks, but in people's minds and hearts. It is my hope, ladies and gentlemen, that in this present session, we shall take a few more steps towards this European union we so ardently seek.

4. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of the credentials of the new representatives and substitutes nominated since our last session whose names have been published in Notice No. 1.

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, these credentials have been attested by a statement of ratification from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, with the exception of those of Mr. Perinat, member of the Spanish Delegation, who has been nominated since the conclusion of the meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

It is now for the Assembly to ratify his credentials in accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure. The nomination is in proper form according to our rules and no objection has been raised.

The President (continued)

If the Assembly is unanimous, we may proceed to ratification without prior referral to a credentials committee.

Is there any opposition?...

The credentials of Mr. Perinat are therefore ratified by the Assembly, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

I welcome our new colleagues.

5. Observers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, may I also welcome the observers from Denmark, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Turkey and Yugoslavia, who are honouring us with their presence.

I also welcome the members of the Permanent Council attending this part-session.

6. Election of the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the election of the President of the Assembly.

Rule 7 (1) of the Rules of Procedure lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

In addition, Rule 10 (2) and (10) of the Rules of Procedure states that no representative may stand as a candidate for the office of President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives, and representatives who are members of governments may not be members of the Bureau.

I have received only one nomination, that of Mr. Robert Pontillon. The nomination has been properly made and is in the form prescribed by the rules. If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that Mr. Pontillon be elected by acclamation.

Is there any opposition?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore proclaim Mr. Pontillon President of the Assembly of Western European Union. I congratulate him and invite him to take the Chair.

(Mr. Pontillon then took the Chair)

7. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, allow me, first and foremost, to thank you for the honour you have paid me in

electing me to preside over your work. You may be sure that I shall do my very utmost to justify your confidence, in particular by endeavouring to ensure that the Assembly's debates and action receive the response they deserve – but do not always receive – and by expanding its initiatives and promoting its actions. In short, I shall try to rediscover the spirit and aspirations in which those responsible for originating the organisation in days gone by wished it to develop.

In this connection, I would like to pay tribute to my two predecessors, Jean-Marie Caro and Charles Goerens and I assure you this tribute is no mere polite formality.

Through them, the Assembly has been a real contributor to the security policy, co-operation and peace that we seek, and a participant – and even a forerunner – in such positive developments as the dialogue with the East, which President Caro so wisely instigated and President Goerens so successfully and actively pursued, the sharing of tasks between WEU and the EEC and transatlantic relations. To me, it is both a privilege and a proof of friendship to be able to go on having the benefit of their advice and help – I know I can count on this. It is in all sincerity and friendship that I make this acknowledgement not only on my own behalf but, I am sure, on behalf of you all.

It is a particularly pleasant task for me to start my term of office by welcoming among us, for the first time as full members of our Assembly, the delegations from the Portuguese and Spanish parliaments. Our Rules of Procedure have already been amended to allow us to receive them. The work that had to be done in our building to give them the facilities to which they are entitled has just been completed. On behalf of you all, I can therefore bid the Portuguese and Spanish members of the WEU Assembly welcome and tell them how much importance we attach to their contribution to our debates to which they will add a new dimension just when we are examining the course WEU should follow in a Europe in the throes of evolution and, in particular, the Mediterranean dimension of our security. In this connection, we must attempt to give a firm answer to the wish recently expressed by the Spanish Prime Minister, Mr. Felipe Gonzalez, to see the disarmament process extended to include the Mediterranean.

We were all extremely gratified that developments in the Soviet Union and the Central and Eastern European countries that started in 1985 moved at a rate and to an extent in the last half of 1989 that no one could have foreseen. Not so long ago, the competition, at the heart of our continent, between two apparently incompatible ideologies, the clash between two increasingly powerfully-armed military blocs and the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction

The President (continued)

seemed inevitable. Today, there is reasonable hope that they will disappear since the trend really seems to have been reversed.

At the same time, however, we fully realise that this truly European revolution must be continued in conditions that preclude a return to the international anarchy of the years preceding the two world wars. In spite, or perhaps because, of the confrontation of the two blocs, the last half century has witnessed the emergence of international structures of a new type in Europe, the most remarkable being the European Economic Community. The Atlantic Alliance and WEU have afforded sufficient guarantees of our countries' security. The Soviet Union, for its part, together with the Eastern European countries, formed an economic and military entity which, by admittedly questionable means, refused to allow national disputes. It must now be ensured that abandoning these means and methods does not release a sudden explosion of such disputes and that cold war structures give way to peaceful and co-operative structures.

In other words, the events that have just taken place raise more problems than they solve. On the one hand, they herald the disappearance of the structure in which Eastern Europe has lived for forty years, because this was based on the political, economic, ideological and military domination of the Soviet Union and rejection of that domination calls in question its instruments. Furthermore, the entire western world consequently has to adapt the structures it had established to the new circumstances.

In the past year – the Luxembourg Conference is the most recent illustration – our Assembly has been giving thought to this adaptation. This thinking must now produce realistic conclusions that can be proposed to the governments. The strengthening of a European Community destined, in the words of the President of the French Republic, to become a Western European federation and the growth of all-European co-operation on a confederal basis have become the joint targets of our governments, and the inclusion of WEU in this twofold approach raises a series of questions which are far from settled. The three years which lie ahead will therefore be of decisive importance for the institution that brings us together here and for our Assembly, which must be both a forerunner and a spur, cannot wait for the governments to take their decisions before attentively examining each aspect of the problem thus raised.

There must be a growing feeling that military defence is one aspect of security, a security of which we must have a global perception, taking into account its political, economic, social and cultural dimensions. This will sometimes lead us to look slightly beyond our responsibilities and

we have to be careful not to venture into territory that is not ours. However, we must be aware of these dimensions. In this connection, we should bear in mind the message by that great British and European statesman, Lord Avon (Anthony Eden), co-founder of WEU with Pierre Mendès-France, who, in the House of Lords in 1974, deplored the fact that WEU had never been made to play the major rôle for which it had been set up.

WEU's future course must obviously take it in three directions, more or less those which Mr. Pierre Harmel outlined in his remarkable paper at the colloquy on the future of European security that we held in Florence last year.

First, it must be the European wall of defence in the Atlantic Alliance, a reformed alliance admittedly, but still essential for Europe's security. The alliance must indeed turn more towards the organisation of peace and the development of disarmament than in the past. According to the address by the United States Secretary of State in Brussels on 3rd May, this is the crux of what the United States is proposing when talking about the alliance being more politically orientated, and Mr. Baker confirmed this again in a speech in New York on 14th May, when he specifically referred to the rôle of WEU. The European members of the alliance will probably also have to play a greater part, if only because of the reduction in American forces stationed in Europe that has already been announced. However, in spite of everything, it remains the organisation running the West's defensive system in Europe. To question its *raison d'être* too soon would imperil the security of us all, threaten Western European cohesion and jeopardise all the structures on which peace in Europe is based. In no event must WEU be seen as a substitute for Atlantic solidarity. It must be an additional link that ensures the concerted participation of its members in the common effort to preserve the alliance's deterrent capabilities.

Here, of course, it is a matter of ensuring our security and doing what is necessary for it to be received and perceived in the part of Europe opening up to democracy in the East but also of making certain that this new security structure is acceptable and – to dream a moment – why not open one day to the Soviet Union.

This is obviously why, for the first time in the history of WEU, the Council is, according to the letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly dated 14th May, embarking upon "concertation among member states in preparing for the Atlantic Alliance summit", thus asserting itself as the European pillar of the alliance. At the present session, we shall be considering this aspect of our vocation thanks to the remarkable report submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

The President (continued)

Second, WEU must foster the development of the union or Western European federation which, between now and 1st January 1993, will be making decisive progress, both economically and politically. Just as it must not rival NATO, WEU must not compete with the Community. However, in areas within its purview, which the Community cannot handle, it must bring about the union of those Europeans who have elected to combine their forces to ensure joint security. We know that some are expecting the Community soon to increase its activities in defence matters. Some are even hoping for it. I do not believe the present situation allows this and the vocation that the Community was acknowledged to have at the Paris summit meeting in July 1989, i.e. to implement a policy of increasingly close co-operation with those Central and Eastern European countries which so wish, might divert it from the course that would lead it to assume responsibility for defence matters.

I find infinitely more realistic the remarks by the Spanish Prime Minister, Mr. Gonzalez, as reported in the last letter from our Secretary-General, envisaging "WEU ultimately being incorporated in the political co-operation structures of the future European union". This is a prospect we cannot ignore. It is in direct line with the course set by the signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty and embodied in the first three articles of the treaty which place this organisation among those helping to unite Europeans.

Finally, the third course opening up for WEU is that of ensuring effective participation by its members in the transformation of Europe as a whole. In his letter of 14th May, the Secretary-General tells us that the Soviet Chief of General Staff, General Moiseev, asked him "if, unlike NATO, WEU could enhance the security of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact". Let us leave to General Moiseev responsibility for his assessment of the rôle of NATO, but it must be agreed that the question he put is a legitimate one and we must give a positive answer if our organisation is to take its place in the Europe of future decades.

We must not, however, turn a blind eye to the fact that the Soviet Union considers an essential element of its security to be a matter which is not within our competence, i.e. the military status of reunified Germany. Suffice it to recall that WEU, of which reunified Germany will inevitably be a member, can help to reassure those who fear that one of its members might pursue a policy in Europe dictated by purely national considerations. In this capacity, it can be a factor of security for our neighbours in the East, particularly if the creation of large multinational units for defensive purposes, as

envisaged by the Council at its last ministerial meeting, were to allow the Warsaw Pact countries to be shown that western forces are not designed to support national claims.

Continuing uncertainty about the future of the régimes and policies of the Soviet Union and most of the Warsaw Pact member countries obviously make the fate of the pact itself even more uncertain, and it is not without reason that we are wondering how the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe might organise and manage a new political and strategic order in Europe. It is therefore impossible for us, today, to surrender our responsibilities in this area to an all-European forum which is not yet a sound structure capable of guaranteeing peace, frontiers and respect for democratic principles by all participating states.

The situation should however at least allow us to develop and extend the relations we have entered into with the Soviet Union and several Eastern European countries. Since 1987, our Presidential Committee has had extremely fruitful exchanges with the Supreme Soviet. At its extraordinary session, the Assembly was addressed by representatives of the Polish Government and the Soviet Union. It has invited the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the new Hungarian Government formed after free elections to the present session and we shall therefore listen to him with particular interest. You may be sure that I shall endeavour to maintain and strengthen the links thus established because I am convinced that the future of WEU depends closely on the place it takes in the new organisation of a Europe that associates Eastern European countries with those of the West. The fact that the Assembly's overtures were from the outset approved by the Council and that the Council, for its part, has very recently taken a first step in the same direction give full political meaning to the action taken by our Assembly which, once again, has shown the WEU ministerial organs the way.

There is absolutely no contradiction between WEU's three vocations as European bulwark of the alliance, framework for a future European defence union and instrument for promoting a new European security order. It emerged clearly from our Assembly's debates at recent sessions that, among us at least, there is a very wide consensus which considers that the future of WEU, at any event in the coming years, is based on this threefold anchorage.

It is this threefold prospect that will lead us to pay attention to the directions proposed for our organisation by several member governments, and in particular by the Chairmanship-in-Office in recent months, that were approved by our Assembly and very recently summed up by the French Minister of Defence: first, creation of a committee of chiefs of staff to plan and co-

The President (continued)

ordinate the forces of the various member countries; second, development of means allowing each member country to play an effective part in the verification of disarmament agreements through the creation of a space agency for observation satellites; third, establishment of a security system for Western Europe's Mediterranean flanks; fourth, encouragement of co-operation among defence industries.

In one way or another, each of these proposals is already being considered by the Council. It is therefore for us to amplify them in order to encourage governments to proceed without delay to a preliminary examination of their practical implementation so as to achieve the goal set by the French Minister of strengthening Western European Union, thus promoting the formation of the European bulwark of defence. I apologise for quoting in this manner. It is due not to a desire to highlight my country's action but merely to my belief that it represents a state of mind that is common to many members of this Assembly. There is indeed hardly any other way whereby Europe, without detriment to its security, can pass through the approaching period of turbulence, with the transformation of the alliance and the search for new foundations for the organisation of peace.

The late arrival of the Council's report for 1989 did not allow us to prepare the replies which the Assembly is primarily concerned with addressing to the Council. It is not for me to anticipate on the debate that we shall hold on this subject in December, but I wish to say a few words about the nature of the relations between the two WEU organs in the present period of uncertainty.

The Assembly's rôle, as defined in the treaty, is to supervise the correct application of the treaties by the WEU ministerial organs and hold a debate on the annual report of the Council, which is the highlight of relations between the Assembly and the Council. However, it would seem that, while the reactivation of WEU was marked by a considerable growth in intergovernmental activities, it was also followed by a significant relaxation in the constraints to which the Council agreed to submit itself where the Assembly is concerned.

Annual reports have never been so devoid of substance or the replies to our recommendations so brief or vague, and our written questions sometimes receive no reply at all. Admittedly, the letters from the Secretary-General and the joint meetings between the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council and various Assembly bodies eventually produce most of the information required for our parliamentary work, but they are poor mitigation for the inadequate

trickle of press information for a public which knows nothing of WEU, its rôle and its activities.

Thanks in particular to the active participation of ministers of defence in the work of the Council, the reactivation of WEU has become a reality. However, European security, which reactivation is intended to promote, does not depend only on discussions between leaders but also on the state of mind of the people. To make its contribution to the emergence of a spirit of European defence which must be the foundation and rampart of peace in Europe, our parliamentary Assembly has to be able, by virtue of its founding treaty, to rely on a true, public dialogue with the corresponding governmental body. It is something of a paradox that most public relations work is done by the Assembly. If the public is to know about WEU and take it seriously, those in power must shoulder their responsibilities.

One of the first tasks I set myself is to extend the dialogue. Clearly, however, I shall manage to do so only if the Council for its part agrees to co-operate. The Belgian presidency, which finishes at the end of this month, is to be thanked for the concern it has shown for this aspect of our life together and for what it has done in this sense. But it is the Council as a whole that must change its attitude significantly, both towards the Assembly and towards public opinion, if the existence of security Europe is effectively to be recognised by all.

I end my remarks with this appeal which is also a hope. Ladies and gentlemen, I should like once more to thank you for your confidence, and now invite you to move on to the business of this thirty-sixth session of our Assembly.

8. Election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 7(1) of the Rules of Procedure lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

In addition, Rule 10(2) and (10) of the Rules of Procedure states that no representative may stand as a candidate for the office of Vice-President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives and representatives who are members of governments may not be members of the Bureau.

Six nominations have been submitted in the prescribed form.

The President (continued)

They are, in alphabetical order, those of Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Soares Costa, Mr. Soell and Mrs. Staels-Dompas.

The other places will be filled later.

If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that these Vice-Presidents be elected by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare them elected as Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

The order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents according to age is as follows: Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Soares Costa, Mr. Soell and Mr. Martinez.

**9. Address by Mr. Martinez,
leader of the Spanish Delegation**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, as you are aware, Mr. Lagorce and I, perhaps overdoing it, have referred to the presence of the Portuguese and Spanish Delegations with us today for the first time as full members.

Because of this, the leaders of both delegations would like to address our Assembly.

I am pleased to call for the first time in this Assembly Mr. Martinez, leader of the Spanish Delegation.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, now that the elected representatives of the Spanish nation are really taking part in the parliamentary Assembly of WEU, we and our country see this as an event of historic importance which gives cause for great joy and satisfaction. Today, when we are confirmed as full members of Western European Union, a consummation in which beyond doubt this Assembly has played a most important part, for which we here formally express our thanks, we Spaniards are completing a process whereby Spain has been incorporated into Europe and the project of building Europe.

We are thereby without doubt marking the importance of the work which Spain can perform in WEU and, more than that, celebrating the grand finale to the incorporation of Spain into the western world, its values, and its marks of identity. It is worth reminding ourselves, Mr. President, that for too many years, for centuries, for one reason or another Spain has lived outside the geographical context, in which historically and culturally it should have been placed. And in objective terms this isolation has meant for our nation marginalisation,

underdevelopment, backwardness and a low standard of living; it has meant that we Spaniards were different from what we would have wished to be, and from those with whom we deserved to be equal. It has meant that Spain has been increasingly distanced from the place where decisions were taken, decisions which undoubtedly increasingly affected us.

There is no doubt that this phenomenon of marginalisation and isolation with its consequences of social backwardness was at a peak during the long years of dictatorship, which we had to suffer for four decades. It was therefore the more remarkable that on re-emerging, our country should have so readily identified itself with the process of building Europe, with the recovery of freedoms and rights, ending in its rejoining the cavalcade of progress. Thus the project "Europe" has had an almost magical attraction for us, and has placed upon political leaders the responsibility for instilling content into this aspiration of our people.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, ever since we took the first step along this road we have been fully convinced that Europe could not be built without a common external policy and particularly without a common policy on security. It was this conviction that led the Spanish Government to call a referendum in order to measure and mobilise popular support for a global project involving the participation of our country in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on specific terms reflecting our situation and our historical experience. And with this referendum we obtained popular support for the project involving membership of WEU which we are today confirming. Thus it is on the basis of a majority vote of the people freely, consciously and responsibly expressed, that we are taking this further step in pursuance of our European vocation and of our commitment to the cause of peace. We are here with the will to give effective help in forwarding the global process of European unity, and to do this with the object of defending peace in the continent and peace between Europe and the rest of the world.

Mr. President, we are living through a fascinating period in which events and especially the reforms in the Soviet Union, have resulted, *inter alia*, in the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and hence the possibility or even the necessity of organising security arrangements throughout our continent on fresh bases and into new patterns. These arrangements must take account of the new realities, and must also reflect Europe's determination to be master of its own destiny instead of simply going along with what the superpowers say and decide, even on matters concerning our own identity. This being so, as far as we and the vast majority of the political forces in our country are concerned – with

Mr. Martinez (continued)

hardly any even minor exceptions – WEU loses nothing of its relevance or potential; on the contrary it gains a lot. It is indeed a launching pad towards more ambitious goals.

It is in this spirit that we commence our activities in this parliamentary Assembly where we have so many friends. We shall conduct ourselves, as we have already done in the Assembly of the Council of Europe, with energy, dedication and the will to work. Mr. President, we wish above all to learn quickly, to make up for lost time and to work with you, and we are confident that in so doing we can count upon your understanding, your indulgence and your counsel. Thank you in advance on this day, a joyful day for Spain, on which we invite all our colleagues and all the people in the countries which together with ourselves make up WEU to rejoice with us. We promise to participate in this work with dedication and loyalty. Thank you Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Martinez, for what I think we may take as an act of faith. Spain now has its place back in Europe and is a full member of this Assembly. The cycle is now complete. Thank you for being both with us and among us.

10. Address by Mr. Soares Costa, leader of the Portuguese Delegation

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I now call the leader of the Portuguese Delegation. I have also received one request to speak, which I shall grant later, but would you please treat these as signing-in speeches with no need for any debate.

I call Mr. Soares Costa, leader of the Portuguese Delegation.

Mr. SOARES COSTA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, allow me, on behalf of the Portuguese Delegation, to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your election a few minutes ago. From the work we have done together in the Council of Europe where we have got to know each other well, I know how great your commitment is to the construction of Europe. Because of this we are all certain that as President you will guide the future of this Assembly in accordance with its objectives.

Being new, the present Portuguese Delegation had no occasion to work with President Goerens, but I know I express the feelings of my colleagues who were members of the previous delegation of Portuguese observers in commending him for the drive he put into directing the work of the Assembly, a tribute with which I myself also wish to be associated.

We in the Portuguese Delegation, elected representatives of the Portuguese people, are delighted to be able to participate in the work of the WEU Assembly. As well as being delighted, we give a solemn undertaking that the Portuguese Delegation will work with you in fulfilling the objectives and principles of the WEU treaty, to which we pledge ourselves. We are here to work with you all in what is an essential element in the construction of Europe, which all of us wish to see achieved, namely the security and defence of our continent.

There is no doubt that a measure of instability still surrounds developments in Eastern and Central Europe; the very events and the news reaching us over the last few weeks are evidence of this. Consequently we believe that the WEU Assembly, and WEU as an institution, is bound to have an important part to play in building an effective security system in Europe.

We believe that the CSCE process must be extended in order to arrive at a stable security system in Europe, but without losing sight of the fact that our current task in Europe is not only to further efforts to ensure our security but also to continue improving the efficiency of our defence system at a time when it appears that the old blocs are in some disarray. The real task is to discover how we may jointly set about ensuring the defence of Europe. We have no illusions. There are still dangers threatening us. In the first place there is the instability I mentioned a moment ago, which will continue for some time in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. But let us not forget that very close to us, in the Near East, there is persistent instability, which could spell trouble for Europe. Furthermore, as has already been mentioned, there are the events now taking place particularly in Mediterranean Africa and generally throughout the Mediterranean area, with the problems which may be caused by the demographic explosion and the dangers which could arise from the accentuation of religious fundamentalism in the region.

Hence the importance of WEU as the European pillar of NATO, since the rôle of NATO will have to be redefined in the context of current political developments in Europe.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I believe that there is undoubtedly a pressing need to build a European defence system, but the truth is that the cost, the size and even the sophistication of the components of such a system mean that it is now inconceivable that the defence of European countries should be left to each of them individually. Clearly there will have to be a more or less unified co-operative system, even down to particular aspects of its organisation, such as the problem of the armaments industry which must be co-operatively developed and requires harmonisation, and even the problem

Mr. Soares Costa (continued)

of combat units, which in some way can develop into a system of co-operation between different European countries by the formation of mixed units.

Obviously Portugal and our delegation support the strategic arms reduction agreement; we nevertheless take the view that an agreed reduction of conventional forces is essential to the effective construction of a security system in Europe; but we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Soviet Union is still the most powerful military power on the continent. It is, therefore, logical to reactivate and strengthen Western European Union and it is worth bearing in mind that this European logic is in no sense contradictory to the so-called Atlantic logic. The defence of Europe has to be conceived as a supplement, now strengthened, to what was the Atlantic Alliance.

So WEU is a common platform for European interests in the field of security, but basically this platform bears the imprint of a certain organisational Atlanticism in affirming that its members are resolved to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

Our view is that an economically prosperous Western Europe, which is giving economic and financial assistance for development in the third world and which is now committed to economic reform and aid to the eastern countries, no longer needs to be significantly dependent upon the United States for its defence.

Portugal's membership of WEU represents a response, which is essentially the same as that of the majority of EEC countries, answers questions concerning the framework for our own defence and declares solidarity with the democratic values which constitute Europe's political and cultural tradition. All this in some sense raises questions about our traditional Atlanticism, which is a natural consequence of our geographical and strategic position. This is a point at which I think Portugal's participation in this Assembly can also be an effective contribution which we wish to share with all of you, that is the contribution which Portugal with its geostrategic position fronting the Atlantic can make to strengthening the pillar which is so important for the defence and security of Western Europe.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we are here to work together with you. You have our promise of loyalty to the principles and aims of the treaty. I trust that our work together may help to advance the construction of the Europe of the future to which we are all committed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Soares Costa, for your address and its promise for the future.

I should simply like to add that the presence here today of the representatives of Portugal and Spain is largely due to this Assembly. The Assembly's rôle in the enlargement of WEU to include Portugal and Spain was decisive for which the credit goes to Presidents Caro and Goerens.

I call Mr. Caro for a few moments.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – On behalf of the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats, I should like to join in celebrating this historic moment in the life of our Assembly.

Six years have passed since the extraordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union in Rome, held at the same time as the first meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers to be attended by the defence ministers of what were then our seven member countries.

At the time, only Portugal was an applicant: our Spanish friends were still struggling with the unresolved problem of their policy towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. So it has taken six years for these two great countries of the Iberian peninsula to join the seven founder members of Western European Union.

Admittedly, it is not easy to become a member of Western European Union, which clearly shows the importance of the Brussels Treaty and the commitments and consequences it implies.

The statements we have just had from Mr. Martinez and Mr. Soares Costa demonstrate how much better armed, if I may use the expression in an Assembly responsible for defence matters, we now are to undertake with you, Mr. President, whom I congratulate on your election, not only the promotion of our political rôle in defence matters, but also a greater responsibility as regards the perception of defence problems in the new Europe that is now being built.

Thank you, Mr. President. Welcome to our friends.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen, leader of the Socialist Group.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, on behalf of the Socialist Group I should like to say a few words about Charles Goerens and the way he has presided over our Assembly for the last three years.

In those three years much has changed in Western European Union. The revitalisation of a semi-moribund institution as WEU was – the Rome declaration is considered to be the start of this process – continued over the period running from mid-1987 to mid-1990. In earlier years, the Assembly had regarded WEU as an instrument,

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

a means of contributing to the policy of détente and the improvement of relations with the USSR.

Charles Goerens was the steersman in this process of change. It was under his presidency that there were visits to the USSR and contacts with Mr. Karpov and members of the Supreme Soviet.

It was also under his presidency that our Assembly began its in-depth thinking about the consequences of the tremendous changes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe and the de facto disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and about the implications of these changes for WEU, NATO and the CSCE.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – On behalf of the Liberal Group, I congratulate you on your election as President of our Assembly and assure you of our full co-operation and support in the tasks before you.

As leader of the Liberal Group I shall not go into any protracted eulogy of President Goerens, since Mr. Stoffelen has already done this so well. Nor need I stress how many talented and competent members there are in our group, Mr. Goerens being an ideal illustration. So I shall simply pay tribute to him, and express to him our satisfaction at seeing the Portuguese and Spanish Delegations officially joining us today because this, to a large extent, is the result of his work and that of his predecessor, Mr. Jean-Marie Caro, to whom I should also like to pay homage.

As we have already been reminded, it was the determination of these two Presidents of the Assembly that made the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU possible. I am sure that these countries' involvement in our work will help us towards an even sharper analysis of security problems in Europe with particular regard to the countries of the south which they know so well. I thank them for joining us and I thank Presidents Goerens and Caro for having done so much to this end.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That says it all and says it well. With these expressions of confidence in them our Portuguese and Spanish colleagues can now play a full part in our work.

11. Re-enrolment on the agenda of reports of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Procedure, the Political Committee, the Technological and Aerospace

Committee and the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations have requested the re-enrolment on the agenda of certain reports not agreed within the prescribed time.

Are there twenty members opposed to the Political Committee's request?...

No. The report of the Political Committee is re-enrolled on the agenda.

Are there twenty members opposed to the request of the Technological and Aerospace Committee regarding the report on the IEPG?...

No. It is re-enrolled on the agenda.

Are there twenty representatives opposed to the request relating to observation satellites?...

This is not so. The report is re-enrolled on the agenda.

Are there twenty members opposed to the request concerning the report on developments in command, control, communications and intelligence?...

It is re-enrolled on the agenda.

Are there twenty members opposed to the requests by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations?...

The two reports are re-enrolled on the agenda.

12. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session

(Doc. 1214)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session, Document 1214.

Is there any objection to the draft order of business?...

The draft order of business is adopted.

13. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1220)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee on action by the Presidential Committee, Document 1220.

I call Mr. Goerens, former President of the Assembly.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, before reporting on the activities of the Presidential Committee in the first half of 1990, I should like to congratulate our President, Mr. Pontillon,

Mr. Goerens (continued)

and wish him every success as leader of our Assembly.

As usual, the activities of the Presidential Committee are both administrative and political in nature. I shall deal at greater length with the political aspect.

As regards administrative matters, the Presidential Committee has been concerned with two issues: reorganisation of the headquarters building and treatment of the staff of the security agencies.

The improvements to our headquarters were completed just in time. The paint is barely dry and indeed there were many difficulties. The work started late and one contractor went bankrupt and had to be changed in midstream. However, we can now receive the Portuguese and Spanish Delegations and provide better working conditions for all members of the Assembly.

As you have realised, the new committee rooms are bigger. Interpretation into languages other than French and English is now possible if the delegations concerned are prepared to meet the cost.

Delegations' offices have been improved. I know that space-wise the improvement is still not good enough and the Presidential Committee regrets that the Council would only agree to work directly connected with the enlargement of WEU.

I now turn to a problem of indirect concern to our Assembly but which the Presidential Committee could not ignore: that of the security agencies' staff made redundant by the establishment of the Institute for Security Studies.

The Presidential Committee was informed by the staff association of the agencies of the terms under which the contracts were terminated. The committee opened discussions on the subject, but to no avail in spite of the sympathy shown by the Secretary-General.

I now turn to the political aspect of the Presidential Committee's activities.

In the present period of upheaval in Central and Eastern Europe, the Presidential Committee has endeavoured both to establish new forms of dialogue with certain Warsaw Pact countries and to give effect to the agreement with the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union concerning reciprocal visits.

You saw evidence of our dialogue with the Warsaw Pact countries at our last extraordinary session in Luxembourg where you will recall the address by Mr. Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland and his dialogue with Mr. Genscher, which was a high point in that session.

Then there was the address by Mr. Falin, Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Pursuing the same object, the Presidential Committee has invited to this session the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the new Hungarian Government. He will address you on Thursday morning.

Parliamentary observers from Hungary and Yugoslavia also came to Luxembourg and spoke. They are here again in Paris and representatives of Poland and the German Democratic Republic are coming too. I hope that they will add to the content of our debates.

Next I propose to report on the Presidential Committee's visit to Moscow in April. There had been two previous meetings, one in Moscow in 1987 and the other in Paris last year. It has been agreed that from now on this would become an annual event alternating between Paris and Moscow.

For the detail of the talks we had in Moscow please refer to my written report. Briefly what happened is that we met Mr. Zagladin, Mr. Gorbachev's adviser to whom I conveyed the Assembly's thinking on the pursuit of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe as set out in our Luxembourg recommendation. We felt that Mr. Zagladin shared the same constructive spirit. The future of the different security systems should, in his opinion, be considered in the framework of the security of the whole of Europe.

Others we spoke with stressed the similarity of the viewpoints expressed on both sides, particularly as regards the inviolability of frontiers. Differences arose over German reunification and NATO membership of a reunified Germany. The members of the Presidential Committee, and our German colleagues in particular, emphasised for their part the need for the German people to be free to choose their alliances, their policies and their future.

What did they say about armaments?

They told us that Vienna I needed to be followed by Vienna II, that nuclear disarmament should leave a minimum stock and that there should be co-operation between the two alliances to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons. The Presidential Committee had no hesitation in expressing its concern over Lithuania.

That then is a brief summary of the very interesting talks we had.

May I now conclude with some personal thoughts. The ideological war is over; the countries of Eastern Europe are now converted to the principles of the West. Democratisation is on

Mr. Goerens (continued)

the march in the Soviet Union as in other European countries but in the Soviet Union it is a challenge to the unity of the state. The peoples within the Soviet Union are making use of their new freedom of expression to assert their personality, often in a very inflexible way.

Cohesion in the Soviet complex can no longer be secured by the party and its ideology. In perestroika the Soviet Union is living through a revolution. How, in these circumstances, can we found a new international order with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe? Our basic principle, of course, is people's right of self-determination but the Soviet Union wants this principle to be linked with the need to maintain the balance of forces. Hence the controversy on the reunification of Germany. What is wanted therefore is a pan-European security order that will ensure lasting peace in Europe and provide a sound basis for international co-operation. Reductions in conventional weapons will need to be combined with a ban on the production of chemical and biological weapons and the existence of a minimum deterrent.

Europeans will also have to find ways of making their characteristic diversity a source of enrichment rather than disorder.

In 1955 Western European Union was used to allow Germany to be rearmed in an atmosphere of mutual confidence. Today, we have to establish a new European order. Can Western European Union remain silent? The Assembly, for its part, has acted with the means at its disposal and we now call upon the Council to shoulder fully its serious responsibilities.

Mr. President, I would like to conclude by expressing my thanks.

Firstly to the Assembly, for its continuous contribution to the debate on security in Europe throughout my term of office as President of the Assembly, and more particularly to the national vice-presidents, my predecessor, Mr. Jean-Marie Caro, the Chairmen of the permanent committees, and the leaders of the political groups who have helped me in the Presidential Committee to bridge the gap between the plenary sessions and thus ensure continuity in the Assembly.

My thanks are also due to Mr. Poos, Mr. van den Broek, Mr. Eyskens and also Sir Geoffrey Howe, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, with whom it was my honour to work during my presidency.

My thanks also to Mr. Alfred Cahen and Mr. Wim van Eekelen whose qualities and friendship I have grown to value during my term of office.

I should also like to express my thanks to the members of the Permanent Council. We succeeded in establishing good relationships with the delegates and, even if at times our viewpoints diverged, we always found solutions – occasionally even more satisfactory. I am deeply grateful to them.

I must also thank Mr. Georges Moulias, Clerk of the Assembly, and all the staff that back him up in his important work. Together we have been through some very interesting times coinciding with the most fascinating changes to have taken place in Europe since the war.

I thank all of you for enabling me to make this experience my own.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro to speak in the debate.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Speaking on behalf of the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats I am taking advantage of the report just presented by President Goerens to express two sentiments.

The first – as you yourself were saying, Mr. President, in your inaugural speech – is that we are part of an Assembly which, after substantial debate achieves positions that are remarkably consistent over time and meet with wide approval across the benches. This enables us to maintain a good atmosphere in our serious, arduous and fascinating political work in which friendship remains a particularly strong feature. It is in the name of this friendship that I should like to pay tribute to Mr. Charles Goerens who, as a Luxembourg parliamentarian, friend and travelling companion, since we have worked together for so long, has helped the Assembly overcome all the obstacles along its road, as a result of which we shall – as I am sure Mr. President you are fully aware – be able to achieve even greater things in the coming months, or at least the coming years of your presidency.

My thanks, therefore, to Mr. Charles Goerens, for his friendship, his remarkable professionalism and in particular the conviction in his opinions which is essential for a politician to be respected.

This respect and tribute I pay to Mr. Goerens on behalf of my political group is also surely shared of course by all my colleagues here present.

My second point concerns the Presidential Committee's report. The leader of the Presidential Committee is the President of the Assembly. His is a major political rôle. It is he who ensures that the Assembly machinery runs smoothly and, by means – if I may use the expression – of a pre-determined strategy, enables our Assembly to decide in advance the stances that it is to put before our partners, whether they be parliamentarians, governments

Mr. Caro (continued)

or the public – and I am thinking particularly of the media.

On that score, the report presented by Mr. Goerens contains a whole series of positive features. The material benefits that we have gained through the accession of our Portuguese and Spanish friends are without a doubt not up to our expectations and we hope that we shall manage to push apart still further the walls which enclose us in such heat in these premises of the Economic and Social Council so that WEU, once the problem of location has been settled, will be able to take its proper place in the political structures of the future. I hope that the Presidential Committee will be able to continue with this work that has begun and, as you know, Mr. President, we are there to help you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Caro, for this offer. In the first part of your statement, I think you echoed not only the feeling of the group that you represent, but also the common and unanimous feeling of the Assembly as a whole. I am therefore very happy to be able to associate the presidency with this tribute to President Goerens's work.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

The debate is closed.

I think that the Assembly will agree to ratify the action of the committee as reported.

Is anyone against?...

It is so decided.

14. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.

I am particularly happy to call Mr. van Eekelen.

Mr. van EEKELLEN (*Secretary-General of Western European Union*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, your session is taking place at a time which may not be so exhilarating as a few weeks ago but is nonetheless still crucial to the history of Europe: it is marked by a convergence of East and West on the basis of democracy, self-determination and the market economy on the one hand and, on the other, renewed political impetus to the process which is to lead us towards European union. In this context, WEU not only has a major rôle to play in paving the way for the necessary changes within the framework of the alliance and the CSCE in accordance with rapidly-evolving timetables but, even more important, it has a funda-

mental task to deepen the European security identity – the sine qua non for future decisions on the institutionalisation of Europe's security.

First of all, Mr. President, may I congratulate you most warmly on your election to the presidency of the WEU parliamentary Assembly. Your eminent career leaves us all in no doubt that we can look forward to what will surely be a most active and fruitful process of collaboration. You are, Mr. President, not only a distinguished parliamentarian of long standing, esteemed by colleagues in various forums, but you are, above all, a communicator with practical experience of the latest technologies. This is a dimension of WEU's activities that we wish to develop with the maximum professionalism and effectiveness. Your experience will be particularly valuable for us. In this connection, your written question of 16th January will receive a detailed reply once the Council has had the necessary debate on our organisation's public relations policy, the principal basis for which will be the proposals which the Director of the WEU Institute for Security Studies will submit to it during the summer.

My feelings of satisfaction do not stop there since today we have the double satisfaction of witnessing the final stage in the process of WEU enlargement, namely the presence of the two delegations from the Portuguese and Spanish parliaments. Their participation in your debates this week demonstrates that, in terms of its security, Europe's nucleus is now complete since WEU now embraces the five countries most directly involved in Central Europe as well as the three countries which share an uninterrupted Mediterranean coastline stretching from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Ionian Sea. Now that Portugal and Spain are members, WEU is at last able to channel ideas and opinions from the very heart of the European security area in the major debates on the future of our continent as seen in a continental, transatlantic and Mediterranean perspective.

I shall now turn to the agenda of your session.

As regards relations between the Council and your Assembly, I have to convey the Permanent Council's regrets at receiving the draft recommendations and reports of your committees only a week in advance since it attaches the greatest importance to being able to make a detailed study of the fruits of your work. Quite clearly, this is a precondition for a meaningful dialogue during your sessions. With this end in view, it would also be useful and, I believe, profitable to all concerned that the Council be apprised as soon as possible of the topics selected by the Assembly Committees for their work from one session to the next. Could we not consider discussing these, possibly between your sessions?

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

Such a discussion could, for example, take place during the meetings between the Council presidency and your Presidential Committee; these meetings should have a substantive agenda and not merely be restricted to a series of questions and answers on topical issues. Finally, may I reiterate my proposal to brief your committees on the substance of the Council working groups' activities, provided your rapporteurs consider it helpful for their deliberations to discuss in more detail specific points raised in the information letters which I shall continue to send to you, Mr. President, on a regular basis. As I informed you by letter on 14th May, the Council's briefing of the Assembly on the work of the IEPG will be forwarded to you in the same way.

I do not doubt that we shall continue to improve the quality of our exchanges of information on the basis of the significant progress already achieved under the presidency of Charles Goerens to whom I should here like to pay tribute for his great courtesy and understanding of the constraints weighing on our initiatives in this regard. Your Assembly has already voiced its commendation of his policy of openness towards the East European countries. I would also like to mention his constructive rôle, agreed with the Council and the Assembly, in the reorganisation of the building which now provides you with improved working conditions. Many thanks, Charles. I shall have valued memories of your co-operation. Clearly, WEU has a rôle to play in informing public opinion but, need I repeat, this is essentially a national responsibility. The organs of WEU are doing, and will continue to do, as much as possible in this area within the limits of the means allocated to them by the member states' governments.

Since this matter is also raised in Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's report before you, may I confirm that the excellent long-standing relationships established between the Council and SHAPE, between the NATO Secretary-General and myself, and the rôle of our countries in these bodies in no way justifies the suggestion that WEU is acting secretly and in a manner at variance with that of the alliance bodies. Quite the contrary. Besides, that would be in contradiction with both the spirit and the letter of the commitments contained in the Hague platform. If there is one point on which there is complete unanimity with WEU, it is on the continuing need for the alliance and for its political unity. The Brussels communiqué clearly underlines this need for cohesion, which the Council presidency is putting into practice by regularly briefing the North Atlantic Council on discussions held within WEU.

The WEU Institute for Security Studies is being set up in accordance with the arrange-

ments made by the Permanent Council. Mr. Roper has already set up home in Paris and is here amongst us. It will be operational on 1st July and have a balanced and highly-qualified team. I have just received all governments' agreement to the appointment of the four experts proposed by the Director. On specific subjects, the institute will be assisted by "task forces" which will include experts from the capitals. Security in the Mediterranean will be one of the first subjects to be studied in this way. The work programme to be drawn up this summer will focus on the new European strategic environment and its implications for western and European security structures. From the outset, the institute will endeavour to promote contacts with similar bodies both in the East and the West and to stimulate a dialogue with opinion-formers and decision-makers. Finally, the detailed arrangements for co-operation between the Assembly and the institute, in respect of which I must stress that, in this initial phase of its existence the human and material resources will be limited, will have to be worked out at the appropriate time in such a way as to avoid duplication.

The Washington summit brings us two pieces of good news on arms control: the broad lines of a future treaty to cut strategic weapons by a third and an agreement to destroy stocks of chemical weapons. There are still a number of sticking points which prevent us from hailing this meeting as a remarkable, let alone an historic, event. The cold war is now over but it is still too soon to abandon weapons or speak of the dawning of a new era.

The Soviets have clearly not yet drawn all the conclusions from the present situation. Mr. Gorbachev's advisers admitted in Washington that the Warsaw Pact no longer existed. Let us wait for them to show the same realism towards Germany and recognise its full sovereignty. This is no time for euphoria or horse-trading. The problems are not on our side. What we are offering are solutions: a CFE treaty followed by other negotiations to improve and extend its scope; a renewed alliance and a changed NATO, whose success militates in favour of its retention, the broad outline of which could well be sketched out in the next few months.

(The speaker continued in English)

WEU and the alliance are already engaged in a wide-ranging assessment of the future needs of European security and the necessary adaptation of the rôle and responsibilities of European countries in the Atlantic framework.

As the threat recedes geographically, what level of military effort will be regarded as acceptable by public opinion in WEU countries? How heavily will European defence budgets be cut? It is vital for WEU member states to

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

harmonise their planning in this area and to evaluate all the economies of scale that might accrue from growing specialisation, closer co-operation on armaments and equipment and the pooling of resources for the verification of future conventional arms control agreements.

The Soviet Union continues to retain a marked advantage in conventional and nuclear capabilities, despite the unilateral withdrawals or reductions that have been announced or implemented. The intended shift of Soviet military doctrine to a defensive concept is a welcome development, but it has not yet been translated into a significant change of posture. Nor do we see any slackening in the modernisation of Soviet armaments or equipment. If the Soviet Union wishes to expedite the reduction in German forces – apparently that is one of its objectives – it must, in all logic, abandon its policy of blocking the CFE talks.

By allowing a positive outcome to be reached, it will hasten the opening of negotiations for a second stage which would include manpower levels. Such negotiations will be even more significant in that they will be predicated on new realities, such as a unified Germany, and Eastern European democracies which have regained full and complete freedom of manoeuvre.

In the context of Lord Newall's report we must concentrate on the objectives of such follow-on negotiations in a situation in which the Warsaw Pact has ceased to function militarily. Can those negotiations be transferred from the twenty-three to the thirty-five? Perhaps. One may ask what kind of disarmament measures would have equal application to all thirty-five participating countries.

When and if a CFE treaty is signed, our collective security will still depend on a combination of dialogue which should be as intensive and comprehensive as possible – co-operation and defence. The best form of defence will still be credible deterrence at the lowest possible levels of forces. The rôle of nuclear weapons will remain crucial. It is very hard to conceive that the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France or the United States will abandon their nuclear weapons. Dialogue with the East in the military field should lead to a convergence of doctrines and the recognition of mutually-acceptable, vital security interests, paving the way for a future pan-European global security concept. However, the Soviet Union is only at a very early stage in a process which might bring this distant prospect nearer. Our member states are aware of the need to keep up the momentum, and the ministerial organs will review the objectives and procedures

for post-CFE negotiations, both conventional and nuclear.

We must be prepared to carry on contributing adequate resources for defence in the context of progressive evolution and adaptation of our security structures. We should warn public opinion against the illusion of reaping the so-called benefits of peace or disarmament too soon. Huge savings are unlikely for us Europeans. You do not need me to remind you in detail of the increasing cost of more and more sophisticated armaments and equipment that will be needed in any event. Greater armaments co-operation could help, but we are still hoping for a major breakthrough in the IEPG context, where all other organisations have made little progress. Some headway has been made with bilateral and multilateral co-operation. In the end much will depend on the rationalisation of European armaments industries through collaboration and mergers. The recent positive developments are not enough. We need to do more.

The apportionment of cuts among European forces will offer a major opportunity for a concerted effort to harmonise national requirements and increase the efficiency of Europe's rôle in the Atlantic Alliance.

Allow me at this point to say a few words on the concept of multinational units which was mentioned in the debates at Luxembourg. I regard the concept as militarily feasible and politically opportune, and it might make some inescapable consequences of German unity more acceptable to Germany's neighbours to the East. Multinational forces would be a useful device to strengthen European identity and make defence efforts more acceptable within our respective countries. Those forces might solve the problem of stationed forces in Germany by making the issue irrelevant. They should have access to the whole of a united Germany and the territory of other member states. Examples of multinational co-operation already exist, offering useful points of departure. Units from different countries could best be combined at brigade level or above – that is, the national input being not lower than the brigade. They might be twinned with their North American counterparts. Indeed, the interest shown by Richard Cheney indicates that the United States Government realises the potential of such a concept for a credible future military link with Europe. Being highly mobile, self-sustainable units of brigade or division size, their variable geometry and various command systems would make multinational units better suited to a possible conflict of the future.

The geographical asymmetries we know today will never disappear. The Soviet Union will remain the largest military power on the mainland of Europe and a major nuclear power. Given these realities, a step-by-step approach,

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

making the best of the new opportunities for co-operation across the continent, is the most constructive way forward.

I would now like to review the main recent proposals for new European structures, which need to be carefully assessed by the WEU Assembly. Alfred Dregger has suggested a security community within the alliance on the basis of WEU. Sir Leon Brittan advocates the merger of all European security co-operation structures – Eurogroup, IEPG and WEU – into a European security community to be subsumed in due course by the European Community itself. Mr. Tindemans has proposed merging WEU into the EEC right away. I seldom disagree with him because I have a high regard for his European feelings, but that would be a retrograde step because WEU has several advantages over European co-operation, as it is based on a treaty, has a stronger secretariat and a permanent structure, and brings ministers for foreign affairs and defence together at the same table. WEU may have only a transitory rôle to play, but the obstacles to the immediate establishment of a European security community derive mainly from the variable geometry of membership of the various existing institutions. That variable geometry reflects differences in terms of strategic concepts and commitments. It is therefore crucial to define a security identity first and make potential new partners subscribe to it, rather than expand geographically and have to start the complex harmonisation process all over again.

If we look to the East, it will be counter-productive to maintain inappropriate or rejected structures, but it is also premature to propose this structure for European architecture before all the repercussions of the development triggered off in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are clearly manifest. I refer to the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the full exercise of the right to self-determination for all the peoples of the Soviet Union.

The European home can be built only if East and West can provide the building blocks. In the West we have WEU, the European Community, EFTA, the Council of Europe, OECD and NATO, all with remarkable records of success. The Community is the economic and social inner circle, the nucleus of the European construction process, and WEU is its equivalent in the security field. Our task is to make full use of that potential for attraction and to reinforce it while, at the same time, forging new links with Eastern Europe.

I think it safer to opt for a pragmatic approach and invite the new Eastern European democracies to be progressively associated with the Community by means of concentric circles. In

so doing, we should try to maintain the same pace in the political, social and economic fields.

I believe that a European confederation as proposed by Minister Eyskens and President Mitterrand is an attainable goal, provided that we first succeed within the Community in reaching the objective set out in the Single Act: European union, with its security dimension.

The East, on the other hand, has no institutions or policies to offer. The WEU Assembly should reflect on and react to the proposals regarding the appropriate parliamentary framework, with global competence for European security matters, such as a European senate for the Twelve based on national parliaments.

The CSCE – the Helsinki process – is a skeleton; it is important, but it has little flesh and almost no muscle, even less than the defunct League of Nations. I am happy that it has acquired much prestige but it needs to be developed further if we recognise the need for a forum tackling global European issues. Common principles, a shared cultural heritage and the growing homogeneity of our societies – as a result of the free flow of people and ideas across our continent – are all a sound basis on which to build. The CSCE might become the right framework – a conciliation machinery for dealing with new instabilities and for addressing the problems of nationalities. As it is, the CSCE cannot yet provide the European continent with the security structures it will need.

The Soviet Union is not in a position to preach on the theme of the common European home until it has put its own house in order, and it is quite clear that the only credible model stems from the Europe of the Twelve. WEU member countries have a crucial rôle to play in ensuring its political, economic and monetary development.

The cohesion and stability of Western Europe's existing security structures are major assets in the face of the uncertainties surrounding the consolidation of democracies in Eastern Europe and the future of Soviet power. If the USSR is to survive, reform of the Soviet system is no longer enough; it must be abolished. The urgency of the situation may hasten the arrival of new leaders. We must be prepared for every eventuality.

The balance of force will continue to dominate the international dialogue even though significant progress has been achieved in arms control, where each new stage seems to add to the complexity of the problems to be solved.

Greater stability in Europe does not automatically lead to greater stability outside Europe. In an increasingly multi-polar world, risks are both

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

proliferating and diversifying. Faced with this practical reality, Europe must have well-balanced capability so that it can react to the crisis situations which, as we know from experience, can flare up with brutal suddenness. The WEU Assembly, institute and ministerial organs must continue resolutely to concert their views on the new circumstances of European security. Our member states' reaction capability will largely depend on their ability to acquire a rational medium and long-term planning system and the machinery for operational co-operation. It is harder and more perilous to reduce than to reinforce defence capability. Europeans must act in concert rather than make an unseemly rush for doors only just opened by the arms control negotiations.

At a time when the European Community has decided to press on with economic and monetary union, while agreeing on a timetable for the definition of political union, WEU must make a decisive contribution to the shaping of the future of European security structures, based on a clear-cut European security identity.

The WEU parliamentary Assembly will, I am convinced, make an important contribution to the debates on the means for member states' concerted action to bring about a new European order of peace and security founded on stability and confidence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General, for your very full report and for your readiness, in advance, to respond to the requests and wishes of the Assembly, an attitude that strengthens and improves the collaboration between the two institutions to the extent that this is possible. Actually I ought to say three institutions because here is Mr. John Roper sitting on our benches – a promise of the future collaboration that will permeate our work. This is in our shared interest and is a common condition that can only serve to promote the aspirations and projects you have just mapped out.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I did not want to put my name on the list of speakers until I knew what Mr. van Eekelen was going to say. I have two or three points to make. I hope that he will not be offended by them, but they need to be said.

First, Mr. van Eekelen said that he regretted the short notice given in respect of three of our reports. I remind him that in the past seven years the Assembly has made the same complaint to the Council of Ministers over and over again. I hope that he will not regard this occasion as balancing out those other occasions when ministers have failed to answer us.

Secondly, Mr. van Eekelen said that he would welcome longer discussions between the chairmanship-in-office and the Presidential Committee. Those would only be valuable if ministers stayed for the whole of the meeting and if much time was not taken up with long ministerial speeches. If we are to have proper discussions there should be brief ministerial speeches and a great deal of discussion.

Thirdly, I should like to issue an invitation to ministers to hold their next meeting in the United Kingdom Delegation's office to see how eighteen of them can fit into the room, let alone sit on the seven chairs in that marvellous new office. I do not know who decided on the size of the rooms or on the furnishings, but no low-grade civil servant would be prepared to occupy the accommodation. Still less should parliamentarians or ambassadors have to do so.

I extend the same open invitation on behalf of my colleagues from Germany, Italy and France who in theory have the largest offices.

Finally, and perhaps more constructively, let me say how much I welcome the forward-looking and constructive approach that Mr. van Eekelen has always shown to the Assembly since he became Secretary-General. It is by such an approach that we shall achieve the greater co-operation that will help us all. I welcome 99% of his remarks. The remaining 1% consisted of items that I picked up for him to note rather than to comment on in great detail.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – First, I should stress that as a former politician and member of the Assembly I will never be offended by anything that a member of the Assembly says.

I take Sir Geoffrey's point about past delays. My remarks were made in a forward-looking spirit and were intended to address the questions: how can we improve our co-operation and how can we ensure that, on the basis of your reports, which we always find very valuable, a fruitful dialogue can take place? Obviously, when we have had only a little time to consider a report such as your own – which I found on the day of my arrival in Paris – we cannot do it justice, and you must excuse us for that.

You spoke about the length of ministerial speeches. I shall take your point to heart and discuss it in Council.

You asked also about the delegation offices, and I shall have to refer your question back. We have posed the same question ourselves and Ambassador van Bellinghen, acting on behalf of the Belgian presidency, asked it when he visited, and was told that the delegates preferred two smaller rooms to one larger room. Moreover, the

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

plan was submitted to us, not imposed by the Council. In any case, Sir Geoffrey, thank you for the positive spirit in which you made your comments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I hope these replies give a complete answer to Sir Geoffrey's questions.

I call Mr. Speed.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – In your interesting speech, Mr. Secretary-General, you dealt at some length with the dramatic changes taking place in Europe and compared our institutions in the West with those in Central and Eastern Europe. It became clear that, in your view – certainly in mine – there is a strong, continuing rôle for WEU. However, there was an omission from your speech – and there has been an omission from some of the debates taking place about the future of WEU. You failed to mention our possible rôle and function out of area.

I cannot be the only one who believes that the security of the West – indeed, of the world – is perhaps imperilled by events taking place outside Europe, in the Middle East and elsewhere. Three years ago WEU was probably the only security organisation in the West that could act as we acted in the Gulf, on a multilateral basis. Do you not think that the possibility of intervening if necessary and at least having a command and control structure when necessary to protect the vital interests of the West, which are worldwide, would constitute an important plus for WEU, which we are perhaps ignoring and neglecting at the moment?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELLEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – Yes, I could not agree more. I said in my introduction that stability in Europe did not mean stability outside Europe and in adjacent areas and I meant my remarks to refer to our out-of-area rôle. I also emphasised the importance of the Mediterranean, both in terms of our own activities and the task force for Mediterranean issues that John Roper wants soon to establish. In our work in WEU – and especially in the Mediterranean Working Group – we concentrate a great deal on such questions. For example, we consider naval deployment in the Mediterranean, ballistic missile proliferation and certain countries' potential to produce chemical weapons. We are very much aware of the new risks associated with developments there but we need to consider what sort of action we can take. We have the example of the operation in the Gulf. We keep such questions under review. New contingencies may arise and I fully

share your feeling that those contingency planning activities should also contain some embryonic arrangement for mounting new security operations quickly whenever the need arises.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone else have a question for the Secretary-General?...

Apparently not.

Thank you once again, Secretary-General, for your outstanding contribution to our proceedings.

15. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1225)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee on WEU in the Atlantic Alliance, Document 1225.

I call the Rapporteur, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – The report that I have the honour to present is dated 25th May. Therefore, I can in no way claim that it is up to date. Indeed, had I written the report four days ago, it would still have been out of date by today. That is the problem, and it is the same problem that you, Mr. President, experienced with your superb report on East-West relations. We have a changing scene. We try to catch up, but as soon as we do the next instalment is upon us.

I thank Mr. Burgelin and many others who helped me with the detailed preparation of a very tricky report. The last year has been one of the most fast-moving in modern history. I venture to suggest that no one present would have predicted twelve months ago the circumstances in which we find ourselves today. Had he done so, he would have been taken away by little men in white jackets to an institution, although not a Western European institution. New developments occur each day. I have only to remind you of the recent meeting of the Defence Planning Committee of NATO and the statement issued in Brussels on 24th May, which said:

“ We are already moving with the times. The principles of alliance security set out in the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament remain valid. On this basis, and looking forward to the forthcoming NATO summit which will consider NATO's rôle in a transformed Europe in the 1990s, we have decided to undertake a review of NATO's military strategy and that we will continue to

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

adapt our defence requirements to ensure that they take full account of the new circumstances now emerging. We will also need to adjust the operational concepts and doctrines which underpin the strategy, so that they continue to meet our security requirements."

In other words, flexible response and all the other matters are already under careful consideration by ministers.

It is essential to fix the place of WEU within the alliance. Two wars have started in Europe in which North America has eventually been brought into the conflict. It is almost certain — many historians have already admitted this — that, had North America been more closely aligned with Europe, no world war would have come about. Efforts at the end of the 1914-1918 Great War to involve it formally and actively in the League of Nations proved useless and in consequence the League was virtually stillborn.

In 1945, the United Nations was a better attempt, although the veto rendered it less valuable than it should have been. But nobody could deny that, had President Wilson been able to get America to play the part that he wanted it to play in the League of Nations, there would certainly have been no second world war.

NATO has been the great success that it has because a place was kept in Europe for North America and for four decades NATO has maintained the peace, and Western European Union, as its European pillar, has played its full part.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the closer accord between the USSR and the United States have given rise to two major issues. While spelling them out, I stress that, even if nuclear weapon treaties are effective, Soviet conventional forces still make the USSR more powerful than NATO. No evidence is yet available of any substantial conventional reductions in the USSR. I emphasise that I do not disbelieve Mr. Gorbachev's promises. However, they are slow to be translated into facts in Europe.

I need only refer to paragraph 50 of Charles Goerens's report, presented this morning, in which he reminds us: "the military power built up by the Soviet Union during the period of tension is still intact, declarations of intent concerning its reduction not yet having had any significant effect. We know the factor of inertia that applies to disarmament. It is not easy to implement quickly even the most sincerely proposed reductions".

The first issue that I wish to raise is about the form of any new pan-European security organisation, which is vital to us all. I say, with the greatest possible friendship to my old friend Sir

Leon Brittan, who would be better advised to deal with trade and competition within the Community than to intervene in defence matters, that pan-European organisation must include a unified Germany, and we must give security confidence to the USSR as well as to NATO and WEU. Urgent action is needed to find what is required. I hope that that issue will be grasped forthwith.

Chancellor Kohl made an interesting speech to the IPU conference on 25th May. He said: "It is time to tie together all the various ideas for European architecture", and he made special mention of the United Kingdom, United States, French, Polish and Czech views. He said that we should create pan-European institutions within the CSCE framework. He stressed that the intention was not to look for new institutions to replace existing ones, but to complement tried and tested institutions such as NATO and WEU.

While discussing the concept of a new security organisation we must remember that it is two-sided and that it cannot be formed on the basis of what suits one country or bloc. If we do that we shall build unnecessary tensions. On 29th May, Mr. Shevardnadze contributed an interesting article to *Izvestia* in which he said: "At the same time, there are concerns that we might find ourselves travelling down the same roads of bloc-to-bloc confrontation". He said that might be avoided if politicians learnt from the past and appraised the situation realistically. The processes connected with German unity meant that one could not be tardy about that.

I should have thought that the lesson to be learnt from the past about German unity was that it was wiser and safer for a reunited Germany to be within the framework of an organisation such as NATO which is dedicated to maintaining the peace in Europe. That is better than Germany being a neutralised organisation. That is where the danger might exist for the Soviet Union. I hope that Mr. Shevardnadze will remember history and draw the right lesson.

In the Washington talks about a reunited Germany, mention has been made of joining NATO but little mention is made of what would happen if the German Democratic Republic acceded to the German Federal Republic under Article 23 of its constitution and automatically became part of WEU. That would mean that the new united Germany would be subject to the Hague declaration. That is an interesting problem for the lawyers, because the border countries are not members of NATO or WEU. That must be faced. Ministers have concentrated their discussions on NATO. The fait accompli is likely to come more quickly for WEU members after a reunified Germany and all the problems that will be created if

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

Mr. Gorbachev is not apprised quickly of the issues.

Mr. Gorbachev has made it clear that he recognises that we have a major rôle to play in a dialogue between the two blocs. Perhaps that is a task for the Presidential Committee and perhaps we should have further talks with the Supreme Soviet about what might happen if the German Democratic Republic becomes part of the German Federal Republic under Article 23.

The second issue, which is linked with the first, is the need to maintain American and Canadian interest in and support of Europe. In that famous speech to the Council of Europe it was made clear by Mr. Gorbachev that he did not foresee the disappearance of American forces in Europe or of American interests in Europe.

Perhaps the CSCE, with a democratic parliamentary input, is the solution, but a more immediate possibility is a Western European Union to which other nations are added for the specific purpose of the security aspect.

WEU is the sole European body charged by treaty with discussing defence matters. No other European organisation has such competence. Mr. Pontillon said that we should concentrate on our own functions and not interfere in the functions of other European organisations. That works both ways in that other organisations should not interfere with our functions.

Many people in WEU countries and the United States have already spent in their minds what we call the peace dividend and are looking for more. I caution against that because much is uncertain at present. In sound commerce one does not distribute dividends without money in the bank. We do not yet have the money in the bank. After all, what could be the effect of the Yeltsin factor? The Republic of Russia is the most powerful of the Soviet republics, yet we have no direct links with it. We have read some of Mr. Yeltsin's statements. We do not know what they mean – no one does yet – but we must not overlook them completely.

In a strange way, life seemed more secure with NATO and the Warsaw Pact in place, although the two were not comparable in major ways, such as democratic choice and free will. None the less structured as they were, they maintained an easy or uneasy peace in Europe.

We are now in uncharted waters. Our erstwhile potential enemy may not be able to deliver on his promises – or may not be allowed to do so – however sincerely they were meant, but time will tell. I remain hopeful but cautious. We should remain cautious, and that is the framework in which the report was prepared and

adopted unanimously by the Political Committee. However, we may have to upgrade and update it regularly because, as I said earlier, events move on all too fast.

I could say very much more about the report – one of my failings is brevity – but I do not believe in making long speeches. I therefore commend the report to the parliamentary Assembly.

There is a major rôle for WEU to play. Let us ensure that we have the guts, determination and ability to perform it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, brevity is clearly one of your qualities but so too is clarity. Thank you for this splendid introduction to the debate in which many members wish to speak.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I did not ask for the floor when my fellow heads of parliamentary groups offered their congratulations, thanks and welcome because as the first speaker listed to comment on this report, I thought I could use the opportunity to speak for the Communist Group. Warmest congratulations, therefore, to our President, Mr. Pontillon, and many thanks to his predecessor, Charles Goerens, whose balanced and open approach allowed every member of the Presidential Committee to feel at ease in helping to formulate the Assembly's policy.

On behalf of the Italian communist representatives, I should like to offer a very warm welcome to the Spanish and Portuguese Delegations. This is no mere formality because we are counting on their contribution to extend the process of security and co-operation in Europe to the Mediterranean.

Turning to the report before us, credit is due to Sir Geoffrey Finsberg for having worked with his well-known commitment and ability on a subject and a situation in a constant state of flux and has succeeded in producing a draft recommendation acceptable to all of us which provides a sound basis for WEU's future action and its relations with NATO, now in need of far-reaching changes in its strategy and policies, and takes account of the developments required in order to arrive at a new joint pan-European security system.

The draft recommendation represents a reasonable balance between the various demands made in the Political Committee and if there are no major changes we shall vote in favour.

This is the second time in six months that the Assembly has met immediately after a Bush-Gorbachev summit. A large number of agreements were reached on bilateral relations

Mr. Pieralli (continued)

between the United States and the Soviet Union and considerable progress was made, although not as yet enshrined in treaties, towards strategic nuclear and chemical disarmament. The most burning questions of the day were, however, not resolved – and this was bound to be the case – in particular as regards the structure and international position of unified Germany and, therefore, the future European order linked with the disarmament negotiations now going on in Vienna.

What I regard as an important fact is that even though the Soviet and American presidents disagreed on positive solutions, they stressed the common interest and determination of the United States and the Soviet Union to continue to play a decisive part in Europe's stability and security in the years to come and by their political, economic and military presence, to ensure a rôle for the two superpowers in the future European order.

In our view this presence is still essential and we therefore believe that the recent Washington summit achieved something positive on this point also. It would, however, be a great mistake if we Europeans concluded that we should stand and watch and passively await developments in the Soviet Union and, therefore, new meetings and new agreements between the Soviets and the Americans. In particular, we Europeans should be prepared to adopt a new and far-sighted approach on the essential aspects of the German question such as denuclearisation, cuts in conventional armaments and forces of unified Germany and the latter's international military status between NATO and the new European security system. On these points Western European Union and the European Community must be prepared to speak up and make their views count, both directly and indirectly, while at the same time respecting the rights of the four victors of the second world war in relation to the two Germanys.

I should like to repeat what I said previously at the extraordinary session in Luxembourg and at the meetings we had with the Supreme Soviet in Moscow during the Presidential Committee's recent visit. We must say a clear no to a neutral Germany but, at the same time, we must find for the international position of united Germany some solution which will reassure and fully safeguard the Soviet Union and will be politically acceptable to that country. The answer to the problem lies in the Helsinki process not as a general fall-back but as a place where a common European security system is being constructed. With Helsinki 2 the decision must be taken to start laying the first foundations of this system and establishing its first institutional links. We have risked and would continue to risk ending

up in a blind alley if we did not accept that thirty-five power Europe can serve as the mould for agreements and instruments capable of ensuring European security until the functions of the two military alliances are seen to have changed with the ultimate prospect of their being replaced. We have risked and would continue to risk ending up in a blind alley if we simply championed the inclusion of united Germany in NATO with its present structures and its old logic based on blocs.

The time has come to take truly courageous new options. The relationship between Europe and the United States, of whose importance we are firmly and irrevocably convinced, cannot continue to be linked to the perpetuation of old agreements for political and military integration in NATO but must increasingly be developed on the basis of relations between Western European Union, the European Community and the United States and of joint participation in the growing commitments of the Helsinki process.

Before concluding, I should like to refer briefly to another question concerning which Sir Geoffrey quite rightly expresses serious concern in the report and the draft recommendation because of its possible adverse effect on European security. I am referring to the situation in the Middle East. Over the last few months the danger of a conflict has heightened both because of Israel's rejection of any reasonable proposals for negotiations, such as the Baker plan, and because of Iraq's rearmament policy. I believe that the time has really come for Western European Union and the European Community to make all their political and economic weight felt in order to avoid an imminent catastrophe of which we have due warning.

(Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, up to now Europe's position has been one in which the balance of terror has prevented new hostilities from breaking out. Now, for the first time since 1945, we have a chance to convert this balance into a completely new form, commensurate with the European nations' right to self-determination. I believe Western European Union has a duty to avail itself of this opportunity and to come forward with ideas of its own.

If only for this reason, I should like to thank our Rapporteur, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, for the report that he has submitted to us as a basis not only for debate but also for our future work.

At the moment we are at an interim stage, where the opportunity is open for the Eastern

Mr. Reddemann (continued)

and Central European countries to move towards democracy, and where all of us, as European states – and we in particular, as democratic ones – will have the chance to help the people of most of the Central and Eastern European countries, whether in the form of ideas or of material aid.

Nevertheless, we must not forget that the threat of which we have so long been aware has not yet been completely eliminated. We must not forget that there are still major problems in several countries of south-eastern Europe – in Yugoslavia, for instance, they are only just beginning – which could lead to conflicts reminiscent of the Balkan wars before the first world war.

Equally, we have to realise that developments in the Soviet Union simply cannot be viewed as optimistically as many people have believed in recent months. The situation in the Soviet Union may become far more critical – for Europe, too – than many people now envisage. With the best will in the world, there is no denying the danger that an insecure government in Moscow will need external successes – whether of a military nature or in terms of threatening diplomacy – which, while they will not solve internal problems with the economy and nationality issues, for example, may at least distract attention from them. The danger that, despite the current euphoria in Europe, we shall one day be brought down to earth again by other developments in the East, even if they are short-lived, should at least be borne in mind.

Ladies and gentlemen, in the last few days we have seen the President of the United States and the President of the Soviet Union in Washington and Camp David trying to decide on something which is, in fact, an inherently European issue. To be critical, I hope that was the last summit meeting at which two countries whose main interests are not in Europe seek to show the countries and peoples of Europe the way, if not actually to decide their fate.

When I hear that in Copenhagen yesterday the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Shevardnadze, suddenly offered the Potsdam protocol of August 1945 as a future basis for European policy, then I must say that the initially more tactical position the Soviet President appeared to have adopted in Washington is evidently founded on a completely different premise, based on the successes of Stalinist policy and Stalinist imperialism, rather than on the confident co-operation that we all really want.

Mr. President, we should nevertheless remain optimistic, simply because we know that the people in Central and Eastern Europe and, of course, in the Soviet Union, are no longer

willing to put up with the dictatorships which they were forced to accept and which to some extent still exist, but are able, like us, to transform their countries into free states and free societies. Much of what has happened in recent months is therefore now irreversible.

We Germans – and I say this quite frankly and gladly – can be a little more optimistic, not least because in these difficult times we have the guarantee that for the last forty years we have had more friends and allies in Europe than Germany has ever had since its reorganisation in 1871. The conclusion we intend to draw from our self-evident co-operation with our neighbours, the other free European countries, is that we shall not be withdrawing after forty years just because an opportunity for reunification suddenly presents itself. Instead, we intend to continue our active participation in Western European Union, NATO, the Council of Europe and the European Communities.

I must admit to some surprise over the Soviet President's firm opposition to a future united Germany's membership of NATO. One thing is surely obvious: if, as he has often insisted, he really fears a replay, as it were, of the second world war, because Germany might suddenly be too strong again, it must surely be in his interests for Germany to stay in NATO. The accession of a sovereign Germany to NATO was not, after all, the only crucial factor: we also integrated our whole army into NATO of our own free will. We have placed all our troops under NATO command, and no one intends to go back on this decision. Unless the Soviet President is also profoundly distrustful of the other NATO member countries, he ought really to accept the argument that it makes sense for Germany to remain part of the group in which, I think I can claim, it has for several decades pursued a policy which has been both peaceful and responsible.

Ladies and gentlemen, it would mean a great deal to me if this Assembly were to decide to advocate continued German membership of NATO, if this association of peaceful states, which is now taken for granted, were to be maintained and if we could remain within this association, joined by our compatriots in what is still known as the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. President, I am grateful to you for giving me so much time in which to state my opinion. I appeal to you all once again to regard German unification, which is bound to come in the foreseeable future, as a major opportunity not only for my country but for all democratic states in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's excellent report could not

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

be better timed. Just when developments in Eastern Europe, and in the Soviet Union in particular, have never been so unpredictable and when Germany is galloping all-out towards unification, the rumour is growing in the media and official circles that NATO, the instrument of inter-bloc policy, is destined before long to disappear. This rumour, which would indirectly raise questions about the rôle of WEU in an alliance approaching its end, is all the more disturbing in that there are other voices propagating the idea that the CSCE can and should replace the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. In my opinion, there can clearly be no question of this, particularly in the short term.

NATO has proved its worth for nearly half a century and in spite of the crises that sometimes seemed to cast doubt on its legitimacy and its future, its existence enabled the peoples of Western Europe to live in security and allowed a certain ideal of democracy and peace to fructify in those countries. Yet it is at this moment, when its success has never been so overwhelming and when the instability and risk of chaos in the eastern part of our continent have never been so great that some people want to put an end to this institution that we still need for the protection of our societies and replace it by an assembly whose thirty-five members do not even share the same conceptions or objectives in security matters.

In my view, the at least to some extent Utopian idea of collective security from the Atlantic to the Urals based on treaty-based undertakings to keep military capabilities within certain limits takes no account at all of realities in Eastern Europe or elsewhere.

Hence my belief that it is essential, both here and in other European and international assemblies to resolutely reaffirm the attachment of the nations of Western Europe to the survival of a new-style NATO, symbol of the indissoluble bond linking the old continent and the United States of America. In other words there can be no question of wondering whether the Atlantic Alliance should still exist.

As regards my own country, France, whose special position with regard to NATO is well-known, I can do no better than quote what our Defence Minister, Mr. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, said on 21st May at the Institute of Advanced National Defence Studies, namely, that it would be wholly anachronistic and contrary to the course of present events to think about France rejoining the integrated military structure of NATO. The alliance is an element of stability and balance. As Mr. Jean-Pierre Chevènement said in the same speech, the history of the twentieth century tells us that it was the United States' isolation after the first

world war that allowed the second to happen. The possible recurrence of American isolationism cannot be ruled out for all time.

On the other hand it is clear that NATO, as guarantor of the security of nations sharing the same values, must adapt to changes in the international environment. Its security objectives need to be redefined in terms of future threats and that means reassessing the basic strategic concepts, structures and resources of the Atlantic Alliance.

In that perspective, there is a fundamental rôle awaiting WEU within the alliance as the institutional instrument of an integration-oriented European defence – with Europe as a partner of, and not subordinate to, the United States – centred on the Europe of the Communities. If this is to be achieved it will have to reconcile divergent European defence policies and redefine how burdens and costs should be shared as the result of a new division of labour.

Reappraising the options is an agonising process but today this is more necessary than ever. Whilst NATO may appear to be the surest framework for bringing a European defence entity to birth, WEU – as progress is made with European political integration – should work on defining a community vision of European security interests, in conjunction with the other NATO partners of course, framing the right strategic concepts, and defining ways and means of implementing them. However, this vision of integration, which would demand of the allies an agonising reappraisal of their traditional political options, is for the moment somewhat unreal.

It is easy to spell out the objective, namely, that the western community should speak with one voice in defence matters and should do so through a reorganised NATO. In addition to considering the various tasks that this institution must now successfully apply itself to – strategy planning, defence integration, harmonisation of resources and internal communication – there is one vital point that I feel has to be stressed and that is the task falling to WEU, on the Community's behalf, of keeping the general public informed and ensuring it is aware of what is at stake as far as the security of our continent is concerned. Certainly, without the active support of that public for the essential strategic concepts of nuclear deterrence and flexible response to possible aggression, – which have so far helped to ensure the security of our continent – we run the risk of being damaged by well-orchestrated propaganda campaigns undermining the foundations of our common strategy.

What is at stake is all the greater in that the situation is changing daily at a disconcerting pace. In order therefore to avoid complex

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

interplay between contesting partners and opponents, a long-term overall vision of common security interests is the only way to impose some degree of wisdom on the participants. It is in this perspective that WEU must clearly make itself the key actor in the phased development of an integrated European defence policy whose common aim would be to protect the fundamental values of pluralist democracy and freedom.

These are the realistic positions developed by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg in his particularly full, not to say exhaustive, report. Whilst inviting the nations of Europe to a permanent dialogue – and why not within the framework of enlarged forums like the CSCE? – I hope to see the day when the countries of Eastern Europe, free and independent, decide to link their political and economic destiny with our own and to join a community of opinion and goals, possibly extending from the Atlantic to the Urals and bringing together equal partners seeking to preserve within the European house the essential ideas that have ensured the success of our western societies.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am grateful to Sir Geoffrey Finsberg for taking the trouble to describe how he and the committee view Western European Union's position within the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. I thought I heard him say he wanted to "pin down" this position but that may have been due to the interpretation. I feel that is going rather too far. I do not think it would be easy at the moment, because there are a number of things connected with Western European Union as such, especially in the context of other European co-operative organisations and other defence organisations, which cannot yet be pinned down.

I have a few brief, critical but, I feel, constructive comments to make. Firstly, I think the report leans too much in the direction of NATO and does not do enough to reveal what is actually meant by the separate identity for WEU which we are now discussing. It admittedly speaks of being "closer to", and refers to other forms of direct links with NATO, but it does not really do enough to show what we have to offer in the way of co-operation, precisely what our task will be and how we will stand in this context, and I find that regrettable, especially as this is the first occasion on which we have discussed Western European Union's position with our Iberian friends. True, we have had preparatory discussions, but we might have gone into the subject in rather greater depth on this occasion. I am about to do so, but I note that the

Iberians are already showing less inclination to take their seats here in the chamber.

The third paragraph of point 1 of the draft recommendation explains that some kind of review of WEU's function is needed because the situation in Europe has changed so fundamentally. That brings me back to what I have just said. The tenor of the report does not do enough to show that the Rapporteur is aware of this. It sticks to the present situation, Western European Union's weak position, which is not described in greater detail, and the umbrella provided by the North Atlantic Alliance. The report does refer to Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty to confirm that we are committed to this co-operation, but this is simply a case of extracting the article for the occasion, to underline the point. The whole of the preamble to the treaty, which explains the purpose of Western European Union, how it intends to bring about a situation of peace and security in Europe and why the treaty calls for economic, social and cultural co-operation in order to achieve collective self-defence, is conveniently ignored.

If we were to take this as Western European Union's real task, if we reiterated it to refresh people's memories of the task that Western European Union has to perform, then there would not be so much opportunity for playing soldiers, and that would not be so interesting for many of the people who come to these debates. They prefer to stay where the sabres can be rattled. That is why Mr. van Eekelen – he too spends less time in this Assembly these days – said that the cold war was not yet over and immediately added that deterrence must be retained. We know that deterrence includes the concept of the arms race, and we know that the arms race destabilises national budgets. Once we have unstable national budgets, there is, of course, nothing more we can do about the other social, cultural and economic aspects, because there is no money left.

To digress further, Mr. van Eekelen had moved, so I did not realise that he was in the chamber. I therefore withdraw my comment.

Back to the point. If Western European Union wants to play a rôle in the Atlantic Alliance as a whole, I believe it must regain its original identity. For one thing, it will have to concentrate on European co-operation outside the military sphere. At the moment this is the point that is of greatest interest to the other countries where peace and security are concerned, and not only to the German Democratic Republic, but to the other countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well. Greater strength in this sector is a far better guarantee of peace and security than playing about with weapons and shifting pieces from one side to the other.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Maris.

Mr. MARIS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to congratulate the Rapporteur on the very good and clear report he has drawn up on WEU in the alliance. The Rapporteur reminds me a little of a good, old-fashioned dentist: he finds out what is wrong and tries to remedy it by exposing a few sensitive spots.

One of the sensitive spots is the gap that is emerging between WEU and NATO. There was also a technical point I was going to criticise, but the Rapporteur beat me to it.

When we talk about the security situation, we could indeed say that words grow obsolete on one's very lips. For instance, the report says that an attempt will have to be made to re-examine the forward strategy. But we find that the forward strategy is already behind us. There is not much that can be done about this. We cannot keep things up to date all the time.

Mr. President, since I can agree to the recommendation, I could sit down now, but I feel slightly concerned about the report and about the image it conveys of WEU. What is the image of NATO's European pillar today? I will try to throw some light on this.

In a policy speech he made on 12th December 1989, Secretary of State Baker referred to the concentric circles, the concentric spheres of security and unification-integration. He said there were four of them, and these have already been mentioned today. I will begin from the outside. The United Nations has 159 members, the CSCE thirty-five members, NATO sixteen and the European Community twelve.

Mr. President, WEU does not appear in the picture painted by Mr. Baker. We now have before us a report from WEU's Political Committee, which we can regard as the leading committee of the parliamentary dimension. The Rapporteur gives a clear explanation of the line to be followed. He refers to a short-term programme and the future of European security. And how is this vision of the future reflected in the recommendation? Hardly at all, Mr. President, and the report reveals why this is so.

One of the strengths of our kind of democracy is the strength of the parliamentary dimension, but if we cannot recommend a clear solution for the future, we should not be surprised by the kind of outline put forward by Mr. Baker: four circles, but sadly no sign of WEU. And the future, Mr. President, begins tomorrow. There is not much time. That is why I am concerned about the image of WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). – We are discussing a timely and perceptive report which re-emphasises the rôle that WEU can and should play. Certain key elements come through the report, and I hope that the Council of Ministers will take note of them and act upon them.

The report makes clear the need for an association between the United States and Europe in security matters. We are right to re-emphasise that at a time when so many speeches on the Hill have an opposite emphasis and concern the withdrawal by the United States from any involvement in Europe.

As the military pacts change, particularly NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the need for an assembly of Europeans who are knowledgeable in defence matters and can assess the political impact of the changes is ever more evident. As disarmament commences there is a vital need for verification. That is not a new rôle for WEU. For many of us the *raison d'être* for the organisation was verification after the last war. WEU has more experience than any other comparable organisation in Western Europe and it is right that it should be charged with undertaking whatever verification is needed.

The possible, even probable, removal of a European threat does not solve the problem of the eastern and southern Mediterranean. It was right that one of our colleagues should remind us today that WEU played a key rôle in the mine-sweeping operation in the Strait of Hormuz. Events in the eastern Mediterranean are deeply worrying and we must not ignore them.

The rôle of France and its involvement, or absence of involvement, in terms of the integrated command structures of NATO is understandable in relation to NATO's rôle in the past, but the report is right to question whether that is now appropriate. We look forward to hearing France's view.

The report is self-explanatory on the question of the reunification of Germany. The final key matter is that contained in point 7 of the recommendation which calls for the restoration of mutual confidence between Eastern and Central Europe and deals with the rôle of WEU. I can think of no more appropriate rôle for WEU than to act as a catalyst between the countries of Western Europe and those of Central and Eastern Europe. The report is a yardstick, and I sincerely hope that the Council of Ministers will take note of the important foresight shown in the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I welcome Sir Geoffrey's wide-ranging report. It forms an invaluable basis on which we can exercise our minds about the future security

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

arrangements of our continent. We must, above all, clarify our view as to what constitutes the true rôle of our organisation. I suggest that that rôle concerns a grand strategy for our joint security in Europe. What do I mean by "a grand strategy"? We should bring together the diplomatic, economic and military strategic evidence in a joint European endeavour to ensure the security of the European democracies.

In a period of drastic change we would do well to hold fast to organisations such as ours which have stood the test of time. The mutual security provisions of the Brussels Treaty remain as valid and as important as ever, as do the security imperatives of the Hague platform, especially in relation to the need for a nuclear deterrent and for defence at the frontiers of the signatories to the Brussels Treaty.

I shall try to clarify the strategic objectives. We need to do that with great precision at this time of revolutionary political change. The first imperative should be to ensure the total withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which the Soviets have undertaken to do. We must also secure their withdrawal from Poland and the German Democratic Republic at the earliest possible date. That transcends all other policy objectives.

Secondly, the United States must retain its nuclear and physical guarantees for the liberty of the democracies of our continent. However, we have to recognise that those guarantees will in the future have to be undertaken at a dramatically lower level of in-place forces, especially on the central front.

Thirdly, we must involve a European military counterweight as the prime factor in the security equilibrium against a still preponderant Soviet military power in our continent. This is a key rôle for WEU, not in seeking to duplicate NATO's integrated military structure but to provide political impetus for adequate defence.

We must expand our membership to countries that have already applied, such as Greece and Turkey, and to other possible entrants to our club such as Norway or even Hungary and the other emerging democracies in Central Europe or we shall wither and die.

Fourthly, we must avoid the invidious singularisation of Germany. For example, whether our newly united German friends will in the near future opt for continued participation in NATO's integrated military structure or, like Norway and Denmark, for NATO status that precludes the permanent basing of foreign troops as well as nuclear and chemical weapons on their soil in time of peace, is a decision for the single democratically-elected government of

a united Germany when they take office. I have every confidence that the freedom-loving German people, through their elected representatives, will make the right decisions – we need have no anxieties on that score – which will be not only in their interests but will take into account the security interests of their neighbours.

Fifthly, we should support the CSCE as a forum for confidence-building and reconciliation between the European democracies and the remaining communist nations of our continent. However, we should not ascribe to the CSCE powers that it manifestly does not and will not possess. It can exert no penalty against countries that flout its decisions. Like the Pope, it has no divisions, but, unlike the United Nations, it has no peacekeeping forces at its disposal.

However optimistic we may be about security in Europe, the sanction of military force will still be required to guarantee our freedom. That military force must be deployed in classic style by sovereign states in support of freely entered collective security arrangements, such as WEU and NATO.

Sixthly, the European Community will have a rôle in the grand strategy that I have described, but as an engine for economic development and prosperity rather than as a security institution. So long as the European Community contains a neutral country – Ireland – and attracts other neutral nations such as Austria, it can have no true defence rôle. I do not believe that Europe is yet ready to accept the total submergence of national sovereignty that is inherent in a European defence community.

In short, WEU does not lack a rôle within the NATO alliance, but it could lack the vision and determination among governments and ministers to realise its full potential. That potential lies, first, in concerting the grand strategy that I have described; secondly, in verifying arms control; thirdly, in sponsoring weapons collaboration and the security dimension of space technology; and, fourthly, in motivating governments, parliaments and electorates to maintain the common peace premium required to ensure our joint security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am in the happy position of being able to see the Secretary-General of this organisation clearly from where I sit. I am glad he is with us today, which is more than I can say for a number of our colleagues.

I should like to take advantage of the excellent report drawn up by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg to make a few brief comments on the question of

Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (continued)

whether, now that the security situation in Europe has changed, there is a place for WEU alongside other organisations that are concerned to a greater or lesser degree with the same problems.

There is no conflict with NATO. After all, we see Western European Union as a necessary complement to NATO. There may no doubt be some rivalry with the European Community, as has been pointed out today. In the not too distant future there may also be some friction with the CSCE, or the CSCE process, as regards its relationship with our organisation. If there is a place for Western European Union – and I think I can say we are assuming there is – then we must ourselves determine what that place is, what Western European Union's responsibilities are and on what its activities must therefore be concentrated. In other words, we must set priorities and, therefore, ultimate objectives.

When I look at the communiqué issued after the WEU ministerial meeting of 23rd April, I am sorry to find that it does not include many clues to this problem. In itself the communiqué is a coherent and logical account. The trouble is that it does not have much to say about WEU. It lists the side-issues rather than the main areas on which the Council believes WEU should focus. Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's report, on the other hand, concentrates on the main issues, and that is its value for this debate.

What are the main issues on which WEU should concentrate? After all, we should not only be stating the problem: we must also offer a solution.

First, WEU should concentrate on playing a rôle where the European contribution to the debate on NATO's strategy is concerned. At the recent DPC meeting NATO's defence ministers discussed a few strategic issues, but they did not get any further than saying that forward defence and the flexible response need to be revised. This is not a criticism. I am merely stating a fact. A European contribution, and therefore a WEU contribution, is badly needed here, but I note that it is missing, in fact not even considered, in the WEU ministerial communiqué I have mentioned. My observation is, of course, based on the view that WEU's contribution must ultimately be made through NATO, because that organisation is absolutely essential as a guarantee of our joint security.

Second, another of the main issues is the out-of-area problem. In the constantly changing political situation in Western, Central and Eastern Europe one thing is clear: however radically our image of the threat from the USSR and Central and Eastern Europe may have changed, it is becoming clearer – partly as a result of this,

perhaps – that there are other areas in the world where vital European security interests or economic interests may be at stake. Sir Geoffrey Finsberg pointed this out in his report, and it is referred to in the WEU ministers' communiqué, though rather vaguely, going no further than "European countries follow closely developments in other regions". I am referring to point 7. More emphasis needs to be placed on this question, because Europe as well as the United States needs to make its voice heard on security when it comes to determining vital interests. Whatever the European Community's future structure, this kind of out-of-area question may have a military security dimension that WEU must consider at all times, if only because there is no other European forum to take on this task – an argument which is both negative and positive.

Third, another main issue is a European contribution in the bodies concerned with the disarmament process, particularly CFE. The central principle of European stability at a lower level of armament also calls for a voice from Europe in Vienna. Verification of what has been achieved in the area of arms control should form part of this and may evolve into a major breakthrough, as Mr. Wilkinson has already said.

Fourth, I would then refer to WEU as a bridge, where European security is concerned, between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Western European countries. A serious need for this has emerged, in the Central and Eastern European countries as elsewhere. This is a task which no other organisation could take over from WEU at the moment, and which is vital to the consolidation and stimulation of stable developments. It would be wrong in my opinion to claim, as people regularly do, that the CSCE would be the only link between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and our own.

Fifth and last, Europe should make its views on security known to our American partners and friends on the other side of the Atlantic ocean. They are literally, but certainly not figuratively, on the other side. We need them, and they need us.

Mr. President, those, to my mind, are the five issues on which we should concentrate. We must not fool ourselves and each other in this respect. Given current rapid developments, it is not a foregone conclusion that WEU will manage to find a place for itself in a new European security structure. New ideas are being put forward from two sides. There are people who say we no longer need a classical European security structure like the one that has proved highly successful in the past forty-five years. We are going to build, these people say, a pan-European security structure within the CSCE framework, with thirty-five countries involved. This cannot

Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (continued)

be done in an organisation where the United States' vote counts for no more than Malta's. Nor can it be done in an organisation that is able to operate only on the basis of consensus. I am touching on this because I detected this idea in Mr. Genscher's speech to our Assembly in Luxembourg and I am rather worried about it. Another new idea has already been floated this afternoon by people who say the European Community, European political co-operation, can discuss a number of problems connected with European security and go further than the Single European Act allows European political co-operation to do. I detect growing support for this idea, which is closely linked to giving further shape to European political union.

For the moment – and I stress “for the moment” – the European Community line is no substitute for what should be happening as regards the restructuring of European security. I would not rule out the possibility of the Community assuming some responsibility for security as well as other policies in the more distant future as it continues to develop towards European political union. But at the moment I think it is still far too early for that.

To conclude, let me say this. I have tried to summarise a number of issues, because it is not a foregone conclusion that WEU can look forward to a happy future, as I have already said. It will be necessary to concentrate on what we see as the main tasks. It will not help us to complain about a lack of attention in the media. As a rule journalists have a very fine nose for what is news and what is not news. If the statements we make or the actions we take are not news, we should not be surprised if we do not read anything about them in the newspapers.

The dearth of references to WEU in the debate on a future security structure is something we parliamentarians should discuss with our own governments, at least if we think that WEU should keep its place in the new security structure. If governments or we ourselves feel that WEU is no longer necessary, they or we should be honest enough to say so.

As you will have realised, Mr. President, I do not believe that it can be said in the present situation that there is no longer a place for WEU. But this proposition should include the answer to the question regarding the priorities that Western European Union must then set. I refer in this context to my five main issues.

It is obvious from what I have said that I consider Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's report, which I attacked for presenting a general view, to be an excellent basis for further discussion. The simple conclusion that WEU has the right to exist and other organisations must not encroach on our

territory will soon prove to be insufficiently sound in itself. The main proposition should therefore be that Western European Union's future must not lie in its opposing other people or organisations. Western European Union's future depends on ideas. Let us bear that in mind.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lord.

Mr. LORD (*United Kingdom*). – I start by welcoming Sir Geoffrey's report, which essentially summarises the situation to date. He would be the first to acknowledge that reports such as his tend to be out of date within a matter of minutes, and that that is bound to be the case.

We must accept that Western European Union is one of the political tools of our national governments, which have a variety of them – the CSCE, NATO and the EEC. If we believe in WEU and in our own importance, it is essential that we demonstrate our value. It is essential to lead the debate on the sort of issues that we are talking about. So often we monitor and record and, although it is difficult to keep ahead of the game, I do not think that we lead and initiate often enough. As a forum, that is one of our essential rôles.

Our loyalty to our own nation and government must not be undermined, but we are a forum for new ideas and proposals for our governments to consider. None of us is privy to the innermost thoughts of our prime ministers, presidents and foreign ministers. Therefore, we are entitled and duty bound to float ideas that they can think about.

In recent months and years there has been a huge change of heart and outlook by the USSR. How much should that be matched by our attitude in the West? The rapid unification of Germany and its ultimate defence position will prove a stumbling-block in the path to political harmony and disarmament in Europe, but it need not be and, indeed, must not be.

We urgently need a goal. We are in the days of the World Cup and it is probably pertinent to talk about goals, although this is a much more serious subject than football. We need a goal – a framework – at which to aim. To use Mr. Wilkinson's words, we need a grand strategy. There is no urgency to complete the negotiations for arriving at that goal. We can use the usual words such as “in due course” and “in the fullness of time”, but there is an urgency for such a framework to be established, and in order to do so much heart-searching must be done by all of us. Possibly great changes of heart will need to be made.

NATO was originally formed to defend the West from a potential aggressor and enemy. Who now is that enemy? How do we now per-

Mr. Lord (continued)

ceive the USSR? Is it still the enemy in the old-fashioned sense? What do we mean by such terms as "them and us", "different blocs" and "different camps"? We use them often enough. Until recently, Hungary and Poland were the enemy, or at least were hostile. It was not their fault because they were occupied. Until a few months ago East Germany was seen as the enemy, but it is proposed that soon it will be very much one of us. How right is it that, with all that has happened, we should still regard the USSR as the enemy? How do we change in military terms from being enemies to being friends? We must be open, constructive and fair with the Soviet Union. At the same time, we are entitled to expect its openness and, particularly, its willingness to disarm. I agree with every word that John Wilkinson said about making sure that it is firmly held to its obligations.

Would the Soviet Union be more or less likely to be aggressive if it were a member of a Europe-wide defence or security organisation that gave security and stability, not least to Russia herself? There is a real chance that it would be less likely to be aggressive once embraced by such an organisation. The ultimate framework for Europe needs to be the extension of WEU so that it includes other states that want to join, such as Hungary and Poland, in the fullness of time. One day it should also include the Soviet Union, and be called simply the European Union.

I accept all that has been said about the links with the United States, which we must never lose because they are an important arm of our defence organisations.

I have already said that I agree with the points that John Wilkinson so precisely spelt out. We need to start seriously to entertain the idea that the USSR may no longer be the enemy and that, one day, there may just be a place for it here in our midst.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Sarti.

Mr. SARTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I imagine I am one of the last of today's speakers and I would not like to waste a lot of delegates' time. Regarding the report presented by our friend, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, I shall simply say that like him it is serious, precise and well-thought out and deserving of all our appreciation. But it is also a report that raises problems because it encourages us to look a little further than 30th May. There has been a summit meeting in the United States of America which could change our viewpoint to some extent and, to make only one point, has opened wide prospects for deals. At the same time, however, it did not greatly advance the cause of German unification as many of us would have wished.

This is a subject which also involves the problem of WEU, within the problem of NATO of course. Many of us are calling for an effort of imagination and a so-called political leap forward for WEU and Europe precisely on the German question. It is said that NATO may still be an obstacle to the joining of the two Germanys because of the anomalous situation which would arise from the presence on the same national territory of two armies belonging to politically-integrated military systems still formally opposed to each other. WEU might, however, offer itself as a middle way for handling the difficult German situation. It is the only organisation empowered to deal with security and defence problems in Europe and it is quite certain that those powers cannot be delegated to the European Economic Community and even less to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, as Sir Geoffrey quite rightly observed. Furthermore, WEU has the backing of its founding treaty which is drafted in the clearest terms but makes no provision for integrated military commands. Why, as suggested by cautious and hesitant observers, could this not be WEU's hour at least on the territory of unified Germany? I submit this question to the Assembly but personally I have no answer.

In this Assembly I have tried like everyone else not to be influenced by any esprit de corps. Pride at belonging to our great Assembly should not lead us to blink the facts when we defend the political reasons for the creation of WEU in dramatic circumstances under pressure from powerful totalitarianism, with a specific philosophy and the aim of linking in a mutual aid and assistance pact the free countries which signed the WEU treaty and guaranteed the North Atlantic ally the backing of the European partners. This philosophy is still valid and must therefore be maintained even though the situation in the East has changed. It can, however, only be maintained if the framework is also maintained. If we say that things must remain as they are this means that we are thinking also that the changes taking place in the East and particularly in the Soviet Union are reversible; I repeat, reversible.

In my view this belief has a foundation in fact. Above all, the Soviet military will play a political rôle in accordance moreover with the doctrine which is currently gaining ground in the birthplace of contemporary Marxism. The Soviet military do not believe in Marxism any more than, in the centuries of imperial decline, the Roman military believed in the pagan gods, Jupiter, Mars and Juno. Some religions need vestal virgins in order to survive and I do not believe that the totalitarian religion is so close to declaring itself bankrupt.

So, we need vigilance but also imagination.

Mr. Sarti (continued)

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg is quite right to draw attention to suspicions which are felt across the Atlantic about a kind of secret grouping within the alliance, made up of the WEU countries, particularly since reactivation. These suspicions must be set at rest once and for all. But the position must be made clear; what belongs to WEU must go to WEU and what belongs to NATO must go to NATO.

I must give credit to the French Minister, Mr. Chevènement, for having moved a long way forward in the interview recently reported in *Armées d'aujourd'hui*.

In conclusion, I would like to echo his hopes concerning the WEU institutions and in particular concerning the new one shortly to be based in this splendidly renovated building. And on this point we must pay tribute to the heads, organisers and officers of the Assembly for surprising and delighting us with this renovation.

We would like the Institute for Security Studies to be given an immediate commission, which it seems to me is the same as that which Sir Geoffrey Finsberg suggested in his much-appreciated report. It should at once start a study of the new problems now arising for security in the Mediterranean, such as the division of Cyprus, the dramatic events in Lebanon, the rearmament of Iraq, Syria's intrigues and the political confusion in Israel; and on the basis of that study – or even without it – its agenda should include the request which Turkey and Greece, already members of NATO, have made or are about to make to become members of WEU.

This would be a way of making the situation clear as Sir Geoffrey Finsberg suggested in his excellent report which, beyond the problems reviewed, is deserving of our fullest support and appreciation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Thank you, Sir Geoffrey, for your excellent work and for creating such excellent conditions for the thinking that the Political Committee asks the Assembly to undertake at this particularly important time.

I shall not go back over all the reasons I have for agreeing with the Rapporteur and for being particularly pleased to vote in favour of this report. It is an excellent report and the ideas it contains should receive our urgent attention.

I shall stress three points: the first concerns the present situation and its implications; the second our problem in relation to the Soviet Union, i.e., chiefly the attitude of Mr. Gorbachev, and the third the field of competence of WEU.

I propose to quote one sentence, point 5, from the draft recommendation because it is fundamental and encapsulates the whole doctrine: "The Assembly notes that Western European security continues to be guaranteed through implementation of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty." This is the basis. It also means the Atlantic Alliance and all the commitments we have entered into – commitments that we have undertaken to maintain and improve. That being so, our rôle can be perceived in two ways: to manage a *de facto* situation that is imposed upon us or else to try to influence developments in the ways we consider necessary, both for Europe and for our organisation.

The rather passive and intellectually secure management of the outcome of political developments is an exercise I leave to analysts and other political and military specialists. But endeavouring to reform and prepare for tomorrow's world, in conformity with our goals and doctrine, though we may make mistakes, is also I feel an operation where we have a chance of winning. This is surely the essential rôle of the responsible politician who alone has the right and authority to take risks, fully accepting responsibility, of course, *vis-à-vis* the people he represents, for both failure and success. It is in this spirit that we must see the developments, which can be perceived with increasing clarity, both in the Atlantic Alliance and, within the Atlantic Alliance, in WEU.

From the time when we laid down the general parameters for setting up the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, whether clearly expressed or still only a confused feeling, we have known very well that the European pillar – or bulwark, to use a new term – in the Atlantic Alliance can only be made reality by replacing multilateral relations with the United States by bilateral Euro-United States relations.

It is out of this bilateralism within the Atlantic union, with all its areas of competence, including the political fields which we wish to develop, that the European pillar can arise.

Should our reason for this perception be that Central Europe is on the move and that we need to take military measures in view of Mr. Gorbachev's positions about the withdrawal at a fairly early stage, of the troops stationed in the former Soviet colonies of Central Europe, or should we see this reshaping of NATO in terms of what we are seeking for tomorrow, namely, a united and strong Europe capable of speaking with a single voice at the international level and acceding to the ranks of the superpowers not, as the report rightly says, so as to be able to redress the balance of power and military relations but in order to use the language of Europe when Europe is concerned?

Once again we have had a summit where essentially, as other speakers have pointed out,

Mr. Caro (continued)

the topic was Europe, but where there was no public mention of certain aspects of Europe; other subjects were discussed instead. But what was really at the heart of this debate? Whether it be Lithuania, the German Democratic Republic or the other subjects at issue, the central subject was indeed Europe, but we were still not there.

For Europe to attain the rank of a superpower it has to have a coherent defence policy as an essential part of a foreign policy the world will believe in coupled, of course, with strengthened economic and monetary potential. The latter is the province of the European Economic Community, but defence is the province of Western European Union. The two institutions are both based on treaties that have the same objective, namely, the promotion of a European identity at the international level.

This means that our reasoning can include the results that are there to be analysed and counted in the events we see each day in Central Europe. Now we know very well that what has been happening in Central Europe is related to the above developments. Those events have taken place through osmosis with what we are in process of becoming, and not by rejecting Western European Union, the Council of Europe, the European Economic Community and the Atlantic Alliance.

So the positive results of our efforts, through all these years after the second world war, encourage us to feel reasonably proud of ourselves and to be optimistic in the right way and capable, therefore, of firmness in our language with Mr. Gorbachev.

No, Mr. Gorbachev has no right or reason to make the presence of Soviet troops in Central Europe and in the German Democratic Republic an international diplomatic bargaining counter.

No, he has no right to use Lithuania in exchange for some kind of concession over the German Democratic Republic. No, Mr. Gorbachev must realise that only the German people have the right to decide how German reunification will come about since, whatever else happens, it will be by democratic process, in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights and in accordance with the commitments made by the German Democratic Republic in the family of the nations of Europe.

We have the right to say no to Mr. Gorbachev, and to say that though it is thanks to him that things have changed and though we are there to help him, we are not going to let ourselves be caught in the positions of weakness that he may find himself in. Rather, we can help him out of

the trap in which it looks as though he may well be caught.

The Atlantic Alliance has never been anything but a defensive alliance. The peoples of the world must one day be made to understand this.

A comparison could be drawn between a hedgehog and a tank bristling with guns, missiles and every kind of murderous weapon but surely the hedgehog is the best possible illustration of all-round defence when, that is, it is attacked. Otherwise, it is the most peaceful creature in the world.

The stance we have taken is defence, deterrence and no war. As regards Germany, let us have an end to all these suspicions. Some say that tomorrow the present nine plus East Germany will make ten. I tell you no, ladies and gentlemen, nine plus one is going to make nine. This is the very foundation of our democratic doctrine for the organisation of Europe.

Finally, a few words about areas of responsibility. Manage the results of present developments, why not? But, we have institutions and specialists. Why not take the risk and have our western perestroika, I mean a western restructuring. Why not have our own perestroika before moving into any common house? We are ready to make the move but clearly the withdrawal of Soviet troops that we are asking for will only be in exchange for a part-withdrawal over time of United States troops. But our defensive no-war policy means that armed troops have to be there. Who is going to provide them? Here I come back to the statement made in our recommendation. Western European Union is there, in Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty. Gentlemen of our governments, make use of it.

When the Brussels Treaty was signed, it had both political and military powers. Military powers were passed over completely to the Atlantic Alliance when the integrated command was set up. We are now moving to a second stage, particularly with regard to the security requirements of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The time has come to sit down with our American friends, in the context of the bilateralism of a new-style NATO with full French presence, and talk about partially recovering the military powers, with the agreement of the United States and elaborating the basic concepts that the Secretary-General of WEU referred to earlier. The responsibilities of WEU are about to be subject to upward review. Anything that can be done in that direction can only increase our credibility, reduce demarcation conflicts with other organisations – particularly the European Community – and increase the potential for convergence with that organisation in the context of a wholly self-confident Europe, released from the fears and threats that had been generated by the conflicts between the blocs.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Brito.

Mr. BRITO (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen. My first comment is that the improvements introduced will considerably benefit the final text of the draft recommendation. I think that it is of such importance that account must be taken of concepts and considerations which shape the principles and condition the context of our proposals and the very future of our institution. We must consider whether these concepts and considerations are compatible with the objective of building a democratic Europe consolidated in respect, security, peace and co-operation between countries.

I think that the development of Europe and of relations between states and the superpowers, and the legitimate expectations of reshaping the structure of Europe, are incompatible with old concepts and understandings of political and military strategy, and with doctrines posited on facts and situations developed in a cold war climate and which, happily, belong increasingly to the past.

I think that realism and the care with which we should examine and assess events and their consequences should not be confused with quibbles and unbalanced concepts about security, the balance of forces or their offensive and defensive character.

I believe that the credibility of our proposals and mutual confidence do not require us to seek out every pretext for justifying, strengthening or giving permanency to the concept of a Europe divided into blocs.

It is equally unconstructive systematically to formulate reservations and raise obstacles to the rôle and institutionalisation of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the building of a viable pan-European system of security, which would make a decisive contribution to the construction of a European space without frontiers, for freedom and for democracy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is adjourned.

16. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now proceed to the election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

For the two vacant posts, two nominations have been submitted in the prescribed form; they are, in alphabetical order, those of Mr. Aarts and Mr. Sarti.

If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that these Vice-Presidents be elected by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare them elected as Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

The order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents according to age is as follows: Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Sarti, Mr. Aarts, Mr. Soares Costa, Mr. Soell and Mr. Martinez.

17. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 38(6) of the Rules of Procedure, I ask the Assembly to agree to the changes in the membership of committees contained in Notice No. 1 which has already been distributed.

Are there any objections?...

The changes are agreed to.

18. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 6th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
2. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance (Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Document 1225).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.55 p.m.)

SECOND SITTING

Wednesday, 6th June 1990

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Observer.
4. Address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
Replies by Mr. Eyskens to questions put by: Mr. Caro, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Cetin (Observer from Turkey),
5. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance (*resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1225*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Stoffelen, the President, Mr. Müller, Mr. Wielowieyski (Observer from Poland), Mr. Bowden, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Antretter, Mr. De Decker.
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Observer

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I should first like to welcome as an observer Admiral Sir Benjamin Bathurst, Commander-in-Chief Channel Command, who is the only European of the three NATO commanders-in-chief.

Welcome to this Assembly, Admiral.

4. Address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. Minister, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, may I welcome you to this Assembly for which you have been our main contact with the Council over the year and, may I add, an agreeable, pleasant and courteous one.

Now that the Belgian Chairmanship of the Council is coming to a close, may I on behalf of all the members of this Assembly congratulate you on the effectiveness of your action in a particularly decisive period in the history of this institution.

I should also like to thank you for the attention you have accorded our work and for the courtesy you have always shown, through its chairmen, to the Assembly as a whole.

Thank you, Minister. Would you please come to the rostrum.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, yesterday in Copenhagen at the opening of the CSCE Conference, the thirty-five ministers there decided to launch the preparatory work for the summit which we hope will take place at the end of the year. Our French colleague, incidentally, proposed that it be held from 19th to 21st December. Tomorrow sees the start of the NATO Council meeting at

1. See page 18.

Mr. Eyskens (continued)

Turnberry in the run-up to the NATO summit in early July. It is in this context that I speak today.

Let me first, however, congratulate you, Mr. President, on your recent election which means that you will be directing the work of this Assembly.

Your great experience of international affairs, your profound knowledge of security problems, your European convictions and the eminent part that you personally played in drafting the excellent report which formed the central pivot of the work of the extraordinary session in March in Luxembourg are clear evidence of the excellent choice made by your peers.

I should also, on behalf of the Council, like to take this opportunity to extend my warmest congratulations and thanks to your predecessor, Mr. Goerens, for the outstanding way in which he performed his presidential duties at an important juncture in the history of the Assembly.

I am also pleased to greet your Portuguese and Spanish colleagues who now sit in your Assembly as full members. My greetings also go to all the observers and, in particular, those from Eastern Europe who, I am sure, are following your work with very great interest.

Mr. President, Europe has entered a crucial phase in its history. A page has been turned – the page of division and the cold war; another is now being written – the page of mutual understanding; everything suggests that we are now in a position where we can look to the future with optimism.

The Washington summit gave us an accurate measure of the warmth of the relations between the superpowers. The will to move forward and the reciprocal understanding are evident. This is important because without them nothing can be done. However, not everything is settled – far from it, particularly where Europe is directly concerned. I shall come back to this point.

It is important for an organisation like ours, which is at the heart of European security problems, to make itself heard, which is what you strive to do. It was also the aim of the Council in the communiqué it adopted on 23rd April – sometimes called the Brussels declaration – in which we emphasised that although our approach should remain flexible, showing at all times the necessary understanding and open-mindedness, our objectives had to be clear.

What are these objectives? To restore Europe's geographical, human and cultural unity, to secure peace and co-operation and to efface the divisions inherited from an all too bitter past, but at the same time, to construct European security by all and for all; this also means, with

particular regard to the WEU member countries, consolidating and developing the process of community integration by including stage by stage, but without too much delay, a political dimension which would include security. At the same time, in this transitional period when everything is changing, the viability of the Atlantic Alliance has to be safeguarded, since it remains the irreplaceable instrument of our security and the best guarantee of stability in Europe.

In practical terms, Atlantic solidarity is an essential precondition for the development of genuine pan-European co-operation, whatever its forms and structures. Pan-Europeanism is not a substitute for the alliance any more than the converse is true. Similarly, there will be no valid Atlantic solidarity without the active solidarity of Europeans within the alliance. This European solidarity, which at present finds its most complete expression in WEU, I naturally perceive as a feature of the European union to come with all that this implies, including the field of security.

Europeans need the alliance but, in its turn, the alliance needs to be able to count on a plan for a united Europe. It is, I believe, in this spirit that the WEU countries are preparing for the forthcoming key dates: Turnberry tomorrow, the summit in July and then the move towards the summit of the thirty-five.

Referring to the thirty-five, the time has come to lay down the foundations for institutionalised co-operation, even though that can only develop gradually. At the all-European level we must ensure and guarantee the security of all by providing ourselves with the appropriate mechanisms wherever necessary and with efficiency in mind.

European security is a matter for all Europeans so let us organise it accordingly. It will be the job of the summit at the end of the year to reach the necessary decisions which will need to be lucid – institutions are nothing without political will – and pragmatical. The first proof of the faith of the men who built cathedrals was in the foundations they laid.

I think I am right when I say that all WEU countries are approaching the question with an open mind and goodwill, and that they are ready, along with their partners, to do what is necessary in the clearly-defined interests of all.

The results of the Washington summit are encouraging in many respects. In spite of his problems at home, President Gorbachev shows remarkable powers of command, for which we can only be grateful. He will certainly need these powers in the coming days, weeks and months, in view of the news we heard this morning on the radio that his plan for economic reform has been attacked by the political bodies in his

Mr. Eyskens (continued)

country at several levels. This would appear to weaken the position of the Soviet Government considerably. Fortunately, there is now some distance between the position of the Soviet president and the prime minister but this morning the BBC commentators said they considered that Mr. Ryzhkov's days were numbered and that a new economic programme would have to be drafted. As regards economic reforms, time is not on Mr. Gorbachev's side. The fact is that the economic and financial situation of the country is extremely critical and the same applies to the balance of payments situation and the increasing lack of foreign currency, for the Soviet Union is now selling a part of its gold and even platinum reserves. There are limits to how far any country can go down that road.

Once again, Europe and the Atlantic, in the wide sense, have a major responsibility. What is our attitude to the Soviet Union now confronted with such serious economic and internal problems?

The agreement in principle on the reduction of strategic weapons, crowning negotiations which can be said to have lasted fifteen years after the SALT disappointments, is a contribution to the general stability on which we are dependent.

The bilateral agreement on the reduction of United States and Soviet chemical arsenals, which was reached as a step towards a multilateral convention for a total and universal ban, brings us considerably closer to what has always been our objective, but fresh efforts will need to be made in Geneva to get there and, above all, to persuade all potential or actual possessors of chemical weapons to accede to it.

There remains, of course, the vital question to us Europeans of the agreement on conventional forces in Europe. Here it has to be said that progress in Vienna has not lived up to the expectations we nursed a few months ago when, in Ottawa, the objective appeared to be in sight.

I agree, Washington was not the right place to settle the problem because it is a multilateral one and primarily concerns the Europeans themselves. But it was also rather important that the two superpowers should confirm their resolve to conclude things in Vienna this year in the run-up to the summit of the thirty-five.

We are going to review the situation at Turnberry. As regards the allies in general, and those who are members of WEU in particular, the conclusion of the CFE agreement is the top priority. A CFE agreement is an essential step on the way to any organised disarmament process. A CFE agreement, as we see it, is not an end in itself but a necessary stage towards the definition of the new defence image of Europe.

Clearly, German unification, in particular its strategic and military aspects, is at the centre of the debate. The two-plus-four negotiations should quickly lead to the liquidation of the rights and responsibilities of the four powers and a definitive settlement of the Oder-Neisse frontier issue. That is their purpose. But everything affecting the level of military forces – and that naturally includes reunified Germany itself – will need to be settled in the framework of the CFE agreement.

There are plenty of proposals, but, as you know, no solution is yet in sight – on the contrary, the Soviet leaders persist in adopting a fairly intransigent position, with little flexibility so far. Probably their reasons are purely tactical.

On the western side we have made it clear that there can be no question whatsoever of deploying NATO troops on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic.

It has already been suggested that the West should accept the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of the ex-German Democratic Republic for a transitional period. But you know as I do that these troops are equipped with nuclear weapons, which would pose the problem of our accepting nuclear weapons on territory forming an integral part of the European Community and the NATO pact. Unless, here too, it were possible to find a negotiated nuclear disarmament solution and keep conventional forces on the territory of the ex-German Democratic Republic.

That leaves the idea of multinational forces as argued with great conviction by our Secretary-General. But we have on every occasion, including one of the WEU meetings, said that if this idea were to materialise on a much greater scale – it may be said to have done so already to some extent – it could never be applied without some countries feeling that they were being discriminated against. This is a very tricky problem for our German friends.

The purpose of all this is to ensure general equilibrium and stability and not to exploit some kind of tactical advantage, as is sometimes suggested. The security of Europe can never be based simply on tactical considerations. Let there be no doubt about that. But neither should anyone use German unification, a natural and legitimate development in the present historical context, to invalidate the results of negotiations whose success was in sight only a few months ago.

The Federal Republic of Germany is in the alliance. It was in this framework, inter alia, that it formed its links with the western democracies. A unified Germany, like any sovereign country, will be free to decide its own future, including whether it should remain loyal to the Atlantic Alliance and WEU.

Mr. Eyskens (continued)

This then is the reply to the Soviet Union. It may be rather formal perhaps, but in terms of international law it cannot be challenged.

To claim, in the name of equilibrium, that Germany should no longer belong in the alliances of which it is a member or to insist, which amounts to the same thing, that these alliances should automatically cease, would be a dis-service to the cause of stability in Europe.

But the alliance is not a static structure either. It ceased some considerable time ago, contrary to what some would have us believe, being the alliance of the cold war and confrontation. It is not even the alliance of the Harmel report which, we should not forget, helped to open the dialogue without which things would not be what they are today. The alliance's aim now is to be an instrument of entente as well as détente.

Clearly this does not mean a demilitarised alliance – general and complete disarmament is probably not of this world – but an alliance prepared to shoulder its responsibility in the new European environment that is emerging in the changes that its purely defensive nature requires it to make.

These are questions that we shall be looking at in Turnberry and at the summit to follow.

The problem is twofold. First the strategy and operational concepts deriving from that strategy have to be adjusted and second we have to make sure that this complex exercise can be performed coherently and with general agreement. The Defence Planning Committee has already begun to study it. But that is not enough. The exercise is also, and perhaps above all, political. Hence the importance of the studies that we decided to launch in WEU at the Council meeting on 23rd April.

There is clearly no question of WEU taking the place of the alliance or competing on the same ground. Even so, in the interests of the alliance, Europeans must shoulder their full responsibilities towards both themselves and their North American allies whose contribution, as the communiqué of 23rd April points out, is fundamental.

Only yesterday, at the CSCE meeting in Copenhagen, Mr. Genscher made a vibrant plea for human rights and for their embodiment in legislation to apply in all the countries of the group of thirty-five. But he also stressed the absolute need to maintain and further strengthen our Atlantic fellowship. He made the case for a kind of transatlantic declaration which would dot the "i"s and cross the "t"s by pointing out that, in all that is on the move today, Europe cannot be regarded as being at the same distance from the United States of America as it is from the Soviet Union.

This Atlantic solidarity is also necessary at the political level, if in the future we wish to maintain a sufficiently balanced construction in what is being called "the new architecture of Europe". The European Community is, we hope, moving towards union. Institutionally WEU is, so to speak, at the fringe between European integration and the alliance. This alliance, the instrument of the United States' commitment in Europe, and all these institutions have their place and their rôle to play in the security of greater Europe.

The USSR forms part of this greater Europe because not only its political, but also its military and strategic weight is such that, without it there can be no European security worthy of the name. The thirty-five are therefore individually and collectively the guarantors of general security in Europe.

We know that these concepts are very broadly your own as well.

It is not unthinkable that the two superpowers might in the future act as very specific guarantors within, or perhaps alongside, a new architecture of Europe. We know that these concepts are also very broadly your own.

During its presidency, Belgium has endeavoured to defend a certain undoubtedly self-assertive concept of Europe. This vision is, of course, in line with a well-established direction of opinion in my country. But, aside from the specific nuances of national policies, no one, I believe, will deny that the present situation, which in many respects is revolutionary, demands more of Europe and certainly not less.

It is to this that WEU at its particular level, should contribute. As time goes by it should give an increasingly concrete content to the notion of a European identity in the sphere of security and defence. In the present state of the construction of Europe it is the only body able to do so. These are the reasons why the Council of Ministers of WEU instructed the working groups to intensify their studies on the future of European security.

Here there are many ideas in the air and imagination can be given free rein. All these proposals and suggestions or ideas for proposals will need to be studied.

There is renewed talk about an agreement or kind of pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and I noted the interest expressed by Mr. Baker a couple of days ago in this idea; previously, that is last month, the Americans were explaining that, because of its disintegration, the Warsaw Pact could no longer be a partner and consequently any dealings should be conducted directly with the Soviet Union and not with that organisation.

Mr. Eyskens (continued)

Some people, in the context of the "thirty-five" negotiations and in the CSCE process as well, are talking about a peace treaty covering, of course, the unification of the two Germanys, a non-aggression pact. The history of the last fifty years offers nothing to strengthen our faith or belief in non-aggression pacts.

Others are talking about a security charter, a system of consultation, information, prevention, mediation, arbitration or conciliation in the event of frontier disputes, problems of ethnic minorities and the multinational force that we discussed at length in Brussels.

All these ideas are extremely useful. What is the right formula? What is the formula that is politically feasible? What formula can not only guarantee our security in a totally defensive spirit and our progress towards European union but also the security of the Soviet Union and the political position of the present leaders in the Kremlin? It is all this that has to be reconciled.

For politicians it is always extremely disagreeable and sometimes destructive, or even self-destructive, to have to lose face. A formula must therefore be found which enables the others also – because it is necessary to put oneself in the place of the other side when negotiating, though not too much at the start but at a given moment – not to lose face. We have to realise how difficult things are for a man like Mr. Gorbachev who has to get public opinion to accept certain formulae that are diametrically opposed to what it has been fed by the Soviet media and one-sided propaganda for thirty or forty years or even longer. It is no easy manoeuvre. We have to have some understanding, therefore, for the extreme difficulty of this exercise in the Soviet Union.

Then there is disarmament verification which has proved to be particularly fertile ground for international co-operation because the logistic requirements for verifying a conventional disarmament agreement in Europe are well beyond the capabilities of a single nation. We have therefore made practical arrangements designed, *inter alia*, to open up our inspector training programmes to other member countries.

On-the-spot verification demands staff in larger numbers than any of us has available. Hence the setting up of a working group to study special technologies, including those required for verification purposes. This is an area in which, alongside the vast experience it already has in the civil domain, Europe can develop additional capabilities which may serve other areas of observation. WEU is now the mainspring in this area because it is the only

European organisation studying space technology applications in an area traditionally reserved for the superpowers.

In all these fields – security requirements, verification and space – a feature of WEU's work is its particular attention to the requirements and priorities of the countries of Europe. However, our organisation does not focus its attention exclusively on developments in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Each day brings fresh reminders of the destabilising potential of the conflicts and tensions in the Mediterranean area and further south. Last April, ministers confirmed the mandate of the working group concerned, which is studying these questions primarily from the standpoint of security, naval forces and the proliferation of ballistic missiles, matters to which you rightly attach great importance.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I should like to turn to institutional questions. The accession of Portugal and Spain, to say nothing of the quickening pace of political and strategic events in Europe, has necessitated some adaptation in our organisation in the form of the rationalisation of its ministerial organs.

The increasingly complex nature of the questions with which the Council and groups of experts from the capitals have to deal has highlighted the importance of WEU having a high-quality instrument of analysis and study. The Assembly has always voiced its keen interest in the organisation having such a unit.

The creation of the WEU Institute for Security Studies should enable the Council and the organisation as a whole, and hence the Assembly, to benefit from academic expertise in security matters. The personality of the director designate, Mr. John Roper, whose drive and creativity I here commend, is our best guarantee that this will be so. I very much hope that the institute will be able to start work on 1st July.

It is my conviction that, with this modernisation of the organisation and the increased resources available to the Secretariat-General and the Assembly, WEU is now well equipped to face the challenges posed by current political and strategic developments in Europe.

Our organisation must remain open for dialogue at all levels: within the Council, between the Council and the Assembly, with our Atlantic allies, with the countries of Eastern Europe, and above all with public opinion in all our countries. Through the responses it will provide to the challenges to European security that I have just mentioned, WEU will play its full part in the building of Europe. This, Mr. President, is the philosophy Belgium will follow in its continuing contribution to the work of the only European organisation mandated by treaty to deal with security questions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Your presidency, Minister, ends on a high note and with a remarkable address from which we have all benefited. It is not only a penetrating and subtle analysis of the present international situation but also, in many respects, a positive contribution to transatlantic and pan-European co-operation.

In this way, you closely follow the tradition of Belgian diplomacy in its unflinching contributions ranging from the Harmel report to the definition of an attitude shared by our countries.

Following another tradition, Minister, you have also agreed to answer questions. Several speakers have put their names down.

I call the first speaker, Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. Minister, I too should like to thank you for your particularly interesting address and for the quality of your thinking and to pay my respects to you as a convinced European. It shows in everything you say and in your will to promote European union which is one of your primary concerns as it is of all of us. Thank you again.

In that part of your speech where you analyse the guarantees of security, peace and order in Europe you asked a question: what kind of formula will guarantee the security of the Soviet Union? I found myself wondering whether the Atlantic Alliance or WEU had ever posed a problem for the security of the Soviet Union. You also said that the thirty-five should be the guarantors of European security and, as regards the process now under way, that it was the two superpowers who must be its guarantors. As regards the presence of Soviet troops in the German Democratic Republic, in the context of German reunification, you mentioned the possibility – providing there is general agreement on nuclear disarmament – of talks on the maintenance of conventional Soviet forces on the territory of what will be the ex-German Democratic Republic. You paid tribute to the action of WEU which you considered to be a hinge between the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community.

Do you not think that the real guarantee of security in Europe is in fact the modified Brussels Treaty, spelt out in the Atlantic Alliance treaty, with its built-in capacity for expansion, in the light of what is happening in Central and Eastern Europe? In this connection, we should be giving a course of political and diplomatic instruction to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, beginning with Mr. Gorbachev, so as to show that the only valid system for providing this guarantee is the one that we have set up. So long as our governments and yourself, Minister, in your capacity as Chairman and spokesman of the WEU Council are unable to tell us that the Council as a whole

considers that it is the treaties which we have signed, defended and adapted to new developments which are the true guarantees of peace and security in Europe and so long as recourse is had to the superpowers and to negotiations in which we take no part, we shall have failed to achieve our objective. I have no wish to be critical, Minister, but I should very much like to hear your explanations on this point.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – It is very clear Mr. Caro, that the Atlantic Alliance has always been a defensive one. Mr. Shevardnadze explained to us a few months ago how difficult it had been for the Politburo and his country's decision-makers to decide that the Soviet Union should strike out the reference to the NATO countries being seen as enemies in a major political text. For him this was a political decision of extreme importance. We told him he was wrong, that our attitude towards his country had never been aggressive and that we had always designed our defence without any thought of aggression in the back of our minds. For the Soviet leaders, therefore, there is a problem of perception for one thing and a problem with regard to their public opinion for another. So it has to be borne in mind that it is not easy for the Soviet leaders to put across the idea that a unified Germany should be not only a member of the European Community but also a member of the NATO pact which, in the Soviet Union, has always been considered as an instrument of revanchism and aggression.

This therefore is a psychological problem, but we are all aware that in politics they are as serious as real problems. After all, what is the difference between a concrete problem and a psychological problem? So a solution has to be found for this situation.

Basically you are quite right. Our alliances are defensive and multilateral and take the form of mutual guarantees. This is why in all our talks with the Soviet Union over the last two or three months we have taken such pains to insist that reunified Germany must remain within NATO, that NATO must be kept going and that there is no symmetry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The original conception of the two pacts is totally different as is the way they work politically: NATO consists of pluralist democracies whereas the Warsaw Pact works on the basis of consensus which is a very different thing. The Warsaw Pact, which a number of countries had imposed upon them, as is not at all the case with NATO, is collapsing. But we do realise that the NATO pact too has to change and become more political provided certain forms of disarmament can be achieved.

Mr. Eyskens (continued)

So I still think that, whilst remaining completely faithful to our alliances and to everything on which they are based we ought to exercise our imagination so that, within the existing CSCE framework, the thirty-five can propose a formula to the Soviet Union enabling it to accept a unified Germany as a full member of NATO, not a unified Germany that would become a member of a political system and which, de facto, would be demilitarised. This would obviously be an unsatisfactory, totally unacceptable compromise, which has already been rejected by Chancellor Kohl.

So, my answer basically is that I entirely agree with you, but we still have to convince the Soviet Union and show some understanding for its problem which, as I said at the rostrum, is mainly psychological and one of mistrust kept alive for over fifty years, a problem which we must in some way pin down by a major educational effort, as you say.

I have the feeling that we are making progress along this path and that increasingly the Soviet leaders are recognising the truth that NATO is neither machination nor an aggressive machine and that it is in this multilateral context that the surest guarantees for the security of all are to be found.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister spoke about setting up a working group to look at defence issues in Europe. Will he give an undertaking on behalf of the presidency that the Assembly will be consulted before the final decisions are set in concrete? Otherwise this will leave us with no chance of any input.

Secondly, the Minister spoke about institutionalising the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. What did he mean by that, in view of recent speeches by Prime Minister Thatcher, Chancellor Kohl and Mr. Shevardnadze to the effect that it might be wiser to build on existing organisations than to create new ones?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – The answer to your first question is yes. I suppose that the conclusions of the working group will be at the disposal of the Assembly and that there will be input by the Assembly, too.

Your second question is an important one. Certainly, many politicians speak about the institutionalisation of the CSCE. What is in a word? According to Mr. Genscher, for instance, it might go rather further, in the sense that he

has proposed several times a list of possible institutions that might be created under the umbrella of the CSCE – including all kinds of co-operation among the thirty-five countries in areas such as research and development, the environment and the surveillance of disarmament. We are, if not reluctant, at least cautious when such reforms are listed, because as you, Sir Geoffrey, correctly stated, it would be unacceptable for politicians in favour of further progress on the path of European integration to set up institutions that do the same as some institutions already do in the European and other frameworks.

We are not opposed to pragmatic institutionalisation of the CSCE. It seems wholly reasonable to propose meetings of a council of foreign affairs ministers of CSCE countries, to be held once or twice a year. Indeed, this year we have already met in Ottawa, and yesterday in Copenhagen. These meetings are very encouraging, and to institutionalise them looks logical. To do that, it would probably be desirable to create a secretariat with a small infrastructure, but we should be extremely cautious about a tendency towards bureaucracy. More regular meetings of foreign affairs ministers within the framework of the CSCE look unavoidable and even desirable, however, if we want to strengthen this sort of co-operation among the thirty-five countries of the CSCE.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cetin.

Mr. CETIN (*Observer from Turkey*). – You mentioned the enlargement of Western European Union and the extension of its relations with Eastern and Central European countries. What is your opinion about European members of NATO which are not at present members of WEU, such as Turkey?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I would say to our Turkish friend that that question is on the agenda at each meeting of the Council of WEU. To make up our minds, we need unanimity around the table, so the individual positions of individual governments are not at stake here. As Chairman of the Council, I can say that the position of the Council was, and is, that to become a full member of WEU rather than an observer a country must belong to the Community. Let us be clear that our friends from the countries of Eastern Europe have been invited here as observers and not as full members. In this place, we regroup members of the European Community which are also members of NATO. As long as that remains the position of the Council, we have to find means of association. We have to work out and

Mr. Eyskens (continued)

implement a policy of proximity and await other solutions in future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I should like to ask you a question primarily in your capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Council, but also in your capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs of a country and partner that is very much involved in all these current developments.

You have pointed out that the problem of verification is a particularly suitable field for international co-operation and a particularly important problem into the bargain – and let me say how much we agree with your analysis. Disarmament yes, provided it can be verified. In this connection you spoke of a working group to which you have, as a consequence, given new tasks.

My question, incidentally, backs up one that has already been asked by previous speakers: what can you tell us about this working group and WEU whose mission, once again, is unique as defined by its treaties? Where will the working group and WEU stand, in this exclusively practical and essential sphere of verification, in relation to the CSCE and in relation – why not – to NATO? In other words what will be the group's specific mandate and geographical coverage in the field of verification?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – It has to be admitted that WEU has no voice at the negotiating table. As an organisation WEU has no seat at any international conference. We may regret it, but that is the political fact.

What contribution can these working groups and their conclusions make? Answer: they can make a contribution to the West's preparation and proposals for the negotiations.

Some time ago, we decided to organise preparatory meetings as early as July for the big CSCE conference in late 1990. That being so, it would be useful if the ideas produced by our organisation could be put on the table during that preparatory work.

For political reasons we are all familiar with, I therefore conclude that our contribution is mainly indirect which does not mean that it will be necessarily less useful or less effective than that made by those sitting at the negotiating table itself. Everything will depend on the quality of our proposals and ideas.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I want to ask the Belgian Foreign Minister one simple – although complicated – question. In response to our Turkish questioner, he pointed out what is perhaps obvious – that all members of WEU are also members of the European Community. It is also true that the European Community is rapidly developing a persona in foreign policy and speaking more and more with a common voice on foreign affairs, although not, of course, on defence matters, which are confined to this institution. How does the Foreign Minister envisage the European Community and WEU evolving a long-term relationship on the question of security?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – That is an important and a difficult question and one's answer must depend upon one's basic view of the future of the Community, the degree of integration and of the evolution of the European Community towards so-called political union. Personally, I cannot imagine political union without competences in respect of security and defence matters and also matters of external policy of the Community. The ideal solution is the evolution of the Community towards something between a federation and a confederation that also exerts competence in matters of security and defence.

For the time being, it is useful to distinguish between security and defence matters. There seems now to be a growing consensus on the capability of the Community to tackle problems of security but not yet problems of defence. The distinction is perhaps a subtle one. Matters of security concern all the matters tabled in the framework of the CSCE, with the exception of military aspects of security. Defence starts where the military aspect comes in. For the time being, I think that our formula is workable. It is important that the defence identity of the Community should be treated and elaborated here. We must bear in mind the possibility – I think that it is also a need – that the Community will be enlarged, provided that the applicants accept l'acquis communautaire and accept all the conditions that will enable them to become full members. It is important that WEU should remain the organisation that deals with defence and even security matters as some members of the Community, being neutral, would be unable to participate in discussions on such matters.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ewing.

Mr. EWING (*United Kingdom*). – I realise, Mr. President, that you called Sir Russell and myself in order of age: Sir Russell is much older than I am. Will the Minister expand on his reply to my colleague, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg? To me, both question and answer were at the crux of the matters that we are discussing today – namely, the institutionalisation of CSCE. The Minister said that that organisation is to be institutionalised with a small secretariat, although in my experience secretariats grow like Topsy. They start small, but before we know where we are they have become larger than the organisation that they are supposed to serve. WEU has a secretariat. What would be the relationship between the institution that the Minister envisages and its secretariat, and this institution and its secretariat? I am sure that the Minister will understand that there is a growing worry that WEU is being phased out and that nothing that he has said has allayed our fears in that regard.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I share those fears. A deeper principle is involved in the development of bureaucracies throughout the world. I am not in favour of a secretariat. However, we have to find a political solution to the management of security in Europe. Some form of institution is needed.

The enormous expense of meetings such as ours is striking. Ministers and their assistants travel from north and south, east and west. We are a little like a United Nations for Europe. The process is expensive and not always efficient. It is less efficient because our decisions are based upon unanimity. High diplomacy is required and the process is time-consuming. I am in favour of an operation which is efficient and inexpensive. What price are we prepared to pay for peace in Europe? I think that a meeting twice a year is worth the expense and we should be prepared to meet it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Minister, I detected in your replies a certain sympathy or even preference when you said you could perfectly well imagine – or possibly even wish – that the European Community should assume responsibility for security and defence questions. Later you said security should be distinguished from defence matters. The reason for my question is that I simply cannot understand how security policy can be divorced from defence policy and how one can discuss them with a different emphasis in different forums.

Taking your thinking to its logical conclusion I would have to infer that in WEU we are no more than a sock-counting committee for the troops, while the big problems are dealt with somewhere else. So I would like to ask you once again: are you really convinced that the EEC could also be responsible for security and defence questions, even though you admit that the EEC could well be enlarged to include countries that are currently not members of our defence alliance? Would it not perhaps be more appropriate for the Council of Europe as the parliamentary institution of the CSCE, rather than the Community, to deliberate on security policy and structures or collective security in Europe?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – It is not I who invented the distinction between security and defence. I said a moment ago that the distinction is subtle. You are perfectly right, there is a grey area between the two and in practice, it is sometimes very difficult to draw the line between them.

However, there is a set of questions which are more to do with security than defence, such as setting procedures in place for prevention, consultation, conciliation and so on. Everything that comes under the heading of confidence-building measures and not military disarmament in the strict sense, can be classified under security measures. The trend within the community today seems to be for the majority of countries – I have not heard of any against – to accept that security policy in this sense falls in the area of political co-operation within Europe.

In its memorandum, Belgium specifically proposes that political co-operation should be made a community matter and that political co-operation, including security policy, should be the responsibility of the General Affairs Council. Defence policy is not included, first because there is no provision for it in the treaty, and secondly because the Community already has one neutral member and one at least if not two others that would enter reservations at any decision to make defence problems a Community responsibility.

What would happen if the treaty were changed to make the Community responsible for defence questions? What would be the attitude of the neutral member countries? The question is extremely complex.

The formal answer is that it would depend on the neutral countries applying to join. It would be up to them to decide whether they could adopt the same attitude in defence matters as those already in the Community. It would be up

Mr. Eyskens (continued)

to them to adapt and adjust. In this connection, a very lively argument is going on, incidentally, in Austria, even within the present coalition.

I could reply that it is not impossible but even probable and desirable that defence problems will have a completely different content in one, two or three years time if we are able to establish and manage an order of peace and a community of co-operative security among the thirty-five or thirty-four countries of Europe. The problem of a neutral country joining would then be quite different and much easier.

A third point is that there are different kinds of neutrality.

The neutral European countries that I know all have different brands of neutrality. There is a big difference between Ireland's neutrality and that of Austria, Switzerland and Sweden but in every case neutrality has its roots in the past history and political environment of the country concerned.

However, under the Treaty of Rome, which is an open treaty, I feel the European Community has to be open to other countries which apply to join and accept what the Community has already done and what its objectives are for the future. I also think that a solution has to be found to their non-membership of NATO.

That latter solution will have to be found via WEU and in this field WEU can go on playing an essential rôle in the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the Political Committee.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President, for calling me as the last speaker.

Minister, you will probably have noticed from our questions that the members of this Assembly – like, for that matter, those of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe – have misgivings over any talk of institutionalising the CSCE in terms of creating new organisations in that body. My first question, Minister, is this: do you share my view that the last thing Europe needs is yet another organisation? Our fellow-citizens get the European Community, the Council of Europe and WEU hopelessly mixed up even now. No one knows which is responsible for what any more. Quite apart from that we are also suffering from duplication of effort and the antagonism that is sometimes detectable between the existing organisations. On the grounds of those fears I would ask you this: should we not be very careful about creating further institutionalised bureaucracies which, as we know, tend to perpetuate themselves and expand? That is my first question.

My second is this: do you not think we should make use, in the context of the CSCE process, of all the positive experience we feel we have had since the last war in setting up parliamentary bodies in the Council of Europe, WEU and the European Community? Would that not make it possible for parliamentary discussion to take place in the existing bodies? May I remind you that in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, where we have the same people in our delegations as in WEU, we already have representatives working together from twenty-three of the thirty-five Helsinki signatory states.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – There are many dangers in the so-called institutionalisation of the CSCE, which is an extremely ambiguous term. First there is the creation of a new bureaucracy, which is wholly to be deplored but sometimes inevitable. But to me the greatest danger is the dilution of the existing organisations, a danger of dilution of the European Community because of a measure of duplication with the Council of Europe and other institutions. So my first reply is that we must avoid duplication and instead strengthen the existing institutions and first and foremost the European Community.

The Belgian Prime Minister and I held a press conference two months ago to present the Belgian memorandum and draw the attention of the general public in Europe to the danger of dilution. As I said in my address, we need more not less Europe, otherwise we run the risk of drifting towards what General de Gaulle called a "big whatsit". This "big whatsit" may have its use. No one today disputes the extreme utility of the United Nations. But there is no need for a new organisation to replace one already there and working well and which, moreover, gives us our identity and the possibility of expressing what we want in a spirit of – I repeat – openness. Those who want to join us and share our ideas and our ideals can do so, though I do share your reservations and misgivings.

As to your idea of organising parliamentary meetings under the aegis of the CSCE, I see no objection. It is even logical. Were a CSCE Council of Ministers to meet once or twice a year it would not be inadvisable for some form of parliamentary monitoring to be organised even if only of an informal and non-institutionalised nature.

Also it could be argued against you, Mr. Ahrens, that there is surely quite a difference between being against any form of institutionalisation of the CSCE and for the convening of a parliamentary assembly such as the

Mr. Eyskens (continued)

CSCE. If a council of ministers is duly and properly convened and decisions ensue, I feel that, as a democratic principle, there has to be an assembly, an ad hoc parliamentary gathering drawn from the parliaments. I hope that at that time, Europeans will choose to be represented, not by the delegations of their national parliaments but by a parliamentary delegation from the European Parliament. It would be a simpler and better way of speaking with one voice, at least let us hope so.

All this is perfectly feasible and your proposal falls logically into a kind of symmetry between some degree of institutionalisation of the ministerial meetings and the meeting of delegations from the parliaments of the thirty-five countries.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Ahrens, what subjects those are for study by the Political Committee, exactly in the spirit of the contribution to the current debate at the level of states and governments that Minister Eyskens called for a short time ago.

Once again, Minister, you have given us a great deal of your time, a fact we have appreciated during the whole of the Belgian presidency. Thank you. Thank you too for your address and your active participation in our debates.

5. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance

(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Document 1225)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee on WEU in the Atlantic Alliance, Document 1225.

The debate is resumed.

I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – How do you organise a defence policy when there is no way of knowing what tomorrow will bring and whether Mr. Gorbachev, in spite of all Mr. Bush's care and attention, will still be in power in a few years time? This is the problem facing our leaders wrong-footed by the pace of disintegration in Eastern Europe.

Yesterday's world was simple when Europe's defence was in two halves: one in the East with the Warsaw Pact and the other in the West with NATO, the Europeans themselves having nothing or very little to say in the real decisions and choice of strategies.

But where are the certainties of yesteryear? Where is the enemy now? What is his real strength? Instead of the worries and threats of

the past we now have the uncertainties of the future. The new Europe recovering from the earthquake of 1989 is neither intellectually nor politically prepared for this challenge to its own future.

It no longer knows what its future anchor point or points will be. The certainties of the past have crumbled away; the whole pattern of Europe of the Yalta agreement is in pieces and there is no way of putting them back together again: we do not even know where to begin.

The break-down of Eastern Europe is a reason for hope, but it also threatens instability and new dangers. The nations of Europe are simply spectators at the summit talks and do not really participate. Remember Reykjavik and Malta and now Washington, plus the occasional telephone call from Mr. Bush to the European heads of state to tell them about what has been discussed or may be decided, in their absence, between the two superpowers. What will our place be in the new system, in this new Atlanticism as Mr. Baker called it, which is to convert NATO into a political treaty but still maintain it as a defence organisation?

No one can know what will happen to the Soviet Union under the pressure of discontent, economic collapse and nationalist claims. There is also uncertainty with regard to Central Europe and more particularly Germany where the changes must influence future strategic decisions. European strategies and military stances will be different depending on whether Germany is in NATO or neutral.

Neither can these new strategies ignore changes in public attitudes. People want to draw the dividends of peace soon, probably too soon, and do not sufficiently understand the difference between what is proposed and what can be done.

It is up to the Europeans alone to define Europe's positions and its security conditions. Europeans have a right to speak but they do not often do so or do so clearly enough. With the disappearance of the Soviet bloc and the immediate military threat it has so far represented, the justification for maintaining the West European framework of collective security is directly challenged.

In addition to an artificially maintained and now outdated military doctrine – flexible response and forward strategy – the Atlantic Alliance's very *raison d'être* and viability are now fading away in the eyes of certain political leaders and in the mind of the public in many countries. The collapse of the Berlin wall and the reunification of Germany will give that country increasing weight if Europe fails to include united Germany in the framework of a European union. But the race between the reunification of Germany and the unification of

Mr. Baumel (continued)

Europe has already been won, let there be no mistake, and no illusions about that.

This is why we should seriously think about the rôle and responsibilities that WEU must now assume. Many people feel that WEU should cease to be a forum and become a force – which it clearly is not – and a European defence centre contractually bound to and on an equal footing with the United States, and not merely a diplomatic academy, however useful that may be. This would mean that WEU would, as now, comprise representatives of both NATO and non-NATO member countries, a subject we discussed at length this morning. With time it could even open its doors to the new democracies of Eastern Europe as they become more independent and leave the Warsaw Pact, whereas for the moment they only participate in the debates of our Assembly as guests or observers.

But we need to go much further and in this very important debate, coming so soon after the Washington summit, I should like to propose several practical steps:

First, an institutional meeting of WEU Defence Ministers who, on a regular basis, could strive to co-ordinate the policies of their respective countries.

Second, the establishment of a joint headquarters for planning and co-ordinating member countries' forces. Close co-operation is needed at the top – and this does not exist. I am sorry to say this in front of our Secretary-General, but it is preferable to the system of multinational forces he referred to in his speech yesterday. His proposal is original but difficult to achieve because, if I may remind him, in the throes of the cold war my country was unable to agree to join an EDC even at that time when it might have constituted an attractive guarantee for Europe. How could it be thought that, after refusing President Kennedy's preposterous proposals on multilateral forces some twenty-five years ago, we could really contemplate a system of multinational forces under what would ultimately be American command? We must not nurse any illusions and instead find our way out of the present situation by co-ordinating our national defence forces at the top and in a very concrete manner.

Third, the setting-up of specific bodies for verifying and monitoring arms limitation in the context of the application of disarmament agreements, a third essential step which falls perfectly within the province of WEU.

Fourth, the organisation of defences on the southern flanks of Europe, because it is clear that now, the threat is no longer from the East but from the south and from certain countries beyond the Mediterranean. Institutionally NATO

cannot do this, and so WEU has to tackle these essentially European security problems. The dangers for Europe are no longer simply within the greater Europe but outside, and are directed against that greater Europe.

Fifth and finally, co-operation between and the planning of our defence industries, in general and research and development in those industries in particular, an old subject that keeps coming up without any progress being made and to which serious thought should now be given.

These are some of the concrete proposals that we would do well to have on our future agenda and more particularly to propose to the only bodies, including WEU, that can really get things moving outside the Assembly, namely the Council of Ministers and our respective governments.

In conclusion I congratulate our Rapporteur on his excellent report. It presents many extremely useful proposals and I shall be very happy to support and vote for it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as I am taking part in this debate mainly as a Dutchman, I will speak in my own language.

As I did in the Political Committee, I should like to say how very grateful I am to the Rapporteur, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, for being so willing to listen to others. That is not something that can be said of all the members of the Assembly. Sir Geoffrey was prepared to accept many amendments suggested by myself and others. The text of the recommendation in its present form may be rather long, but it is in every way acceptable in content. Especially when there are differences of opinion which are not irreconcilable there is everything to be said for arriving at a text in committee which, though not acceptable to everyone, is endorsed by the vast majority. We owe this to Sir Geoffrey, who made a very decisive contribution to this result.

Mr. President, although I approve the report, I have two comments to make. The first concerns the need for further efforts to achieve disarmament and détente. Let me put it this way. The harsh reality is still that over three million guilders or three million Deutschmarks are spent every minute on arms throughout the world. At the same time twenty-four people throughout the world starve to death every minute – twenty-four people every minute! Mr. President, there is therefore an urgent need for everything possible to be done to bring détente closer and to reduce spending on armaments. This was one reason why the agreement on the abolition of medium-range missiles was such a gigantic step forward. So we must realise

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

that WEU is the most suitable instrument for Western Europe's contribution to further détente and a further reduction in military spending. WEU must therefore help to work out a solution and make a contribution to all the negotiations on the subject which are now in progress or are due to begin this year.

First and foremost in the next twelve months come the two plus four negotiations – and their successful conclusion – on German reunification. Then there is the conclusion of the negotiations in Vienna on reductions in conventional armaments – CFE-1 – and the agreements that have to be reached on the second round. It is very important – as the recommendation also says – for us to urge the Council of Ministers and our governments to make an immediate start on the second round when the first CFE agreement has been reached.

Despite the need to overcome irregularities in the balance of power between East and West, the goal for this second agreement should be a 50% reduction in current NATO forces. The second agreement might, for example, lead to a situation of mutually-accepted defence strategies whereby it was structurally impossible for a surprise attack to be launched or for the territory of another country to be occupied.

In these twelve months negotiations must also be initiated on the removal of all short-range weapons from Europe. In these same twelve months an agreement may also be reached – and it looks as if this will happen – on a very drastic reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, by 30% in the first phase and 50% in the second. There is also the prospect of an agreement on the banning of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles. We fervently hope that all countries that have chemical weapons will sign an agreement to this effect.

Mr. President, yesterday saw the opening of the CSCE negotiations – the Helsinki process – in Copenhagen. At the summit conference at the end of this year the intensification of pan-European security co-operation, possibly including new tasks and/or instruments, is bound to be discussed.

This brings me to my second comment, which concerns the future responsibilities and usefulness of Western European Union. As Mr. Maris has already indicated, the report is, to say the least, cautious on this subject.

Certainly WEU will, more than ever, be an extremely useful instrument for Europe in the next three to four years. In fact, it will be the only instrument. WEU can put forward ideas and contribute to the success of all these negotiations, in which we in Europe are so closely involved. Are we to be allowed to think and talk

about things that affect our own lives and our survival? It is not just a question of staying put, but of actively and creatively joining in the thinking, partly with the help of the new Institute for Security Studies.

I am a definite advocate, Mr. President, of giving greater depth and breadth to European political union in the European Community. But I also realise that the Community and the member states must go all out – and will have their hands full, to say the least – to achieve European monetary union, for example, and all that it entails, in 1993. Quite apart from the fact that the EEC treaty does not give the Community any authority in the area of European military security, it is highly unrealistic to think that in the next three, four or five years the Community will be willing or able to increase its authority to include European security and, with it, military security. Nor can I bring myself to believe that the European Community will or can accept new members for the next seven years.

Where the CSCE negotiations are concerned, I feel a great effort should be made to avoid two extremes. We should not try at this stage to specify the essence and structure of future pan-European security. Eventually, no doubt, there will be a different structure. The Warsaw Pact will undoubtedly continue to disintegrate, which is definitely not in our own security interests. Nor is there any doubt that, like NATO, the Warsaw Pact will undergo major changes. But it would be undesirable and impossible at this stage to try to provide a blueprint for the future pan-European security structure. An equation with more than one unknown quantity is very difficult to solve. What happens in the next few years will determine the final outcome.

However, the other extreme is just as irresponsible: letting everything take its course, making everything possible, the “letting a thousand flowers bloom” attitude, thinking that anything is possible, but nothing is obligatory. That attitude would be wrong. I see a great danger here – and I am also speaking now as Chairman of the Committee on Legal Affairs of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Catherine Lalumière, the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, also referred to this last week. This is the danger of two systems, two standards developing in Europe, for human rights and respect for those rights. The first is set out in the European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols and is monitored by our Committee on Human Rights and our European Court of Human Rights. This is a strict system, with a high level of respect for human rights. The other system would make for a much lower level of respect for human rights. It would be a very loose, easily evaded system within the framework of the CSCE process and

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

under a new treaty, possibly to be discussed at the end of this year. This would be a disgraceful development, Mr. President. There must be no dual system, no double standards when it comes to human rights. This has always been the position adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and it is my fervent hope that any such double standards will also be avoided in the future.

Mr. President, let me conclude by restating my comment in general terms, which also brings me back to WEU. It would be wrong – I believe this is the general view of the whole Assembly – virtually to displace valuable achievements and institutions in the course of the CSCE process by creating something new, something superfluous, something at a lower level.

Mr. President, I am convinced that in all probability the next three, four or five years will, more than ever before, be extremely important and very useful years for WEU, and with this wish and this prediction I will bring my statement to an end.

(Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As the first Spanish member ever to have the honour of presiding over the proceedings of the Assembly, I should like to convey to you my emotion and gratitude and that of my people for your support for our application to join WEU and to renew my commitment and that of the rest of the delegation to the work of the Assembly and WEU.

I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's report is a well thought-out and outstandingly well composed photograph of a fast-moving scene. We all know that what it records could well be interpreted in a different way in the next few weeks or months, but we also know without doubt that a number of pillars have been firmly established.

We live at a time that would have been inconceivable only a year ago and can perhaps only be compared with that of the French Revolution or the era when Giordano Bruno and Galileo Galilei changed our conception of the world in the sixteenth century. A time of continuous change like this needs firm pillars, because a boat rocking on the sea in a constantly changing wind needs a pillar somewhere to which the anchor cable can be made fast and that pillar is European security.

Mr. Stoffelen referred a moment ago to the efforts of the CSCE in the field of human rights. Efforts are in fact being made to solve security questions in the framework of the CSCE pro-

cess. There are even efforts to create a new security system within the CSCE.

Here, if you do not mind, I would make a couple of sceptical comments. For one thing, I do not think that a body as big as this is in a position to offer us the security we have had up to now and still need in the West. On that score, the CSCE reminds me more of the eternal Diet of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, described by Samuel von Pufendorf, the expert in constitutional law, as a "monster".

After all, we have had not just a European but a worldwide security system since 1945. In 1945 the United Nations was set up to create peace on earth for all time. The institution of the Security Council was designed, after the experience of the second world war, to ensure that there would be no more wars. We all know that this instrument has been a failure: since 1945 there have been over a hundred armed conflicts around the world.

That means we have to consider what our present situation is, and what is our best course of action in that situation. The rôle of the Warsaw Pact is of course being relativised, and in the outer defences of the Soviet Union Soviet troops are being withdrawn from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as we hope they soon will be from Poland and the German Democratic Republic, as it still is known. But it cannot be said that universal peace or security has broken out in Europe, or that conflicts could never again arise. We have only to look south-eastwards, towards the Balkan states – Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria – to observe the daily reports of new nationality and border conflicts and similar problems.

A short while ago I had occasion to speak to a minister from these Balkan countries at a Council of Europe ministerial conference. He said that the situation in the Balkans was at least as explosive as it had been before the first world war. We all know that the first world war was triggered off there by the shooting at Sarajevo.

Perhaps at this point I could repeat a joke that a prominent politician from one of these countries told me and which, macabre though it may be, illustrates what things are like there just now. The story comes from Bulgaria and goes like this: what is an optimist? An optimist is someone who learns English: what is a pessimist? A pessimist is someone in Bulgaria who learns Turkish. And what is a realist? A realist is someone who buys a sub-machine gun and keeps it handy in the cellar. When I hear this kind of macabre joke – if I may call it that – I know how tense the situation is in a certain part of Europe.

In another part of Europe the security problems – the "German question" – are being

Mr. Müller (continued)

solved by the reunification of Germany. Perhaps this should remind us that the first step in the process of setting up Western European Union was the Treaty of Dunkirk, when five countries signed a pact designed to prevent any resurgence of German militarism. That was the original starting point of Western European Union. Because of the East-West conflict it developed into something entirely different and WEU became an alliance, with the Federal Republic as one of its members, for the maintenance of peace and security in Europe.

I am not quite as optimistic as Mr. Stoffelen who counted on 50% reductions straight away. To my mind, based on our common experience, reducing military forces is as slow a process as slimming down bureaucracies. My concern is that the CSCE process in Vienna is advancing too slowly, for me at least, and that so far no results have been achieved. Suspicions keep arising that there may be pressure from the military structures in the Soviet Union to delay rather than to accelerate the process.

Regardless of how things go, the restructuring of our military potential in the West will also no doubt call for combat forces that can intervene speedily in different places rather than massive armies and for reserves that can be mobilised in the emergency that can never be completely ruled out. Mr. Stoffelen spoke about the thousand flowers we should let bloom. I too am for having a thousand flowers bloom but we must never forget that after the appeal to let a thousand flowers bloom there was also Tienanmen, the Square of Heavenly Peace, in Beijing, so it is perfectly possible for developments to take a completely different turn.

What seems to me important – Mr. Baumel also made this point – is that WEU and NATO should turn their eyes in a new direction: towards the south and south-east. In fact, I think that the great east-west confrontation that has been a governing factor for the last forty-five years will cease to play that rôle. But that does not mean that no new fields of conflict have arisen elsewhere. Whilst we in Europe are seeking to outlaw nuclear weapons, the word is – and please do not forget this – that India and Pakistan could be on the threshold of an atomic war. Whilst we are working to get rid of chemical weapons, we know that chemical weapons have been used in the war between Iraq and Iran. We know that a major build-up of armaments is continuing in this area. We also know that there are ideologies in that part of the world that are aggressive in the sense of conquering the world for the sake of an idea and not just making war in the traditional sense.

The Soviet Union will play a rôle – though a passive one – in this process, because the con-

flicts in the south of the Soviet Union are already affecting an empire that has failed to organise itself on federal lines or to integrate the various languages and cultures in a spirit of togetherness and competition. The old nationalistic slogans are heard again, and in fact their influence has increased in recent months.

Listening to the comments from the Soviet Union on present developments in German policy I am continually surprised at the fluctuations they reflect. When Mr. Shevardnadze in Copenhagen refers back to Potsdam, while at the same time Mr. Gorbachev says we must have another Versailles, these utterances from the Soviet Union remind me of the title of a great Dostoyevsky novel, *The Gambler*. You get the feeling that they are gambling, trying to hold open options that really should have been discarded long ago. Soviet policy on these questions sometimes gives the impression of a set of traffic lights whose central system has gone haywire, switching from green to amber and back to green and then staying on red for a long time. This could be a pessimistic view although I would describe myself less as a pessimist than as a realist and being a realist also means being an optimist.

Having said it also means being an optimist, let me close by quoting from Mr. Gorbachev at the final press conference during his visit to the United States, where he said that the option we wanted for Germany was one that would strengthen rather than weaken everything in Europe. As a German parliamentarian, I can only say that this has my 100% support. We too want an option that will strengthen everything in Europe rather than weaken Europe. It also means, of course, that in WEU and in NATO we have to bring new ideas to bear on questions of disarmament and arms control and that the planned Institute for Security Studies must be a think-tank to help us identify future problems and to create a truly European security system in which all men of good will can live in peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wielowieyski, Observer from Poland, Vice-Marshal of the Polish Senate.

Mr. WIELOWIEYSKI (*Observer from Poland*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I have pleasure in conveying a brief message to the Assembly of Western European Union on behalf of the Polish parliament. Mr. Mikalak and myself represent the civic parliamentary group born of the Solidarity movement, which ten years ago started the great and, let me say, unexpected drive for freedom, the results of which are now emerging as a challenge to which you too have to respond.

There is no doubt that the wise and just decisions taken by Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership in 1985 and thereafter as a result of their reverses in the cold war have also been of

Mr. Wielowieyski (continued)

great importance. It is equally true that this defeat and the freedom movement in Eastern Europe would not have taken place without Western European Union and NATO, or without your determination, by prudent but firm policies, to defend democratic freedoms and human rights in Europe.

Yesterday, we went through Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's remarkable report. I was greatly impressed by its precision and lucidity. Clearly its purpose is to propose changes in military doctrine and to restore mutual confidence between the countries of the West and those of Central and Eastern Europe.

But it is also clear that there is a point where the writers of this report stop short. They raise problems and ask questions but they fail to give replies. In the present situation, NATO is still necessary but at the same time the organisation is incapable of taking on new tasks. This is confirmed, moreover, in paragraph 77 of the report.

However, the main feature of the new situation in Europe is the severe economic and political weakness of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. There is no machinery or system capable of organising this vast area of 120 million people – not including the 70 million people in the various Soviet republics of Eastern Europe – that are also seeking a national identity, dignity and independence, Lithuania being a case in point.

The Warsaw Pact is alive but ineffective.

The report draws attention not only to the problems and issues of frontiers and ethnic minorities, it also points out the undeniable fact that this area and its 120 million population could well be an arena of interest to the major powers, especially to a Germany fortunately reunified and regaining its national identity and to a Russian republic, your deep mistrust of which is clear from paragraph 39 of the report, which is also seeking a new way forward in a confederation of Soviet republics.

In the West one often hears the warning that we must be careful not to exchange the unjust system of Yalta for the dangers of a Sarajevo-type situation. I do not feel this fear is fully justified; Sarajevo was simply a pretext for moves by the great powers in their game of European and world domination.

Eastern Europe needs ideas on the grand scale. Without them it will be unable to make the great effort required to climb out of the deep crisis it is in and go further along the path of European integration.

Two ideas that meet the criteria are, first, the return to normal life in accordance with our tra-

ditions, identity and aspirations and, second, the return to a united Europe.

In spite of all the emotion and ethnic and national complexities, our fellow-citizens can understand that guarantees for frontiers and ethnic minorities are essential. But they also see that the place to solve these problems is in the framework of a united Europe. They look, therefore, for signs or deeds to prove we are moving towards co-operation and integration in Europe.

From my own experience, I can tell you that the Hungarians in Transylvania, Serbia and Slovakia, the Slovaks in Hungary, the Turks in Bulgaria and the Ukrainians and German Silesians in Poland are all hoping for a normal and respected status in a Europe that would be like a community of peoples with respect for countries and frontiers whilst allowing the free circulation of ideas, people, capital and, of course, economic creativity.

To advance along this road and in order to prevent conflicts between peoples and states, they need a system and machinery guaranteeing their security and ensuring progress in political co-operation. Unfortunately, I have the impression that the report yields to the temptation of the historic British principle of "wait and see".

I quote paragraph 65 as an example: "it is doubtful if there is a strong desire to create yet another permanent organisation, except among the bureaucrats, and it will be preferable to build upon the democratic structures we now possess...". But then paragraph 77 admits that there is a wide range of subjects that the WEU member countries could not handle either in the framework of the Community or in that of NATO or the CSCE and on which there can be consultations only in WEU. In other words the existing structures, especially those of the CSCE or NATO, are incapable of meeting the challenge. So this is the challenge confronting you.

The grand idea of a new form of European co-operation launched by President Mitterrand, like the more concrete project put forward by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Polish Prime Minister and by Jiri Dienstbier, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, concerned European institutions. These projects relate to the fundamental needs of our countries and also, I feel sure, the future of Europe as a whole.

I am convinced that the progress and development of this European policy demand a great effort of integration and co-operation, not only from you but also from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The report under discussion is prudent and reasonable. I can well understand that it may be too early yet to quicken the pace in developing institutions.

Mr. Wielowieyski (continued)

Nevertheless, we cannot sidestep the challenges before us. WEU and the CSCE cannot avoid taking on new responsibilities. We must prepare to meet the challenge effectively, otherwise we may well be overtaken by events.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, you saved Western Europe. Now you have wider and no less difficult responsibilities to shoulder. I wish you courage, wisdom and imagination in tackling these important tasks.

I thank you for your invitation and your warm welcome.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We are the ones who should thank you, Mr. Wielowieyski.

I call Mr. Bowden.

Mr. BOWDEN (*United Kingdom*). – May I add to your words of thanks, Mr. President, to our Polish parliamentarian for his speech. It is marvellous to see him here. His contribution was well received, and I am sure that I speak on behalf of everyone in wishing him and his country every good fortune.

In presenting his report, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg concealed the massive amount of work and preparation that was done to ensure that it is so up to date. It deals sharply with the issues involved and I think that it will stand the test of time. The research and effort that went into preparing it was quite remarkable.

The attitude of, and the problems faced by, the Soviet Union have not been discussed much in the debate. It is important that the Assembly remembers the problems that have arisen for it from the inevitable reunification of Germany. It has not forgotten that it lost more than 25 million people in the second world war. It is difficult for the Soviet leaders to adjust to the sudden and dramatic changes that have taken place.

Huge forces are at work in the Soviet Union which may lead to an entirely different scenario from the present one. All colleagues would wish President Gorbachev to continue in office, but I wonder whether the chances of him leading his nation in twelve months' time are better than 50:50.

That poses tremendous questions. With the internal security of the Soviet Union becoming shaky, the Russian military leaders have seen their outer protective barriers – the Warsaw Pact countries – if not completely eliminated, certainly neutralised. If we were in the position of those leaders, we would be extremely worried and concerned about the security of our nation. There may be forces at work in the Soviet Union that believe that President Gorbachev is going

too fast down too many paths and creating problems that would not have arisen if the same rules that applied only twelve months ago were in force today. I hope that that scenario will not arise, but I believe that it is possible that within months President Gorbachev will be deposed and a new form of military-political government installed.

It could mean that the iron curtain would not be coming down around the Warsaw Pact countries. However, a new iron curtain could come down around the Soviet Union. The forces at work within that country would re-establish themselves and decide what they think should be brought about – a new internal security and stability. That would not be based on the principles of democracy and freedom. It would also mean, if that scenario were to occur, and we cannot discount it as a possibility, that the Soviet leaders, in ensuring that the policy was accepted by a substantial proportion of the Russian people, would have to use, as one of their excuses, the dangers that still existed to USSR security from the outside world – the West and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. They would have to play up that scenario in propaganda terms to maintain their position.

I am not by nature a pessimist. Most of my friends would say that I am an optimist, but I am talking in these terms because it is necessary in such debates to consider all the possibilities and take them into account when deciding what policies we should adopt and support. That leads me to the logical conclusion that we cannot go for complete disarmament. We must be careful not to be tempted by the peace dividend that we would love to see spent in our own countries on things other than arms or assume that a peace dividend would automatically reach a substantial percentage of our respective defence budgets. I fear that we are a long way from that point.

In his presentation to us, the Belgian Foreign Minister talked about the Soviet Union's acceptance of NATO. In whatever context and regardless of what may happen in Russia in the coming years, that is a long way off. I am not apportioning blame in this debate, but the forty years of tension and mistrust, even, on occasions hatred, that existed in the Soviet Union's attitude to some countries and people in other parts of the world cannot be eliminated overnight. It will take a long time for that atmosphere to be dissipated and for the new feelings of working together and establishing democratic systems to take effect.

Without doubt, it would be a serious setback to Europe if President Gorbachev were to be displaced. Some political groups in Russia are currently working for that for their own purposes. I believe that one or two of the men who might wish to take over from President Gorbachev

Mr. Bowden (continued)

could bring infinitely greater difficulties and problems not just for the Soviet Union, but the world.

The world is still a dangerous and uncertain place. Even outside the European boundaries there are difficulties and problems of religious fundamentalism in the Near and Middle East. Who in this Assembly would deny that the tinderbox of the Middle East could explode at any time and a new conflict break out, the consequences of which would be impossible to forecast?

Therefore, we need to continue working more and more closely with the United States of America. As Sir Geoffrey Finsberg said, we must not forget that if America's involvement had been greater in the early part of this century, we might well have avoided two appalling world wars. We must not be lulled into a sense of false security, but at the same time we must put our effort and work into building democracies, supporting those new democracies and helping those who wish for a truly peaceful world. At the same time we must maintain an effective defensive shield otherwise we might jeopardise the freedom of generations to come.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as this is the first occasion on which I have spoken in this Assembly as a fully-fledged member, I resolved to remain silent and listen to the interesting speeches made here on a subject of the utmost importance. However, I do not wish to miss this opportunity of thanking all the speakers who have referred to Spain for the many expressions of regard and the cordial welcome given to our delegation, as well as Minister Eyskens who spoke in the same vein. Nor would I wish to neglect this opportunity of at least indicating the attitude with which we join this Assembly, and of congratulating Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on his excellent report.

Our position on such an important subject as relations between NATO and WEU is simply as follows. The world outlook is now very hopeful owing to the spectacular collapse of the system of scientific socialism, admitted by the rulers themselves with a sincerity and honesty greatly to their credit. But this extremely important event with historic consequences is also undoubtedly due to the rôle played by the organisations created for multinational or multilateral co-operation in the West after the second world war.

Mr. President, I am very glad to be speaking now, just after the representative and observer from Poland who has paid warm tribute to our organisations as having defended western civili-

sation. The effectiveness and vitality of our multilateral organisations such as the European Community, the Council of Europe, WEU and NATO should encourage us to keep them in being whilst adapting them to the new times and circumstances, even strengthening them as Minister Eyskens said, rather than falling into the temptation of weakening them.

We therefore believe, Mr. President, that the main tenor of Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's report is the need to strengthen these organisations and that the main challenge facing Western European Union in the immediate future is to strengthen it, because we shall not be able to achieve the full integration of Europe without also achieving the full integration of its defensive system. In the debate on Mr. Eyskens's speech some speakers referred to the differences between security and defence, saying that there are grey areas between the two spheres. Clearly, many things are necessary for the attainment of security; they include goodwill, dialogue and a climate of détente and above all adequate means of dissuasion in case there are temptations to destroy this security. And the only means of dissuasion is a firm policy of defence by multilateral co-operation through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation together with WEU. These organisations are definitely not incompatible; rather they are complementary and necessary. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – This is an interesting report which deserves to be approved in the Assembly, not least because it demonstrates a significant degree of political convergence, as shown by the realisation that there is a prospect of peace. The report is realistic in that it recognises that during the transition to peace there are certain difficulties. But it is sufficiently optimistic to justify suggesting that Mr. Bowden's untypical pessimism can be avoided.

The report also realistically recognises that we need the alliance structures, because if we are to build a bridge of peace that must be done by detailed negotiation and without the structures such negotiations cannot effectively proceed. We must also consider what will eventually happen when the negotiations are successful and when we have all crossed the bridge to peace. Then, perhaps, the structures can be changed and we must move to the CSCE framework. I am glad that it was mentioned in the report.

The CSCE framework cannot be transferred to the Community; no matter what governments or ministers may say, the responsibility is one for the whole common house of Europe – for the Europe of the thirty-plus, for the confederation, not for the trading federation of the Twelve.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

There must also be adequate North American involvement and interest, and I am glad that Sir Geoffrey has begun to grasp that nettle. Europe must also grasp it, and relatively soon.

Earlier, I mentioned political convergence. I thank the Rapporteur for his reference to short-range nuclear weapons. Greater urgency must now be shown in that respect, not least because of the political position that must emerge in Central Europe. I was reminded of this matter by Mr. Caro's speech yesterday, in which he referred to the hedgehog. My British colleagues will be aware that I have an amateurish but long standing interest in natural history and wildlife, and some years ago I made a speech about the hedgehog in the British Parliament.

The hedgehog is a species under threat. Mr. Caro saw a model in it. He saw it as a peaceable animal surrounded by its own defence arrangements in the form of its spines, which have developed through the centuries to withstand threats posed by natural predators. Unfortunately, the spines of the hedgehog are no protection against the onslaught of automotive power and modern technology. Humanity may now have reached the point at which its technological abilities outstrip its capacity to defend itself. This is why it is essential that the process of peace be pursued and why it is reasonable for us to assume that we are no longer technologically capable of providing absolutely secure defences, given the ever-increasing offensive capacity of technology.

Europe may at last be poised to make arrangements to establish peace. Mr. Bowden was right: the world now requires a balanced and sensible Europe with a degree of structured stability which is necessary in the global interest, and so much is perceived, directly or indirectly, in the report. So, whatever disagreements we may have about minor details, the historic thrust of the report should command overwhelming endorsement in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we are today at a juncture where so much is changing in international relations so quickly and so basically that it is impossible to give definitive answers at this stage to the new challenges. To my mind our first need today is to frame the right questions and sort out what problems need to be solved. I regard Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's report first and foremost as an analysis of the problems and I also consider that it was right and necessary to deal with this subject in connection with Mr. Pontillon's report.

It used occasionally to be said that the purpose of NATO was to keep the United States in and the Soviet Union out of Europe and to keep the Germans down. Although this kind of simplification may not please everyone, the subject is still topical. Out of the countless new problems arising I would pick the following three areas: first the involvement of the United States in Europe, secondly the integration of reunified Germany in a collective security system and thirdly the security interests of the Soviet Union.

I think it is essential to do everything to facilitate and where possible even strengthen American co-responsibility for the security of Europeans. For this there are two possible structures. One is NATO and the other is the CSCE. Both should be used for the even more intensive development of Euro-American co-operation and shared responsibility.

The report's proposals regarding the emphasis on WEU as a body that will strengthen NATO and American involvement seem very useful in this respect. The fact that, for the first time, a representative of the American administration is to address the Assembly is a welcome sign that this WEU objective is increasingly understood by the United States.

The second problem area concerns the determination of reunified Germany's security policy position in Europe. I need hardly mention that this is one of the most difficult questions. The German question dominated the most recent American-Soviet summit and is the centre of attention at all multilateral conferences at which security questions are discussed. Understandably the number of countries wishing to take part in the processes of consultation and decision on Germany's security policy affiliation is extraordinarily large. The Germans certainly do not want to exclude anyone; but neither do they want any new special status for a reunified Germany. I am therefore pleased to see that the recommendation urges that reunified Germany's participation in the collective security of Western Europe should take Soviet security interests into account. Often what is not said in a recommendation is important, as well as what is. The recommendation does not, for example, include the requirement that reunified Germany must belong to NATO.

It is also worth noting that, publicly at least, the Soviet Union has so far only rejected NATO membership for reunified Germany. Membership of WEU has not been discussed in this connection. Whether this is as simple as the Rapporteur made it sound in his oral presentation, i.e. that, in the event of the accession of the German Democratic Republic under Article 23 of the Basic Law, the WEU treaty would

Mr. Antretter (continued)

automatically apply to the whole of Germany, I do not know. The Federal Government is rather more hesitant on this point. It recently answered a question on the subject in the Bundestag and I quote from that answer:

“ The security policy status of the territory of the present German Democratic Republic will need to be clarified in all its aspects with the freely elected government of the German Democratic Republic and with the four powers responsible for all Germany. The question of the area of validity of the WEU treaty also belongs in this context. ”

One of the most important recommendations in my view is the one asking the Council to use WEU to help restore mutual confidence between Eastern and Western Europe.

That brings me to the third problem area, i.e. the security interests of the Soviet Union. When the Paris treaties were originally discussed, Mr. Mendès-France, the French Prime Minister at the time, said in November 1954:

“ The system of arms limitation and control provided in the Paris treaties constitutes in my eyes a useful example, even a prototype, of a more general system. ”

If we really want to use WEU as a pan-European control and security institution, which would also be of interest to the Soviet Union, we would have to strike out on completely new paths. But in any case new thinking is required of us all. One possibility could be to involve the Soviet Union and other East European states in verification within the framework of WEU. We should also remember that the agreement signed in December 1957 on a binding procedure with regard to control did not enter into force because France would not ratify it. In a future verification process constitutional measures should guarantee this kind of procedure.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I too should like to congratulate the Rapporteur on carrying out an undeniably difficult task because, both as regards the development of European structures and the development and adaptation of NATO structures to a new geostrategic situation, we find ourselves at the crossroads. This report has been drawn up at an intermediate juncture and had therefore to leave all its doors open to events due to take place in the weeks and months to come. It is nevertheless well-timed when it stresses – you know how much I am in favour of strengthening or even further revitalising WEU – the importance of having the United States associated with the organisation of European security. This should

not be forgotten just as we should not forget that, although the Brussels Treaty was signed before the Washington Treaty that established NATO, it is precisely the fact that the Brussels Treaty was already there and signed that made the Washington Treaty possible.

I propose briefly to recall the circumstances in which these events occurred. Recently, at a conference in Brussels, Mr. Harmel recalled that on the afternoon of that day in 1948 when the Brussels Treaty was signed, Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, who was at that time the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, received a telephone call from President Truman asking him whether the treaty had actually been signed. The Belgian Minister replied that it had, and Mr. Truman said: “ Well then we can now get round the table and talk about extending European security to the United States! ” The Atlantic Alliance was born.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg quite rightly points out that if the United States had been more closely associated with European security at the start and middle of this century the two world wars would probably not have happened. This is worth remembering.

That said, contrary to the previous speaker, and in particular with respect to one of the sentences in the draft recommendation, I have some reservations. Paragraph 2 reminds us that:

“ The Assembly considers it necessary for a reunified Germany not to be neutral and that it be integrated in the European Community and play a full part in an all-European security system as soon as it is set up by the CSCE and, during a transitional period, a search be made for solutions acceptable to all concerned with maintaining balance and peace in Europe. ”

What I regret – and what my predecessor was delighted to discover – is that it does not state in so many words that a unified Germany should form part of Europe. In my view it is essential that a unified Germany must of course and automatically belong to Western European Union. But it should also, then, belong to NATO for it would be unthinkable that, just to make it easier for the Soviets to withdraw troops from Eastern Germany – where they have about 380 000 men – and to allow the Democratic Republic of Germany into NATO as part of a unified Germany, we should virtually accept that Federal Germany, five or six times the size of Eastern Germany, should drop out of the NATO integrated military command and the Atlantic structure. For us this would obviously be a totally unacceptable reverse. It is unthinkable that a unified Germany should one day not be a full member of NATO, which obviously would also imply – and I hope for the German people that this happens – the with-

Mr. De Decker (continued)

drawal of all Soviet troops from East Germany. This is also an obvious precondition if Berlin is to be once again the capital of Germany, because I cannot see how a city can be the capital of a country when encircled by Soviet troops. It is for all these reasons that I regret that the report does not state formally that Germany should form part of NATO.

On the other hand, it does say that Germany should "play a full part in an all-European security system as soon as it is set up by the CSCE". Here too, the task of finding a solution for European security is being delegated to the CSCE. This is something I deplore, because we have an institution which is perfectly capable of doing this, especially as it is now being attended by observers from the Eastern European countries. The Atlantic Alliance has a part to play and so does the Council of Europe and the European Community. We must always seek to strengthen the structures of Europe, as Mr. Eyskens said this morning, and not start accepting their dilution into another structure, which, if given too much importance, would quickly be converted into a United States-USSR condominium. Europe must play the rôle and bear the responsibilities that are specifically Europe's own.

I also feel that this recommendation is important in its appeal to those member countries that do not form part of the NATO integrated command. The recommendation specifically asks them to examine to what extent the new situation and the new rôle to be played by NATO allow them to associate their armed forces more closely with joint deployment. This paragraph is clearly directed particularly to France and Spain. I think that Europe is really at a turning point in its history. We know that at a certain moment, and for historical reasons familiar to all of us, General de Gaulle – in my view he was probably right at the time – decided to withdraw from the integrated command, more particularly in order to secure complete independence in connection with the French nuclear deterrent. It was the right decision at the time but, now that a complete change is taking place in the geostrategy of the continent with Soviet disengagement in Eastern Europe and the lifting of the leaden blanket weighing down upon the countries in this region of the world, I believe we are reaching a stage where we must have an all-round security concept for Europe – "une sécurité tous azimuts" as General de Gaulle would have said – and not be obsessed by a possible danger from the East.

In the light of the changes to come in NATO – there is talk of a meeting in Scotland next week and a summit of heads of state and government – the time has come to make NATO more European and it would be very positive, in that

context, if Spain and France were to return, maybe only partly, to the NATO integrated military command. We could, at the same time, of course, hope that Western European Union will make a fresh attempt at revitalisation. We could try to find a second mind – couldn't we, Jean-Marie Caro? – for what we were trying to do in 1984 and perhaps have a shot at developing the rôle of WEU's political-military structure. However, I repeat that we must bear in mind that there is no possible security for Europe without the help of the United States and, hence, that the rôle of the Atlantic Alliance is fundamental.

The events that are now taking place should encourage the French and Spanish Governments to review their position regarding the integrated military command. It would make what most of us want possible, namely, a far more European NATO. It would also give WEU a much greater rôle because WEU has the tremendous advantage of having no geographic limitations so that its out-of-area capabilities have exactly the answer required for the serious challenge and great new danger confronting Europe – the danger that will still be left – namely the events taking place in North Africa, the Middle East and the southern flank of Europe.

I should be extremely happy if, as a result of your report, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, we were to see a definite move in this direction, which would strengthen both the security of the European countries within the alliance and, above all, the development of Europe as a political entity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is adjourned.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance (Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1225).
2. Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee, Document 1223).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.50 p.m.)

THIRD SITTING

Wednesday, 6th June 1990

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1225*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Soell, Mr. Lopez Valdivielso, Mr. Veryvakis (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Spiliotopoulos (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Ward, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Ahrens (*Chairman*).
4. Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1223*).
Speakers: The President, Lord Newall (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Mezzapesa, Mr. Speed, Mr. Fioret, Sir John Stokes, Mr. Fassino, Mr. Kosutic (*Observer from Yugoslavia*), Mr. Feldmann, Mr. Martino, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Sole, Mr. Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Meisel (*Observer from the German Democratic Republic*), Mr. Kiraly (*Observer from Hungary*).
5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance

(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1225)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee on WEU in the Atlantic Alliance and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1225.

The debate is resumed.

I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the Rapporteur, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, has submitted a very interesting report at a very turbulent and stirring time. He was fully aware how difficult it is to make valid statements that will not be overtaken by events. Therefore he has understandably emphasised fully accredited facts and recommended us to stick to them.

This has not lessened his awareness that the tried and tested ties and alliances are faced with fresh challenges, owing to the peaceful and democratic revolutions in East-Central Europe and Eastern Europe and the imminent reunification of the two German states. Considerable changes have already taken place in the security situation.

Recommendation 1 of the report does indeed say something about the Soviet Union, though to me what it says is somewhat questionable, because it does not sufficiently take account of the substantial withdrawals of Soviet troops that have already taken place, from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and also to some extent from the German Democratic Republic. But that is by the way. More important is the fact that in countries such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the German Democratic Republic the military cohesion of the Warsaw Pact virtually no longer exists; only a vague political alliance remains. This clearly demonstrates – and the Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact is meeting today in Moscow – that considerable changes in the security situation had taken place even before agreements on conventional disarmament were reached in Vienna.

¹ See page 20

Mr. Soell (continued)

According to estimates by the American intelligence services and the United Chiefs-of-Staff, it is clear that the early warning period has lengthened not merely by days but by weeks. In other words the highly tense situation, the state of alert we have had in Europe for so many years, no longer exists.

The Rapporteur justifiably raised the question as to how the problem of the accession of the German Democratic Republic to Western European Union is to be settled. Regarding the problems bound up with the two-plus-four talks and the fact that the Soviet Union, at least for the present, has not agreed to reunified Germany's becoming a member of NATO, it is often forgotten that under Article 23 of the Basic Law the German Democratic Republic will automatically become a member of Western European Union on joining the Federal Republic.

Nor is the public aware that Western European Union makes a large number of decisions which are binding upon its members. There is an automatic duty to the alliance. There is the obligation to defend each others' frontiers. Furthermore there is no provision, as there is in the NATO agreement, for the option of leaving the organisation within one year. On the contrary, there can be no resignations before 1998, unless all the other members of Western European Union agree. What this means is that the accession of the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic and hence to Western European Union has from the viewpoint of international law a binding force quite different from, say, the accession of the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic in the light of its membership of NATO.

In contrast to the assessment expressed in the report, however, I would remind members that, as other speakers have emphasised, the obstacles on the Soviet side are matters less of substance than of psychology. We have discussed this matter in previous debates, particularly at the extraordinary session held in Luxembourg. For it was the Soviets who made the greatest sacrifices in defeating Hitler's fascism in the second world war.

I believe that the problem of membership of NATO by a reunified Germany would be easier to solve if three concessions could be made to the Soviet Union. Firstly, they should be informed in the two-plus-four talks – in advance of further negotiations in Vienna about conventional force reductions – about the future size of the German armed forces, and not only of the armed forces of the Federal Republic, but also of the present National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic.

The second point, which is certainly not the main item for discussion, concerns financial settlements. In view of the fact that some of the withdrawals of Soviet troops from Eastern and Central European countries to the Soviet Union have been halted because there were not enough barracks or family accommodation available there, it is understandable that, in addition to the many other problems we are aware of from direct observation in the Soviet Union, the problem of financial settlements is also of special importance, and we should be forthcoming in this respect.

The third important point is entry into a comprehensive system of security at European level. I concur with the Rapporteur, who said that we do not need yet another bureaucracy here. Standing bodies like the Conference of Foreign Ministers are mainly concerned, and these do not require extensive staff and equipment. A verification centre, which has been proposed by several governments, is also needed, and of course there is a need for greater obligations under international law.

The Belgian Foreign Minister, who is still the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, has proposed a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and what remains of the Warsaw Pact, and the members of NATO. That would undoubtedly be a further step which would make it easier for the Soviet Union to agree that a reunified Germany should be a member of NATO.

Yesterday in his report on the summit conference in Washington the Secretary-General said that this had been the last summit conference on the old pattern. No longer would decisions about the future of Europe be taken in Washington or Moscow. This sounds very impressive – but what is the real situation? Yesterday our friend and colleague Jean-Marie Caro asked a number of penetrating questions about the security policy aspects of European political union. Let me speak quite frankly on this subject. If you study what the individual governments of member countries of Western European Union believe on this point you will find that there are at least three major lines of thought.

I shall start with the German view. Large sections of the German public, including sections of the government, are in favour of political union, believing that in view of the problems of embedding a reunified Germany in a future Europe this is even more urgent than before, but they are sceptical about the security policy aspect of European political union.

Turning now to the French Government, it is clear that it has not yet made up its mind whether to give up its special position in the matter of military integration or to put its armed forces, including their nuclear components, into a European political union.

Mr. Soell (continued)

The British Government continues to insist on its special relationship with the United States and believes that this would be best safeguarded by placing the emphasis on membership of NATO and of the integrated NATO military structure. There are doubtless many other positions within the countries of Europe, especially those that carry genuine weight and could play a leading part in European political union.

If this is a correct assessment of the reservations existing in the various countries, it becomes clear that the dangers to Europe which might arise, and not just from outside Europe, can be eliminated only if they are overcome by a forward-looking consensus. Indeed even the degree of economic and political unity achieved so far will be imperilled in the long run if we do not make progress in this area. I have to say, as several speakers before me have emphasised, that the dangers which may threaten Europe from outside will be different in kind from the threats with which we formerly had to reckon between East and West, and these new threats will have to be countered by different means.

It is not possible to halt certain population movements by nuclear deterrence. Religious fundamentalism cannot be combated with conventional rearmament. What is needed in these circumstances is a more thoroughgoing political, economic and social consensus, with appropriate strategies stemming from this consensus on the part of all European countries.

In conclusion may I again emphasise that Western European Union offers a contractual and institutional framework for the inner security policy nucleus of a Europe constructed on the pattern of concentric circles. However, we must now really make use of this framework, not in an exclusive way but rather so as to offer countries from Eastern and Central Europe the opportunity of involvement in one way or another. It is critically important for the nucleus itself to be aware that it must now organise itself differently in matters of security policy, and by so doing will really become the European pillar of NATO. At present we could not even call it a little pillar. Just now, both governments and we ourselves are simply pushing a lot of paper about.

Finally, my hope is that now that our Assembly has a French President and that from 1st July we shall also have a French President of the Council of Ministers, this will provide a powerful impetus. France can play an important part in building up the security policy component of European political union. If France goes ahead, others who at the moment are still balking in one way or another will follow.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lopez Valdivielso.

Mr. LOPEZ VALDIVIELSO (*Spain*) (Translation). – Thank you Mr. President. May I begin by congratulating Sir Geoffrey Finsberg for the extraordinary report he has produced, and for his brilliant and convincing exposition. We have a saying in Castile, where I come from, that the best way to promote understanding is to call a spade a spade, and that is what you have done. In line with the content of that report, and although by now nearly everything has been said that can be said, I should like briefly to refer to what in my opinion are the three key aspects of the matter.

It is obvious that because of the historic events through which we are living, we have to embark upon the difficult task of trying to formulate a new doctrine on European defence and security, that everything or nearly everything that has so far been said and written about Europe and its defence has become largely obsolete and inapplicable, and that this rapid succession of changes can invalidate current thinking from one day to the next. But it is equally true that in matters affecting security a new page has been turned; the only reality today is that the outlook has changed, but that the most difficult and really important part is yet to come. We who are here represent the expression of the popular will of a great number of European citizens who believe in freedom and democracy. We therefore bear the responsibility and the obligation to be objective in analysis and to follow the dictates of the head, not of the heart only – in short, not to indulge in wishful thinking. Consequently we have to proceed with extreme caution in building the Europe that has come to birth after the cold war. On with all the conversations, conferences and agreements that make for peace; but let us not forget that the Soviet army has not vanished overnight, and that the personal luck of Mr. Gorbachev should not make us oblivious to the delicate path the architect of perestroika has to tread.

It would be absurd for Western Europe to believe its wishes have been fulfilled, since the way before us is strewn with too many unknown hazards. In a word, what has happened so far is important, but does not warrant the West's dismantling a whole system of security which has given such good results.

My second thought, connected with the previous one, is that neither past happenings nor those likely in the near future would appear to contradict this affirmation. European security is unthinkable without the assistance of the United States of America. A European security doctrine cannot be formulated outside the framework of NATO. As is well said in the report, the threat may be different but it has not yet gone away. NATO has played, is playing and will continue to play a fundamental rôle in the security of Europe.

Mr. Lopez Valdivielso (continued)

The report states that the western world cannot disarm more than is sufficient to ensure re-establishment of the balance of forces in Europe and maintenance of an acceptable deterrent force in case of a reversal of Soviet policy. Can this be done without the assistance of our allies on the other side of the Atlantic? Despite all that has happened up till now, Soviet military capacity, far from having decreased, has increased, particularly on the southern flank of the alliance where the Comiso base is being evacuated and there is argument about whether the base at Crotona to accommodate 401 wing, at present in Torrejón, should be constructed. In addition, the Pentagon plans to close all air bases east of the Rhine, and congressmen in America are being urged to approve the closure of more than a hundred bases on American soil. Is not all this worrying for Europe?

As the report says, rather than adopting untried theories, Europe should establish a new security scheme directly involving Canada and the United States. One of the basic principles of deterrence is the credibility of a possible response to materialisation of a threat. Would this be possible without the assistance of the United States? The strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance, of WEU itself, depends only on the Europeans themselves, but it is in their interest to do this in concert with the United States, doubtless lessening the financial burdens and reducing the responsibilities of the United States, but without introducing any element of antagonism.

Thirdly, I believe that the neutralisation of a united Germany would stand in the way of any policy of joint security in Western Europe, would finally put an end to WEU, and thus weaken the European pillar. In other words, the defence of Europe necessarily involves a united Germany which is a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. On the one hand, the unification of Germany cannot take place unless East Germany recovers full sovereignty within a single Germany. And this is neither feasible nor imaginable without the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of East Germany, which is essential for the right of the German people to free elections in accordance with Mr. Gorbachev's statement in his speech at the United Nations in 1988 when he said that free elections constitute a universal principle allowing of no exceptions. Moreover, German unification cannot occur without automatically involving its freely-decided membership of NATO.

Lastly, Mr. President, I am a member of the delegation of a country, Spain, which yesterday became a member of this Assembly of Western European Union. Perhaps therefore it is presumptuous of me to make definite statements.

But now more than ever this organisation has the opportunity to play a decisive part in the near future – to be the vehicle and link for closer relations between the two sides of the Atlantic. When voices are heard questioning the viability and even the need for Western European Union, I reply that it can and must be essential to the construction of a new security doctrine banishing the possibility of subjugated citizens forever. Let us leave future generations the heritage of a united and free Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Veryvakis, Observer from Greece.

Mr. VERYVAKIS (*Observer from Greece*). – The occasion of the debate on WEU in the Atlantic Alliance, and in particular on the draft recommendation about the tightening of links between WEU and European members of the Atlantic Alliance which are not members of the organisation, presents me with an opportunity to mention the case of my own country, Greece.

In 1987, Greece asked for full participation in WEU, considering such action could help European union, security and defence. In April 1989, the Ministerial Council established the procedure for consultation, but we are still waiting for full membership of this institution.

It would be useful to remind the Assembly that the member countries of WEU use the Single European Act as the cornerstone of their commitment to building a European union. It should, however, be recalled that the Single European Act was signed and ratified by all members of the European Community "to transform relations as a whole among their states in a European union".

The creeping distinction between the members of the Economic Community and those of WEU, who see in their platform "the revitalisation of WEU as an important contribution to the broader process of European unification", far from strengthening their cohesion, risks introducing a division which would unavoidably hinder the European construction to which we are all dedicated. We are obliged, I think, to accept more new member countries.

In 1988, the European Parliament decided that the political, economic and military aspects of security are related and cannot be considered separately. That, too, is important.

It is obvious that the European Community and WEU are pursuing parallel objectives, so the non-participation in WEU of the member states of the European Community which have formally expressed their desire to accede to WEU constitutes an anomaly which is hardly conducive to European construction. New developments in Central and Eastern Europe, too, create new political situations.

Mr. Veryvakis (continued)

We all welcome the sweeping changes in Europe in 1989 and 1990. The division of Europe is now being overcome. The emergence of new democracies following free elections is opening up new prospects for broader co-operation among Europeans. On the other hand, it is more necessary now than in the past for the member countries of the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance to promote a European security dimension and to unite their efforts in the same institutions and organisations to overcome the instability and uncertainty of the times.

Thus, we Greeks think that the full participation of Greece in WEU will further the achievement of WEU's aims. Greek observers repeat that the candidacy of Greece for immediate full membership of the institution should be accepted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cetin, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. CETIN (*Observer from Turkey*). – I congratulate the Rapporteur on his excellent report on WEU and the North Atlantic Alliance.

We have reached a watershed in European history. The surprising developments and radical changes of the past months in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are a sign that we have reached a rare turning point in the history of Europe and of the world. We have observed with satisfaction developments on the way to democracy and peace. It may be said that, in a sense, world war two is now coming to an end.

The political and social developments in Eastern and Central Europe have started to create the conditions necessary for the establishment of a durable and stable order of security in Europe, and it should be our principal aim to contribute to the establishment of such an order. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that, in a period of rapid change and uncertainty about the future, we must move ahead with the utmost caution. The need for such caution is emphasised in the report. I am sure that NATO and WEU have an important rôle to play in the unification of Europe and in establishing an efficient defence and security system for Europe.

A question remains to be answered, if WEU is to work more efficiently as a European pillar of NATO in this process: what is our Rapporteur's opinion concerning European members of NATO which are not, at present, members of WEU, such as Turkey, Greece and Norway? Whatever criteria are used, it is difficult for me and for the Turkish people to understand why Turkey is still not a full member of WEU.

As an active member of OECD, the Council of Europe and NATO, Turkey has shown its strong interest in all the relevant matters and in the democratic values and institutions of the European movement over the past forty-five years. We are very pleased to have representatives of the Central and Eastern European countries in any western organisation and they have our sincere support. But how can we explain why priority should be given to the newcomers?

We all know, too, that things are becoming more complicated. There are several different Europes; the Europe of NATO consists of fourteen countries; the Europe of the European Community consists of twelve countries; Western European Union consists of nine countries. We have also the Europe of the OECD and the Europe of the Council of Europe. Having listened to the Minister this morning, I am somewhat confused about the functions and rôle of WEU and the European Community. WEU is known as the European pillar of NATO and deals with security and defence matters, whereas the European Community is an economic organisation. If European Community membership is to be a precondition of WEU membership, we shall have to change all the treaties and rules of this organisation.

As you all know, Turkey has accepted the rules and regulations of WEU, and asked for full membership three years ago. The Ministerial Council should now consider the application for full membership from Turkey. The accession of Turkey as a full member of WEU will contribute to the strengthening of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spiliotopoulos.

Mr. SPILIOPOULOS (*Observer from Greece*). – Speaking on behalf of the liberal government party, I congratulate you Mr. President, on your election as President of the Assembly. I also congratulate Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on his exceptional work on the report, WEU in the Atlantic Alliance.

We recognise that, following recent developments in Eastern Europe, European stability must now, more than ever, be based on the collective and individual commitment of all partners in the EC and the alliance. A greater degree of co-operation is fundamental to allow the Europeans to enhance their contribution to stability on the European continent and to the protection of their legitimate security interests.

We also recognise the importance attached to the concluding of a CFE agreement, to the holding of the CSCE summit before the end of the year and to the agreement on new confi-

Mr. Spiliotopoulos (continued)

dence- and security-building measures. We also consider that the momentum of the negotiating process should be sustained to enhance stability, promote co-operative structures and expedite the attainment of a new peace order in Europe.

We stress that Greece plays a major rôle in the construction of European security. We must emphasise that – as has been said by the NATO Secretary-General in the past – “the defence effort of Greece in terms of inputs is one of the best of the alliance”. As was emphasised recently by a high-ranking official of WEU: “from the time that Greece accepts the WEU platform, is a full member of the EC and the alliance, there are no more obstacles for Greece to adhere to the organisation.”

We are happy to congratulate our Spanish and Portuguese colleagues on their accession to WEU as full members. The Mediterranean front is certainly strengthened by that, but the interest of this organisation should be to strengthen it more by accepting Greece’s application for full membership, pending since February 1987. The particular importance that Greece attaches to WEU was recently emphasised by our deputy Minister of Defence in the framework of the Eurogroup.

The newly-elected Greek Government is determined to contribute actively to the building of European security within the European Community, NATO and Western European Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ward.

Mr. WARD (*United Kingdom*). – I, too, congratulate Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on his excellent report. It provides a base for our discussions and clear recommendations for future action. When deciding the future of WEU let us be honest and recognise that we are in competition with other organisations, some of which wish to take over our rôle, and others with which we have had a variable relationship over many years. If we believe in the future usefulness of WEU it is not good enough to accept a passive rôle or to react to events as they happen or, indeed, to react to the decisions of other organisations. As Mr. Wilkinson said in his excellent speech yesterday, we must clarify our strategic objectives and then consider with equal clarity the political means to attaining peacefully those objectives.

We have been reminded by several contributors to our debate about the speed of events. Indeed, this debate might be out of date within seven days. WEU’s reaction to events must be equal to the speed of the events if we are to continue to have a rôle. I hope that you, Mr. President, will ensure that the Presidential Committee continues to keep a watchful eye on that

aspect and that you will not hesitate to call special meetings of your committee as and when you feel that they are needed.

Where do we go from here? Like other contributors, I hope that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from countries where they are no longer welcome will be conducted with all speed. However, given the lessons of history, we must understand the Soviet Union’s concern about granting total freedom to territories which, until recently, it has regarded as its forward defence area. Despite that, the pressure for the withdrawal of troops must be maintained.

We know from our own experience of the difficulties of assessment in NATO and in our own national defence forces that there are demands for so-called peace dividends. Some of those demands are too early and excessive, but there is a public expectation that there will be a general reduction in armaments. Too many people are already spending the money that is to be made so available.

It is with relief that we see that the area of potential military conflict is no longer in Europe. How much more difficult must it be for former eastern bloc countries, who are having to adjust not only their military thinking but to the acceptance of democracy? I call for aggressive optimism from WEU. We have an important rôle. Let us proclaim it and remind the West that a cool and considered response over the years has led us to the present momentous situation where peace looks as though it will triumph at last.

Let us produce reports not just for internal consumption but ensure that reports of the same high quality are targeted at the people and organisations that we wish to influence. Let us build further contacts with Eastern and Central Europe, as has been done so successfully by the Council of Europe. Let us accept that the new democracies make their own decisions in their own interests and let us ensure that they appreciate that there is a widening, not a depreciating, rôle for WEU which ultimately might stretch beyond the frontiers of Europe.

In these exciting times we need cool heads, but we also need decisive and positive action. I support the report and its recommendations in all aspects.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur to tell us what we should understand by the “aggressive optimism” Mr. Ward has referred to and to answer the many questions put to him.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Mr. President. This is the first major report for which I have had the honour of acting as Rapporteur. I shall follow the custom of the United Kingdom Parliament in noting what

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

every contributor said and in making a brief comment on each. Our tradition is that all contributors are courteous in that they remain to hear the reply. I shall assume that all contributors are still in the hemicycle as I comment on their contributions. A total of twenty-seven members have spoken.

Mr. Pieralli was worried about the German issue. He is here: I saw him go out and have a cigar and then come back. I remind him of the ministerial communiqué of 23rd April which made it clear that the people of Germany have expressed their wish that a united Germany should remain a member of NATO, as they have the right to do by virtue of principle 1 of the Helsinki final act. That covers in full how we should look at the proposed German membership of NATO.

Mr. Reddemann sounded a note of caution and that is the theme that I tried to present in the report. As Mr. Reddemann said, the reduction of tension gives rise to euphoria and sometimes euphoria can be dangerous.

Mr. Lagorce asked whether NATO was likely to be swept away. I believe that that is unlikely in the foreseeable future. I was more confused at the end of Mr. Eyskens's speech than I was at the beginning, but I believe that he said that there was a future for both NATO and WEU. He made it clear that WEU is the only organisation with competence in defence matters.

I assure Mr. Tummers that I did not say that things should remain fixed in concrete, because the situation is still fluid and flexible. I hope that my report illustrates that. He was unhappy that I did not spell out what WEU should, or should not, be. I thought that that was self-evident and I did not wish to state the obvious and make a long report even longer.

General Maris spoke of dentistry. Dentists frequently send one to sleep in order to operate. I try not to do that. I might not be unhappy at swapping a dentist's income for that of the average member of parliament but I do not wish to pursue what happens in open holes. In general, dentists fill them with amalgam. Generals sometimes fill holes with bodies.

Mr. Baker, the United States Secretary, spoke of the four circles, as General Maris rightly said, but there are two more – WEU and the Council of Europe with its membership of twenty-three plus five, and soon to be more. That body is almost as large as the CSCE and has the advantage of the Soviet Union as a guest member. It will not feel isolated when matters are being discussed in that forum.

Mr. Morris reminded us of the essential rôle of verification. That surely is the rôle of WEU. We have played that rôle and will continue to do

so constructively. He reminded us of what the report said about the necessity for vigilance in out-of-area activity. That point was appreciated by the United States of America.

John Wilkinson asked us to flesh out our grand strategy policy and to consider how we might enlarge more swiftly. That is a long process. Most were astounded how long it took, once agreement was reached about the accession of Spain and Portugal, for that simple process to go through member parliaments. It took an astoundingly long time, especially in the parliaments of the two new members. The British Parliament passed it about ten days after it became possible, but others took rather longer.

Mr. Wielowieyski of Poland made some welcome comments. He perceptively pointed out that many questions cannot be answered. He is right: much deep thought will be needed swiftly, because too much thought paralyses action. That task is now under way. We have illuminated signposts, but there is a choice of paths, as set out in paragraphs 91 and 92 of the report. I touched on this during my recent visit to Poland, where I addressed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which is chaired by my dear friend, Mr. Zielcowski.

Andrew Bowden concentrated on the major problems of the Soviet Union, of which we must take cognisance. We must be prepared to look beyond the present façade. He rightly said that the scenario is set for us, but much will depend on the strength of the new Supreme Soviet, which may not accept the picture that he painted about the military. Those who have had the privilege of meeting members of the Supreme Soviet know that they are not rubber-stamping things but have made some tough remarks about some of the things happening in the Soviet Union. I do not believe that they would be regarded as a pushover if there were trouble.

Mr. Lopez Henares warned us that the collapse of the socialist system in Eastern and Central Europe could have immense repercussions for all of us and that we need to be cautious.

Peter Hardy agreed that the report shows a large degree of political convergence. I am glad that he appreciates that because I tried to ensure that the report would command the Assembly's respect and support without so castrating its contents that it is useless. That was not an easy task, and I thank Mr. Burgelin for his help in clearly and closely setting out that theme.

Peter rightly said that the Twelve cannot be the spokesmen of the new wider Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic. The Council of Europe consists of twenty-three plus five or six and is the oldest of all the European organisations. Our governments must build on the existing most suitable bodies, which cover the largest possible area.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

Mr. Antretter enlarged the analysis and again stressed the need for WEU, as part of NATO, to ensure that the United States and Canada remain strongly linked with us. The WEU treaty speaks of the Federal Republic. I say, without equivocation, that the moment that the German Democratic Republic becomes part of the Federal Republic, that Federal Republic will be part of WEU. Nobody can veto that because the treaty is very clear. I wish that the Council of Ministers of WEU would have the guts to state the obvious. The lawyers may be arguing, but pragmatic, common-sense politicians know that what I say is right. I wish that they would say it because the relationship that this organisation has built up with the Soviet Union gives the reassurance that the Soviets want and they would not be unhappy if that were stated. I hope that ministers will take that on board.

I am grateful for Mr. De Decker's recognition of the difficulties of preparing such a report at this time. As many members have said, what is written today is invisible ink by tomorrow and you need fresh writing fluid.

Mr. Soell reminded us that the Warsaw Pact is changing and that, while it is weaker, it is becoming political rather than military. That may not be a bad thing.

I am glad that Mr. Valdivielso welcomed my bluntness. My friends sometimes do not like that trait, but I would rather be blunt and call a spade a spade than wrap it up in four hundred words when one could have used only ten. He wisely said that reality should take precedence over our desires.

Mr. Veryvakis and Mr. Spiliotopoulos pleaded for membership of WEU for their country. The Assembly noted that and I am sure that it will be taken on board by the Ministerial Council, as will the remarks of Mr. Cetin on behalf of Turkey. He rightly reminded us that we are at a watershed in our European relationship.

The final speaker, Mr. Ward, realistically reminded us of the fluidity of the situation and of our contacts with the USSR. I hope that we shall be able to have equal contacts with the United States of America. It is sad how difficult that has proved over and over again. As we have established an annual relationship with the Supreme Soviet, it should be possible to do so with Congress. I propose to ask the United States Deputy Secretary of Defence about that when he visits tomorrow because it can be only in our and their interests to have a closer relationship. Let me make it clear that we must not exclude Canada. Interestingly, it is easier to meet Canadian politicians than United States politicians. We want to be able to meet and talk with them and to build on a relationship that is so valid.

Forgive me, Mr. President, if I have spoken for longer than I should have. I am grateful for all the generous remarks which have been made about the report, which was interesting to prepare. I hope that it has proved useful and that it will be a foundation stone on which we can build the common European house, which was invented not by Mr. Gorbachev but, a long time before that, by a distinguished Austrian. Some of us know who wrote that speech. It was our old friend Ludwig Steiner from the Council of Europe – more than twenty years before President Gorbachev used it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Sir Geoffrey, for these replies and for their conciseness; thank you above all for your obvious concern not to bruise the various sensitivities around this Assembly. In this way I hope that your report will shortly be adopted unanimously.

I call the Chairman of the committee who no doubt may wish to add a few comments.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen. May I begin with a word of thanks to all of you who have taken part in this debate and have followed it with great interest. Special thanks are due to our Rapporteur, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, and to the secretariat, because the preparation of this report posed special difficulties, in that events in Europe were changing so fast. Thus the report before you is not a first but a second draft.

We politicians at European level are in a somewhat difficult situation. I always seem to myself like an actor on a stage where the scenery is constantly changing, into whose hand somebody thrusts a piece of paper and says: starting now, it is a different play. At any rate, that is how it seems to us.

Nevertheless we here are all thankful and glad that we now have a shared responsibility for speaking and thinking about the part of Europe which only twelve months ago was still behind the iron curtain that had divided our continent for decades.

Central to yesterday's and today's debate were the problems arising from the reunification of Germany. That is understandable, because a united Germany will be a stronger Germany. I am fairly convinced that a stronger, larger Germany needs a stronger Europe. But a bigger Germany will also have an effect upon the very sensitive balance in Europe. Despite the satisfaction it gives us to know that our system of values has shown itself to be stronger than what in Central and Eastern Europe was called a socialist system, despite our satisfaction that NATO has survived and still survives, whilst the Warsaw Pact has crumbled, nevertheless at the end of this process the Soviet Union must not be

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

given the rôle of the great loser. May I recall what Minister Eyskens said about the psychological situation in Europe. I shall not repeat his words, with which I am in full agreement. We must not press the Soviet Union to the periphery or even push it right out of Europe. For, as Minister Eyskens rightly said, without the Soviet Union there will be no lasting peace and security in Europe. We have to draw the Soviet Union in.

But this also means that the Soviet Union must not catapult itself out of Europe; it must not pursue policies which lead to isolation. Here I see a certain danger in the attitude of the Soviet Union towards the future Germany's membership of NATO, repeated by President Gorbachev in Washington during the past week. All those who have spoken yesterday and today in this room have emphasised that the Federal Republic, including the enlarged Federal Republic, must remain in WEU and also in NATO. For under Article 23 of our Basic Law, union between the two Germanys will not create a new entity in international law, a new state: the Federal Republic will still be here, only enlarged, stronger, and more significant. It is also our intention that the future Germany should remain in the integrated structure, including the integrated military command, at least so long as we have not thought out, planned and implemented a better system of security which embraces the whole of Europe. It is unthinkable for this Germany to be left neutral in the middle of Europe. We cannot secure peace on this continent if a country in the centre of Europe sometimes opts for one side and sometimes for the other. We cannot govern Europe with changing majorities.

It is pertinent to observe in this connection that unlike the Warsaw Pact which, apart from the Brezhnev doctrine, is or was nothing more than a military alliance, NATO has always had two aspects. It has been from the outset both a military and a political organisation. Consequently it is entirely consonant with the principles of NATO when Minister Eyskens says that NATO must become a unifying alliance in Europe, also in order to overcome the psychological hindrances and obstacles in the Soviet Union.

Our colleague, Mr. Reddemann, pointed out yesterday that without the help of our western allies, and especially without the help of the countries represented here, it would never have been possible for us to consider unification of the two German states and see it coming within reach. The future, too, can only be faced together. Nor can the future Federal Republic be debarred from freely choosing an alliance. With your permission, Mr. President, I should like to

quote what the Helsinki Final Act says about this, as Sir Geoffrey has already mentioned:

“Participating states have the right to belong or not to belong to international organisations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality.”

No state, and this includes the future Federal Republic, can be debarred from making those choices.

Mr. President, when last autumn, as we all saw on our television screens, hundreds of thousands of Germans in the German Democratic Republic went on to the streets and demonstrated, at a time when it was not yet known whether these demonstrations might not end like those of 17th June 1953 in Berlin, or in the autumn of 1956 in Budapest, or like the Prague spring – when these people demonstrated last autumn, they were not demonstrating for the Federal Republic. They wanted only one thing: to have the same rights as we in the West have. They were demonstrating for our western system of values: for freedom, democracy and human rights.

This too means quite unequivocally that the decision – the completely free decision – must be left to us, that we can express our loyalty and feel we belong where these rights are guaranteed to us – as in the past, so also in the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1225.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call? ...

That is not the case. We shall therefore vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

May I congratulate you, Sir Geoffrey.

4. Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1223)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee on Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union, Document 1223.

I call Lord Newall, Rapporteur.

1. See page 21.

Lord NEWALL (*United Kingdom*). – My report is short and factual. I am assuming that members may have read it so I do not intend to repeat it all here. Hopefully, it provides all the necessary, relevant information, including the appendices and glossaries for those who, like me, find it difficult to remember all the many abbreviations. It is designed to be not only informative, but to ensure that we, the Assembly, fully understand that our voices should be heard on the issue of conventional disarmament.

Events in Europe are moving fast, as we have already heard many times. The Soviet and East European force reductions have already begun unilaterally without treaties and without verification. The Warsaw Pact is close to de facto dissolution. Now it is all the more important to have a CFE treaty to control, co-ordinate and verify all the changes taking place now – and in the future – until the situation stabilises.

In the past two months the Russians have slowed down the CFE talks. Many people believe that to be due to a lack of instructions from above because of the work overload internationally and nationally. This work overload can be divided into four categories: first, the disarray of the Warsaw Pact; secondly, the problems of reuniting Germany with the two-plus-four talks in which the Germans feel it necessary to have a decision earlier than on the CFE talks; thirdly, the urgent internal problems in Russia; and, fourthly, the military's influence with the politicians.

It is now unlikely that an agreement will be signed at the proposed CSCE summit in the autumn, but I hope that it will be signed before 21st December, a date mentioned by Mr. Eyskens this morning. The Soviets are more concerned about housing and employment for the vast numbers of officers and non-commissioned officers who have been demobilised. It is a much greater problem for them than some of us realise. Even building materials are in short supply, and the rapid changes in Eastern Europe have necessitated the acceleration of movements of Russian soldiers.

I now turn to verification, which is a complex and sensitive subject. There will be an enormous bill to pay; it is a very expensive business. We have to avoid duplication and ensure co-operation, and that can be done by, for instance, organising inspection teams and language and other training. Whether or not this is done by satellite, it will definitely need people on the ground to go and inspect. Verification is a vital part of the force reduction process and until the climate is such that everyone trusts everyone else – I am afraid that that may take a little time – we have to continue with verification ideas.

There has been a lot of talk in Washington and Moscow about using the CSCE process to create more offices and officials and even a par-

liamentary assembly, but there is a great deal of agreement in this assembly that an ad hoc system with a light supporting framework would be better. We do not need any more organisations. After CFE there may be an opportunity to discuss purely national ceilings. That was strongly emphasised when I had informative discussions with the Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Skubiszewski, in Luxembourg, and various other East European politicians have explained to me that they need individual decisions for their countries.

The CFE process will take three, five or possibly even more years to implement, during which time many changes will continue to take place. So it is urgent to reach an agreement and begin the process. We now need the CFE negotiators to set up a European verification centre, as proposed by Mr. Genscher on 23rd March. Membership would not be limited to WEU; all signatories of CFE, East and West, would be members. Hence my and the committee's single recommendation in the report – it was unanimous – for an immensely important rôle for WEU. We should grasp this opportunity for the organisation to show that it has a purpose and can act as it once did in the Gulf in 1987-88. I trust that we may seize this initiative, and if the recommendation is passed I hope that you will all make a conscious effort to relay this decision to your governments and to urge on them some action.

I commend the report to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Lord Newall, for your conciseness.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Lord Newall's report on Vienna, disarmament and WEU is a useful analysis of the current state of the arms control process and of how it affects the perspectives for European security and the future of our organisation. I believe, however, that our debate would have been more comprehensive and fruitful if we had combined it with a debate on Christian Lenzer's technical report on observation satellites and a European means of verifying disarmament.

I have a personal sense of déjà entendu on this subject, as my first report to this Assembly ten years ago was on an observation satellite system for Europe. Europe undoubtedly needs to have at its own disposition a technical means to verify the arms control agreement that will greatly affect the security of our continent.

Arms control verification should most rationally be conducted on a joint basis by the European members of NATO. That is clearly necessary to prevent duplication of effort and

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

the wastefulness inherent in relying on purely national means of verification.

Secondly, as long as an adversarial element remains in our security system in Europe through the perpetuation of totalitarian systems in at least some parts of the continent, we surely cannot allow equal access to our verification data for the USSR and others of the few remaining communist or non-democratic nations in Europe.

Thirdly, we should not invest too much political or emotional capital in the arms control process. The improvement in the defensive position of the western democracies owes far more to internal economic liberalisation – and above all political liberalisation – through the establishment of free and fair elections, multi-party systems and the rule of law in countries such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Poland, than to results from arms control at any level. The process of political change in Europe is far and fast outstripping the arms control process.

Fortunately, we must remember that arms control, as pursued at Vienna, in CFE and elsewhere, institutionalises a bloc-to-bloc confrontation which has already been overtaken by events. It may be a negotiating convenience for NATO to deal with the Warsaw Pact in Vienna, but the Warsaw Pact, as our Rapporteur reminded us, is no longer militarily or politically a meaningful entity. Perpetuating the fiction of the Warsaw Pact's security policy's relevance and significance could impede more radical policies on our part which could bring swifter and more substantial security dividends to us.

WEU's grand strategy must be, by all means available to us, to underpin and stabilise the democratisation of Central and Eastern Europe. I say Central and Eastern Europe advisedly, because it has undoubtedly been the unholy alliance of old-fashioned Russian imperialism with totalitarian communist ideology these past seventy years – and especially since the world war – that has brought an iron curtain down across our continent and, until recent days, perpetuated a tragically sterile cold war in Europe. It would be inconsistent and anomalous for us, in the democratic nations of Europe, to welcome self-determination and democratisation in Central Europe and not to welcome those liberating processes within the Soviet Union itself. It is hard not to be convinced that the restoration of genuine independence to all the Baltic states and to Armenia, Byelorussia and the Ukraine would be preferable to the perpetuation of a monolithic Soviet Union, although it may be rather easier to negotiate with a monolithic Soviet Union than with a multiplicity of smaller republics in Eastern Europe.

Our Rapporteur has done us a signal service by his comprehensive and thorough analysis of the arms control process as it is today. Nevertheless, I feel that the interests of the superpowers may, at least in the strategic sphere, begin to diverge from those of Europeans – hence the need for a European satellite verification system and for a verification centre to pool the data available from joint efforts, rationally organised on our part under the aegis of WEU or the European members of NATO. That is the way forward and it is better to do that than prematurely to suggest that we have reached such a state of confidence with the Soviets as to wish to make our own satellite data and verification data available to them. After all, they know what they are up to: they do not need us to tell them.

(Mr. Soares Costa, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson, for your contribution to the debate.

The next speaker on our list is Mr. Mezzapesa.

Mr. MEZZAPESA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, credit is due to Lord Newall for his well-constructed and very detailed report which offers pertinent thoughts on the rôle of Western European Union in the completely changed circumstances in Europe, particularly as regards arms control.

As he says, it is true that today's events may be overtaken by tomorrow's; what is essential is that we at all times act with clear ideas, strategies and policies in the firm belief that by taking cohesive action we are or may be furthering the changes.

What seems to me to be the main gist of the report before us is that European co-operation must not be compromised. The upheavals in the East must not be used by any country as grounds for acting on its own and in its sole interest in the matter of disarmament. We said so in the strongest terms in Luxembourg and we are very pleased that this demand is taken up and reiterated in Lord Newall's report.

The break-up and termination of other alliances should not necessarily lead to the disintegration of our unity which above all has shown itself in the past to be the best way of serving the cause for which that unity was sought, namely, defence against possible aggression and therefore the preservation of peace. This does not, however, mean remaining deaf and blind to the new circumstances; it means maintaining the same purpose and determination, adapting tactics and reviewing means and methods of intervention with the degree of flexibility which today's events call for.

Mr. Mezzapesa (continued)

In this respect the Rapporteur is right when he says that the Council of Ministers cannot take a bureaucratic and cavalier attitude to the Assembly's recommendations saying that ideas are before their time, that the subject is not within the province of Western European Union and so on. Today's headlong changes call for more flexible attitudes and, first and foremost, the completion of matters in hand, for example by asking national parliaments to ratify the CFE treaty quickly and then by the promotion of a broader, convergent approach to security, a policy to which we committed ourselves when, in November 1989, we approved Mr. Steiner's report which argued that the WEU countries should respect the NATO alliance but should in future concert their action more fully through the new Institute for Security Studies which we asked for. Gradually we should get away from the idea of bloc against bloc which has always been and still is the basic philosophy of the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.

This is also a very appropriate context for the proposal for a European verification centre observing the same philosophy as the European satellite observation agency, proposed by this Assembly in Recommendation 468, which ensures that all countries are completely open to each other.

It is vital that we should always be guided by clear thinking and a spirit of realism, and not give way to easy and dangerous enthusiasm. For example, Mr. President, I cannot share some people's misguided enthusiasm for the recent summit in Washington and at Camp David. An Italian might well be in his seventh heaven at seeing Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev singing *Funiculi Funiculà*, although that is certainly much better than seeing somebody banging on his desk with his shoe at the United Nations.

But the brio of a Neapolitan song is not enough to dispel the fears and doubts about this summit which produced no concrete results or not at least those hoped for, either on the reduction of strategic missiles or cuts in conventional armaments. The reason why the Americans gave the impression that the results were excellent was that, quite rightly, they were concerned not to harm Mr. Gorbachev and not to weaken in his own country a man who unquestionably deserves to be encouraged because it is he who has triggered the most revolutionary changes in the history of our time. And as we have seen in the press today, that same man, when he returns to Moscow, will have to face very serious problems such as Mr. Yeltsin's radicalism, the Lithuanian crisis, food shortages and so on.

The Secretary-General warned us yesterday that the Soviet Union is still only stumbling

towards democracy and the reduction of armaments, so, ladies and gentlemen, it is our duty in these circumstances to maintain, strengthen and extend our union and co-operation to meet the new and very serious problems with which we are faced.

If, on the other hand, we allowed our union to break up we should certainly not be serving the cause of Europe or of world peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Speed.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – I thank my colleague, Lord Newall, for his excellent report, which deals with the complicated question of disarmament and contains a glossary of initials and abbreviations that will be of great use to many people who use them frequently and with facility but who might not know their exact meaning.

This week's debates centre on the importance and relevance of WEU in a fast-changing European scene. We all believe that there is a continuing and important rôle for our organisation but we have much work to do. The report highlights a particular task. I am much in favour of WEU having specific tasks rather than high-flown generalities which cannot be carried forward.

Any disarmament agreement is as good as its verification and monitoring procedures. Trust between members and good intentions are not enough. I disagree with Lord Newall on a minute point that he made in his opening remarks, when he said that it would take some time before trust would be established between the parties to the CFE treaty. Even when trust is established we shall need verification. Governments, military commands and attitudes can change. Verification is an essential bedrock of any treaty that might be agreed.

When the CFE treaty is concluded we shall need a robust and long-lasting régime of verification. It will be costly and complex but it is vital to the security of Western, Central and Eastern Europe.

I agree with the Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, and others, who yesterday stressed the reasons why we should not set up new organisations and institutions. We should seek to modernise, improvise and adapt what we already have. It is in that spirit that the report recommends setting up, under WEU, a European verification centre. That means the pooling of assets, capabilities and know-how. It means joint training of inspection teams. It certainly means guaranteeing proper and equal access to information held by the various countries. I share the Rapporteur's view that the Council should seize the initiative without delay.

Mr. Speed (continued)

I share the Secretary-General's view that the CFE agreement must be brought to an early conclusion. Whatever the reasons for the Soviet Union not making the progress that we should like to see, it is important that the treaty is signed as soon as possible. I hope that the Soviet Union takes a positive attitude to the CFE treaty and that the difficulties involving aircraft are solved within the next few months.

I am disturbed about the issue discussed in paragraphs 41 to 45 of the explanatory memorandum. One year ago today, this Assembly passed a recommendation that a WEU liaison officer should be appointed to the CFE talks. We sent that recommendation to the Council of Ministers. We learn from a reply in the French National Assembly that the issue has never been discussed by the Council of Ministers. As Lord Newall rightly says, the problem is one of communication. I think that it is more than that. At a time when we in the Assembly are rightly trying to push forward positive and constructive ideas and a rôle for WEU in a fast-changing situation, the problem is also one of credibility for the Council of Ministers itself. I hope that there will be no more communication problems and that that extremely important and positive recommendation will be acted upon with speed. I support the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fioret.

Mr. FIORET (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as was to be expected, many questions remain unanswered after the recent meetings between Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev in Washington and at Camp David. The summit did, however, show quite clearly that an agreement between the two super-powers no longer provides a sufficient and appropriate framework for world security and that negotiations on disarmament cannot be limited to East-West relations but require the involvement of more governments and states to defuse situations which threaten war in various parts of the world and particularly around the Mediterranean and in the Middle East where Europe's vital interests are at stake.

Lord Newall's excellent, very detailed report on Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union shows very clearly that the scenarios with which we are faced daily are extremely variable and complicated.

Paradoxically, the uneasy peace and the unlikelihood of war based on the logic of the military blocs, reveal the urgent need for permanent balances no longer maintained by deterrent weapons. Prior to the complex events of 1989 in the eastern countries, the basic problem for the maintenance of peace was to

present an adequate response to the threat. Since the crumbling of the Berlin wall, the basic problem is that of ensuring security with means that render new threats unlikely.

The Vienna negotiations which typify this philosophy and the appropriate methods could not be other than they are because states which are all involved in the CSCE process are included. The accepted principle that a mutually controlled security system must be set up is posing and will continue to pose questions regarding implementation which it will be difficult to resolve at purely military and technical level. German reunification confirms that Europe as a whole must take joint action to work out a security strategy and to play a leading rôle in maintaining its special historical traditions.

The turning point of Helsinki was certainly made possible by the part played by the United States and the Soviet Union but the results would not have been achieved without the active participation of the European countries who saw the CSCE process as putting an end to the Yalta logic, in the name of a common historical and political destiny which the 1945 agreements were unable to destroy. But wiping out the past is not enough for building the future. It is, of course, difficult to hazard any guess as to how long the Helsinki 2 conference will take and the emergence of exaggerated expectations reflects more a hope than a realistic assessment of the difficulties to be overcome. Helsinki 2 must be prepared carefully and wisely and requires the establishment of a permanent institution to which the participating states must contribute their historical experience stemming from past glories but also from disappointments and suffering.

Western European Union, together with the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community are organisations and institutions conceived by the father of Europe and certainly created to ensure the wellbeing and security of our peoples, but they are above all the expression of a political will to avoid a repetition of the tragic experiences of the past.

For the Vienna negotiations and even more during the preparations for CSCE 2, Western European Union can therefore serve as an ideal forum for the formulation of ideas and strategies and for free and frank discussions between our governments and parliamentary representatives.

Lord Newall's report contains valuable suggestions and is a useful point of reference for what we have to do to strengthen peace and security. This is the objective which has united us over these years of shared tension, and which opens up for us the prospect of a new Europe, no longer as a battlefield but as a focus for effective agreements ensuring the wellbeing and freedom of all nations throughout the world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Stokes.

Sir John STOKES (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate my colleague Lord Newall on his excellent report on Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union. Lord Newall has been a valuable member of the WEU Defence Committee for some years, and all his wisdom, moderation and common sense are brought out in his admirable report. His calm and mature view of events is most valuable when so many heavy events are succeeding each other all over the countries of Eastern Europe.

Lord Newall's subject is vast. His clear and brief summaries of the various disarmament talks will be found most useful by all members of the Assembly, as will the excellent appendices and glossaries at the end of the report. His strong suggestion that WEU should have a full part to play in verification will find an echo in many hearts here.

WEU has vast experience of verification. We must hope that our ministers will take most seriously the suggestion of a European verification centre, supported by satellites when necessary, and that they will do all they can to ensure that WEU plays a larger part than at present in the momentous events related to disarmament and other subjects that are now unfolding, including the necessity for the closest liaison with the CFE talks.

Lord Newall's report was not concerned with the problem of the unification of Germany, except that future arms ceilings would have to take account of the addition of German Democratic Republic troops to the forces of the Federal Republic. Clearly the Soviets will be anxious about that and the West must try to reassure them. I believe from what Mr. Baker said yesterday that the West is probably in the process of doing that without in any way hindering the new Germany's entry into NATO.

Lord Newall's summary of the present position in the disarmament talks will be of great help to every member of the Assembly, and I warmly commend the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fassino.

Mr. FASSINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish to join other speakers in recognising that Lord Newall has produced an effective and careful report on disarmament and the functions of WEU. In my view his comments stressing the break-up of the Warsaw Pact, to which many other speakers have alluded, are especially pertinent; until a few years ago this break-up was inconceivable but it now seems to be reality and to be acknowledged on all sides. To think of East Germany as a western country was a contradiction in terms a

few years or even a few months ago; today East Germany is moving economically towards the West – for example the currencies are being unified – and history teaches us if we look back to Bismarck's "Zollverein" that economic unions are always the prelude to political unions. If, therefore, East Germany is shortly to make the dramatic shift into the western ideological sphere – which will undoubtedly be the prelude to restructuring the alliances – we must anticipate the disintegration of the eastern military alliance with a consequent reshaping of the whole European system of defence.

These facts and signs foreshadow a more open and certainly a more relaxed confrontation between East and West. A confrontation which, by concentrating on only two sets of interests, could absorb national rivalries and individual areas of friction. Not, however, the military aspect because we certainly cannot conceive of a Europe unprepared for possible events.

Lord Newall has quite rightly devoted considerable space to the confrontation between the offensive potentials of the two sets of forces, which despite everything still exist. He is also right when he accordingly asks our Assembly to accept the proposal, which seems to me to be generally accepted, already put forward last March by Mr. Genscher, for the creation of a European verification centre to involve not only the WEU countries but all western and eastern signatories of the CFE treaty.

Let us not forget that, although the democratisation of the East has gone forward at great speed, it is not yet as firmly established as we all would like. Let us not forget that Mr. Gorbachev's position has not been greatly strengthened – at least that is how I see it – by the recent talks with President Bush and that his position at home will have to be assessed against possible events over the next few days.

Nor is it yet known what agreement will be reached about Germany, nor is it conceivable, as has been stressed, that anything can be achieved without the agreement of the Soviet Union; if this condition is not fulfilled, no agreement will in fact be possible.

Many possibilities still remain. That is why the Rapporteur's proposal for a European verification centre, which I mentioned earlier, appears to be completely valid and acceptable, even if it involves the formulation of a complex strategy for verifying the forces deployed. Provided, that is – and I wish to stress this point – precise details can be worked out as to how, when and with what means this can be achieved in practice. The proposal is also valid because it calls for vigilance and not lowering our guard in face of a threat which has certainly lessened but has not completely disappeared. The Warsaw Pact forces have not vanished and we must continue to wait.

Mr. Fassino (continued)

Although WEU certainly lacks the operational and military powers of NATO, and is not a military institution able to deploy forces and armies on the battlefield, it must, however, act as a watchful guardian keeping a permanent check on European security; let us not forget that ours is the only European parliamentary assembly with powers of monitoring and not merely the power to make proposals.

That is why I believe the verification centre to be appropriate and consistent with the function of keeping a vigilant watch on a balance of forces which even though extremely delicate, seems to be the surest guarantee of our common security. And in my view WEU could well play a leading rôle in this.

If we want a peaceful Europe, as we all do, from the Atlantic to the Urals, we must, above all, keep a close watch on the advance of democracy in the East and also on the material and reasonable translation of that process into a military balance at progressively lower levels to be consolidated at the essential minimum for countries which sincerely and constructively wish to live in peace with each other.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Kosutic.

Mr. KOSUTIC (*Observer from Yugoslavia*). – It is a genuine pleasure to meet for the second time in succession – on this occasion at an ordinary session of your prominent institution. We not only wish to continue this successfully initiated co-operation but are prepared to do so.

We live in a period of fundamental changes, deep democratic transformation and enormous possibilities. The establishment of world peace, progress and justice are not wholly free of repressive processes. Nationalism and religious fundamentalism are not exclusively characteristic of Central and Eastern Europe; they are characteristic of other parts of Europe and the world in general. Therefore, we are keenly interested in today's item on the agenda.

Yugoslavia has always supported all processes directed at consolidating and strengthening the disarmament process in Europe, convinced that continued efforts towards the democratisation of relations in Europe lead to the democratisation of international relations in general. It is in that context that we view the unification and integration processes, which are the focus of attention on our continent. The European dimension of these processes represents a guarantee of the progressiveness of their orientation. Therefore, we consider these processes to be linked with the CSCE process, which was and has remained a factor of positive

change, the achievements of which are a lasting incentive to co-operation and which contributes to the progressive overcoming of political, economic and ideological divisions on the continent.

The divisions that once existed are gradually and irrepressibly being substituted by the vision of a common European home and of a new order of security and peace, in the construction of which Western European Union can take a significant rôle. In the implementation of this goal, the CSCE, the institutional organisation, can and should assume an important rôle.

In our opinion, the first, although modest, results were achieved at the sixth session of negotiations of thirty-five participating countries on confidence-building measures and security held in Vienna from 15th March to 16th April 1990. The general consensus reached on certain new elements in the future system of confidence-building measures and security, above all in the fields of the surveillance of military activities, military calendars, consultations, promotion of communications among the participating countries, inspires hope that a new substantial document on confidence-building measures and security will be adopted at the summit conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

In our view, the sixth round of negotiations of twenty-three countries on conventional weapons in Europe, held at the same time in Vienna, did not live up to expectations. Nevertheless, it is of paramount importance that, on the basis of their results, the Vienna negotiations on conventional weapons in Europe be asserted as part of a broader process of the CSCE. Yugoslavia supports the negotiations on conventional weapons, and believes that they should evolve into an all-European process. We expect these negotiations to be brought to their successful close at the end of the year, on condition that their progress is not slowed down.

Yugoslavia is contributing to this multilateral trend through its own unilateral measures aimed at disarmament by reducing its military budget and military effectiveness and so on. We must point out the effort we are exerting to achieve a comprehensive and global ban on chemical weapons as a priority issue together with the speedy termination of negotiations and the subsequent signing of a convention on a comprehensive and global ban on chemical weapons. All these, and other forms of disarmament, are without doubt conducive to the strengthening of security – a goal to which we all aspire.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Kosutic, for your contribution.

I now call Mr. Feldmann.

Mr. FELDMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, may I first thank the Rapporteur, our colleague Lord Newall of the Defence Committee, for the good and informative report which will certainly help us to make progress. I should like to make one observation about Chapter VI: The way ahead. I fully support the efforts to make Vienna II follow immediately upon Vienna I to maintain the momentum and the will to disarm.

However, on this matter we must also take very specific action and try to set clear objectives. Vienna I should conclude with the decision to complete the work of Vienna II by the next-but-one CSCE conference in 1992. By that time there must be some tangible results. It would be a good thing if we could include a specific resolution to this effect.

The disarmament negotiations in Vienna should continue and be expanded into pan-European disarmament negotiations. The division which still exists between the thirty-five and the twenty-three should be ended. We are in favour of a common pan-European initiative.

Permit me a further reference to the Vienna discussion on verification. The ideas on verification that have been put forward and discussed in Vienna have a somewhat broader scope than those which the Rapporteur has worked out in his report. The Vienna inspection and verification proposals are more far-reaching inasmuch as they are based on a copious and broadly-based exchange of information, which they regard as an integral part of verification, including even the subsequent on-site inspection of the weapons to be destroyed. That is one of the main points of the wide-ranging thinking about verification.

There is of course also the problem of air inspections. On this subject we have all become somewhat disillusioned after the unsuccessful endeavours to reach an open sky agreement.

I should also like to mention, as many speakers have done today, the hesitant attitude of the Soviet Union in Vienna. The situation has undergone a complete change since the Vienna CSCE conference began. In disarmament talks and in efforts on behalf of peace we must also be careful to take account of the interests of the other side. It is not enough to view complicated questions of security only from our own narrow perspective. We must always be at pains to look at them from the viewpoint of the potential adversary as well. I believe that only then will we attain a realistic view and an objective assessment. After all, our efforts are directed towards achieving stability and peace in Europe, so we should not disregard the ideas and interests of the other side.

The situation has completely changed for the Soviet Union since the CSCE conference began in Vienna. Hungary can no longer be regarded as a member of the Warsaw Pact, neither can Czechoslovakia, Poland nor of course the German Democratic Republic. Without doubt the Soviet Union must now be constantly considering the status of its own pact, of which our Polish colleague said earlier that it still exists but is no longer effective. If the Soviet Union is pondering its own situation from this point of view, no doubt its hesitancy is understandable. But that should not prevent us from making our own contribution to success in the Vienna negotiations. NATO and the West also bear responsibility for achieving a good result quickly in Vienna. NATO has of course already shown flexibility on the military question. But we may have to be a little more flexible on the political side as well.

I should now like to say something about the frequently-expressed reservations about institutionalising the CSCE process. Nobody wants a new bureaucracy, or a Eurobureaucracy. Nobody wants a new body just for the sake of having one. However, we in Europe have a duty to institutionalise the CSCE process. It is a must, and we cannot avoid it.

In this connection we shall have to exercise our imagination and develop a realistic outlook. There is no point in retreating to the dear old positions to which we have become so attached; that will not make for progress. That will not be enough, if we really wish to put stability and peace in Europe on a firm basis.

Hitherto we have had stability, because we have two blocs in Europe. In the future we shall have to work to achieve stability, because we are in transition from confrontation to co-operation, and not only in economic, technological and cultural matters; we are on the way to co-operation in the field of security policy too.

Because the CSCE process offers a good contractual basis, we must institutionalise it and bring into it both our American partners and the Soviets, who in the past have been potentially our military adversaries. We shall be able to build a stable and peaceful Europe only if we include both our American partners and our former Soviet opponents – who are also a European power. Therefore we should not rule out consideration of a European security council. A European centre for the settlement of conflicts and of course the European verification centre discussed in this report should also be included.

Ladies and gentlemen, we cannot afford to push the Soviet Union out of Europe. Rather we must draw the Soviet Union into Europe, for

Mr. Feldmann (continued)

that is in the interests of us all. Events in the Soviet Union are developing in ways that favour our European interests. The Soviet Union is in the process of opening up and treading the path to democracy and pluralism. We should encourage the Soviet Union along this path and tie it into Europe so that even after Mr. Gorbachev it will not look for a Chinese or other non-European way.

In order to reach this goal of a stable peaceful order in Europe – which can only be done with American and Soviet participation – we should regard this European verification centre too as a beneficial and important instrument.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Feldmann, for your intervention.

I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I hold the theory that every time a prevailing security situation is studied and analysed, events inevitably overtake the work done so that it then becomes a review of past events. This certainly does not imply any tardiness on the part of the person making the study because in many cases the rapporteur makes changes while he is drafting his report, goes back over the various arguments, and ultimately feels that he can write a full stop to the questions covered.

But, Mr. President, there is a Penelope that we call history which unravels what was woven before and makes fresh patterns which have to be reconsidered without possible breaks in continuity. Perhaps, Mr. President, that makes our work seem tiresome, a kind of labour of Sisyphus which humiliates every effort made to promote peace in security and freedom.

Even after close examination, therefore, it is not easy to produce detailed proposals about Vienna, disarmament and our organisation. There is meanwhile a basic ambiguity about the assumption that everything relates to a defence problem – to the extent that the Defence Committee looked at these subjects – when from now onwards the question must relate – and we must say so boldly – to global and many-sided security. If this were not the case how is defence to be interpreted? By whom against whom?

The Europe of the days before Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev, with the opposing defences of NATO and the Atlantic Alliance versus the Warsaw Pact, no longer exists, at least not in the old terms now overtaken by current events in Germany. That is true but Hungary, Poland and many other countries involved in the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces in Europe now find themselves, Mr. President, not knowing where they stand and no longer sure of the positive or negative value of numbers.

Mr. President, that is why, looking at our colleague's report with its very full account of developments in Europe and of the great progress recently achieved, considering the clear reference to the problem of Vienna timings we find two sentences, each with a question mark concerning the way ahead. What should be on the agenda? A programme for action by WEU is suggested and described but may seem weak in the light of events. There may be a failure to allow for history and the lack of a courageous approach. We should perhaps decide to look at the fact that institutions have been left behind by the changes in the real situation that could in future be dealt with elsewhere and included in global security which can only be put together here in WEU in our political Assembly with its capacity for understanding the whole political and security problem and of formulating it in a manner consistent with the original modified Brussels Treaty without taking anything away from the supranational institutions by which we are bound.

Then consideration might also be given, with some caution but also with some urgency, to the problem of the application from Turkey and Greece to join before urgent and pressing demands are received from certain eastern countries which are beginning to knock on the door of Europe's common history.

My thanks, Mr. President, to the Rapporteur for his work but I ask both you and myself the questions which still appear to me to be unresolved.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this will be the first time I have spoken in this Assembly and I take this opportunity of greeting all colleagues, whom I know well from the Council of Europe.

Since this is my first time and since I did not take part in the work in committee on this report, I shall not attempt a detailed analysis, which in any event the report does not need. However, its importance leads me to make a few general comments which I think are of interest. It goes without saying that the report is informative, incisive and excellent and I believe in addition that it deals with two extremely relevant matters, one of which I would describe as being of cardinal importance. For it is opportune to speak of disarmament at a time when it is under discussion in Vienna, in the United States, or in Copenhagen, and the question of verification, which is the substantive question of this report, is crucially important in relation not only to disarmament but also to the entire developing process of peace and security. Because disarmament in depth will never take

Mr. de Puig (continued)

place without real verification, nor will a new system of peace and security come into being in Europe without far-reaching, thorough-going verification measures.

Mr. President, in Vienna, in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, in the negotiating committees on conventional forces and everywhere that disarmament questions are being discussed we are not only talking about disarmament in terms of sectors or specific cases; we are discussing and shaping up a new security scenario for Europe. With all due caution and without taking risks, as has been said throughout this morning and yesterday, it is certain that a change in the order of peace in Europe and a change in the system of European security is being thought out. A qualitative and quantitative change preceded by another change. If we talk about transforming the system of security as well, we do so because change has been and is taking place in Central and Eastern Europe and enables us to discuss East-West relations in a different way and from a different perspective – a change which has transformed the assumptions underlying security in Europe.

Communism has fallen, and the outlines of a new internationalism can be discerned – an internationalism which of course looks very different from the one inherited from the second world war. Consequently we are talking about adapting or readapting and transforming NATO; we are discussing the pan-European rôle that can be played by the European Security Conference; and here during our meetings we are discussing and talking about the new meaning which WEU may have, the new goals which Western European Union may have; and because of this there is talk in the European Economic Community about the possibility of enlarging its powers and responsibilities in the field of defence.

We are in the early stages of a wide debate on fundamentals from which must emerge that new order of peace and the new security system. We do not know what this will be like, but obviously suggestions have been made. We all remember how a few weeks ago in the Council of Europe President Havel suggested what he called the Helsinki zone, with a system of security and collective security undertakings, to which both the USSR and the United States would belong and also of course the countries of both Central and Western Europe.

So we are talking about collective security systems different from the former defensive systems based on a given deterrent capability or a given destructive capability. And whilst we are discussing this future framework of security the disarmament process and the very important agreements which have been reached during

recent months are going ahead with some success. This has revealed the very great importance of the question of verification, because there will be neither in-depth disarmament nor a new system of security, nor can minimum levels of deterrence be arrived at, unless the other states are sure that each of our countries truly guarantees not only disarmament, not only the destruction of armaments when this is necessary, but also the assurance that it will not manufacture new armaments clandestinely. Because this is what is at stake, Mr. President, we are not talking about creating a new system of security with the same arms or the same offensive power we have maintained until now. Levels of armaments, and levels of deterrence must be lowered. As our Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Spanish Minister Fernández Ordoñez, has stated, we should go ahead with reformulating the doctrines that will take us to this minimum defensive sufficiency in armaments which hitherto has been talked about but never achieved. Therefore verification, though not easy, is of fundamental importance.

Lord Newall's report shows the extent to which verification calls for major far-reaching commitments involving a clear change in strategies, doctrine and military structures, a change nevertheless which in the last resort points in the direction of peace, security and confidence, and from which clearly WEU cannot stand aside. It follows that the proposal for a European verification centre working through WEU seems to us to be a positive and practical proposal for continuing to build this political and military framework which enables us to say that, as never before in history, Europe and the world now face the prospect of real and lasting peace, based on confidence – not on confidence in destructive power or destructive capability, but confidence in collective commitments and in co-operation between peoples. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Sole.

Mr. SOLE (*Spain*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. I too wish to say how pleased I am to be able to address the Assembly of Western European Union today. May I first say that I considered the report presented by Lord Newall to be excellent in both its close argument and its clarity of exposition; this said, however, I should like to make some observations and raise a number of queries.

I am generally in agreement with the statement, the conclusions and the draft recommendation, but I believe that both the explanatory memorandum and the actual draft recommendation pose some problems that perhaps go beyond the specific proposals made in the document. I believe that one of the most important aspects of the report is the stress it places on the

Mr. Sole (continued)

need to eradicate the spirit of bloc versus bloc which still characterises the Vienna negotiations. And I believe this to be specially important now, bearing in mind that one of the two blocs engaged in the Vienna talks is disintegrating and falling apart, and it is quite possible that, as a result of internal tensions in the countries which founded and still formally constitute the Warsaw Pact, unilateral decisions that could change the terms of the problem are already being taken within the Pact. For example, Soviet troops may be withdrawn from Hungary or from other countries independently of the talks now going on in Vienna.

I therefore believe that the proposal to set up a European verification centre, as recommended by Mr. Genscher, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, is very appropriate. But in my view this is where a question mark or, if you wish, a certain ambiguity, arises. The draft recommendation says that it would be appropriate for the European verification centre to be created under WEU auspices. It is even said in point (xv) of the preamble that WEU should form the nucleus of this centre. I believe that this brings us to a different aspect of the problem, namely, what part has Western European Union to play in the construction of the new European political scenario? For, after all, the draft recommendation converts Western European Union into a key institution for defining the new security scenario, and this is where I believe that the distinction which was made this morning between disarmament and security acquires its full significance, in a Europe which is still thinking and acting in accordance with a logic of division and confrontation which really belongs more to the past. After all, every organisation now existing in Europe was formed for a different Europe, a Europe divided into opposing blocs. We should be thinking about how to organise ourselves to meet the challenge of a new Europe not yet furnished with organisations capable of integrating the whole continent.

From this point of view, whilst not minimising the importance of the draft recommendation, I believe that there is a degree of ambiguity in the preamble, because it offers the possibility of choosing between negotiation within the framework of the enlarged Vienna talks: an "enlarged CFE" negotiation, or else a CSCE "task force". I believe that an alternative is being introduced which is not clearly resolved. In the last resort we have to make the choice: either we must take on a certain rôle which will place us within the orbit and the logic of CSCE and will transform us into a kind of parliamentary body specialising in CSCE defence matters, or else we shall choose a specific field of our own for the verification committee which

would be that of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries together with five neutral countries as proposed in the document.

I believe that this is not really clarified, or at least I have not seen it, but in either case we are bound to define more accurately what is the real field of our action, of our activity as an organisation, because the fact is that a European verification centre under the auspices of Western European Union is not viable if the political, strategic and geographical space subject to verification does not extend to a wider area than that up till now specifically covered by Western European Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cetin.

Mr. CETIN *Observer from Turkey*. – I thank and congratulate Lord Newall for his excellent report, which includes much useful information.

We meet at a time when history is in the making in Europe. Political changes are radically transforming the set-up and strategic balance throughout the continent. One of the determining factors of the revolution is arms control and disarmament. Turkey attributes great importance to the alliance's strategic integrity, political cohesion and indivisibility of security. Those fundamental principles were kept in mind in preparing the alliance's position for the CFE talks. We believe that the overriding consideration in the negotiations must still be undiminished security for all the allies. Turkey, like other allies, wishes to finalise the CFE treaty by the targeted date.

The CFE offers a valuable opportunity for all of us to come up with a treaty which encompasses all five categories of weapon systems. The CFE talks seem to be at the forefront of the Vienna process. However, the success of arms control initiatives depends also on the establishment of an environment of mutual confidence and security.

The complementary confidence- and security-building measures under discussion at the CDE-II forum would contribute significantly to creating a secure and confrontation-free environment in Europe. Therefore, the successful conclusion of the CDE-II negotiations is equally important.

The dangerous proliferation of a chemical weapon capability poses a great threat to international security. Turkey has no chemical weapons in stock, nor does it aspire to possess them. The purpose of that is to achieve the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention that would globally ban the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of such weapons under effective verification. We

Mr. Cetin (continued)

support the ongoing efforts at the conference on disarmament in Geneva and all the other initiatives to that end.

I thank you, Mr. President, and again congratulate the Rapporteur on his excellent and comprehensive report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for your contribution, Mr. Cetin.

I call Mr. Meisel, a parliamentary observer from the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. MEISEL (*Observer from the German Democratic Republic*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, for the first time representatives of the German Democratic Republic are able to attend this Assembly as observers. I should like to express my thanks for this opportunity. It is very instructive for us to take part in this meeting and to pick up so many interesting suggestions and thoughts from the speeches, and in particular from the accurate and well-argued reports, of which the present one is a good example.

Allow me in this connection to make a few basic observations about our concerns in the eastern part of Germany with respect to disarmament. The changes that have taken place during the last year in the eastern part of Europe have indeed been without precedent, and their extent could not have been foreseen even a year ago. They provide a chance for the movement towards stability and détente in Europe to proceed at a rate that could not have been anticipated earlier. This is of tremendous interest to us, because the change that has taken place in my country and in Eastern Europe during the last few months was in no sense the victory of one part of Europe, which had remained strong, over other parts that had become weak; it was the direct consequence and fruit of the process of détente. As long as both sides were fearful and believed in security through strength alone, there was also an inward hardening. The process of democratisation could not go forward until this burden had been lifted and new prospects were visible of a security common to all the countries in Europe. In other words, the process that has brought us together here gathered momentum only as a consequence of détente.

I think that this process should now continue until a pan-European security system is achieved, which does not call for security against some parts of Europe but includes the whole of Europe in a common bond of security. All of us realise that that point is still a long way off. The report before us brings out the difficulty of each step, and shows how precise and careful the verification must be, to avoid imbalances along the way.

But it is also clear that there is no road to the future of Europe that can bypass this common European security system. It must be clearly stated that this road is still very vulnerable. It could be blocked, if the hawks on one side or the other regain the upper hand and there is a reversion to the attempt to achieve security through strength.

I can only agree wholeheartedly with the remarks made by my colleague Mr. Feldmann on this subject. We in Germany are extremely anxious that the road to German unity should not be blocked because the fears of our eastern neighbours are disregarded.

In this connection I should like to say something more about the assumption made by many of the speakers here that the most heartfelt desire of the people of the German Democratic Republic is to become part and parcel of NATO as soon as possible. If I am any judge of opinion in our country, that is certainly not the case. For forty years our country was compelled to be a member of a security system without really having any share in deciding whether it wanted to have such ties. It is therefore easy to understand that many sections of the population have considerable misgivings about being drawn into a security system with all that that implies – once again without being asked and without having any part in arranging the terms and structure of this membership.

On the other hand, we naturally all understand that there cannot be a neutral security gap right in the heart of Europe. Therefore a way will have to be found of enabling the population of the German Democratic Republic to agree cheerfully to our joining a security community which is a stage towards pan-European security. But it must be clearly stated that this too implies changes in the strategy hitherto adopted by NATO.

Undoubtedly NATO can be a milestone on the road to common security in Europe, an institution to which we contribute our strength. But in that case it must be made quite evident that this is the chosen road and that there is no going back. With this proviso we strongly support concurrent efforts to carry forward and institutionalise the CSCE process in some way. This does not mean that new institutions have necessarily to be created; existing institutions such as WEU or the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe could well be used for the purpose. But that the process of disarmament and détente in Europe should go steadily ahead and that progress should be made in reducing armaments and the financial burdens they cause in Europe greatly concerns many people in my country, because after a period of economic decline they urgently need the power, the resources and the hope that will lead to a new

Mr. Meisel (continued)

and peaceful situation in Europe, in which there will be as many arms as necessary but also as much co-operation as possible.

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the last speaker of the day, Mr. Kiraly, an observer from Hungary.

Mr. KIRALY (*Observer from Hungary*). – I am talking on behalf of both my friend, Dr. Bratinka, a member of the Hungarian Delegation, and a member of the Hungarian Democratic Forum and myself, an independent member of the parliament. We are both profoundly grateful for the invitation to sit in on these sessions and for the Assembly's graciousness in permitting me to say a few words. Our Foreign Minister will disclose our foreign policy tomorrow, so I shall merely make a short comment about it. I shall comment indirectly on the magnificent report of Lord Newall.

The first and most important factor I wish to emphasise is to call the attention of the Assembly and of other organisations in Europe to the profundity of the change in Eastern Europe in general and in Hungary in particular. I hope that it will not be indiscreet if I illustrate that change with a personal tale.

In 1951 I was condemned to death. In 1956 I was the commander-in-chief of the Hungarian freedom fighter forces. In 1958 I was again condemned to death. At the end of the 1980s I was among the five most wanted men in Hungary. Today, I enjoy the utmost privilege of representing the Defence Committee of the Hungarian Parliament as a duly-elected member of the parliament. That profound change made our parliament and the existing branch of our government adopt an open-door policy. In the past four or five years we have already opened our doors and wish to open them even more for the exchange of technical goods and services. We want to open the door for verification in security.

I do not say that we are ready, or intend, to stab the Soviet troops in the back. That is not a Hungarian habit. On the contrary, we want to do whatever is in our power to reassure the Soviet Union that there will be no risk of the Soviet Union being endangered by Hungary. However, our parliament has passed a resolution that has the force of law in which we declared that we intend to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, not unilaterally or arbitrarily, but as a result of peaceful, systematic and legal negotiations – which has always been our approach to democracy. However, we want to close our ranks with you as closely as you permit us to do.

There is a paradox: we have enjoyed extremely warm and sympathetic relations with

individual groups and international and national organisations, including this Assembly, and that tremendous sympathy for our fate and actions is highly appreciated. However – and this point was voiced several times this morning and yesterday, openly or half-openly – there is a tremendous fear that what we do in Central Europe may become a source of instability. I assure the Assembly that Hungary's Government is absolutely stable and has a parliament and executive that are devoted to you and are determined to join ranks with you as closely as we are permitted. We would be a ready and eager partner if you would permit us to become one.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Kiraly, for an interesting and meaningful speech, which the Assembly appreciated.

That concludes the debate.

The Rapporteur will reply tomorrow morning. The vote on the draft recommendation will also take place tomorrow after our two visiting ministers address us.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 7th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Coëme, Minister of Defence of Belgium.
2. Address by Mr. Jeszenszky, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary.
3. Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union (Replies to speakers and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1223).
4. Observation satellites – a European means of verifying disarmament – guidelines drawn from the symposium (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1230).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 5.45 p.m.)

FOURTH SITTING

Thursday, 7th June 1990

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Address by Mr. Coëme, Minister of Defence of Belgium.
Replies by Mr. Coëme to questions put by: Mr. Eicher, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Soell, Mr. Cetin (Observer from Turkey), Mr. De Decker, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Eisma.
4. Address by Mr. Jeszenszky, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary.
Replies by Mr. Jeszenszky to questions put by: Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Speed, Lord Mackie, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Sole, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Fioret, Mr. Brito.
5. Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union (*Replies to speakers and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1223*).
Speakers: Lord Newall (Rapporteur), Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman).
6. Observation satellites – a European means of verifying disarmament – guidelines drawn from the symposium (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1230*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Lenzer (Rapporteur), Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Lenzer (Rapporteur), Mr. Stegagnini (Chairman).
7. Changes in the membership of committees.
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Coëme, Minister of Defence of Belgium

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Coëme, Minister of Defence of Belgium, whom I am very pleased to welcome at the end of this

Belgian presidency during which many initiatives have been taken. When the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium addressed us yesterday, we were able to say how much we are indebted to your country, Mr. Minister, for the effort it has made, for the energetic and positive way in which the presidency has acted and for your own very personal contribution.

Mr. Minister, would you please come to the rostrum.

Mr. COËME (*Minister of Defence of Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is both a pleasure and an honour to be with you again in the Assembly of Western European Union, at the end of the Belgian presidency. Thank you for giving me this opportunity to address you. The points I intend to deal with this morning relate more particularly to the Europeanisation of the Atlantic Alliance which must be the most topical of all subjects at the moment, as it is so crucial for the Europe of tomorrow.

Clearly, the on-going changes in the East and in Germany offer fresh and welcome prospects for Europe's future. At the same time, they pose a number of questions concerning not only security but also co-operation between the member countries of Western European Union.

Over the last few months the pace of European history has accelerated in an extraordinary manner. To such an extent that the

1. See page 26.

Mr. Coëme (continued)

current negotiations in Vienna seem to have been overtaken somewhat by events. The artificial and unacceptable division of Europe, inherited from the second world war, is being wiped out and the strategic picture is changing at dizzying speed.

These changes are marked by the failure of the communist system, spectacular progress towards democracy and freedom in most of the East European countries, the crumbling of the Warsaw Pact, the declaration of a defensive doctrine by the Soviet Union and acceptance of the principle of asymmetric and verifiable reductions, leading ultimately to parity of conventional forces.

On both sides of the Oder-Neisse line military dispositions will be relaxed, forces will be drawn apart and concentrations will no doubt be reduced. As warning times will be longer, a bigger proportion of military potential will consist of mobilisable forces.

As a consequence of these new circumstances in Europe, it is clear that not only has a surprise attack against Western Europe become virtually impossible but also that the hypothesis of a general offensive by the Warsaw Pact is now hardly conceivable, without long preparation and breaking of the future treaties.

Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet empire has released national aspirations in Eastern Europe and offers the prospect of German reunification in the near future.

In the Soviet Union itself there are potential destabilising factors, due mainly to internal political tensions, the pressure for secession in some of the republics – which is a burning issue as it is still happening today – and the deep social and economic crisis from which the Soviet giant is suffering. These sources of instability can only worsen as the Soviet Union finds itself faced by internal unrest and instability in some neighbouring countries. Quite clearly, the idea that the reforms are irreversible does not have the same meaning in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. This means that, whatever happens, Russia will continue to be a great power straddling Europe and Asia, and this is not without importance for Europe's future security.

The threat under which we have lived for forty-five years is changing to a marked extent. Warning times have become longer, the size and location of the opposing forces are affected and the régimes have become more open, and with the conclusion of the Vienna agreement we shall be moving towards parity of conventional forces. This calls for a review of the closely intertwined conventional and nuclear aspects and of the underlying doctrines and operational con-

cepts. The fact is that there is no longer any reason to mass as many troops along a demarcation line which has virtually ceased to exist or to threaten the new East European democracies with short-range nuclear weapons. All this is being mulled over in NATO and the last two meetings at which the defence ministers discussed the subject last month were most revealing as regards both the Nuclear Planning Group and the Defence Planning Committee. The Soviet withdrawal from East Europe and the major cuts in American forces stationed in Germany will leave the two superpowers with much-changed influence in the organisation of European security.

These changes will have to go hand in hand with a declaration that the future organisation of our continent's security must be predominantly European. There will therefore have to be changes in the Atlantic Alliance. NATO's structures will have to be Europeanised. At the same time, East-West relations will have to be Europeanised and become more relaxed.

What will be needed, therefore, is flexible adaptation of the present inter-allied, integrated military structures as a number of factors gradually evolve; these include reduction of the threat, the new relationship between transatlantic forces, progress with the construction of Europe and lastly, the state and conditions of German unification. It is also essential to arrive at a secure and stable Europe, dominated by no one, based on a number of prior conditions such as closer integration of the European Community, which is unquestionably attracting the East European countries, settlement of the German question, acceptance of the post-war frontiers and the cooling of nationalist sentiment particularly in South Eastern Europe.

The worst mistake for Western Europe would be to become a watered-down community, with the German question unresolved, armed forces renationalised and an unstable Eastern Europe.

We Europeans must therefore organise ourselves to take better charge of our own destiny and to try to establish for ourselves a new European security order which will reassure everybody and welcome the new democracies.

The CSCE might be an appropriate place for working out jointly a new pattern of treaties and security guarantees. As the two superpowers are involved, the CSCE retains its full importance for the solution of our continent's problems such as human rights, economic relations and security issues. At the same time, there is a danger that it may be permanently influenced by the weight of the United States and the Soviet Union and by the fact that these two superpowers have somewhat similar geopolitical interests. Before the CSCE is provided with

Mr. Coëme (continued)

institutions it is essential that the Twelve should speak with one voice.

Consequently, all security problems should put pressure on us to react more as Europeans. If we act individually we may be condemned to become passive witnesses of developments over which we shall have scarcely any control even though we are more concerned than anyone else.

Any move to create a new transatlantic partnership geared to the new circumstances in Europe will therefore have to be preceded by an effort to bring Europeans closer together; sooner or later they will have to assert themselves more clearly on security issues but they must at the same time maintain solidarity with their North American allies in order to counterbalance the weight of Soviet power.

Furthermore, the strength of the alliance can only be increased by a framework for practical European co-operation on defence and arms production and a stronger, more active and more responsible Western Europe. Starting from a modified, Europeanised alliance we must therefore use the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to build a European peace order in collaboration with the United States and the Soviet Union. It is with this end in view that the Belgian presidency of WEU has sought to lay a favourable foundation for moving forward in the direction I have just outlined. I believe that my colleague for foreign affairs, Mr. Eyskens, reviewed achievements under the Belgian presidency yesterday. I shall look only at the specifically military aspects.

My first point is the work of the Special Group and of the Defence Representatives' Group on the European security environment from 1991 to 1995 and on the problem of verification. Much remains to be done in this area which should above all be the concern of the WEU Assembly. We have marked out the way towards a future European space system for which we envisage close European co-operation without however excluding consultation with the other allied partners. In particular, this space system should add to the security of member states and of the whole alliance by increasing its global observation potential and at the same time sharing rôles, risks and responsibilities in a more balanced manner. It should also increase Europe's powers and its contribution to the control of armaments and should strengthen its industrial and technological potential and at the same time increase resources for the surveillance and management of ecological risks.

Such co-operation will provide, at lowest possible cost, services which these countries could not finance out of national resources.

Our organisation has been given new missions. Special mention should be made of the ministerial decision to instruct the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the Secretary-General to establish contacts, for the exchange of information, with the new democratic governments elected in Central and Eastern Europe. I am delighted to learn that observers from the countries in question are present in the Assembly.

I can add that, following the signature of a protocol of agreement between my Hungarian counterpart, who was Mr. Karpati at the time, and myself, military exchanges have been arranged between our two countries. As a result, some sixty Belgian military personnel have visited Hungary and the Soviet Union while Hungarian and Belgian ministers are currently attending a seminar in Brussels to discuss tomorrow's Europe and the security of the continent.

I think that such initiatives are to be encouraged. We must go forward.

In another direction, we have opened the way for new ideas on forms of co-operation. I am thinking specifically of the possible formation of multinational forces on the model of the Franco-German brigade but much wider in scope to bring in more countries. It is my firm belief that this could add to the solidarity of the alliance but we Europeans must also ensure that it does more to strengthen European unity in the matter of security.

As your work is concerned particularly with the Independent European Programme Group, I will say a few words about that body and the prospects for co-operation between armaments industries.

What should be the framework for this European military co-operation? As yet, the treaties do not explicitly empower the Community to deal with defence problems. Furthermore, not all the European members of NATO belong to the Community which includes one neutral country, Ireland. The Twelve are therefore somewhat reluctant to discuss security questions – some people would even say that they are dragging their feet.

Another point is that the recent, more open economic approach to the Central European countries may further complicate the formulation of a new European defence policy. This new market offers a potential for substantial economic growth and the decision may be difficult as it would close the door to the new democracies in Central Europe. But being so important for the political integration of the Community, the opportunity must be followed up.

Then there is our institution, Western European Union. The Brussels Treaty and the Paris Agreements give our organisation a basis

Mr. Coëme (continued)

in law, but a number of European allies are not members. Western European Union serves as a place where the nine member states can discuss together the conditions of their security, work out joint views and agree on concerted action. This effort to bring Europeans closer together must not be seen as a threat by the United States or as a substitute for concerted action within the alliance.

On this point I have to say that at the last two NATO meetings I attended there was talk of a kind of resurgence of protectionism in the United States. And I will not conceal the fact that I moderated European reaction on certain points, believing that it would perhaps be a mistake to move too quickly in the direction I have indicated because of possible reactions from the United States.

That is why I am arguing as I did when I last addressed this Assembly, Mr. President, that there should be genuine dialogue so that the changes which must take place in the Atlantic Alliance, involving the adaptation of strategies and force dispositions and also the Europeanisation of the alliance, should not be left to events but should be controlled on both sides of the Atlantic.

Regarding the alliance itself, even if the CFE and CSBM negotiations culminate in the signature of one or more treaties, it will be several years before the disarmament measures to which these negotiations are directed become fully effective.

It is important, therefore, that an American presence be maintained in Western Europe during this transitional stage of disarmament. Without doubt, the Atlantic Alliance is still crucial for Europe's stability and security. Europeans must therefore make clear that they wish to retain their links with the United States while at the same time indicating that changes are necessary.

Far from weakening the partnership with the United States, the European countries' wish to co-operate and increase their rôle in security matters could, on the contrary, help to establish new and lasting bases adapted to the new European security context and transatlantic relationships as a whole.

As part of this day is devoted to the Independent European Programme Group, I shall speak only of the prospects for co-operation on armaments in that body. Here again, there is a great danger of misunderstandings first perhaps among ourselves but even more certainly between Europeans and North Americans.

Co-operation is a form of action aimed at sharing benefits between partners with equal

rights and at protecting common interests. At the beginning of this century a national market was necessary to maintain a viable defence industry. Henceforth, with more and more technology and falling production, a wider market will be essential. And I have to tell you that today in Belgium decisions which are vital for two of the biggest arms companies are to be taken: La Fabrique nationale and Les Poudreries de Belgique.

The theoretical points I have touched on therefore have very practical aspects. I am convinced that these ideas should be discussed jointly and in all the member countries of WEU.

If we are looking at a world market, it has to be possible to negotiate on equal terms. The European industry is being restructured throughout. Firms are looking for mergers to make them big enough to develop weapons systems and at the same time they are seeking to ensure their viability by developing processes which mean a changeover to production for the civil sector.

It is only after this stabilisation has been achieved that any independent dialogue can be developed, opening the way for new and genuine transatlantic collaboration based on trust and effectiveness. This is the objective of the Independent European Programme Group - IEPG. I agree that this body includes all the European members of NATO but it has no legal basis and cannot as yet, therefore, really be looked upon as being an international entity in its own right.

The United States has many times expressed fears about the closing of the European armaments market. It has to be stated clearly that these fears are unfounded. Since the first world war, the United States has been one of the pillars of Europe's security and stability. So it should not make the same mistake as in 1919 by withdrawing into isolationism. I repeat that the transatlantic relationship is to the benefit of both the United States and Europe but changes are necessary and markets must remain open to our American partners in the defence field. Our intention is, therefore, not to shut Europe in behind closed doors but to develop a military equipment market open to both Europe and the United States.

It must be remembered, however, that the objectives of the Independent European Programme Group are strictly limited to the member countries. Everything the IEPG does is in fact directed towards promoting co-operation between member countries, harmonising purchasing procedures and creating an open armaments market for member countries. This single armaments market is gradually taking shape and we and our firms have to adapt to it. There are still many challenges to be met and many

Mr. Coëme (continued)

problems to be resolved. We are trying to formulate a "market code" to regulate the allocation of programmes among countries, problems relating to property rights, the problem of building up backward armaments industries, as in the case of the DDI countries and proper attention to financial and even commercial flows.

We shall therefore have to explain ourselves clearly and frankly to our American partners. However, I think that, in the case of the Euclid programme in particular, if there were no such discussion on research and development for arms where there are possible civilian applications, we would be straying from our purpose if we opened the door at the research and development stage to countries which are not members of the IEPG.

So, markets should be opened up, but the goal for research and development is and must continue to be the development of a genuine European arms industry. To act in any other way would be to change the basis of the Independent European Programme Group's objectives.

I am saying all this, ladies and gentlemen, to stress how urgent it is, here as in other matters, to create a real European defence pillar to provide the European nations with a legal instrument enabling them to assert themselves without breaking the rules of the game which are a fair return, equal opportunities, and reciprocity.

The agreements to be finalised this year concerning the "principles governing the management of a European defence equipment market" should allow the IEPG defence ministers to heed the European industries' recommendations without ending up with a European fortress excluding non-European countries from that market.

Our aims are, as always, the better use of resources, greater standardisation and interoperability of equipment, the promotion of European technology and the European armaments industry and the strengthening of the European defence pillar.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Europe is now in a transitional stage. The challenges to be met are changing radically. The new political and military scene highlights the importance of a strong and cohesive European identity and the need for a fair and balanced transatlantic link. The time has come to support and further the progress of détente but we must at the same time be more determined to assert a European identity based on solidarity in the matter of security and on co-operation between arms industries.

The alliance, as the cornerstone of stability and security in Europe, needs a strong and determined European pillar for which Western European Union is undoubtedly the driving force at present.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Coëme, the applause shows how greatly your address and particularly your closing remarks meet with the Assembly's approval.

You have been good enough to say you will answer a number of questions. Five members are down to ask questions so I will call the first, who happens to be one of our Belgian colleagues, Mr. Eicher.

Mr. EICHER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Minister, you made some very discreet allusions to the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Germany. Could you clarify your ideas on the subject?

Secondly, what are your thoughts about the withdrawal from the Federal Republic of Germany of American and other countries' troops at present stationed there?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Might you, Minister, be able to answer two or three questions together?

Mr. COËME (*Minister of Defence of Belgium*) (Translation). – Gladly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I hope that only one question will be taken at a time; otherwise answers tend to get lost and ministers sometimes get away without answering the questions one by one.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Can you accept Sir Geoffrey's suggestion, Mr. Coëme?

Mr. COËME (*Minister of Defence of Belgium*) (Translation). – By all means; I am perfectly willing to follow your Assembly's normal procedure. I would add that it is not my practice to fail to answer questions even in the course of a debate.

I will start by answering Mr. Eicher's first question.

It is correct that early this year I announced that I had requested a study by the Belgian General Staff with a view to the possible withdrawal of Belgian troops from Germany. It is not sufficiently realised that among the members of the Atlantic Alliance it is Belgium which has the most troops abroad in proportion to its military strength. The figure is practically 30% and I would ask all of you to compare this with the figure for your own country if it is involved. I can tell Sir Geoffrey that in this respect we come just above the United Kingdom.

Mr. Coëme (continued)

Speaking about the progress of détente and prospects for disarmament, I said and still say that it is inconceivable that so many troops should continue to be stationed in Germany and deployed in the same way as though nothing had happened at the end of last year, the Berlin wall had not come down, the frontier between East and West Europe still existed and the threat was still as immediate.

It is also clear that détente has gone so far that at the most recent meetings of alliance defence ministers last month we decided it would now be much better to talk of a risk rather than a real threat. I answered Mr. Eicher in advance of my speech when I said that in our view a surprise attack is no longer possible and that, in any case, a general attack would require so much preparation that it could be met. It is not for nothing that the alliance authorities have very recently decided to review the whole of alliance strategy including force dispositions.

To be quite clear, I would say to Mr. Eicher that I have done no more than ask for a study because I am well aware of the financial and social consequences of a partial withdrawal of troops and of the effect on infrastructures. The study will cover these points. It is simply a matter of prudent management. I would add that there is no question of any unilateral withdrawal of Belgian troops. Any decision which has to be taken will be taken in the context of the alliance and in accordance with the procedures for consultation.

This is not the time to weaken the alliance. However, the application of our General Staff's plan involves limited withdrawals, in the same way as the Netherlands' medium-term plan which provides for withdrawing some of the troops stationed in Germany. But any further steps must, of course, be decided in accordance with the procedures for consultation or, quite simply, within the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance.

Mr. Eicher also asked me about American withdrawals. In the course of last year, President Bush announced two major withdrawals and there are suggestions that the process might be carried much further. I note all this without registering any official reaction but it should make us ask ourselves a number of questions. It is not untrue to say that these decisions to withdraw have been taken without any real consultation in the alliance and that the machinery created for the purpose has not been used.

As regards consequences, this calls to mind what was said a few years ago about my country for failing to replace Nike rockets by Patriot rockets. Right up to last year we were criticised at every NATO meeting for not taking a

decision for the change and it was argued that failure to do so was in the eyes of our fellow members creating a weak route of entry or a hole.

I fear that if any decisions to withdraw American troops were not accompanied by a wider discussion of the whole allied disposition in Germany a problem of the same kind would be created.

It would therefore be wise to review not only strategies but also our force dispositions in Germany in the light of national decisions and the overall context, without, of course, weakening the Atlantic Alliance as a result. I made this point in my address. I believe that the future creation of multinational forces will be one part of a possible answer to the problems currently facing the Atlantic Alliance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Coëme, I think that your reply and particularly your last remarks will have the full approval of our Secretary-General.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I thank Mr. Coëme for his kind remarks about the stationing of United Kingdom troops and for putting us ahead of Belgium's in terms of proportion. May I reciprocate by saying how grateful we all are for Belgium's strong support for NATO and WEU.

Part of my question was answered by the last sentence in the Minister's speech, which brought him back to what Mr. Eyskens said yesterday. The Minister then said that the newly-emerging democracies of Eastern and Central Europe desired to join the European Community. Will he give us his reasons for thinking that, because those of us who have had contacts with the parliamentarians of those countries find that their first desire is to join the Council of Europe, which they see as their bridge to Europe? Our experience is that they want association with the Community only for trade matters.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. COËME (*Minister of Defence of Belgium*) (Translation). – It is clear that these Eastern European countries are interested first and foremost in the Council of Europe and that, as they meet the conditions for membership, it is quite natural that they should be accepted. This will benefit the whole continent of Europe and the member countries of the Council of Europe.

But I would, perhaps, not go so far as Sir Geoffrey. After meeting a number of leaders in the eastern countries I am convinced that the European Community has a very strong attraction for all of them. I am thinking, of

Mr. Coëme (continued)

course, of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. All the efforts of the European Community are directed to making an economic and social response to their aspirations; but politically – even if not expressed so openly – there is clearly a profound desire to move much further towards integration into the European Community. For many reasons this is no doubt impossible at present. There is a wide divide and we must accept that, after achieving freedom and democracy, these countries will have to live through extremely difficult transitional periods over the next few years in view of the shaky or even broken down state of their economies.

We must therefore try to meet the hopes of these countries by avoiding the de facto formation of a new frontier which would not, of course, be political and military but simply economic and social, as this would be another serious problem for the Europe of the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for this further contribution to the debate.

I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I should first like to thank the Minister for the contribution the Belgian Government has made during its presidency of Western European Union's Council of Ministers through your colleague, Mr. Eyskens, and yourself. The proposals you have made with regard to the security- and confidence-building measures and the CSCE process are much appreciated. You have said – and here I take up something Mr. Eyskens said yesterday – that the creation of a European identity in the security sphere now calls for far more concrete action. In your speech you said that this approach would, of course, be greeted by the superpowers with suspicion, undoubtedly more so in Moscow than in Washington. But there would certainly be suspicion in Washington too. In my opinion, what will exacerbate the problems of identity in the sphere of security policy will not be whether Moscow frowns more or Washington less: it will be the national reservations of the Europeans themselves.

My question is: what are you specifically proposing to overcome national reservations, be they German, French, British, Italian or whatever, so that this identity may emerge within the framework of European political union?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. COËME (*Minister of Defence of Belgium*) (Translation). – I share the view expressed by Mr. Soell who did not incidentally really ask me

a question; but I shall add something to his remarks.

Before moving towards a meeting of the CSCE, which we all want to see, I believe that two conditions must be met.

The first is that real agreement must be reached in Vienna and not an agreement from which all military effect is removed just so that it can be reached. The aim in Vienna is to achieve parity for a number of weapons systems and that must be the key to open up this road to détente.

That is why I believe we must not look for unanimity on this question in the West. A CSCE conference at the end of this year will no doubt represent progress and will make it possible to go further in defining what I personally call the European peace and security order.

This will open the way to détente and to outlining further disarmament agreements. But before going on to think about some kind of institutionalisation of the Helsinki process and specifically of the CSCE I believe that, looking further ahead, there must be an intermediate stage during which major progress can be made towards establishing a European identity and possibly advancing towards the creation of a real European pillar at the level of the Community and Western European Union.

It would be wrong if we, who are most concerned of all, could not be involved right from the start in discussions where the weight of the United States and of the Soviet Union might predominate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Turkish observer, Mr. Cetin.

Mr. CETIN (*Observer from Turkey*). – I thank the Minister, whom I had the privilege to meet in Turkey a week ago. I have two short questions. First, as WEU is called the European pillar of NATO, what do you think about European members of NATO that are not members of WEU? Turkey, for example, expressed its desire for full membership in 1987.

Secondly, the European Community is an economic organisation; it does not deal with defence matters. But WEU, on a legal basis, deals with defence and security matters. How are the two organisations related? Do you think that European Community membership is a precondition of full membership of WEU?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – While Mr. Cetin was speaking, the Hungarian Delegation arrived, headed by Mr. Jeszenszky, whom we shall have the pleasure of hearing shortly. I welcome the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary.

I apologise for the interruption, Mr. Coëme. You now have the floor to answer our Turkish colleague.

Mr. COËME (*Minister of Defence of Belgium*) (Translation). – Following my official visit to Turkey at the end of last week, I shall begin by reporting that the Turkish authorities, including the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and all the other leaders that I met, are quite determined to integrate with Europe as fully as possible.

My answer to the Turkish speaker is that the Council of Western European Union has agreed a procedure for consultation based essentially on information, which we regard of course as a minimum, and that a final decision must be taken very quickly; this is what we are debating and this is the challenge facing us Europeans who are members of WEU and of the European Community. This final decision will determine the reply that can be given to Turkey and in particular to its very strong wish to become part of Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I too would like to thank Mr. Coëme for his most interesting address. Mr. Minister, you know that many of us in this Assembly share your desire for greater Europeanisation of the alliance, the construction of a European pillar and an increased rôle for our countries in our continent's security.

Some of us share your somewhat sceptical view about the CSCE and in particular your fear that the two superpowers may play too powerful a rôle in the CSCE in terms of our truly European destiny.

I would like to ask you two questions: the first relates to the nuclear deterrent in the context of Europeanisation of the alliance. What place do you see for nuclear deterrence in this changing Atlantic Alliance and in relation to Europe's greater determination to be master of its own security? This question is decisive for the future of the whole problem and for the whole process of restructuring the alliance, which we shall have to take in hand over the coming days and months.

My second question relates to the statement at the beginning of your address that you would like a bigger rôle for mobilisable forces in Europe. What do you mean by that? You know that for one of its forthcoming sessions I shall be preparing a report for the Assembly on the rôle of reserve forces. In my view there can be no doubt that in the context of the events now taking place in Europe we are moving towards the restructuring of armed forces and a bigger rôle for reserve forces, which will mean keeping conscription. I should like your views on this point.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. COËME (*Minister of Defence of Belgium*) (Translation). – This is an extremely far-reaching and delicate question, so much so that at the last but one meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in autumn 1989 we decided to look into the problem following the upheavals which have recently taken place.

When that decision was taken these upheavals were at their earliest stage. The question we now have to answer is how we shall be able to handle the nuclear problem in the light of these developments and more particularly after CFE, with the prospect of parity of conventional weapons at lower levels after a period of instability. This is clearly a challenge for us Europeans and we must think about it. This, moreover, is what we are trying to do in the Council.

I shall not offer any too definite ideas at this point because the situation is changing all the time and we still have no specifications for the military techniques – and these are essential for any real discussion on policy. It is clear, however, that as we are trying to create a European identity, including defence, everything that exists at the moment will have to be reviewed in the closest detail.

The maintenance of the transatlantic link has implications as regards nuclear weapons but we shall have to accept the realities and I cannot imagine that the present situation in Europe will fail to be taken into account. Here, I am thinking more particularly of France. In future, when Europeans are much more closely involved in defence, France will no doubt have to decide for itself. I think that largely answers your question.

As regards mobilisable forces, present troop numbers and quality are still geared to the cold war. As it has ended, we shall have to adapt to the new situation.

It is my belief that the work which NATO is at present speeding up to some extent will result, as is already argued within the Atlantic Alliance, in cuts in active troops and in special emphasis being laid on the storage of equipment which could be remobilised and redeployed if international circumstances so required. In other words, there will no doubt be units which can act much more quickly with the accent on mobility. Smaller, more mobile units and the importance of the storage of equipment are some of the subjects which will come up at the present meetings within the Atlantic Alliance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your replies, which will provide material for future enquiries and Mr. De Decker's reports.

I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – We are all grateful for Belgium's support for NATO and WEU. In the United Kingdom we were tremendously impressed by the efficiency and courage of the Belgian naval and other forces during the rescue operation connected with the ferry disaster in the English Channel a few years ago. We were enormously grateful for what Belgium did on that occasion.

My question is supplementary to that asked by Mr. De Decker on the nuclear question. Our defence and security are far more important than our feelings about identity. Security comes before self-expression. If our defences are to become more Europeanised, how can we be sure that we are not taking a dangerous gamble vis-à-vis the Soviet Union? Our defences must be based on certainties rather than probabilities. We cannot be certain that the Soviet Union's economic weaknesses will continue, nor can we be sure that the Soviet old guard will not reassert itself. The Soviet Union is superior in conventional forces. Does the Minister accept that the solid European pillar to which he referred should contain a nuclear deterrent? He said that he could not be precise yet but will he tell us his thoughts on the matter?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. COËME (*Minister of Defence of Belgium*) (Translation). – I am rather surprised by this question as my country accepted the Hague platform which gives the reply. To what has just been said I would add that all the possible scenarios we are at present looking at for a review of strategy and force dispositions take account not only of the present situation as regards détente and armaments but also of the possibility, which I personally do not rule out, that détente may be checked.

Nobody can guarantee that all will continue to go well. I do not know how agreement can be reached at the meeting of the two-plus-four. After last week's summit, difficulties persist about the unification of Germany and this prevents the conclusion of an agreement in Vienna which is a key factor for both disarmament and détente. Early this year I paid an official visit to the Soviet Union from which I, like all my colleagues who went with me, returned with mixed feelings. It is true that freedom has been recovered and that there is a strong desire for peace, but life is harder in the Soviet Union than when Mr. Gorbachev came to power. Furthermore, the way the Soviet authorities have reacted to the risk that the Soviet Union may break up closely resembles the Coué method. There are so many destabilising factors in the Soviet Union at the moment that whereas I feel the favourable developments in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to be virtually irreversible, I would not go that far as regards the Soviet Union.

That is why, while détente and disarmament must be encouraged, there will still be every need for caution in case the movement came to a halt.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Your remarks echo what the French Defence Minister said and what Mr. King told us when he came back from Moscow.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – We are grateful for the Minister's fascinating speech, but it is remarkable that hardly a cloud seems to obscure the horizons of his sunny optimism about the future of European security. I am glad that my colleague, Toby Jessel, expressed his doubts.

Is it not true – I should like to hear the Minister's view on this – that although there are good grounds for optimism, there are grounds for grave anxieties, involving the considerable instability on our continent, nationalism, the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, balkanisation, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in countries near Europe and the proliferation of chemical weapons in totalitarian hands in countries near Europe – countries that are able to threaten Europe's vital security interests?

Will the Minister be more precise about the firm necessity for the alliance to have a nuclear deterrent, as the Soviet Union remains a formidable nuclear threat? It can still use blackmail against us, even if it may be an empire in decline.

How does he hope that WEU will continue to exert itself as a force for out-of-area security, and how can it be utilised politically to underpin the arms collaboration process in Europe, which he so rightly underscored?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – This is a very wide subject.

I call the Minister.

Mr. COËME (*Minister of Defence of Belgium*) (Translation). – Indeed it is, Mr. President.

I think I gave a partial reply in answer to the previous questioner. I am not among those who are euphoric about the way events are going. There were once good grounds for euphoria when the Berlin wall was symbolically pulled down and when so many countries joined us in sharing the values of democracy, freedom and respect for human rights.

It is my habit to say daring in politics but prudence in military matters. By that I mean that the changes must be encouraged but, with my military coat on, I, like all the rest of you, must ensure that if the machinery jams, security must still be ensured – at the lowest possible level, of course.

Mr. Coëme (continued)

You expressed concern, which I share, on a number of points.

You mentioned in particular the problems of nationalist sentiment. This does indeed exist and we should be concerned about it. That is why we must try to help the Eastern European countries in resolving fundamental problems. I am thinking of the economic and social situation which may be the catalyst for nationalism and ethnic or minority rivalries.

When the lid was taken off the Soviet world late last year it became clear that while we in Western Europe had succeeded in solving many problems of that kind since the war, this had not happened on what used to be the other side of the iron curtain. So we need to be extremely careful. This is a factor which could well upset our hopes concerning the future of peace and security in Europe.

May I conclude, Mr. President, by saying that these threats and risks are no excuse for us not pushing ahead towards a European identity and creating within the Atlantic Alliance a real European pillar in which there is still, unfortunately, very little concrete reality.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Eisma.

Mr. EISMA (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – In his extremely interesting statement, the Minister spoke about the European Community and its relationship with WEU. He also referred to the desire, to be fulfilled in the longer term, of certain Central European countries to join the European Community. He and his colleagues are currently considering the substance of the future European political union. At the European summit meeting to be held at the end of this month and the beginning of next month a decision will be taken on what should be understood by European political union. Is the Minister a proponent of a European political union of the Twelve, including security policy, divided into political and military aspects? If so, what does this mean for the future of Western European Union?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. COËME (*Minister of Defence of Belgium*) (Translation). – At the close of my address I said that the driving force for a European security identity was at present Western European Union. I do not know what is going to happen, Mr. President, but as the European Community is moving towards becoming a full political organisation, with meetings of foreign ministers and unanimous decisions by the Twelve on foreign policy, it is obvious that the security question will still be there after economic and

monetary unification. I will simply say that the debate is not over and this is precisely why Western European Union should go forward on the subject.

In any case, no one here is master of the development of a Europe which is being formed at twelve-power level at the moment and no doubt at thirteen-power level very soon. What will it be like? There is an opportunity for Western European Union to take but I shall not in any case feel myself inhibited by the question of which institution will be in charge of security in future. My view is that, as things stand and for the time being, we should build up this security policy and that there can be no obstacle to it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister. Rest assured that in any event our Assembly intends to do everything in its power within the limits of its prerogatives and responsibilities, to make its contribution not only to the building of European security but also to the definition of what developments are to be desired.

On that score, our Political Committee has decided to include the problem of revision of the treaties in the agenda for its coming meetings. It has called on two of its leading experts, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and my predecessor Mr. Goerens to look at the problem.

Finally, I wish to thank you, Minister, on behalf of the Assembly, for this remarkable last contribution you have made and for the fanfare you have sounded for the Belgian presidency.

The Belgian presidency will be remembered in the history of the Assembly and institution as a very important event. Yesterday I expressed our gratitude to the Belgian Government for its efforts and the positive contribution which has marked its presidency.

I should like to express the same gratitude to the Minister of Defence of Belgium for his special contribution recalling the fresh efforts for the IEPG, the practical start on examining problems relating to the creation of a disarmament observation and surveillance satellite and a meeting of Chiefs-of-Staff which must be carried forward. I hope that the next presidency will be able to capitalise on all your efforts.

Thank you again, Mr. Coëme, for your contribution. Our thanks to Belgium for this outstanding presidency.

4. Address by Mr. Jeszenszky, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Jeszenszky, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary.

The President (continued)

I am delighted to welcome you, Minister. It is a privilege for the Assembly of Western European Union to have you and your delegation with us here today.

You are a member of the first freely-elected Hungarian Government for forty years. It has only just been formed and little is yet known about its views. We are therefore not only happy to have you here but also eager to hear what you have to say.

Your presence here this morning is therefore both significant and symbolic.

It is significant as evidence of your country's wish to take its full place in the free alliance of free peoples. It is symbolic because it marks the return of Saint Stephen's old European kingdom to the Europe whose culture, way of life and civilisation it helped to shape.

Minister, you represent a newly-formed government about whose views we still know very little. Mr. Jeszenszky, I am pleased to give you the rostrum.

Mr. JESZENSZKY (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary*). – First I should like to express my heartfelt thanks for the kind and moving words that I have just heard from the Chair, and for the knowledge and understanding of our special place in, and special problems we have with, Europe.

It is a great honour for me that one of my first trips as Minister for Foreign Affairs of the first freely-elected government of Hungary since 1947 has taken me, at the invitation of your President, to this session of the Assembly, an organisation that is assuming an ever greater rôle in Europe.

I regard it as an historic event that someone from the other Europe should come here to speak to Western European Union. Perhaps, at this very hour, the Prime Minister of Hungary is addressing another meeting, the highest political forum of the Warsaw Pact. Obviously that is a far more important appearance, but mine is more natural. A thousand years ago we Hungarians definitely chose the West, the Occident, and christianity, and we have never wavered. It was only history and ill fate that severed us from you more than once.

We tried to rejoin Western Europe in 1945, and then again in 1956. But we are quite confident that our present attempt will be more successful. We appreciate all the sympathy that we received and the support that Western Europe and your organisation gave to the peaceful removal of the party state and the establishment of parliamentary democracy and political pluralism in Hungary. With that, we played a pio-

neering rôle in the European transformation, in the annus mirabilis of 1989.

With the political and constitutional transformation largely completed, we now have the immensely difficult job of changing the economy. In bringing about the renewal of Hungary, we have built first and foremost on our own national resources and the ability and entrepreneurship of our nation. Those are qualities that Hungarians, forced into emigration, have often displayed. At the same time, we count strongly on the participation of foreign capital and businessmen.

Our foreign policy is guided by the principle of giving priority to our national interests. It pursues the principal goal of contributing to the establishment of a new system of European security and co-operation, restoring Hungary's traditional ties with Europe, finding a more balanced form of foreign policy action and joining the Western European organisations involved with integration as soon as possible.

We think that North America's rôle in Europe is also important for maintaining the balance in Europe. We attach outstanding significance to close co-operation with Germany, while welcoming the historic openings that France and Great Britain have started towards Central Europe, and recently towards Hungary. We also appreciate our growing relations with other Western, Northern and Southern European states. We are grateful for all the economic, scientific and moral support that we are receiving from you.

Concurrently, it is our foreign policy endeavour to strengthen relations with our neighbours on the basis of democratic values and mutual advantage. That purpose is served by, among other factors, our efforts towards our reinterpreted good neighbourliness and the development of forms of regional co-operation.

We envisage the future of a united Europe not as a great monolithic bloc but as the sum of regionalism, preserving the diversity of national identities. Because of its well-directed nature and rich programme of action, the scheme of co-operation among the five countries of the Central European region – Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Italy and Hungary – will undoubtedly make an important contribution to building a common Europe. It may enrich it and make it more valid.

We take the same view of other regional groups that already exist or are emerging in our continent. With the Soviet Union – the great power that has common boundaries with us – we are striving for the development of balanced and correct good-neighbourly relations, geared towards equality. We intend to replace Comecon

Mr. Jeszenszky (continued)

with bilateral economic co-operation that takes place at world market prices on the basis of accounting in convertible currency.

The changes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe have given us a great opportunity to put an end to the conflicts that have long pitted the peoples living in the area against each other. Nations that are becoming free should develop free relations with each other. State boundaries should not obstruct the free flow of persons, information and ideas. The Hungarian Republic is determined to do everything possible to realise this goal. Intensive regional co-operation is an integral part of all European co-operation, and that is what we are working for in respect of all our neighbours.

Our geographical and political position and our being situated at the meeting point of the great European linguistic families, religions and culture are to be taken maximum advantage of. In a Europe progressing towards unity it is precisely regionalism that may ensure the preservation of national characteristics and the further assertion of national interests. Tolerance towards those who profess different political views or who have a different religion or who speak a different language – toleration for all minorities – is the cornerstone of democracy.

The principal aim of our policy on minorities is to gain observance for human rights and, within those rights, for minority rights. Due to the upheavals of history one-third of all Hungarians were left outside the borders of the country, so the Hungarian Republic bears special responsibility for seeing to it that the Hungarian nation remains in existence as a cultural and ethnic community. That is why, respecting international treaties and acting in their spirit, we are taking a stand on the observance of the collective and individual rights of the Hungarian communities living outside our borders. This intention of ours is also in harmony with the promised declarations made by our neighbours.

The time has come for the national minorities to constitute the most important bridge of friendship between countries, but that is something that only communities which have regained their rights and a sense of dignity can do. It is in this context, too, that we highly appreciate the stand of the democratic countries of Western Europe in favour of eliminating all kinds of discrimination against national minorities.

We have a basic aim – security for Hungary – but we are aware that it is attainable only when there is security for all. We intend to contribute to a system which provides that both for the countries of NATO and for those of the Warsaw

Pact and the neutral countries. The Hungarian National Assembly and Government have asserted that our country's participation in the Warsaw Treaty is against the will of the nation as expressed in 1956, and that the Warsaw Treaty itself has become superficial.

Bearing this in mind we shall initiate negotiations with the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty, but instead of taking unilateral steps we shall take into account the stipulations of international law, the positions of our neighbours and the necessity to preserve the defence capability of our armed forces – as well as more global interests and concerns.

Soviet troops will be withdrawn from Hungary – I hope by the middle of 1991. Two days ago the Soviet Foreign Minister told me in Copenhagen that the Soviet Union was ready to accept Hungary's new orientation; indeed, he regarded it as quite natural and expressed his hope to see an agreement between the two alliances once they cease to regard each other as enemies. Although we are determined not to remain bound to an alliance that never served our interest, for the sake of European security we are willing to do our part to help the successful conclusion of the talks in Vienna and to work towards an all-European security system as a possible replacement for our allies.

The CSCE institutional framework – the meetings and structures that must be set up gradually in the areas of political dialogue, conflict management, military security, economic co-operation, environmental protection and the human dimension – is of paramount importance for the creation of a new European unit, complementing the other European organisations whose experience and activities are indispensable to the Helsinki process and which would naturally continue to function.

A particularly important rôle in the establishment of the new peaceful order in Europe will be attributed to the continent's organisations for integration, so it is with delight that we note that these organisations, which include WEU and your Assembly here, have in the past few months paid particular attention to the historic transformation that has taken place in East and Central Europe. Your Assembly has devoted an extraordinary session exclusively to this very matter and we greatly appreciate that.

We also welcome the resolution of the WEU Council, adopted on 23rd April, which instructed the acting Chairman and Secretary-General of WEU to establish contacts with the democratically-elected governments of East and Central Europe, with a view to collecting information. For our part we very much look forward to the development of these new forms of relations with you. We already have a relationship dating back one and a half years with your

Mr. Jeszenszky (continued)

Assembly, a period of dynamic development, and it is with good feelings that we recall the visit to Budapest of the former President of your Assembly, Charles Goerens, in 1989; and we are thankful to you that Hungarian members of parliament have already participated twice in sessions of your Assembly.

In accordance with the objectives set forth in the aforementioned resolution of the WEU Council, I herewith invite the Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council and the Secretary-General to pay a visit to Hungary, with a view to further developing mutually advantageous relations with the Assembly. We also look forward with feelings of friendship to a visit to Hungary of delegations from the Assembly, and I confirm our former invitation to that effect. We should be glad if these visits could take place this year. In our opinion, a new institutional dimension could be given to our relations with the Assembly if the latter would provide special guest status for Hungary.

I owe my thanks to you, Mr. President, and to you, ladies and gentlemen, for your invitation and for this opportunity to outline to you the goals and endeavours of Hungarian foreign policy. I shall be pleased to try to answer your questions. Thank you for your attention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister. You can see how much interest your remarks have created in the Assembly. Thank you for the valuable information they included in programme form and for the invitations you have issued to the Assembly. I hope it will be possible to accept them and experience, in your magnificent capital on the banks of the Danube, all the charms of a visit to Hungary.

You were good enough to say, Minister, that you would answer questions.

I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I do not think that it is in any way disrespectful to the Minister's President to suggest that his presence here is far more historic than his President's speaking at the meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries. We welcome him particularly because of that.

I accept that the principal task of the Minister's country is to develop democratic institutions and bring about the economic resurgence that is essential to national and, indeed, international stability, and also I accept his assertion that security for Hungary can be achieved only with security for all. But what is the Minister's conjecture regarding the particular part that Hungary can play – outside the Warsaw Treaty organisation, not inside – within all the European security requirements, particularly in

terms of a contribution to the future security of Europe and in building greater understanding between what were, until so recently, two warring blocs?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. JESZENSZKY (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary*). – Thank you for your kind words. I agree that it is perhaps far more important that Hungary is now being admitted into the community of Western European nations. In our present circumstances, I must still maintain that negotiations conducted in the East are absolutely essential for us and for our immediate future.

It is always difficult to foresee the future, particularly in changing times. That is why I was never in favour of planned economies or of too much planning. It is even more difficult to plan the future part that Hungary or other countries can play in bringing about rapprochement between the various groupings in Europe. I can assure you – I am quite sure about this – that countries such as Hungary which have experience of the eastern part of Europe and its workings but which also continue to pay great attention to Western Europe can be helpful and can act as a clearing house for ideas. They can also be quite useful in establishing other relations. We should certainly like to act as mediators. I do not know how far we can count on the confidence of the various power blocs of Europe, but we should certainly be pleased to offer Hungary and our capital as a meeting place for conferences at which we can try to bring about a new system of collective security.

We know that in the inter-war period it was not really possible for such a system to materialise. It is extremely difficult to find solutions acceptable to both power blocs and we certainly do not think that it is for us to decide for how long these power blocs should continue. That is especially true of NATO. We have our own view about the Warsaw Pact and its future. That is one reason why we want a negotiated withdrawal. We should like to serve as a meeting ground.

I confess that I have been in post for only two weeks. I have tried to do my homework and to read all the documents that have been placed before me, but I do not think that it is simply a question of study. A lot of new thinking is required if we are to find an acceptable solution. That task will not be achieved quickly, but I am certain that the sooner we start it, the better. I am sure that meetings such as this will enable us to devise solutions acceptable to all parties concerned.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Speed.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – Having heard your distinguished parliamentary colleague yesterday afternoon – I understand that he was condemned to death twice thirty odd years ago in Hungary – and having heard your speech this morning, let me say that we are living in moving and momentous times. I welcome your presence and that of the Hungarian Delegation generally.

You spoke about the rights of minorities and made it clear that your government's approach is very pragmatic. What is your government's view of the steps being taken by the Baltic republics and other regions of the Soviet Union towards self-determination and independence? Do you think that a pragmatic solution is possible?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. JESZENSZKY (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary*). – That is certainly a difficult subject and for us it has psychological and moral significance. Hungarians and other East Europeans have often felt themselves abandoned. Of course, we were aware of the realities and of the danger of nuclear war. Nevertheless, Hungary in 1956, certainly Czechs and Slovaks in 1968 and the Poles on numerous occasions, felt that the world was failing to do all that was possible. Now that we are on the point of regaining our independence, we do not want to make a comparable mistake or to be regarded as having forgotten about those countries that are even less fortunate than we were. Our behaviour towards the Baltic states and their desires and actions in the direction of independence is guided by pragmatism, if you like, but certainly not by simply being over-cautious. Hungary recognised the independence of those countries back in 1920, and I do not know of a declaration by any Hungarian Government that has nullified that position.

It is not enough for us simply to support the Baltic states' desire for independence. It is essential that that desire should be accepted by the Soviet Union – by Moscow. We should like to help to achieve an understanding between the two sides. We do not want to make things harder for the Baltic republics or for President Gorbachev by taking a step which, although it may be in accordance with our sympathies, may not be of practical help to the Baltic states.

Our idea is that a solution should be found to ensure independence for those countries while taking into consideration the concerns of the Soviet Union.

A similar situation arose in 1867 when Hungarian independence was recognised but the Hapsburg monarchy was maintained. No monarchical solution is possible in the Baltic-Soviet relationship – that option is not really

available – but some sort of agreement along the lines of those reached during the dissolution of other great empires is possible, and I think that sound behaviour and good counsel will bring it about.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Mackie.

Lord MACKIE (*United Kingdom*). – I attended a meeting of the committee of the Council of Europe in Hungary recently. I greatly enjoyed the wine, I loved the food and the people were charming.

How are things progressing with the Hungarian minority in Romania? We were much impressed by the position of the German minority in Hungary about which much work has been done to reach a satisfactory solution. Are people still coming in from over the border?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. JESZENSZKY (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary*). – Thank you, Lord Mackie. I could deliver a long exposition on the problem, but I do not wish to take up too much time. There was a refugee problem long before the end of last year because of intolerable living conditions in Romania. After the revolution at the end of last year the flow of refugees stopped and many people returned to Romania in the hope of a new beginning. Unfortunately, after the first few days of exuberance some tragic events occurred when innocent Hungarians demanding cultural rights were attacked by incited mobs. That created a new wave of migration. We hope that that is now over. Although the right of emigration is essential, it is important that people born in a country and who love that country should be able to remain there without fear. The most recent arrivals are youngsters whose parents see a new future for them.

The Romanian elections are behind us and we have repeated assurances about a new behaviour. If the Copenhagen conference is successful and agreement is reached, I hope that we shall establish a new international code for the treatment of national minorities. That is much required by Romania and other East European countries and it would resolve the immigration problem. It is essential that interest is maintained and that observers and journalists are sent to Eastern and Central Europe so that the ideas and policies that exist in the West prevail in the East. Then we can sit back in a more peaceful Central Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martinez.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. Minister, Hungary is well on the way to joining the Council of Europe, and I believe there is

Mr. Martinez (continued)

very good reason for thinking that it will be confirmed as a full member in November.

Furthermore, you have suggested to us here today that the Assembly of Western European Union might create a special guest status, following the example of the Assembly of the Council of Europe which has given such good results there.

I should like to ask you, first, what are Hungary's real wishes regarding membership of bodies such as WEU? And what part might Hungary play in building a new pan-European system of relations including, of course, the field of security? Possibly a system of this kind could be formed by institutionalising what is now the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. JESZENSZKY (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary*). – I welcome the opportunity to answer a question by a representative from Spain because we follow events in Spain and Portugal with keen interest. Many people in Hungary regard Spain as a model.

We intend to join as many European organisations and institutions as possible. We believe that that might serve as a guarantee of our present standing and our recent achievements. Because of the military situation in Central Europe, we need all possible guarantees, even if they are only oral guarantees.

We would like to be members of organisations which involve negotiations between countries. I have to admit that we do not expect to leave the Warsaw Pact within months, although there will be a time when we shall be a member of several institutions which conduct negotiations. Our rôle in that capacity is essential. The talks in Vienna sometimes go well, but there can be difficulties. The countries which take part in those talks can report on Hungary's rôle there.

We can set an example when participating in the negotiations by acting as interpreters. The teaching of the Russian language was obligatory in Hungary. Although the results were not so successful, we understand Russian. We will therefore try to interpret in the forthcoming negotiations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Sole.

Mr. SOLE (*Spain*). – Within the general political framework of Central and Eastern Europe that you have outlined, especially the prospect of the new orientation of security policy, according to the national interests that you mentioned, what is the position of the Hun-

garian Government on the process of German unification, and especially on the possibility of the German Democratic Republic joining the NATO structure?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. JESZENSZKY (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary*). – In opposition, and now in government, we made it quite clear that we regard the right of self-determination as natural, and it cannot be denied to the Germans. We have developed good personal relationships with many East Germans. Even before the flow of refugees through Hungary, we were aware of their intentions.

It is natural for us to support the idea of German reunification. We are pleased that it will take place within a European setting, particularly within the framework of the European communities. We are making it clear in Moscow today that we regard NATO membership of a united Germany as being the best arrangement. That is good not only for Western Europe but for the Soviet Union. We support the line taken by most European countries that those arrangements should be supported. We are aware that the emerging Europe is different from that which existed before the first world war or during the inter-war period. That assures us that we have no reason to be afraid about the balance in Europe, because the European Community and the various other organisations ensure that we do not have to rely on strong self-contained sovereign states but instead can move towards integration.

We are aware that Germany is a country of various regions, and the Länder in Germany are playing an important rôle. The Hungarians have special ties with Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg. The future Europe will be one of regions. That is why we support German membership of Europe: not one large Germany, but one consisting of several regions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Lentz-Cornette.

Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Minister, you said: "Nations that are becoming free should develop free relations with each other". I should like to ask you about this complete or partial freedom.

Officially you still belong to the Warsaw Pact. In sentiment you no longer do so. In sentiment you are much closer to us, that is to NATO, but you cannot officially belong to that organisation.

Officially your army and your troops are still under the Soviet flag. If the Soviet army decided tomorrow "to invite" troops into one of the republics, what would your soldiers do?

Mrs. Lentz-Cornette (continued)

Secondly, what short-, medium- and long-term plans do you have for your army?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. JESZENSZKY (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary*). – I share your view, but in our hearts we are closer to Europe. I assure you that, although we are members of the Warsaw Pact, the Hungarian armed forces are under the command of the President of the Hungarian Republic. Without his approval or that of the Hungarian Minister of Defence, no order can be given to the Hungarian troops. That is important and we certainly cherish it.

We want to maintain an army as long as other countries do so, so I suppose it will continue for some time. We should like to have a small, highly professional army. Its purpose would be not so much military but as an institution for national service. It would be part of the general education system. The mental and psychological renewal of the country requires not necessarily the army but a national institution to imbue a new spirit of democracy, collaboration and Europeanness. In a modest way, the Hungarian army can serve that end.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fioret.

Mr. FIORET (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, you made a brief reference to the special relationship agreed between Hungary, Italy, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia with the aim of promoting European cohesion.

My question is what rôle does Hungary plan to play in this and what practical results does it hope to obtain in the short run?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. JESZENSZKY (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary*). – That is a so-called pentagonal organisation. It is relatively new, but it has an older ancestor – the Alps Adria co-operation, which was done on a regional basis. The pentagonal organisation, which sometimes is referred to as the Danube Adria collaboration, is supported and organised by governments. It is one of the emerging new organisations or movements in Europe. Much will depend on what course it takes. It is important that the various regions, especially those with historic economic ties with each other, which were unfortunately severed by the wars of the twentieth century, should have that co-operation between them restored. Those five countries are ideal grounds for that.

However, we can well imagine other regional co-operations. In Western Europe there is co-operation in Scandinavia and the Benelux

countries. In Central and Eastern Europe there is also room for similar groupings and the pentagonal may serve as a good example for some other emerging south, north or north-eastern co-operations. We appreciate the pioneering rôle that Italy has taken in that co-operation. Its influence has already proved useful.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Brito.

Mr. BRITO (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Minister, I think I may gather from your observations that you are not defending the concept of a Europe divided into blocs as a solution for the future.

To dispel any uncertainty in my mind, might I ask whether you feel more drawn to the Atlantic Alliance or to a pan-European security system?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. JESZENSZKY (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary*). – I do not want to give a very long answer. In 1956, during the Hungarian revolution, there was a general call for neutrality in Hungary. When the present Prime Minister, then a young man, addressed the crowd and spoke about neutrality, many people in the crowd started to shout that they wanted to join NATO. But that was in 1956. Now it is different and we in Hungary regard NATO as an important institution. As a historian, I particularly appreciate the rôle that that organisation has played in the past forty-five years. However, NATO's future should be decided by its members, and it is not for us to try to combine its future with that of other organisations.

I was asked about my honest, true, heart-felt opinion. It is that NATO will last for much longer than the imposed bloc of Eastern Europe. I hope that we can have a united Europe in the foreseeable future. One does not know how long it may take, or whether it will take the form of a confederation or a federal union. Only two or three years ago no one in this room could have predicted this meeting, the presence at it of a person of my nationality, or all the changes that have taken place. That is why, although we have no reason to think that history runs to a predetermined course, an all-European union is something that could happen at any time in the future. Some people in this room – I hope many – will live to see it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your great willingness to help us. Thank you for your address which, as you must have felt, answers many of the concerns naturally expressed in this Assembly.

I cannot answer the request you made. The committees concerned will consider it and decide. Speaking personally, if I may be so

The President (continued)

allowed, I see no reason why what is all right at Strasbourg should not be allowed in Paris. But I hope I am right in saying straight away that your presence simply foreshadows more permanent collaboration between us and Hungary.

Thank you for your invitations to our future Chairman-in-Office, our Secretary-General and a delegation from this Assembly. To listen to Lord Mackie we ought to take them up very quickly as those who know Hungary and its wonderful capital will confirm.

You have brought us proof that Europe has now again become a Europe of peoples and of nations. You have shared our European history ever since 1848. When the first rising for Hungarian independence took place, Europe – in Paris, London, Vienna and Berlin – held its breath. You are today the last representative of that struggle. Thank you for what you have said and our thanks also to your delegation.

**5. Vienna, disarmament
and Western European Union**

*(Replies to speakers and vote
on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1223)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is replies to speakers on Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1223. The debate was closed yesterday afternoon.

I expect the Rapporteur would like to summarise the conclusions of the debate and that the Chairman of the committee would no doubt like to speak after him.

I call Lord Newall.

Lord NEWALL (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to add my warm congratulations to Mr. Jeszenszky, whom I met in Budapest only two or three weeks ago.

I should like to thank everybody who contributed to yesterday's debate. Many points were brought out, but as there was full agreement with the report, there is no need for me to comment in detail on the individual speeches.

It is sad that so many people who put their names down to speak did not bother to turn up and do so. It is particularly unparliamentary, rude to the committee and a disservice to the Assembly when they do so, having put down their names late. Some twenty people put down their names but only fourteen spoke. I should like to give my special thanks to Mr. Kosutic from Yugoslavia, Mr. Cetin from Turkey, and Mr. Meisel from the German Democratic

Republic who, as observers, made a special contribution to the debate. I should especially like to thank Mr. Kiraly, who made a fascinating speech. We all admire his bravery at having survived two death sentences. Such observers are all welcome.

So much of what was said yesterday was an echo of the report. Much is happening at present to speed up the thinking on how to achieve force reductions in practical terms. I hope that all members will give the Defence Committee's recommendation a unanimous vote so that that will give Western European Union another opportunity to play a solid rôle in the years ahead.

(Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the committee.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – No one who has been in touch with what has been happening in the conventional force reduction talks in Vienna could fail to be impressed. The Defence Committee was lucky enough to go there last year and to have some meaningful discussions with the leaders of the various delegations. Given the spirit of optimism that reigned then, many of us have been disappointed to hear that there have been some slight setbacks; we are still monitoring the position – like many other people – and we very much hope that in due course things will come right.

That is why it is important that we should have this brisk and efficient report from Lord Newall before us today, since it carries on the monitoring work, the guidance and the help that we seek to render to other organisations in vital matters such as disarmament talks. Our voice should always be heard, as several members said in the debate. It is important that WEU's views should be put on record at this stage while negotiations are going on.

Lord Newall's report deals with the issue of a European verification agency. Verification should play a major part in all our considerations. As several speakers said yesterday, it is the key to all disarmament. Without verification there would be no meaningful disarmament, as I am sure we all agree.

On a lighter note, I am delighted that Lord Newall decided to include a glossary in his report – something that has been lacking for a long time. We live in a world of acronyms and initials and few of us could reel them off correctly. I was also delighted to see that he included the initials WEU in the glossary. However, contrary to the wishes of certain ministers whom I have heard in recent days, Lord Newall did not include the European Parliament or the European Community.

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

If I may throw out an idea, I venture to hope that our future reports will also contain glossaries. It is important that we should be able to communicate with everyone who reads the reports so that people can know exactly what is going on.

This is a significant and relevant recommendation, and it has been well handled by Lord Newall. The Defence Committee has the strongest possible desire to recommend it to the Assembly. There was complete unanimity about it in committee, and on that basis I commend it to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1223.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

**6. Observation satellites
– a European means of verifying disarmament –
guidelines drawn from the symposium**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the Technological and Aerospace Committee
and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1230)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on observation satellites – a European means of verifying disarmament – guidelines drawn from the symposium and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1230.

I call Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Madam President, a somewhat worried glance at the clock tells me that we do not have a great deal of time. I will therefore try to be brief in presenting this report, which I am submitting on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.

Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, I should first like to say how grateful I am for the help we received from many quarters while

drawing up this report. I am grateful for the contributions made by the experts from the scientific and business communities during the symposium held by the committee in Rome on 27th and 28th March of this year. As I know that many of them are here today listening to this debate, I once again offer them my very sincere thanks.

I should also like to thank the committee secretariat and, lastly, the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Stegagnini. I must also thank all my colleagues for making it possible for the draft recommendation to be unanimously approved in committee. I believe this shows that we did not make it easy for ourselves during our discussions. We reached a consensus which may also be important to Western European Union's future work.

This is not, of course, the first time that the Assembly of Western European Union has considered the question of an independent verification system, with a view to being taken seriously as an independent partner in international co-operation. On 30th January 1989, we received from the Council of Ministers an answer to our Recommendations 465 and 466 which I would frankly say did not completely satisfy us.

In the meantime the debate has continued. Political developments in Central and Eastern Europe in particular have continued. As a result a consensus has meanwhile been reached in the Council. It is considering whether plans should be made for a satellite-based verification system with a wide range of tasks, about which I should like to say a few words in a moment. A sub-committee, which has met again in the last few days, has been set up to consider this question, and to decide on the technical design of a system of this kind in the foreseeable future.

Although ours is a technical and scientific committee, I do not want to discuss these questions today. Nor do I want to discuss the question of costs. All this is still very much a matter of speculation. Reliable statements on the costs involved, for example, will not be possible until it is known what is expected of the system. I would therefore refer you to the very detailed comments in the report for information on this.

The report is, I believe, more in the nature of a political report. Although it considers a technical system and the political contribution it has to make, it is – I would emphasise once again – above all politically based. This being so, permit me to make a few comments. The political upheavals in Eastern Europe and especially in my own country, Germany, and the radical changes in the East-West relationship have fundamentally altered the environment for European foreign and security policy, as the

1. See page 27.

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

speeches by the two ministers have just shown. The East-West conflict is fading and changing in nature. Although the possibility of military conflicts cannot be completely ruled out in the future, major wars are becoming less likely than they were in the past. At the same time the likelihood of conflicts caused by nationalist and independence movements and ethnic rivalry is growing. Whether or not they occur has nothing to do with the East-West conflict, although they may affect it.

Disarmament and arms control, confidence-building measures and co-operation are increasingly shaping the East-West relationship and eclipsing the waning antagonism. As this trend continues, the European countries and especially the member states of Western European Union, and the European Community as well, must assume their own responsibility for shaping a new peaceful order in Europe.

In the Europe of the future, however, security will no longer consist solely of protection against major wars between East and West. There are signs of fresh challenges, some of a global nature, which are a threat to Europe's security and for which a forward-looking peace policy must cater. Some examples are: threats to the environment, cross-frontier terrorism, worldwide drug trafficking and the spread of such dangerous technologies as chemical and nuclear weapons, and missile technologies which governmental and non-governmental agencies might use unpredictably.

The member countries of WEU face the task of using their technological, economic and political potential to pursue a forward-looking peace policy in these areas. Their ability to use space provides them with new instruments and opportunities to make their own, European contribution to preventive crisis management, effective arms control and protection against environmental hazards and new threats from outside Europe.

In view of the radical changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union it will be necessary to gear new security policy activities and institutions to dimensions covering the whole of the alliance and the CSCE from the outset. In this situation one of the main requirements is that countries willing to co-operate should not be permanently excluded by the erection of unnecessary political and administrative barriers from attempts to participate in the joint maintenance of security. This is particularly true of the verification of arms controls and disarmament measures.

The conclusion we reach in this report is that space technology has opened up a new dimension of earth observation and of local and

regional reconnaissance. Earth observation with the help of sensors in space – be they optical or radar sensors – gives access to a wide range of data and information that can be used in many different ways both in the civil sector and in the area of security and defence.

Given the future prospects of more extensive disarmament, it is very important that the European countries should have independent access to observation and surveillance capabilities on the ground, from the air and also from space if they are to participate actively and responsibly in the process of arms control, disarmament and mutual confidence-building by means of reliable monitoring and verification. As an important complement to the co-operative verification measures currently available, autonomous European intelligence-gathering in space can give the European countries the information they need to ensure the steady and stable progress of disarmament and to give political shape to a lasting peaceful order in Europe.

Space programmes are long term and comparatively expensive. Consequently, particular care always has to be taken in justifying new space activities to parliament and the public. Investment in space and on the ground must bring clearly predictable and lasting benefits for Europe's assured political and economic position in the international community. This is all the more true as regards the question of a European satellite observation system as a contribution to the improved protection of peace and of living and environmental conditions in Europe.

Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, in our draft recommendations we have assumed that significant agreements on conventional disarmament are likely to be reached at the negotiations in Vienna this year, that the European countries have made a major contribution of their own in this respect, and that the need for verification and the exchange of information will consequently grow. We also know that satellite-based systems in particular will become more important in the future. They will make verification possible, for example, even when the country concerned would refuse to allow such measures – on-site inspections, for instance – or other forms of monitoring. They can also observe areas where unexpected new threats may arise.

We also know – this has never been questioned, not even by the representatives of the scientific and business communities at the symposium in Rome – that we, the member states of Western European Union and other countries besides, have the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to establish a system of this kind. I might refer in this context to the European Space Agency as a management organisation

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

and its major international programmes. I might also refer to the current Helios project on which France, Italy and Spain are co-operating and the results of the various Spot satellite programmes here in France and the Euclid programme of the Independent European Programme Group.

We now come to the first recommendation, which is that this Assembly approve the idea that Western European Union decide as a matter of urgency to establish a satellite image-processing and interpretation agency.

Our second recommendation – both recommendations were, by the way, unanimously approved by the committee – is that this Assembly support the idea of our establishing a full-scale European verification satellite system with optical sensors, the appropriate ground segment, radar sensors and at a later stage, a data-relay satellite. On the committee's and my own behalf I urge you to approve these recommendations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Lenzer has submitted an excellent report, which amply documents the need for a satellite-based surveillance system. I say amply because it not only describes the technical aspects but also sets out the political dimension as a priority. This priority is clearly revealed by the statement that a worthwhile CFE treaty must include far-reaching agreements on verification and the exchange of information as a confidence-building measure.

The report rightly calls for satellite systems because they can be used – along with the co-operative measures which are considered suitable at one time or another – to observe relevant areas without the co-operation of the country concerned.

An autonomous European satellite capability is required because it alone can supply the flows of unfiltered data that are essential for an assessment of our own security situation and of the progress being made with disarmament. The peacetime strength and presence of armed forces, their degree and level of preparedness are directly dependent on how reliably and quickly information can be made available to prevent a crisis.

When I refer to an autonomous satellite capability, I mean not only orbiting satellites but also the equipment on the ground needed to screen, store, organise and interpret the flow of data.

I endorse the recommendation that a WEU satellite image-processing and interpretation agency be established, but we must realise that it will be very expensive. Making this agency part of WEU is the right choice, because it should form part of the organisation where discussions are held and decisions taken on the Western European countries' defence questions, and that is WEU. We are the organisation responsible.

It is true that the aerospace industry in Europe is considered to be a growth industry. It has highly skilled jobs to offer. In the European Space Agency, ESA, and our European space industry we have suitable management and production capacities, which should be able to find economically acceptable solutions to meet our needs. I do not intend to take the easy way out and say: "All we need is the political will". The solution must also be, and continue to be, within our means.

When the Chairman of the Committee on Science and Technology of the Council of Europe – and the CDU-CSU's spokesman on research and technology in the Bundestag – calls, as WEU's Rapporteur, for the various segments, such as optical satellites and radar satellites, to be raised to the state of the art and ready for use, thus aiming at quite a range of possible uses, then I can only say – because I am familiar with the entire background to his thinking – that this is both scientifically correct and forward-looking.

The frequently-disputed spin-off effect undoubtedly exists in this case. But although a correct and necessary choice of subjects has been made – verification and arms control on the one hand, environmental protection as a global task on the other – we should not demand so much from the outset that the resulting costs make the project impossible or delay its implementation until some time in the distant future. Success will also be achieved with a step-by-step policy, which can and must also apply to the very expensive space activities. In other words, although a great deal should be expected, we must find a realistic way of achieving success with a step-by-step policy.

From my own experience I can only support the call for an autonomous verification and disarmament monitoring capability, which is also needed to cope with global tasks, especially in the area of environmental protection, because the earth, which we have to administer for all mankind, is merely on loan to us.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, you will understand how pleased I am to see the report presented by Mr. Lenzer because, as everyone will remember, we previously had to

Mr. Fourré (continued)

deal with this subject here, together with my colleague, Mr. Malfatti, for the Technological and Aerospace Committee and even on behalf of the Defence Committee; we were able to look back to an old proposal which I presented to the Council of Europe and then here in Western European Union, taking up an old idea presented in 1978 by President Giscard d'Estaing concerning the creation of an international satellite observation agency.

The conclusion at that time was that the idea could not be taken any further because the two superpowers were opposed to the creation of such an agency. The problems were not technical or financial but political and in my opinion a fresh initiative was needed; why should that not be a European initiative?

On the basis of this idea I proposed the creation of a European satellite observation agency. The Assembly studied the report on the creation of such an agency and approved it, if you remember, almost unanimously. The report gave details of Europe's technical capabilities as regards satellites, launchers and image interpretation; it also proposed guidelines for possible action by such an agency to verify crisis situations, conflicts and armaments control procedures.

It was on the basis of this last idea that our Assembly seemed to be interested in the creation of the agency because we have now reached a point in time when control and verification are decisive for the disarmament process. WEU's very place in this disarmament process favoured the creation of this European satellite observation agency. It gave me great satisfaction that the whole Assembly was with me in that initiative. The draft recommendation approved at the time offered great hopes but we thought that without bringing in the Council of Ministers and beyond it all our governments it might remain a dead letter. That was why we made it very clear that our proposals and suggestions needed to be thoroughly examined by the Council of Ministers. The Council listened to us and set up an expert committee which is still working today though we have not been informed of the results of its work. In the recommendation we asked the Council to inform us of its conclusions but we still do not know if it took any interest in our proposal. Some governments, and in particular the French Government, expressed their approval and I was very pleased to be associated with the initiative taken by the Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee in Rome – and I would like to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on that initiative which was brilliantly organised – where we saw that many governments were making a move and also that the European space industry was represented.

This European agency has to be set up. What is still standing in the way? No doubt the need for a firm declaration of political intent by the Council and no longer just by the Assembly perhaps, and for planning the initiative in a number of stages on the scale of the resources available to us but not losing sight of the original objective. In this respect Mr. Lenzer's proposal is particularly interesting and I approve his conclusions.

I said in my report that not everything can be done at once. Mr. Lenzer takes up this idea and goes even further, suggesting that as some resources are already available, we could go through an intermediate stage and set up a centre for interpreting images. We already have civilian satellites which provide images. We could use the Spot-image network and the facilities available for interpreting these data. Using all these facilities available to WEU we could make a start on setting up the European satellite observation agency.

Ladies and gentlemen, you will have understood from what I have said that I approve the contents of Mr. Lenzer's report and the draft recommendation. We have enormous capacity in Europe and in the present political context we are being asked about our specific rôle in the matter of defence and disarmament. Let us make the best possible use of this capacity by creating the European agency; that is the wish I make and the specific request I put to the Council of Ministers.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to thank Mr. Klejdzinski and Mr. Fourré for their statements. I must also refer once again – this has already been mentioned – to the activities initiated by Mr. Fourré and Mr. Malfatti some considerable time ago. They formed a very good starting position on which we were able to build. There has been little change in the political line followed: an independent system as an independent partner in international co-operation on the new verification and security structures. I would be very grateful for a unanimous vote to lend weight to this whole objective.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, our committee today sees the culmination of a great deal of preparatory work following the Rome symposium of 27th-28th March on our goal of creating a WEU agency for the satellite observation of disarmament.

Mr. Stegagnini (continued)

My thanks therefore go to Mr. Lenzer for what has been a very complicated task for him because the reports in Rome were extremely technical and it cannot have been very easy to transpose them to a political report. I should also like to thank Mr. Fourré who was to some extent the initiator of our work, and in Rome presented a highly expert contribution emphasising that this proposal is of major political importance for Europe and above all for WEU.

I should now like to recall a number of points. Firstly, this proposal for monitoring disarmament by satellite is a confidence-building measure which was recognised and accepted by the Soviet leaders whom the Presidential Committee of WEU met in Moscow. This confidence-building measure is therefore bound to speed up the Vienna treaty and to ensure by real and efficient verification that the treaty is effective and verifiable for all concerned.

The basic problem is still the political will to go ahead with this important proposal. Mr. Lenzer and Mr. Fourré, whom I thank together with Mr. Klejdzinski, have certainly made it clear that the industrial, scientific and technological capacity exists in Europe; until today the political will was lacking. Yesterday the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and all the government and parliamentary representatives who spoke declared that this political will exists.

I have to say that all the reports presented at this session declare that this proposal must go ahead. This means that the will is unanimous not only in our committee, not only in the Assembly as a whole, but among the representatives of WEU including the Council of Ministers and the Secretary-General. What we have to do is to ensure that our vote in favour today does not have the same fate as the vote we took some years ago.

As an Assembly, we must exert pressure on the Council of Ministers. The committee which has been set up must work energetically so that it can submit positive results to the Assembly, possibly at the next session, assessing the feasibility and operability of the proposal today submitted for vote by the Assembly.

In my view, today's vote approving the recommendation represents a milestone for WEU. If the proposal is put into effect or even only launched, it will give our organisation a further reason for existing and a recognised international rôle in line with the treaty. The symposium held in Rome on 27th and 28th March last therefore set in motion machinery for the effective reactivation of WEU's rôle by providing it with an enormous opportunity to

become the main player on the European and international disarmament scene.

Though few people are still in the chamber, I hope that the vote we are about to take will represent not only the finishing post for a report but also the starting point for progress towards a great objective and a target we all want to achieve for the sake of both WEU and its future and of Europe's peace and security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1230.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

7. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The French Delegation has notified me of the following changes in committee membership: on the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations Mr. Lemoine should replace Mr. Pontillon as a titular member; on the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges Mr. Worms should replace Mr. Barrau as an alternate member.

Are there any objections?...

These changes are agreed to.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States.
2. The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and Western European Union (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1228 and amendments).

¹ See page 28.

The President (continued)

3. WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations concerned with security and European defence (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1226).
4. The new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly (Presen-

tation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1227).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.)

FIFTH SITTING

Thursday, 7th June 1990

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Address by Mr. Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States.
Replies by Mr. Atwood to questions put by: Sir Dudley Smith, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Lord Mackie, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Speed, Mr. Soell, Mr. Gabbuggiani, Mr. Zierer.
4. Tribute to a former Vice-President of the Assembly.
5. The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and Western European Union (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1228 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Garrett, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Speed, Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stegagnini (*Chairman*), Mr. Klejdzinski, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. Wilkinson; (*point of order*): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Speed, Dame Peggy Fenner, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Stegagnini; Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Stegagnini; (*point of order*): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Jessel.
6. WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations concerned with security and European defence (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order*, Doc. 1226).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Stegagnini (*Rapporteur*), Sir William Shelton (*Vice-Chairman*).
7. The new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution*, Doc. 1227).
Speakers: The President, Sir John Hunt (*Rapporteur*), Sir William Shelton, Mr. Caro, Sir Dudley Smith, Dame Peggy Fenner, Mr. Kosutic (*Observer from Yugoslavia*), Mr. Moya, the President, Lord Mackie, Mr. Tummers, Sir John Hunt (*Rapporteur*), Sir William Shelton (*Vice-Chairman*).
8. Change in the order of business.
9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The first order of the day this afternoon is the address by Mr. Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States.

Deputy Secretary, we have great pleasure in welcoming you, in particular for what you symbolise: the presence amongst us of that America whose importance and significance we Europeans have learnt to know at what have generally been sad periods in our history.

Today when Europe is in the throes of upheaval and self-interrogation and renewing old ties with the other Europe, it is most important that a representative of the great American republic should come here to tell European policy-makers what it hopes and wants for itself and what it expects of us. No doubt we shall be telling you too, Deputy Secretary, what we expect of the United States, but you already know, and that is, above all, that the United States should stay with us in pro-

1. See page 31.

The President (continued)

viding for the defence, security and enduring survival of our democratic values and freedom.

It is therefore a special pleasure to welcome you here today. You are the first representative of the American Government to address this Assembly, an event that has a special and symbolic value for us. After what President Bush said about our institution and the interest that Mr. Baker, speaking more recently in New York, said there was in Western European Union, it was important that we should hear from you again about what we should and can do together.

Mr. Atwood, welcome to this Assembly. I have pleasure in asking you to address the Assembly of Western European Union for the first time.

Mr. ATWOOD (*Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States*). – Thank you, Mr. President, for that kind introduction. It is a great pleasure for me to be here. Although I have visited Paris many times in the past, this is my first trip here since becoming Deputy Secretary of Defence.

I want to thank the members of Western European Union for inviting me to speak today. For me, WEU is an important organisation, whose influence will expand in the months and years ahead by assisting the countries of Eastern Europe to complete their march towards democracy. Together with NATO, WEU will serve as an instrument of security for the member nationals and as a factor for stability throughout Europe.

The spirit of democracy now spreading across Europe has survived the forty-five years that have passed since the most destructive war in our collective history. Out of its ruins evolved a relationship between the United States and Western Europe that has provided for our common security and has kept the peace. It is a relationship built on a shared commitment to democracy and the steadfast resolve to protect our freedom.

These same ideals have at last found expression in many parts of the communist world. Today, we stand on the threshold of a new era among the nations of Europe. Our commitment to resist the forces of oppression has sown the seeds for the rebirth of democracy that is sweeping eastward across the continent.

For more than forty years, our need for preparedness has been driven by the concern for the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union. But the Soviets now seem to have adopted a less aggressive and more conciliatory approach in their relations with the West. The meeting last week between President Bush and President Gorbachev has reinforced that positive trend.

The Soviets have begun to reduce their military spending and appear willing to negotiate further reductions through arms control agreements. We are encouraged by these efforts. However, the coupling of massive Soviet military capability with a narrowly-based government structure necessitates a concern for the future.

The Kremlin still possesses an enormous standing army and continues to modernise its awesome strategic nuclear capability. Given the propensity of previous Soviet leaders to use those forces for the expansion of their empire or to intimidate others, the entire world has a stake in the outcome of current efforts to transform Soviet society.

This is the reason why so many are concerned about current developments in the Baltic states. The United States has never recognised their incorporation into the Soviet Union. We believe the people of those nations should be allowed self-determination. And we believe the current crisis should be resolved through dialogue, not force. The Baltic states may be viewed as a litmus test for Soviet intentions. An inability to come to grips with this sort of tough issue will not bode well for the future.

The political problems of the Soviet Union are not confined to the Baltic region. We see dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs in many of the Soviet republics, including the largest – Russia. Essentially, the current leadership is being held accountable for the years of indifference the communist party has shown to the needs and desires of the Soviet people. As a result, the people want a change.

As we look ahead, we can envision the future we want to see. We want to see a strong, confident Soviet Union. But that strength and confidence should not be based on military power and intimidation. It should be based on a strong economy and, most importantly, on a government that is responsible to the desires and needs of the Soviet peoples. Such a Soviet Union would earn the respect, not the fear, of its neighbours. It would interact with the world in a positive way.

The Soviets are faced with enormous economic difficulties. Basic staples are in short supply. It is difficult for us to imagine the extent to which reform is needed when just getting soap is a demand of striking coal workers.

Market reforms are repeatedly promised only to be later postponed. It is clear that the Soviet Union lacks the managerial leadership and infrastructure to make the transition easily to a free market economy, if that is indeed what is anticipated.

Even if and when they decide to make that transition, it will undoubtedly be a tough and painful process. The experience of Eastern

Mr. Atwood (continued)

Europe has demonstrated that it must be coupled with genuine political reform if the average citizen is expected to support the difficult choices that must be made.

When he accepted the newly-created presidency, Mr. Gorbachev recognised that the Soviet economic crisis is connected to its political structure. He said: "We have been hampered by inertia, by dogmatic views which have taken root over decades, by a habit of stagnation, by passiveness, by a life of being instructed from above."

The decision whether he plans, or is able, to undertake essential fundamental reform hangs in the balance. The events of 1989 have taught us that the desire for freedom and human dignity is universal and cannot be permanently suspended. Nineteen eighty-nine has also taught us that a government's credibility is based on the degree that it accurately represents the goals and aspirations of its people.

We clearly welcome the Soviets' stated intentions. But until the Soviet Government is based on political pluralism, free elections and the rule of law, we have to focus on Soviet capabilities. Capabilities take years to develop, but intentions can change overnight.

What do all of the lessons of 1989 mean from the standpoint of United States defence policy? The Bush administration has moved aggressively to adapt our national security policy to the changing international environment. With the significantly reduced threat of a major land war in Europe, we have begun the process of restructuring our military forces to take advantage of the changes that have occurred in Europe.

President Bush has asked NATO to launch a far-reaching review of its strategy. On the military side, General Galvin has already begun to lower readiness requirements. Other adjustments will follow, particularly if we can achieve a CFE agreement. We support this review, and we look forward to close co-operation with our allies to adapt NATO to a new security situation.

The one overriding issue that has dominated our planning has been this: if the favourable developments of the past year continue without major reversals and if the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat continues to erode, what kind of global requirements would exist for United States military power?

In answer to this, there are two concerns and two major conclusions. The first is that we can afford to continue to make significant and appropriate cuts in our military forces. And the second is that, even in the best of foreseeable sit-

uations, the United States must still maintain a significant military capability that can span the globe, and in particular we should keep a military presence in Europe.

This afternoon, I would like to discuss the six fundamental elements on which United States defence policy for the coming decade is based.

First, the United States must maintain a strong strategic deterrent capability because, even under the most optimistic scenario, the Soviet Union is still going to have a robust strategic nuclear arsenal. These forces represent the core of Soviet global power. If the Kremlin were to abandon them, it would lose its status as a superpower.

Even now, the Soviets are modernising their nuclear forces at a remarkable pace for a nation in the midst of an economic crisis. Last year, for example, the Soviets built 140 ICBMs, while we built only twelve. The Soviets may reshape their nuclear forces to fit an arms control agreement, but they give every indication of continuing their modernisation programme.

Furthermore, we are going to have to be prepared for a world in which more countries have nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, witness the recent attempt by the Iraqis to acquire the triggers for nuclear weapons and their continuing development of ballistic missiles.

For decades, deterrence has worked. But we should be moving toward a well-balanced mix of modern offensive and defensive systems in the future. The strategic defence initiative offers an important opportunity to enhance our deterrent capability. It can also counter the growing ballistic missile threat and the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons now being developed in the third world.

The second requirement that we foresee is the continuing need for strong alliances. Our alliance relationships in Europe and Asia have been at the core of our successful national strategy over the past forty years.

The Atlantic Alliance is especially important for the United States. It remains the best way for the United States to maintain its presence in Europe, and it is our primary vehicle for political-security dialogue throughout Europe.

But we also believe that organisations such as Western European Union are essential for the future of Europe because of their ability to reach out to Eastern Europe and assist in the political and economic restructuring. While NATO will remain the primary means of providing for our future security, we welcome a stronger European pillar in the alliance, and the contributions that WEU can bring to this effort.

In the future, we and our allies may well play different rôles. The responsibilities of the

Mr. Atwood (continued)

partners probably will shift. But what we should not change is our fundamental commitment to unity and military strength.

In particular, there is a continuing need for a nuclear deterrence force reflecting widespread alliance participation. And we will need creative initiatives for dealing with future force requirements, including multinational corps.

Of course, if our commitment was backed up only by words, it would be hollow. So the third enduring element of our strategy is forward deployment of United States forces.

The United States will stay in Europe for as long as we are wanted. In conjunction with our allies, our presence here and around the world dampens traditional regional tensions, while creating a sense of security and stability in which democracies can grow and free market economies can flourish.

The difference between words of support and actions of conviction is that we are willing to put United States troops on the ground. The message that is sent to friends and enemies alike is that Americans are willing to risk their lives to ensure the security of our friends and allies.

It is certainly true that we will be adjusting the levels of our deployments, especially in Europe, but only after a conventional forces agreement is reached with the Soviets. Nothing can substitute for the stability and deterrence provided by our forward deployments.

Fourthly, no matter how much political relations among nations might change, geography does not. We are separated from our friends by oceans, and control of the seas will always be important to us, regardless of what happens in Moscow.

The growing interdependence of the economies of the United States, and its major trading partners overseas will make maritime superiority even more important in the years ahead. However, these interests can be protected by a somewhat smaller naval force.

The fifth element is our ability to project power quickly and effectively throughout the world. To defend United States interests and to protect American lives, we must have the military capability to use force in ways appropriate to the level of conflict.

Overwhelming nuclear superiority is of little value in regional conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq war. We need a well-trained, highly professional, properly-equipped force ready to go anywhere and at any given time.

Therefore, maintaining the mobility of our forces is essential. We must have the speed and flexibility of airlift to accommodate rapidly-

developing threats, and we must have the capacity and endurance of sea-lift to sustain deployed forces. In short, mobility will continue to be an integral part of our worldwide deterrent capability.

The sixth and final requirement is for a strong, technologically-sophisticated industrial base. The key to a strong defence is a high quality military force. That means well-educated and well-trained personnel supported by advanced technology weapons. Our weapons systems are important force multipliers, which can effectively counter a numerically superior enemy.

As we begin the fundamental restructuring of our armed forces, we will rely, as never before, on our ability to develop the best high technology weapons in the world. Our future security depends directly on maintaining a strong and vital industrial base.

If we lose our capacity to produce first-class weapons, we shall not just have a smaller force in 1995; we shall have a dangerously weaker one as well. An important part of our effort to maintain a high-quality military force will be expanding co-operative weapons development programmes with our allies and friends.

With defence spending levels declining, neither the United States nor its allies will continue to be able to meet their national security needs by themselves. We shall all find it increasingly difficult to finance the advanced weapons necessary to meet our future security requirements.

Armament co-operation reduces the high cost of weapon development by eliminating duplicative research and development. Because we can make better use of the technology residing in each participating nation, co-operative programmes create a larger base of scientific information and expertise with which to meet our collective security needs. For this process to succeed it is essential that each country become a full partner both contributing and receiving technology. The United States is deeply committed to this approach.

To summarise, the six elements of United States defence policy for the 1990s are as follows: offensive and defensive strategic forces; our system of alliances; forward deployed forces; maritime superiority; flexible contingency forces; and a strong industrial base.

Far from becoming less of a force in the world, America will continue to assume global responsibilities in the years ahead. We will still possess a capability for global reach. Security threats were not invented by the communist party of the Soviet Union, and threats will remain long after that party has gone out of business. As a result, the world will still be a

Mr. Atwood (continued)

dangerous place – a place that will continue to benefit from, and indeed require, the stabilising influence of a strong American military, with strong democratic allies.

It is not our intent to engage in the kind of radical reductions in our armed forces that followed world war two, Korea and Vietnam. Those reductions left us weaker and eventually had to be reversed at great cost. We are now pursuing a more prudent path to lower defence spending – a path guided by a strategy that has been successful for forty-five years.

The future of the United States and that of Europe are bound together. Let us use the successes of the past to build a new political and economic framework so that Europe can once again be whole and free.

Dean Acheson titled his autobiography "Present at the Creation". He was referring to the effort to rebuild the institutions of Europe after world war two. Today, we are present, if you will, at the re-creation of Europe. We have the opportunity to shape the world for the generations to come. We must not waste it.

Thank you all very much.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Atwood.

The Deputy Secretary has kindly agreed to follow the custom of the house and reply to questions. The first question comes from Sir Dudley Smith speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Defence Committee of this Assembly.

I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – In view of the most interesting and specific six points which our distinguished guest speaker described, what floor does he envisage being established for United States forces stationed in Europe, bearing in mind the precepts that he has just described?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Deputy Secretary of Defence.

Mr. ATWOOD (*Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States*). – As is known, the President recently offered to bring our forces down to 195 000 in the central region and to 225 000 in total in Europe. That has been under consideration by the Soviets and I should like to await their response to the negotiations on that number before embarking on another series of figures.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Atwood is probably aware that this parlia-

mentary Assembly has established a regular relationship with the Supreme Soviet. We go over to Moscow once a year to meet the Soviets and they come to us. In spite of Herculean efforts, we have failed to establish a relationship of any value with the United States Congress, although we have a slightly better relationship with the Canadians. Can Mr. Atwood suggest anything that we might do, or better still that he might do, to help us to establish a relationship with our closest allies?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Deputy Secretary of Defence.

Mr. ATWOOD (*Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States*). – I think that it is very important that the relationship with this organisation and the United States Congress is at least as strong, hopefully stronger, than that with the Soviets, or even with our Canadian friends. I offer my services, along with those of Mr. Cheney, and the executive branch, to help establish such a rapport and such a series of discussions. That is very important.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for this encouraging reply. We can only say, Deputy Secretary, that we shall need your real and effective support to be sure not to find ourselves back in the situation we were in two years ago when the Political Committee visited Washington.

I call Lord Mackie.

Lord MACKIE (*United Kingdom*). – I greatly enjoyed Mr. Atwood's address. It was remarkable in that I did not fall asleep after lunch. I am intrigued about the reasons for the meetings between President Gorbachev and President Bush. They seem to be characterised by President Bush's sympathy and understanding of the problems in Russia. They appeared to make a new relationship. How far will this go? There was a marvellous visit by Mrs. Bush and Raisa to Wellesley College. Could we be experiencing a new relationship that will make us in Europe very jealous? Could it be that the two monolithic powers may become so close that Western Europe is neglected?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Deputy Secretary of Defence.

Mr. ATWOOD (*Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States*). – I did not fall asleep after lunch either. I feel, too, that the meeting between President Bush and President Gorbachev was successful. I was fortunate in being able to attend briefings before President Gorbachev arrived, as well as a reception. The meetings are indicative of a growing confidence in the relationship between the two presidents. Obviously, we must nurture that. We must nurture an understanding of our problems. The

Mr. Atwood (continued)

summit indicates an understanding of the depth of the problems being experienced by President Gorbachev. His economic problems came through clearly. If I were to judge his difficulties, I would put the economic crisis at the top of the list because, until and unless that is solved, great unrest will continue in the Soviet Union and will mean that his basic policies are deficient.

The ability to conclude a green agreement and the ability, in the face of difficulty, to approach a general trade agreement, with the proviso that the Soviets must amend their emigration laws, is extremely important. The improved relationship does not involve only President Bush and President Gorbachev; Mrs. Thatcher is also involved. In the last two days here in Paris the respect and admiration for President Gorbachev has become apparent. We can only hope that we are wise enough to support President Gorbachev and to help him to bring about permanent reforms in his country.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I have two questions. The first is brief. Does Mr. Atwood envisage a significant rôle for this organisation in the verification of arms reduction? My second question is perhaps politically more important and concerns the future of CSCE. This week my colleague Sir Geoffrey Finsberg presented a report on the alliance and we dealt with the future of CSCE in our debate. Does Mr. Atwood accept that there must be an institutional framework and that we do not need any new structure, because already in Europe we have the Council of Europe and a structure which could provide an institution that history will require to be developed during the 1990s?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Deputy Secretary of Defence.

Mr. ATWOOD (*Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States*). – I should like to approach that bearing in mind the magnitude of the problem that we and the Soviet Union face. I mentioned earlier the very severe economic difficulties which the Soviets face, along with other Warsaw Pact countries. They lack the fundamental infrastructure to make the conversion from a dictatorial government to a free economy government. It will take the best of brains, concerted effort and assistance to help them with that transition. They have lived for fifty or seventy years with a dictatorial government without having any concept of what a free economic system is. Each day there are more stories about the ignorance and lack of experience of what it will take to achieve that transition to a truly free and powerful economy.

Secondly, as they make that transition to a free democracy we must recognise that they do not have the infrastructure to do so. They do not have the laws or the form of government in place and they need all the help that the free democracies can offer. In short, there are many problems with which they need assistance, but I feel that within the CSCE and, very importantly, within WEU, there is the opportunity, collectively or individually, to make such assistance available. I urge you all to think about how best to do so. It would be presumptuous of me to say that you should do it in one way or another, but the problems are so severe and the opportunities and experience so great, that I would look for great assistance from the nations and WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Speed.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – This appears to be a United Kingdom monopoly at the moment!

Various distinguished United States senators and congresswomen have been critical of us in Europe about the burden-sharing issue. Some of those criticisms may have been justified, but one of the advantages of WEU – this reinforces the point that Sir Geoffrey made about liaison between this body and Congress – is that we have an out-of-area capability, as was shown two or three years ago during the Gulf conflict. We are all aware that we need to take a full part in that burden-sharing process. Given what was done by WEU forces in the Gulf and the capability and command and control structure that we have for conflicts that might arise outside NATO's area of operations, do you think that could perhaps help to quell some of the criticisms made in your country?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Deputy Secretary of Defence.

Mr. ATWOOD (*Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States*). – I should not be too bothered about the criticisms by some members of Congress – I am used to that. On the other hand, they are making a point, to which you have responded. The effectiveness of WEU has been well demonstrated in the past, particularly the ability of member nations to act collectively in a fashion where, perhaps individually, they could not act. In particular, I am referring to the actions in the Persian Gulf. Undoubtedly, there will be other conflicts in which WEU will participate in the same way. Almost everyone in the administration, including the President, feels strongly about that issue and we are fully supportive.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I should first like to thank Deputy Secretary of Defence Atwood for

Mr. Soell (continued)

reacting to the different schools of thought in our Assembly on whether the United States wants a stronger European pillar by giving a proper answer: yes, it does. Some people were afraid that Washington might frown on Europe's assuming a stronger identity in relation to security, in Western European Union, for example.

I should like to put the following question about the current two-plus-four negotiations and the numbers of foreign troops on German soil. The Soviet Union, which is having great difficulty in coming to terms with a united Germany as a member of NATO, is making it clear everywhere – including during talks which Western European Union's Presidential Committee had in Moscow – that it will, of course, make the presence and numbers of Soviet troops in Germany dependent on the presence and numbers of American troops in Germany.

Although the majority of Germans, in the Federal Republic at least, quite definitely want to stand by the alliances and links that have proved their worth in the past, there is also the understandable feeling that they would eventually like to be left alone, that they would not like to have 1.4 million foreign troops stationed on a permanent basis in an area roughly equivalent in size to the state of Oregon, the famous comparison Helmut Schmidt always makes in the lectures he gives in America. In other words, there is a desire to be relieved of a military presence in all sorts of ways.

For several months now the Secretary-General of Western European Union has been raising the subject of multinational units. How prepared are the Americans to participate in such multinational units in Europe? How can this be linked to the question of the numbers and presence of Soviet troops?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Deputy Secretary of Defence.

Mr. ATWOOD (*Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States*). – At a recent meeting Secretary Baker discussed the issue of Soviet troops in East Germany. Two of the points that he made included the fact that we recognise the necessity for a transition period during which Soviet troops could stay in East Germany, subject to the agreement of the Germans, and that we would discuss with them, following a CFE agreement and the reunification of Germany, the level of troops and how to accommodate the transition among our allies.

The second point you made was on multinational forces. At a recent meeting of the NPG, Secretary Cheney offered the positive approach

that we would support consideration of multinational forces. Obviously, there have been difficulties in the past, and there has been concern about them, but the Americans are ready to move ahead with open dialogue on multinational forces.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Deputy Secretary.

I call Mr. Gabbuggiani.

Mr. GABBUZZIANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – In view of the vital problems to be resolved in the near future and of the relationship between Europe and the United States, of whose importance and permanence we are fairly convinced, we wonder whether or not that relationship should remain linked to the perpetuation of old agreements for the political and military integration of NATO. Our view is that it must be developed increasingly through relations between the European Community, the United States and joint participation in the increasingly binding Helsinki process.

NATO and the Atlantic Alliance are today involved in a major bilateral process of reducing tension and armaments and formulating confidence-building measures which will allow relations between the allies to be reshaped and clarified. There are fresh negotiations on the status of United States bases in a number of allied countries in the Mediterranean area.

Italy has provided infrastructures and military bases for the United States of America under the terms of an appropriate general agreement dated 20th October 1954 which is still secret, on which the individual agreements for each specific concession are based.

The agreement of 20th October 1954 was concluded in implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty and also of the mutual security agreement of 7th January 1952 which added to the commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty.

My question which stems principally from the statements made by the Italian Government after the events at Sigonella a few years ago, is: is the United States prepared to negotiate a new agreement to take the place of that of 20th October 1954 and at the same time to revise the agreements resulting from it?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Deputy Secretary of Defence.

Mr. ATWOOD (*Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States*). – I should like to make a couple of points. In the force reduction that we have already started to make, we must consider the closing of bases, both overseas as well as domestically in the United States. We have a number of recommendations currently under review. One report has been completed and we

Mr. Atwood (continued)

are implementing the closing or major modification of about eighty-four of the bases in the United States.

Last January, in anticipation of what we were submitting for a budget, we recommended slightly more than fifty bases throughout the world, including about twenty overseas, that we would consider making adjustments to or closing. I understand that our two governments are even now discussing the subject you raised and so I would be well disposed to the proposal.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Zierer.

Mr. ZIERER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – In his statement the Deputy Secretary of Defence referred to six elements which the future security system will comprise. Your fourth point, I think, was the need for forward defence. Do you not think that it will be very difficult to tell troops where forward is?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Deputy Secretary of Defence.

Mr. ATWOOD (*Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States*). – The short answer to that is, yes. It is difficult to determine what forward is. We must remember that the Soviets are close, whether present in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries or just east of the Warsaw Pact countries. Therefore, we would like to remain in Europe as long as that threat exists and we are wanted here. We have been through a long history of two world wars and, in between those, a great reversion to a feeling of isolation. After the second world war we reached an accommodation with the nations of Europe for a continuing presence here. We did that through NATO and I believe that it has helped to create the environment that has brought about the great progress that has been made politically and economically. I do not want to move away unilaterally from what is proving to be successful.

As for forward deployment, we intend to stay in Europe as long as we are wanted. We recognise that there is a big difference between being based just west of the Warsaw Pact countries and being based many thousands of miles across the Atlantic Ocean.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Deputy Secretary, let me say again how greatly we have appreciated your presence here. The information you have provided has already made a valuable contribution to our own thinking.

At the same time the discussion is not yet wholly finished. It needs to be broadened and followed up if America and Europe together are to build something positive, balanced and durable.

The Gulf crisis to which you referred showed that Europe's involvement was essential to the solution of the great problems that previously used to be formulated in bipolar terms. Your comments and replies are ample evidence that you agree on this subject with the President of the United States and Mr. Cheney, Secretary of State. So we have to pursue and deepen this dialogue. This, I suspect, was the reason for Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's question about the natural partner of this Assembly, the United States Congress. Our experience shows that it is not always easy. You have been kind enough, Deputy Secretary, to promise us your support in improving and developing this relationship. That is one of the objectives of this Assembly and we shall try to make a success of it in the future.

Your presence here and what you have said show that we are on the right lines and that there is much to be done together. Thank you, Mr. Deputy Secretary, for coming and for making this clear.

4. Tribute to a former Vice-President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I have some news which will sadden all of you, especially the British Delegation. We have just heard that Mr. Bob Edwards, one of our former colleagues and a member of the British Delegation from 1966 to 1987, has died.

Mr. Bob Edwards was a Vice-President of our Assembly and President of the Defence Committee. Having had the privilege of knowing and appreciating him, I should like personally to say how much his death affects us. I wish to pay tribute to what he was, what he did, and the memory he has left us. I extend our very sincere sympathies to his family and to the British Delegation.

In respect for our colleague, will you please observe one minute's silence.

(The delegates stood for a minute's silence)

5. The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and Western European Union

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1228 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on the Independent European Programme Groupe (IEPG) and Western European Union and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1228 and amendments.

I call Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – After the sad announcement that you, Mr. President, have just made, I should like publicly to express my congratulations to you on your election as our President. I am sure that your record of long political service and impressive international experience will greatly enhance your authority at this Assembly.

I also welcome the clear support for our organisation expressed this afternoon from the platform by the Deputy Defence Secretary of the United States, Mr. Atwood. I noted with special satisfaction his observations on the importance to our alliance of the maintenance of our defence industrial base.

The report on the Independent European Programme Group and WEU which it is my privilege to introduce on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was passed unanimously and without amendment by the committee. Some might understandably regard the subject matter as arcane and perhaps too technical to be interesting. I urge them not to be put off by its specialist nature and instead to grasp its relevance to the democratic international Assembly of WEU with enthusiasm.

Others may wonder, as the direct Soviet military threat to the security of Western Europe appears to have dramatically declined over the past year, what the exact justification for WEU's continued existence may be. Certainly uncertainties and anxieties about our future abound.

However, we should take heart from the fact that Belgian Defence Minister Coëme, on behalf of the Ministerial Council, reaffirmed his faith in WEU and made it clear this morning that the period of diminished East-West tension, reduced force levels and arms control upon which we have entered will demand not less but greater armaments collaboration in Western Europe. Piecemeal unilateral disarmament and precipitate defence equipment cancellations by individual members of our alliance could only do economic and social damage, put mutual confidence in WEU partners at risk and prejudice the evolution of a coherent security system in our continent.

It is more important than ever that we in this Assembly who derive legitimacy for our collective deliberations on European defence from the democratic mandate of our national parliaments and peoples should exert a clear and consistent control over the initiatives that our governments jointly take in our name. They do so in one area of arms collaboration through the Independent European Programme Group, to harmonise the operational requirements of the armed forces of the European members of NATO and to harmonise the schedules within which those armed forces take into their inventories the defence equipment which has been conceived in common.

For years our Assembly has requested that the Council of Ministers of the IEPG officially and regularly inform the Assembly of WEU about the progress of IPEG's work. At last, a few weeks ago, a communiqué from the IEPG Council was addressed to its WEU ministerial counterpart, which transmitted it onward to the Presidential Committee of the Assembly.

Of course, the membership of the IEPG exceeds, at least for the time being, that of WEU, and there will be a need to declassify IEPG progress bulletins issued to WEU. But I am sure that with good will these minor problems can be easily surmounted. My suggestion and that of the committee is that the President-in-Office of IEPG address this Assembly once a year; and that the IEPG issue regular progress bulletins to the committees most especially concerned with its work – the committees on technology, aerospace and defence.

To exercise our parliamentary rôle properly we need the facts to do the job. Neither governments nor the Ministerial Council should be secretive towards us. If they are to obtain the support from parliamentarians and public which they deserve they must take us fully into their confidence. In short, we need to end the political vacuum within which the IEPG has operated for far too long. That is especially necessary, as I argued earlier, because our electorates may all too easily believe that in the improved climate of East-West relations the IEPG's work in armaments is of little value and that defence equipment budgets exist only to be raided in pursuit of short-term extravagance for electoral gain.

On the contrary, I believe that the IEPG can overcome these tendencies on the part of our electorates and peoples – and some parliamentarians, too – through constructive co-operation. IEPG will do that by rationalising the excess capacity that is bound to exist in our defence industries in Europe in a way that is compatible with the clear need for open and intense competition, to obtain better value for money from defence budgets which will become increasingly squeezed. Lower force levels will demand of the armed forces of the western alliance better command and control, communications and intelligence – Mr. Hill of our committee is to produce a report on that very subject and Mr. Lenzer has already produced one on remote-sensing satellite systems – and will require increased mobility, flexibility and firepower to concentrate decisive force at particular danger spots.

We cannot, therefore, ignore the need for continuing technical sophistication in weaponry and defence equipment. The harmonisation of IEPG's military research effort under the Euclid programme along the lines that this Assembly

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

has long advocated will require further political support from us. It will involve the identification of key areas for research, more joint funding and the rationalisation of existing national defence research establishments to avoid duplication and waste. The Assembly's seminar on military research in London, following closely in time and in recommendations Mr. Vredeling's report "Towards a stronger Europe", made a positive contribution to the progress already achieved and welcomed in this area by our Assembly. We are pleased that the establishment of a small permanent IEPG secretariat, long advocated by this Assembly, has now taken place.

I certainly believe that the maintenance of a corpus of specialist research and development and procurement expertise to advise the IEPG presidency will be increasingly necessary; and that, in view of the long gestation of defence equipment programmes, continuity in post of key officials should be achieved in the IEPG's Lisbon office. That can be done without building a top-heavy bureaucracy which no one would want. The Lisbon secretariat's rôle will also include monitoring the system of open tendering between companies in IEPG nations and the universal availability to industries among those nations of the appropriate contract bulletins and data. Much progress has already been made, through more open competition and more open tendering, towards the creation of a far more open defence equipment market in the IEPG countries and in NATO as a whole.

However, as Defence Minister Coëme warned us this morning, this must be done in future without resorting to a European protectionism that would exclude United States and Canadian defence equipment manufacturers or other manufacturers from friendly nations of Europe who are not yet partners of our organisation but who aspire to the same ideals as we do. Were we to take such a backwards protectionist step we would risk not only unwelcome retaliation against our exporters but denying European governments the capabilities that they may well require for their continued defence effort.

Lastly, we should not forget the continued technical and industrial importance to the civil economy of our continent of armaments collaboration and manufacture. These activities have significant civil fallout. They provide important employment and are vital economically. That is why I advocated in my recommendation that we should regularly inform the EEC Commission of IEPG work and argued for the early evolution, within the framework of the European Community, of a system of common company law to facilitate the process of transnational merger, consortium-building and collaboration which, at

an industrial level, have made spectacular progress in Western Europe in recent years and months.

In short, I hope that my report will convince the Assembly that armaments co-operation is a vital part of our work at WEU, that we have a responsibility to monitor and to back the work of IEPG and that we can do so only if we are kept fully in the picture by the Ministerial Council. I hope that the report that I have had the honour to present will be unanimously endorsed by the Assembly as it was by the committee.

(Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your excellent report, Mr. Wilkinson, the more so as several members were wondering about the need for the IEPG and the work it does.

I take this opportunity of thanking you for all your work and very considerable activity in the Technological and Aerospace Committee.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Garrett.

Mr. GARRETT (*United Kingdom*). – This is the first occasion on which I have had the opportunity to address the President of this Assembly as Madam President and I congratulate Mrs. Staels-Dompas on taking the post.

My colleague John Wilkinson is rightly honoured as being one of the best members of the committee, of which I am also a member. I agree with the thrust of the report. However, I have some reservations about draft recommendation 3, which members of the committee may share. We are falling into an error by suggesting that our committee should provide the EEC with information on a regular basis.

I submit that the European Economic Community has more than enough to do without becoming involved in defence matters. On British radio this week, the former President of NATO said that he would welcome the allocation of some responsibility for defence to the EEC. In my view, that would be wrong.

First, we do not want to add a further layer of bureaucracy upon the EEC, and I know the structure well enough to know that that is what would happen. Secondly, we have enough expert opinion on our side, not merely in this organisation but in organisations similar to ours, to carry developments in the defence debate and knowledge about such matters back to the nations in respect of which joint treaties exist. The member states of the Assembly, some of whom are also among the Twelve, know full well that the EEC cannot manage its agricultural, transport and pollution problems. Therefore, it

Mr. Garrett (continued)

is impudent to suggest that it should have some rôle in deciding the defence strategies of our nations. I hope that when we debate the report fully, the Rapporteur may consider withdrawing recommendation 3.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, I have spoken to quite a number of reports by Mr. Wilkinson in this Assembly. I compliment him on the quality of his reports, which are comprehensible and consistent and appear to move forward quite logically and purposefully towards a conclusion.

Each of the separate paragraphs of the draft recommendation can be approved and has my support, but it becomes a little difficult when they are all considered in context. As Mr. Garrett has rightly pointed out, paragraph 5 is a major problem, both as regards the allocation of tasks and especially if you take the trouble – as I have done – to find out in what areas research is being conducted in the various countries. As far as details are concerned, what I have heard from my national parliament was not very revealing, but what I have been told about the areas of high technology in which concentrated research is to be conducted shows in effect that in this respect we have not taken enough trouble in the past over co-ordination at the level of the armaments directors in the various national defence sectors, where there is, of course, a great deal that is also of interest to industry as a whole.

It was quite rightly said just now that co-operation is necessary. Co-operation can undoubtedly even be a confidence-building measure.

Turning to paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation, I will tell you what I would not like to see. I can only endorse the call for the harmonisation of European company law in paragraph 6, but if this call is associated with the goal of permitting transnational mergers, I am reminded of an incident in the past, of the tug-of-war between a German firm and a group of British companies over defence research capacities. As a member of the House of Commons you will undoubtedly recall this incident. All I can say is that, while I can support the idea of making transnational procurement possible and encouraging defence companies to co-operate, I am opposed to an industrial armaments complex – this is also covered by paragraph 6 – emerging, possibly with our parliamentary support, and then, reinforced by mergers, reinforced by transnational management structures, appearing as a potent power factor and perhaps restricting the decision-making freedom of us

parliamentarians, because decisions for disarmament and against certain weapons systems might be paralysed by such key-words as jobs, local financial resources, technology labs, high technology research capacity and replacement jobs.

Paragraph 7 concerns the opening up of the market. But the question is, what will this lead to? What does it mean when it says that the interests of the developing defence industry countries must be secured? Anyone who points out, as paragraph (ii) of the draft recommendation does, that, on the one hand, reductions in military confrontation automatically lead to a reduction in orders for armaments and, on the other hand, calls for rationalisation, diversification and specialisation with a view to managing overcapacity, should not want to create a new armaments capacity, totally dependent on defence orders, in other countries.

I would add that rationalisation, diversification and specialisation have never yet created high quality jobs: all they have ever done is to replace high quality jobs with jobs of lesser quality. All that has increased – this is a principle of economics – is the cost of capital investment in each remaining job.

To conclude, we endorse the draft recommendation, if the aim is to reduce armament capacities or to encourage conversion where this is appropriate. By conversion I do not mean only the conversion of industrial manufacturing. Conversion as I understand it means more. I refer to conversion for a whole region, for a whole location, with all that it entails. Where armed forces are reduced, there will undoubtedly be less need for military equipment, but service industry capacities and jobs will also be reduced. Something will have to be done for the regions concerned.

I will be commenting on behalf of the Socialist Group on the amendments which Mr. Fourré has tabled to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Speed.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – I welcome the report and congratulate my colleague, John Wilkinson. The report shows us the way ahead in terms of European arms research and development and procurement. Trying to achieve our aims on a European basis is fraught with difficulties. The explanatory memorandum explains that in detail.

A strong theme throughout the report is the reduction of conventional arms, which means that there will be fewer but more sophisticated weapons. One cannot envisage our navies, armies and air forces becoming obsolete, not least because of the uncertainties surrounding

Mr. Speed (continued)

the Soviet Union, the uncertainties and dangers out of area and the constant threat from international terrorism, which knows no boundaries. We shall have fewer but more sophisticated systems. High-quality is the watchword. Unit costs will rise and budgets will be reduced because our electorates are demanding some kind of peace dividend. We should be thinking in terms of more meaningful international co-operation which will result in reductions in each of our budgets.

The Rapporteur will agree with me that the record so far has not been very good. The process of procurement nationally and internationally is time-consuming and cumbersome. Memorandums of understanding on staff requirements and project definition demonstrate the technical problems and the fact that we shall experience all sorts of such technical problems involved in the changing of specifications by the military during the lifetime of weapon systems.

As the report says, the way forward must be more intensive European research and development and production, but we must not underestimate the difficulties. As we have seen in recent days the beef situation proves that, notwithstanding treaties, when a strong pressure group in any one country decides to exert pressure on another country the government tends to give way. Whatever the treaties or understandings about international weapons, I would not expect France to give up tank production or Germany to give up research into military radar or electronics. I would not expect the United Kingdom to give up its torpedo manufacturing capability.

The explanatory memorandum, especially paragraphs 27 and 28, faces up to those problems. That does not impress me but merely shows that governments from time to time have to act as politicians. It means that if we cannot go for a whole loaf we must try for half a loaf and achieve what we can.

A number of projects listed in the excellent appendices of the reports, such as helicopters and the European fighter aircraft, have led a dangerous life with threatened cancellation from time to time. There are other projects not included in the list which should have been. The death of the NATO frigate a few months ago means that we should have a collaborative frigate project. Most European navies will need replacement ships.

It was a great pity a few years ago that the Netherlands and the United Kingdom did not get together to develop a conventional submarine, the SSK. Today the two countries are going down expensive paths, each developing

and producing separate submarines to meet the same requirement. It is a pity that we did not get our act together in time.

The report draws attention to European industries' mergers and collaborative efforts. We must do all that we can to encourage that and to remove the legal, fiscal and psychological obstacles to those efforts. With respect to my colleague Ted Garrett, although I share his detestation of the European Community becoming involved in security affairs, European law has to be changed in certain ways to facilitate mergers and collaborative efforts. The European Community, not WEU, can change that law.

We should be better informed and I welcome the report's recommendations in that respect. I also welcome the expansion of the Euclid programme that the report suggests. That is a practical way in which WEU countries can put a research and development effort together. I hope for a streamlining of procurement procedures on a European-wide basis along the lines that I have suggested. WEU could be a positive and vital spur in trying to achieve that.

Although I welcome the report, I have to add that we shall only achieve co-operation across frontiers if the political will exists constantly and not just when it suits individual governments. There must also be the political will and the strength of character in our Defence Ministers to ensure that admirals, air marshals and generals are told that enough is enough. Sometimes the best is the enemy of the good. On a European-wide basis it is best to co-operate properly and not continue to refine, thus wasting a great deal of time. In armaments time is money.

Probably the best way forward is the commercial imperative, which will lead to mergers and co-operation in defence industries in our various countries. That might be the most fruitful development and is already proceeding apace, as Mr. Wilkinson says in his report.

WEU has an important rôle to play in that, and if need be we must play it strongly. We must ensure that the subject is regularly at the top of the agenda, which is why I welcome the strong recommendations and hope that the report will be adopted unanimously.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – May I briefly reply to the speeches that have been made in this short debate, and then perhaps we can deal with the amendments individually.

I should like to express my appreciation of the tremendous work done by the clerk, Mr. Floris de Gou, in providing factual data,

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

arranging meetings and in many inestimable ways making the report worthwhile not only for this debate but as a work of reference for students and those who specialise in this area. I should also like to thank Mr. Stegagnini, the Chairman of the committee, who has given support for the report and for our work.

In his speech, Ted Garrett understandably expressed anxiety that perhaps implicit in the recommendations is some abrogation of our defence responsibilities to the ordinary European Communities. That is not true. Defence, as far as we can foresee, will be the responsibility of sovereign states within the alliance, working together to ensure collective security through NATO and the Brussels Treaty organisation. We should not confuse in our minds allusions made to the Communities with the idea that we are suggesting a specific strategic or defence rôle for the EEC.

Ted Garrett mentioned paragraphs 3 of the draft recommendations and the Euclid programme. That is not a European Community programme; the Eureka project is the European Community programme. Paragraph 38 of the report helpfully deals with the areas of military research that fall under the Euclid programme.

I appreciate that the wording of paragraphs 3 and 6 of the draft recommendation might set alarm bells ringing in some members' minds, so I shall deal briefly with them. As to paragraph 3, we are in a process of conversion and change in which there is bound to be over-capacity in defence industries. Many of those facilities will have to be used for civil production, but there is genuine interest within the industrial community in maintaining the industrial base, the technical capabilities of our industry and the competitive framework within the market must operate. That was only a suggestion of information, not decision-making by the European Community.

Paragraph 6 advocates exploration with the Commission of the EEC of the possibility of some acceleration of the harmonisation of European company law, which is in the interests not only of defence equipment suppliers but companies that operate on a transnational basis in Western Europe.

I am in full sympathy with the points made by Mr. Klejdzinski about the Euclid programme. Like Mr. Garrett, he speaks with authority as a long-standing member of the committee. I acknowledge that it will be difficult to identify the fields of research to pursue, but if we are relatively modest in our ambitions, and if we proceed step by step and do not bite off more than we can chew, we will not go far wrong and certainly will not waste too much money.

Inevitably, we discussed over-capacity and the need to change our defence industry capabilities to civil capabilities, but that is bound to have local employment and economic effects. As warning time will presumably be increased, there will be a need to maintain technical capabilities through an active research programme so that if tension increases again we do not find ourselves lacking the high capability equipment that we might need. As Keith Speed so rightly said, less means better. If we must ensure our security with less armed forces and armaments, they must, ipso facto, be more capable and better equipped. He speaks with considerable expertise as a former naval minister, and he brought to his speech the rigorous intellectual analysis with which we are familiar.

In particular, he reminded us of the difficulties that we have experienced with several collaborative programmes, the NATO frigate being one of the most topical recent examples. The demise of that collaborative programme was undoubtedly sad. I support his advocacy of a European venture to succeed it both in the anti-aircraft rôle and possibly in the anti-submarine rôle. If we can identify joint requirements and work out joint re-equipment timescales early through the IEPG, perhaps we will not get into such difficulty about the development and production phases of equipment. WEU and this Assembly can be an important catalyst in achieving effective armament co-operation through the IEPG and elsewhere. I wholeheartedly hope that we will embrace that rôle and that the report will be adopted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Stegagnini, Chairman of the committee.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I hope we shall approve this important report unanimously. Mr. Wilkinson, with all his well-known experience and professionalism and also his foresight in planning this report while Chairman of the committee, concludes with a kind of camera shot of the European organisations concerned with defence, security and the arms industry. In some measure, therefore, it provides us with up-to-date information on their structures, organisation, efficiency, work and future in the context of the changes taking place in Europe.

The IEPG is, of course, a non-governmental organisation, of which the Belgian Minister of Defence spoke at length this morning, created when the defence industry was thriving in Europe and armaments still had to be in sufficient quantity to meet the dangers and the threat. Today this situation is changing completely.

In my opinion, the IEPG must change its methods of work to aim basically at optimising

Mr. Stegagnini (continued)

research and development, enabling firms to work together as much as possible, achieving a division of labour in Europe in all branches and sectors of the arms industry such as electronics, aircraft, space, new technologies and so on, and also creating areas for collaboration with the European Community.

I disagree with Mr. Garrett who says this is impossible – Mr. Wilkinson himself made this point quite clearly. The Euclid programme, which is costing billions of ECUs for very advanced research in sectors of unquestionable military interest, but will also have a civilian spin-off, is clearly an opportunity which the IEPG and everyone concerned with arms problems must not miss.

Our report speaks of the new sunrise technologies, such as underwater electro-acoustics which is destined in future to be of fundamental importance for civilian underwater research as well; it refers to particle accelerators, that is electronic cannon, of the greatest importance in all sectors including pollution control in power station emissions for example and so on but equally important in the military sector; it mentions opto-electronics and artificial intelligence – in short, all sectors destined to play a fundamental rôle in the development of civilian technologies too. I repeat, therefore, that this is an opportunity not to be missed and the IEPG is quite rightly maintaining a close relationship between these resources and their strict use for military purposes also, at a time when those to be devoted to armaments and research must be progressively reduced.

I should like to thank Mr. Wilkinson, his associates, the secretary of the committee and all members who contributed to the report which is accompanied by extremely interesting annexes in which the vigour of the European arms industry comes out clearly. Details are given of all co-operation established between firms and all agreements on individual projects and programmes; it shows how the industries in the different European countries have co-operated on a common objective. Praise is due to the IEPG for these efforts in conjunction with the arms directors who play an important part.

We have to thank Mr. Wilkinson for this report which must not be pigeonholed but be kept at hand because the efforts of the IEPG are extremely valuable and quite vital for WEU and for the European arms industry in terms of technological research and the civilian sector.

I hope, therefore, that members will show their appreciation of our work by voting unanimously for what is definitely a good report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Fourné has tabled Amendment 1 which reads as follows:

1. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after “cross-frontier competition” and insert “and transnational collaboration between defence companies”.

I call Mr. Klejdzinski to move Amendment 1.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I will be very brief. Paragraph 6 of the recommendation reads: “Explore with the Commission of the EEC possibilities for some acceleration of harmonised European company law” – which is right and reasonable – “to facilitate fair cross-frontier competition...”, which we also approve. But it should then read “and transnational collaboration between defence companies”.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – It would be a pity if the amendment were carried. It seems to try to stop the important issue of competition. If we are trying to get something useful done, I should be much happier to have cross-frontier competition that can be read in more than one way than merely transnational collaboration which, in many cases, can be a nice cosy relationship that does not give the sort of results that one wants for the consumer, governments and taxpayers. Therefore, I suggest that the amendment should be rejected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – We oppose the amendment.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – May the Rapporteur also say a word? I think it is in order that he should. I am sorry to butt in, but it is normal practice.

The amendment proposed by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of Mr. Fourné would be exceedingly damaging and would prejudice the long-term development of our armaments industry. Sir Geoffrey Finsberg clearly referred to the need to maintain competition and to improve supplies to governments, but if members look at the appendix that lists the transnational agreements and mergers and collaboration that already exist, they will see how many there are and the way in which they are developing. For example, I presume that the recommendation would have made impossible Aérospatiale's and MBB's merger of their helicopter activities and would have prevented the establishment of Eurodynamics between Thompson CSF in France and British Aerospace. It would have been a thoroughly retrograde development.

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

I support Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and the committee Chairman, Mr. Stegagnini, in urging the Assembly to reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. Wilkinson said that he supported Mr. Stegagnini in rejecting the amendment. The interpretation was that we were obliged to accept the amendment. I must complain that the interpretation during this session has been damnable. The interpretation of what Mr. Stegagnini said was totally opposite to what he said. Therefore, I ask the Clerk to do something. This is the fifth time that I have had to complain about misinterpretation. We have been told that Mr. Stegagnini said “Accept it”, whereas he said “Reject it”.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I believe that the committee – both Chairman and Rapporteur – rejected the amendment.

The interpretation was presumably at fault because both the Chairman and Rapporteur said the amendment was rejected.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order. The English interpretation was a quite clear.

Dame Peggy FENNER (*United Kingdom*). – I am sorry, but in the English interpretation the Chairman of the committee said that we were bound to accept it. The interpretation of what the Rapporteur said was that we were bound to reject it.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – In Italian, he said “Reject” quite clearly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Is it now clear that both the Chairman and the Rapporteur of the committee have rejected the amendment?

I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I quite understand that the amendment has not been adopted, but I object to its being rejected because of something that is not in the amendment.

Both the Rapporteur and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg have said they want cross-frontier competition. Our amendment does not question that in any way. It is solely concerned with the wording: “processes of transnational merger and acquisition”. This should be deleted. It is not right to argue that we, the authors of the amendment, are opposed to competition. That is not a conclusion that can be drawn either from the original English text or from the translation I have heard.

I just wanted to say this to clarify the situation. Otherwise, I quite understand that the majority of the Assembly will not be approving the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Madam President, I wish to make it quite clear that, as I have already said, we are opposed to the proposed amendment. If the interpreter said something different it was a mistake.

I repeat that we – the Rapporteur and myself – are opposed to this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is negated.

Mr. Fourré has tabled Amendment 2 which reads as follows:

2. In paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “developing defence industry” and insert “member”.

I call Mr. Klejdzinski to move the amendment.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I hope to be more successful with this amendment than I was with the first. To my mind, it does not call for a fundamental change.

It seeks to replace the words “developing defence industry countries” in paragraph 7 of the recommendation by “member countries”. The recommendation should not say that there are qualitative differences in the level of development of the defence industries of the various countries. It might be inferred from the present wording that there are countries in WEU with a highly developed defence industry and others with a less developed defence industry. It is not within our scope to determine which defence industry is of a better quality. The phrase “developing defence industry countries” should therefore be replaced by “member countries”.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call the Chairman.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Madam President, part of the amendment as proposed is acceptable but part is not. We can offer a compromise solution. While the amendment proposes that the words “developing defence industry” be replaced by the word “member”, we would suggest inserting the word “member” before the words “defence industry countries” and retaining the words that

Mr. Stegagnini (continued)

the proposers of the amendment wish to delete. We therefore ask the proposers of the amendment if they can accept this compromise solution.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – Yes!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Should we not have a written text if the committee agrees?

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on a point of order.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Madam President. Could the Clerk tell us exactly what we are being asked? I heard the translation that the Chairman was happy to leave the word “member”. That is what the amendment says, anyhow. What exactly are we voting on?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Perhaps I can help the Assembly. The proposal was to insert “member developing defence industry country”. That was to make it clear that we are referring specifically to those developing defence industry countries that form part of the IEPG. It would be regrettable if we left out DDI countries, as the amendment intended, because they need special help and we want to recognise that fact. This compromise should meet both objectives in a mutually satisfactory way. I suggest keeping the original but inserting the word “member” before DDI countries.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – If I have understood correctly, the end of paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation would be amended to read as follows: “... whilst ensuring that the interests of the member developing defence industry countries are secured...” leaving the rest of the paragraph unchanged.

Thus amended, I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2, as amended, is agreed to.

We shall now proceed to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

I call Mr. Jessel on a point of order.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Madam President. I hope that I will be excused for raising a point of order further to that which was raised five minutes ago, which contained two elements. First, it concerned what was the correct translation of the advice given by the committee representatives to the Assembly on how we should vote, and that element was dealt with.

The second element related to the very serious character of the mistranslation and what could be done to prevent a recurrence. That second element is very serious. The mistranslation came to light only because a bilingual delegate happened to be able to hear both the translation and the original at the same time.

I think that the Assembly is entitled to insist that proper note is taken of the second element of Sir Geoffrey Finsberg’s point of order and that action is taken to prevent such an error in future. I should like my point of order to be minuted and something to be done about it.

The PRESIDENT (Traduction). – We take note of what you say, Mr. Jessel. The secretariat will do what it can.

6. WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations concerned with security and European defence

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1226)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations concerned with security and European defence, and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1226.

I call Mr. Stegagnini, Rapporteur.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*). – The importance of developing contacts with research institutes that are capable of exercising significant influence on public opinion and politicians has been always recognised by our Assembly and particularly by its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. Similarly, our committee is convinced that Western European Union and its Assembly should take full advantage of the existence of a number of non-governmental organisations working in its area of responsibility. This is the first time that these questions

¹. See page 32.

Mr. Stegagnini (continued)

have been studied in an Assembly report. They are particularly topical in the light of the creation of the WEU Institute for Security Studies which is to co-operate with institutes in other countries, including those of Warsaw Pact countries.

The report that I have the honour to present to you is consequently divided into two main parts. The part numbered II deals with research institutes and reviews some useful information about forty-one institutes working in fifteen different countries.

The analysis of the activities of these institutions concentrates on two aspects. The first deals with the diversity of aims and statutes of the establishments concerned and their working methods, which might be better used for WEU's own work.

In this connection, special attention has been paid to the possibilities for an organisation such as WEU to join such institutes as a corporate member or how Assembly members could obtain individual membership in relevant bodies in their home countries.

Secondly, the public relations efforts of certain research institutes have been studied. Of course, this is not the first aim of these establishments, their first objective being research. Nevertheless, it is interesting to realise that several of them pay close attention to developing relations with the media and the public. This is so for the American Council on Foreign Relations in New York. This is not surprising in a country in which the media play a crucial rôle in political life. But some Western European institutions too attach importance to their public relations and use quite different means, some of which are quoted in the report.

With regard to WEU's place in the work of research institutes, the study demonstrates that several establishments seem to be paying increased attention to WEU. Many of them work in areas within WEU's competence without being really aware of the latter's work or without WEU and its Assembly being aware of their activities. It will therefore be very useful for the WEU Institute for Security Studies to contribute to improving relations and exchanges of information with the research institutes. The Assembly is, of course, very interested in benefiting from the contacts the institute will establish with them. Furthermore, it should be ensured that the Assembly may take advantage of the computerised documentation system which will be procured for the institute.

In part III of the report, the question of developing relations with appropriate non-governmental organisations dealing with matters within the purview of WEU has been followed

up further to discussions in the committee. Since the goal of promoting such contacts is to encourage the relevant non-governmental organisations to give maximum publicity to Western European Union's aims and initiatives, in paragraph 55 the specific character of our organisation and its Assembly has been summarised. The implementation and ways and means of organising working relations with NGOs will raise a number of practical questions which should be examined carefully. The draft order therefore proposes that the committee examine this matter further.

This is a short report of our work. It concludes with a list of institutes for strategy and military problems, and also lists the specialisations of those institutes. There is a case for supporting the establishment of a new institute for research on military strategy and defence within WEU. That is our opinion and we should like to see such an institute established.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Nobody has put his name down to speak. Does the Chairman of the committee wish to speak now?

Sir William SHELTON (*United Kingdom*). – It is a pleasure to do so, Madam President, although in fact, I am Vice-Chairman of the committee, standing in for the Chairman. I think that we should all like to congratulate our friend and colleague Mr. Stegagnini. I think that the fact that no one has expressed a wish to speak on the report stems not from the fact that the matter lacks importance but from the committee's unanimity in supporting the recommendations.

I can recollect only one matter, concerning the security of the institution, which was dealt with by the Rapporteur. The three recommendations in the report, namely, that the institute should have the broadest possible independence for its work, that the Assembly should have access to documentation data and that there should be closer co-operation with international non-governmental organisations – are, of course, correct, and I again congratulate the Rapporteur.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We will now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1226.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The President (continued)

*The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously*¹.

We will now vote on the draft order contained in Document 1226.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

*The draft order is agreed to unanimously*².

7. The new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1227)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on the new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1227.

I call Sir John Hunt, Rapporteur.

Sir John HUNT (*United Kingdom*). – It is a great honour to present my report on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. I pay tribute to the staff of the committee who helped me so much in the preparation of the report.

Much of our time and attention in this session has been preoccupied with the future of WEU, and the reports of my colleagues Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Lord Newall emphasised that this organisation, far from being moribund or superfluous, has an important rôle to play in the future defence and security of Europe. To be effective and successful, that rôle depends upon a much more rigorous promotion of our work and activities. The basic message of my report is that, unless we promote ourselves, no one else will do it for us. Each of us, in our dual rôles as members of this Assembly and as members of our national parliaments, has a special duty and responsibility in these matters.

1. See page 33.

2. See page 34.

I make the point in my report that “national parliaments do not know enough about the activities of WEU and its Assembly”. That, I fear, is certainly true. In previous debates reference has been made to the depth of public ignorance in our member countries about WEU’s work. In my experience, there is also an alarming lack of knowledge and understanding amongst many parliamentarians at home. We have to acknowledge that in most parliaments membership of this Assembly is regarded by those of us who come here as a great privilege. There is, therefore, sometimes a reluctance to speak too freely or frequently about the activities of the Assembly for fear of increasing the competition for places on the national delegations. I fear that some prefer to keep what goes on here a closely guarded secret.

We must try to overcome such personal inhibitions and apprehensions in the greater interest of WEU as a whole. We must realise that we are the essential link between the Assembly and our national parliaments. Unless we speak up for WEU, I fear that its case will inevitably go by default.

It was good to hear the Prime Minister of France roundly declaring that: “Western European Union has a leading rôle in preparing the more open, more co-operative Europe which is to be built.” In other words, far from being overtaken by events, as some would have us believe, WEU is indeed equipped to meet the challenge of the new Europe and to respond to the exciting opportunities of the next decade.

I would not like to give the impression that nothing is being done at present. In my report I pay tribute both to the initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany in issuing half-yearly reports to parliament on the activities of WEU and to the decision of the French Delegation to publish a regular information bulletin on its activities, both in WEU and the Council of Europe. Those are important and welcome developments which set an example to other delegations.

The problem is that half-yearly reports cannot, by their nature, always be topical and relevant, and there is often a need for a much more speedy dissemination of government information. That is why in my report I make the specific suggestion that each national delegation should take advantage of the period when its government assumes the Chairmanship-in-Office of the WEU Council in order to promote and enhance the image of WEU within the national context. We should use our country’s chairmanship, when it comes up, as a peg on which to stimulate press interest which, in other circumstances, is too often sadly lacking. I hope that my suggestions will be enthusiastically taken up by our respective delegations, and we look forward to seeing some positive results in the months ahead.

Sir John Hunt (continued)

Having achieved those results in terms of press and parliamentary coverage, it is important for them to be transmitted back to the Committee secretariat here as quickly as possible so that the information can be widely circulated and the maximum benefit achieved in terms of our public relations.

In paragraph 25 of my report, I set out a format which has been suggested by the United Kingdom secretariat for the return of information to the committee secretariat. But, as I emphasise, that should not preclude the transmission of more urgent and topical information. I suggest the more extensive use of telefax facilities for that purpose. We really must take full advantage of the new technology available to us to promote our cause more effectively and efficiently, recognising that the more topical the information the greater the press interest and coverage is likely to be.

The final section of my report, in paragraphs 37 to 39, touches upon a more controversial issue – the composition of our national delegations. Paragraph 39 states that the German Bundestag said: “Changing the provisions of the treaty” – the Brussels Treaty – “should allow an end to be put to the obligation to appoint a single delegation of representatives of the Bundestag to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Assembly of Western European Union”.

Speaking from a personal point of view, I have much sympathy with those sentiments. Inevitably, with a large delegation that must serve WEU and the Council of Europe, some members will have only a limited interest and expertise in defence and security matters. If the delegations were separated, it would help to ensure that those attending WEU had a specific interest in defence; they would be better qualified to explain the work of WEU within their parliaments and to their national media.

I recognise that any proposed splitting of the delegations, as the Bundestag and I have suggested, would not be universally popular. We have a saying in the United Kingdom that turkeys cannot be expected to vote for an early Christmas. I am sure that several members of the Assembly would not want to put an end to their careers here. However, I believe that that proposition is worthy of consideration, again within the context of the revision of the Brussels Treaty.

I conclude, as I began, by emphasising that the future effectiveness of WEU is in our hands. I am sure that we shall all leave here with the best of intentions – to promote the work and rôle of WEU in our respective countries. However, inevitably, once we get home we have many

other preoccupations, and it is sometimes difficult to maintain the momentum of our good intentions.

The message of my report is that, at this crucial time for WEU, we should be making a special effort, each of us acting as ambassadors in our countries for this organisation. I commend that objective to the Assembly. I also commend my report and hope that it will be unanimously accepted, as it was in committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call the Vice-Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, Sir William Shelton.

Sir William SHELTON (*United Kingdom*). – Although I have my name down to speak later, it might be more appropriate to make my speech now.

I commend my friend and colleague, Sir John Hunt, on the report which is very important. The importance of the public relations aspect of our work is deeply underestimated by many colleagues. That is evidenced by the few members present for the debate. They are making a mistake by not being present because this is an important debate.

My first point, which is touched on in the report and was mentioned by Sir John Hunt, concerns strengthening the impact of the Assembly's work in our national parliaments. It is strange that the distinguished parliamentarians who are members of WEU seem to have difficulty in obtaining the ears of our parliaments and increasing their awareness of WEU. I seem to find myself in two worlds – one in the House of Commons in London and the other here in Strasbourg – I mean Paris. When I am in Paris I forget about London, and vice versa. I suppose that is something to do with the pressure on our time, so I am delighted that the report suggests that we should place some pressure on ourselves.

I support the suggestion made by the United Kingdom Delegation in paragraph 25. I understand that the French Delegation has decided that there should be a timetable format for regular reports from each delegation detailing all the interventions, questions and speeches made by individual members.

The report suggests that the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations should be kept informed. That would help to focus our minds on our responsibilities in our national parliaments of increasing the awareness of WEU in Paris. It would be like an end-of-term report and perhaps would make us slightly more active in our duties.

The report mentions enhancing the public image of delegations in member countries.

Sir William Shelton (continued)

I regret that we have not yet moved to simpler, more understandable and more public-oriented texts with the same format. I think I am right in saying that that is agreed by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. It has not yet been adopted by the Assembly, but I hope that it will be. Although it is not entirely relevant to the report, I am still seeking the new logo that has been discussed at various times.

According to paragraph 47 of the report, Mr. Büchner said: "All efforts to enhance the Assembly's public impact are without real effect if the substance of WEU's work is not improved."

As someone who previously worked in marketing, I absolutely agree with that. Unless the product is good, the public are not much interested.

I recognise the importance of the rôle and work undertaken by those who are fortunate enough to serve on WEU. Given the distinguished parliamentarians who serve here, I cannot help wondering whether we should consider an enhanced rôle for WEU, as was mentioned earlier by one of our distinguished visitors. I cannot help asking whether we are contributing as much as we can to the resolution of some of the important questions about security in Europe.

As the Vice-Chairman of the committee, I strongly commend the report. As Sir John Hunt said, it was unopposed in committee, so I hope that it will not be opposed by the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I too should like to congratulate Sir John Hunt on his report. I fully support the proposals put to us.

I should like to speak about one of the essential aspects of the argument followed by the committee in the report as a whole.

The object, in reality, is to get the governments of member countries to take notice at the national level of the work done by Western European Union and in particular by the Assembly.

Clearly there is a need for continual improvement in the relations we have with the Council of Ministers. We have made considerable progress during the last few years, no doubt largely due to current events, which are likely to continue to provide compelling reasons for developing those relations.

It is at times disappointing to see political relations between the Council and the Assembly being impaired by procedural delays when very

often what these relations demand is not only efficiency, which is obvious, but also speed. For aside from the positions adopted by governments, one thing is of fundamental importance for an institution like ours, namely dialogue between governments – and hence the Council – and the Assembly, in other words the joint search for a position acceptable to all member countries.

It is in this framework that the efforts to be made at national level can be planned.

Nationally, I believe I can agree with our Rapporteur that the members appointed to the Assembly of Western European Union are making an ever-increasing effort. They are doing what they can, but in a distressing procedural void. Any initiatives the Assembly of Western European Union may take are launched into a complex world where every country has its own set habits and special procedures, and where we often have the greatest difficulty in bringing to the fore the real case we are trying to make in Western European Union.

Sir John Hunt in his report referred to the initiatives taken in national parliaments, particularly in the Bundestag by the Federal German Government. Until governments ensure that their national assemblies debate WEU positions as they should, I do not think we shall make the necessary impact whether in terms of influencing public opinion or co-ordinating our policies on European defence and diplomacy.

Here is an example from my own country. I am on the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly. Like many of my French colleagues, I also have the privilege of being a member of the Assembly of Western European Union and of the Council of Europe. By constantly raising the problems discussed in WEU – which, putting it kindly, are practically unknown to the other members of parliament – we have gradually succeeded in making it understood that it is right for us to discuss things not only with the Minister for Foreign Affairs but also with the Minister of Defence. In the Council of WEU we now have the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Defence sitting together.

Very often, in our national parliaments, our dialogue is solely with the minister responsible for the same questions as the WEU committee concerned.

Yesterday afternoon we listened with very great interest to Mr. Chevènement's address to the Foreign Affairs Committee in the National Assembly. Here, that same morning, we were addressed by Mr. Eyskens, with whom we discussed the problem of Germany, and conventional forces reduction negotiations, to take just these two examples. There was also another subject of great concern to us, that of a reunified

Mr. Caro (continued)

Germany and the military forces remaining there. So there was no break in continuity; there was a direct link between WEU and the French National Assembly. But who will know? How do we make it known that the substance of all these discussions was studied here? We French parliamentarians who are also members of the Assembly of Western European Union had the advantage of a broader capacity for dialogue with the government than other members and yet they have the same powers and the same mandate.

What we would like to happen is to have the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Defence Minister both present in committee at the French National Assembly. We know very well that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, with their differing sensitivities, may sometimes see the future of WEU in different lights. Co-production of arms raises more than simply technical problems between armaments industries. It also raises major problems of foreign policy.

That being so, I hope the Council of WEU approves this resolution and takes it on board. They could hardly do otherwise: our proposals are so modest that the Council could well want to go further. After the Council has approved the recommendations of the WEU Assembly, however, member governments will then have the vital task of implementing them at national level. This task is not for members of parliament alone. It is also for governments and the representatives of our governments. In these recommendations it will be WEU speaking as a full-scale European institution and committing governments as well as MPs. Governments must find ways of co-ordinating their decisions and initiate public debates in national parliaments about these most topical results of our labours.

We had an extremely interesting example in the context of Franco-German relations to which I referred during the last session. When the Bundestag and the French National Assembly came to ratify the financial and defence protocols of the Elysée Treaty, it was decided to hold this ratification in public and with due ceremony on the same day in both countries. As a result it got media coverage.

Why could our governments not arrange for WEU proposals to be discussed in their national parliaments between the WEU spring and winter sessions? Currently it would surely not take a genius to find subjects in the recommendations adopted this part-session that would greatly interest the public and members of national parliaments. This is the only way to highlight the importance of the work done by

national parliamentarians in the Assembly and at the same time to attract, more often and more regularly and not just for tittle-tattle, the support and interest of the general media as well as the specialised defence and armaments press.

We need public opinion on our side and the Assembly of Western European Union has been working extremely hard on this for many years. Governments must understand that they are our partners. If our national parliaments fail to have due regard and respect for the decisions taken by our Assembly, then our governments have to be asked whether they realise that they have failed in their duty. But if they believe they have done what they should, then they have to explain to us why in that case things are not yet working right.

Madam President, I would state in conclusion that we are entitled to expect that our respective national parliaments provide us with assistance on a purely material level. The idea came up a long time ago, and I am bringing it up again now. The Clerk of our Assembly and the secretaries-general of our national parliaments should meet regularly and draw up a procedure for submission to our policy-makers. That is a staff job. We may have excellent generals, but if the staff does not back them up the battle cannot be waged. I hope very much that with these excellent proposals put forward by our committee and its Rapporteur, Sir John Hunt, whom I once more thank, we can tackle one of the key problems in the political activity of Western European Union, namely that of co-ordinating debates in the national parliaments in order to promote an idea which we all share: the higher interests of European security as understood and defined by Europeans showing themselves to be capable of representing these interests.

I thank the committee; I shall vote in favour of this report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Excellently said, Mr. Caro. We can see that as a former President you are still keenly interested in everything connected with Western European Union.

I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – For years the press in a number of countries – I cannot speak for all of them as I know mainly only my own – has studiously ignored WEU and there have been few, if any, reports of its activities. In some ways that is not surprising because nowadays there are few reports in British newspapers about the European Parliament, and apart from one or two quality newspapers, which themselves have cut down coverage, there is little coverage of proceedings in our parliament. Often the high-level confrontational aspects of parliament are reported, yet the more mundane but nonetheless necessary activities tend to be ignored. At this late stage in the

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

career of WEU, it is a little much to expect that there will be a sudden burst of activity and we shall become universally known in our countries because of the WEU Assembly: we shall not.

What disturbs me – it is underlined by Sir John's report – is the fact that so many people who should know better, politicians and parliamentarians, know little or nothing of WEU, just like the public in our various countries. I confess that when I first became a member of the British Delegation about eleven years ago, I knew little about either the Council of Europe or WEU. Like everyone else who has come here, I have grown to resent the indifference of political colleagues who are not involved themselves.

That was underlined for me recently when I talked to two colleagues whom I regard as otherwise extremely intelligent and politically sound. They told me that these must be exciting days in the Council of Europe, with Eastern Europe taking part, and that a certain amount of publicity is now being given to its activities which was not given before. They told me that there is a world of opportunity, and that it is good that we are getting together with the Eastern European countries, developing themes and carrying forward the movement towards democracy. But they said that they supposed that we will be wrapping up WEU soon as there is no longer any need for it. I realise that if parliamentary colleagues speak like that, their views must be replicated in other member parliaments and therein lie the seeds of our destruction – much more so than in any realignment due to governments coping with the new political situation.

In his good report, Sir John is trying to tell us that our primary task is to do everything that we can, not to obtain more publicity in our national media – that is impossible – but to influence and win over our colleagues in all parliaments. Unless we get the backing of our national parliament and the encouragement and enthusiasm of ministers in our respective governments, persuading them not to regard us with indifference and not to send along the third string to meetings of the Assembly, we shall eventually die on our feet. Given recent events, it is extremely important that an institution such as WEU remains in existence. It has a rôle to play in furthering the cause of permanent peace, which we seem to be in striking distance of for the first time since the second world war.

The report refers to the dual mandate. I do not entirely agree about that. We need a certain degree of flexibility because we know of the strains on parliamentarians; some are much more keen on this Assembly, others on the Council of Europe. Perhaps a mixture of those with dual mandates and others who specialise in

one institution is the answer. I am absolutely confident that there must be some linkage. I know from experience that our sister organisation, the Council of Europe, takes note of WEU, although it deals with different subjects, and that there is a healthy degree of assistance between the two, carried on by many notable members here. My good friend Mr. Caro is one of those who exemplify that by doing excellent work in both assemblies. While this link continues, a good case can be made for sustaining and continuing these organisations. If we begin to separate them, they may well be picked off, and that would be regrettable.

I commend Sir John's report and I hope that it will have an impact on those who serve us and on those who direct us through their national parliaments. I, too, regret the fact that there are not more people present to hear Sir John's and Mr. Caro's words of wisdom, because those in the Assembly should carry home the message.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Dame Peggy Fenner.

Dame Peggy FENNER (*United Kingdom*). – I am honoured to follow my United Kingdom colleague, who has had eleven years' service on this Assembly. I do so with some diffidence, having been here only since 1987. I wish to support Sir John Hunt and his concise report.

I want to raise one matter that follows on from what Sir Dudley Smith said. Strangely, although I naturally prepared a few notes before our distinguished visitors arrived today, I have heard confirmation of one of my views from Mr. Coëme, and I am delighted to say that I have had some reassurance from Mr. Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States.

I refer especially to paragraphs (i) and (ii) in the draft resolution. The first sentence is extremely telling. It expressed regret that, for some time, WEU member governments have preferred to avoid making public statements about the rôle of WEU. For some time before I joined the Assembly I shared the view that Sir Dudley Smith expressed, finding that many of my colleagues in Westminster believed that WEU was becoming a moribund institution. I understand why its value was recognised again in 1984, and its value should now most emphatically be recognised. Some of our parliamentary colleagues took a similarly indifferent view of the Council of Europe but have suddenly awakened to the fact that the Council of Europe has been providing a bridge by which the Central and Eastern European nations can cross into the company of western democracies. I regret what Sir John Hunt points out in paragraph (ii) but I understand the reason for it.

In presenting his most important report, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg repeatedly emphasised most

Dame Peggy Fenner (continued)

strongly that NATO is absolutely vital to Europe. Now that I am a member of the Assembly I am more acutely aware that when we have debates on defence at Westminster and when a WEU member speaks on defence, WEU is always placed firmly in the context and against the background of NATO. I am a little pessimistic about Sir John Hunt's wishes in this respect. Governments that have made only sparing use of public statements to stress WEU's rôle are not likely, in the face of present discussions of the rôle of NATO, to say anything that they fear might undermine their assertion that the NATO status quo is vital.

I was much encouraged by the words of Mr. Donald Atwood today. He stressed that NATO is in Europe for as long as we want it. I felt reassured by that. Various reports from Eastern Europe in the British press only yesterday suggest that, to reassure Eastern Europe, NATO should become more a political force and less a military force. That would not provide Western Europe with the reassurance that Eastern European countries clearly believe it would provide for them. Thus, I wholly agree with Sir John Hunt's conclusion urging member governments to use the means offered by WEU to respond to such expectations.

Having listened to the inspiring and sad words of Mr. Kiraly of Hungary, who was condemned to death twice for his democratic convictions, how can we doubt that WEU can be a focus of security for the wider Europe and act as a real European pillar? This morning Mr. Jeszenszky of Hungary, whom I had the pleasure of meeting a few weeks ago in Budapest when he was Foreign Minister designate, made an impassioned but gentle appeal. He wants his country to be part of European institutions of value because he believes that that means security for Hungary and democracy. I hope that the relevant committee of this Assembly will consider his appeal for Hungary to be co-joined with us in any way that our constitution permits.

In the words of Mr. Coëme this morning, we Europeans must get organised and get European security more firmly in our own hands. Mr. Coëme also said that we must be more assertive of our own will. That does not in any way undermine the need and wish for a NATO force in Europe, although in these changing times many institutions are having to be re-evaluated and changed.

I commend both the resolution and the report generally. I note with approval the actions of both the French Delegation and the German Government in pursuit of communication on the evolution of WEU. I recognise the rôle of national delegations as set out by Sir John and the clear responsibility that he has placed on the

individual delegates. I realise that our actions must be improved to secure the objectives of the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Kosutic, Observer from Yugoslavia.

Mr. KOSUTIC (*Observer from Yugoslavia*). – We are particularly glad that the issue of relations of Western European Union with parliaments and public is one of the items on the agenda of this session. A long history of democratic institutions in many Western European states clearly indicates that the experiences of these countries will continue to be very useful for all those countries that are endeavouring to establish or further to develop democratic political systems. The basic precondition of democracy is transparency of the work of elected representative bodies and other organs of power, and therefore this requires particular attention in all democratic political systems. Therefore, we are convinced that the insight that we shall all gain at this session, on the basis of reports submitted by Mr. Stegagnini and Sir John Hunt on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, will represent a significant contribution to the establishment of democratic links and relations of the Assembly of Western European Union with parliaments of members of this union, and with the public.

This is a time of fundamental changes and intensive integration processes in Europe. Unfortunately, there are no absolute guarantees that these integration processes in Europe, and attempts to overcome contradictions, mutual distrust and self-containment in East-West and North-South relations, will automatically succeed. Therefore, national and European forums – among them the Assembly of WEU – should continue to have the leading rôle in the search for the best way to establish peace, security and justice in Europe. Scientific and research institutes from different fields of activity, as well as non-governmental organisations concerned with security and defence, could make a significant contribution to the achievement of that end. It would be extremely beneficial if European states as well as Western European Union would establish co-operation between their respective parliaments and corresponding scientific institutions and non-governmental organisations.

As Yugoslavia is a multinational country with a specific form of constitutional order, we shall follow with great interest your views and estimates of the rôle of national parliamentary delegations in the activities of the Assembly of Western European Union. What makes our interest in this issue even greater is the fact that the Yugoslav Assembly has two chambers and that each republic, irrespective of its population, has the same number of representatives in these two chambers, with provinces having

Mr. Kosutic (continued)

fewer representatives than republics, and that the Assembly of Yugoslavia practically functions as a unicameral parliament while in one of these houses acts are passed on the basis of previous agreement of the assemblies of all republics and provinces – namely, on the basis of unanimity.

That mode of decision-making which was adopted to ensure the equality of nations and to prevent the supremacy of the majority over the minority, in addition to positive results, undoubtedly yields some negative results. We are therefore convinced that the experiences of your Assembly, as well as those of other European parliaments and similar European institutions, will prove useful in searching for the optimal forms of decision-making in multi-national communities. We also hope that some of our experiences will contribute to that objective.

I thank you once again, Madam President, for making it possible for us to participate in the deliberations of your Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Kosutic. We are very pleased to see you at this Assembly.

I call Mr. Moya.

Mr. MOYA (*Spain*) (Translation). – Thank you, Madam President. I should like to begin by associating myself with the thanks expressed by other members of the Spanish Delegation on previous days for the splendid welcome accorded to our delegation in this our first session as full members.

May I sincerely congratulate Sir John Hunt on his clear and timely report. It is particularly timely because it places the accent upon a most important question, that of public awareness of what we do and what we stand for. It seems to me that our activities get little publicity and that this calls for a good deal of thought. There is a notable lack of communication and image projection. The citizens of our countries know very little about the nature and the rôle of our institution. And as one of our colleagues said earlier, a similar ignorance of the rôle and nature of our institution prevails among our own parliamentary colleagues in our own countries. Consequently whatever is done and whatever we can do to raise the level of awareness and information in this respect will be a small matter and will be welcome. The report and the recommendations it contains are therefore extremely timely and necessary.

Secondly, I believe that the present situation as regards European and international security is to our advantage and is in itself a factor favourable to our task of intensifying communi-

cation with society. For there can be no doubt that the era of détente, disarmament, the building of a new pan-European security order and hope for a united Europe in the fields of politics and security are all factors widely accepted and well received by the general public. This being so, whatever explanations and information we as parliamentary delegations can pass on to the public in our countries are likely to enjoy the advantage of active interest and a favourable reception and reaction. Our responsibility and also our problem is to translate these concerns into practice and bring them home effectively by using the communication media and all methods and channels available to us. We also have a duty to stimulate and gain the attention of the media for this task.

I particularly wish to express my agreement with the recommendations and suggestions in the resolution accompanying this report, when it stresses the need for action in two directions: in the first place, by intensifying the debate on security matters and the rôle to be played by our institutions in the framework and within the sphere of our respective parliaments; secondly by devoting imagination and effort to bringing our positions and opinions closer together by using the media for communicating with a public which in my view is sensitive and receptive to these matters but is largely ignorant of them.

We are living in something of a paradoxical situation. We ourselves are convinced that our work is relevant and useful. But this is not enough. We must not remain cocooned within our own convictions; we must give direction to our efforts and seek to persuade our governments, parliaments and public to take the same view as us and to share our conviction. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Maybe it is not the done thing for the President of the Assembly to pass comment, but I am going to, nevertheless. The fact is that I am wondering whether our press department could not do more to help us. It is our job to inform and influence our national governments and parliaments but, as Mr. Moya rightly said, the public gets very little information about the work WEU does. I therefore voice the wish that our press department give us more support in this regard.

I call Lord Mackie.

Lord MACKIE (*United Kingdom*). – I commend the report. Sir John Hunt has produced it with his usual practical common sense and he puts his finger on one of the main points – that it is only now that our colleagues are becoming interested in what is going on. One of the most interesting and gratifying aspects is the way in which our Eastern European colleagues,

Lord Mackie (continued)

immediately they had the chance, applied to join the Council of Europe. That has been noticed by our parliamentary colleagues, and that is a great step forward.

In the United Kingdom we are becoming more and more Europe-conscious because of the work being done by the EEC, the Council of Europe and WEU. But we have a long way to go. For instance, if a member of the European Parliament has the chance of getting a seat in his national parliament he will take it.

It is first-class that the report names the countries that have done well. Those countries on the list include France and, to my astonishment, the United Kingdom. I was astonished that Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands were on the black list. I have always regarded those countries as being supremely European. Naming those who have not paid their subs is a good way to collect the money owed, and I recommend it.

In our debate last year I expressed regret that nothing had been done in the House of Lords about the problem. Since then I have made one speech about the Council of Europe which was extremely well received and members of the House of Lords commented on the Council of Europe's excellent work. However, I am sorry that none of my colleagues in the House of Lords has mentioned WEU, and we must put that right at the earliest opportunity. I do not think that ministers on the Council are as bad at reporting back to national parliaments as they are reluctant to answer our questions within WEU. We still have much work to do and we should apply ourselves to it. I commit myself and my colleagues in the House of Lords to so doing.

A practical suggestion was made for the committee to table questions for answer in our own parliaments. As we all know, the best questions come from people who have outside knowledge and interests, who write to give information about something of public importance. Such questions not only give us a reminder but provide us with the information that we need.

I am not sure about the split of membership. I am inclined to think that the EEC, the Council of Europe and WEU are in a state of flux. A European security system must include all European countries. I am not sure whether we need separate or dual membership, but it is certainly a suggestion to consider.

This is a good report, and I am sure that no one will vote against it. I thank Sir John and Sir William – who does not know whether he is in London, Paris or Strasbourg, but his heart is in the right place. I hope that every member will vote for the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Madam President, thank you for adding my name to the list of speakers. Activities elsewhere prevented me from attending the last meetings of the committee which is presenting this report and of which I am a member. That is why I did not originally enter my name on the list.

However, I have heard a few things I would like to comment on. Some are facts, others go a little further. It has been said that the Rapporteur was aware that reports on what happens here are drawn up for the parliaments in London and Bonn. The same is done in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands we have what are known as white papers for the two chambers – in international terms, the assembly and the senate. These papers are numbered 1 for the First Chamber and 2 for the Second Chamber. In them the clerk to the delegation to this Assembly reports precisely what was on the agenda and what the Dutch members said. The documents do not contain a full record of the proceedings or summarise them, but they do refer to the documents that are drawn up here and sent to the various capitals. They are a kind of index, a kind of guide to what the members of the Assembly of WEU have done here for the upper and lower houses of the Dutch Parliament.

If I understood the Rapporteur correctly, he spoke of a German proposal to set up separate delegations for WEU and the Council of Europe. As I have said before, I do not think this should happen, and I have arguments to support my view.

A new version of the orange booklet, the information booklet, has been published. I am grateful that I was able to present this as an information document on the Assembly and our activities here. In the introduction to the report that resulted in the publication of this orange booklet I explained the precise relationship and how it should be understood. I refer to it once again, probably to the point of tedium, unnecessarily perhaps, and I shall go on repeating this as long as the comments made indicate the need for it.

The treaty is a “treaty of economic, social and cultural collaboration and collective self-defence”. It was signed in Brussels in 1948 and then amended and modified several times. The reference to economic, social and cultural collaboration was not included in the title for nothing. When the treaty was drawn up, the authors were well aware that one of the main causes of the second world war was that economic conditions had brought Hitler to power in Germany, that the German social situation had been reduced to ruins and that the Hitler régime

Mr. Tummers (continued)

took a hostile attitude towards European culture. All new treaties leading to European co-operation were therefore designed to ensure socially, economically and culturally that there would be no recurrence of circumstances which might lead to war, as had been the case in the 1930s and 1940s.

WEU's social, economic and cultural tasks have since been transferred to the Council of Europe. We know that. That is history. This shows how closely related we are – I would almost say, dramatically, we are blood brothers – to the Council of Europe. The members concerned with economic, social, health and cultural matters in the Council of Europe therefore need to be members of WEU too, so that they can consider whether there are in fact social, economic and cultural circumstances in Europe which are conducive to peace and security rather than encouraging their opposites. That is why it is important for the people in Strasbourg to come here to perform this function on the basis of the work they do there. Otherwise we might as well create a second North Atlantic Assembly. But it is the link between the Council of Europe and the WEU Assembly that is essential.

If we intend to take international affairs at all seriously, we must make absolutely sure, as parliamentarians, that our work complies with the treaties as closely as possible. If we depart from the treaties, dilute them and make skimmed milk of them, we shall be to blame if they are no longer regarded as guides to the co-operation that is needed in Europe. I have been a member of this Assembly for eleven years. I have taken part in the debates on this question from the outset. I am a member of the appropriate committee, which I regard as one of the most important committees, able to inform the various national parliaments about what goes on here. We can take advantage of our dual mandate to ensure the closest possible link between what is achieved here and the national parliaments.

The treaty was signed fifty years ago. The next eight years will be exciting as regards deciding whether we in Europe are capable of joining with the countries that used to be known as Central and Eastern Europe in ensuring that not only the military aspects of peace and security are tackled, but also the social, economic and cultural aspects that will minimise the risks to peace throughout Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur, Sir John Hunt.

Sir John HUNT (*United Kingdom*). – We have had a wide-ranging debate and I am extremely grateful to all my colleagues who participated in

it. I appreciated your intervention, Madam President. It was somewhat unexpected, but we were all delighted to hear you put your point of view and impress upon the press department its rôle in helping us to promote the work of WEU in our respective parliaments. I understand that it was not present for most of the debate, which shows a rather regrettable indifference to our discussions.

My colleague, Sir William Shelton, referred, as did others, to the importance of acquainting national parliaments with the work that is done here. He said that he often feels that he is living in two worlds – or was it three? I think that in the end it was three, but of course in that respect Strasbourg, Paris and London are complementary. One of our tasks is to bring them more closely together to achieve the common aim of greater understanding in Europe.

He also made a plea that I endorse and echo, for simpler and more understandable texts. We sometimes get caught up in specialised jargon on defence affairs that is virtually incomprehensible except to experts, but we must acknowledge that the subject is complex and many of our parliamentary colleagues are not expert and they would certainly welcome simpler definitions and explanations of some of those complicated matters.

I thank Mr. Caro for his remarks. He stressed the importance of dialogue between ministers and members, and between this Assembly and our national parliaments. When he referred to the initiatives taken in the National Assembly it was clear that France is giving a lead in these matters that could be usefully followed by other member countries.

Sir Dudley Smith referred to the lack of coverage and knowledge of our affairs. There is a link between the two – if we can achieve greater coverage, we shall achieve greater knowledge.

I thank Dame Peggy Fenner for her remarks. I am sure that she was right to stress the value of this organisation and the need for governments to be more effective exponents of our work here. I particularly welcome the contribution from Mr. Kosutic. It was very good to hear a Yugoslav voice being raised for the first time in this debate. I am glad that he found my report helpful. I am sure that we all look forward to our work together in future years to establish what he called peace, security and justice in Europe.

Mr. Moya of Spain referred to the low level of our public image. I am sure that it is the same in Spain as in most of the other member countries. He said, rightly, that we must somehow stimulate the media into a greater awareness of what we are doing.

Sir John Hunt (continued)

I thank Lord Mackie for his comments. He said that in the United Kingdom we were becoming more Europe-conscious. There may be some truth in that. If that is so, the more conscious we become – this applies to other countries as well – the more receptive and responsive we shall be to the reports from Western European Union about what we are doing and therefore, on that basis, in the future we can look forward to greater coverage of our work and activities here.

I thank Mr. Tummers for his remarks. I also want to correct what he said because there are two references in my report to the Netherlands and the reports given to the Dutch Parliament. They occurred in paragraphs 18 and 33, to which I refer him. I am grateful for his speech and his general support.

The debate has been extremely useful. In my recollection it is one in which we have had more speakers than usual and the quality of contributions has been quite outstanding. The debate has focused the attention of all of us and, I hope, of a wider audience outside, on the importance of our work and our responsibilities as individual members to project and promote that work so that we can enhance WEU's reputation and gain a greater understanding of our work throughout Europe. I thank those who have contributed to the debate, and hope that the report will be given a fair wind and be unanimously supported.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank the Rapporteur.

I call Sir William Shelton.

Sir William SHELTON (*United Kingdom*). – I wish only to say how much I welcome the interventions by our seven colleagues and you, Madam President, and, on behalf of us all, congratulate Sir John Hunt, the Rapporteur, on the excellent way in which he summed up the debate. I congratulate him and hope that the report will be passed unopposed, with dispatch, and be acted on.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft resolution contained in Document 1227.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft resolution is adopted unanimously¹.

8. Change in the order of business

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Two sittings are scheduled tomorrow for the consideration of the three reports which remain to be debated. On these reports, comparatively few members have put their names down to speak and no amendments have been tabled.

I know that many of us would like to be able to complete our business tomorrow morning. I therefore propose that the report to be presented by Mr. Lord should be debated tomorrow morning and not tomorrow afternoon. I understand that Mr. Lord has agreed to this change.

Are there any objections?...

The proposal is therefore agreed to.

9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Friday, 8th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. The future of low flying (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1222).
2. Developments in command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I) (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1229).
3. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1989 (revised) and 1990 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1218).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.25 p.m.)

1. See page 35.

SIXTH SITTING

Friday, 8th June 1990

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. The future of low flying (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1222*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Klejdzinski (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Maris, Mr. Zierer, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Jessel, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Steiner, Mr. Stegagnini, Lord Mackie, Mr. Klejdzinski (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Jessel (*point of order*), Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman*).
4. Developments in command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I) (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1229*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Hill (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Fourré, Mr. Caro, Mr. Hill (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stegagnini (*Chairman*).
5. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1989 (revised) and 1990 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1218*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Lord (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Caro, Mr. Lord (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Klejdzinski (*Chairman*).
6. Adjournment of the session.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. The future of low flying

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1222)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and

debate on the report of the Defence Committee on the future of low flying and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1222.

I call Mr. Klejdzinski, Rapporteur.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, before I deal with the substance of my report, I should like to thank all those who have helped me to draw it up, whether with friendly comments, critical remarks or important preparatory work. I am particularly grateful to the committee secretariat and to my fellow members of the Defence Committee, who approved the report unanimously.

There is a great deal of public discussion on low flying. This is a fact we must bear in mind. One example among many is a report from the United Kingdom which is concerned only with the problem of low flying. This proves that it is a matter of concern not only in the Federal Republic but also in other countries.

There are two important facets to the question of low flying, which many members of the public in the countries of Western Europe regard as contradictory. On the one hand there is the need for our pilots and the various air forces to carry out the instructions they are given by the politicians. On the other hand, the noise pollution caused by low and very low flying must be considered: it has become increasingly unacceptable to the public. Organising a defence capability

1. See page 38.

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

will succeed only if the public is convinced that the inevitable noise pollution has a purpose and that there are no realistic alternatives.

This report is a serious attempt to resolve this paradox. I do not in any way think today's report marks the end of the debate – the subject is too important for that – and we will therefore have to consider the matter again quite frequently. I am grateful to my colleagues that we have been able to discuss low-altitude flying in such detail and breadth at numerous meetings. Many of the discussions revealed that wherever low-altitude flying goes on there is a heated debate on the subject. Objective arguments often give way to emotions. As a politician with a particular interest in defence I cannot deny this fact. It must also be remembered in this context that the latest Tornado, for example, is 40% quieter than the old Phantom, ignoring for the moment the question of its ability to penetrate enemy airspace and survive and its success in the rôle assigned to it. Everyone knows that this view does not favour the Phantom, a fact which is reflected in paragraph 2 (j) of the draft recommendation:

“the standard of the equipment of various types of aircraft should not be the only factor for determining low-altitude training techniques and conditions”.

In other words, modernisation costs money. If a weapons system cannot be updated on schedule on financial grounds, it is unfair to continue low-altitude test flights while referring to the need to maintain the defence capability, in the knowledge that a modern aircraft could fly more quietly and practise in a realistic environment without causing noise nuisance.

I know and would emphasise that pilots do their duty. They do what parliaments tell them to do. We politicians are responsible. The range of tasks they perform flows from the analysis of the assumed and actual threat. Although we are now seeing the Warsaw Pact disintegrating, it is nevertheless true, and we must not close our eyes to this, that the USSR's tactical and operational air forces represent a decisive factor in its ability to achieve its strategic military objectives in the Central and Western European theatre by means of air strikes. These air forces are still in existence. I am not saying that they will attack us. Taking defensive precautions means beating this kind of thing in mind. Until disarmament has been completed, the assumed threat must take all options into consideration.

This means that it has always been a requirement for the air forces to restrict low-altitude training to the operationally essential minimum. But we parliamentarians are also under an obligation to take any appropriate measures to

reduce the burden on the public in future to the irreducible minimum. Noise pollution in areas where aircraft train at 75 metres is tremendously high and no longer accepted by the local population. Hence the need for us to take action.

The draft recommendation urges the Council to take a number of measures which will mean cuts in the various air forces. The recommendation that training flights should be carried out overseas would also impose a strain on aircrews and maintenance personnel and separate aircrews from their families. The development of simulators and increased training on simulators cannot completely replace low-altitude training, though money invested in this development is not wasted. Realistic early-warning periods do not at present justify constant low-altitude training, especially as the changes in the Warsaw Pact have shifted the former operational concept for fighter bomber forces and its justification into a non-definable sphere.

Someone reading the report might gain the impression that it is concerned only with the Federal Republic's airspace. While it is true that low-altitude flying over the territory of the Federal Republic is discussed in paragraphs 48 to 80, the report consists of twenty-eight pages of text and twenty-one pages of explanatory diagrams.

Another of my concerns is that the report should also increase awareness of the problem. I am convinced that the problem discussed here, with the Federal Republic as the example, exists in all the WEU countries. Proceeding from paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation, which calls on the Council to include the subject of low-altitude flying and attendant problems in its own agenda and also urges the NATO authorities to do likewise, the report, which was unanimously approved by the Defence Committee, is a helpful introduction to the problem. I believe it contains sufficient material for a debate. We will continue to discuss it in depth in the future.

We expect the WEU Council to draw up a general report, to which sections on the other countries can be added.

In conclusion I would add that I received a great deal of support and assistance in drawing up this report. Thank you, once again, to all those who have helped me.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Klejdzinski for this excellent report.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Maris.

Mr. MARIS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, first let me congratulate the Rapporteur on this report. He has seized the opportunity to present a complex subject in a way that makes it accessible to political

Mr. Maris (continued)

decision-making. Not everyone has the gift of doing this so well. This kind of report helps to strengthen the parliamentary dimension of our system. It is made clear to us parliamentarians by reports such as this that we have to choose, that there are cases in which politicians, and parliamentarians in particular, have to choose. If things go wrong the military are not to blame: in all likelihood the wrong political choice has been made.

Mr. President, I will explain this by considering the present system in the Soviet Union and the West. They are in fact two systems which, if you compare them, produce remarkable conclusions. It has already been said that in the Soviet Union the military doctrine is all-powerful. This military doctrine is formulated at two levels, but I will ignore the level of military-technology. What I am interested in is the other level, the formulation of the military doctrine at the socio-political level. The military complex in the Soviet Union has found a solution to this, the understanding being that at political level only senior military staff are appointed to hold political office. This, of course, makes the military complex even more inviolable. Mr. Gorbachev has held out the prospect of this situation coming to an end, though I know many people doubt that this is possible. I myself have some doubts, especially as the Defence Minister, Mr. Yasov, has again become a marshal. Mr. Gorbachev had also said that was a thing of the past, but Mr. Yasov has both been made marshal and been appointed to the Presidential Council. In other words, the military complex in the Soviet Union still wields considerable influence.

And yet the political component of the military doctrine is formulated at political level there. It is also remarkable, given the changes that have taken place in this military doctrine, that the question of winning a war has been officially replaced with the political challenge of preventing a war. This is also reflected in all manner of publications and declarations, and it is a major gain. But why this change? If we consider what is being said about this in the Soviet Union itself, we find there are three schools of thought. The first, which Mr. Yasov supports, expressly assumes that the Soviet Union has become a peace-loving nation. I will not discuss this further. The second school of thought is to be found at the United States-Canada Institute, headed by Mr. Mazing. It says: we have come to the conclusion that there will be no winners in a nuclear war. This is a conclusion that many people in Western Europe have already reached. The third school of thought is the dangerous one. It says: No, it has all been done for economic reasons. The Soviet Union must have a defence that can be paid for economically. There

is danger in this if it is the only reason for the change in the military doctrine of the Soviet Union, because the same people will return to the former military doctrine if and when the economy picks up again.

What is the situation in the West? We do not have a military doctrine, we have a strategy. We are having difficulties in the West because many politicians still regard strategy as a matter for the military. Politicians do not have much say in NATO strategy. The political scientist Mr. De Wijk, who obtained his doctorate at the University of Leiden last year, looked into this question and came to a number of conclusions. His thesis has been published in English so anyone who is interested can read it. Politicians, Mr. De Wijk concludes, do not have any decisive influence on NATO strategy. They have a tendency to brush it aside as a technical matter, for which the military is responsible. That is the case in my country, and I detect the same tendency, to a greater or lesser degree, in a number of other countries. Mr. De Wijk's thesis is one confirmation of this conclusion.

To revert to Mr. Klejdzinski's report, it establishes that, although the background to this problem is one military technology, it is the politicians who must take the decisions. That is the great merit of this report. We must have more reports like this! That is not to say, Mr. President, that I find nothing to criticise in this report. I have a slight objection to one or two points. I feel, for example, that the Rapporteur is being a little simplistic when he says that the air forces have only a defensive image. I am not sure about this. It may be true, but our thinking in terms of non-provocative defence should not always be based on the air forces. There were all kinds of examples in the second world war of very aggressive acts to which air forces contributed.

These are minor points, which do not detract from the value of this report. I wish Mr. Klejdzinski the best of luck with his report, which I fully report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Zierer.

Mr. ZIERER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, every one of us is aware of the adverse effects of low-altitude flying. Everyone is familiar with the infernal din made by low flying jet aircraft.

In the Federal Republic of Germany we have seven low-flying areas, stretching from Schleswig-Holstein to Bavaria. Low-altitude flying goes on even in holiday areas, so it is not surprising that there should be a storm of protest. As a member of the Bundestag sub-committee that deals with complaints about military aircraft noise I am confronted with these protests.

Mr. Zierer (continued)

But let me begin by thanking Mr. Klejdzinski and congratulating him on his excellent report, which entailed a lot of hard work. Not only is he an experienced parliamentarian: he used to be a pilot in the Federal German air force, hence his extensive knowledge of these problems.

His report makes a large number of recommendations, which can all be endorsed, whether they concern a reduction in the number of low-altitude flights or an increase in the use of flight simulators. We need much better flight simulators than we have had in the past.

The most important point is that there must be an end to flights at very low altitudes, below 75 metres, especially over populated areas.

However, the report assumes – I quote from paragraph (iv) – that there will be an “agreement in Vienna to make substantial reductions in... combat aircraft”. That is a prospect for the future. We all hope this will come about, but we cannot be sure at present.

When it comes to security I regard relying on probabilities as both dubious and dangerous. We know that the Soviet Union is not prepared to give way, especially in this area. That is why it wants to keep four thousand more combat aircraft than NATO is proposing.

Another risk, which United States Deputy Secretary of Defence Atwood spoke about before this Assembly yesterday, is the present domestic situation in the USSR, which is completely unstable. I therefore feel obliged to warn against excessive euphoria.

In conclusion my view is that there must first be an agreement with the Russians in Vienna that imposes a ceiling and sets a level for reductions throughout the conventional sphere. Until there is certainty in this area, vigilance is called for. For the time being, therefore, it will not be possible to dispense with low-altitude flights completely.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am very grateful to Mr. Klejdzinski for dealing with this subject as he has. You may recall, Mr. President, from the time when you were Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, our discussing whether it was not up to this particular committee to draw up an assessment on the very subject we now find in paragraphs 177-179 of the report, namely public opinion.

I want to say a few words about public opinion and rather more specifically about the human or, if you like, inhuman aspects of low-altitude flying. I myself did my military

service in the air force. I remember very clearly that we suddenly had to break off quite a serious exercise in the grounds of the barracks – the military are like that – because a flight of Gloucester Meteors was flying over. Our commandant at the time was tremendously impressed by the fact that this flight swooped right down over the barrack square and then shot vertically upwards at top speed. He said: “That really is stupendous”.

What was stupendous about it? Quite simply, the impression it created. It was quite simply a display of power, quite simply an unnecessary noise. It may have seemed fun at the time in the context of the barrack square, but even then, of course, it should have been forbidden. Nothing went wrong in this case, but we know that many accidents were to follow.

There are a number of activities in society that give people the opportunity – I do not know what psychological mechanism is involved – to take things to the limits of tolerance in order to create an impression. As soon as they have something that distinguishes them from others, as soon as the police have flashing lights, as soon as they can sit on a motorcycle and tear along the kerb beside the public, as soon as people have all these things, they begin to indulge in a kind of animal display to demonstrate their difference. This is all covered by Professor Gideon's book, *Mechanisation Takes Command*, which appeared a few years ago.

Those are the facts. As soon as man allows mechanisation to take command, he goes to the limits of tolerance in interpersonal relations.

I do not think there is enough about this in the report. I do not mean this as a criticism, because I know Mr. Klejdzinski to be a very humane man, but I would have been very pleased to see the report saying rather more about civilised behaviour among aircrews, about the need to do more to point out to people during their training that, just like everyone else, they run the risk of approaching the limits of tolerance as far as their fellow men are concerned, once they are given machines to operate. This has to be pointed out, because we all run this risk, because we are all human and because we are all subject to the phenomenon whereby people seek to derive additional power from mechanisation. If the report provides a satisfactory response in this respect, and I am sure it will, it will receive my full support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Since you have referred to the work of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, Mr. Tummers, may I say to the Assembly how much we appreciate the effort you have personally put into writing the brochure that is being distributed during the present session. It is a valuable tool for our external relations.

The President (continued)

Thank you, Mr. Tummers.

I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – I start from the standpoint that defence must be put first. Throughout history peoples have attacked one another. The apparent détente in 1990 does not mean that it would be safe to imagine that the human race will be immune from the risk of war for this decade, let alone for future generations. It would be arrogant of us to assume that human nature has now changed so much for the better that our countries will be safe from the future risk of war. That would be dangerous complacency. It would be to ignore the lessons of history.

The ancient Romans said, “If you want peace, prepare for war”. If we are to save the peace by preparing for war, pilots must be trained. If they are not trained they will not be prepared and our preparedness for war will lack credibility.

I bring to the debate considerable experience on the subject of aircraft noise. The constituency that I represent is six kilometres from Heathrow airport, which is the busiest airport in the world, partly because it is so close to the capital city of a densely-populated island. There are nine hundred flights a day at Heathrow, far more than at Frankfurt or Chicago or any other airport. Of course, Heathrow is not alone in the problems of airport noise for large populations close to major airports. I have fought aircraft noise for twenty years, not without some success. Together with other members of parliament who represent constituencies surrounding the airport I have been able to stop the construction of a fifth terminal, to stop most night flights and to stop a helicopter link between Heathrow and Gatwick; and quieter aircraft engines have gradually been introduced.

Despite all this, aircraft noise remains a serious problem. The problem derives partly from the number of flights. Although this report goes into great detail on many aspects and is in many ways thorough and workmanlike, it has one serious gap: at no point are we told about the number of flights a day in any particular place. We are merely given the total figures for the number of flights a year for the whole of Germany. But people who suffer from aircraft noise are not worried about the total number of flights over their nation; they are worried about the number of flights over the place where they live – the ones that affect them personally. The report should have told us the numbers of flights a day in the worst-affected areas; without such information we cannot assess their impact.

There are two components in the problem. The first is the average peak loudness of each

flight; the second is the number of flights. I hope that the Rapporteur will give us the figures for which I have asked, and that if he cannot do so within the next quarter of an hour, he will make inquiries and convey the information to the Assembly later.

Of course aircraft noise affects people's quiet enjoyment of their homes and gardens. It interferes with the work of schools, hospitals, churches and offices. It upsets a great many people, especially the elderly and the ill and those trying to concentrate on complicated work. It wakes up babies and can frighten them, especially in the summer months when they tend to be left out of doors in their prams.

Paragraph 87 mentions psychiatric illness. The Rapporteur has said that there is no evidence of any research either way on this. I am afraid that I did not see the report until after it was in print, and I happen not to be on the Defence Committee. Had I been on it I would have been able to tell the committee – so that it could have been included in the report – of the research by the consultant psychiatrist at the West Middlesex hospital who has produced some evidence of a correlation between psychiatric illness and intense aircraft noise.

So living near an airport such as Heathrow from which there are 900 flights a day can cause ill health. The nearest analogy between civilian and military flying comes in the shape of Concorde, which makes an extremely loud noise. It passes over quickly because it goes so fast but it makes a shattering noise which disturbs those below.

Similarly, military aircraft can be sudden and loud, especially when flying low. I have consulted my colleague Mr. Wilkinson – unfortunately, he cannot be here for this debate although he was Rapporteur for a debate yesterday – who is not only a former pilot with the Royal Air Force: he actually trained other pilots in the service. He has told me that it is essential for the training of military pilots, who have to be alert and up to the mark in their reactions, that they fly as low as possible, within the limits imposed by trees, buildings and cables. To be effective, such flying must be fairly frequent and some of it must be over land. It is not enough to do it over the sea.

I draw a sharp distinction between civilian and military aircraft. Defence is vital and civilian flying is merely a matter of convenience. Nevertheless, even for military flying the burden on the people below ought to be as small as possible consistent with defence preparedness. We have already heard that Tornado is 30% quieter but we have not been told whether it is as efficient as the aircraft that are 30% noisier.

As far as possible, training should be carried out in remote and sparsely populated areas.

Mr. Jessel (continued)

Newfoundland in Canada is a case in point, and perhaps the most remote areas on the coast of Scotland and Northern Ireland, where the population is much thinner, could also be used. Both flat and mountainous areas need to be used if military training is to be effective. No doubt our WEU colleagues can name relatively sparsely populated areas in their countries, too.

It is important to keep the frequency of flights as low as possible while ensuring that the training remains effective. I do not believe that simulators are effective; pilots have to train in military aircraft.

Low-flying aircraft present us with a difficult problem and the Assembly is right to focus on it, but I hope that, in the end, the Assembly will decide to put defence first.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I believe this Assembly's Defence Committee took a wise decision in appointing Mr. Klejdzinski as Rapporteur on this subject. He was once a pilot, he has been a politician for a long time, and he also lives in an area which suffers from the noise of low-flying aircraft.

We can see it was a good choice from the report he has presented to us today. I think it is an excellent report. The technical problems are well explored, and the report contains some excellent recommendations. I shall therefore have little to say about it. I sincerely hope that the recommendations which Mr. Klejdzinski has presented to us and which, I assume, will have our full support, will be studied by the Council of Ministers rather more closely than it usually does, to judge from the answers we receive. Why should the Council take a serious look at this subject? This question has been answered by Mr. Klejdzinski in his report and by the previous speakers.

It was discussed at length in the Defence Committee. Where noise is concerned, there are few things that frighten people so much as suddenly being confronted with a low-flying aircraft. Who has not had the experience of sitting quietly in the garden, on the balcony or wherever, and being shocked by the noise of an aircraft that suddenly appears out of nowhere? Mr. Klejdzinski says in his report that there is absolutely no evidence of this noise making us ill. I feel that, although it may not be possible to measure or demonstrate this accurately, there is a possibility of people suffering ill health when constantly exposed to such noise. Mr. Jessel has just said that there is an English report, at least, which proves this.

The report has little to say about air shows, which I find regrettable. The Rapporteur may reply that he did not think this formed part of his mandate. But it was the disaster at Ramstein that actually prompted this report. Low flying for defence purposes cannot be taught entirely on simulators. Practical training will continue to be necessary, but we are not going to sit and wait for air shows. In view of the serious accidents that have occurred, it would be better not to have these shows. It also causes a great deal of noise and has adverse effects on the environment, through pollution in particular. I would like to see more interest taken in this aspect. I feel the Rapporteur might have proposed that the Assembly recommend the banning of such displays.

Another aspect I will briefly mention is flying in areas that are not very densely populated. The Rapporteur discusses this in paragraph 166 of his report. The Federal Republic and the Netherlands have permission to train pilots at Goose Bay in Canada, but there are more and more reports that the local population objects to these exercises, so we in the Netherlands are wondering whether we should be doing our training flights there. Although relatively few people are involved, those people are certainly inconvenienced.

Mr. President, as I have already said, there is otherwise nothing but good to say about this report. I wholeheartedly endorse its recommendations. I hope the Council, which has the power to put these recommendations into effect, will ensure that a consensus on this matter is reached in the various countries and that something is done about this annoying form of training. The CFE negotiations in Vienna will, I hope, leave few prospects for low-altitude flying in the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Steiner.

Mr. STEINER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, today, on the last day of our summer meeting, we are discussing the future of low-altitude flying. We are doing so on the basis of an outstanding and objective report drawn up by Mr. Klejdzinski. By objective I mean that he has succeeded in making a clear distinction between the future of low-altitude flying and other matters, also, of course, connected with flying. Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman has just mentioned air shows. I believe a clear distinction must be made between low-altitude flying and air shows, and am grateful to Mr. Klejdzinski for having done this.

This is not the first time we have considered this subject, nor will it be the last, even if we approve this report today and adopt the realistic and well thought-out recommendations. That

Mr. Steiner (continued)

became clear during the discussions in the Defence Committee, when repeated reference was made to the new opportunities for reducing aircraft noise which may and, I hope, will arise from the relaxation of East-West tension. At the committee's meeting yesterday, in particular, some well-meant suggestions were made for the updating of this report to include other data, specifically from the United Kingdom, and to cover the special situation in France. I do not think this should present any difficulties, especially as the Rapporteur has given a comprehensive and detailed account of the problems and the possible means of reducing low-altitude flying in the present circumstances and technical environment.

We must thank Mr. Klejdzinski for his commitment and the experience he has brought to this report, as a former pilot. There may be some objections to the report's highlighting the problems connected with low-altitude flying over the Federal Republic of Germany. But for those familiar with the subject matter this is not surprising, since its geographical location at the interface between NATO and the Warsaw Pact has made, and indeed was bound to make, the Federal Republic of Germany the main low-flying area for the air force units stationed in Europe and assigned to NATO. The result was that low-level flights and interception training at all altitudes were conducted over the most densely-populated area of Europe. In the past the hardship suffered by the public in many areas of the Federal Republic of Germany has exceeded tolerable limits and, as other speakers have said, this has also affected people's health, or there are at least serious indications that it has done so.

The obvious logical consequence is that public criticism of low-altitude military training flights has been increasing steadily and not only in Germany. As we now know, the trend in the most severely affected regions of other Western and Southern European countries has not been essentially any different from that in the Federal Republic. Although the air force commands have been able to reduce low-altitude training in recent years with the advent of new technical facilities – flight simulators, for example – or to transfer low-altitude training to sparsely-populated areas, the dissatisfaction over aircraft noise voiced by large sections of the population of our countries has continued to grow as the political tension between East and West has declined.

Nor am I betraying a secret when I say that public sympathy for extreme forms of low-altitude military training flights and interception training has declined still further since the radical political changes in Central and Eastern Europe and especially since the autumn

of 1989. Far from being surprising, this is only too understandable, and we must draw the necessary conclusions.

We are all expert enough to know that the military threat has waned and that the military early-warning periods are also much longer now than they were at the time of the cold war.

We all expect an agreement on a substantial reduction in conventional weapons and in combat aircraft to be reached in Vienna this year, although doubts have been expressed about this today. This will mean even more détente and, I believe, even more security. I feel we would do well to approve the recommendations now before us, with the proviso that the prospect of even greater relief should be held out to the public in our countries as East and West continue to disarm.

I entirely agree with Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman that as politicians in this Assembly we should exert the necessary pressure to ensure that the Council really does implement the recommendations which I hope we will be approving here today by a large majority or even unanimously. I believe that an update of the report in line with further developments will form a good basis for future decisions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may I also compliment Mr. Klejdzinski on his excellent report. I should like to refer particularly to a problem which seemed to emerge from yesterday's debate. We are torn between the need on the one hand to provide sufficient training for our air force units, and more particularly for operational tactical support units, which naturally make more low-level flights in support of ground forces, or for units which penetrate enemy territory and therefore have to avoid enemy radar, and on the other not to disturb the lives of civilians unduly and to avoid the dangers which such flights involve for them.

This is a real problem; the general public, particularly in densely-populated areas, feels a very strong need for an efficient operational air force.

I should like to add one question to those already discussed. We have of course talked about tactical and strategic air forces which make most flights of this kind and require this type of training. But there are also transport aircraft which make low-level flights every day for training parachutists so that they can make the planned number of drops. Then, in summer there are specially equipped transport aircraft whose crews have to be trained for low-level flights to deal with forest fires, particularly in southern Europe. Pilots must therefore be

Mr. Stegagnini (continued)

allowed to practise for flights which are also operational but extremely dangerous because they cover very inaccessible areas where little flight assistance is available; for example, in mountain areas, where the risks are greater when the requested flights are made, particularly for the heavy transport aircraft used, which are more difficult to manoeuvre. In Italy tragic events have occurred during the fighting of forest fires.

It is, therefore, our duty to provide adequate training for pilots because these services are also performed on behalf of the civilian population, who must however make some sacrifices in return for assistance and protection when disasters occur.

The problem, therefore, is to find new areas, outside Europe also, where such flights can be made. Today mention has been made of Goose Bay in Canada, where the air forces of many countries receive operational training. But there are greater difficulties for other countries because Canada does not wish to accommodate more air forces for this type of training which is bound to upset civilians living there, even if there are not many of them.

Nevertheless, all the allies must show great solidarity in dealing with the problems mentioned. The sacrifice to be made by a few small villages in Canada for the Atlantic Alliance and the operational capability of European air forces is considerable. They must be prepared to accept it.

I should also like to use this opportunity to recall that we shall shortly be dealing with the open skies treaty which was talked about in Ottawa and also here during the session. It is an opportunity which must not be missed. Obviously, such a treaty must allow for training of the kind under discussion which is essential for pilots who are to be operational. It is no use having highly sophisticated and efficient aircraft if the pilots are not adequately trained and have had no opportunity to make the tactical operational flights for which those aircraft are designed.

The open skies treaty offers an opportunity which must not be missed for trying to resolve the problem we are discussing; a solution which will at one and the same time meet Europe's need firstly to inflict less hardship on the public and secondly to resolve the problem of the shortage of areas suitable for training by finding new areas suitable for the purpose.

This is what I would hope and my compliments go to Mr. Klejdzinski who has raised a problem of great concern to the general public at a time when air traffic is expanding rapidly to

such an extent as to create difficulties for civilian traffic as we all know for ourselves when we go to an airport.

In particular, then, during the summer, when the weather would be more favourable, training is cut down or even halted completely. In addition to the usual difficulties about training there is the further obstacle that air traffic controllers reduce military flights during the summer because there is more civilian traffic.

This means that training is being cut down due to the continuous growth of civilian traffic and the situation is desperate in the summer for the reasons I have given. There is little awareness of training requirements and there are difficulties with the public at large. New areas must therefore be found and the opportunity offered by the open skies treaty must be used so that training can go ahead.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Mackie.

Lord MACKIE (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Mr. President. I regret that I did not put my name down to speak, but I should like to say a little about this and I will not take very long.

I cannot bring to the debate up-to-date experience of flying because it is almost fifty years since I flew. In those days, Mr. Klejdzinski, low flying was not considered low flying unless you returned with a bit of tree on the wing of your aircraft. You were then considered to have flown low enough.

I have considerable experience in this respect: I live in Scotland, where there is probably more low flying than in most parts of Europe. When a jet flies over my house, at what appears to be zero feet, my only reaction is to say "good boy", because the noise clears my nose. Low flying is a serious problem, and members of my party in Scotland receive many complaints about it from their constituents. We have had two fatal accidents which could have been much worse if they had involved housing in the area.

I must say to my colleague, Mr. Toby Jessel, that the population of Scotland may be more widely spread than in his constituency but it is not thinner – it is well fed. We in Scotland accept that people must be trained in low flying because no technique can be employed unless pilots are trained in it.

Mr. Klejdzinski's report gives all the facts. He has done an excellent job from his standpoint as a former fighter pilot and a politician. I shall take several copies of his report home to give to my colleagues because they will make excellent balanced ammunition and will help them to explain to their constituents the necessity for low flying I congratulate him on the report and thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the opportunity to speak.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Klejdzinski, Rapporteur.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, let me begin by thanking you for your criticisms and for your kind words on the report I have presented. To make it absolutely clear once again, it is not my report: many people have worked on it. I must therefore pass on your thanks to those who have helped me.

Mr. Maris raised what I consider to be a very interesting point, making me aware how important it is for us politicians not to allow the experts simply to force something on us, but to remember that we bear the responsibility. He pointed out the differences in the decision-making structures. I feel we can learn from this.

Mr. Zierer referred to a number of subjects which I view in the same way as he does. Although I share his views, I hope the negotiations in Vienna do not take the line originally envisaged where aircraft are concerned. I might say that, if we now had to bring our aircraft up to the Soviet strength, we would find ourselves rearming. The exclusion of naval aircraft, for example, is certainly a problem that will have to be discussed further. The argument he advanced in this respect cannot therefore be totally rejected. On the other hand, I have said elsewhere that, looking realistically at the threat that exists, we must in effect do some rethinking. Mr. Steiner was quite right when he said we must think again in the light of the situation obtaining at any particular time and then perhaps – this is the hope, and politicians should always have hope – decide on greater reductions.

I must also take up the argument advanced, that air forces are not defensive. Fighter bombers can certainly be offensive. A defence alliance should therefore concentrate primarily on defensive strategies – that is to say, fighters – and less on low-flying fighter bombers. This is a debate in which this report should not in principle engage. But the fact that fighter bombers, especially the latest low-flying, long-range fighter bombers, may certainly be offensive is something that needs to be discussed.

As Mr. Tummers quite rightly said, the report does not go into this, though we could have covered this aspect. On the other hand, there are various comments on pilot discipline, particularly with respect to Skyguard operations. Skyguard radar equipment is quite capable of detecting by means of film and sound recordings with details of times and altitudes, whether anyone has flown too low. Since this system was introduced in the Federal Republic, all the NATO air forces, including the Dutch, have

obeyed the rules. Those who have been caught have lost their pilot's licences. Statistics have been kept, but they are not detailed in the report.

Mr. Jessel made some interesting comments on the noise and the number of take-offs at a civil airport. But I would emphasise once again – other speakers have also pointed this out – that in a low-flying area, where aircraft fly at 75 metres, or 250 feet, the noise itself comes as a shock, out of a blue sky, and from the direction you least expect. It is precisely this that puts such a strain on the public. An added factor in the Federal Republic and in parts of the Netherlands and Belgium – I am familiar with these, unlike conditions in Scotland, so I will not comment on them – is that in the present situation, as aircraft are not permitted to fly over airport control zones, large industrial areas and so on, thus restricting the space available even further, pilots have no option but to fly over health resorts and hospitals, because they simply cannot avoid them. If they did, no aircraft would be able to fly. That is the problem in densely-populated areas.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman referred to air shows and I agree with her, but I did not feel I could introduce the subject here, because I was afraid that if I included all the important arguments, the report would be too extensive. It is quite long enough already.

Mr. Steiner concluded with a few general remarks. Allow me to voice one criticism where Goose Bay in Canada is concerned. On the one hand, I can understand the Canadians. I have been to Goose Bay with Mr. Steiner and looked around there for two days. To be truthful it must be said that the Canadian authorities are very worried and that protests are on the increase. But there is no one living anywhere in the area where low-altitude flights are made. There are 1 500 people living near the airfield, and they work at the airfield or are indirectly associated with it. When a group of Indians moves into the area, for example, the various air forces contact each other by radio and map out an area with a radius of twenty-five nautical miles around their tents and no one flies in that area.

If we could transfer these ideal conditions to Europe, we would not have any problems with low-altitude flying. It has sometimes been suggested to us that this Canadian problem is mainly one of compensating the people who believe they have to register ancient claims. It is not for me to intervene in this internal Canadian debate, nor to appraise it. I just wanted to make things a little clearer, so that anyone thinking of making a comment might perhaps first consider the general situation. The citizens' committees in the area around the airfield were in favour of expansion because it means jobs. Without the

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

airfield the region would be economically dead. That also has to be borne in mind.

Thank you once again for your very useful comments. I feel the fact that such a vigorous debate can be held on this subject on a Friday morning shows how important the subject is. I hope that some of what has been said can be added to the report. We have agreed, Mr. Jessel, to amend the report so that it recommends a ban from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. This was in fact a minor point for us.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order. I hope that the Chairman of the committee will excuse my making a point of order on whether the words “between 10 p.m. and 8 a.m.” rather than “6 a.m.” are included in the recommendation. Can it be confirmed that the Rapporteur has agreed to do that, and it will be done?

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – I agree with eight a.m.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – This is not really a point of order, Mr. Jessel. At most it is perhaps a problem of drafting. I am informed that the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the committee are ready to accept the wording you yourself have suggested in paragraph 2 (e) of the resolution:

“(e) all low-altitude flying to be banned between 10 p.m. and 8 a.m. (even in training areas) and generally on Sundays and bank holidays,”

which I believe is what you wanted.

I call the Chairman of the committee.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – As has already been said, the report stems from the tragedy at Ramstein, which involved low-flying aircraft in an air display. We are dealing exclusively with low-flying training over districts that might, and often do, contain residents.

As the Rapporteur said, it has been interesting to have so many contributions at the fag-end of this session. It stresses the interest that so many members take in the subject and the representation that they try to make on behalf of their constituents back in their home countries.

Before the debate I heard criticism that Mr. Klejdzinski had concentrated too much on Western Germany. That is natural because he comes from that country and, as he explained, he was a fighter pilot. It is a valuable report. The Defence Committee has already agreed to monitor the subject, and will probably come back to it. The expressions of interest that have

been heard this morning show the importance of making sure that the subject is continually under surveillance from this organisation.

I appreciate the fanaticism of Mr. Jessel. I have heard him many times on the subject of aircraft noise, which is a point he makes so assiduously on behalf of his constituents. A cynic might say that because of his success, which he has emphasised, he is more than partly responsible for the tremendous overcrowding at Heathrow airport and the air traffic jams experienced on the continent because of the routes used at certain times of the day. I shall not pursue that subject, because you, Mr. President, would rule me out of order. I suggest that my colleague's speech was largely out of order because parts of it dealt with ordinary aircraft noise. We are concentrating on low flying by military aircraft.

Like many others, Warwickshire people rightly protest at the surprise element of loud noise and the disturbance it causes. There is a feeling that sometimes those who fly the aircraft are cheating, flying lower than they should and deviating from the routes they should take. Unfortunately, near to where I live and in my constituency, is one of the main routes to the Welsh mountain district that is extensively used for low-flying training. I am sure that aircraft sometimes get a bit off course. It requires a strict application of the rules and I am assured by my own Minister of Defence that those rules are being rigorously enforced and that any deviation incurs substantial penalties for the pilots involved. That must be right and I hope that such rules will be maintained not only in Britain but also in other countries on the continent.

It is important for us to try to stress now, more than ever before, as Mr. Klejdzinski has done in his report, the need for low flying because we cannot call into account the pressures of the cold war. With disarmament proceeding and the new atmosphere throughout Europe, it is much harder to try to convince the ordinary man in the street that such training is necessary.

We hope to return to the subject again, updating the position. Meanwhile, the Defence Committee commends Mr. Klejdzinski's report to the Assembly and hopes that it will give it a fair wind.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1222.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

The President (continued)

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

4. Developments in command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I)

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1229)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on developments in command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I), Document 1229.

Before calling Mr. James Hill, Rapporteur, I have to tell you that this is the last time Mr. Hill will be attending this Assembly.

He became a substitute in the Assembly in 1979 and has been a full representative since 1982. We all know that Mr. Hill has given devoted service to the institution during these eleven years, earning for himself the respect and esteem of all his colleagues.

Thank you for all you have done, Mr. Hill. You take with you our best wishes for your future.

You now have the floor.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – Your words, Mr. President, were somewhat unexpected as I had told only the secretariat and my immediate conservative colleagues. I am unexpectedly returning to the House of Commons to join Mr. Speaker's administrative staff as one of the chairmen of Mr. Speaker's panel of chairmen. I am looking forward to the work, although I have enjoyed immensely the work of WEU. The work is done so well that NATO has been fully supported in our documents. I sincerely hope that this document will be of some interest to NATO, although there was unfortunately great difficulty with security clearance for some of the material.

I draw the attention of the plenary session to paragraph 6 of the report:

“It should be recalled, however, that much information on this subject is of a confidential nature. Although discussions with experts in preparing this report have been extremely helpful, much important information could

not be revealed in this report, thus limiting its scope considerably.”

I congratulate Floris de Gou on his persistence in trying to get NATO in Brussels and SHAPE in Mons to release details. There followed a period of six months in which the draft memorandum had to go to those bodies for final approval, so we have been working on the document for a long time. Members will realise that there are omissions, but the document is now fully approved for release to the public.

The difficulty with the reductions in conventional and nuclear forces is that the preparedness of the forces that are left will have to be total. Efficiency in communications and intelligence will have to be increased. The purpose of the document is to show that we approve of all the agreements between the two superpowers but to ask how we are expected to cope with emergencies in Europe. The report explains in some detail that Europe's defence budget will not suddenly and mysteriously be reduced; there may be a moment when about £25 million more will have to be found for software, early surveillance, early warning – in short, for intelligence-gathering for our defence forces, which will be working on split-second decisions, not at the more leisurely pace of the past.

I have received a paper from my government who are very aware of the potential benefits of an integrated C³I system for Allied Command Europe and who support the work done by NATO in this respect. Of course, the United Kingdom Government are always cost-conscious, and they say: “The costs of such proposals arising from the work will be a matter of consideration in the light of competing priorities.” That is always the way in defence; competing priorities have to do with which part of the defence structure has the ear of the person who may be able to approve the expenditure.

There is an interest in European and multinational aerial systems for stand-off surveillance and targeting, and in airborne early warning and control for the process of verifying the implementation of a CFE treaty. The verification task in defence will in future confirm the presence of equipment in the expected numbers. The main rôle for these systems should lie more in the area of intelligence-gathering and inspection targeting. This, too, is an area of national sensitivity which could make these difficult matters almost impossible for WEU to study effectively.

When presenting a technical paper on the various strategic and tactical systems the problem is always, as members will see from the table in section III, that every country mentioned seems to have a different system. I am not sure whether we would have been as ready

1. See page 39.

Mr. Hill (continued)

for instant defence as we have so often been told by Allied Command Europe in the past. The military network BICES is supposed to be an integrated communication system, but each nation is pursuing its own way. Even the United Kingdom has Ptarmigan as its tactical system. I think that a number of switching systems will be needed in future, so harmonisation of communications is hard to envisage, as the report says.

Ace High, Satcom and the CIP-67, the very low-frequency systems associated with our submarine forces and, of course, emergency high-frequency systems, are all to be desired from the point of view of our survival after a nuclear attack. It is easy to think that one is in communication with command until the nuclear attack stops. We are all aware that the document addresses the horror scenario rather than the reality of the present but I do not want anyone to run away with the idea that the document is to be completely discounted. Following the very interesting reports of talks between President Bush and President Gorbachev – and, indeed, with the whole CSCE scenario – we are fully aware that the document can only apply to the present. No doubt we shall move on rapidly on the communication side and each day a further piece of research – certainly on survivability – will be brought forward.

I draw attention to the conclusion in paragraph 77. We accept that political changes are taking place in Eastern Europe. Every day, we are confronted with newly-elected politicians from the emerging democracies wishing to address us on their immediate problems and on defence. Paragraph 77 may clear the mind a little. It says: "CFE negotiations in Vienna will most probably produce quick results."

The words "most probably" are the operative words. The paragraph continues: "A further tightening of the defence budget is written on the wall."

As politicians, we know that many people have earmarked the possible savings from a reduction in defence spending for other purposes. In the United Kingdom, for example, there is almost constant talk of defence spending going on the social services, the National Health Service and education, but I do not think that great savings will be made in the beginning. A vast number of forces will have to be retained and redundancy payments will have to be made. Other work will have to be allocated and in industry there will have to be a shift from the production of equipment for war to other sorts of production, insisted on by the people.

We must accept that this can only be an interim report. We shall move on and Allied Command Europe will be keeping a sensitive

eye on research and development in the field. We have already had one disappointment since we first drafted the document. The open skies proposal recently made by President Bush seems quietly to have landed somewhere and the two superpowers seem now to be hesitating, feeling perhaps that open skies is not quite the programme for the immediate future. We shall have to keep a close eye on the situation. When a group such as NATO reduces its forces – and in the Warsaw Pact forces are at least superfluous to requirements in several of the emerging democracies – we need to place more emphasis on the immediate priority, which is the ability to position forces in the shortest possible time. One can do that only by far-reaching surveillance and the intelligence that flows from it, and by having a smaller force to deal with an emergency. The command control of that force must be of the highest calibre and communications must be the master card.

We had difficulties with the report, as I am sure my Chairman, Mr. Stegagnini, will point out. I congratulate Mr. Floris de Gou on his tenacity in dealing with the security forces in Europe. I hope that we have produced documents that will be of interest to those who follow these matters. I was about to say that I hoped that they would be easily read, but I think that that may be going a bit far. I hope, anyway, that the report will be of interest.

(Mr. Soares Costa, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Hill, for the excellent presentation of your report.

I wish to associate myself with the earlier remarks about your long-lasting contribution to the work of this Assembly. I, too, congratulate you on your contribution.

The debate is now open.

Mr. Fourré, you have the floor.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – I should like to associate myself with your remarks, Mr. President, and to say how much I appreciated working with Mr. Hill for so many years in this committee which I know well, although it is some time since I was a member of it.

We have often worked on the same problems, and I am moreover pleased to find that the report which he is submitting to us today follows up some ideas I voiced in an earlier report dealing with the whole question of military electronic data-processing, when we were already tackling these problems of interoperability and compatibility between different equipments and the different techniques in use within NATO and of course more generally among member states of WEU.

Mr. Fourré (continued)

May I therefore begin by congratulating him on this technical report of a kind which our committee is so good at drafting. It does of course have considerable political importance. Perhaps our Assembly takes too little notice of reports of this kind. It is true that the technical nature of the subject-matter can sometimes inhibit speakers noticeably. But how can we discuss WEU action without at some point considering the compatibility between our different technical services? How can we discuss the rôle of our Assembly without bringing in command, control, communication and intelligence?

As regards interoperability, every member here could, in my place, point out the proven reciprocal benefit of interoperable systems. This was explained extremely well just now by Mr. Hill, and I shall not revert to it.

Over and above this political will which is manifest in our countries, there are a number of investments in areas of fundamental research, applied research and development in each country that come to mind, and so it is constantly necessary to remember the need for coherence to ensure compatibility in command and operations control in NATO countries.

The fact remains that there are also special cases. For example, I would remind you that France, a member of the alliance, may, precisely because it is a special case, differ from others in its views on all the equipment listed by Mr. Hill.

As regards the air command and control system described in the report, France has taken an active part in the NATO work. In the preparatory discussions for the ACCS master plan for the France region, France's membership of the ACCS team meant that the special features of French military organisation bound up with the concept of deterrence – our distinctive feature within the alliance – could be more easily understood and accepted, particularly on one point which might have appeared to be incompatible with the very idea of ACCS, namely the existence of several air commands with separate responsibility for defensive, offensive and logistic operations. In spite of that, we reached a compromise on the system. So our unusual position in the alliance lets us keep in step with the other countries in several areas of interoperability within our WEU.

Therefore, Mr. President, I hope that our Rapporteur too will accept that this special position be allowed for in the recommendation. On rereading the English and French texts I do not think there should be any difficulty. However, with the Rapporteur's agreement and yours, Mr. President, I would prefer the English version of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation to be accepted.

The French text recommends the Council to urge member governments to endorse NATO's planning "sans réserve", but no equivalent of "sans réserve" appears in the English version. Personally, I would wish the words to be omitted from the French text too, simply on the special-case grounds I have just referred to, which allows us to go along with practically all the planning whilst preserving for us the special place we have in the alliance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I should like to take the opportunity of this debate to express our feelings of deep friendship and gratitude to our friend James Hill. I especially wish to do so in my capacity as Chairman of the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats, but with your permission also recalling my times as leader of this Assembly.

For us, Mr. James Hill is the very embodiment of the British Euro-MP, hard working, conscientious, loyal and true.

I believe that, as is the custom, one Briton will be followed by another, but his image, that will long remain famous as the worthy representative of John Bull in this Assembly and with whom I myself have had the pleasure of working, may well be hard to replace.

I would add that it is with men like James Hill that here in Western European Union we made the first overtures in our important and tricky relations with the closed world of international communism, the first feelers having been put out in the direction of communist China and the first steps taken there by parliamentarians on behalf of a committee whose title at the time was the General Affairs Committee, on which Mr. Hill served.

This is only one memory among many, and I mention it simply to stress how sorry we shall be at the loss of his participation but also how much we count on him – as he may count on us – to take every practical opportunity of expressing this friendship and trust he places in us.

Once again I thank him for all he has done for our Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Caro. The Assembly is glad that you added your words to those of your President. There is no doubt that your sentiments towards Mr. Hill are as sincere as those of all the members of this Assembly. Images do not fade, and the image of our friend Mr. Hill will always be with us.

(The President continued in English)

The debate is now closed.

Does Mr. Hill wish to reply?

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – If I had known, I would have worn my Union Jack waistcoat and brought along a bulldog to create the right picture. When one acquires such a reputation in an institution such as this one sometimes hopes that people have not noticed the blacker side of one's character. Those members who recognise that side of my character must have left the chamber. I am grateful to Mr. Fourré and Mr. Caro for their kind words. I shall not forget the friendship that I have made here.

People have been excessively kind. I can accept what has been said about the French translation of section 1 of the recommendations. John Bull was a simple and shy man. He had to dress in that way and still today a man travels the world dressed as John Bull.

We try to keep politics at a level that can be enjoyed. When it is not enjoyed disagreements and hatred can develop. I hope that I have helped to make politics enjoyable. If that is my only epitaph I shall be pleased.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Hill.

Does the Chairman of the committee wish to speak?

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I too should like to express my esteem and appreciation to my friend Mr. Hill, not only for his work but also for this report which in a way is his swan song as a WEU parliamentarian. It is a very concise report which, as already mentioned, encountered many difficulties because most of the information in it is classified at various levels of confidentiality for security reasons. Nevertheless, thanks to our secretary's persistence we have managed to present to the Assembly a reasonably informative report which is important because it deals with the heart of Europe's defence. The European and national command and control system is vital to the conduct of defence in Europe. Defence can no longer be ensured by traditional systems alone but must be as scientific as possible and must be based on data acquired through modern systems.

As members will know, command and control systems are based on systems for the collection and transmission of information and target acquisition by various methods including aircraft, satellites, radio-electric systems, radar and electronic systems. All this information is centralised at command and control headquarters, where it is assessed, decoded – because it generally arrives in code – and converted into positive data. Then it is passed to computers or even translated, by artificial intelligence, into command decisions. This means that the use of

troops, and fire power, the selection of a particular weapon or unit, the logistic capability required to support an operation and therefore the logistics needed to carry it through all have to be fed into the command and control system which with minimal real-time delay passes on to the commanders of major units, such as army corps, all the information needed to fight the battle. This report is, therefore, looking at the heart of Europe's defence, which is even more important today when the talk is of force cuts, the selection of units and cuts in resources for defence purposes.

Greater efforts must therefore be made to use the available forces and the operational capability of units to best possible advantage.

The efficient modern command and control system which every country is acquiring or has already acquired is essential for the conduct of operations.

Of course, apart from NATO resources, we have various national strategic and tactical command and control systems which are already operational, working with ground, air and naval forces, strategic missile forces and nuclear forces. They are, however, assigned by the individual command and control systems to the responsible commanders.

I think that NATO and the European countries have made a great effort to equip themselves with the systems described. At national level firms have certainly had to work very hard to combine different electronic, optoelectronic and industrial activities in the aircraft sector, and in the acoustic and electro-acoustic sector. Clearly a very major effort has been made to produce sensors for collecting information in conjunction with every kind of telecommunications system including optical fibres and satellites. A very great technological effort has indeed been made.

The report we are discussing tries to provide information on the state of the art in this field which is essential particularly because resources are now limited and must therefore be used to best advantage.

I think that report may be the first of a long series because technology is advancing at a dizzy pace in this field. The last report for this year together with the others on satellites and the IEPG show that the committee is fully committed to make a significant contribution on what is being done in the field of technology and science applied to the military art in relation to problems concerning the protection of Europe's security. This is a considerable amount particularly with the limited resources available.

My thanks again to Mr. Hill, the committee secretary and all members of the committee who have contributed unstintingly to the drafting of this report.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1229.

There are no amendments.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

**5. Opinion on the budgets
of the ministerial organs
of Western European Union
for the financial years 1989 (revised) and 1990**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation,
Doc. 1218)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1989 (revised) and 1990 and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1218.

I call Mr. Lord to present his report.

Mr. LORD (*United Kingdom*). – This is the first time that I have had the honour to appear as a Rapporteur before the Assembly. I am the first to appreciate that budgets are not the most exciting topic. I am also aware that this is the last sitting of this meeting of the Assembly. I am not sure whether it will be a grand finale or, as we say in England, the event after the Lord Mayor's show. I think perhaps the latter, but I am grateful to colleagues who are still present to deal with this business.

On behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, I am pleased to submit my report in the form of an opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1989 (revised) and 1990, with the draft recommendation contained therein.

I am able to be brief, which at this stage of the proceedings will please colleagues, for two reasons: first, because of the clear way in which the report has been set out by Mr. Cannizzaro and his colleagues, making it extremely easy to understand; and, secondly, because the precise

structures and staffing levels of the organisations concerned are still uncertain, the budgets have had to be provisional. That uncertainty effectively precludes much debate at this stage. The committee regards the budgets as a holding operation.

There are two reasons for the uncertainty. First, the plans originally proposed to enhance the secretariat-general by seven posts to cater for the arrival of Spain and Portugal and other increases in the workload were blocked by the ministerially-appointed Budget and Organisation Committee, which instead asked for a management review by outside experts in organisation. Their findings are still awaited and therefore cannot be costed. The seven posts have been withdrawn and the budget for the secretariat-general is much the same as last year, but with some additions for communications equipment. It will have to be recosted when the outcome of the review is known.

Secondly, the Paris agencies are to be wound up on 30th June and replaced by the Western European Union Institute for Security Studies, which will start its work on 1st July. At present, we do not know what the structure and staffing of the new institute will be, so a half year's budget has been prepared up to 30th June and a further budget will have to be produced when more precise details are available.

As well as all those uncertainties, the committee was concerned about two other issues. First, the responsibility and competence of the ministerial Budget and Organisation Committee. We found it hard to understand why the committee did not feel competent to fulfil the task of agreeing the expansion of the secretariat-general, which seemed to us to be its very reason for existence. We have called for a further report on the matter.

Our second concern is the treatment of the staff employed by the Paris agencies, whose future has been in much doubt for many years. We felt that their treatment left much to be desired. The uncertainty about their future, jobs, financial position and the lack of consultation generally, together with the up-to-date position, is all clearly set out in our report. The addendum to the explanatorium memorandum sets out the Permanent Council's final decision, which the committee notes with deep regret.

My thanks are due to Mr. Cannizzaro and his colleagues for their efforts and expertise, and to my Chairman, Mr. Klejdzinski, and our colleagues on the committee. I apologise for being unable to give a more complete picture of the year ahead for the good reasons that I have given. I trust that the Assembly will feel able to agree the draft recommendations that are clearly set out and accept the report, as the committee did, with unanimity.

1. See page 41.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Lord, for the presentation of your report.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I entirely agree with this report, which raises some extremely important problems. Obviously, as it comes at the end of the session there are as usual not many of us here. Nevertheless, I trust that it will prompt and receive all the attention it deserves both from our colleagues who have to take the appropriate action and from the Council of Ministers who will have it on their agenda.

It poses some extremely important problems both as regards organisation in general and at the same time as regards what I would describe as respect for staff representation. I do not want to single anyone out for criticism but I share the unhappy feeling, to put it mildly, to which our Rapporteur, Mr. Lord, gives voice and which I hope the Assembly will also unanimously express. I do not know if there is anyone to blame but what I do know is that this situation is the result of the lack of a European civil service. A European civil service should have been set up years ago.

Staff representatives at the Council of Europe, WEU and OECD alike have constantly demanded that a European system be set up to safeguard the civil service. We have two systems that coexist. The first is fairly well organised and well designed; it is that prevailing in the European Community. The other goes stammering along impelled by what is called concertation among the co-ordinated organisations with representation at staff and, of course, secretary-general level. And all this means the only progress is one step at a time, not only in the problem of the procedures for representing the interests of the staff, the necessary dialogue and arbitration problems in disputes, but also as regards job security.

As our Rapporteur, Mr. Lord, reminds us, Mrs. Pack protested in a previous report to the Assembly about temporary contracts which were renewed every six months but left the staff in a constant state of uncertainty, whereas an organisation should be providing job security and career paths.

How can careers be provided if contracts are only temporary and their renewal is not even automatic but hanging by the thread of the appointments board's decision.

The other point concerns dialogue. There is a dialogue and good faith on both sides, but the procedure provides no guarantee that the results of this dialogue will have any effect. The body exercising the powers of appointment and decision and that taking the decisions and acting

as arbitrator are one and the same. You cannot be judge and jury.

The staff should be able to have recourse to an independent procedure for appeal or arbitration to settle disputes with the appointing body. There is no such procedure – and there was none for the staff of the Paris agencies that have been closed down. These have been replaced by the institute, which has had no policy guideline from the Council requiring it to re-engage as many of the staff given notice as possible.

And since the policy decision had to be followed by an administrative decision, staff seeking more compensation than the rules provide are refused anything extra purely and simply because no precedent must be created. But are we here to preserve habits or even routines, or to try to promote relations between staff and decision-makers?

To my mind, an advantage in this report is that it raises one of the fundamental factors governing the activity of our intergovernmental organisations linked together by a form of co-ordination whereby progress can be made simultaneously in all of them.

I earnestly hope, Mr. President, that whether it be for staff employed by the Council or staff employed by the Assembly the necessary action will be taken to set up fully-democratic procedures of dialogue and arbitration both in our organisation where they are still inadequate and also at the level of the co-ordinated organisations, so that we put new life into our efforts to achieve the most important objective, namely that of instituting a European civil service.

No doubt 1992 should enable us to move forward thanks to the precedents created in the European Community, but that is still in the future. The intergovernmental nature of our institutions presupposes that this is what each of our governments wants with the aim of a unanimous or, if that is not possible, majority decision in the Council. Our work is of very great importance. Throughout these sessions we have been speaking about the future of WEU, its potential for becoming the essential and effective tool for organising security in Europe. We need motivated and confident staff with the necessary job security. We require the support and services of a very highly skilled staff.

These I believe are the objectives that the Assembly seeks to defend in this report, and I am very glad that it has been put before us.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Caro, thank you for drawing our attention to the problem of the staff of the institute and that of the staffing of all the European intergovernmental organisations. As we all know, there are

The President (continued)

similar problems in the Council of Europe where the matter has already been raised, but regrettably not yet resolved.

The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Lord.

Mr. LORD (*United Kingdom*). – I merely wish to underline Mr. Caro's point. It is vital that our own ministers should be made to understand clearly how strongly the Assembly feels about such matters. When the Assembly makes a proposal involving staffing levels, we are told that it must go out to business experts. However, when it comes to dealing with our staff, we deal with them in a way that no self-respecting company or business would dream of doing. That point should be brought home very clearly.

I can only repeat the sentence in the addendum that says that what is happening "is contrary to the staff's expectations and the Assembly's recommendations". I hope that that important point – and the others in the report – will be agreed to by the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does the Chairman of the committee wish to speak?

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is getting late, and the chamber is emptying. I do not want to become involved in a debate on the subject now, because our Rapporteur has, as I see it, given an accurate description of the problems, for which I am grateful to him.

Otherwise, all I can say is that so important an item should not be placed last on this Assembly's agenda, because the report also concerns the Assembly's self-image.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1218.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

6. Adjournment of the session

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly has now come to the end of its business for the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session.

I therefore declare adjourned the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed 12.10 p.m.)

1. See page 42.

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