

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-NINTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1983

I

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

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PARIS

The proceedings of the first part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume I: Assembly documents.

Volume II: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM.	ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
	BOGAERTS August	Socialist
	BONNEL Raoul	PVV
	DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
Mrs.	HERMAN-MICHELSENS Lucienne	PVV
Mr.	MICHEL Joseph	PSC
Mrs.	STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP

Substitutes

MM.	BIEFNOT Yvon	Socialist
	DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
	DE DECKER Armand	PRL
	LAGNEAU André	PRL
	PÉCRIAUX Nestor	Socialist
	STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP
	VAN DER ELST Frans	Volksunie

FRANCE

Representatives

MM.	BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
	BERRIER Noël	Socialist
	CARO Jean-Marie	UDF/CDS
	DURAFFOUR Paul	Soc. (App.)
	FRÉCHE Georges	Socialist
	JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
	JUNG Louis	UCDP
	LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
	MAYOUD Alain	UDF
	OEHLER Jean André	Socialist
	PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
	PONCELET Christian	RPR
	SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
	SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
	SPÉNALE Georges	Socialist
	VALLEIX Jean	RPR
	VIAL-MASSAT Théo	Communist
	WILQUIN Claude	Socialist

Substitutes

MM.	BARTHE Jean-Jacques	Communist
	BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
	BEIX Roland	Socialist
	BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
	BERTILE Wilfrid	Socialist
	DELEHEDDE André	Socialist

MM.	FORTIER Marcel	RPR
	FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
	GALLEY Robert	RPR
	GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
	JAGER René	UCDP
	JOXE Pierre	Socialist
	KOEHL Émile	UDF
	MÉNARD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
	MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left
	PROUVOST Pierre	Socialist
	ROSSINOT André	UDF
	N...	

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM.	AHRENS Karl	SPD
	ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
	BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
	ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
	GERSTL Friedrich	SPD
	HAASE Horst	SPD
	HARTMANN Klaus	CDU/CSU
	HORNHUES Karl-Heinz	CDU/CSU
	KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
	LINDE Jürgen	SPD
	MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
	REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
	RUMPF Wolfgang	FDP
	SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
	SCHWARZ Heinz	CDU/CSU
	SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
	UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU
	VOGT Roland	Die Grünen

Substitutes

MM.	BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
	ERTL Josef	FDP
	HACKEL Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
	HANDLOS Franz	CDU/CSU
	HAUFF Volker	SPD
	HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
	HORN Erwin	SPD
	JÄGER Claus	CDU/CSU
Mrs.	KELLY Petra	Die Grünen
MM.	LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
	LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
	SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
	SCHEER Hermann	SPD
	SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
	SCHMITZ Hans Peter	CDU/CSU
	STAVENHAGEN Lutz	CDU/CSU
	VOGEL Hans-Jochen	SPD
	WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM.	AGRIMI Alessandro	Chr. Dem.
	ANTONI Varese	Communist
	BERNINI Bruno	Communist
	BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
	CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
	DELLA BRIOTTA Libero	Socialist
	DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
	President of the Assembly	
	FORMA Renzo	Chr. Dem.
	FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
	FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
Mrs.	GBERBEZ Gabriella	Communist
MM.	MONDINO Giorgio	Socialist
	PECCHIOLO Ugo	Communist
	PETRILLI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
	RUBBI Antonio	Communist
	TRIPODI Antonio	MSI-DN
	VALIANTE Mario	Chr. Dem.
	VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM.	AJELLO Aldo	Radical
	AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
	BENEDIKTER Johann Hans	SVP
	CAFIERO Luca	PDUP
	CALICE Giovanni	Communist
	CONTI PERSINI Gianfranco	PSDI
	FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
	GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
	GUNNELLA Aristide	Republican
	MARTINO Leopoldo Attilio	Communist
	ORIONE Franco Luigi	Chr. Dem.
	PATRIARCA Francesco	Chr. Dem.
	POZZO Cesare	MSI-DN
	ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
Mrs.	ROSOLEN Angela Maria	Communist
MM.	SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
	STERPA Egidio	Liberal
	ZITO Sisino	Socialist

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM.	BERCHEM Albert	Dem.
	MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
	THOSS Maurice	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM.	GLESENER Jean-Pierre	Soc. Chr.
	HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
	PRUSSEN Robert	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM.	AARTS Harry	CDA
	van den BERGH Harry	Labour
	BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
	SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
	STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
	TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
Mrs.	van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA

Substitutes

Mrs.	BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth	Labour
Mr.	EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
Mrs.	den OUDEN-DEKKERS Greetje	Liberal
MM.	van der SANDEN Piet	CDA
	de VRIES Klaas	Labour
	van der WERFF Ymenus P.W.	Liberal
	WORRELL Joop	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Mr.	Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir	Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr.	Thomas COX	Labour
Sir	Anthony GRANT	Conservative
MM.	Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
	Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir	Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
	James HILL	Conservative
Lord	HUGHES	Labour
Mr.	Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Mrs.	Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr.	Michael McGUIRE	Labour
	Maurice MILLER	Labour
MM.	Fred MULLEY	Labour
	John PAGE	Conservative
Lord	REAY	Conservative
Sir	Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr.	Thomas URWIN	Labour

Substitutes

MM.	David ATKINSON	Conservative
	Ronald BROWN	SDP
Lord	DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM.	Anthony DURANT	Conservative
	Kenneth EASTHAM	Labour
	Robert EDWARDS	Labour
Sir	Russell FAIRGRIEVE	Conservative
MM.	Raymond FLETCHER	Labour
	Edward GARRETT	Labour
	Harry GOURLAY	Labour
	Ralph HOWELL	Conservative
Lord	McNAIR	Liberal
Mr.	John MORRIS	Labour
Lord	NORTHFIELD	Labour
MM.	John OSBORN	Conservative
	Laurence PAVITT	Labour
	Keith STAINTON	Conservative
	John WILKINSON	Conservative

AGENDA

**of the First Part of the Twenty-Ninth Ordinary Session
Paris, 6th-8th June 1983**

I. Report of the Council

Twenty-eighth annual report of the Council to the Assembly

II. Political Questions

1. Political activities of the WEU Council – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council *Report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Committee*
2. China and European security *Report tabled by Mr. Caro on behalf of the General Affairs Committee*

III. Defence Questions

1. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council *Report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*
2. Burden-sharing in the alliance *Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*

IV. Technical and Scientific Questions

The law of the sea *Report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*

V. Relations with Parliaments

Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly Recommendations 383 on the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism *Report tabled by Mr. Page and Mr. Dejardin on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments*

ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the First Part of the Twenty-Ninth Ordinary Session
Paris, 6th-8th June 1983

MONDAY, 6th JUNE

Morning

Meetings of Political Groups.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the twenty-ninth ordinary session by the Provisional President.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business of the first part of twenty-ninth ordinary session.
7. China and European security :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Caro on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.

4 p.m.

8. Address by Mr. Möllemann, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
9. China and European security :
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

TUESDAY, 7th JUNE

Morning 9.30 a.m.

1. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.

10.30 a.m.

2. Twenty-eighth annual report of the Council :
presentation by Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
3. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council :
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

4. Political activities of the WEU Council – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Burden-sharing in the alliance :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

3.30 p.m.

2. Address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

3. Burden-sharing in the alliance :

Resumed debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

WEDNESDAY, 8th JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

The law of the sea :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly Recommendations 383 on the problems of nuclear weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Page and Mr. Dejardin on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

Debate.

CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TWENTY-NINTH ORDINARY SESSION

*Twenty-eighth annual report of the Council to the Assembly
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period
1st January to 31st December 1982*

INTRODUCTION

1. The Council of Western European Union transmit to the Assembly the twenty-eighth annual report on their activities, covering the period 1st January to 31st December 1982.
2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters:

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VI. Budgetary and administrative questions	44

CHAPTER I

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY

Presenting the Council's twenty-seventh annual report to the Assembly, the Chairman-in-Office, the Belgian Minister for External Relations, Mr. Tindemans, stated:

"... the Council appreciate the very considerable services which your Assembly renders to Europe's cause by regularly studying the basic problems affecting the security and essential unity of Europe, and by submitting its views to the governments of the member states.

Your Assembly, ..." he recalled, "is the only European parliamentary body empowered, by virtue of a treaty, to discuss defence matters which are of crucial importance to our countries, and of which – as the current climate requires – the general public in our countries must be made more aware."

In their reply to Recommendation 379, the Council referred to the proposals put forward by the French Government, which take account of this unique position of the Assembly. They stated that, having regard to the questions legitimately voiced by public opinion in the WEU member countries and the importance of democratic dialogue, through which peoples reach a better understanding of the defence efforts needed, the Council supported the notion expressed in the Assembly on 1st December 1981 by the State Secretary to the French Minister of Defence, that the Assembly should extend its debates to all the extremely varied themes which raise the problems relating to the security of European countries.

Throughout 1982 the Council, for their part, continued to assist the Assembly to fulfil its rôle effectively. To this end, they have maintained their dialogue with it on questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty including – in accordance with the undertaking given in 1972 and subsequently renewed – those dealt with by member governments of WEU in other international fora.

A. Twenty-seventh annual report of the Council to the Assembly

1. The activities of the ministerial organs of WEU during 1981 were described in the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council. The progress of co-operation between the WEU

member states in other international fora in areas in which the Assembly is particularly interested was also referred to in that report.

Moreover, as regards armaments control, additional information was provided to the Assembly in accordance with the procedure applied since 1971, which was set out in the Council reply to Written Question 123.

2. The Council welcome the fact that the Assembly noted with satisfaction the information thus provided.

B. Informing the Assembly about the Standing Armaments Committee's study on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU

Following their communication of 1981, the Council addressed to the Assembly on 10th May 1982 a document containing the revised legal part of the study carried out by the Standing Armaments Committee as well as the updated presentation of the first section of the economic part of that study.

In accordance with their undertaking, the Council will not fail to inform the Assembly adequately once the SAC study has been completed.

C. Assembly debates – Assembly recommendations to the Council and written questions put to the Council by members of the Assembly; replies by the Council

1. The Council took note, with interest, of the reports presented by Assembly committees during the two parts of the twenty-eighth ordinary session and carefully followed the debates on those reports. They welcome the fact that in response to the call by the State Secretary to the French Minister of Defence, the Assembly, on the basis of reports submitted to it by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and by the General Affairs Committee, examined in depth the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe and the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism.

As a number of reports were submitted at a late stage, the Council wish to point out that

earlier receipt of committee documents would be desirable, particularly in order to provide fuller information to the ministers participating in the Assembly's debates.

2. The Council gave careful consideration to the sixteen recommendations¹ adopted by the Assembly during the second part of the twenty-seventh ordinary session and the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session and to three written questions² put by members of the Assembly.

3. With the assistance of the national administrations, the working group and the Secretariat-General, the Council drew up substantial replies to all these recommendations and questions. They took account of co-operation within the various bodies in which the member states of WEU participate. Thus they gave the Assembly as much information as possible about consultations in which representatives of the member states had taken part in the framework of European political co-operation and in the Atlantic Alliance.

D. Meetings between the Council and Assembly bodies

1. Three informal meetings took place in London on 19th May 1982 after the ministerial session held under the chairmanship of Lord Belstead, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

At a working lunch organised by the United Kingdom Chairman, the members of the Council met the Assembly Presidential Committee.

During the afternoon, the Council met two Assembly committees in succession and discussed with each the matters which it had proposed. Exchanges of views with the General Affairs Committee covered WEU activities, political co-operation in Europe, co-operation between Europe and the United States on security matters arising inside and outside Europe, the situation in Poland, the Falklands crisis, and those with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments covered the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, questions concerning disarmament, co-operation on armaments matters, the Falklands crisis.

On the same day, Lord Belstead, representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, received the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

1. Nos. 372 to 387.

2. Nos. 229 to 231.

2. The Council remain favourable to such annual contacts with representatives of the Assembly. Indeed they consider that these contacts are useful insofar as they enable the participants to speak regularly and freely about the evolution of the complex problems dealt with by the Assembly. Hence the Council have given a positive reply to the requests submitted to them for the year 1983.

E. Speeches made by the Chairman-in-Office and other ministers of WEU member countries at the Assembly

1. Each year it is customary for the Chairman-in-Office to present to the Assembly the annual report of the Council's activities.

The Council moreover encourage the participation of government representatives, particularly defence ministers, in the Assembly's debates. The Council's aim is to meet the Assembly's legitimate desire to be better informed in this way of the respective views of the governments of WEU member countries on the questions appearing on its agenda.

2. In 1982, the Chairman-in-Office and five other ministers addressed the Assembly.

During the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session, Mr. Tindemans, the Chairman-in-Office, outlined the main aspects of the activities of the WEU ministerial organs in 1981 and added certain information on the first months of the current year. Speaking as Belgian Minister for External Relations, he conveyed to the Assembly his thoughts on the security policy of Europe. Questions affecting the security and defence of European countries were the theme of speeches by Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External Relations, and Mr. Leister, State Secretary at the Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany.

During the second part of the session, Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence, outlined to the Assembly the main aspects of his country's defence policy; on this occasion he recalled the suggestions made to the Assembly in December of 1981 by the State Secretary to the Minister of Defence. Lord Belstead, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, indicated the fundamental trends in United Kingdom defence policy and stated his government's position on the Falkland Islands. Mr. Fioret, Italian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, informed the Assembly of his government's views on co-operation between Europe and the United States, East-West relations, the situation in the Middle East, the situation in South-East Asia, as well as on European unification.

The Ministers all reaffirmed the importance which their respective governments attached to Western European Union and they emphasised that the Assembly, the only European parliamentary forum competent to deal with defence questions, had an essential rôle to play in the examination of such questions. Some of them referred on this occasion to the wishes expressed by the Assembly in its Recommendation 380 with regard to the control of armaments.

After their speeches, the ministers answered questions put by members of the Assembly.

F. Colloquy on international aeronautical consortia

The Council were represented at the colloquy organised by the Assembly on 9th and 10th February 1982 in London and they followed the work with interest.

At the inaugural sitting Lord Trenchard, United Kingdom Minister of State for Defence Procurement, summarised the British Government's attitude to matters of collaboration in the procurement of defence equipment. Mr. Lemoine, French State Secretary to the Minister of Defence, made a speech in which, after recalling that his government considered it necessary to develop co-operation in the WEU framework, he presented the guidelines of French aeronautical policy.

Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, spoke at the end of the colloquy. He noted that since WEU remained the sole European grouping with a treaty-based authority to discuss defence matters, the Assembly had a particularly useful rôle to play. He observed that the excellent work done by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was a valuable example in this respect. Following their speeches, the Ministers replied to questions from the participants.

CHAPTER II

ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL

Introduction

1. The Council and the ministers who addressed the Assembly in 1982 reaffirmed the importance that the governments of the member states attach to WEU, the only European organisation which by treaty has been given competence in defence matters.

In presenting the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council, the Chairman-in-Office reaffirmed WEU member countries' attachment to the modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols and their determination to fulfil all their obligations. He stressed that the commitment to collective self-defence contained in Article V of the treaty was one of the cornerstones of the European security system.

2. During 1982, the Council ensured that the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols were applied and observed and were concerned to avoid – as is indeed required by the treaty – duplication of work with that in which the member states of WEU participate, in other international fora.

3. The Council met at ministerial level in London on 19th May under the chairmanship of Lord Belstead, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

They held twelve meetings at permanent representative level. Their working group met twenty-five times.

4. Various aspects and phases of the implementation of the Paris Agreements have appeared twenty-four times on the Council's agenda.

The discussions at ministerial level covered the development of East-West relations, the situation in the Mediterranean, the study of the Standing Armaments Committee on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU.

5. Lastly, the dialogue with the Assembly, which constitutes an important part of the Council's activity, was continued, the Council giving careful consideration, for example, to the suggestions of the Assembly which were contained in Recommendation 372 on European union and WEU, Recommendation 379 on the political activities of the Council, and Recommendation 380 on the application of the Brussels Treaty, as shown by the replies given, particularly in respect of armaments control.

6. As the Council stated to the Assembly, they will continue to exercise the responsibilities incumbent on them, and in so doing assert the European approach in consultations on security, armaments control and disarmament. They consider it desirable that in these spheres the provision of information and the harmonisation of attitudes should take place in various bodies and at various levels, avoiding as far as possible any duplication. As pointed out by the Council, the fact that all WEU member countries are members of the Atlantic Alliance and share the conviction that defence of the continent of Europe and global defence are inseparable, does not affect the specificity of the mandates and the respective approaches. The Council attach great importance in the present circumstances to a deepening of the understanding existing between themselves and the Assembly.

*A. Political questions**1. East-West relations*

(a) As stated in their reply to Assembly Recommendation 374 the Council pay particularly close attention to the various aspects of the development of East-West relations.

In the detailed discussions by the Council at their meeting at ministerial level in London on 19th May 1982 they noted with concern that these relations remained subject to severe tensions as a result of the continued build-up of Soviet military potential, the continuing occupation of Afghanistan by the USSR, the repression imposed in Poland with the encouragement and the support of the USSR, and the destabilising activities of the Soviet Union in other parts of the world.

The ministers stressed that improvements in East-West relations depend on the readiness of the Soviet Union to be seen to exercise restraint and act with responsibility in the conduct of international affairs.

They stated that, for their part, the governments of WEU member countries would persevere in their efforts to establish a more constructive East-West relationship through dialogue, negotiation and mutually advantageous exchanges with the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact.

The ministers reaffirmed that their governments attached fundamental importance to the co-ordination of their positions in this matter in the framework of European political co-operation and within the Atlantic Alliance.

(b) In the context of their dialogue with the Assembly the Council kept the latter regularly informed of the continuing consultations between the member countries of WEU and their European and Atlantic partners in 1982 concerning the development of the situation in Poland and the discussions at the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting.

(i) In their previous annual report, the Council called the Assembly's attention to the declaration of the Ten on Poland on 15th December 1981, immediately following the grave measures taken by the Polish leaders on 13th December in defiance of the provisions of the final act of Helsinki, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

As indicated in their reply of 3rd February 1982 to the statement by the Presidential Committee of the Assembly dated 8th January 1982, the Council fully supported the declaration by the Foreign Ministers of the member states of the European Community on 4th January 1982 and the declaration by the North Atlantic Council meeting in extraordinary ministerial session on 11th January, in Brussels.

They pointed out that the governments of the WEU member countries totally denounced the repression imposed in Poland, and urged the Polish authorities to live up to their declared intention to end the state of martial law, to release those arrested and to restore immediately a dialogue with the church and Solidarity; these governments also called upon the Soviet Union to respect Poland's fundamental right to solve its own problems free from foreign interference.

The member countries of WEU participated in the close and active consultation which took place throughout 1982 within the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance to co-ordinate their policies in the face of developments in the situation in Poland.

In response to suggestions by the Assembly in its Recommendation 378, the Council outlined the measures taken concerning humanitarian aid for the Polish people, the suspension of financial and economic assistance to Poland, the restriction of imports from the Soviet Union decided within the EEC framework and the conclusions of the meeting of the European Council on 29th and 30th March regarding East-West economic and commercial relations.

The Council were deeply concerned to learn of the outlawing of the Polish trade unions, including Solidarity, on 8th October.

In their reply to Assembly Recommendation 384, they pointed out that this retrograde step, inconsistent with the final act of Helsinki and contrary to various statements made by the Polish leadership since 13th December 1981, would render more difficult the restoration of normal relations between Poland and the West.

On this occasion, the Council assured the Assembly that the member states of WEU would continue their efforts within European political co-operation and the Atlantic Alliance to persuade the Polish Government to honour their undertaking to re-establish civil liberties and the process of reform and to permit the revival of a genuinely free trade union movement.

The events of 31st August and the mass protests that followed the dissolution of Solidarity were further reminders that only through genuine dialogue could Poland achieve lasting political and economic stability.

Noting with concern and disapproval the serious external pressure and the campaign directed by the USSR and other eastern countries against the efforts for renewal in Poland, the Council informed the Assembly that they would continue to follow closely the effect of measures applied to Poland and the Soviet Union by western governments.

The Council supported the positions set out in the declaration published by the European Council following its meeting on 3rd and 4th December in Copenhagen and in point 3 of the final communiqué of the ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council held in Brussels on 9th and 10th December¹.

The Council noted the suspension of martial law and the release at the end of the year of a large number of internees in Poland. They hoped that these measures would be followed without delay by other developments needed to meet the demands of the WEU member countries.

(ii) With regard to the discussions which took place between 9th February and 12th March 1982 at the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting, the Council, in reply to Assembly Recommendation 378 noted with regret that the violation of the principles of the final act of Helsinki, of which the repression in Poland constituted a particularly grave element, had not only prevented the Madrid meeting achieving positive results, but had even put at risk the entire CSCE process. The Council stated that the WEU member countries remained committed to the continuation of the CSCE process and hoped that, when the Madrid meeting resumed

1. See Annex I.

on 9th November, circumstances would be more conducive to the achievement of a positive outcome.

In their reply of 9th November to Recommendation 384 – the very day of the resumption of the meeting in Madrid – the Council reaffirmed the importance attached by WEU member countries to the CSCE process as a useful tool for furthering their objectives both with a view to better implementation of the final act of Helsinki and in order to develop a management of relations in general with the East.

As regards the sixth phase of the Madrid meeting, the WEU member countries expressed their preoccupation about the situation in Poland during the review of implementation of the final act of Helsinki. They continued their efforts to arrive at a substantial and balanced concluding document based on the draft submitted by the neutral and non-aligned countries in December 1981. The allies introduced a number of amendments to bring it up to date with realities in Europe and to call for progress on human rights, free trade unions and a freer movement of people, ideas and information.

The Council regret that it was in large measure because of the negative effects of the situation in Poland the Madrid negotiations could not be successfully concluded in 1982. They noted however that when the meeting broke up on 17th December, the participants had at least agreed to resume work on 8th February 1983.

They recall that in accordance with the aims stated in the declaration of the European Council following its meeting of 3rd and 4th December in Copenhagen and in point 13 of the final communiqué of the ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council held on 9th and 10th December, in Brussels, the WEU member countries are resolved to continue their efforts to arrive at a substantial and balanced concluding document which would contain the following two elements: a precise mandate for a conference on disarmament in Europe to negotiate in a first phase militarily-significant, politically-binding and verifiable confidence and security-building measures applicable to the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals; progress in the application of the provisions of the final act of Helsinki relating to humanitarian aspects of East-West relations.

(c) The Council also wish to point out that, following the change of leadership in the USSR, the WEU member countries in concert with their European Community and Atlantic Alliance partners emphasised that their relations with that country would continue to be based on firmness and dialogue and that they

were ready to respond positively to the efforts expected from the Soviet Government to improve confidence in international affairs and to work together with the USSR and other East European countries for a more constructive East-West relationship.

2. *Situation in Afghanistan*

The Council confirm the views expressed on this subject in their previous annual report to the Assembly.

The Council deplored the continuation into 1982 of the military occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in the face of determined resistance by the Afghan people, the repression of the civilian population, and the forced exile of more than three million people since the intervention of the Soviet army.

The Council recalled that in a declaration published on 30th March, after the international day of Afghanistan, the European Council had reaffirmed the need to hasten the search for a political solution based on the complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops and respect for the independence, sovereignty and non-alignment of Afghanistan.

They welcomed the sustained efforts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his personal representative to reach a solution in accordance with the principles of the resolutions adopted by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly.

The Council associate themselves with the declaration published following the meeting on 3rd and 4th December in Copenhagen by the European Council¹ which expressed the view that the new Soviet leadership would reassess its position, again expressed its readiness to support any realistic effort to achieve a political solution based on the principles mentioned above and recalled the European Council proposal of 30th June 1981 for such a solution.

3. *Situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East*

(a) With regard to the evolution in 1982 of the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Council welcomed the final withdrawal of Israel from Sinai which took place on 25th April; this was an important step forward not only for the development of peaceful relations between Israel and Egypt but also for efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242.

On the other hand, the Council deplored the policy pursued by Israel in the occupied

1. See Annex II.

territories, which is not only illegal under international law but is a serious obstacle to the creation of the climate of confidence required for any negotiations. They also strongly deplored the tragic events that occurred in the Lebanon and in this connection recall the following:

The European Council on 29th and 30th March and the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Ten on 25th April, the day following the Israeli bombardment of the Lebanon, urged all the parties involved to renounce the use of force and to assure conditions for the respect of the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

In view of the sharp deterioration in the situation and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon at the beginning of June, the governments of the WEU member countries firmly supported the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 5th and 6th June (Nos. 508 and 509) and the subsequent resolutions on this question. They welcomed the declaration of 6th June by the representatives of the industrialised countries at their summit meeting in Versailles. They also played an active part in the consultations between the member countries of the European Community whose position was stated in the declaration published by the Foreign Affairs Ministers at their special session in Bonn on 9th June and by the European Council after its meeting of 28th and 29th June in Brussels. In view of the massacre of Palestine civilians in Beirut they gave their full support to the resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 19th September (No. 521) and to the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly adopted on 24th September. They also expressed their profound shock in the declaration published by the Ten on 20th September.

In reply to Assembly Recommendation 386, the Council strongly condemned the cycle of violence, especially the Israeli invasion of the Lebanon. They affirmed the WEU member countries' solidarity with a friendly country whose population had suffered so cruelly and whose stability was dangerously threatened. They expressed their profound revulsion at the crime perpetrated against Palestinian civilians in Beirut.

The Council stated that the WEU member countries hoped that the Lebanese people would be able to bring about national reconciliation; these countries were prepared to assist in the relief and reconstruction of the Lebanon. Furthermore, the Council welcomed the United Nations Security Council Resolution 521 and the significant contribution to the security of the civilian population of Beirut made by the deployment of the multinational force in which forces belonging to two WEU member coun-

tries, France and Italy, were participating along with the United States.

The Council said that they were convinced that a return to lasting peace in the Lebanon and the restoration of its national sovereignty required the rapid and complete withdrawal of all foreign forces, except those authorised by the Lebanese Government, whose authority should be fully re-established over all its national territory. All efforts designed to achieve these objectives would be supported by the Council.

In their reply to the Assembly, the Council reaffirmed their conviction that, looking beyond the solution of the Lebanese problem, the Middle East could only enjoy lasting peace and true stability through the participation of all parties in a comprehensive settlement which should be based on the principles of security for all states, justice for all peoples of the region and renunciation of force by all parties concerned. The Council emphasised that such a settlement should be founded on mutual recognition by all the parties involved of Israel's right to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers and also of the right of self-determination for the Palestinians with all that this implied. For such negotiations to be possible, the Council considered that the Palestinian people must be represented and the PLO would have to be associated with negotiations.

In view of the principles mentioned above, the Council welcomed President Reagan's new initiative contained in his speech on 1st September 1982, which offered an important opportunity for peaceful progress towards a solution of the Palestinian question and the reconciliation of the parties involved. In this connection, they underlined the importance of the statement adopted by the Arab heads of state and government at Fez on 9th September, which they saw as an expression of the unanimous will of the participants, including the PLO, to work for the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East encompassing all states in the area, including Israel. Finally, the Council expressed the view that discussions of the Franco-Egyptian draft treaty by the Security Council could play a useful part in establishing a common basis for a solution of the problems of the area.

The Council endorsed the appeal to each of the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the urgent recommendation for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Lebanon expressed in the declaration issued by the European Council at its meeting in Copenhagen on 3rd and 4th December¹.

1. See Annex III.

The Council hope that the negotiations between Israel and the Lebanon, which began on 28th December, will soon achieve positive results.

(b) With regard to the conflict between Iran and Iraq, the Council recall that in 1982 the WEU member countries, in concert with their partners of the European Community, on several occasions expressed their grave concern at the continuation of this violent and destructive conflict between the two countries. They endorsed the wish, expressed in the declarations published by the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Ten on 24th May, by the European Council on 29th June as well as by its Chairman-in-Office in the speech which he made at the General Assembly of the United Nations on 28th September, namely that there should be an immediate settlement based on the principles adopted by the international community, such as those defined by the Security Council in its resolutions of 28th September 1980 and 12th July 1982. The Council recall that the WEU member countries are prepared to help towards attaining this objective.

4. *Falklands crisis*

As stated in reply to Assembly Recommendation 373, the Council are convinced of the need to find political solutions to crises and conflicts that may occur in the world, particularly in the South Atlantic, and in so doing abide fully by the Charter of the United Nations.

The Council, therefore, deplore the grave events which occurred in the South Atlantic, in which force was used against a member country of WEU, contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter – especially that of the peaceful settlement of disputes – and in defiance of the Security Council resolutions.

With respect to the attitude of WEU member countries to the Falklands crisis, the Council recall the following:

Immediately after the Argentine fleet set out to the Falklands, the United Kingdom began urgent consultations at the United Nations Security Council, within the framework of European political co-operation and within the Atlantic Alliance.

On 2nd April, the day of the invasion by the Argentine forces, the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Ten stated that they condemned the armed intervention of the Argentinian Government and called upon the latter to withdraw its forces immediately and to abide by the United Nations Security Council appeal asking it to refrain from the use of force and to continue efforts towards a diplomatic solution.

In their declaration of 10th April¹ the Ten stressed that they attached the greatest importance to the immediate and effective implementation of Security Council Resolution 502, namely an immediate cessation of hostilities, an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands and a search for a diplomatic solution to their dispute by the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom.

To these ends, and in a spirit of mutual solidarity, the governments of the Ten applied a complete embargo on the export of arms and military equipment to Argentina and, a few days later, they applied an embargo to imports of Argentine origin, agreed in the context of the application of the Treaty of Rome.

In the final communiqué of 18th May issued after the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Luxembourg, the representatives of the member countries of the alliance also condemned Argentina for its aggression against the Falkland Islands, in view of the fundamental importance which they attached to the principle that the use of force to resolve international disputes should be resolutely opposed by the international community. They called for a continuation of the efforts by the parties concerned to achieve a satisfactory negotiated settlement in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502 in its entirety.

The WEU Council discussed the Falklands crisis with representatives of the Assembly at the joint meetings held on 19th May in London with the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. They noted carefully the reports drawn up by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the views expressed on this matter at the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly. Lord Belstead, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, informed the Assembly in his speech on 1st December of his government's position with respect to the Falkland Islands.

5. *Co-operation between Europe and the United States*

The Council refer to the declaration issued by the European Council in Brussels on 30th March 1982 concerning transatlantic relations; the text of this declaration is annexed to this report².

In their reply in November to Recommendation 387 on European-United States co-

1. See Annex IV.

2. See Annex V.

operation for international peace and joint security, the Council stated that they attached particular importance to the consultations within the framework of existing machinery and recalled that in the event of a specific crisis the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance had at their disposal a wide variety of facilities for adequate consultation, enabling them to react accordingly.

The Council expressed the opinion that informal meetings at ministerial level could contribute to an improvement in transatlantic relations. Such a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the alliance took place on 2nd and 3rd October at Val David (Canada).

In this same reply, the Council acknowledged that divergent views may have arisen between western countries as regards their economic relations with the eastern countries. The Council recalled that since the beginning of 1982, the western countries had met in various fora in order to reach a common approach remaining consistent with their political and security interests; the Council also stressed that a concerted, realistic and cautious approach towards the eastern countries was one of the major concerns of the WEU member countries.

B. Defence questions

In the course of the year under review, questions relating to European defence and security have continued to play an important rôle in the Council's activities.

Thus, on the occasion of the presentation of the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council in June, Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations of Belgium and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, recalled that the Council pursued its activities with the objective of ensuring that the obligations defined under the modified Brussels Treaty were properly fulfilled. He emphasised that the Council continued to maintain a close watch over the implementation of the provisions of the treaty and its protocols relating to the levels of forces and armaments in the member states, and that the procedures laid down for this purpose functioned normally. The Minister confirmed once again the importance attached by member countries to the commitment to collective self-defence contained in Article V of the treaty. He observed that, in the matter of armaments control, the Council had repeatedly indicated their wish to take account of the changing situation in Europe and could always take advantage of the procedural rules which empowered them to make whatever adjustments might be required as a result of technical advances in the armaments field.

Answering a point raised by a member of the Assembly following his presentation, Mr. Tindemans explained the provisions of the treaty and its protocols governing armaments control adding that, if the Council were to re-examine the relevant lists, they would do so in total compliance with the procedures laid down by the treaty.

The Council paid particular attention to the report on the application of the treaty, prepared by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments as a reply to the twenty-seventh annual report, and to the debate leading up to the vote by the Assembly on Recommendation 380¹.

1. Level of forces of member states

(a) Forces under NATO command

The maximum levels of ground, air and naval forces which member states of WEU place under NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty. Article III of the protocol provides for a special procedure, if necessary, to enable these levels to be increased above the limits specified in Articles I and II.

So that they may satisfy themselves that the limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II are not exceeded, the Council receive information every year concerning the levels in question, in accordance with Article IV of that protocol. This information is obtained in the course of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and is transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking officer designated by him to that end.

The information, as at the end of 1981, which was conveyed by this officer at the appropriate time, was considered by the Council on 24th March. Information indicating the status as at the end of 1982 was called for in December and is expected to be presented to the Council at the usual time.

Furthermore, the Council take the necessary steps to implement the procedure laid down in their resolution of 15th September 1956 whereby the levels of forces under NATO command are examined in the light of the annual review.

For the year 1981, at a meeting held on 18th January 1982 in Brussels, the permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom examined the levels of forces

¹ See 4 (a) below.

of WEU member states and reported to the Council.

The Council, at their meeting of 24th February, noted that the level of forces of the member states of WEU, as set out in the NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II, as in force at that time. They also took note of a declaration on French forces made by the representative of France.

On 15th October, the Council examined the report of a further meeting of the same six permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council, and approved the acceptance by one member state of the increase in its force level recommended by SACEUR.

The first steps to implement the procedure laid down in the resolution of 15th September 1956 have been taken for the year 1982.

(b) Forces under national command

The strength and armaments of forces of member states maintained on the mainland of Europe and remaining under national command – internal defence and police forces, forces for the defence of overseas territories, and common defence forces – are fixed each year in accordance with the procedure specified in the agreement signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 in implementation of Article V of Protocol No. II.

<i>Rôle</i>	<i>Aircraft/Equipment</i>	<i>Squadrons</i>
Strike/Attack	Buccaneers	2
	Jaguars	4
Offensive support	Harrier	2
Reconnaissance	Jaguars	1
Air defence	Phantom	2
	Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles	1
	Rapier surface-to-air missiles	4
Air transport	Puma	1
Ground defence	RAF regiment	1

3. Study of the situation of the armaments sector of industry in member countries¹

The Permanent Council, with assistance from the head of the international secretariat of the SAC, prepared this question for consideration by Ministers at their meeting on 19th May.

1. See also Chapters I, B and IV, A.1.

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By means of the methods set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have been able, in 1982, to carry out their obligations under Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty concerning levels of forces.

2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe

In accordance with the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 331 the Government of the United Kingdom have informed the Council that the average number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1982 in accordance with the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty was 59,567. The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty there. In 1982 there were on average 909 men in Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated these units would be speedily returned to their duty station in an emergency affecting NATO.

Furthermore, in accordance with the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 348 the Government of the United Kingdom have informed the Council that the strength of the United Kingdom's contribution to the Second Allied Tactical Air Force in 1982 was:

At this meeting, Ministers were informed of the successive stages to date in the implementation of the mandate given to the SAC by the Council on 20th April 1977.

A declassified version of the SAC's study had been transmitted by the Council to the Assembly on 10th May.

Ministers agreed that work should continue on updating the economic part of the study.

Ministers also referred to possible ways of giving new direction to and reactivating the Standing Armaments Committee.

4. *Replies to Assembly recommendations and written questions*

(a) Following the adoption by the Assembly at its June part-session of Recommendation 380 on the application of the Brussels Treaty, the Council held a number of discussions on the proposals contained in this particular recommendation.

The Council welcomed the fact that the Assembly recognised that the provisions of the Brussels Treaty retained their full value and that it stressed the importance of WEU in the sphere of security.

Recalling that Annex III to Protocol No. III had been amended on several occasions since 1958, the Council stated in their reply that they had received with great interest and were considering the Assembly's recommendation to cancel paragraphs IV (Long-range missiles and guided missiles) and VI (Bomber aircraft for strategic purposes) to the list at Annex III according to the procedure laid down in Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty. As regards varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III, they were considering the technical, military and political aspects of the problem.

They added that the overall system organised under the treaty and its protocols, the implementation of which, as regards level of forces, regularly appeared in the annual report, enabled the Council to be informed of and to assess the situation of the level of forces and their armaments assigned to SACEUR for the common defence. The level of forces thus assigned resulted from the undertakings made by the member states within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance as stated notably in II.5 and 6 and IV of the final act of the Nine-Power Conference, held in London between 28th September and 3rd October 1954. The forces assigned by the various countries to the common NATO defence were in fact defined on the basis of a plan which was kept up to date within NATO. Decisions relating to the forces resulted from the joint effort of the member countries in accordance with the capacity of each to contribute and with the aim of ensuring at all times an adequate level of forces.

Consequently, there appeared to be no need to invite the states concerned to make unilateral declarations to the WEU Council concerning a matter which was already dealt with in the multilateral context of NATO. Nor did there appear to be any possibility of including in future annual reports any state-

ments on the level of forces other than those which were already given.

(b) In their reply to the suggestions in Recommendation 372 regarding consultations on matters relating to disarmament or the limitation of both conventional and nuclear weapons, the Council recalled that the member countries consulted regularly and effectively on such matters in different fora; and in particular concerning INF, the Special Consultative Group brought together all the countries which took part in the decision to modernise these forces. They also stated that it was within the framework of NATO's long-term defence plan, which provided for the strengthening of certain fundamental sectors of allied conventional forces, that direct participation by certain European countries had assumed importance. The Council endorsed the Assembly's desire that Europe should provide itself with the means necessary for playing an effective part in measures taken in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance for its own security.

(c) The theme of European security was taken up again by the Council in responding to Recommendations 373, 374, 375, 382, 383 and 387, and to Written Questions 230 and 231.

Thus, their reply to Recommendation 375 stated that it was the declared intention of the NATO allies concerned that they would move ahead with the December 1979 two-track decision on intermediate-range nuclear force modernisation and arms control.

The Council recalled that they attached the greatest importance to the positions and attitudes of the publics in member countries on the subject of nuclear weapons and their arms control. They believed that an important and continuing task was the explanation of the defensive nature of the North Atlantic Alliance, the rationale behind the strategy of deterrence and the essential rôle of arms control. The task of explanation was all the greater in the light of the sustained Soviet propaganda campaign which aimed to undercut public support for agreed objectives and policies of the alliance.

The Council consider that it is essential to put the case for western security forcefully. They welcomed, therefore, at the part-session in December, the Assembly's debate, arising from a detailed report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, on the problems arising from pacifism and neutralism.

In their detailed reply to Recommendation 382 on disarmament, the Council reaffirmed their full commitment to support all efforts to guarantee respect for the principles set out in the United Nations Charter, and in particular the principle of non-use of force in interna-

tional relations, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the right of security and legitimate defence and the right of all peoples to self-determination. The Council shared the view that enhanced respect for these principles contributed to creating favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process.

They observed that a substantial reduction in the level of nuclear weapons can only be attained by balanced agreements, while only mutually agreed reductions would promote stability. Concerning the INF talks, only the "global approach", put forward by the United States and supported by the European allies, was a realistic point of view.

In their reply to Recommendation 383, the Council asserted that NATO's resolve in implementing its 12th December 1979 decision was the key factor in persuading the Soviet Union to enter into arms control negotiations in Geneva and would continue to be crucial to achieving concrete results. WEU member countries that participated in the December 1979 decision would continue to do all within their power to promote early progress towards negotiated agreement on the basis of the so-called "zero option" or "zero-level outcome" for American and Soviet longer-range land-based INF missiles. These countries considered that the negotiations should, as a priority, relate to those systems which constituted the greatest threat. They did not rule out the possibility that in the event of agreement, subsequent phases of the negotiations might relate to other INF systems. They believed that it would be premature to prejudge the forum in which any arms control agreement covering short-range or battlefield nuclear systems might be considered. The opening of the START talks was also welcomed and the Council endorsed the Assembly's concern to see effective verification measures in any arms control agreement.

In the course of their answer to Recommendation 387 on European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security, the Council recalled that, in spring 1982, NATO had published for the first time an official comparison of the forces of the NATO integrated military structure and of the Warsaw Pact. The Council regarded it as of great importance that the alliance countries concerned should continue to base their public statements about the balance of forces as much as possible on such a commonly agreed document and that they were in agreement that new decisions in the armaments field needed to be explained in relation to the threat to which they were designed to respond.

In their answer to Written Question 230, the Council repeated that close consultations on

the nuclear arms limitation negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union took place between the former and other NATO partners, parties to the decision of 12th December 1979, who made an active contribution in the Special Consultative Group towards establishing the INF negotiating position of the United States. A suitable procedure of consultation on a regular basis had been established within the alliance with regard to the START negotiations.

The Council took the opportunity afforded by Written Question 231 to state that member countries participating in the MBFR negotiations had played a full part in developing in NATO the western proposal for an integrated agreement announced at the Bonn NATO summit in June. These countries were convinced that the common collective force ceilings proposed would permit sufficient United States and other allied conventional forces to remain in the area of reductions in Central Europe to guarantee the alliance's collective deterrence and defence capability.

(d) The various aspects of, and problems associated with, the development of co-operative armaments programmes were set out in the Council's substantial reply to Recommendation 385 where the aims and tasks of the various bodies working in this sphere were explained.

With regard to the Standing Armaments Committee, it was pointed out that this body was set up in 1955 with the aim of increasing the efficiency of the forces of the countries of WEU by improving their logistics and the use of the resources available to them for equipping and supplying their forces and, by sharing, in the best interests of all, the research on, development of, and production of armaments. The Committee had carried out its task in a variety of ways for many years.

Insofar as the SAC study on the "Armaments sector of industry in the WEU member countries" was concerned, the Council, as stated in their reply to Recommendation 374, would examine, at the appropriate moment, in depth and with the aim of efficiency, the action to be taken on this study, which, it was hoped, would assist member governments to move towards greater co-operation in their programmes and military investment expenditure.

Moreover, in their reply to Recommendation 379, the Council observed that if the international secretariat of the SAC were occasionally to assist the Assembly in the study of clearly-defined themes, this could only be done under a procedure involving a case-by-case examination by the Council, under whom the SAC was placed. It was clear that such work could not have the effect of relieving the SAC

of its responsibilities nor could it affect its competences, these being the Council's exclusive responsibility.

5. Meeting between the Council and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly

On the occasion of the joint meeting of 19th May, the Council discussed with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments several subjects which the latter had proposed¹.

6. Contacts with SHAPE

In the context of maintaining the long-established links between the Council and the military authorities of NATO, and at SACEUR's invitation, arrangements were set in train for the Council to visit SHAPE for a briefing and to attend SHAPEX 83. Council representatives were also present as observers at certain NATO military exercises.

7. Military archives of the Brussels Treaty Organisation

The Council agreed that an ad hoc group of experts should meet in spring 1983 to consider releasing for research purposes the 1948-1950 military archives of the Brussels Treaty Organisation.

C. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions

The Council noted with interest the views expressed in the conclusions of the high-quality reports produced by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, during the sessions of the Assembly, and at the colloquy on international aeronautical consortia organised by the committee. The Council noted with satisfaction that these views corresponded broadly with their own.

In their replies to Recommendations 376, 377, 381 and 385, the Council provided detailed information regarding the policies of WEU member countries on energy, aeronautics, and space questions. They also stated the position of these countries regarding the work of the third Conference on the Law of the Sea.

1. The energy problem

The Council fully recognises the necessity of increasing the security and independence of energy sources of member countries.

¹ See Chapter I, D.1.

In their reply to Recommendation 381, the Council recalled that these countries were already studying, within the framework of the European Communities and, for those who are members of it, the International Energy Agency (IEA), the possibility of increasing supplies through concerted action, to enable each of them to reduce its vulnerability to possible sudden crises.

The Council also pointed to the measures taken by member countries to encourage greater autonomy in the energy field, through reduction of the extent of their dependence on oil imports and more rational and efficient use of energy, as well as increased use of nuclear energy; in this connection the Council noted that, in accordance with recommendations of the INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation) study, the value of the use of fast-breeder reactors had been recognised.

Finally, the Council stated that to ensure greater continuity in energy supplies, they believed that sources of supply should be diversified to the greatest degree possible.

The Council welcome the fact that one of the priority goals stated in the conclusions of the European Council meeting in Copenhagen on 3rd and 4th December should be the pursuit of a vigorous energy policy with a view to saving energy and diversifying supply, and that consequently it was decided to speed up the adoption of the Commission's current and forthcoming proposals in that field.

2. European aeronautics

The Council welcome the interest that the Assembly displays in European aeronautical co-operation. The colloquy on international aeronautical consortia held in London on 9th and 10th February 1982, under the auspices of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, is further evidence of this interest, as is Recommendation 385 on the conclusions of this meeting, which the Council has studied attentively.

As pointed out in their reply to the Assembly, the development of co-operative armaments programmes, particularly in the field of aeronautics, is a lengthy task calling for a pragmatic approach and patient efforts. The seeking of consensus between industrial, economic, military and political interests explains why progress is difficult. Nevertheless, as recognised unanimously by the participants in the London colloquy, co-operation is an absolute necessity. The exorbitant and ever-increasing burden of the research, development and production costs of aeronautical programmes is an argument for European co-operation, parti-

cularly through suitable consortia, whenever such co-operation, with all the diversity required, is possible. Airbus Industrie, Euromissile and Panavia are illustrations of such an approach.

Inspired by a constantly reaffirmed political will, the various competent international bodies, each within the framework of their responsibilities, have a particular rôle to play in this co-operation. In the Council's opinion, the machinery available for consultation must function as efficiently as possible within the Independent European Programme Group, the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU and the Conference of National Armaments Directors of the Atlantic Alliance.

Like the European institutions, the governments are fully aware of the emergence of a civil aircraft industry within Europe and are endeavouring to advance along the difficult path towards harmonising legal and fiscal systems. As regards the armaments industry, and in particular military aircraft, the Council pointed out that the security interests of the WEU member countries cannot be ignored. The latter consider, therefore, that questions of a structural nature should remain within the province of the bodies competent in defence matters.

The Council noted that the governments of the WEU member countries are also fully aware of the importance of the family of aircraft concept, of which the Airbus is a striking reality. In the military sphere, the application of this concept is undoubtedly more difficult, but the variety of prospects that it offers will nevertheless be thoroughly explored.

Furthermore, in their reply to Written Question 229, the Council gave certain details on the Franco-German second generation Transall programme and the Franco-Italian regional transport aircraft ATR-42.

3. *Space questions*

In reply to the Assembly's Recommendation 376 on United States-European co-operation, the Council gave the following details:

The diplomatic missions in the United States of the WEU member countries continue to follow developments in respect of the international solar-polar mission.

Under an agreement signed in 1973 the United States Government are committed to using European-built Spacelabs, components and spares, where these are available, in accordance with agreed schedules and at reasonable prices. The United States Government has also agreed not to duplicate the Spacelab development.

The European Space Agency is completing definition studies of a programme for an oceanic observation satellite ERS-1, which could be launched in 1987. The European countries welcome international collaboration in the development and utilisation of remote-sensing of the earth. Later, as these developments become operational, the establishment of reciprocal arrangements for the exchange of data or mutual access will be an important goal.

The space telescope is due to be launched from the shuttle in late 1985 and will enable extensive stellar investigation to be made from outside the earth's atmosphere. NASA has indicated that it attaches high priority to this project for which ESA will be supplying the solar arrays and faint-object camera.

In its Recommendation 381, the Assembly recalled the importance attached to the development of European co-operation in space matters.

Accordingly, in their reply, the Council pointed out that WEU member countries had for several years played an active part in the work of the European Space Agency, whose purpose is to promote scientific and applied research in the space field and to make European industry in this sector competitive in world markets.

They noted that ESA is actively involved in many scientific meteorological and earth observation satellite projects, and also in telecommunications and data-processing systems projects. They added that the ESA member countries are considering setting up an operational European meteorological satellite system. Negotiations have been in progress since January 1981 and are expected shortly to reach a positive conclusion.

4. *Law of the sea*

In their reply in April to Recommendation 377 the Council stated that they shared the Assembly's view that the third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference was of the greatest importance for the political, economic and security interests of the WEU member states.

They stated that the aim pursued by the governments of these states in the intensive consultations held among themselves and with all other states and groups of states represented in this conference, was to reach a universally accepted international convention on the law of the sea. They stated the advantages such a convention might have with respect to a better establishment of the rule of law on the world oceans: it could forestall in the future many

difficulties and therefore would constitute a factor in maintaining peaceful and friendly relations between states. It would also be important for relations between western industrialised countries and developing countries of the third world.

The Council pointed out that a satisfactory international regulation of deep seabed-mining was strategically and economically of great importance especially for industrialised Western European countries which are highly dependent on imports of raw materials to be extracted from the deep seabed. A generally acceptable treaty was also important to the developing countries, inter alia because of the financial benefits they would gain from the sharing of revenue resulting from the exploitation of the raw materials concerned. WEU member countries have participated constructively in all the consultations and negotiations that have taken place on this subject, with a view to setting up a fair régime for exploitation of the seabed, comprising a system of adequate access that takes into account all interests concerned.

The Council regret therefore that the conference did not achieve acceptable results for several WEU member countries, which did not sign the convention submitted to the countries represented on 10th December at Montego Bay (Jamaica).

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The Council have examined carefully the request made at the end of the year by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions which, on the basis of the reply to Assembly Recommendation 381, asked for the assistance of the Standing Armaments Committee and its international secretariat in order to prepare the second part of its report on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields¹.

D. Secretariat-General

The Secretariat-General assisted the Council and its working group in all their activities during 1982.

The Secretary-General or his principal officers, representing WEU, attended a number of meetings of other international organisations when questions of concern to WEU were under consideration. As in previous years the most frequent of the Secretary-General's contacts were with the authorities of the Atlantic Alliance and the Council of Europe.

1. The Assembly was informed of the Council's decision on 28th January 1983.

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Deputy Secretary-General of WEU

The Council noted with regret the departure of Ambassador Joachim Schlaich who was recalled by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to take up a new post. The Council paid tribute to the high quality of the Ambassador's services to the organisation over a period of five years.

The Council appointed Ambassador Dr. Jürgen Diesel to succeed Mr. Schlaich in the post of Deputy Secretary-General of WEU. Mr. Diesel took up his post on 25th November 1982.

ANNEX I

Declaration on Poland issued by the European Council following its meeting on 3rd and 4th December 1982 in Copenhagen

The European Council discussed recent developments in Poland and noted with regret that a large number of persons remain in detention, that martial law continues, and that the free trade union, Solidarity, has been dissolved.

It also noted, however, that the recent release of some internees, including the leader of Solidarity, might constitute a step towards the fulfilment of the appeal made by the Ten on 4th January 1982.

The Ten will continue to follow developments in Poland closely and in particular study the implications of the possible lifting of martial law, including the conditions under which this will take place.

Extract from the final communiqué issued by the North Atlantic Council following its meeting on 9th and 10th December 1982 in Brussels

3. The violations in Poland of the Helsinki final act and of the conventions of the International Labour Organisation, in particular by the banning and dissolution of trade unions including Solidarity, continue to cause the gravest concern.

The allies call upon the Polish authorities to abide by their commitment to work for national reconciliation. Recalling their declaration of 11th January 1982, the criteria of

which are far from being fulfilled, the allies have noted the recent release of a number of detainees and continue to follow closely developments in Poland, including possible relaxation of military rule. They emphasise that in this regard the actions of the Polish authorities will be judged by their practical effects. The allies consider that the improvement of relations with Poland depends on the extent to which the Polish Government gives effect to its declared intention to establish civil rights and to continue the process of reform. Freedom of association and the rights of workers to have trade unions of their own choice should not be denied to the Polish people. The dialogue with all sections of Polish society must be resumed. The allies call on all countries to respect Poland's fundamental right to choose its own social and political structures.

ANNEX II

Declaration on Afghanistan issued by the European Council following its meeting on 3rd and 4th December 1982 in Copenhagen

The European Council in particular expressed the view that the new Soviet leadership could make an important contribution to the improvement of international relations in general and of East-West relations in particular by reassessing its position on the question of Afghanistan. It endorsed the verdict of the international community on the situation in Afghanistan, embodied in the fourth successive vote of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The people of Afghanistan should be permitted to regain their national sovereignty and independence and the status of a non-aligned state.

It expressed its readiness to support any realistic efforts to achieve a political solution and recalled the European Council proposal of 30th June 1981 for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict.

ANNEX III

Declaration on the situation in the Middle East, including Lebanon, issued by the European Council following its meeting on 3rd and 4th December 1982 in Copenhagen

Following a report by the Presidency on recent contacts the European Council discussed events in the Middle East where two aspects in particular continue to cause deep concern.

First, as regards the Arab-Israeli conflict, the European Council expressed its disappointment at the delay in grasping the political opportunity created by the initiative contained in President Reagan's speech on 1st September 1982 and the will to peace expressed in the declaration of Arab heads of state meeting at Fez on 9th September 1982.

It called upon each of the parties to assume its international responsibilities without further hesitations. It expects each of the parties to cease to ignore the United Nations security resolutions and explicitly make known their approval of these resolutions.

Secondly, the European Council continued to view the situation in Lebanon with the greatest concern. It particularly noted that in spite of the various efforts made by the negotiators on the spot, no significant progress had yet been achieved towards the withdrawal of the Israeli, Syrian and other foreign forces. The persistence of this situation would constitute a threat to the integrity and unity of Lebanon, carrying serious dangers for the whole region.

The withdrawal of foreign forces could be of a progressive nature, but should take place within a fixed and short period of time and under conditions which would permit the Lebanese authorities to exercise fully their rights of sovereignty over all of Lebanon.

The Ten have already demonstrated their willingness to contribute to the solution of the problems, especially by giving their support to the United Nations forces and United Nations observers established by the Security Council as well as the multinational force in Beirut to which two of their members contribute. The Ten and the Community are equally prepared to continue to contribute to the reconstruction of Lebanon.

ANNEX IV

Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the member countries of the European Community issued on 10th April 1982 in Brussels

1. Representatives of the Ten discussed the grave situation resulting from the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina.
2. They recalled that in their declaration of 2nd April the Ten had already condemned the flagrant violation of international law which the Argentine military action constituted.
3. The Ten remain deeply concerned by the continuation of this crisis, which endangers international peace and security. They there-

fore attach the greatest importance to the immediate and effective implementation of Security Council Resolution 502 in all its aspects, namely an immediate cessation of hostilities, an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands, and a search for a diplomatic solution by the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom.

4. To these ends, and in a spirit of solidarity among the member countries of the Community, the Ten decide to take a series of measures with respect to Argentina which should be put into operation as soon as possible. They will likewise take the measures necessary to ban all imports of Argentine origin into the Community. In this context the Ten noted that their governments have already decided to apply a complete embargo on the export of arms and military equipment to Argentina.

5. With respect to economic measures, these will be taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Community treaties.

6. Given that the situation resulting from the invasion of the Falkland Islands by the Argentine armed forces is a cause of grave concern for the entire international community, the Ten call on other governments to associate them-

selves with their decisions, so as to ensure the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 502 with the least possible delay.

ANNEX V

***Declaration on transatlantic relations
issued by the European Council following
its meeting on 29th
and 30th March 1982 in Brussels***

The European Council discussed the state of transatlantic relations.

It emphasised the importance which it attaches to the links of the Ten with the United States and its willingness to develop further consultations between Europeans and Americans.

It valued the statement made by President Reagan on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, in which the United States confirmed its wish to co-operate closely and on the basis of partnership with a united Europe and in accordance with Europe's economic and political importance, and its rôle in the world.

CHAPTER III

ARMAMENTS CONTROL AGENCY

A. Introduction

Under the terms of Article VII of Protocol No. IV, the Agency is required:

- firstly, to control the level of stocks of armaments held by member countries on the mainland of Europe, this control extending to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective ;
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the undertakings given by the Federal Republic of Germany not to manufacture certain types of armaments on its territory are being observed.

Subject to the restrictions referred to under points B.2 below, the Agency's control activities in 1982 were performed at a satisfactory level.

B. General remarks on control activities**1. General operating methods**

The methods used by the Agency are determined by the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and by Council decisions on the subject. During the year under review they remained basically unchanged.

Within the Agency's terms of reference, controls from documentary sources serve mainly for checking levels of armaments as a whole. They also contribute to the preparation of field measures for the control of levels and of the non-production of certain categories of armaments. This aspect covers all activities concerned with processing, for the purposes defined above, any useful documentary material including, in particular, countries' replies to the Agency questionnaire, and the results of field control measures carried out earlier.

The execution of test checks, visits and inspections, and all that is linked with these functions, constitutes that part of control carried out physically wherever there are activities and stocks subject to control and, more generally, wherever this is necessary to ensure that the information supplied is correct and that undertakings are observed.

The control system is based primarily on controls from documentary sources, the purpose of field control measures being to verify, physi-

cally, the accuracy of all the information collected in implementation of Part III of Protocol No. IV.

Documentary and field control measures are complementary, and equally essential for the accomplishment of the Agency's task.

Traditionally, the annual report has always presented documentary and field control measures separately, in the interests of both convenience and clarity. However, it must not be forgotten that these measures together make up a single control function.

The Agency draws great benefit from the continuity of its methods ; by its steadily-growing knowledge of the organisation of the forces of each member state, of the progress of armaments production or procurement programmes, the Agency develops its control activity efficiently and logically, both in the fixing of levels and quantities of armaments and in the choice and assessment of its control measures.

2. Atomic, chemical and biological weapons

The position described in the last annual report of the Council has remained unchanged.

The activities of the Agency cover neither nuclear nor biological weapons.

The control activities dealt with in this chapter do not, therefore, concern these two categories of armaments.

In the case of chemical weapons, only non-production controls take place ; no quantitative controls are made since the member states have always declared they possessed no such armaments (in this connection, for 1982, see point E.5 of this report).

C. Controls from documentary sources

In this field of control, the Agency studies the relevant documents with the main purpose of comparing the quantities of armaments held by the member states with the levels fixed by the Council and thus establishing whether these constitute appropriate levels within the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty.

1. *Information processed by the Agency*

During 1982, documentary controls were carried out in the normal way by studying, processing and collating documents and information obtained from various sources.

The principal source of information available to the Agency is the reply sent by each member state to its annual questionnaire which, when processed in the light of data provided by NATO concerning the forces placed under allied authority, allows the fixing of appropriate levels.

The second source is the national defence budgets which, when cross-checked with the data provided by member states in their replies to the questionnaire, make it possible to evaluate expenditure on armaments and to monitor the financing of production programmes.

Finally, published material assembled by the Central Documentation Office, provides a source of valuable information for cross-checking data obtained through official channels and for updating the knowledge of the experts.

(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies by member states

Follow-up action on the replies to the questionnaire sent to member states as in all previous years was twofold. Some of the facts reported were checked physically by means of field control measures. In addition, all the replies were studied by the Agency experts who compared them with the other sources of information available, including member countries' earlier replies to Agency or NATO questionnaires and budgetary documents.

(b) Request for annual information

Control of undertakings by one of the member states regarding the non-production of certain types of armaments takes the form of field control measures.

These measures are partly prepared from a study of documents based on the replies of the country concerned to the annual questionnaire and to the Agency's requests for annual information.

As in previous years, the replies received from the country concerned in 1982 were taken into consideration for selecting and preparing visits, inspections and agreed control measures for inclusion in the Agency's programme of control measures.

(c) Information provided by NATO

See point 2(a) below.

(d) Information provided by the United States of America and Canada (Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV)

The Agency received, through the Council, information supplied by the Governments of the United States and Canada concerning their programmes of external aid in military equipment to the forces of member states stationed on the mainland of Europe. Since 1966, these countries have provided no aid to the forces concerned.

(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information

Within the context of the documental control carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article VII of Protocol No. IV, the Agency has pursued its budgetary studies in 1982 under the same conditions as in previous years.

The processing of the member states' replies to its questionnaire and of unclassified documents (general studies, reports of finance committees of national parliaments, articles in the specialist press) has enabled the Agency to identify, in broad outline, the development and trends expected by the governments of the member countries in the field of defence and to monitor more particularly the allocation and use of credits assigned to the production of equipment subject to control.

The conclusions of the budgetary studies have confirmed, insofar as they are related, the results of the Agency's work on the control of armament stock levels.

(f) Use of published material

The Agency's Central Documentation Office has made every effort to provide the Directorate and its experts with information of value for their activities by a systematic study of the daily press, the official journals of the member countries, about sixty specialised magazines and technical brochures as well as bulletins from NATO and, as the case may be, from other international organisations.

The daily press review, prepared by the office, was also sent to the international secretariat of the SAC.

The constant acceleration of technical progress and the increasing complexity of coproduction agreements, makes this documentary work increasingly necessary.

2. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments

(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces placed under NATO command

After receiving and processing the member states' replies to the annual questionnaire and studying the statistical reports furnished by the authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Article VII, 2(a), of Protocol No. IV) and, in particular, by the NATO international staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, for the annual consultations with the NATO military authorities called for by Article XIV of Protocol No. IV.

As in previous years, these consultations included a joint study session at Casteau, on 16th November 1982, attended by Agency experts and the appropriate officers of SHAPE, and concluded with a meeting in Paris on 13th December 1982; at this meeting, which was attended by the representatives of the Agency, of SHAPE and of the international military staff of NATO, it was concluded that the levels of armaments for the forces of member states placed under NATO authority and stationed on the mainland of Europe represented appropriate levels for the control year 1982 within the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV, for those armaments over which the Agency has so far been placed in a position to exercise its mandate of controlling levels.

(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe

In accordance with the procedure in force for the implementation of the Agreement of 14th December 1957, the Agency supplied the Council with the elements of information gathered on the quantities of armaments for these forces, notified to the Agency by the member states in their replies to the 1982 questionnaire.

Under the same procedure, the Council accepted or approved for 1982 the maximum levels of armaments of these forces and notified the Agency accordingly of the purpose of the drawing-up of the final tables of the abovementioned forces.

D. Field control measures

1. Principles governing the application of field control measures and general methods of execution

As recalled in the introduction to this chapter, the treaty requires the Agency:

- to satisfy itself that the undertakings not to manufacture certain types of armaments are being observed;

- to control the level of stocks of certain armaments.

Field control measures continued during 1982 on the same basis as during previous years, as an essential part of the Agency's work, in accordance with Article VII of Protocol No. IV.

(a) Initial studies

The accumulated experience and information and the results of its controls in 1981 led the Agency to draw up a 1982 programme on the same scale and lines as those of recent years, i.e.:

- for non-production field control measures, a limited programme was considered adequate for verifying the undertakings of a member state not to manufacture specified armaments. The Agency was again aided in this task by the reply to its request for information from the member state concerned;
- for quantitative field control measures, sampling methods were again thought adequate to verify the accuracy of data declared by member states and so to provide an acceptable level of confidence in the Agency's documental control. No factor had emerged to vary significantly the distribution of the field control measures. However, continuing national budget problems were increasingly limiting or slowing down procurement and so stretching programmes with repercussions on the pattern of the 1982 programme of control measures in production plants.

(b) Programme definition

Depot and unit stock patterns were reassessed in the light of known organisational changes and of declared re-equipment programmes. The basic programme of quantitative field control measures then emerging was examined in the light of production declarations. Where these studies suggested the need to extend such controls to factories, their production programmes were reviewed to ensure that each inspection was planned to take place at the most appropriate time. For those factories where non-production and/or repair depot stock controls were also indicated, all types of control measures were co-ordinated, so keeping the frequency of the Agency's measures at these private concerns to an acceptable minimum.

To avoid duplication, Article VIII of Protocol No. IV provides for control measures to

be undertaken by the appropriate NATO authorities themselves for those forces placed under NATO authority. Thus, the forces under the control of the Agency vary from country to country, a factor weighed in the preparation of the programme. Depots, to which Article VIII equally applies, are subject to different considerations. Since logistic support for forces under NATO authority remains a wholly national responsibility, difficulties could arise in defining which armaments in some depots are or will be assigned to forces under NATO authority and which armaments remain under national command. Accordingly, the system of joint Agency/SHAPE inspections introduced in, and used each year since, 1957 was again authorised for 1982 and certain of these depots were therefore programmed for inspection by Agency/SHAPE teams.

As the Convention for the due process of law¹ has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1982, as in previous years, to take the form of "agreed control measures".

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' notice. Since this agreement has never been withheld, the 1982 programme of control measures at privately-owned plants was therefore drawn up with full confidence that it could be implemented as in previous years.

In May, the Director presented the Agency's annual report for 1981 to the Council and outlined the programme for 1982. Very few changes were necessary following further reviews and analysis of the replies by member states to the Agency's questionnaire.

2. Methods, type and extent of field control measures

In 1982, no major changes were made in the Agency's established procedure for the conduct of its field control measures.

The teams selected for the Agency's field control measures all included one member of the nationality of the establishment visited, the head of mission and other experts all of different nationalities.

The total number of control measures was sixty-nine.

1. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957).

These measures fall broadly into the following categories:

- (a) quantitative control measures at depots ;
- (b) quantitative control measures at units for forces under national command ;
- (c) control measures at production plants:
 - (i) quantitative control measures:

In 1982, these control measures were carried out at plants manufacturing aircraft or aero-engines, equipment for the army, munitions and at shipyards ;

- (ii) non-production control measures:

These control measures related to chemicals and missiles.

It should be stressed that the reports on field control measures are protected by the most stringent security measures at all stages of their preparation, custody and subsequent analysis.

3. Conclusions

(a) In the fields where it is authorised to exercise its mandate, the Agency was able effectively to carry out its task of applying control measures. Such problems as arose in this very complex field of inspections were dealt with satisfactorily through the excellent relations maintained with the national authorities.

(b) On the basis of all the field control measures carried out in 1982, the Agency was able to report to the Council:

- the measures taken for the control of the stocks of armaments at depots, units under national command and production plants amply confirmed the data obtained from documentary control measures ;
- the measures taken for the control of non-production revealed no production contrary to undertakings.

E. Production and procurement of various types of armaments in the member countries of WEU and control activities of the Agency

1. Armaments for land forces

(a) Production and procurement

The programmes to modernise the equipment of the land forces have continued in 1982, although some have been slowed down as a result of budgetary problems.

With regard to the Federal Republic of Germany, mention should be made of the production of Leopard II battle tanks, of a wheeled (TPZ) armoured vehicle for command and communications purposes and deliveries of the tank-mounted Roland anti-aircraft system.

In France, the production of AMX-30-B2 battle tanks and tank-mounted Roland systems has continued and a substantial number of AMX-10, in the tracked and wheeled version, have been delivered. The programme to re-equip units with the VAB (*véhicule de l'avant blindé*) is drawing to a close and deliveries were well advanced by the end of the year. A substantial number of 155 mm AUF-1 (GCT) self-propelled guns have been produced for the artillery. The changeover from the older smooth bore 120 mm mortars to a more modern and a more accurate rifled version has continued.

In Italy, the land forces have received the remainder of their order of 155 mm FH-70 guns during the year and a quantity of 155 mm self-propelled Palmaria guns were manufactured for the national forces. The latter have also received a further delivery of Leopard I tanks and M-133 armoured personnel carriers.

The Netherlands have imported a substantial number of Leopard II tanks.

(b) *Control activity in 1982*

Control measures have been carried out at a number of depots, at a number of units under national command and at factories manufacturing armaments for land forces. A production control and a depot inspection was carried out at one of these factories.

2. *Guided missiles and other self-propelled missiles*

(a) *Production and procurement*

There have been no significant changes in 1982 to the guided weapon and other self-propelled missile inventories of WEU member countries.

Despite a somewhat static stockholding situation overall, there have been discernible increases in some specialised areas, notably in the anti-tank and air-to-surface fields. Virtually every member state which uses one or other of the Milan, Hot or Dragon anti-tank weapons has to some extent increased its stockpile of these weapons. As for air-to-sea weapons, the main additions have occurred with the French navy receiving their first Exocet AM-39 missiles and the Federal Republic of Germany increasing its holdings of the Kormoran anti-shiping missile.

The following guided missiles were manufactured in 1982: anti-tank missiles Milan and Hot (manufactured jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany and France) and SS-11 anti-tank missiles (France); surface-to-air missiles Roland (manufactured jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany and France), Matra R-440, Crotale and Masurca (France); ship-to-ship missiles Exocet MM-38 and MM-40 (France), Sistel Seakiller MK-2 (Italy) and Otomat (manufactured jointly by France and Italy); air-to-ship missiles Exocet AM-39 (France) and Kormoran (Federal Republic of Germany); air-to-air missiles Matra Super 530 and Matra Magic 550, and Sidewinder AIM-9L (manufactured jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom); the Aspide surface/ship-to-air missile (Italy).

In addition to the guided weapons listed above, other self-propelled weapons were manufactured i.e.: Zuni air-to-ground rockets (Belgium), 210 mm rockets (Federal Republic of Germany), ASM-375 mm rockets (France) and 105 mm rockets for the navy (Italy).

During 1982, a number of guided weapons were imported by WEU member countries from the United States: Tow anti-tank weapons by Luxembourg and the Netherlands, Dragon anti-tank and Harpoon ship-to-ship missiles by the Netherlands, Sidewinder and Seasparrow air-to-air missiles and Tartar ship-to-air missiles by the Federal Republic of Germany.

(b) *Control activity in 1982*

Quantitative control measures were carried out at several depots, at units under national command and at a factory at which a non-production control measure was jointly carried out.

3. *Air force armaments*

(a) *Production and procurement*

Events in 1982 have confirmed yet again the determination of member countries to improve and modernise the armament of their air forces by the procurement of aircraft such as the F-16, Tornado, Mirage F-1, and the Alpha-Jet, the scrapping of the oldest aircraft such as the G-91 and the F-104G, the procurement of engines of the RB-199 and Larzac type and of missiles such as Sidewinder 9L, Matra Super 530, Crotale and, lastly, by the study of new programmes.

This drive for modernisation has been supported by the industries involved in the production of the Tornado, F-16, Alpha-Jet and Mirage aircraft. For example, mention should

be made of the Tornado programme which is progressing well in the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy.

In France, the Mirage F-1 – in the reconnaissance version – has begun flight trials and series production of the Mirage 2000 has also started.

The Federal Republic of Germany has received its last Alpha-Jet and has scrapped the ageing G-91-Rs from its operational forces.

Production and deliveries of the F-16 have progressed normally; the Netherlands have ordered a further consignment and Belgium has decided to procure an additional batch of F-16s.

(b) Control activity in 1982

Control measures were carried out at depots, at units under national command and at factories. Both a production control and a depot inspection were carried out at some of these factories.

4. Naval armaments

(a) Production

In France, the nuclear submarine Rubis, first of a series, became operational and others of the SNA-72 type are being built. The destroyer Montcalm, the third of the C-70 type, became operational and further vessels are under construction. The underway replenishment ship Var, the third vessel of the Durance class, was commissioned. New Super-Etendard attack aircraft were also delivered in 1982.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, F-122 class frigates came into service. Work was also completed on the Gepar, the first of a series of fast attack craft of the 143-A type. A number of F-104 Starfighters were replaced by Tornado fighter/attack aircraft.

In Italy, the Marconi submarine – last of the Sauro class boats – became operational. Construction work on the Garibaldi helicopter carrier continued. As regards frigates, the Maestrale, the first of a class, became operational and others began sea trials. Work has been completed on a number of Sparviero class fast attack craft (hydrofoils).

In the Netherlands, a further Kortenaer class frigate has entered service and new Orion maritime patrol aircraft have been delivered.

(b) Control activity in 1982

Quantitative control measures were carried out at naval shipyards.

5. Chemical weapons

(a) List of chemical weapons subject to control

As in previous years, the Agency asked member countries whether they wished to renew in 1982 the list of chemical weapons subject to control.

The member countries agreed to this renewal. This was reported to the Council who duly noted the fact.

The Agency has therefore continued to use this list for its control activities during 1982.

(b) Control activity in 1982

In application of Article III of Protocol No. III, which lays down conditions to enable the Council to fix levels of chemical weapons that may be held on the mainland of Europe by those countries which have not given up the right to produce them, and in accordance with the Council decision of 1959, the Agency asked the countries concerned in its questionnaire whether production of chemical weapons on their mainland territory had passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage.

All the member countries concerned once again gave an explicit negative reply in 1982.

In addition, in the covering letter to its questionnaire, the Agency, as in previous years, asked the member states to declare any chemical weapons that they might hold, whatever their origin. In reply to this questionnaire, no country reported holding any chemical weapons and, because of this, the quantitative control of weapons of this nature raised no problems.

As each year, in accordance with the resolution approved by the Council in 1959 and in application of the Council directive extending to chemical weapons the provisions laid down for the control of non-production of the armaments listed in Annex III of Protocol No. III, the competent authorities of the country concerned provided the Agency with a detailed, precise and complete reply. In addition, the temporary procedure applied with these authorities since 1973 was again used with success in 1982. On the basis of the information thus supplied, the Agency was able to select the factories at which to carry out agreed control measures in 1982.

For each control measure carried out, a delegation from the national authorities was present.

None of these measures revealed any indication of production of chemical weapons within the terms of Annex II to Protocol No. III.

6. *Biological weapons*

All the member countries reported their agreement on the renewal in 1982 of the list of biological weapons subject to control as accepted by the Council in 1981. The Council noted the fact.

However, it will be recalled (see point B. 2 of this chapter) that the Agency exercises no control in the field of biological weapons.

7. *Atomic weapons*

Since the situation has remained the same as in previous years, the Agency is unable (as stated in point B. 2 of this chapter) to exercise any control in the atomic field.

F. *Studies and technical information visits by experts of the Agency for the Control of Armaments*

1. As in previous years the experts have been engaged in various studies relevant to the mission of the Agency with the aim of updating their knowledge and improving the methodology of control. One of the principal activities in this area has been the preparation of a series of well-documented "overviews" of the armed forces of member states. These provide the structure and evolution of the forces and prove of great value to experts when processing national replies to the Agency questionnaires.

2. The Agency considers that technical information visits play an important rôle in maintaining the expertise of its specialists.

(a) The Agency attaches particular importance to the technical information visits for its biological and chemical experts in view of the potential, as weapons of war, of various bacteria and chemicals used for civilian purposes. These experts were invited to the two factories of Rhône-Poulenc in France: the factory at Saint-Fons produces fine chemicals, phenols and vanilline being of particular interest to the experts; the installation at Pont-de-Claix is concerned with the production of selective herbicides without dioxine. The Rhône-Poulenc management subsequently proposed that the experts attend a symposium on dioxine, which was very instructive. The Federal Republic of Germany authorities invited the biological and chemical experts to visit the university of Hohenheim-Stuttgart where the discussions provided information on certain major aspects of the resistance of bacterial spores and on the dissemination of biological agents in the atmosphere. Finally, very useful visits were made to the Committee on Disarma-

ment and the World Health Organisation in Geneva.

(b) The Agency land force experts visited the British Army Equipment Exhibition (BAEE) at Aldershot. They had very interesting discussions with the staff at this exhibition about the features of various armaments and their recent deployment in the Falklands campaign.

(c) The naval experts attended the *Mostra Navale* at Genoa (Italy), and the *Salon Naval* at Le Bourget (France), where the naval shipbuilding and aerospace industries of each nation displayed their respective wares and their approach to combating the naval threat. They also attended the International Naval Technology Exhibition at Maastricht (Netherlands).

(d) The air armament experts were able to call at the Hanover Air Show (Federal Republic of Germany) and certain experts attended the SBAC exhibition and flying demonstrations at Farnborough (United Kingdom), which were particularly interesting from a military point of view. The Agency was invited to visit the *Centre d'Essais des Propulseurs* at Saclay (France) where test facilities were seen in operation. Two experts also attended the colloquy on international aeronautical consortia organised by the WEU Assembly in London.

G. *Director of the Agency for the Control of Armaments*

On completion of General Vittorio Leonelli's term of office on 31st January 1982, the Council paid tribute to the excellent work that he had accomplished in his five years as Director of the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

General Eugenio Rambaldi, who was appointed by the Council to succeed General Leonelli as Director of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, took up his duties on 1st February 1982.

H. *General conclusions*

In accordance with Articles VII and XIX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency was able to report to the Council that, as a result of the control exercised in 1982, the figures obtained in accordance with Article XIII of Protocol No. IV:

- for armaments of forces under NATO command under the terms of Article XIV of Protocol No. IV; and
- for armaments of forces maintained under national command under the

terms of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of Protocol No. IV and the Agreement of 14th December 1957, concluded in execution of Article V of Protocol No. II,

represented for the control year 1982 and for each of the member states, the appropriate levels of armaments subject to control for these categories of armaments over which the Agency has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate.

As required by Article XX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of field control measures carried out at force units and military depots and during agreed control measures of production plants, it did not detect for the categories of armaments which it controls:

- either the manufacture of a category of armaments that the government of the

member state concerned had undertaken not to manufacture ;

- or the existence, on the mainland of Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of Protocol No. IV) or not justified by export requirements (Article XXII of Protocol No. IV).

In 1982 the Agency again applied controls in those fields which are open to it in an effective, simple and inexpensive manner. As in the past, the help and co-operation of national and NATO authorities, and of heads and staff of both the private firms and the military establishments visited played an important part in the accomplishment of its mission.

CHAPTER IV

STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE

In 1982, the Standing Armaments Committee met in plenary session on 22nd January, 19th March, 25th June, 21st September, 10th December and as an ad hoc group on 21st September.

The main items on the agenda were: the study of the situation in the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU; the updating of WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 on trials methods for wheeled vehicles and the question of drawing up a similar agreement for tracked vehicles; the activities of Working Group No. 8 on operational research; relations with the FINABEL Committee.

A. Study of the situation of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU

1. As instructed by the Council, the Standing Armaments Committee, with the assistance of the international secretariat, drew up a report comprising the updated legal part and an updated presentation of the first section of the economic part of its study on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU. This document was sent to the Council which, in turn, forwarded a copy to the Assembly on 10th May 1982¹.

2. Following the Council's decision taken at the ministerial meeting on 19th May², the SAC – meeting as an ad hoc group and in plenary session – examined a number of general questions concerning the updating of the classified version of the first section of the economic part of its study.

Following this examination, based on documents drawn up by the international secretariat, it was decided that the updating would cover the period from 1972 to 1981, that the authorities concerned would supply the requisite statistical information to the international secretariat as soon as possible, and that the Committee would endeavour to complete its work on the subject in time for the next meeting of the Council at ministerial level in 1983.

3. With regard to the preparation by the SAC of the second section of the economic part of its

1. See Chapter I, B.

2. See Chapter II, B.3.

study – dealing with the capabilities of the industrial sector of the WEU member countries – it is recalled that since a similar study has been undertaken by the IEPG, and in order to avoid unnecessary work, the SAC has decided to wait for the data provided by countries for the IEPG study to be made available.

B. WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 on trials methods for wheeled vehicles

1. Since the forwarding of the agreement to the United States' authorities in 1981, in response to their request¹, the question of co-operation between WEU and the United States on harmonising trials methods for wheeled vehicles has still not been settled.

2. Apart from this question, the SAC discussed at its meeting on 10th December the updating of the agreement and the advisability of drawing up a similar agreement for tracked vehicles. The Committee decided to resume this discussion at its first meeting of 1983.

C. Activities of the working groups

1. Working Group No. 8 on operational research

The remit of Working Group No. 8 is to exchange the findings of national operational research studies, to organise symposia on operational research methods and techniques and to arrange visits to national operational research centres. The group has also done considerable work over five years to produce a five-language glossary of operational research terms.

The group held two meetings in 1982, on 11th May and 5th October. These were linked, respectively, to a seminar on methodology in Paris and to a visit to the Electronics Centre for Armaments (CELAR) at Bruz (France).

(a) Exchanges of information

During the year, the delegations presented sixteen information forms, four of which related to new studies and twelve to updates. The total number of studies presented by the member countries has therefore now reached 337.

1. See the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council Chapter IV, A.2.

(b) Eighth symposium on methodology

The theme of the eighth symposium organised by the group, held on 11th May at the WEU offices in Paris, was "the use of multiple criteria for selecting equipment".

Three countries presented papers, and these were followed by discussions. A fourth country reported on the progress reached in updating the method which had formed the basis of the work on the "evaluation of military equipment".

(c) Visit to Bruz (France)

At the invitation of the French authorities, the group visited the Electronics Centre for Armaments (CELAR) at Bruz.

Talks were given by experts from CELAR, and these were followed by a number of technical demonstrations and discussions.

(d) Lexicographical activity

The international secretariat, acting on the authority given by the SAC to continue work on the five-language glossary of operational research terms, has embodied in this document the corrections given in the lists of errata submitted by the delegations.

As to the pilot study designed to assess the work needed to prepare a second improved and extended edition of the glossary, the group reached agreement on the general criteria to be adopted although they would still have to consider the matter in more detail.

The delegates also took note of a dictionary of terms used in war games published in 1982 and decided to devote future group meetings to an examination of the translations of terms missing from the work.

(e) Exchange of documentation with NATO

At the request of NATO Panel VII, a copy of the report by Working Group No. 8 on their visit to CELAR was sent to them together with the proceedings of the group's eighth symposium on methodology. The committee was asked to send to the SAC – on a reciprocal basis – a copy of the report by its Chairman and the other documents relating to its work.

2. Group of experts on the evaluation of military equipment

The group of experts is still awaiting a decision by the SAC to proceed with the

second stage of its work, i.e. the "evaluation, using different methods, of new equipment which has not yet been evaluated".

However, in accordance with the SAC's decision, the question of the evaluation of military equipment could be put back on the Committee's agenda at the request of any government wishing to submit a work proposal.

D. Relations with FINABEL

It will be recalled that the task of FINABEL, a co-ordinating committee between the army chiefs of staff of the WEU member countries, is to promote agreements between them on the military characteristics of future land forces' equipment, whereas the SAC is an official body of an international organisation with a tri-service competence. In 1973, a joint meeting was held between FINABEL and the SAC in order to allocate the work and set up close contacts between the two secretariats. These contacts enable the international secretariat of the SAC to encourage the study of certain FINABEL agreements in order to stimulate co-operation between member countries; since that time a range of questions has been discussed within the SAC.

Relations between the secretariats of the SAC and FINABEL have continued in 1982 in accordance with the provisions for co-operation between these two bodies worked out in 1973. At its meeting of 10th December, the SAC was apprised of the points raised at a meeting on 23rd November between its international secretariat and the FINABEL secretariat. It noted that FINABEL wished to receive information, particularly on new methods of obstacle building and the trials methods currently used by the member countries of WEU for wheeled vehicles; also, that FINABEL's requirements would be specified once it had completed its reorganisation based on a restructuring of its working groups.

E. International secretariat

1. The international secretariat has assisted the SAC in all its work.
2. On 28th April 1982, the head of the international secretariat presented his annual oral report to the Council on the activities of the SAC in 1981.
3. He informed the SAC of the discussions on armaments questions which had taken place in the second part of the twenty-seventh ordinary session and in both parts of the twenty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly.

Extracts from speeches, reports, debates and recommendations on these questions were consolidated by the international secretariat in a series of documents which have been sent to SAC members.

4. Relations between the secretariats of the SAC and FINABEL have continued normally in 1982. As already stated in point D above, a co-ordinating meeting was held between the two secretariats on 23rd November, a report on which was made to the SAC on 10th December.

5. As regards contacts with NATO, a member of the international secretariat was present, as observer, at the meetings of the Conference of National Armaments Directors which took place in April and October in Brussels. A member of the international secretariat also took part in the June and December meetings in Brussels of the NATO Naval Armaments Group.

6. The Council noted with regret the departure of Mr. Alain Plantey and paid tribute to

the high quality of his services to the organisation over a period of ten years.

The Council appointed Mr. Eric Hintermann to succeed Mr. Plantey in the post of head of the international secretariat of the SAC, Assistant Secretary-General of WEU. Mr. Hintermann took up his post on 1st November 1982.

F. Assembly colloquy

During the colloquy on international aeronautical consortia organised by the Assembly on 9th and 10th February in London, the Belgian delegate to the SAC and the Chairman-in-Office presented a communication on the links between the Belgian Government and its aeronautical defence equipment industry; the head of the international secretariat of the SAC, Mr. Plantey, also presented - in a personal capacity - a communication concerning the legal arrangements relating to international consortia.

CHAPTER V

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE

A. Meetings of the committee

In 1982, the Public Administration Committee held its annual meetings, which take place in each of the member countries in turn, in the Federal Republic of Germany (Bamberg) from 27th to 29th April, and in France (Albi) from 12th to 14th October. In both cases, the meetings provided an opportunity for contacts with local authorities, which are useful in the context of the committee's work.

As in previous years, the meetings were devoted mainly to exchanges of information on significant administrative developments in the member countries during the preceding six months and the preparation of the next multilateral course for government officials organised in the autumn of each year under the auspices of the committee.

Among the many subjects mentioned in the exchanges of information in the committee, it is interesting to note the development of long-term exchanges of A-Grade officials between the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United Kingdom. These exchanges enable officials to enter the administration of one of the other countries to work for a period of nine months. In the same field, the tenth anniversary of the Anglo-German agreement on in-service training was celebrated in 1982. This is an agreement under which more than 900 officials have already benefited.

Generally speaking, political and administrative life has continued to be dominated in all the member countries by the economic situation, which has called for more rigorous and restrictive budget policies. In several countries, the government has been invested with special powers to take the measures which it considered essential. In most countries, the civil service has been affected by the stabilisation or reduction of staff, part-time work, early retirement. As regards remunerations, purchasing power has stagnated or even been reduced.

At the same time, the crisis facing governments has caused them, in most countries, to intensify their efforts to achieve greater effectiveness and efficiency in the civil service by better use of the staff and resources available. The problem of providing efficient government services on a reduced budget was in fact the subject chosen by the committee for the

multilateral course for government officials in 1982. It is becoming particularly clear today that the greatest possible number of senior government officials should have adequate experience of financial management. The importance of proper training is thus paramount and the training services or institutes are called upon to adapt their programmes along these lines.

The foregoing remarks illustrate once more the extent to which certain problems preoccupy the government and administration of all member countries, and one of the most valuable aspects of the exchanges of views and information within the committee is that they reveal these common problems and permit the solutions implemented in the various countries to be examined.

B. Courses for government officials

It is recalled that the XXXth multilateral course for government officials organised under the auspices of the Public Administration Committee was held at Siena from 18th to 24th October 1981. The subject of the course – attended by twenty-two government officials from the member countries – was “unemployment among young intellectuals in Europe”. The course proceedings were set out in the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council, but the reaction of the participants had not been received at the time of drafting the report. It may therefore be appropriate to mention now the particularly positive conclusions of one group of participants: “The analysis of the problems, as set out by the working groups at the conclusion of the course, was very satisfactory and can provide useful pointers for all those who, like ourselves, work in the economic and social field. We also feel that our professional ability as civil servants has been enhanced by our taking part in the course and, on a more general level, that our experience has been enriched by it. In conclusion, we consider that international solidarity, which is so often threatened during recession such as that at present affecting the whole industrialised world, should be strengthened by meetings designed to increase understanding between countries and to revive hope of a common solution to the various economic and social problems. In this

respect, the great effort made by WEU is a valuable example”.

The 1982 course for government officials was held in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Bad Godesberg, from 27th September to 1st October, and was on the following subject: “Providing efficient government services on a reduced budget, and the control of public expenditure”. The course brought together twenty officials from the administrations of the member countries interested in the subject dealt with.

The first day was devoted to an examination of the budget methods and control techniques in the various member countries, based on replies to a detailed questionnaire which each national group of participants had completed before the course. Multinational working groups were then set up to study the following aspects: budgetary techniques which favour the reconstitution of a “margin for manoeuvre”; the problem of choices of priorities; the impact of ex-post control on political budget-decision bodies; implementation of the budget: achievement of initial targets and adaptation to new situations; plan and budget; modern management methods and the budget.

A written report was drawn up by each working group, but there was not sufficient time for a general discussion.

Once again, the organisation noted the interest that such courses aroused among participants, many of them thus having for the first time the opportunity to exchange views and experiences with their colleagues from other countries within a sufficiently restricted group to allow genuine personal contact.

C. Study visits

Study visits enable an official to spend one or two weeks in the administration of one of the other member countries studying his own speciality. They are organised bilaterally between the national delegations of the sending and host countries. However, the committee devotes a part of its time at each meeting to this subject and each delegate can comment or draw upon the experience of his colleagues in this field.

Examples of visits organised during the year: the workings of the government information service (subject studied in France); inner-city housing (subject studied in Italy); regional planning machinery; parliamentary control of public expenditure; retail pre-packaging control (subject studied in the Netherlands).

CHAPTER VI

BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS

A. Budget

It was noted in the 1981 annual report that the economic situation in member countries necessitated the utmost discipline in all areas of public expenditure. 1982 has seen little change in this respect.

The budgets of the WEU ministerial organs have inevitably had to reflect the present climate. The achievement in the 1982 budgets of a measure of "negative growth" for the London office has, in the draft estimates for 1983, been extended – and to a greater degree – to the London and Paris offices of the ministerial organs.

The Council wish to emphasise that such economies were made without impairing the efficiency of the organisation or its ability to meet its commitments under the modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols.

Summary tables for the budgets, as adopted by the Council, are annexed to this document.

B. Social security of staff members serving in the United Kingdom

Following the agreement with the United Kingdom authorities, concluded in September 1981, exempting from class 1 compulsory contributions to the national social security scheme those members of the staff who are members of the organisation's pension scheme, and the conclusion, reached by the Council in November 1981, that members of the staff wishing to remain in the provident fund should also be exempted from such compulsory affiliation, the option period for joining the pension scheme was re-opened for those still in the provident fund.

This resulted in January 1982 in five out of fifteen staff members remaining in the provident fund, the others opting for the pension scheme.

Thereupon a second agreement was concluded with the United Kingdom authorities in May 1982 which exempted also the staff members in the provident fund from class 1 compulsory contributions to the national social security scheme.

With the conclusion of this second agreement, the negotiations on this matter have now been finalised.

All staff are henceforth exempt but may voluntarily pay class 3 contributions to the national social security scheme for a reduced range of benefits under the scheme. Measures approved by the Council to compensate some of the effects of exemption of the staff have entered into force.

All class 1 contributions which had been collected from the employees and kept in a WEU suspense account during the negotiations have now been paid over to the Department of Health and Social Security, whilst the employer's contributions collected via the budgets have been returned to member states.

C. Provident fund

At present fifteen staff members are still fully affiliated to the WEU provident fund, the youngest member being 39 years old. The uncertainties about the required liquidity of the fund and its final size having been resolved with the conclusion of the negotiations on United Kingdom social security as described above, long-term arrangements for an investment policy, together with a more rationalised administration of the fund, are now being pursued.

D. WEU administrative meetings

The necessary contact between the administrative staff of the London and Paris offices have been maintained often by combining meetings with travel already scheduled for other official purposes.

E. Activities in the framework of co-ordination

The Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts held ten meetings in 1982, each of one or two days' duration. In addition there were seventeen meetings of the Committee of Heads of Administration, thirteen joint meetings of the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General and the Standing Committee of the Staff Associations, as well as three meetings of the Secretaries/Director-General.

The main subjects dealt with at these meetings, some of which are still under review,

resulted in reports by the Co-ordinating Committee covering:

- the periodical adjustment as at 1st January 1982 of remuneration to take into account the increase in cost of living, and of the daily rates of subsistence allowances for staff travelling on duty;
- the problems associated with any form of extension of co-ordination to other international organisations;
- the triennial salary review in accordance with the 159th report of the Co-ordinat-

ing Committee, to be applied to the procedure for the review of 1st July 1982;

- a comprehensive review of the present procedure for the adjustment of remuneration, as contained in the 159th report, to be applicable for the next three-year period, and to take into account in particular the impact of the current economic recession and the budgetary constraints of member governments;
- the question of institutionalising staff participation in the framework of co-ordination.

APPENDIX

Summary of WEU main budget for 1982

	A*	B*	C*	Total B+C
	£	F. frs	F. frs	F. frs
Salaries and allowances	1,362,452	9,879,000	19,894,300	29,773,300
Pensions	104,880	1,199,500	2,803,100	4,002,600
Travel	25,860	166,300	484,700	651,000
Other operating costs	168,905	593,950	855,450	1,449,400
Purchase of furniture, etc.	36,600	19,950	43,900	63,850
Buildings	—	44,380	79,890	124,270
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	1,698,697	11,903,080	24,161,340	36,064,420
WEU tax	505,865	3,499,950	6,820,900	10,320,850
Other receipts	46,000	440,000	209,000	649,000
Pension receipts	32,875	266,500	669,500	936,000
TOTAL INCOME	584,740	4,206,450	7,699,400	11,905,850
NET TOTAL	1,113,957	7,696,630	16,461,940	24,158,570

National contributions called for under the WEU main budget for 1982

	600ths	£	F. frs
Belgium	59	109,539.11	2,375,592.72
France	120	222,791.40	4,831,714.00
Germany	120	222,791.40	4,831,714.00
Italy	120	222,791.40	4,831,714.00
Luxembourg	2	3,713.18	80,528.56
Netherlands	59	109,539.11	* 2,375,592.72
United Kingdom	120	222,791.40	4,831,714.00
TOTAL	600	1,113,957.00	24,158,570.00

*A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Agency for the Control of Armaments.

Summary of revised WEU budget for 1981

	A*	B*	C*	Total B + C
	£	F. frs	F. frs	F. frs
Salaries and allowances	1,298,672	-	-	-
Pensions	116,080	-	-	-
Travel	25,860	-	-	-
Other operating costs	225,705	-	-	-
Purchase of furniture, etc.	36,600	-	-	-
Buildings	-	-	-	-
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	1,702,917	-	-	-
WEU tax	485,195	-	-	-
Other receipts	26,000	-	-	-
Pensions receipts	43,985	-	-	-
TOTAL INCOME	555,180	-	-	-
NET TOTAL	1,147,737	-	-	-

*A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Agency for the Control of Armaments.

*Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly
Recommendations 383 on the problem of nuclear weapons in
Europe and 388 on the problems for European security
arising from pacifism and neutralism*

INFORMATION REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Relations with Parliaments
by Mr. Page and Mr. Dejardin, Rapporteurs*

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INFORMATION REPORT

submitted by Mr. Page and Mr. Dejardin, Rapporteurs

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Recommendations 383 and 388 and the replies of the Council

Information Report

(submitted by Mr. Page and Mr. Dejardin, Rapporteurs)

Preliminary Note

The two joint Rapporteurs appointed to prepare the present report agreed to submit a purely analytical first part, for which they would be jointly responsible, followed by two chapters expressing the individual views of the Rapporteurs.

I. Introduction

1. The purpose of the present report is to examine action taken in the parliaments of member countries on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments has therefore chosen two recent recommendations relating to the same problems from different standpoints, i.e. deployment by NATO of new intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe in accordance with the twofold decision of December 1979 and the development of neutralist and pacifist movements since that date. The link between the two problems is evident since doubts about the 1979 twofold decision have been at the centre of protests in Western Europe since that date and even now application of the decision is the subject of heated public debate in several WEU member countries and naturally in the parliaments.

2. The choice of these two recommendations involved special problems, however, because of the very intensity and topical nature of the discussions on the subjects they tackle. Recommendation 383 was adopted in June 1982 and the Council's reply has therefore been received and many questions have been put in parliaments. This is not so for Recommendation 388 which was adopted only in November. The Council's reply reached the Office of the Clerk in April 1983 and the questions already put in national parliaments have often not yet been answered. For this reason, your Rapporteurs wish to stress the drawbacks involved in the time the Council considers it necessary to take in answering Assembly recommendations. It is indeed difficult to speak of a dialogue on topical questions when some six months elapse between adopting a recommendation and receiving the Council's answer.

3. Second, as these matters were in fact important for a large section of European public opinion, many questions were put to governments on the subjects raised in the recom-

mendations without it being possible to know whether they were inspired directly or indirectly by the recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly. The fact that such questions were or were not put by members of the WEU Assembly or even of its Committee for Relations with Parliaments is not sufficient to prove that this was or was not the case. It is quite clear that if the committee had chosen recommendations farther removed from the major political questions of the day your Rapporteurs would not have had such abundant documentation to choose from. They could probably then have assessed more accurately the action taken on Assembly recommendations. But by choosing such formidable subjects the committee has placed them in the position of being better able to elucidate the positions of the governments of member countries on these subjects. Its choice was therefore perfectly justified. The aim of this report will consequently be to show how specific, well-chosen questions put in the national parliaments can complete the information given in the WEU Council's replies to the Assembly's recommendations and to draw the appropriate lessons.

4. Finally, it should be mentioned that the Rapporteurs have certainly not seen all the questions put in the parliaments of the various member countries on the subjects covered by the two recommendations. Furthermore, they had to choose between those which they had since many related to the same facts and received almost identical answers. Again, sometimes in parliament sometimes elsewhere and in different circumstances, governments have made public statements on these questions. The questions put in parliaments and the answers received naturally take account of these statements but your Rapporteurs are not able to report on all these texts. They consider nevertheless that their spot checks allow useful conclusions to be drawn for increasing the effectiveness of the work of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

II. Analysis of Recommendations 383 and 388

5. The two recommendations adopted by the Assembly at a six-month interval have many similarities, which is not surprising since they were adopted by the same assembly and consequently by similarly-composed majorities. Likewise, there was a fairly wide conformity of views between the two committees

which presented one text each and some continuity of views on the part of the parliamentarians, which is all to their credit.

6. Paragraph A.1 of Recommendation 383, which recommends that the Council:

“ Call on member governments acting in the North Atlantic Council,

To continue the present much improved close and continuous consultations to ensure that an agreed allied position is maintained on all aspects of nuclear deterrence and nuclear arms control ”,

may in fact be likened to paragraph 1 of Recommendation 388:

“ Demand that participating [Council] states strive to ensure the success of the various ongoing negotiations on the limitation or reduction of armaments and forces in Europe and in the rest of the world ”.

Similarly, paragraph 2 of Recommendation 388:

“ Announce its unambiguous support for any proposal for the complete renunciation by the United States and the Soviet Union of medium-range nuclear weapons or, failing that, for the establishment of a true balance at the lowest possible level and to agree to the deployment of such weapons on the territory of member countries only as long as this goal has not been attained within the time limit laid down in the NATO decision of December 1979 ”,

meets concerns fairly close to those expressed in paragraphs A.2 and A.3 of Recommendation 383:

“ To ensure that preparations continue in the countries concerned for the deployment from 1983 of the agreed levels of ground-launched cruise and Pershing II missiles less any reductions previously agreed in the INF talks;

To press for the earliest agreement in the INF talks on the zero option for land-based missiles, and the step-by-step pursuit of these talks to include other weapons systems, and the eventual inclusion of battlefield systems in these or the MBFR talks ”.

Paragraph 3 of Recommendation 388:

“ Ensure that full, accurate and objective information on the levels of forces and armaments of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact is regularly made public ”

for its part corresponds to paragraphs A.7 and B.1 of Recommendation 383:

“ To bring up to date and publish from time to time on an agreed objective basis the NATO comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, and to urge the Soviet Union to be equally forthcoming and objective in publishing force comparisons;

Call on member governments to pursue active information policies, to ensure that public opinion is objectively informed both about the nature of the threat and about the purpose of allied defence and arms control and reduction policies.”.

Finally, paragraph 5 of Recommendation 388:

“ Effectively concert the defence policies of member countries and their positions towards disarmament with a view to working out a European approach to such matters ”

accentuates the “ European ” concern expressed in paragraph B.2 of Recommendation 383:

“ Develop a European approach to the political aspects of the discussions in the North Atlantic Council ”.

7. The main differences between the two recommendations concern the following paragraphs of Recommendation 383, which have no counterpart in Recommendation 388:

“ A.4. To welcome the resumption of the SALT process through the proposed opening of START in June, and to press for the closest linking of these to the INF talks and the continued mutual respect of all SALT limits during the negotiations;

A.5. To give increased emphasis to the negotiation and adoption of effective procedures for verification, as essential for any agreement on arms control and reduction;

A.6. To ask the United States Government to examine seriously Senator Jackson's proposal for a joint United States-Soviet Union command post in a neutral country to deter the possibility of war by accident or miscalculation ”

whereas Recommendation 388 contains the following paragraph:

“ 4. Ensure that in any event Western Europe's development policy is pursued and strengthened, particularly in the framework of the European Communities ”.

8. Moreover, these differences correspond to the specific responsibilities of the two committees and to the different subjects of the two

reports, which is quite normal. Your Rapporteurs propose to group the various parts of their study round the topics dealt with in the recommendations, i.e.:

- (i) negotiations on the limitation of armaments;
- (ii) the deployment of new missiles in Western Europe;
- (iii) informing public opinion;
- (iv) European consultations.

III. *Negotiations on the limitation of armaments*

9. The Council's reply to Recommendation 383 was relatively detailed on this point:

"1. The Council welcome the continued interest of the Assembly in the matter of intermediate nuclear forces (INF) and take careful note of the Assembly's views. The Council endorse many of the opinions expressed in the recommendation and its preamble, notably the need for arms control and defence measures to complement each other in a balanced security policy, and the importance of the 1979 double decision as the basis for redressing the imbalance in INF.

2. The Council agree with the Assembly on the need to continue the current consultations amongst the allies on the subject of the INF negotiations. They welcome the addition of regular briefings of the North Atlantic Council, by the leaders of the United States Delegation to these INF negotiations, to the continued series of meetings of the Special Consultative Group for those member countries which participated in the dual decision of December 1979.

.....

4. The Council are happy to repeat the welcome which has been given by member governments to the renewal of strategic arms control through the opening of the START talks and to the assurances that what has been achieved through existing agreements will not be undercut pending the negotiation of a START agreement, subject to reciprocity. The Council endorse the Assembly's concern to see effective verification measures in any arms control agreement.

5. The Council doubt that the United States Government need outside encouragement to keep under review the existing

measures to prevent any possibility of war by accident or miscalculation and in this respect have noted the initiatives outlined by President Reagan in his speech in Berlin in June 1982."

10. However, this information may be enlarged upon considerably by referring to the information given or statements made by government representatives in the parliaments of member countries. The matters referred to in these paragraphs were the subject of government statements, debates and many questions in the parliaments of all these countries during the second half of 1982. It is obviously not possible to claim that these interventions were due to the recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly, except in cases where the questions put referred specifically to these recommendations. The present report cannot quote all these statements, debates and questions; it will merely make brief reference to them and perhaps quote a few specific elements given by government representatives on these occasions.

11. Generally speaking, the attitudes adopted by governments towards negotiations on the limitation of armaments are set out in government statements, often during the presentation of draft foreign affairs or defence budgets, or in general policy statements. No major differences can be discerned between the attitudes of the various member countries, but a number of details:

12. Replying to an oral question put by Mr. Daras in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives on 16th December 1982, Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations, reviewed the situation on that date as follows. This reply is one of the fullest and avoids the need to quote many other replies:

"... since November 1981, three sessions have been held in Geneva at which there were statements by and exchanges of views between the American and Soviet Delegates on the possible deployment of medium-range missiles on European territory.

At the first session, the United States and the Soviet Union set out their views on the matter.

The United States wants total elimination, i.e. no deployment of SS-20, 4 or 5 or of cruise or Pershing II missiles. This is the American point of view which the United States is also upholding on behalf of its western allies.

The Soviet Union holds another opinion: it wishes to limit the number of missiles of this type and on a given territory, i.e. from mid-Atlantic to the Urals. But the

Soviet proposals also include certain types of aircraft and nuclear forces which exist in France and Great Britain. Hence these are two totally different approaches.

At the second session, the two parties set out and explained their proposals in detail. Only at the third session did true negotiations begin. As I have just said, there are still major differences between the American and Soviet concepts, one approach being global, the others being territorial.

For the Americans, it is the zero option, i.e. no deployment of this type of missile either by the Soviet Union or by the United States.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, wishes to reduce the number of such missiles to a certain ceiling. Its proposals also have a geographical aspect and it wishes to include certain French and British arms and certain types of aircraft in the proposed system.

So far, it has been impossible for the United States to accept this Soviet point of view for this would mean the Soviet Union having to be as strong as all the other forces combined. Hence there would no longer be a balance between the United States and the Soviet Union but between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States plus France and Britain on the other.

In these circumstances, no agreement has yet been reached. Does this mean the negotiations are a failure? Not at all! They are neither blocked nor in a dead-lock. The negotiations are certainly serious. The attitude of the United States and the West has already in a way compelled the Soviet Union to give more details of its own proposals. We are convinced that in the coming months the negotiations will not only be continued but, we hope, will produce good results."

13. A reply by Mr. von Staden, Secretary of State, to a written question put by Dr. Mertes in the Bundestag on 9th October 1982 explains how the United States' allies were consulted:

"On 2nd February 1982, i.e. a few weeks after the beginning of the negotiations on 30th November 1981, the United States tabled a detailed draft agreement: this draft, which basically proposes a reciprocal zero option for American and Soviet intermediate-range missiles, has since then, together with the Soviet positions put forward in the meantime, been the subject of intensive negotiations in Geneva

guided by a desire to succeed. All the points to be included in the text of the treaty are being negotiated in detail. The Federal Government receives regular and complete information on the state and progress of the negotiations, both in the framework of the NATO special consultative group (SCG) and in the framework of bilateral German-American consultations. Through these consultation procedures it can also inject its own ideas into the negotiations. As you know, it has already availed itself of this possibility on several occasions."

14. The British position was given in a reply by Mr. Rifkind to Mr. Robertson on 15th June 1982, which is clearer than that of Mr. Hurd's reply to Mr. Page on 20th July 1982:

"We strongly support the American proposal for substantial cuts in the total numbers of ballistic missile warheads, but the strategic arms reduction talks should, in our view, address only the strategic arsenals of the two major nuclear weapon states. This view is shared by all members of the alliance. United Kingdom forces will not therefore be involved."

15. Finally, this position was confirmed by the British Prime Minister on 18th January 1983 in reply to a question by Mr. Allaun:

"Mr. Frank Allaun asked the Prime Minister whether Her Majesty's Government have yet made any response to the new ideas on nuclear missile reduction put forward by the Soviet Union and mentioned by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on 15th December 1982.

The Prime Minister: We have made it clear, publicly and to the Russians, that their statement may be a step in the right direction, if it means they recognise that SS-20 missiles must be reduced. But to demand a continuing Soviet monopoly of such longer-range missiles, while insisting that the Americans alone implement a zero option, would be unacceptable. The British deterrent has no place at the INF negotiations."

Many written and oral questions have in fact been put on this subject in the House of Commons and have elicited important ministerial statements which it is impossible to quote in the limited framework of this report.

16. The Luxembourg position was given by Mrs. Flesch in answer to a question put by Mr. Glesener on 12th October 1982. She said Luxembourg subscribed to the NATO Council decisions and her statement was given in the

thirty-sixth volume of collected texts issued by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. The position was set out in much greater detail during a debate in the Chamber of Deputies on 29th October 1982.

17. France's position has been described by various members of the government but generally outside parliament. As an illustration, your Rapporteurs have chosen a statement by Mr. Henu, French Minister of Defence, at a meeting of *Conventions pour l'armée nouvelle* in Paris on 23rd December 1982:

“The priority given by France to nuclear armaments is decisive. France is defended. But France needs all it has and even a little more, not to attack but to defend itself. The Soviet Union and the United States have what they have and even rather too much, although unbalanced. Hence, what Mr. Andropov is proposing is interesting, but interesting for the Soviet Union and the United States.

.....

France is not concerned. Pacifists are now fully aware, thanks to Mr. Andropov, that the arms race is not of our doing. The superpowers must disarm. France is waiting for the two superpowers at the threshold of sufficiency.”

IV. *Deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe*

18. Here, the Council's reply is particularly vague since it refers neither to the place nor the date of possible deployment and merely sets out the conditions in very general terms:

“3. The Council further agree with the Assembly on the importance to be attached to preparations for the deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles. NATO's resolve in implementing its 12th December 1979 decision was the key factor in persuading the Soviet Union to enter into arms control negotiations in Geneva and will continue to be crucial to achieving concrete results. Members of the Council who participated in the December 1979 decision will continue to do all within their power to promote early progress towards negotiated agreement on the basis of the so-called ‘zero option’ or ‘zero-level outcome’ for American and Soviet longer-range land-based INF missiles. They reconfirm that the negotiations should, as a priority, relate to these systems which constitute the greatest threat. They do not rule out the

possibility that in the event of agreement, subsequent phases of the negotiations may relate to other INF systems. They believe that it would be premature to prejudge the forum in which any arms control agreement covering short-range or battlefield nuclear systems might be considered.”

19. Yet this is a matter which more than any other has gripped the attention of members of parliament of the countries where such missiles are to be deployed, first because the inhabitants of the areas under study for the possible deployment of missiles have voiced their anxiety and second because peace movements have often centred their activities on opposition to such deployment.

20. Speaking about deployment arrangements, Mr. Blaker threw useful light on the subject when replying to Mr. Marlow in the House of Commons on 16th November 1982:

“My hon. friend knows the arrangements in relation to cruise. They will be the same as those that have applied to American nuclear forces in this country for many years under successive governments – the bases cannot be used without the consent of both governments.”

21. On 7th February 1983, Mr. Blaker described the British position in reply to a question by Mr. Roper:

“The United States Government made it clear to the United Kingdom and to the other European countries that are accepting basing of the Pershing II and cruise missiles that they were prepared to make the missiles available on a dual key basis. There is no point of principle here. As my right hon. friend the Secretary of State made clear recently, the option of having a dual key was open to the United Kingdom if we had purchased the missile and supporting equipment and provided British servicemen to man them, with the United States providing only the nuclear warheads. This would have cost hundreds of millions of pounds and required well over 1,000 additional British servicemen”.

22. The conditions for deploying cruise missiles in Italy were spelled out by Mr. Scovacchi, Under-Secretary of State for Defence, on 29th June 1982 in reply to an oral question by Mr. La Valle and Mr. Pinna:

“The Comiso base in particular must not be considered as a ‘paying objective’ in the sense that it is not a launching ramp for cruise missiles and is therefore not a possible target for a potential aggressor.

In fact, as the Minister of Defence already explained in the Senate during the joint meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees on 20th and 21st August 1981, in the event of crisis or emergency the squadrons carrying the missiles would immediately leave the base and disperse over a wide surrounding area, thus becoming practically invulnerable to attack.

.....

Once these squadrons have left, the base would be an empty shell of no further military interest, like a barracks abandoned by the men assigned to it in peacetime.

This assessment, based on unassailable technico-operational arguments, can but be that of the command posts of a possible aggressor.

As further confirmation that the base is not a 'paying objective', it should be recalled that the families of the bases' military personnel will live on the base itself.

Finally, to answer the last part of the question, it should be recalled that the decision to install cruise missiles in Europe was dictated solely by the need for NATO to counterbalance the modernisation and strengthening of the Soviet missile arsenal.

In the eyes of the Soviet Union, cruise missiles therefore play a clearly deterrent rôle. The zero option provision confirms that such is the case. Italy was in effect the first European country to make acceptance of the cruise missile programme subject to a rider: if, before new western missiles are installed in Europe and in Italy, the Soviet Union agrees to destroy its new SS-20 intermediate-range missiles, Italy will cancel its cruise missile programme.

No other non-nuclear country in the vast area surrounding Italy therefore has anything to fear from the decisions taken by the Italian Government."

23. The Belgian Minister of Defence gave details in his reply to a written question by Senator Royen on 14th September 1982:

"... all the member states, even those which do not install INF missiles on their territory, undertake to show solidarity in participating in the European installation costs under the NATO cost-sharing system for joint programmes. It was also clear that in the event of the disarmament negotiations not succeeding the installation of INF missiles would begin in 1983 as provided for in the twofold decision.

ment negotiations not succeeding the installation of INF missiles would begin in 1983 as provided for in the twofold decision.

With regard to the meeting of Defence Ministers in May 1981, I refer to the NATO press communiqué in which the ministers confirm the validity of every aspect of the twofold decision. It was also stated that the ministers had paid increased attention to the earmarking of sufficient funds for NATO infrastructure (joint programmes) and that they had approved the financing of the programme for the current year.

At that meeting, the ministers decided to earmark a sum of 70 million IAU (1 IAU=FB 136.24) on a provisional basis for preparing the possible installation of INF missiles and to approve the exact amount needed for this programme at the next meeting in December 1981.

My honourable predecessor was therefore acting in accordance with the government statement in force and the NATO twofold decision, approved by Belgium.

It is true that the Netherlands Minister asked that this matter be handled with the necessary discretion. This is not my responsibility and I have no intention of giving my views on the intentions of a minister of a friendly country.

In any event, the succession of facts, decisions and official statements described above and known to the public prove that it is not possible to speak of a cover-up operation."

24. These details correspond moreover to those given on several occasions by the same minister answering oral or written questions by Belgian parliamentarians. To them may be added the reply by Mr. Würzbach, Federal German Secretary of State, to a written question by Mr. Scheer in the Bundestag, admitting that the measures taken to deploy missiles under the December 1979 NATO twofold decision concern only the infrastructure and not the missiles themselves.

25. The same secretary of state, replying to Dr. Friedmann on 12th November 1982 gave further details:

"1. The methods of bringing into service Pershing batteries of the Luftwaffe and the American army are defined in a document held by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

2. Knowing that in the event of war the Pershing batteries would be an ideal tar-

get for the enemy, NATO's fundamental tactical concept is based on:

- rapid evacuation of sites occupied in peacetime;
- transfer to remote areas;
- frequent movement.

This is the only means of ensuring the survival capability of the Pershing batteries.

3. It is clear that the great mobility required for implementing this concept can be maintained in peacetime only at the cost of constant training. The transport of Pershings on our roads is carried out principally in the framework of these exercises.

4. Security measures needed for such transport are the responsibility of each country. With regard to the Luftwaffe Pershing batteries, these measures, which have just been revised at the end of last year, make provision, *inter alia* and independently of security provisions already in force for munitions, for:

- (a) an escort detachment;
- (b) the limitation of movements to the minimum required for conducting the exercise.

In this connection, I would refer to the BMVg press release of 4th November 1982 in which it was stated in substance that the transport of a Pershing missile was no more dangerous - on the contrary - than the transport of fuel or chemical products."

26. On the other hand, the governments concerned have always refused to supply lists of sites where the new missiles might be deployed. In the Federal Republic, this refusal has been absolute and unrelenting (cf. reply by Mr. Würzbach to question 3 by Mr. Antretter on 24th November 1982), but it was specified (by the same secretary of state in reply to a question by Mr. Catenhusen on 28th October 1982) that the number of Pershing IIs which it was planned to deploy in the Federal Republic was 108.

27. In the United Kingdom, the government has specified several times that the sites chosen had all been leased already to the American army since the second world war, including Molesworth and Greenham Common, where the deployment of cruise missiles may become effective in December 1983 (reply by Mr. Blaker to Mr. Meacher on 17th January 1983). In Belgium, the Minister for External Relations confirmed that the Florennes site cor-

responded best to the technical requirements for building a base (reply to question 17 by Mr. le Hardy de Beaulieu of 19th November 1982), but the proposal to deploy missiles at Ursel was postponed indefinitely (reply to question 24 by Mr. van den Bosoche in the Chamber on 22nd November 1982). Questioned about the possible deployment of cruise missiles in Germany, at Prüm and Bithug near the Belgian frontier (question 36 by Mr. Kuijpers), the Belgian Government replied in the Chamber on 14th December:

"The German authorities have had no contact at all with the Belgian Government about the sites for stationing cruise missiles. Nor, moreover, have there been any negotiations with NATO for installing these missiles on German territory."

28. In Italy, the government has not denied the announcement by certain senators on 23rd November 1982 that it was proposed to install cruise missiles at Comiso in Sicily.

V. *Informing public opinion*

29. The Council's reply to the point about keeping public opinion informed of military policy in the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact shows that the Assembly was quite right but gives it little concrete satisfaction:

"6. The Council agree that the figures published on the forces of the integrated military structure of the alliance and of the Warsaw Pact, such as those in the NATO force comparisons paper published in the spring of 1982 may need to be updated from time to time. They also accept that member governments will need to continue their active information policies to ensure that public opinion is well informed about alliance security policy, and the threat faced by members of NATO."

30. When Mrs. Knight asked for the views of her country's Minister of Defence, the reply by Mr. Blaker on 27th January 1983 merely referred to Chapter 3 of the 1982 statement on defence estimates. The same reply was given to Mr. Greenway on 1st February 1983.

31. Conversely, the British Government has replied to many questions about movements of public opinion caused by the debate on the deployment of nuclear weapons or proposals for unilateral British disarmament initiatives. A written question by Mr. Wigley allowed Mr. Hurd to specify that a booklet "The nuclear debate", of which 50,000 copies were published by the Arms Control and Disarma-

ment Research Unit, had given ample information about the disarmament negotiations. Your Rapporteurs consider the governments of the other member countries might usefully also be asked to give information on the balance of forces and on matters relating to disarmament, as they are urged to do in the two recommendations studied in the present report.

32. A third area in which public opinion might be informed is that of peace movements, which are not limited to the World Peace Council, the only one referred to in Mr. Blaker's reply to Mr. Atkinson on 20th December 1982:

"The Soviet Union largely finances the World Peace Council - which has its headquarters in Helsinki - and its national ancillaries. As ministers have previously stated, the WPC is a disguised instrument of Soviet foreign policy. Discussions of the WPC's governmental funding caused the withdrawal of its application for consultative status at the United Nations Economic and Social Council in February 1981. The British affiliate of the WPC is the British Peace Assembly."

33. In any event, pacifist demonstrations have had considerable repercussions in national parliaments. They have been echoed in all questions relating to deployment sites in the five countries concerned. In Italy a number of senators tabled a motion for a constitutional law on 23rd November 1982 whose main provision was:

"The question to be put by referendum is: Do you consent to the installation at Comiso or elsewhere on national territory of ground-based ballistic or cruise missiles with nuclear warheads?"

34. In the Netherlands, the new government formed in autumn 1982 immediately had to come to grips with the problem. On 22nd November 1982, it explained its general policy on a number of subjects including its foreign and defence policies. The Prime Minister, Mr. Lubbers, declared:

"The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is the main instrument of western collaboration. Outside Atlantic co-operation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation there is no foreseeable forum which could guarantee peace and security. For both political and military considerations, the Netherlands is obliged to make a reasonable contribution to the common defence effort. At the same time it will emphasise to the utmost the need to find solutions to armaments questions through consultations between

East and West on the mutual reduction of armaments. The Netherlands will continue to promote an active armaments restriction policy directed towards reducing dependence on nuclear weapons.

The Netherlands will make every effort within the alliance to offer the maximum chances for the progress of negotiations. Here, East and West have a historical opportunity to master the armaments race.

To do everything possible is what those taking part in the peace demonstrations on 21st November 1982 and all others who pray for peace have demanded."

35. In the ensuing debates, several motions were submitted on such matters as putting a halt to all preparatory work for the establishment of cruise missiles, imposing a ceiling of 2 % per year on the defence budget, the development of the French neutron weapon, the nuclear tasks of the Orion and F-16 aircraft and the mutual and controllable freezing of nuclear weapons arsenals. Mr. Lubbers then added that the government did not agree to a freeze as it did not wish to interfere in the discussions in Geneva on the Soviet Union's medium-range nuclear weapons and SS-20 missiles. It hoped that the outcome would be to reduce and completely dismantle the armaments concerned. The government hoped that the results of the Geneva negotiations would be acceptable to all concerned.

36. On 13th and 14th January 1983, the permanent committees for foreign affairs and defence of the Second Chamber had a meeting with General Rogers, SACEUR, and Dr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO. In the discussions, Dr. Luns pointed out that he thought that both sides were trying to reach an agreement in the Geneva discussions and he considered this was still a possibility. He thought the same was true for the START discussions on strategic weapons.

37. He was not optimistic about the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, but nevertheless thought that in 1983 armaments containment would dominate the East-West dialogue.

VI. *Inter-allied consultations*

38. Here a distinction should be drawn between consultations in the framework of the North Atlantic Council and consultations in more specifically European forums. On the first, the WEU Council replied:

"The Council agree with the Assembly on the need to continue the current consultations amongst the allies on the

subject of the INF negotiations. They welcome the addition of regular briefings of the North Atlantic Council, by the leaders of the United States Delegation to these INF negotiations, to the continued series of meetings of the special consultative group for those member countries which participated in the dual decision of December 1979."

39. On 27th October, this reply was completed by the Council's reply to Question 230 put by Mr. Günther Müller:

"Consultations on the issue of nuclear arms limitation negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union have indeed taken place within the framework of NATO ever since this issue became valid.

Accordingly, the INF negotiating position of the United States and in particular the zero option proposal, aiming at a total renunciation of longer-range INF missiles by the United States and the USSR, were established in close consultation and with the active contribution of other NATO partners who are parties to the decision of 12th December 1979 on the modernisation of longer-range INF and on negotiations aiming at the reductions of such weapons. A special forum, the special consultative group (SCG), was established in order to ensure a thorough and regular consultation between the United States and these countries, a consultation which in fact associates these countries to the negotiation. A suitable procedure of consultation on a regular basis has been established within the alliance with regard to the negotiations on the reduction of strategic arms (START). For the above reasons there clearly exists no need to have recourse to other fora for this kind of consultation."

40. It must however be borne in mind that while there are consultations between the United States and its NATO partners and between European governments, little information reaches the parliaments other than through parliamentary initiatives such as questions put by members of parliament to governments.

41. Only too often governments are perhaps not very spontaneous in keeping parliaments fully informed.

42. The quotations in Chapters III and IV of this report give some indication of the extent and nature of these consultations and give an intimation of certain limits.

43. On consultations in a European framework, particularly WEU, the Council replied:

"As regards a European approach to the political aspects of the discussions in the North Atlantic Council, the European members of the alliance discuss the issues on the agenda of the North Atlantic Council with each other as well as with their North Atlantic allies, as part of normal consultations. A number of these subjects are also discussed by the members of the European Community as a normal part of the Community's political co-operation procedures."

44. To this should be added the replies by Mr. Mauroy, French Prime Minister, to Mr. Aubert on 28th June 1982 and by Mr. Blaker to Mrs. Knight on 27th January 1983 which bring out the widely divergent attitudes of the two governments towards WEU. The former said:

"France's defence is independent. It is based on its own strategy of deterrence – of the strong by the weak – allowing damage to be inflicted on an aggressor, even a stronger one, which is calculated to be greater than the stake which France represents for the enemy and his vital interests. Moreover, the French authorities have begun to sound out our European partners about the need to discuss the common problems which may arise for our countries. For instance, France has recalled its attachment to the treaties setting up Western European Union, WEU, and its parliamentary Assembly in particular, is in fact the only existing institution where it is possible to refer to matters of defence. It has therefore been suggested to the WEU parliamentarians that they discuss in depth problems affecting Europe's security. In parallel, and the Franco-German summit meeting in February 1982 was an illustration of this, those in authority in France are doing their utmost to facilitate a rapprochement between European governments wishing to ensure their security in an international environment which is threatened by a deteriorating military balance."

While the latter, on the contrary, specified that:

"The security of Europe is the concern of all members of NATO and therefore it is the government's view that the alliance should remain the principal body in which detailed discussion of defence and disarmament policies takes place. However, the WEU Assembly has an important rôle to play in promoting understanding of the defence policies of its member nations."

45. It would obviously be most useful to obtain similar clarification from the other governments.

VII. Conclusions

46. Your Rapporteurs are well aware of the limits of their study: it was not possible for them to examine all parliamentary work on the problems raised in the two recommendations in question in all the parliaments of member countries. Nor moreover did they try to cover everything for fear of repetition or platitudes. However, they believe that this outline will allow a number of conclusions to be drawn which should be of interest to the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and to the Assembly as a whole.

47. (i) Such comparative studies of action taken on WEU Assembly recommendations are of real interest and should be repeated and taken further after this initial attempt. This would require greater assistance from national delegations.

48. (ii) When Assembly recommendations are on highly topical matters, as was the case here, there is a wide response to them in parliaments and the replies given by the Council may be usefully interpreted in the light of those given in national parliaments by the governments of member countries since the Council expresses the joint position of the Seven.

49. (iii) In the parliaments of some member countries, procedure for written questions does not produce information of the same value as that for oral questions, particularly when they give rise to debates. It is for each individual member of the committee and of the Assembly to draw the consequences of this.

50. (iv) The questions put have greater impact if they relate to matters of direct concern for parliamentarians and those they represent as was the case for the sites for deploying cruise or Pershing II missiles. This means members of the Assembly must adapt their questions to their own national and local circumstances and not merely reproduce the suggestions made by the Chairman of the committee at the close of each session.

51. (v) The committee wishes the Assembly again to urge the Council to reply more quickly to recommendations, particularly when they relate to highly topical matters.

52. (vi) The committee wishes the General Affairs Committee to be asked to prepare another report on nuclear weapons and the reactions of public opinion.

VIII. Point of view of Mr. Page

53. The Assembly and its individual members have a duty, collectively and separately, to inform and to warn their constituents about the build-up of Soviet arms, and the threat to their countries from the cleverly-named peace movements (more properly they should be called pacifist movements) with their emphasis on unilateral nuclear disarmament and hostility to the United States.

54. The comments made in the earlier part of this report emphasise the fundamental unity of WEU member states as shown by their attitude towards Recommendation 383.

55. There has not yet been time for full discussion of Recommendation 388 or general reaction to it, but there can be no doubt that Europe is only beginning to appreciate the carefully organised and orchestrated strategy of the peace movements. This will be dealt with later in this paper.

Multilateral disarmament: the path of hope

56. In the face of the Soviet Union's one-nation arms race over the past fifteen years, the NATO allies now have no choice but to respond in order to preserve peace.

57. But this requirement has not caused us to lose sight of our overall objective – the achievement of balanced reductions in armaments by both sides – nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional – leading to general and complete disarmament.

58. NATO's initiatives for multilateral disarmament offer the maintenance of peace with freedom in the nuclear age. Two key propositions have been put to the Soviets:

- (i) a one-third reduction by both sides in strategic nuclear warheads;
- (ii) to stop the deployment to Western Europe of cruise and Pershing II missiles, if the Soviet Union scraps its deployment of SS-20s which directly threaten our civilian populations.

59. We must convince our fellow citizens that the path to peace in the nuclear age is exclusively in the pursuit of multilateral – not unilateral – disarmament.

The nuclear build-up in Europe

60. Since the mid-sixties, when the United States unilaterally withdrew its Thor and Jupiter missiles from Europe, NATO has had no land-based missiles in Europe. The Soviets

not only failed to reciprocate this gesture, but continued to build SS-4 and SS-5 missiles until they had some 600 deployed against Western Europe. At the height of détente in the late seventies, the Soviets introduced the mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile known as the SS-20 and the Backfire supersonic nuclear-strike bomber.

61. The deployment of the SS-20 alone has resulted in doubling to 1,200 the numbers of Soviet nuclear warheads aimed at the cities and civilian populations of Western Europe. This is, of course, apart from warheads carried by the Backfire bombers, currently being built at the rate of thirty-five per year and each capable of delivering four missiles with nuclear warheads. With the decommissioning this year of Britain's Vulcan bombers, the nuclear balance in Europe is tilting sharply against the western allies.

Peace campaigns are sweeping Europe

62. In spite of the facts shown above, the peace movements are gaining vast media and TV coverage throughout Europe. Their successful demonstrations reached their climax during the Easter holiday period of 1983.

63. Most of the demonstrations have an anti-nuclear flavour, but are basically anti-American and anti-NATO.

64. In West Germany, over the Easter period, it is estimated that a total of 500,000 people will have joined in ninety events. Thousands have demonstrated in the Netherlands and even Switzerland has become a platform for demonstrations. In Southern Italy at Comiso there have been continuing demonstrations and in Britain the women's anti-nuclear movement (centred on the demonstrations at Greenham Common United States air base) has become a central news feature. Only in France has the anti-nuclear campaign been muted.

How is the peace movement organised internationally?

65. The most authoritative document yet produced on this subject is "Soviet manipulation of the European peace movement" by Dr. W. Joshua, published in the "Strategic Review" 1983. She quoted a former KGB officer saying:

"The trick is to make people support Soviet policy unwittingly by convincing them they are supporting something else. Almost everybody wants peace and fears war."

66. The most important "front" organisation is mentioned in paragraph 32 of our report in answer to a question by Mr. Atkinson and is the World Peace Council. As Dr. Joshua reminds us:

"Based in Helsinki since 1968, it claims some 135 national chapters throughout the world. Most of its funding comes from Moscow. Its current president, the Indian communist Romesh Chandra, was apparently 'discovered' in the 1960s by R.G. Bogdanov, a KGB colonel and now, appropriately, one of the deputies of the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada."

67. Responsibility for the World Peace Council rests with Vitaly Shaposhnikov, a Deputy Chief of the International Department. The latter is also a member of the Council's Presidential Committee.

68. The World Peace Council and its affiliates have played an important rôle in organising demonstrations and conferences in both the anti-neutron bomb and anti-INF campaigns. For example, the Council sponsored an "international conference against the arms race" in June 1981 in Stockholm. The meeting drew representatives from thirty European countries, the United States and Canada. Not surprisingly, it condemned the INF programme. The World Peace Council also staged an "international organisations meeting" in September 1981 in Prague to discuss ways to avert nuclear war.

69. By organising anti-nuclear rallies and advocating Soviet-endorsed disarmament policies, the World Peace Council exploits fears of nuclear war.

70. It is difficult exactly to trace Soviet financing for the peace movements, but the CIA estimates that the activities of the World Peace Council, the Prague-based Christian Peace Council and other international front organisations are costing the Soviets about \$63 million per year. Many of the peace organisations are openly or covertly supported by local communist parties who receive finance from Warsaw Pact countries - for instance, the West German Communist Party from the East German Government.

71. At the present time in Europe, the peace movements seem to be flourishing most strongly in the Netherlands, in West Germany and to a lesser extent in Britain. In these largely protestant countries, churchmen have become particularly vulnerable to pacifist propaganda and this gives a spurious respectability to the movements. However, the Roman Catholic Church appears to retain a more aloof stance.

The counter-thrust

72. As our report shows, there is a remarkable solidarity among the governments of the WEU member countries for European defence strategy and this seems to be reflected in the majority view of the Assembly. Opposition to this strategy now appears to be gaining strength through organisations which exist *outside* parliaments rather than from inside. Thus, if we are not to lose the defence argument, it will be necessary for parliamentarians to take the argument right out to the public and fight the battle in the towns and villages rather than just in the debating chamber.

73. For those who believe in defence and multilateral disarmament, it may now be necessary to campaign actively in our countries to clarify the issues and counter Soviet misinformation. It would be dangerous for parliamentarians to allow the pacifist arguments to go unanswered and it will be constantly necessary to remind the public, in the words of a famous churchman, that "It is futile for sheep to pass resolutions in favour of vegetarianism unless the wolves are prepared to do the same".

IX. Point of view of Mr. Dejardin

74. Analysis of action taken on the two Assembly recommendations concerned and of their effects in national parliaments brings two elements to light :

- (i) the insufficient response in member countries to the work of the WEU Assembly;
- (ii) the discrepancy between "official" government positions and those expressed among public opinion.

75. Neither is likely to console the Assembly, either with regard to its functioning and efficacy or to its ability to represent all points of view.

A. Efficacy of the Assembly

76. The concern of the protagonists of the modified Brussels Treaty to avoid duplication of work between WEU and other international organisations on the one hand and, on the other hand, the decision expressed in the resolution of 20th December 1950 that it was no longer necessary to maintain the Western Union defence organisation in its present form (i.e. transfer of the exercise of the military activities of the Brussels Treaty Organisation to NATO), together with the creation of the North Atlantic Assembly and the development of its activities resulted in the audience and political efficacy of the Assembly being restricted.

77. Moreover, WEU and its Assembly suffer from underlying fundamental disagreement about the objective to be attained, a fundamental disagreement which was at the root of the failure of the EDC between the concept of Europe as a structure which would dominate relations between states and do away with their free will and the concept expressed among others by General de Gaulle that in building Europe use must be made of the free will of states and a European will created common to the states concerned.

78. The first concept, promoted for instance by Mr. Schuman, Mr. Monnet and Mr. Spaak, is moreover the reason for the European Parliament's claim to handle defence and security matters, as emerges from the recent report by Mr. Ferguson.

79. When debating the reports by Mr. Mommersteeg and Mr. Lagorce, the WEU Assembly was able to tackle a "hot" topical subject. The debates were lively and meaningful but nevertheless the media showed very limited interest in them in spite of the efforts of the WEU press department.

80. But the desire to revise the rôle of WEU shown by the French and Italian Governments and recognition by the governments of all member states of the exclusive nature of the responsibility of WEU and its Assembly for the military aspects of defence and security matters could lead to new dynamism and a new identification of essential collective defence in Europe, which is a factor of joint security and integration.

81. Ever since it was set up, the Assembly has considered that Article IX of the treaty acknowledged its parliamentary rôle stemming from the application of the treaty and that it was entitled to exercise the same general responsibilities as the Council. It has a purely consultative rôle because it has no real powers. Its audience depends closely on the interest aroused by its activities and follow-up action in national parliaments through reports by its members there.

82. Would it be impertinent to wonder about the real will of each one to assume this task to the full ?

83. In spite of everything, human relations in politics as elsewhere are dominated by a balance of forces.

84. All experts in defence or security questions and circles competent in such matters testify unanimously to the high standard of the Assembly's work. So that is not the problem.

85. On the "technical" level, the balance is very positive but on the political level it is not, although the conclusions adopted by a majority

of the Assembly largely coincide with the positions of governments and NATO bodies, particularly in the case of the two recommendations referred to in this report.

B. *Discrepancy with public opinion*

86. In his report to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on East-West relations, Mr. Lied refers to various public opinion polls which clearly bring out a majority expression of hostility to the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe. He also recalls that it is against war that a section of public opinion is militating and he considers this public opinion to have been earlier anaesthetised by faith in détente.

87. It is certain that never before have initiatives in favour of peace through disarmament met with such a favourable response among the population. Not so long ago "anti-nuclear marches" and other similar demonstrations were mainly a matter for young people's organisations and marginal groups to the left of the political stage. Moreover, the fact that communist parties were active in these initiatives and unconditionally espoused even the most undefendable positions of the Soviet Union too often and unfairly led to rejection by "traditional" political forces.

88. Today the situation has changed. No doubt the fact that a number of former young activists of movements and initiatives for peace and against war (even cold) are now in responsible political positions must be taken into consideration. However, this is not enough to explain the change, even if most of them are to be found in the ranks of the demonstrators. Political parties with a government vocation such as the socialists, social democrats and christian democrats openly adopt positions in favour of anti-nuclear objectives and disarmament negotiations and, as Mr. Lied says, they meet what appear to be the aspirations of large sections of the population.

89. It would be derisory as well as inaccurate to seek explanations for this trend of opinion in the effects of Soviet propaganda when circles favourable to NATO's decision of 12th December 1979 have at their disposal more extensive means of information and hence of mobilising public opinion.

90. But until now the latter have not been able to gather together enough adepts to organise demonstrations, apart from a few sparsely-attended academic meetings.

91. Would it not be worthwhile to describe the origins of the present pacifist movements?

92. They really started just before the first United Nations General Assembly special session on disarmament. Their action is therefore fundamentally based on the principles laid down and the statements made during that session.

93. Its importance became apparent in Europe following NATO's decision of 12th December 1979 and in the autumn 1981 demonstrations. In the United States, it was seen on the occasion of the demonstration organised in New York on 12th June 1982 by the Freeze Now Movement during the second United Nations session on disarmament.

94. These movements have a number of new characteristics:

- their mass effect;
- their instigators are either from the churches or from large co-ordinating committees bringing together most young people's organisations, pacifist groups, trade union organisations and political parties in which overt or covert communist influence is more often than not to be felt only among a minority;
- their ability to assess the nuclear stakes (the Western European movements in fact now have their own independent experts, for instance in Belgium there is GRIP - group for research and information on peace).

95. The biggest mistake their opponents might make would be not to recognise their real independence of the military-political-industrial blocs for, in order to thwart them, they would have to bypass the democratic strategy of convincing by objective information and adopt an unacceptable strategy of violence which would be tantamount to repudiating the democracy to which all subscribe.

96. To deny the independence of views and sincerity of the opponent soon leads to overt or covert violence. Particularly since opponents of the deployment of nuclear weapons in both East and West are as undeniably voluntarist as unaligned in attaining their goals.

97. The German and Nordic movements are more unilateralist, i.e. they call on each partner in negotiations to take the initiative of "independent steps" towards disarmament, while movements in Latin areas concentrate more on bilateral, simultaneous steps.

98. Nevertheless, a common will to prevent the installation of Euromissiles was again expressed last February at a Western European co-ordination meeting at Bradford (United Kingdom) which included France and Spain

and at Easter demonstrations in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic.

99. The Western European movement inspired the United States Freeze Now Movement and is now encouraging similar action in Eastern Europe. In the German Democratic Republic there is the Protestant Church movement and in Hungary the Independent Peace Movement.

100. Views on the nature of pacifist organisations and demonstrations for peace and disarmament very often lead to heated discussion.

101. In fact, for a long time the unilateralism of the world peace campaign made some people think that the movements fighting for peace and disarmament would be remote-controlled. However, a few recent events are likely to invalidate such a view, for instance the incidents provoked in Sofia in 1980 by western participants in an international demonstration for peace at which some of the latter publicly denounced the Manichaeism of pro-Soviet pacifism. Again, in East Berlin at the end of 1982 the Belgian delegates to the conference of eastern and western Christians condemned the arms race by the two superpowers.

102. It is now the Soviets themselves who talk about incomprehension, particularly in letters from Mr. Yuri Jukov, Chairman of the Soviet Committee for the Defence of Peace and substitute member of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, and from a Komsomol leader to CNAPD (the Belgian committee which co-ordinates pacifist and young people's associations and all action and demonstrations in Belgium against the arms race). In these letters, the two Soviet officials paternalistically warn western movements against the risks of anti-Sovietism, because in its directives CNAPD rejects unilateral declarations and challenges the deployment of all nuclear weapons in Europe, in both East and West.

103. Again, the support publicly expressed by western pacifists for "unofficial" pacifist initiatives in communist countries, including the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania, is obviously little comfort for the authorities in those countries.

104. Analysis of all these factors confirms the real independence of the peace movement of the eighties and its proximity to the social misgivings of the population, victims of the crisis. In its ranks was born the slogan "Disarm to develop", thus extending the objective to third world concerns.

105. The danger of social control inherent in speeding up the arms race just as much as a perilous orientation of economic growth are increasingly encouraging people to opt for the alternative chances of greater freedom and democracy and another form of economic development thanks to disarmament.

106. In this connection, the rift between very large sections of the population, if not the majority (according to inquiries, polls and the undoubted success of demonstrations on a scale hitherto unprecedented), and the present governments of member states seems to be growing deeper.

107. However, examination of ministers' replies to parliamentarians, government communiqués and positions publicly adopted by a large number of political leaders shows a steady inflection of the determination initially expressed at the end of 1979, not only among socialists and social democrats but also among christian democrats and others.

108. Nor is it possible to gloss over the changed attitudes shown in new proposals by both East and West and the revival of the Geneva negotiations.

109. There is no doubt that this is an effect of constant public pressure aroused by the now co-ordinated pacifist and anti-nuclear movements which also have an influence in the East, although still inadequate.

110. The governments of member states intend to respect the December 1979 commitment; however, they can see the growing hostility of public opinion which is perhaps insufficiently informed but which is increasingly militant because it senses the danger involved in any lowering of the nuclear threshold and the proliferation of arsenals of all sorts in both Eastern and Western Europe.

111. What can come of such a situation? In a democratic system, who should have the "last word"? Military experts or the political will expressed by a majority of the people?

112. The Assembly is caught up in this dilemma and its member parliamentarians will certainly not find the road of wisdom through polemics, even if this is, rightly or wrongly, an intrinsic part of the political debate.

113. To endeavour by hook or by crook to impose nuclear over-armament in Europe and to caricature the positions in this matter of all concerned would in the long run turn the people of Europe completely away from any collective defence system or military alliance and consequently would most certainly frustrate the ambitions of WEU and its Assembly.

APPENDIX

*Recommendations 383 and 388 and the replies of the Council*RECOMMENDATION 383¹*on the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe*²

The Assembly,

- (i) Believing that the balance of all nuclear forces can be assessed only as a whole, but noting that the Soviet Union has a disturbing superiority in heavy intercontinental missiles and in intermediate-range forces, while the United States lead in total numbers of nuclear warheads has been reduced;
- (ii) Believing that arms control and adequate defence measures are two sides of a balanced security policy designed to prevent war, not only nuclear war;
- (iii) Stressing the importance of the conventional component of the NATO deterrent forces;
- (iv) Reiterating its belief that the NATO dual decision of 17th December 1979 remains the basis both for adjusting the imbalance in intermediate-range forces, an imbalance which has been increased by the deployment of 300 SS-20s so far reported, and for negotiating the zero option;
- (v) Regretting that SALT II remains unratified although at the time of its signature endorsed by the Assembly and all NATO governments as a step in a necessarily continuous process of strategic arms control negotiations, and that nearly three years have elapsed since its signature without further progress;
- (vi) Welcoming the declaration of the United States Government that it will refrain from actions which undercut existing strategic arms agreements as long as the USSR shows equal restraints, and comparable statements of the Soviet Union, and appealing to both governments to formalise those statements at the opening of the START negotiations;
- (vii) Believing that in view of the mutual benefits of such control the strategic arms reduction talks should be opened urgently and pursued independently of other aspects of East-West relations, and welcoming therefore President Reagan's speech of 9th May 1982 calling for them to open at the end of June, and making realistic proposals for significant reductions of strategic nuclear weapons;
- (viii) Hoping also that the opening of those talks will have a beneficial effect on the INF negotiations which must be conducted in the framework of START;
- (ix) Stressing the need for a verifiable comprehensive test ban in order to block the development of ever more sophisticated nuclear weapons;
- (x) Stressing the importance of concrete confidence-building measures of the type agreed at Helsinki as a precursor and complement of balanced reductions in the armouries of both sides;
- (xi) Seeing in most peace demonstrations both in Europe and the United States, an expression of deep and justified concern about the dangers of an unrestricted arms race and the possibility of nuclear war;
- (xii) Regretting however the unilateral trends and over-simplifications apparent within movements which ignore the need for military stability, both nuclear and conventional, and for objective analysis of the facts in order to negotiate reductions;
- (xiii) Welcoming the publication of "NATO and the Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons" for which the Assembly has repeatedly called, and believing that a continuing effort must be made by governments and parliamentarians to inform the public objectively about the nature of the threat and the basis of allied defence and arms control policies;
- (xiv) Regretting that in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union public opinion has no opportunity to discuss freely the concepts on which European and international security should be based,

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (4th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 918).

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

- A. Call on member governments acting in the North Atlantic Council,**
- 1. To continue the present much improved close and continuous consultations to ensure that an agreed allied position is maintained on all aspects of nuclear deterrence and nuclear arms control;**
 - 2. To ensure that preparations continue in the countries concerned for the deployment from 1983 of the agreed levels of ground-launched cruise and Pershing II missiles less any reductions previously agreed in the INF talks;**
 - 3. To press for the earliest agreement in the INF talks on the zero option for land-based missiles, and the step-by-step pursuit of these talks to include other weapons systems, and the eventual inclusion of battlefield systems in these or the MBFR talks;**
 - 4. To welcome the resumption of the SALT process through the proposed opening of START in June, and to press for the closest linking of these to the INF talks and the continued mutual respect of all SALT limits during the negotiations;**
 - 5. To give increased emphasis to the negotiation and adoption of effective procedures for verification, as essential for any agreement on arms control and reduction;**
 - 6. To ask the United States Government to examine seriously Senator Jackson's proposal for a joint United States-Soviet Union command post in a neutral country to deter the possibility of war by accident or miscalculation;**
 - 7. To bring up to date and publish from time to time on an agreed objective basis the NATO comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, and to urge the Soviet Union to be equally forthcoming and objective in publishing force comparisons;**
- B.1. Call on member governments to pursue active information policies, to ensure that public opinion is objectively informed both about the nature of the threat and about the purposes of allied defence and arms control and reduction policies;**
- B.2. Develop a European approach to the political aspects of the discussions in the North Atlantic Council.**

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 383

1. The Council welcome the continued interest of the Assembly in the matter of intermediate nuclear forces (INF) and take careful note of the Assembly's views. The Council endorse many of the opinions expressed in the recommendation and its preamble, notably the need for arms control and defence measures to complement each other in a balanced security policy, and the importance of the 1979 double decision as the basis for redressing the imbalance in INF.
2. The Council agree with the Assembly on the need to continue the current consultations amongst the allies on the subject of the INF negotiations. They welcome the addition of regular briefings of the North Atlantic Council, by the leaders of the United States Delegation to these INF negotiations, to the continued series of meetings of the Special Consultative Group for those member countries which participated in the dual decision of December 1979.
3. The Council further agree with the Assembly on the importance to be attached to preparations for the deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles. NATO's resolve in implementing its 12th December 1979 decision was the key factor in persuading the Soviet Union to enter into arms control negotiations in Geneva and will continue to be crucial to achieving concrete results. Members of the Council who participated in the December 1979 decision will continue to do all within their power to promote early progress towards negotiated agreement on the basis of the so-called "zero option" or "zero-level outcome" for American and Soviet longer-range land-based INF missiles. They reconfirm that the negotiations should, as a priority, relate to these systems which constitute the greatest threat. They do not rule out the possibility that in the event of agreement, subsequent phases of the negotiations may relate to other INF systems. They believe that it would be premature to prejudge the forum in which any arms control agreement covering short-range or battlefield nuclear systems might be considered.
4. The Council are happy to repeat the welcome which has been given by member governments to the renewal of strategic arms control through the opening of the START talks and to the assurances that what has been achieved through existing agreements will not be undercut pending the negotiation of a START agreement, subject to reciprocity. The Council endorse the Assembly's concern to see effective verification measures in any arms control agreement.
5. The Council doubt that the United States Government need outside encouragement to keep under review the existing measures to prevent any possibility of war by accident or miscalculation and in this respect have noted the initiatives outlined by President Reagan in his speech in Berlin in June 1982.
6. The Council agree that the figures published on the forces of the integrated military structure of the alliance and of the Warsaw Pact, such as those in the NATO force comparisons paper published in the spring of 1982 may need to be updated from time to time. They also accept that member governments will need to continue their active information policies to ensure that public opinion is well informed about alliance security policy, and the threat faced by members of NATO.
7. As regards a European approach to the political aspects of the discussions in the North Atlantic Council, the European members of the alliance discuss the issues on the agenda of the North Atlantic Council with each other as well as with their North Atlantic allies, as part of normal consultations. A number of these subjects are also discussed by the members of the European Community as a normal part of the Community's political co-operation procedures.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th November 1982.

RECOMMENDATION 388¹***on the problems for European security
arising from pacifism and neutralism***²

The Assembly,

Considering that the development of neutralist and pacifist movements in Europe and throughout the world makes it all the more necessary to examine the justification of the security, defence and disarmament policy pursued by the western countries;

Noting that deterrence, which is the basis of this policy, depends largely on the existence of strategic nuclear weapons;

Considering that implementation of the NATO twofold decision of December 1979 is encountering negative reactions from citizens of WEU member countries;

Welcoming the opening of the START negotiations – including the part of the Geneva negotiations on so-called Eurostrategic weapons – and the resumption or revival of other negotiations designed to reduce the level of forces and armaments in Europe and elsewhere;

Considering that unilateral initiatives in disarmament matters would cause those negotiations to fail and would jeopardise the foundations of Europe's security and deploring the growing evidence of Soviet involvement with and funding of pacifist movements pursuing unilateral disarmament in the West;

Considering that pacifist movements are entitled to call for new initiatives from the members of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact to achieve substantial progress in the negotiations on disarmament;

Considering that assistance to the third world is morally, economically and politically essential for all industrialised countries, quite apart from any considerations relating to their defence budgets;

Noting that the situation of each Western European country forces each country to shape its defence policy and attitude towards disarmament according to its own particular conditions and strongly influences the course followed by pacifist movements;

Considering nevertheless that any serious progress towards European political union requires close co-ordination of national policies in these fields;

Considering that WEU is an appropriate framework for consultations between the European members of the Atlantic Alliance on all matters relating to defence and disarmament;

Regretting that Recommendation 379 on the activation of the WEU Council and its dependent bodies has not been effectively followed up by the Council,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Demand that participating states strive to ensure the success of the various ongoing negotiations on the limitation or reduction of armaments and forces in Europe and in the rest of the world;

2. Announce its unambiguous support for any proposal for the complete renunciation by the United States and the Soviet Union of medium-range nuclear weapons or, failing that, for the establishment of a true balance at the lowest possible level and to agree to the deployment of such weapons on the territory of member countries only as long as this goal has not been attained within the time limit laid down in the NATO decision of December 1979;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1982 during the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (9th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Lagorce on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 934).

3. Ensure that full, accurate and objective information on the levels of forces and armaments of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact is regularly made public;
4. Ensure that in any event Western Europe's development assistance policy is pursued and strengthened, particularly in the framework of the European Communities;
5. Effectively concert the defence policies of member countries and their positions towards disarmament with a view to working out a European approach to such matters.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 388***

The Council have noted with interest Recommendation 388 on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism, which illustrates the importance attached by the WEU Assembly to the security aspirations voiced by public opinion in the member countries.

1. The Council take this opportunity to reassert that for the maintenance of peace it is essential to establish a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. They are wholeheartedly in favour of a successful conclusion to the current negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union on their respective nuclear forces. For their part, the member countries of WEU fully support the efforts made in this direction by the United States, whose so-called "zero-zero option" proposal relating to INF constitutes an important initiative, and whose global approach they fully endorse. They hope that the Soviet Union will also contribute to the achievement of speedy progress.

The WEU member countries are also very concerned by the imbalance in favour of the USSR and the countries of the East which characterises the force relationship in conventional weapons. WEU member countries, who are all taking part in the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting, are in favour of the speedy conclusion of this meeting with a balanced and substantial concluding document which includes a mandate for a conference on disarmament in Europe, as proposed by France. Those of them who take part in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna are striving to achieve a more stable situation in Europe through the establishment of parity in the conventional forces in Central Europe in the form of a common and collective ceiling.

2. The decision of 12th December 1979 providing for a limited modernisation of intermediate-range nuclear forces, combined with a parallel offer of negotiations on American and Soviet weapons of this kind, was referred to clearly and fully in the communiqué issued after the last ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council (9th and 10th December 1982). The member countries of WEU wish to reaffirm their commitment to the terms of this communiqué of the Atlantic Alliance to which they all belong.

3. As the Council have repeatedly stated, they take the view that the security policy of the member countries – consisting of deterrence and defence as well as of arms control and disarmament – enjoys the genuine support of the overwhelming majority of public opinion. The information activity carried out within parliamentary bodies can also contribute to this support; this task requires that the fullest possible information be given on the alliance's position and on the threats facing its members. With this end in mind, the member states of WEU will continue to answer any questions on this topic which might be raised by public opinion in their countries.

4. The policy of Western Europe on development aid is a natural component of its foreign policy; the member countries of WEU are convinced that this policy secures international stability.

This aid – already reflected in the considerable efforts made bilaterally by the countries represented on the Council – is also provided continuously and actively on a multilateral basis. This is evidenced by the Lomé Conventions concluded by the European Communities and the many consultations which have been held over the past year and which are continuing with the aim of achieving better co-ordination and consolidation of the measures taken by the international aid institutions.

5. The member countries of WEU will continue to seek ways of strengthening their concerted action within various bodies and at various levels on matters of security and disarmament; in so doing they will affirm the specific nature of their common interest in the matter. Better co-operation between European states in the field of security and disarmament offers possibilities for strengthening the dialogue and co-operation with the United States.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th March 1983.

*Political activities of the WEU Council
Reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Frederic Bennett (Chairman); MM. De Poi, Urwin (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Mrs. Baaryeld-Schlaman, MM. Berrier, Bertile (Alternate: Caro), Bogaerts, Conti Persini, Gessner, Hardy (Alternate: Lord Hughes), Lagneau (Alternate: Steverlynck),*

Lagorce, Lord McNair, MM. Michel, Müller, Prouvost (Alternate: Baumel), Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Rösch (Alternate: Vohrer), van der Sanden, Thoss, Valiante, Vecchietti, van der Werff, Wilquin, Zito.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

*on the political activities of the WEU Council –
reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) Reaffirming its determination to fulfil the whole range of its duties by dealing as thoroughly as possible with the many aspects of European security;
- (ii) Recalling that the exercise of its responsibilities calls for a meaningful dialogue with the Council;
- (iii) Convinced that this dialogue will be easier to develop if the Council plays a more active rôle in concerting European activities in areas within its competence;
- (iv) Welcoming the full-bodied report on European political co-operation submitted by the Council but noting that, in exercising its mandate, the Council does not yet seem to have taken account of the desire expressed by several of its members to strengthen their co-operation in various fields relating to their security;
- (v) Welcoming the transmission by the Council of the declassified version of the study by the Standing Armaments Committee on member countries' armaments industries and noting that in its reply to Recommendation 379 the Council confirmed the task given to the SAC;
- (vi) Recalling that the mandate instructing the SAC to promote European armaments co-operation implies that it take account of the latest decisions by NATO bodies in regard to defence plans,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Apply its competence in full by studying and tackling certain security problems which call for a concerted European approach;
2. In that context instruct the SAC *inter alia* to complete its study without delay, with the addition of proposals to remove economic and legal obstacles to better co-operation between the armaments industries of member countries and transmit the results of this study to the Assembly;
3. Instruct the SAC to study the possible implications for European armaments production of the decisions taken by the NATO Defence Planning Committee in December 1982.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In his reply to the annual report of the Council for 1981, Mr. Vecchietti, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, rightly underlined a degree of uncertainty among member governments with regard to WEU, and Recommendation 379 made a number of suggestions and called on the Council to give its views on them. It cannot be said that the reply to that recommendation, any more than the annual report for 1982, threw much light on the points raised last year.

2. The reasons why the situation has not been clarified are probably not confined to WEU. Consideration by the European Parliament of two reports seeking to assert its own ability to examine matters which are WEU's responsibility has not been at all conclusive. It is encountering difficulties stressed for instance by Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence, when he addressed the WEU Assembly on 30th November 1982:

"The European Community, by virtue of the treaties on which it is founded, is not competent to deal with defence questions. Moreover, the presence of a neutral state makes any de facto extension of its authority in the realm of security problematical."

3. Similarly, the proposal for a European act made by Mr. Genscher and Mr. Colombo has so far led to no firm commitment by governments. Nevertheless, if this Assembly wishes its views to continue to retain the attention of the governments, as the Council maintains that it does, it must relentlessly scrutinise the ways in which Europe should organise itself in order to handle its defence and security problems and also, as the Council urges it to do, "extend its debates to all the extremely varied themes which raise the problems relating to the security of European countries". This, in any case, is the course being followed by the General Affairs Committee. It is also the sense of the recent publication by five prominent leaders of foreign affairs institutes of five member countries entitled "The European Community: progress or decline?" which makes positive reference to the position of WEU in Europe.

4. However, in the last year there have been signs that after ten years of apparent somnolence following the United Kingdom's accession

to the European Communities WEU is at last beginning to stir, although it is not yet possible to distinguish suggestion from proposal or encouragement from initiative. These signs may be listed as follows:

5.(i) The French Government renewed its gestures of interest in the organisation at the last two sessions by sending its Minister for External Relations and then its Minister of Defence to address the Assembly in terms similar to the proposals made by Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State for Defence, in November 1981 and February 1982. Furthermore, Mr. Mauroy, Prime Minister, addressing members of the Assembly on 29th November 1982, stressed and explained France's interest in WEU. All ministers from member countries who addressed the Assembly at the two part-sessions in 1982 indicated that they approved these proposals.

6.(ii) There were two changes at the top of the organisation at the end of 1982: Ambassador Diesel replaced Ambassador Schlaich as Deputy Secretary-General and Mr. Hintermann replaced Ambassador Plantey as Assistant Secretary-General, head of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. The latter was not a national civil servant but an expert in international questions who had been pursuing a political career. He is therefore well placed to give the SAC a political impetus which had perhaps been lacking hitherto. In any event, his appointment meets to some extent a concern expressed several times by the General Affairs Committee, particularly in Recommendation 103 in December 1963, for the secretariat-general to be led by a "political personality" which, according to the Council's reply of 3rd April 1964, was "unnecessary at the moment". The Assembly is satisfied to note that, at least where the head of the international secretariat of the SAC is concerned, the Council believes that circumstances have since changed.

7. Your Rapporteur wishes to take this opportunity of expressing the Assembly's thanks to Ambassador Schlaich and Ambassador Plantey who, in their respective capacities, served WEU with both competence and devotion.

8.(iii) The reply to Recommendation 380 announced that the Council had undertaken the study on "technical, military and political aspects" of problems raised by a possible

change in the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III and the cancellation of paragraphs V and VI of Annex III to the same protocol, which should allow the control system of the Agency for the Control of Armaments to be better adapted to "the evolution of the situation in Europe". This probably means that the seven governments now agree that the whole system of arms controls conducted by WEU should be reviewed and it is gratifying that instead of merely looking for ways to reduce the budget and possibly abolish posts they are facing up to the present situation in Europe and its implications for armaments control.

9.(iv) At the Franco-German summit meeting in October 1982, the two countries decided to extend the scope of their regular bilateral consultations to security and defence matters. In the absence of adequate information on action taken on this decision, it is not yet possible to assess its exact impact, but statements by the French authorities hint at a desire for a concerted European approach to these matters, and the Federal Republic has always shown it was prepared to go as far in this direction as its French partners wished provided it was not detrimental to the rôle of NATO and relations between Europe and the United States, which remain the basis of the security of Europe and of the Federal Republic.

10. Such consultations do not concern WEU directly. Nevertheless, they could possibly modify certain aspects of co-operation in the organisation, first because neither the Federal Republic nor probably France envisages keeping within bilateral limits consultations between the two countries on security questions which cannot stop at their frontiers but which necessarily concern the whole of Central Europe, and second because if these consultations progress favourably they might promote agreement on matters over which divergences between the European allies had blocked the activities of WEU. The Assembly would be most interested to receive any information about this which would allow it to complete its study of the situation.

II. Relations between the Council and the Assembly

11. The foregoing remarks relate to the signs of movement and not the probable outcome of that movement. The Council's statements and even those of governments of countries most in favour of relaunching WEU's activities do not yet allow a very accurate idea to be obtained of the extent of the possible evolution. As Mr. Vecchiotti pointed out in the explanatory memorandum to the General Affairs Committee's reply to the Council's annual report for

1981, France, by leaving the NATO integrated military organisation, created a new situation, the full consequences of which for Europe's security are yet to be seen. It is for France therefore to make proposals on the nature and extent of European defence co-operation as it sees it.

12. The present French Government has clearly said what it expects of the WEU Assembly and the ideas it has expressed on the subject have been widely endorsed by the other governments. They have been effective, as shown by the agenda of recent Assembly sessions, because they corresponded very closely to the Assembly's own concept of its rôle. The Council fell short of the French proposals however where the Standing Armaments Committee is concerned. In November 1982, Mr. Hernu took up the remarks made by Mr. Lemoine the year before:

"A year ago, Mr. Georges Lemoine, Secretary of State for Defence, speaking here, made a number of proposals aimed at giving more content to the work of your Assembly and of WEU as a whole, and making it more effective. He suggested in particular that the Standing Armaments Committee should serve systematically as a 'design office' for the Assembly, to tackle directly certain fundamental political problems, the independent in-depth treatment of which calls for a self-contained analysis and research service. The balance of Soviet-American conventional forces, an analysis of the pacifist movements, etc., would be among the possible subjects. These suggestions are still on the table and it is up to the parliamentarians and the member states to implement them. For instance, what would there be against placing the Standing Armaments Committee at the service of the Assembly, provided the Assembly and Council of WEU agreed? We support such a reform which could be very useful even though some may feel it to be modest. I call upon them to show their good will, for it will be difficult for them to convince anyone that major projects in the sphere of defence policy in Europe can be implemented if there is no way of furthering realistic and reasonable proposals."

13. In the end, the Council agreed to this co-operation only on certain conditions, as stressed in its reply to Recommendation 379:

"As regards the Standing Armaments Committee, which also was the subject of proposals by the State Secretary of the French Ministry of Defence, the Council recall that this body was set up on 7th

May 1955 to promote co-operation in the matter of armaments. If in this respect the international secretariat of the SAC were occasionally to assist the Assembly in the study of clearly-defined themes, this could only be done under a procedure involving a case-by-case examination by the Council, under whom the SAC is placed. It is clear that such work could not have the effect of relieving the SAC of its responsibilities nor could it affect its competence, these being the Council's exclusive responsibility."

Here it met the concern expressed by the Assembly when it adopted the draft recommendation submitted by the General Affairs Committee urging that the Council:

"Ensure that the possible extension of tasks given to the SAC does not result in that body being relieved of its present responsibilities."

14. There therefore seems to be wide agreement between the Assembly and the Council that, while the SAC and its international secretariat may be asked to assist the Assembly to a certain extent, they remain intergovernmental bodies and there is no need to modify their status, which corresponds to the reason for their existence. It is to be hoped that the pursuit of the assistance to be afforded by the SAC in the preparation of a report by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions will allow methods of work to be defined more clearly.

15. It is understandable that the French Government should have considered turning the SAC and its international secretariat in this new direction, particularly as the Assembly itself had requested it. In some respects, it is the result of the conclusions drawn from the SAC's meagre achievements in its own specific field. It may be wondered whether, within the limits assigned to it by its terms of reference, the Council's decision of 7th May 1955 and the Council's constant concern to avoid duplication of work between the international institutions, the SAC has really fulfilled its assigned rôle.

16. As it was only in May 1982 that the Assembly received an almost complete version of the study on European armaments industries, which had been prepared for it following requests first from the General Affairs Committee (Recommendations 293, 330, 335, 358 and 374) and then by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, it has not until now had an opportunity of expressing its views on the document. Moreover, the General Affairs Committee is not required to give its views on armaments problems proper but only on the legal and economic aspects of the study, as it

has already done at the Brussels symposium in 1979 and in many of its replies to annual reports of the Council. Similarly, the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions showed its interest in certain aspects of the study in Recommendation 381.

17. The document sent to the Assembly is only a declassified version of a fuller text handed to the Council part by part, starting in 1978, and which was not communicated to the Assembly. Possibly therefore some of the following remarks may not apply. Some clarification was given however in the paper submitted by Ambassador Plantey, then Assistant Secretary-General of WEU and head of the international secretariat of the SAC, to the General Affairs Committee at the symposium on a European armaments policy held in Brussels from 15th to 17th October 1979 on the juridical conditions of defence procurement.

18. The mandate given to the SAC on 31st May 1976 and 26th May 1977 to conduct a study on the armaments industry of member countries was but a first stage in implementing the proposal made by Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, and adopted by the WEU Council in London on 2nd May 1975. When speaking about these proposals to the Assembly on 5th December 1974, Mr. Van Elslande described them as follows :

"I think it is now urgent to try to do something and to begin to shape a common policy. A number of major equipment and re-equipment programmes have to be implemented in the comparatively near future. It is urgent for Europe to seize upon this opportunity, which may be the last.

.....

The industrial problem, and that of exports which is closely bound up with it, are by far the most vast and most delicate. I believe that WEU could devote itself to the study of these questions, to which insufficient attention has hitherto been paid. WEU includes the chief European producers. The first step must be a thorough study of the structures of the military sectors in the economy of each country. We must also ascertain what is their relative importance, what forms of specialisation are possible and what can be done about the pooling and financing of research activities. Finally, we must determine the best ways towards progressive integration, taking account of existing financial structures and of alliances which may constitute an advantage or a disadvantage, depending on circumstances.

But transcending these studies, projects and cogitations, a common armaments policy soon comes to imply that decisions must be taken at the political level.”

19. A large part of the SAC's study was handed to the Council in May 1981, and it was approved in June. Even if it needs updating, the Council has had the text it requested since that date. There are no indications that in the meantime it has considered moving on to the second stage, in spite of the urgency stressed by Mr. Van Elslande of taking decisions at political level. Yet from the abridged and declassified version of the SAC study submitted to the Assembly (document SAC (82) 1A-D27 of April 1982) it can be seen that certain facts noted in the study would require, as a logical follow-up to the 1976-77 mandate, that a further mandate be given to the SAC to make suggestions and proposals to the Council.

(i) *Legal aspects*

20. (a) The remarks about the limited government *calls for tender* show restrictions on competition which must be removed if progress is to be made in European co-operation.

21. (b) When private firms carry out research and development for defence production at the request of governments, the latter normally reimburse expenditure incurred plus a profit margin, but retain rights over the results obtained. For European co-operation to be developed, the principles governing industrial patent rights allowing governments to communicate these results to other firms should be defined jointly to provide a basis for specific agreements between governments and firms.

22. (c) In the field of *industrial patents*, the procurement of armaments outside Western Europe should imply the simultaneous acquisition of the knowhow used.

23. (d) Contrary to general principles of the Common Market, Article 223 of the Rome Treaty authorises states to make *discriminatory arrangements* for firms producing equipment for defence purposes. Specific proposals might be made for limiting this authorisation, particularly in the case of conventional weapons.

24. (e) *Differences in legislation governing company law* are being studied by the EEC with a view to harmonisation, although no major results have yet been achieved. Such harmonisation would be of particular interest for armaments co-operation and might be the subject of a special study for the industries concerned.

25. (f) In order to facilitate transnational co-operation, *reciprocal assistance agreements* have been concluded by certain countries to allow development, tests and quality and price

controls by the local authorities on behalf of the foreign partner for whom the equipment is intended. Extension of such agreements to all WEU member countries might encourage transnational co-operation.

26. (g) Application by certain countries of *Article 223 of the Rome Treaty* to exempt from customs duties armaments procured outside the Community and in principle subject to the joint EEC customs tariff unduly favours certain sellers outside the Community. A joint study of the implications of Article 231 with a view to its uniform application would be of real interest.

(ii) *Economic aspects*

27. (a) The SAC study notes that “*the data collected are not always complete or homogeneous between one country and another*” and in particular that it is not always possible “to dissociate armaments production from the overall production of military equipment and supplies, or from co-operative and compensatory production”, and finally that “certain countries have no statistics on their armaments production”. An attempt to make data homogeneous would be a logical follow-up to the SAC study.

28. (b) The same is true of data relating to *imports and exports of military equipment*, in view of the fact that :

- “for most of the countries, the data in question concern deliveries actually made, whereas for some others only export licences granted are taken into account”;
- “no statistics on the export of military equipment are kept in certain countries”;
- “direct exchanges between industries are not always listed”;
- “transnational co-operation is not usually singled out in the statistics”;
- “national statistics on foreign trade do not allow comparisons in the strict sense of the word. This quantified information is not always uniform on account of differences in the definitions and the ways of drawing up statistics... They may or may not include figures on compensation and co-operation... and it is impossible to determine to what extent they include armaments imports in the form of semi-finished products”;
- “the available data on armaments imports and exports do not allow accurate conclusions to be made. Sta-

tistics do not single out, with any certainty, exchanges between WEU member countries, particularly where co-operative armaments production is concerned. Consequently, the foreign armaments trade of WEU, taken as a whole, cannot be estimated”.

29. (c) *Data on research* seem to suffer from the drawback reported in paragraph 14 of the study: “A fundamental aspect of this part of the study must be stressed: all the information contained therein comes from available official sources”. Indeed, as paragraph 18 indicates, “it was not possible to obtain information on the amounts spent by private firms from their own funds for military research and development. In certain countries these amounts could be considerable”. This remark makes one wonder about the value of the Council’s reply to Recommendation 381 of 24th November 1982 in which it agreed to invite the international secretariat of the SAC to assist in preparing a report on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields and to envisage drawing up a list of military research and development programmes which might be worthwhile matters for European or international co-operation.

30. As the Assembly has often said, the maintenance of good relations between the two WEU bodies depends not just on whatever friendly gestures the Council may make towards it – and it must be recognised that from this point of view the Assembly can but welcome the Council’s attitude towards it – but rather on the way in which the Council shoulders the tasks assigned to it by the modified Brussels Treaty. The principal difficulties stem from the Council’s own field of activities, i.e. basically from the governments’ will to apply the treaty in full with all that implies in the field of the joint production of armaments and political co-operation.

(iii) *Updating the study*

31. Parts of the SAC study have now been overtaken by events and it must be updated if it is to be followed up. In addition to bringing up to date the statistical elements, the scope of the study might be broadened, for instance :

- (a) *financial movements* resulting from imports and exports are not included, which limits the scope of the study considerably;
- (b) the comment that national data are not homogeneous might be followed up by a *critical examination of such data and the establishment of a reference system*, as NATO has done in many areas;

(c) *a list of bi- and multilateral agreements* might be drawn up, as well as of past, present or projected joint production programmes, which might be most useful for governments and potential importers, particularly if it were kept up to date, there being no indication of this in the declassified version of the SAC study;

(d) the very notion of co-operation might be made clearer by including *a list of co-operative bodies* together with comments on their *terms of reference*, composition and origins as the Assembly already recommended to the Council in 1972 in Recommendation 222 ;

(e) by evaluating results obtained by the two-way approach for the European economies.

32. These are merely a few suggestions : not having the text of the study proper, the Assembly cannot expect to make proposals to the Council in the knowledge that they are well-founded. However, if the Council really wished to give the SAC a useful task, as Mr. Van Elslande proposed it should, it is now urgent for it to tackle the second stage referred to by the former Belgian Minister and that it prepare the way for “decisions... taken at the political level”.

33. Strictly from the point of view of relations between the Council and the Assembly, there is no doubt that communication of this study, even in a declassified version, is a gesture of good will and of dialogue on the part of the Council, which the Assembly appreciates.

III. *Political activities of the Council*

34. Although this chapter of the Council’s annual report shows no substantial change in the Council’s foreign policy activities, it nevertheless provides the Assembly with useful documentation insofar as, in response to a wish expressed by the General Affairs Committee, it has annexed the texts to which it refers, whether they emanate from the European Council or the North Atlantic Council. This is logical since the Council considers that decisions taken by these two bodies, in which all the WEU member countries are represented, are in fact decisions by the WEU Council when they relate to matters which are its responsibility.

35. It therefore becomes clearer that there was a real convergence of views between the governments and the Assembly on certain

matters, including the Polish crisis, Afghanistan and the conference on security and co-operation in Europe held in Madrid in 1982 and 1983. By linking neither disarmament nor the development of economic relations with the East with developments in the abovementioned two countries, but by underlining the violations of the Helsinki final act represented by Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states and, a fortiori, the military invasion of one of them, the Western European governments have shown their solidarity and their firm intention not "to develop a management of relations in general with the East" on any basis other than "better implementation of the final act of Helsinki", particularly in Poland. The Assembly welcomes the convergence of the positions described in Chapter II of the annual report on Poland, the Madrid conference, Afghanistan and the Middle East and those expressed by the Assembly, particularly in Recommendations 378, 384 and 386.

36. The Council's paragraph on the Falklands crisis calls for a few remarks, however, insofar as there appears to be a contradiction between the annual report and statements by certain members of the French Government when addressing the Assembly. The annual report states that :

"In their declaration of 10th April the Ten stressed that they attached the greatest importance to the immediate and effective implementation of Security Council Resolution 502, namely an immediate cessation of hostilities, an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands and a search for a diplomatic solution to their dispute by the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom.

To these ends, and in a spirit of mutual solidarity, the governments of the Ten applied a complete embargo on the export of arms and military equipment to Argentina and, a few days later, they applied an embargo to imports of Argentine origin, agreed in the context of the application of the Treaty of Rome."

But Mr. Hernu, addressing the Assembly on 30th November 1982, said that :

"... it is interesting to note that, from the outset of the Argentinian aggression at Port Stanley, it was the seven member states of WEU that imposed the embargo on arms deliveries to Argentina. For while the embargo had the appearance of a Community decision, several EEC member states, not members of WEU, indicated that they would remain aloof from this decision.

It is therefore symptomatic that in a conflict opposing a member of WEU and an outside aggressor, the members of this organisation should have reacted in very similar fashion. And yet it involved something taking place very far from our Europe.

This identity of view must, a fortiori, prevail in security and defence problems that concern the European continent..."

37. It can be seen that the contradiction between the two views is not just a historical matter but raises the question of what true solidarity there is between the Ten. If the French Minister is to be believed, it is not the same as seven-power solidarity. The Assembly would therefore wish to be able to assess the true value of these two statements.

38. Finally, on relations between Europe and the United States, the Council, quoting its reply to Recommendation 387, indicates that it :

"acknowledged that divergent views may have arisen between western countries as regards their economic relations with the eastern countries. The Council recalled that since the beginning of 1982, the western countries had met in various fora in order to reach a common approach remaining consistent with their political and security interests; the Council also stressed that a concerted, realistic and cautious approach towards the eastern countries was one of the major concerns of the WEU member countries."

It is difficult for the Assembly to be satisfied with such an answer. Recommendation 387 was clear enough. It was based on a well-developed explanatory memorandum. The Assembly is therefore entitled to expect a far more detailed answer from the Council than it received which in fact amounts to a refusal of the recommendation, particularly with regard to disagreement between Europe and the United States about economic relations with the eastern countries.

39. Finally, if, as the Council stresses in quoting its reply to Recommendation 379, it considers the Assembly should "extend its debates to all the extremely varied themes which raise the problems relating to the security of European countries", it should draw the consequences of this wish for itself. As the Assembly has often recalled, WEU forms a whole and the Assembly cannot be expected to develop its activities if it is not accompanied by its only institutional partner, the Council. But it has to be noted that far from "extending" its consultations the Council for its part persists in clinging to a very restrictive concept of its rôle. The fact that the French Government wishes

the range of the Assembly's work to be extended and the other member countries endorse this wish is excellent. But what is preventing the French Government from making parallel proposals to the Council? It might then be hoped that the other countries would follow suit. Failing this, governmental statements in the framework of WEU will remain worthless and unavailing.

IV. Conclusions

40. In adopting Recommendation 379 presented by the General Affairs Committee on a report by Mr. Vecchietti in June 1982, the Assembly transmitted a series of detailed proposals to the Council. It must be noted that the Council's reply to this recommendation was imprecise and vague if not simply evasive. In fact:

41.(i) The recommendations adopted by the Assembly were addressed to the Council. The Council's replies essentially concern the Assembly which for its part, as the Council recognises moreover, took the utmost account of the Council's suggestions. The wording of paragraph I of the reply is very typical. The Council:

"... note, first of all, that Western European Union is the only European organisation which by treaty has been given competence in matters of defence. Consequently, its Assembly is of special importance, being the only European parliamentary body empowered by statute to discuss defence questions, including the control of armaments."

42.(ii) Most of paragraph II is also devoted to the Assembly, whose debates, says the Council:

"undoubtedly make an important contribution to the Council's reflections. The Council, for their part, will not fail to follow with the greatest possible attention the movement of ideas among European public opinions and their impact."

It would be most desirable to know what the Council's activities are in this latter connection. The annual report does not mention them.

43.(iii) Paragraph III of the reply must probably be taken as a refusal of the paragraph of Recommendation 379 concerning terrorism since the Council:

"note that discussion of this question takes place in other European fora."

It should therefore be noted that this is a further relinquishment of activities by the Council which, until recently, had examined

certain aspects of terrorism, particularly the protection of diplomats.

44.(iv) The Council denies the prolongation of its inactivity and says:

"They will continue to exercise the responsibilities incumbent on them, and in so doing assert Europe's presence in consultations on security, armaments control and disarmament."

Your Rapporteur finds little trace of these activities in the present annual report, nor in earlier ones, although the Council recognises that:

"The fact that all the WEU member countries are members of the Atlantic Alliance and share the conviction that defence of the continent of Europe and global defence are inseparable, does not remove the justification for abiding by the mandates and for pursuing specific approaches."

45.(v) The Assembly can but take note of the Council's refusal to follow up the paragraph in the recommendation concerning the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

46.(vi) With regard to the SAC, on the contrary, the Council gives the Assembly the assurance it expected when it states that:

"It was clear that such work could not have the effect of relieving the SAC of its responsibilities nor could it affect its competences, these being the Council's exclusive responsibility."

It remains to be seen how the Council intends to use the SAC. The present explanatory memorandum includes a number of suggestions for action to be taken on the study on European armaments industries. But if the Council really intends the SAC to carry out the task given to it on 7th May 1955, i.e. to promote European armaments co-operation, it should be instructed to examine the implications for Europe of the decisions taken by the NATO Defence Planning Committee in December 1982 from the standpoint of armaments production, failing which the SAC will remain out of touch with Europe's present and future armaments requirements.

47. It can thus be seen that the General Affairs Committee has little reason to be satisfied with the Council's action on its reply to the annual report for 1981 and several of its recommendations will have to be repeated. They would probably carry more weight if the member governments wishing WEU, its Council and ministerial organs to play their full rôle under the modified Brussels Treaty wasted less time before spelling out their proposals on these matters.

*Political activities of the WEU Council –
reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 ¹
tabled by Mr. Lagorce and others

1. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “ the latest decisions by NATO bodies in regard to defence plans ” and insert “ all the latest technological developments in this field ”.
2. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ the decisions taken by the NATO Defence Planning Committee in December 1982 ” and insert “ all the latest technological developments in the armaments field ”.

Signed: Lagorce, Pignion, Berrier, Bassinet, Fourré

1. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1983 (amendments agreed to).

China and European security

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
General Affairs Committee²
by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur*

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on China and European security

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Frederic Bennett (Chairman); MM. De Poi, Urwin (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Berrier, Bertile (Alternate: Caro), Bogaerts, Conti Persini, Gessner, Hardy (Alternate: Lord Hughes), Lagneau (Alternate: De Decker),*

Lagorce, Lord McNair, MM. Michel, Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Rösch (Alternate: Vohrer), van der Sanden, Thoss, Valiante, Vecchietti, van der Werff, Wilquin, Zito.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Introductory Note**Principal persons met by the committee or by the Rapporteur*

Your Rapporteur wishes to thank all the persons he met before, during or after the visit by the General Affairs Committee to the People's Republic of China from 7th to 22nd April 1983 and who received the committee or helped it to organise its visit and to obtain the information necessary for the preparation of this report. He regrets that he is not able to give a full list, the reasons being that certain persons wish to remain anonymous or, in some cases, he is not sure enough of their identity or duties. His gratitude is not therefore limited to those whose names are listed hereafter. However indebted he may be, he has refrained from quoting the sources of his information in the text of the report and assumes sole responsibility for the present document and the opinions expressed therein.

In Beijing

Zao Ziyang, Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China;

Hao Deqing, President of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs;

Xie Li, Secretary-General of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs;

Jia Shi, Vice-Minister for Economic and Trade Relations with Foreign Countries;

Wu Xiuquan, former Assistant Chief of General Staff and President of the Beijing Institute of Strategic Studies;

Zhou Nan, Assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Xing Yimin, Assistant Secretary-General of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

In Shanghai

Zhang Anyou, Assistant Director of the Municipal Foreign Affairs Bureau;

Liu Funian, Delegate to the National People's Congress; Rector of the East China College of Higher Education; Professor;

Fu Peibing, Delegate to the National People's Congress; Director of the Rui Jin Hospital; Professor;

Zhou Xiaoyan, Member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee; Assistant Principal of the Shanghai Music Conservatory; Professor;

Cao Miao, Assistant Director of the Shanghai Building Commission;

Ding Chen, Vice-President of the Shanghai Municipal Federation of Industry and Trade; Economist;

Jiang Li, Assistant Director of the Bureau of External Trade;

Yu Baoling, Assistant Director of the General Administration of the Standing Committee of the Shanghai Municipal People's Congress;

Zhao Andong, Head of the Education Division of the Shanghai Higher Education Bureau;

Yuan Xin, Assistant Head of Division, Economic Research Centre.

Throughout the visit to the People's Republic of China

Members of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, including:

Wang Chuliang, Deputy Secretary-General.

The institute's committees in Xian, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Guilin, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, the provincial and municipal authorities of those towns and the leaders of people's communes, production groups and agricultural, industrial, tourist, trade and other sectors who received the General Affairs Committee in these towns.

In Hong Kong

Mr. Richard Margolis, Deputy Political Adviser to the Governor of Hong Kong.

In Paris

His Excellency the Ambassador and staff of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China;

Wang Hsien Hua, Paris correspondent of the newspaper Guangming Ribao (Clarity).

The committee also had the benefit of the assistance of their Excellencies the Ambassadors or Chargés d'Affaires of the WEU member countries in Beijing, including His Excellency Mr. Roger Denorme, Ambassador of Belgium, the country ensuring the Chairmanship-in-Office of the WEU Council, to whom it expresses its particular gratitude, and the Consuls-General of these countries in Hong Kong.

Draft Recommendation
on China and European security

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the priority given to internal development in the People's Republic of China is directing it on a lasting basis towards the search for international peace;
- (ii) Considering that the People's Republic of China is an essential factor in the world balance and that the development of its economy should lead it to play an increasingly important rôle in international relations;
- (iii) Considering that in spite of differences in their political and social régimes the interests of Western Europe and of China converge in many fields;
- (iv) Considering that the development of trade and co-operation between Western Europe and China is in their joint interests;
- (v) Considering that the People's Republic of China is now making proposals to European states and firms for co-operation of mutual interest;
- (vi) Reaffirming the commitments which closely link Western Europe with the United States, particularly for all aspects of defence and security,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that the Western European countries start regular consultations with the Government of the People's Republic of China in the most appropriate frameworks on matters relating to the maintenance of peace in the world;
2. Carefully examine in the appropriate frameworks the possibility of increasing Western Europe's trade and economic co-operation with China;
3. Remove as far as possible all current obstacles to the development of this trade and co-operation;
4. Impress this point of view on the United States and on its partners in the OECD;
5. Insist that the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons do not allow the Soviet Union to deploy in Asia weapons withdrawn from Eastern Europe;
6. Urge its members to pursue a concerted policy in order to lay the foundations for lasting peace in Eastern Asia and, inter alia, to endeavour to re-establish an independent state in Cambodia and to facilitate the search for a negotiated solution for Hong Kong.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. When the General Affairs Committee adopted the report submitted by Sir Frederic Bennett on China and European security on 16th May 1978, it drew its conclusions from the trend of Chinese policy which had taken China from being a privileged ally of the Soviet Union to its leading opponent. It proposed that in the interests of European security the countries of Western European Union co-operate closely with the People's Republic of China on the grounds that "the enemies of our enemies are our friends", as the Rapporteur said in summary.

2. There may be some reservations about these slightly provocative words since, whatever one might think about the policy of the Soviet Union and the dangers for international peace of its unbelievable accumulation of armaments of all kinds, it cannot be considered that it is inherently an enemy. Positive developments in its relations with the countries under its domination, renunciation of its policy of expansion, liberalisation of its domestic régime and a reduction in its military strength would probably make Europeans revise radically their present attitude of deep distrust.

3. But some have wondered to what extent the People's Republic of China still considers the Soviet threat as a real danger and since autumn 1982 there have been signs of détente in Sino-Soviet relations. One of the questions which your Rapporteur will try to answer is to what extent it is just détente which, in the long run, is desirable for all the partners in the international arena, including the Western European countries which have no interest in the worsening of conflicts in Asia, or whether the resumption of "normal" relations between China and the Soviet Union is heralding a rapprochement between two powers which, all being told, claim to follow the same ideology and might consider joining forces again, as they did after 1949, in order to dominate jointly the Asian continent or even a larger fraction of the planet.

4. In conducting this study, the General Affairs Committee had a special advantage in having been invited to visit China in April 1983. This visit was of exceptional interest because of the standing of the people the committee met, the time they were prepared to devote to in-depth talks and the frankness of their remarks. However, your Rapporteur has been careful not merely to record official spee-

ches but to examine comparatively the information given and to seek a broad cross-section of views so that the committee might study the essential and permanent bases of Chinese external policy in full knowledge of the facts. Among these, the study of the Chinese economy and its requirements, information the committee has obtained about China's means of ensuring its security, Chinese views on problems of national unity, its frontiers, the balance in Asia and throughout the world and the conclusions the committee has drawn about the stability of the political régime and the chances of its fundamental aims being maintained give very valuable pointers to the possible evolution of the People's Republic of China in future years and its relations with the Soviet Union, the West and the third world.

5. There is little doubt that China's importance in the world will grow in future years in step with confirmation of the progress of its economy, the stability of its political and social system, the modernisation of its armed forces and its diplomatic activities. It is already an important factor in the balance of forces and its rôle in the world economy and in international politics is steadily gaining ground. Europe cannot neglect these considerations in tackling problems affecting its own security which can be ensured only by consolidating peace and developing the world economy.

II. Economic problems

A. The heritage of the past

6. Considering that the Chinese Communist Party's assumption of power in 1949 marked the country's liberation from a long period of foreign occupation and the restoration of national unity which had constantly been undermined by civil war for more than a century, it will surprise no one that great illusions were entertained, at least regarding the rate at which it would be possible to carry out the necessary transformations in a country whose infrastructure was out-dated, which had suffered considerable war damage and whose national unity had to be rebuilt. History has shown that these illusions led to economic and political choices which were not always judicious.

(a) The population

7. The first choice concerned the population. For a long time, over-confidence in the ability of the communist régime to transform the basic economy prevented the Government of the People's Republic of China from paying due attention to the danger for the Chinese economy of the population increasing too quickly. Only in the last ten years has a determined effort been made to reduce the birth rate, but the effects take a long time to be felt and China, which in the fifties had difficulty in feeding 500 million inhabitants, now has over 1,000 million inhabitants according to the latest figures, without its production capacity having doubled in the last thirty years. Although measures taken to reduce the birth rate may seem severe, they are obviously necessary. But it must be noted that for the moment they are still insufficient and that if they are too radical there is a future risk of the population aging, thus bringing a very heavy burden for the active population.

8. Available statistics show that the birth rate fell from 40 ‰ in 1953 to 18.4 ‰ in 1980, but over the same period the death rate fell from 19 ‰ to 6.29 ‰. Consequently, the annual rate of increase – 22 ‰ in 1953 – was still 12.1 ‰ in 1980 which, for a population which then reached the 1,000 million mark, would correspond to an increase of 12 million per year. Many observers believe the hope of reducing this annual increase to 5 ‰ in 1985 is too optimistic.

9. It is quite clear that employment has not kept up with the birth rate in the countryside where 200 million agricultural workers can provide 800 days' work per cultivated hectare per year, which is obviously far too much, or in the towns where the effort made between 1977 and 1980 to reduce unemployment apparently led to unduly large numbers of workers being employed in state firms and the administration. Conversely, there is a serious lack of qualified workers in spite of all the efforts made to improve technical and professional training. Managerial staff, of whom there are too few, were the main victims of the purges before and after the Chinese Communist Party takeover and during the cultural revolution when the training of such staff was almost wholly interrupted. While there is abundant labour, China nevertheless suffers from a serious shortage of adequately trained technicians and managerial staff, which considerably cramps the possibilities of quickly increasing its agricultural and industrial productivity. This situation is becoming particularly critical since the generations now reaching positions of responsibility are those whose education suffered the most from the effects of the cultural revolution. It

should improve considerably in the next few years with the arrival of subsequent generations.

10. Furthermore, there is a voluntarist policy to halt migration from the country to the towns which has increased too quickly, presenting urban administrations with almost insoluble problems. The aim is to decentralise industry towards rural communes, some aspects of which the committee was able to witness. However, the inadequate development of the communications and transport network limits the possibilities of a satisfactory relocation of industry in rural areas.

(b) The economy

11. Although in 1949 China was in many respects an economically underdeveloped country, the Chinese Communist Party intended, on coming to power, to make far-reaching economic changes and organise a socialist society. This ambitious programme encountered a number of obstacles from which stemmed a complex history marked by successive changes of course which obviously affected China's development. However, considered in the long term it can be seen that in the last thirty years the Chinese economy has even so made considerable progress and the country is now a great power. On the whole, conditions for the people have improved in spite of the over-rapid increase in the population and more definite progress is to be hoped for in future years (see table below).

*Growth of Chinese industrial and agricultural production
1970-1980*

Year	Industrial production	Agricultural production
1970	100	100
1971	110.4	102.5
1972	121.6	99.7
1973	137.9	111.7
1974	143.9	114.9
1975	158.7	116.6
1976	158.7	116.9
1977	180	117.7
1978	205	128.2
1979	223	139.2
1980	242	143

12. As is natural, particularly in a country where the state has a tight control over the economy, links between the struggle for power and the choice of economic courses have been many and close. Three major periods may be distinguished in the history of the People's Republic of China :

13. (i) From 1949 to about 1960 there was widespread optimism about the possibilities

available to China for its internal development, its rôle in the world and, above all, the progress of world revolution. Property redistribution, the growth of farming co-operatives and the preparation of a plan with substantial Soviet financial and technical assistance led to a very high growth rate and a remarkable economic take-off. However, fascinated by the Soviet example, the new Chinese leaders do not seem to have taken sufficient account of the possibilities of a country where the rural element was still very largely dominant: when the first five-year plan (1953-57) was drawn up, 89 % of investment was earmarked for heavy industry, which was far too much. Moreover, the establishment of large industrial complexes under state control meant that many Soviet managerial staff had to be recruited, and the fact that farmers had to join one of the 700,000 rural co-operatives, which were grouped in 26,000 rural communes in 1958, seriously slowed down the development of agricultural production. The appeal for a collective effort to make without delay a "great leap forward", decreed at the beginning of 1958, led to the breakdown of a planning system which had over-equipped heavy industry with much wasted effort, the more so since the departure of Soviet technicians in 1960 increased the number of bottlenecks in the economic circuit. Agricultural production fell noticeably as from 1959 without it being possible to maintain the rate of industrial growth, which had reached 18 % per year before 1958.

14. (ii) From 1960 to 1975, economic options and the struggle for power were closely linked. A collegiate leadership took over at the end of 1959 with Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Without changing the main course followed during the previous period, they opened up the Chinese economy to more trade with the West, particularly with a view to more rational development of agricultural production and the diversification of industry. However, in 1966 the outbreak of the disturbances known as the cultural revolution, followed by the army taking over the country again in 1967-68, placed this policy in doubt by reducing China's external trade to virtually nothing. In cultural and commercial matters, only one's own forces counted. The economic consequences of this difficult period were not disastrous, however, since the Chinese market was sufficient to provide an outlet for agricultural production, which in 1970 had returned to its 1958 level, at least where grain was concerned. Certain industrial sectors were also developed, including oil production, which by 1975 amounted to approximately 100 million tons, which figure has hardly been exceeded since.

15. (iii) Since 1975, a new course has been slowly worked out for the Chinese economy on the

basis of the "four modernisations" launched at that time by Zhou Enlai. However, the death of Zhou and Mao in 1976 followed by the differences between the new leadership, led by Hua Guofeng, proponents of major reforms led by Deng Xiaoping and the most fundamentalist advocates of Mao Zedong's ideas, together known as the Gang of Four, delayed until 1977 or even 1979 the application of the 1975 programme which was supposed to accomplish the full modernisation of agriculture, industry, science and technology before the end of the century so as to raise the Chinese economy to the highest world level, as Zhou Enlai said on 13th January 1975. The first years of application of this programme made China realise that it would have to procure much of the industrial equipment, means of transport and even armaments it needed in the West. It soon saw that, partly because of the world crisis, its exports were not increasing sufficiently to cover its programmes for imports and the acquisition of technical knowhow from the West. It therefore returned progressively, and the course was not smooth, to less ambitious development programmes, limiting its purchases abroad, and hence its debts, directing its programmes towards China's more essential requirements: feeding 1,000 million human beings, improving their standard of living and providing them with employment. More ambitious projects, particularly in the military field, were postponed, not without good reason.

B. Present economic aims

16. It is obviously not for your Rapporteur to draw up a table of China's economic situation but merely, by using the most recent information at his disposal, to examine the possible effects of economic aims on the country's external policy. Thus he will first try to examine the Chinese authorities' concepts for the country's economic future, for the next ten years at least, then study the implications of these concepts for China's external trade and finally examine the probable consequences of these concepts for future relations between China and the rest of the world.

(a) China's economic development

17. During the period of rapprochement between China and the West, marked by President Nixon's visit to China in 1972, it was hoped that the Chinese economy would develop quickly thanks to much broader prospects for trade and very large-scale investment designed to develop the most modern sectors of activity. At the same time, the aim was to

abandon, or at least relegate to a secondary rôle, traditional doctrines whereby the development of heavy industry was given absolute priority at the expense of agricultural production, means of communication and industries producing consumer goods. The opening of the Chinese market was to be accompanied by a speedy increase in the standard of living of the Chinese people.

18. However, this policy very soon ran up against obstacles impossible to overcome. First, in spite of firm measures to limit the birth rate, the Chinese population continued to increase too quickly. This steady increase has obviously slowed down the rise in the standard of living.

19. Second, priority had to be given to developing the agricultural sector since China's external trade was weighed down by the need to feed the population. China is still a major importer of food products, particularly grain, and progress in the agricultural sector is inevitably slow (see table below).

Structure of national income

%	1952	1956	1972	1978	1979
Industry	18.0	26.4	43.0	46.9	45.7
Agriculture	59.2	48.1	38.8	35.3	38.8
Building	3.0	5.6	4.1	4.1	3.9
Transport	4.0	4.4	3.9	3.9	3.6
Trade	15.8	15.5	10.2	9.8	8.0

20. Third, the Chinese authorities resolved, no doubt very wisely, to place tight restrictions on China's external debt. However, as export capacity could not increase very quickly because of the time needed to implement the investment projects decided upon and the growing number of bottlenecks, such as inadequate port equipment, many investment programmes had to be postponed or cancelled for lack of means to pay for them. The hoped-for technology transfers were therefore made only in part.

21. Finally, these difficulties were discovered only gradually, thus leading to delays and incoherence in decisions governing the country's economy. Thus, the plan adopted in 1978, whose effects should have lasted until 1985, placed emphasis on the achievement of about 120 major industrial projects. But in July 1979 this plan had to be shelved and a two-year period of readjustment introduced in order to lay sounder foundations for a five-year plan. In September 1980, this plan in turn was abandoned before a start had been made on its implementation, and the rate of growth

planned for the coming years was limited to 5.5%. In December 1981, Zhao Ziyang, the Prime Minister, announced in the National People's Congress that the readjustment policy would be extended for at least five years and defined "ten economic principles" underlying the sixth five-year plan (1981-85). The aim of this plan is to lay the foundations for development. Its main effect should be to improve the profitability of firms in the framework of an economy which is to remain directed but in which a wider margin of initiative is left to local bodies and to firms themselves. This policy already seems to have been productive in 1982, in which year the rate of growth was 7.3% (7% for agriculture and 7.8% for industry), far more than forecast in the plan. This very favourable trend seems to have been confirmed in the first quarter of 1983, which gives credibility to the aim proclaimed at the twelfth Chinese Communist Party congress in 1982 of quadrupling China's agricultural and industrial production before the end of the century. In 1985, agricultural and industrial production should be worth 871,000 million yuan, of which 605,000 million for industry and 266,000 million for agriculture, compared with a total of 715,000 million in 1980.

22. These "readjustments" did not affect the overall direction. Priority still went to developing agriculture, involving the establishment in northern China of vast state farms specialised in the production of grain. Large-scale development of industries producing consumer goods, including textiles and food products, was to provide exports and at the same time ensure the well-being of the population. One can therefore well imagine the disappointment of the Chinese leaders at the quotas for Chinese textiles introduced by the United States and by the EEC too. Conversely, a 5% reduction in heavy industrial production was planned for 1982.

23. In the field of energy, hopes for the early development of oil were abandoned and plans are now limited to the - apparently problematical - maintenance of the level of little more than 100 million tons per year which has been the level for several years now. In these circumstances, oil being a good item for export, China is now trying to reduce its consumption of oil which is only about 40 million tons per year through a policy of economy and greater use of coal, the production of which has been at 630 million tons for the last three years and might gradually be increased by a careful investment policy, pending the fulfilment of the hopes placed in offshore oil research which requires technology not yet available in China. To overcome the handicap of China's late arrival in the oil business, several contracts on a mixed-economy basis associating China with

foreign firms have already been concluded or are now being negotiated, particularly for the prospection and exploitation of offshore oil. Finally, better use should be made of oil production through the development of refinery capacity and petrochemical industries.

24. In spite of the ups and downs of Chinese planning in recent years, it is possible to note a number of constant factors which have remained from one readjustment of the country's economic projects to another. First and foremost is the repeated wish to strengthen the country's capability by relying on its own means, i.e. by ensuring that economic development does not make China dependent on any of its partners, be it through indebtedness or too great a deficit in the balance of trade, or undue reliance on foreign technology and particularly technicians, or even trading or co-operating too exclusively with certain countries. This means drawing full advantage from China's raw material resources and its large working population, particularly in the agricultural sector. Even if new changes are still possible, there is every reason to think that these fundamental guidelines will remain because they concord with the permanent facts of Chinese geography and China's permanent interests.

(b) Trend of external trade

25. For present Chinese leaders, as opposed to those who witnessed the breakdown of relations with the Soviet Union in 1960, the desire to rely on oneself no longer means economic isolation for China. On the contrary, the development of external trade is seen as a means of fostering the country's transformation, even if trade has not increased at the rate foreseen in 1972 because of a series of obstacles which have impeded it :

26. (i) Chinese currency is not convertible, which means China's purchases are paid for in western currency or based on clearing agreements. Even trade with other countries whose currencies are not convertible such as the Soviet Union is governed by a currency of account, the Swiss franc, chosen no doubt because of its stability, or the United States dollar, and is not the subject of financial settlements. If one of the countries is in deficit for a long period, it has to compensate for this deficit with a 2 % agio calculated in goods. This system limits the scale and speed of trade since it makes it subject to agreements between states which are renegotiated each year in the case of Sino-Soviet trade.

27. (ii) Chinese goods on the international market are of a limited nature and this limits what China can buy. In spite of a considerable effort to develop its exports in the last five years

China has not yet managed to raise its external trade to a sufficiently high level. It is currently trying to develop exports of mining products, including oil and non-ferrous metals, and products manufactured from these metals, agricultural products, handicrafts and certain light industrial products : mechanical constructions, electrical equipment, furniture, textiles and processed food products. For this reason short-term credits granted by foreign countries have been concentrated on these industries, which can be set up or modernised promptly and produce for export fairly quickly. However, these plans have been encountering serious difficulties in the crisis conditions around the world since October 1973 because they concern products for which there is strong competition, especially between developing countries, and because protective measures have been adopted by the western countries which cannot allow their national industries to be completely ruined by competition from Chinese goods. This is mainly the case for textiles whose import is everywhere on a quota basis. Where this is not yet the case, western producers call for it, e.g. at the present time French slipper manufacturers, who are unable to compete with China in present market conditions. It should be added that the requirements of western markets, of the Soviet market and of the underdeveloped countries are very different in these fields, which makes it hard to offset the loss of one market by gaining another.

28. (iii) After 1972, China placed too much hope in the immediate future of its exports, foreseeing a rate of increase in production which was subsequently reached only in part. A case in point was its commitments to Japan for the sale of oil : deliveries are marking time at just over 8 million tons per year, whereas it had planned to deliver 9.5 million tons in 1981 and 15 million tons in 1985. It has had to cancel a number of contracts which it could not fulfil, and this has had serious repercussions on its imports and, consequently, its equipment and output. There is no doubt that the Chinese leaders will henceforth be determined to be more circumspect in their forecasts and commitments. In 1982, 17 % of China's exports were agricultural, 39 % light industrial and 43.4 % heavy industrial products.

29. Regarding imports, one of the main aims of China's economic policy is to avoid any imports which are not essential for the country's economic advancement. This includes imports of grain which the development of agricultural production should reduce considerably, while the purchase of equipment for mines, transport and processing industries should, by about 1990, free China from the need to import semi-finished goods. To this end, any long-term loans obtained by China

should be used for infrastructure work, particularly in the energy, transport and communications fields. Imports of technology and equipment should be confined to what is not yet available in China, the aim being less to acquire complete equipment, as was the case in earlier years, than to make the most of the country's present potential. In 1982, 39 % of China's imports were raw materials, 35 % durable goods, 7 % agricultural products and 10 % other consumer goods. There seems no reason to expect any great change in this breakdown in the near future.

30. In 1982, the overall value of China's external trade amounted to 74,300 million yuan. The trade balance had a surplus of 4,600 million thanks to an 8.6 % increase in exports, while imports remained at the same level as in 1981. The sixth plan forecasts an annual increase of 8.7 % which would bring trade up to 85,500 million in 1985, exports to 40,200 million and imports to 45,300 million, which would imply even greater growth than for exports, which is favourable for the equipping and development of the country.

31. The Chinese Government's resolve to develop its trade relations on an almost wholly reciprocal basis inevitably led it to deal with the largest possible number of partners. At present, China trades with 174 countries or regions and has co-operation agreements with 89 countries. Its trade with the western countries is far greater than with the eastern countries, including the Soviet Union. In 1980, 1.2 % of Chinese exports went to the Soviet Union, representing only 0.3 % of the latter's imports, while 1.5 % of Chinese imports came from the Soviet Union, representing 0.3 % of its imports, thus making the Soviet Union the seventeenth customer and eleventh supplier of China, China being the thirty-third customer and thirty-eighth supplier of the Soviet Union. In 1981, trade between the two countries picked up slightly and improved again in 1982. It must be noted that in view of the close proximity of the two countries, their population and their size, these figures are abnormally low and might rise significantly without the West taking offence (see tables below).

Growth of Chinese external trade from 1970 to 1980 (1970 = 100)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Exports											
- value	100	116	146	234	308	332	335	374	467	635	891
- volume	100	115	134	158	148	163	181	183	229	278	...
- price	100	101	109	148	208	204	185	204	204	228	...
Imports											
- value	100	103	127	233	331	329	268	316	498	692	913
- volume	100	106	130	194	184	180	156	165	253	306	...
- price	100	97	98	120	180	183	172	191	197	226	...

Trend in the composition of Chinese imports

Percentages \$ million between brackets	1955	1959	1962	1966	1970	1973	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Total (\$ million)	(1,065)	(2,060)	(1,150)	(2,035)	(2,245)	(5,225)	(7,385)	(6,010)	(7,100)	(10,305)	(14,345)
Food products (%)	2.1	1.0	40.0	25.0	17.6	20.7	12.2	9.3	15.7	12.9	12.3
Grain (%)	-	-	...	19.7	12.4	17.0	9.1	5.4	10.5	9.4	10.0
Raw materials and fuel (%)	14.8	21.7	25.8	16.7	16.5	20.0	14.1	14.9	20.3	17.3	16.1
Textile fibres (%)	8.0	5.6	9.5	7.4	5.1	8.0	4.8	5.1	7.0	8.4	8.0
of which artificial (%)	0.7	1.0	1.3	1.9	2.1	1.7	1.0
Chemical products (%)	9.6	7.5	7.0	2.3	14.7	9.0	11.1	10.0	12.5	10.5	9.7
Fertilisers (%)	3.7	3.4	3.5	7.6	10.6	4.0	5.5	3.8	4.9	4.2	4.3
Machines and equipment (%)	22.8	47.6	10.4	22.4	16.7	17.0	30.0	30.4	17.3	19.3	26.7
Other manufactured pro- ducts (%)	10.4	...	22.4	35.2	33.0	32.3	34.0	32.8	39.6	34.4
Iron and steel (%)	11.1	18.0	19.0	21.0	24.0	22.1	27.9	23.0
Non-ferrous metals (%)	{ 8.9	...	{ 7.4	3.0	9.7	8.0	6.1	4.3	3.7	4.0	3.4
Other (%)	12	...	3.3	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.9	1.4	0.4	0.8

32. These facts may cause surprise if it is recalled that much Chinese equipment, particularly in industry and transport (lorries and aircraft), was purchased from the Soviet Union between 1950 and 1960, since it was between 1960 and 1970 that trade between the two countries declined most sharply: Sino-Soviet trade in 1970, expressed in roubles, was less than 5 % of the 1950 figure, and the rise in the following decade only brought it back to 20 % of the 1960 figure, in spite of the depreciation of the rouble. Yet China was still obliged to purchase spare parts from the Soviet Union as these were essential for running its industry, and this left little room for other items, one of which is important: sawn timber. Soviet purchases from China were mainly non-ferrous ores, meat and textiles.

33. It might be considered that political decisions thus interrupted trade which might otherwise have developed quite differently. However, this is not so for, if the main items imported and exported by China are considered, it can be seen that they are almost identical with those of the Soviet Union. The two countries compete for exports of oil products, for which the western countries and Japan are the main customers, and both are importers of large quantities of grain and the western countries are best prepared to supply them with the equipment and technology which are lacking both in the Soviet Union and in China. It would even be difficult to imagine China switching its imports of cotton from the underdeveloped countries to the Soviet Union.

34. Admittedly, the geographical proximity which might be enhanced by building in the present decade the Baikal-Amur railway with several branch lines to China is a factor favourable to the development of Sino-Soviet trade. The lack of strong currencies can but encourage the two countries to develop bilateral trade based on the clearing system and it is not at all surprising that the desire to normalise their relations should encourage them to try to increase their trade considerably. But it cannot be claimed that economic burdens are drawing them closer together.

35. On the contrary, it seems quite clear that both China and the Soviet Union consider the West a better partner because its economy is a better complement of theirs. However this may be, if the West wishes to develop trade relations with China and maintain or even strengthen links with that country it will have to grant favourable credit terms, the right to import the equipment China needs and freer access to western markets for China's exports. One has only to listen to Chinese grievances about the United States to be convinced of the harm caused to Sino-American relations in the last decade by the protective measures adopted

by the United States in recent years. Europe has enough products and technology to offer China for it to be able to open its frontiers to Chinese goods without fearing the development of reciprocal trade. It can urge the United States to avoid undue protectionism, as it has already done in fields affecting its direct interests, and open its own frontiers as widely as possible to Chinese products within the limits which allow its own industries to survive, as the EEC has done for a number of other developing countries.

36. There is every indication that China now finds the development of its economic and trade relations with Western Europe desirable because Europe has too small a share in its foreign trade, it is afraid of becoming over-dependent on the privileged partner that Japan is gradually becoming, and Europe is well placed to purchase Chinese products and to supply China with equipment items it needs. Receiving the General Affairs Committee on 9th April 1983, Zhao Ziyang, Prime Minister, emphasised that:

“We must realise that in spite of differences in our social systems our needs are complementary. I hope that, thanks to efforts on both sides, China and WEU will be able to make breakthroughs in the field of economic co-operation.”

37. All the views expressed to the committee in China concurred to attach great importance to the development of economic and trade relations between China and Western Europe on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty, principles of reciprocal advantage and equality of the partners. Such principles are obviously endorsed by the European countries.

38. In fact, trade between Western Europe and China has developed steadily in recent years without running up against fundamental difficulties. In 1982, trade between China and Western Europe amounted to \$5,400 million, i.e. 13.97 % of China's external trade. Chinese exports amounted to \$2,560 million, i.e. 11.76 % of the total, and its imports to \$2,870 million, i.e. 16.78 % of the total, which left China with a deficit of \$300 million, largely offset by its trade surplus with other regions.

39. Overall Chinese imports of finished products declined sharply but China wishes to acquire more parts essential for the equipment of industries which it will produce itself and more technology which it will be able to apply. However, the committee heard complaints in China about Western Europe's falling imports of Chinese products in 1981 and 1982, although this trend has not been confirmed in the first months of 1983.

40. Again, the Chinese authorities drew the committee's special attention to the importance they attach to industrial co-operation between European and Chinese firms, particularly through mixed-economy firms capable of attracting western capital to China and helping to train Chinese technicians and executives. They have already done much to facilitate the formation of such firms, particularly in special economic zones such as Shenzhen on the Hong Kong frontier which the committee was able to visit in detail. To that end, many of the principles of state control applied in the rest of China have been relaxed and the greatest flexibility is allowed in order to encourage foreign investors to play a larger part in the industrialisation of China. It is to be regretted that Europeans are rather slow in responding to these invitations, particularly as Asian competitors seem to be showing greater alacrity. In any event, the Prime Minister confirmed China's good will when telling the committee that :

“ We are prepared to take your interests into consideration by opening up the Chinese market to products of mixed-economy firms... In the future, China and Western Europe will be able to make progress with the gradual transfer of technology through mixed-economy firms. ”

41. Furthermore, particularly during the visit by Mr. Tindemans, Chairman-in-Office of the EEC Council, last March, China has shown its desire to co-operate more closely with the European Community and one of its most authoritative representatives told the committee that this country hoped to be accepted into the category of countries to which the EEC grants generalised preferences.

(c) *Prospects of change*

42. The true shape of the new course adopted by China since the end of the cultural revolution became clear only in about 1978. It is yet too soon and insufficient information is available to assess the full impact, particularly as there have been several readjustments. The most recent available information comes from the presentation of the sixth five-year plan, covering the period 1981-85, by Zhao Ziyang, Prime Minister, at the beginning of December 1982. On this occasion, he confirmed the lines already known, referring to the good results in 1982 but warning that such results might not always be so encouraging. Thus, the plan proposed an annual global growth rate of 4% to 5% for the five-year period as a whole, i.e. moderate progress, account being taken of outside and inside constraints, which should allow the government to retain control over the economic system.

43. These good results were obtained by a policy which systematically generalised encouragement to shoulder responsibility, particularly in the agricultural sector where the peasants' share in production profits was developed through such means as the farming contract which in fact decollectivised land exploitation. The new constitution, adopted in December 1982, at the same time reduced the rôle of the rural communes, depriving them of their administrative duties and making them economic units. These measures were subsequently completed by the freeing of many prices already begun in 1982, and by increases in and reorganisation of wages and decentralisation of economic powers to the benefit of the municipalities. But apparently the government, anxious to avoid disturbances, decided to introduce these various reforms progressively and perhaps at different rates according to the regions concerned.

44. Furthermore, concentration of investments, 40% of which are earmarked for energy and transport, should increase coal production by 13% and electricity production by 20% between now and 1985. In 1982, a first offshore oil drilling and exploitation contract was signed with an American firm and negotiations for other areas are being conducted with French and Japanese firms. Expected consequences are: in spite of a reduction in state subsidies for production, amounting to 30% of public expenditure in 1982, the budgetary deficit, which was 2,500 million yuan in 1982, should increase to 3,000 million in 1983. Co-operation with western firms should be more widespread. The trade balance, which was in surplus in 1982, thus allowing China to build up a foreign currency reserve of about \$10,000 million, will probably become a deficit because of increased purchases of modern equipment and technology, mainly from the West and Japan. Finally, the traditional policy of refusing to contract debts abroad might be seriously circumvented.

45. The above remarks and conclusions are obviously significant only insofar as the evolution on which they are based is confirmed and lasts. With regard to the present trend in China, the Soviet new economic policy comes to mind in which Lenin, in 1921, restarted the machinery of free enterprise, while retaining very strict state control over the whole economic system, which allowed the Stalinist planning system to be introduced even before Stalin came to power. The new economic policy was a tactical expedient to relaunch the economy after the civil war and in no way committed the Soviet Union to a liberal economic course. But the first Chinese reforms only started in 1976 and it was only in 1981 or 1982 that they gathered enough speed to offer some prospect of

a far-reaching change in the facts of the Chinese economy. As to whether it is possible and probable that the trend might be reversed is a question worth raising but obviously no firm answer can yet be given.

46. However, there are many indications that the reforms undertaken will be continued and that, whoever China's future leaders may be, they will not be able to revert to the previous economic system. Indeed, everything points towards the present trends being maintained and strengthened.

47. (i) The average standard of living of the Chinese is still very low. Admittedly, figures which can be quoted vary somewhat (\$256 per capita GNP in 1976 according to the World Bank and \$315 per capita in 1982 according to Chinese economists), which places China among the underdeveloped countries. Even if the 1981 and 1982 high growth rates are confirmed in the coming years and the growth in the population is contained, which is not yet the case, it will be many years before the whole Chinese population attains a significantly higher standard of living.

48. (ii) The failure of the great leap forward in 1958 produced a shock which has not been forgotten. It resulted in reduced production and famine with millions of victims and largely explains the excesses of the cultural revolution which also left bitter memories. All this is a warning against undue voluntarism in the economic field and against the belief that planning can overcome all constraints.

49. (iii) Chinese society, with all its adversities and various traditions firmly anchored in a collective mentality, is a brake on initiatives from above. This makes it necessary to decentralise economic decisions and every attempt to avoid this has so far failed.

50. (iv) Conversely, the first steps towards decentralising economic decisions and diversifying investment conditions and management firm by firm and region by region have produced worthwhile results and probably to a large extent explain the recent progress of the Chinese economy.

51. (v) Similarly, the development of the free market, the return to a certain degree of independence and family initiative in production groups or people's communes, a greater degree of profit-sharing for the workers, the responsibilities assigned to workers' collectivities in the social security field, the wider independent margin of decision and above all the possibility of using part of the profits made by firms for self-financing admittedly seem to have given rise to difficulties and problems but they have also changed ways of thinking, brought younger

elements to posts of responsibility and produced promising results.

52. (vi) Although in many areas such as housing there is little relationship between prices and costs, the recent development of the free market seems to have helped to bring these two elements closer together in other sectors with the result that there is an increased sense of economic responsibility among those responsible for production at every level, which is also a factor of reorganisation and progress.

53. (vii) Even if China no longer considers that there are models of socialism in other countries to which it can conform, particularly in view of the absolutely unique nature of its situation, it can nevertheless be noted that the Eastern European countries which, like Hungary or even the Soviet Union in certain sectors, have started to allow a degree of economic pragmatism and decentralisation of decisions have not lost in the process. Rigid planning is no longer so attractive as it seemed.

54. (viii) Finally, in 1982 China, for the first time for more than twenty years, published a statistical yearbook (for 1981) and the number of economic information reviews has increased in recent years, which means that the public now has the facts allowing it to assess and form an opinion on the results of the government's economic policy.

55. These various considerations admittedly give us no clear indication of what the future will be. History never follows expectations. However, factors recorded by the committee during its visit to China compared with the most recent western publications have convinced it that the course followed since 1976, and particularly in 1981-82, is not, in the opinion of the present Chinese leaders, a provisional expedient but commits the country for a long time to come. Results already obtained hold promise of success on the economic and social level and, consequently, will be welcomed by a nation that has suffered too much from past uncertainties not to be ready for the benefits to be gained from espousing a certain degree of pragmatism and liberalisation.

(d) *Economy and foreign policy*

56. From the point of view of foreign policy, the first consequence of the economic options adopted by China, if they are pursued, should be to induce the Chinese Government to give priority to the country's internal development rather than to external activities and hence limit as far as possible expenditure on defence and all external commitments. This implies that:

57. (i) The indispensable modernisation of Chinese armed forces will be slow and China will have to pay far greater attention than in the past to achieving effective results in the disarmament field.

58. (ii) China will be extremely cautious in its external initiatives and will be ever more hesitant about embarking upon ventures as in Korea in 1950, India in 1962, the Sino-Soviet frontiers in 1969 or Vietnam in 1979.

59. (iii) Even if China continues to claim to be a third world country it is not in a position to replace the western countries at short notice in its trade with the third world. This trade has so far been mediocre for a number of reasons:

- (a) China's exports, particularly to Japan, can be increased only at the expense of those of other developing countries, such as Indonesia for oil and raw materials, and many countries for textiles;
- (b) the priority China gives to its economic development imposes a burden on it which will greatly reduce its already limited ability to grant third world countries long-term loans at favourable rates;
- (c) the internal economic guidelines recently adopted by China, if successful, can still allow it to be a model for countries faced with similar problems, but it can hardly claim to be the guiding star of world revolution which to some extent it was in earlier years.

60. (iv) Inevitably, the West and Japan will be China's economic partners because they alone can supply it with the technology, equipment and credits it needs and at the same time offer it outlets for its exports provided they agree not to protect their domestic markets against products from the People's Republic.

61. (v) Apart from political considerations, the Soviet Union, whose economy is not complementary to that of China, cannot be a leading economic partner for China for any length of time. For economic as well as political reasons, therefore, the normalisation of relations between the two countries cannot lead to a return to the situation in 1950, at least on a lasting basis.

62. In short, China needs an extended period of peace and trade development, particularly with the West and Japan, for deep-rooted and permanent reasons, and everything shows that it now fully realises this. It may be deduced that it should pursue the policy of peace and economic opening to the rest of the world which it has been following for several years

now and which conforms perfectly with Europe's interests. It might even accentuate this policy, or at least this is the impression your Rapporteur gained during the committee's visit to China.

III. Political options

A. The committee's inquiry

63. The purpose of the study undertaken by the General Affairs Committee is not to express an opinion on the institutions of the People's Republic of China and even less to interfere in that country's internal affairs. But insofar as domestic policy has an influence on relations with the outside world it cannot disregard these matters entirely and, to be specific, it has examined the nature of the relationship between the party and state bodies and sometimes local institutions or firms. Depending on which of them tips the balance, vast differences are possible in the way the economy may be run and political decisions taken, maintained or carried out. Consequently, very different conclusions may be drawn about the future of relations between China and the rest of the world.

64. It should be said straight away that this is a point on which your Rapporteur does not feel able to express unassailable views following the committee's visit to China. A few remarks may be made however:

65. (i) All the questions put by committee members about the recruitment of business executives received the answer that ability was the sole criterion, thus confirming the priority given to economic profitability at every level.

66. (ii) Behind overall approval of government policy, no attempt was made to conceal reservations about certain aspects of its application, but feelings regarding the importance of local responsibilities were expressed strongly.

67. (iii) Inadequate consideration given to certain working conditions, particularly security, showed a great weakness in the trade union organisation in face of the requirements of profitability.

68. (iv) Ideological imperatives were never in conflict with economic considerations in describing the economy of the country, regions, towns or firms.

69. (v) In views expressed to the committee on foreign policy, defence, China's economic relations with the rest of the world or the country's domestic problems, whatever they might be, although "different ideological bases" were mentioned for relations with the rest of the world, at the same time it was specified that

such differences were not an obstacle to de facto convergences. Similarly, when mention was made of "building socialism" in domestic affairs, it was specified that this in no way precluded analysis of the facts, whether it be a matter of nationality, economic imperatives, weaknesses in the structure of the country or the weight of traditional ways of thinking.

70. In short, your Rapporteur realised that any consideration of the situation in China which stopped when it came to ideological obstacles between China and Western Europe would be inadequate and pointless. Similarly, any projection which failed to take account of China's past and its evolution since 1949 would produce a partial and unsound judgment. Conversely, when analysed objectively and historically, China is seen to be following a slow and sometimes bumpy road from the semi-colonial position it occupied before 1949 towards an improvement in the living conditions of the people, economic development, greater freedom and an opening towards the rest of the world.

B. The political heritage

71. In the economic field, the situation inherited by the two successive Chinese Governments which have been in power since 1976 was difficult to handle in spite of the remarkable start obtained in 1949 because of the choices made in the early years of the new régime and the influence then exercised by the Soviet Union followed by the isolation to which China was reduced after breaking off relations in 1960. The same was almost true for the political situation in which Mao Zedong left his country, without stable institutions, close to anarchy, but where the revolution had produced apparently lasting unity in a country which had been divided for more than a century at the risk of being permanently split. The fact that Taiwan has remained outside the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Government's setbacks in some of its attempts to recuperate China's former frontiers are of little account compared with the major fact that the mainland of China is reunited under the guidance of a government which, in spite of dictatorial aspects and adhering to an ideology not wholly suited to the real requirements of the Chinese people, quickly managed to gain recognition as the legitimate government and impose its authority on a country emerging from a long period of division and anarchy.

72. However, the economic difficulties stemming from the failure of the great leap forward in 1958 led Mao Zedong to withdraw progressively from his political responsibilities. He was replaced as President of China in 1959 by

Liu Shaoqi, which started a long period of struggle for power marked by the cultural revolution which started in 1966, abandonment of the application of the 1954 constitution, the reconquest of power between 1967 and 1969 by the Red Guards on behalf of Mao Zedong, once again Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party in 1968, the progressive setting up of revolutionary committees in the provinces and the disappearance in often obscure circumstances of the principal leaders of the country and of the Communist Party. A radical purge of so-called counter-revolutionaries was continued until 1973.

73. As from that date, new institutions were set up under the 1975 constitution which considerably strengthened the powers devolving on the party and a new government was formed, the principal leaders being Deng Xiaoping, who became Vice-Chairman of the Party, Deputy Prime Minister and Chief of Staff in 1975, and Hua Guofeng, who became Prime Minister after the death of Zhou Enlai in 1976. However, the struggle for leadership continued after the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976 with the arrest and trial of some of his supporters such as the Gang of Four, convicted in 1980, and the rehabilitation of their victims. In fact, it was in 1977 that a new team of leaders took over. This was confirmed by the eleventh congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which appointed Hua Guofeng Chairman of the Party and adopted a third constitution for the People's Republic of China. The further change in leadership of the country and party which took place in 1981-82 and brought Hu Yaobang to the head of the CCP and made Zhao Ziyang Prime Minister on the contrary took place without apparent clashes but led to further major transformations in China's political and economic course.

74. These struggles for power did not entirely paralyse China, however. In the economic field, national production grew significantly during the cultural revolution. In external policy, the break with the Soviet Union came in 1960, the first fighting on the Ussuri in 1969, but only in 1979 did China denounce the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty, at the same time as it tried a first series of talks on the "normalisation" of these relations. The first signs of rapprochement with the United States and Japan were in 1971. The decision to bring China out of its diplomatic and economic isolation therefore antedates the death of Mao Zedong and has been constantly pursued ever since.

75. It may be deduced from these facts that the main guidelines of China's foreign policy were not dictated by domestic events alone but that they were motivated by more than the prevailing economic situation, as Sir Frederic Bennett underlined in his report. However, the

way these guidelines have been followed up since 1977 has changed considerably and this is certainly attributable to the new leadership.

76. China has not had a President since the death of Mao Zedong but it is governed by a State Council on which several tendencies are represented. The 3,500 delegates to the National People's Congress are appointed so as to be truly representative of the country. In spring 1983, a new Congress was elected. Economic and political options have been debated openly and it has been possible to voice opposition. There has been growing moderation in the repression of former leaders. The strict measures applied to aliens have been greatly relaxed, if not abandoned. The former democratic parties were able to meet again and hold congresses at the beginning of 1979.

77. At the same time, mention of threats or the use of force to attain foreign policy aims disappeared from official speeches where they were prominent in the days of Mao. Furthermore, the declared wish to make China a great economic power without delay and the first country with a truly communist régime gave way to an increasingly realistic assessment of a situation which dictated far more modest ambitions. It is now evident that the condemnation of Maoist excesses expressed more and more clearly in the last fifteen years are not only part of the political struggle but above all recognition of the failures of an extreme policy of voluntarism and a sign of the firm intention to adapt Chinese policy to the limits imposed on it by a situation beyond its control.

C. *New political options*

78. The Chinese constitutional system was modified quite recently, since the new statutes of the Chinese Communist Party were adopted at the twelfth party congress in September 1982 and a constitution by the National People's Congress in November 1982. In order to throw light on these texts, your Rapporteur thought it would be useful to draw from the very remarkable report presented by Hu Yaobang at the twelfth party congress a number of pointers to the Chinese Government's intentions.

79. It should be recalled that the constitution in force until 1982 dated from the beginning of 1978 and was thus drawn up immediately after the death of Mao Zedong, at a time when the new team of leaders was not yet firmly established and had not yet defined the new course it wished the Chinese economy to follow, which it did later in 1978. Referring to the period 1978-82, Hu Yaobang wrote that the arduous task of ending confusion about guidelines had

been accomplished and a great historical turning point reached by re-establishing the normal course of things.

80. The signs of this turning-point, as he presented them, may be summed up as follows:

- (i) we have resolutely broken the fetters of dogmatism and the personality cult which existed for a long time, and have reaffirmed the Marxist ideological line of seeking truth from facts;
- (ii) we have put an end to years of social turbulence and brought about a political situation characterised by stability, unity and liveliness;
- (iii) socialist democracy and the socialist legal system are being gradually perfected;
- (iv) equality and unity among all our nationalities have been strengthened anew;
- (v) the patriotic united front has expanded further [i.e. the number of political groups outside the Communist Party has increased];
- (vi) we have resolutely shifted the focus of work of the party and the state to economic construction [i.e. the economy is no longer subordinated to purely political considerations];
- (vii) relations between the party and the intellectuals have improved enormously;
- (viii) we have made tremendous efforts to build a modern regular revolutionary army.

81. Your Rapporteur considers that these eight points show most explicitly how the policy of the new team of leaders has broken with the legacy of the past whose shortcomings in the eyes of the present leaders may be guessed from the references to "truth from facts", social unrest, legality, nationalities, intellectuals and building up the economy. They also suggest how these leaders intend to run the country in the coming years. The new party statutes are above all designed to promote, within that organisation, greater representativity of the various elements of Chinese society and greater freedom of expression. It is clear that the new constitution meets the same concerns and reflects the same trend. This is what Hu Yaobang already announced when he said that "the draft constitution, soon to be submitted to the National People's Congress for adoption, contains many new and very important stipulations formulated in the light of the achievements scored and the principles worked out in

developing socialist democracy since the third plenary session of the Eleventh Central Committee. The adoption of this constitution will mark a new stage in the development of China's socialist democracy and legal system".

82. The text of the 1982 constitution can be interpreted only in the light of a constitutional trend marked by five fundamental texts. A comparison of these texts shows a significant trend. For instance, the new constitution gives far less prominence than earlier constitutions to the leading rôle of the party but, on the contrary, places greater emphasis on the autonomy of various organs, particularly judicial organs (Section VII) and on respect for a number of freedoms, including religious freedom (Article 36), not to speak of personal freedoms (Articles 37, 39 and 40).

83. Information obtained by your Rapporteur from other sources makes him think that liberalisation has already been very real in recent years, thus leading to considerable détente in relations between alien populations, particularly Buddhist Tibetans, and the central state, and also between religious minorities (Moslems, Buddhists, Christians, etc.) and the communist régime. Associated with the re-emergence of a private market, détente has put an end to the clashes which, in the days of Mao Zedong, seem to have been quite serious. Greater autonomy for towns and provinces, the reality of which the committee was able to see, particularly in Shanghai, the creation of special administrative regions such as that of Shenzhen which the committee visited in detail, whose statute is determined "in the light of the specific conditions" (Article 31) - some Chinese speakers told the committee that Taiwan, Macao and Hong Kong might one day be included - also show a desire to liberalise, decentralise (Sections V and VI) and allow more room for the expression of various opinions and respect for the populations. The preamble to the constitution even specifies that "in the struggle to safeguard the unity of the nationalities, it is necessary to combat big-nation chauvinism, mainly Han chauvinism, and also necessary to combat local-national chauvinism".

D. Implications of the internal situation for foreign policy

84. The only too brief analysis your Rapporteur has been able to make of the present trend of Chinese internal policy allows a few indications to be deduced concerning foreign policy on the basis, inter alia, of Hu Yaobang's report. The resolve that China's action should be based on analysis of facts leads the Chinese Government to consider that "China's foreign policy... proceeds from the fundamental interests of the people of China and the rest of the

world", which implies that while it is still convinced "that communism will ultimately be realised throughout the world... revolution cannot be exported but can occur only by the choice of the people of the country concerned". The five principles of:

- mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- mutual non-aggression;
- non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- equality and mutual benefit; and
- peaceful coexistence

have consistently guided China in its effort to develop relations with other countries. These principles are set out in the preamble to the constitution of 4th December 1982.

85. An attentive reader cannot overlook the fact that each of these principles is in clear contradiction with the policy pursued by the Soviet Union, particularly with regard to the countries it occupies or controls. Hu Yaobang emphasised moreover that if Sino-Soviet relations had deteriorated it was because "the Soviet Union has pursued a hegemonist policy", a feature of which was the continue stationing of "massive armed forces along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders", support of Vietnamese expansionism, "constant provocations along China's border" and the occupation of Afghanistan. While the Soviet Union had expressed a desire to improve relations with China, "deeds, rather than words, are important", i.e. abandonment of hegemony. "With the friendly socialist countries of Korea, Romania and Yugoslavia we maintain close co-operation."

86. The hegemony of which the Soviet Union is accused is not just the aggressive policy it pursues in Asia but also and perhaps mainly its claim to be a model socialist régime to which all communist countries and parties should conform. By emphasising its desire to "rely on its own forces" China intends to remain fully responsible for deciding how to organise its economy, society, political system and external relations.

87. Where peace and disarmament were concerned, Hu Yaobang said that: "The most important task for the people of the world today is to oppose hegemonism and safeguard world peace. Due to the rivalry between the superpowers, the danger of a world war is growing ever greater. However, experience shows that the people of the world, by persevering in their struggle, can upset the strategic plans of the superpowers. World peace can be safeguarded, provided the people truly unite

and fight resolutely against all expressions of hegemonism and expansion. We have always firmly opposed the arms race between the superpowers, stood for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and for their complete destruction and demanded that the superpowers be the first to cut their nuclear and conventional arsenals drastically."

88. With regard to Japan, the writer said that if "the development of relations of peace and friendship, equality and mutual benefit, and prolonged stability between China and Japan is in accord with the long-term interests of the two peoples and conducive to the peace and stability of the Asian-Pacific region", it was primarily because "Japan is China's neighbour". As for the United States, "a cloud has all along hung over the relations between the two countries. This is because the United States, despite having recognised that the Government of the People's Republic of China is China's sole legal government and that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China, has passed the Taiwan Relations Act which contravenes the principles embodied in the joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations, and it has continued to sell arms to Taiwan, treating Taiwan as an independent political entity".

89. Again, "socialist China belongs to the third world" and is quite prepared to co-operate with those countries, both in the economic field and "in the struggle... against imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism".

90. Finally, relations with Western Europe were mentioned in the following terms:

"Many western countries have social systems different from China's, yet we share a common desire to safeguard world peace and a common interest in developing our economic and cultural co-operation, for which the potentials are great, and we have maintained good relations over the years. The past few years have also seen some development in our relations with East European countries."

91. It therefore seems quite clear that "setting right our practical work on all fronts" on the sound, permanent foundations laid by the 1982 constitutional reforms is leading China to adopt an external policy which conforms to the underlying aspirations of the Chinese people and to develop its economy and introduce more democratic political and social conditions through internal order and external peace. Defining itself as a third world country, announcing the precedence of economic considerations over political considerations and launching liberal reforms in many fields necessarily means renouncing a foreign policy which

is adventurous or dominated by ideological concerns. For these reasons it would appear that undue importance should not be attached to Sino-American tension or the Sino-Soviet rapprochement of recent months and it should be noted that China and Western Europe have a fairly parallel approach to international questions because, although they respect very different ideologies, they are based on the same facts of life.

IV. Foreign policy

A. China and East-West relations

92. The external policy of the People's Republic of China has passed through several very characteristic stages.

93. (i) From 1949 to 1959, China thought that through close co-operation with the Soviet Union and confrontation with the capitalist countries it could find the normal security policy of a communist country. The assistance the United States gave the Kuomintang in the last years of the civil war and the guarantees extended to the refugee government in Taiwan which continued to claim to represent the whole Chinese people, its refusal to recognise the régime in Beijing and allow it a seat in the United Nations left the People's Republic of China little choice in its alliance and in February 1950 it signed a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union. In 1957, an agreement extended military co-operation between the two countries to the field of advanced military technology, including nuclear weapons.

94. (ii) However, this co-operation immediately ran into difficulties since China refused Soviet control over any nuclear weapons that might be delivered to it, and in July 1959 the Soviet Union denounced the 1957 agreement. In July 1960, it also cut off all co-operation with China in every field, including that of defence, thus reducing the People's Republic of China to almost total isolation.

95. It was during this period of isolation that China developed an independent nuclear weapons policy which allowed it to explode its first nuclear bomb in October 1964 and its first thermonuclear bomb in June 1967. At the same time, it strongly criticised the Soviet Union for its attempts to reach agreement with the Americans on limiting nuclear weapons, calling it revisionist and taking the risk of an at least indirect clash with the United States over the islands of Quemoy and Mazu which were under the authority of the Taiwan Government.

96. However, Sino-Soviet relations continued to deteriorate, particularly because of the frontier problems which Sir Frederic Bennett descri-

bed in his report in 1978. Already, when in 1962 China was seizing territories which it considered did not belong to India, the Soviet Union was drawing closer to that country and a treaty of alliance was signed with it in 1971. But above all, in 1969, there was violent fighting in the Far East and Mongolia between Soviet and Chinese armed forces. Information on this subject indicates that China is believed to have been seriously defeated in Mongolia, while forces engaged along the Ussuri River apparently resisted more successfully.

97. If to these facts is added the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union in spring 1968, one can understand why China increasingly saw the Soviet Union as an imperialist power dangerous for its security. Its military setbacks in Mongolia brought out its military inferiority in the conventional field and the fact that the number of forces it was capable of mobilising was not enough to ensure its security in face of the much better equipped Soviet army. Soviet diplomatic activity in Asia, its protectorate in Mongolia, its support for the new People's Republic of Vietnam and for India, particularly during the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, the growth of its influence in Afghanistan and then the invasion of that country in December 1979 were so many subjects of concern for China which encouraged it to emerge from isolation to ensure its security.

98. (iii) During the same period, American power was beginning to seem less dangerous for China. In 1969, President Nixon announced his intention to end the war in Vietnam. Some of the United States' European allies had re-established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and in October 1971 it was admitted to the United Nations where it took the permanent seat occupied until then by the Taiwan Government. In February 1972, President Nixon paid an official visit to the People's Republic marking a rapprochement between the two countries.

99. Since then, relations between the People's Republic of China and the western countries and Japan have developed apace, particularly in the economic field and even, for certain European countries such as France and the United Kingdom, in the armaments field. But this rapprochement has also affected the political field.

100. (iv) However, since 1980 China's external policy seems to have taken a new turn. One reason is probably because it has found it materially impossible to follow up a number of economic co-operation projects with the western countries or Japan, which led to disappointment on all sides.

101. Further, assistance granted by the United States under Mr. Reagan's Presidency to the

Taiwan régime, which still considers itself to be the legal Chinese Government, while the government in Beijing considers Taiwan to be part of Chinese national territory of which it is the legitimate government, has led to serious tension between China and the United States since 1981. On 17th August 1982, Sino-American talks led to the publication of a joint communiqué which the Chinese Government consider committed the United States to a progressive limitation of its deliveries of armaments to Taiwan. The conclusion of a new contract between the United States and Taiwan at the end of the same year was considered in Beijing to be a breach of this commitment.

102. Moreover, the introduction of quotas for imports of Chinese textiles to the United States, the maintenance of certain modern equipment on the lists of products whose export to China is forbidden by Cocom, the refusal to deliver certain weapons and an advanced computer to China and finally the March 1983 decision to grant asylum to a young Chinese tennis player further contributed to the deterioration in relations which seemed promising at the time of President Nixon's visit to China in 1972. Mr. Shultz's talks in Beijing in February 1983 were apparently not enough to dispel all the clouds which had gathered over Sino-American relations, in spite of the significant and steady development of trade relations between the two countries. When denouncing the "two hegemonomies" China admittedly does not place the Soviet Union, which it considers to be "a threat", on the same footing as the United States, which "makes many mistakes", but there is no doubt that Sino-American relations are at present at a difficult juncture.

103. Concerned above all about its economic development since 1977, China has laid stress on the progress of agriculture, light industry and consumption which is at present the essential consideration. These economic options did not allow Chinese military strength to be developed rapidly but required durable international peace, in Asia at least. Thus, after signing a treaty of friendship and co-operation with Japan in 1978, China began a dialogue with Moscow in 1979, just at the time it denounced the 1950 treaty of friendship. It broke it off on 19th January 1980 after the invasion of Afghanistan. However, on 3rd October 1982 Mr. Ilyichev, Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited Beijing for three weeks to hold explanatory talks with his Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen, which seems to indicate that both sides are ready to resume the dialogue.

104. The death of Leonid Brezhnev and his replacement by Mr. Andropov do not seem to have interrupted this process since on the occasion of Mr. Brezhnev's funeral on

16th November Huang Hua, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, met Mr. Gromyko and at the close of their talks the latter declared in Pravda that the Soviet leaders attached great importance to the normalisation of relations with China and that they intended placing such relations on a good neighbourly footing. Finally, both parties agreed that the dialogue should be pursued. Huang Hua for his part told the Xin Hua Agency that peace and friendship between China and the Soviet Union corresponded fully not only to the interests of the two countries and two peoples but also to the interests of peace in Asia and the world. He praised the desire Mr. Brezhnev had shown to improve Sino-Soviet relations and hoped for new Soviet efforts in this sense. However, the fact that Huang Hua had to leave his post on 19th November, i.e. three days after this declaration, leaves a question mark over the Chinese Government's endorsement of this text. A further meeting was held in Moscow in March 1983 and does not seem to have clarified the situation entirely.

105. The Chinese authorities made three requests to the Soviet Union in autumn 1982 : evacuation of Afghanistan by Soviet forces, withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and a reduction in the number of Soviet forces deployed along the Chinese frontiers. These requests correspond exactly to China's known fears of the Soviet Union, but they seem to have produced no results.

106. There is no reason to think that with the resumption of its talks with the Soviet Union China is envisaging a return to the same kind of relations as it had with it prior to 1960. On the one hand, they have left it with nothing but unhappy memories, particularly domination hardly disguised by references to socialist fraternity. On the other hand, the problems opposing it to the Soviet Union, including territorial problems, are still there. But most probably China has no intention of pursuing a confrontation from which it can gain nothing or of making itself over-dependent on its western partners, including the United States, or Japan. In its desire to ensure a period of peace which is essential for its economic development, to maintain its independence by avoiding an accumulation of debts and increasing the number of its partners and to play the international rôle commensurate with a country whose population represents almost a fifth of mankind, it has to oppose any form of hegemony. In this respect, it readily considers Europe, and probably also Japan, as the best partners because it is now difficult to suspect them of imperialist aims, they do not have the wherewithal to exercise hegemony, they are inherently attached to the maintenance of peace and the development of international trade and in the

main both Europe and Japan share China's views and interests.

107. However, this moderate, realistic and reasonable course which seems to have been chosen by the People's Republic of China has probably not secured the approval of all the Chinese leaders. The recent dismissal of Huang Hua is probably an indication of differences over the country's foreign policy and the question is whether the generation now coming to power whose most prominent representatives were at least partly trained in Moscow between 1949 and 1960 is not more marked than the previous generation and the next one by Soviet influence. This would imply that in the next few years Sino-western relations might run into certain difficulties which might then be overcome if Europe manages to meet China's true requirements and prove its interest in maintaining peace and retaining its independence with the means to do so. While it may seem to a Chinese observer that Europe and China at present form the two pillars of peace, this in no way means that one or other should allow its means of defence to be weakened but, on the contrary, that both must acquire the wherewithal to remain independent of any hegemonic power. A comparison between what is known about the Chinese people's desire for independence and, on the other hand, the hesitation among many Europeans about the requirements of a credible defence policy make one wonder whether a political and military weakening is not more to be feared on the European side than on the Chinese side in future years. This seems to be the meaning of the message conveyed to Mr. Carstens, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, when he visited Beijing in October 1982, particularly when Peng Zhen, member of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, apparently referred to the Soviet Union as a "hungry tiger".

108. It therefore seems quite clear that the Sino-Soviet rapprochement in 1982 did not herald any wish by the Chinese authorities to revert to the pre-1960 situation, at least as long as there is no great change in Soviet policy ; it was merely a sign of realism on the part of a government anxious to avoid pointless and dangerous clashes. It may of course be felt that China has less interest in détente in Europe and that it would not be sorry if the Soviet Union transferred some of its redoubtable military forces from Asia to its western frontiers. Probably the Chinese leaders well know that a war involving the two great powers, or even strong tension between them, would probably not spare China. Just as the Soviet Union is not likely to disturb the situation in the East without peace in the West, nor would it risk a serious confrontation in the

West while China remained at full strength since it considers China to be a threat to its immense Asian territories, separated from China by a 7,400 km frontier, several areas of which are contested by China, not without sound reason.

109. The Beijing Government therefore views with some concern the Soviet counter-proposals submitted on several occasions for opening negotiations with the Americans on medium-range nuclear weapons. Indeed, while the zero option offered by President Reagan called for the destruction of SS-20 missiles deployed in Europe, the Soviet counter-proposals referred merely to their transfer further east, i.e. the transfer of a considerable nuclear force to the Sino-Soviet frontiers. Most probably the Chinese authorities strongly encouraged Mr. Shultz, United States Secretary of State, when he visited Beijing on 2nd February, to be very firm about maintaining the zero option as defined so far by President Reagan. Here too China's interests are close to those of Western Europe, which cannot believe that its security would be enhanced by the transfer of SS-20s to the East in view of the mobility of these missiles.

B. Defence policy

110. In the military field, a comparison between the Military Balance for 1982-83 and publications for earlier years shows that many plans to equip the Chinese army with material imported from western countries were not carried into effect and that, taking account of its large numbers, this army is under-equipped and mainly with Soviet equipment procured before 1960 and consequently obsolete. This means that the Chinese army is not in a position to measure up to Soviet forces of which forty-seven divisions, including six armoured divisions, are deployed along the Sino-Soviet frontier. There is every indication that in conventional weapons China, far from catching up with the Soviet Union, has lagged still further behind in the past decade. This is probably not so for nuclear weapons, which are developed enough to give the Soviets second thoughts, but perhaps not truly deterrent in view of the superiority of the Soviet Union which has just reinforced its frontier with China by deploying some hundred SS-20s according to available sources.

111. The Chinese with whom the General Affairs Committee spoke stressed that while Chinese defence, like that of the West, was based on deterrence, its means were not modern or nuclear weapons but the very size of China, the number of inhabitants and the duration of any hostilities in which Chinese territory would

be occupied by foreign forces. These are certainly meaningful deterrents and no power can rationally envisage occupying the whole of China. But this strategy is not enough to shield China from aggression, particularly in sparsely-populated Central Asia. The Chinese authorities are well aware of this and have plans for means of defence other than "revolutionary warfare".

112. Results obtained in conventional weapons are disappointing because of the cost of procurement abroad and the poor level of Chinese production. In recent months the Chinese Government seems to have hesitated in face of the cost of certain weapons to be procured from European countries. Some observers have wondered whether China was not considering buying small quantities of sophisticated weapons which it would then reproduce in China itself, but at the same time they had doubts about the Chinese industry's ability to do this. Even if purchases increased significantly in the next few years, there is little likelihood of the Chinese forces being ready to stand up to the Soviet army for a long time to come.

113. It is in this context that the nuclear weapons China is developing should be considered. At the present juncture, they are not a total deterrent but designed to deter an aggressor from using nuclear weapons against China or its forces. This means that unlike the Western European countries, for which nuclear weapons are the basis of deterrence, China is able to express its willingness not to be the first to use its nuclear weapons. But one may wonder whether this doctrine will not evolve in step with the development of the Chinese nuclear force.

114. Most recent information available indicates that the People's Republic of China does not yet have tactical nuclear weapons but is preparing to develop them. Conversely, it fired several intercontinental ballistic missiles in 1982 and for the first time successfully launched a missile with a nuclear capability from a submarine in October 1982. This means that China now has nuclear strength which must be reckoned with and this is probably one reason why the Soviet Union considered it worthwhile to re-establish normal relations with China. This may have advantages for both sides, but not in the same cases. For the Soviet Union, it may be a means of bringing pressure to bear on the West to welcome its proposals on the limitation of nuclear weapons, while for China it is probably destined to delay the conclusion of the Geneva negotiations which might strengthen the twofold hegemony which it fears.

115. The parallel between the position of China and of Europe obviously cannot be taken

further. Fully committed to its alliance with the United States, Western Europe has no claim to non-alignment, which is an aspect of Chinese policy, nor can China consider that the adhesion of Europe to its positions on disarmament and non-alignment would help to promote a balance likely to ensure peace, any more than Europe can believe that its security would be strengthened by a change in China's economic and social policy.

C. *Asian problems*

116. It is over truly Asian matters that differences have emerged between Europe and China. Admittedly, the Sino-Japanese reconciliation, sealed by a treaty of alliance and friendship in 1978, the year of the normalisation of Sino-American relations, is now a most important factor of peace and stability. Japan has now become the People's Republic's number one supplier and trade partner and its number two customer, which is particularly reassuring for the maintenance of peace in the Far East. There is no longer any real dispute between the two countries, but their solidarity and mutual respect for each other's territory seem to be a major guarantee of joint security.

117. In 1982, Japan bowed to Chinese wishes by agreeing to withdraw from circulation the history books which the Chinese Government accused of glossing over Japan's actions against China during the war. The Chinese too have shown their desire to reach lasting agreement with Japan in recent years. The development of the Japanese economy is proof of the Far East's ability to occupy a leading place in the progress of modern industry and technology. Insofar as Japan, whose investments in the defence field have been very limited, seems to have no wish to undermine China's claim to play a world rôle, its technological development makes it a privileged partner in both trade and industrial co-operation. Some western observers already consider there is a *de facto* community between China and Japan, but this is probably premature. Indeed, while China endorses the Japanese point of view on certain matters, particularly the boundaries of Soviet-Japanese territories, when receiving the special envoy of the new Japanese Government, Yasuhiro Nakasone, in February 1983, it again spelled out its position: although China finds it natural for Japan to acquire the armaments it needs for its security it has no wish for them to exceed certain limits.

118. The same is obviously not true of other territories which are still disputed with other powers. Admittedly, it is not the case of Hong Kong, part of whose territory was leased to the United Kingdom in 1898 for a period of ninety-nine years which is due to expire in

1997. This lease recognises China's sovereign right and hence does not involve questions of principle. But the island of Hong Kong itself was ceded to the United Kingdom on a permanent basis by the 1842 Nanking Treaty. This was one of the unequal treaties whose validity the government in Beijing does not recognise. The narrow limits of that part of Hong Kong's territory would not allow it to survive without the good will of the People's Republic of China, and the United Kingdom has said that it is prepared to negotiate the régime of the whole territory. The negotiations started in September 1982 between the United Kingdom and China in this connection should not therefore encounter insuperable difficulties, but little progress seems to have been made so far.

119. It is clear that China, on the one hand, is anxious to maintain the extensive trade with the West which the statute of Hong Kong allows it (40 % of China's trade with the outside world passes through Hong Kong) but, on the other hand, wishes at all costs to avoid putting a seal on the unequal treaties of the nineteenth century, which would undercut its claims to a large part of central and eastern Asia ceded to Russia. Moreover, an agreement between the United Kingdom and China granting special status acceptable to the 5.5 million inhabitants of the territory whose standard of living is far higher than that of the Chinese of the interior and whose industrial, commercial and banking activities are considerable, and protecting a broad range of economic interests for many countries might encourage the Taiwan authorities also to seek similar status. The fact that, thanks to capital transiting through Hong Kong and the agreement on a special statute for the Shenzhen area by the government in Beijing, investments have been made on both the Chinese and the British sides of the frontier for periods extending far beyond 1997 indicates that both sides are determined to find an acceptable solution. The statute of Macao, recognised in 1976 after four centuries of Portuguese sovereignty as being "Chinese territory administered by the Portuguese", shows that success is possible.

120. The case of Taiwan is entirely different since the Chinese Nationalist Government which took refuge on the island in 1949 has never given up its claim to represent China as a whole, any more than the Beijing Government can give up its claims to the territory of Taiwan. The two governments at least agree not to accept the principle of a permanent division of China into two states. During periods of great tension between the People's Republic of China and the West, there were many incidents between the two governments claiming to represent China. Recognition of the right of the People's Republic to occupy

China's permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council by most western countries, generally accompanied by a break between these countries and the Kuomintang Government, largely contributed to making the situation clearer. Incidents have stopped and in recent years there has been a marked increase in trade between Taiwan and mainland China. At present, the Beijing Government says it is prepared to show the utmost flexibility in its relations with Taiwan, i.e. to agree to wide-ranging concessions to bring about the reunification of China, including meaningful guarantees for the interests of the government and population of Taiwan, even going so far, according to a message by Marshal Yeh Chienying to the "fellow-citizens of Taiwan" on 30th September 1981, as to make it a "special administrative region" in which its different economic and social régimes, administrative autonomy, police force and even its own army would be maintained. Finally, the idea of making the Taiwan head of state Vice-President of the People's Republic of China was mentioned.

121. In these circumstances, can the sale of modern weapons by the United States to the Taiwan Government in 1982 really be in the West's interest? First, China apparently thought the American decision was dictated by a concept directed against Chinese communist ideology and placing China on the same footing as the Soviet Union by supporting against it a régime whose principal merit was anti-communism. Viewed from the People's Republic it seems like a reversion to the theory of two Chinas which the United States renounced after recognising the People's Republic. Moreover, the military strengthening of that régime might well make it more uncompromising or even detract it from reaching agreement with the People's Republic of China, although this would be in the interests of all. In any event, this American policy has led to a deterioration in Sino-American relations which, since 1970, had developed favourably and is probably a reason for the tentative Sino-Soviet rapprochement, but in any case it helps Chinese advocates of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. As underlined in Mr. Brezhnev's speech at Tashkent in March 1982, the Soviet Union rejected the theory of two Chinas but recognised the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China over the island of Taiwan. Your Rapporteur believes that Europe is entitled to exercise a positive influence on United States policy since, having elected to recognise the Beijing Government as being that of the whole of China, it should draw the consequences and encourage reunification by agreement between Beijing and Taiwan.

122. The growing strength of the People's Republic of Vietnam, its expansion in Laos and Cambodia and the threat it represents for other states of the Indo-Chinese peninsula, are also a source of serious concern for China, particularly in view of Moscow's support for the Hanoi Government. Even before the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, there were many conflicts between China and North Vietnam over disputed frontiers, ideological differences and the fate of the large Chinese population in Vietnam. These conflicts have never stopped and frontier incidents have increased: Beijing reported 1,100 in 1970. But when Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia on 7th January 1979 China reacted vigorously and a real war was waged between 17th February and 16th March along the frontiers between the two countries. According to certain sources, there were more than 100,000 victims, without the Chinese diversion preventing the occupation of Cambodia. Since then, the Beijing Government has been supporting movements of resistance to the government set up by the Vietnamese in Phnom Penh and has offered asylum to the former leaders of Cambodia. It is urging its partners to demonstrate clearly their opposition to the continued presence of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia.

123. European opinion certainly did not react very strongly to Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia in view of the atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge to impose a radical revolution at the cost of millions of victims. No tears were shed for the Pol Pot Government and in 1979 the Vietnamese may have been seen as liberators. The situation however has since changed radically because the Vietnamese army stayed in Cambodia and set up a government of its own leaning which resulted in the emergence of several movements which are by no means all followers of the Khmer Rouge. A further wave of emigrants left Cambodia, often in atrocious conditions, to escape the war and the repression of both the Vietnamese and the Phnom Penh Government. China for its part welcomed representatives of the various movements opposed to this foreign domination and endeavoured to reunify them round a coalition government in which the former Cambodian sovereign, Norodom Sihanouk, who could hardly be suspected of conniving with Pol Pot, played a leading rôle.

124. Throughout the Cambodian affair, China took great care not to act without the agreement of the other countries interested in peace in the Indo-Chinese peninsula, particularly Thailand, Singapore, Malaya and Indonesia, grouped in the Association of South-East Asian Nations. In autumn 1980, the various movements opposed to the Phnom Penh Government formed an anti-Vietnamese front in Kuala

Lumpur with the backing of these five countries, their aim being to "free Cambodia from the Vietnamese aggressors". Free elections under United Nations supervision were then to allow the Cambodians to choose their government. Prince Norodom Sihanouk became President of that coalition and on 27th October 1982 the United Nations General Assembly negated the Vietnamese amendment refusing to recognise the credentials of the delegation of the opposition coalition. Most western countries were at the side of China and countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations among the ninety countries which refused to recognise the government imposed by Vietnam. The others abstained.

125. Now, the fact that Chinese assistance goes mainly to the Khmer Rouge group, which is totally discredited by the extortions of the Pol Pot Government, makes several western countries very cautious. Conversely, the fact that China preferred to be associated with other countries interested in protecting the Indo-Chinese peninsula from Vietnamese domination by supporting a coalition, in which the Khmer Rouge is only one of the four components, is more reassuring. China has approved the coalition's declared objective: the re-establishment of a neutral and non-aligned Cambodian state. In this respect, its position has drawn closer to that of the western powers, which could not accept the government set up in Phnom Penh by Vietnam as being representative but could not readily support the Pol Pot Government. Some of them regret that the Khmer Rouge element still seems to have some support in China, whereas they would prefer to place greater emphasis on the neutral and non-aligned nature of the coalition, as President Mitterrand emphasised on behalf of France in Beijing on 3rd May.

126. The third tension area in Asia is Afghanistan where, as soon as it was invaded by the Soviet Union in December 1979, the People's Republic of China adopted a far firmer attitude than the West towards the Soviet Union since it interrupted for two years a dialogue aimed at normalising relations between Moscow and Beijing. It is impossible to know to what extent China assists the Afghan resistance movements but efforts by the Soviet army to control the sole mountain road, inaccessible for half the year, which connects Afghanistan with China show that the Soviet Union is intent on isolating Afghanistan from China. The People's Republic of China for its part is believed to have made the evacuation of Afghanistan one of the three conditions laid down in 1982 for the normalisation of its relations with the Soviet Union.

127. On the other hand, it may be noted that Sino-Soviet frontier problems, both in Mongo-

lia and in the Far East, and matters relating to the Sino-Indian frontiers were not raised by the Chinese on that occasion. In his 1978 report, Sir Frederic Bennett made a careful study of these problems and there is no sign of any great change since then. China has therefore set them on one side deliberately in recent years. This does not mean that it has given up its positions of principle in this respect but probably that it felt it was not desirable to bring them to the fore, knowing that it lacked leverage to advance its cause and had nothing to gain by provoking Soviet reactions on these matters. This attitude is very close to that adopted by the EEC countries with regard to both Afghanistan and Poland.

D. *The third world*

128. It is clear that the positions adopted by the People's Republic of China, particularly with regard to Cambodia, helped to draw it closer to many third world countries, especially the ASEAN countries. The calming down of hostilities with India, its support for the Afghans and the liberalisation of its policy towards national minorities also helped, and the Chinese Government's determination to be included among the developing countries has revived solidarities which had declined during China's isolation.

129. Finally, it should be added that Zhao Ziyang, Chinese Prime Minister, paid a long visit to Africa at the end of 1982. It would be interesting to know what China expects of the African continent and what kind of relations it intends to establish there, or re-establish after a few years during which its interest in that part of the world had been more discreet. Does it wish to demonstrate its solidarity with third world countries in order to strengthen the weight of its diplomacy? In view of the trend of Chinese economic policy, this seems more probable than the search for economic or ideological influence in Africa. Attempts in this sense in earlier decades had only a limited impact and China hardly has the means needed to pursue a policy far from home whose economic effects could but be to arouse possible competition for it on western markets and whose results would in any event be limited. But solidarity with the third world may present certain advantages for Chinese diplomacy, for instance in the United Nations for an affair such as that of Cambodia. In any case, China certainly has a hand in important modernisation programmes in several African countries.

130. In any event it is clear that China is not considering bringing third world countries into opposition with Western Europe and the Chinese leaders whom the committee met, particu-

larly the Prime Minister, Zhao Ziyang, spoke of more active and more concerted co-operation between China and Western Europe for a world development policy.

E. The bases of China's external policy

131. From these considerations, your Rapporteur believes a number of principles emerge which seem to guide the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China :

132. (i) China fully realises that it does not have sufficient conventional or nuclear forces to ensure its security in face of the only power which constitutes a permanent threat, the Soviet Union. This has dictated its attitude of caution, avoiding useless clashes and seeking normalisation of its relations with the Soviet Union without thereby allowing its relations with the western countries to deteriorate, even with the United States which helps to exercise a deterrent rôle which is essential for the maintenance of peace for the benefit of both China and Europe.

133. (ii) While improving its armaments, particularly in the nuclear field, China is now giving priority to its economic development and even to increasing consumption rather than to its armaments policy, which means that its caution will continue for a long time and that it is fundamentally attached to peace.

134. (iii) However, China is not at all prepared to allow the Soviet Union to impose its domination in Asia and is prepared to assist any Asian peoples wishing to defend their independence, particularly in face of Soviet imperialism.

135. (iv) Considering itself as a country divided because of the rivalry between the two great powers, it upholds the principle of the right of peoples to re-establish national unity everywhere in the world, particularly in Korea, but also in Germany.

136. (v) It defends with equal energy the right of peoples to self-determination, be they Cambodians, Afghans or Poles.

137. (vi) However, these aims are secondary compared with the main objective, i.e. the maintenance of international peace. China has principles, but it is not prepared to risk war for their early promotion.

138. Generally speaking, these priorities and principles correspond to those defended by Western Europe. This is obviously one of the reasons why, together with Japan, Europe is now a particularly privileged partner for China since the measures taken by President Reagan's administration in connection with the Taiwan problem run counter to Chinese aims. They

seriously undermined Sino-American relations although, to the best of your Rapporteur's knowledge, not to the extent that improved Sino-Soviet relations allowed a true rapprochement between those two countries.

139. Western Europe must not waste the capital of good will revealed by the Chinese authorities or restrict benefit to the advancement of trade relations, however desirable this may be. It is also and above all for political reasons, principally the maintenance of peace and the defence of the freedom of peoples and their rights, that Western Europe and China must be able to agree on a permanent basis in striving to promote the principles which draw them together for the furtherance of the international peace they both need so much.

140. The Prime Minister, Zhao Ziyang, referred to his country's co-operation with Western Europe in the following words when he spoke to the General Affairs Committee on 9th April 1983:

“ There are many points of convergence between China's position and that of the WEU countries. The starting points may be different but our positions can coincide. I should like China and WEU to exchange views more often so as to take more effective action on international problems. There are no serious divergences between China and Western Europe. More frequent consultations would allow action to be better coordinated. ”

141. These remarks must certainly be compared with the talks between the Chinese leaders and Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations and Chairman-in-Office of the EEC Council, during his visit to Beijing in March 1983. Mr. Tindemans reported to his colleagues in Luxembourg on 26th April in the framework of ten-power political co-operation. There is every reason to hope that this offer will be followed up as it seems to meet the interests of both Europe and China.

V. Conclusions

142. At the close of this explanatory memorandum, your Rapporteur wishes to underline the very great convergence of the information and impressions obtained by the committee in China itself with indications received from non-Chinese sources before the visit.

143. In conclusion, he wishes to recall some of the reasons which he considers militate in favour of pursuing a European policy which is more concerted and more alive than hitherto to the realities of the People's Republic of China.

144. (i) The first obviously stems from the nature of the world balance, which Europe wishes to be neither dominated by a continental hegemony nor defined solely in terms of present bipolarity, i.e. the state of American-Soviet relations. The development of an independent power in Asia can but help to give weight to Europe provided the latter manages to combine forces sufficiently to define a policy.

145. (ii) For China, whose fundamental problem is the transformation of its economy, as well as for Europe, which fully realises that any war between the United States and the Soviet Union would devastate its territory, the aim of a rational policy can but be to strengthen peace. This means that systematic criticism of China for the ideology it pursues is not in Europe's interest; but it has every interest in helping China to find its way in the modern world, particularly since China seems to have given up ideological expansionism.

146. (iii) From an economic standpoint, Europe must bear in mind the advantages of developing a potential market of more than a thousand million persons. It did so in the second half of the nineteenth century but used questionable means whose effect was to share out but not really develop this market. Development depends on the economic transformation of China. Even if China were to become a serious competitor for Western Europe in a number of years' time, the modernisation of its economy should lead to a considerable expansion of international trade from which Europe could derive the utmost benefit if it managed to adapt itself to the specific conditions of the Chinese market. China is at present making proposals for co-operation which are well worth

close examination and it is to be hoped that they will be followed up.

147. (iv) From a political standpoint, the search for reasonable and moderate solutions to international problems, particularly Asian problems, and recourse to bodies such as the United Nations for this purpose clearly seem to be in everyone's interest. Europe must respond favourably to China's proposals for regular mutual consultations.

148. (v) In security and defence matters, the search for methods of disarmament which do not increase the threat to peace or the overwhelming influence of the two great powers seems to be in the interests of both China and Europe.

149. (vi) In the cultural field, converging interests should lead to exchanges from which Europe too might benefit. It is undoubtedly in China's interest to import from Europe not only technology but also ways of thinking developed in recent centuries leading to an understanding of natural, economic, technical and human factors thanks to the progress of modern sciences. But Europe cannot remain indifferent to the establishment of a Chinese way in the economic field because, if successful, it might well become a model for the development of the third world. But, in order to see China as it really is, Europe must make the same effort as China has made in order to improve its understanding of the West.

150. (vii) Finally, the reality of China can but remind Europe of the need for greater unity of means and efforts to face up to a contemporary world in which each individual European country is but a tiny entity.

China and European security

AMENDMENT 1 ¹
tabled by Mr. Fourré

1. At the end of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, add:
“and, in particular, no longer subject the latter to Cocom restrictions on trade with the eastern countries”.

Signed: Fourré

1. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1983 (amendment agreed to).

China and European security

AMENDMENTS 2 and 3 ¹
tabled by Mr. Vogt

2. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.
3. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:
“ Appeal to the People’s Republic of China to stop the tests of atomic weapons and delivery vehicles, especially in the Pacific, in order to comply with the deep concerns of the Pacific peoples about such activities of the atomic powers, thereby setting a good example in the interest of the survival of mankind ; ”.

Signed: Vogt

1. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1983 (amendments negatived).

China and European security

AMENDMENT 4 ¹
tabled by Mr. Bassinet and Mr. Fourré

4. At the end of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add:
“ and refrain from any position which might prevent the return of Taiwan to China ; ”.

Signed: Bassinet, Fourré

1. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1983 (amendment withdrawn).

The law of the sea

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ²
by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur*

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I. Territorial sea and other maritime claims

II. Deep-sea mining consortia

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Valleix (Chairman); MM. Lenzer, Wilkinson (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Adriaensens, Amadei, Antoni, Barthe (Alternate: Lagorce), Fiandrotti, Forma, Fortier (Alternate: Bassinet), Fourré,

Garrett (Alternate: Lord Northfield), Sir Paul Hawkins, MM. McGuire, Manning, Prussen, Spies von Büllesheim, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Topmann, Worrell (Alternate: Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation***on the law of the sea***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the Council's reply to Recommendation 377 on implications of the law of the sea conference that the aim pursued by the governments of member states was to reach a universally-accepted international convention on the law of the sea, which would constitute an important factor in maintaining peaceful and friendly relations between states, especially between western industrialised countries and developing countries in the third world;
- (ii) In agreement with the Council's opinion that a satisfactory international regulation of deep-seabed mining was strategically and economically of great importance, especially for industrialised Western European countries which are highly dependent on imports of raw materials ;
- (iii) Conscious of the third world's claims to a share of deep-sea mineral resources ;
- (iv) Aware of the shortcomings of the proposed seabed mining régime but regretting the policy split among the member states of Western European Union, the EEC and NATO on whether the convention should be signed;
- (v) Considering that this split may be detrimental to Europe's strategic position in the world;
- (vi) Aware of the danger of losing what has been gained in some fourteen years of negotiations and the benefits to be derived from the convention for the greater part of the globe, whereas the navies of the signatory countries, including those of the Soviet bloc, may derive far-reaching advantages with the backing of international law,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine the strategic and tactical disadvantages of the present situation and seek to eliminate the differences in the policies of member countries towards the draft law of the sea convention ;
2. Request the Governments of France and the Netherlands to devote their efforts in the preparatory commission to the introduction of rules and regulations to govern the seabed mining régime in an equitable manner with less state control and protectionism than proposed by the Soviet bloc and many third world countries ;
3. Request the Governments of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom to adopt policies with a view to making full use of Europe's political and industrial influence in the preparatory commission to achieve constructive and acceptable solutions to problems relating to the seabed mining régime;
4. Pursue its efforts to convince the United States Government of the negative consequences of its policy and of the advantages of a duly-signed unambiguous convention on the law of the sea and, consequently, the rule of law of the world oceans, as opposed to a mere customary law situation which cannot be enforced.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1. In Recommendation 377, adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1981, on the implications of the law of the sea conference and attached to its first report, your committee had indicated that the results achieved, especially in seabed mining arrangements, leaned strongly towards dirigism and protectionism. Nevertheless, member countries of WEU were of the opinion that a new international convention might establish the rule of law on the world oceans which might in the future forestall many difficulties and would constitute a factor in maintaining peaceful and friendly relations between states. They were also aware of the importance of such a convention between western industrialised countries and developing countries of the third world.

2. The Council, in its reply of 20th April 1982, stated further as its opinion that a satisfactory international regulation of deep-seabed mining was strategically and economically of great importance, especially for the industrialised Western European countries which were highly dependent on imports of raw materials to be extracted from the deep seabed. WEU member governments were therefore prepared to take part in a constructive manner in the forthcoming consultations and negotiations to arrive at a system which would take into account the interests of all concerned.

3. On 30th April 1982, the last day of the third United Nations conference on the law of the sea, the United States Ambassador, Mr. Malone, called for a vote by the delegates of the participating countries on the draft convention, all efforts to reach a consensus on the convention having been exhausted. The convention was approved by 130 votes to 4, with 17 abstentions. Israel, Turkey, the United States and Venezuela voted against. The Soviet Union and countries of the communist bloc, and Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom abstained. France and Japan voted in favour of the convention. Turkey and Venezuela voted against as they objected to provisions on the delimitation of marine and submarine areas between states with opposite or adjacent coasts. Israel objected because the text gave recognition to the PLO. Albania and Ecuador did not participate in the voting.

4. The Soviet Union and the eastern bloc countries abstained on 10th April 1982 because they did not agree to pioneer investors (Amer-

icans and Western Europeans) having an advantage and thought the establishment of an equitable economic order, taking into account the interests of all countries, was not assured.

5. The full conference then met twice more in 1982: in New York from 22nd to 24th September to act on the recommendations of the drafting committee and for the last time in Kingston, Jamaica, from 6th to 10th December for government representatives to sign the draft convention.

6. After the convention is signed, its ratification by sixty states will bring it into force twelve months after ratification by the sixtieth state.

7. On 10th December 1982 in Kingston, the United States and several WEU member countries did not sign the convention mainly because it contained a deep-seabed mining régime which they could not support. They agreed that the convention on the law of the sea contained many positive provisions consistent with their interests and in the interests of all those who are maritime powers and use the seas.

(a) United States policy

8. The United States Government gave the following reasons for not supporting the deep-seabed mining régime as set out in the convention :

- (i) It would deter development of deep-sea mineral resources as it would limit the availability of minerals for global consumption; in addition, there would be a limit on the number of mining operations that could be conducted by any one country.
- (ii) The draft convention would create a system of privileges operating against private mining companies; the supranational enterprise which would be the seabed mining agency to be established by the convention could gain a monopoly.
- (iii) The decision-making machinery of the seabed authority would not effectively protect the political and economic interests and reflect the financial contributions of participating states; for example, the convention would make American access to

seabed resources dependent on the voting power of competitors and on those countries that do not wish to see the resources exploited.

(iv) Amendments to the convention could come into force through a review process that would not require the approval of all participating states and therefore of the advice and consent of the United States Senate.

(v) In addition to practical problems raised by the provisions setting up official production limits and a mandatory transfer of proprietary technology to competitors of United States companies, these provisions would also create undesirable precedents for future international negotiations.

9. On 9th December 1982 the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Mrs. Jean Kirkpatrick, declared that the seabed régime would set up a big bureaucracy that would have the authority to determine which countries could and which could not have free access to deep-sea minerals. There was an enormous gap between bearing the cost of deep-seabed mining and nations making decisions. She emphasised that the United States would carry out its own seabed mining subject to a reasonable regard for the interests of other states and would not be affected by the law of the sea agreement.

10. United States companies and companies of other countries would be able to mine under an alternative régime for which initial steps have already been taken, as mentioned in your Rapporteur's first report. They call for voluntary procedures to resolve conflicts over seabed mining.

11. It was indicated by the United States that initially this interim agreement would concern only countries that already have an interest in mining and a near-term capability.

12. The interim arrangement would accept private initiative and private investment and take account of the fact that private companies simply would not risk their capital on a new venture unless they knew they would be able to profit if the venture ultimately succeeded.

13. During the law of the sea conference negotiations too many developing countries lost sight, according to the United States Delegation, of the practical economic realities that govern any new industry. These negotiations failed to produce seabed mining provisions compatible with this basic principle

14. As a consequence of the United States position, the government announced on 30th December 1982 its determination to withhold

funds from the United Nations because of the General Assembly's decision to fund the law of the sea preparatory commission from the general United Nations budget. The resolution was voted on 3rd December 1982 and was opposed by the United States Government which would therefore not pay its share of some \$500,000 to \$700,000. The preparatory commission which was to develop rules and regulations for the seabed mining régime should, according to United States delegates, be paid for by those countries which had accepted the law of the sea convention.

15. On 10th March 1983 President Reagan proclaimed officially an exclusive economic zone extending 200 nautical miles from the coast of the United States. He confirmed that the United States would not sign the United Nations law of the sea convention although it contained provisions with respect to traditional uses of the oceans confirming existing maritime law and practices and fairly balancing the interests of all states. He announced three decisions, first that the United States was prepared to act and accept the traditional uses of the oceans such as navigation and overflight on a reciprocal basis. Second, that the United States would exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a world-wide basis but would not accept unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other related high-sea uses. Third, he proclaimed an exclusive economic zone in which the United States would exercise sovereign rights over living and non-living resources within 200 nautical miles of its coast. There would thus be United States jurisdiction over mineral resources out to 200 nautical miles not necessarily on the continental shelf. Recently-discovered deposits in those areas could be an important future source of strategic minerals.

16. The President did not claim a right of jurisdiction over marine scientific research within such a zone.

17. The proclamation included, in particular, new rights over all minerals in the exclusive economic zone which are not on the continental shelf but are within the 200 nautical miles. Deposits of cobalt, manganese and other minerals in these areas have been discovered recently and, although many years away from being commercially recoverable, could become a major future source of strategic and other minerals important to the United States economy and security. The President's statement made clear that the proclamation did not change existing policies with respect to the outer continental shelf and fisheries within the United States zone.

18. The Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Mr. James Malone, declared that the exclusive economic zone was an important component in a new United States oceans policy. He declared the concept of the economic zone as lawful under customary international law. This was recognised by the International Court of Justice and the American Law Institute. He thought that international consensus supported the proclamation. The exclusive international zone was a lawful claim of sovereign rights and jurisdiction under customary international law and brought within United States jurisdiction and control those natural resources which were rightfully theirs while simultaneously preserving to the maximum extent the traditional high-seas freedoms of navigation and overflight.

19. The proclamation was also valid for the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the northern Mariana Islands and United States overseas territories and possessions. The total area was estimated to exceed two million square nautical miles.

(b) Policies of WEU member countries

20. Belgium has not so far signed the convention although it well realises that the European Community can sign it only when six countries of the Community have signed. Belgium's signature would therefore involve the European Community in the work of the preparatory commission. On 21st December 1982 the Belgian Foreign Minister declared in the Chamber of Representatives in Brussels that, on 10th December 1982, Belgium had signed the final act of the law of the sea conference but not the convention. This was mainly because of the articles on deep-seabed mining. Belgium has developed a world reputation for the transformation of non-ferrous metals and the refining of special metals. It was therefore directly concerned with the future consequences of the approval of the convention and the related deep-sea mining. Further consultation was therefore needed with the Belgian industries concerned, the European Economic Community and its member countries. Time was still available as the preparatory commission was not to meet before the middle of March 1983.

21. The French Government has signed both the final act and the convention since the convention has satisfied French expectations in many fields, such as the régime for territorial waters, the economic zone, the continental shelf, the right of transit in straits and through archipelagoes. The articles on pollution were also satisfactory. The preparatory commission should correct some anomalies, however, on

deep-sea mining. France will have a seat on the preparatory commission along with other states which have signed the convention. It is to start its work two or three months after fifty signatures have been obtained.

22. The Federal Republic of Germany has not signed the convention and is to take a decision before the preparatory commission convenes. Of great importance, of course, will be the position of the member countries of the EEC and NATO. In order to take a weighted decision, the following considerations are important:

- (a) participation in the preparatory commission;
- (b) improvement of the deep-seabed mining régime;
- (c) participation in an alternative régime proposed by the United States for deep-seabed mining;
- (d) signature of the law of the sea convention by the EEC and the need for a common approach by the EEC member countries;
- (e) maintaining law and order through the general law of the sea convention, the delimitation of territorial seas, economic zones, freedom of navigation, scientific research and sea pollution;
- (f) keeping open the option for establishing the sea tribunal in Hamburg;
- (g) balancing North-South interests;
- (h) applying the law over seas and oceans;
- (i) keeping open the possibility of ratifying the convention.

23. The Italian Government has followed the same line of reasoning as Belgium and might decide to sign the convention later. Luxembourg has likewise not yet signed.

24. The Netherlands Government has signed the convention mainly because of its involvement in improving North-South relations and the importance of the convention in allowing the have-not states to share in the proceeds of the world's last great untapped reserves.

25. The United Kingdom Government is not planning to sign before it has obtained satisfactory improvements in the deep-sea mining régime. Here it is inclined to follow the same attitude as the United States Government, but a definite decision has not yet been taken.

(c) The position of other states

26. Half of the NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal – have signed the convention. Half of the EEC countries – Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands – have also signed the convention.

27. All the Warsaw Pact countries have signed the convention, mainly out of solidarity with the third world but also because of the rules on freedom of navigation and of transit in straits. Moreover, they hope, through the international seabed authority, to keep in touch with deep-seabed mining technology.

28. Of the 141 countries present at the signing ceremony at Kingston, Jamaica, on 10th December 1982, 117 have signed the convention, 23 states have signed only the final act and 27 states were not represented. The large number of signatures was unexpected as some important western industrialised states had adopted a negative attitude.

29. A large majority of the so-called group of 77 (in fact 120 countries) has signed the convention and those who did not sign had particular reasons, such as Argentina with the problem of the Falkland Islands, Libya because of the refusal to consider the Gulf of Sirte as an inland sea, Venezuela because of delimitation problems with Columbia, Jordan and Saudi Arabia because of the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba and Zaire because of insufficient protection for land-based producers of important metals such as manganese, etc.

30. Arab states such as Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar and Syria have adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Several Latin American countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru and El Salvador wanted time for reflection and insofar as they are coastal countries, they will probably have to change their laws governing the coastal economic zones. Several, like Brazil, insisted on their prior consent in case of naval exercises by foreign navies and have special legislation on the construction of artificial islands in that zone. Several, like Peru, have declared the economic zone a territorial zone which does not, of course, concord with the convention.

31. All Western European countries outside the Communities have signed the convention with the exception of Spain which is not in agreement with the rules on passage through the Straits of Gibraltar which it considers too liberal; for the same reason Morocco did not sign. Switzerland did not want to sign before the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States and several other industrialised countries had signed; Turkey did not sign because of the

delimitation rules of the marine coastal areas. Australia, Canada and New Zealand as well as Japan have signed.

32. Although the Soviet Union and the other communist countries abstained on 30th April 1982, they nevertheless signed on 10th December. They still declared then that they were not in agreement with the articles on advantages for pioneer deep-sea mining investments but they wished to adopt the same attitude as the underdeveloped countries.

33. The Chairman of the conference, the Singapore Ambassador, Mr. Koh, invited the preparatory commission on deep-sea mining arrangements which is to meet in Jamaica in March to be practical and objective and show an "operational" spirit, which were essential conditions for the accession of present non-signatories and without which fourteen years' work would have served no purpose¹.

34. He paid tribute to the success, unprecedented in the annals of the United Nations, of 117 countries representing all parts of the world having signed such an important treaty.

35. Drawing conclusions from the 121 speeches made, he picked out the following four themes:

- the provisions of the convention were an indissociable whole involving both rights and corresponding obligations;
- the convention introduced a new law which was not merely a codification of existing customary law. Among the new provisions based on the convention, he quoted the right of free transit through international straits and movement in archipelagic channels and the new definition of the continental shelf;
- the traditional concept of freedom of the high seas was no longer a legal juridical basis for authorising exploitation of the resources of the ocean floor outside the convention. In the opinion of many countries, mankind's common heritage had become part of customary law on the same basis as freedom of navigation;
- finally, he noted that a unanimous appeal had been made to the United States to change its position so that its attitude would correspond more closely to its history, its special interests in the law of the sea and the key rôle it had played in the conference by negotiating

1. Period covering the work of the Seabed Committee set up at the end of 1967 and transformed into a standing committee by the United Nations General Assembly at the end of 1968.

the many compromises which had allowed the convention to see the light of day.

36. There is, of course, uncertainty as to whether those who have signed will also ratify; for several, such as France and the Netherlands, this will depend on improvements in the deep-sea mining régime.

II. *Some basic provisions of the convention*

37. In his report on the implications of the law of the sea conference of 29th October 1982¹, your Rapporteur underlined some of the security aspects of the law of the sea convention. The acid test is to what extent it would be an instrument to avoid conflicts, and could bring law and order to the world's seas and oceans. It should guarantee freedom of navigation and, in particular, the right of transit in straits; freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines should be preserved.

38. The right of innocent passage through territorial seas is recognised in Article 17 and in Article 38 the right of transit through straits used for international navigation. The passage of warships through territorial seas was a controversial subject and after long discussions the innocent passage of such ships was agreed to and no specific provisions on prior authorisation or notification were laid down.

39. Article 39 of the convention allowed ships and aircraft of all countries transit passage through straits. Vessels of all states enjoy similar rights of innocent passage through archipelagic waters (Article 49). The sea lanes are to be designated by the archipelagic state with sovereignty over these waters.

40. Freedom of the high seas, including the various traditional freedoms, is reaffirmed for all states. Article 87 governs freedom of navigation, overflight, laying submarine cables and pipelines, fishing and scientific research.

41. A uniform 12-mile territorial sea limit has been established where the coastal states have sovereignty over the seabed, the waters and the air space above the territorial sea. A contiguous zone of 24 miles from the coast allows the coastal state to apply its customs, fiscal, emigration and sanitary regulations.

42. From the 134 coastal states, 76 have accepted the 12-mile limit, 26 more than 12 miles and, of these, 14 up to 200 miles. Only 32 states, including the Federal Republic

of Germany, have kept the 3-mile sea limit and in some cases this has been 4 or 6 miles¹.

43. Some 20 coastal states declared that they wanted prior notification of the passage of warships. Whether this can be enforced after signature will eventually be a question to be put before the international sea tribunal.

44. Transit passage is assured through 100 important straits. However, certain important straits, such as the Baltic Sea and its entrances, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, will remain governed by existing treaties, such as the Copenhagen and Montreux conventions. With regard to the Strait of Malacca, the declaration made by the neighbouring countries – Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore – and by the user countries – Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States – remains in force.

45. The convention recognises seven archipelagoes, mainly in the Pacific, which by drawing limits round certain outer islands can declare the seas within these limits inland seas; their sovereignty over these inland seas is, however, restricted as they must allow peaceful transit passage and other high-sea rights.

46. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state – while enjoying sovereign rights for the exploration, exploitation and management of all living and non-living resources, the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures – has jurisdiction but may not influence the freedom of navigation and overflight and freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines. The same applies to the continental shelf in the high seas where, in exercising its right on the continental shelf, the coastal state must not influence the freedom of other states. In certain cases, the continental shelf may extend as far as 350 miles from the coast if certain conditions set out in the convention are met.

47. The exclusive economic zones with restricted sovereign rights for the coastal states are of the greatest importance as in these zones can be found 95 % of all oil and gas resources, 85 % of all fish and possibly many other future renewable energy resources. The majority of artificial islands and constructions are to be found in these zones which are also the most important areas for the protection of the environment. Exclusive economic zones represent about 40 % of the surface of the world's seas.

48. The convention regulations with regard to exclusive economic zones are of great importance for western industrialised states as well as for fast-developing countries like Brazil,

1. Document 890.

1. See Appendix I.

Argentina and India. Eighty states have already indicated their wish to make declarations on exclusive economic zones.

49. For the Federal Republic of Germany, although preferring the old rules, this meant that it had to declare its own fishery zones in the Baltic Sea, in June 1978, and in the North Sea in January 1977 together with the EEC member countries.

50. The treaty provides for procedures for settling disputes through conciliation, the law of the sea tribunal and arbitration. In addition, countries may always turn to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Such procedures for the settlement of disputes are of considerable importance but they do not preclude the risk of political conflict or confrontation since the convention offers no effective means of resolving disputes between states. Most probably there will be many conflicts regarding sovereignty over numerous rocks and islands, the possession of which grants great power over vast expanses of sea and the attendant natural resources. The delimitation of territorial seas, exclusive economic zones and the continental shelf of neighbouring states might lead to many difficulties with controversies over fishing, transfrontier gas and oil deposits, environmental pollution and freedom of movement on the seas and in the air. Your Rapporteur might refer here to the report by Mr. Bassinet¹ on the maritime frontier between Norway and the USSR.

51. The convention favours coastal states but not other countries which are at a geographical disadvantage with only a small coastline or which are landlocked. The latter have a right to fish – only when surpluses exist – in neighbouring economic zones and the encouragement offered to them to take part in the exploitation of marine deposits is small consolation. These arrangements might also give rise to many conflicts.

52. A further cause of conflict is the recognition of exclusive economic zones, which in fact means that international waters are severely reduced. According to Article 140, activities in the area, defined in 1970 as “the common heritage of mankind”, are to be organised and carried out by the international seabed authority for the benefit of mankind as a whole. In fact, the only raw materials now economically accessible in the area are manganese nodules.

53. There is also a source of dispute between countries which have signed the convention and countries such as the United States, probably the largest future consumer of manganese nodules, which do not wish to sign the

convention. Moreover, there is a provision that all seabed activities must be carried out by the seabed authority and its organs, or by private and state entities in association with the authority.

III. *Deep-sea mining aspects*

54. In the first part of his report¹ your Rapporteur discussed several aspects of deep-sea mining problems. Here he wishes to mention the interesting points raised by Admiral Labrousse before the committee on 15th February 1983. He stated:

“Where seabed technology is concerned, the United States is of course in the lead either through private American groups or through multinational groups set up with European countries, Japan and Canada². At the United States Senate I attended a hearing on this subject which brought together most of the large private American firms with international seabed programmes. The heads of the firms questioned by Senate committees answered that they had the technology and had spent \$1,000 million on research. It was private money and the American state had not invested one dollar. The technology was theirs, it was their trade secret, it was their future. They would make it available to the United States if necessary but there could be no question of transferring this technology in any form whatsoever to an international organisation or a foreign country. If the United States Government forced them to do so, they would attack it in the United States Supreme Court.

In the convention, it is first stipulated that the international authority's enterprise must be made viable. It must be capable of exploiting certain seabeds itself under its own authority. If the United States wishes to have permission to exploit the international seabed it must contact the international authority and, at the same time as the permission is requested, afford the authority rights of equivalent value which it will keep in reserve. This will be its capital. But the permission placed in reserve must be exploited. And how can this be done without the necessary technology? Provision had been made for a system of technological transfers by industrialised states to the enterprise since the poorer, underdeveloped countries will in fact never work the international seabed. They will

1. Document 930.

1. Document 890, paragraphs 29-33.

2. See Appendix II.

exploit only their own wealth, the wealth in the 200 nautical miles of economic zone.

On the continental shelf there are no nodules; these are found at depths of about 4,000 or 5,000 metres or more. There is a kind of barrier at a depth of about 3,000 metres between oil and nodules.

.....

A nodule field must allow four million tons to be extracted each year. To work a licence represents an investment of \$10,000 million. These are current estimates provided all the technology is available. It is certain that if the United States, the industrialised countries or multinational firms do not come to the assistance of the authority it will never work.

.....

The United States and certain other industrialised countries have not signed [the convention], not because they are against the very idea of the 'common heritage of mankind' and of the international seabed authority but because it will never be possible for the theoretical and utopian system provided for in the convention to work. This is the main criticism which most industrialised countries which have not signed have to make of the draft convention.

The Russians have signed. I asked them why. Their answer was surprising. They said: 'But why not sign since the system will not work?' That was Soviet reasoning. We industrialised countries do not see things in at all the same way.

.....

A preparatory commission has been set up to implement this enormous project. In my view, it has at least ten years' work before it. Only in ten years' time will we have a more or less accurate idea of the future of this world government of the seabed.

.....

Of course, the group of 77 consisting of most of the third world countries and at present supplying the industrialised countries with most of their mineral resources is not in favour of the exploitation of the international seabed since this would compete seriously with their own resources. Countries of this group are afraid they will have no control over these resources and that the industrialised countries, with their technology, money and manpower,

may be the first to exploit them and the first to gather the fantastic wealth from the seabed. The gap between the developing countries and the industrialised countries would grow even wider and impossible to bridge.

One of the main arguments of the United States Delegation during the ten years of the law of the sea conference was that the wealth exists. It is fabulous. No one has the right to prevent mankind from enjoying it. Progress demands that it be exploited. The conference does not have the right to leave such wealth untapped.

It is possible for a multinational firm with the ships, technology and scientific means of investigation to act on behalf of the enterprise and extract nodules for payment. This is one solution - and probably the only one."

IV. *Defence aspects*

55. In preparation for the report, the committee invited Admiral Labrousse to brief the committee on the defence aspects of the law of the sea conference. He pointed out that all the economic zones in the world, including North and South America, Asia and Africa, covered an area of 100 million square kilometres of which 25 million square kilometres belonged to Western Europe. Western European countries therefore had sovereign rights over one-quarter of the world economic zones.

56. With existing modern technology, coastal countries are able to install detection and control instruments in their territorial waters which give far greater security than was possible under the old 3-mile system. The 1958 convention was unable to fix the limits of the territorial seas but now the 12-mile limit and contiguous zone of another 12-miles have been fixed.

57. Peaceful passage in the territorial sea is more precisely defined than in the 1958 convention. Peaceful passage excludes threat or use of force with regard to the coastal state. No exercises or manoeuvres with the use of weapons are allowed, or information gathering, propaganda broadcasts, the embarkation of military engines or commercial embarkations. Peaceful passage also means the possibility of being able to stop and act in cases of navigational incidents. Submarines have to show the flag and therefore pass on the surface.

58. For Western European countries which are used to peaceful passage in their territorial waters there are therefore no great changes. For the Soviet Union and other eastern bloc

countries which so far have refused the peaceful passage of warships in their territorial waters, it will mean changing their respective laws.

59. All coastal states can, however, adopt laws and regulations with regard to safety of navigation, the protection of navigational aids and of cables and pipelines. However, the coastal state must give due publicity to all such laws and regulations. It has the right to require merchant ships to comply but has no power with regard to warships which it can only ask to leave the territorial waters. For archipelagoes, the right of innocent passage is established; the state can designate sea lanes and air routes for the continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft and submarines can pass through such lanes submerged. Islands belonging to continental states cannot benefit from the régime accorded to archipelagoes.

60. The exclusive economic zone gives the coastal state sovereign rights but not sovereignty over the whole of the economic zone. Freedom of navigation for ships and aircraft is therefore guaranteed, submarines can pass submerged and all ships have the possibility of laying submarine cables and pipelines. The exclusive economic zone has therefore the same régime as the high seas with the exception of reserved rights for coastal states; the coastal state has sovereign rights over natural resources, living and non-living, jurisdiction over artificial islands and installations and can control marine scientific research and the marine environment. In principle, therefore, the exclusive economic zone has no direct influence on the navigation of warships. On the other hand, warships of coastal states are able to control more effectively the maritime approaches. With regard to scientific vessels which may have suspect intentions, the control can be more stringent.

61. With regard to the continental shelf which is limited to 350 miles from the coastal state, the régime is the same as for the economic zone.

62. Rules for transit through straits were of course the main concern of the maritime powers when the law of the sea conference opened.

63. Extension of territorial waters to 12 sea miles in fact led to the closure of almost 140 straits.

64. Rules for innocent passage through contiguous territorial waters of coastal states would have led to considerable inconvenience for private ships and aircraft and particularly for naval forces

65. Submarines would have had to navigate on the surface and aircraft request authorisation to overfly the straits. Another solution thus had to be found.

66. The convention therefore provided that in straits used for navigation between two parts

of the high seas or of the exclusive and constituted economic zones of the territorial waters of coastal states *ships and aircraft would benefit from the "right of unimpeded transit"*. This right means:

- freedom of navigation and overflight for the sole purpose of *continuous and expeditious* transit in accordance with their normal means of navigation, thus allowing submarines to remain submerged;
- the right for aircraft to overfly straits.

67. Ships and aircraft must refrain from the threat or use of force against coastal states, abstain from any activity other than passage and respect international safety regulations relating to maritime and air navigation.

68. Ships must respect international regulations designed to avert, reduce and control pollution. To this end, coastal states may designate sea lanes and traffic separation schemes which ships must respect. Ships may conduct survey work only with the authorisation of the coastal states.

69. But rules for *transit passage* do not apply in the case of:

- straits which are formed by the mainland territory of a state and an island belonging to that state if there exists, off that island, a route through the high seas or through an economic zone of similar convenience (e.g. Straits of Messina);
- straits used for navigation between the high seas or economic zone and a state's territorial waters (e.g. Strait of Tiran).

In both these cases rules for innocent passage will apply.

- finally, straits governed by longstanding international conventions which are still in force continue to be governed by these conventions (Turkish and Baltic straits).

70. In fact, there are now five possible cases:

- straits governed by a special convention;
- straits where there is a route through the high seas or an exclusive economic zone (freedom of the high seas);
- straits consisting of territorial waters used for navigation between two parts of the high seas or economic zones (unimpeded transit);
- the same, but constituted by an island and a mainland territory belonging to

the same state if it is possible to use a high sea route off the island of similar convenience (innocent passage);

- straits formed of territorial waters and used for navigation between the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and a territorial sea (innocent passage).

V. Conclusions

71. The classic principles of the law of the sea were laid down in 1609 by Hugo Grotius who founded the doctrine of freedom of the seas. This doctrine was first challenged in 1945 by the then American President, Mr. Harry Truman, who proclaimed United States jurisdiction over the seabed resources of its continental shelf. Three years later Chile, Peru and Ecuador proclaimed a 200-mile maritime zone and started a fishing war with the United States, seizing its tuna boats.

72. In 1958, the United Nations convened the law of the sea conference in order to find common rules and accommodation between the newly-proclaimed coastal jurisdictions and the traditional freedom of the seas. In December 1982 this resulted in the broadest international convention ever submitted for signature.

73. Territorial claims were reduced to a limit of 12 miles. The convention stated that the right to free and unimpeded passage would be guaranteed, especially through straits narrower than 24 miles. Free passage would apply to all ships whether military or civilian, on the surface or submerged. The exclusive 200-mile economic zone for coastal states was recognised, but the convention does not allow them to restrict the passage of ships or overflights of planes of other nations.

74. The significance of what has been agreed should not be underestimated and, especially for western countries, conflicts over rights of passage can now be avoided in most cases. The convention also greatly reduces the number of issues liable to provoke clashes between third world countries and industrialised powers. As conflicts over rights of passage are now unlikely, major bases in distant oceans of the world are unnecessary and this in turn can therefore lead to the avoidance of conflicts between the superpowers.

75. In return for the concession on free transit, the smaller, poorer and sometimes landlocked nations of the third world have demanded a right of access to the vast mineral deposits that lie on the floor of the ocean outside the 200-mile economic zones. The problem was how to devise a system that balanced the needs of the large western mining companies against the desire of the third world countries to have a share in the deep-sea minerals. After much negotiating, the conference conceived the idea of an international

seabed authority which would supervise the mining of the ocean floor. Part of the ocean would be mined by an international body under United Nations authority and operating on behalf of the developing nations and part would be mined by private mining companies. The preparatory commission to be formed in Jamaica should define the relationship between private mining companies and the international body called the enterprise. To resolve the points still being disputed will not be an easy task, but the acceptance and ratification of the convention by many industrialised countries will depend on solutions being found.

76. The United States position is based on the argument that the advantages the convention granted the maritime powers were already customary law and that all states might therefore benefit from them whether parties to the convention or not.

77. Thus, from a military point of view the new rules for transit through international straits, allowing aircraft to overfly them without authorisation and submarines to pass through submerged, the legal regulations applying to economic zones, provisions relating to marine scientific research and rules on pollution would be matters of customary law merely because they were brought up by the conference.

78. Certain legal experts are unconvinced of the value of this argument and others object that the advantages obtained by the maritime powers with regard to freedom of navigation are naturally offset by those granted to the third world under the international seabed régime.

79. The problem is in fact fundamental, for if the United States argument is correct, it is not essential, from a military standpoint, to sign and to ratify the convention. Conversely, if it is questionable, the risk of losing the remarkable gains of some ten years of negotiations and reverting to the outdated 1958 law would be intolerable for the western naval powers which would be denied the benefits of the convention over the greater part of the globe, whereas the navies of the signatory countries, including the Soviet Union, would derive the maximum advantage with the backing of international law.

80. Hence, our long-term industrial interests must be weighed against our long- and medium-term defence interests.

81. The political interest of such a decision cannot be left unmentioned, particularly in view of its important repercussions on policy towards the third world.

82. The presence of certain WEU countries may bring in their wake other countries of ten-power Europe, thus allowing the EEC to take part in the preparatory commission which thus would not be dominated solely by the Soviet Union.

APPENDIX I

Territorial sea and other maritime claims¹

Lord Kennet asked Her Majesty's Government whether they will now list those states which have established territorial seas of less than 12 miles (specifying their extent), of 12 miles, and of more than 12 miles (specifying their extent); fishery zones of 200 miles and of less than 200 miles (specifying their extent); pollution control zones (specifying their extent); seabed jurisdictions (specifying their extent); and other zones of partial or complete national jurisdiction not universally recognised.

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Belstead): The following lists show claims by states to a territorial sea, fishery limits and exclusive economic zone of the extent indicated. A claim to an exclusive economic zone includes rights with respect to the resources of the seabed and subsoil of the zone and other resources, and may also include some degree of pollution control. States also have jurisdiction under international law over their continental shelf, the extent of which varies.

TERRITORIAL SEA:

(a) *Less than 12 miles*

Australia	3	Lebanon	6
Belgium	3	Netherlands	3
Belize	3	Norway	4
Denmark	3	Nicaragua	3
Dominican Republic	6	Qatar	3
Finland	4	Sao Tome & Principe	6
FRG	3	Singapore	3
GDR	3	Turkey (Aegean)	6
Greece	6	Tuvalu	3
Irish Republic	3	UK	3
Israel	6	USA	3
Jordan	3	St. Lucia	3
Kiribati	3	St. Vincent	3

(b) *12 miles*

Algeria	Ethiopia
Antigua	Fiji
Bahrain	France
Bangladesh	Fujairah (UAE)
Barbados	Grenada
Bulgaria	Guatemala
Burma	Guinea Bissau
Cambodia	Guyana
Canada	Haiti
Cape Verde	Honduras
China	Iceland
Colombia	India
Comoros	Indonesia
Costa Rica	Iran
Cuba	Iraq
Cyprus	Italy
Djibouti	Ivory Coast
Dominica	Jamaica
Egypt	Japan
Equatorial Guinea	Kenya

Republic of Korea	South Africa
Kuwait	Spain
Libya	Sri Lanka
Malaysia	Sudan
Maldives	Surinam
Malta	Sweden
Mauritius	Thailand
Mexico	Tonga
Monaco	Trinidad & Tabago
Morocco	Tunisia
Mozambique	Turkey (Black Sea and Mediterranean outside Aegean)
Nauru	USSR
New Zealand	Vanuatu
Oman	Venezuela
Pakistan	Vietnam
Papua New Guinea	Western Samoa
Poland	Yemen Arab Republic
Portugal	Yemen People's Democratic Republic
Romania	Yugoslavia
Saudi Arabia	Zaire
Seychelles	
Sharjah (UAE)	
Solomon Islands	

More than 12 miles

Albania	15	Liberia	200
Angola	20	Madagascar	50
Argentina	200	Mauritania	70
Benin	200	Nigeria	30
Brazil	200	Panama	200
Cameroon	50	Peru	200
Chile*	200	Senegal	150
Congo	200	Sierra Leone	200
Ecuador	200	Somalia	200
El Salvador	200	Syria	35
Gabon	100	Tanzania	50
Gambia	200	Togo	30
Ghana	200	Uruguay	200
Guinea	200		

*3 miles in Civil Code

FISHERY LIMITS:

(a) *Less than 200 miles*

Albania	15	Republic of Korea	20-200
Algeria	12	Lebanon	6
Anguilla	3	Libya	20
Belize	3	Madagascar	150
Bulgaria	12	Malta	25
Cyprus	12	Monaco	12
Egypt	12	Poland	12
Finland	12	Tanzania	50
Gabon	150	Trinidad & Tobago	12
Greece	6	Tunisia	12
Iran	50	Turkey	12
Israel	6	UAE	up to 73
Italy	12	Yugoslavia	12
Jordan	3		

(b) *200 miles*

Angola	Benin
Antigua	Brazil
Argentina	Burma
Australia	Cambodia
Bahamas	Canada
Bangladesh	Cape Verde Islands
Barbados	Chile
Belgium	Colombia

1. House of Lords, Official Report, 21st March 1983.

Comoros	Mozambique
Congo	Nauru
Costa Rica	Netherlands
Cuba	New Zealand
Denmark	Nicaragua
Djibouti	Nigeria
Dominica	Norway
Dominican Republic	Oman
Ecuador	Pakistan
El Salvador	Panama
Fiji	Papua New Guinea
FRG	Peru
France (except in Mediterranean)	Portugal
Gambia	Sao Tome and Principe
Ghana	Senegal
Grenada	Seychelles
Guatemala	Sierra Leone
Guinea	Solomon Islands
Guinea Bissau	Somalia
Guyana	South Africa
Haiti	Spain
Honduras	Sri Lanka
Iceland	Surinam
India	Sweden
Indonesia	Thailand
Irish Republic	Togo
Ivory Coast	Tonga
Japan	Tuvalu
Kenya	UK
Kiribati	Uruguay
Liberia	USA
Malaysia	USSR
Maldives	Vanuatu
Mauritania	Venezuela
Mauritius	Vietnam
Mexico	Yemen People's Democratic Republic
Morocco	Zaire

States understood to have declared an EEZ of 200 miles:

Antigua	Mexico
Bangladesh	Morocco
Barbados	Mozambique
Burma	Nauru
Cambodia	New Zealand
Colombia	Oman
Comoros	Pakistan
Congo	Papua New Guinea
Costa Rica	Philippines
Cuba	Portugal
Dominican Republic	Seychelles
Fiji	Solomon Islands
France	Spain
Gabon	Sri Lanka
Grenada	Thailand
Guatemala	Tonga
Haiti	UAE
Iceland	USA
India	Vanuatu
Ivory Coast	Venezuela
Kenya	Vietnam
Malaysia	Western Samoa
Maldives	Yemen People's Democratic Republic
Mauritius	

Lord Kennet asked Her Majesty's Government which offshore national jurisdictions they recognise (a) *de jure* and (b) *de facto*.

Lord Belstead: Her Majesty's Government consider that the following zones of offshore national jurisdiction beyond a coastal state's internal and territorial waters are permitted by international law: contiguous zone, fishery zone, exclusive economic zone. In each case, the limits of the zone and the extent of the jurisdiction claimed within it must conform with the rules of international law.

In addition, coastal states exercise sovereign rights over the continental shelf in accordance with international law.

Lord Kennet asked Her Majesty's Government which states now recognise no more than a three-mile territorial sea.

Lord Belstead: At present, in addition to the United Kingdom and dependent territories, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic, Irish Republic, Jordan, Kiribati, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Qatar, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Singapore, Tuvalu and the USA claim no more than a three-mile territorial sea. But Her Majesty's Government are not aware whether these states recognise the claims of other states to wider territorial seas.

Lord Kennet asked Her Majesty's Government what are the advantages to the United Kingdom of maintaining a three-mile territorial sea.

Lord Belstead: As I explained in my written answer to the noble Lord on 7th February, we are now examining the question of the extension of the United Kingdom's territorial sea in the context of the outcome of the United Nations law of the sea conference. While we maintain a three-mile territorial sea we can object on that ground to wider claims by other states which may purport to curtail rights of navigation, particularly in international straits.

APPENDIX II

Deep-sea mining consortia

Six international consortia have been set up:

- (a) the Kennecott Copper Corporation consortium (KCC), established in 1964 and now controlled by British Petroleum, with Consolidated Gold Fields (United Kingdom), Noranda (Canada), Mitsubishi (Japan), British Petroleum Minerals and Rio Tinto (United Kingdom) each holding 10 % and the Kennecott Copper Corporation holding 50 % ;
- (b) the Ocean Mining Associates (OMA) consortium, the main members of which are ESSEX Minerals (a subsidiary of the largest American steel company, US Steel), Union Seas (a subsidiary of l'Union Minière Belge), the Sun Company (United States) and Samin, a subsidiary of the Italian state company ENI ;
- (c) the Ocean Mining Company (OMCO) consortium, comprising Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, AMOCO Minerals and the Shell subsidiary Billiton and Bos Kalis (Netherlands);

- (d) Ocean Management Incorporated (OMI), consisting of INCO (International Nickel Company of Canada), a German group consisting of Preussag, Metallgesellschaft and Salzgitter, the American SEDCO group and a number of Japanese firms combined under the acronym DEMES;
- (e) a recently established purely Japanese consortium;
- (f) the French Association for the Study and Research of Polymetallic Nodules (AFERNOD) of which the main participants are CNEXO (National Centre for Ocean Mining), the Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et Le Nickel company.

For Western Europe, cobalt and manganese are the most important minerals. Several of the abovementioned states may not be parties to the convention, in which event national laws and partial agreements are likely to multiply. In fact, because of developments in the law of the sea concept, the nature of the problem has changed and the convention will not be universally accepted. This change might force a long delay between the signature and the entry into force of the convention.

The law of the sea

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 ¹
tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim

1. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “ seabed mining régime ” leave out “ but ” and insert “ and ”.
2. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper and insert a new text as follows:
“ 4. Pursue its efforts to seek co-operation with the United States with a view to establishing a universally-acceptable system of the rule of law for the world oceans. ”.

Signed: Spies von Büllenheim

1. See 4th sitting, 8th June 1983 (amendment 1 agreed to ; amendment 2 negatived).

The law of the sea

AMENDMENTS 3, 4 and 5 ¹
tabled by Mr. Fourré

3. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “ the policy split ” to the end of the paragraph and insert “ the individual and divergent positions which the member states of Western European Union, the EEC and NATO have taken up as to whether the convention should be signed; ”.
4. At the end of paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add “ more particularly in relation to the developing countries; ”.
5. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ to adopt policies ” and insert “ to sign the convention on the law of the sea ”.

Signed: Fourré

1. See 4th sitting, 8th June 1983 (amendments 3 and 4 agreed to ; amendment 5 negatived).

Burden-sharing in the alliance**REPORT ¹**

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted in committee by 14 votes to 1 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Cavaliere (Alternate: *Valiante*) (Chairman); MM. *Blaauw, van den Bergh* (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Bahr, Sir Frederic Bennett (Alternate: *Wilkinson*), MM. *Bernini, Bonnel* (Alternate: *De Decker*), Cox, Dejardin, Della Briotta, Duraffour (Alternate: *Baume*),

Edwards, Fosson, *Galley*, Sir Anthony Grant (Alternate: *Lord Reay*), MM. *Kittelmann, Lemmrich* (Alternate: *Müller*), Mayoud (Alternate: *Caro*), Ménard (Alternate: *Jung*), Pecchioli, *Pignion, Prussen*, Scholten, *Sir Dudley Smith*, MM. *Steerlynck, Vohrer*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

- VII. Forces of WEU countries
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 - (b) Belgium
 - (c) France
 - (d) Federal Republic of Germany
 - (e) Luxembourg
 - (f) Italy
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 - (h) United Kingdom
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- VIII. Levels of nuclear weapons
- IX. Text of Assembly Resolution 15

Introductory Note

In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows:

7th April 1983 – SHAPE, Casteau

Major General Tabary, Belgian Army, ACOS Logistics;
 Mr. Jonathan Stoddart, Minister, Special Assistant for International Affairs;
 Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Terry, RAF, Deputy SACEUR;
 Lieutenant General Cacciola, DCOS Logistics;
 Colonel Fox, USAF, DCOS Intelligence;
 Mr. Pozzi, Italian civilian, strategic analyst;
 Air Vice Marshal J. Gilbert, RAF, ACOS Policy.

8th April 1983 – NATO, Brussels

General Lewis Melner, United States Army, Deputy Chairman, Military Committee;
 H.E. Mr. Tapley Bennett, Ambassador, United States Permanent Representative; Mr. Savage;
 Dr. Joseph Luns, Secretary-General;
 H.E. Sir John Graham, Ambassador, United Kingdom Permanent Representative; Mr. Colin Balmer; Admiral Sir Anthony Morton, United Kingdom Military Representative;
 H.E. Dr. H. Wieck, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany; Dr. A. Böcker, Minister;
 H.E. Mr. Jean-Marie Merillon, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France.

11th April 1983 – Bonn

Ministry of Defence:

Mr. Manfred Wörner, Minister of Defence;
 Mr. Lothar Rühl, Minister of State for Defence;
 General Tandecki, Führungsstab III; Colonel Rode; Colonel Weige; Colonel Wieland; Colonel Flasse; Colonel Ertmann; Colonel Siebert; Colonel Lingan; Colonel Vorwerck.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs:

Dr. W. Hofmann, Director of Atlantic Alliance and Defence Affairs.

12th April 1983 – Ministry of Defence, London

Mr. David Fisher, DSI;
 Mr. David Wilson, DS 12.

19th April 1983 – Headquarters CINCHAN and COMEASTLANT, Northwood

Rear Admiral Präpper, Royal Netherlands Navy, Chief of Staff;
 Captain Morin, Belgian Navy.

The committee as a whole met at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on Monday, 14th February 1983, when it discussed a draft outline of the present report.

It met subsequently in the United States from 21st to 30th March where, in the United Nations, New York, it was briefed by Mr. Jan Mårtenson, United Nations Under-Secretary General. Department for Disarmament; Mr. Brian Urquhart, United Nations Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs; Mr. Charles Lichtenstein, United States Deputy Representative to the Security Council. In Washington it met with Mr. Gerard Smith, former Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Chief Negotiator for SALT I; Mr. George Kennan, former United States Ambassador to Moscow; Mr. Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defence. In the State Department it was briefed by Mr. Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs; Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, Director for Politico-Military Affairs; Mr. Richard N. Haass, Director, Office of Regional Security Affairs; in the Department of

Defence it was briefed by Dr. William E. Hoehn Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy; Mr. Franklin C. Miller, Office of the Secretary of Defence, Director for Strategic Policy; Mr. Abram Shulsky, Office of the Secretary of Defence, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy; Mr. George W. Heiser, Office of the Secretary of Defence, Theatre Nuclear Policy; Lieutenant Colonel Edward A. Hamilton, Joint Chiefs of Staff, International Negotiations; Major General Earl G. Peck, Office of the Secretary of Defence (Policy), Director for Intelligence and Space Policy; Colonel Kent Montavon, Office of the Secretary of Defence (International Security Policy), Director for NATO Affairs; Colonel James L. Gould, Office of the Secretary of Defence (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics), Director for Mobilisation Plans and Operations; Mr. James W. Morrison, Office of the Secretary of Defence (International Security Policy), Director for European Policy.

The committee then met with Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman of the Defence Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee; and with Mr. Joseph Addabbo, Chairman of the Defence Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, and the following members of the subcommittee: Mr. Les AuCoin; Mr. Norman D. Dicks; Mr. W.G. Hefner; Mr. John P. Murtha; Mr. J. Kenneth Robinson.

In the White House Executive Building the committee was briefed by Mr. Sven Kraemer and Colonel Mayer of the National Security Staff. The committee then visited the Patuxent Naval Air Test Centre, where it was briefed by the Commander, Rear Admiral E.J. Hogan, and saw the AV-8, F/A-18, SH-60B, E2 and P3 aircraft. The committee then visited the Lockheed-California Company, Los Angeles, where it was briefed by Mr. Ed Cortright, President, and Mr. Ben Rich, in particular on the TR-1 and SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft. It visited Hughes Aircraft Company and was briefed by Mr. George E. Todd, Senior Vice-President, International; Mr. David M. Snyder, Associate Director, Middle East and Africa; Mr. Paul H. Kennard, Vice-President and Manager, Advanced Projects Division; Mr. Louis E. Greenbaum, Manager, Communications Systems Division, Ground Systems Group; Mr. Leonard Gross, Vice-President, Electro-Optical and Data Systems Group; and Mr. Robert L. Roderick, Vice-President, Missile Systems Group, on various aspects of the company's activities; visited the Douglas Aircraft Company where it was briefed by Mr. E. Curtis, Senior Vice-President, Fiscal Management; Colonel John Patterson, United States Air Force Plant Representative; Mr. L.J. Colapietro, Manager, Government Customer Relations; Mr. E.A. Chambers, Manager, Government Marketing, and Mr. D.C. Caldwell, Programme Manager, T-45TS Programme, in particular on the VTXTS, C-17 and KC-10.

At the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, the committee was received by the Superintendent, Major General Robert E. Kelley, and Captain Crowley, USAF. The committee then visited NORAD Cheyenne Mountain Complex, where it was received by Lieutenant General Kenneth Thorneycroft, Canadian Forces, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and briefed by Major Bob Tracy, Major Don Read, Lieutenant Colonel Dick Farkas, and Captain Rick Kniseley.

The committee then met in the Sala del Consiglio, Pisa, on 3rd May where it discussed a draft of the present report, and also visited the Italian Parachute Training School where it was received by Colonel Valdimiro Rossi, Commandant. On 4th May it visited the Oto Melara works in La Spezia, where it was received by Mr. Fiaccavento, Mr. Ricci, and Mr. Ferrari, and then visited the NATO SACLANT ASW Research Centre where it was briefed by the Director Dr. Rolf Goodman and staff.

The committee met finally in Brussels on 17th May for a joint meeting with the Council under the chairmanship of Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, and on 18th May when it discussed and adopted the present report.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of Congress, officials, senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the committee and replied to questions.

The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation***on burden-sharing in the alliance***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising that because of its substantial strategic nuclear deterrent and world rôle the United States spends a considerably higher proportion of its national wealth on defence than its European allies;
- (ii) Appreciating the special contribution to overall deterrence made by the independent nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom;
- (iii) Considering that an important factor in the continuing burden-sharing debate arises from the differing approaches of the European allies and the United States administration to relations with the Soviet Union, and consequently from the different views on the necessary size and composition of the allied defence effort;
- (iv) Believing that these differences call for increased consultation between the European allies on strategic policies and defence issues;
- (v) Convinced that within the alliance the political relationship between the European members and the United States should reflect more fully their economic, political and defence contributions to the security of Western Europe in the fullest sense;
- (vi) Aware that isolationism in the United States is likely to grow to the detriment of western security unless the European members of the alliance can convince American public opinion and Congress of the adequacy of the European contribution to the NATO defence effort, and unless European public opinion and parliaments show reciprocal appreciation of all aspects of the United States contribution to allied defence;
- (vii) Welcoming therefore the annual report to Congress by the United States Secretary of Defence on allied contributions to the common defence, and statements by Eurogroup which identify the size of the European contribution;
- (viii) Aware of the manifold difficulties of comparing national defence efforts but concluding that the European allies for the most part now carry a very reasonable share of the agreed burden, a share which has increased from 24 % to 38 % in the last twenty-five years, and increased most significantly in the decade of the 1970s during which the United States effort declined, but believing that certain specific improvements in defence efforts are required;
- (ix) Believing that allied defence plans must take account of the possible consequences of developments beyond the NATO area, and that in the case of such developments which the allies jointly recognise as threatening the vital interests of the alliance, the ready assistance of all allies must be forthcoming within the area to facilitate United States deployments beyond the area, and in the case of certain allies, to participate in such deployments;
- (x) Recalling that problems of common defence and the support of public opinion for national defence projects cannot be isolated from the quality of economic, political and monetary relations between the United States and the European allies,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

- A. Urge member governments concerned within the North Atlantic Council:
 - 1. To maintain and in the following specific cases improve their defence efforts:
 - (a) by maintaining collectively the NATO target of a real increase in defence expenditure in real terms as long as the Soviet military build-up continues, and by adhering to the annual force goals set by SACEUR;
 - (b) by augmenting the combat sustainability of the alliance by providing a minimum of thirty days' stocks of fuel, ammunition, spare parts and consumables and by improving the capacity of reserve forces;

-
- (c) by maximising conventional firepower and raising the nuclear threshold through the progressive introduction of proven systems incorporating emerging technologies jointly developed and produced on an equitable Atlantic-wide basis;
 - (d) by improving the flexibility, mobility, effectiveness and readiness of European intervention forces, both to improve national contributions to ACE Mobile Force and, in a crisis in Europe, to compensate as far as possible for any diversion outside the area of United States reinforcements destined for Europe;
2. In the case of developments beyond the NATO area which the allies jointly recognise as affecting their vital interests:
- (a) to facilitate by all necessary measures within the area the deployment of forces of any NATO country beyond the area;
 - (b) in the case of those allies with appropriate military capability to participate in such deployments;
3. To lend vigorous united support to the United States efforts on behalf of the alliance to secure satisfactory balanced and verifiable arms controls agreements with the Soviet Union in the field of both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces and, failing the latter by the end of 1983, to proceed with the deployment of GLCM and Pershing II missiles in accordance with the decision of 12th December 1979;
4. (a) To improve informal European defence consultation within WEU and the Eurogroup and arrange for the European position to be expounded clearly in the United States, especially to Congress committees and staffs, through a public information effort co-ordinated by the Washington embassies of those countries which provide the Eurogroup secretariat and Chairman-in-Office;
- (b) To undertake a similar effort with the assistance of the Assembly of WEU to explain to the European public and parliaments the contribution which the United States makes to allied defence;
- B. Consider, and report to the Assembly on:
1. The desirability of expanding the defence activities of the Council, last defined in 1957, to include European aspects of allied defence policy;
 2. The desirability of inviting all members of WEU to contribute to strengthening the European pillar of the western alliance.

Draft Resolution

on burden-sharing in the alliance

The Assembly,

Reaffirming its rôle as the only European parliamentary assembly empowered by treaty to discuss defence matters;

Stressing the need for the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance to be strengthened through agreement between all European allies on the basic principles of alliance defence policy and strategy;

Recalling its Resolution 15,

CALLS on the parliaments of Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey to appoint observers to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to participate in the preparation of its forthcoming report on the state of European security;

DECIDES that such observers shall have the right to speak.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. Under the terms of reference this report is to examine European and American contributions to common defence in the alliance and the fair sharing of the burden.

1.2. A collective security system including Western European Union and the Atlantic Alliance must be founded upon the principle of equitable participation in a common defence. Since an attack upon one member is, under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, to be regarded as an attack upon all the members of the alliance, the interdependence of the signatories is not in doubt. The national defence provisions of the Brussels Treaty are even more binding and the commitment of the WEU nations to each other's defence lies at the heart of Western Europe's security.

1.3. Every national contribution, whether political, financial, military, industrial, in manpower or matériel, contributes towards a sharing of the joint burden of defence in the western alliance. However, certain fundamental concepts should underlie the efforts that are made:

- (a) alliance nations must pursue an agreed strategy – in the case of NATO of forward defence and flexible response underpinned by the availability of nuclear weapons to assure deterrence;
- (b) the burden of the military and economic efforts to implement this strategy must be distributed in a manner which all members of the alliance can accept as fair.

1.4. Implementing these concepts is not easy. A free association of independent states has few sanctions it can realistically apply on those members whom the majority of the alliance believe to be in default of a reasonable and realistically attainable contribution to their common defence. A too intense debate over the criteria to be applied to achieve a fair assessment of national obligations can all too easily prejudice political willingness to pursue national security objectives in an alliance context.

1.5. An objective assessment, therefore, of burden-sharing must be very comprehensive and take into account as wide a range of factors as possible if the political susceptibilities of

member countries are not to be dangerously aroused. Such factors should include:

- (a) what outlays are required to meet multilaterally-recognised force goals;
- (b) the contributions of each nation both in input (expenditure and manpower) and in output (forces and equipment) terms;
- (c) what a fair share of the effort required for every individual country actually is on a consensus basis;
- (d) how the burdens can be redistributed to match national circumstances and capabilities and the strategic imperatives recognised by the alliance as a whole.

1.6. Coalition defence between wholly sovereign states has inherent stresses and inner tensions which can only be surmounted through a recognition that the interests of the alliance as a whole transcend those of its individual members. This is particularly so when, as in the case of NATO, there is great geostrategic, topographical, economic, historical and political diversity within it. A constant effort of political magnanimity, imagination and goodwill is required to overcome those potentially fissiparous qualities within the alliance.

1.7. The NATO collective security system evolved in the aftermath of World War II out of an evident necessity to harness preponderant American power to redress a military imbalance in Europe. A relationship of virtual American protectorate, perhaps symbolised by the NATO military doctrine of the conventional force tripwire guaranteed by the strategy of massive United States nuclear retaliation which characterised the 1950s, has evolved to the point today where diminishing nuclear advantage at a strategic level and unfavourable nuclear and conventional balance at a theatre level call in question the ultimate American security guarantee which Western Europeans have conveniently taken for granted for so long.

1.8. At the same time, this relationship of strategic dependency upon the United States, which the European members of the alliance still assume, does not any longer correspond to the economic relationship between the United States and Western Europe, or to the respective

parties' physical involvement in and economic dependence upon strategic developments in the wide areas of the world outside the area of responsibility of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The institutional and consultative mechanism must evolve so that the Europeans assert collectively their growing political authority within the alliance more effectively.

1.9. In short, there is a temptation on the part of the Europeans in NATO to continue to display the military dispositions of client states while adopting the independent-minded political postures commensurate with their new-found economic power. Understandably, public opinion in the United States, with the perspective of a people with global responsibilities, does not understand why certain West European countries, where the standard of living is certainly higher than in America, should spend little more than half the proportion of the national product expended by the United States, much of whose military budget goes to defending the more affluent Europeans. The argument can all too easily become simplistic and dangerously emotive unless it is clearly borne in mind that some of the deepest disagreements between members of the western alliance have very fundamental causes. One of the most obvious is a difference of view about the military threat and hence what is militarily required to meet it.

1.10. Geography, history and economic circumstances all play their part in influencing perceptions of the threat. Concern to preserve the unique relationship with fellow Germans in the German Democratic Republic and to maintain West Germany's traditional trade with Central Europe must influence the Federal Republic's perception of the threat and modify the Bonn Government's formulation of security policy in the widest sense. Likewise, the Nordic balance concept of Norway and Denmark is evolved in response to the neutralist foreign policy of Sweden and Finland and not just to the Soviet threat to the north flank of NATO.

1.11. Following the collapse of the European Defence Community in 1954 and notwithstanding the political consultation within WEU; the Eurogroup; and the process of European political consultation among the Ten, there are bound to be variations in foreign policy, threat analysis and diplomacy between the individual European members of the alliance let alone between the West Europeans and the United States. Issues such as East-West relations, trade with the Soviet bloc, linkage with human rights questions, financial credits, food aid and technology transfers to Eastern Europe, arms control and the implementation of the Helsinki final act often receive markedly different treatment by governments within the western alliance.

1.12. This foreign policy diversity explains why the greatest care must be exercised before reaching definitive conclusions about burden-sharing. Not only are political assumptions often misleading, but a universally acceptable statistical basis of comparison is almost impossible to attain. In the words of a NATO Financial and Economic Board report written as long ago as 1951:

“A final decision as to what constitutes an equitable distribution can never be derived from the mechanical use of any purely statistical formula. Even if the statistics available to the board were wholly comparable, no mechanical formula could be devised or take account of the varying circumstances and peculiar problems of each country. Differences in size, population, economic structure and stage of development of the various countries make simple comparisons impossible.”

1.13. Since then, to quote from the United States Secretary of Defence's report to the United States Congress on allied contributions to the common defence, March 1962: “despite many efforts and agreement that there is a need for burden-sharing, NATO has been unable to agree on an acceptable definition of the burden or how to measure it”.

1.14. An objective definition of the guidelines for fairer burden-sharing within NATO is easier to achieve than a consensus among the individual nations within the alliance as to whether their own contributions are equitable. Countries with low living standards or economic problems argue that a sound economy is a prerequisite for an effective defence. Countries with strong peace movements or a strong ethical tradition in the conduct of foreign affairs will stress the importance of carrying public support for national defence policy. Countries with a weak balance of payments may be reluctant to incur the foreign exchange costs of stationing forces overseas or of purchasing defence equipment abroad.

1.15. As recorded in the introductory note this report draws on information derived from the visit of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the United States in March 1983 and particularly from the briefings and discussions at the State Department, Pentagon, National Security Council, on Capitol Hill and from industry and the United States air force. In Europe information was derived at SHAPE, NATO, CINCHAN and from national defence ministries.

II. *The concept of allied defence*

2.1. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 was the first collective security agreement after World War

II which was directed against the growing Soviet threat. Its provisions as modified by the Paris Protocols of 1954 form the basis of Western European Union and bind the signatories to mutual assistance in the event of external attack in Europe¹. There is no geographic limitation to the applicability of the treaty for consultation purposes² and its unambiguous nature ensures that regardless of political developments among NATO countries in either Northern or Southern Europe and regardless of political developments in North America, there will be a Western European inner security zone among the seven nations of WEU.

2.2. Although by contrast there is a stricter geographic limitation to the applicability of mutual defence under the North Atlantic Treaty, this should not inhibit alliance consultation and co-operation in response to threats to the interests of member countries outside the NATO area. Even so, following the collapse of the southern and eastern tiers of Foster Dulles' alliance system created to contain communist expansion (CENTO and SEATO), the NATO nations did very little to concert their security policies to protect their joint interests in the Middle East, Arab/Iranian Gulf, South-West and South-East Asia and Indian Ocean. Indeed, the Government of the United Kingdom compounded western problems by closing military bases east of Suez even when in 1971 the rulers of the Gulf sheikhdoms still wanted the British to stay.

2.3. Soviet support for the Marxist régimes in Ethiopia and South Yemen and Vietnam at each extremity of the large area of instability along the southern edge of the Eurasian land-mass together with the Iranian revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the heart of the highly volatile region bordering on the oil-rich Arab/Iranian Gulf convinced the Government of the United States that it must be prepared militarily to fill an alarming power vacuum in an area of huge oil reserves and great strategic importance to the West.

2.4. The United States has now created a new South-West Asian Command autonomous of SACEUR and has earmarked a rapid deployment force of up to six divisions to be assigned

to it. Base facilities at Diego Garcia, Mashih Island and elsewhere around the littoral of the Indian Ocean have been built up. The United States navy was already overstretched in view of the Soviet naval challenge worldwide, and with the redeployment of assets from the Mediterranean fleet and elsewhere to the Indian Ocean is almost a four-fleet navy.

2.5. The determination of the United States Administration not to afford to the Soviet Union a monopoly in underpinning the global competition for political influence and economic advantage by military means was heightened by the two shocks towards the end of Mr. Carter's presidency of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the failure of the United States mission to rescue the American hostages from the United States Embassy in Iran.

2.6. The European members of the alliance may or may not agree with the new military rôle which the United States has assumed in South-West Asia but an urgent accommodation on their part with the practical consequences to them of growing American commitments beyond the NATO area is required. Open disagreement with the Americans over their military strategy in South-West Asia would deepen the misunderstanding that already exists within the alliance. Quiet emphasis on the merits of a grand strategy involving diplomacy, aid, political and economic support to complement military preparedness and deployment would be a valuable contribution in terms of European expertise in ensuring the formulation of an effective alliance security policy for a notoriously unstable region where geography affords to the Soviet Union great advantages in any power struggle which might arise.

2.7. Mutual defence arrangements under the North Atlantic Treaty are of course limited to the Atlantic Treaty area defined in Article 6, but the treaty imposes no geographical limitation on *consultation* under Article 4 whenever the security of any party is threatened. Nevertheless, discussion of out-of-area defence matters has evolved only slowly in NATO, the most recent statement of the position being in the texts adopted by the sixteen members at the Bonn NATO summit on 10th June 1982:

“ All of us have an interest in peace and security in other regions of the world. We will consult together as appropriate on events in these regions which may have implications for our security, taking into account our commonly-identified objectives. Those of us who are in a position to do so will endeavour to respond to requests for assistance from sovereign states whose security and independence is threatened.”

1. Article VI: “ If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power”.

2. Article VIII.3: “ At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability”.

The document on integrated defence adopted by representatives of the countries contributing to the integrated military structure contains the following paragraph :

“Noting that developments beyond the NATO area may threaten our vital interests, we reaffirm the need to consult with a view to sharing assessments and identifying common objectives, taking full account of the effect on NATO security and defence capability, as well as of the national interests of member countries. Recognising that the policies which nations adopt in this field are a matter for national decision, we agree to examine collectively in the appropriate NATO bodies the requirements which may arise for the defence of the NATO area as a result of deployments by individual member states outside that area. Steps which may be taken by individual allies in the light of such consultations to facilitate possible military deployments beyond the NATO area can represent an important contribution to western security.”

It is considered in NATO that “developments beyond the NATO area” which “may threaten our vital interests” are only events involving a risk of conflict with the Soviet Union or its allies.

2.8. There are two responses which the European members of the alliance must make in the event of United States out-of-area deployments. First, they have to be prepared to compensate from their own resources not only for any United States redeployments from the NATO theatre to South-West Asia but also to make contingency plans for a situation where, in the event of a simultaneous military threat in Europe, United States reinforcements currently scheduled for rapid deployment to Europe were diverted instead to South-West Asia. Notwithstanding American assurances that the defence of Europe will remain the highest priority of the United States, the danger of a confrontation on two fronts, and of a Soviet feint or diversionary move to tie down United States forces in the Middle East or South-West Asia must be recognised. It can be met primarily by the provision of some additional forces by the Europeans themselves, although the intervention forces of some European nations, notably France and the United Kingdom, are by no means negligible and can have a valuable rôle to play out of the NATO area as their respective deployments in recent years to Chad, Zaïre, Zimbabwe and the Falkland Islands have shown.

2.9. Secondly, where under the Bonn arrangements quoted above NATO collectively recog-

nises that some specific “development beyond the NATO area” does indeed “threaten our vital interests”, the European allies must be prepared to facilitate by action within the NATO area movements of United States forces, or indeed the forces of any other NATO country, passing through the NATO area. Overflying, staging and refuelling and port facilities of all sorts may be involved. The United States on the other hand cannot expect to secure, as it appears to be requesting, open ended agreements from its European allies to facilitate any future United States troop movements for whatever purpose they may be undertaken.

2.10. There is a third response which only certain European allies are in a position to offer. Often the early despatch of a very highly trained experienced force early in a crisis can prevent its development into a full-scale emergency. For this certain European airmobile or amphibious units, such as British marines, and French paratroops, would be particularly appropriate. Certainly an exercised and pre-planned determination by some European countries to bear if only a small part of American out-of-area burdens would greatly enhance mutual understanding in the alliance. So would improved host-nation support, logistic infrastructure, refuelling, docking and maintenance facilities in Europe, not just for United States forces assigned to NATO but also for United States forces en route to South-West Asia.

2.11. Within the NATO area there is undoubtedly potential for increased rôle specialisation but this is politically a highly sensitive issue since defence impinges upon national susceptibilities on sovereignty in a direct way. Few countries are prepared for example totally to assign to other nations the protection of their air space or the defence of their territory. However, the United Kingdom could rationally specialise more in naval, air and intervention forces but this could only be at the expense of its Brussels Treaty commitment on the continent in Germany which would be politically unwelcome to its allies. The Netherlands could logically concentrate its naval forces more in the North Sea and Channel, but that country understandably sets great store by its blue water anti-submarine rôle in the North Atlantic. The Federal Republic could at a cost increase still further its land and air forces in Central Europe although for demographic reasons it would be difficult and would have implications for inner-German relations. France in its latest defence plans has already decided to modernise the whole spectrum of its nuclear capability and Italy with its deployments to the peacekeeping forces in Sinai and Lebanon has demonstrated its intervention capability and

concern for security within the Mediterranean basin as a whole.

2.12. In short, geography, history, manpower, industrial and economic potential already dictate a substantial degree of national specialisation. Only France and the United Kingdom in Europe maintain independent nuclear deterrents. Likewise, only Britain and France maintain balanced forces in all three services together with a substantial overseas intervention capability. The Federal Republic of Germany is the dominant European nation on the central front. The Netherlands concentrates on the larger naval vessels which appertain to an oceanic rôle at sea. The maritime rôle of Belgium is primarily coastal. In air defence there is a worrying tendency for Belgium to downgrade its air defence commitments, particularly as regards its contribution to modernising its section of the Hawk SAM belt. Denmark and Norway have evolved the concept of total defence and have large home guards. Italy plays a key rôle in all three services on the southern flank.

2.13. There is little prospect therefore of any dramatic initiative to achieve either a more equitable sharing of the burdens or a more cost effective defence by means of a rationalisation of national rôles and responsibilities. Modest progress can always be achieved but bold radical changes would be politically fraught with danger. It has to be borne in mind that for an alliance committed to deterrence its cohesion and unity in peacetime is no less important than its combat capability in war. Of course it would be logical for the British to do more at sea and to concentrate more on intervention forces than on the central front, but with the German armed forces already fully stretched and in view of the alliance strategy of a forward defence reliant upon substantial in-place allied force contributions, there is no immediate prospect of such a change in allied rôles. Nevertheless for the defence of Central Europe there are good military and economic reasons why the seven WEU nations at least should better co-ordinate their defence policies. Franco-German military co-operation is valuable for European security as is the integration of French air defence forces with the NATO early warning system. The security of the United Kingdom Air Defence Region and Eastern Atlantic and Channel Command areas are vital for the reinforcement of Europe. It would, therefore, be better if national initiatives like the United Kingdom defence review of 1981 and the French defence review of 1983 were the subject of prior consultation within at least the WEU Council and preferably the Eurogroup Council to facilitate appropriate readjustments within the alliance.

2.14. Although the preponderance of the Warsaw Pact in both armour and manpower on

the central front puts a premium on the value of mobility, manoeuvre and concentrating defence firepower at the decisive point, there is such a narrow defence depth available in West Germany that the Federal Republic's total commitment to forward defence has been inevitably espoused by the alliance as a whole.

2.15. SACEUR's proposals for the use of emerging technology to develop new land/air tactical doctrines to interdict the battlefield more effectively and to prevent the follow-through of second echelon Warsaw Pact formations are promising but they are no panacea. They will be costly and should be regarded as part of the evolutionary process of improving the combat effectiveness of NATO as and when new weapons systems become available. Certainly they should increase the confidence of western public opinion as these doctrines would appreciably raise the nuclear threshold. But to satisfy Western European public opinion the procurement of the new intelligent weaponry and precision munitions essential to enhance NATO's air/land capability to offset Warsaw Pact armoured preponderance on the central front must be achieved on an equitable basis, and it should not distort further in the United States' favour the alliance defence equipment market.

III. *Measuring and comparing the defence effort*

(a) *General*

3.1. Measuring a country's "defence effort" as a general concept is not a simple task; definitions are needed before measurements can be made. It is still more difficult to compare the defence effort of one NATO country with that of another because of different national views of the requirements of defence resulting partly from social, economic and geographical differences, and partly from different political attitudes to defence. Furthermore, financial comparisons involving currency conversion may be distorted when exchange rates do not closely reflect purchasing power. But at least the NATO countries can be compared in terms of a market economy; comparisons between NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact countries with their centrally-directed communist economies are more conjectural, not only because of the incomplete disclosure of defence expenditure in the official Soviet defence budget, but also because of the difficulty of assigning comparable prices to articles in a communist economy.

(b) *Defence expenditure*

3.2. Defence effort is usually assessed in terms of defence expenditure and in terms of manpower in the armed services - the so-called defence inputs. It is more difficult to assess the defence capacity which can be produced from

those resources. Countries differ in the items which they include in their defence budgets, and one of the earliest tasks undertaken by the NATO international staff, in the framework of the annual review, was to draw up a common definition of "defence expenditure" for NATO purposes. This (unpublished) definition adopted in 1952 is known to include government payments to service pension funds, and costs of internal security forces that would serve under military command in war. In general, defence budgets to NATO definition tend to be slightly higher than national defence budgets submitted to parliament, largely because it was easier to agree on a common NATO definition by including items already included in the defence budget of at least one NATO country, rather than by excluding items not included in the national definitions of a majority of countries. Still excluded from the NATO definition, however, are items which certain NATO countries would consider defence-related. These include actual payments of service pensions, war damage, civil defence, strategic stockpiling of industrial war materials, and, in the case of Germany, major host-country support costs, economic assistance to Berlin and Turkey. Figures of defence expenditure at Appendix I are given to NATO definition and have been published regularly in committee reports each year for more than twenty years. The European countries today provide about 38 % of total NATO defence expenditure compared with 24 % in 1958 when the committee first published these statistics.

3.3. It should be noted that defence effort measured in this way is the total defence effort of every NATO country, irrespective of the tasks to which particular elements of the armed forces may be assigned. Not all defence tasks assumed by certain NATO countries would be recognised by a majority of the allies as being "NATO-related" defence tasks. In fact no attempt has been made to assess defence effort in terms of "NATO-related" defence, partly because of the flexibility of defence forces which, for example, recently permitted the United Kingdom to repossess the Falkland Islands in an operation which most NATO countries would not regard as "NATO-related", whereas the bulk of the forces concerned normally operate within the NATO area where they are allocated very much to NATO-related tasks. Similar examples can be cited in the case of military operations conducted in recent years by several NATO countries

(c) *Manpower contribution*

3.4. Appendix I.B. compares the present manpower contribution of the NATO countries to the armed forces. The European countries collectively provide 60 % of total NATO military manpower. As the European countries except

Luxembourg and the United Kingdom rely on conscription, whereas the United States has purely regular forces, there are further hidden defence advantages and economic costs of lost opportunity in the European contribution. The defence advantage is the large pool of trained reserve manpower which conscription automatically leaves in the population at large after completion of compulsory service. This can be particularly impressive and important as in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany which can mobilise its Landwehr rapidly, and in the case of Denmark and Norway which have large home guards and a concept of "total defence".

3.5. The hidden opportunity costs of conscripting manpower can be assessed in various ways. "If allied manpower costs for 1979 are computed at United States pay rates, the value of non-United States NATO total defence would increase relatively to the United States by approximately 20 % reaching a total approximately equal to that of the United States. As a result, several countries such as Canada, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, whose average pay and allowances are higher than in the United States, would have their defence expenditures adjusted downwards; others, notably Turkey, Italy, Portugal and France, would see theirs increased."¹

(d) *Ability to contribute and comparison between NATO countries*

3.6. Defence expenditure statistics published by NATO (Appendix I) include some measures of ability to contribute – gross domestic product; population; and gross domestic product per capita – and derive from these comparative statistics of national contributions to allied defence. The most widely quoted are defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and armed forces as a percentage of the active population because international comparison between these figures is not distorted by conversion of national currencies. Defence expenditure itself, and defence expenditure per capita can only be compared when converted to a single currency with the reservations noted above.

3.7. There are, however, limitations in measuring defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Not all countries can be expected to devote the same percentage of their domestic product to defence – countries with the lowest per capita domestic product will be expected to make a prior claim on it to provide basic living standards for the population before making any significant contribution to allied defence

1. United States Secretary of Defence report to Congress on allied contributions to the common defence, March 1982.

beyond a local domestic defence effort. The "wealthier" countries in terms of GDP per capita can be expected to have a larger "available" GDP after basic living standards have been met, part of which can then reasonably be devoted to allied defence. The graph at Appendix II, therefore, shows defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP plotted against GDP per capita. Surprisingly, this graph shows a very significant defence effort on the part of the three poorest countries of the alliance - Turkey, Portugal and Greece - and a below average defence effort among some of the wealthier countries - Norway, Canada, Denmark and Luxembourg.

3.8. The comparative prosperity of countries as measured by GDP per capita, converted to dollars at current exchange rates, shows a relative decline in the position of the United States compared with the other allies over the last decade. At \$11,348 per head for 1980, the United States came only seventh among NATO countries, among which Norway led with \$13,766. This perception of ability to contribute has bedevilled the transatlantic argument on burden-sharing which is discussed in the following section. It has, however, been pointed out that the exchange rates used in this calculation, and inflation rates assumed for constant price comparisons over a period of years, do not accurately reflect the purchasing power of national currencies. When conversions are carried out using purchasing power parity

instead of fluctuating exchange rates, the United States remains a significantly wealthier country measured by GDP per capita (\$11,348 in 1980) than any other member of the alliance. Luxembourg, the second in this table, had only \$9,430¹.

3.9. Since March 1981, in response to the amendment introduced by Senator Levin to the fiscal year 1981 Defence Authorisation Act, the Secretary of Defence has submitted an annual report to Congress on allied commitments to defence spending (1981) and allied contributions to the common defence (1982). This report goes into burden-sharing in considerable statistical detail. In particular it has investigated other possible measures of ability to contribute than those mentioned above. The most original feature is a "prosperity index" which is derived for each country first by multiplying that country's percentage share of the total allied GDP by its per capita GDP expressed as a percentage of the highest per capita GDP of any NATO country (Denmark). The resultant product is totalled for all NATO countries and an individual country "prosperity index" is expressed as its percentage share of the allied total ("allied" is taken in the Secretary of Defence's report as the total for NATO plus Japan). Other indicators of ability

1. Sharing the defence burden, Rainer W. Rupp, Economic Directorate of the NATO International Staff in NATO Review, December 1982.

*NATO countries' gross domestic product per head
in 1980, in US \$*

Country	Based on exchange rates			Based on purchasing power parity		
	US \$	Index NATO = 100.0	Rank	US \$	Index NATO = 100.0	Rank
(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Germany	13,306	137.1	1	9,411	106.3	3
Denmark	12,957	133.5	2	9,094	102.7	4
France	12,136	125.0	3	9,046	102.2	5
Belgium	12,084	124.5	4	8,924	100.8	6
Luxembourg	12,059	124.2	5	9,430	106.5	2
Netherlands	11,851	122.1	6	8,599	97.1	7
United States	11,348	116.9	7	11,348	128.2	1
United Kingdom	9,344	96.3	8	7,622	86.1	8
Italy	6,906	71.1	9	7,205	81.4	9
Spain	5,648	58.2	10	5,843	66.0	10
Greece	4,236	43.6	11	4,713	53.2	11
Portugal	2,423	25.0	12	3,675	41.5	12
Other NATO countries (*)	5,082	52.3	×	5,508	62.2	×
TOTAL NATO	9,708	100.0	×	8,852	100.0	×

(*) Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey.

to contribute contained in the report are : percentage share of total allied GDP; percentage share of total allied population; per capita GDP as a percent of the highest nation.

3.10. The same report lists seven selected indicators of defence contribution : defence spending as a share of total allied expenditure; defence spending as a percentage increase since 1971; percentage share of total allied defence manpower; percentage increase in defence manpower since 1971; total active and reserve defence manpower share of the allied total; ground forces as a percentage share of total allied ground forces (expressed in armoured division equivalents); and tactical combat aircraft as a percentage share of the allied total. Selected indicators from this report, comparing contribution with ability to contribute, are reproduced at Appendix III.

(e) *Trends of defence expenditure*

3.11. Figures for defence expenditure for a single year are less informative than the trend of defence expenditure over a number of years, partly because with some countries expenditure in a single year may be distorted through the costs of some equipment procurement programme falling particularly heavily in one year. Also in 1977 NATO defence ministers agreed to increase defence spending "in the region of 3% per annum in real terms" over the planning period 1979 to 1984, reaffirmed in 1980 for the period up to 1986. The extent to which countries have fulfilled this commitment can be seen from the table of annual defence expenditure, if expressed in constant prices (to allow for inflation). NATO, however, has not yet been able to reach agreement on the deflators to be applied to defence expenditure in the different countries in order to produce a fair statement of expenditure at constant prices. As a consequence of this, the official NATO defence expenditure statistics published each December do not include a series of country expenditures at constant prices. Curiously, however, for the last few years these statistics have included figures of defence expenditure per capita for six successive years expressed at constant prices. These can only have been produced through the use of some provisional deflator by the NATO staff, and by multiplying by the populations concerned it is possible to deduce from these figures a table of total defence expenditure at constant prices. This is shown at Appendix IV. Annual percentage increases in real terms actually achieved by member countries from 1978 to 1982 have fluctuated widely between one year and another, and between different countries, Greece showing a decrease of 8.8% between 1979 and 1980, while Luxembourg recorded the largest increase of 16.3% from 1979 to 1980.

(f) *NATO-Warsaw Pact comparisons*

3.12. It is instructive to extend the foregoing methodology for international comparison of defence *inputs* to a comparison of the defence efforts of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Most publicity is attracted to East-West comparisons of defence *output* – assessments of the defence capability the inputs produce. As pointed out in paragraph 3.1, however, to make input comparisons an attempt has to be made to assign values to the Soviet defence effort in terms of western market economies. It is of course widely accepted that the officially published Soviet defence budget records only part of defence expenditure, and is known to exclude the large amount spent on research and development.


3.13. For the past fourteen years, the United States Government has published annually estimates of Soviet and Warsaw Pact defence expenditure in the ACDA series "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers". Figures for defence expenditure in dollars given in this publication are calculated by the CIA on the "building block" method whereby separate estimates are made of the value of research and development (nearly a quarter of the total); procurement of equipment and construction (about one-half); and operating costs (a little over one-quarter, of which 60% is personnel costs). These official United States estimates for NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the United States and the Soviet Union are shown at Appendix V. The March 1981 version of World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, quoting constant 1977 prices, shows NATO as a whole to have outspent the Warsaw Pact in defence spending in every year from 1970 to 1978 – the last covered in the publication. The March 1982 version, however, using constant 1978 prices, shows total Warsaw Pact expenditure slightly exceeding that of NATO for the years 1976 to 1978 inclusive, while NATO again overtook the Warsaw Pact in 1979. What, of course, is more disturbing for the United States authorities was the trend of Soviet defence expenditure in these calculations which from being less than that of the United States up to 1970, significantly overtook it in the years 1971 to 1979 – the last quoted in the 1982 edition. Press reports on 7th April of the 1983 edition referred to an estimate for Soviet expenditure of \$188 billion in 1980 compared with United States expenditure of \$131 billion. However, the press one month earlier¹ reported that the CIA estimates on which the WMEAT figures were based had been revised for the year 1981 to show Soviet expenditure of \$160 billion compared with United States \$154 billion.

1. International Herald Tribune, Guardian, 4th March 1983.

The basis of the reduction was CIA intelligence analysis that the Soviet Union had produced less military equipment than predicted, leading the CIA to revise downwards its estimate of annual increase in Soviet defence expenditure from 3 or 4 % to 2 %. Accepted by the State Department, the CIA findings had been disputed by the United States Defence Intelligence Agency which had suggested that original estimates of expenditure were correct, but that higher costs had led to less equipment being produced.

3.14. Independent academic comparisons of Soviet and United States, and of Warsaw Pact and NATO expenditure claim that the CIA dollar estimates of the components of the Soviet defence effort, particularly the research and development and manpower costs, are overstated. The following bar chart shows two official and three independent academic comparisons for 1978 which show an excess of NATO over Warsaw Pact expenditure ranging from about 40 % to 5 % (excluding of course the Warsaw Pact estimate).

Military expenditures of the major alliances, 1978 - five views



1. Defence budgets and official rates of exchange, as reported to UN.

2. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-78.

3. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1979-80, (IISS has since discontinued publication of an estimate for USSR).

4. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI Yearbook 1981.

5. This publication, Table II.

Source: World Military and Social Expenditures 1981. Ruth Leger Sivard. Publisher World Priorities Inc.

3.15. Estimates of numbers in the armed forces are not subject to the uncertainties involved in cost comparisons between the unlike economies of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The United States ACDA WMEAT reports referred to above show total NATO armed forces for 1979 (the latest year available in that publication) of 5.29 million compared with 6.16 million for the Warsaw Pact. The IISS Military Balance estimate for that year is 4.88 million for NATO compared with 4.76 million for the Warsaw Pact; the difference is unexplained. The latest IISS estimates for 1982 are NATO 5.35 million; Warsaw Pact 4.82 million.

IV. *The transatlantic debate*

4.1. The burden-sharing debate at the present time has arisen largely through United States, especially Congressional, perceptions of supposed shortcomings on the part of the European allies. These include inadequate European contributions to what the United States believes the allied defence effort should be, or failure of the European allies to follow United States policy in economic and political relations with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. Typical of some attitudes in Congress, seeking reductions in public spending yet believing that United States superiority in naval and air power was its chief guarantee of protection from the Soviet Union, was the enactment by the Senate last autumn requiring the level of United States troops stationed ashore in Europe by the end of fiscal year 1983 (30th September) not to exceed their real levels at September 1982 (315,600). The move led by Senator Stevens, Chairman of the Defence Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, had originally sought a freeze at the lower level of March 1980.

4.2. The United States Administration itself has to face both ways - at times assuring Congress that the European allies make a large proportionate contribution to the total allied defence effort, at others exhorting the Europeans to make a bigger effort, or to align themselves more closely with United States policy towards the Soviet Union.

4.3. Typical of the first is evidence given by Mr. Eagleburger, Under-Secretary of State, to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 26th March 1982 on "the critical importance of maintaining the United States military presence in Europe". Noting that over the thirty years since the creation of NATO "the United States-Soviet balance has moved from United States superiority to, at best, a precarious balance, with powerful adverse trends", he asserted that "we are now running hard to make up for nearly a generation of neglect in

our military programmes. The allies in contrast, have turned in a remarkably steady performance. Roughly speaking they have sustained an increase of between 2 and 3 % for more than a decade.”

4.4. The Secretary of Defence's annual reports to Congress referred to above¹, submitted in accordance with the Levin amendment to the 1981 Defence Authorisation Act, provide a systematic, objective, and on the whole optimistic assessment of the European contribution. In the words of the 1981 report :

“There is no question that the United States and its allies can provide the forces necessary to meet the Soviet threat and to execute agreed NATO strategy. Collectively we have more than adequate resources – human, industrial, technological and financial – to provide a reasonable margin of security...

The NATO allies maintain on active duty about three million men and women compared with about two million for the United States and 250,000 for Japan. If we include reserves... the allied total is over six million compared with about three million for the United States. If we add civilian defence manpower... the totals come to just under eight million for the allies and just over four million for the United States. The GDP of all the non-United States NATO nations combined represents around 45 % of the NATO and Japan total. Our NATO allies account for over 60 % of total NATO and Japan ground combat capability, around 55 % of the tactical air force combat aircraft and around 50 % of the total tonnage of naval surface combatants and submarines.”

4.5. “... We have devised for the purposes of this report a number of indices of burden-sharing and have developed an overall assessment. We believe this approach – while imperfect and certainly not agreed by the allies – can give a better perspective of burden-sharing than any one individual indicator. Using this formulation, the aggregated NATO allies appear to be shouldering their fair share of the total NATO and Japan defence burden.”

4.6. The 1982 report follows similar lines, pointing out that “collectively [the NATO allies and Japan] have 80 % greater population, four times the GDP and more than double the per capita GDP of the Warsaw Pact”. Curiously

it then reduces significantly the assessment of allied contribution: “Our NATO allies account for over 55 % of total NATO and Japanese ground combat capability, around 50 % of the tactical air force combat aircraft and around 35 % of the total tonnage of naval surface combatants...”. The reductions of these percentages from 60 %, 55 %, and 50 % respectively the previous year are obviously far greater than any real changes in the force balance in the intervening twelve months. In conclusion the report is more critical of its allies: “In the final analysis the United States appears to be doing somewhat more than its fair share of the NATO and Japanese total based on quantifiable measures examined for this report.”

4.7. The informal meeting of defence ministers of all European NATO countries, except France but now including Spain, known as Eurogroup regularly publishes its assessment of the European contribution to defence within the alliance. The last communiqué of 29th November 1982 noted a more favourable European share than did the foregoing reports :

“4. Within the NATO partnership, Eurogroup countries participating in NATO's integrated military structure make a substantial and significant contribution to the alliance's military forces. Their active armed forces total some two-and-a-half million and they provide approximately 75 % of NATO's readily available ground forces in Europe, 75 % of the tanks, 65 % of the air forces and 60 % of the warships...”

A list of new military equipment being introduced by the Eurogroup countries was appended. The percentages would of course be increased if account were taken of French forces.

4.8. In the light of the foregoing authoritative assessments, and the Rapporteur's extensive discussions in NATO, SHAPE, and Bonn, the committee concludes that on the whole the European countries are providing a very reasonable share of the allied defence burden. Required improvements in the European effort call for a long-term commitment to steady enhancement, particularly in “sustainability” of the conventional forces – the ability to offer sustained resistance beyond the first few days of any possible attack. This requires an improvement in the ammunition stockpiles of many countries and in rapidly available reserves to relieve the combat fatigue of forward troops, although there is more insistence in some quarters on the need to be able to “re-establish deterrence” if the forward defences were in danger of being overrun. Certainly a 4 % increase in real terms in defence budgets called

1. On allied commitments to defence spending, March 1981; and on allied contributions to the common defence, March 1982.

for by SACEUR to provide new generations of conventional equipment and weapons to permit detailed reconnaissance, target acquisition and selective attack on the second echelon of Soviet forces will not be forthcoming; the need is rather for steady investment in new weapons technology as proven weapon systems become available. Mr. Weinberger's emerging technology on which he has reported to NATO can be incorporated only progressively into the NATO armoury.

4.9. With the present United States Administration there have been significant failures of allied consultation. President Reagan's address to the National Association of Evangelicals on 8th March 1983 – dubbed the “Darth Vaders” speech by the Washington establishment – portraying the Soviet Union as an implacably hostile power reveals an outlook not shared by European governments. His proposal for research on new ABM systems in his television address of 23rd March – dubbed the “Star Wars” speech – was not conveyed by Mr. Weinberger attending the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO defence ministers in Portugal a few hours earlier the same day. Mr. Weinberger was either himself unaware that the proposal would be made, or still hoping that President Reagan would heed the advice of Department of Defence advisers not to make the proposal. It is a lesser failure of communication that the otherwise valuable briefings given to the committee in the Pentagon only a few hours before the Presidential speech should have contained no inkling of the ABM proposal.

4.10. Differences between the present United States Administration and European governments in general policy issues related to defence are frankly recognised in the Secretary of State's 1982 report on allied contributions to the common defence already quoted in the burden-sharing context above :

“Emphasising social and economic viability as their first priority, many Europeans continue to view the Soviet threat less seriously than the United States. Moreover, United States and European views of how best to counter the Soviet threat remain divergent, in spite of major United States efforts over the past year to portray the threat graphically for European élites and publics... Europeans believe Soviet policy can be moderated through traditional forms of social, economic and political contact. They are less enthusiastic than the United States about the build-up of military force as a counter to the Soviet challenge.”

Referring to foregone economic benefits of defence contributions, the report continues :

“Occasionally however the common interest is overridden. An especially painful example occurred during 1981 and early 1982 when several allies opted in favour of economic expediency rather than defence interests in agreeing to the West Siberian pipeline despite strong opposition by the United States. In this case some NATO countries chose to place the interests of their domestic industry ahead of national security considerations. This occurred even though it was far from clear that the cost of delivered natural gas would be economical, given the hidden charges in the long-term bargain struck with the Soviet Union. In addition, despite the projected massive dependency on Soviet gas of western areas such as Bavaria, no safeguards have been planned by the allies to offset the danger of a gas cut-off. This is a very critical development in the alliance and it may have serious consequences in the future.”

4.11. The tendency of the present United States Administration to assume that its approach to East-West relations is the correct one for the alliance as a whole has led to an increase in consultation on defence and security issues among the European countries independently of the United States, and for calls for further improvement in such arrangements – discussed in the next chapter.

V. *The European pillar*

(a) *General*

5.1. There is a growing feeling today among European members of NATO, reflected strongly among members of the committee, that the European members of the alliance must concert their views on the main principles of allied defence policy and strategy as they affect Europeans. The European pillar of the alliance must be strengthened. That observation has been made many times before. The question on which there is less agreement is on what topics and to what extent should the Europeans consult independently, and in what institutional framework? Several are available and are considered separately below.

(b) *Western European Union*

5.2. Western European Union is primarily a defence organisation as Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty makes clear. After signature of the treaty by the original five members in 1948, the Brussels Treaty Organisation, as WEU was then known, created its own Western Union Defence Organisation and established

the first post-war allied headquarters at Fontainebleau. But even in the eyes of the five signatories WUDO was a stop-gap, awaiting the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty which took place the following year. Once the NATO integrated military structure was in place the BTO dissolved its own defence organisation as superfluous and transferred its existing military headquarters and infrastructure programme to NATO. The relevant resolution of the Council of 20th September 1950 is worth quoting :

“ Resolution by the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Organisation of 20th December 1950 on the future of the organisation of western defence in the light of the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation military structure ¹

1. The Consultative Council have considered the suggestion of the North Atlantic Council that the Brussels Treaty powers should review the status of the Western Union Defence Organisation in the light of the establishment of an overall North Atlantic Treaty Command Organisation.

2. The Consultative Council have noted :

(i) that it has been decided to dissolve the existing European Regional Planning Groups with their Regional Chiefs-of-Staff and principal Staff Officers Committees;

(ii) the view of the North Atlantic Council that, when the new NATO Command Organisation is established, it will be unnecessary and undesirable to have a parallel Western Union Command and that the new Headquarters suggested for Western Europe should be directly under SHAPE and should not be responsible to the Western Union Defence Committee.

3. The Council agree that, in the light of this re-organisation, the continued existence of the Western Union Defence Organisation in its present form is no longer necessary. They accordingly instruct the Permanent Commission to consider in consultation with the Western Union Military Committee, acting on the instructions of the Defence Ministers,

1. Reproduced previously in Document 29, 3rd October 1956, and Document 557, 16th November 1974.

how the proposed re-organisation can best be effected and what military machinery, if any, needs to be retained under the Brussels Treaty.

4. The Council affirm that these new arrangements will in no way affect the obligations assumed towards each other by the signatory powers under the Brussels Treaty. In particular, the Consultative Council established under Article VII, including the non-military organs set up under the Council, will continue to function, and the reorganisation of the military machinery shall not affect the right of the Western Union Defence Ministers and Chiefs-of-Staff to meet as they please to consider matters of mutual concern to the Brussels Treaty powers.”

It will be noted in particular that under paragraph 4 of the resolution the new arrangements “shall not affect the right of the Western Union defence ministers and chiefs-of-staff to meet as they please to consider matters of mutual concern to the Brussels Treaty powers”.

5.3. However, since that date defence ministers and chiefs-of-staff have not met in the Brussels Treaty framework, and when the treaty was modified in 1954 to create the seven member WEU the 1950 resolution was in effect confirmed in the new Article IV of the modified treaty which expressly provides that NATO military bodies will not be duplicated :

“ In the execution of the treaty, the high contracting parties and any organs established by them under the treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.”

In fact, under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty the military provisions concerning levels of forces and control of armaments incorporated in Protocols Nos. II, III and IV, are inextricably linked to the integrated military structure of NATO which is made responsible in part for implementation of some of the WEU treaty obligations.

5.4. While the Council recognises that its defence *responsibilities* – notably under Articles V and VIII of the treaty – are not diminished by post-1950 arrangements, the desirable extent of the Council’s defence *activities* has been the subject of debate between the Council and the Assembly ever since the latter was estab-

lished under the same 1954 modifications. As a consequence of this debate the Council was led in 1957 to define formally the scope of its residual defence and related activities. The seven governments considered that the activities of the Council in the field of defence questions and armaments should relate only to :

- “(a) matters which the contracting parties wish to raise, especially under Article VIII;
- (b) the level of forces of member states;
- (c) the maintenance of certain United Kingdom forces on the continent;
- (d) the Agency for the Control of Armaments;
- (e) the Standing Armaments Committee.”¹

Since then it is understood that no government has in fact raised any matter under Article VIII of the treaty, so that Council defence activities have been limited to discussion of force level limitations, arms control and Standing Armaments Committee matters discussed in another report by the committee². As the committee points out in that report, on the basis of extensive quotations from ministers of member countries who have addressed the Assembly, although member governments today are unanimous in stressing the importance of the *Assembly's* functions as a contribution to public debate on defence issues, no WEU government has proposed that the defence activities of the WEU *Council* should be increased; indeed, Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of France, reporting to the French National Assembly on 6th June 1982 on his earlier address to the WEU Assembly, commented specifically on the lack of any great future for the executive of WEU :

“The other day, on behalf of the French Government, I addressed the Assembly of WEU, not because the executive of WEU seems to have a very great future but because the Assembly is an elected one... competent to handle these [defence] matters, which must be discussed among members of parliament...”

5.5. The fact that despite intermittent urging by the Assembly over the last twenty-five years the Council since 1950 has chosen not to discuss allied defence planning, is not in itself a reason why it should not do so at the present time. Several members of the committee believe that without seeking to replace the

organs of NATO concerned with detailed allied defence planning, and taking full account of member states' obligations to NATO, the Council of WEU should today assume responsibility for discussing the main lines of a defence strategy common to the WEU countries. The advantages of reviving Brussels Treaty defence activities in this way are obvious: the seven member countries collectively provide the great bulk of the European defence contribution to NATO; their forces man the vital central front; they include all the most important defence production industries in Europe; they include all the countries on whose territory it is proposed to deploy a new generation of intermediate-range nuclear missiles if the INF talks fail. Most important, France, which has withdrawn its forces from the integrated military structure of NATO, remains a full member of WEU as does the only other European nuclear power, the United Kingdom.

5.6. There is, however, a serious political disadvantage in discussing collective defence policy among only an inner nucleus of European allies. Your Rapporteur was made very much aware of it during his extensive discussions in preparing the present report, and it has obviously inhibited member governments in making any such use of WEU since 1950. Any proposal for a “caucus” meeting of European countries within NATO is a delicate matter because of the obvious exclusion of the United States and Canada from such discussions. Any inner caucus meeting of seven countries within the fourteen European allies will be particularly resented by the remaining seven just as much as suggestions for defence meetings of a “big three” or “big four” – put forward occasionally in the past have been bitterly resented by other members of WEU. As it happens the peripheral European members of NATO, although the defence efforts of some of them may appear smaller than the average contribution of European countries, all make a vital contribution to allied defence through the strategic location of their mainland and island territories which almost completely block sea and air access of Soviet forces to the open oceans, or provide important naval bases, maritime patrol bases and submarine listening posts. Norway and Turkey alone among NATO countries have common frontiers with the Soviet Union itself.

5.7. For the foregoing reasons many members of the committee feel that in any attempt to agree on a European approach to the main principles of allied defence strategy it is essential to ensure the participation of all European members of NATO. On a number of occasions in the past the Assembly has recommended that other European NATO countries

1. Second annual report of the Council, Document 37, 25th February 1957.

2. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council, Document 948.

should be invited to join WEU¹; the Council has never agreed to extend such invitations knowing that they would not be taken up as was once made clear by one of the countries concerned². The political obstacles to accession to the modified Brussels Treaty by other European allies are several: first the treaty embodies many outdated restrictions on force ceilings and internal arms control; secondly accession at the present late stage could be seen as a vote of no-confidence in NATO and in the United States commitment which is particularly important to the countries of the periphery. Lastly, some European allies may not wish to subscribe to the terms of the mutual defence obligations in Article V of the Brussels Treaty which are more constraining than the corresponding Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

5.8. For all these reasons the draft recommendation proposes in paragraph B.1 that the Council should consider and report to the Assembly on the desirability of expanding its defence activities. The defence activities of the WEU *Assembly* remain uncontroversial. The draft resolution included in this report recalls the earlier Resolution 15 of the Assembly adopted on 18th June 1959, on a report from the Presidential Committee³ whereby the Assembly considered the interests "of member states of NATO which are not members of WEU" and decided that the committee could invite observers from any NATO country to attend its meetings with the right to speak. In implementation of that resolution, the committee did in fact invite parliamentary observers from Denmark and Norway, some of whom duly attended meetings at that time, but the practice appears to have fallen into abeyance. The draft resolution now proposed would specifically invite parliamentary observers from all European NATO countries not members of WEU to participate with the right to speak in meetings of the committee which will be concerned with the preparation of the forthcoming report on the state of European security. In paragraph 4 (b) of the draft recommendation the committee also proposes that the Assembly should assist governments in explaining to the European public and parliaments the contribution which the United States makes to allied defence.

(c) *Eurogroup*

5.9. Eurogroup describes itself as "an informal association of defence ministers of European member governments within the frame-

1. Recommendation 41 of 3rd December 1959; Recommendation 372 of 1st December 1981.

2. Reply of the Council to Recommendation 41.

3. Text at Appendix IX.

work of NATO... " open to all European members of the alliance. It was founded in 1968 at the suggestion of Mr. Denis Healey (the then United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence) "as a means of responding to a widespread desire for closer European co-operation within the alliance"¹. In particular, the Eurogroup "provides an informal forum for an exchange of views by defence ministers on major political/strategic questions affecting the common defence".

5.10. Originally an informal dinner of defence ministers in 1968, discussion among participants today continues between the Permanent Representatives to NATO of the participating countries and their staffs. Participation in Eurogroup has extended progressively and now includes all European members of NATO with the exception of France. Significantly Spain, which does not yet participate in the integrated military structure of NATO, took part in the ministerial Eurogroup meeting on 29th November 1982. Eurogroup has no international staff, or formal structure. Secretarial services are provided by the staffs of the various participating delegations. Meetings are held in the NATO headquarters. Eurogroup also aims at co-ordinating more closely the defence efforts of participating countries and for this purpose has established some nine subgroups which have had varying degrees of success.

5.11. It is as an informal forum for discussion of political and strategic questions affecting common defence that Eurogroup activity appears to have increased during the last two years, as the European NATO countries have increasingly felt the need to co-ordinate the European attitude to the United States within NATO. Such "caucussing" within the NATO framework is of course a politically sensitive matter, but Eurogroup provides a flexible and discreet framework because meetings between officials within the NATO headquarters need not attract publicity.

5.12. France does not participate in the Eurogroup; the then French Minister of Defence, Mr. Debré, took some weeks to consider the invitation to attend the first Eurogroup dinner of defence ministers in 1968. One factor at that time was that the British initiative was suspected of being a "back door" to British membership of the European Community then being negotiated. The other factor undoubtedly was the link with NATO.

5.13. The first of these obstacles to French participation in Eurogroup disappeared in 1973 with British accession to the European Community. As for the second, it can be said that

1. Quotations from "The Eurogroup" pamphlet published by Eurogroup, issued by NATO information service.

Eurogroup as such has no closer links to NATO than France which, despite the 1966 withdrawal from the integrated military structure, has always remained a fuller participant in NATO as a whole than is generally recognised. France, of course, is a full participant in the North Atlantic Council, as it is now in such NATO bodies as the new Air Defence Committee, in the Conference of National Armaments Directors, as well as in the three NATO military agencies based in France. Some French nationals remain in the NATO International Staff, chiefly in the economic and political sections; French military missions are of course appointed to the NATO Military Committee and to all military headquarters. On balance it would seem that the political obstacles in the way of French participation in Eurogroup are fewer than those in the way of the accession of six or seven European NATO countries to WEU. It was noted at the time of the NATO summit meeting in Bonn in June 1982 that the attendance of President Mitterrand at the concluding formal dinner was a precedent. It could not be a greater precedent for a French Defence Minister to attend the next Eurogroup dinner of defence ministers – it is understood that an invitation was extended on one recent occasion.

5.14. The committee suggests in paragraph B.2 of the draft recommendation that the Council consider and report to the Assembly on the desirability of inviting all members of WEU to contribute to strengthening the European pillar of the western alliance. Many members believe that Eurogroup, where all European members of NATO except France are already present, remains the most flexible and appropriate method of concerting European positions on NATO-related defence issues, without having a disruptive effect on allied defence planning. There is a case for strengthening the ability of Eurogroup to make its position better known in the United States, particularly to members of Congress. This can be co-ordinated through the United Kingdom Embassy in Washington, as that country provides the permanent secretariat to Eurogroup, and additionally through the Washington Embassy of the country which for the time being is chairman-in-office of the Eurogroup as happened during a recent tour by Eurogroup officials and senior officers to the United States as a public relations exercise.

(d) European political co-operation

5.15. European political co-operation among the ten countries of the Community has been increasingly successful on a number of issues including Middle East policy. It is now agreed among the ten foreign ministers that "security" policy can be discussed in that frame-

work. The Falklands is a recent example of very rapid decision-making by the Ten in this framework in a resolution condemning the Argentine invasion. Other "security" matters discussed by the Ten include the European position in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and aspects of disarmament usually considered in the United Nations framework.

5.16. European political co-operation is a largely informal arrangement although the functions of the "presidency" have developed around the three ministers comprising the foreign minister who is chairman-in-office for six months, associated with his immediate predecessor and successor. In the foreign ministry of the chairman-in-office room is provided for one official from each of the two other countries associated with the "presidency" for the time being. However, European political co-operation remains outside the framework of the European Community treaties themselves, and two or three member countries at least have reservations about extending the defence functions of this institution at the present time. The neutral position of Ireland remains a problem.

(e) Independent European Programme Group

5.17. The IEPG is yet another informal grouping, without treaty or international staff, in which all European NATO countries participate. Concerned with European armaments production, and co-ordination with the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors in pursuance of a two-way street in defence equipment between Europe and the United States, this is not a body which is likely to become involved in discussing more general aspects of European defence policy.

VI. Defence production

6.1. In measuring progress on the concept of a two-way street in defence equipment between the United States and its European allies, a concept formally adopted by the NATO Defence Planning Committee in May 1975, it is useful to compare the attitudes of the Carter and Reagan administrations.

(a) The Carter administration

6.2. A few days before Ronald Reagan arrived at the White House on 20th January 1981, a report on rationalisation/standardisation within NATO (report to the United States Congress, January 1981) by Mr. Harold Brown of the Carter administration, outgoing Secretary of Defence, was published. According to this

report, the United States expects each NATO nation to do its fair share in support of the collective defence of the West, but joint European defence production is considered to be the best means of improving the two-way street. The 3% formula goes hand in hand with a recommendation that Europeans place their industries on a "united and collective basis". Yet Europe and North America are the two richest, most technologically advanced industrial economies in the world. Together we have a combined GNP more than twice that of the Warsaw Pact. If we were to pool our resources and efforts and pull together, we could produce a credible and capable coalition defence, without economic strain. In his address to the NATO summit in London in May 1977, President Carter emphasised that:

"A common European defence production effort would help to achieve economies of a scale beyond the reach of national programmes. A strengthened defence production base in Europe would enlarge the opportunities for two-way transatlantic traffic in defence equipment, while adding to the overall capabilities of the alliance.

The Europeans have sought the economic benefits (jobs and technological pride and progress) of developing, producing and selling weapons to the United States in order to earn the foreign exchange needed to buy weapons from the United States. But here we confront a structural problem within Europe itself that compounds the problems already mentioned. Only Britain and France (and in some areas, Germany) can produce weapons to a continental scale. No country in Europe can produce to an intercontinental scale. Thus the economies of scale in the alliance needs – and the benefits the Europeans seek – cannot be fully realised until (in the words of the Culver-Nunn Legislation) the European nations organise their defence procurement on 'a united and collective basis'. Europe's fragmented defence industrial base also makes it difficult for its industries to develop and produce weapons competitive in quality, quantity and price with those produced in the United States."

6.3. The attitude towards the IEPG is not negative either:

"As a result of the Eurogroup initiatives, the European members of the alliance established the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) in February 1976 with France as a full member. The Congress, in the Culver-Nunn Legislation

of July 1975, encouraged the European governments to accelerate their efforts to achieve European armaments collaboration. President Carter at the London NATO summit in June 1977 also encouraged these collective European defence industrial efforts, and pledged to work with the Independent European Programme Group as it gathered strength and cohesion. The United States has participated in a transatlantic dialogue with the IEPG in a series of meetings sponsored by the alliance as a whole. However, the IEPG has not developed into a strong device for co-ordinating European contributions to alliance armaments development."

6.4. According to Mr. Brown's report, standardisation and interoperability are essential:

"The challenges to standardisation and interoperability are many. In meeting them, we have had a number of important successes in the past year. In our triad of rationalisation, standardisation and interoperability (RSI) initiatives, we signed the first memorandum of understanding (MOU) for a family of weapons, culminating two years of negotiations. We also made substantial progress towards a second family. We signed two more bilateral general reciprocal procurement MOUs. Dual production of many major systems continues and is planned for others. The periodic armaments planning system (PAPS) and the NATO armaments planning review (NAPR) programmes have started, marking a major step toward an integrated and unified NATO arms planning system. The NATO airborne early warning and control programme is moving from planning to operational status. The alliance Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) has become increasingly active and effective in its support of arms co-operation programmes. The European national armaments directors and defence ministers strongly expressed their sense of progress and commitment to NATO co-operative programmes at their fall 1980 meetings. We also continue to revise DoD directives so that the principles of standardisation and interoperability are reflected in our internal standard operating procedures. Moreover, we are undertaking two major new initiatives: (1) reviewing the feasibility of establishing a second source in Europe for selected systems and (2) examining our foreign ownership, control or influence regulations and procedures and how they affect cross-national investment in arms industries.

Meeting challenges to standardisation/interoperability

To meet the challenges we have outlined, the United States has continued to take three primary approaches for increasing defence co-operation with allies: (1) reciprocal procurement agreements, (2) dual production of weapons systems which have already been developed, and (3) sharing development of next-generation families of weapons. In addition, we are pursuing efforts at developing a NATO-wide acquisition process, have continued to work on the NATO AEW&C programme, and are working toward production of a multiple-launch rocket system. We have also begun a programme by which DoD evaluates weapons and technologies of our allies in terms of potential utilisation in the United States in order to save research and development funds. Finally, the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) has been extremely active in the past year. We continued to make substantial progress in all of these areas."

6.5. Mr. Brown considers results achieved in 1980 to be satisfactory:

"The past year has been one of great success in NATO standardisation and interoperability. The momentum that has been building for several years has resulted in a rapid movement forward. Under the triad of initiatives, we have signed our first family of weapons MOU and have almost completed all of the reciprocal general procurement MOUs. Dual production of systems has proven most valuable. The CNAD has been extremely active with PAPS and NAPR now activated. The NATO AEW&C programme is nearing operational status and other new initiatives are under way. Congress has provided important support for United States and alliance efforts at standardisation and interoperability. In sum, 1980 was a year in which many of our efforts came to fruition and others are being refined and/or are nearing fulfilment."

6.6. Where armaments co-operation is concerned, Mr. Brown's analysis lays greater emphasis on progress accomplished than on the imbalance of trade between the United States and Europe:

"The alliance has made significant progress toward greater co-operation in armaments. The Conference of National Armaments Directors has become a much stronger organisation which is now

working on major co-operative programmes for the future. Under its auspices, the family of weapons concept promises a more efficient division of effort in the field of weapons development. The first family of weapons agreement signed in August 1980 covers air-to-air missiles and provides for the Europeans to develop an advanced short-range missile while the United States develops an advanced medium-range missile. Thus, the family of weapons has moved from concept to reality within four years. Also, the United States has negotiated bilateral MOUs for reciprocal procurement of defence equipment with individual allies (eleven have been signed, and one is pending). These agreements are designed to improve open competition in systems acquisition by waiving buy-national and other restrictive provisions. Ongoing or pending co-operative programmes include:

(A) Dual production in the United States: Roland air defence system, MAG-58 armour machine gun, 120 mm tank gun, CFM engine (KC-135 re-engineing), squad automatic weapon.

(B) Dual production in Europe: F-16, MOD Flir, M483, improved conventional munition; Stinger man-portable air defence system, AIM-9L improved short-range air-to-air missile, Patriot.

(C) Co-operative programmes: NATO AWACS, multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS), rolling air frame missile (RAM), NATO small arms ammunition.

6.7. Mr. Brown therefore asks for the support of Congress:

"The Department of Defence appreciates the support Congress has given NATO rationalisation / standardisation / interoperability. Our efforts in this regard continue to be bolstered by the Congressional affirmation in the FY 77 Defence Appropriation Act that it is United States policy for equipment procured by the United States for use in NATO to be standardised or at least interoperable with that of our allies and that progress toward realisation of standardisation/interoperability objectives would be enhanced by expanded inter-allied procurement of arms and equipment within NATO and greater reliance on licensing and coproduction."

(b) The Reagan administration

6.8. With the Reagan administration the United States seems not only to be keeping up

the transatlantic dialogue but also wishing to strengthen it, recognising its political importance for the Atlantic Alliance. This was affirmed by Mr. Richard DeLauer, United States Under-Secretary of Defence, at the CNAD meeting in Brussels on 5th May 1981. The Reagan administration strongly supports United States and NATO arms co-operation programmes but apparently, unlike the Carter administration, lays greater stress on the fact that industry must play a more active rôle in the process of armaments co-operation than on the need for widespread intra-European co-operation so that Europe may become a real competitor for the United States.

6.9. The programme of the symposium on industrial co-operation with NATO, held in Brussels in April 1983, also offers a number of ideas, for instance:

- “(a) review of mandatory DoD contract clauses and subcontract flow-down provisions to delete those which are inapplicable or unnecessary for contractors/subcontractors located outside the United States;
- (b) negotiation of ‘contract administration’ and ‘pricing/auditing’ annexes to general MOUs to provide for reciprocal exchange of government services
 - audit agreements exist for France and United Kingdom
 - first contract administration annex signed with the Netherlands in April 1982 ;
- (c) strong emphasis on ‘industry-to-industry’ seminars to explore mutual business opportunities ;
- (d) defence acquisition circular no. 76-25, issued on 31st October 1980
 - first major change to section VI ‘Foreign acquisitions’ in over 20 years
 - includes all NATO general MOUs
 - creates new part 14 ‘Purchases from NATO participating sources’
 - waives ‘Buy American Act’; customs duties etc.
 - stresses open subcontracting with NATO sources.”

6.10. Mr. Weinberger, United States Secretary of Defence, in his report on the allied contribution to the common defence (Department of

Defence, March 1982) considers that NATO has developed major programmes for improving the alliance’s defence capability:

“ These are the coproduction, dual production and families of weapons programmes. These programmes provide for the sharing of development and production costs and can produce substantial savings in R&D expenditures. Such savings can improve the industrial base in the United States, Canada and Europe and assist technology transfer within the alliance. These transfers take place in both directions – from Europe to the United States and from the United States to Europe. ”

Major examples quoted by Mr. Weinberger are United States procurement of the MAG-58 machine gun and the 120 mm smooth bore tank gun. He underlines that Europeans have derived benefits from coproduction in the framework of the F-16 aircraft programme:

“ Both sides may benefit from future air-to-air missile weapons families. Dual production, coproduction and the family of weapons programmes enable industry to distribute large R&D costs, to reap the benefits of economies of scale and to share in advanced technology. ”

6.11. Unlike Mr. Brown, he also stresses the problem caused by the imbalance in the equipment trade between the United States and its partners:

“ In 1980, eight major NATO trading partners (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom) accepted United States manufactured defence equipment deliveries amounting to \$1.85b. In contrast, the United States accepted deliveries on only \$0.20b from those same NATO countries – a ratio of 9.4:1 favouring the United States. The comparable ratio was 5.3:1 in 1977 and has been increasing consistently since then in favour of the United States. ”

6.12. In the report standardisation of equipment within NATO (report to the United States Congress, January 1983), Mr. Weinberger comments on the efforts of the Department of Defence and NATO allies to standardise, or at least make interoperable, equipment (including weapons systems, ammunition and fuel) of allied forces committed to NATO. Mr. Weinberger considers progress has been made in the effort to strengthen alliance conventional forces and to adapt the alliance defence posture to the changing needs of the 1980s:

“ Improvements in NATO planning procedures are contributing to the process of

improving standardisation and interoperability within NATO. NATO has agreed to explore urgently ways to improve its conventional defence by taking advantage of emerging technologies."

6.13. Mr. Weinberger considers it necessary to:

"... improve NATO's efforts to allocate development of related weapon types to specific allies under the family of weapons concept. Artificial barriers to trade in defence equipment must be removed under the reciprocal memoranda of understanding that we have with our allies.

Coproduction may be selectively employed to provide industrial participation to allies who agree to adopt standardised systems.

Finally, the two-way street/armaments co-operation must be made a reality through increased trade in defence equipment in both directions across the Atlantic resulting in benefits to NATO as a whole."

6.14. Another difference between Mr. Weinberger's approach (see abovementioned text) and that of Mr. Brown is the emphasis he places on the need for a major leadership rôle for industry (in this process) and his desire to see a reduction in obstacles to direct industry-to-industry agreements.

6.15. In the United States, it has been decided that the determination of allied governments is not enough. It is also necessary to obtain United States Congress backing and ensure a will on the part of American industry to carry out European projects jointly. Anxiety about unemployment also carries great weight in this analysis. Mr. Weinberger concludes the introduction to the abovementioned report with remarks about Congress's attitude:

"We welcome the positive statement of the Congress for greater co-operation with our allies as expressed in the FY 1983 Defence Authorisation Act.

We will intensify consultations to meet these objectives. At the same time we solicit the assistance of Congress in elimination of obstacles to co-operation, e.g. specialty metals legislation which is seriously undermining NATO's arms co-operation efforts."

6.16. Nevertheless the rhetoric exceeds tenfold the practical progress made towards achieving an equitable two-way street. True there are notable examples of European equipment's being accepted for the United States armed for-

ces but primarily where the European produce was outstanding such as the Harrier for the United States Marine Corps, the Hawk for the United States navy and the CF-56 powerplant for the KC-135 tankers of Strategic Air Command.

6.17. Surprisingly, amendments in favour of NATO industrial co-operation like the Roth-Glenn-Nunn Amendment (Appendix VI) can be passed by the Senate and yet amendments like the Speciality Metals Amendments and the Defence Appropriations Bill are carried which do immense damage to the prospects of the procurement of European equipment by the United States armed forces and to transatlantic relations.

6.18. The Europeans do not help their own cause by their slow progress towards interoperability, standardisation, and joint development and procurement. The IEPG has had great difficulty, inevitably, in harmonising national operational requirements and procurement time-scales. Some promising examples exist of greater co-operation such as the Tornado programme or the new generation of collaborative anti-tank guided weapons. Others such as the tortoise-like progress towards a new European combat aircraft for the Italian air force, Luftwaffe and Royal Air Force show how hard it is even for the Europeans to concert their procurement among themselves let alone with the United States.

(c) *Conclusions*

6.19. Both the democratic and republican administrations placed and are placing emphasis on the need for standardisation and/or at least interoperability of allied equipment. Both show interest in the principle of the two-way street, considered to be essential for enhancing the defence capability of the alliance itself.

6.20. However, there are differences of tone or rather of emphasis in the two approaches. Mr. Carter's administration underlined the idea that large-scale intra-European co-operation could have been a means of making Europe a true competitor for the United States. The 3% formula goes hand in hand with this idea. The Reagan administration makes more direct reference to the imbalance of trade between the United States and Europe but in its strong desire to pursue cross-Atlantic industrial teaming does not mention the expediency of intra-European co-operation (at least in the reports examined by your Rapporteur) and, although on the one hand it proposes to repeal the Buy American Act, on the other hand it vigorously asserts the need for a "major leadership rôle for industry" and a reduction in "obstacles to direct industry-to-industry agreements".

VII. Forces of WEU countries

(a) General

7.1. This section briefly summarises the forces which the WEU countries make available for allied defence. There are of course other important forces in Europe: those of the United States and of the other European NATO countries - Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey.

(b) Belgium

7.2. The Belgian forces, which include conscripts, are mostly NATO-assigned in peacetime. A significant element of the Belgian corps is stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany in peacetime and comes under the command of the NATO Northern Army Group, but there is some doubt about continued Belgian participation in the vital Hawk SAM screen in Germany. The Belgian air force is largely under command of the 2nd Tactical Air Force of NATO. Belgium contributes a parachute battalion group to the ACE Mobile Force and transports them in the C-130s of its air force. The small but modern naval force usually contributes a frigate to the peacetime Standing Force Atlantic and minesweepers to the Standing Force Channel. Together with the Netherlands they form a joint minesweeping force for their coastal waters. In developing situations, reserve formations are formed to reinforce the NATO-assigned forces, or to provide a force under national control for internal defence, and for the protection of national lines of communication. In wartime all naval ships will operate under NATO control.

(c) France

7.3. France, although a member of the NATO alliance, does not assign forces to NATO and does not participate in the integrated military structure, although elements of these forces participate from time-to-time on a bilateral basis in military exercises outside the NATO area with allied nations. There is conscription in France. France maintains an army corps in Germany, consisting of three divisions, and a garrison in Berlin at battalion strength. Some corps troops are stationed in north-east France. Two army corps headquarters and some eleven other divisions are located in France and their army is tasked to defend French territory in war. The French navy will eventually have six nuclear missile submarines for deterrence; Jaguar aircraft squadrons, and of course the ballistic missiles at the Plateau d'Albion installation, and nuclear-capable Mirage-IV aircraft also serve this purpose. Besides having

some twenty-eight conventional submarines, the navy possesses two conventional aircraft-carriers, and some forty-four destroyers, frigates and corvettes. The naval air arm has a total of some 200 aircraft, some that are carrier-borne and others that are engaged in maritime surveillance. The French air force is based in France, although there is normally a detachment at Djibouti. The French air force consists of some 700 combat aircraft and there are about 300 aircraft in the transport or liaison rôle. The French army has already despatched a contingent to join the United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon. It always has units at readiness to meet requests for military aid at typically brigade group strength with the necessary air force support for countries such as Chad who have a military aid agreement with France. French forces at battalion strength are stationed in Guyana, at Kourou, and in Mururoa, Oceania, and are mainly employed in the engineer rôle. French overseas territories, which are administered as part of metropolitan France, have their own local defence forces in which local conscript soldiers serve.

(d) Federal Republic of Germany

7.4. Almost without exception, the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany, which include conscripts, are based in the Federal Republic. The army, however, has a training facility in Canada and the United Kingdom for tank formations and the air force, until recently, has maintained an F-104 pilot training facility in the United States of America which will be closed due to the establishment of a new facility in the United Kingdom for training Tornado pilots at RAF Cottesmore for aircrews of the Luftwaffe, German naval air arm, Italian air force and RAF.

7.5. For the defence of the Federal Republic's eastern frontier, the land forces place an army corps size formation under Northern Army Group and two army corps under the command of the Central Army Group. A further formation operates in the Jutland area under the command of Allied Forces Northern Europe. Reserve formations are assembled during developing situations to reinforce NATO and to protect lines of communication. The naval forces consist of some twenty-four conventional submarines, twenty frigates and destroyers, and some fifty light fast-patrol craft. Their rôle is to maintain naval superiority of the Baltic Sea and the Kattegat and to operate in the North Sea; they contribute units to the Standing Force Atlantic and the Standing Force Channel in peacetime.

7.6. The navy is supported by some twenty maritime patrol aircraft and has some 100 shore-based 104-G fighters which are being gradually replaced by Tornado aircraft.

7.7. The air force possesses some 600 combat aircraft, most of which are assigned to NATO and serve in the 2nd and the 4th Tactical Air Forces. There is a detachment of the Luftwaffe with an air-sea rescue capability at the NATO training base at Decimomannu, Sardinia.

(e) Luxembourg

7.8. Luxembourg provides a regimental combat team, which includes conscripts, which is normally assigned to the ACE Mobile Force but is transported by the air forces of other NATO countries.

(f) Italy

7.9. Italy confines its forces almost entirely to the defence of its territory and its immediate coastal waters. It is fair to say that the three services of the Italian forces, which include conscripts, are to all intents and purposes assigned to NATO. They comprise an army corps based in the north of Italy, and twenty-five squadrons of aircraft, totalling some 300 combat machines, some of which have a maritime rôle. Italy possesses a fleet of twenty-seven warships and a number of fast attack craft. There remains about three brigades under national command for internal defence in wartime. The Italians, at the moment, are contributing to the United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon and they provide contingents for the ACE Mobile Force which they airlift in their own aircraft.

(g) Netherlands

7.10. The Netherlands armed forces, which include conscripts, are mainly based in that country, although a naval picket ship is normally on station in the Netherlands Antilles with a detachment of marines, and one or two maritime aircraft for air-sea rescue and coastal surveillance tasks are based there. The army assigns an army corps to NATO, consisting of an armoured division and two infantry divisions. The navy contributes units to the Standing Force Atlantic and Standing Force Channel. Their minesweeping effort works jointly with that of Belgium. The fleet of some fifteen destroyers and frigates, supported by fleet supply ships and six submarines, is also assigned to NATO. Two squadrons of maritime patrol aircraft are available. The air force has some 200 combat aircraft and is almost completely under NATO command.

(h) United Kingdom

7.11. The United Kingdom considers that the support of NATO is the principal rôle of its

regular armed forces. On the European continent a corps, comprising three divisions and an artillery division, is assigned to NATO. The logistical support of these formations remains under national control. This British effort is called the British Army of the Rhine, and in 1982 was at an average peacetime strength of some 58,600 men.¹ The Brussels Treaty imposes an obligation upon the United Kingdom to station an army of the equivalent of four divisions and a tactical air force on the continent. The Royal Air Force maintains a number of air bases in Germany on which some 160 combat aircraft are stationed in peacetime. These are assigned to the 2nd Tactical Air Force of NATO. Reforming in the United Kingdom at this moment is the 2nd Infantry Division, comprising regular and reserve brigades and of course their supporting arms. This formation is to reinforce BAOR when required. The United Kingdom has its own air defence capability which operates under NATO. The United Kingdom maintains a brigade in Berlin and a strong presence of all three arms of service in the Falklands at brigade strength. A battalion-sized garrison is kept in Gibraltar together with naval elements to support fleet operations in the Mediterranean if required. A battalion group, with a detachment of Harrier aircraft and a naval picket ship, is based on Belize in Central America. The United Kingdom is able to provide a contribution to the ACE Mobile Force – usually Royal Marines – for deployment on the flanks of NATO and able to engage in Arctic warfare if required.

7.12. Naval elements are provided to the Standing Force Atlantic and the Standing Force Channel. Contributions are made to the United Nations peacekeeping forces in Cyprus and Lebanon, the United Kingdom base in Cyprus supporting this force. The British forces are required to provide training support for certain former colonies and the Gulf states. Certain units of the forces assigned to NATO are detached for duty in Northern Ireland in order to maintain law and order in a paramilitary rôle.

7.13. Maritime aircraft, operating from United Kingdom shores, are able to maintain surveillance over a wide sea area, particularly the Faroes gap and the Denmark Strait and are able to engage hostile naval submarine and surface units. Airborne early warning aircraft extend the United Kingdom surveillance capability. The United Kingdom possesses its own nuclear deterrent in the form of four nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines which each carry sixteen Polaris missiles, which is to be modern-

¹ Twenty-eighth annual report of the Council, Document 942, page 11.

ised towards the end of this decade through the construction of four new nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines and the procurement of a complement of Trident D5 missiles for them.

(i) *ACE Mobile Force*

7.14. The committee has frequently drawn attention in the past to the political importance of Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) which, when activated, draws on specially trained and equipped units supplied by all WEU countries (except France), the United States and Canada. In a crisis it can be rapidly deployed by air to either NATO flank to provide a military demonstration of the political solidarity of the alliance. The force comprises a land component of brigade group size drawn from infantry battalions and support units supplied by Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States, and an air component of some four squadrons one of which is provided by the Netherlands. AMF is a tangible demonstration of burden-sharing in a joint allied force and it is essential that participating countries meet their commitments. At present the land component needs more local air defence, and the Luxembourg infantry battalion – the only military unit which Luxembourg contributes to NATO – is at less than half strength.

VIII. Nuclear weapons

8.1. The committee is to prepare a separate report on all aspects of nuclear weapons for the second part of the session in November; it last reported in detail in May 1982¹. The present chapter merely records the present levels of nuclear weapons, the status of modernisation and improvement programmes and the relevant arms control negotiations.

(a) *Current levels of nuclear weapons*

8.2. Current information on levels of nuclear weapons by categories is given at Appendix VIII – estimates for autumn 1982 with some updating.

(b) *INF debate*

8.3. The INF debate goes back at least to the late 1950s when the Soviet Union began deployment of some 600 SS-4 and SS-5 medium-range missiles while NATO deployed comparable Thor missiles in the United Kingdom and Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey, and had primitive cruise missiles of the day –

1. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe, Document 918, 19th May 1982.

Matador and later Mace – deployed in Germany. With the entry into service of ICBMs, however, these NATO weapons systems were rapidly considered obsolescent and were phased out by 1963, reliance being placed both on the United States ICBM and SLBM force and on aircraft including the forward-based F-111 in the United Kingdom, the FB-111A in the United States, and carrier-borne aircraft.

8.4. NATO began a re-examination of the theatre nuclear force (as it was then called) position in the light of the appearance of the Soviet Backfire bomber from 1974 and SS-20 missile from 1977. A high level group under United States chairmanship was established in NATO and considered NATO force improvement proposals ranging from 200 to 600 missiles. In April 1979, NATO established a similar special group to examine the arms control aspects of theatre nuclear forces. At the conclusion of these deliberations a special meeting of NATO foreign and defence ministers announced the “dual track” decision on 12th December 1979 whereby NATO decided on the deployment in Europe of 572 United States nuclear missiles distributed as follows:

Country	GLCM	Pershing II	Total
Belgium	48	–	48
Netherlands	48	–	48
Germany	96	108	204
Italy	112	–	112
United Kingdom	160	–	160
TOTAL	<u>464</u>	<u>108</u>	<u>572</u>

8.5. The communiqué said:

“As an integral part of TNF modernisation, 1,000 United States nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible... The 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level.”

8.6. The communiqué stressed the importance of arms control and supported the United States decision to negotiate LRTNF limitations with the Soviet Union along the following lines:

A. Any future limitations on United States systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems.

B. Limitation on United States and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach.

C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment

of agreed limitations on United States and Soviet land-based long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.”

8.7. The communiqué concluded :

“11. The ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO’s strategy of deterrence and defence and thus maintain the security of its member states.

A. A modernisation decision, including a commitment to deployments is necessary to meet NATO’s deterrence and defence needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF.

B. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet build-up can enhance alliance security, modify the scale of NATO’s TNF requirements, and promote stability and détente in Europe in consonance with NATO’s basic policy of deterrence, defence and détente as enunciated in the Harmel report. NATO’s TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.”

8.8. Deployment of the United States missiles is to begin at the end of 1983 and site construction is in progress in the United Kingdom and Italy. There have been conflicting reports of progress in development of Pershing II and the Tomahawk GLCM in the United States. Belgium and the Netherlands have reserved a final decision on deployment in their countries pending an assessment of progress in the INF negotiations.

8.9. The bilateral INF talks opened in Geneva towards the end of 1980, under the Carter administration, and were then adjourned for a year until 30th November 1981 while the Reagan administration considered its negotiating position. On 21st October 1981 the NATO Nuclear Planning Group formulated NATO’s zero option position : “On the basis of reciprocity the zero level remains a possible option under ideal circumstances...”. President Reagan defined the zero option in more

detail in a speech on 18th November 1981 : “The United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles.”

8.10. The SS-20 missile has been deployed both in European Soviet Union and around the Urals, from both of which sites it is within range of Europe, and about one-third out of range of Europe near Mongolia. The United States has made it clear that the zero option would require the Soviet Union to dismantle all SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles whether in range of Europe or of China and Japan, particularly stressing that some of these missiles are a threat to Japan and other Asian countries.

8.11. On 30th March 1983, President Reagan, apparently responding to urgings from most European allies, announced that the United States had informed the Soviet Union in the INF talks in Geneva that the United States was “prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in which the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II and GLCM provided the Soviet Union reduce the number of its warheads on longer-range INF missiles to an equal level on a global basis”, and had proposed that the talks, which had adjourned for Easter, resume on 17th May. The zero option remained on the table. Press reports had earlier suggested the proposals would imply an interim level of 300 INF warheads on each side, but the statement made no reference to numbers, nor did it link an interim agreement to Soviet acceptance of zero levels as the ultimate aim. By referring to “a global basis”, the statement included all Soviet INF systems in the Far East as well as Europe.

8.12. The public position of the Soviet Union on the INF talks had been Mr. Andropov’s earlier statement of 21st December 1982, key excerpts from which are :

“... We have suggested an agreement renouncing all types of nuclear weapons – both medium-range and tactical – designed to strike targets in Europe... We have also suggested another variant : that the USSR and the NATO countries reduce their medium-range weaponry by more than two-thirds. So far the United States will not have it... It has submitted a proposal which, as if in mockery, is called a zero option. It envisages elimination of all Soviet medium-range missiles not only in the European, but also in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, while NATO’s arsenal of nuclear missiles in Europe is to remain intact and may even be increased... We ... will continue to work for an agreement on a basis that is fair to both sides. We are prepa-

red, among other things, to agree that the Soviet Union should retain in Europe only as many missiles as are kept there by Britain and France – and not a single one more. This means that the Soviet Union would cut down by hundreds of missiles, including dozens of the latest missiles, known in the West as SS-20... If later the number of British and French missiles were scaled down, the number of Soviet ones would be additionally reduced by just as many. Along with this there must also be an accord on reducing to equal levels on both sides the number of medium-range nuclear-delivery aircraft stationed in this region by both the USSR and the NATO countries.”

8.13. At a rare televised Moscow press conference on 2nd April, Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, rejected President Reagan's proposals of 30th March, stressing that it would give NATO a 2.5 to 1 superiority over the Warsaw Pact in warheads on all INF systems. He reiterated the demand for British and French nuclear forces, and United States forward based systems, to be taken into account. He rejected the “global” basis of the United States proposal to cover Soviet systems in Asia, pointing out that the Soviet Union was surrounded “by a ring of United States bases” where United States “medium-range nuclear weapons are deployed”. The latest public statement of the Soviet position was contained in Mr. Andropov's speech at a dinner in Moscow for the East German leader, Mr. Honecker, on 3rd May 1983, in which he offered to count warheads, as well as missiles, but still insisted on British and French nuclear forces being taken into account, and on limiting the scope of an agreement to Soviet weapons “in the European part of the Soviet Union”. The real Soviet negotiating position will be explored only when the bilateral talks resume in Geneva on 17th May.

8.14. United States press reports of 16th and 20th January 1983 said Mr. Nitze, the United States INF negotiator, had discussed an informal agreement with his Soviet counterpart, Mr. Kvitsinsky, in July 1982 whereby the United States would forego all planned INF missile deployments in Europe if the Soviet Union reduced its INF missiles in range of Europe from 500 to 50, and froze those in range of China and Japan at the present level of 100. The proposal was said to have been rejected by the Soviet Union and not subsequently endorsed by the United States authorities.

8.15. Opposition circles in the United States and some European countries have regarded the “zero-zero” option as unrealistic on

the grounds that the Soviet Union has had 600 intermediate-range missiles deployed since the early 1960s and cannot be expected to reduce these weapons to zero in exchange for the non-deployment by NATO of weapons that do not yet exist. Mr. Paul Warnke, the former Director of United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and negotiator of SALT II, has proposed that :

“ 1. all intermediate-range missiles be taken into account, regardless of nationality or whether launched from the land or sea; and

2. the United States would cancel the Pershing II and GLCM deployment if the Soviets reduced an equivalent number of warheads.”¹

This would involve the dismantling by the Soviet Union of all 280 remaining obsolete SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and about 100 of the SS-20 missiles. “The result would be equilibrium between the Soviet land-based force of SS-20 missiles and the western (British, French and American) sea-based missiles of intermediate range. The Soviets would have 215 SS-20 missiles (100 of which would remain targeted only on China or Japan) carrying 645 warheads, and the West would have 184 missiles carrying 544 warheads. (There are also eighteen land-based French IRBMs and approximately thirty Soviet SS-N-5 SLBMs.)” Mr. Denis Healey, in his address to the WEU Assembly Socialist Group in December 1982, specifically endorsed Mr. Warnke's proposals.

8.16. Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on a number of occasions have endorsed both aspects of the NATO dual track decision of December 1979, but have stressed that any attempt to measure “nuclear balance” between East and West can only be done globally, taking account of all categories of nuclear weapons on both sides, because of the great complexity of defining categories of nuclear weapon which should be deemed “of interest” to the European theatre. Reports have similarly stressed that for deterrent purposes reliance must be placed on the whole range of nuclear weapons available to the West, so as to avoid any risk of “decoupling” the United States strategic deterrent through mistaken reliance on a supposed separate nuclear balance within Europe. Any agreement on the reduction of weapons on the other hand would almost certainly have to be limited to narrow categories of weapons systems. Reports have stressed that although there can be no question of France or the Uni-

1. Source : Committee for National Security – statement released on 16th September 1982.

ted Kingdom accepting reductions in the present relatively small levels of their nuclear weapons, while levels of Soviet and United States weapons remain very large, nevertheless existing numbers of British and French weapons are inevitably taken into account by the Soviet Union in its own assessment of the balance.

(c) *Strategic nuclear weapons*

8.17. As part of the United States strategic force modernisation programme the air-launched cruise missile became operational for the first time on 16th December 1982 when a squadron of fourteen specially marked B-52s were fitted with twelve ALCM each, the first of 201 B-52s earmarked to carry ALCM of which 4,348 have been ordered¹. The special marking of the B-52s in accordance with SALT II is to permit external verification. Plans for deployment of the controversial MX ICBM are still in abeyance pending further decisions on the basing mode. A bi-partisan Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces appointed by President Reagan, under the chairmanship of retired Air Force General Brent Scowcroft, reported on 12th April that the Soviet ability to destroy United States land-based missiles (as claimed by the Reagan administration) was theoretical only, because of "problems of operation accuracies" and "planning uncertainties". The commission recognised that reasonable survivability of ICBMs "may not outlast this century", that the MX could not be invulnerable, but that 100 should be deployed in Minuteman silos, and that a new small mobile ICBM with only one warhead should be developed. On 17th December 1982 the forty-eight British Vulcan bombers were withdrawn from service.

8.18. The SALT II Treaty negotiated during the successive presidencies of Nixon, Ford and Carter, signed by the last on 18th June 1979, has not been ratified. The Reagan administration has found it "fatally flawed" but declared that it will not "undercut" it provided the Soviet Union does not do so either. SALT II was signed on the assumption that negotiations on a SALT III, to include restrictions on theatre or forward-based nuclear systems, would have started at once, and the attitude of the United States Administration to the protocol to SALT II is not clear. The protocol would have expired on the last day of 1981 and forbids: (i) the deployment or testing of mobile ICBMs; (ii) the deployment of GLCMs or SLCMs with a range greater than 600 km; or

the testing of such missiles with MIRVs; (iii) the testing or deployment of air-to-surface ballistic missiles.

8.19. United States proposals for reductions of strategic nuclear weapons in the START talks, proceeding parallel to the INF talks in Geneva, were announced by President Reagan on 9th May 1982 in general terms, concentrating on a reduction in ICBMs, the category in which the Soviet Union is superior to the United States. Officials at that time said the proposal was for a common ceiling of 850 ballistic missiles (SLBMs plus ICBMs) with a total of not more than 5,000 warheads, of which only 500 warheads could be on ICBMs. This was said to involve a reduction of 1,500 Soviet missiles and 1,300 warheads compared with a reduction of 850 United States missiles and 2,200 warheads, the reductions to be carried out over ten years.

8.20. Mr. Andropov, in his speech of 21st December 1982, proposed a 25% reduction in all strategic weapons of both sides, restrictions on improvements to nuclear weapons, and a freeze at present levels while negotiations were in progress. Comments in Pravda of 2nd January 1983 pointed out that this proposal amounted to a 25% reduction in the ceilings of SALT II to leave each side with a combined total of 1,800 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers by 1990. The Soviet Union has proposed a total ban on all new types of strategic weapon including ALCM, GLCM and SLCM.

IX. Conclusions

9.1. The present burden-sharing problem arises chiefly because of differences in the way that the European allies on the one hand and the present United States administration on the other approach relations with the Soviet Union, differences which lead to differing views as to the necessary size of the total allied defence effort.

9.2. Because of these difficulties the committee fully recognises that there is a greater need for defence consultation between European allies and for a more equal political relationship between the European members and the United States. The relative merits of WEU and the Eurogroup as a forum for discussion among European allies are examined in Chapter V above and the committee's conclusions are presented in paragraphs A.4 and B of the draft recommendation and in the draft resolution. There is a need for the European position to be expounded clearly in the United States, especially to Congress committees and staffs, through a public relations effort co-ordinated by the Washington embassies of the

1. Press reports have suggested the existing ALCM will shortly become vulnerable to Soviet AWACS and improved defences; it will be replaced by a new model with small radar image.

countries which provide the Eurogroup secretariat and chairman-in-office. Reciprocally there is a need for European public opinion and parliaments to show greater appreciation of all aspects of the United States contribution to allied defence; WEU, especially the Assembly, has an important rôle to play in this connection.

9.3. International comparisons between the defence efforts of different countries are difficult to make, both because of problems of methodology discussed in Chapter III above, and because of differences in military manpower policy, geography, economic and industrial capacity, logistic infrastructure, political priorities and perceptions of the threat. The committee concludes however that the European allies for the most part now carry a very reasonable share of the agreed burden, a share which has increased from 24 % to 38 % in the last twenty-five years, and has increased most significantly in the first eight years of the last decade during which the United States effort declined.

9.4. It is important to maintain the collective commitment to an annual increase in defence expenditure in real terms as long as the Soviet military build-up continues, and to meet the NATO biennial force goals as approved by nations on proposals from the supreme commanders. Certain specific improvements listed in paragraphs 1 (b), (c) and (d) of the draft recommendation are also required.

9.5. Unilateral decisions by any allied country to opt out of a specific defence rôle which forms a part of collective allied defence plans can be particularly damaging. Despite its theoretical attraction the committee has not identified specific rôle-sharing opportunities that would permit any greater specialisation by member countries in specific military rôles than exists at present.

9.6. In the case of developments beyond the NATO area which the allies jointly recognise as threatening the vital interests of the alliance (discussed in paragraph 2.7 above), the ready assistance of all allies must be forthcoming within the area to facilitate deployments by the United States, or by any NATO country, beyond the area. Certain allies, such as France and the United Kingdom, should be ready to participate in such deployments.

9.7. The British and French independent nuclear forces constituting an additional centre of strategic decision and national riposte to potential Soviet aggression afford an extra dimension to overall western deterrence and must not be bargained away in any accommodation between the Soviet Union and United States over the balance of intermediate-range nuclear forces between them.

9.8. The United States and its allies should seek to balance although not necessarily to match at every level the growing nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union. However, the deployment since the end of 1977 of some 350 SS-20 ballistic missiles by the Soviet Union has had a seriously adverse effect upon the theatre nuclear balance in Europe, and unless this deployment is substantially reduced or countered it could have a gravely intimidating impact upon the Soviet Union's neighbours around the Eurasian landmass. The first objective therefore of the "twin track" decision of 12th December 1979 remains a priority. If it cannot be met in verifiable manner there must be no departure from the agreed national commitments to deploy GLCMs or Pershing II ballistic missiles. It is to be hoped that the deployment process would induce the Soviet Union to reach an accommodation with the United States over INF on a mutually-acceptable basis of balance as a first step to reductions on both sides.

9.9. Every effort should be made at all levels both politically, diplomatically and militarily to maintain trust and mutual confidence between the European and American components of the alliance. This can only be achieved in the long term if the Europeans show an understanding of America's concern over its worldwide peacekeeping rôle in view of the emerging Soviet global threat and if the Europeans make a financial and military contribution to the alliance commensurate with their economic potential.

X. Opinion of the minority

10.1. The report as a whole was adopted by 14 votes to 1 with 2 abstentions. The minority of the committee which voted against was opposed to the terms of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation calling for the deployment of cruise missiles failing agreement in the INF negotiations.

	ure as % of sers' values		Defence expenditure per head (current prices — US \$) <i>a</i>					Defence expenditure as % of total WEU				
	1981	1982 <i>f</i>	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982 <i>f</i>	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982 <i>f</i>
	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
3	3.5	3.3	323	369	401	343	299	4.63	4.37	4.01	3.84	3.31
0	4.2	4.1	354	424	492	442	437	27.51	27.28	26.76	27.05	26.45
3	3.4	3.4	361	417	447	386	386	31.22	29.82	27.03	26.17	25.84
4	2.5	2.6	110	137	168	152	163	9.11	9.37	9.70	9.84	10.46
1	1.2	1.2	102	115	142	126	118	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
1	3.2	3.2	303	359	372	318	321	6.16	6.06	5.34	5.13	5.12
1	5.0	5.3	262	342	478	440	459	21.31	23.05	27.11	27.93	28.78
7	3.8	3.8	275	332	394	351	355	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
9	1.9	2.0	174	174	196	217	246	5.96	4.96	4.76	5.94	6.76
4	2.5	..	258	297	314	280	..	1.92	1.83	1.63	1.63	..
7	7.0	6.9	227	256	237	266	281	3.10	2.91	2.30	2.92	3.07
9	2.9	3.0	322	357	408	402	439	1.91	1.75	1.69	1.87	2.02
6	3.6	3.4	63	71	88	84	86	0.91	0.84	0.88	0.96	0.97
3	4.9	5.3	64	68	55	62	65	3.98	3.61	2.47	3.19	3.39
6	5.9	6.6	491	543	632	740	856	159.26	147.15	145.80	192.68	222.04
1	5.4	..	383	422	485	562	..	177.02	163.05	159.54	209.19	..
4	4.8	..	335	383	445	470	..	277.02	263.05	259.54	309.19	..

affected by
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Units per US \$

0.84866
0.83086
0.85645
1.13677
1.29059

2.16336
2.00608
1.98812
2.49520
2.60680

5.24224
5.06406
4.93922
5.73951
6.01421

43.94021
48.92344
50.06208
61.54642
71.05603

24.28216
31.07752
76.03811
111.21862
147.75632

0.52097
0.47135
0.42987
0.49312
0.55142

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A. FINANCIAL EFFORT

Country	National currency unit	Defence expenditure (national currency, current prices)					Defence expenditure (current prices — US \$ million) <i>a</i>					GDP in purchasers' values (current prices — US \$ million) <i>a b</i>					Population (thousand)					Defence exp GDP in pu	
		1978	1979	1980	1981	1982 <i>f</i>	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982 <i>f</i>	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982 <i>e</i>	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982 <i>e</i>	1978	1979
(0)	(1)	(-5)	(-4)	(-3)	(-2)	(-1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
Belgium.....	Million B. Frs.	99,726	106,472	115,754	125,689	127,901	3,175	3,632	3,958	3,385	2,958	97,251	111,127	119,327	97,369	90,259	9,841	9,849	9,859	9,873	9,887	3.3	3.3
France (c).....	Million F. Frs.	85,175	96,439	111,672	129,708	145,155	18,874	22,668	26,425	23,867	23,651	474,450	573,422	652,775	569,395	575,436	53,277	53,478	53,713	53,962	54,124	4.0	4.0
Germany.....	Million DM	43,019	45,415	48,518	52,193	54,553	21,417	24,778	26,692	23,094	23,097	639,810	759,722	814,818	683,159	677,858	59,409	59,454	59,667	59,763	59,850	3.3	3.3
Italy.....	Milliard Lire	5,301	6,468	8,203	9,868	12,066	6,246	7,785	9,578	8,681	9,349	261,887	323,998	395,900	350,226	359,877	56,714	56,914	57,069	57,197	57,403	2.4	2.4
Luxembourg.....	Million L. Frs.	1,154	1,242	1,534	1,715	1,876	37	42	52	46	43	3,562	4,245	4,575	3,750	3,567	362	364	365	365	365	1.0	1.0
Netherlands.....	Million Guilders	9,146	10,106	10,476	11,296	11,932	4,228	5,038	5,269	4,527	4,577	137,291	157,501	168,929	140,486	141,745	13,942	14,038	14,150	14,246	14,280	3.1	3.2
United Kingdom.....	Million £ Sterling	7,616	9,029	11,510	12,154	14,186	14,619	19,155	26,775	24,647	25,726	315,713	407,140	523,373	497,079	484,886	55,902	55,946	56,010	56,021	56,032	4.6	4.7
TOTAL WEU.....							68,596	83,098	98,749	88,247	89,401	1,929,964	2,337,155	2,679,697	2,341,464	2,333,628	249,447	250,043	250,833	251,427	251,941	3.6	3.6
Canada.....	Million C. \$	4,662	4,825	5,499	6,289	7,415	4,087	4,119	4,703	5,245	6,044	205,596	228,483	253,348	279,950	297,052	23,493	23,701	23,959	24,213	24,564	2.0	1.8
Denmark.....	Million D. Kr.	7,250	7,990	9,061	10,230	..	1,315	1,519	1,608	1,436	..	56,464	65,047	66,594	57,579	58,883	5,104	5,117	5,125	5,120	5,118	2.3	2.3
Greece.....	Million Drachmas	77,861	89,791	96,975	142,865	171,968	2,125	2,420	2,276	2,578	2,745	31,690	38,519	40,138	36,707	39,912	9,360	9,450	9,599	9,707	9,775	6.7	6.3
Norway.....	Million N. Kr.	6,854	7,362	8,242	9,468	10,844	1,307	1,454	1,669	1,650	1,803	40,647	47,130	57,400	57,143	59,179	4,060	4,073	4,087	4,100	4,107	3.2	3.1
Portugal.....	Million Escudos	27,354	34,343	43,440	51,917	61,859	623	702	868	844	871	17,758	20,326	24,076	23,485	25,533	9,820	9,863	9,905	10,005	10,106	3.5	3.5
Turkey.....	Million L.	66,239	93,268	185,656	313,067	447,790	2,728	3,001	2,442	2,815	3,031	52,499	69,371	56,886	57,560	57,355	42,926	43,821	44,737	45,672	46,718	5.2	4.3
United States.....	Million US \$	109,247	122,279	143,974	170,033	198,509	109,247	122,279	143,974	170,033	198,509	2,131,801	2,376,828	2,587,100	2,881,512	3,008,587	222,585	225,055	227,627	229,805	231,988	5.1	5.1
TOTAL NON-WEU.....							121,432	135,494	157,540	184,601	..	2,536,455	2,845,704	3,085,542	3,393,936	3,546,501	317,348	321,080	325,039	328,622	332,376	4.8	4.8
TOTAL NATO (d).....							190,028	218,592	256,289	272,848	..	4,466,419	5,182,859	5,765,239	5,735,400	5,880,129	566,795	571,123	575,872	580,049	584,317	4.3	4.2

Note a: GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States \$ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not in conversion.

For the period 1978-1982 the following rates of exchange have been applied:

Country	Unit	US \$ per unit	Units per US \$	Country	Unit	US \$ per unit
<i>Belgium and Luxembourg</i>	Franc			<i>Italy</i>	1,000 Lire	
— 1978		0.03184	31.41000	— 1978		1.17832
— 1979		0.03411	29.31860	— 1979		1.20357
— 1980		0.03420	29.24260	— 1980		1.16761
— 1981		0.02693	37.13101	— 1981		0.87969
— 1982		0.02312	43.24500	— 1982		0.77484
<i>Canada</i>	Canadian Dollar			<i>Netherlands</i>	Guilder	
— 1978		0.87664	1.14073	— 1978		0.46224
— 1979		0.85371	1.17136	— 1979		0.49849
— 1980		0.85523	1.16928	— 1980		0.50299
— 1981		0.83409	1.19891	— 1981		0.40077
— 1982		0.81518	1.22672	— 1982		0.38361
<i>Denmark</i>	D. Krone			<i>Norway</i>	N. Krone	
— 1978		0.18134	5.51462	— 1978		0.19076
— 1979		0.19008	5.26097	— 1979		0.19747
— 1980		0.17743	5.63593	— 1980		0.20246
— 1981		0.14038	7.12337	— 1981		0.17423
— 1982		0.12594	7.94010	— 1982		0.16627
<i>France</i>	Franc			<i>Portugal</i>	Escudo	
— 1978		0.22159	4.51276	— 1978		0.02276
— 1979		0.23505	4.25445	— 1979		0.02044
— 1980		0.23663	4.22604	— 1980		0.01998
— 1981		0.18401	5.43458	— 1981		0.01625
— 1982		0.16294	6.13738	— 1982		0.01407
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany</i>	Deutschmark			<i>Turkey</i>	T. Lira	
— 1978		0.49785	2.00863	— 1978		0.04118
— 1979		0.54559	1.83288	— 1979		0.03218
— 1980		0.55016	1.81767	— 1980		0.01315
— 1981		0.44248	2.26000	— 1981		0.00899
— 1982		0.42338	2.36195	— 1982		0.00677
<i>Greece</i>	Drachma			<i>United Kingdom</i>	£	
— 1978		0.02729	36.64843	— 1978		1.91951
— 1979		0.02696	37.09694	— 1979		2.12155
— 1980		0.02347	42.61666	— 1980		2.32628
— 1981		0.01805	55.40842	— 1981		2.02791
— 1982		0.01596	62.63780	— 1982		1.81350

Note b: GDP (p.v.) = Gross domestic product in purchasers' values, current prices.

Prior to 1978, tables of defence statistics published in reports of the committee used gross national product (GNP) as a measure of national wealth. In line with the practice of other organisations, the tables are now given in terms of GDP which is somewhat higher than GNP. Consequently, the figures for defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP are higher than the percentages of GNP previously published.

Note c: France is a member of the alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure; the relevant figures are indicative only.

Note d: The corresponding statistical data for Spain are not available.

e = Preliminary estimate.

f = Forecast.

Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(82)24.

B. MANPOWER EFFORT - 1982

	Period of compulsory ¹ military service (months)			Total in armed forces ² military personnel (thousands) (e)	Total armed forces ² (military and civilian) as percentage of active population (e)
	Army	Navy	Air force		
Belgium	10 ³	10 ³	10 ³	109	2.8
France	12 ⁴	12 ⁴	12 ⁴	578	3.1
Germany	15 ⁵	15 ⁵	15 ⁵	495	2.5
Italy	12	18	12	517	2.4
Luxembourg		voluntary		1	0.8
Netherlands	14-16	14-17	14-17	106	2.6
United Kingdom		voluntary		335	2.2
TOTAL WEU				2,141	2.6
Canada		voluntary		81	1.0
Denmark	9	9	9	31	1.6
Greece	22	26	24	186	5.9
Norway	12	15	15	40	2.5
Portugal	16	24	21-24	91	2.3
Turkey	20	20	20	769	4.4
United States		voluntary		2,189	2.9
TOTAL NON-WEU				3,387	3.0
TOTAL NATO				5,528	2.8


Sources:

1. IISS, Military Balance, 1982-83.
 2. NATO press release M-DPC-2 (82) 24, 1st December 1982.
 3. Eight months if served in Germany.
 4. Eighteen months for overseas.
 5. To be eighteen months.
- e = estimate.

APPENDIX II

Defence expenditure as percentage of GDP plotted against income per capita - 1981

Defence expenditure as percentage of GDP



APPENDIX III

Selected indicators comparing defence contribution with ability to contribute

Country	Ratio defence spending share/ GDP share			Ratio defence spending share/ prosperity index share			Ratio active defence Manpower share/ population share		
	1981	1982	1983	1981	1982	1983	1981	1982	1983
Belgium	0.88	0.86	0.85	0.77	0.77	0.94	1.29	1.11	1.11
France	1.08	1.05	1.03	0.99	0.93	1.05	1.24	1.25	1.23
Germany	0.89	0.84	0.83	0.71	0.68	0.81	1.02	1.02	1.02
Italy	0.67	0.63	0.61	1.16	0.98	1.07	0.89	0.91	0.92
Luxembourg	0.33	0.29	0.30	0.29	0.25	0.32	0.36	0.40	0.33
Netherlands	0.92	0.81	0.79	1.11	0.74	0.87	0.85	0.90	0.88
United Kingdom	1.38	1.33	1.31	1.90	1.52	1.59	0.96	0.98	0.97
Canada	0.53	0.50	0.50	0.55	0.51	0.46	0.46	0.47	0.47
Denmark	0.56	0.63	0.61	0.43	0.53	0.59	0.85	0.80	0.80
Greece	1.50	1.45	1.73	3.60	3.63	4.93	2.07	2.09	2.05
Norway	0.86	0.75	0.71	0.71	0.58	0.55	1.17	1.15	1.13
Portugal	1.00	0.92	0.88	4.29	4.13	4.06	0.87	0.94	0.93
Turkey	1.18	1.21	1.29	7.65	10.20	11.02	1.61	1.62	1.63
United States	1.37	1.39	1.38	1.27	1.31	1.19	1.28	1.26	1.27
Japan	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.29	0.32	0.28	0.21	0.21	0.21
NATO less United States	0.95	0.92	0.90	0.97	0.91	1.02	1.09	1.09	1.09
NATO plus Japan less United States	0.77	0.76	0.72	0.81	0.79	0.82	0.86	0.87	0.87
Total NATO	1.15	1.13	1.15	1.12	1.09	1.12	1.16	1.16	1.16
Total NATO plus Japan	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Note : Years are date of Secretary of Defence report.

"Share" means "share of total for NATO plus Japan".

Source : Successive reports to United States Congress by the Secretary of Defence on allied contributions to the common defence.

APPENDIX IV

Defence expenditure at constant 1980 prices¹

\$ million

Country	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982 (e)
Belgium	3,799	3,881	3,963	3,999	3,727
France	24,880	24,974	26,427	27,467	27,387
Germany	25,724	26,100	26,671	30,419	27,530
Italy	8,904	9,106	9,588	9,552	9,816
Luxembourg	43	45	53	55	57
Netherlands	5,145	5,363	5,264	5,442	5,555
United Kingdom	25,491	26,015	22,773	27,226	28,016
TOTAL WEU	93,986	95,484	94,739	104,160	105,815
Canada	4,581	4,551	4,696	4,867	5,011
Denmark	1,592	1,597	1,609	1,613	1,662
Greece	2,555	2,485	2,275	2,796	2,766
Norway	1,608	1,641	1,667	1,714	1,754
Portugal	766	789	872	880	859
Turkey	2,361	2,410	2,461	2,466	2,523
United States	132,438	137,509	143,860	151,212	163,784
TOTAL NON-WEU	145,901	150,982	157,440	165,548	178,359
TOTAL NATO	239,887	246,466	252,179	269,708	284,174

1. Calculated from NATO figures for per capita expenditure.

APPENDIX V

*United States ACDA official world military expenditures and arms transfers**(Military expenditure, constant prices)*

\$ billion

March 1981 edition – 1977 prices			March 1982 edition – 1978 prices				
	NATO	Warsaw Pact	United States	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Soviet Union	
1970	174.7	129.4	128.8	192.4	150.0	127.8	1970
1971	166.9	133.0	117.9	184.2	153.4	130.2	1971
1972	169.3	138.0	117.4	187.1	158.9	134.4	1972
1973	165.2	144.3	112.1	183.3	165.8	140.5	1973
1974	167.8	150.1	112.3	185.8	173.1	147.2	1974
1975	164.9	154.6	108.5	183.3	178.1	151.4	1975
1976	161.5	161.2	103.3	179.8	185.4	158.2	1976
1977	167.5	161.7	108.0	186.3	187.2	159.9	1977
1978	169.1	165.1	108.4	188.8	189.0	161.6	1978
1979	–	–	112.3	195.2	193.6	166.7	1979

APPENDIX VI

*Roth-Glenn-Nunn Amendment*¹

The full text of the Roth-Glenn-Nunn Amendment on NATO Defence Industrial Co-operation follows :

Sec. 1122. (a) The Congress finds that—

- (1) the United States remains firmly committed to co-operating closely with its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereinafter in this section referred to as NATO) allies in protecting liberty and maintaining world peace;
- (2) the financial burden of providing for the defence of Western Europe and for the protection of the interests of NATO member countries in areas outside the NATO treaty area has reached such proportions that new co-operative approaches among the United States and its NATO allies are required to achieve and maintain an adequate collective defence at acceptable costs;
- (3) the need for a credible conventional deterrent in Western Europe has long been recognised in theory but has never been fully addressed in practice;
- (4) a more equitable sharing by NATO member countries of both the burdens and the technological and economic benefits of the common defence would do much to reinvigorate the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation alliance with a restored sense of unity and common purpose;
- (5) a decision to co-ordinate more effectively the enormous technological, industrial, and economic resources of NATO member countries

will not only increase the efficiency and effectiveness of NATO military expenditures but also provide inducement for the Soviet Union to enter a meaningful arms reduction agreement so that both Warsaw Pact countries and NATO member countries can devote more of their energies and resources to peaceful and economically more beneficial pursuits.

(b) It is the sense of the Congress that the President should propose to the heads of government of the NATO member countries that the NATO allies of the United States join the United States in agreeing—

- (1) to co-ordinate more effectively their defence efforts and resources to create, at acceptable costs, a credible, collective, conventional force for the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty area;
- (2) to establish a co-operative defence-industrial effort within Western Europe and between Western Europe and North America that would increase the efficiency and effectiveness of NATO expenditures by providing a larger production base while eliminating unnecessary duplication of defence-industrial efforts;
- (3) to share more equitably and efficiently the financial burdens, as well as the economic benefits (including jobs, technology, and trade) of NATO defence; and
- (4) to intensify consultations promptly for the early achievement of the objectives described in clauses (1) through (3).

1. Approved by the United States Senate by 87 votes to 1 on 13th May 1982.

APPENDIX VII

*Major United States equipment procured by European countries and vice-versa**A. European equipment being procured by the United States*

- MAN truck for weapon systems in Europe (Germany)
- MAG-58 armour machine gun ¹ (Belgium)
- 120 mm tank gun ¹ (Germany)
- 5.56 mm squad automatic weapon ¹ (Belgium)
- Muzzle bore sight (training) (United Kingdom)

B. European equipment being evaluated by the United States

- Anti-tank weapons :
 - LAW-80
 - M72-750
 - M72A3
 - Jupiter
 - Panzerfaust III
 - Armbrust
 - Apilas
 - Strim
- Plessey groundsat rebroadcast radio
- 90 mm Cockerill Mk III gun
- Large-calibre bore brushes
- Underground field shelter, MK-2
- MH-842 (Markhandler rough terrain forklift truck)
- 7.62 mm machine gun mount
- Chemical agent monitoring system
- Conventional generic mine devices (training mines)
- HC smoke pots
- Cartridge, 5.56 mm, ball, practice, Xm 858
- 4.2 inch mortar sub-calibre training system
- Cartridge, 50 calibre, ball and tracer, plastic training ammunition
- DM 82 (hand grenade fuse)
- FH-380 (personal dosimetry system)
- Lightweight decontamination system (SANATOR)
- Inflatable decoy system for United States Hawk air defence system
- 150 kW low noise generator
- Aerial radiac system
- 105 mm kinetic energy practice ammunition
- Kinetic energy recovery rope
- Penguin missile
- PAP-104 mine neutralisation system
- Minesweeper hunter (MSH-1) procurement
- Searchwater radar
- Versatile exercise mine (VEM)

C. United States equipment being procured by European countries

- M113 APC
- AN/TSQ-73 missile Minder (a part of the fire direction centre of the improved Hawk battery)
- I-Hawk (air defence system)
- 66 mm M72 Law (a squad-level anti-tank weapon)
- Projectile 155 mm M483A1 (anti-personnel round delivered by the 155 mm Howitzer)

1. Produced in the United States.

- 2.75 inch rocket (air-delivered anti-personnel round)
- MOD Flir
- Tow W/helicopter roof-mounted sight
- M109A3 SP Howitzer
- Stinger missile (man-portable infrared-homing air defence missile system)
- Harpoon anti-surface ship missile
- Submarine-launched Harpoon
- MK-46 light-light anti-submarine torpedo
- Sparrow advanced monopulse missile (AMM) AIM/RIM-7M
- AIM-9L infrared air-to-air missile (The AIM-9L will be employed on the F-14, AV-8, F-16, F-15, F/A-18 and the MRCA Tornado. This Sidewinder missile differs from its predecessors principally in having an all-aspect attack capability.)
- High-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM)
- F/A-18 naval strike fighter aircraft
- P-3 patrol aircraft Orion
- Super rapid-blooming offboard chaff (SRBOC)
- E2-C early warning aircraft
- F-16 multinational fighter programme ¹
- Airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) programme
- Navstar global positioning system (GPS)¹
- Joint tactical information distribution system (JTIDS) (system adopted for the NATO AEW&C programme)
- Advanced medium-range air-to-air missile ¹
- KC-135 (tanker fleet) re-engining (CFM-56)¹
- Electronic countermeasure simulator
- Peace Green communications equipment
- ALQ-131 electronic countermeasure pods
- ALQ-101 electronic countermeasure pods

1. European coproduction.

Source: Standardisation of equipment within NATO (report to the United States Congress by Mr. Weinberger, January 1983).

APPENDIX VIII

*Levels of nuclear weapons**A. Total warheads all systems*

Numbers of nuclear warheads mid-1982 (Figures rounded to nearest hundred)		
	United States	Soviet Union
ICBM	2,100	5,200
SLBM	4,800	1,800
Strategic bomber	2,300	300
Total strategic ¹	9,200	7,300
All other ²	14,700	8,700
Grand total ³	24,000	16,000

- Sources : 1. As in following table.
 2. Deduced by difference.
 3. Hearings United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 13th November 1981.

*B. Levels of United States and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons
(covered by SALT)**United States strategic systems (covered by SALT)*

Type	Medium-range (km)	Number	Number of independent warheads each	Assumed total number of warheads
ICBMs				
Titan II	15,000	52	1	52
Minuteman II	11,300	450	1	450
Minuteman III	13,000	{ 250 (160 kt) 300 (353 kt- Mk 12A)	} 3	1,650 ¹
Sub-total		1,052		2,152
SLBMs				
Poseidon C-3	4,600	304	10-14	3,040
Trident C-4	7,400	216		
Sub-total		520		4,768
BM total		1,572		6,920
Aircraft B-52	16,000	312 ²	up to 10 or 12 ALCM	2,280
TOTAL		1,884		9,200

1. On the assumption that the maximum number of warheads are fitted.

2. 570 reported in SALT II data base includes 220 in "deep storage". United States figures for March 1983 show a further 75 B-52D withdrawn from service.

Soviet strategic systems (covered by SALT)

Type	Maximum-range (km)	Number	Number of independent warheads each	Assumed total number of warheads
ICBMs				
SS-11	10,500	570	1	570
SS-13	10,000	60	1	60
SS-17	10,000	150	1 or 4	600 ¹
SS-18	9-10,500	308	1 or 8	2,464 ¹
SS-19	11,000	310	6 or 1	1,500
Sub-total		1,398		5,200
SLBMs				
SSN-5	1,120	57	1	57
SSN-6	2,400-3,000	400	1	400
SSN-8	8,000	292	1	300
SSN-17	5,000	12	1	12
SSN-18	8,000	208	3	1,040
Sub-total		969		1,800
BM total		2,367		7,000
Aircraft	Combat radius (km)			
Bear Tu-95	5-6,000	105	2-4	210
Bison Mya-4	4-6,000	45	1-2	90
Sub-total		150		300
TOTAL		2,498		7,300

1. On the assumption that the maximum number of warheads are fitted.

Note: Forces loadings for aircraft deduced from total warheads (rounded to nearest hundred).
United States forces estimated at mid-1982.

Source:

- IISS, Military Balance 1982-83.
- United States Department of Defence Annual Reports fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 1983.
- Soviet military power, United States Department of Defence, September 1981.
- Whence the threat to peace, Soviet Ministry of Defence, January 1982.

C. Levels of intermediate-range nuclear weapons of interest to Europe

Maximum range or combat radius (km)	Assumed warheads per system	Weapons	Western estimates ¹		Soviet claims ³
			Total inventory	In range of Europe ²	
5,000	3	USSR: SS-20	351	234	"land-based" 496
2,000	1	SS-4	210	170	
4,000	1	SS-5	15	70	
1,000	1	SS-12	70	70	
1,000	1	SS-22	100	100	
1,120	1	SS-N-5	57	57	"sea-based" 18
4,000	3 or 4	Backfire	100	40	
2,800	2	Badger	310	124	"air-based" 461
3,100	2	Blinder	125	50	
1,600	2	Fencer	550	110	
720	1	Flogger D	550	220	
600	1	Fitter C/D (a)	688	138	
		TOTAL	3,126	1,313	975
1,900	2	NATO inc. France: F-111	156	78	723
2,000+	4 or 6	FB-111A	60	60	
750	1	F-4	424	127	
800	1	F-104	290	87	
		F-16	68	20	
1,000	2	A-6/A-7	68	34	
950	2	Buccaneer	50	25	
720	1	Jaguar	117	58	46
1,600	1	Mirage IV-A	34	34	
560	2	Super-Etendard	16	8	64
720	1	Pershing I	180	180	
4,600	1	Polaris	64	64	64
3,000	1	M-20	80	80	80
3,000	10 or 14	Poseidon (b)	40	40	
		TOTAL	1,647	895	913 ⁴

1. IISS Military Balance 1982-83 and NATO NPG communiqué of 23rd March 1983.

2. Military Balance estimate of numbers available in nuclear rôle in Europe.

3. Lev Semeiko in Moscow News, 17th January 1982.

4. Omitting 55 Vulcan bombers phased out in February 1983.

(a) The Military Balance 1982-83 also lists 265 Fitter A and 100 Fishbed J-N aircraft under long- and medium-range systems for the European theatre but their combat radius of 400 km has excluded them from this table.

(b) 400 Poseidon warheads are assigned to SACEUR but are also included in strategic table B.

D. Historical levels of SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 missiles

Year	Total of SS-4 and SS-5	SS-20	Total missiles	Total warheads ¹	Total yield MT ²	Total equivalent megatons ³	Total warheads in range of Europe ⁴	Notes
1962	200	—	200	200	200	200	200	Period of SS-4 and SS-5 build-up
1963-1971	700	—	700	700	700	700	525	
1972-1976	600	—	600	600	600	600	450	
1977	600	(20)	620	660	609	617	440	
1978	590	100	690	890	635	675	642	Start of SS-20 deployment
1979	590	120	710	950	644	692	682	
1980	440	160	600	920	512	576	650	
1981	380	230	610	1,070	483	575	745	
1982 ⁵	230	324	554	1,200	376	504	820	

Source: Successive editions of IISS Military Balance.

1. Assuming 3 warheads on all SS-20 missiles, but ignoring any reloads.
2. Assuming 1 MT on SS-4, SS-5 warheads; 0.15 MT on SS-20 warheads.
3. Total of $Y \frac{2}{3}$ where Y is yield of each warhead in MT.
4. Assuming $\frac{3}{4}$ SS-4, 5 and $\frac{2}{3}$ SS-20 in range of Europe.
5. Figures from NATO NPG communiqué of 30th November 1982.

APPENDIX IX

RESOLUTION 15 ¹*on the participation of observers in certain meetings
of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments* ²

The Assembly,

Considering the interests of member states of NATO which are not members of WEU,

DECIDES

1. That the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments may invite observers to attend its meetings from member states of NATO which are not members of WEU;
2. That such observers shall have the right to speak.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1959 during the first part of the fifth ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Patijn on behalf of the Presidential Committee (Document 130 and Addendum).

Burden-sharing in the alliance

AMENDMENT 1¹
tabled by Mr. Ahrens and Mr. Reddemann

1. Leave out paragraph 3 (a) of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed: Ahrens, Reddemann

1. See 3rd sitting, 7th June 1983 (report referred back to committee).

Burden-sharing in the alliance

AMENDMENTS 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9¹
tabled by Mr. Dejardin

2. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “ and world rôle ” and insert “ due in particular to a worldwide concept of its rôle ”.
3. In paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “ and in the case ” to the end of the paragraph.
4. Leave out paragraph A.1(a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
“ (a) by maintaining and improving if necessary the quality of their conventional defence potential while advocating a possible reappraisal of the tasks and force goals set by SACEUR in order to meet the social, economic and budgetary constraints of member states ; ”.
5. In paragraph A.1(c) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ Atlantic-wide ” and insert “ European ”.
6. In paragraph A.1(d) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ both to improve ” to the end of the paragraph.
7. Leave out paragraph A.2(b) of the draft recommendation proper.
8. Leave out paragraph A.3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
“ To take account of the anxiety of public opinion regarding the arms race and to exert all necessary pressure on the superpowers in order to avert the deployment of intermediate-range missiles on European territory ; ”.
9. In paragraph A.4(b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ the United States ” and insert “ each and everyone ”.

Signed: Dejardin

1. See 3rd sitting, 7th June 1983 (report referred back to committee).

Burden-sharing in the alliance

AMENDMENTS 10 and 11¹
tabled by Mr. Wilkinson

10. In the first line of section A of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “concerned within the North Atlantic Council”.

11. In paragraph A.1(a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “annual force goals set by SACEUR” and insert “NATO biennial force goals approved by the nations”.

Signed: Wilkinson

1. See 3rd sitting, 7th June 1983 (report referred back to committee).

Application of the Brussels Treaty
Reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur

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APPENDIX

Recommendation 380 and the reply of the Council

1. Adopted in committee by 15 votes to 1 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Cavaliere (Alternate: *Valiante*) (Chairman); MM. *Blaauw, van den Bergh* (Vice-Chairman); Mr. Bahr, Sir Frederic Bennett (Alternate: *Wilkinson*), MM. *Bernini, Bonnel* (Alternate: *De Decker*), Cox, Dejardin, Della Briotta, Duraffour (Alternate:

Baumel), Edwards, Fosson, *Galley*, Sir Anthony Grant (Alternate: *Lord Reay*), MM. Kittelmann, Lemmrich (Alternate: *Müller*), Mayoud (Alternate: *Caro*), Ménard (Alternate: *Jung*), Pecchioli, *Pignion, Prussen*, Scholten, *Sir Dudley Smith*, MM. *Steverlynck, Vohrer*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

*on the application of the Brussels Treaty
- reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the wide agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the application of the Brussels Treaty, revealed in Recommendation 380 and the Council's reply thereto, and on the proposition that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s ;
- (ii) Noting that the Council has received with great interest and is considering the Assembly's recommendation to cancel the few remaining restrictions on the production of conventional weapons in one member country, and is considering the technical, military and political aspects of the Assembly's recommendation to vary by reducing the list of weapons subject to quantitative controls ;
- (iii) Aware that the controls on atomic and biological weapons provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty have never been applied, but considering in the present circumstances that it is no longer appropriate to apply them ;
- (iv) Believing that the fullest use should be made of the qualified staffs of the Standing Armaments Committee and of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, both for the study of problems within their respective competence for the benefit of the alliance as a whole, and to assist the Assembly in the preparation of its reports, and warmly welcoming the first tentative experiment in the latter connection, in implementation of the Council's reply to Recommendation 331 ;
- (v) Deploring the severe reductions which the present United States administration has imposed on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with which the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments has co-operated from time to time ;
- (vi) Welcoming the inclusion in the Council's annual report, in response to Recommendations 331 and 348, of specific information on the levels of British ground and air forces assigned to SACEUR, and recognising that no provision of the Brussels Treaty requires this information to be included ;
- (vii) Regretting however the Council's refusal in recent years to include in annual reports various other items the Assembly has requested,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. In application of Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III;
2. Submit to the Assembly in the near future the results of its consideration of the technical, military and political aspects of varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III, in application of Article V of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, while taking into consideration the possibility of deleting the list concerned except for atomic, biological or chemical weapons ;
3. Instruct the Agency for the Control of Armaments to extend its studies of control, verification and exports of armaments, in co-operation with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with a view to assuming for the benefit of the alliance as a whole certain tasks which the latter agency is no longer in a position to undertake ;
4. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to extend its study of the European armaments industry to include a survey of the status of the two-way street and an analysis of the factors which would help to increase the proportion of European equipment in the armed forces of all allied countries ;
5. Request the international staff of the Standing Armaments Committee to assist within its competence in the preparation of reports of Assembly committees when these so request, and to extend such assistance to the collection of the necessary information ;
6. To include in future annual reports :
 - (a) a statement of the levels of forces which the WEU countries make available to NATO, and of the French forces in Germany ;
 - (b) information as full as in reports for 1981 and earlier, on the production and procurement of armaments in member countries ;
 - (c) as far as possible the latest approved lists of chemical and biological weapons subject to control.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur)

Introduction

0.1. At its meeting on 2nd December 1982, the Presidential Committee followed usage by referring to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments the following chapters of the annual report of the Council: Chapter I: Relations between the Council and the Assembly (to the extent of the committee's competence, which covers defence questions); Chapter II: Activities of the Council – B. Defence questions; Chapter III: Agency for the Control of Armaments; Chapter IV: Standing Armaments Committee.

0.2. The committee notes that Recommendation 380¹, adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1982 on the committee's previous report², was largely accepted by the Council and several ministers of member countries have commented favourably on the report in question. As the basic situation has not evolved, the principal ideas in the present report follow those of last year's report:

- The fundamental provisions relating to security in the modified Brussels Treaty (Articles IV, V and VIII (3)) are still as valid today as when they were signed. Public demonstration of their credibility is to be found in the dialogue between the Assembly and the Council.
- The WEU Assembly provides the best forum for public debate between European members of parliament on defence, security and armaments control matters, a debate which is essential in order to keep public opinion informed, and to support the defence effort for our countries' security.
- For the rest, and particularly as regards the control of levels of forces and armaments provided for in Protocols Nos. II, III and IV to the treaty, WEU must as far as possible be adapted to the political circumstances of the eighties.
- Allied defence plans proper continue to be the preserve of the NATO bodies in accordance with Article IV of the Brussels Treaty.

0.3. As the committee recognises in another report¹, European intergovernmental consultations on defence questions are necessary. These consultations are at present held in the flexible framework of the Eurogroup, and more general "security" questions in the framework of European political co-operation. The committee notes that since the Brussels Treaty was modified in 1954, no member government has asked that the WEU Council be convened, as provided for in Article VIII (3) of the treaty, to allow the seven governments "to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace...". This problem is discussed in the committee's other report¹.

I. Relations between the Council and the Assembly

1.1. Relations between the Assembly and the Council in 1982 were very good, as shown by the detailed replies given to the various recommendations adopted by the Assembly on the basis of the committee's reports. With regard in particular to Recommendation 380 of the Assembly on the application of the Brussels Treaty, adopted by the Assembly in June 1982, the approving words of the various ministers who in turn addressed the Assembly should be quoted.

1.2. Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations of Belgium and then Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressing the Assembly on 14th June 1982 once again underlined the importance of the treaty and indicated that the Council was prepared, where the control of armaments was concerned, to take account of the evolution of the situation in Europe:

"By way of conclusion to this part of my statement, may I reaffirm WEU member countries' adherence to the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols and their determination to fulfil the obligations they have entered into. They stress once again the importance they attach to the commitment to collective self-defence contained in Article V of the treaty, which is one of the cornerstones of the European security system.

.....

1. Text of Recommendation 380 and the Council's reply at Appendix I.

2. Document 908, adopted on 20th April 1982.

1. Burden-sharing in the alliance, Document 947, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson.

In the matter of armaments control, the Council has repeatedly indicated its wish to take account of the changing situation in Europe... ”

1.3. It was then the turn of Mr. Leister, Minister of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, to describe on 16th June the broad lines of his country's defence policy, stressing the importance of NATO and expressing his government's agreement with the Assembly's proposals for adapting WEU to the needs of the day and deleting those treaty provisions which seem obsolete :

“ There is no doubt that when speaking of collective security policy for Europe we have to think above all of NATO and the NATO security system which includes our North American partners. However, against the background of the present global – and not exclusively military – threat to our free way of life, it appears increasingly necessary to direct our deliberations to the possibilities arising from European co-operation in the various existing forums.

In this connection the WEU Assembly is of particular importance as a forum for the discussion of European security policy. Not only is WEU the sole European parliamentary forum dealing with matters of security and defence policy, but by pledging military assistance in the form of a treaty it also contributes decisively to deterrence and, consequently, to the safeguarding of peace.

The Federal Government is following with interest and attention the Assembly's endeavours to adapt the WEU treaty to present requirements. We were therefore pleased to note that the Assembly passed, by a large majority, a proposal to cancel some provisions of the treaty which seem outdated. Let me stress, however, that the Federal Government's commitment to its WEU treaty obligations will remain as unreserved as in the past. ”

1.4. Addressing the Assembly on 15th June 1982, Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of France, laid particular emphasis on the need for a public debate on peace, the balance of forces, security and disarmament and the importance of the WEU Assembly in this context :

“ ...Let me ask you this : how many years is it since our national parliaments last had any real debates on peace, the balance of forces, security and disarmament ?

You are an elected Assembly, the only one in our European countries at present to have the competence, the qualifications and the interest to discuss these matters. You must help the governments, you must help those responsible by enabling this debate to take place. Furthermore, you are the elected representatives of our European countries, and in this debate the European countries have an interest, an approach and ideas of a specific and particular nature.

Do not misunderstand me. There is no question of dividing the defence of Europe from that of the other countries of the alliance. With the present imbalance of forces on the continent of Europe itself that would be a fatal risk...

So there must be absolutely no doubt that defence on the continent of Europe and global defence go hand in hand. Nothing could be more dangerous than to doubt this, until there is something like a balance of forces on the continent itself, a balance of forces and weapons capable of reaching the continent and sited there. But while nothing must be done which might separate the defence of Europe from that of the alliance as a whole, it is nevertheless extremely useful for us to be able to express our own ideas. They do exist, and in some variety, too.

... So it is a good thing, when public attention is at last involved and a genuine debate on these defence problems begins, that the opinions and constraints peculiar to the people of these countries should be expressed.

Mr. President, this is the French Government's appeal to this Assembly. It must become the main forum in which our peoples can discuss, through their elected representatives and with the necessary feedback, all the problems connected with our security... ”

1.5. Reporting to the National Assembly on 6th July 1982 on his address to the WEU Assembly, Mr. Cheysson again underlined the latter's importance :

“ The other day, on behalf of the French Government, I addressed the Assembly of Western European Union, not because the executive of WEU seems to have a very great future but because the Assembly is an elected one, elected in the second degree. This elected Assembly is competent to handle these matters, which must be discussed among members of parliament... ”

Perhaps to a greater extent than his predecessors, Mr. Cheysson in fact stresses the importance of the NATO integrated command for the security of non-nuclear European countries which cannot be protected by the French nuclear force. This is what he affirmed in his article in the Wall Street Journal of 25th February 1983 :

“ Adequate to guarantee our vital interests, our nuclear arms are not now intended – nor will they be in the future – to insure the protection of the entire European zone of the Atlantic Alliance. Nor may they be used to this end, since we retain exclusive control over them. The guarantee of European territories that do not have nuclear weapons therefore can come only from the integrated command of NATO, that is to say, in fact, the United States. For this reason, maintaining the American nuclear deterrent and continually modernising it insofar as this is necessary are in our view essential. ”

1.6. Most recently, on 1st December 1982, Lord Belstead, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, particularly showed his government's agreement with the Assembly's views as expressed in the last two recommendations on the application of the Brussels Treaty : 365, adopted on the report by the Defence Committee (Rapporteur : Mr. Tanghe) in June 1981, and 380, already mentioned, adopted in 1982 :

“ Also this [WEU] is the only European parliamentary forum empowered by statute to address defence matters. This is of great importance and will continue to be so. But it is also important to be realistic about the aims we pursue here. Recommendation 365 was right to acknowledge that ‘ for greater effectiveness the material organisation of collective defence is undertaken in the wider framework of the North Atlantic Council and the Independent European Programme Group ’. We cannot consider collective defence adequately without giving full weight to the contribution of the United States.

If I have understood correctly the views expressed in the Assembly in recent years, the Assembly now believes that, twenty-eight years after the Brussels Treaty was modified, the time has come for some adaptation. The message which emerges from Recommendations 365 and 380 is that the political situation has evolved since 1954 and the Assembly therefore questions, for example, the need to defray so many of WEU's limited resources on checking on member

governments' armaments... Checks on armaments data lie at the heart of arms control negotiations with the Warsaw Pact, but the records of the member states of WEU are not closed books and I am sure that it is right that the Council should be giving careful thought to Recommendation 380.

In the preamble to Recommendation 380, the Assembly urged that WEU should be adapted to the needs of the 1980s. With this the Government of the United Kingdom agree. However, I do not mean to imply support for complete revision. For one thing, the United Kingdom Government, along with our European partners, regard the mutual defence commitment in Article V of the Brussels Treaty as of fundamental importance. It is a commitment that uniquely expresses our support to each other as Europeans. ”

1.7. The committee finds it particularly encouraging that its recommendations, ratified by the Assembly, should be listened to so carefully by the governments.

1.8. In its reply to Recommendation 380, the Council lastly undertook to endeavour to communicate its annual report to the Assembly by the end of February. As the last chapter reached the Office of the Clerk in mid-March this year, committee members had time to examine it before discussing the draft of the present report.

II.B. *Activities of the Council – defence questions*

1. *Level of forces of member states*

2.1. Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty, completed by the Council's resolution of 15th September 1956 and the agreement of 14th December 1957, imposes limits on member countries' armed forces and provides that changes in the level of these forces must receive the approval of member countries expressed either in the WEU Council or by the representatives of the seven member countries on the North Atlantic Council. With regard to the land and air forces which the six mainland countries place under the command of SACEUR in peacetime, these are subject to upper limits laid down in a special (unpublished) agreement appended to the stillborn European Defence Community treaty. When NATO defence plans make provision for increases in the levels of forces assigned by these countries, any increase must receive the

unanimous approval of the seven member countries, which may be expressed in NATO.

2.2. The annual report for 1982 informs us that :

“The Council, at their meeting of 24th February, noted that the level of forces of the member states of WEU, as set out in the NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II, as in force at that time. They also took note of a declaration on French forces made by the representative of France.

On 15th October, the Council examined the report of a further meeting of the same six permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council, and approved the acceptance by one member state of the increase in its force level recommended by SACEUR.”

This is believed to refer to an increase in the number of helicopters which Germany assigns to NATO. This cumbersome procedure for approving the levels of various categories of member countries' forces provided for in Protocol No. II and related documents, like the control of armaments provided for in the treaty, has clearly been overtaken by events. However, the treaty provisions do not allow the procedure to be modified unless the treaty itself is modified.

2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe

2.3. Under Article VI of Protocol No. II, the United Kingdom initially undertook “to maintain on the mainland of Europe... the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, that is to say four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force, or such other forces as the Supreme Allied

Commander, Europe, regards as having equivalent fighting capacity... not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the high contracting parties...”. Following successive decisions of the Council, the level of this commitment is now down to 55,000 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force.

2.4. The committee notes with satisfaction that the information concerning this commitment given in the Council's annual report for 1982 again fully meets its wishes as expressed inter alia in the Assembly's Recommendations 331 and 348. The report states in fact that the average number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1982 in accordance with Article VI of Protocol No. II was 59,567. However, it continues :

“...The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty there. In 1982 there were on average 909 men in Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated these units would be speedily returned to their duty station in an emergency affecting NATO.”

It may be deduced that the average number of British troops stationed in Germany was 58,658 men, whereas the commitment is for 55,000. In the previous year, 58,885 were declared for Germany and 1,899 for Northern Ireland, making an average of 56,986 actually on the spot.

2.5. Like last year, the annual report gives the following details on the strength of the United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force :

“Furthermore, in accordance with the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 348 the Government of the United Kingdom have informed the Council that the strength of the United Kingdom's contribution to the Second Allied Tactical Air Force in 1982 was :

<i>Rôle</i>	<i>Aircraft/Equipment</i>	<i>Squadrons</i>
Strike/Attack	Buccaneers	2
	Jaguars	4
Offensive support	Harrier	2
Reconnaissance	Jaguars	1
Air defence	Phantom	2
	Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles	1
	Rapier surface-to-air missiles	4
Air transport	Puma	1
Ground defence	RAF regiment	1”

These figures have not changed since last year but the report does not indicate whether, as was supposed, Rapier units were sent to the Falklands in 1982.

2.6. Although the foregoing statements on United Kingdom force levels on the continent show that the United Kingdom has more than met the current Brussels Treaty commitment of 55,000 men plus the second TAF in 1981 and 1982, the June 1981 White Paper "The way forward" announced that "(17) BAOR's manpower which had been planned to continue to increase beyond the 55,000 level, will be held at that level". Planned reorganisation of BAOR over the period 1983 to April 1984 involves both some strengthening of units in Germany with armoured regiments and Rapier missile units, but also net reductions of about 2,000 men with one divisional headquarters and an infantry battalion being withdrawn to the United Kingdom. The committee will wish to be assured in future years that the level of 55,000 men is met, irrespective of any temporary deployments to Northern Ireland or elsewhere.

2.7. Last year, in its report on the application of the Brussels Treaty, the committee proposed the tacit extension to the other member countries of the commitment to maintain adequate forces under allied command. In fact, under the Brussels Treaty only the United Kingdom (which escapes most controls on armaments) has to maintain a minimum number of forces on the mainland of Europe assigned to SACEUR. In its reply to Recommendation 380, the Council rejected the Assembly's proposal to invite the other member countries taking part in the NATO integrated system to make unilateral declarations concerning the level of forces which they undertake to assign to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Nor did the Council agree to include in its annual reports a declaration on the level of such forces, similar to the one already made with regard to United Kingdom forces.

2.8. The committee recalls that publication in the Council's annual reports of the level of British forces assigned under Article VI of Protocol No. II is in no way a requirement imposed by the treaty. The United Kingdom agreed to include these figures in the annual report only in response to Assembly Recommendations 331 and 348, and only after repeated requests by the Assembly in several consecutive years. The committee sees no reason why the other six member countries should not agree to include in the annual report similar declarations concerning the forces which they assign to NATO command or, in the case of France, the forces which it maintains in

Germany and which, according to the Council's annual report, are treated by the Council, as far as approval of their levels is concerned, in the same way as forces under NATO command. The committee therefore repeats this proposal in the draft recommendation.

3. Control of armaments

2.9. In the context of its proposals for adapting WEU to the needs of the eighties, the committee has for several years been pointing out that the provisions relating to the control of armaments contained in the Brussels Treaty and its protocols have completely lost their point in the circumstances now prevailing in Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. The committee proposed that the control system be reduced to the minimum which could be achieved by using the procedure for amendment contained in the treaty itself and its protocols, but without having recourse to international negotiations which would be required to modify the treaty texts themselves.

2.10. Two lists of armaments subject to control can be amended by the procedure laid down in the treaty :

- (i) the list of certain conventional weapons which Germany undertook not to manufacture on its territory (Protocol No. III, Annex III) ;
- (ii) the list of atomic, biological and chemical weapons and certain conventional weapons subject to quantitative controls on the mainland of Europe (Protocol No. III, Annex IV).

2.11. With regard to the first list, which concerns Germany, this may be amended or cancelled "in accordance with the needs of the armed forces" if a recommendation to this effect is made by the competent supreme commander of NATO, if the German Government submits a request accordingly, and if the WEU Council approves the proposals by a two-thirds majority. Since it was signed, this list has been reduced on several occasions, most recently on the Assembly's recommendation, and now includes only strategic bomber aircraft (paragraph VI) and long-range surface-to-surface missiles (paragraph IV). Last year, in Recommendation 380, the Assembly recommended that the Council cancel these last two items. In its reply, the Council recalled that in applying the controls provided for in the treaty "account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situation in Europe... The Council have received with great interest and are considering the Assem-

bly's recommendation to cancel paragraphs IV... and VI... ”.

2.12. Last year's proposal is taken up again by the committee in the draft recommendation. It is suggested that Germany take the initiative (as provided for in the treaty) of asking for this cancellation not because it intends to manufacture such weapons in the immediate future but in order to put an end to an obsolete situation.

2.13. With regard to the second list, which applies to all member countries on the mainland of Europe, Article V of Protocol No. III to the treaty provides quite simply that “the Council of Western European Union may vary the list in Annex IV by unanimous decision”. Last year, in Recommendation 380, the Assembly asked that the Council “vary by reducing the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III”. In its reply, the Council informed the Assembly that “the Council are considering the technical, military and political aspects of this problem”. Now this three-page list has not been amended since the treaty was modified in 1954. The Council is at present examining the proposal made by the Director of the Agency for the Control of Armaments on the amendment of this list. The committee for its part considers that the Council should report to the Assembly on the result of its consideration of the problem, and should consider deleting the list except for atomic, biological and chemical weapons.

2.14. It might have been thought that for political reasons it was wise to retain controls on the atomic, biological and chemical weapons which head this list. In reality the Council has never allowed the controls provided for in the treaty to be applied to atomic or biological weapons, and the committee considers in present circumstances that it would no longer be sensible to apply them. Quantitative controls are not applied to chemical weapons because no country has declared that it has stocks of such weapons. But by retaining atomic, biological and chemical weapons on the list of weapons subject to quantitative controls by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, a certain degree of reciprocity of commitments will be maintained with Germany, which has renounced the right to manufacture these weapons.

III. Agency for the Control of Armaments

3.1. Chapter III of the Council's annual report of the Agency for the Control of Armaments follows, with one slight difference (referred to in paragraph 3.9 below), the one for the previous year. The committee therefore considers it worthwhile to repeat in the present

report the same explanations as it gave last year on current practice relating to the application of controls.

3.2. The extent of the Brussels Treaty controls is not widely understood, nor is the fact that the Council failed to apply many of the control provisions from the outset. The control provisions of the treaty may be summarised as follows:

- (i) Germany undertook not to manufacture atomic, biological or chemical weapons on its territory;
- (ii) Germany also undertook not to manufacture certain conventional weapons, the list of which may be amended or cancelled in accordance with a special procedure, the Council deciding by a two-thirds majority;
- (iii) the Council determines the level of stocks of atomic, biological and chemical weapons which countries manufacturing them may hold on the mainland of Europe¹;
- (iv) levels of atomic, biological and chemical weapons and certain conventional weapons held by member countries on the mainland of Europe¹ are subject to verification by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments. The list of these ABC and conventional weapons may be modified by a unanimous decision of the Council;
- (v) the Agency for the Control of Armaments verifies that the above provisions are respected, except for the weapons of forces assigned to NATO, which are verified by the latter.

(a) Non-application of controls

3.3. In the earlier days when the controls could be held to serve some purpose, the Committee had frequent occasion to draw attention to the major shortcomings in their application by the Council. The twenty-eighth annual report of the Council indicated no change in this situation.

3.4. Like earlier reports, the Council's present report refers to fields where the Agency does not exercise its activities:

“Atomic, chemical and biological weapons”

1. The expression “on the mainland of Europe” excludes British weapons on British metropolitan territory.

The position described in the last annual report of the Council has remained unchanged.

The activities of the Agency cover neither nuclear nor biological weapons.

The control activities dealt with in this chapter do not, therefore, concern these two categories of armaments.

In the case of chemical weapons, only non-production controls take place; no quantitative controls are made since the member states have always declared they possessed no such armaments."

Previous reports have included a statement to the effect that:

"The non-nuclear components of such [nuclear] weapons (namely the missiles themselves and other specially designed equipment) are subject to control except as regards the weapons qualified as 'strategic' by one member state. Furthermore, as this state has declared that its nuclear capability as a whole is directed to one and the same objective of deterrence, its missiles with nuclear capability and tracked launchers are no longer subject to control."¹

The Committee has noted² that the state in question was France and that Pluton tactical nuclear missiles had been withdrawn from Agency control as from 1979.

3.5. The Council's report goes on to say:

"As the convention for the due process of law³ has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1981, as in previous years, to take the form of 'agreed control measures'.

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' notice. Since this agreement has never been withheld..."

3.6. The annual report also specifies that:

"In application of Article III of Protocol No. III, which lays down conditions to

1. Document 833, 28th March 1980.

2. Document 875, 4th May 1981.

3. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954. (Signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 but ratified by only six states: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.)

enable the Council to fix levels of chemical weapons that may be held on the mainland of Europe by those countries which have not given up the right to produce them, and in accordance with the Council decision of 1959, the Agency asked the countries concerned in its questionnaire whether production of chemical weapons on their mainland territory had passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage.

All the member countries concerned once again gave an explicit negative reply in 1982.

In addition, in the covering letter to its questionnaire, the Agency, as in previous years, asked the member states to declare any chemical weapons that they might hold, whatever their origin. In reply to this questionnaire, no country reported holding any chemical weapons and, because of this, the quantitative control of weapons of this nature raised no problems."

3.7. On the subject of biological weapons the Council's report states:

"All the member countries reported their agreement on the renewal in 1982 of the list of biological weapons subject to control as accepted by the Council in 1981. The Council noted the fact."

The Committee calls as far as possible for the revised list of biological weapons subject to control to be communicated to the Assembly, together with the list of chemical weapons subject to control, a first version of which was communicated to the Assembly in the annual report for 1960, whereas the list of chemical agents which the Council has added to the list in the meantime has been communicated only to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)¹.

(b) Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments

3.8. Although the WEU controls have lost their usefulness, and the Agency's true areas of activity remain limited solely to conventional weapons, the number of inspections carried out by the Agency each year shows that generally speaking there has been no reduction in its activities, as may be seen from the following table. Non-production controls no longer apply to

1. The list of chemical agents subject to control, approved by the WEU Council, was published by SIPRI in 1973 in "The problem of chemical and biological warfare", Volume II, "CB weapons today", page 217.

German shipyards because, following a recommendation to that effect by the Assembly, the Council in 1980 deleted warships from the list

of armaments not to be produced in Germany. Quantitative controls still apply to shipyards of all member countries on the continent.

Numbers and types of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments

	Quantitative control measures				Non-production control measures		Total control measures (all categories)
	at depots	at units under national command	at production plants	Sub-total	at production plants	(of which non-production of chemical weapons)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1961	29	15	12	66	7	(2)	63
2	26	20	11	57	7	(2)	65
3	35	13	13	61	10	(4)	74
4	39	19	13	71	9	(4)	80
5	26	16	11	53	7	n.a.	60
6	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	78
7	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
8	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	79
9	*	*	*	*	*	(3)	77
1970	<i>a</i> *	<i>a</i> *	<i>a</i> *	<i>a</i> *	<i>a</i> *	n.a.	<i>a</i> 82
	<i>b</i> *	<i>b</i> *	<i>b</i> *	<i>b</i> *	<i>b</i> *	n.a.	<i>b</i> 72
1	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	82
2	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	66
3	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	66
4	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	71
5	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	72
6	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	71
7	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
8	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	68
9	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
1980	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
1	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
2	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70

Notes *a, b*: From 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of figures (old and new style – *a* and *b*) for the years 1970 and 1971.

n.a.: Information not available.

Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from published annual reports of the Council. With regard to the various categories of controls (columns 1 to 6), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the published annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the Committee. Those for 1970 to 1982 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permission to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without significance.

* Confidential information available to the Committee deleted from the published report.

3.9. The committee finds particularly useful the lists of armaments currently being produced, set out in parts 1 to 4 of Section E on the state and problems of control in certain particular fields which is a summary of current armaments production programmes in member countries. However, in the present annual report the Council has cut down this section considerably. The committee asks the Council to retain in future reports all the useful information which the Agency for the Control of Armaments can provide.

(c) Conclusion on the control of armaments

3.10. The annual report of the Council stresses the limited nature of the field control programme, particularly visits to private firms, but it is clear that the Agency for the Control of Armaments performs its tasks efficiently in those fields which are open to it.

3.11. For the reasons given above, the committee now recommends that the Council *abolish non-production controls of conventional weapons and consider abolishing quantitative controls*. The Council is empowered to take this step under the terms of Article V of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, by modifying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III. This step will leave in force the unilateral undertaking by Germany not to manufacture nuclear, biological or chemical weapons on its territory. It continues to be the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany not to manufacture such weapons. While controls on these non-production undertakings would remain in force under the treaty, as noted above the Council applies them only in the case of chemical weapons and then only in the form of "agreed verifications". The unilateral undertaking by Germany not to manufacture specified conventional weapons on its territory would come to an end with the cancellation in accordance with Article II of Protocol No. III of the only weapons still on the list: long-range surface-to-surface missiles and strategic bombers.

(d) Studies by the Agency for the Control of Armaments

3.12. The Agency for the Control of Armaments conducts important studies on the principles of arms control, sometimes in technical fields. Its experts are in contact with various outside bodies. In the past the Agency has co-operated with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, particularly in connection with the observation of military manoeuvres organised by ACDA on Salisbury Plain (England). But this United States agency which, since it was set up, had acquired

a worldwide reputation for the objectivity of certain of its publications¹, has been partly dismantled by the present United States administration². The committee proposes that the WEU Agency re-establish its former contacts with ACDA to examine to what extent it might take over from it, for the benefit of the alliance as a whole, certain major studies on principles governing the control, verification or export of armaments which ACDA is having to relinquish for lack of funds. Such a contribution on the part of the WEU countries to studies hitherto conducted by the United States alone would be a further contribution to defence burden-sharing in the alliance.

IV. Standing Armaments Committee

4.1. As in recent years the work of the Standing Armaments Committee in 1982 was concentrated chiefly in exchange of information by countries in Working Group No. 8 on operational research. It is also updating the economic (first section) part of its study of the situation of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU. An unclassified version including the updated legal section and the "presentation" of the first section of the economic part was communicated to the Assembly on 10th May 1982.

4.2. The Council has agreed, in its reply to Recommendation 331, to consider the possibility of the SAC assisting the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to undertake specific studies "within the competence of the SAC as defined in the decision of 7th May 1955" (the Council decision whereby the Standing Armaments Committee was established) and Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the French Minister of Defence, addressing the Assembly on 12th December 1981, added:

"And rather than need to obtain the Council's consent each time, could not the SAC be authorised, at each session of the Assembly, to give help with the various studies decided upon?... If the political will exists, I do not think anyway that institutional obstacles could hinder the expansion of the SAC's rôle."

1. See for instance the series "World military expenditures and arms transfers".

2. Since President Reagan took office the ACDA annual budget has been reduced from \$ 18.5 m to \$ 15 m; its staff reduced from some 200 to 150 and one-third of senior posts left unfilled; its operational analysis office abolished; its computer removed and twenty years of research material transferred to a Washington University. Mr. Eugene Rostow, the Director originally appointed by President Reagan, was dismissed on 12th January 1983 and replaced by Mr. Kenneth Adelman after a controversial confirmation by the Senate. Mr. David Emery, who has now been nominated as Deputy Director, is likely to face equally controversial confirmation hearings.

However, in its reply to Recommendation 379, communicated to the Assembly on 24th November 1982, the Council unfortunately did not follow Mr. Lemoine:

“As regards the Standing Armaments Committee, which also was the subject of proposals by the State Secretary of the French Ministry of Defence, the Council recall that this body was set up on 7th May 1955 to promote co-operation in the matter of armaments. If in this respect the international secretariat of the SAC were occasionally to assist the Assembly in the study of clearly-defined themes, this could only be done under a procedure involving a case-by-case examination by the Council, under whom the SAC is placed. It is clear that such work could not have the effect of relieving the SAC of its responsibilities nor could it affect its competence, these being the Council's exclusive responsibility.”

4.3. However, agreement has now been reached with the Council to allow the secretariat of the SAC to assist in the preparation of the major report by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields¹. The committee welcomes this first attempt at co-operation, which will have to be extended in the future. As Mr. Lemoine said in the abovementioned address:

“With, as it were, an information and research department available to it, the Assembly would be in a position to initiate more ambitious studies.”

4.4. The Standing Armaments Committee could make a further useful contribution to joint production among the allied countries if it were to extend its study of the armaments industry to include a survey of the present status of the two-way street, and an analysis of the

factors which help to increase the proportion of European equipment in the armed forces of all allied countries.

V. Conclusions

5.1. The committee's principal conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation which relates to this explanatory memorandum as follows:

Draft recommendation Explanatory memorandum

Preamble

- (i) and (ii) Appendix and Chapter I
- (iii) Paragraphs 2.14 ; 3.4.
- (iv) Paragraphs 3.8 to 3.12 ; 4.2 to 4.4.
- (v) Paragraph 3.12.
- (vi) Paragraphs 2.3 to 2.8.
- (vii) Paragraphs 2.7 ; 3.7 ; 3.9.

Operative text

- 1 and 2 Paragraphs 2.9 to 2.14 ; 3.10 and 3.11.
- 3 Paragraph 3.12.
- 4 Paragraph 4.4.
- 5 Paragraph 4.2 ; 4.3.
- 6(a) Paragraph 2.7.
- 6(b) Paragraph 3.9.
- 6(c) Paragraph 3.7.

5.2. In paragraph 2.6 above the committee also notes the need for assurance in future years concerning the levels of United Kingdom forces on the mainland.

VI. Opinion of the minority

6.1. The report as a whole was adopted by 15 votes to 1 with 1 abstention. The minority which voted against did not state in committee its reasons for so doing.

1. However, it appears that the SAC secretariat has been unable to assist in the collection of data from public sources for the Scientific Committee's report. The committee accordingly recommends that the SAC be empowered to collect information.

APPENDIX

RECOMMENDATION 380¹*on the application of the Brussels Treaty*
*– reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council*²

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the wide agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the application of the Brussels Treaty, revealed in Recommendation 365 and the Council's reply thereto;
- (ii) Noting that the Council and Assembly alike recognise that the fundamental provisions of the Brussels Treaty, particularly the mutual security provisions of Articles IV, V and VIII.3, retain their full value, and that there is interest in making greater use of Western European Union as an instrument of European security;
- (iii) Believing that several arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty no longer serve any useful purpose, and noting the Council's view that "in applying the provisions of Protocol No. III and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situation in Europe";
- (iv) Believing therefore that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. In application of Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III;
2. In application of Article V of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, vary by reducing the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III;
3. Call on member countries which participate in the integrated system of NATO, and are not already bound by Article VI of Protocol No. II, to make unilateral declarations concerning the level of forces they undertake to assign to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and station as agreed with him, and not to withdraw against the wishes of a majority of the high contracting parties;
4. To include in future annual reports a statement on the levels of all assigned forces;
5. To communicate its annual report, as in the past, before the end of February.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (2nd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 908).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 380

The Council welcome the fact that the Assembly recognises that the fundamental provisions of the Brussels Treaty retain their full value and that it stresses the importance of WEU in the sphere of security.

1. The Council recall their position, namely, that in applying the provisions of Protocol No. III and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situation in Europe. This is why Annex III of that protocol has been amended on several occasions since 1958. The Council have received with great interest and are considering the Assembly's recommendation to cancel paragraphs IV ("Long-range missiles and guided missiles") and VI ("Bomber aircraft for strategic purposes") of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III according to the procedure laid down in Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty.

2. As regards varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III, the Council welcome the fact that, as a result of the debate and vote by the Assembly, the initial draft recommendation was amended to take account of certain legal and political considerations.

The Council are considering the technical, military and political aspects of this problem.

3 and 4. The overall system organised under the treaty and its protocols, the implementation of which, as regards level of forces, regularly appears in the annual report, enables the Council to be informed of and to assess the situation of the level of forces and their armaments assigned to SACEUR for the common defence.

The level of forces thus assigned results from the undertakings made by the member states within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance as stated notably in II.5 and 6 and IV of the final act of the nine-power conference, held in London between 28th September and 3rd October 1954. The forces assigned by the various countries to the common NATO defence are in fact defined on the basis of a plan which is kept up to date within NATO. Decisions relating to the forces result from the joint effort of the member countries in accordance with the capacity of each to contribute and with the aim of ensuring at all times an adequate level of forces.

Consequently, there appears to be no need to invite the states concerned to make unilateral declarations to the WEU Council concerning a matter which is already dealt with in the multilateral context of NATO. Nor does there appear to be any possibility of including in future annual reports any statements on the level of forces other than those which are already given.

5. The Council will endeavour, as in the past, to communicate its annual report to the Assembly before the end of February.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 15th November 1982.

*Replies of the Council to Recommendations 388 to 392***RECOMMENDATION 388 ¹*****on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ²***

The Assembly,

Considering that the development of neutralist and pacifist movements in Europe and throughout the world makes it all the more necessary to examine the justification of the security, defence and disarmament policy pursued by the western countries;

Noting that deterrence, which is the basis of this policy, depends largely on the existence of strategic nuclear weapons;

Considering that implementation of the NATO twofold decision of December 1979 is encountering negative reactions from citizens of WEU member countries;

Welcoming the opening of the START negotiations – including the part of the Geneva negotiations on so-called Eurostrategic weapons – and the resumption or revival of other negotiations designed to reduce the level of forces and armaments in Europe and elsewhere;

Considering that unilateral initiatives in disarmament matters would cause those negotiations to fail and would jeopardise the foundations of Europe's security and deploring the growing evidence of Soviet involvement with and funding of pacifist movements pursuing unilateral disarmament in the West;

Considering that pacifist movements are entitled to call for new initiatives from the members of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact to achieve substantial progress in the negotiations on disarmament;

Considering that assistance to the third world is morally, economically and politically essential for all industrialised countries, quite apart from any considerations relating to their defence budgets;

Noting that the situation of each Western European country forces each country to shape its defence policy and attitude towards disarmament according to its own particular conditions and strongly influences the course followed by pacifist movements;

Considering nevertheless that any serious progress towards European political union requires close co-ordination of national policies in these fields;

Considering that WEU is an appropriate framework for consultations between the European members of the Atlantic Alliance on all matters relating to defence and disarmament;

Regretting that Recommendation 379 on the activation of the WEU Council and its dependent bodies has not been effectively followed up by the Council,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Demand that participating states strive to ensure the success of the various ongoing negotiations on the limitation or reduction of armaments and forces in Europe and in the rest of the world;
2. Announce its unambiguous support for any proposal for the complete renunciation by the United States and the Soviet Union of medium-range nuclear weapons or, failing that, for the establishment of a true balance at the lowest possible level and to agree to the deployment of such weapons on the territory of member countries only as long as this goal has not been attained within the time limit laid down in the NATO decision of December 1979;
3. Ensure that full, accurate and objective information on the levels of forces and armaments of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact is regularly made public;
4. Ensure that in any event Western Europe's development assistance policy is pursued and strengthened, particularly in the framework of the European Communities;
5. Effectively concert the defence policies of member countries and their positions towards disarmament with a view to working out a European approach to such matters.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1982 during the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (9th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Lagorce on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 934).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 388***

The Council have noted with interest Recommendation 388 on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism, which illustrates the importance attached by the WEU Assembly to the security aspirations voiced by public opinion in the member countries.

1. The Council take this opportunity to reassert that for the maintenance of peace it is essential to establish a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. They are wholeheartedly in favour of a successful conclusion to the current negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union on their respective nuclear forces. For their part, the member countries of WEU fully support the efforts made in this direction by the United States, whose so-called "zero-zero option" proposal relating to INF constitutes an important initiative, and whose global approach they fully endorse. They hope that the Soviet Union will also contribute to the achievement of speedy progress.

The WEU member countries are also very concerned by the imbalance in favour of the USSR and the countries of the East which characterises the force relationship in conventional weapons. WEU member countries, who are all taking part in the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting, are in favour of the speedy conclusion of this meeting with a balanced and substantial concluding document which includes a mandate for a conference on disarmament in Europe, as proposed by France. Those of them who take part in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna are striving to achieve a more stable situation in Europe through the establishment of parity in the conventional forces in Central Europe in the form of a common and collective ceiling.

2. The decision of 12th December 1979 providing for a limited modernisation of intermediate-range nuclear forces, combined with a parallel offer of negotiations on American and Soviet weapons of this kind, was referred to clearly and fully in the communiqué issued after the last ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council (9th and 10th December 1982). The member countries of WEU wish to reaffirm their commitment to the terms of this communiqué of the Atlantic Alliance to which they all belong.

3. As the Council have repeatedly stated, they take the view that the security policy of the member countries – consisting of deterrence and defence as well as of arms control and disarmament – enjoys the genuine support of the overwhelming majority of public opinion. The information activity carried out within parliamentary bodies can also contribute to this support; this task requires that the fullest possible information be given on the alliance's position and on the threats facing its members. With this end in mind, the member states of WEU will continue to answer any questions on this topic which might be raised by public opinion in their countries.

4. The policy of Western Europe on development aid is a natural component of its foreign policy; the member countries of WEU are convinced that this policy secures international stability.

This aid – already reflected in the considerable efforts made bilaterally by the countries represented on the Council – is also provided continuously and actively on a multilateral basis. This is evidenced by the Lomé Conventions concluded by the European Communities and the many consultations which have been held over the past year and which are continuing with the aim of achieving better co-ordination and consolidation of the measures taken by the international aid institutions.

5. The member countries of WEU will continue to seek ways of strengthening their concerted action within various bodies and at various levels on matters of security and disarmament; in so doing they will affirm the specific nature of their common interest in the matter. Better co-operation between European states in the field of security and disarmament offers possibilities for strengthening the dialogue and co-operation with the United States.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th March 1983.

RECOMMENDATION 389¹

***on European security and the evolution
of the situation in South-West Asia²***

The Assembly,

Recalling Recommendations 341, 349, 361, 371 and 386;

Deploring and condemning the massacres in Lebanon from 16th to 18th September 1982;

Nevertheless welcoming the determination shown by the Lebanese people to restore national unity;

Welcoming the presence of French, Italian and United States armed forces to protect the civilian population;

Considering that the occupation of Lebanon by the Israeli and Syrian armies makes it impossible to restore unity and terminate the acts of violence being committed there;

Considering further that a settlement of the Palestinian problem is one of the prerequisites of the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East;

Considering that this settlement implies the application of Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council, Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and recognition of the right of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers and of the right of the Palestinian people to independence and sovereignty;

Considering that the continuing establishment of Israeli settlements on the West Bank is an obstacle to the restoration of peace and casts doubt on the will of the Israeli Government to achieve this;

Welcoming the fact that the final act adopted by the heads of Arab states at their meeting in Fez on 9th September 1982 contains elements of substance which show considerable progress towards the application of Resolution 242;

Noting that recent events show more clearly than ever that the Palestinian people needs a homeland;

Considering that at the present juncture the PLO is the only organisation which can speak for the Palestinian people;

Considering that the dispersal of the Palestinian people in the Arab countries will not solve the problem but will create unacceptable conditions for the persons concerned;

Welcoming the declaration by President Reagan on 1st September 1982 as an essential contribution to the restoration of peace in the area;

Considering that the pursuit of the war between Iran and Iraq is a serious threat to the security of the whole area;

Condemning the continued Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan as a serious violation of the Charter of the United Nations, a grave threat to the countries in the area and a negation of Soviet proposals for demilitarising the Indian Ocean;

Condemning recourse to chemical weapons and the continual massacres of the civilian population in Afghanistan;

Reaffirming the close relationship between the security of Europe and the peaceful solution of conflicts which upset political balances in the Middle East and South-West Asia,

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1982 during the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (10th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Lord Reay on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 927).

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Reaffirm the support of all its members for any initiative aimed at applying Resolution 242 and its radical opposition to the establishment of further Israeli settlements on the West Bank;
2. Urge the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon except if their presence has been requested by the Lebanese Government;
3. Use all the means available to member countries to support the restoration of the Lebanese state;
4. Supply humanitarian aid to the Lebanese people and to all foreign minorities in Lebanon which require it;
5. Urge the Israeli Government to disclose without delay what it intends to do with those imprisoned during the occupation of southern Lebanon;
6. Urge the Israeli Government to allow the International Red Cross immediate and full access to those imprisoned during the occupation of southern Lebanon, to arrange their earliest possible release and to publish in full the conclusions of the inquiry into the massacres at Sabra and Chatila; and call on the Lebanese Government to complete their inquiry into the Beirut massacre and to publish a full report on the inquiry;
7. Demonstrate its belief that the question of Palestinian refugees cannot be solved by dispersing them but only by the early establishment of a Palestinian homeland;
8. Call for the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan;
9. Urge member countries to refuse any connection with the Afghan régime and to assist the Afghan resistance movement as long as there is Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan;
10. Increase member countries' financial and technical assistance to Pakistan and food aid to Afghan refugees.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 389***

1 and 7. The Council again voice their deep concern and outright opposition to the continuing Israeli policy of settlement on the West Bank, particularly in view of the fact that it is being pursued at a time when it is more important than ever not to jeopardise the opportunities offered last autumn by the Reagan plan and by the declaration of the Arab conference in Fez for a negotiated settlement to the Middle East crisis. They therefore reaffirm their continuing commitment to the promotion of a global solution based on Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council leading to the mutual recognition of the rights of the parties involved. In particular such a solution should allow the Palestinians to realise self-determination with all that this implies as well as security for all the states in the region, including Israel's right to exist.

2. The Council, in affirming their complete solidarity with the Lebanese Government, consider it vital for the purposes of achieving lasting stability in Lebanon and for the restoration of its full sovereignty and political independence that all foreign forces whose presence is not explicitly requested by the Lebanese Government be withdrawn from the country. In this context, the Council express the hope that the current negotiations on this matter will meet with success.

3. The Council support the full re-establishment of the authority of the Lebanese Government over all its national territory and in this connection emphasise the worthwhile and substantial contribution made by some WEU member countries and the United States, in deploying a peacekeeping force in the Beirut area.

4. Accordingly, the Council pledge their support for all humanitarian aid to the civilian population of Lebanon who have been so cruelly afflicted by recent events.

5 and 6. The Council note the importance that the Assembly attaches to the Sabra and Chatila massacres being fully clarified. They note that up till now, as far as Israel is concerned, the publication of the report of the commission of inquiry has helped to shed some light on these tragic events.

8 and 9. The Council express their deep concern at the continuing Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan which, together with the continuing violations of human rights which this involves, shows flagrant disregard for the principles of the United Nations Charter and remains a serious source of tension in East-West relations; this occupation was recently condemned by an overwhelming majority of the member countries of the United Nations for the fourth time on 29th November 1982.

The Council stress the urgent need for a negotiated settlement to the Afghan problem in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions, i.e. one based on an immediate and complete withdrawal of Soviet troops, respect for the independence, sovereignty and non-alignment of Afghanistan and the restoration of the right of the Afghan people to self-determination and conditions in which the Afghan refugees can return to their homeland in safety and honour. Only in this way will it be possible to find a genuine political solution which can put an end to the grief and destruction inflicted on the Afghan people.

10. The Council also stress the need to take all possible measures to alleviate the suffering of the Afghan refugees who have found welcome shelter in Pakistan from the horrors of an externally imposed war.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th April 1983.

RECOMMENDATION 390¹
on the state of European security²

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the continued increase in the ocean-going capability of the Soviet navy and concerned at the increased opportunity this provides the Soviet Union to project its power, particularly in unstable parts of the world;
- (ii) Believing therefore that more attention should be paid to maritime surveillance;
- (iii) Recalling its Recommendations 254, 278 and 288, welcoming the accession of Spain to the North Atlantic Treaty with the full approval of that country's democratically-elected parliament, and hoping that European security will be strengthened in due course through the integration of Spanish forces into the military structure of NATO;
- (iv) Recognising the important special nature of the contribution to allied defence made by many of the smaller countries of the alliance through their geographical position as well as through their defence effort;
- (v) Noting, however, the small proportion of national product devoted to defence by certain allied countries, including those with above average per capita income;
- (vi) Welcoming the increased emphasis being placed on conventional defence but reiterating its view that a balanced security policy must be designed to prevent all war, not only nuclear war,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments, acting where appropriate in the North Atlantic Council:

1. To improve further existing NATO and bilateral co-operative arrangements for NATO-area and world-wide surveillance of Soviet naval vessels, surface and sub-surface, and of other militarily-significant Soviet vessels, in particular through:
 - (a) stressing the need to make use of all surveillance resources – satellite, airborne, surface and sub-surface, shore and bottom-based;
 - (b) remedying shortages of modern maritime patrol aircraft, and retaining in service adequate numbers of diesel-electric submarines and frigates;
 - (c) modernising NATO surveillance co-ordinating centres, and improving communications links between these centres and between them and national centres;
2. To co-operate fully with other NATO governments:
 - (a) to invite Spanish liaison officers to be appointed to all appropriate NATO command headquarters;
 - (b) to plan and adjust command arrangements to accommodate the contribution of Spanish forces to NATO;
3. To urge on all allied countries the need to maintain and improve the defence effort, despite the general recession, and at the same time to pursue actively arms control negotiations in all forums.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1982 during the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (11th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 936).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 390

1. The member governments of Western European Union share the Assembly's belief in the necessity of effective arrangements regarding co-operation on the surveillance of Soviet naval vessels within the NATO area and throughout the world. They wish to assure the Assembly that the measures taken collectively or unilaterally by the members of the Atlantic Alliance already work very effectively. Despite the inevitable restrictions on resources flowing from the current economic situation the member governments of Western European Union continue to seek ways of enhancing their efforts in this area with particular reference to the use and co-ordination of the surveillance resources to which the Assembly refers.

2. The member governments of Western European Union warmly welcome Spanish membership of the Atlantic Alliance. However, the Assembly will be aware that the Spanish Government has decided to freeze discussions with the NATO authorities on the arrangements for the integration of Spain's armed forces into NATO's military structure. The Council observe that in view of this fact, action on the second paragraph of the Assembly's recommendation will have to await the decision of the Spanish Government as to the manner in which it wishes to proceed on the issue.

3. The Council agree with the Assembly that all members of the alliance need to maintain and improve their defence efforts, and note that to this end the countries which participate in the integrated military structure have agreed a target of an annual increase in defence spending in the region of 3 % in real terms. The limitations imposed by current economic circumstances on the additional resources available for defence emphasise the need for the member countries of the alliance to make even more effective use of their existing resources. The Council agree that these efforts need to be accompanied by the active pursuit of arms control negotiations with a view to achieving balanced, equitable and verifiable agreements leading to enhanced security at a lower level of forces.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 22nd March 1983.

RECOMMENDATION 391 ¹

*on the Falklands crisis*²

The Assembly,

- (i) Firmly condemning the armed invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina on 2nd April 1982 in flagrant violation of international law and of the statement by the President of the Security Council the previous day;
- (ii) Taking note of the rapid and effective operation of European political consultation leading to the statement of condemnation issued by the Ten on 2nd April and the declaration of economic sanctions on 10th April;
- (iii) Taking note of the agreed statement of the President of the United Nations Security Council on 1st April and of Security Council Resolution 502 of 3rd April 1982, but regretting that the Security Council was unable to ensure implementation;
- (iv) Regretting that the initiatives of the United States Secretary of State, the President of Peru and the Secretary-General of the United Nations failed to secure a negotiated withdrawal of the Argentine forces;
- (v) Welcoming the position adopted by the United States and by NATO after the failure of the attempted negotiations;
- (vi) Regretting that the Council was not convened in application of Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (vii) Welcoming the determined and successful action taken by the United Kingdom to restore international order in application of Resolution 502 of the Security Council and in conformity with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter;
- (viii) Deploring the loss of life that resulted from the conflict;
- (ix) Concerned at the weakening of allied forces in the North Atlantic Treaty area following the necessary deployment of larger British forces outside the area for the long-term defence of the Falkland Islands, and noting that NATO can learn many lessons from the conflict;
- (x) Concerned at the deterioration in relations between the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and Latin America,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments to seek agreement in the European Community and in NATO on the following objectives:

1. Measures to be considered by NATO countries within the treaty area to compensate for the deployment of British forces outside the area as long as these forces are necessary for the defence of the Falklands;
2. The early restoration of good relations between the countries of the alliance on the one hand and of Latin America on the other, and in particular the normalisation of relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina;
3. An urgent study by NATO of the lessons it can learn from the conflict including:
 - (a) the need for consultation and decisions not only on developments beyond the NATO area which may threaten vital allied interests, but also on those which may threaten national interests in cases of self-defence, even if the Soviet Union is not involved;
 - (b) the need for proper assessment of voluminous and conflicting information to permit the early identification of attack;
 - (c) the performance of defence equipment;
 - (d) the need for a common and restrictive policy on the export of defence equipment to non-allied countries.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1982 during the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (12th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Cavaliere on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 935).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 391

1. The Council welcome the Assembly's interest in the Falklands crisis and in the lessons which may be drawn by the alliance as a result. Despite the present situation in the South Atlantic area, it does not appear that the deployment of British troops in the Falkland Islands need give rise to concern about the strength of allied forces in the North Atlantic. The detailed consequences for NATO of the deployment of British forces to the South Atlantic will be discussed within the alliance as part of the normal planning process. The Council note that in the meantime British forces in the South Atlantic remain committed to NATO albeit at a lower level of availability.

2. In the view of the Council it may still be too early to evaluate all the consequences of the Falklands crisis, but the Council note that economic relations between members of the alliance and Latin America are returning to normal.

Discussions and voting in the 37th United Nations General Assembly on the Falklands resolution, the attitude assumed by Latin America within the non-aligned movement and the slow process of normalisation between the EC and Latin America after the lifting of EC embargo however are underlining the fact that further efforts should be made to improve relations between the countries of the alliance and Latin America.

The Council note that since the cessation of hostilities the United Kingdom has declared its willingness to resume normal relations with Argentina, but that the Argentine Government has not up to now agreed to a formal ending to hostilities. Member countries of the European Community have pursued the question of resuming normal trade relations for all of them with Argentina, but although these approaches have not yet led to concrete results as desired, it is hoped that future efforts will be reciprocated and that the obstacles still existing will be surmounted.

3. As regards the implications for members of the alliance of events beyond the NATO area which threaten vital allied interests, and in particular the consequences for NATO of deployments outside the area to meet such threats, the Council note that these are already under study in the alliance. The Council emphasise that the question of consultation within the alliance on threats outside the NATO area to the purely national interests of allies is a matter for ad hoc decision at the time.

4. Insofar as the accurate assessment of information permitting the early identification of attack is concerned, the Council wish to stress that this activity represents a continuing concern of the alliance.

5. The Council note that the experience of the United Kingdom as regards the performance of defence equipment in the South Atlantic will be shared with her allies and be subjected to appropriate study.

6. The Council note the Assembly's interest in the field of policy concerning the export of defence equipment to non-allied countries, and stress in this regard that policy on the export of arms is a matter for individual countries, although consultation on the subject takes place within the alliance when appropriate.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 9th May 1983.

RECOMMENDATION 392¹***on energy requirements and the security of Europe – Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements²***

The Assembly,

Considering the need for close relations between Western European countries and Norway on such subjects as security, economic, energy, space and other research and development policies ;

Considering also the relationship between the Norwegian energy supply and other important energy resources outside Western Europe and the fact that before 1990 more Norwegian gas cannot be available to replace all or part of Soviet gas ;

Aware of the risk of all Western European countries importing concurrently their energy supplies from outside Western Europe and of the wastefulness of duplicate pipelines ;

Considering that Western Europe and the United States do not always make the same analysis and do not always have the same view of East-West economic relations ;

Considering the need for a close study of European energy requirements in the next decades so as to ensure Europe's energy supplies, particularly natural gas, essential for its security ;

Considering also the need to study the present rôle of COCOM, the co-ordinating committee of the allied countries which supervises high technology and defence exports to Eastern European countries, and to update COCOM's list of prohibited items,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Promote and reinforce relations between Norway and the other countries of Western Europe in security, economic, energy, space and other research and development policies;

2. Promote studies on:

(a) European energy requirements in the next decades and the consequent problems for Europe's security and defence;

(b) high technology exports to Eastern European countries liable to have military applications;

(c) the possibilities of setting up an interconnected intra-European gas pipeline network;

and report to the Assembly on the results of these studies;

3. Promote an energy policy designed to guarantee member countries regular and adequate supplies of energy to meet their security requirements.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1982 during the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (12th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Bassinet on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 930).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 392

1. The Council recognise the importance of good relations between Norway and the other countries of Western Europe, especially in the sectors mentioned in the Assembly's recommendation. Close relations between Norway and the other countries of Western Europe exist, in particular in the security field, within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. Consultation on co-operation in the field of economics and energy takes place not only within the alliance, but also within the framework of the OECD, of which Norway is also an active member. As for co-operation with Norway in the field of space research and development policy, the Council refer to the activities which take place within the framework of the European Space Agency.

2. (a) The Council consider that detailed studies on future European energy requirements are already available or taking place. For instance, there is the OECD and International Energy Agency study entitled "World Energy Outlook", which contains a thorough analysis of European energy requirements in the next decades; there is also the study on the energy supplies of OECD member countries and their security, currently being carried out within that organisation.

(b) As regards point 2 (b) of this recommendation, the Council note that concrete proposals have been made by the United States in this area.

(c) Since the result of the abovementioned initiatives may provide further criteria for assessing the desirability of setting up an interconnected intra-European gas pipeline network, the Council would prefer to wait for the outcome of these initiatives before taking a more definite stand on this subject. As the initiatives mentioned under 2 (a) and 2 (b) have already been taken in other fora, the Council will inform the Assembly in due time as far as possible on the further developments in these fields.

3. The Council are confident that the measures, which WEU member countries have taken both individually and collectively within the framework of the International Energy Agency and of the European Community, for example, will be sufficient to ensure regular and adequate supplies of energy in order to meet their security requirements. The measures relate inter alia to the pursuit of policies of conservation and of diversification by developing all sources of energy. The member countries are firmly determined to promote effective implementation of these measures.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th April 1983.

*Written question 232
and the reply of the Council*

QUESTION 232

*put by Sir Frederic Bennett
on 15th February 1983*

Do the governments of the WEU member countries have non-classified information about the extent of financing from exterior sources of "peace movements" in their countries to supplement and update the statement in 1981 to that effect by the Secretary-General of NATO and the evidence put before the Sub-Committee on Oversight of the United States Permanent Select Congressional Committee in 1980, specifying an annual total of at least \$63,000,000 of KGB funding of international front organisations serving "to co-ordinate and further Soviet foreign policy goals and military strategy"? Are the Council able to give further detailed information in regard to the situation in this context obtaining in the various member states of WEU?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 27th April 1983*

From the non-classified information available, there is no precise evidence for the governments of the WEU member countries to claim that the peace movements in their countries are in receipt of Soviet funds, for example through the KGB.

However, it appears that the activities of certain peace movements in certain WEU countries may receive indirect financial support from some East European countries from profits made from the sale of vast amounts of propaganda material. These profits contribute to the financing of meetings and demonstrations against the NATO modernisation programme.

In any event, the governments of the WEU member countries are aware of this problem, which they are following very closely in view of its connection with their countries' peace and security policies.

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