

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-EIGHTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1982

I

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

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Assembly Documents

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The proceedings of the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume I: Assembly documents.

Volume II: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
BONNEL Raoul	PVV
DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
Mrs. HERMAN-MICHELSENS Lucienne	PVV
MM. MANGELSCHOTS Jan	Socialist
MICHEL Joseph	PSC
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP

Substitutes

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	Socialist
DE BONDY Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
HOYAUX Jacques	Socialist
LAGNEAU André	PRL
STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP
VAN DER ELST Frans	Volksunie

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BARTHE Jean-Jacques	Communist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BERRIER Noël	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF
DURAFFOUR Paul	Soc. (App.)
FRÊCHE Georges	Socialist
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
MAYOUD Alain	UDF
OEHLER Jean-André	Socialist
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
PONCELET Christian	RPR
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
SPÉNALE Georges	Socialist
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
WILQUIN Claude	Socialist

Substitutes

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BELX Roland	Socialist
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BERTILE Wilfrid	Socialist
BIZET Émile	RPR (App.)
DELEHEDDE André	Socialist

MM. FORTIER Marcel	RPR
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
JAGER René	UCDF
JOXE Pierre	Socialist
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LE MONTAGNER Louis	UCDP
MÉNARD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left
PROUVOST Pierre	Socialist
ROSSINOT André	UDF
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	Communist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ALTHAMMER Walter	CDU/CSU
BARDENS Hans	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
GESSNER Manfred-Achim	SPD
JUNG Kurt	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
MÄNNING Peter	SPD
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hermann	SPD
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
SPRUNG Rudolf	CDU/CSU
UNLAND Hermann Joseph	CDU/CSU
VOHRER Manfred	FDP

Substitutes

MM. BAHR Egon	SPD
EICKMEYER Karl-Arnold	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
HORN Erwin	SPD
JAGER Claus	CDU/CSU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
LORENZ Peter	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Hans-Werner	CDU/CSU
Mrs. PACK Doris	CDU/CSU
MM. PENSKY Heinz	SPD
RÖSCH Klaus	FDP
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHLUCKEBIER Günter	SPD
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
TOPMANN Günter	SPD
WITTMANN Fritz	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AGRIMI Alessandro	Chr. Dem.
ANTONI Varese	Communist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FORMA Renzo	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
MONDINO Giorgio	Socialist
PECCHIOI Ugo	Communist
PETRILLI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
PUCCI Ernesto	Chr. Dem.
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
TRIPODI Antonio	MSI-DN
VALIANTE Mario	Chr. Dem.
VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM. AJELLO Aldo	Republican
AMADEI Giuseppe	Socialist
BATTAGLIA Adolfo	Republican
BENEDIKTER Johann Hans	SVP
CAFIERO Luca	PDUP
CALICE Giovanni	Communist
CONTI PERSINI Gianfranco	PSDI
DELLA BRIOTTA Libero	Socialist
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MARTINO Leopoldo Attilio	Communist
ORIONE Franco Luigi	Chr. Dem.
PATRIARCA Francesco	Chr. Dem.
POZZO Cesare	MSI-DN
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
Mrs. ROSOLEN Angela Maria	Communist
MM. SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STERPA Egidio	Liberal

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. BERCHEM Albert	Dem.
MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
THOSS Maurice	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM. GLESENER Jean-Pierre	Soc. Chr.
KRIEPS Robert	Soc. Workers
PRUSSEN Robert	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
van den BERGH Harry	Labour
van EEKELEN Willem	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne-Maria	CDA

Substitutes

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth	Labour
MM. BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
EIJSINK Rudolf	CDA
MERTENS Chel	Democrats 66
MOMMERSTEEG Joseph	CDA
van der WERFF Ymenus P.W.	Liberal
WORRELL Joop	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Mr. Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Thomas COX	Labour
Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr. James HILL	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
Mr. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr. Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr. Maurice MILLER	Labour
MM. Fred MULLEY	Labour
President of the Assembly John PAGE	Conservative
Lord REAY	Conservative
MM. Thomas URWIN	Labour
John WILKINSON	Conservative

Substitutes

MM. David ATKINSON	Conservative
Ronald BROWN	SDP
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Anthony DURANT	Conservative
Kenneth EASTHAM	Labour
Robert EDWARDS	Labour
Sir Russell FAIRGRIEVE	Conservative
MM. Raymond FLETCHER	Labour
Edward GARRETT	Labour
Harry GOURLAY	Labour
Ralph HOWELL	Conservative
Lord McNAIR	Liberal
Mr. John MORRIS	Labour
Lord NORTHFIELD	Labour
MM. John OSBORN	Conservative
Laurence PAVITT	Labour
Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Keith STAINTON	Conservative

AGENDA

**of the First Part of the Twenty-Eighth Ordinary Session
Paris, 14th-17th June 1982**

I. Report of the Council

Twenty-seventh annual report of the Council to the Assembly

II. Political Questions

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Political activities of the WEU Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Vecchiotti on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 2. European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security | <i>Report tabled by Mr. van Eekelen on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 3. Evolution of the situation in Poland | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Michel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |

III. Defence Questions

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 2. Disarmament | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Vohrer on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 3. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 4. The Falklands crisis | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Cavaliere on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |

IV. Technical and Scientific Questions

- | | |
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| 1. International aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982 | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |
| 2. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Fiandrotti on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |

V. Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

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| Revision of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges</i> |
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VI. Relations with Parliaments

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Outline booklet on WEU and its activities | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Berchem on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments</i> |
| 2. Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Stoffelen on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments</i> |

ORDER OF BUSINESS

**of the First Part of the Twenty-Eighth Ordinary Session
Paris, 14th-17th June 1982**

MONDAY, 14th JUNE

Morning

Meetings of Political Groups.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the twenty-eighth ordinary session by the Provisional President.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session.
7. Ratification of decisions of the Presidential Committee.
8. Twenty-seventh annual report of the Council :
presentation by Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations and Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
9. Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Vecchiotti on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
10. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
11. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Fiandrotti on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.
Debate.

TUESDAY, 15th JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council :

Resumed debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

11 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of the French Republic.
3. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe :

Resumed debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. Disarmament :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Vohrer on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

WEDNESDAY, 16th JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

1. The Falklands crisis :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Cavaliere on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

11.30 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. Leister, Minister of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany.
3. Evolution of the situation in Poland:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Michel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Evolution of the situation in Poland :

Resumed debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. International aeronautical consortia – Conclusions drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982 :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

THURSDAY, 17th JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van Eekelen on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Outline booklet on WEU and its activities :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Berchem on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

Debate.

2. Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Stoffelen on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

Debate.

3. Revision of the Rules of Procedure :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Debate.

Vote on the draft resolution.

CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ORDINARY SESSION

*Evolution of the situation in Poland*REPORT¹

submitted to the Presidential Committee
on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Mr. Michel, Rapporteur*

*Draft Recommendation
on the evolution of the situation in Poland*

The Assembly,

Recalling its Order 53 and Recommendation 370;

Considering that the existence of a military dictatorship in Poland constitutes a flagrant violation of the final act of the Helsinki conference;

Considering that Poland's serious economic difficulties do not justify the replacement of the dialogue between the state authorities and Solidarity by a policy of repression;

Considering that the public acts of the Soviet Union reveal interference in the internal affairs of Poland and pressure on the Polish Government for the establishment of that dictatorship;

Noting that the situation thus created in Poland is such as to cause Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty to be applied;

Regretting that no member government of WEU has judged it necessary to examine in the framework of the Council the implications of this situation for the security of Europe;

Believing that as long as repression persists in Poland there can be no question of re-establishing normal relations with Poland and its allies, starting with the Soviet Union;

Firmly recalling that the re-establishment of such normal relations depends on :

- (a) the termination of martial law in Poland;
- (b) the release of all political prisoners and in particular of Solidarity members;
- (c) the resumption of the dialogue between the government, Solidarity and the Catholic church,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure close exchanges of views between the European and American members of the North Atlantic Alliance in order to co-ordinate measures taken and to be taken in respect of both Poland and the Soviet Union in accordance with the statement of the North Atlantic Council of 11th January 1982;

* In accordance with the provisions of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.

1. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to 1 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee: Sir Frederic Bennett (Chairman); MM. De Poi, Urwin (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Berrier, Bertile,*

Mrs. Boniver, MM. Conti Persini, van Eekelen, Gessner, Hanin (Alternate: Michel), Hardy, Kurt Jung, Lagneau, Lagorce, Lord McNair, MM. Mangelschots, Mommersteeg, Günther Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Thoss, Valiante, Vecchiatti, Wilquin.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

2. To this end, continue to work out in the most appropriate European framework a joint policy towards the Soviet Union and Poland, particularly in economic and financial matters, in both the long and short term;
3. Further, invite member countries to suspend economic and financial assistance to Poland as long as political freedom is not re-established in that country;
4. Also invite member countries to pursue and develop their humanitarian assistance to the Polish people insofar as it does not strengthen the authorities responsible for the military coup d'état on 13th December 1981;
5. Meet to follow closely the development of the situation in Poland and hold a continuing dialogue with the Assembly on this question, *inter alia* by answering without delay the statement communicated to it by the Presidential Committee on 8th January 1982;
6. Conduct talks with the countries of Eastern Europe on the application of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe particularly in connection with serious examination of events in Poland.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Michel, Rapporteur)

The explanatory memorandum, brought up to date, is in Document 915.

*Twenty-Seventh Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period
1st January to 31st December 1981*

INTRODUCTION

1. The Council of Western European Union transmit to the Assembly the Twenty-Seventh Annual Report on their activities, covering the period 1st January to 31st December 1981.

2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters:

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IV. Standing Armaments Committee	42
V. Public Administration Committee	45
VI. Budgetary and administrative questions	47

CHAPTER I

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY

Addressing the Assembly to present the Council's twenty-sixth annual report on behalf of the Chairman-in-Office, the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs for the United Kingdom, Mr. Hurd, said: "The Council continues to appreciate the rôle played by the Assembly in watching over the evolution of the problems of security and European union and in submitting its thoughts to governments for their attention. We believe that the standard of these reports is generally high and that the Assembly, which is the only parliamentary institution empowered to debate defence questions, exercises this prerogative with remarkable consistency and insight."

The importance the Council attach to the work of the Assembly was again stressed in their reply to Recommendation 365 on the application of the Brussels Treaty.

During 1981, the Council have been concerned to maintain close and constructive relations with the Assembly. To this end, they have continued their dialogue with it on questions relating to the application of the treaty including - in accordance with the undertaking given in 1972 and subsequently renewed - those dealt with by the member governments of WEU in other international fora.

A. Annual report of the Council to the Assembly

1. In their twenty-sixth annual report, the Council have sought to give as much information as possible on the various aspects of co-operation between the member states during 1980. A detailed report on the activities of the ministerial bodies of WEU was given. Some additional information on armaments control was provided to the Assembly in accordance with the procedure applied since 1971¹.

They noted with satisfaction that the Assembly had appreciated the content of this document.

2. Taking account of the wish expressed by the Assembly, the Council have done their utmost to expedite the procedure for preparing this twenty-seventh report.

1. Cf. Council reply to Written Question 123.

B. Assembly recommendations to the Council and written questions put to the Council by members of the Assembly

1. The Council took note, with interest, of the reports presented by Assembly committees during the two parts of the twenty-seventh ordinary session and carefully followed the debates on those reports.

2. The Council gave careful consideration to the seventeen recommendations¹ adopted by the Assembly during the second part of the twenty-sixth ordinary session and the first part of the twenty-seventh ordinary session and to five written questions² put by members of the Assembly in 1981.

3. They replied in a detailed manner to all these recommendations and questions.

Wherever possible, they also reported on activities in which the member states of WEU participate elsewhere.

Thus, they gave the Assembly a considerable amount of information on the consultations in which the representatives of the member states had taken part in the framework of European political co-operation and in the North Atlantic Council. They appreciate the Assembly's satisfaction in this connection.

In reply to the recommendations on co-operation in armaments matters, the Council referred to the work of the Independent European Programme Group, wherever they judged this possible. As they have pointed out from time to time, informing the Assembly on this raises a delicate problem, since the IEPG collects information, which is often confidential, provided by countries, some of which are not members of WEU. It is therefore essentially national parliamentarians who can be given information and this is the responsibility of each of the governments which participate in the activities of the IEPG.

4. The Council fully understand that the Assembly would like the time taken to reply to its recommendations or questions to be reduced. They have done their best to meet the Assembly's wishes. However, as the Assembly is aware, preparation of the best possible text requires thorough consultation between governments. Inevitably, in many cases, this will take some time.

1. Nos. 355 to 371.

2. Nos. 224 to 228.

C. *Informing the Assembly about the Standing Armaments Committee's study on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU*¹

1. A presentation of the economic study carried out by the SAC within the framework of its mandate was communicated to the Assembly on 21st May 1981. This document contains data for the years 1972 to 1977. The Council informed the Assembly that they would send it an updated version as soon as possible.

2. Further, in reply to Recommendation 365, the Council confirmed that, when the final report of the SAC was received, they would not fail to consider how the Assembly might be informed of its content and principal conclusions.

D. *Meetings between the Council and Assembly bodies*

Three informal meetings took place at The Hague on 3rd June 1981, after the ministerial session held under the chairmanship of Mr. van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. On the same day, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council also received the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee of the Assembly.

1. The members of the Council met the Assembly Presidential Committee at a working lunch.

2. During the afternoon, the Council met two Assembly Committees in succession and discussed with each the matters which it had proposed. Exchanges of views with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments covered security in Europe and in the Mediterranean, the question of theatre nuclear weapons, and European co-operation on armaments matters, and those with the General Affairs Committee covered the activities of WEU, political co-operation in Europe, security in the Persian Gulf, and Poland.

On this occasion, explanations were given to both Committees regarding the presentation of the SAC's economic study, which the Council had recently forwarded to the Assembly.

E. *Meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on joint production of armaments*

1. The purpose of meetings of this body, which was set up in 1959 and comprises the

1. See also points D and E of this chapter.

members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the members of the Standing Armaments Committee and Council representatives, is to provide the Committee with information of a technical nature on questions concerning armaments co-operation dealt with by the SAC.

2. The eleventh meeting of the sub-committee was held in Paris on 16th November 1981, under the chairmanship of Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, for the parliamentary side and, for the Standing Armaments Committee, Mr. Armstrong, Chairman-in-Office of that body; the Council were represented by the Secretary-General of WEU. This meeting was concerned firstly with the current work of the SAC and its working groups and, secondly, with the SAC's study of the armaments sector of industry in the WEU member countries. It brought out the high degree of technical complexity of the problems dealt with by the SAC.

F. *Speeches to the Assembly by Ministers of member governments*

1. The Council are well aware of the importance which the Assembly attaches to participation in its debates by Ministers, who attend whenever their numerous commitments allow.

2. In June 1981, Mr. Hurd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs for the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly to present, on behalf of the Chairman-in-Office, the Council's twenty-sixth annual report. In his capacity as a member of the British Government, he also spoke on the main aspects of his country's defence policy.

In December, three government representatives responsible for defence analysed and commented upon current questions relating to European security, before the Assembly: Mr. Lagorio, the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Italy, Mr. Blaker, Minister of State for the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom, and Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the Minister of Defence of the French Republic. On this occasion, Mr. Lagorio commented that WEU was the only institution in which there was continuity in discussing and dealing with security and it was the only truly "European" link for defence and armaments control matters. He said this was why Italy regarded WEU as an important European forum that could not be given up. Mr. Blaker confirmed that the United Kingdom would stand by its modified Brussels Treaty commitment and

maintain 55,000 troops in the British Army of the Rhine. Mr. Lemoine stressed that, in his government's view, the authentically European institution of WEU, set up by a specific treaty, the topicality of which no one could question, must have a special rôle with regard to European security. He said it was the organisation within which France would wish to discuss the

aims of her policy in this field. In the light of the needs and opportunities of the moment, the Minister made some suggestions to the Assembly.

Following their speeches, Ministers answered numerous questions put to them by members of the Assembly.

CHAPTER II

ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL

Introduction

1. In 1981, the Council met at ministerial level in The Hague on 3rd June under the chairmanship of Mr. C. van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

They held sixteen meetings at permanent representative level. Their working group met twenty-three times.

2. In accordance with their mission, the Council ensured that the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols were applied and observed.

In pursuing their activities, they were concerned both to ensure proper implementation of the obligations defined by the treaty and – as is indeed required by the treaty – to avoid duplication of work with that in which the member states of WEU participate, in other international fora.

Taking account particularly of co-operation among the Ten, within the North Atlantic Council and in the framework of the Independent European Programme Group, they have kept their sphere of activities within the limits observed in previous years.

Various aspects and phases of the implementation of the Paris Agreements have appeared twenty-three times on the Council's agenda.

On 3rd June 1981, the Ministers discussed the development of East-West relations since their previous meeting. They had an exchange of views on the situation in the Mediterranean. They also considered the progress of the Standing Armaments Committee's study on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU.

4. The dialogue with the Assembly¹, which constitutes an important part of the Council's activity, was continued.

5. Within the framework of this dialogue they reaffirmed on a number of occasions the member countries' attachment to the modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols and their determination to fulfil the obligations they have entered into. In reply to concern expressed and views put forward by the Assembly in its

1. See Chapter I.

Recommendations 358 on the future of European security and 365 on the application of the Brussels Treaty, the Council stated in particular:

The member states of WEU remain convinced of the importance attached both to realising the objectives of the treaty, in which they expressed their resolve to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe, and maintaining the commitment to collective self-defence which they made in Article V.

Article VIII gives the Council adequate scope to discuss a wide variety of subjects. The Council continue to be flexible and have sufficiently wide powers to embrace any debate relevant to the application of the treaty.

The participation of Ministers of Defence, or their representatives, in Council meetings would certainly not be without its value. This would be possible where matters which are the direct responsibility of these Ministers were being discussed; where this is not the case, their participation in essentially political debates would not appear to be strictly necessary.

In the matter of armaments control, the Council are aware of the fact that in applying the provisions of Protocol No. III and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situation in Europe. Thus, in accordance with the procedures laid down in Article II of Protocol No. III, which are still available, Annex III of this Protocol has been amended on several occasions since 1961.

Furthermore, it is clear that if the Council considered at a given moment that it would be appropriate to review the list contained in Annex IV of Protocol No. III, this could only be done by following the procedure laid down in Article V of this Protocol. The question of the pattern of field control measures could also arise, for example in the form of an examination of the present level of sampling used for verifying the member countries' declarations.

Finally, the Council are still willing to improve European consultation and co-operation in the sphere of armaments, "with a view to finding joint solutions which would assist governments of member countries in meeting their equipment requirements" (Article 10 of the decision of the Council of 7th May 1955 setting up the Standing Armaments Committee).

A. *Political questions*

1. *East-West relations*¹

(a) At their meeting at ministerial level, held in The Hague on 3rd June 1981, the Council discussed in depth developments in East-West relations since their previous meeting.

They were mainly concerned with multilateral aspects of the question. However, as at every WEU ministerial meeting, the German delegation reported on the state of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the countries of Eastern Europe, in particular with the German Democratic Republic.

Ministers noted with concern that East-West relations were still seriously impaired as a result of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and were being subjected to new tensions; in this connection, they referred, among other matters, to the continued increase in Soviet military potential and the uncertainty over Poland's future.

They stressed that the improvement in these relations which was desired by their governments required that the Soviet Union should, by taking tangible measures, show restraint and responsibility in international affairs.

They stated that their governments, together with their western partners, would continue the dialogue begun with the USSR and its allies and would continue to work to bring about genuine détente, based on stable foundations, indivisible and world-wide.

On the subject of Poland, Ministers stressed their governments' firm determination that the principles enshrined in the final act of Helsinki should be respected by all the signatory states.

In conclusion, the Council noted the great importance members attached to continued close co-operation between Europeans and western countries in order to adopt common positions.

(b) With this in view, the governments of the member states of WEU played an active part in the consultation which took place throughout 1981, in the framework of European political co-operation and within the Atlantic Alliance on matters connected with East-West relations, two of them in particular which the Council discussed with the Assembly on various occasions: the situation in Poland; and the CSCE negotiations in Madrid.

(i) In their twenty-sixth annual report, the Council restated the position expressed by the European Council in Luxembourg on 2nd

December 1980, with regard to Poland. That Council, in a statement published at the conclusion of its meeting in Maastricht on 23rd and 24th March 1981, reaffirmed the need for Poland to solve her internal problems in a peaceful manner and without outside interference, in the interest of the Polish people and also of stability in Europe. It underlined again the obligation of all states signatory to the Helsinki final act to base their relations with that country on the strict application of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the final act. It emphasised that any other attitude would have very serious consequences for the future of international relations in Europe and throughout the world.

A statement along the same lines was made by the Ministers of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, at the conclusion of their first meeting of the year, in Rome on 4th and 5th May.

In October, in their reply to Assembly Recommendation 370, the Council referred to the position thus expressed by their members, together with their partners in the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance.

Referring to the economic aid already accorded to Poland by the WEU member countries, they pointed out that these countries had responded positively to Polish requests and that, in addition to the provision of new credits, they had agreed to a substantial rescheduling of Polish debt repayments in 1981. They noted that, in addition to this, the European Community had, in response to specific requests, made available large amounts of Community food-stuffs to Poland at special prices and member states had assisted with credits to purchase these.

In a statement published in London on 27th November, the European Council reaffirmed the will of the member states of the European Community to support Poland's efforts to revive her economy.

The North Atlantic Council, at the conclusion of its meeting on 11th and 12th December, reiterated its earlier statement and stressed that the allies remained totally attached to the human dimension of détente and thus to the tangible benefits which it must offer to the individual.

Immediately following the grave measures taken by the Polish leaders on 13th December, the representatives of the WEU member countries joined in consultations within the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 14th December, in the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 14th and 16th December and among the Foreign Ministers of the European Community who met on 14th and 15th December in London. At

1. See also point 2 below and Part B, point 4, of this chapter.

their meeting on 16th December, in replying to Written Question 228 put to them by the President of the Assembly, the Council expressed their deep concern over the development of the situation in Poland. They drew the Assembly's attention to the declaration by the Ten, the text of which is attached at annex ¹.

The governments of the WEU member countries have maintained close contact with their partners in the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance and held further consultations with them in the closing days of the year under consideration.

(ii) With regard to the CSCE negotiations in Madrid, to which they referred in their replies to Recommendations 361 (points 2 to 4), 366 (point 9) and 367 (point 5), the Council wish to point out the following:

During the first phase of the Madrid meeting, held from 11th November to 19th December 1980 and devoted to reviewing the implementation of the final act of Helsinki since the Belgrade meeting, the representatives of the WEU member countries had made firm statements asserting the importance their governments attached to full implementation of the principles and provisions of the act.

Their speeches during the second phase of this meeting, which opened on 27th January 1981 and was devoted to the discussion of new proposals, were guided by their determination to achieve substantial and balanced results, in the form of progress in all spheres of the final act of Helsinki and in particular in the field of human rights, human contacts, information and military aspects of security.

As to the latter field, the WEU member countries fully supported the French proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe to negotiate initially militarily significant verifiable and binding confidence-building measures applying to the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. Together with the other western countries, they endeavoured to obtain an agreement by the thirty-five participants in the Madrid meeting to convene a conference with a specific mandate incorporating the above criteria. However, negotiations on this question came to a standstill because of the difficulties made by the USSR about accepting unconditionally for all its territory situated in Europe the same treatment as had been agreed already by the other participating European states, i.e. the Soviet Union would not accept without conditions extension to the Urals of the area of application of the measures to be negotiated at the conference.

Since it was not possible to complete the work of the Madrid conference by the end of

the year as the western countries had hoped, the meeting was adjourned on 18th December. The serious events in Poland, concerning which a very large number of delegations made firm statements, cast a shadow over the closing debates.

2. Afghanistan

The member countries of WEU have played an active part in efforts made within the framework of European political co-operation to encourage a political settlement of the Afghan question, and in consultations within the Atlantic Alliance during 1981. Their position was explained to the Assembly on two occasions during the year under consideration.

In their reply to Recommendation 361 in May, the Council recalled that, since the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops, the member countries of WEU had unceasingly and vigorously denounced this act of intervention which had been condemned by the great majority of the international community and which constituted an unacceptable violation of the United Nations Charter and the principles enshrined in the final act of Helsinki. The Council declared:

The WEU member states call for an immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and call upon all parties concerned to work for the urgent achievement of a political solution and the creation of the necessary conditions which would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honour. They reconfirm the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever. They repeat that preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and neutral and non-aligned character of Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solution of the problem.

The Council stressed that member countries of WEU were aware that the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet troops brought severe hardship to the Afghan people and caused a massive outflow of refugees. They reaffirmed their readiness to take and to support any initiative designed to promote a political solution which would provide for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, ensure the free exercise by the Afghan people of the right of self-determination and enable Afghanistan to recover its traditional position as an independent, neutral and non-aligned state. The Council noted that it was in this spirit that they welcomed the initiative which formed the

1. See Annex I.

subject of the United Nations resolution of 20th November 1980, and that which had been put forward by France.

In their reply to Recommendation 371, in November 1981, the Council said they welcomed the initiatives taken by the Islamic Conference, the European Council and the United Nations Secretary-General to promote a political solution in accordance with the two resolutions which had been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.

The Council recalled the proposals put forward by the European Council, in its declaration of 30th June 1981, the text of which is attached at annex¹; they noted that these proposals remained on the table and offered a reasonable, practical framework for moving towards an internationally acceptable settlement of this problem. They said that, for their part, the member countries of WEU awaited, from the Soviet Union, a positive and constructive response to this initiative.

The Council told the Assembly they believed that one of the major elements of the situation in Afghanistan was the existence of a nationwide movement of resistance to Soviet intervention and to the setting-up of a puppet régime in Kabul. They noted that the opposition of the Afghan people to the Soviet invasion had also been demonstrated by the continuing exodus of Afghan refugees into Pakistan and Iran.

They expressed their regret that the International Red Cross had not been allowed to carry out its humanitarian mission in Afghanistan.

The Council also wish to recall that within the framework of the United Nations, the member countries of WEU voted for a resolution which was adopted by an overwhelming majority by the General Assembly on 18th November 1981 and which confirmed its two previous resolutions.

Furthermore, the European Council, at its meeting of 26th and 27th November in London, confirmed its conviction that the proposals of 30th June 1981 offered a reasonable and practical approach to the solution of the Afghan question.

3. *Situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East*

(a) The Council, replying to Assembly Recommendation 366 on European security and the Mediterranean, recalled that WEU member states were trying to dissuade those countries which were not members of NATO from

granting port facilities to the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. They noted their particular concern at recent attempts by the USSR to acquire important naval bases in the Mediterranean. In 1980 a member state of WEU undertook to support the status of neutrality declared by the Government of Malta (which is thus pledged not to permit any foreign military base on its territory and, except in certain exceptional circumstances, not to grant to foreign armed forces the use of any of its military facilities). The same member state invited other countries to make similar declarations recognising the neutrality of the island, which still plays a military and strategic rôle of primary importance. The Council pointed out that although the subject of recognition of Maltese neutrality remained a matter that primarily concerned Mediterranean powers, it was a matter of no less importance to the international community.

Finally, the Council declared that they would ask the member governments to harmonise national policies as far as possible, within the various Community bodies, to contribute to peace and security in the Mediterranean region.

(b) As was stated in the Council's reply to Recommendation 371 on the situation in the Gulf and security, the member countries of WEU, concerned about the preservation of stability in this area, have noted the wish of the Gulf states to co-operate among themselves without asking for external support. They therefore heartily welcomed the creation, in May 1981, of the Gulf Co-operation Council and the objectives which it is pursuing.

They recognised the need for continuous and close contacts of every kind between Europe and the Gulf states, as evidenced by the increased number of high-level visits between the two regions. They attached much importance to the continuation of contacts through such means as the Euro/Arab dialogue.

The Council stated that Europe's greatest contribution to the stability of the Gulf can be made by the continuation of European Council efforts on the Arab/Israel dispute, the core of which is the Palestinian problem and which remains the primary concern of all Arab Gulf states.

(c) The member states of WEU have played an active part in the efforts made during 1981 within the framework of European political co-operation to encourage a comprehensive peace settlement of the Middle East conflict.

As the Council noted in their reply to Recommendation 361, the Foreign Ministers of the Ten, meeting in Brussels on 20th January, instructed the Netherlands Presidency to conti-

1. See Annex II.

nue the European action carried out on the basis of the declaration adopted by the European Council at Venice on 13th June 1980 and the decisions taken at its meeting of 1st and 2nd December 1980 in Luxembourg.

On the occasion of WEU's ministerial meeting in The Hague, on 3rd June 1981, Mr. van der Klaauw referred to the visit he had made to the Middle Eastern states bordering the Mediterranean, as a part of his information mission.

The European Council, meeting in Luxembourg on 29th and 30th June, noted the report of the Presidency as well as Mr. van der Klaauw's oral comments on his contacts with the parties concerned with the Middle East conflict. It instructed Ministers to elaborate further the practical possibilities available to Europe to make an effective contribution towards a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, through internal reflection, appropriate contacts being maintained with all parties concerned, including the United States. As regards the attack by the Israeli air force on the Iraqi nuclear plant on 7th June 1981 the European Council could only endorse the resolution adopted unanimously by the United Nations Security Council.

The governments of the member countries of WEU learned with deep sorrow of the tragic death of President Sadat on 6th October. They paid tribute to him individually and, together with their partners in the European Community, at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Ten, on 12th and 13th October in London. The Ministers stressed the great importance of the preservation of internal stability in Egypt and expressed their countries' support for the Egyptian Government and people. They also asked Lord Carrington, the President-in-Office, to visit Prince Fahd, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, to study the proposals for a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East which had been put forward by the Head of the Saudi Government at the beginning of August. In this connection, they confirmed their governments' firm attachment to the principles set forth in the Venice declaration, namely the right of all states in the region to exist in security and the right of the Palestinian people to justice and self-determination.

On 23rd November 1981, in a declaration the text of which is attached at annex¹, the Governments of France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom stated that they had decided to accede to the request of the Governments of Egypt, Israel and the United States to contribute to the multinational force in Sinai; they specified how their participation in this

1. See Annex III.

force was to be understood. A declaration by the Ten on this subject was published on the same day; this text is also attached at annex¹.

At its meeting in London on 26th and 27th November, the European Council noted Lord Carrington's report on his talks in Riyadh and discussed the latest developments in the Middle East situation.

Following the decision taken on 14th December by the Israeli Government and the Knesset to extend Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to occupied Syrian territory in the Golan Heights, the member countries of WEU, together with their partners in the European Community, stated that they strongly deplored this decision. In the statement made by the Foreign Ministers of the Ten following their meeting of 14th and 15th December in London, it was noted that such an extension, which was tantamount to annexation, was contrary to international law and therefore invalid in their eyes. It was observed that this step prejudiced the possibility of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and was bound to complicate further the search for a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East to which the member states of the European Community remained committed.

France and the United Kingdom, as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, supported the resolution unanimously adopted by that body on 17th December, which enjoined Israel to rescind her decision.

(d) As they stated in their reply to Recommendation 371, the Council welcomed the efforts being made to solve the Iran/Iraq war by the Islamic Conference, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and by the Non-Aligned Movement. They were ready to support any measures which seemed likely to be effective in bringing an end to the hostilities and which could command the necessary international approval.

The Council noted that on 23rd September 1980, immediately after the worsening of the conflict between Iran and Iraq, the Foreign Ministers of the Nine at their meeting in New York had recalled, in a declaration concerning the conflict, the supreme importance that the entire international community attached to ensuring the freedom of navigation in the Gulf which should in no way be impeded.

B. Defence questions

It will be seen, from Chapters I and II (introduction and part A) of this report, that the Council have been very much concerned,

1. See Annex III.

during 1981, with problems of defence and security as they affect member states.

Thus Mr. Hurd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, in the course of presentation of the Council's twenty-sixth annual report to the Assembly, drew attention to the significance of the modified Brussels Treaty. He declared that the treaty, Article V of which required the member states to offer each other mutual assistance in the event of aggression, was one of the keystones of the security system embracing the signatory countries. The validity of all the provisions of the treaty and its protocols, and the determination of member countries to carry them out, had been reaffirmed in the annual report. He added that the Council had continued to keep a close watch on the application of the provisions of the treaty and its protocols concerning the levels of member states' forces, and the procedures for that purpose had functioned normally.

In answer to a question concerning the level of the British Army of the Rhine, Mr. Hurd had the opportunity to confirm that it was the intention of the United Kingdom Government to maintain its obligations under the treaty.

The Council were gratified by the manner in which their annual report was received by the Assembly, and specifically in the reply by the latter on the application of the Brussels Treaty, which formed the basis for Recommendation 365.

In their reply to this recommendation, the Council again noted with satisfaction the positive rôle played by the Assembly, which is the sole European parliamentary body where members of national parliaments debate, under the terms of a treaty, the problems of security common to the member states.

1. *Level of forces of member states*

(a) *Forces under NATO command*

The maximum levels of ground, air and naval forces which member states of WEU place under NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty. Article III of the protocol provides for a special procedure, if necessary, to enable these levels to be increased above the limits specified in Articles I and II.

So that they may satisfy themselves that the limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II are not exceeded, the Council receive information every year concerning the

levels in question, in accordance with Article IV of that protocol. This information is obtained in the course of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and is transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking officer designated by him to that end.

The information, as at the end of 1980, was conveyed by Lt.-Gen. M. Gariboldi, whose appointment, in succession to Vice-Amiral U. Masetti, as SACEUR's representative to the Council, was notified to the latter in February. The Council examined this information at their meeting on 1st April. Similar information giving the status of these forces as at the end of 1981 was called for in December, and it is expected that the presentation to the Council will be made at the usual time.

Futhermore, the Council take the necessary steps to implement the procedure laid down in their resolution of 15th September 1956, whereby the levels of forces under NATO command are examined in the light of the annual review.

For the year 1980, the permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, at a meeting held on 26th January in Brussels, examined the levels of forces of WEU member states and reported to the Council.

The Council, at their meeting of 11th March, noted that the level of forces of the member states of WEU, as set out in the NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II as at present in force. They also took note of a declaration on French forces made by the representative of France.

The same procedure is under way for the year 1981.

(b) *Forces under national command*

The strength and armaments of forces of member states maintained on the mainland of Europe and remaining under national command – internal defence and police forces, forces for the defence of overseas territories, and common defence forces – are fixed each year in accordance with the procedure specified in the agreement signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 in implementation of Article V of Protocol No. II.

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By means of the methods set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have been able, for the 1981 control year, to carry out

their obligations under Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty concerning levels of forces.

2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe

In accordance with the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 331, the Government of the United Kingdom have informed the Council that the average number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1981 in accordance with the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty was 58,885. The

continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty there. In 1981 there were on average 1,899 men in Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated, these units would be speedily returned to their duty station in an emergency affecting NATO.

Furthermore, in accordance with the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 348, the Government of the United Kingdom have informed the Council that the strength of the United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force in 1981 was:

<i>Rôle</i>	<i>Aircraft/Equipment</i>	<i>Squadrons</i>
Strike/Attack	Buccaneers	2
	Jaguars	4
Offensive support	Harrier	2
Reconnaissance	Jaguars	1
Air defence	Phantom	2
	Bloodhound surface to air missiles	1
	Rapier surface to air missiles	4
Air transport	Puma	1
Ground defence	RAF Regiment	1

3. Study of the situation of the armaments sector of industry in member countries¹

The Council, at both permanent and ministerial level, have kept this question under review.

With regard to the economic part of the study, the Head of the International Secretariat of the SAC, reporting to the Permanent Council on 29th April on the activities of the Committee, recalled that its second section was to be prepared on the basis of data resulting from the survey made by the Independent European Programme Group. He added, in connection with the matter of updating the legal and economic parts already prepared, that in his view the need to carry out this work clearly appeared to be in the interests of governments.

At their meeting on 20th May, the Permanent Council approved the draft of the declassified version of the SAC's economic study, which was forwarded to the Assembly on 21st May.

On the occasion of the ministerial meeting held on 3rd June in The Hague, Ministers agreed to the updating of the declassified version of the study, the data in which stopped at 1977.

1. See also Chapters I and IV.

On 4th July, the Permanent Council agreed that the data in the legal study and in the first part of the economic study should be updated, on the basis of work to be carried out by the International Secretariat of the SAC using public documentation internationally available.

4. Assembly recommendations

As stated in Chapter I of this report, detailed replies providing a considerable amount of information were given by the Council to the recommendations adopted by the Assembly, eight of which were concerned with defence questions.

(a) The theme of European security ran strongly through the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly.

Thus, in their reply to Recommendation 359, the Council, recalling that peace and stability are best preserved by a policy based on deterrence, defence and détente, underlined their continuous awareness of the allied dimension of all security issues. They noted that the close and intensive consultations provided for by the allied countries which participated in the decision of 12th December 1979 in the field of both defence and arms control and disarmament were welcomed. They stressed that the

aim of negotiations on arms control was to improve security by attaining a stable balance at the lowest possible level.

The Council also welcomed the fact that, as a result of the continuous implementation of both elements of the December decision, serious preliminary discussions towards agreed limitations of theatre nuclear forces (TNF), now renamed intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), could be started between the Soviet Union and the United States. These discussions served to continue the SALT process which was of great importance for the achievement of a stable balance in the nuclear field and for the stabilisation of East-West relations in general.

The Council took the opportunity afforded by their reply to Recommendation 366 on European security and the Mediterranean to recall that although the obligations of the NATO members remained limited to the area indicated by the treaty, consultations among the allies were however envisaged in the event of a crisis outside the NATO perimeter, likely to have repercussions on the security of its member states. Member countries of the integrated military structure had recognised that the possible deployment of forces of some NATO partners outside NATO boundaries might require increased defence efforts of others within the NATO area.

The urgent need to modernise Greek and Turkish military power, the long-term defence plan itself, and the issue of naval bases and port facilities in the Mediterranean were also stressed by the Council.

(b) Although Recommendation 361 was concerned chiefly with the political implications for Europe of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Council's reply inevitably touched on the military aspects of the situation that had arisen as a result of the Soviet Union's action. The Council recalled that NATO had clearly shown its will to improve its military potential, particularly following the events in Afghanistan and the Gulf. Implementation of the modernisation part of the decision of December 1979 about theatre nuclear weapons in Europe was being continued by the countries concerned in line with the time-table designed to see the entry into service of the first systems by the end of 1983. The countries concerned again stressed the importance of pursuing armaments modernisation and arms control negotiations as a parallel and complementary approach.

The Council also reiterated their support for the SALT process and referred to proposals that had been tabled by the West on MBFR.

(c) The problem of strategic arms limitation and the rôle of the British and French nuclear forces was the subject of Recommendation 360.

Having, in their reply, recognised the importance of maintaining deterrence through political determination, adequate military strength and cohesion, whilst at the same time pursuing effective balanced and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament, the Council recalled that the member states of the Alliance "supported further negotiations and remained deeply committed to the SALT process as a way of achieving meaningful mutual limitations on United States and Soviet strategic nuclear forces that would help enhance western security and preserve East-West stability".

The Council also referred to the terms of the Ottawa declaration of 1974, whereby it was recognised that the British and French nuclear forces were "capable of playing a deterrent rôle of their own, contributing to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance".

(d) Answering Recommendation 355 on the subject of the northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands, the Council acknowledged the vital rôle of naval forces in the defence of the area and welcomed the attention which the Assembly's report focused on the rapidly increasing maritime capability of the Soviet forces. They also acknowledged the value of long-term national naval construction programmes, mountain and arctic warfare training, and agreements for stockpiling ammunition and heavy equipment.

(e) The important implications of chemical and nuclear attacks were underlined by the Council in their reply to Recommendation 356. The need for a proper defensive capability in order to deal effectively with these implications was realised.

Observing that no member country of WEU was in possession of chemical weapons, the Council stated that they shared the Assembly's concern about the imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in this field. In their opinion an effective international agreement to ban the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons should be sought with great vigour. The Council noted that, in a resolution, which met with their full approval, the United Nations General Assembly had urged the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations on a multilateral convention on chemical weapons as a matter of high priority.

(f) With regard to collaborative arrangements for the production of high technology military equipment (Recommendation 362), the Council referred, inter alia, to the work of the IEPG.

The latter had intensified its efforts towards implementing the transatlantic dialogue, and member states were using this organisation to achieve, to the maximum extent possible, interoperability and standardisation of defence equipment.

(g) In replying to Recommendation 365 on the application of the Brussels Treaty, the Council stated that they had no objection to examining, on a case-by-case basis, the possibility of co-operation between the SAC and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. However, they could only give their agreement to such co-operation for studies relating to subjects within the competence of the SAC as defined in the decision of 7th May 1955.

5. SHAPEX 81

On 7th and 8th May, the Council attended SHAPEX 81 at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. This conference, whose theme was "Allied Command Europe in the 80s", gave representatives a useful opportunity to be kept informed on a variety of topics that were important for their work.

C. *Scientific, technological and aerospace questions*

The Council noted with interest the reports produced by the Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Committee and have followed closely the Assembly's debates on these reports.

In their replies to Recommendations 363, 368 and 369, the Council stated that their concerns and views broadly corresponded with those of the Assembly; as in previous years, they provided the Assembly with detailed information regarding the policies of WEU member countries on energy, aeronautics, and space questions.

1. *The energy problem*

(a) In their reply in April to Recommendation 363 on energy and security, the Council stated inter alia the following:

The member countries of WEU are fully aware of the practical constraints on the development of an energy policy common to all western countries. They are making the maximum effort, both in the European Community and together with other western countries including the United States, Canada and Japan in the framework of the International Energy

Agency (IEA), towards the adoption of convergent energy measures.

They have acknowledged the need to move towards energy self-sufficiency by reducing dependence on imported oil, more rational and efficient use of energy, and where possible, the development of alternative sources. To this end, they have agreed energy policy guidelines for the decade to 1990 and they have agreed action on energy conservation. Member states are also pursuing research and development activity in the energy sector. The key rôle of economic energy pricing in achieving agreed objectives has been recognised.

The energy ministers of the member countries of the IEA, as reported in the communiqué resulting from their meeting of 9th December 1980, agreed with the main conclusions of the Coal Industry Advisory Board (CIAB) and undertook to examine closely the recommendations put forward and adopt, if appropriate, the required measures.

In line with the results of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) study, which highlighted the need to apply techniques leading to the maximum economies in the use of uranium, most member countries agreed on the need for wider use of fast breeder reactors and on making provision also for the possibility of thermal recycling of plutonium. The EEC also demonstrated its sympathy with this orientation by approving the three-point nuclear plan.

In order to ensure the continuity of supply of energy and raw materials as much as possible, the Council consider diversification of sources of supply to be desirable. The question of imports of energy from Eastern European countries is to be carefully examined.

In their declaration of 23rd September 1980 dealing with the conflict between Iran and Iraq, the Foreign Ministers of the member countries of the Community emphasised, inter alia, the need for freedom of navigation in the Gulf to be respected.

(b) It should be added that at its meeting of 27th October 1981, the Council of Energy Ministers of the European Communities approved a procedure applicable in the event of limited or temporary shortage of oil supplies, as well as a series of measures that could be adopted according to the situation. It was agreed that these procedures and measures would be re-examined in the light of consultations to be held with other western countries. They would be additional to the machinery already set up a few years ago within the framework of the European Communities and of the IEA, to ensure the supply of oil to the countries concerned in the event of a crisis.

2. *European aeronautics*

As recalled in their reply to Recommendation 368 on the European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments, the Council welcome the interest which the Assembly, by virtue of its competence in defence matters, shows in projects arising from European co-operation in the field of military aeronautics.

(a) As regards the future combat aircraft, they share the Assembly's view that it is necessary to design a technologically advanced multi-purpose aircraft able to meet the various forms of threat to which European countries may be subjected.

Having noted other matters of concern expressed by the Assembly regarding this aircraft, the Council made the following observations:

The development of co-operative armaments programmes is a long and arduous task calling for consensus at national level between industrial, economic, military and political interests. The countries concerned with the combat aircraft are fully apprised of the importance of flexibility and efficiency in organisation, taking into account its requirements. Co-operation in the matter of armaments, which is the fruit of pragmatic and patient efforts, naturally draws upon the lessons of the past, even if the programmes present themselves under the same configuration.

At the preliminary design stage, definition of characteristics and harmonisation procedures must involve using with maximum efficiency the already existing machinery for concerted action in the sphere of armaments and in particular the IEPG, the Conference of National Armaments Directors, the Standing Armaments Committee.

The future combat aircraft is notably the subject of intense tripartite discussions between the French, German and United Kingdom Governments. In addition, because of the interest shown by various European governments, a project group for this aircraft has been set up within the Independent European Programme Group, thus providing a vehicle for concerted action and exchanges of information. Although the interest of the various countries within the IEPG has been stressed and regularly reaffirmed, the fact remains that any further progress within this project group will be dependent on harmonisation of characteristics, a matter currently being discussed in detail between the military authorities and the staff of the armaments directors of the various countries.

(b) Furthermore, the Council informed the Assembly that talks had started in connection

with helicopters and transport aircraft. They stated that initial studies had led to the setting-up, within the IEPG, of an exploratory group whose terms of reference were to determine the long-term requirements of the various European countries in the matter of transport aircraft.

3. *Space questions*

The Council wish to recall the main elements of the detailed reply given in November to Recommendation 369 on the future of European space activities:

A common European programme for the 1980s has been presented by the Director-General of the European Space Agency, in which, as the Assembly is aware, several states, not members of WEU, also participate. This programme, which is preliminary in nature and had not yet been approved by the delegations of the various member states at the time when the Council replied to the Assembly, defines the guidelines of future European space policy.

Its principal limiting factor is the level of funding, fixed at 450 million accounting units per year (at 1979 price levels). The drawing-up of long-term European plans and the definition of the European space strategy must necessarily take account of this funding basis.

Europe is developing various remote sensing/earth observation programmes within both the ESA framework and the national framework. A microgravity research programme covering a period of five years has been finalised as an ESA optional programme. In addition, the execution of the Spacelab follow-on development programme has been approved by the ESA Council.

Through the development of the Ariane programme, Europe has acquired an independent and competitive launch capability for the coming decade. This European launch capability has led to an increase in requests for utilisation by both government and commercial users.

Following the final test flight (which took place on 20th December 1981) and the qualification of the launcher, Ariane will provide significant short-term capability (Series 1, 2 and 3) and a basis for subsequent improvements in services and costs through the development of possible successor series. A start has been made to the construction of a second launch site which will allow the present interval between successive launches to be considerably reduced and will represent a safeguard against the risk of accidental damage on the existing site.

The Council have also stated that a programme for the improvement of the Space-

lab system and for the development of experiments on retrievable shuttle-based platforms was currently under discussion. Studies were also being conducted on manned, unmanned, recoverable and non-recoverable systems as well as on a propulsion module with engines that can be switched on and off for in-flight low-orbit modifications.

The Council also pointed out that various programmes had been started or were in the project phase in the field of earth observation.

As regards meteorological satellites beyond the preoperational basis of Meteosat I and II, seventeen countries have for some time been considering the setting-up of Eumetsat, a European system of operational meteorological satellites.

For the study of earth resources, ESA intends to earmark 20 % of its budget and aims to meet user requirements with three or four types of programme: ocean monitoring, climatology, advanced earth surveillance, earth physics.

A related programme for a preoperational satellite (ERS-1) to be launched in 1987 is under discussion.

As regards advanced earth surveillance, ESA is studying in detail user requirements in order to present concrete proposals for specific programmes.

Finally, as regards communication satellites, the approved programmes are in the implementation phase: ECS and MARECS, launch and exploitation of the multi-mission satellite within the framework of ESA or on a national or bilateral basis; new communications missions and techniques for linking with the ground segment.

ESA together with its member states is actively participating in the preparation of the second conference on the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space, Unispace 82, which will be held in Vienna from 9th to 21st August 1982. In this context, various publicity operations will be started in order to familiarise the general public with the current and potential advantages offered by space technology and its applications in furthering economic and social development.

In addition, the Council noted that the possibility was being considered by some member states of convening in due course a space conference at ministerial level aimed at providing, at the highest level, the guidelines for a European space policy designed to meet future scientific and industrial requirements. Thus, as the Council pointed out, fresh impetus would be given to co-operation within ESA

and to informing both the public and the European Parliament of the benefits and aims of the ESA programmes.

D. Secretariat-General

During the year 1981, the Secretary-General or his principal officers, representing Western European Union, attended a number of meetings of other international organisations, as observers, when questions of concern to WEU were under consideration.

As in previous years the most frequent of the Secretariat General's contacts were with authorities of the Atlantic Alliance and the Council of Europe.

ANNEX I

***Declaration on Poland
issued by the Foreign Ministers
of the member states of the European
Community on 15th December in London***

1. The Foreign Ministers of the member states of the European Community are concerned at the development of the situation in Poland and the imposition of martial law and the detention of trade unionists. They have profound sympathy for the Polish people in this tense and difficult time. They look to all signatory states of the Helsinki final act to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of the Polish People's Republic. They look to Poland to solve these problems herself and without the use of force, so that the process of reform and renewal can continue.
2. Foreign Ministers of the Ten are continuing to follow events in Poland with particular attention, and agreed to remain in close consultation on this question.

ANNEX II

***Declaration on Afghanistan
issued by the European Council
on 30th June 1981
in Luxembourg***

The European Council notes with deep concern that the situation in Afghanistan remains an important cause of international tension, that Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan and that the sufferings of the Afghan people continue to increase.

The European Council recalls its earlier statements, notably those issued at Venice on 13th June 1980 and Maastricht on 24th March 1981, which stressed the urgent need to bring about a solution which would enable Afghanistan to return to its traditional independent and non-aligned status free from external interference and with the Afghan people having the full capacity to exercise their right to self-determination. In keeping with the resolutions voted by the United Nations, the Islamic Conference and the New Delhi Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, the European Council has made it clear on several occasions that it will support any initiative which could lead to the desired result.

The European Council considers that the time has come for a fresh attempt to open the way to a political solution to the problem of Afghanistan. They therefore propose that an international conference should be convened as soon as possible, for example in October or November 1981, and that the conference should consist of two stages, each stage being an integral part of the conference.

The purpose of stage one would be to work out international arrangements designed to bring about the cessation of external intervention and the establishment of safeguards to prevent such intervention in the future and thus to create conditions in which Afghanistan's independence and non-alignment can be assured.

The European Council proposes that in due course the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, Pakistan, Iran and India and the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference, or their representatives, be invited to participate in stage one of the conference.

The purpose of stage two would be to reach agreement on the implementation of the international arrangements worked out in stage one and on all other matters designed to assure Afghanistan's future as an independent and non-aligned state.

Stage two would be attended by the participants in stage one together with representatives of the Afghan people.

The member states of the European Community will be ready at a later stage to make further proposals on the detailed arrangements for the proposed conference.

The European Council firmly believes that the situation in Afghanistan continues to demand the attention of the international community. It is convinced that this proposal offers a constructive way forward and therefore

calls on the international community to support it fully with the aim of reducing international tension and ending human suffering in Afghanistan.

ANNEX III

***Statements published on 23rd November 1981
by the Governments of France, Italy,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
and by the Ten***

Statement by the Four:

The Governments of France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, after consulting their partners in the Ten, have decided, subject to their constitutional procedures and to agreement on the practical and legal arrangements, to accede to the request of the Governments of Egypt, Israel and the United States to contribute to the multinational force and observers in Sinai.

The four governments state that their participation in the multinational force and observers in Sinai is based on the understanding that:

- (i) the force exists solely for the purpose of maintaining peace in Sinai following Israeli withdrawal. It has no other rôle;
- (ii) the force is being established in its present form in the absence of a United Nations decision on an international force and its position will be reviewed should such a decision become possible;
- (iii) participation by the four governments in the force will not be taken either as committing them to or excluding them from participation in such other international peacekeeping arrangements as have been or may be established in the region; and
- (iv) participation by the multinational force and observers in Sinai by the four governments is without prejudice to their well-known policies on other aspects of the problems of the area.

This decision is a symbol of our determination to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement following negotiations between the parties which would bring justice for all the peoples and security for all the states of the area. They welcomed the achievement of peace between Israel and Egypt as a first step towards that goal. Similarly we welcomed the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai as the first step towards the realisation of the call for withdrawal contained

in Security Council Resolution 242, which specifically declared inadmissible the acquisition of territory by war, and we believe that the international community has a duty to play its part, as necessary and with the agreement of the parties concerned, in peace arrangements in the Middle East. We are ready to participate also in such arrangements in the other territories currently occupied in the context of Israeli withdrawal. They regard their support for the arrangements associated with the implementation of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty as quite distinct from and independent of the rest of the Camp David process.

In addition, we wish to express our firm support for the Egyptian Government and people and our belief in the need for stability and continuity in Egypt. Our decision to participate in the MFO follows from the policy, as stated in the declaration issued at Venice in June 1980 and in subsequent statements. This policy, while insisting on guarantees for the security of the state of Israel, places equal

emphasis on justice for the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination. It also holds that the PLO must be involved in the process leading to a comprehensive peace.

We pledge ourselves to support the MFO. We also repeat that, together with our partners in the Ten, we will continue to work for the achievement of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East in all ways consistent with the principles to which they hold.

Statement by the Ten:

The Ten consider that the decision of France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to participate in the multinational force in Sinai meets the wish frequently expressed by members of the Community to facilitate any progress in the direction of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East on the basis of mutual acceptance of the right to existence and security of all the states in the area and the need for the Palestinian people to exercise fully its right to self-determination.

CHAPTER III

ARMAMENTS CONTROL AGENCY

A. Introduction

Under the terms of Article VII of Protocol No. IV, the Agency is required:

- firstly, to control the level of stocks of armaments held by member countries on the mainland of Europe, this control extending to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective;
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the undertakings given by the Federal Republic of Germany not to manufacture certain types of armaments on its territory are being observed.

In 1981, the Agency's activities continued at the same level as in previous years.

Subject to the comments made under point B.2 below, the programme drawn up by the Agency for 1981, the twenty-sixth year of control, was carried out satisfactorily.

B. General remarks on control activities**1. General operating methods**

The methods used by the Agency are determined by the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and by Council decisions on the subject. During the year under review they remained basically unchanged.

Within the Agency's terms of reference, controls from documentary sources serve mainly for checking levels of armaments as a whole. They also contribute to the preparation of field measures for the control of levels and of the non-production of certain categories of armaments. This aspect covers all activities concerned with processing, for the purposes defined above, any useful documentary material including, in particular, countries' replies to the Agency questionnaire, and the results of field control measures carried out earlier.

The execution of test checks, visits and inspections, and all that is linked with these functions, constitutes that part of control carried out physically wherever there are activities and stocks subject to control and, more generally, wherever this is necessary to ensure that the information supplied is correct and that undertakings are observed.

The control system is based primarily on controls from documentary sources, the purpose of field control measures being to verify, physically, the accuracy of all the information collected in implementation of Part III of Protocol No. IV.

Documentary and field control measures are complementary, and equally essential for the accomplishment of the Agency's task.

Traditionally, the annual report has always presented documentary and field control measures separately, in the interests of both convenience and clarity. However, it must not be forgotten that these measures together make up a single control function.

The Agency draws great benefit from the continuity of its methods; by its steadily-growing knowledge of the organisation of the forces of each member state, of the progress of armaments production or procurement programmes, the Agency develops its control activity efficiently and logically, both in the fixing of levels and quantities of armaments and in the choice and assessment of its control measures.

2. Atomic, chemical and biological weapons

The position described in earlier annual reports remained basically unchanged.

The activities of the Agency cover neither nuclear nor biological weapons.

The control activities dealt with in this chapter do not, therefore, concern these two categories of armaments.

In the case of chemical weapons, only non-production controls take place; no quantitative controls are made since the member states have always declared they possessed no such armaments (in this connection, for 1981, see point E.5 of this report).

C. Controls from documentary sources

In this field of control, the Agency studies the relevant documents with the main purpose of comparing the quantities of armaments held by the member states with the levels fixed by the Council and thus establishing whether these constitute appropriate levels within the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty.

1. Information processed by the Agency

During 1981 documentary controls were carried out in the normal way by studying, processing and collating documents and information obtained from various sources.

The principal and essential official source of information available to the Agency is the reply sent by each member state to its annual questionnaire. A scrupulous and thorough analysis of the results constituted again in 1981 a sufficiently firm working basis. The results of this analysis were cross-checked with the data communicated by NATO for the forces placed under its authority.

Furthermore, the information provided by the defence budgets published by the states on the budgetary resources assigned to production programmes relative to armaments subject to control enabled the Agency to keep itself informed of the financing of these programmes.

In addition to official documents, published material provides an appreciable source of information of great assistance to the Agency in accomplishing its studies. The study of this documentation is essential to the Agency in meeting one of the responsibilities assigned to it by Article XX of Protocol No. IV.

(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies by member states

Follow-up action on the replies to the questionnaire sent to member states as in all previous years was twofold. It is recalled that some of the facts reported are checked physically by means of field control measures. In addition, all the replies are studied by the Agency experts, and compared with the other sources of information available, including member countries' earlier replies to Agency or NATO questionnaires and budgetary documents.

(b) Request for annual information

Control of undertakings by one of the member states regarding the non-production of certain types of armaments takes the form of field control measures.

These measures are partly prepared from a study of documents based on the replies of the country concerned to the annual questionnaire and to the Agency's requests for annual information.

As in previous years, the replies received from the country concerned in 1981 were taken into consideration for selecting and preparing visits, inspections and agreed control measures for inclusion in the Agency's programme of control measures.

(c) Information provided by NATO

See point 2 (a) below.

*(d) Information provided by the United States of America and Canada
(Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV)*

The Agency received, through the Council, information supplied by the Governments of the United States and Canada concerning their programmes of external aid in military equipment to the forces of member states stationed on the mainland of Europe. Since 1966, these countries have provided no aid to the forces concerned.

(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information

The budgetary studies called for by Article VII, Protocol No. IV are one of the aspects of armaments control carried out by the Agency. These studies are not only based on the examination of the budgetary data supplied to the Agency by the governments of the member states, but also on the unclassified documents reproduced in the press and specialised periodicals and on the reports on the annual budgetary discussions in national parliaments.

In 1981 the Agency's studies in this field were pursued under the same conditions as in the past; after a general examination of defence expenditures, the attention of the Agency turned more particularly towards the use of credits assigned to production of controllable matériel.

The conclusions of budgetary studies in respect of control only serve to confirm the results of other work conducted by the Agency on the evolution of armament levels.

(f) Use of published material

By systematic study of the daily press, about sixty specialised magazines and books and catalogues published in the WEU member countries and in the United States, as well as bulletins from NATO and, as the case may be, from other international organisations, the Agency's Central Documentation Office made every effort to provide the Directorate and its experts with information of value for their activities.

The daily press review, prepared by the office, is also sent to the international secretariat of the SAC.

The constant acceleration of technical progress and the increasing complexity of co-production agreements, makes this documentary work increasingly important.

2. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments

(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces placed under NATO command

After receiving and processing the member states' replies to the annual questionnaire and studying the statistical reports furnished by the authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Article VII, 2 (a), of Protocol No. IV) and, in particular, by the NATO international staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, for the annual consultations with the NATO military authorities called for by Article XIV of Protocol No. IV.

As in previous years, these consultations included a joint study session at Casteau, on 27th November 1981, attended by Agency experts and the appropriate officers of SHAPE, and concluded with a meeting in Paris on 11th December 1981; at this meeting, which was attended by the representatives of the Agency, of SHAPE and of the international military staff of NATO, it was concluded that the levels of armaments for the forces of member states placed under NATO authority and stationed on the mainland of Europe represented appropriate levels for the control year 1981 within the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV, for those armaments over which the Agency has so far been placed in a position to exercise its mandate of controlling levels.

(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe

In accordance with the procedure in force for the implementation of the Agreement of 14th December 1957, the Agency supplied the Council with the elements of information gathered on the quantities of armaments for these forces, notified to the Agency by the member states in their replies to the 1981 questionnaire.

Under the same procedure, the Council accepted or approved for 1981 the maximum levels of armaments of these forces and notified the Agency accordingly for the purpose of the drawing-up of the final tables of the above-mentioned forces.

D. Field control measures

1. Principles governing the application of field control measures and general methods of execution

As recalled in the introduction to this chapter, the treaty requires the Agency:

- to satisfy itself that the undertakings not to manufacture certain types of armaments are being observed;
- to control the level of stocks of certain armaments.

Field control measures continued during 1981 on the same basis as during previous years, as an essential part of the Agency's work, in accordance with Article VII of Protocol No. IV.

(a) Initial studies

When drawing up its programme of control measures, the Agency again worked on the basic assumption, which is supported by the observations of previous years, that the undertakings and declarations of member countries are being honoured. The accumulated experience and information and the results of its controls in 1980 led the Agency to draw up a 1981 programme on the same scale and lines as those of recent years, i.e.:

- for non-production field control measures, a limited programme was considered adequate for verifying the undertakings of a member state not to manufacture specified armaments. The Agency took due account in forming this view of both the reply to its request for information from the member states concerned and of the cancellation of paragraph V of Annex III to Protocol No. III;
- for quantitative field control measures, sampling methods were again thought adequate to verify the accuracy of data declared by member states and so to provide an acceptable level of confidence in the Agency's documental control. No factor had emerged to vary significantly the distribution of the field control measures. However, national budget problems were already foreshadowing procurement delays or reductions in 1981 that might eventually reduce the number of control measures appropriate in production plants.

(b) Programme definition

Depot and unit stock patterns were reassessed in the light of known organisational changes and of declared re-equipment programmes. The basic programme of quantitative field control measures then emerging was examined in the light of production declarations. Where these studies suggested the need to extend such controls to factories, their production programmes were reviewed to ensure that each inspection was planned to take place at the most

appropriate time. For those factories where non-production and/or repair depot stock controls were also indicated, all types of control measures were co-ordinated, so keeping the frequency of the Agency's measures at these private concerns to an acceptable minimum.

To avoid duplication, Article VIII of Protocol No. IV provides for control measures to be undertaken by the appropriate NATO authorities themselves for those forces placed under NATO authority. Thus, the forces under the control of the Agency vary from country to country, a factor weighed in the preparation of the programme. Depots, to which Article VIII equally applies, are subject to different considerations. Since logistic support for forces under NATO authority remains a wholly national responsibility, difficulties could arise in defining which armaments in some depots are or will be assigned to forces under NATO authority and which armaments remain under national command. Accordingly, the system of joint Agency/SHAPE inspections introduced in, and used each year since, 1957 was again authorised for 1981 and certain of these depots were therefore programmed for inspection by Agency/SHAPE teams.

As the Convention for the due process of law¹ has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1981, as in previous years, to take the form of "agreed control measures".

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' notice. This agreement has never been withheld. The 1981 programme of control measures at privately-owned plants was therefore drawn up with full confidence that it could be implemented as in previous years.

In May, the Director presented the Agency's annual report for 1980 to the Council and stated his general intentions regarding the 1981 programme. Subsequently this programme was changed only in a few instances as a result of the replies to the Agency's questionnaire.

2. Methods, type and extent of field control measures

In 1981, no major changes were made in the Agency's established procedure for the conduct of its field control measures.

¹ Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957).

The teams selected for the Agency's field control measures all included one member of the nationality of the establishment visited, the Head of Mission and other experts all being of different nationalities.

The total number of control measures was seventy.

These measures fall broadly into the following categories:

- (a) quantitative control measures at depots;
- (b) quantitative control measures at units for forces under national command;
- (c) control measures at production plants:

- (i) quantitative control measures:

In 1981, these control measures were carried out at plants manufacturing aircraft, ammunition, missiles and matériel for rockets, and at shipyards;

- (ii) non-production control measures:

These control measures related to chemicals, missiles and certain aircraft.

It should be stressed that the reports on field control measures are protected by the most stringent security measures at all stages of their preparation, custody and analysis.

3. Conclusions

(a) In the fields where it is authorised to exercise its mandate, the Agency was able effectively to carry out its task of applying control measures. Such problems as arose in this very complex field of inspections were dealt with satisfactorily through the excellent relations maintained with the national authorities.

(b) On the basis of all the field control measures carried out in 1981, the Agency was able to report to the Council:

- the measures taken for the control of the stocks of armaments at depots, units under national command and production plants amply confirmed the data obtained from documentary control measures;
- the measures taken for the control of non-production revealed no production contrary to undertakings.

E. State and problems of control in certain particular fields

1. Armaments for land forces

(a) Current production and purchases

During 1981, member countries continued the modernisation of their land forces by renewing the equipment of front line formations and by relegating, more often than not, the replaced matériel to reserve units. Armaments were also being modernised by fitting guns of longer range and thus of larger calibres.

Within this setting two major features emerge: the completion of the mechanisation of the front line formations of the Federal Republic of Germany with the formation of a Panzer division and two Panzer Grenadier divisions; the reorganisation of BAOR by a redistribution of resources (matériel and other) without any reduction of combat potential.

Armoured matériel

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the full rate of production of the Leopard II battle tank (120 mm gun) has been attained this year. Production of the TPZ 1 six-wheeled armoured troop carrier has now reached the planned level.

The modernisation of M-48 battle tanks has been completed this year.

In France, the first of the AMX-30-B2 battle tanks has come off the production line. At the same time, a number of AMX-30-B tanks have been converted to AMX-30-B2 standards. Series production of two versions of the AMX-10 family of armoured vehicles is continuing with the AMX-10-P (infantry combat vehicle) and the AMX-10-RC (six-wheeled reconnaissance vehicle armed with 105 mm gun). A first light cavalry regiment has been equipped with the AMX-10-RC. Production of the Panhard Sagaie light armoured vehicle (six wheels, 90 mm gun) has been launched. A first combat regiment has been equipped with this vehicle.

In Italy the programme for the production of Leopard I for the national forces continues. These tanks will gradually replace the last M-47s.

Artillery matériel

The trilateral programme for the production of the FH-70 involving the United Kingdom, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany is almost completed. A self-propelled version (SP-70) is being developed and prototypes are being manufactured.

In France, pending delivery of the new 155 TR-F-1 towed gun, a number of regiments have replaced their old 105-SP guns by the 155-M-50 towed howitzer.

In the Netherlands, the modification of 8'' SP-M-110 and 175-SP guns into 8'' M-111-A2 howitzers has been completed.

Anti-tank matériel

Member states continued to allocate a significant proportion of their defence budgets to the purchase of second-generation anti-tank weapons.

Anti-aircraft matériel

The Guépard programme is complete. This gun tank is in service with the German, Belgian and Netherlands armies.

Ammunition

The member countries have continued their major efforts to improve stocks.

(b) Control activity in 1981

Quantitative control measures have been carried out at a number of depots, at several units under national command and at a plant manufacturing armaments for land forces.

2. Guided missiles and other self-propelled missiles

(a) Current production and purchases

In most WEU member countries, the rate of increase in stock levels of the most up-to-date missiles has been influenced somewhat by the effects of the worldwide economic recession with the inevitable reductions in defence expenditure. Nevertheless, there have been notable improvements in selected areas where deliveries of previously budgeted production orders have been maintained. Again the most discernible improvements have been in the anti-tank guided weapon field. Belgium has increased its stocks of Milan, France has acquired more Milan and Hot missiles, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom forces in Europe have improved their Milan and Tow holdings and the Netherlands have been equipping their forces with the United States Dragon missile system. With surface-to-air missiles, France has continued its build-up of Roland for the army and Crotale for the navy. The United Kingdom forces in Western Europe have increased their stocks of the shoulder-launched Blowpipe anti-aircraft missile and obtained more Rapier weapons. The Belgian army has been receiving its final delivery of improved Hawk missiles. The

Federal Republic of Germany has added to its holdings of the air-launched Kormoran anti-ship missile.

In conclusion, 1981 has been more a year of consolidation than one of major change, where member states of WEU have gradually improved their guided weapon capability and simultaneously ensured that their missile production facilities, where applicable, have maintained their viability during this period of economic depression.

The following guided missiles were manufactured in the member countries during 1981: Milan and Hot anti-tank missiles (produced jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany and France), SS-11 (France) and Mamba (produced jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy); the surface-to air missiles Roland (produced jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany and France), Indigo (Italy); Matra R-440, Crotale, Masurca and Hawk-Helip surface/ship-to-air missiles (France); the ship-to-ship missiles Exocet MM-38 and MM-40 (France), Sistel Seakiller MK-2 (Italy) and Otomat (produced jointly by France and Italy); the air-to-ship missiles Exocet AM-39 (France) and Kormoran (Federal Republic of Germany); the air-to-air missiles Matra Magic 550, Matra 530 and Matra Super 530 (France) and Sidewinder AIM-96 (produced jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom); the surface/ship-to-air missile Aspide (Italy); AS-12 air-to-surface missiles and Malafon anti-submarine rocket motors (France).

In addition to the guided weapons listed above, other self-propelled weapons were produced: Zuni air-to-ground rockets (Belgium), 110 mm Lars rockets (Federal Republic of Germany) and ASM-375 rockets (France).

During 1981 a number of guided weapons were imported by WEU member countries from the United States: Tow anti-tank weapons by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands; Dragon anti-tank and Harpoon ship-to-ship missiles by the Netherlands; Sidewinder air-to-air missiles by the Federal Republic of Germany.

(b) Control activity in 1981

Quantitative control measures were carried out at a number of depots, at units under national command and at plants. One of these measures was carried out jointly with a non-production control measure.

3. Air force armaments

(a) Current production and purchases

Numbers of combat aircraft have remained about the same but quality has been consider-

ably improved. Modern combat aircraft, fully equipped with computers and avionics produced after 1970, such as Jaguar, F-16, Tornado, etc., now represent 20 % of the total as against 14 % previously.

In France the Jaguar A and B programme was completed. In the Federal Republic of Germany the new Alpha and Tornado combat aircraft were delivered regularly in spite of some delays for budgetary reasons; in turn, a number of F-104G and G-91 aircraft were withdrawn from service. Italy has confirmed its order for a number of Tornado aircraft and the first series production model from the Aeritalia assembly line has been delivered to the air forces; at the Macchi plant, series production for export of the MB-339K combat aircraft has begun; the air force has also signed a contract with MBB for the purchase of the Kormoran anti-ship missile weapons system to equip the Tornado. The Netherlands have continued to replace F-104G aircraft by the F-16; the F-104 all-weather interceptors were all removed from service by the end of 1981. The United Kingdom air forces on the mainland of Europe have remained almost unchanged; the only development has been the appearance of the new Skyflash missile.

(b) Control activity in 1981

Control measures were carried out at depots, at a number of units under national command and in factories. One of the latter was subjected jointly to a production control measure, a control measure at a depot and a non-production control measure.

4. Naval armaments

(a) Current production

As new construction and modernisation have continued, a modest number of new and modernised units have joined the fleets of the member countries.

In France the Rubis (originally named Provence), the first French nuclear attack submarine, has entered on sea trials; the Saphir, second of this class, has been launched; a third one is under construction. The destroyer Dupleix, second of the Georges Leygues class, became operational; a third and fourth are under construction. The aircraft carrier Clemenceau completed her extensive refit and can now operate Super Etendard aircraft. The replenishment ship Var, the third ship of the Durance class, is still under construction. Deliveries of Super Etendard attack aircraft have continued in 1981.

In the Federal Republic of Germany the modernisation programme for the Lutjens class

destroyers has continued. The refit of the *Rommel* has entered its final phase. The frigate *Bremen*, the first ship of the F-122 class, has begun sea trials; others have been launched and are being fitted out or are under construction. The manufacture of fast attack craft of the 143-A type has continued. The modernisation programme of the Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft has also continued.

In Italy, the *Sauro* and *Di Cossato* submarines have become operational; *Da Vinci* is on sea trials. The helicopter carrier *Garibaldi* is under construction. As regards frigates, *Maestrale*, the first of a class, was commissioned end 1981, while *Grecale* has commenced sea trials; other vessels of this class are under construction. The fast attack craft (*hydrofoil*) and *Spaviero* and *Nibbio* are operational and others of this type are on sea trials.

In the Netherlands, construction of submarines of the *Walrus* class has continued. Several of the *Kortenaer* class have become operational and some of them joined the fleet in 1981; others are under construction.

(b) Control activity in 1981

Quantitative control measures were carried out at naval shipyards.

5. Chemical weapons

(a) List of chemical weapons subject to control

As in previous years, the Agency asked member countries whether they wished to renew in 1981 the list of chemical weapons subject to control.

The member countries agreed to this renewal. This was reported to the Council who noted the fact.

The Agency therefore continued to use this list for its control activities during 1981.

(b) Control activity in 1981

In application of Article III of Protocol No. III, which lays down conditions to enable the Council to fix the levels of chemical weapons that may be held on the mainland of Europe by those countries which have not given up the right to produce them, and in accordance with the Council decision of 1959, the Agency asked the countries concerned in its questionnaire whether production of chemical weapons on their mainland territory had passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage.

All the member countries concerned once again gave an explicit negative reply in 1981.

In addition, in the covering letter to its questionnaire, the Agency, as in previous years, asked the member states to declare any chemical weapons that they might hold, whatever their origin. In reply to this questionnaire no country reported holding any chemical weapons and because of this the quantitative control of weapons of this nature raised no problems in 1981.

As in each year, in accordance with the resolution approved by the Council in 1959 and in application of the Council directive extending to chemical weapons the provisions laid down for the control of non-production of the armaments listed in Annex III of Protocol No. III, the competent authorities of the country concerned provided the Agency with a detailed, precise and complete reply. In addition, the temporary procedure applied with these authorities since 1973 was again used with success in 1981. All the information supplied in this way was a major factor in selecting chemical plants at which to carry out agreed control measures in 1981.

For each control measure carried out, a delegation from the national authorities was present.

None of these measures revealed any indication of production of chemical weapons within the terms of Annex II to Protocol No. III.

6. Biological weapons

All member countries reported their agreement to the entry into force in 1981 of the list of biological weapons subject to control as revised by Council decision. The Council noted the fact.

However, it will be recalled (see point B. 2 of the present chapter) that the Agency exercises no control in the field of biological weapons.

7. Atomic weapons

Since the situation remained the same as in previous years, the Agency is unable (as stated in point B. 2 of this chapter) to exercise any control in the atomic field.

F. Technical information visits and other means of improving the efficiency of the experts¹

1. During the year, the Agency conducted a number of studies designed to improve and to update its working documents as well as to maintain the level of knowledge of its experts.

1. See also point C.1 (F).

2. At the invitation of the national authorities, technical information visits were arranged in 1981.

The Agency land force experts were able to visit the Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment at Fort Halstead in the United Kingdom. A series of full briefings was given in various aspects of research and development in the field of armaments subject to control and in particular on the United Kingdom's rôle in the development of the SP-70 howitzer. A presentation of new gun shells was also given. The experts then visited the Royal Armoured Corps Centre at Bovington for briefings on current trends in the field of armoured matériel. Finally, they visited the Royal Ordnance Factory in Nottingham to witness the manufacture of tube artillery and its supporting platform and to observe the forging of "electric slag refined" steels into barrels.

The visit to the *Institut Franco-Allemand* at St. Louis in France afforded the experts the opportunity to see work on the research and development of shells and other weapons.

The Head of the Inspection and Control Division and the naval expert attended the Royal Navy Exhibition in Portsmouth (United Kingdom). They were also able to visit a number of the most recent warships and study the integration of weapons systems and the advances in the field of electronics.

The air armament experts visited the RAF's major overhaul facility for aircraft and aero-engines at Royal Air Force, St. Athan (United Kingdom). Next, they proceeded to the IMI Kidderminster establishment which produces rocket motors for the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. They ended their stay in the United Kingdom by a visit to Hunting Engineering Ltd. in Bedford where they were briefed on several projects concerned with the development and production of air-launched weapons.

Finally, certain experts visited the *Manufacture belge de lampes électriques* in Brussels which produces no controllable armaments but which manufactures major electronic installations for tanks and combat aircraft. The experts were thus able to update themselves in the basic technology of these sub-systems, which are increasing in importance for armaments subject to control, and their production methods.

The Agency considers that technical information visits, in the same way as studies, contribute greatly towards keeping up to date and even enhancing the technical expertise that it has acquired by its policy of recruiting highly qualified personnel.

G. Contacts

1. On 20th May 1981, the Director of the Agency presented the Agency's report on its activities in 1980 to the Council.

2. For the satisfactory conduct of its mission, the Agency must carry out its duties in an atmosphere of trust and close co-operation with the national authorities. To this end, the Director and the principal members of his staff in 1981, as in previous years, maintained frequent contacts with these authorities.

3. As laid down in the modified Brussels Treaty, the Agency has maintained close contacts with the appropriate NATO authorities.

In this connection, mention should be made in particular of the two meetings held to fix the level of armaments of the forces under NATO command, already referred to in point C. 2 (a) of this chapter and of the implementation of the system of combined Agency/SHAPE inspections mentioned in point D. 1 (b).

In addition, the Director of the Agency and the principal members of his staff have made the usual contacts with the office of the Secretary-General, the International Military Staff of NATO, with SHAPE, on the occasion of SHAPEX 81, during the North Atlantic Treaty Assembly and in the course of liaison visits.

H. General conclusions

In accordance with Articles VII and XIX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency was able to report to the Council that, as a result of the control exercised in 1981, the figures obtained in accordance with Article XIII of Protocol No. IV:

- for armaments of forces under NATO command under the terms of Article XIV of Protocol No. IV; and
- for armaments of forces maintained under national command under the terms of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of Protocol No. IV and the Agreement of 14th December 1957, concluded in execution of Article V of Protocol No. II,

represented for the control year 1981 and for each of the member states, the appropriate levels of armaments subject to control for these categories of armaments over which the Agency has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate.

As required by Article XX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of field control measures carried out at force units and military depots and during agreed control

measures at production plants, it did not detect for the categories of armaments which it controls:

- either the manufacture of a category of armaments that the government of the member state concerned had undertaken not to manufacture;
- or the existence, on the mainland of Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of

Protocol No. IV) or not justified by export requirements (Article XXII of Protocol No. IV).

In 1981, the Agency again applied controls effectively in those fields which are open to it. In this connection, as in the past, the help and co-operation of national and NATO authorities, and of heads and staff of both the private firms and military establishments visited played an important part.

CHAPTER IV

STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE

A. Activities of the Standing Armaments Committee

The Standing Armaments Committee met in plenary session on 8th May, 3rd July, 2nd October and as an ad hoc group on 16th November 1981.

The main items on its agenda were the study of the situation in the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU, the WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 and the activities of Working Group No. 8 on operational research.

In addition, the members of the SAC and the Head of the International Secretariat, together with his senior staff, attended the meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on the joint production of armaments¹ on 16th November.

1. Study of the situation of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU

(a) After preparing the "Presentation of the economic study of the armaments sector of industry in the WEU member countries", which was forwarded to the Assembly by the Council on 21st May 1981, the SAC was instructed by the Council to update it on the basis of publicly available documentation².

Under the authority and on the instructions of the SAC, the international secretariat undertook the preparatory work necessary for this updating, which will bring together in one series the data covering the years 1972 to 1980 but retain the data for 1972 to 1977 which have been given in the initial version.

At the end of the year, it was planned that the drafts already prepared by the international secretariat would be considered by the SAC at its January 1982 meeting, with a view to releasing to the Assembly the document prepared for it in time for the first part of its twenty-eighth session.

(b) Following the Council decision on this matter³, the international secretariat hopes to be in a position to undertake the preparatory work necessary to enable the SAC to update the data contained in the legal part and the first section of the economic part of its study.

(c) With regard to preparation by the SAC of the second section of the economic part of its study, the Chairman-in-Office of the SAC, at the meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee, gave the following explanations to the members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments:

It was intended that this section should be concerned with the capabilities of the industrial sector of the WEU member countries, in the armaments sphere. A similar kind of study was, however, planned in the IEPG and, in order to avoid unnecessary work, it was decided to wait for the data provided by nations for the IEPG study to be made available. As this information is not yet available, the WEU study cannot be completed. The SAC will take stock of the position again once the data of the IEPG study are available.

2. WEU Agreement 4.FT.6

(a) On the SAC's instructions, the Group of National Experts on Agreement 4.FT.6 met in Paris on 26th February 1981 with the following terms of reference: to study the American proposals for co-operation with a view to drawing up international trials standards for wheeled and possibly tracked vehicles, taking account of the work going on in NATO; to submit proposals to the SAC on the updating of Agreement 4.FT.6 and the group's future activities.

After their discussion, the experts agreed on the need to achieve wide standardisation of trials methods on the basis of Agreement 4.FT.6, beginning with wheeled vehicles.

(b) In accordance with the SAC's decision, the text of the agreement was despatched to the United States authorities, who were asked to give their comments on it and to provide, on a reciprocal basis, descriptions of their own trials methods, together with proposals for future co-operation.

The Committee agreed that the questions of updating the agreement, the future activities of the Group of National Experts and how further co-operation with the United States should best be pursued should be reconsidered subsequently, when the reply expected from the United States authorities had been received.

(c) The members of the Assembly Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments were informed of the above, at the meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on the joint production of armaments.

1. See Chapter I, E.

2. See Chapter I, C and II, B.3.

3. See Chapter II, B.3.

B. Activities of the working groups

1. Working Group No. 8 on operational research

As the Chairman-in-Office of the SAC pointed out at the meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee, Working Group No. 8 is constituted to exchange the findings of national operational research studies and to organise symposia on operational research methods and techniques, and visits to national operational research centres. The group has also done considerable work over five years in editing a glossary of operational research terms in five languages.

The group held two meetings in 1981, on 14th May and 9th October. These were linked with a symposium in Paris, in the first case, and a visit to the Netherlands, in the second.

(a) Exchanges of information

During the meeting in the first half-year, information was exchanged on the studies described in the forms sent in 1980 and in the first months of 1981, viz: eight documents, which have led to requests for exchanges of reports; new forms have also been presented. The international secretariat introduced the 1981 edition of the summary of exchanges of information carried out within Working Group No. 8. The new edition is not only a repertory of the forms sent in by the delegations and the bilateral exchanges of reports on operational research studies, but also lists the talks given during the six symposia on methodology organised by the group from 1975 to 1980. It is a very valuable working tool, since it contains all the information exchanged since the group was set up.

During the second half of 1981, there was a bilateral exchange of twenty-six study reports; two new reports have been added to the operational research library; two documents on new forms were presented to the group at its meeting on 9th October.

(b) Symposium

The subject chosen for the seventh symposium of Working Group No. 8, which took up the whole of 15th May, was "tactical and command post exercises and war games".

Eighteen experts on operational research took part.

The talks gave rise to exchanges of views and a large number of questions, which showed the lively interest aroused by the subjects considered.

(c) Visit to the Netherlands

At the invitation of the Netherlands authorities, the members of Working Group No. 8, together with other operational research experts, were received by the TNO Physics Laboratory in The Hague on 8th October and by the National Aerospace Laboratory in Amsterdam on 9th October.

In addition to the visits to the two laboratories arranged for them, eleven illustrated talks on operational research studies were given, which covered a very wide field and were related to the three services. Each of these talks was followed by a large number of questions put by the participants, thus showing their great interest in the subjects dealt with.

(d) Lexicographical activity

The international secretariat is listing the corrections to the five-language glossary of operational research terms, on the basis of information supplied by the delegations concerned.

With a view to further work on the glossary, Working Group No. 8 has prepared a programme, comprising three stages, which has been submitted to the SAC. The SAC has authorised it to continue its work, which for the time being will be limited to two tasks: the preparation of an addendum to the glossary as it now stands; a pilot study relating to the preparation of a new improved and completed edition of this glossary.

2. Group of experts on the evaluation of military equipment

The group of experts is still awaiting a decision by the SAC regarding the second stage of its work, i.e. the evaluation, using different methods, of new equipment which has not yet been evaluated.

At its meeting on 28th November 1980, the SAC decided that although the question of the evaluation of military equipment would no longer be on its agenda, it could be retabled at the request of any government wishing to submit a work proposal.

C. International Secretariat

1. Contacts with the Council and the authorities of the WEU member countries

The Head of the International Secretariat presented to the Council, on 29th April 1981, his annual verbal report on the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee and its working groups.

In November, he went to Rome, where he met authorities from the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministries.

2. *WEU Assembly*

The Head of the International Secretariat informed the SAC of the discussions on armaments questions which had taken place during the second part of the twenty-sixth ordinary session and the first part of the twenty-seventh ordinary session of the Assembly.

Extracts from speeches, reports, debates and recommendations on these questions were collected in two documents and circulated to the members of the SAC.

3. *Relations with NATO*

The Head of the International Secretariat was present, as observer, at the session of the North Atlantic Assembly which was held in Munich in October.

He was represented by a member of the international secretariat, as observer, at the meetings of the Conference of National Armaments Directors which took place in April and October at the NATO headquarters in Brussels.

A member of the secretariat was present at the June and December meetings of the NATO Naval Armaments Group.

4. *Relations with FINABEL*

As the Chairman-in-Office of the SAC recalled at the Liaison Sub-Committee meeting, FINABEL is a co-ordinating committee between the army chiefs of staff of the WEU member countries and its vocation is to reach agreement among them on the military characteristics of future land forces' equipment, whereas the SAC is an official body of an international organisation with a tri-service vocation. A joint meeting between FINABEL and the SAC was held in 1973 in order to divide the work and set up close contacts between the two secretariats. These contacts enable the international secretariat of the SAC to encourage the study of certain FINABEL agreements in order to stimulate co-operation between member countries. A range of questions has thus been discussed within the SAC in recent years.

Relations between the secretariats of the SAC and FINABEL have continued in 1981 in accordance with the provisions for co-operation between these two bodies worked out in 1973.

The international secretariat was represented at the annual meeting of the FINABEL Co-ordinating Committee where the discussion revealed certain areas in which co-operation between the SAC and FINABEL could be improved, particularly with regard to informing the FINABEL working groups, while taking account of the need to avoid duplication of work between the two bodies.

CHAPTER V

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE

A. Meetings of the Committee

In 1981, the Public Administration Committee held its two annual meetings, which take place in each of the member countries in turn, in Brussels from 28th to 30th April and in Middelburg from 7th to 9th October. The Committee continues to hold some of its meetings in towns other than the capital of the host country, so as to have the opportunity for contacts with local authorities, which are useful in the context of its work.

These meetings are devoted mainly to exchanges of information on important administrative developments in the member countries during the preceding six months and the preparation of the next multilateral course for government officials organised under the auspices of the Committee.

One aspect of discussion within the Committee concerns administrative organisation in the member countries, the factors governing such organisation and the principal new problems, generally problems common to the majority of the member countries, which have to be faced by the administration. In this context, members of the Committee keep each other informed about the various changes occurring in the state and administrative machinery of their countries in consequence of changes or reshuffling of government. The principal laws whose impact on the administration is significant are reported and, where appropriate, their texts circulated.

Among problems which are in the forefront in several countries and which have important administrative consequences, those raised during the year under consideration concerned ethnic and cultural minorities, sometimes involving public disturbances, the problems of large agglomerations, often in areas of industrial decline: housing, urban renewal. Soil pollution and the need for the administration to intervene in this field was another of the subjects raised.

A second aspect of the exchanges of views and information within the Committee naturally relates to the activities and terms of service of state employees and efforts to improve the quality and efficiency of the civil service. The importance of good recruiting in this connection need not be stressed; mention was made of the possible introduction of new techniques, using computers, for civil service recruitment and promotion examinations, as well as new

systems for assessing ability and output. Finally, concern was expressed to have a better definition of the requirements for the various categories of staff (A, B, C,...). Among other subjects referred to at meetings, mention should be made of the introduction and regulation of part-time employment in the civil service in some countries, the introduction of flexi-time and social protection for unestablished staff.

Finally, as in the previous year, the members of the Committee discussed the effect on the administration of the unfavourable economic situation in the member countries. In the majority of them, the adoption of austerity budgets has, to a greater or lesser degree, imposed reductions on public expenditure and a variety of measures has been taken to effect economies in the public service. In a number of countries, there has been a critical survey of various fields of government activity and strict limits have been placed on recruitment policy. However, measures to combat unemployment have led, elsewhere, to the creation of new public service jobs. As already stated in the twenty-sixth annual report, policies to combat inflation and unemployment have continued, throughout the year under consideration, to form the background to administrative life in the member countries.

B. 1981 course for government officials

The thirtieth multilateral course for government officials, sponsored by the Public Administration Committee, was held at Siena from 18th to 24th October, on the topic of unemployment among young graduates in Europe.

The objective of the course was to give a selected group of public officials from the member countries with at least ten years' seniority, the opportunity of comparing their professional experience regarding a grave problem which affects all countries in varying degrees. This confrontation was to be achieved:

- by means of documented evidence of unemployment in Europe in the last decade, with particular reference to the proportion of unemployment among young graduates and its economic and social importance;
- by an analysis of the typology and the results of any ad hoc public interventions;

- by an analysis of the specific impact of unemployment among young graduates on the structures of public administrations (quantitative and qualitative effects on competitive recruitment, direct appointments, etc.);
- by an effort of imagination with a view to suggesting changes to the interventions effected or new projects for dealing with the problem.

The course, which brought together twenty-two participants at the *Collegio universitario Bracci di Pontignano* (Siena), was organised as follows: information on the general problems of unemployment among young graduates in Europe, by means of two lectures by experts; discussion of experience in the various countries, on the basis of a paper submitted by each delegation; meetings with the local authorities concerned; group study of the suggestions made during the course.

At the time of drafting this chapter, national delegations' comments on the interest-value and usefulness of the course have not yet been received. However, it is worthy of note that, quite apart from the importance of the subject considered and the "technical" results of the joint work, the valuable point about courses for government officials is that they bring together national officials who otherwise would be unlikely to have the opportunity to meet. This was very clearly expressed in one of the reports received after the 1980 course in the United Kingdom: "We are agreed that for us the main value of the course lay in the

opportunity it gave us to make close personal acquaintance with other European civil servants. It is often difficult in dealing with colleagues from abroad to reach a stage where a perfectly frank and confident exchange of views is possible. One of the results of this was that we found a great deal more in common than we would previously have expected."

C. Study visits

Study visits, which enable an official to spend one or two weeks in the administration of one of the other member countries, studying his own speciality, are organised bilaterally between the national delegations of the sending and host countries. However, the Committee devotes a part of its time at each meeting to this subject and each delegate can comment or draw upon the experience of his colleagues in this field.

These visits cover a wide variety of subjects, as is shown by the following few examples of visits carried out during 1981: control of bargain offer claims; health and safety at work legislation (subjects studied in Germany); official social surveys in France; administration and distribution of European regional development funds (subjects studied in France); marketing of agricultural commodities; problems of radioactive waste disposal; future energy choices and public consultation thereon; use of mini- and micro-computer networks in government administration (subjects studied in the Netherlands).

CHAPTER VI

BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS

A. Budget

As pointed out by the Council in their reply to Recommendation 365, the budget situation in the member countries at the present time calls for rigorous economies.

The budgets of the WEU ministerial bodies for 1981, which were still under scrutiny when the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council was transmitted to the Assembly, were approved by the Council in April; they came within the limits of the rates of inflation forecast for France and the United Kingdom. Recapitulatory tables for these budgets, as adopted and then revised, are annexed to this document.

Also in April 1981, the Council charged an ad hoc working group with a study aimed at identifying all acceptable measures that might be taken to achieve economies, together with greater efficiency in the organisation's methods of work and use of the staff of the WEU ministerial bodies, without impairing the organisation's ability to meet its obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty, the Protocols and the Council's Decision of 7th May 1955.

During this study, it was noted that as a result of excellent co-operation, certain expenditure effected for the benefit of the Assembly was borne by the budgets of the two WEU ministerial bodies.

The recommendations of the ad hoc group were taken into account by the Council in the detailed discussions which they devoted to the preparation of the budgets of the WEU ministerial bodies for 1982.

B. Social security of staff members serving in the United Kingdom

An agreement with the United Kingdom authorities was concluded in September 1981. It exempts from compulsory contributions to the national social security scheme (class 1) those members of the staff who are members of the organisation's pension scheme. They may, if they so choose, contribute voluntarily (class 3) for a reduced range of benefits.

As for the agreement to be concluded with the United Kingdom Government to regulate the situation of staff members wishing to remain in the Provident Fund, the Council's discussions have led to the conclusion that

these members should also be exempted from affiliation to class 1 of the United Kingdom scheme, on the understanding that they would have the opportunity of contributing to class 3 of the scheme on a voluntary basis.

As the Council pointed out in their previous annual report, a meeting of national experts was held in October 1980 to discuss, in relation to general social security principles, the effects of exempting WEU staff members. It was concluded that, even if they contributed to class 3 of the United Kingdom scheme on a voluntary basis, there would be certain gaps in their benefits and cover during their service with WEU and/or after their departure from the organisation. The Council approved palliative measures for most of these gaps. Furthermore, discussions on other points are being held within the framework of co-ordination.

Under arrangements agreed with the United Kingdom authorities, the social security contributions collected from all staff members since April 1975 and up to the end of the last insurance year in March 1981 were paid over to the Department of Health and Social Security from the WEU suspense account in September 1981. The balance of these contributions for the current tax year will be paid in March 1982.

C. Provident Fund

The short-term policy of investment in French francs only was discontinued in the spring of 1981 and the investment is now diversified over four currencies to minimise the risk arising from fluctuations in rates of exchange and their consequent effect upon the value of the fund.

D. WEU administrative meetings

The need for frequent meetings between the administrative staff of the London and Paris offices of WEU has again been further reduced in 1981. Many of the initial problems arising from the introduction of the pension scheme have now been overcome and, in that connection, much credit is due to the assistance provided now by the Joint Pensions Administrative Section.

The good working relationship with the WEU Staff Association has continued as before.

The retired staff of the co-ordinated organisations have in the course of 1981 instituted an "Association of pensioned staff of the co-ordinated organisations and of their dependants", with a secretariat in Paris, to take care of their interests with respect to the pension scheme, and working in close co-operation with the existing staff associations of the active staff members.

E. Activities in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations

The Co-ordinating Committee held eight meetings in 1981, each of two days' duration. In addition there were eleven meetings of the Committee of Heads of Administration, nine joint meetings of the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General and the Standing Commit-

tee of Staff Associations, as well as one of the Committee of Secretaries-General.

The main problem areas that were discussed during these meetings and resulting in seven reports by the Co-ordinating Committee, were:

- the periodical review and adjustment of salaries and allowances;
- the comparison of grade equivalencies in order to judge a parameter in the trend of salaries, with one member country;
- the problems associated with any form of extension of co-ordination to other international organisations;
- the conduct of periodic salary surveys in some member countries;
- the particular impact on salaries and allowances of the current economic recession.

APPENDIX

Summary of WEU main budget for 1981

	A*	B*	C*	Total B+C
	£	Frs	Frs	Frs
Salaries and allowances	1,218,582	9,010,600	18,658,300	27,668,900
Pensions	104,160	861,800	2,217,100	3,078,900
Travel	34,790	129,500	489,250	618,750
Other operating costs	177,315	509,670	728,020	1,237,690
Purchase of furniture, etc.	2,675	16,550	31,850	48,400
Buildings	—	68,750	123,750	192,500
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	1,537,522	10,596,870	22,248,270	32,845,140
WEU tax	443,402	3,164,900	6,487,000	9,651,900
Other receipts	43,870	85,200	187,800	273,000
Pension receipts	29,090	312,100	666,000	978,100
TOTAL INCOME	516,362	3,562,200	7,340,800	10,903,000
NET TOTAL	1,021,160	7,034,670	14,907,470	21,942,140

National contributions called for under the WEU main budget for 1981

	600ths	£	F. frs.
Belgium	59	100,414.07	2,157,643.77
France	120	204,232.00	4,388,428.00
Germany	120	204,232.00	4,388,428.00
Italy	120	204,232.00	4,388,428.00
Luxembourg	2	3,403.86	73,140.46
Netherlands	59	100,414.07	2,157,643.77
United Kingdom	120	204,232.00	4,388,428.00
TOTAL	600	1,021,160.00	21,942,140.00

* A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Agency for the Control of Armaments.

Summary of revised WEU budget for 1981

	A*	B*	C*	Total B+C
	£	Frs	Frs	Frs
Salaries and allowances	1,218,582	9,010,600	18,658,300	27,668,900
Pensions	104,160	861,800	2,217,100	3,078,900
Travel	29,715	129,500	489,250	618,750
Other operating costs	204,815	509,670	728,020	1,237,690
Purchase of furniture, etc.	2,675	16,550	31,850	48,400
Buildings	—	68,750	123,750	192,500
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	1,559,947	10,596,870	22,248,270	32,845,140
WEU tax	443,402	3,164,900	6,487,000	9,651,900
Other receipts	43,870	85,200	187,800	273,000
Pension receipts	29,090	312,100	666,000	978,100
TOTAL INCOME	516,362	3,562,200	7,340,800	10,903,000
NET TOTAL	1,043,585	7,034,670	14,907,470	21,942,140

* A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Agency for the Control of Armaments.

Revision of Rules 14, 29, 34, 38 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges²
by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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DRAFT RESOLUTION

on the revision of Rules 14, 29, 34, 38 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.
2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Grieve (Chairman); MM. Michel, Schulte (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Beix, Brassieur, Mrs. Chepy-Léger, MM. Eastham (Alternate: Cox), Edwards, Eijnsink (Alternate: Aarts), Giust, Glesener, Howell

(Alternate: Osborn), Mondino, Pucci, Manfred Schmidt, Sénès, Spies von Büllenheim (Alternate: Wittmann), Sterpa, Unland, Vial-Massat, van der Werff.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Resolution
on the revision of Rules 14, 29, 34, 38 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure

The Assembly,

DECIDES

To draft Rules 14, 29, 34, 38 and 40 as follows:

1. *Rule 14*

Paragraph 1 shall read:

“ The Presidential Committee shall consist of the President of the Assembly, who shall be Chairman *ex officio*, his predecessors as long as they remain Representatives or Substitutes of the Assembly without interruption, the Vice-Presidents, and the Chairmen of the permanent committees. If absent, or unable to discharge his duties, the President may be replaced by one of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, and the Chairman of a permanent committee by a Vice-Chairman of that committee. The President may invite the Chairmen of the political groups to attend meetings of the Presidential Committee. ”

2. *Rule 29*

The second sentence of paragraph 3 shall read:

“ Unless otherwise decided by the President of the Assembly, they shall relate to only one paragraph at a time. ”

3. *Rule 34*

Paragraph 2 shall read:

“ However, the vote shall be taken by roll-call whenever ten or more Representatives or Substitutes present request it. ”

4. *Rule 38*

The French text of paragraph 4 shall read:

“ Un groupe ne peut comprendre moins de neuf Représentants ou Suppléants. ”, the English text not being revised.

5. *Rule 40*

Paragraph 1 shall read:

“ Committees shall examine questions and documents which are referred to them by the Assembly or by the Presidential Committee. ”

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. Rule 14, paragraph 1

Provision for former Presidents of the Assembly to sit on the Presidential Committee was included in Rule 14, paragraph 1, through an amendment adopted by the Assembly on 10th December 1969.

Its purpose was to allow the Presidential Committee to benefit from the experience gained by former Presidents of the Assembly as long as they remained members of the Assembly.

However, at the December 1981 session this provision was criticised. It was in fact pointed out that a former President who left the WEU Assembly and who then returned to the Assembly a few years later would become a *de jure* member of the Presidential Committee again although he would have been unable to keep in touch with the Assembly's business.

The Committee therefore feels that the Rules of Procedure should specify that a break in the term of office of a Representative or Substitute has the effect of making a former President ineligible for *de jure* membership of the Presidential Committee. It therefore proposes to amend paragraph 1 by replacing "former Presidents of the Assembly who are Representatives or Substitutes to the Assembly" by "his predecessors as long as they remain Representatives or Substitutes of the Assembly without interruption".

Some Committee members, however, would have preferred it to be stipulated that only the President's immediate predecessor is entitled to *de jure* membership of the Presidential Committee and that this would be limited to a period of one year.

2. Rule 29, paragraph 3

In spite of the provisions of this paragraph, the President sometimes has to submit to the Assembly, with its agreement, amendments grouped together.

It is thus possible, in certain cases, to shorten a discussion which an unduly large number of amendments would have made

tedious and to improve the clarity and coherence of debates.

In order to take account of exceptional circumstances which may arise, the Committee unanimously proposes that the second sentence of paragraph 3 be amended to read:

"Unless otherwise decided by the President of the Assembly, they shall relate to only one paragraph at a time."

3. Rule 34, paragraph 2

Paragraph 2 has been criticised for its lack of precision and complexity.

(i) It seems to lack precision because it does not indicate whether the request for a roll-call vote must be made in writing or whether it may be made by a Representative or Substitute from the floor.

It is in fact by counting the number of Representatives endorsing the request for a roll-call vote that the President notes that at least ten Representatives or Substitutes are making the request.

(ii) It seems complex insofar as it seeks to avert the danger of a manoeuvre by which members of the Assembly could request a roll-call and then withdraw from the chamber to prevent there being a quorum and thus make a vote impossible. This fear is unfounded since the rules relating to the quorum have been revised to make the quorum depend not on the number of Representatives or Substitutes taking part in the vote but on the number of signatures on the attendance register.

The Committee proposes to clarify and simplify paragraph 2 by drafting it as follows:

"However, the vote shall be taken by roll-call whenever ten or more Representatives or Substitutes present request it."

Some Committee members thought, however, that if several authors of the request are absent when the vote is taken the President of the Assembly should be able to revert to normal procedure.

4. Rule 38, paragraph 4

The present text of this paragraph is not absolutely identical in the two languages since the French text seems to refer only to the formation of political groups. But the minimum number of Representatives or Substitutes required by the Rules of Procedure applies not only to the formation of a group but also to its continued existence. Any properly-formed group whose numbers fall below this threshold ceases to exist.

This is clear in the English text of the rule.

The French text should therefore be brought into line with the English text, which is more comprehensive.

The Committee unanimously proposes to draft the French text of paragraph 4 as follows:

“Un groupe ne peut comprendre moins de neuf Représentants ou Suppléants.”

5. Rule 40, paragraph 1

Rule 40 was not amended in the general revision of the Rules of Procedure. Its wording corresponded to that of former Rule 26 which provided that unless the Assembly decided otherwise the examination of a matter in Committee should be preceded by a general debate.

But Rule 16, paragraph 2, revised in December 1980, now lays down that:

“Any item referred to a committee by decision of the Assembly or of the Presidential Committee shall also be included in the Assembly’s register.”

The Committee therefore unanimously proposes that paragraph 1 read as follows:

“Committees shall examine questions and documents which are referred to them by the Assembly or by the Presidential Committee.”

Revision of Rules 14, 29, 34, 38 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure

AMENDMENT 1¹
tabled by Mr. Cox

1. At the end of paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, add:
“ Paragraph 3 shall read:
 3. The vote on:
 - (a) the draft reply to the annual report;
 - (b) a motion to disagree to the annual report or to any part of it; or
 - (c) a draft recommendation or draft opinion considered as a whole,shall, if there is opposition, be taken by roll-call.

If there is no opposition, the names of any representatives who signify their wish to abstain by standing in their places will be recorded in the minutes.”

Signed: Cox

1. See 6th sitting, 17th June 1982 (report removed from the orders of the day).

The Falklands crisis

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman and Rapporteur*

The Assembly,

- (i) Firmly condemning the armed invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina on 2nd April 1982 in flagrant violation of international law;
- (ii) Welcoming the rapid and effective operation of European political consultation leading to the statement issued by the Ten on 2nd April and the declaration of 10th April;
- (iii) Fully endorsing those declarations, but regretting that the Council did not meet in application of Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (iv) Welcoming the initiative of the United States Secretary of State to seek accommodation between the two powers concerned;
- (v) Noting that the Soviet Union and certain of its allies have not hesitated to afford Argentina, after condemnation by the United Nations Security Council, certain assistance;
- (vi) Concerned at the weakening of allied forces in the North Atlantic following the necessary dispatch of large British forces outside the area,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To implement fully the decision of the Ten to ban the export of arms and military equipment to Argentina and to ban all imports into the Community originating in Argentina;
2. To concert their political, economic and diplomatic efforts in all countries and appropriate international bodies to secure the immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502, the peaceful settlement of the dispute in full accord with the wishes of the inhabitants of the islands, and the widest support for the foregoing decision of the Ten;
3. To study the lessons for European security which may be drawn from the crisis, including:
 - (a) ways of ensuring that governments obtain earlier warning of impending military attack;
 - (b) the need for the vital interests of the Alliance to be defended outside the area prescribed in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
 - (c) the compensatory measures to be taken by the allies within that area forthwith following the dispatch of large British forces outside the area;
4. To draw the attention of the Council to Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty.

1. Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman); MM. van den Bergh, Mayoud (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Bahr, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bernini, Bizet, Blaauw, Bonnel (Alternate: van der Elst), Cox, Dejardin, Duraffour (Alter-

nate: Baumel), Edwards, Fosson, Grant, Kittelmann, Lemmrich, Maravalle, Ménard (Alternate: Louis Jung), Pecchioli (Alternate: Amadei), Pignion, Prussen, Hermann Schmidt, Scholten, Smith, Tanghe, Vohrer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

The Falklands crisisREPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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on the Falklands crisis

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submitted by Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman and Rapporteur

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- II. History of the Falklands
 - (a) British interpretation
 - (b) Argentinian interpretation
- III. Negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom
- IV. Official texts
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 - (b) European political co-operation – Communiqué issued by the ten Ministers for Foreign Affairs – 2nd April 1982
 - (c) Statement by the Secretary-General of NATO after the urgent meeting of the North Atlantic Council – 2nd April 1982
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 - (h) NATO Defence Planning Committee – Communiqué issued after the meeting of Defence Ministers – 7th May 1982

1. Adopted in Committee by 11 votes to 2 with 4 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman); MM. van den Bergh, Mayoud (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Bahr, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bernini (Alternate: Martino), Bizet, Blaauw, Bonnel (Alternate: De Decker), Cox (Alternate: Brown), Dejardin, Duraffour, Edwards,

Fosson (Alternate: *De Poi*), Grant (Alternate: *Hill*), Kittelmann, Lemmrich (Alternate: *Wittmann*), Maravalle (Alternate: *Della Briotta*), Ménard, Pecchioli, Pignion, Prussen, Hermann Schmidt, Scholten, *Smith*, *Steeverlynck*, *Vohrer*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on the Falklands crisis

The Assembly,

- (i) Firmly condemning the armed invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina on 2nd April 1982 in flagrant violation of international law ;
- (ii) Welcoming the rapid and effective operation of European political consultation leading to the statement issued by the Ten on 2nd April and the declaration of 10th April ;
- (iii) Fully endorsing those declarations, but regretting that the Council did not meet in application of Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty ;
- (iv) Regretting that the initiatives of the United States Secretary of State, the President of Peru and the Secretary-General of the United Nations to seek accommodation between the two powers concerned have not so far succeeded ;
- (v) Noting that the Soviet Union and certain of its allies have not hesitated to afford Argentina, after condemnation by the United Nations Security Council, certain assistance ;
- (vi) Concerned at the weakening of allied forces in the North Atlantic following the necessary dispatch of large British forces outside the area,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To implement fully the decision of the Ten to ban the export of arms and military equipment to Argentina and to ban all imports into the Community originating in Argentina ;
2. To concert their political, economic and diplomatic efforts in all countries and appropriate international bodies to secure the immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502, the peaceful settlement of the dispute in full accord with the wishes of the inhabitants of the islands, and the widest support for the foregoing decision of the Ten ;
3. To study the lessons for European security which may be drawn from the crisis, including:
 - (a) ways of ensuring that governments obtain earlier warning of impending military attack ;
 - (b) the need for the vital interests of the Alliance to be defended outside the area prescribed in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
 - (c) the compensatory measures to be taken by the allies within that area forthwith following the dispatch of large British forces outside the area ;
4. To draw the attention of the Council to Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. On 2nd April 1982 Argentine forces attacked and occupied the Falklands Islands.

2. The Presidential Committee referred the matter to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, requesting it to report to the Presidential Committee in time for it to be considered by that committee on 19th May.

3. The committee adopted a draft recommendation on 20th April¹ and subsequently adopted the present report with revised draft recommendation on 19th May immediately prior to the meeting of the Presidential Committee on that day. In the revised draft recommendation now submitted – revised only in paragraph (iv) of the preamble to take account of mediation initiatives subsequent to 20th April – the committee first and foremost calls on the Assembly to condemn the unprovoked aggression committed by Argentina, in flagrant violation of international law. The use of force in pursuit of territorial claims must be universally condemned. Almost no corner of the world would be free of the threat of hostilities, and there would be a grave risk of world war, if nations could resort to force with impunity in such circumstances. The committee particularly deplors the fact that the Argentine attack on the Falklands took place on 2nd April in defiance of the agreed statement from the President of the United Nations Security Council on 1st April:

“The Security Council accordingly calls on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to exercise the utmost restraint at this time and in particular to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region and to continue the search for a diplomatic solution.”²

4. The committee’s text welcomes the rapid and effective operation of European political co-operation, which *condemned* the armed intervention the same day that it occurred, and led to the European Communities agreeing on economic sanctions³; it calls for the widest support for that decision. It regrets, however, that the Council of WEU was not convened under Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty which provides for consultation “with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise...”.

5. The committee notes that the position of the United States, and of NATO, was originally less clearly defined than that of the European Community. At the outset the United States sought to maintain an impartial status for its Secretary of State while Mr. Haig was acting as intermediary between the United Kingdom and Argentina, but the United States would also have preferred, if possible, to have secured a withdrawal of Argentine forces without impairing United States-Argentine relations, because of their importance to the present United States administration in its policy of resisting communist penetration of Latin America. With the failure of the Haig mission on 30th April, however, the United States finally took sides, offering “material” assistance to the United Kingdom, and denying military and economic assistance to Argentina, although not imposing economic sanctions.

6. Comment by NATO has shifted similarly. At British request the North Atlantic Council held a special meeting on 2nd April after a statement issued by the Secretary General noted merely that “Members of the Council expressed deep concern at the dispute...”. The Defence Ministers of the eleven European NATO countries, members of Eurogroup, at their meeting on 5th May “condemned Argentina’s armed invasion”, and the ministerial meeting of the NATO Defence Planning Committee on 7th May endorsed the Eurogroup statement¹.

7. The basis for an end to hostilities is Security Council Resolution 502, adopted with only one vote against (Panama) and four abstentions (Soviet Union, China, Poland, Spain) on 3rd April. It “1. Demands an immediate cessation of hostilities; 2. Demands an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands; 3. Calls on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences and respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations”². This report does not examine subsequent attempts by various persons, alluded to in paragraph (iv) of the preamble, to secure the application of Resolution 502, which has not been accepted by Argentina, and a negotiated settlement of the crisis. While these efforts continue, any report on their progress would be out of date before it was distributed.

1. Text at Appendix I.

2. Full text at Appendix IV (a).

3. Texts at Appendix IV (b), (e) and (f).

1. Texts at Appendix IV (c), (g) and (h).

2. Full text at Appendix IV (d).

The recommendation calls simply for the withdrawal of Argentine forces in accordance with the resolution, and the peaceful settlement of the dispute in full accord with the wishes of the inhabitants.

8. While deploring the loss of human life that has so far resulted from the conflict, the committee is also aware that many conclusions can be drawn for European security, not least the need for early warning of impending military attack; the need to ensure that political authorities make proper use of warning when received and take proper measures to prevent a threat materialising; and the compensatory measures that need to be taken in the area covered by the Alliance when national forces are necessarily sent outside the area in the defence of vital interests. The committee calls for these and other lessons to be studied. It is too soon to attempt to draw such conclusions in the present report.

9. The present report does not examine the substance of the Argentine claim to the Falklands; there is a summary of the rival historical claims at Appendix I and of recent Anglo-Argentine negotiations at Appendix II. The committee merely notes that United

Kingdom administration of the islands has been effective and uninterrupted since January 1833; that the population is of British stock and seeks no change in the status enjoyed by the islands prior to the Argentine invasion.

Opinion of the minority

10. The original draft recommendation of 20th April was adopted by 15 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions. The minority on that occasion, while supporting much of the recommendation, was opposed to the reference to the Soviet Union in paragraph (v) of the preamble, and to paragraph 3 of the operative text calling for the lessons for European security to be studied. The revised recommendation of 19th May was adopted by 11 votes to 2 with 4 abstentions. A proposal of the minority on this occasion was that the report should examine the history of the rights of the inhabitants of the Falklands. Some of those abstaining believed the report should have examined longer-term political solutions to problems raised by the crisis, including the improvement of relations between Europe and Latin America in general.

APPENDIX I

Document 907

20th April 1982

*The Falklands crisis*DRAFT RECOMMENDATION ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman and Rapporteur*

The Assembly,

- (i) Firmly condemning the armed invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina on 2nd April 1982 in flagrant violation of international law;
- (ii) Welcoming the rapid and effective operation of European political consultation leading to the statement issued by the Ten on 2nd April and the declaration of 10th April;
- (iii) Fully endorsing those declarations, but regretting that the Council did not meet in application of Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (iv) Welcoming the initiative of the United States Secretary of State to seek accommodation between the two powers concerned;
- (v) Noting that the Soviet Union and certain of its allies have not hesitated to afford Argentina, after condemnation by the United Nations Security Council, certain assistance;
- (vi) Concerned at the weakening of allied forces in the North Atlantic following the necessary dispatch of large British forces outside the area,

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Urge member governments:

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 - (a) ways of ensuring that governments obtain earlier warning of impending military attack;
 - (b) the need for the vital interests of the Alliance to be defended outside the area prescribed in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
 - (c) the compensatory measures to be taken by the allies within that area forthwith following the dispatch of large British forces outside the area;
4. To draw the attention of the Council to Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty.

1. Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman); MM. van den Bergh, Mayoud (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Bahr, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bernini, Bizet, Blaauw, Bonnel (Alternate: van der Elst), Cox, Dejardin, Duraffour (Alter-

nate: *Baumel, Edwards, Fosson, Grant, Kittelmann, Lemmrich, Maravalle, Ménard (Alternate: Louis Jung), Pecchioli (Alternate: Amadei), Pignion, Prussen, Hermann Schmidt, Scholten, Smith, Tanghe, Vohrer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

APPENDIX II

*History of the Falklands***(a) British interpretation¹***14th August 1592*

The islands are believed to have been first sighted by the English captain, John Davis, from the ship "Desire". Two years later, in 1594, Sir Richard Hawkins sailed along their northern coast. In 1598, the Dutch sailor, Sebald van Weerdt, is said to have visited some of the islands of the archipelago (probably the Jason Islands).

27th January 1690

Captain John Strong of the British Royal Navy made the first known landing on the islands, which had never been inhabited, and named the sound between the western and eastern islands Falkland after Viscount Falkland, the Treasurer of the Royal Navy. French seal-hunters from St. Malo were frequent visitors to the islands in the eighteenth century, hence their French name of *Iles Malouines* and their Spanish name of *Islas Malvinas*.

31st January 1764

A French sailor-explorer, Bougainville, founded the first settlement on East Falkland in the name of France and at his own expense: Fort St. Louis on East Falkland.

12th January 1765

Commodore John Byron, sent by the British Admiralty to survey the islands, proclaimed that they were uninhabited and claimed them for Great Britain. In January 1766, after deciding that the occupation of the islands was "the key to the whole of the Pacific Ocean", the Admiralty sent Captain John MacBride to complete the occupation with a settlement of about a hundred people at Port Egmont on Saunders Island off West Falkland and build a fort. He discovered the French settlement in December and told the settlers to leave.

1767

France relinquished its claim to the islands in return for the equivalent of a

£24,000 payment by Spain under a Franco-Spanish treaty of 1761: the *Pacto de familia*; Fort (now Port) Louis was renamed Puerto de Soledad.

4th June 1770

The Spaniards compelled the British to leave Port Egmont. The action brought Britain and Spain to the brink of war. In 1771, Port Egmont was returned to Britain and British settlers came back, before leaving voluntarily in 1774 for economic reasons. However, the British claim to sovereignty was maintained and a plaque was left on the islands.

Spain placed the islands under the jurisdiction of Buenos Aires, then a Spanish colony, and appointed nine successive governors. The last governor and the Spanish settlers left East Falkland in March 1811.

9th July 1816

The United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, whose capital is Buenos Aires, declared their independence from Spain, claiming sovereignty over Spanish lands in the region. In 1816, the United Provinces consisted of Bolivia, Uruguay, Argentina and Buenos Aires (as a separate entity) but the first two territories seceded in 1825 and 1828. A Federal State of Argentina was proclaimed by the 1852 constitution but this was not ratified by Buenos Aires until 1880, thus conferring its present form on the country.

1820

The Buenos Aires government sent a ship under the command of Colonel Jewitt to take possession of the islands.

1826

Louis Vernet, a Hamburg merchant, was granted land and fishery rights by the Buenos Aires authorities and founded a settlement at Puerto de Soledad; he was appointed governor by these authorities in 1828 in spite of British protests.

August 1831

An American warship, the *Lexington*, commanded by Captain Duncan, destroyed the fort of Soledad as a reprisal, Vernet having seized three American schooners in a dispute

1. Sources: United Kingdom Central Office of Information, Document 152/82, March 1982; the Falkland Islands and their dependencies, article by David Cross in the Times, 15th April 1982.

over fishery rights. The islands seem to have been under no apparent authority until September 1832, when a new governor was appointed by the Buenos Aires government.

January 1833

The British Government reasserted its sovereignty by sending out a warship, HMS *Clio*, under the command of Captain Onslow. On reaching Soledad, Captain Onslow ordered the some fifty inhabitants to leave the islands. Soledad then became Port Louis. Britain claims that the colony was established as of this date. Naval officers remained in charge until the formation of a civil administration in 1841.

Twentieth century

Buenos Aires did little about its claim to sovereignty over the Falklands in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The election of Juan Peron in 1946 led to a revival of Argentina's claims to the Falklands, their dependencies and the Antarctic continental shelf off Argentina. The matter was placed before the United Nations in 1965.

(b) *Argentinian interpretation*¹

Argentina's claims to the Falklands are based on the following *de facto* and *de jure* circumstances:

1. "Priority of discovery", although not sufficient to establish dominion, belongs to the Spanish or the Dutch but not to the British. The accounts of Captains Davis and Hawkins are too vague and circumstantial. Moreover, before their discovery by van Weerdt in 1598

1. Source: *La cuestion Malvinas* by R.S. Martinez Moreno, 1965.

there were maps of the Falklands (discovered and published in the 1960s) drawn up by Diego Ribeiro, a Portuguese mapmaker, in 1529 and by Bartolomé Olives in 1562, and therefore well before 1592 or 1594. Finally, according to the Argentinian historian Hector Rato, a Portuguese sailor in Magellan's expedition, Esteban Gomes, discovered the islands during his journey back to Spain in 1520.

2. The first effective occupation, in January 1764, the sole basis for dominion over territories which had never been inhabited, was by France, which ceded them to Spain, recognising the latter's sovereignty over the islands.

3. The Falkland Islands have belonged to Spain since America was discovered and were included in the domains assigned to Spain by the Papal Bull of Alexander VI in 1493 apportioning Spanish and Portuguese land, this domain being ratified with some changes by the Treaty of Tordesillas signed by the Portuguese and Spanish states.

It was under the *Pacto de Familia* of 1761 in which Spain and France gave each other mutual guarantees in respect of all the territories in their possession without reserve or exception that France returned the Falkland Islands to Spain.

4. Under the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), Britain recognised Spanish sovereignty over territories colonised by the latter.

5. Spain's devolution to Britain following the 1770 war concerned only Port Egmont with a secret verbal agreement that Britain would subsequently evacuate it, which it did in 1774, the agreement being intended to allay British susceptibility following the expulsion of British settlers in 1770.

6. Argentina inherited all Spain's rights by emancipation. It was dispossessed by force and its original rights remain intact.

APPENDIX III

*Negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom**(1965-February 1982)**16th December 1965*

The twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2065 (XX) which noted the existence of a dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom about sovereignty over the Falkland Islands: it invited the two governments to negotiate and seek a peaceful solution. (This resolution is one of a series of resolutions on ending colonialism.) Argentina voted for the resolution and the United Kingdom abstained.

1966

On 18th July, the two countries started preliminary talks in London. For the British, there was no question of discussing the question of sovereignty.

On 28th September, there was a symbolic invasion of the Falklands by Argentinian commandos. The Argentinian Government dissociated itself from this invasion and from the anti-British demonstrations.

1967-71

On 19th December 1967, the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution urging the two countries to continue negotiations and find a peaceful solution as soon as possible.

The negotiations were continued in 1968; the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs undertook, in the various parliamentary assemblies and during a visit to the Falklands (23rd-28th November), not to relinquish sovereignty over the islands to Argentina against the wishes of their inhabitants.

On 12th December, Argentina said it could not accept this position. The negotiations were continued in 1969 and 1970 with more particular attention being paid to the problem of communications since in 1969 Argentina said it was prepared to study ways of establishing and improving direct links between the continent and the islands.

On 1st July 1971, the two countries reached agreement on measures for establishing regular sea and air communications, improving postal, cable and telephone connections and

accepting inhabitants of the Falklands in schools and hospitals in Buenos Aires.

1973-77

The return to power of General Juan Peron revived the controversy between the two countries at the end of 1973. On 14th December 1973, the United Nations General Assembly adopted another resolution, No. 3160 (XXVIII), urging the two parties to find a solution in order to put an end to the colonial situation. Relations deteriorated seriously at the end of 1973 when the United Kingdom announced its intention of sending an economic delegation to the Falklands: the Argentinian Ambassador in London was recalled on 28th October 1975 and the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires on 19th January 1976. In December 1976, the United Nations General Assembly adopted another resolution which recalled earlier resolutions "and called upon the two parties to refrain from taking decisions which would imply introducing unilateral modifications in the situation while the islands were going through the process recommended in the abovementioned resolutions". The United Kingdom voted against it.

The conclusions of the report of the economic delegation in 1976, which mentioned the need for closer relations with Argentina, led the United Kingdom to resume negotiations in 1977. After a series of consultations with the inhabitants of the Falklands and with Argentina in February, the two parties issued a memorandum preparing for Anglo-Argentinian negotiations on political relations, including the questions of sovereignty and economic co-operation in the archipelago, the dependencies and the South Atlantic as a whole. Two working groups were set up to this end, but with no concrete result (15th December 1977).

1978-82

Negotiations were resumed in February 1978 and again in April 1979 (inter alia with a representative of the islands' legislative council present) but without great success. It was not until 16th November 1979 that diplomatic relations were re-established at ambassadorial level.

In April 1980, a series of preparatory talks was organised on very varied subjects. On 26th and 27th February 1981, further talks

were held in New York, two members of the islands' council being present. Argentina refused the British proposal to freeze the dispute for an agreed period, allowing the two countries to co-operate in exploiting the archipelago's resources. In the United Nations, Argentina warned the United Kingdom that it would not allow the Falklands to continue to exist as a British colony and asked for further serious negotiations.

In February 1982, a second series of official talks was held in New York. Argentina proposed measures for advancing the negotiations (creation of a standing committee). The United Kingdom refused. However, both parties asserted their determination to find a solution. The joint communiqué issued on 27th February declared that the talks had been held "in a cordial and positive spirit".

APPENDIX IV

*Official texts***(a) Agreed statement by the President of the United Nations Security Council, Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda, Zaïre***1st April 1982*

After holding consultations with members of the Council, I have been authorised to make the following statement on behalf of the Council:

“The Security Council has heard statements from the representatives of the United Kingdom and Argentina about the tension which has recently arisen between the two governments.

The Security Council has taken note of the statement issued by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which reads as follows:

The Secretary-General, who has already seen the representatives of the United Kingdom and Argentina earlier today, renews his appeal for maximum restraint on both sides. He will, of course, return to headquarters at any time, if the situation demands it.

The Security Council, mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, expresses its concern about the tension in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). The Security Council accordingly calls on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to exercise the utmost restraint at this time and in particular to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region and to continue the search for a diplomatic solution.

The Security Council will remain seized of the question.”

(b) European political co-operation – Communiqué issued by the ten Ministers for Foreign Affairs*2nd April 1982*

The Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Ten condemn the armed intervention of the Argentinian Government in the Falkland Islands, violating the declaration made on 1st April by the President of the Security Council of the United Nations which is now dealing with the matter. They urgently call upon the Argentine Government to withdraw its forces immediately

and to abide by the United Nations Security Council appeal asking it to refrain from the use of force and to continue efforts towards a diplomatic solution.

(c) Statement by the Secretary-General of NATO after the urgent meeting of the North Atlantic Council*2nd April 1982*

Members of the Council expressed deep concern at the dispute between a member of the Alliance and a state with which all have friendly relations and reiterated the call made to the parties by the President of the Security Council yesterday to refrain from the use or threat of force and to continue the search for a diplomatic solution.

(d) United Nations Security Council Resolution 502*3rd April 1982**The Security Council,*

Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council at the 2345th meeting of the Security Council on 1st April 1982 (S/14944) calling on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to refrain from the use or threat of force in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

Deeply disturbed at reports of an invasion on 2nd April 1982 by armed forces of Argentina,

Determining that there exists a breach of the peace in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

1. *Demands* an immediate cessation of hostilities,

2. *Demands* an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

3. *Calls* on the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

**(e) European political co-operation –
Declaration by the Ten**

10th April 1982

1. Representatives of the Ten discussed the grave situation resulting from the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina.
2. They recalled that in their declaration of 2nd April the Ten had already condemned the flagrant violation of international law which the Argentine military action constituted.
3. The Ten remain deeply concerned by the continuation of this crisis, which endangers international peace and security. They therefore attach the greatest importance to the immediate and effective implementation of Security Council Resolution 502 in all its aspects, namely an immediate cessation of hostilities, an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands, and a search for a diplomatic solution by the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom.
4. To these ends, and in a spirit of solidarity among the member countries of the Community, the Ten decide to take a series of measures with respect to Argentina which should be put into operation as soon as possible. They will likewise take the measures necessary to ban all imports of Argentine origin into the Community. In this context the Ten noted that their governments have already decided to apply a complete embargo on the export of arms and military equipment to Argentina.
5. With respect to economic measures, these will be taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Community treaties.
6. Given that the situation resulting from the invasion of the Falkland Islands by the Argentine armed forces is a cause of grave concern for the entire international community, the Ten call on other governments to associate themselves with their decisions, so as to ensure the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 502 with the least possible delay.

**(f) European Communities – Text of the
regulation promulgated by the Council
on economic sanctions against Argentina**

14th April 1982

The Council of the European Communities,

Whereas the serious situation resulting from the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina, which was the subject of Resolution 502 of the Security Council of the United Nations, has given rise to discussions in the

context of European political co-operation which have led in particular to the decision that economic measures will be taken with regard to Argentina in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Community treaties;

Whereas following the measures already taken by the United Kingdom the member states have consulted one another pursuant to Article 224 of the treaty establishing the European Economic Community;

Whereas in the context of these consultations it has proved important to take urgent and uniform measures and whereas the member states have therefore decided to adopt a Council regulation pursuant to the treaty;

Whereas in these circumstances the interests of the Community and the member states demand the temporary suspension of imports of all products originating in Argentina;

Whereas import documents issued and contracts concluded before the entry into force of this regulation should not be affected by it; whereas, however, transitional provisions should not be applied to imports into the United Kingdom which were the subject of United Kingdom measures with effect from 7th April;

Having regard to the treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Article 113 thereof;

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,

Has adopted this regulation:

Article 1

Imports of all products originating in Argentina for the purpose of putting them into free circulation in the Community are hereby suspended.

Article 2

1. This regulation shall not preclude the putting into free circulation of products originating in Argentina

- accompanied by import documents issued before the date of its entry into force which mention Argentina as the country of origin, or
- to be imported in execution of contracts concluded before that date, or
- in course of shipment to the Community at that date.

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to imports into the United Kingdom of products covered by this regulation which were

the subject of measures adopted by the United Kingdom with effect from 7th April.

Article 3

This regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

It shall apply until 17th May 1982.

Before that date, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, shall examine whether it is appropriate to extend, amend, or, if necessary, repeal this regulation.

This regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all member states.

(g) Eurogroup – Communiqué issued after the meeting of the eleven Defence Ministers

5th May 1982

(Extract)

Ministers condemned Argentina's armed invasion of the Falkland Islands and the dependencies as well as her failure to comply with Security Council Resolution Number 502. Ministers noted the importance of maintaining

the principle that aggression or occupation of territory by force should not be allowed to succeed, and urged the need to seek a negotiated solution acceptable to all parties concerned on the basis of the implementation of Security Council Resolution Number 502 in all its parts.

(h) NATO Defence Planning Committee – Communiqué issued after the meeting of Defence Ministers

7th May 1982

(Extract)

Ministers endorsed the statement by Eurogroup Ministers, in their communiqué of the previous day, in which they condemned Argentina's armed invasion of the Falkland Islands and the dependencies as well as her failure to comply with Security Council Resolution Number 502; noted the importance of maintaining the principle that aggression or occupation of territory by force should not be allowed to succeed; and urged the need to seek a negotiated solution acceptable to all parties concerned on the basis of the implementation of Security Council Resolution Number 502 in all its parts.

The Falklands crisis

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2¹
tabled by MM. Stoffelen and Miller

1. Leave out paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.
2. Leave out sub-paragraph 3 (b) of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed: Stoffelen, Miller

1. See 4th sitting, 16th June 1982 (report referred back to committee).

The Falklands crisis

AMENDMENTS 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10¹
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

3. After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as follows:
“ Welcoming the position adopted by the United States after the failure of the attempted negotiations; ”.
4. After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert new paragraphs as follows:
“ Expressing its solidarity with the United Kingdom concerning its decision to restore international order and to secure the application of Resolution 502 of the Security Council;
Expressing its solidarity with the United Kingdom concerning its decision to invoke Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations; ”.
5. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “ assistance ” and insert “ support ”.
6. After paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:
“ Concerned at the possible deterioration in relations between Western Europe and North America and Latin America; ”.
7. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert “ in accordance with the decisions of the Council of the European Communities; ”.
8. In paragraph 2, line 2, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ the immediate ” and insert “ after the ”.
9. In paragraph 2, lines 2 and 3, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502 ”.
10. In paragraph 2, line 4, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ islands ” to the end of the paragraph and insert “ and to safeguard relations with the countries of Latin America, so as to avoid any extension of Soviet influence in that continent; ”.

Signed: Cavaliere

1. See 4th sitting, 16th June 1982 (report referred back to committee).

The Falklands crisis

AMENDMENT TO AMENDMENT 6¹
tabled by Mr. Dejardin

In Amendment 6, line 1, leave out “the ” and insert “a ” and in lines 2 and 3 leave out “ and North America ”.

Signed: Dejardin

1. See 4th sitting, 16th June 1982 (report referred back to committee).

The Falklands crisis

AMENDMENT 11¹
tabled by Mr. Maravalle

11. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ and to ban all imports into the Community originating in Argentina ”.

Signed: Maravalle

1. See 4th sitting, 16th June 1982 (report referred back to committee).

The Falklands crisis

AMENDMENTS 12 and 13¹
tabled by Mr. Dejardin

12. After paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Expressing its relief at the announcement of the end of fighting and paying tribute to all the victims of the conflict; ”.

13. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert a new paragraph as follows:

“ To concert their political, economic and diplomatic efforts in all countries and appropriate international bodies:

(a) with due respect for United Nations resolutions, to work out a solution which is fair for all the parties involved in the Falklands dispute, including, above all, the inhabitants of these islands, on the one hand to avoid the subsequent outbreak of further fighting and on the other hand to guarantee all the democratic rights of the inhabitants;

(b) to safeguard relations with the Latin American countries, inter alia with a view to promoting democratic ideals and avoiding any extension of Soviet influence; ”.

Signed: Dejardin

1. See 4th sitting, 16th June 1982 (report referred back to committee).

*Application of the Brussels Treaty
Reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council*

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur*

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APPENDIX

Recommendation 365 and the reply of the Council

1. Adopted in Committee by 17 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman); MM. van den Bergh, Mayoud (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Bahr (Alternate: Ahrens), Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bernini, Bizet, Blaauw, Bonnel (Alternate: van der Elst), Cox, Dejardin, Duraffour (Alternate: Baumel), Edwards, Fosson,

Grant, Kittelmann, Lemmrich, Maravalle, Ménard (Alternate: Louis Jung), Pecchioli (Alternate: Amadei), Pignion, Prussen, Hermann Schmidt, Scholten, Smith, Tanghe, Vohrer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

*on the application of the Brussels Treaty
– reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the wide agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the application of the Brussels Treaty, revealed in Recommendation 365 and the Council's reply thereto;
- (ii) Noting that the Council and Assembly alike recognise that the fundamental provisions of the Brussels Treaty, particularly the mutual security provisions of Articles IV, V and VIII.3, retain their full value, and that there is interest in making greater use of Western European Union as an instrument of European security;
- (iii) Believing that most arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty no longer serve any useful purpose, and noting the Council's view that "in applying the provisions of Protocol No. III and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situation in Europe";
- (iv) Believing therefore that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. In application of Article V of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III;
2. Call on member countries which participate in the integrated system of NATO, and are not already bound by Article VI of Protocol No. II, to make unilateral declarations concerning the level of forces they undertake to assign to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and station as agreed with him, and not to withdraw against the wishes of a majority of the high contracting parties;
3. To include in future annual reports a statement on the levels of all assigned forces;
4. To communicate its annual report, as in the past, before the end of February.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. In application of Rule 27(2) of the Rules of Procedure, Chapters II.B. Activities of the Council – defence questions; III. Agency for the Control of Armaments and IV. Standing Armaments Committee of the annual report of the Council are referred to the Committee. The present report replies to these three chapters.

1.2. As Chapter III of the annual report did not reach the Office of the Clerk until 5th April, your Rapporteur had very little time to examine it when this report was drafted.

1.3. 1981, to which the annual report of the Council relates, was marked by a definite rapprochement between the views of the Assembly and those of the Council about the operation of Western European Union. Thus, the chapter of the report on relations between the Council and the Assembly quotes the flattering words of Mr. Hurd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, when presenting the previous annual report to the Assembly:

“The Council continues to appreciate the rôle played by the Assembly in watching over the solution of the problems of security and European union and in submitting its thoughts to governments for their attention. We believe that the standard of these reports is generally high and that the Assembly, which is the only parliamentary institution empowered to debate defence questions, exercises this prerogative with remarkable consistency and insight.

The value which the Council attaches to the Assembly's work was again underlined in its reply to Recommendation 365 on the application of the Brussels Treaty.”

1.4. The text of Recommendation 365, adopted by the Assembly on the basis of the Committee's previous report¹, and the Council's reply are given at appendix.

¹. Document 875: Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council, Rapporteur: Mr. Tanghe, 4th May 1981.

II.B. Activities of the Council – defence questions

1. Amendments to Annexes III and IV to Protocol No. III

2.1. The chapter of the annual report on the defence activities of the Council in 1981 contains no section on amendments to Annex III to Protocol No. III (the list of conventional weapons whose production is forbidden in Germany) because this list was not reduced during the year. However, in the introduction to this chapter, the Council quotes part of its reply to Recommendation 365 in which the Assembly had recommended the progressive reduction of the two lists of conventional weapons – those in Annex III, already mentioned, and in Annex IV – weapons of all the member countries on the mainland of Europe which are subject to control by the Agency for the Control of Armaments:

“In the matter of armaments control, the Council are aware of the fact that in applying the provisions of Protocol No. III and its annexes account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situation in Europe. Thus, in accordance with the procedures laid down in Article II of Protocol No. III, which are still available, Annex III of this protocol has been amended on several occasions since 1961.

Furthermore, it is clear that if the Council considered at a given moment that it would be appropriate to review the list contained in Annex IV of Protocol No. III this could only be done by following the procedure laid down in Article V of this protocol. The question of the pattern of field control measures could also arise, for example in the form of an examination of the present level of sampling used for verifying the member countries' declarations.”

2.2. For several years the Committee has noted that the usefulness of the controls of armaments provided for in Protocols Nos. III and IV of the Brussels Treaty was questioned. Devised in 1954 in the framework of the agreements which sanctioned the rearmament of Germany, these controls, which are partly reciprocal, partly discriminatory, have now been overtaken by events and the political climate in the Atlantic Alliance. The Committee

has recommended in the past that in application of the provisions of these protocols the Council invoke the powers conferred on it in Articles II and V of Protocol No. III to reduce or delete the lists of conventional weapons whose production is forbidden in Germany or of weapons which are subject to the control of the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

2.3. As for the Council's suggestion that "the question of the pattern of field control measures could also arise, for example, in the form of an examination of the present level of sampling...", the Committee notes that the frequency of field controls carried out by the Agency is already at the lowest level that might be considered necessary. As the twenty-second report of the Council¹ indicates:

"The Agency's basic assumption in this respect, which is supported by the observations of previous years, is that the undertakings and declarations of member countries are being honoured. Clearly, if any doubt existed on this point, control measures would have to be increased. In any case, the measures taken by the Agency must provide a sufficiently high probability of detecting any contravention."

As noted in the sections of the annual report referred to below, the controls provided for in the treaty are already not applied in many fields.

2.4. For these reasons, and anxious to respect the treaty in force, failing which the credibility of all treaties is called in question, the Committee could not endorse a further reduction in the rare controls now carried out in the fields where they are applicable. It is for the Council to act in accordance with the treaty by deleting the lists of weapons subject to control, so that controls cease to be applicable.

"Furthermore, in accordance with the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 348, the Government of the United Kingdom have informed the Council that the strength of the United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force in 1981 was:

<i>Rôle</i>	<i>Aircraft/Equipment</i>	<i>Squadrons</i>
Strike/Attack	Buccaneer	2
	Jaguar	4
Offensive support	Harrier	2
Reconnaissance	Jaguar	1

2. *United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe*

2.5. Under Article VI of Protocol No. II, the United Kingdom initially undertook "to maintain on the mainland of Europe... the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, that is to say four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force, or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, regards as having equivalent fighting capacity... not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the high contracting parties...". Following successive decisions of the Council, the level of this commitment is now down to 55,000 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force.

2.6. The Committee notes with satisfaction that the information concerning this commitment given in the Council's annual report for 1981 again fully meets its wishes as expressed *inter alia* in the Assembly's Recommendations 331 and 348. The report states in fact that the average number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1981 in accordance with Article VI of Protocol No. II was 58,885. However, it continues: "The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be deployed for short tours of duty there. In 1981 there were on average 1,899 men in Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated, these units would be speedily returned to their station in an emergency affecting NATO." It may be deduced that the average number of British troops stationed in Germany was 56,986 men, whereas the commitment is for 55,000. In the previous year, 56,985 were declared for Germany and 2,480 for Northern Ireland, making an average of 54,505 actually on the spot.

2.7. Like last year, the annual report gives the following details on the strength of the United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force:

1. Document 731, 11th March 1977.

Air defence	Phantom	2
	Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles	1
	Rapier surface-to-air missiles	4
Air transport	Puma	1
Ground defence	RAF Regiment	1 "

2.8. However, the Committee had expected the words of the Council's previous report "these strengths will remain unchanged in 1981" (but referring to 1982) to be included in the present report. But they are not there.

2.9. As far as aircraft are concerned, it may be deduced that British forces stationed on the mainland of Europe include eleven squadrons of tactical aircraft plus a squadron of Puma helicopters which have replaced the previous year's Wessex helicopters.

2.10. The Committee again welcomes the strength of British forces stationed on the mainland of Europe and in particular the standard of the aircraft, which include the Harrier, the first vertical take-off aircraft to become operational in the world.

2.11. The Committee recalls that under Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty, the United Kingdom alone undertook "to maintain on the mainland of Europe the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe". It undertook "not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the high contracting parties".

3. *Adapting WEU to the 1980s*

2.12. The annual report draws attention inter alia to the addresses in the Assembly by Mr. Lagorio, Italian Minister of Defence, and Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the French Minister of Defence, in December 1981. Mr. Lagorio pointed out that WEU was the only real "European" liaison for problems of defence and armaments control. Mr. Lemoine stressed that "Western European Union, as a genuine European institution, must have a special rôle to play" in Europe's security. These speeches, particularly the one by Mr. Lemoine, found some response, and several European leaders, including Chancellor Schmidt, Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Dankert, President of the European Parliament, have since referred to the concept of European consultations on defence matters, although not all see them in the framework of WEU.

2.13. The Committee does not discuss here the question of the framework in which Europeans should consult each other on defence questions. It is at present being examined by the

General Affairs Committee¹. However, the Committee proposes that henceforth WEU be adapted to the real requirements of the eighties, on the one hand by abolishing certain obsolete control functions (referred to in paragraphs 2.1 to 2.4 and 3.11), and on the other hand by the tacit extension of commitments designed to maintain adequate forces under allied command.

2.14. As indicated in paragraph 2.11, under the provisions of the treaty only the United Kingdom entered into such a commitment, which offset its exemption from controls provided for in the same treaty which are applied only "on the mainland of Europe". Parallel with the abolition of controls on conventional weapons, the Committee proposes: (i) that the remaining member countries which participate in the integrated military structure of NATO make unilateral solemn declarations in the Council concerning the level of forces they undertake to assign to SACEUR and station as agreed with him, and not to withdraw against the wishes of a majority of the High Contracting Parties; (ii) that future Council reports refer to the level of forces of all member countries assigned to SACEUR and stationed in agreement with him, as the present report does in the case of the United Kingdom.

2.15. Thus adapted to the requirements of the day, WEU would appear to be the ideal instrument for all European consultations on defence matters, should member countries unanimously feel that was appropriate.

III. *Agency for the Control of Armaments*

3.1. As the Committee has pointed out on a number of occasions most of the arms control provisions contained in Protocols Nos. III and IV of the modified Brussels Treaty – which date from 1954 – no longer serve any useful purpose. In perpetuating discrimination against one member country or in hampering the defence effort they may be detrimental. The Council in its reply to Recommendation 365² has gone some way to accepting that view, saying "that in applying the provisions of Protocol No. III and its annexes account should

1. Report on the political activities of the WEU Council.
2. At Appendix.

be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situation in Europe”.

3.2. The extent of the Brussels Treaty controls is not widely understood, nor is the fact that the Council failed to apply many of the control provisions from the outset. The control provisions of the treaty may be summarised as follows:

- (i) Germany undertook not to manufacture atomic, biological or chemical weapons on its territory;
- (ii) Germany also undertook not to manufacture certain conventional weapons, the list of which may be amended or cancelled in accordance with a special procedure, the Council deciding by a two-thirds majority;
- (iii) the Council determines the level of stocks of atomic, biological and chemical weapons which countries manufacturing them may hold on the mainland of Europe¹;
- (iv) levels of atomic, biological and chemical weapons and certain conventional weapons held by member countries on the mainland of Europe¹ are subject to verification by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments. The list of such atomic, biological and chemical weapons and of conventional weapons may be modified by a unanimous decision of the Council;
- (v) the Agency for the Control of Armaments verifies that the above provisions are respected, except for the weapons of forces assigned to NATO, which are verified by the latter.

(a) Non-application of controls

3.3. In the earlier days when the controls could be held to serve some purpose, the Committee had frequent occasion to draw attention to the major shortcomings in their application by the Council. The twenty-seventh annual report of the Council indicated no change in this situation.

3.4. Like earlier reports, the Council's present report refers to fields where the Agency does not exercise its activities:

1. The expression “on the mainland of Europe” excludes British weapons on British metropolitan territory.

“Atomic, chemical and biological weapons

The position described in earlier annual reports remained basically unchanged.

The activities of the Agency cover neither nuclear nor biological weapons.

The control activities dealt with in this chapter do not, therefore, concern these two categories of armaments.

In the case of chemical weapons, only non-production controls take place; no quantitative controls are made since the member states have always declared they possessed no such armaments.”

Previous reports have included a statement to the effect that:

“The non-nuclear components of such [nuclear] weapons (namely the missiles themselves and other specially designed equipment) are subject to control except as regards the weapons qualified as “strategic” by one member state. Furthermore, as this state has declared that its nuclear capability as a whole is directed to one and the same objective of deterrence, its missiles with nuclear capability and tracked launchers are no longer subject to control.”¹

The Committee has noted² that the state in question was France and that Pluton tactical nuclear missiles had been withdrawn from Agency control as from 1979.

3.5. The Council's report goes on to say:

“As the convention for the due process of law³ has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1981, as in previous years, to take the form of ‘agreed control measures’.

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' notice. This agreement has never been withheld...”

1. Document 833, 28th March 1980.

2. Document 875, 4th May 1981.

3. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 but ratified by only six states: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).

3.6. The annual report also specifies that:

“In application of Article III of Protocol No. III, which lays down conditions to enable the Council to fix the levels of chemical weapons that may be held on the mainland of Europe by those countries which have not given up the right to produce them, and in accordance with the Council decision of 1959, the Agency asked the countries concerned in its questionnaire whether production of chemical weapons on their mainland territory had passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage.

All the member countries concerned once again gave an explicit negative reply in 1981.

In addition, in the covering letter to its questionnaire, the Agency, as in previous years, asked the member states to declare any chemical weapons that they might hold, whatever their origin. In reply to this questionnaire no country reported holding any chemical weapons and because of this the quantitative control of weapons of this nature raised no problems in 1981.”

3.7. On the subject of biological weapons the Council's report states:

“All member countries reported their agreement to the entry into force in 1981 of the list of biological weapons subject to control as revised by Council decision. The Council noted the fact.”

The Committee calls for the revised list of biological weapons subject to control to be communicated to the Assembly, together with the list of chemical weapons subject to control which has been published by SIPRI, but never communicated to the Assembly.

(b) Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments

3.8. Although the WEU controls have lost their usefulness, and the Agency's true areas of activity remain limited solely to conventional weapons, the number of inspections carried out by the Agency each year shows that generally speaking there has been no reduction in its activities, as may be seen from the following table. Non-production controls no longer apply to German shipyards because, following a recommendation to that effect by the Assembly, the Council has deleted warships from the list of armaments not to be produced in Germany. Qualitative controls still apply to shipyards of all member countries on the continent.

3.9. Once again, the Committee finds particularly useful the lists of armaments currently being produced, set out in parts 1 to 4 of Section E “State and problems of control in certain particular fields” which is a summary of current armaments production programmes in member countries.

(c) Conclusion on the control of armaments

3.10. The annual report of the Council stresses the limited nature of the field control programme, particularly visits to private firms, but it is clear that the Agency for the Control of Armaments performs its tasks efficiently in those fields which are open to it.

3.11. For the reasons given in paragraphs 2.13 and 3.1 above, the Committee now recommends that *quantitative controls* on the mainland of Europe be abolished. The Council is empowered to take this step under the terms of Article V of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, by cancelling the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III. This step will leave in force the unilateral undertaking by Germany not to manufacture nuclear, biological or chemical weapons on its territory. The Committee understands that it continues to be the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany not to manufacture such weapons and that it welcomes these treaty provisions. While controls on these non-production undertakings would remain in force under the treaty, as noted above they are applied only in the case of chemical weapons, and then under certain restrictions. The unilateral undertaking by Germany not to manufacture specified conventional weapons on its territory would also remain in force, but following some eight deletions made by the Council to the list concerned (Annex III to Protocol No. III) this now covers only long-range surface-to-surface missiles and bomber aircraft for strategic purposes.

IV. Standing Armaments Committee

4.1. As in recent years the work of the Standing Armaments Committee in 1981 was concentrated chiefly in exchange of information by countries in Working Group No. 8 on operational research and will be updating the economic (first section) and legal parts of its study of the situation of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU. An unclassified version of the first section of the economic part was communicated to the Assembly on the occasion of the joint meeting between the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Council on 21st May 1981. That version too is to be updated from 1977 to 1980.

Numbers and types of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments

	Quantitative control measures				Non-production control measures		Total control measures (all categories)
	at depots	at units under national command	at production plants	Sub-total	at production plants	(of which non-production of chemical weapons)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1961	29	15	12	66	7	(2)	63
2	26	20	11	57	7	(2)	65
3	35	13	13	61	10	(4)	74
4	39	19	13	71	9	(4)	80
5	26	16	11	53	7	n.a.	60
6	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	78
7	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
8	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	79
9	*	*	*	*	*	(3)	77
1970	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>		<i>a</i> <i>b</i>
1	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	82 72
2	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	82 72
3	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	66
4	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	66
5	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	71
6	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	71
7	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	70
8	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	68
9	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	70
1980	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	70
1	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	70

Notes *a, b*: From 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of figures (old and new style – *a* and *b*) for the years 1970 and 1971.

n.a.: Information not available.

Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from published annual reports of the Council. With regard to the various categories of controls (columns 1 to 6), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the published annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the Committee. Those for 1970 to 1981 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permission to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without significance.

* Confidential information available to the Committee deleted from the published report.

4.2. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments held a joint meeting with the Standing Armaments Committee in the Liaison Sub-Committee on the Joint Production of Armaments on 16th November 1981.

4.3. The Council has agreed, in its reply to Recommendation 331, to consider the possibil-

ity of the SAC assisting the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to undertake specific studies "within the competence of the SAC as defined in the decision of 7th May 1955" (the Council decision whereby the Standing Armaments Committee was established) but suitable topics have not yet presented themselves.

V. *Conclusions*

5.1. The Committee's principal conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation. At appendix are the texts of Recommendation 365 and the Council's reply which record the wide agreement between the Council and Assembly referred to in the preamble. The Committee's main proposals in the substantive paragraphs are designed to adapt WEU to meet the requirements of the 1980s.

5.2. The scope of the Committee's proposal (substantive paragraph 1 of the recommendation) that the Council cancel the list of weapons subject to control on the mainland of Europe is explained in paragraph 3.11 above of this explanatory memorandum. The proposal in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the recommendation for unilateral declarations on the assignment of forces to SACEUR, with corresponding statements in the Council's annual report, is described in paragraph 2.14 of the explanatory memorandum.

5.3. In paragraph 4 of the recommendation the Committee calls for annual reports of the

Council to be communicated in their entirety before the end of February of the year following that covered by the report. As noted in paragraph 1.2 above, Chapter III of the annual report for 1981 was received only on 5th April 1982. From 1975 to 1977 annual reports for the preceding years were received in their entirety before the end of February or in the first week of March.

5.4. The Committee in paragraph 3.7 of the explanatory memorandum also calls on the Council to communicate to the Assembly the revised list of biological weapons, and the list of chemical weapons subject to control.

VI. *Opinion of the minority*

6.1. The report as a whole was adopted by 17 votes to 1. The minority would have deleted paragraph 1 of the operative part of the draft recommendation, believing that quantitative controls on the mainland of Europe on weapons listed at Annex IV to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty should be retained.

APPENDIX

RECOMMENDATION 365 ¹*on the application of the Brussels Treaty –
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council* ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the fundamental provisions of the Brussels Treaty, particularly those in Articles IV, V and VIII.3, have retained their full value and are one of the key factors in the security system of the signatory countries;
- (ii) Noting however that for greater effectiveness the material organisation of collective defence is undertaken in the wider framework of the North Atlantic Council and the Independent European Programme Group;
- (iii) Considering that a continuing and tangible activity in the framework of the treaty is essential to its credibility and that at the present time this activity is chiefly ensured by the Assembly and by its dialogue with the Council;
- (iv) Considering further, for the abovementioned reasons, that at a time of economic difficulty for member countries the resources they make available to the WEU organs should be redeployed to adapt the latter to present conditions;
- (v) Congratulating the Council for its response to paragraphs 1 to 6 of Recommendation 348 of the Assembly,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Conduct an investigation into:
 - (a) the extent of the controls provided for in Protocols Nos. III and IV that should be maintained and the decisions the Council should take under Articles II and V of Protocol No. III;
 - (b) the appropriate allocation of financial resources and staff among all the WEU organs in the light of the present scope and importance of their respective activities;
 - (c) the possibility of extending to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly the current practice of close co-operation between the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments;
2. Entrust the international secretariat of the SAC with the research necessary for the report on the rôle and contribution of armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime which is referred to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments;
3. Communicate to the Assembly the completed chapters of the Standing Armaments Committee's study on the European armaments industry.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1981 during the First Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session (1st Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 875).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 365***

1.(a) The Council recall the important contribution that Western European Union has made, since its foundation, to the development of co-operation between the member states, in accordance with the objectives of the modified Brussels Treaty, the parties to which stated their resolve, inter alia, to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe. They emphasise that the member states remain convinced of the importance attached both to realising these objectives and maintaining the commitment of collective self-defence under Article V of the treaty.

The Council note with satisfaction the positive rôle played by the Assembly, which is the sole European parliamentary body where members of national parliaments debate, under the terms of a treaty, the problems of security common to the member states.

That said, the Council are aware of the fact that in applying the provisions of Protocol No. III and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situation in Europe. Thus, in accordance with the procedures laid down under Article II of Protocol No. III, which are still available, Annex III of that Protocol has been amended on several occasions since 1961.

Furthermore, it is clear if the Council considered at a given moment that it would be appropriate to review the list contained in Annex IV of Protocol No. III, this could only be done by following the procedure laid down in Article V of Protocol No. III. The question of the pattern of field control measures could also arise, for example in the form of an examination of the present level of sampling used for verifying the member countries' declarations.

(b) The budget situation in the member countries at the present time calls for rigorous economies. It is within this context that the Council charged an ad hoc working group with the task of carrying out a study aimed at identifying all acceptable steps that might be taken to achieve economies, together with greater efficiency in methods of work and use of staff in WEU's ministerial bodies, without impairing the organisation's ability to meet its obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty, the Protocols and the Council's decision of 7th May 1955.

In this connection, it should be recalled that, as a result of excellent co-operation, certain expenditure effected for the Assembly is borne by the budgets of two of the WEU ministerial bodies.

(c) The Council might examine the possibilities of extending to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly the current practice of administrative co-operation between the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Armaments Control Agency. Indeed, a measure of administrative co-operation already exists. However, rules of security, which differ in scope for the Assembly and the executive bodies of WEU, limit the extent to which such co-operation could be realised.

2. As pointed out to the Assembly in their reply to Recommendation 331, the Council have no objection to examining, on a case-by-case basis, the possibility of co-operation between the SAC and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. However, they could only give their agreement to such co-operation for studies relating to subjects within the competence of the SAC as defined in the decision of 7th May 1955. In this connection, the Council regret to have to state that the subject proposed in the present recommendation does not meet this criterion.

3. A presentation of the economic study carried out by the SAC within the framework of its mandate was communicated to the Assembly last May.

The Council confirm the assurance given in their reply to Recommendation 335, namely, when the final report of the SAC is received, the Council will not fail to consider how the Assembly might be informed of its content and principal conclusions.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 18th November 1981.

*Application of the Brussels Treaty –
reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 4¹
tabled by Mr. De Poi

1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “most” and insert “several”.
2. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
“ 1. In the light of the political evolution of Europe and of military technological developments, make a critical reassessment of the list of armaments at Annexes III and IV of Protocol No. III and subject to control by the Agency; ”.
3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.
4. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed: De Poi

1. See 2nd sitting, 15th June 1982 (amendment 1 agreed to; amendments 2, 3 and 4 negatived).

*Application of the Brussels Treaty –
reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 5¹
tabled by Mr. Prussen

5. In the draft recommendation proper, before paragraph 1 insert a new paragraph as follows:
“ In application of Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III; ”.

Signed: Prussen

1. See 2nd sitting, 15th June 1982 (amendment agreed to).

*Application of the Brussels Treaty –
reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 6¹
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

6. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “cancel” and insert “vary by reducing”.

Signed: Cavaliere

1. See 2nd sitting, 15th June 1982 (amendment agreed to).

DisarmamentREPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Vohrer, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in Committee by 11 votes to 4 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman); MM. van den Bergh, Mayoud (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Bahr (Alternate: Ahrens), Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bernini, Bizet, Blaauw, Bonnel, Cox, Dejardin, Duraffour

(Alternate: Baumel), Edwards, Fosson, Grant, Kittelmann, Lemmrich, Maravalle, Ménard (Alternate: Louis Jung), Pecchioli (Alternate: Amadei), Pignion, Prussen, Hermann Schmidt, Scholten, Smith, Tanghe, Vohrer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

- (d) Other disarmament subjects not dealt with in the Committee on Disarmament
 - (vii) Specially injurious weapons
 - (viii) Mutual and balanced force reductions
 - (ix) Confidence-building measures and CSCE
 - (x) Conference on disarmament in Europe
 - (xi) International satellite monitoring agency
 - (xii) START (SALT) and INF
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- IV. Military expenditures, GNP, central government expenditures, public health expenditures, and public education expenditures, 1969-78, by region, organisation and country
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Introductory Note

In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows :

2nd November 1981 – London

Mr. Christoph Bertram, Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies.

23rd and 24th February 1982 – MBFR negotiations, Vienna

H.E. Mr. Edward Jackson, Ambassador, Head of the United Kingdom Delegation ;

H.E. Dr. Walter Boss, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany ;

H.E. Mr. Richard Starr, Ambassador, Head of the United States Delegation ; Mr. Leo Reddy, Political Adviser ;

H.E. Mr. André Wieland, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the German Democratic Republic ;

H.E. Baron W. J. de Vos van Steenwijk, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation ;

H.E. Mr. Valerian V. Mikhailov, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the USSR ;

H.E. Mr. Stanislaw Przygodzki, Ambassador, Head of the Polish Delegation ;

25th and 26th February 1982 – Committee on Disarmament, Geneva

H.E. Dr. Henning Wegener, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany ;

Mr. Pedro Nuñez Mosquera, Second Secretary, Cuban Delegation ;

H.E. Mr. Louis G. Fields, Ambassador, Head of the United States Delegation ; Mr. Jack Leonard ; Dr. P. Corden ;

H.E. Curt Lidgard, Ambassador, Deputy Head of the Swedish Delegation ;

H.E. Mr. Anisse Salah-Bey, Ambassador, Head of the Algerian Delegation ;

H.E. Mr. Rikhi Jaipal, Ambassador, Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, United Nations ;

H.E. Mr. V. Issraelyan, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the USSR ;

Mr. Lawrence Middleton, Counsellor, United Kingdom Delegation ;

Mr. G. Corea, Secretary-General, UNCTAD.

The Committee as a whole met in Ottawa on 8th March when it discussed a first draft of this report. It was addressed by the Hon. J. Gilles Lamontagne, Canadian Minister of National Defence, and, with particular relevance to the present report, was briefed by Mr. T. C. Hammond, Director, Defence Relations Division, Department of External Affairs, on Canadian policy on arms control.

The Committee next met at NATO headquarters, Brussels, on 19th April where it was addressed by Mr. Fredo Dannenbring, NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs ; Admiral R. H. Falls, C.F., Chairman of the Military Committee ; and Lt.-Gen. Lewis Melner, US Army, Deputy Chairman of the Military Committee. At Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe the same day the Committee was briefed by Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Terry, RAF, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe ; Lt.-Gen. Mario Gariboldi, Italian Army, DCOS Logistics, Armaments and Administration ; Lt.-Gen. Hans-Joachim Mack, DCOS Plans and Operations ; Air Vice Marshal Tony Skingsley, ACOS Plans and Policy ; Colonel Hans-Peter Heck, German AF, Nuclear Policy Section ; Colonel John Craig, USAF, Nuclear Policy Section ; and Colonel Roelof Ubels, Netherlands Army, Arms Control Section. The meeting was resumed at NATO headquarters, Brussels, on 20th April when the Committee discussed a revised draft and adopted the report as a whole.

The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials, senior officials and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the Committee and replied to questions.

The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the Committee.

Draft Recommendation*on disarmament*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament is to open on 7th June 1982 ;
- (ii) Aware that since the first special session in 1978 there is negligible progress to report on arms control and none on disarmament ;
- (iii) Aware that in the meantime world military expenditure has increased to \$ 455 billion a year ;
- (iv) Recalling its Recommendation 323 of 21st November 1978,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments to take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following objects in view:

1. To establish preconditions for disarmament:
 - (a) by fostering wider but balanced commercial relations between East and West, and between North and South ;
 - (b) by investigating the possibility of developing weapons systems that would be manifestly defensive ;
2. To secure a substantial reduction in the level of nuclear weapons in the world as a whole, and in Europe the "zero option" in the INF talks and the establishment of a proper balance of conventional forces ;
3. To seek the earliest agreement on the following specific disarmament, arms control and confidence-building measures:
 - (a) at the world level:
 - (i) a complete ban on the production, stockpiling and use of chemical and mycotoxin weapons, through a resumption of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the first place ;
 - (ii) a complete ban on nuclear weapons testing, through a resumption of the trilateral talks between the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union in the first place, to conclude an agreement on the terms already agreed in 1980 ;
 - (iii) amendment of the 1967 outer space treaty to ban all weapons for use in or from outer space ;
 - (iv) the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency on the lines of the report of the United Nations Secretary-General ;
 - (v) the establishment of a register to be prepared and published by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of international transfers of armaments ;
 - (vi) the appointment of a United Nations working group of experts to examine alternative defence systems excluding nuclear weapons ;
 - (b) at the European level:
 - (vii) a phase 1 agreement on MBFR together with permanent measures of verification to remain operative for the duration of the agreement ;
 - (viii) a conference on disarmament in Europe on the lines of the French proposal of 1978 ;
 - (ix) enhanced confidence-building measures in Europe ;
4. To secure reductions in armaments in third world countries through the example to be set by the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in reducing their nuclear and conventional forces, and, when measures of actual disarmament are implemented, in diverting to developing countries the funds thus released.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Vohrer, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

(a) Terms of reference

1.1. The Committee intends the present report to be a general report on all aspects of arms control and disarmament with reference to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament which is to be held from 7th June to 9th July 1982. Like the reports adopted in 1978¹ at the time of the first special session on disarmament of the General Assembly, which lasted from 23rd May to 1st July 1978, this report deals chiefly with the disarmament issues most likely to be considered at the forthcoming special session and in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament.

1.2. The report deals also with certain regional aspects of arms control of more direct concern for European security – the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions, which have now been going on for eight years; experience with the confidence-building measures agreed within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in Madrid, and the French proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe.

1.3. The Committee is reporting separately on the NATO dual decision of December 1979; the associated United States-Soviet Union negotiations on intermediate nuclear forces and on the prospects for the continuation of the SALT process, now referred to by the United States as START (Strategic Armaments Reduction Talks)². These topics are not therefore discussed in detail in the present report.

(b) General political considerations

1.4. The problems of armaments on a global scale should not be limited to a more quantitative analysis. No doubt quantitative facts, like number and type of certain weapon systems,

1. Disarmament, Document 778, Rapporteur: Mr. Roper, adopted on 20th June 1978 during the first special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly, but referred back to the Committee during the first part of the twenty-fourth session of the Assembly. Disarmament, Document 788, Rapporteur: Mr. Roper, 31st October 1978, containing a revised version of the draft Recommendation in Document 778, taking account of the conclusions of the United Nations special session. On Document 788, the Assembly adopted Recommendation 323 on 21st November 1978 (text at Appendix I).

2. See the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe, Rapporteur: Mr. Mommersteeg.

lead to qualitative assumptions, but they have to be inserted into the existing, or yet to be created, political framework. The reason for this is equally self-evident as trivial: defence efforts result from economic, social and general political conditions.

1.5. Where East-West antagonism is concerned, the determining factors are ideological and political rivalry, social and economic differences and the existence in both major systems of an exceptional military potential. Both systems regard their existence threatened by the other. The arguments are well known. It does not matter in this context whether the threat is real. The assumption of a threat, or a belief in one, is sufficient. In this tense situation, the control of armaments is an attempt to facilitate the settlement of differences by peaceful means with the aim of giving tangible form to the principle of renunciation of violence set out in the United Nations Charter¹.

1.6. In both systems an armaments industry has established itself which, under different structural conditions, produces comparable quantities. In the democratic, market-oriented states the armaments industry has gained economic power and thus a dynamism of its own. In the states with a centralised economy the armaments industry lays claim to the entire technological and intellectual elite and its know-how without regard to market-oriented profit. Neither side appears able to bring the other to its knees economically. Neither do massive and military attempts by the super-powers to achieve hegemony seem possible in the face of nuclear arms technology. Thus it is essential to find the ways and to create the general political conditions which could lead to disarmament. In the western industrialised countries, the employment situation, alarming in political and social terms because of the high rate of unemployment, must not be quoted as an argument for maintaining or increasing armaments production or even for justifying an expansion of armaments exports.

(i) Avoiding conflict and securing peace

1.7. The fundamental political condition is agreement between the democratic and communist states, as well as the third world, about the

1. See *Rüstungskontrolle und Abrüstung. Instrument der Friedenssicherung* (Armaments control and disarmament: Instruments of the establishment of peace), Friedrich Ruth, *Aussenpolitik*, 33rd edition, Hamburg, January 1982, page 5.

credible intention to avoid war. If the theoretical claim of the communist states, and in particular of the Soviet Union, is taken seriously, the notion of class struggle specific to communist ideology means that social conflicts must be solved by revolution. This revolutionary element involves a strong tendency towards geographical expansionism. The theoretical claim of the western democracies consists inter alia of defending freedom in an atmosphere of peace. Social conflicts must be solved by means of reforms. The western concept of a democratic state is thus not based on a form of conflict and is moreover free of expansionist claims. Because of certain historical events and of a few isolated exceptions to this theoretical claim, the communist side attributes imperialist aims to the West.

1.8. As stated above, East-West antagonism has many levels. Hence it must be settled on many levels. The control of armaments directly affects only military potential and indirectly East-West social and economic differences. A means must therefore also be found of allowing a direct influence on social and economic differences. Previous decades showed that the prevailing idea of economic harmony could not come about. What is known as the theory of convergence proved unrealistic. Faced with different systems, there is thus a possibility of strengthening trade to the benefit of *both* parties. In order for the ensuing advantages for the two parties to be evident, it must be possible to apply the reverse principle according to which a breakdown in trade relations would involve major disadvantages for the population on both sides. A system of East-West trade association would thus make a fundamental contribution to the establishment of a security association.

1.9. Only under such general conditions for avoiding conflict can one construct a policy of disarmament in order to secure peace. Attempts to secure real disarmament are important because the quantity and quality of today's weapon systems create problems of security which, independent of political decisions, lie in the sphere of technology as well as in the realm of possible misunderstandings. Attempts to disarm are also crucial because the economic disparity in the world will lead any further arming and the associated tying-up of capital and labour into a global economic conflict of immensurable size.

(ii) *East-West versus North-South*

1.10. The inclusion of the third world in the debate on armaments is not only important because these countries are almost exclusively the battlefield, but because the economic tensions between North and South, as well as

between third world countries with a different level of development, have led directly and indirectly to an ideological conflict between the major democratic and communist systems. The involvement of the great powers, which had consequences in the sphere of the arms transfer, creates a potential for conflict inside the third world and has repercussions for the original relationship between the great powers.

1.11. After having analysed in quantitative terms the armaments and arms-transfer policy, and after having presented the measures proposed at various conferences, this study will present proposals which, on the basis of a trading relationship between East and West and between North and South, could lead to a new partnership in security matters.

(c) *Approach to disarmament*

1.12. Historically debates on disarmament or arms control in the framework of the United Nations, and in the Geneva-based Committee on Disarmament, have tended to focus on proposals for general and complete disarmament or on the general abolition or prohibition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. These issues have been the main preoccupation of many non-aligned countries, and the Soviet Union and its allies have found it convenient to pay lip-service to them. Regional negotiations of more direct interest to the western Alliance, such as MBFR; the confidence-building measures of the CSCE; and the proposed conference on disarmament in Europe, often appear distant and parochial negotiations to the many non-aligned members of the United Nations who now form a majority of its membership. Calling on the major military powers to take the lead in reducing the level of their armaments, particularly their nuclear armaments, the non-aligned countries have often been sceptical of purely bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States (SALT; a chemical weapons ban) or trilateral negotiations including the United Kingdom (on a comprehensive nuclear test ban), pointing to their failure to make progress.

1.13. The importance of the limited negotiations was in fact recognised at the first special session of the General Assembly which called for priority to be given to nuclear disarmament and to a chemical weapons ban. To meet that demand it would be important for the participants in the limited negotiations to be able to report progress to the second special session. If the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons enshrined in the non-proliferation treaty is to be preserved, it is equally important for the superpowers to show progress in the reduction of their nuclear forces, in accordance

with Article VI of the non-proliferation treaty. Unfortunately, there is no prospect of genuine progress being reported under either of these heads.

II. Armaments and expenditure on armaments

(a) Assessing levels of armaments, exports and imports

2.1. Almost all data concerning the defence posture of both political systems come from one source only, namely the western one. Although those institutes which are concerned with this subject consider themselves academic, it is doubtful whether calculations, made by one side, can in fact be objective or academic. The institutes cannot be blamed for this state of affairs, but the unwillingness on the part of the communist side to offer transparency and openness.

2.2. The only way to achieve some objectivity is to compare the data of the established institutes. The limited usefulness of data prepared in this way can be shown by tabulating different estimates of both quality and quantity. The reaction of the politicians so far has been clear. Faced with the alternative estimates for the opposite side, they have, as a rule, taken the highest estimates as the basis of their political concepts and the consequent defence efforts. When judging the security pros and cons it has so far been regarded too dangerous to consider equal or even lower estimates of armaments levels on the other side. In practical terms this has meant that each side has felt the high levels attributed to the other side. This is the relationship between available data and the armaments spiral.

2.3. On the other hand, however, purely political choices made without due consideration of technical military data are quite irrational. A demonstration of goodwill in the form of unilateral disarmament cannot be made without serious security risks for both sides, on the basis of a single set of estimates. Data must form the basis of any structural change in security policy. Numerical arguments, saying for example that since the world can now be destroyed four times over when once is sufficient, therefore present arms levels can be reduced to one quarter, are naïve in the face of qualitative interrelationship between weapon systems. The following data should therefore serve as the basis for the politico-structural conditions in the field of security and their possible alteration.

(b) Defence spending and governmental development aid

2.4. In 1980 \$ 450 billion (DM 1 million million) was spent on armaments in the world as a whole and only \$ 17 billion (DM 40 billion), that is to say 4 % of the defence expenditure, on development aid. To cite only one figure: for \$ 0.5 billion all the children in the world could receive full vaccination.

2.5. The figures of misery are disheartening. Every year 12 million children in the third world die of hunger under the age of five. Two out of three people do not receive sufficient food. Almost one in two is illiterate. The population in the third world increases ten times as fast as in the developed world. Every second human being lives in dwellings unfit for human habitation. Hundreds of billions are being spent to further the cause of antagonism, yet 4 % of this sum must suffice to support the common cause and survival of the human race.

2.6. According to SIPRI 81/82, NATO countries account for 43 % of world defence expenditure including 24 % for the United States alone; 26 % can be attributed to the Warsaw Pact countries, including 24 % for the USSR. The other industrialised countries account for 6 % on defence; the third world for 16 % and China 9 %. With regard to arms exports, the United States takes first place in SIPRI's annual review 1981/82 with about 45 %, before the Soviet Union with about 27 %.

2.7. Defence expenditure in 1980 at constant prices is given by SIPRI as follows (in US \$ million at 1978 prices and 1978 exchange rates):

NATO (excluding the United States)	78,929
NATO (including the United States)	193,910
Warsaw Pact (excluding the Soviet Union)	12,250
Warsaw Pact (including the Soviet Union)	119,550
Other European countries	17,821
Middle East	37,900
South Asia	4,902
Far East	25,767
Oceania	3,369
Africa	9,859
Central America	2,186
South America	6,050


2.8. The figures of the IISS are incomplete. It is thus impossible to establish data for the Alliance or the regions for 1981. The following figures have been established from the latest

available data without applying fictitious rates of increase (figures in US \$ million):


Warsaw Pact (total)	143,080
NATO (total)	282,019
Other European states (total) .	14,948
Middle East	3,419
Africa	5,087
Asia	93,653
Latin America	8,999

2.9. The data from "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-1978" is as follows (figures in US \$ billion). In 1978, the world as a whole spent 479.9 on armaments; of which the industrialised countries used up 370.3 and the developing countries 109.6. In terms of Alliance figures, this means: NATO-Europe 68.9 and Warsaw Pact 177.4; the expenditure of NATO-total amounted to 181.7, that of the Warsaw Pact to 177.4; OPEC countries spent 29.9 and the OECD 199.8. More interesting, however, are the rates of increase during the decade.

Regional shares of the major weapons supplied to the third world, 1970-79



Shares of the supplier countries in the exports of major weapons to the third world, 1970-79



Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1981 (Figures 4.4 and 4.5).

Governmental development aid
Aid from major groups of donor countries (1980)

	ODA \$ million	Share in world ODA %	ODA as per cent of GNP %	Per capita GNP \$
United States	7,138	19.9	0.27	11,540
France	4,053	11.3	0.62	12,140
Germany	3,517	9.8	0.43	13,400
Japan	3,304	9.2	0.32	8,900
United Kingdom	1,781	5.0	0.34	9,390
Netherlands	1,577	4.4	0.99	11,240
Canada	1,036	2.9	0.42	10,290
Sweden	923	2.6	0.76	14,620
Italy	672	1.9	0.17	6,910
Australia	657	1.8	0.48	9,420
Belgium	581	1.6	0.49	12,050
Norway	473	1.3	0.82	14,030
Denmark	468	1.3	0.72	12,620
Switzerland	246	0.6	0.24	16,260
Austria	173	0.5	0.23	10,250
Spain	146	0.6	0.07	5,730
Finland	106	0.3	0.22	10,320
New Zealand	71	0.2	0.32	7,090
Ireland	31	0.1	0.18	5,160
OECD Total ^a	26,962	75.4	0.36	10,480
<i>of which:</i>				
DAC	26,767	74.9	0.37	10,770
EEC countries	12,680	35.5	0.46	10,660
OPEC	6,978	19.5	1.35	2,620
<i>of which:</i>				
Arab donors	6,802	19.0	2.34	5,540
Saudi Arabia	3,040	8.5	2.60	9,410
Kuwait	1,188	3.3	3.88	22,790
U A E	1,062	3.0	3.96	27,890
Iraq	829	2.3	2.12	2,930
Qatar	319	0.9	4.80	26,900
Libya	281	0.8	0.92	10,280
Algeria	83	0.2	0.21	2,110
Non-Arab donors	175	0.5	0.08	1,640
CMEA	1,817	5.1	0.12	4,000
<i>of which:</i>				
USSR	1,580	4.4	0.14	4,140
GDR	72	0.2	0.06	6,750
Eastern Europe	165	0.5	0.06	3,040

^a Countries above.

Source: Development co-operation, OECD Review 1981, Paris 1981, S. 78 (Table VI-2).

(c) Qualitative assessment of data

2.10. A comparison between the data is almost impossible. Besides the problem, already mentioned, of obtaining reliable figures, especially in the case of the Soviet Union, there is the additional problem of conflicting methods of analysing and interpreting the data. The first problem concerns the non-convertibility of certain currencies, notably that of the Soviet Union. In addition, the comparison of industrial and economic costs between market economy and socialist-oriented states is almost impossible. The CIA assesses Soviet defence production as if it had been produced by the United States industrial base. If one assesses the cost of personnel in this way, the basic performance of the Soviet Union increases enormously.

2.11. The Soviet Union on the other hand refers constantly to its own, published budget, which, with regard to defence and armaments exports, only amounts to one-sixth of the real amount, even at the most conservative estimate. Thus Soviet figures are about 80 % below those for the Soviet Union given by the United States. Until 1978, SIPRI increased all Soviet data by 30 %. The new SIPRI formula (from 1978 on) is based on a 1970 CIA calculation which has been computed by using a rate of increase of 1.5 % until now. Conversion to US\$ has been accomplished by applying an artificial purchase factor of 2.2.

2.12. It is noteworthy that there is no objective data available. Also the data arrived at by the various institutes is inconsistent. Since the publication of these figures already implies a

World military expenditure

\$ billion at 1978 constant prices and 1978 exchange rates (percentages in brackets)

	1978	1980
World	435.3 (100 %)	455.3 (100 %)
NATO	189.7 (43.6 %)	193.9 (42.6 %)
Warsaw Pact	115.8 (26.6 %)	119.6 (26.3 %)
Non-oil-producing developing countries	30.5 (7.0 %)	38.4 (8.4 %)

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: "World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook 1981".

judgment, the figures become even more subjective when assessing weapon systems. This shows that disarmament talks are encumbered with unreliable data.

2.13. In its report for the 1978 special session, the Committee pointed out that over the previous decade the greatest increase in military expenditure had come from the poorest third world countries whereas expenditure of the two military blocs had been roughly constant in real terms but had decreased from 80 % to 70 % as a proportion of world military expenditure. The same source for figures of world military expenditure in 1978 and 1980, the last year for which figures are available, shows the same trend as the above table shows.

III. The 1978 special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly*Final document*

3.1. The special session was convened largely at the instigation of the non-aligned countries which took a very active part in the deliberations. As the Committee noted in its previous report, a number of concrete proposals were put forward by several of the allied countries, particularly France, but the two superpowers, who had been sceptical of the usefulness of the special session, took a less active part.

3.2. The final document adopted by consensus at the end of the special session reflects these different attitudes. It is a rambling document of 129 paragraphs containing something for everybody, in a mixture of pious but unrealistic intentions with a few concrete proposals.

3.3. Paragraph 17 of the final document recognises realistically enough that "no real progress has been made so far in the crucial field of reduction of armaments". It cites only the convention on the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons as an agreement limiting or eliminating certain weapons. It notes that "for more than a decade there have been no negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament" which, in paragraph 19, is identified as the final goal.

General priorities

3.4. In paragraphs 20-24 of the final document can be found general priorities for disarmament as identified by the special session, which can be succinctly enumerated as follows:

- (i) nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war;

- (ii) the prohibition of other weapons of mass destruction, with "high priority" to be given to the elimination of all chemical weapons;
- (iii) "the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments", and "the limitation of international transfer of conventional weapons";
- (iv) the prohibition or restriction of excessively injurious conventional weapons;
- (v) collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields and confidence-building measures.

The final document in paragraph 28 declares that "the nuclear weapons states have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other military significant states, for halting and reversing the arms race".

Programme of action

3.5. Seventy paragraphs of the final document are devoted to a programme of action which calls for a range of measures of varying feasibility. Some of these measures, usually formulated in different language, were taken up by the WEU Assembly in paragraph 1 of Recommendation 323¹. The chief points in the programme of action are summarised in paragraphs 3.6 to 3.15 below.

3.6. *Nuclear disarmament* is to be achieved through the cessation of the improvement and development of nuclear weapons; the cessation of production of nuclear weapons and means of delivery; and through progressive reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and means of delivery.

3.7. *Cessation of nuclear weapon tests* is to be achieved through the negotiations between the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union on a comprehensive test ban which will be submitted to the Committee on Disarmament so that a draft treaty can be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly.

3.8. *Strategic arms limitation* requires the earliest conclusion of SALT II by the United States and the Soviet Union, to be followed by significant reductions and qualitative limitations on strategic weapons.

3.9. *Measures to prevent nuclear war* should include arrangements "to assure to non-nuclear weapons states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". *Nuclear weapon-free*

zones and zones of peace are to be achieved by agreement among states in the region concerned and the existing Tlatelolco Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America is cited.

3.10. The section on *non-proliferation of nuclear weapons* refers to the obligations of nuclear weapons states to stop the nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament, as well as obligations of non-nuclear weapons states in preventing proliferation. It is noted in passing that adherence to the non-proliferation treaty "has increased in recent years", but the right of all countries to participate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is stressed.

3.11. The section on *other weapons of mass destruction* calls on all states to adhere to existing treaties including the 1925 Geneva Protocol on gas and bacteriological warfare and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. The conclusion of a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons "is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations". A convention banning radiological weapons is called for, and further measures in addition to those in the two treaties concerned should be taken to prevent an arms race on the seabed or in outer space.

3.12. In the field of *conventional weapons*, there should be agreements on appropriate mutual reductions and limitations in Europe and there should be consultations "among major arms supplier and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons based in particular on the principle of undiminished security of the parties...". There should be an agreement to restrict the use of certain particularly injurious conventional weapons.

3.13. The programme of action also calls for *reduction of military expenditures*; confidence-building measures; and a strengthening of institutions for maintaining peace.

3.14. Two paragraphs recognise briefly the importance of measures of *verification* for disarmament agreements. The French proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency is noted in the final document.

3.15. Lastly, the programme of action calls for a considerable programme of studies, information, education and training on various aspects of disarmament both through the secretariat of the United Nations; through the establishment of a semi-independent research centre and through UNESCO.

Machinery

3.16. The last section of the final document provided for a revision of disarmament machi-

1. Text at Appendix I.

nery in the United Nations and associated frameworks. In particular the previous conference of the Committee on Disarmament (originally the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament), which met under the authority of, and at the invitation of, the United States and the Soviet Union as co-chairmen, was modified to become the Committee on Disarmament with a membership enlarged to forty countries under a chairmanship rotating on a monthly basis among all of its members. This is the principal negotiating (as opposed to deliberating) forum.

IV. Prospects for the 1982 special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly

4.1. Six months after the conclusion of the first special session on disarmament, the United Nations General Assembly decided that its second special session devoted to the same subject should be held in 1982, and in December 1980 established a Preparatory Committee composed of 78 member states to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly on the basis of appropriate geographic distribution. That Preparatory Committee on 14th October 1981 reported to the General Assembly its proposals for the agenda and organisation of the 1982 special session. Among the 78 members of the Preparatory Committee are the following 12 NATO countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

4.2. The special session is to be held from 7th June to 9th July 1982 and the substantive items on the present draft of the agenda read as follows:

“8. General debate including:

- Review and appraisal of the present international situation in the light of the pressing need for specific generally agreed measures to eliminate the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, halt and reverse the arms race and to achieve substantial progress in the field of disarmament, especially in its nuclear aspects, taking due account of the close interrelationship between disarmament, international peace and security, as well as between disarmament and economic and social development, particularly of the developing countries.

9. Review of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament:

- status of negotiations on disarmament as contained in the programme of action and bearing in mind the priorities set out in the programme;
- consideration of the report of the Committee on Disarmament, in particular any draft instruments transmitted by the Committee;
- consideration of the report of the Disarmament Commission;
- consideration of the implementation of resolutions of the General Assembly on specific tasks, in particular studies, aimed at the realisation of the final document and their follow-up.

10. Consideration and adoption of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

11. Implementation of the declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade as well as consideration of initiatives and proposals of member states.

12. Enhancing the effectiveness of machinery in the field of disarmament and strengthening the rôle of the United Nations in this field, including the possible convening of a world disarmament conference.

13. Measures to mobilise world public opinion in favour of disarmament:

- disarmament education, seminars and training (United Nations programme of fellowship on disarmament);
- world disarmament campaign;
- other public information activities.

14. Adoption, in an appropriate format, of the document(s) of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.”

4.3. The Preparatory Committee recommends that member states should be represented at the special session at the highest possible level. The 1978 special session attracted the highest level of participation on the part of many countries, including several NATO countries for whom the following spoke: Belgium - Mr. Simonet, Foreign Minister; Denmark - Mr. Ostergard, Minister without Portfolio; France - President Giscard d'Estaing, President of the

Republic; Germany – Mr. Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor; United Kingdom – Mr. Callaghan, Prime Minister. However, both the United States and the Soviet Union played a less prominent rôle. Mr. Mondale, Vice-President of the United States, made an address which was chiefly critical of the Soviet Union.

4.4. It is understood that President Mitterrand of France, Chancellor Schmidt of Germany, Mrs. Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and President Reagan of the United States will be addressing the 1982 special session in person. Decisions concerning other western leaders have not yet been announced.

4.5. Among the items on the foregoing draft agenda, the following can be expected to attract particular attention especially from the non-aligned who are the principal protagonists of the special sessions:

- Status of negotiations contained in the programme of action of the first special session, bearing in mind the priorities in the programme.
- Report of the Committee on Disarmament, *in particular any draft treaties that it may have prepared.*
- Implementation of special tasks and studies referred to in the final document.
- The comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The following section summarises present progress on some of these specific topics which will be of particular relevance in the 1982 special session.

V. *Status of certain specific arms control or disarmament subjects*

(a) *The various disarmament conferences and negotiations*

5.1. The various disarmament conferences and armament control negotiations are not of purely military concern. They are – and this has been emphasised especially by the West – embedded in certain wider considerations. Negotiations on the control of armaments should seek to bring about the renunciation of force which is enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Secondly, these negotiations should contribute, together with relevant military agreements, to securing peace on the basis of a stable balance, possibly at a lower level of armaments. Thus where world stability is concerned, the third world has to be included. These are the preconditions for all negotiations. They are neither options nor scenarios; they are concrete, political foundations for

security which are derived from the real situation, including the fact that different contractual ties between states have led to economic, military and political alliances. The dominant position within the Alliance of the United States, based upon superior economic, military and political might, is a matter of fact, yet it does not result in the Alliance partners being held in tutelage, or in discrimination against them. In contrast the dominance of the Soviet Union inside the eastern alliance is more coercive.

(b) *Committee on Disarmament*

5.2. Designed as a negotiating body – one in which specific disarmament treaties can be drafted – the Committee on Disarmament and its predecessor, originally the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), has met regularly in the United Nations headquarters in Geneva since 14th March 1962. The ENDC arose originally from a 1961 agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to establish the negotiating body comprising representatives of five NATO countries, five Warsaw Pact countries, and eight non-aligned countries to meet under the joint chairmanship of the two superpowers. France, however, objected to the dominant rôle thus assumed by the two superpowers and did not accept the seat offered to it. China was not among the countries invited to attend.

5.3. The ENDC was progressively enlarged to 30 participants, changing its name to the “Conference of the Committee on Disarmament” and succeeded in negotiating a number of international agreements, in particular the non-proliferation treaty signed in 1968. One of the most positive outcomes of the 1978 special session of the General Assembly was agreement to change the basis of the Committee by replacing the original co-chairmanship of the United States and the Soviet Union by one that rotates each month among all members, the number of which was increased to 40. Thus reconstituted as the “Committee on Disarmament” both France and China have joined it so that in one sense it is a more realistic negotiating body because all five nuclear weapon powers are represented on it. At the same time, the 40-nation membership has undoubtedly made it a more unwieldy body. Cuba, for example, claims membership of the non-aligned group of 21 countries while attending meetings of the Soviet bloc, as does Ethiopia unofficially.

5.4. The Committee on Disarmament is the primary body in which any substantive progress will be made on disarmament subjects which have to be referred to the 1982 special session.

In its 1982 session, which opened on 2nd February, it had the following substantive items on the agenda:

- (i) nuclear test ban;
- (ii) cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;
- (iii) effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapons states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (so-called "negative security assurances");
- (iv) chemical weapons;
- (v) new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons;
- (vi) comprehensive programme of disarmament;
- (vii) prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In addition to its work in plenary session, the Committee on Disarmament for 1982 has established four ad hoc working groups on: a comprehensive programme of disarmament; negative security assurances; chemical weapons ban; and radiological weapons. In 1981 there was a further "ad hoc group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events" and in 1982 the non-aligned, publicly supported by Australia, the Netherlands and Japan, called for the establishment of a working group on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, but the proposal was vetoed by the United States although that country subsequently indicated that it would not oppose a working group limited to verification and compliance with a test ban.

5.5. There is a reasonable working atmosphere within the Committee on Disarmament but progress in preparing specific draft treaties in its framework will be very limited, because of the present state of East-West relations. Specific subjects are dealt with in the following section.

(c) *Subjects discussed in the Committee on Disarmament*

(i) *Nuclear test ban*

5.6. The partial test ban treaty concluded in 1963 prohibits the conduct of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, or under water. It has been adhered to by 112 countries including three nuclear weapons powers, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, who, since its conclusion, have conducted all their nuclear testing underground and there have been no reported violations. Radioactive contamination of the

atmosphere has significantly declined with the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in other environments by these three powers. France, although not a party to the treaty, has in fact conducted all its nuclear tests underground since the beginning of 1975 and the single Indian nuclear explosion (claimed to be a "peaceful device") in 1974 was also conducted underground. China continues to conduct a few tests in the atmosphere.

5.7. On 3rd July 1974 the United States and the Soviet Union concluded a *threshold test ban treaty* banning underground tests in excess of 150 kt, and on 28th May 1976 the two powers signed a treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. These treaties were submitted to the United States Senate for ratification by President Ford on 29th July 1976, but have not so far been ratified although in 1976 the two powers stated that they would abide by their terms.

5.8. Independent trilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States began in Geneva in 1977 and the three countries have made regular joint reports to the Committee on Disarmament, the last on 30th July 1980 reporting the status of the tripartite negotiations on "a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments and its protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes". At that time this undoubtedly appeared to be the most important arms control treaty on which agreement was then imminent. It had been agreed that the treaty would prohibit any nuclear explosions and prohibit assistance to any other country to conduct explosions. A separate peaceful nuclear explosion protocol would be attached to the treaty providing for a moratorium on peaceful explosions until agreement was later reached on arrangements for such explosions consistent with the comprehensive test ban.

5.9. Significantly, agreement had been reached on the fundamental aspects of verification which would combine national means of verification; the international exchange of seismic data; on-site inspection by request and further verification measures with procedures for on-site inspection of suspicious events, including "the installation and use by the three parties of high quality national seismic stations of agreed characteristics". It was agreed in principle that ten seismic stations would be installed on the territory of each of the United States and the Soviet Union, but negotiations were continuing on the demand by the Soviet Union to install ten such stations on United Kingdom territory – including one in Hong Kong – to which the United Kingdom, for some unexplained reason, was objecting. It was anticipated that final

agreement would be reached on a total of some 21 of these stations – which were to be sealed “black boxes” installed by one party on the territory of another with a right of periodical access to check readings and ensure against tampering by the host country.

5.10. It was understood that a treaty would initially be of limited duration, the Soviet Union calling for five years, the United States for three (although the original demands of these two countries had been the opposite), but would become of unlimited duration on the accession of the two remaining nuclear powers, France and China, which had not agreed to renounce testing. The question of initial duration was the only substantive issue on which agreement had not been reached when the negotiations last met on 18th November 1980.

5.11. There has been considerable opposition within the United States to the very concept of a comprehensive test ban, both from the weapons design establishment and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, chiefly on the grounds that the reliability of existing nuclear weapons stocks cannot be ensured without periodical “confidence” testing, and that a ban would hamper new designs of nuclear weapons. Typical of evidence given to United States Senate Committees is that of Dr. H.M. Agnew, Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory which designs and manufactures nuclear weapons:

“...I do not believe we can maintain a technology base or the necessary cadre of first-class scientists and engineers to enable the United States to have a nuclear weapons design capability for more than a few years if testing ceases.”¹

Senator Bartlett, for example, submitted a report opposing a comprehensive test ban in 1978². The Reagan administration has taken a year to review its test ban policy, during which time the tripartite negotiations have been suspended, and on 9th February 1982 Mr. Eugene Rostow, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, informed the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva that:

“It is clear that any consideration of a complete cessation of nuclear explosions must be related to our ability to maintain credible deterrent forces... It is equally clear that a test ban cannot of itself end

1. Letter of 19th April 1977 appended to Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 28th July, 3rd August and 8th and 15th September 1977.

2. “The consequences of a comprehensive test ban treaty”, report to the Senate Committee on the Armed Services, 11th August 1978.

the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Direct means for achieving progress towards that objective are the negotiation of significant reductions, the restoration of Article 2(4)¹ of the United Nations Charter as an effective element of world politics, and the eventual elimination of the weapons themselves. Thus, while a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing remains an element in the full range of long-term United States arms control objectives, we do not believe that, under present circumstances, a comprehensive test ban would serve the twin objectives of eliminating the threat of nuclear weapons and maintaining the stability of the nuclear balance. Nevertheless, the United States will continue to work with the Committee in its efforts to deal with the issues involved.”

5.12. Thus negotiation of a comprehensive test ban has ceased to be an aim of United States policy at the present time. The United States has refused to resume the trilateral negotiation and has opposed the establishment of a working group in the Committee on Disarmament to negotiate such a ban². The decision to continue nuclear testing is closely linked with the new United States nuclear warhead programme. According to press reports³, Mr. Charles Gilbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Materials in the United States Department of Energy, implied in Washington on 28th February 1982 that the total stock of United States nuclear warheads was to be increased from the present 24,000 to about 40,000. Other reports, however, refer to the production of about 17,000 new warheads to replace existing warheads in a stockpile of 25,000 without significant net increase in total numbers. President Reagan’s warhead production programme signed on 5th March 1982 included only about 380 more warheads than the programme for increased production signed by President Carter in October 1980.

5.13. The Committee calls for a resumption of the trilateral negotiations which offer the best forum for agreement, and in which it has to be recognised that the Soviet Union has made several concessions.

(ii) *Chemical weapons*

5.14. The United States and the Soviet Union commenced bilateral negotiations on a convention to ban chemical weapons in 1974; as in the case of the test ban negotiations, periodical

1. Article on refraining from the threat or use of force.

2. See paragraph 5.4 above.

3. The Guardian, 1st March 1982; International Herald Tribune, 23rd March 1982.

reports on the progress of the negotiations were made to the Committee on Disarmament, the last on 7th July 1980 which showed agreement on the scope of a convention to ban development, production or stockpiling of chemical weapons. Agreement had been reached on definitions of chemical weapons and the (small) amounts of specified chemicals that might be held for non-military purposes. It was agreed that adequate verification measures would be required in a convention, including the right of on-site inspection by request, but the necessary procedures for on-site inspection, including the rights and functions of inspection personnel and the functions of the host side, had not been agreed. These bilateral negotiations have not been resumed by the Reagan administration.

5.15. Pressure for more progress in the bilateral talks had been growing both in the United Nations General Assembly and in the Committee on Disarmament, and in 1980 that Committee finally established the ad hoc working group on chemical weapons which could discuss the matters to be included in a convention, but was not supposed to draft actual treaty language. Under the chairmanship of Sweden, this group worked hard during 1981 and produced a document which falls not far short of a draft convention. It concluded in its report to the Disarmament Committee, adopted on 20th August 1981, that "while it was generally agreed that the group made substantive progress during its 1981 session, many delegations regretted that it was not possible to obtain a revised mandate which would enable the group to initiate negotiations on the text of a convention". As the Committee on Disarmament under its rules of procedure appoints working groups by consensus, opposition from a few countries, including the United States, has so far prevented the working group from being authorised to draft an actual convention, in spite of the fact that no draft treaty has emerged from the bilateral negotiations. Reconstituted in 1982 the working group under Polish chairmanship is considering "elements" for inclusion in a treaty, including the all-important verification measures on which working papers have been submitted by the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.

5.16. The Republican administration in the United States under President Nixon in 1969 suspended production of chemical weapons when stockpiles of nerve gases were very large¹. An accident with the experimental testing of these gases had killed a large number of sheep, leading to public protests.

5.17. Since 1979, the United States has been claiming that there is evidence of the use of chemical weapons by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and by Vietnam in South-East

Asia, but analysis had not established the use of chemical agents. It also claimed in 1979 that an outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk could have originated in a bacteriological warfare plant. The present administration, most authoritatively in the evidence given by Mr. Richard Burt, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the State Department, claimed on 10th November 1981² that the substances detected by United States experts in samples from South-East Asia were trichothecene mycotoxins - poisonous chemicals produced by living organisms - which were prohibited by the 1972 convention banning biological and toxin weapons. The United States has asked British scientists and aid officials working in areas of South-East Asia to which refugees have fled from Laos and Cambodia to assist in securing evidence of the use of toxins known locally as "yellow rain". On 22nd March 1982 the United States released a 32-page document in support of its claims.

5.18. So far, however, the United States claim has not been universally accepted; expert evidence at the Senate hearings was in conflict³, and the 22nd March publication has also been found non-conclusive⁴. In December 1980, the United Nations General Assembly, against the opposition of the Soviet Union and its allies, established a group of experts to investigate the allegations. In a report to the General Assembly on 24th November 1981, these experts (from Egypt, Kenya, the Philippines and Peru) rejected the United States findings that analyses proved the use of chemical weapons in Laos and Cambodia; they were unable to confirm or deny such use; they had also visited Thailand from 31st October to 10th November but were unable to investigate areas where chemical attacks were alleged to have occurred. The

1. Total chemical weapon agent estimated at from 42,000* to 38,000** tons; total filled chemical munitions at 150,000 to 200,000 tons*** in about 3½ million items (bombs, shells, rockets, etc.) of which 4,000 tons reportedly stored in Germany at Pirmasens, Massweile, Mannheim and Hanan***.

(* Lt.-Col. G. Eifrid, Chemical Officer, in "Army", December 1979, quoted by Julian Perry-Robinson in "Survival", January/February 1982; **E.M. Kallis "Chemical Warfare", Issue Brief IB 81081, United States Congressional Research Service, updated 10th February 1982; ***Article in "Der Spiegel", 22nd February 1982.) See also the Committee's earlier report "Nuclear, biological and chemical protection", Rapporteur: Mr. Banks, Document 838, 29th April 1980.

2. "Yellow rain and other forms of chemical and biological warfare in Asia", hearings of the Arms Control Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

3. "Yellow rain and other forms of chemical and biological warfare in Asia" op. cit - see evidence of Dr. Matthew Meselson, Professor of Biochemistry, Harvard University.

4. Sunday Times, 28th March 1982, "Poison 'proof' under fire".

report noted that more time would be required for a conclusive investigation and that access to the regions concerned was required. On 9th December 1981 the mandate of the experts was extended by the General Assembly; they were to visit Pakistan in the area of the Afghanistan border in February 1982.

5.19. Western estimates of Soviet chemical weapon stocks have varied widely. United States estimates have been expressed in the form of "from 5% to 30% of conventional munitions" or in terms of United States stockpiles - from 4 to 1 up to 10 to 1 superiority¹. But these estimates are reported to be based on assumptions concerning presumed Soviet chemical warfare tactics, not on direct estimates of stocks or production which are inaccessible to western intelligence. Other analysts have implied that Soviet stocks are smaller than those of the United States¹. A Rapporteur of the Committee, after extensive investigation in 1980, was informed merely that Soviet stocks were "sufficient for their requirements"². Recently the United Kingdom Minister of State for Defence Procurement, Viscount Trenchard, said "I can confirm that our belief is that the USSR has a stock of [chemical] weapons, much of it deployed in forward stores, of over 300,000 tons, and that by any estimation it has well over 10 times the amount of the United States", but said it would not be in the public interest to indicate the evidence on which the belief was based³. Well-documented, of course, is the presence of a large number of well-equipped chemical defence troops in the Soviet forces. This emphasis on chemical defence is consistent with Soviet fear of the large United States chemical stockpile, and the heavy Russian gas casualties of World War I; it would also be consistent with Soviet readiness to initiate the use of chemical weapons.

5.20. Since the 1969 ban on the manufacture of chemical weapons in the United States, there has been an intense debate between the chemical warfare lobby within the Pentagon and the opponents of chemical weapons - which also include much of the military establishment - over proposals to resume production of a new form of chemical weapons - known as "binary" weapons. Binary weapons would not contain the highly toxic nerve gases as such, but two less toxic chemicals which would be caused to mix during the flight of the projectile so as to combine to form nerve gas which would be released on impact. In 1981, the

1. See Congressional Research Service paper op. cit.

2. Document 838, Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 2.50.

3. Hansard, House of Lords, 18th February 1982.

Reagan administration secured congressional approval of a \$23 million budget to build facilities for the production of binary chemical weapons at the Pine Bluff Chemical Weapons Centre in Arkansas. The total chemical weapons budget for fiscal year 1982 is \$455 million, mostly for defensive purposes. The planned chemical weapons budget for FY 1983 would be \$810 million of which \$104 million for binary weapon production. In 1984 total chemical funding is planned to rise to \$1.4 billion to permit full-scale production in that year. On 18th January, further press reports said that in addition to plans for binary chemical shells and bombs for aircraft, the United States was studying the feasibility of chemical warheads for cruise missiles.

5.21. The Pine Bluff binary production facility will not be completed before mid-1983, and on 8th February 1982 President Reagan officially certified to Congress (as he was required to do by legislation if production was to begin) that production of the new chemical weapons "is essential to the national interest". In 1980, the United States Defence Science Board recommended the production of binary chemical weapons and proposed that they be stored in the United Kingdom, but both Britain and the United States have confirmed that no official proposal has been made for storage in the United Kingdom. Military strategy will require storage in the European theatre, but it is clear that because of political opposition the United States administration will delay formal requests to European allies until after the deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing II under the December 1979 decision has been completed.

5.22. The debate on the advisability of resuming production of chemical weapons is a serious issue in the United States, and the scepticism which has greeted some United States allegations concerning the use of toxin weapons in South-East Asia and Afghanistan arises from the belief that the allegations have been made to justify United States manufacture of chemical weapons. However, a number of European experts now consider it likely that there has been experimental use of chemical or toxin weapons by the Soviet Union or its agents; others no less qualified remain sceptical.

5.23. Pravda, on 22nd January, denied again United States allegations on the use of chemical or toxin weapons in Afghanistan and in Cambodia, called for a complete ban on their production and use, and blamed the United States for breaking off the bilateral negotiations. The United States press¹ on 26th January reported government officials as saying that the United

1. International Herald Tribune.

States would now propose new multilateral negotiations among the (some 100) signatories of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of the use of poison gas in war, with a view to negotiating a treaty to eliminate chemical weapons, albeit in the belief that such negotiations could not succeed before production of binary weapons began. The negotiations were needed however "to head off allegations in Western Europe... that the United States was starting an arms race in chemical weapons".

5.24. In the past, the Committee has recommended that production of chemical weapons in the United States should still be held in abeyance pending a further attempt at successful bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on a chemical weapons ban.

(iii) *Radiological weapons*

5.25. Under the agenda item "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons", the Committee on Disarmament has chiefly considered a possible ban on radiological weapons. These are hypothetical weapons which would contain highly radioactive material but employ a bursting charge of purely conventional explosive in order to scatter radioactivity over a large area. There is no evidence that any country has ever produced such weapons because the problem of shielding such intensely radioactive material in weapons prior to their employment would make it virtually impossible to handle them outside laboratory or factory conditions. However, as the final document of the first United Nations General Assembly special session on disarmament called for a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, many countries who were sceptical of the practical value of such a convention have been prepared to subscribe to the principle as a cosmetic gesture.

5.26. The Committee on Disarmament established an ad hoc working group on radiological weapons under the chairmanship of Hungary which last reported to the plenary Committee on 20th August 1981. It has been reconstituted in 1982 under the chairmanship of the Federal Republic of Germany. The United States and the Soviet Union agreed in July 1979 on a joint proposal on the major elements to be included in a treaty banning radiological weapons. Discussion in the working group has shown that some countries led by Sweden believed that the specific weapons as defined in the joint Soviet-United States proposal were so theoretical as not to merit a treaty in themselves, but that such a treaty could be a useful vehicle for prohibiting

attacks on civilian nuclear facilities such as nuclear reactors which could present a very real risk of mass destruction from the spread of radioactivity. The Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor lends urgency to this view. Other countries preferred a merely cosmetic treaty banning radiological weapons and the nuclear weapons powers have not so far supported the Swedish position.

5.27. It is now unlikely that a draft convention on radiological weapons will be ready for submission to the special session - unless strictly limited to such weapons, with provision for further negotiation on an optional protocol to ban attacks on nuclear installations.

(iv) *Negative security assurances*

5.28. Under the agenda item "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", the Committee on Disarmament has been discussing what is known colloquially as "negative security assurances". The General Assembly had recommended to the Committee on Disarmament that it continue negotiations on "effective international arrangements... to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons...". Another ad hoc working group, under the chairmanship of Italy in 1981 and now under that of Pakistan, has been considering this matter.

5.29. The five nuclear weapon powers have at various times made unilateral declarations undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon countries, but each in a different form and with different provisos. Documentation of the working group provides the following list:

(1) *China*: "Complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons are essential for the elimination of nuclear war and nuclear threats. We are aware that its realisation is no easy matter. This being the case, we hold that the nuclear-weapon states should at least undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-free zones. On its own initiative and unilaterally, China long ago declared that at no time and in no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons."

(2) *France*: To negotiate with nuclear-free zones participants in order to contract effective and binding commitments, as appropriate, precluding any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the states of those zones.

(3) *USSR*: To offer a binding commitment in a new international convention not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states parties to such a convention

which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no nuclear weapons in their territory or under their jurisdiction or control, and to consult whenever any party to the convention has reason to believe that the actions of any other party are in violation of this commitment.

“I wish also solemnly to declare that the Soviet Union will never use nuclear weapons against those states which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territory.”

(4) *United Kingdom*: Not to use nuclear weapons against states which are parties to the non-proliferation treaty or other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices except in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such states in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.

(5) *United States of America*: Not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the non-proliferation treaty or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces or its allies by such a state allied to a nuclear-weapon state or associated with a nuclear-weapon state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.

5.30. The Netherlands has submitted a suggested “common formula” for negative security assurances to be incorporated in a Security Council resolution.

5.31. Discussion in the working group has turned both on the content of such undertakings that non-nuclear weapons countries would prefer, as well as on the form in which undertakings should be incorporated – an international convention; a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly merely noting the different forms of undertaking given by the five nuclear weapon countries; or a resolution of the Security Council have all been mentioned.

5.32. The last report of the ad hoc working group to the Committee on Disarmament was adopted on 20th August 1981 recommending that a search should continue in 1982 for a “common approach” and for a “common formula” to be included in an international instrument of a legally-binding character.

(v) *Comprehensive programme of disarmament*

5.33. The concept of “general and complete disarmament” was a favourite theme of disarmament discussion in the United Nations

framework, especially in the period 1959 to the mid-1960s. On 20th September 1961, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint statement of agreed principles as a basis for multilateral negotiations on disarmament and in 1962, in the newly-constituted ENDC in Geneva, the two superpowers tabled two important texts – the United States an “outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world” and the Soviet Union a “draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control”. Amended from time to time, these documents remained the basis of discussion on the concept of world-wide disarmament for the rest of the decade but there have been no new initiatives from the superpowers whose efforts subsequently became concentrated on more restricted negotiations in the SALT process, the comprehensive test ban and the chemical weapons ban, and in regional negotiations such as MBFR.

5.34. There has been widespread demand from the non-aligned countries in the General Assembly, especially in its 1978 special session, for attention to be turned again to general disarmament in the form of a “comprehensive programme of disarmament”.

5.35. Another ad hoc working group on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, under the chairmanship of Mexico, has been established in the Committee on Disarmament. It has studied more than thirty different proposals put forward by member countries. In 1980, it adopted an outline programme including chapters on objectives, principles, priorities, measures, stages of implementation and machinery and procedures.

5.36. On 6th August 1981, Australia, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom jointly submitted a working paper on a “comprehensive programme for disarmament” to the working group. The ultimate objective of the programme is complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; its achievement is to be based on confidence-building measures. One motive for this global programme would be the desire to render an effective contribution to the economic and social development of all states, especially in the third world, by disarming. The process of disarmament, according to the above proposal, is to take place in accordance with the final document of the 1978 special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. The following principles should be particularly noted:

- The security of all states must be safeguarded and guaranteed throughout all phases of this process of disarmament. Each phase should attempt to pro-

vide undiminished security at a lower level of armament and forces. The geo-strategic and geo-social factors should be taken into account. In order to avoid destabilising consequences a balance between the conventional and nuclear spheres should be created. The international verification of these steps must be guaranteed.

- The main responsibility for nuclear disarmament lies with the nuclear powers.
- The Charter of the United Nations must be strictly adhered to.

5.37. The working group on a comprehensive programme intends to resume its discussion of a draft programme in 1982 in time for submission to the General Assembly special session. It promises to be a lengthy list of measures of disarmament which should be agreed in various stages, all of which have eluded agreement so far.

(vi) Outer space

5.38. The last item on the current agenda of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva is "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" but the Committee will not have found time for more than a preliminary discussion before its anticipated adjournment on 20th April. It is understood that two allied countries would have tabled proposals on this subject but were dissuaded by the United States because the present administration has still not completed its review of policy on defence and arms control in outer space.

5.39. The 1967 outer space treaty, to which there are 82 parties including, with minor exceptions, all militarily significant states, in particular all NATO and Warsaw Pact countries¹, prohibits the stationing in space in orbit or on celestial bodies of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, and prohibits any military installations, operations or tests on celestial bodies. It would not prohibit the use in space of weapons other than "weapons of mass destruction" taken to mean nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. At the present time, however, there are no weapons designed for use in outer space except presumably the few ABM missiles permitted under the 1972 ABM treaty. The superpowers maintain communications, navigation, and many types of observation and detection satellites in orbit – systems which have become very important for verification "by national means" of arms control treaties in force.

¹. China and Portugal are not parties; India signed but has not ratified the treaty.

5.40. There are now, however, a number of proposals in the United States – and it must be assumed there are similar unpublicised moves in the Soviet Union – for the development of weapons systems for use in or from outer space. These include systems to destroy satellites, and space platforms to carry high energy lasers capable in their turn of destroying anti-satellite weapons or ballistic missiles in flight. Such systems would be destabilising if they resulted in the destruction of observation and detection satellites on which confidence in existing and future arms control agreements depends; or if the possibility of an anti-missile capability resulted in the abrogation of the 1972 ABM treaty. They would certainly be very costly – estimates range from \$15 to 20 billion per system or up to \$400 billion for a full space weapons capability.

5.41. Such weapons are at least a decade away. Once operational it would be impossible to verify any arms control agreements to limit them, but like MIRVs they would be readily observable during development testing. Hence an agreement to ban such weapons would have to enter into force before development testing begins, just as any agreement to ban MIRVs would have had to have been effective before they entered service in the 1970s.

5.42. The Committee recommends urgent steps to ban space weapons by simple amendment of the existing outer space treaty as Article XV of that treaty permits. Such a ban must not interfere with existing observation and detection satellites.

(d) Other disarmament subjects not dealt with in the Committee on Disarmament

(vi) Specially injurious weapons

5.43. International conferences to update the 1949 Geneva Convention on the protection of war victims culminated in a United Nations conference held in Geneva from 15th September to 10th October 1980 which adopted a "Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects" together with Protocol I on non-detectable fragments; Protocol II on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby traps and other devices; and Protocol III on prohibitions or restrictions on use of incendiary weapons. The convention has been open for signature since 10th April 1981 when it was signed by 34 states; more have signed since.

5.44. The body of the convention reinforces general humanitarian rules of war contained in the 1949 Geneva Convention. Protocol I pro-

hibits the use of weapons producing fragments (e.g. plastic) which cannot be detected by X-rays. Protocol II provides guidelines for recording the location of mines and booby traps with a view to reducing civilian injury. Protocol III seeks to limit injury to civilian population through the use of "incendiary weapons" which include flamethrowers as well as shells and bombs. States wishing to accede to the convention are required to accede to at least two of the three protocols.

5.45. This convention, and just possibly a limited treaty to ban radiological weapons, will provide the only concrete arms control achievements to be reported to the 1982 special session of the General Assembly.

(viii) *Mutual and balanced force reductions*

5.46. The parties to the MBFR negotiations are the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Direct participants on the western side are: Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States. Indirect participants on the western side are: Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway, Turkey. Direct participants on the eastern side are: Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Poland, Soviet Union. Indirect participants on the eastern side are: Bulgaria, Romania. The status of Hungary is open. The negotiations aim at reducing forces on both sides in the reduction area comprising the territory of the following direct participants: Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg and the Federal Republic of Germany on the one hand, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Poland on the other. The negotiations have been going on in Vienna since 1973 and have so far been extended to over twenty rounds of talks, the latest resuming on 28th January 1982. So far no concrete agreement has been reached on a number of specific points.

5.47. On 19th December 1979, the western side tabled the most recent NATO proposals

which were for a reduction of 13,000 United States and 30,000 Soviet ground forces in a first phase interim agreement to be followed in a second phase by reductions to provide mutual collective ceilings of 700,000 ground troops and a total of 900,000 combined ground and air forces on each side. A balanced package of associated measures was incorporated in the proposals to provide for "greater transparency of military postures and activities of the two alliances... as well as to enhance the security of all participants including those with special status" in the words of the Netherlands Ambassador to the negotiations speaking on behalf of the NATO countries in Vienna on 10th December 1981. There was still no agreement on a data base for negotiations, NATO claiming that the Warsaw Pact ground forces in the area exceeded those of NATO by more than 150,000 and that the discrepancy between NATO and Warsaw Pact figures for numbers of Soviet ground forces in the area was more than 50,000 men.

5.48. Disagreement on data and on "associated measures" to provide for adequate verification have been main obstacles to agreement in Vienna. At the outset in November 1973 the NATO participants introduced data concerning both NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces in the area, showing Warsaw Pact superiority of more than 150,000 troops. However, it was not until June 1976 that the East agreed to provide some data on its ground and air force manpower in the area which was significantly different from the NATO estimates. The East does not appear to have challenged the NATO estimates of NATO manpower. Somewhat more detailed (disaggregated) data appear to have been exchanged by both sides in 1978 but neither side has made public the details of the exchange of data - this is one hopeful indication that both sides are genuinely seeking agreement. The following unofficial table is believed to be a fairly reliable reflection of the gross data comparisons as they stood in 1978:

1978 gross data comparisons

	NATO forces			Warsaw Pact forces			Warsaw Pact superiority		
	Ground	Air	Total	Ground	Air	Total	Ground	Air	Total
NATO estimate	791,000	193,000	984,000	962,000	200,000	1,162,000	+171,000	+ 7,000	+178,000
Warsaw Pact estimate	(791,000) ¹	(193,000) ¹	(984,000) ¹	805,000	182,000	987,000	+ 14,000	- 11,000	+ 3,000
Discrepancy		(nil) ¹		157,000	17,700	174,000	+157,000	+ 18,000	+175,000

1. NATO estimates tacitly accepted by Warsaw Pact.

Source: Adapted from: "Mutual and balanced force reduction, issues and prospects", William B. Prendergast, as quoted in "Prospects for the Vienna force reduction talks" prepared for the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress, 10th October 1978.

United States forces represented about 25 % and Soviet forces about 50 % of the above ground force figures.

5.49. It appears that agreement has been reached over the years on the following three points – that the aim of reductions should be to leave common collective ceilings on each side in the reductions area of 900,000 men, including a sub-ceiling of 700,000 ground forces. Reductions would be carried out in two phases ; in Phase 1 only United States and Soviet forces would be withdrawn. To reach the agreed ceilings reductions would have to be unequal.

5.50. However, the Warsaw Pact countries have called for an additional ceiling of 200,000 for air forces (the NATO position would leave open the option to increase air force manpower if ground force manpower were correspondingly reduced); they have called a further limitation whereby the forces of any single country would not exceed 50 % of the total; they have also called for “proportional” reductions instead of the “asymmetrical” reductions demanded by NATO in order to reach the common ceilings. NATO had proposed that phase 1 reductions should be 13,000 United States ground forces and 30,000 Soviet forces. The Warsaw Pact has not accepted NATO proposals for associated measures, including permanent observers at entry and exit points and an annual quota of on-site inspections.

5.51. On 18th February 1982, Poland, on behalf of the Warsaw Pact countries, submitted a draft phase 1 agreement which, it is understood, codified for the first time in writing a number of concessions which the Warsaw Pact countries had accepted during the course of the negotiations. It specifically proposed that phase 1 reductions should be 13,000 United States troops and 20,000 Soviet troops. It has been pointed out that the Soviet Union in October 1979 announced a unilateral reduction of 20,000 Soviet ground forces which were said to have been carried out in January 1980. While the western position remains that in the absence of proper means of verification there is no certainty that those troops were removed, it is understood that on a unit count basis, unverified western estimates show reductions of at least 15,000 men to have been actually carried out.

5.52. The 18th February proposals for a phase 1 agreement can be summarised as follows:

- The United States and the Soviet Union would remove 13,000 and 20,000 troops respectively from the area each including one complete division and sub-units equivalent to an armoured brigade together with all their armaments and combat equip-

ment. The reductions would be completed within one year, the troops being withdrawn to their own countries and located so as not to threaten the security of other (indirect) participants (e.g. Turkey).

- All other parties to the negotiation would freeze their forces in the reduction area for the duration of phase 1.
- The duration of the agreement would be three years.
- (Linkage to phase 2) Parties would agree that in a subsequent phase 2 there would be proportionate reductions of forces of all direct participants to common collective ceilings of 900,000, reductions of each country to be proportionate to the country's proportionate contribution to the total forces in the area; the forces of no participant would ever exceed 50 % of the 900,000 ceiling.
- Measures associated with reductions would be commensurate with the volume of the reductions; parties withdrawing forces would notify the start of the reductions and monitoring posts would be established at exit points during the actual period of reductions, comprising one representative from each of the United States and the Soviet Union and one representative of the country from which the forces were being withdrawn. Other associated measures would include notification of troop movements and exercises, and prohibition of exercises in excess of 50,000 men.
- It is understood that the proposals further provided that the 900,000 common collective ceiling should never be exceeded even temporarily in the course of exercises or the rotation of troops.

5.53. The draft phase 1 agreement puts in writing a number of Warsaw Pact concessions to the western position. In the view of the Rapporteur the proposed reductions should provide a useful basis for negotiating an acceptable phase 1 agreement which would, however, require provision for the monitoring posts to remain in position for the whole of the duration of the agreement – not merely for the period during which reductions would take place. If the size of reductions can be effectively monitored, agreement on disputed data can be postponed until phase 2, but it will then become crucial to agree data on remaining troop levels to ensure that agreed common collective ceilings are effectively met.

(ix) Confidence-building measures and CSCE

5.54. In the Helsinki final act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, signed on 1st August 1975, a number of confidence-building measures were agreed on the implementation of which the Committee last reported in detail a year ago¹. A table of mutual notification of military exercises and invitations extended to observers under the terms of the final act is at Appendix V.

5.55. The review conference on the implementation of the final act opened in Madrid on 22nd November 1980 and discussion of confidence-building measures there has turned on the French proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe discussed below. Before the year-end recess agreement was near on a concluding document on the basis of the draft submitted by the eight neutral countries on 16th December 1981 under which the participating states would have agreed to convene a conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe in 1982-83. Following the declaration of martial law in Poland, however, when the Madrid conference reconvened on 9th February it discussed the Polish situation in the context of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki final act, and then decided to adjourn until 9th November, any agreement on a concluding document being postponed until then.

(x) Conference on disarmament in Europe

5.56. In January 1978, the French Government for the first time proposed a conference on disarmament in Europe (CDE) from the Atlantic to the Urals. At the special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament in May 1978, the French President presented this plan for a conference and communicated details to the CSCE participants on 19th May 1978. In the summer of 1979 France agreed that a mandate for a CDE should be obtained at the CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid.

5.57. Important features of the CDE are that France proposed to exclude nuclear and naval forces; that unlike the negotiations which cover only Central Europe, CDE should extend from the Atlantic to the Urals; and that the conference should proceed in phases – first on confidence-building measures, second on force reductions. Initially the Soviet Union reserved its position on the geographical area. At the 26th party congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union it was agreed, however, that European territory of the Soviet Union could

be included in the CDE area of application, and a conditional offer has been made.

5.58. The essential feature of the CDE is a package of confidence-building measures. There are three main proposals:

The French package:

- Measures of mutual information (– multilaterally): exchange of data on command structures and location of major formations.

Exchange of data on military budgets (– and bilaterally): exchange of observers for exercises, visits and naval visits.

Exchange of military instructors and lecturers.

Facilitating the work of military attachés.

- Measures against surprise attack on the basis of one month's advance notice of exercises and troop movements to cover the following: exercises of land, air and amphibious forces involving one or two divisions, with details of numbers of troops and major equipment; mobilisation exercises.

Movement of land and air forces of similar size over a distance of more than 200 km including details of the major points of passage, especially border crossings.

- More stringent measures of stabilisation: upper limits for exercises of land and air forces of, e.g., 60,000 men under defined conditions of space and time. Establishing a system of airborne or satellite supervision.

The Warsaw Pact package:

- One month's advance notice of major exercises involving more than 20,000 men.
- Notification of movement of land forces (more than 20,000) without details of distance or time.
- Notification of major naval exercises close to territorial waters of other participating states (without details of time, size or area involved).
- Limits on military exercises to 40,000-50,000 men.
- Readiness to examine further confidence-building measures.

The Warsaw Pact proposals, in contrast to the French, are not to be compulsory and do not

1. State of European Security, Document 859, 17th November 1980, Rapporteur: Mr. Brown.

provide for verification. Further Soviet confidence-building measures consist of readiness to dissolve NATO and the Warsaw Pact simultaneously; non-acceptance of any new members in the respective alliances, and a treaty against the first use of nuclear and conventional weapons.

The Yugoslav package:

- Renunciation of military exercises, movements or other activities in areas of crisis.
- Prohibition of exercises with more than 30,000 men in Europe and the adjacent waters.
- Prohibition of increases in armed forces or armaments.
- Stopping the increase of defence expenditure.
- Withdrawal of foreign troops from host countries.
- Closing down of foreign military bases.

These Yugoslav points do not, in fact, amount to real disarmament measures; only during a second phase would there be real disarmament measures for conventional and tactical nuclear weapons.

5.59. The non-aligned compromise proposal for the Madrid concluding document, referred to in paragraph 5.43 above, would have referred to a first-stage conference devoted to confidence- and security-building measures with adequate means of verification, covering the whole of Europe and, in respect of activities which it is agreed to notify, the adjoining sea and air space, and covering also the non-European part of the territory of participating states, as defined in the Helsinki final act concerning prior notification of military manoeuvres.

5.60. To sum up, it can be said that binding and verifiable confidence-building measures would lower the risk of surprise conventional attack and would help to prevent war. The French proposals, moreover, would facilitate greater transparency. All confidence-building measures, which are binding and verifiable, pose a fundamental threat to the Warsaw Pact since they tend to level up the differences between an open society – the western states in the Alliance – and a closed society – the states of the Warsaw Pact. Also the geographical area is of importance; a binding agreement on force reductions would oblige countries like France and the United Kingdom to make reductions while the Soviet Union could comply in pro forma fashion by withdrawing the formations in question

behind the Urals. Appropriate electronic supervision by satellite would, however, detect any redeployment in its early stages.

5.61. According to recent press reports¹, East Germany on 12th January had replied positively to a West German suggestion of 11th December that the two Germanies should make joint disarmament proposals in the United Nations designed to make the intentions of each country more “transparent”. The measures would be verifiable and aimed at achieving a balance of forces. The Federal Republic of Germany is keeping its allies informed on these proposals which arise from articles of the inter-German agreement of 1972.

(xi) International satellite monitoring agency

5.62. Arising from a proposal made by France in the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1978, the Secretary-General of the United Nations has submitted for the 1982 special session a detailed report by a group of governmental experts on the incidences of the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency². The experts were provided by the Governments of Argentina, Austria, Colombia, Egypt, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, Romania, Sweden, Tunisia, Upper Volta and Yugoslavia, and met under the chairmanship of the French member, Mr. Bortzmeyer of the French *Centre National d'Études Spatiales*. The French proposal was for an international agency to collect and distribute information from observation satellites to be used for verifying both disarmament agreements and security agreements. The origins of this proposal are to be found in two earlier reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments³ and the concept had also been proposed by the Swedish Minister for Disarmament, Mrs. Myrdal⁴.

5.63. The Secretary-General's group of experts concludes that surveillance satellites would make a valuable contribution to verification of arms control, disarmament and security agreements; that technically the proposal is feasible; that there are no juridical obstacles to the establishment of an international governmental organisation for satellite observation; and that the cost would vary widely according to which of a number of technical options were to be adopted.

1. *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 15th January 1982.

2. United Nations Document A/AC 206/14, 6th August 1981.

3. East-West relations and defence, Document 587, 8th November 1972, Rapporteur: Mr. Destremau; Security and the Mediterranean, Document 637, 21st May 1974, Rapporteur: Mr. Jung.

4. *Scientific American*, Volume 231, No. 4, October 1974.

5.64. Thus in phase 1, in which the ISMA would operate only an image-processing and interpretation centre, utilising data to be supplied by member countries, the capital cost would be approximately \$ 8 million and operating costs \$ 25 million to \$ 30 million per year, exclusive of any fees payable to countries providing data. In phase 2 ISMA would also operate its own ground receiving stations to receive data from satellites operated by member countries; capital cost for a global system of ten stations would be \$ 60-80 million and operating costs of \$ 20 million per year exclusive of any fees to countries granting access to satellites. In phase 3 ISMA, operating a three satellite system of its own, would cost about \$ 0.9-\$ 1.2 billion over four to six years plus from \$ 50 million to \$ 200 million per year replacement costs. A low altitude manoeuvrable satellite for close look would cost \$ 1.5 billion over ten years with \$ 120 million per year replacement and operating costs. As the report points out in its conclusions, even the most complete and expensive phase 3 "would cost the international community each year well under 1% of the total annual expenditure on armaments".

5.65. The attempts by the space powers to produce so-called killer satellites gravely endanger current satellite reconnaissance facilities. As in the provisions concerning the production of anti-missile systems, in the ABM treaty contained in SALT I, binding and verifiable agreements have first to be reached on satellites. The ability of modern technology to supply data on troop movements, military facilities, production of armaments factories, etc., calls for a world-wide United Nations satellite reconnaissance programme. Much will depend on the willingness of the two space powers to make their technological expertise available to the United Nations. For the great powers themselves such a unified system would have the advantage of sharing out the operating costs. Against a satellite programme is the argument that national secrecy is diametrically opposed to the purpose of this programme which makes for transparency.

5.66. The Committee endorses proposals for an international satellite monitoring agency as an important contribution to confidence-building measures and the avoidance of conflict.

(xii) *START (SALT) and INF*

5.67. The chapter on specific arms control or disarmament topics is not complete without a reference to the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) which began in Geneva on 30th November 1981, and to the prospects for a resumption

of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), now to be known as strategic arms reduction talks (START). The Committee reports in detail on these matters elsewhere¹.

5.68. The INF talks had held ten sessions up to the meeting between the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, in Geneva on 26th January which lasted eight hours. At a press conference afterwards, Mr. Haig said the United States would not embark on START until "conditions permit" - before the military coup in Poland, these talks had been expected to begin in March; an announcement is not now expected until the NATO summit meeting to be held in Bonn on 10th June. Meanwhile the levels of United States and Soviet strategic weapons are still within the limits laid down in SALT II, although that agreement has not been ratified by the United States.

(e) *Armaments and development aid*

5.69. Although proposals for comprehensive disarmament consider the developing countries, they do not establish a direct link between armaments and development aid. But it is not by chance that there is a link between disarmament and development assistance. Development policy must be considered as a contribution to the policy of peace since it facilitates the elimination of social conflicts. Moreover, the western countries are continuously insisting on the fact that their military expenditure must help to establish peace while preserving freedom, on the basis of a military balance. Disarmament therefore has no meaning unless East and West reduce their military expenditure in equal proportions. The reduction of military expenditure would then free funds which until now have been considered as devoted to stabilising peace. Development policy makes a major contribution to the policy of peace and the use of sums originally assigned to military purposes for the development policy purposes would be a logical means of earmarking credits to serve the cause of peace. Sums becoming available through economies due to disarmament would play a part in attaining an aim which is just as important, i.e. stabilising peace. At the present time, eight third world countries spend more than 10% of the GNP on armaments and thirteen between 5% and 10%². Thus, for the third world countries a

1. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe, Rapporteur: Mr. Mommersteeg.

2. Total expenditure on armaments is twenty-five times higher than that on development assistance. In the third world, more than 130 conflicts have been recorded since the second world war which have caused more than twenty million deaths.

reduction in military expenditure would lead directly to an automatic reduction in their budgets, consequently helping to finance domestic social and juridical reforms. This social-political causality naturally also exists in the industrialised countries. In the latter case, priority given to internal policy might be an obstacle to the establishment of a link between development assistance and disarmament. In the industrialised countries, the influence on peace of savings in the armaments field should be defined in political terms. We must therefore clearly show our intention of continuing to earmark for peace amounts hitherto earmarked for that purpose. External peace has a direct effect on peace inside our countries. For economic reasons in particular, it is not evident that a handful of industrialised countries should in the future be able to form stable islands of relative prosperity in an ocean of poverty.

5.70. If a link were to be established between disarmament and development aid, the arms exporting nations would have to agree, as a first step, on restrictions. It would be absurd if the countries of the first and second world were to invest in the third world the money released by disarmament, only to see that money spent on weapons.

(f) Political analysis

5.71. Political analysis of disarmament negotiations should concentrate on the results or likely results. It can safely be said that, so far, no negotiations have led to real disarmament; if anything they have led to limited rearmament. The central political problem of all these negotiations lies in the absence of mutual trust among the participants as well as in the lack of generally acceptable confidence-building measures. Proposals have been made principles like renouncing the use of force; not striving for hegemony; awareness of international interdependence; readiness for dialogue and for bridging the North-South gulf. Terms like confidence-building, openness, verification and balance are controversial since so far the Soviet Union has been against confidence-building, openness and verification. In fact, the problem for totalitarian states is that transparency, openness and verification measures closely affect their own legitimate security aspirations to the point of threatening them. A totalitarian state cannot function unless the above-mentioned conditions are fulfilled. If it accepts such conditions at the external policy level, it is almost certain of having to face a reaction at the internal policy level.

5.72. On the other hand, there is no logical reason why any nuclear power should not disclose its destructive options. If nuclear weapons serve a strategy of deterrence, then it

is necessary to declare what systems are available, what effect they would have and under what circumstances they would be used. Deterrence may be a matter of debate among politicians and the military, yet for the population of the state against which such weapons might be used the principle of deterrence becomes mere terror. As it becomes increasingly apparent that the existing nuclear systems are sufficient to extinguish the human race, the principle of nuclear deterrence loses its base of consensus within society. Political principles – even in the field of security – which are no longer supported by society are subject to dispute. It is impossible to secure international agreements to avoid conflict if the foundation of these agreements leads to conflict among the people concerned. Deterrence is not a constant principle of security. Moreover, today's satellite warning technology renders any international attack futile.

5.73. Secrecy in the field of nuclear options is thus a fatal danger. In order to start off the process of confidence-building measures all great powers should agree to disclose their entire nuclear potential (much of which is already known through satellite supervision) to make deterrence credible and verifiable. This will be a decisive step.

5.74. As far as armaments exports and development aid are concerned, the export and import of weapons have to be controlled. A decisive, objective step would be a register to be compiled by the United Nations on the basis of the former League of Nations "Statistical Yearbook of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition" published in the 1930s which the Assembly proposed in Recommendation 323 adopted in November 1978, and which was also proposed by Mr. Genscher, the German Foreign Minister at the 36th session of the United Nations General Assembly on 23rd September 1981. The decisive reasons for armaments lie in economic confrontation of which account must be taken in proposals for disarmament if they are to have any true chances of success. What applies for the great powers in the nuclear field is equally valid for other countries in the conventional sphere. Since effective modern weapon technology can be supplied only by a handful of countries, the receiving countries should, in fact, have a vital interest in their neighbours knowing of their defence capabilities. In this context, the negotiations, on every level, have to go beyond numerical definitions of balance.

VI. Proposals

6.1. The general aims are the elimination of conflict and securing peace. In order to achieve these aims, it is not sufficient to discuss marginal disarmament proposals. Since the

origins of armaments lie in an economic confrontation, as stated above¹, proposals for disarmament must take this into account so that they can be truly successful. The following proposals, with due regard to the earlier proposals of the Committee and of the Assembly², cover the whole spectrum of disarmament.

(a) Widening trade relations

6.2. Overall widening of trade relations without one-sided advantages for one partner leads to mutual economic interdependence. The southern hemisphere has to be integrated in these global trade relations. The need to restructure economic co-operation within the framework of development aid for the promotion of alternative energy sources and with great regard to ecological conditions has already been emphasised at last year's United Nations conference on world energy in Nairobi. Mutual trade relations encourage the process of mutual knowledge and understanding among the parties.

6.3. A major obstacle, however, lies in the different economic systems. These trade relations should not be linked to theories of a certain economic order, as otherwise diametrically opposed economic interests would block the establishment of a trade relationship. A further obstacle is the monopolistic or oligarchical attitudes of the multinationals or giant state enterprises. If all aspects are considered then discussion of the new global economic order turns on ideological and economic bids for hegemony. These attempts can be circumvented, however, by creating mutually beneficial trade links. The economic order then becomes of secondary importance. One example of such an agreement that transcends ideologies is the Soviet-German gas pipeline deal and the agreements with France and the Netherlands. Both sides can claim decisive advantages.

6.4. Increased trade relations between the blocs, between North and South, between states in general, are the key to the removal of economic grounds for conflict. Economic grounds for conflict are – as has been pointed out – one cause of military threats.

(b) Confidence-building measures

6.5. The second step to avoiding conflict and stabilising peace is provided by the confidence-building measures. Any attempt to disarm is

1. Paragraphs 1.6-1.9.

2. Recommendation 323 and Document 788, Disarmament, 31st October 1978. Rapporteur: Mr. Roper.

condemned to remain ineffective as long as opportunities for verification are blocked. The advantage of confidence-building measures is that they permit the compilation of objective data. Moreover, they provide the basis for verification of this data as well as any agreements reached. In addition they form the general foundation for the socio-political transparency of political systems.

6.6. Closed political systems may view confidence-building measures with even greater apprehension than the trade links, because transparency, openness, and means of verification run counter to the tenets of closed systems of society. They could lead to signs of disintegration within the established power structure. Furthermore, dictatorships and similar political systems can have no interest in readiness for dialogue, avoidance of conflict and security of peace since they are by their nature aggressive. When weighing the arguments, it becomes evident that conceptions of threat depend on the perception of each state. In this context it is of little relevance whether the level of threat is real or imaginary. If, for example, a country denies rumours that it possesses nuclear weapons, the denial is tantamount, as far as the neighbouring states are concerned, to verified possession of such weapons. The potential danger or threat amounts in such a case almost to a real one.

6.7. For this reason, objective perception, that is to say the reduction of potential threats to real facts, must be striven for. For this purpose transparency and openness, as well as readiness to renounce force and readiness for dialogue, are essential. The option of nuclear attack in particular is militarily absurd since nuclear conflicts could hardly be limited. In the conventional field, a balance of forces – even at a lower level – is not itself sufficient. Here a qualitative restructuring of the forces must be envisaged.

(c) Defensive weapons

6.8. Most existing weapons, especially the major systems, can be used, as a rule, both for offensive and defensive purposes. Even if agreement were reached on simultaneous reductions of armaments, some offensive systems, which could be used offensively, would still remain. Given the inventiveness of armaments industries in East and West, the Committee believes it is not utopian to propose that the possibility should be investigated of developing primarily defensive weapons. Among existing weapons the hand-held anti-tank weapon can already be said to be defensive in some circumstances.

6.9. The Rapporteur personally stresses that the main present weapons systems have three essential characteristics:

- (a) the cost of new systems rises exponentially;
- (b) systems are more and more complex;
- (c) technically, they are increasingly vulnerable.

Rising costs mean that in order to acquire the latest weapons for their forces the countries concerned are compelled to make savings, particularly in the social field and in investments. This phenomenon may be observed both in developing and in industrialised countries. It especially affects the developing countries which thereby lose almost all chance of establishing industrial links with the northern hemisphere. However, in the industrialised countries, too, savings in the social field are encountering growing resistance from the population. In the future it may no longer be possible to reconcile a country's optimum defence policy with optimum social stability. Moreover, an essential feature of modern systems is their growing complexity. But in conscript armies in particular, the level of training in the use of these weapons is liable to suffer considerably. For instance, pilots of combat aircraft more often reach the physical limits of human body. Thirdly, these systems are also increasingly vulnerable. Many of them can now only be operated with a highly perfected electronic communication system. It can easily be imagined that to put out of action a purely electronic weapon it would suffice for the enemy to throw the electronic system only slightly out of adjustment. It must also be underlined that these developments apply exclusively to conventional systems. Rising costs and the complexity and vulnerability of weapons systems may be alleviated by quantitative and qualitative restructuring.

6.10. The development of defensive weapons is a possibility worth study. The Rapporteur personally believes it is quite obvious that there would be unanimous support for this type of weapon in the context of peace policy since potential aggressors would no longer have to fear an attack. In addition, an offensively armed side would be revealed politically and ideologically as the potential aggressor when arrayed against a defensively armed one. It must nevertheless be underlined that the defensive theory is not applicable to nuclear weapons. Short-range nuclear weapons have no defensive function since they inflict excessive destruction on the territory of those possessing them. Nor can longer-range nuclear weapons, by definition, be considered as defensive. Europe must not embark upon negotiations on a defensive military system before the

necessary conditions for creating a denuclearised Europe exist.

6.11. The Rapporteur personally suggests that a first stage would consist of bringing the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range missiles to a conclusion with the adoption of a zero option. Once this aim has been attained, consideration could then be given to the permanent integration of essentially defensive weapons in the present defence concept. Such a medium-term step would make an essential contribution to relaunching the Vienna MBFR negotiations, which are marking time, by giving them new qualitative impetus.

6.12. The Rapporteur personally believes that where the third world is concerned, defensive weapons systems are in fact the only solution. Here the financial and technological problems referred to earlier should be recalled. The special session of the United Nations General Assembly seems to be the appropriate forum for discussing this matter. In many parts of the third world, purely military, geostrategic or geographical considerations, plus other factors already mentioned, militate in favour of defensive weapons. In this context, it also seems important to make a detailed examination of the possibility of concluding agreements on denuclearised zones. For instance, these might include an undertaking by the superpowers not to threaten a country with the use of nuclear weapons if no such weapons were deployed on its territory.

6.13. To sum up the personal views of the Rapporteur, it may therefore be said that it seems reasonable to give an army defensive weapons only when there is no longer any nuclear threat.

(d) Satellite reconnaissance

6.14. The Committee strongly supports the proposal for an international satellite monitoring agency described in paragraphs 5.62 et seq.

(e) Disarmament versus development aid

6.15. Twenty-five times more is being spent on armaments than on development aid. If it were possible to establish a link between disarmament and development aid, immense sums could be released for the latter purpose as many United Nations reports have pointed out. The direct relationship between ideological confrontation on a global scale and conflicts in the third world calls for such a link. Since World War II there have been 130 armed conflicts with over 20 million dead in the third world. The countries supplying the weapons carry a

large share of the responsibility. No government, during a world-wide economic crisis, would impose disproportionate costs for development on its own population, to the detriment of its standard of living, but it would be politically feasible to use the funds released from the armaments budget. Development aid too will be severely criticised in the donor countries when it becomes apparent that the recipients still have the resources to purchase arms. Recently a government aroused public anger when its leaders placed massive orders for modern fighter planes with a European arms manufacturer while attending the FAO conference on world hunger. An argument against linkage between disarmament and development aid is the economic recession in the industrialised countries. Money released through disarmament could be spent on employment programmes.

6.16. On balance, linkage between disarmament and development aid is beneficial to all sides. If such a process were set in motion disarmament would become inevitable. The temptation to spend the money thus released on the national economy, however, must be resisted as otherwise the North-South gap would become even wider. On the world scale, it is unreasonable that in a sea of poverty and misery a few islands should enjoy permanent affluence. Both objectives, i.e. disarmament and development aid, are contributions to the avoidance of conflict, to the removal of political tensions and to the process of securing peace. A combination of these two objectives would have a disproportionate effect on the process of securing peace. The double effect of increased demand on the part of the developing countries for non-military goods and greater efforts in the field of development aid by the industrialised countries strengthens the trading partnership between industrialised countries and the third world and improves the conditions for a true partnership in security.

VII. Conclusions

7.1. The conclusion to be drawn from this summary of disarmament and arms control talks in the four years that have elapsed since the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament is that there will be little or no concrete progress to report to the next special session in June. The convention on specific inhumane weapons and possibly a limited convention prohibiting radiological weapons will be the only formal agreements to have been concluded, and the latter will be of little practical value. On two of the most urgent matters for negotiation identified at the first special session – a chemical weapons ban and a complete nuclear

test ban – the promising bilateral and trilateral negotiations have been suspended since the end of 1980. This report has not discussed the prospects for negotiations on nuclear weapons in the INF or START frameworks¹ but it would be unrealistic to imagine progress in either of those fields by the time the next special session opens.

7.2. Significantly there have been no negotiations on one topic identified in the final document of the 1978 special session – the limitation of international transfer of conventional weapons – chiefly because non-aligned countries have been as concerned to preserve their right to receive weapons as they have been ready to call for reductions in the weapons of the larger powers. In fact, the general attitude to disarmament of all states has been to point accusing fingers at militarily more powerful states – first and foremost at the nuclear weapons powers – and demand that they commence the process of disarming.

7.3. The Committee's proposals are set forth in the preliminary draft recommendation. The text of Recommendation 323 referred to in the preamble, and which was adopted by the Assembly on the occasion of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, is at Appendix I.

7.4. Operative paragraph 1(a) calling for wider but balanced commercial relations is explained in paragraphs 6.2-6.4 of this explanatory memorandum; paragraph 1(b) on defensive weapons is explained in paragraph 6.8 above. Operative paragraph 2 of the recommendation calling for a substantial reduction in the level of nuclear weapons is included for completeness, in view of the priority attached to nuclear disarmament by the United Nations General Assembly (paragraphs 3.4, 4.2 and 5.4 above) but the subject of nuclear weapons is to be dealt with by the Committee in another report².

7.5. The specific disarmament, arms control and confidence-building measures advocated in operative paragraph 3 of the recommendation are explained in this explanatory memorandum as follows:

<i>Sub-paragraph of recommendation</i>	<i>Paragraphs of the explanatory memorandum</i>
(i) Chemical weapons ban	5.14 to 5.24
(ii) Nuclear test ban	5.6 to 5.13

1. Discussed in the report on the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe. Rapporteur: Mr. Mommersteeg.

2. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe. Rapporteur: Mr. Mommersteeg.

(iii)	Outer space weapons ban	5.38 to 5.42
(iv)	International satellite monitoring agency	5.62 to 5.66
(v)	Register of international arms transfers	5.74
(vii)	MBFR	5.46 to 5.53
(viii)	Conference on disarmament in Europe	} 5.54 to 5.60
(ix)	Confidence-building measures	

7.6. Finally, the operative paragraph 4 of the recommendation on the relationship between third world armaments and those of the alian-

ces is described in paragraphs 5.69, 5.70 and 5.74 above.

VIII. *Opinion of the minority*

8.1. The report as a whole was adopted by 11 votes to 4 with 2 abstentions. A minority of the Committee was opposed to any report on disarmament being submitted at a time when it considered that more resources should be devoted to armaments. A larger minority was opposed to paragraph 1 (b) of the operative part of the draft recommendation, believing that there could be no such thing as purely defensive weapons.

APPENDIX I

RECOMMENDATION 323 ¹on disarmament ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that world expenditure on armaments has now reached \$ 400 billion per annum and that some of the poorest countries are devoting more than half of their public expenditure to defence;
- (ii) Noting that, apart from the biological warfare convention of 1972, no arms control agreement since the war has yet achieved any measure of disarmament;
- (iii) Believing that new impetus must be given to negotiating certain urgent and concrete measures of arms control and disarmament but that the ultimate objective must remain general and complete disarmament under effective international control;
- (iv) Welcoming the conclusions of the special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly to the extent that it has focused world opinion on the urgency and importance of arms control measures, and transformed the Committee on Disarmament into a more effective negotiating forum;
- (v) Recalling its proposals of 1972 and 1974 for a United Nations satellite observation capability;
- (vi) Recalling further the expertise acquired by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments and urging that it be placed at the disposal of any international disarmament organisation;
- (vii) Recalling the annual publications of the League of Nations: "Armaments Year Book" and "Statistical Year Book of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition";
- (viii) Recalling the work under the diplomatic conference of 1975-77 of the ad hoc committee on inhumane weapons and the associated conferences of government experts;
- (ix) Accepting the responsibility shared by WEU members with other major arms suppliers to seek agreements to reduce the world trade in armaments,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS

Take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following objects in view:

1. To secure universal agreement on a programme of immediate disarmament and arms control measures to be concluded in the next five years, including:
 - (a) a comprehensive test ban;
 - (b) a chemical weapons treaty;
 - (c) a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation régime with rigorous safeguards at all stages of civil nuclear fuel cycles, linked with appropriate security assurances to non-nuclear countries;
 - (d) a substantial reduction to restore the balance of forces and armaments in Europe;
 - (e) agreements involving both supplier and recipient countries to restrict the international transfer of conventional arms which recognise the special responsibility of the major arms-producing countries to exercise restraint in their arms transfer policy;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (10th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 788).

- (f) the scrupulous and systematic application of measures provided by the CSCE final act to strengthen mutual confidence in the military field;
- (g) the extension to other areas of confidence-building measures of the type included in the CSCE final act;
- (h) agreements to restrict the development of new generations of inhumane conventional weapons and incendiaries;
- (i) the creation of denuclearised zones and zones free of military bases in various regions of the world;

and, concurrently if possible with the first agreement providing for independent verification:

- (j) the establishment of an international disarmament agency under United Nations aegis equipped with its own means of verifying compliance with arms control agreements and peacekeeping arrangements, and responsible *inter alia* for publishing, on the basis of its own sources of information as well as mandatory reports by all countries, annual reports on the forces and armaments of all countries and arms transfers between countries;
2. To secure the participation of all nuclear weapon powers and previous members in the transformed Committee on Disarmament and the negotiation in that body of agreements on the foregoing items 1 (a), (b), (e), (g) and (h);
 3. To examine sympathetically the proposals for an all-European conference on disarmament convened with the participation of all signatory states of the CSCE final act with a view to ensuring the progressive achievement of a programme of confidence-building measures and controlled limitation of forces;
 4. To maintain the expectations of progress on concrete measures of disarmament engendered by the special session of the United Nations General Assembly, by the convening of a further special disarmament session in 1981 to review progress.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 323

1. The Council take the opportunity of confirming their frequently-repeated undertaking to support all efforts to further progress towards general and complete disarmament under close and effective international control.

In this context and in line with the results of the special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly, member states will continue to work for the definition of a series of priority measures for adoption as a matter of urgency.

However, while this undertaking still holds good, there would seem to be no possibility of setting a precise term for the conclusion of universally acceptable agreements on all the specific points listed by the Assembly, although some are now sufficiently advanced to offer the hope and possibility of achieving this goal in the near future.

Furthermore, disarmament and arms limitation are usually understood to cover agreements aimed at preventing *inter alia* the use or introduction of specific types of weapons when they have been identified in concrete terms. Mention should, therefore, be made of the success not only of the convention on biological weapons but also of other agreements of undoubted significance and value such as the ENMOD (convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques).

(a) (b) Negotiations are now in progress between three nuclear powers for the complete banning of nuclear tests.

As regards the prohibition of chemical weapons, it is hoped that the Committee on Disarmament will in due course produce a draft treaty.

(c) Strong nuclear non-proliferation arrangements are among matters of vital concern to the member countries of WEU. They are one of their primary objectives in the appropriate fora and are no obstacle to international co-operation in the field of peaceful applications of the atom.

(d) No practical opportunity will be neglected by the members of the Alliance participating in the Vienna negotiations on MBFR of strengthening stability in Europe by mutual balanced force reductions to achieve a common collective ceiling.

(e) The problem of limiting transfers of conventional weapons should be dealt with through agreements worked out on a regional basis between purchasers and forming the subject of subsequent consultations with supplying countries; in this connection, mention should be made of the Mexican proposal for an agreement to limit the acquisition of conventional weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.

(f) Reinforcement of the confidence-building measures provided for in the final act of the CSCE undoubtedly constitutes a significant factor and its progress should match that of all the measures provided for in the final act of the CSCE.

(g) At the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, member countries sponsored a resolution calling for consideration by all states of arrangements for appropriate confidence-building measures.

(h) The chances of limiting the use of certain conventional weapons are to be assessed by a special United Nations conference which will convene in Geneva in September this year and will take appropriate decisions arrived at by consensus.

(i) The creation of nuclear weapon-free zones would unquestionably make a positive contribution to disarmament and non-proliferation. The Council and member states reiterate their undertaking to support the establishment of such zones wherever nuclear weapons are not needed to maintain the balance and therefore to guarantee the safety of all states, and provided the countries in the region concerned agree.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 11th June 1979.

(j) Finally, as regards the establishment of an international disarmament agency under United Nations aegis, equipped with its own means of verifying compliance with international arms limitation agreements and peacekeeping arrangements, the Council and member states hope that it will be possible, in the future, to examine the substance of such a proposal, by such means as the United Nations may consider appropriate.

2. During the special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly, member states gave proof of their determination to set up a negotiating body in which all nuclear weapon powers and major military powers can take part, taking due account of the need to keep numbers small so that the proceedings do not become unwieldy. To this end, the existing members of the CCD were reappointed in order to ensure the continuity of work already started and the total number of participants was increased to make the negotiating body more representative without loss of efficiency.

In this context, the Council and member states are most anxious that all the states nominated and, in particular, the nuclear weapon powers should take up the seats reserved for them from the outset. As regards the agenda for the Committee there is nothing to prevent the negotiating body from discussing, by consensus and within the terms of its own standing orders, any question submitted to it and in particular those listed by the Assembly.

3. The proposal for a European disarmament conference on conventional weapons with all participants in the CSCE attending is at present the subject of close study and of consultations between member states and all the countries concerned.

4. The member states of WEU will make every effort to ensure that the objectives laid down by the tenth special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly are fulfilled as far as possible before the next special session fixed for 1982 by the thirty-third General Assembly for the purpose of reviewing the progress of work on disarmament, of reporting on its findings and possibly of setting new objectives.

APPENDIX III

World military expenditure, in constant price figures

Figures are in US \$ million, at 1978 prices and 1978 exchange rates.

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
NATO										
<i>North America:</i>										
Canada	3 273	3 279	3 290	3 515	3 468	3 702	3 939	4 087	3 875	3 745
United States	120 655	121 105	114 976	113 666	110 229	104 261	108 537	109 247	109 861	111 236
<i>Europe:</i>										
Belgium	2 266	2 388	2 498	2 532	2 758	2 902	2 978	3 175	3 246	3 305
Denmark	1 137	1 131	1 074	1 177	1 276	1 260	1 266	1 315	1 322	(1 322)
France	14 663	15 023	15 573	15 505	16 194	16 898	17 670	18 623	19 112	19 498
FR Germany	18 024	19 255	20 010	20 885	20 791	20 641	20 561	21 417	21 730	22 003
Greece	1 044	1 114	1 112	1 065	1 705	1 665	2 015	2 071	1 882	1 673
Italy	5 457	6 027	6 018	6 025	5 607	5 580	5 990	6 246	6 642	6 324
Luxembourg	18.8	20.9	22.9	24.7	26.3	28.2	27.6	30.0	30.9	34.7
Netherlands	3 452	3 558	3 614	3 781	3 965	3 922	4 373	4 228	4 482	4 333
Norway	1 045	1 043	1 052	1 080	1 171	1 200	1 223	1 307	1 340	1 365
Portugal	1 112	1 097	1 014	1 215	836	653	616	623	631	674
Turkey ^d	1 655	1 683	1 806	1 894	2 980	3 420	3 320	2 728	2 368	2 211
United Kingdom	13 321	14 375	14 201	14 501	14 494	14 770	14 155	14 618	15 281	16 187
Total NATO (excl. United States)	63 196	66 715	67 996	69 685	71 805	72 940	74 195	76 381	78 068	78 929
Total NATO	187 124	191 099	186 261	186 866	185 501	180 903	186 671	189 715	191 803	193 910
WTO										
Bulgaria	399	440	475	538	611	664	(597)	(624)	(666)	..
Czechoslovakia	1 721	1 739	1 831	1 948	2 008	2 115	(2 148)	(2 105)	[2 115]	..
German DR	2 745	2 864	3 058	3 172	3 364	3 444	3 560	3 738	4 123	4 470
Hungary	721	668	651	712	766	721	750	819	780	..
Poland	2 586	2 621	2 807	2 838	3 001	3 208	(3 412)	(3 218)	(3 195)	..
Romania	681	708	719	795	874	951	977	1 070	(1 064)	..
USSR	[93 900]	[95 400]	[96 900]	[98 300]	[99 800]	[101 300]	[102 700]	[104 200]	[105 700]	[107 300]
Total WTO (excl. USSR)	8 853	9 040	9 541	10 003	10 624	11 103	(11 444)	(11 574)	[11 943]	[12 250]
Total WTO	[102 753]	[104 440]	[106 441]	[108 303]	[110 424]	[112 403]	[114 144]	[115 774]	[117 643]	[119 550]
Other Europe										
Albania ^a	142	144	144	149	155	191	172	201	204	..
Austria	472	506	511	575	642	657	679	741	767	(765)
Finland	381	435	442	455	490	499	462	485	473	532
Ireland	121	144	152	167	162	169	174	182	200	206
Spain	1 718	1 868	2 042	2 217	2 308	2 472	2 478	2 461	2 672	2 784
Sweden	2 739	2 811	2 822	2 844	2 925	2 919	2 932	2 980	3 067	2 908
Switzerland	1 766	1 799	1 743	1 737	1 638	1 856	1 753	1 762	1 843	1 814
Yugoslavia	1 477	1 666	1 683	2 060	2 279	2 363	(2 414)	(2 379)	[2 363]	[2 605]
Total other Europe	8 814	9 374	9 537	10 204	10 598	11 125	(11 064)	(11 192)	[11 587]	[11 821]

Conventions

- .. Information not available or not applicable.
- () SIPRI estimates, based on uncertain data.
- [] Imputed values, with a high degree of uncertainty.

Notes

^a *Developed market economies* include all NATO countries, Other Europe except Albania and Yugoslavia, plus Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Israel and South Africa.

Centrally planned economies include all WTO countries, Albania, North Korea, Mongolia, China and Cuba.

OPEC countries include Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Algeria, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, Ecuador and Venezuela. Qatar, although a member of OPEC, is not included. Oman, although it is not a member of OPEC, is included, since its position is essentially similar to that of other Arab OPEC countries.

^b At current prices and 1978 exchange-rates.

^c Wholesale price index used as deflator.

^d See section on inflation in appendix 6B.

^e Include internal security, etc.

^f Per cent of gross national product.

^g Per cent of gross material product.

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1981.

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Middle East										
Bahrain	31.4	34.9	36.1	46.6	25.0	32.7	42.7	50.6	[55.5]	..
Cyprus	16.8	16.4	15.2	21.7	23.1	22.5	29.9	23.8	[17.6]	..
Egypt	2 972	2 911	5 367	5 927	5 756	5 004	5 238	[3 322]	[2 790]	..
Iran	1 810	2 518	3 467	7 664	9 731	10 557	8 573	9 424	4 757	..
Iraq*	862	830	1 025	2 016	2 050	2 011	2 101	1 988	2 440	..
Israel ^d	2 166	2 134	3 880	2 900	3 160	3 159	3 079	2 676	2 783	2 218
Jordan*	270	292	282	250	246	411	329	311	323	..
Kuwait*	353	371	396	724	865	1 064	1 183	1 076	923	[931]
Lebanon ^{c, d}	122	174	191	209	212	174	108	166	200	..
Oman*	46.3	72.4	122	342	698	785	686	767	689	880
Saudi Arabia	2 006	2 623	3 348	(4 111)	(6 267)	(8 433)	(9 146)	(11 379)	(15 137)	(18 514)
Syria	370	427	661	624	1 116	1 110	1 111	1 165	2 018	3 186
United Arab Emirates ^b	13.3	20.6	32.0	80.6	611	689	1 033	[1 162]
Yemen, Arab Republic	..	100	94.7	106	118	135	150	165
Yemen, Peoples' Democratic	50.4	51.6	46.2	46.6	51.5	55.1	61.3	78.5	98.1	..
Total Middle East	11 189	12 569	18 943	25 007	30 350	(33 033)	(32 451)	(33 283)	[33 445]	[37 900]
South Asia										
Afghanistan	[33.5]	42.4	46.2	43.5	47.6	49.6	55.8	59.4
Bangladesh	46.1	52.7	68.3	117	125	113	117	121
India	3 021	3 223	2 826	2 648	2 980	3 500	3 400	3 535	3 662	3 605
Nepal	9.2	9.0	9.3	9.5	10.8	14.0	14.5
Pakistan	874	978	914	912	943	943	937	988	1 001	(1 068)
Sri Lanka	18.0	16.5	11.8	14.5	15.2	17.8	(16.1)	(19.8)	23.8	30.9
Total South Asia	3 955	4 269	3 853	3 680	4 065	4 642	4 549	(4 731)	(4 882)	(4 902)
Far East										
Brunei	22.2	21.7	23.8	27.8	50.5	80.6	139	131	155	..
Burma	211	220	200	170	147	149	[167]
Hong Kong	39.5	41.7	32.9	28.7	28.3	51.3	77.1	92.9	[101]	(102)
Indonesia	..	[1 353]	[1 268]	[1 168]	[1 621]	[1 590]	1 813	2 050	1 870	1 455
Japan	6 298	7 093	7 486	7 597	7 899	7 978	8 232	8 875	9 251	9 200
Korea, North	956	613	608	759	909	1 004	(1 034)	1 144	1 250	1 337
Korea, South	662	825	920	1 052	1 271	1 840	2 189	2 721	2 661	2 990
Malaysia	395	511	540	561	640	579	687	764	[958]	1 136
Mongolia ^b	(50.3)	(57.1)	(63.4)	(108)	(111)	(121)	(120)	(125)	(143)	(176)
Philippines	176	219	307	(355)	(395)	544	595	652	[646]	677
Singapore ^c	304	321	269	262	301	368	392	443	508	..
Taiwan	1 101	1 162	1 254	1 069	1 199	1 398	1 665	[2 697]	4 205	5 409
Thailand	501	515	485	457	621	675	757	770	888	(859)
Total Far East, excl. Kampuchea, Laos and Viet Nam	11 966	12 954	13 457	13 614	15 193	16 377	17 867	20 658	22 849	24 271
Total Far East	13 267	14 254	14 757	14 694	16 193	[17 427]	[19 058]	[21 916]	[24 260]	[25 767]
Oceania										
Australia	2 567	2 522	2 597	2 820	2 911	2 912	2 920	2 901	2 910	3 046
Fiji	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.8	2.7	2.9	3.2	3.4	4.4
New Zealand	270	273	273	285	290	278	282	298	305	318
Total Oceania	2 839	2 797	2 871	3 106	3 203	3 193	3 204	3 203	3 218	3 369

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Africa										
Algeria	221	(217)	(224)	426	371	426	473	465	524	..
Benin ^a	5.8	5.9	6.1	6.8	7.5	7.8	11.9	(11.9)
Burundi	7.0	9.6	10.2	11.9	10.6	12.6	17.3	(21.3)
Cameroon	59.2	58.0	59.0	59.4	63.0	66.2	63.6	60.7	61.9	56.8
Central African Republic	12.8	10.7	12.4	11.7	10.8	10.5	9.3	10.1	12.7	..
Chad	[30.0]	28.6	25.0	23.3	22.2	31.6	(35.7)	(41.3)
Congo	31.9	24.7	32.0	40.8	43.0	45.8	43.9	38.1	45.9	..
Equatorial Guinea ^b	(3.6)	(3.7)	(3.8)	(3.9)	(3.9)
Ethiopia	89.3	99.4	97.7	136	213	170	154	251	299	[344]
Gabon	16.1	17.3	20.3	22.0	24.3	26.9	34.9	(53.9)	(59.2)	88.2
Ghana ^d	361	299	284	370	350	312	179	133	(145)	..
Guinea ^b	21.3	20.9	20.9	20.9
Ivory Coast	55.3	(57.2)	(59.8)	78.9	70.3	66.7	(65.1)	87.8	79.4	..
Kenya	48.9	63.7	71.2	76.5	77.0	110	185	240	242	..
Liberia	8.7	7.4	6.0	5.1	5.4	6.2	6.7	[6.9]
Libya	(476)	(533)	(637)	(1 010)	(1 048)	(1 603)	(1 577)
Madagascar	26.8	29.1	30.6	34.5	33.1	41.4	50.7	52.2	67.7	..
Malawi	2.8	2.9	4.5	5.3	10.3	10.8	15.7	21.1	19.3	..
Mali ^d	19.0	23.4	21.1	23.6	32.3	38.6	37.6	30.9	34.9	..
Mauritania	6.1	7.9	9.6	11.2	35.1	(50.5)	(65.6)
Mauritius	7.9	8.5	9.5	9.9	11.5	(10.7)
Morocco	241	270	311	367	538	755	867	(770)	(1 093)	..
Mozambique ^b	14.0	(41.0)	44.3	(85.1)	87.0	..
Niger	8.0	7.5	6.8	9.5	11.1	11.2
Nigeria	1 388	1 618	1 782	1 958	2 927	2 544	2 388	1 794	1 739	1 524
Rwanda	12.4	11.0	17.0	13.6	12.4	14.2	13.7	14.8	15.2	..
Senegal	42.7	42.0	37.3	35.1	34.9	41.9	45.1	49.1	50.4	48.4
Sierra Leone	6.2	6.5	7.4	8.0	7.8	7.2	10.6	[11.4]
Somalia	25.9	30.5	31.4	35.5	31.9	31.9	34.9	(66.7)	(76.7)	..
South Africa	701	710	869	1 164	1 429	1 768	1 999	2 179	1 916	1 989
Sudan	294	259	228	184	152	193	220	(207)	[285]	..
Tanzania ^a	67.3	79.0	102	134	126	132	164	(265)	[247]	..
Togo	8.6	8.9	10.2	11.5	11.9	17.2	18.3	21.2	19.7	..
Tunisia	45.4	51.7	52.7	63.8	86.9	98.0	133	148	139	..
Uganda ^d	447	566	409	315	315	279	199	156
Upper Volta	9.2	9.9	10.0	10.2	22.1	29.1	26.9	23.2	(26.2)	..
Zaire ^d	541	501	400	635	430	(253)	(58.7)	(45.5)	(121)	..
Zambia	[244]	[271]	[218]	[268]	[355]	[290]	[279]	[246]	[263]	..
Zimbabwe	87.2	95.2	123	151	169	216	285	327	390	..
Total Africa	5 679	6 064	6 259	7 750	9 138	9 796	9 859	(9 577)	[10 037]	[9 859]
Central America										
Costa Rica ^a	9.8	9.9	10.9	11.2	13.5	17.7	19.5	22.1	(19.2)	[19.2]
Cuba ^{b, c}	367	338	342	357	413	..	886	992	1 065	[1 026]
Dominican Republic	64.6	64.6	59.7	68.6	72.1	78.8	78.5	87.1	145	..
El Salvador ^d	24.4	25.1	38.8	42.1	37.8	48.0	56.8	59.0	(58.7)	..
Guatemala	[37.5]	45.4	38.1	41.7	57.7	60.3	83.9	73.2	[64.4]	..
Haiti	3.7	3.8	3.2	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.5
Honduras	18.3	23.5	23.2	21.7	25.8	27.2	26.8	31.4
Jamaica	14.0	14.9	23.1	21.7	24.0	29.1	27.7
Mexico	361	401	447	477	520	543	531	536	588	563
Nicaragua	22.3	28.1	22.7	27.2	32.5	43.5	43.2
Panama	21.8	13.9	14.9	15.5	17.7	16.7
Trinidad and Tobago	7.9	7.4	5.9	6.3	7.4	8.2	8.9
Total Central America	953	975	1 030	1 093	1 223	(1 526)	1 786	(1 912)	(1 969)	[2 186]
South America										
Argentina ^d	1 020	1 021	796	939	(1 200)	1 723	1 438	1 492	1 685	1 542
Bolivia	28.6	39.1	46.7	52.9	72.1	79.0	75.8	80.8	[87.6]	..
Brazil ^d	1 367	1 462	1 737	1 764	1 758	2 100	1 986	2 041	1 744	..
Chile ^d	199	199	318	554	432	430	500	630	[839]	984
Colombia	380	200	182	174	193	199	182	168	(184)	229
Ecuador	71.9	83.8	100	115	141	129	215	164	168	..
Guyana ^a	13.6	14.4	15.2	21.9	42.0	58.5	35.0	(25.5)
Paraguay	30.0	29.4	28.6	26.6	33.3	34.5	37.0	38.8	35.9	..
Peru ^d	300	280	338	359	474	537	780	599	464	469
Uruguay ^d	121	109	109	131	123	95	100	132
Venezuela	411	470	452	628	707	482	631	590	568	577
Total South America	3 942	3 906	4 121	4 765	(5 175)	5 867	5 980	5 953	(5 953)	[6 050]

APPENDIX IV

TABLE I

Military expenditures, GNP, central government expenditures, public health expenditures and public education expenditures, 1969-78, by region, organisation and country

Year	Military expenditures MILEX		Gross national product GNP		Central government expenditures CGE	Public health expenditures H	Public education expenditures E	MILEX GNP	MILEX CGE	H GNP	E GNP	H + E MILEX
	billion dollars		billion dollars		billion constant 1977 dollars			%	%	%	%	%
	current	constant 1977	current	constant 1977								
WORLD TOTALS												
1969	236.0	383.4	3537	5746	1145.4	120.6	275.5	6.7	33.5	2.1	4.8	103
1970	247.5	382.3	3912	6043	1208.5	139.0	293.0	6.3	31.6	2.3	4.8	113
1971	259.8	381.8	4293	6310	1288.0	154.3	315.2	6.1	29.6	2.4	5.0	123
1972	278.7	393.4	4704	6641	1364.2	167.6	323.0	5.9	28.8	2.5	4.9	124
1973	301.2	402.1	5314	7095	1428.3	177.3	350.9	5.7	28.2	2.5	4.9	131
1974	339.5	414.2	5951	7259	1468.2	191.5	359.5	5.7	28.2	2.6	5.0	133
1975	383.0	426.5	6599	7348	1708.0	211.6	381.8	5.8	25.0	2.9	5.2	139
1976	411.5	435.4	7284	7707	1785.2	224.7	408.7	5.6	24.4	2.9	5.3	145
1977	439.1	433.1	8010	8010	1863.4	237.0	427.0	5.5	23.6	3.0	5.3	151
1978	479.9	446.7	8967	8348	1991.0	253.5	441.1	5.4	22.4	3.0	5.3	155
DEVELOPED												
1969	197.3	320.4	2892	4698	940.5	108.3	241.1	6.8	34.1	2.3	5.1	109
1970	202.2	312.4	3172	4900	985.7	125.7	255.0	6.4	31.7	2.6	5.2	121
1971	209.8	308.4	3464	5091	1033.3	139.7	272.7	6.1	29.8	2.7	5.4	133
1972	224.0	316.2	3783	5340	1083.1	151.6	275.7	5.9	29.2	2.8	5.2	135
1973	238.5	318.5	4248	5672	1119.6	159.9	300.9	5.6	28.4	2.8	5.3	144
1974	268.2	327.2	4717	5754	1130.6	173.9	309.6	5.7	28.9	3.0	5.4	147
1975	295.4	328.9	5172	5759	1306.9	192.4	323.5	5.7	25.1	3.3	5.6	150
1976	314.0	332.2	5712	6043	1365.2	204.6	346.9	5.5	24.3	3.4	5.7	166
1977	339.3	339.3	6256	6256	1425.6	216.1	362.7	5.4	23.8	3.5	5.8	170
1978	370.3	344.7	6971	6490	1528.7	231.0	374.2	5.3	22.5	3.6	5.8	175
DEVELOPING												
1969	38.8	63.0	645	1048	205.0	12.3	34.5	6.0	30.7	1.2	3.3	74
1970	45.2	69.9	740	1143	222.7	13.3	38.0	6.1	31.4	1.2	3.3	73
1971	50.0	73.4	829	1219	254.7	14.5	42.5	6.0	28.8	1.2	3.5	77
1972	54.7	77.2	921	1301	281.1	16.0	47.3	5.9	27.5	1.2	3.6	82
1973	62.6	83.6	1066	1423	308.7	17.5	50.0	5.9	27.1	1.2	3.5	80
1974	71.3	87.0	1233	1505	337.6	17.6	49.9	5.8	25.8	1.2	3.3	77
1975	87.6	97.6	1427	1589	399.1	19.2	58.3	6.1	24.5	1.2	3.7	79
1976	97.6	103.2	1572	1663	420.0	20.1	61.8	6.2	24.6	1.2	3.7	79
1977	99.8	99.8	1754	1754	437.9	21.0	64.3	5.7	22.8	1.2	3.7	85
1978	109.6	102.0	1996	1858	462.2	22.5	67.0	5.5	22.1	1.2	3.6	87
BY REGION												
AFRICA												
1969	2.8	4.6	86	140	30.6	1.6	5.3	3.3	15.0	1.1	3.8	150
1970	2.8	4.3	98	151	32.4	1.6	5.7	2.8	13.3	1.1	3.8	169
1971	2.9	4.2	108	158	37.0	1.7	6.0	2.6	11.4	1.1	3.8	183
1972	3.2	4.6	114	161	39.4	1.8	6.2	2.8	11.7	1.1	3.8	173
1973	3.5	4.7	126	169	41.2	1.9	7.2	2.8	11.4	1.1	4.3	193
1974	4.1	5.0	146	179	45.4	1.7	6.8	2.8	11.0	0.9	3.8	170
1975	5.1	5.7	168	187	60.0	1.9	8.1	3.0	9.5	1.0	4.3	175
1976	6.4	6.7	187	198	64.5	2.1	8.6	3.4	10.4	1.1	4.3	159
1977	6.9	6.9	206	206	66.5	2.2	7.9	3.3	10.4	1.1	3.8	146
1978	7.1	6.6	228	212	65.0	2.4	8.2	3.1	10.2	1.1	3.9	160

Year	Military expenditures MILEX		Gross national product GNP		Central government expenditures CGE	Public health expenditures H	Public education expenditures E	MILEX GNP	MILEX CGE	H GNP	E GNP	H + E MILEX
	billion dollars		billion dollars		billion constant 1977 dollars			%	%	%	%	%
	current	constant 1977	current	constant 1977				%	%	%	%	%
EAST ASIA												
1969	23.2	37.7	457	743	119.6	4.0	26.8	5.1	31.5	0.5	3.6	81
1970	27.6	42.6	539	833	130.7	4.4	30.8	5.1	32.6	0.5	3.7	82
1971	30.5	44.8	602	885	147.4	4.9	35.1	5.1	30.4	0.6	4.0	89
1972	32.7	46.2	675	953	164.8	5.4	39.4	4.8	28.0	0.6	4.1	97
1973	35.4	47.3	791	1056	166.7	5.7	42.8	4.5	28.4	0.5	4.1	102
1974	39.2	47.8	879	1072	169.7	5.6	46.8	4.5	28.2	0.5	4.4	109
1975	43.4	48.3	997	1111	186.4	5.8	49.9	4.3	25.9	0.5	4.5	115
1976	47.9	50.7	1101	1165	188.2	6.2	52.4	4.4	26.9	0.5	4.5	115
1977	50.8	50.8	1241	1241	203.3	6.5	55.9	4.1	25.0	0.5	4.5	122
1978	55.4	51.6	1439	1340	229.5	6.8	59.6	3.9	22.5	0.5	4.4	128
EUROPE ALL												
1969	113.8	184.8	1638	2661	563.6	64.6	117.6	6.9	32.8	2.4	4.4	98
1970	122.3	189.0	1824	2817	602.4	78.4	125.2	6.7	31.4	2.8	4.4	107
1971	132.8	195.1	1995	2933	636.2	86.1	135.2	6.7	30.7	2.9	4.6	113
1972	144.1	203.4	2156	3044	661.3	94.2	133.8	6.7	30.8	3.1	4.4	112
1973	157.9	210.8	2415	3224	698.0	100.0	145.6	6.5	30.2	3.1	4.5	116
1974	179.8	219.3	2729	3329	758.2	109.8	153.8	6.6	28.9	3.3	4.6	120
1975	202.0	224.9	3007	3348	833.8	122.1	164.1	6.7	27.0	3.6	4.9	127
1976	219.9	232.7	3300	3491	874.5	128.2	180.3	6.7	26.6	3.7	5.2	132
1977	233.6	233.6	3584	3584	913.0	137.9	188.7	6.5	25.6	3.8	5.3	139
1978	256.6	238.9	3976	3701	978.0	151.0	196.9	6.5	24.4	4.1	5.3	145
OF WHICH												
NATO EUROPE												
1969	31.4	51.0	814	1322	274.9	31.2	60.7	3.9	18.6	2.4	4.6	180
1970	33.0	51.0	900	1391	290.6	42.0	66.1	3.7	17.5	3.0	4.8	212
1971	36.3	53.4	981	1443	305.5	48.3	73.3	3.7	17.5	3.3	5.1	227
1972	39.9	56.3	1065	1503	319.5	54.1	67.9	3.7	17.6	3.6	4.5	216
1973	42.9	57.2	1189	1587	336.9	58.2	75.4	3.6	17.0	3.7	4.7	233
1974	48.8	59.5	1327	1619	364.9	65.2	80.7	3.7	16.3	4.0	5.0	245
1975	54.0	60.2	1435	1598	407.9	74.6	88.2	3.8	14.8	4.7	5.5	270
1976	58.2	61.5	1589	1681	416.6	79.0	100.7	3.7	14.8	4.7	6.0	292
1977	62.7	62.7	1720	1720	433.6	86.6	105.9	3.6	14.5	5.0	6.2	307
1978	68.9	64.1	1902	1771	470.6	96.2	110.3	3.6	13.6	5.4	6.2	322
WARSAW PACT												
1969	77.3	125.5	640	1040	236.9	24.7	42.4	12.1	53.0	2.4	4.1	53
1970	83.7	129.4	717	1108	256.5	26.6	44.0	11.7	50.4	2.4	4.0	54
1971	90.5	133.0	789	1160	271.0	27.4	45.9	11.5	49.1	2.4	4.0	55
1972	97.8	138.0	846	1194	281.7	28.9	49.1	11.6	49.0	2.4	4.1	56
1973	108.1	144.3	952	1272	300.6	30.2	53.3	11.3	48.0	2.4	4.2	57
1974	123.0	150.1	1089	1328	325.3	31.5	55.7	11.3	46.1	2.4	4.2	58
1975	138.9	154.6	1232	1372	353.1	33.0	58.0	11.3	43.8	2.4	4.2	58
1976	152.3	161.2	1347	1425	379.5	34.3	60.4	11.3	42.5	2.4	4.2	58
1977	161.7	161.7	1470	1470	398.0	35.9	62.6	11.0	40.6	2.4	4.3	60
1978	177.4	165.1	1641	1528	420.3	38.5	65.5	10.8	39.3	2.5	4.3	63

Year	Military expenditures MILEX		Gross national product GNP		Central government expenditures CGE	Public health expenditures H	Public education expenditures E	MILEX GNP	MILEX CGE	H GNP	E GNP	H + E MILEX
	billion dollars		billion dollars		billion constant 1977 dollars			%	%	%	%	%
	current	constant 1977	current	constant 1977				%	%	%	%	%
OTHER EUROPE												
1969	5.1	8.3	183	298	51.8	8.7	14.4	2.8	16.0	2.9	4.8	278
1970	5.6	8.6	205	317	55.3	9.7	15.1	2.7	15.6	3.1	4.7	288
1971	6.0	8.8	224	329	59.8	10.5	15.9	2.7	14.7	3.2	4.8	300
1972	6.5	9.1	245	346	60.1	11.3	16.8	2.6	15.1	3.3	4.8	308
1973	6.9	9.3	273	364	60.6	11.6	16.9	2.5	15.3	3.2	4.6	306
1974	8.0	9.7	312	381	68.0	13.1	17.4	2.5	14.3	3.4	4.6	314
1975	9.0	10.1	339	378	72.7	14.6	17.9	2.7	13.9	3.9	4.7	321
1976	9.4	10.0	364	385	78.4	15.0	19.2	2.6	12.8	3.9	5.0	342
1977	9.2	9.2	392	392	81.3	15.3	20.1	2.3	11.3	3.9	5.1	384
1978	10.3	9.6	432	402	87.2	16.3	21.2	2.4	11.0	4.1	5.3	390
LATIN AMERICA												
1969	2.8	4.5	159	258	33.4	1.9	7.9	1.7	13.5	0.7	3.1	217
1970	3.3	5.1	179	277	36.0	2.1	8.6	1.8	14.2	0.8	3.1	209
1971	3.7	5.5	202	297	40.2	2.6	9.8	1.9	13.7	0.9	3.3	225
1972	3.9	5.5	225	317	44.6	2.9	10.5	1.7	12.3	0.9	3.3	243
1973	4.5	6.0	258	345	49.4	2.6	11.3	1.7	12.1	0.8	3.3	231
1974	5.5	6.8	304	371	58.3	2.8	12.1	1.8	11.7	0.8	3.3	219
1975	6.7	7.5	344	384	63.3	3.1	12.8	1.0	11.8	0.8	3.3	212
1976	5.9	6.3	380	402	67.1	3.2	12.8	1.6	9.4	0.8	3.2	254
1977	6.6	6.6	421	421	63.9	3.2	14.3	1.6	10.3	0.8	3.4	265
1978	7.4	6.9	471	439	63.3	3.7	14.8	1.6	10.9	0.8	3.4	268
MIDDLE EAST												
1969	6.2	10.0	62	101	35.1	1.1	4.0	9.8	28.5	1.1	3.9	51
1970	7.5	11.5	70	109	39.2	1.2	4.3	10.5	29.3	1.1	3.9	47
1971	8.2	12.1	81	119	47.0	1.2	5.1	10.1	25.7	1.0	4.3	52
1972	10.0	14.2	99	140	53.1	1.5	6.2	10.1	26.7	1.1	4.4	54
1973	14.5	19.4	121	162	67.7	3.0	7.0	11.9	28.7	1.8	4.3	51
1974	17.4	21.3	147	179	77.5	2.4	6.4	11.9	27.5	1.3	3.6	41
1975	25.6	28.5	175	195	106.0	2.7	10.7	14.5	26.9	1.4	5.5	47
1976	30.3	32.1	201	212	107.0	3.0	12.2	15.1	30.0	1.4	5.7	47
1977	29.4	29.4	220	220	111.8	3.1	12.5	13.3	26.3	1.4	5.7	53
1978	32.6	30.3	242	225	124.6	3.4	13.2	13.4	24.3	1.5	5.9	54
NORTH AMERICA												
1969	83.5	135.6	1024	1663	328.4	44.4	108.1	8.2	41.3	2.7	6.5	112
1970	80.1	123.7	1077	1664	330.4	48.1	111.9	7.4	37.4	2.9	6.7	129
1971	77.2	113.5	1170	1720	340.5	54.2	116.8	6.6	33.3	3.1	6.8	150
1972	80.1	113.0	1289	1820	360.3	57.9	119.2	6.2	31.4	3.2	6.5	156
1973	80.9	108.0	1440	1923	364.7	60.3	129.2	5.6	29.6	3.1	6.7	175
1974	88.8	108.3	1566	1910	314.8	65.1	124.4	5.7	34.4	3.4	6.5	175
1975	94.0	104.7	1699	1892	404.4	71.1	126.1	5.5	25.9	3.8	6.7	188
1976	94.4	99.9	1890	2000	428.4	75.7	132.0	5.0	23.3	3.8	6.6	207
1977	104.8	104.8	2092	2092	445.8	78.0	136.4	5.0	23.5	3.7	6.5	204
1978	112.8	105.0	2335	2174	464.6	80.0	136.3	4.8	22.6	3.7	6.3	206

Year	Military expenditures MILEX		Gross national product GNP		Central government expenditures CGE	Public health expenditures H	Public education expenditures E	MILEX GNP	MILEX CGE	H GNP	E GNP	H + E MILEX
	billion dollars		billion dollars		billion constant 1977 dollars			%	%	%	%	%
	current	constant 1977	current	constant 1977								
OCEANIA												
1969	1.9	3.1	52	85	20.1	2.2	3.4	3.6	15.4	2.6	4.0	180
1970	1.9	2.9	58	91	21.7	2.5	4.0	3.2	13.4	2.7	4.4	224
1971	1.9	2.8	64	94	23.6	2.7	4.4	3.0	11.9	2.8	4.6	253
1972	1.9	2.7	69	98	22.8	3.0	4.8	2.7	11.8	3.0	4.9	288
1973	1.8	2.4	78	104	24.2	3.0	5.2	2.3	9.9	2.9	5.0	341
1974	1.9	2.3	87	106	27.7	3.3	6.5	2.2	8.3	3.1	6.1	426
1975	2.4	2.7	97	108	33.1	3.9	6.8	2.5	8.2	3.6	6.3	396
1976	2.7	2.9	107	113	33.1	5.2	7.0	2.6	8.8	4.6	6.2	420
1977	2.9	2.9	114	114	34.9	5.0	7.8	2.5	8.3	4.4	6.8	441
1978	3.2	3.0	127	118	35.7	4.9	8.2	2.5	8.4	4.1	6.9	436
SOUTH ASIA												
1969	1.8	3.0	56	91	14.7	0.7	2.3	3.3	20.4	0.8	2.5	100
1970	2.1	3.2	63	98	15.8	0.8	2.6	3.2	20.3	0.8	2.6	106
1971	2.6	3.8	68	100	16.1	0.8	2.7	3.8	23.6	0.8	2.7	92
1972	2.7	3.8	74	104	17.9	0.9	2.8	3.6	21.2	0.9	2.7	97
1973	2.6	3.4	81	109	16.3	0.8	2.6	3.1	20.9	0.7	2.4	100
1974	2.8	3.5	90	110	16.6	0.8	2.7	3.2	21.1	0.7	2.4	100
1975	3.7	4.2	107	119	20.9	1.0	3.2	3.5	20.1	0.8	2.7	100
1976	3.9	4.1	115	122	22.2	1.1	3.4	3.3	18.5	0.9	2.8	109
1977	4.1	4.1	129	129	24.3	1.2	3.6	3.2	16.9	0.9	2.8	117
1978	4.8	4.5	146	136	30.1	1.3	3.9	3.3	15.0	1.0	2.9	115
BY ORGANIZATION												
NATO, ALL												
1969	114.9	186.6	1838	2986	603.2	75.7	168.8	6.2	30.9	2.5	5.7	131
1970	113.1	174.7	1978	3055	620.9	90.1	178.0	5.7	28.1	2.9	5.8	153
1971	113.5	166.9	2152	3164	646.0	102.4	190.1	5.3	25.8	3.2	6.0	175
1972	119.9	169.3	2354	3323	679.9	112.0	187.1	5.1	24.9	3.4	5.6	176
1973	123.8	165.2	2629	3511	701.6	118.5	204.6	4.7	23.5	3.4	5.8	195
1974	137.6	167.8	2894	3530	679.7	130.3	205.1	4.8	24.7	3.7	5.8	199
1975	148.1	164.9	3135	3490	812.4	145.7	214.3	4.7	20.3	4.2	6.1	218
1976	152.6	161.5	3479	3681	845.0	154.7	232.7	4.4	19.1	4.2	6.3	239
1977	167.5	167.5	3813	3813	879.5	164.6	242.3	4.4	19.0	4.3	6.4	242
1978	181.7	169.1	4238	3945	935.3	176.1	246.6	4.3	18.1	4.5	6.3	250
WARSAW PACT												
1969	77.3	125.5	640	1040	236.9	24.7	42.4	12.1	53.0	2.4	4.1	53
1970	83.7	129.4	717	1108	256.5	26.6	44.0	11.7	50.4	2.4	4.0	54
1971	90.5	133.0	789	1160	271.0	27.4	45.9	11.5	49.1	2.4	4.0	55
1972	97.8	138.0	846	1194	281.7	28.9	49.1	11.6	49.0	2.4	4.1	56
1973	108.1	144.3	952	1272	300.6	30.2	53.3	11.3	48.0	2.4	4.2	57
1974	123.0	150.1	1089	1328	325.3	31.5	55.7	11.3	46.1	2.4	4.2	58
1975	138.9	154.6	1232	1372	353.1	33.0	58.0	11.3	43.8	2.4	4.2	58
1976	152.3	161.2	1347	1425	379.5	34.3	60.4	11.3	42.5	2.4	4.2	58
1977	161.7	161.7	1470	1470	398.0	35.9	62.6	11.0	40.6	2.4	4.3	60
1978	177.4	165.1	1641	1528	420.3	38.5	65.5	10.8	39.3	2.5	4.3	63

Year	Military expenditures MILEX		Gross national product GNP		Central government expenditures CGE	Public health expenditures H	Public education expenditures E	MILEX GNP	MILEX CGE	H GNP	E GNP	H + E MILEX
	billion dollars		billion dollars		billion constant 1977 dollars			%	%	%	%	%
	current	constant 1977	current	constant 1977								
OPEC												
1969	6.3	10.3	105	171	45.0	1.9	6.9	6.0	22.9	1.1	4.0	85
1970	6.8	10.6	122	188	45.8	2.0	7.6	5.6	23.1	1.1	4.0	90
1971	7.5	11.0	136	201	58.1	2.0	8.3	5.5	18.9	1.0	4.1	93
1972	9.2	13.0	157	222	65.2	2.3	9.9	5.8	19.9	1.0	4.4	93
1973	11.3	15.2	188	251	79.5	3.5	11.3	6.1	19.1	1.4	4.5	97
1974	14.9	18.2	223	272	94.0	2.6	9.4	6.7	19.4	1.0	3.4	65
1975	22.4	25.0	265	295	131.4	3.2	15.3	8.5	19.0	1.1	5.2	74
1976	27.2	28.8	306	323	134.7	3.6	16.9	8.9	21.4	1.1	5.2	71
1977	26.4	26.4	340	340	140.4	3.5	16.6	7.8	18.8	1.0	4.9	76
1978	29.9	27.9	378	352	153.6	3.9	18.0	7.9	18.2	1.1	5.1	78
OECD												
1969	123.3	200.2	2321	3770	722.6	85.4	201.6	5.3	27.7	2.3	5.3	143
1970	122.2	188.8	2532	3912	748.8	101.2	214.1	4.8	25.2	2.6	5.5	167
1971	123.5	181.5	2761	4058	784.1	114.6	230.3	4.5	23.1	2.8	5.7	190
1972	130.8	184.6	3035	4285	823.6	125.3	231.2	4.3	22.4	2.9	5.4	193
1973	135.2	180.5	3408	4551	842.7	132.6	252.3	4.0	21.4	2.9	5.5	213
1974	150.5	183.6	3756	4582	830.0	145.7	258.5	4.0	22.1	3.2	5.6	220
1975	163.0	181.4	4085	4548	983.0	163.3	270.8	4.0	18.5	3.6	6.0	239
1976	168.4	178.2	4524	4787	1014.5	173.9	292.6	3.7	17.6	3.6	6.1	261
1977	183.8	183.8	4960	4960	1059.9	184.0	306.5	3.7	17.3	3.7	6.2	266
1978	199.8	186.0	5522	5141	1144.6	196.4	315.3	3.6	16.3	3.8	6.1	275

Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-78.

APPENDIX V

*Military manoeuvres notified in 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980
under the provisions of the Helsinki final act*A. *Allied manoeuvres*

Sponsoring country	Name of the manoeuvre	Type of the manoeuvre	Area	Size	Participating forces	Period of the manoeuvre	Invitation to observers
<i>1975</i>							
<i>A. Major manoeuvres</i>							
Fed. Rep. of Germany	Grosse Rochade	Ground/air	Bavaria	68,000	GE-CA-FR-US	15th-19th September	—
United States	Certain Trek ¹	Ground/air	NW Bavaria	57,000	GE-CA-FR-US	14th-23rd October	Yes
<i>B. Smaller scale manoeuvres</i>							
Turkey	Deep Express	Joint	Aegean Sea and Turkish Thrace	18,000	TU-US-UK-GE BE-IT-NL	12th-28th September	—
Norway	Batten Bolt 75	Joint	Oestfold (NO)	8,000	NO-UK-DE-NL	3rd-7th October	—
Netherlands	Pantsersprong	Ground/air	Western part of Germany	10,000	NL	28th October-6th November	—
<i>1976</i>							
<i>A. Major manoeuvres</i>							
Fed. Rep. of Germany	Grosser Baer	Ground/air	North-West Germany	50,000	GE-NL-UK-US	6th-10th September	Yes
United States	Gordian Shield	Ground/air	Hesse (GE)	34,000	US-GE	7th-11th September	—
United States	Lares Team	Ground/air	Southern Germany	44,000	US-CA-GE	13th-17th September	Yes
<i>B. Smaller scale manoeuvres</i>							
Norway	Atlas Express	Joint	South West Troms	17,000	CA-GE-IT-NL NO-UK-US	24th February-23rd March	—
Norway	Teamwork 76	Joint	Trøndelag (NO)	13,500	NO-NL-UK-US	10th-24th September	Yes
Denmark/GE	Bonded Item	Joint	Jutland & Schleswig-Holstein	11,000	DE-GE-US	11th-21st October	—
United Kingdom	Spear-point	Ground	North-West Germany	18,000	UK-DE-US	2nd-11th November	Yes

N.B. "Major manoeuvres" are those involving more than 25,000 men.

1. Within Certain Trek the United States notified Reforger 75, a ground/air manoeuvre of 10,000 troops.

Sponsoring country	Name of the manoeuvre	Type of the manoeuvre	Area	Size	Participating forces	Period of the manoeuvre	Invitation to observers
<i>1977</i>							
<i>A. Major manoeuvres</i>							
United States	Carbon Edge	Ground/air	Germany	58,700	US-BE-CA GE-NL-UK GE-US	13th-23rd September	Yes
Fed. Rep. of Germany	Standhafte Chatten	Ground/air	Germany	38,000		12th-15th September	Yes
<i>B. Smaller scale manoeuvres</i>							
United States	Certain Fighter	Ground/air	Germany	24,000	US	1st-8th May	—
Denmark	Arrow Express	Ground/air	Denmark	16,000	BE-CA-DE-GE IT-LU-NL- UK-US BE-GE-US	19th-23rd September	Yes
Belgium	Blue Fox	Ground	Germany	24,500		12th-23rd September	—
Netherlands	Interaction	Ground/air	Germany	12,000	NL	24th September- 1st October	Yes
Turkey	Tayfun 77	Ground/air/ naval	Turkey	15,000	TU	13th-14th October	Yes
<i>1978</i>							
<i>A. Major manoeuvres</i>							
Fed. Rep. of Germany	Blaue Donau	Ground/air	Nurnberg Regensburg Augsburg Uhlm	46,000	CA-GE-US	17th-21st September	Yes
United States	Certain Shield	Ground/air	Bad Hessfeld Schweinfurt Darmstadt Monburg Limburg	56,000	BE-GE-LU UK-US	18th-28th September	Yes
Netherlands	Saxon Drive	Ground/air	Luneburg Wafsburg Hannover Bremen	32,500	GE-NL-US	18th-29th September	Yes
Fed. Rep. of Germany	Bold Guard	Ground/air	Schleswig- Holstein Baltic Command Area	65,000	DE-GE-UK-US	19th-22nd September	—
<i>B. Smaller scale manoeuvres</i>							
Norway	Arctic Express	Ground/air	Troms	15,300	CA-GE-IT-NL NO-UK-US	1st-6th March	Yes
	Black Bear	Ground/air	East Agder	8,200	NL-NO-UK-US	22nd-26th September	—

Sponsoring country	Name of the manoeuvre	Type of the manoeuvre	Area	Size	Participating forces	Period of the manoeuvre	Invitation to observers
<i>1979</i> A. Major manoeuvres							
United States	Certain Sentinel	Ground	N. Baden Württemberg W. Bavaria	66,000	CA-GE-LU-NL UK-US	30th January- 6th February	Yes
United States	Constant Enforcer	Ground with air support	Wissen/Sieg Frankenberg Kassel Eschwege - Bad Hersfeld Giessen Diez/Lahn	29,000	BE-CA-GE-US	10th-21st September	Yes
Fed. Rep. of Germany	Harte Faust	Ground with air support	Oldenburg Osnabrück Münster Nordhorn	60,000	GE-NL-US-DE	17th-21st September	Yes
B. Smaller scale manoeuvres							
Norway	Cold Winter 79	Ground/air	County of Troms	10,000	CA-NL-NO UK-US	17th-22nd March	—
Turkey	Display Determination 79	Joint	Aegean Sea and Turkish Thrace	18,000	IT-TU-UK-US	28th September- 14th October	—
France	Saone 79	Ground	Haute-Marne Haute-Saone Doubs - Jura Côte d'Or	16,000	FR	1st-7th October	Yes
United Kingdom	Keystone	Ground	Hameln Hildesheim Salzgitter	18,000	UK	15th-27th October	—
<i>1980</i> A. Major manoeuvres							
Fed. Rep. of Germany	St. Georg	Ground with air support	Dillenburg Eschwege Bamberg Heilbronn	44,000	GE-US	15th-19th September	Yes
United States	Certain Ramparts	Ground	Southwest of Nürnberg	40,000	CA-GE-US	15th-24th September	Yes
United Kingdom	Spearpoint	Ground	Osnabrück Minden Nienburg Wolfsburg Braunhage Unna	90,000	GE-UK-US	15th-25th September	Yes
B. Smaller scale manoeuvres							
Norway	Anorak Express 80	Joint	Troms area	18,200	CA-GE-IT-NL NO-UK-US	14th-19th March	—
Norway	Teamwork 80	Joint	North Møre South Trøndelag	16,800	NL-NO-UK-US	18th-24th September	Yes
France	Marne 80	Ground with air support	Aube - Marne et Meuse	17,000	FR	6th-10th October	—

B. *Warsaw Pact countries' manoeuvres*

Sponsoring country	Name of the manoeuvre	Type of the manoeuvre	Area	Size	Participating forces	Period of the manoeuvre	Invitation to observers
1975 None							
1976 A. <i>Major manoeuvres</i>							
USSR	Caucasus	Ground/air	Kutaisi-Tbilisi Yerevan	About 25,000	Soviet	25th January- 6th February	Yes
USSR	Sever	Ground/air	Leningrad Military District	About 25,000	Soviet	14th-18th June	Yes
Poland	Shield 76	Ground/air	Bydgoszcz Szczecin Wroclaw	35,000	POL-USSR CZ-GDR	9th-16th September	Yes
B. <i>Smaller scale manoeuvres</i>							
Hungary	—	Alert/ tactical exercise	Denafolovar (Central Hungary)	About 10,000	Hungarian	6th April	—
Hungary	—	Ground/air	Tisza/Danube and Danatul	15,000 ¹	Hungarian Soviet	18th-23rd October	—
1977 A. <i>Major manoeuvres</i>							
USSR	—	Ground/air	Kiohinev Odessa Nikolayev	25,000	Soviet	31st March- 5th April	—
USSR	Carpathia	Ground/air	Lutsk, Lvov Rovno	27,000	Soviet	11th-16th July	Yes
1978 A. <i>Major manoeuvres</i>							
USSR	Berezina	Ground/air	Minsk-Orsha Polotsk	25,000	Soviet	6th-10th February	Yes
USSR	Tarcza 78	Ground/air	GDR	30,000	Soviet	3rd-8th July	—
USSR	Kavraz II	Ground	Kutaisi Batumi and Kirovabad (Trans- Caucasus MD)	25,000	Soviet	5th-20th September (notified 5th-12th September)	—

1. Including certain staffs and units of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary.

Sponsoring country	Name of the manoeuvre	Type of the manoeuvre	Area	Size	Participating forces	Period of the manoeuvre	Invitation to observers
<i>1979</i> A. <i>Major manoeuvres</i> USSR / Czechoslovakia USSR	Druzhiba	Ground /air	Western Czechoslovakia Rovno-Ivano Frankovsk Panevejis Taurage-Alitus	26,000	Soviet Czechoslovak	2nd-7th February	—
		Ground /air		About 25,000	Soviet	2nd-7th April	—
USSR	Neman	Ground /air		25,000	Soviet	23rd-27th July	Yes
B. <i>Smaller scale manoeuvres</i> Hungary	Shield 79	Ground	Area between Lake Balaton and Tisza River	less than 25,000	BU-CZ-HU-RO USSR	mid-May	—
<i>1980</i> A. <i>Major manoeuvres</i> USSR	—	Ground /air	Stendal Magdeburg Cottbus Brandenburg GDR-Baltic Sea Coast	30,000	Soviet	10th-16th July	—
German Democratic Republic	Brother- hood in arms 80	Ground /air Amphibious		40,000	WP countries	First half of September	—
B. <i>Smaller scale manoeuvres</i> Hungary	Dyna 80			18,000	HU /Soviet	23rd-30th August	—

C. Neutral and non-aligned manœuvres

Sponsoring country	Name of the manœuvre	Type of the manœuvre	Area	Size	Participating forces	Period of the manœuvre	Notification given (No. of days)	Content of notification	Invitation to observers
1975 A. Major manœuvres Switzerland	-	Ground/air	Schaffhausen	40,000	Swiss	10th-18th November	31	Detailed	Yes
B. Smaller scale manœuvres Yugoslavia	-	Ground	SW Macedonia	18,000	Yugoslav	21st-25th October	25	Adequate	-
1976 A. Major manœuvres Yugoslavia	Golija 76	Ground/air	SW Serbia	24,000	Yugoslav	20th-23rd September	34	Adequate	Yes
B. Smaller scale manœuvres Sweden	Poseidon	Joint	Eastern military district (Gottland) and adjacent air and sea areas	12,000	Swedish	2nd-6th October	30	Adequate	-
1977 A. Major manœuvres None									
B. Smaller scale manœuvres Sweden	Vonn 77	Ground/air	North West Province of Jaemtland	10,000	Swedish	4th-9th March	21	Adequate	Yes
Spain	Podenco	Ground/air	La Mancha (Ciudad Real)	8,000	Spanish	8th-15th October	53	Poor	Yes
Austria	Herbstuebung 77	Ground/air	Ried Im Innkreis-Mattighofenv	12,000	Austrian	11th-19th November	37	Detailed	-
1978 A. Major manœuvres None									
B. Smaller scale manœuvres Austria	-	Command/post/communication exercise	Weinviertel Lower Austria	5,000	Austrian	13th-17th November	20	Detailed	-
1979 A. Major manœuvres Switzerland	Knacknuss	Ground with air support	NE Switzerland Bodensee-Rhine Lake Zürich	34,000 milit. 13,000 civ. def. 4,000 civil.	Swiss	5th-9th March	28	Detailed	Yes
Switzerland	Forte	Ground with air support	Prealps between Lake Lemman and Lake Quatre-Cantons	27,000	Swiss	1st-6th October	33	Detailed	Yes
Austria	Area defence exercise 1979	Ground	Lower Austria Piedmont	27,500	Austrian	19th-22nd November	45	Detailed	Yes

Disarmament

AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3¹
tabled by Mr. Hardy

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “establish preconditions for” and insert “promote”.
2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “establishment of” insert “a substantially-reduced level and”.
3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after “forces” insert “and dismantling and scrapping surplus or obsolete weapons”.

Signed: Hardy

1. See 3rd sitting, 15th June 1982 (amendments agreed to).

Disarmament

AMENDMENT 4¹
tabled by Mr. Beix

4. In the draft recommendation proper, after sub-paragraph 1(b) add a sub-paragraph 1(c) as follows:

“(c) by guaranteeing respect for the principles set out in the United Nations Charter, and in particular the peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 33), the right of security and legitimate defence (Article 51) and the right of peoples to self-determination;”.

Signed: Beix

1. See 3rd sitting, 15th June 1982 (amendment agreed to).

Disarmament

AMENDMENTS 5 and 6¹
tabled by Mr. Vohrer

5. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "is to open" and insert "opened".
6. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "\$ 455 billion" and insert "more than \$ 500 billion".

Signed: Vohrer

1. See 3rd sitting, 15th June 1982 (amendments agreed to).

*Evolution of the situation in Poland***RECOMMENDATION 378**

*adopted by the Presidential Committee
on 8th February 1982¹*

The Assembly,

Recalling its Order 53 and Recommendation 370 ;

Considering that the existence of a military dictatorship in Poland constitutes a flagrant violation of the final act of the Helsinki conference ;

Considering that Poland's serious economic difficulties do not justify the replacement of the dialogue between the state authorities and Solidarity by a policy of repression ;

Considering that the public acts of the Soviet Union reveal interference in the internal affairs of Poland and pressure on the Polish Government for the establishment of that dictatorship ;

Noting that the situation thus created in Poland is such as to cause Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty to be applied ;

Regretting that no member government of WEU has judged it necessary to examine in the framework of the Council the implications of this situation for the security of Europe ;

Believing that as long as repression persists in Poland there can be no question of re-establishing normal relations with Poland and its allies, starting with the Soviet Union ;

Firmly recalling that the re-establishment of such normal relations depends on :

- (a) the termination of martial law in Poland ;
- (b) the release of all political prisoners and in particular of Solidarity members ;
- (c) the resumption of the dialogue between the government, Solidarity and the Catholic church,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure close exchanges of views between the European and American members of the North Atlantic Alliance in order to co-ordinate measures taken and to be taken in respect of both Poland and the Soviet Union in accordance with the statement of the North Atlantic Council of 11th January 1982 ;
2. To this end, continue to work out in the most appropriate European framework a joint policy towards the Soviet Union and Poland, particularly in economic and financial matters, in both the long and short term ;
3. Further, invite member countries to suspend economic and financial assistance to Poland in present circumstances ;
4. Also invite member countries to pursue and develop their humanitarian assistance to the Polish people insofar as it does not strengthen the authorities responsible for the military coup d'état on 13th December 1981 ;
5. Meet to follow closely the development of the situation in Poland and hold a continuing dialogue with the Assembly on this question ;
6. Conduct talks with the countries of Eastern Europe on the application of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe particularly in connection with serious examination of events in Poland.

1. In accordance with the provisions of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.

Outline booklet on WEU and its activities

INFORMATION REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Relations with Parliaments
by Mr. Berchem, Rapporteur*

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INFORMATION REPORT

submitted by Mr. Berchem, Rapporteur

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Information Report

(submitted by Mr. Berchem, Rapporteur)

1. Introduction

1. Strictly speaking, this document is not a report. Its aim is to meet the wish expressed by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments that members of the WEU Assembly, particularly those attending its meetings for the first time, and all persons interested in the organisation be provided with documentation about Western European Union in as brief, clear and precise a manner as possible. Other publications deal with WEU and its history. Here it is simply a matter of guiding a busy reader towards understanding the organisation as it now operates and the problems facing it. Little will therefore be said about the history of WEU, thus leaving more room for outstanding problems.

2. As represented by the committee, this is merely a first outline to allow members of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments first, and then the Assembly as a whole at its June 1982 session, to make any comments or suggestions which may help in drafting the final text.

3. In drafting the present text, your Rapporteur has drawn very extensively on Admiral Cantu's booklet on "The Agency for the Control of Armaments of Western European Union" and Mr. Borcier's booklet on "The Assembly of Western European Union" and made use of the anonymous booklet on "The Assembly of Western European Union" issued in 1975, merely extending its scope and bringing it up to date. He wishes to thank the authors of these three publications, all of which were published by WEU.

II. Modified Brussels Treaty

A. Origins

4. In 1950, the United States asked its European allies for Germany to be associated with the Atlantic Alliance. Some of them were not then prepared to allow this country to build up an independent military force and on 24th October 1950, Mr. Pleven, then French Prime Minister, proposed that a European army be set up to include all the forces of the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance.

5. The ensuing negotiations led in May 1952 to the signing of a treaty by which the six

countries which had just set up the European Coal and Steel Community (Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) would form a European Defence Community. This community was to place member countries' integrated forces under the guidance of a single European authority. However, on 30th August 1954 the French Parliament, in a vote on a previous question, rejected the proposed European Defence Community and another treaty had to be prepared. This was the Paris Agreements of 23rd October 1954 which, on the basis of the Brussels Treaty of 17th March 1948, associated the Benelux countries, France and the United Kingdom together with Germany and Italy, which implied substantial changes, in order to set up a new European organisation. The signatories of the 1954 Paris Agreements clearly indicated their aims in the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty: "to reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights... and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations... to preserve the principles of democracy... to strengthen... the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united" by co-operating "to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery... to afford assistance to each other... in resisting any policy of aggression... to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe". This was tantamount to saying that they considered Europe's unity and security to be closely linked, as well as its economy and defence, which explains the place they accorded in the framework of WEU both to armaments co-operation and to the establishment of mutual confidence which, at that time, implied collective control of levels of forces and armaments. Consequently, while Protocol No. I to the Paris Agreements modified the Brussels Treaty, Protocols Nos. II, III and IV contained further provisions relating to the levels of forces and armaments of member countries.

B. The treaty

6. The cornerstone of the treaty is Article V, which lays down that:

"If any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other high contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power."

It thus defines a defensive alliance far more binding than the North Atlantic Treaty or any other treaty now in force since it commits the forces of all the member countries unconditionally in the event of an attack on one of them.

7. Article VIII of the treaty sets up a Council organised so as to be able to exercise its functions continuously and deciding by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure had been agreed. The Council's aim is to strengthen peace and European security and also to promote unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe. At the request of any of the high contracting parties it may be immediately convened to consult "with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability". No limit is placed on the Council's responsibilities and the preamble to the treaty underlines that its aim is to "preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law" and "to strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties" uniting the signatory countries. In other words, nothing is outside the responsibilities of WEU.

8. Article IX sets up "an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe" to which the Council has to make an annual report on its activities.

9. Protocol No. II to the Paris Agreements makes it incumbent on signatory mainland countries not to exceed a certain level of forces without the unanimous agreement of their partners and to submit their force levels to the Council for approval. The United Kingdom for its part is committed to maintain four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force on the mainland of Europe. This undertaking is subject to verification but there is no check on British forces stationed elsewhere.

10. Protocol No. III bans the production by the Federal Republic of certain armaments and makes all member countries' heavy weapons subject to verification by WEU, for which purpose an Agency for the Control of Armaments was set up under Protocol No. IV.

11. Finally, Article IV of the treaty stipulates that the WEU Council is to "rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters".

C. Application of the treaty

12. While the modified Brussels Treaty gave Western European Union extremely vast, not to

say unlimited, responsibilities, it also demonstrated its signatories' concern that the body they had set up should not duplicate the work of other international organisations. Already, following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4th April 1949, the Brussels Treaty Organisation had decided in its resolution of 20th December 1950 to transfer the exercise of Western Union's defence activities to NATO, while specifying in paragraph 4 of that resolution that "these new arrangements will in no way affect the obligation assumed towards each other by the signatory powers under the Brussels Treaty" nor "affect the right of the Western Union Defence Ministers and Chiefs-of-Staff to meet as they please to consider matters of mutual concern".

13. Although not fundamentally changing it, the Paris Agreements amending the treaty described the relationship between WEU and NATO. Article IV of the treaty stipulated that the signatory countries and any organs established by them "shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation" and recognised "the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO". The statute of the Agency for the Control of Armaments specified, for instance, the nature of the information on the level of forces of member countries that NATO was to submit to it each year. Conversely, the exercise of the WEU Council's strictly military responsibilities was transferred to NATO from the outset.

14. The same concern to avoid duplication of work led the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, obviously with the approval of the WEU Council, to transfer in 1960 the exercise of WEU's social and cultural responsibilities under Articles II and III of the modified Brussels Treaty to the Council of Europe with the exception of those exercised by the WEU Public Administration Committee. This measure affected the Council's activities but not its actual responsibilities, as the Council specified in its annual report on its activities in 1959.

15. The Council's activities in the economic field, defined in Articles I and VIII of the treaty, have effectively been pursued, particularly since the agreement of 11th July 1963 organised exchanges of views between the United Kingdom and the then six member countries of the European Economic Community. However, when negotiations began between the United Kingdom and the Communities on 14th September 1970 the Council decided to halt its activities, without however calling in question the agreement of 11th July 1963 and the principle of consultations.

16. Finally, the Council's activities in the political field proper diminished considerably as and when consultations developed between

the member countries of the European Communities in this field. Thus, consultative meetings between representatives of member countries prior to meetings of many international organisations, including the United Nations General Assembly, came to an end as a result of a decision of the WEU Council of 24th May 1972, without however this measure prejudicing the future of political consultations in the framework of WEU.

17. Conversely, in application of Article VIII.2 of the treaty, the Council decided on 7th May 1955 to set up a Standing Armaments Committee to promote the joint production of armaments. However, the creation and development of NATO bodies with parallel tasks, subsequently Eurogroup and finally the Independent European Programme Group prevented the Standing Armaments Committee assuming the importance which the authors of the 1955 decision undoubtedly expected.

18. The main reason why the WEU Council has found itself gradually deprived of many of the activities for which the treaty had made it responsible is certainly that all the WEU member countries were also members of NATO, the Council of Europe and then the enlarged EEC, together with other countries. It was therefore logical for the exercise of these activities to be taken over by the larger organisation, insofar as it consented to do so, at the expense of the smaller one.

19. In order to understand the present situation of WEU, three main factors must therefore be noted:

- (i) its Council now exercises only very reduced and so to speak residual activities ;
- (ii) nevertheless, it retains all the responsibilities conferred on it by the treaty and may at any time be called upon to resume this exercise ;
- (iii) the Assembly is still responsible for the overall application of the modified Brussels Treaty and although the Council has relinquished the practical aspects it must reply to recommendations by the Assembly or questions put by its members relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even if the treaty is applied in other frameworks. It has always recognised this principle and has furnished effective replies in many cases.

III. The WEU Council

20. Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty setting up the WEU Council merely

indicates that " it shall be so organised as to be able to exercise its functions continuously ". This implies on the one hand that the governments may be represented at the level and in the manner they wish and on the other hand that the Council may be composed of permanent representatives. But in any event it is the governments of member countries that are represented at whatever level the Council may meet.

21. Convenience alone led to a distinction between two types of Council meeting:

22.(i) Ministerial meetings, with the participation of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of member countries or other members of governments to replace them, are held under the chairmanship of each one in turn, generally in his capital. Until 1970, these meetings were held quarterly, then became more spaced out and are now held only once a year. Between 1963 and 1970, in addition to a day set aside for political consultations, a second day was reserved for economic consultations. Since then, meetings have lasted only one day or even half a day.

23.(ii) Meetings of the Permanent Council at the seat of the organisation in London, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General of WEU, bring together member countries' ambassadors to the Court of St. James and a senior official from the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Although the treaty draws no distinction between the two types of Council meeting, it is evident that the Permanent Council corresponds to Article VIII.3 of the treaty which specifies that:

" At the request of any of the high contracting parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability. "

24. In fact, such meetings have never been convened, but the Permanent Council meets about fifteen times a year, inter alia to carry out the Council's statutory tasks: implementation of the protocols, adoption of the annual report and of replies to recommendations adopted by the Assembly and questions put by its members, and decisions relating to the activities of the ACA or the SAC. It is very exceptional for it to tackle foreign policy and defence matters of its own accord.

25. The Council is assisted in this task by a *Working Group* of officials of member countries' embassies in London and of the Secretariat-General, which is responsible for preparing its work. Depending on circumstances, a first draft reply to Assembly recommendations

or questions may be prepared in one of the member countries or by the Secretariat-General for submission to the Working Group prior to adoption by the Council. Generally speaking, the Working Group meets at least twenty times a year.

26. Furthermore, the *Public Administration Committee* meets twice a year in each of the member countries in turn. It organises an annual meeting of officials from these countries and affords its support to study visits by officials of one member country to another. This is a residual activity since the Council transferred the exercise of its cultural and social responsibilities to the Council of Europe.

27. Except in a few cases provided for in Article VIII.4 of the modified Brussels Treaty and specified in Protocols Nos. II, III and IV (which all relate to the level of forces and armaments or their control), the Council always takes its decisions unanimously. This provision, necessary in order to protect the sovereignty of states in defence questions, has made it very difficult for it to take decisions on questions within its responsibility and also on the organisation of WEU itself.

28. The Assembly has often voiced its dissatisfaction at the slender activities of the Council and has made many suggestions for strengthening them. Certain governments have publicly considered reactivating it, as instanced by Mr. Jobert, then French Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 21st November 1973, in an address to the Assembly about political consultations, Mr. van Elslande, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 28th May 1975, when speaking about armaments co-operation and Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the French Minister of Defence, on 1st December 1981. So far, the only initiative taken by the Council has been to instruct the SAC, on 31st May 1976, to prepare a study on the European armaments industries.

IV. Agency for the Control of Armaments

29. The treaty provided for the immediate creation of an Agency for the Control of Armaments to provide the Council with data allowing it to guarantee that all the member states would follow a policy of peace whilst reinforcing their security and encouraging the progressive integration of Europe. In the exercise of its institutional tasks, the Agency is in fact responsible directly to the Council of WEU.

30. The Agency for the Control of Armaments of WEU is thus the first example of an instrument for the quantitative control of armaments, freely accepted by a group of states with equal rights, each one being free to assume specific commitments in agreement with its partners.

31. The Council, at its first meeting on 7th May 1955, created the Agency for the Control of Armaments in accordance with the provisions of Protocol No. I. This Agency now has its headquarters in Paris at 43, avenue du Président Wilson. It has a staff of 52, including 22 managerial staff, heads of service and experts in the following divisions:

- the Directorate of the Agency (Director, Deputy Director, Director's Office and Documentation Office);
- Information and Studies Division;
- Inspection and Control Division;
- Administration and Legal Affairs Division.

32. The Director of the Agency is directly responsible to the Council for control activities. He is also responsible for selecting staff who are moreover under the general administrative supervision of the Secretary-General of Western European Union.

33. The Agency for the Control of Armaments of WEU, whose Charter is covered by Protocol No. IV, has been given a twofold mission:

34. (a) Verification that the undertakings of the Federal Republic of Germany not to manufacture, on its territory, certain categories of armaments are observed. The armaments still subject to this "non-production" control now include:

- atomic, biological and chemical weapons;
- long-range missiles and guided missiles with certain exceptions;
- bomber aircraft for strategic purposes;
- parts, devices and products specially designed or essential for use in or with A, B, C and the abovementioned weapons;
- installations specially designed for producing the armaments that the Federal Republic of Germany has undertaken not to produce.

Excluded are any systems or parts thereof, apparatus, means of production, product or body used for civil purposes or for scientific, medical and industrial research in basic and applied science.

35. There is no provision for amending the undertakings relating to atomic, biological and chemical weapons but the remainder of the list has been amended on several occasions by Council decisions taken by a two-thirds majority at the request of the Federal Republic of Germany and on the

recommendation of the competent Supreme Commander of NATO¹.

36. (b) A general quantitative control of the heavier armaments defined by the treaty. They include:

- atomic, biological and chemical weapons;
- artillery equipment of more than 90 mm calibre and the corresponding ammunition;
- all guided missiles and other self-propelled missiles of a weight exceeding 15 kg;
- mines of all types except anti-tank and anti-personnel mines;
- tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles of a weight of more than 10 tons;
- submarines;
- warships over 1,500 tons displacement;
- warships powered by means other than steam, diesel or petrol engines or gas turbines;
- small craft capable of a speed of over 30 knots and equipped with offensive armament;
- combat aircraft;
- aircraft bombs of more than 1,000 kg;
- certain major components of these weapons.

37. This applies to all member countries on the mainland of Europe.

38. The mission of controlling levels of stocks covers the armaments of the forces of all the member countries on the mainland of Europe whether these forces are placed under NATO command or retained under national command. It also covers reserve stocks whether or not they are intended for one or other of these categories of forces. It extends to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective. It takes into consideration any external aid received. Finally, the Agency is kept informed of any exports of material subject to control in the context of its task of controlling production.

39. The Agency reports to the Council through a yearly report. It must also report

1. For instance, the Council resolution of 21st July 1980 cancelled paragraph V of Annex III to Protocol No. III relating to warships, with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes.

immediately should there be any manufacture of armaments contrary to the undertaking of the government concerned or should there be any stocks of armaments in excess of quantities fixed in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. It must also inform the Council of any problems of legal interpretation of texts which it considers itself unqualified to resolve.

40. As from 1957 the full process of control was applied in depots and in units of forces under national command. Control of production also began in 1957, but it will continue to be on a provisional basis until the convention making provision for due process of law to protect private interests comes into force in accordance with Protocol No. IV.

41. Such a convention was signed on 14th December 1957. It lays down the legal measures or regulations to be taken by the member states to enable the Agency to execute its control measures, to protect private interests against any damages suffered in the course of an inspection and thus to allow recourse to an appropriate international court. However, this legal instrument has not so far come into force, since it has not yet been ratified by France. The Agency must therefore obtain the prior consent of the firms through the national authority concerned. Under this provisional procedure, control measures at industrial establishments are known as "agreed quantitative control measures" or "agreed non-production control measures".

42. An agreement signed on 14th December 1957 lays down the conditions under which the Council determines each year the maximum levels of the strength and armaments of forces maintained under national command by the member states on the mainland of Europe.

43. So far, the control of atomic and bacteriological weapons has not come into force.

44. All the basic criteria for the verification of undertakings not to manufacture certain categories of armaments are to be found in the treaty or in the decisions of the Council.

45. For the control of stock levels, maximum levels of armaments can be determined only in relation to the maximum levels of forces and strengths that the states may hold on the mainland of Europe.

46. But the assessment of maximum levels of forces and strengths and the resulting determination of appropriate armament levels are worked out differently depending on whether the forces are:

- under NATO authority;
- or maintained under national command.

47. NATO, in its annual review, must lay down force goals to be met or maintained in the light of its current or longer-term plans and it is on the basis of these goals that the Agency determines the necessary levels of armaments for the period under consideration, after which its mission is to ensure that these levels are not exceeded.

48. For forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe, the maximum strength and armaments have to be determined each year on the basis of the provisions of Protocols Nos. II and IV set out in the agreement of 14th December 1957.

49. In the case of non-production control, i.e. verifying that the undertakings by the Federal Republic of Germany not to manufacture certain armaments are observed, the Agency carries out inspections in the establishments that could effect the corresponding production. These inspections are prepared by studies conducted by its experts working from the documents at their disposal. After each inspection, with the agreement of the Agency, the Council may issue an attestation to the firm visited certifying that the commitments under Protocol No. III are being respected.

50. For the control of stock levels, a distinction must be drawn between:

51.(i) The study of statistical and budgetary documents provided on request by the member states and NATO, known as "documentary control".

52. At the end of each year, the Agency sends a questionnaire to all the member states asking, for each type of armament subject to control and held on the mainland of Europe:

- total quantities of armaments required to attain the goals corresponding to the appropriate force levels;
- the total quantities of armaments held on 1st January of the year in question together with their distribution in the units and depots, making a distinction between forces under NATO authority and those under national command;
- new resources expected in the course of the year considered;
- quantities expected to be available at the end of the year taking account of consumption, attrition, obsolescence, etc.

53. Member states' replies to the annual questionnaire allow calculations to be made so as to be able to compare levels forecast for the end of the control year with appropriate levels. They pinpoint part-stocks in depots

and units. The information they contain on industrial armaments production is supplemented by the list of producer factories with details of the quantities produced by each one.

54. These replies thus serve as a basis for:

- operations for evaluating the levels;
- and field control measures.

55. As regards documentary control, the Agency, through its co-operation with NATO, obtains information which must be in harmony with the information received from member countries. On the basis of this information which is processed by the Agency and then discussed with the competent NATO military authorities the quantities of armaments required for the forces under NATO authority can be determined.

56. The studies of the production programmes and budgetary documents of the different member countries conducted by the Agency are also part of documentary control. A thorough study of these documents provides a cross-check of the information submitted in the replies to the annual questionnaire.

57. All other possible sources of information are processed as necessary. The Agency has a Documentation Office which assembles all information having a bearing on its field of action and which sorts, classifies and files any such items after submitting them to the experts concerned.

58.(ii) The execution of control measures at the units and depots (field control measures) which relate to holdings, whether operational or reserve, or to production (factories).

59. It is impossible of course to verify all the data obtained from documentary control by field visits. The Agency decides each year the proportion of the information to be checked on the spot and consequently selects the establishments to be visited in a form which may range from a simple test check to a full inspection.

60. Whereas documentary control by the Agency extends to the armaments of types subject to control held by all categories of forces of the member states on the mainland of Europe, where forces and depots under NATO authority are concerned test checks, visits and inspections are undertaken by the appropriate authorities of NATO, the Agency receiving notification of the information they communicate to the Council.

61. The Agency inspection groups are generally composed of three experts commissioned by the Director of the Agency. These commissions give the inspectors free access to the depots and plants designated. They act with the co-operation of the national authorities, if

the latter so wish, and their powers and obligations are fixed by a regulation approved by the Council. They can question the responsible authorities and managements, inspect such documents and accounts as may be relevant to the control and take, as required, extracts therefrom. They can invoke the assistance of the national authorities if this proves necessary for the accomplishment of their mission. They are bound by security regulations identical to those in force at NATO and hold certificates to this effect.

62. Production for the current year in a plant is verified by checking information obtained from observation of production in hand against forecasts established at the beginning of the year which may be subject to various and sometimes major unexpected changes. The inspection group obtains general information concerning the production establishment, notes the characteristics of the production facilities at the assembly stage of the armaments to be controlled, examines the relevant production plans, etc. Next, it checks that the figures of the annual report conform with planned production for the current year.

63. In its appreciation, the inspection group must take into account the rate of production at the time of the inspection and that expected in the near future. The volume of current orders, the information obtained from the material accounts, a knowledge of stocks of complete items and certain assemblies or major components, are all useful indications on which to form a judgment and to check it against observations made at the production line or in the workshops where the assembly phase of the armament to be controlled takes place. The average number of field control measures carried out each year is seventy.

64. However, it should be noted that since the production of C weapons has not entered the effective production stage, the Council has been unable to fix the level of stocks which member countries are authorised to hold. Where A and B weapons are concerned, it is well known that the Agency has not yet carried out any controls. Secondly, the fact that the convention for due process of law of 14th December 1957 has still not come into force considerably hampers the Agency's field controls.

65. In spite of these handicaps, following the second world war the Agency made a major contribution to establishing an element which was essential to the restoration of confidence between Western European countries without which the participation of all in the Atlantic Alliance on an equal footing would have been inconceivable. There is now some question of whether the lists drawn up more than

twenty-five years ago are still fully significant and whether the restoration of confidence is not now a fact. Hence the question has often been put in recent years of whether it would not be possible to transfer the experience acquired by the Agency to measures for controlling armaments beyond the framework of seven-power Europe.

V. *Standing Armaments Committee*

66. The Standing Armaments Committee was set up by a decision of the WEU Council of 7th May 1955 in application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. Unlike the Agency, it is composed of representatives of the WEU member countries who may be either their permanent delegates or other senior officials under the chairmanship of the representative of each country in turn. Its aim is to find "joint solutions which would assist governments of member countries in meeting their [military] equipment requirements" by "agreements or arrangements on such subjects as the development, standardisation, production and procurement of armaments" concluded between all or some WEU countries and remain open to participation by other NATO member countries. To this end, the SAC is free to set up any sub-committees and working groups that may be required and observers from NATO may be associated with them.

67. The Committee has an international secretariat whose head is an Assistant Secretary-General of WEU and which has a small staff. Twice a year, the head of the international secretariat reports to the WEU Council on the activities of the SAC. The budget of the international secretariat is part of the WEU budget. This secretariat also co-operates with FINABEL, a body for co-operation between military headquarters of member countries in the field of armaments.

68. It is difficult to draw up an objective balance sheet of the SAC's activities. On the one hand, it must be noted that no actual WEU equipment has ever been produced, but it must also be borne in mind that the very frequent meetings between the armaments directors of member countries or their representatives in the framework of NATO, the SAC and the IEPG have established very fruitful links which have led to many bi-, tri- or multilateral productions which originated in meetings in the framework of the SAC, its sub-committees or working groups. Apart from all its own specific tasks, what has been the exact rôle played by the SAC in many agreements for the co-production of military equipment concluded between the WEU member countries in the last quarter of a century? In order to answer this question, an

in-depth study would be required, based on unpublished sources.

69. However this may be, the question arises of possible duplication of work between the SAC and other bodies, particularly the IEPG, and the governments, like the Assembly, have tried to find specific tasks for the SAC, particularly since Mr. Jobert and Mr. van Elslande in 1973 and 1975 drew attention to this need.

70. Thus, at its ministerial meeting on 31st May 1976 the Council gave the SAC the task of preparing an outline study of member countries' armaments industries. After considering this outline, the Council instructed the SAC on 20th April 1977 to conduct a wide-ranging study of the situation of the armaments sector of industry in member countries according to the principles and methods it laid down. A report was submitted to the Council chapter by chapter between 1978 and 1982. In May 1982, the Council transmitted a declassified version to the Assembly.

71. Further, in Recommendation 331 adopted on 19th June 1979, the Assembly asked the Council to "consider the possibility of incorporating appropriate studies proposed from time to time by the Assembly among the new tasks which the Council is considering entrusting to the Standing Armaments Committee". The Council's reply was not negative since it said it was prepared to do so. But "they will make their decisions on a case by case basis, according to the nature of the proposals made and in the light of the SAC's other tasks and of the resources at its disposal, whilst avoiding any duplication of work done by other organisations".

72. It should be noted that Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the French Minister of Defence, suggested in his address to the Assembly on 1st December 1981 that there should be far more extensive co-operation between the SAC and the Assembly:

"Without touching the texts, the SAC can be placed at the disposal of the Assembly subject to the consent of the Council of WEU. And rather than need to obtain the Council's consent each time, could not the SAC be authorised, at each session of the Assembly, to give help with the various studies decided upon? This is just one suggestion, but other solutions are possible, of course. If the political will exists, I do not think anyway that institutional obstacles could hinder an expansion of the SAC's rôle.

With, as it were, an information and research department available to it, the Assembly would be in a position to initiate more ambitious studies. It could

rely on an independent, specifically European agency whose work could not be suspected of being biased, which is the most important thing. I would remind you that the SAC is currently composed of 28 civil servants of different categories. This staff is large enough to carry out such tasks on behalf on the Assembly."

The words used by the Secretary of State show that he was thinking of the permanent secretariat and not the SAC itself when making this proposal which has so far not been adopted by the WEU Council.

73. In any event, it will be interesting to follow further work on the study on the situation of the armaments sector of member countries' industry and to discover what type of assistance the SAC or its permanent secretariat will be authorised to give the Assembly.

VI. *The Assembly*

74. The institution of the WEU Assembly in 1954 under the modified Brussels Treaty was a new expression of the overall trend which had earlier led to the formation of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and the ECSC Assembly. However, since the matters for which WEU is responsible relate essentially to fields in which member states retain full sovereignty, the idea of electing it by direct universal suffrage has not been envisaged, the signatory countries preferring it to be formed of members of their parliaments.

75. It was linked with the wishes of the advocates of the European idea to have the same type of democratic representative institutions as in the national framework. In accordance with the principles of parliamentary democracy, the European organisations with political responsibilities should have a representative parliamentary body to balance the governmental representatives.

76. Consequently, the authors of the treaty, after defining the Council's competence in Article VIII, made it binding on the Council, in Article IX, to submit an annual report on its activities to "an assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe", i.e. consisting of parliamentarians members of the latter assembly.

77. The WEU Assembly which was thus created meets twice a year in plenary session in the chamber of the French Economic and Social Council, Place d'Iéna, Paris. It may, however, meet elsewhere, and has held sessions in London, Rome, Brussels and Bonn. The Assembly's permanent seat is at 43 avenue du

Président Wilson, Paris (16^e), in premises adjoining the chamber of the Economic and Social Council.

A. Membership, powers and statutes of the Assembly

(i) Membership

78. The WEU Assembly is composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, i.e. Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

79. Further to Article 26 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, these countries are entitled to the number of representatives given below:

Belgium	7
France	18
Federal Republic of Germany	18
Italy	18
Luxembourg	3
Netherlands	7
United Kingdom	18

80. The Assembly of WEU is consequently composed of 89 representatives. A like number of substitutes is also appointed, all of whom, in practice, are members of their national parliaments, drawn from government and opposition parties, broadly in proportion to their strength in parliament.

81. Substitutes of the representatives may sit, speak and vote in the place of representatives prevented from attending a sitting of the Assembly.

(ii) Powers

82. Unlike the WEU Council, which has handed the exercise of a number of its responsibilities to other organisations, the Assembly defined its powers by stating in Article I of its Charter that it may proceed on any matter arising out of the modified Brussels Treaty. In the political field, the Assembly started a dialogue with the Council on European political co-operation and parallel with this has always resolutely transmitted recommendations to the Council on means of ensuring European security, feeling its action in this field to be particularly important since it is the only official international parliamentary assembly with competence in defence matters. The WEU Council has always replied to its recommendations, which are transmitted to the North Atlantic Council whenever appropriate.

83. Finally, the Assembly has extended its discussions to the field of civil and military technological and scientific co-operation and it

should be noted that the Council has often produced very substantial replies to recommendations on these matters. Conversely, the Assembly has not dealt with specifically social and cultural questions and purely economic questions now occupy only a minor place among its activities.

(iii) Statutes

84. The Assembly's activities are not just an echo of those of the WEU Council, and this is normal since they reflect the Assembly's political independence which proved possible from the very outset with the backing of the Council as voiced by the then Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Spaak, in his speech to the Assembly at its first meeting on 5th July 1955:

“We [the Council of WEU] have been determined to leave you the greatest possible freedom, relying upon your experience and your wisdom... We consider that the organisation and working methods of the Assembly... are matters for its own decision... The Assembly of Western European Union is to be independent of all other assemblies, and will have its own Clerk.”

85. Taking advantage of this freedom, the Assembly appointed a Committee on Organisation which drew up a Charter whose terms, adopted unanimously, provided it with the means of asserting its independence.

86. The Assembly's independence is first expressed at political level in Article I, paragraph (a), which lays down that:

“The Assembly carries out the parliamentary function arising from the application of the Brussels Treaty. In particular, the Assembly may proceed on any matter arising out of the Brussels Treaty and upon any matter submitted to the Assembly for an opinion by the Council.”

87. The Assembly thus confirmed its right to draw up its agenda and applied Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty broadly insofar as its deliberative powers embrace not only the annual report of the Council but also “any matter arising out of the Brussels Treaty”.

88. It should also be recalled that during the period when France left its seat on the Council vacant (from 14th February 1969 to 15th June 1970) the French Delegation continued to sit in the Assembly.

89. In pursuit of its duties, the Assembly appointed its steering bodies, the Bureau and Presidential Committee, and its working bodies, the committees, whose discussions are confiden-

tial and whose reports are published after being adopted on a vote by roll-call.

(a) *Steering bodies*

90. *The Bureau* consists of the President and six Vice-Presidents elected by the Assembly from among its members, one from each of the seven member countries.

91. *The Presidential Committee* is composed of the President of the Assembly, former Presidents members of the Assembly, the six Vice-Presidents and the Chairmen of Committees. It is customary for the President to invite the Chairmen of the three political groups to attend meetings of the Presidential Committee.

92. It meets as often as necessary and, subject to subsequent ratification by the Assembly, acts on behalf of the Assembly in between sessions or part-sessions. It decides the dates, draft agenda and draft order of business of plenary sessions and draws up the draft budget of the Assembly in collaboration with the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

(b) *Committees*

93. The Assembly appoints five permanent committees at the beginning of each ordinary session. It may set up special committees or, with the approval of the Council, committees of investigation in order to obtain full particulars regarding a specific aspect of the annual report. The committees prepare reports on matters referred to them by the Assembly, appointing a rapporteur for each subject. Their meetings are not public but they may invite guest speakers to address them – usually ministers or senior officials. The committees meet most frequently at the seat of the Assembly in Paris, but also in other places whenever appropriate.

Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (27 members)

94. The committee holds some eight or ten meetings a year, about six of which are held in the period between sessions of the Assembly. In addition to the normal activities of other committees, the Defence Committee visits NATO and national headquarters and military installations in the NATO countries and may invite senior officers to address it. It holds joint meetings with the Council. Also, it generally invites the chairmen of the parliamentary defence committees of the seven member countries to meet with it once each year, and it meets occasionally with the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly.

95. The committee examines the parts of the annual report of the Council which deal with the control of armaments, defence and disarmament.

It frequently studies the state of European security, the organisation of western defence, the joint production of armaments, disarmament and the limitation and control of armaments. Finally, it has organised two symposia on a European armaments policy, one in 1973 and the other in 1979 in conjunction with the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

General Affairs Committee (27 members)

96. The General Affairs Committee holds some eight or ten meetings a year, about six of which being held in the period between sessions of the Assembly. It also holds joint meetings with the Council.

97. Ministers and other high-ranking officials may be invited to address committee meetings.

98. The Chairman of the committee meets the Chairman-in-Office of the Council after each meeting of the Council at ministerial level.

99. At each session, the committee reports to the Assembly on questions concerning the political and economic organisation of Western Europe and the main international political problems. Each year, it prepares a reply to the sections of the annual report of the WEU Council dealing with political matters.

Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions¹ (21 members)

100. The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions holds some eight or ten meetings a year, about six of which being held in the period between sessions of the Assembly, and visits scientific and aerospace installations.

101. Ministers, other high-ranking officials or experts may be invited to address committee meetings.

102. It prepares a reply to the chapters of the annual report dealing with scientific and technological co-operation.

103. Since it was set up, the committee has reported to the Assembly on the political, military and legal aspects of scientific research, space technology, aeronautics, computers and oceanography.

104. In the space field, the committee's aim is the establishment of a European NASA; in the aeronautical field, it is endeavouring to promote close co-operation between European

1. A Committee on Space Questions was set up on 31st May 1965 and on 13th June 1967 became a permanent committee with the title "Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions".

industries; finally, with regard to the other sectors of advanced technology, it advocates a European approach to problems. To this end, it organised colloquies on a civil and military aeronautical policy for Europe in 1973, on a European aeronautical policy in 1976 and on international aeronautical consortia in 1982.

Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (21 members)

105. The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration meets three or four times each year. In collaboration with the Presidential Committee, it draws up the draft budget of the Assembly, gives its opinion on the budget of the Secretariat-General and considers all administrative questions affecting the organisation.

106. The budget of the Assembly is transmitted to the Council in accordance with an informal procedure which allows views to be reconciled before the vote on the budget. It is thus possible to avoid open encounters with the Council which could be settled only by means of a joint meeting.

107. It should be noted that on 13th October 1956 the Assembly adopted its financial regulations setting out the rules for its financial administration.

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges (21 members)

108. The Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges meets each time a question concerning the revision or interpretation of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly is submitted to it by the Assembly. Any request addressed to the President by the competent authority of a member state for the waiver of the immunity of a representative or substitute is referred to it.

Committee for Relations with Parliaments (14 members)

109. The Assembly has also set up a Committee for Relations with Parliaments composed of 14 members (2 for each member country). The secretaries of the national delegations to the Assembly are invited to attend its meetings. The committee, which usually meets four times a year, selects certain texts adopted by the Assembly for discussion in national parliaments and reports to the Assembly on the action taken on these texts. It periodically visits the parliaments of the seven member countries and is addressed by ministers responsible for relations with parliament and senior parliamentary officials.

(c) Political groups

110. Representatives and substitutes may join political groups. There are now four groups: the Communist Group, the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats, the Liberal Group and the Socialist Group¹.

(d) Office of the Clerk

111. The Secretary-General (Clerk) is appointed by the Assembly on the proposal of the Bureau. "He shall provide the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require."

112. The Clerk appoints the staff of the Office of the Clerk in consultation with the Bureau.

(e) Languages of the Assembly

113. Documents of the Assembly and its committees are published in English and French. Speeches in the Assembly or in committee may be made in the official languages of the member states. The secretariat arranges for simultaneous interpretation of speeches in the Assembly in the official languages of all the member states and at committee meetings in French and English.

B. The Assembly's methods of work

114. In providing a firm basis for its independence, the Assembly has enhanced the interest of its dialogue with the Council. Having started with the report provided for in Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, this dialogue has been developed further through the establishment of public, and subsequently confidential, procedure.

(i) Public procedure

115. Prior to the spring session, the Council of WEU communicates an annual report to the Assembly on its activities during the preceding year. The Assembly refers this report to the appropriate committees for study and they submit their views to the Assembly in a report.

116. At the plenary session, the annual report is presented orally by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, who generally then makes a statement on his government's policy. He then answers oral questions put by the parliamentarians, sometimes as Chairman-in-Office and sometimes as Minister for Foreign Affairs of his country.

1. On 1st December 1981, the Communist Group had 12 members, the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats 62 members, the Liberal Group 21 members, the Socialist Group 67 members, and 16 members of the Assembly belonged to no group.

117. After debating the reports submitted by the committees in reply to the annual report of the Council, the Assembly votes on the draft recommendations. It may adopt a motion to disagree to the annual report by an absolute majority of representatives to the Assembly.

118. The Assembly also considers in plenary session reports from its committees on questions referred to them. It gives its opinion by voting on the substantive texts of these reports which are generally in the form of a recommendation to the Council to which the Council replies in writing. The Assembly may also send resolutions to international organisations, governments or the national parliaments.

119. Its consultative status largely explains the methods of work adopted by the WEU Assembly. The Assembly has in fact no real means of sanctioning the Council. It has neither a permanent majority nor a permanent opposition and has no legislative powers. The Assembly is therefore aware that the impact of its recommendations is even greater if they are the object of wider agreement. It therefore endeavours to adopt its texts unanimously or by a large majority.

120. Such a consensus has been possible on certain subjects. In this respect, mention should be made of the positions adopted by the Assembly in favour of enlarging the Communities and strengthening European co-operation in the fields of foreign policy, defence and advanced technology.

121. However, the Assembly has not always managed to reach as wide agreement as it would have wished. Thus, one of the matters which has been the subject of the greatest controversy is that of Europe's identity in the defence field.

122. With a view to adding substance to its debates, the Assembly invites ministers and other senior governmental or international officials or service officers to address it in plenary session. Sittings are normally public, but the Assembly may exceptionally decide to hold a closed sitting.

123. Representatives may normally put oral questions to ministers or other speakers who address the Assembly. They may put written questions to the Council at any time and a written reply will be received.

124. Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty has thus allowed considerable development. However, the fact that the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly is held in public imposes certain limitations.

125. First, the annual report does not allow the Council to give the Assembly a full picture

of its activities because the report is a public document and the Council's deliberations are confidential.

126. Again, the Council's replies to recommendations are sometimes not very explicit owing to the difficulty of reaching a joint position in the Council. In a few instances, though rarely, the Council has even had to recall the statutory obligation to take decisions unanimously and state that it has been unable to reach agreement.

127. In addition, the handling of defence matters by the organs of the Atlantic Alliance, the transfer of the exercise of WEU's competence in the cultural and social fields to the Council of Europe, the development of the European Communities and the establishment of political co-operation all combine to impose considerable limitations on the questions on which the Council can report to the Assembly that it has taken action.

128. However, it must not be thought that these obstacles and restrictions make the dialogue with the Council devoid of interest or bearing. Through its recommendations, the Assembly induces the Council to seek and define points on which the seven member countries can agree, and a comparison of the Council's replies to Assembly recommendations on the same subject over the years shows how much progress the European states have been able to make towards the definition of a common policy. Furthermore, the Council has agreed to inform the Assembly to the best of its ability about any matters relating to its responsibilities, even if they are exercised by other institutions.

(ii) Confidential procedure

129. In view of the shortcomings of public procedures for exchanging views, provision has been made for confidential exchanges, in order to overcome the obstacles constituted by the need for the Council's discussions to be secret, the transfer of the exercise of much of its competence and the unanimity rule. It has thus been possible to meet the Assembly's requests – while respecting the rules governing the competence and methods of work of the Council. For instance, information which the full Assembly was unable to obtain has been given to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the General Affairs Committee at joint meetings held in camera under the chairmanship of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council accompanied by members of the Council and – in the case of joint meetings between the Council and the Defence Committee – with the participation of senior NATO officials and officers.

130. In order to prepare the joint meetings, written questions are communicated to the Council beforehand. It should be pointed out that matters relating to NATO are generally transmitted to that organisation by the WEU Council. In this way, members of the Defence Committee may often obtain information about the activities of the North Atlantic Council through the intermediary of the WEU Council. It should however be noted that for several years the Council has not agreed to hold joint meetings but has preferred "informal meetings" for which the questions and answers do not have to be prepared or transmitted beforehand. Meetings of this kind are also held between the Council and the Presidential Committee as a result of the motion to disapprove the annual report of the Council which the Assembly adopted in June 1967. This motion expressed the Assembly's discontent with what it considered to be the quite inadequate information which the Council had provided about its work. As a result, the Council sought new procedures for exchanging views with the Assembly and proposed an annual meeting between the Council at ministerial level and the Presidential Committee of the Assembly. These meetings are informal, have no agenda and thus allow freer discussion. On the whole, after the difficult period in 1967, relations between the Council and the Assembly have improved considerably.

131. At the close of ministerial meetings, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council may also provide the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee with confidential information on the Council's activities. Insofar as this infor-

mation may be communicated to members of the General Affairs Committee, the parliamentarians who have to follow these specific questions may thus be kept informed.

132. Finally, the committees obtain information on the policy of a given country in the fields of foreign policy, defence or technology direct from ministers who are invited to address the committees in camera and to answer questions afterwards.

133. It is obvious that relations between a Council and an Assembly cannot be the same in an international organisation as in a state. It was therefore felt necessary to provide a means of bringing the views of parliamentarians to the attention of the national parliaments as well as the Council. To this end, members of the WEU Assembly do their utmost in their own national parliaments to put questions or organise debates on matters which have been discussed in the WEU Assembly.

134. The WEU Assembly therefore helps to shape a European spirit not only among its members but also in the parliaments of the seven countries which signed the Paris Agreements. In many of its recommendations it shows the need to find a European solution to certain problems and encourages parliamentarians to approach their governments to ensure that such a solution is found.

135. Thus, it endeavours to promote the political will of governments, parliaments and public opinion which is essential for the building of Europe.

*Conditions for improving relations
between the WEU Assembly and public opinion*

INFORMATION REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Relations with Parliaments
by Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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Information Report

(submitted by Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman and Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments plays a very particular kind of rôle, which is defined in a special rule of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, Rule 42 *bis*. This rule lays down that paragraphs 6 and 7 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure on candidatures for membership of committees and the composition of their bureaux shall apply to the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, thus implying that the other rules on committees do not apply, particularly Rule 42 on reports of committees, Rule 41 on procedure in committees and Rule 40 on the powers of committees.

2. On the other hand, paragraph 5 of Rule 42 *bis* allows it to invite to its meetings the administrative secretaries of national delegations, i.e. non-parliamentarians, and furthermore its composition (two members per member country) takes no account of the weighting which exists in the composition of other committees, thus implying that it cannot adopt recommendations for presentation to the Assembly.

3. Conversely, it has three duties under Rule 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure:

- (i) to select, from the texts adopted by the Assembly, those which, in its opinion, should be debated in the parliaments;
- (ii) to make all necessary arrangements with a view to calling the parliaments' attention to the work of the Assembly and inviting them to follow up this work;
- (iii) to submit to the Assembly, twice each year, a report on its activities.

4. These remarks throw light on the content of the present report. It is normal and desirable for the Committee for Relations with Parliaments to examine and report to the Assembly on how it hopes the Assembly's work might be brought more closely to the attention of parliaments. It should be added that several times and in various ways it has been brought out at recent sessions that the Assembly, and particularly the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, considered the press's interest in the Assembly's work to be an essential factor in its effectiveness both as regards public opinion in general and also the parliaments of member countries.

5. That is reason enough to try to reanalyse the working methods of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. After many years of activities by the Committee one has to realise that the public awareness of the existence of Western European Union is still zero. Moreover, it is a fact that even in national parliaments many parliamentarians, if not the majority, do not know WEU and/or the Assembly. The very interesting account by Mrs. Knight in her June 1981 report about the impact of our work in the Federal Republic illustrated this point. Even if we know that improving our working methods will not drastically change the impact of the activities of WEU and the Assembly we have to do all we can to make the activities of the Assembly as effective as possible. In the opinion of the Rapporteur the committee has to be or become a kind of parliamentary pressure group bringing its influence to bear on national parliaments and public opinion by its own particular means, in order to make the Assembly's action better known and better understood and to secure more effective support for it.

6. Your Rapporteur has therefore been asked by the committee to submit proposals designed to increase the interest shown by the press, public opinion and parliaments of member countries in the WEU Assembly. These are not recommendations intended for adoption but opinions expressed by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, if the latter endorses the views of the Rapporteur.

7. The report will deal successively with (1) the activities of the Assembly, especially the content and number of reports, (2) relations with members of the Council of Ministers, (3) relations with national parliaments, (4) relations with the press and (5) finally the position and responsibilities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

II. Activities and rôle of the Assembly

8. Like the WEU Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has a Committee for Relations with Parliaments. Inherently, the latter has more widespread activities than the corresponding WEU committee since it concerns the parliaments of twenty-one countries instead of seven, the Council of Europe holds four sessions a year instead of two, it handles a very wide range of subjects and finally has far more parliamentarians and a

much larger secretariat. It is not therefore surprising that it should have acquired far more experience than the WEU committee, and your Rapporteur feels it would be desirable for the Committee for Relations with Parliaments of the WEU Assembly to establish and maintain frequent contacts with its counterpart in the Council of Europe and take advantage of the latter's experience.

9. Insofar as he is familiar with this experience, your Rapporteur has drawn a few conclusions relating to the organisation of sessions, sittings and debates in international parliamentary assemblies from which he feels the WEU Assembly might benefit.

10. First, the Assembly has to realise that it will be much easier to attract the interest of members of national parliaments and of journalists if the Assembly debates topical subjects in the field of European defence. The Assembly of Western European Union is the only parliamentary assembly which is entitled to discuss matters of European "foreign" policy and European defence. Therefore two conclusions can be drawn. For the sake of the credibility of the Assembly the committees, when preparing reports, have to restrict themselves to matters strictly connected with the aims and content of the Brussels Treaty. The second conclusion is that if a report and/or the debate on that report does not reveal anything new and/or any politically relevant fact we cannot expect the press and our colleagues at home to be interested. At the same time it is not good for the credibility of the Assembly if we do not discuss topical subjects. Seen from that point of view the Assembly must discuss the twofold decision by the North Atlantic Council, the peace movement in the European countries, the relations between WEU and the United States, and so on.

11. Second, the number of documents sent to parliamentarians and press should not be too large, otherwise only very limited attention is paid to them. Distributing too many documents is thus a considerable waste of energy and resources and the results achieved are just the opposite to those expected.

12. Regarding the Assembly's debates, your Rapporteur believes they would undoubtedly gain a wider hearing and have a greater impact on the parliaments of member countries, thanks to the press in particular, if fewer questions were debated at each session and if the reports dealt with topical matters, which is not the case today.

13. Your Rapporteur realises that each committee has a natural inclination to make its half-yearly programme of work cover as many subjects as possible and, furthermore, that the

practice of adopting half-yearly programmes of work is encouraged by the fact that the Assembly holds only two sessions a year. But it means that committees choose several subjects for their work so as to cover any matters which may be topical six months later. Should some not be covered, they have to add further questions to their programmes of work in the course of the year without, however, interrupting work already under way.

14. Your Rapporteur therefore suggests that the number of reports submitted by each committee be limited and that one subject be left open until shortly before each session in order to cover any topical question that arises. Another solution might be for each committee to appoint a Rapporteur who would be given a certain possible freedom in the way he handles his subject so that his report might be adapted to the requirements of the day.

III. Relations between the Assembly and members of the Council of Ministers

15.(i) It should not be forgotten that debates on reports are the Assembly's main activity and it is to them that the attention of public opinion, press and national parliaments should be drawn. This does not detract from the fact that addresses by ministers during debates are most certainly useful and likely to increase the interest of debates. However, it happens only too often that debates are interrupted by addresses by ministers followed – and this is worthwhile – by questions and answers. Your Rapporteur suggests that ministers be invited to address the Assembly in the framework of the debate on specific reports. They should speak on the report and not only answer questions but take part in the debate on the report as a whole, or at least a substantial part of it. There would thus be a true exchange of views with a minister or, in any event, with the Chairman-in-Office of the Council on a topical subject of interest to the press and public opinion. The minister might open the debate after the Rapporteur has presented the report, and wind it up, as is customary in the parliaments of member countries. Your Rapporteur cannot over-emphasise the value of this suggestion.

16. Finally, a member of the committee stressed the value for members of the Assembly and the press of taking votes immediately after debates and not grouping them since it is difficult for a journalist one day to write about a report and the relevant debate and the next day or the day after give the result of the vote. If he did so, he would be neither read nor understood by the public. It is for the Assembly to follow up this sensible remark.

17.(ii) Special attention should be paid to the meetings between representatives of the Assembly and of the Council. It is obvious that there is a relationship between the importance of a meeting (i.e. the subject of the meeting) and who is present at the meeting (i.e. ministers or ambassadors). The Rapporteur is inclined to believe that if there are hardly any subjects of importance to deal with it is preferable not to organise such a meeting between Assembly and Council representatives. On the other hand the Assembly is entitled to expect better "ministerial" representation of the Council if more important subjects are to be discussed.

IV. Relations between the Assembly and national parliaments

(i) Selection of texts

18. The primary function of the committee is to select texts from among those adopted by the Assembly for transmission to national parliaments. In your Rapporteur's opinion the committee should limit its selection to those texts which contain practical and concise proposals that governments can implement and not select any texts drafted in broad terms and dealing only with questions of general principle.

19. This means in practice that your Rapporteur in co-operation with the secretariat must submit proposals inviting the committee to select usually two texts after each Assembly part-session and describing action to be taken on these texts by members of the committee. Members and delegation secretaries hardly comment on these proposals during meetings.

20. Your Rapporteur feels that it is worth considering whether the committee should discuss selections more intensively, determine priorities among texts suggested for selection and agree on "campaign tactics" with regard to their follow-up at national level.

21. Discussing such tactics is important, since a parliamentary question is not always the best way of dealing with a subject. More use might be made of direct approaches to governments. Moreover, in different countries different methods have to be applied. There is room for differentiation in proposals for action on Assembly texts.

Proposed action:

22. Members of the committee could be invited:

- (a) to participate more actively in the discussion of proposals concerning texts with a view to agreeing on more differentiated action at national level;

- (b) to invite to its meetings rapporteurs from other committees to enable them to give advice about the best approach to "selling" the adopted texts to national parliaments and to the press;

- (c) to discuss whether

- the number of texts to be selected after each part-session should be further limited;
- the material provided by the secretariat is appropriate;
- further model questions should be prepared by the secretariat.

(ii) Relations with national delegations

23. The statistical table appended to each of the committee's half-yearly reports is the true application of Rule 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure since it gives detailed information on action taken in the parliaments of member countries on the work of the Assembly. The table in the present report shows that the number of questions put in national parliaments by members of the Assembly, and often by members of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, rose considerably in 1981, thus showing that delegations, thanks to their secretariats, paid greater attention than in the past to following up the activities of the WEU Assembly, each one acting in accordance with procedure and methods specific to the parliamentary traditions of the country concerned. This is gratifying, and the committee is thus able to show that it has very satisfactorily accomplished its task.

24. However, the number of documents relating to the work of the WEU Assembly distributed in parliaments of member countries is not enough to provide adequate information about the activities of the Assembly or, *a fortiori*, to ensure that governments follow them up. The inquiry in the Bundestag referred to by Mrs. Knight in her June 1981 report showed that much could and hence should be done to increase the impact of our work in member countries, and not only in the Federal Republic. One step might be to improve the standard of questions put to governments on the activities of WEU so as to obtain more satisfactory answers than in the past. It is for the Chairman of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments to suggest to members of the committee the text of questions relating to the recommendations selected by the committee at the close of each session. Here your Rapporteur has followed in the wake of his predecessors. However, the ways of putting certain questions varies from one country to another.

For instance, a question on the production of certain sophisticated weapons cannot be put in the same way in Luxembourg, which produces few weapons of this type, as in a country with a far more highly-developed industrial range in this field.

25. It is therefore for members of the committee to adapt the questions they put in the light of their countries' specific problems. They have moreover always understood this, but they might be asked to make a further effort not to give up the idea of putting a question to their governments on a recommendation adopted by the WEU Assembly merely because the wording proposed by the Chairman of the committee seems inappropriate to the situation in their countries.

26. Moreover, it is clear that our governments are in no hurry to reply in the national framework to questions on the activities of WEU. In earlier years, it would appear that the governments, or probably officials responsible for preparing the texts of replies, agreed amongst themselves to refuse to answer questions dealing with recommendations being studied by the WEU Council. The first effect of this practice was to discourage members of the Assembly who would have been prepared to put questions to their governments on the action they intended to take on the recommendations adopted by the Assembly. It consequently reduced the work of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments to nil, since its task is precisely to put questions to each of the member governments on the recommendations which have just been transmitted to the Council, where they are therefore being studied. The solution then found was to have the questions proposed by the then Chairman of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments so worded as to avoid specific reference to the recommendations concerned, thanks to which it was possible to obtain answers. The drawback was that it was then extremely difficult for WEU Assembly and delegation officials to pick out from among the mass of documents published by each parliament answers in which the name of WEU did not appear. Following the Assembly's complaints, this practice by national administrations now seems to have stopped, which is most gratifying.

27. Certain members of the committee, whose views your Rapporteur fully endorses, consider each delegation should prepare a report on each Assembly session for circulation to all members of parliament in the member countries at the earliest possible date. Most delegations do so, but the practice might be generalised.

(iii) Follow-up procedure

28. The usual method used by members of the Assembly in national parliaments or by other members of national parliaments is the written or oral question asking for their governments' opinion on an Assembly text. Governments' answers give the Assembly a more accurate idea of the probable fate of its text.

29. Members of some delegations prefer to approach ministers concerned directly, rather than to ask parliamentary questions.

30. Government replies to such initiatives are often only vague promises or declarations. If these replies are not duly followed up the whole exercise will be rather ineffective.

31. In the opinion of the Rapporteur a follow-up procedure should be worked out *inter alia* to consider, for instance once a year, whether a continuing action could be effective.

32. Neither of the Assembly's two annual part-sessions lasts more than four days. They are the only occasions on which all members of the Assembly are convened. Committee meetings are called several times between sessions but they are restricted to small groups of parliamentarians. This means that members of the Assembly who are at the same time members of their national parliaments, of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and often of other parliamentary, local or international bodies, have considerable difficulty in retaining a continuing view of the work of the WEU Assembly. In a way, they rediscover the Assembly and its problems at each session. They adopt recommendations but by the time they receive the Council's replies, i.e. generally five or six months later, they can no longer remember the texts of the recommendations they adopted and have only a rather vague recollection of the reasons why they voted as they did.

33. They therefore often have an intermittent view of the work of the Assembly, which may seem disjointed and difficult to follow coherently. This must be even more true in the case of members of national parliaments who are not members of the WEU Assembly or journalists having to report on its work. In order to remedy this situation, a major effort should be made to ensure that matters dealt with are followed up after recommendations are adopted. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments cannot do this alone and each Assembly committee might take responsibility for examining action taken by the Council or by the governments of member countries on the recommendations which it submitted to the Assembly.

34. Each committee might examine ways and means of doing this. An appropriate means might be the formation of a sub-committee for this purpose. This was the solution adopted by the General Affairs Committee for following problems raised by a recommendation on developments in the Middle East which was adopted in June 1981. This experience might be worthy of closer examination.

35. A member of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments suggested that a Rapporteur be appointed to compare the replies of the various governments to the questions put in national parliaments. This suggestion might be adopted, and the committee's next Rapporteur could be asked to carry out this comparison for the recommendations adopted in 1981, or at least some of them.

36. Finally, it would be desirable for the next Rapporteur of the committee to bring together all the committee's earlier decisions in order to see what action was taken on them and what results were achieved, so as to select those which were not satisfactorily applied and thus describe the way in which the committee has carried out its duties under Rule 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure and what it should do to improve the way in which it fulfils its rôle.

V. Relations with the press

(i) Information on policy

37. From this point of view, the WEU Assembly has pursued a more reasonable policy than the Council of Europe. However, a number of documents might yet be dispensed with. In the report which Mr. Berchem presented to the Assembly at the December 1981 session, he gave a table of all the documents published by the WEU Assembly. The list was impressively long and your Rapporteur wonders whether it should not be reduced, on the one hand by limiting the number of subjects tackled at each session and on the other by abolishing certain periodical publications which he does not consider essential, including some issued on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. For instance, what use do members of the Assembly make of the "Monthly Information Bulletin" or the "Monthly Index of Documents"? Your Rapporteur suggests that a questionnaire be sent to members of the Assembly to ascertain whether they really wish to receive such documents and that, if necessary, the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and possibly the Presidential Committee re-examine the usefulness of publishing them.

38. Moreover, certain documents are difficult to use because the information given reaches members of the Assembly in separate parts. Your Rapporteur is thinking of the questions put by members of the Assembly to their governments in the national parliaments and the answers received. Instead of distributing both questions and answers separately, they might be published collectively prior to each Assembly session, which is already done, but in future they might be grouped so as to make them easier to consult in accordance with a procedure which will be described below, the aim being to give a far clearer picture of the policies of the governments of member countries on matters dealt with by WEU.

(ii) Meetings with the press

39. Your Rapporteur thinks that it might be worthwhile from every point of view for the Assembly, at a forthcoming session, to organise a meeting between some of its members and journalists who follow sessions in order to obtain their opinions on how its methods of work might be adapted. The Presidential Committee or the Committee for Relations with Parliaments might be made responsible for this contact which could be a friendly meeting with broad terms of reference.

(iii) Relations with the press in the various countries

40. Finally, it is quite clear that the whole press from all member countries cannot be represented at each Assembly session. The press from some countries is not represented at all. At best, only a few newspapers are able to send journalists to Paris for our sessions. This is apparently inevitable. However, an effort might be made to alleviate this difficulty as far as possible. National delegations might organise meetings and contacts after each session of the Assembly so as to report to the parliamentary press of their own countries on what happened during the session.

41. Thanks to the improvement in his budget in 1980, the Assembly's Press Counsellor has been able to organise meetings between representatives of the press in several member countries and representatives of national delegations. These meetings have proved extremely worthwhile and our thanks and congratulations are justified. It is obviously not possible for him to do this regularly after each session, particularly since information should be given to the press immediately after the session. It is therefore for the delegations and their secretariats to take such initiatives, and too much cannot be done to encourage them in this sense.

42. Between four and ten weeks after each session, the Committee for Relations with Parliaments for its part issues a booklet giving a summary of debates and addresses by ministers together with the texts of recommendations adopted. This booklet is prepared by the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly under the responsibility of the Chairman of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and is distributed in the five official languages of member countries to all members of the seven parliaments. This is certainly an excellent practice. However, your Rapporteur considers that the summary of debates takes insufficient account of the ideas voiced by the various political groups. Only speeches by Rapporteurs and committee Chairmen are summarised and the amendments tabled are not included.

43. As Chairman of the committee and consequently responsible for the publication of this booklet, your Rapporteur is not unaware of the difficulties raised by its preparation: the bilingual summary records of sittings do not allow those drafting the text to have direct knowledge of speeches made in German, Italian and Dutch. Moreover, since they have to be impartial, it is difficult to ask officials to pick out the speeches or amendments they consider the most important. In future, however, your Rapporteur will endeavour to ensure that certain speeches and amendments, particularly those made on behalf of political groups, are summarised or, in the case of amendments, reproduced in the booklet on the session.

VI. Position and responsibilities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments

44. In the opinion of the Rapporteur it is inevitable for the tasks and responsibilities of the committee to be extended in two ways:

- (a) the committee should be renamed the Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations ;
- (b) the rules should be changed in order to enable the committee to present a draft recommendation or order to the Assembly.

VII. Conclusions

45. As the committee is not empowered to adopt a draft recommendation or order, your Rapporteur will, as a first step, merely ask the committee to approve the ideas set out in this document which he has already presented to the committee moreover at its meeting on 17th November 1981, when they obtained wide endorsement. In this document he has added to the proposals he made on that occasion the suggestions made by several members of the committee, with which he personally unreservedly agrees.

46. If the committee approves, the document as a whole might be transmitted, after the Assembly has debated it at the June 1982 session, to the Presidential Committee so that it may take the necessary steps to apply those parts which concern it. At the same time, the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, the other committees and national delegations would be asked to apply those of the suggestions contained in this document which concern them, or, should such application encounter difficulties, to report to the Committee for Relations with Parliaments so that it may consider how to overcome them. In this way, everyone could help to improve the impact of the work of the Assembly on press, public opinion and parliaments in the member countries.

APPENDIX I

Table of action in the parliaments of member countries*(Totals by country for each session)*

Recommendations adopted in	Member countries							Total
	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	
1956	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
1957	4	0	1	0	0	5	2	12
1958	2	0	3	0	0	4	3	12
1959	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
1960	3	12	2	8	0	3	1	29
1961	0	2	0	3	0	6	0	11
1962	2	4	4	6	2	3	10	31
1963	0	0	13	22	1	2	3	41
1964	4	14	9	11	1	5	2	46
1965	0	11	12	24	0	5	28	80
1966	2	12	12	49	1	4	18	98
1967	14	9	22	29	2	6	16	98
1968	6	14	20	22	1	16	47	126
1969	11	15	17	8	0	4	36	91
1970	3	15	15	7	2	3	10	55
1971	0	4	19	9	0	6	10	48
1972	0	6	2	1	0	1	0	10
1973	0	4	2	6	1	0	0	13
1974	0	1	3	13	2	0	0	19
1975	10	28	8	19	3	11	3	82
1976	16	40	13	14	2	3	8	96
1977	4	18	4	15	1	1	14	57
1978	17	49	12	21	4	10	14	127
1979	9	45	12	10	10	1	10	97
1980	0	32	16	10	12	0	8	78
1981	15	36	12	9	18	0	38	128
Total	122	373	245	316	65	99	285	1,505
Annual average ...	4.69	14.35	9.42	12.15	2.50	3.96	10.96	8.29

APPENDIX II

Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1978

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session
June 1978	312									-	33
	313	x	2	2					2	6	
	314	x	2	2		1	2	3	2	12	
	315			2		2				4	
	316									-	
	317				2	1				3	
	318	x	1	3		1			2	7	
	319									-	
	320									-	
	321					1				1	
Nov. 1978	322					1				1	72
	323	x		6		1				7	
	324					1				1	
	325		7	2	2	1				12	
	326	x	2		4	3			2	11	
	327									-	
	328	x	2		2	4	2	2	4	16	
Other action			4	7	4	4		3	2	24	
June 1979	329	x	2	2	2		2		2	10	37
	330									-	
	331		2							2	
	332									-	
	333	x	2	2					2	6	
	334									-	
335	x	2	2	4				6	14		
Resolution 63				2		3				5	
Other action											
Dec. 1979	336									-	47
	337	x			2		2		2	6	
	338	x	1	2						5	
	339	x		2						2	
	340									-	
	341	x	2	2			8			12	
	342									-	
	343									-	
344									-		
Other action			5	3	6	7		1		22	

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session
June 1980	345									-	56
	346									-	
	347					2				2	
	348			7						7	
	349	x		1	2		6	2	2	13	
	350					2				2	
	351			2	2					4	
	352	x		2	4	2				8	
	353			2		2				4	
	354					6				6	
Other action				4		2			2	8	
Dec. 1980	355										40
	356										
	357										
	358	x		6	4		2		2	14	
	359	x			4		2		4	10	
	360										
	361									2	
	362						2			2	
363						2			2		
Other action				10	2					12	
June 1981	364	x	2	2					2	6	69
	365	x	2	4					2	8	
	366	x	2	4			2		2	10	
	367	x		2			2			4	
	368	x	2	1					2	5	
	369	x	2	1					10	13	
	370	x		2			2			4	
371	x	2	2			2		4	12		
Other action				7	2					9	

*Political activities of the WEU Council –
Reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council*

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Mr. Vecchietti, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee: Sir Frederic Bennett (Chairman); MM. De Poi, Urwin (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Berrier, Bertile, Conti Persini, De Bondt (Alternate: Michel), Della Briotta, van Eekelen (Alternate: Blaauw), Gessner, Hardy (Alternate:*

Hill), Kurt Jung, Lagneau, Lagorce (Alternate: Baumel), Lord McNair, MM. Mangelschots, Mommersteeg, Günther Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann (Alternate: Böhm), Thoss (Alternate: Berchem), Valiante, Vecchietti, Wilquin.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

***on the political activities of the WEU Council –
reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Noting the satisfactory aspects of the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council;

Nevertheless deploring the prolongation of the WEU Council's inactivity throughout 1981;

Drawing attention to the importance of the proposals for reactivating WEU made in December 1981 by Mr. Lemoine, French Secretary of State to the Minister of Defence;

Stressing that these proposals should be explained and if possible further elaborated by the French Government and should elicit a response from its six partners;

Noting that the dangers to peace and security in Europe are now more serious than ever;

Recalling that WEU is still the only European organisation with effective responsibilities in defence questions and, consequently, disarmament,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Make an in-depth examination of the proposals concerning WEU made by the French Government with a view to determining the extent of agreement France's partners are able to reach on the basis of these proposals;
2. Extend its consultations to questions raised by the evolution of European public opinion in the face of threats to Europe's security;
3. Inter alia consider the means available to the governments of member countries for countering international terrorism with a view to strengthening them through greater co-operation;
4. Extend its discussions to all threats to the security of Western Europe, wherever they arise;
5. Prepare the ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council by consultations in the framework of WEU on European defence and on the development of Soviet-United States conversations on the limitation of armaments;
6. Undertake, at meetings of the Permanent Council, frequent and regular exchanges of views on topical questions relating to European defence in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance;
7. Examine how the experience acquired by the Agency for the Control of Armaments might be used to contribute to the solution of monitoring problems raised at all international conferences on disarmament;
8. Ensure that the possible extension of tasks given to the SAC does not result in that body being relieved of its present responsibilities.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Vecchiotti, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The annual report of the WEU Council for 1981 does not in itself call for any particular comment. In the main it confirms a situation and positions already affirmed by the Council in previous years in regard to its own activities and relations with the Assembly. It shows a desire to meet the Assembly's requests provided the policy of governments – or absence of policy – towards WEU is not called in question. Such a report can hardly be expected to say more, nor can the government representatives on the Permanent Council be expected to do more as long as the governments themselves have not so decided. For that reason your Rapporteur will make only a brief examination of the actual text of the report.

2. Conversely, he considers it essential to examine all the problems raised by the Council's annual report in the light of certain new factors and principally the affirmation, repeated by several of the highest authorities in France in the last months of 1981 and the first months of 1982, of France's will to give new life to WEU and to examine French proposals and the reactions of France's partners to those proposals. By doing this, he feels he would be better fulfilling his task of Rapporteur than if he merely made a literal analysis of the Council's annual report.

II. Reactivating WEU

3. When the Brussels Treaty was modified in 1954 to create Western European Union, the aim was to allow Germany and Italy to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty and to join NATO and at the same time to alleviate the disadvantages for the future of Europe of the United Kingdom's refusal to ratify the treaty setting up the EDC. At the time, there were considerable problems of many kinds. The North Atlantic Treaty and NATO provided for Western Europe's security, but the modified Brussels Treaty also met political and economic requirements.

4. Subsequently, two new factors changed this situation: the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities and the development of political consultations between the members of the Communities on the one hand, and France's withdrawal from the NATO integrated military organisation and the deve-

lopment of the French nuclear force on the other. These two series of events led to WEU losing its economic, and to a large extent political, importance and to creating the need for co-ordination between France and its partners in the defence field. While WEU seems fully resigned to the first aspect of this trend by doing practically nothing in the economic and political fields, it cannot be said that it has done much to adapt itself to the second question, i.e. to find work in the defence field. Thus Europeans have not used the instrument at their disposal to examine together the requirements of European defence, with the result that the United States has had to carry too great a military, political and economic burden for the defence of Europe.

5. Since it was France that had created the new situation in this field, it was obviously for that country to say how far it intended to co-operate with its partners. This it has done to a large extent in regard to its European partners, first by making it clearly known – and successive governments have left no doubt about this – that it would not go back on its withdrawal from NATO and would not allow its forces to be placed *a priori* under any integrated command, and second by proposing to its allies certain forms of co-operation, either on a bilateral basis, in particular for stationing its troops in the Federal Republic of Germany and for the production of armaments, or on a multilateral basis, in the framework of NATO, WEU and the IEPG, in certain fields at least.

6. This is probably how the address by Mr. Jobert, then French Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Assembly on 21st November 1973 should be interpreted. Passages from his address may be quoted as follows:

“

The road leading to European defence, as we well know, is paved with considerable difficulties.

It is all the more important that we Europeans should henceforth undertake an intensive effort of thinking and talking.

.....

If all its members were in agreement, WEU could constitute a valid theatre for the thinking and talks which I have just suggested.

.....

The French Government, in proposing that the Standing Armaments Committee should provide the privileged framework for European co-operation in armaments manufacture, has already clearly demonstrated the interest it takes in your organisation. I hope that the French proposal will make speedy and satisfactory progress.

.....”

7. The first of these two proposals does not seem to have been carried into effect, at least in the framework of WEU, since one might consider that the development of political consultations in the European Communities meets these proposals to a certain extent. “To a certain extent” only, since matters relating to Europe’s defence are not dealt with there although it appears that certain non-military aspects of “security” are and will be increasingly in future years if the proposals by Mr. Genscher and Mr. Colombo are accepted by the Ten.

8. The second proposal was taken up again in the Assembly by Mr. van Elslande, then Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 5th December 1974 in an address in which he said:

“... The industrial problem, and that of exports which is closely bound up with it, are by far the most vast and most delicate. I believe that WEU could devote itself to the study of these questions, to which insufficient attention has hitherto been paid. WEU includes the chief European producers. The first step must be a thorough study of the structures of the military sectors in the economy of each country. We must also ascertain what is their relative importance, what forms of specialisation are possible and what can be done about the pooling and financing of research activities. Finally, we must determine the best ways towards progressive integration, taking account of existing financial structures and of alliances which may constitute an advantage or a disadvantage, depending on circumstances...”

9. It is common knowledge that this study was effectively entrusted to the Standing Armaments Committee and certain chapters have been given in to the Council which, in 1981, even consented to communicate to the Assembly, as the annual report recalls, a version of the economic chapter of the study which had obviously been much watered down. However, seven years after Mr. van Elslande’s proposal, this study has not been completed. The chapters already given to the Council need to be brought up to date, as the annual report also

indicates. The Assembly has been given only parsimonious information about this. Above all, no one knows what member countries, responsible for the slow progress of the SAC’s work, will do with this study. Only the very vaguest of answers have been given to the many questions put by members of the Assembly on this subject.

10. It may therefore be said that the attempts made by certain countries in 1973-74 to guide WEU in a direction corresponding to its true vocation have had only very limited results. Some have even thought, rightly or wrongly, that they could discern behind the concern expressed by other governments to “make economies”, a desire to reduce both the already very small staff of WEU and its activities.

11. There is thus every reason to welcome the fact that the new French Government in 1981 took up the idea of reactivating WEU. In his address on 3rd December 1981, Mr. Lemoine, French Secretary of State to the Minister of Defence, underlined the continuity of these proposals with those made by Mr. Jobert eight years earlier. Although he did not say whether these earlier proposals were still the same for the present French Government, statements by reliable French authorities indicate that this is so. For instance, Mr. Lemoine quoted a statement by Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External Relations, in Brussels on 19th November 1981:

“... There can be no question of the Ten talking about defence matters, firstly because one member country – Ireland – would not agree and secondly because there is Western European Union...”

12. Moreover, after recalling that Mr. Mauroy, the French Prime Minister, had, on 19th September 1981, recalled France’s loyalty to the modified Brussels Treaty, a statement which was confirmed by Mr. Hernu, Minister of Defence, on 16th November 1981, when he said that a serious threat to the security of these states would gravely affect France’s security, Mr. Lemoine said:

“... A military balance at the lowest possible level and effective and verifiable disarmament are France’s goals. And it wishes to discuss them within the only European organisation which stems from a specific treaty still in force and which is unchallengeably of topical significance. That organisation is Western European Union. France attaches importance to its existence, to an expanding of its activities and more particularly to the labours of your Assembly”.

This took up a remark by President Mitterrand on 24th September 1981:

“ ... The arms negotiation debate must be based on the fundamental notion that only a balance of forces can preserve peace... Therefore I would like to see negotiations begun, but only on a clear basis, without either partner being able to speculate on a momentary advantage... ”

Finally, at the WEU colloquy in London in February 1982, Mr. Lemoine recalled France's will to revive WEU, while Mr. Hernu said in an interview in the *Frankfurter Rundschau* that WEU was the only organisation in which Europeans could discuss their common defence problems.

13. This wealth of quotations shows that on the French side there is a deliberate will to use WEU for its intended purpose. It should be noted that this view is shared by a number of members of the Assembly. For instance, speaking to Mr. De Poi's report just before Mr. Lemoine's address, Mr. Bernini said:

“ ... The real danger is that by seeking, in the name of European union, to institutionalise the European Council – which is a consultative body with no treaty status – and by flanking it with secretariats and committees for both defence and economic questions or again by giving WEU and the Commission of the Economic Community the rôle of consultants, and in fact mere executives, the ultimate result will be to deprive WEU and the European Community of their powers and help circumvent the existing European treaties – the Rome Treaty setting up the European Community and the modified Brussels Treaty setting up WEU; objectively this would also mean the abandonment of WEU... ”

This does not mean French statements are abundantly clear. Mr. Lemoine's address in fact raises certain questions.

14. The first ambiguity relates to the respective rôles of the Council and of the Assembly of WEU. For instance, when he proposes subjects for study by WEU – most interesting and important subjects – he is addressing the Assembly and not the Council. It is clear that the Assembly would have every interest in taking such suggestions fully into account. But should a government really turn to the Assembly when it wishes to have a matter examined by WEU? Why does it not go straight to the Council, as it is authorised to do under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty? Several of Mr. Lemoine's remarks emphasising the rôle he asks the Assembly to play make one wonder whether his proposals also concern the Council.

Here it should be recalled that WEU is a whole and the Assembly, set up under Article IX of the treaty, has no existence outside the organisation as a whole. Without a governmental counterpart its work would become academic, as Mrs. Knight emphasised when submitting the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments in June 1981.

15. The second ambiguity is linked with the first and concerns the Standing Armaments Committee. In this connection, Mr. Lemoine said on 3rd December:

“ Such studies would require the Assembly to tackle, with the utmost determination, problems which directly affect the security of all countries.

An independent source of technical information would be required for this work.

Such an instrument is available. All we need do is use it. I refer to the Standing Armaments Committee. This institution may have had some difficulty in finding its true rôle since bodies besides the SAC already existed for arms co-operation on a bilateral basis – Franco-German for example – or on a multilateral basis in the shape of the Independent European Programme Group. Precedents, although infrequent in recent years, have shown that the SAC can be placed at the disposal of the Assembly subject to the consent of the Council of WEU. And rather than need to obtain the Council's consent each time, could not the SAC be authorised, at each session of the Assembly, to give help with the various studies decided upon? This is just one suggestion, but other solutions are possible, of course. If the political will exists, I do not think anyway that institutional obstacles could hinder an expansion of the SAC's rôle.

With, as it were, an information and research department available to it, the Assembly would be in a position to initiate more ambitious studies. It could rely on an independent, specifically European agency whose work could not be suspected of being biased, which is the most important thing. I would remind you that the SAC is currently composed of 28 civil servants of different categories. This staff is large enough to carry out such tasks on behalf of the Assembly. ”

16. This statement obviously goes much further than what the Council has allowed the Assembly so far in response to the latter's request to be able to make use of the SAC's abilities. The Council's annual report recalls the reply to Recommendation 365 which, there is

every reason to believe, defines the Council's doctrine in the matter as follows:

"As pointed out to the Assembly in their reply to Recommendation 331, the Council have no objection to examining, on a case-by-case basis, the possibility of co-operation between the SAC and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. However, they could only give their agreement to such co-operation for studies relating to subjects within the competence of the SAC as defined in the decision of 7th May 1955. In this connection, the Council regret to have to state that the subject proposed in the present recommendation does not meet this criterion."

17. Admittedly, one should probably not stop short at the fact that this reply refers only to assistance to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and it is hard to see why it should not apply to other Assembly Committees if their request met the criterion defined by the Council. Actually, the problem is quite different. It lies in the fact that the WEU Council decision of 7th May 1955 setting up the SAC makes it a purely governmental body, as specified in paragraph 2 of the decision:

"The Standing Armaments Committee shall consist of representatives of the member countries of Western European Union. In order to ensure continuity member countries will maintain permanent delegates at the seat of the Committee who may also be members of their delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The governments of the member countries may be represented at meetings of the Standing Armaments Committee, as occasion demands, either by officials responsible in their national administrations for the questions to be discussed, or by their permanent delegates."

18. Mr. Lemoine's proposal therefore seems to raise three questions, one legal, the second political and the third practical:

19. First, is it conceivable for a body so specifically governmental to be annexed in this way to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly? The reply to Recommendation 365 is all the Council has granted the Assembly in this field. Mr. Lemoine's suggestion seems rather surprising in view of the fact that the SAC is an organ of the WEU Council. If the seven governments agree, it can certainly be asked to make studies for the Assembly, but only the governments can supply the information it would need and they too would decide how

much publicity could be given to such studies. Unlike the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly, this intergovernmental committee cannot be considered to be independent and consequently it cannot be asked to prepare anything other than studies under government responsibility. If, on the other hand, Mr. Lemoine was thinking only of the twenty-eight officials of the SAC secretariat, it should be recalled that the main task of that international secretariat is to assist the SAC of which it is the instrument above all else. It might certainly be given other work but this should not affect its character.

20. Second, would such a measure not imply that the governments had in fact given up the idea of having the SAC carry out its intended tasks and were making it available to the Assembly merely to ensure its survival? Would this be a sound basis for defending an institution of this type if its efficiency and fundamental aims were in doubt? Could it at one and the same time pursue its work, including its study on European armaments industries, and provide the Assembly with the documentation it requests without Council supervision?

21. Third, in practice it appears that the SAC itself has had serious difficulties in obtaining from the governments the information it needed for the study they had asked it to prepare although the study was not intended for publication. Is a better fate to be expected for work intended for the Assembly and hence for publication?

22. To sum up, Mr. Lemoine's proposal must not lead to the SAC being disqualified as a governmental body without it becoming - for that seems very difficult - an effective instrument for the Assembly's work. But the Council must be asked, while maintaining the SAC's normal work, to allow it to provide the Assembly with appropriate documentation for some of its requirements or even documentary notes to fill out its reports.

23. These remarks in no way seek to minimise the French initiative but, on the contrary, try to pinpoint their exact meaning so as to encourage the French Government to make its views clear. It is to be hoped that it will have an opportunity of doing so at the Council's ministerial meeting on 19th May. Your Rapporteur believes the Council should be encouraged to shoulder its full commitments under the modified Brussels Treaty, either by strengthening the SAC to promote European co-operation in the production of armaments or, in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, by fostering more active European participation in the problems of its defence and of the reduction and control of armaments.

24. This being said, and recognising that it was for France to take the necessary initiatives so as to show how and to what extent it intended to co-operate with its European partners after its withdrawal from the NATO integrated commands, it is to be hoped that France's partners will not hesitate to make known their views on these proposals.

25. In this connection, the Assembly's requests have been satisfied to some extent either by the Council or by certain member countries. This is the case inter alia of the reply to Recommendation 365, which states that, although the budget situation in the member countries at the present time calls for rigorous economies, the working group set up to achieve economies also has the task of promoting "greater efficiency in methods of work and use of staff in WEU's ministerial bodies, without impairing the organisation's ability to meet its obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty, the Protocols and the Council's decision of 7th May 1955".

26. Furthermore, the governments of all member countries have in one way or another declared that they considered WEU, to use the words of Mr. Blaker, United Kingdom Minister of State for the Armed Forces, at the December 1981 session to be "the only European parliamentary institution which is empowered to debate defence issues", although Mrs. Thatcher, United Kingdom Prime Minister, gave a fairly non-committal answer to an oral question put by our colleague Mr. Urwin on 16th March about WEU providing a ready-made forum for developing an independent European defence policy in that she emphasised the undisputed rôle of NATO in these matters.

27. For Italy, Mr. Lagorio, Italian Minister of Defence, said at the same session in December 1981:

"In any case, WEU is the only body where security is continuously discussed and the only real European point of contact for problems of defence and arms control. That is why Italy regards WEU as an important and indispensable European forum."

28. In short, they all said they would continue to apply the modified Brussels Treaty and that they were determined to keep alive the organisation which it engendered. As far as your Rapporteur is aware, no one has yet adopted a public stance on the French proposals other than Mr. van Elslande in his address to the Assembly in 1974. It should be recalled that France, with all its armed forces and weapons, is committed by Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty to the collective defence of Western Europe. It is therefore essential for

the intentions behind the French proposals to meet with a favourable response so that, the dialogue being continued and deepened, all these forces, which do not belong to the NATO integrated military organisation, may be an essential and positive part in the building of a European defence policy based on deterrence which is more essential than ever at the present juncture. This is probably what Chancellor Schmidt meant in his discussion with staff of *Le Monde* reported on 24th February 1982:

"The Germans were prepared for the idea of European defence and reactivating Western European Union from the beginning of the fifties when WEU became a new instrument for the defence and security of Western Europe. Germany was then ready to enlarge WEU in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. Today, I see no objection of principle on the part of Germany but conversely objections on the part of France due to its status as a nuclear power. I therefore wonder whether the ideas you mention could become official French policy. If so, we would be interested."

29. The question may obviously arise as to how much room remains for significant work by the WEU Council between the North Atlantic Council, in which all its members take part, and the European Council, in which they also all take part. Everything indicates that, although small, room exists, since the North Atlantic Council is not specifically European and, even if the Colombo-Genscher plan proposes that the European Council handle "security" matters, it has no specific responsibility for matters relating directly to the defence of Europe. This was underlined by Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence, in his 16th February 1982 interview in the *Frankfurter Rundschau*. In this connection, reference may be made to certain specific fields which should provide fuel for the Council's discussions:

30. First, as suggested by Mr. Hernu in this interview and by Mr. Lemoine in the Assembly: the questions raised by the development of pacifist movements and their consequences for Europe's security. Here, it should be emphasised that a defence policy based on deterrence is credible only if based on the whole of society's will to resist and that civism is the basis of any defence policy.

31. Second, the development of terrorism in the last decade concerns all our countries and the need for a joint European policy in this field is being felt everywhere. However, it seems difficult to extend consultations on this policy to NATO where the presence of Turkey on the one hand and the United States and Canada on the other would, for widely varying

reasons, make it difficult to reach joint conclusions acceptable to the WEU member countries. The presence of Ireland at the ten-power consultations would also raise difficulties whereas the framework of the WEU Council would seem more appropriate. It is evident that the Council's reply to Recommendation 229 which attributed to "other European bodies, in particular... the Council of Europe" responsibility for European consultations on this subject, meets the legal aspect of the problem but not the political or military aspects.

32. Third, more generally, matters relating to the military aspects of Western Europe's security outside the NATO area can be handled in the framework of WEU whose responsibility in this field is set out in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. In this respect, it should be noted that, unlike the North Atlantic Treaty which defines an "area" in which *casus foederis* may apply, the modified Brussels Treaty has no limit to its application.

33. Fourth, following President Mitterrand, Mr. Lemoine indicated the importance France attached to the link between guaranteed security for Europe and the need to pursue disarmament. Unfortunately, from the summary record of the London colloquy in February 1982 it is not possible to see exactly what was in Mr. Lemoine's mind when answering questions put to him about the rôle of WEU in defining a policy in conformity with this twofold will. It would be desirable for the French Government to explain its thoughts on this point. Inter alia, the Council should examine whether the experience gained by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, which makes it an instrument whose efficacy is unique in the world in its field, could not be used for purposes less narrow than those assigned to it in the protocols to the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly now that the lists in Annex III to Protocol No. III have been considerably shortened. Further easing of controls might be considered and a possible enlargement of WEU to other European members of the Atlantic Alliance wishing to join the organisation would obviously facilitate such a change of course. Conversely, the study of control procedures prepared by the Agency might help to solve the delicate monitoring problems raised at all international conferences on disarmament.

34. Fifth, finally, the WEU Council would be infinitely better placed to promote the interests of European security if it met at ministerial level prior to each of the two annual meetings of the North Atlantic Council in order to prepare these meetings by including European defence problems in its agenda and really discussing them. Two annual meetings instead of the present one meeting would not be too great

a burden for the ministers who, until the United Kingdom joined the European Communities, met quarterly.

35. Sixth, the permanent representatives who meet in camera about twice a month might make a practice of holding regular exchanges of views on all topical matters affecting the defence of Europe or European defence. The three of the ten nations which are not members of WEU might, if they so wished, be kept informed of the gist of these talks, for instance through the intermediary of the country chairing the Council.

36. These suggestions are obviously not exhaustive but they show that if the Council is still almost inactive it is not because there are no areas in which it could act but because the governments are not decided to act.

III. *Relations between the Council and the Assembly*

37. Although the Council did not exist as a political body in 1981, it must be noted that its relations with the Assembly were as good as possible, particularly because the Secretary-General and the officials of the Secretariat-General, on the one hand, and the ambassadors of member countries in London and their staff who worked together on behalf of the WEU Council, on the other, did their utmost to foster these relations. It must be made quite clear that the Council's shortcomings cannot be attributed to its members but to the governments which did not allow it to play its due rôle. There is every reason to believe that this will continue to be the case until the seven governments agree to define WEU's tasks in the circumstances of today. Nor can the Assembly be satisfied with a situation which fails to concord with government statements asserting their determination to apply the modified Brussels Treaty in full and with the requirements of European security.

38. The number of written questions put by members of the Assembly to the Council fell to five in 1981. Contrary to what is indicated in the Council's report, the meeting between the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the Chairman of the Assembly's General Affairs Committee was not held in 1981 but this was not at all the fault of the Council. The Assembly's lack of enthusiasm with regard to the Council is hardly surprising when one considers the attitude of the Council itself.

39. Joint meetings between the Council and Assembly Committees continued to be informal as emphasised in the annual report and were grouped, together with the working luncheon of

the Council and Presidential Committee, in a single day during which the Council moreover also held its sole meeting of the year at ministerial level. Judging by the ministers present at the joint meetings, it may be deduced that several member countries were represented at this sole meeting neither by their Minister for Foreign Affairs nor even by a parliamentary secretary of state.

40. It would be highly desirable for the governments of the WEU member countries to be represented by full-ranking ministers, including Ministers of Defence, in view of the nature of WEU's specific responsibilities.

41. The subject matter of ministerial addresses to the Assembly and the interest of the answers ministers give to questions put by parliamentarians encourage the Assembly to call for more frequent and greater participation by ministers in its work and to express the wish that, as far as possible, ministers speak on one or other of the reports debated.

42. However, in view of your Rapporteur's remarks about relaunching WEU's activities, it is quite clear that there can be a real improvement in relations between the Council and the Assembly only if the Council itself is reactivated. None of the minor measures mentioned in the annual report can cure the serious shortcomings in the governments' work although they may sometimes conceal them.

IV. *Political activities of the Council*

43. Chapter II of the annual report reached the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly after Chapter I but on 26th February 1982. In other words, the Council has made a particularly worthy effort to allow the Assembly to examine the report in satisfactory conditions. It should be added that it is easier to read this chapter because certain important documents mentioned in the report are appended as the General Affairs Committee requested in its reply to the annual report for 1980. Finally, the annual report's systematic description of consultations between its members on certain major political questions handled mainly in frameworks other than WEU meets a request often made by the Assembly and corresponds to the Council's promises. All this should be noted, although it is to be deplored that the Council should have taken so little action itself on matters which nevertheless relate to European defence, for which it continues, as it has often recognised, to be exclusively responsible.

44. In this respect, its refusal to respond to the Assembly's request for Ministers of Defence to take part in its meetings has to be recorded.

At least the refusal was not categorical and it is to be hoped that, if WEU is to be revived, it will carry its own statements into effect:

“The participation of ministers of defence, or their representatives, in Council meetings would certainly not be without its value. This would be possible where matters which are the direct responsibility of these ministers were being discussed; where this is not the case, their participation in essentially political debates would not appear to be strictly necessary.”

It is also recalled that:

“Article VIII gives the Council adequate scope to discuss a wide variety of subjects. The Council continue to be flexible and have sufficiently wide powers to embrace any debate relevant to the application of the treaty.”

One may wonder why, except at its annual ministerial meeting, it never does so. It should be recalled that there is no text to deprive the Permanent Council of this vocation which is incumbent upon it just as it is on the Council meeting at ministerial level.

45. Finally, your Rapporteur has to note that the proposals he outlined in Chapter II of this document correspond closely to the remarks and aims which the Council sets itself in the introduction to Chapter II of its annual report as regards the control of armaments, the activities of the SAC and those of the Council itself. He can but note that the Council has a very desultory approach to the commitments it assigns to itself.

46. These are not new comments. However, insofar as the Council describes its duties particularly pertinently in the present annual report, such a considerable difference between announced intentions and reported facts stands out. This is perhaps not a bad omen for a possible relaunching of its activities since the fact is that the seven member countries managed to adopt this definition of their intentions unanimously. In other words, if the French Government explains its proposals it is to be hoped that they will be welcomed by its partners and, after reading the report, the prospects of relaunching WEU seem particularly auspicious.

47. Turning to *political questions* themselves, it should be pointed out that an unfortunate numbering of the headings tends to indicate that all these questions come under *East-West relations* or *Afghanistan*, including matters concerning the Gulf or Palestine. If it were not just a mistake in the numbering, this would be a questionable and dangerous view of Middle East problems.

48. The Council and the Assembly largely share the same views on East-West relations. Both consider that the Afghanistan and Polish affairs violate human rights and the Helsinki final act. But at the same time the annual report indicates that the governments:

“... together with their western partners, would continue the dialogue begun with the USSR and its allies and would continue to work to bring about genuine détente, based on stable foundations, indivisible and worldwide”

even if:

“... the improvement in these relations which was desired by their governments required that the Soviet Union should, by taking tangible measures, show restraint and responsibility in international affairs.”

49. This way of thinking coincides remarkably with that expressed by the General Affairs Committee, *inter alia* when on 19th January 1982 it adopted the report submitted by Mr. Michel on the evolution of the situation in Poland. Thus, on the one hand, food assistance to Poland, a moratorium on the reimbursement of its debts, support for its efforts at economic recovery and, on the other, a reminder of the essential principles of détente as laid down in Helsinki, suspension of the Madrid conference on 18th December and consultations between allies, are the two sides of a Western European policy on which the governments and a majority of the Assembly are unanimous.

50. Similarly, the full support of the WEU member countries for the French proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe demonstrates that although WEU is a defensive alliance it is not concerned with the military effort alone but also takes into account the urgent need for disarmament to which European public opinion showed that it was firmly attached in 1981.

51. On the *Near and Middle East*, although the annual report makes little reference to specifically WEU activities, it makes it abundantly clear that there has been a revival of European activity in the area and that there is a broad consensus between the Western European countries with regard to Afghanistan, the Iranian-Iraqi war, relations with the Gulf countries, the Palestinian conflict and Egypt. Considerable progress has been made as illustrated by the fact that the Chairman-in-Office of the European Council was twice sent on a collective mission and the debates in the United Nations General Assembly and in the Security Council and the participation of member countries in United Nations peacekeeping military operations were the subject of consultations between the Ten leading to the joint definition of quite specific

political aims, particularly at the Venice summit meeting, with regard to Palestine.

52. Although there are many internal and external, military and economic threats to Europe today which justify scepticism and fear for its future, the Council's review of European political consultations is certainly far more positive than it could have been in previous years and this is encouraging.

53. However, it should be emphasised that this review is very incomplete insofar as it concerns only a few areas of the world where tension is certainly serious but where convergences of views are relatively important. A review of intra-European political consultations should not however overlook the fact that there are other areas where tension is equally serious but where, perhaps, it would be more difficult to achieve such unanimity, particularly Africa and Latin America. It is unbelievable that the Council should not feel itself obliged to refer to these areas in a report on Europe's activities in the external policy field.

V. Conclusions

54. Everything indicates therefore that the Council's annual report for 1981 is a masterpiece of diplomacy on the part of those who wrote and adopted it. The Council has managed to provide in reasonable time a text which conforms remarkably to the wishes expressed by the Assembly in recent years and have even managed to give it true political content, particularly in the introduction to Chapter II and in Part B of that chapter. It should be congratulated.

55. However this may be, the present annual report, like its predecessors, if only by its references to what has been done outside WEU, mainly underlines the inexistence of the WEU Council in 1981. Here your Rapporteur can but repeat what has been emphasised so often by the Assembly: the constituent party of WEU cannot be separated and there can be no effective Assembly without a valid counterpart in the Council. The fact that the Council's report is a monument of diplomacy worthy of all-round admiration does not blind us to the fact that this technical success is a thin veil for a *de facto* situation about which the Assembly has continuously complained. Once again this year it must repeat its displeasure at the Council's shortcomings.

56. However, this displeasure must be tempered by the prospects which the future seems to offer with the French proposals expressed twice by the Secretary of State, Mr. Lemoine. Clearly these proposals need to be explained and completed, but they show a noteworthy will to

reactivate WEU and France's six partners must now respond positively. In Chapter II of this report, your Rapporteur has made a number of suggestions which he has incorporated in the draft recommendation for submission to the General Affairs Committee. He feels the Council could subscribe to these proposals without encroaching on the rights of other institutions. From the Council's reply to such suggestions it will perhaps be possible to deduce what the governments intend to do with WEU in coming years.

57. Your Rapporteur believes that there is obviously no question – and everything indicates that the French Government shares that opinion – of giving new impetus to the arms race by setting up another European military bloc alongside NATO. This has never been the aim of the modified Brussels Treaty whose signatories were determined from the outset to

place it in the twofold context of the United Nations Charter and of the Atlantic Alliance. On the contrary, the aim is to allow Europe to make its voice heard more effectively in the two corresponding institutions, on the one hand so as to reactivate a disarmament process which has been marking time for many years because of the overly bipolar view of international relations and, on the other, thanks to real progress towards effective, controlled disarmament, the ultimate aim of which would be the progressive dissolution of the two military blocs which is necessary if the European nations and the rest of the world are to be really able to choose, without outside constraints, the course of their national development. Insofar as it can further this twofold aim, WEU can be seen as a positive step towards international peace based on the freedom of peoples and not on the ever-threatened balance of terror.

***Political activities of the Council – reply to the
twenty-seventh annual report of the Council***

AMENDMENT 1¹
***tabled by Mr. Blaauw
and the Liberal Group***

1. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper; add “and report to the Assembly within a year”.

Signed: Blaauw and the Liberal Group

1. See 1st sitting, 14th June 1982 (amendment amended and agreed to).

***European-United States co-operation for
international peace and joint security***

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. van Eekelen, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee: Sir Frederic Bennett (Chairman); MM. De Poi, Urwin (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Berrier, Bertile, Conti Persini, De Bondt (Alternate: Michel), Della Briotta, van Eekelen (Alternate: Blaauw), Gessner, Hardy (Alternate:*

Hill), Kurt Jung, Lagneau, Lagorce (Alternate: Baumel), Lord McNair, MM. Mangelschots, Mommersteeg, Günther Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann (Alternate: Böhm), Thoss (Alternate: Berchem), Valiante, Vecchietti, Wilquin.

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.

Draft Recommendation

***on European-United States co-operation for
international peace and joint security***

The Assembly,

Considering that the cohesion of the free world is an essential condition for the maintenance of peace, European security and economic recovery;

Noting that the European and American partners of the Atlantic Alliance remain fully convinced of this fact;

Noting that western cohesion is being challenged by increased tensions in international relations and the present serious economic recession;

Regretting that measures required for collective security are not really understood by the public and therefore do not receive as much support from public opinion as they might;

Noting that such reactions and challenges, amplified by modern means of communications, give rise to mistrust on both sides of the Atlantic;

Welcoming the initiatives to improve consultations between Europe and North America within the framework of existing institutions;

Considering that events in Afghanistan and Poland require that any measures aimed at improving relations between members of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact should be the subject of close collective examination to prevent the impression that faits accomplis are being accepted;

Welcoming the intensive consultations within NATO on the INF negotiations at Geneva;

Expressing support for an early beginning of the START negotiations and vigorous pursuit of the other disarmament negotiations;

Considering the need to arrive at a consensus on the military threat posed to the Alliance and on the balance of forces;

Considering further that public support for armament decisions would increase if these measures were presented as a counterweight to Warsaw Pact programmes and allowed for constraints by that side;

Considering that frequent contacts between parliamentarians from European and North American member countries of NATO are essential for a better understanding of public opinion and should be organised as effectively as possible,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. Prepare a comprehensive report on the European defence effort within the framework of NATO on sharing the burden of common defence;

II. Urge member countries

1. In agreement with the United States and the other members of NATO, to specify the principles to which all members of the Atlantic Alliance should conform in their economic relations with the member countries of the Warsaw Pact, with particular regard to those items of strategic or technological significance whose export is limited, the credit conditions granted and the conclusion of long-term contracts;

2. To make full use of existing machinery for consultations in the political, military and economic field to allow them to react quickly and in a concordant manner in an emergency or crisis;

3. To consider ways of improving transatlantic consultation, in particular by informal meetings at ministerial and high official levels, thus improving the effectiveness of existing institutions;

4. To ensure that NATO arrives at an early assessment of the balance of forces which can be released to the public;
5. To present new decisions in the armaments field against the background of specific Warsaw Pact programmes and capabilities in order to discourage new incentives to the arms race;
6. To support a policy of vigorous and determined negotiations for a controlled limitation of nuclear weapons ensuring a balance of forces as a prerequisite for the security of Europe and of the whole western world.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. van Eekelen, Rapporteur)

I. Foreword

1. This report was drafted after a visit by the General Affairs Committee to the United States from 25th to 31st March 1982 which allowed it to obtain ample information from the American authorities, particularly at the State Department and the Pentagon. It also endeavoured to ascertain the views of independent observers at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and to assess the state of American public opinion by meeting parliamentarians and journalists, especially with the assistance of the Overseas Press Club in New York.

2. Furthermore, your Rapporteur and other members of the committee took advantage of this or other visits to the United States to examine these matters in detail.

3. Your Rapporteur believes he can speak on behalf of the whole committee in thanking the United States authorities who received it, in one capacity or another, and expressed opinions which, although not always convergent, were always frank and sincere and of considerable assistance in preparing the present report. He wishes to convey his particular gratitude to the staff of the State Department and the United States Embassies in Paris, London and The Hague who were good enough to organise the visit. He prefers not to name them as he wishes to thank them all, and he is afraid of omitting some of those helped with this organisation and kept members of the General Affairs Committee informed in one way or another although perhaps remaining unknown to him.

4. This being said, the ideas expressed in this report are his own and although your Rapporteur hopes they will be endorsed by the General Affairs Committee, they commit none of those who received it.

5. The present report is the first one on European-American co-operation since the General Affairs Committee adopted the report by Mr. Schlingemann on a visit to the United States in March 1979. Scientific and technological aspects were discussed in the report by Mr. Hill adopted by the Assembly in December 1981. In addition, attention should be drawn to the publication by the Council of Europe of the proceedings of its panel on "Relations between Western Europe and the United States of America", held in Strasbourg in June 1981.

6. One preliminary observation on the visit concerns the difficulty of having adequate contact with members of the United States

Congress. In view of the multitude of visits by European politicians to the United States, either individually or within the framework of international organisations, it seems desirable to explore the possibility of achieving some degree of co-ordination of these visits in order to enhance the effectiveness of transatlantic political contacts.

II. *Is there a crisis of confidence between Europe and the United States?*

7. Very different judgments may be formed of the trend of relations between Europe and the United States depending on whether it is considered from a long-, medium- or short-term standpoint. Similarly, day-to-day information, passing reactions by public opinion, even if filtered through parliamentary speeches, press articles or public opinion polls, give a very jagged impression of these relations: an unbroken succession of misunderstandings, clashes and crises affecting practically every field, whereas contacts with American leaders give a feeling of broad continuity and a profound understanding of mutual points of view and common interests.

8. Looking beyond momentary ups and downs in relations between Western Europe and the United States in the thirty-six years which have elapsed since the end of the second world war, it is clear that many positive aspects can be noted, the appreciation of the need for western solidarity has become firmer on both sides and the realisation of common aims and common problems and the assessment of the dangers to international peace and the world's economy are very similar on both sides of the Atlantic.

9. Positive examples of allied co-operation are the continued resolve on the double track decision of December 1979 regarding intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, the cohesion shown at the Madrid follow-up conference of the CSCE, agreement on the accession of Spain to NATO which will strengthen both the Alliance and Spanish democracy, the reaction to the Polish crisis emanating from the unprecedented extraordinary meeting of the NATO Council at ministerial level, European-American co-operation in Sinai as a welcome proof of joint action and shared responsibility after past divergencies on Middle Eastern policies, and the constructive efforts of the Western Contact Group on Namibia to solve an almost intractable problem.

10. This does not mean there are no major differences over how to handle the challenges now facing the world, but the differences are not primarily transatlantic. They exist within the United States itself, as they do in Europe, and this will be shown by the discussions which this report will probably stimulate.

11. Nor does it mean that the divergencies, confrontations and clashes which the press, as is its task and duty, reports each day are without importance or danger. The deployment of particularly active Soviet policies throughout the world has multiplied the number of crises in recent years. The development of Soviet nuclear, military and naval power, which has attained hitherto unparalleled proportions of a particularly and directly threatening nature, above all for Western Europe with the deployment of some 300 SS-20 missiles targeted on our part of the continent without there being any equivalent weapon to offset them at the present time, is causing anxiety or even fear.

12. Finally, the long and serious economic recession throughout the world since October 1973 has also given rise to often contradictory analyses, apprehension and reactions among the western countries and hence to clashes between the members of the Atlantic Alliance.

13. These crises, fears and clashes have had effect. Their frequency and the number of areas concerned often give public opinion, both in the United States and in Europe, the impression that a serious, global crisis is now affecting relations between Europe and the United States and is liable to lead to a separation which would be disastrous for the world economy and for joint security.

14. It will certainly not be your Rapporteur's aim to minimise their extent but rather to try to ascertain how they are seen in the United States and in Europe and to show that they are not aspects of a global crisis in transatlantic relations but merely an accumulation of specific problems which governments on both sides are trying to solve with a very clear idea in mind of the danger of a build-up of tests of strength, resentment and misunderstandings. The General Affairs Committee can testify to the considerable efforts made by the United States administration to convince Congress and public opinion, and by a number of American parliamentarians to convince their electors, not to fall back on scepticism, discouragement or resentment towards their European partners. Your Rapporteur is convinced that all the Western European governments are doing the same with regard to the United States in view of their understanding of their own nations' feelings.

15. Your Rapporteur wishes to make a modest contribution to this effort to understand

and explain the problems and he hopes the General Affairs Committee and then the Assembly will endorse an approach justified by concern for the truth and for the security of the free world, the maintenance of international peace and the recovery of the western and world economies. Confrontation between Europe and the United States can contribute nothing positive and can but be dangerous. But, as a journalist whom the committee met in Washington said, the problem is at the level of the man in the street. Without wishing to say what this man in the street is, your Rapporteur believes that all the underlying forces to which the democratic régimes address themselves must now be warned of the true nature of the threat and convinced of the reality of solidarity between Europe and the United States.

16. At present, there appear to be four main areas in which there are misunderstandings between Europe and the United States:

(a) *European security* because of the leading rôle played by the United States in Western Europe's defence and because in many fields the western side has lost its earlier lead. The pursuit of negotiations on the control of armaments, particularly strategic weapons, between the United States and the Soviet Union, is obviously of the utmost concern to Western Europe's security, as are the deployment of new weapons in Europe and the possible evolution of strategies on both sides;

(b) *Euro-American co-operation outside Europe* since security policy requires a minimum of agreement between Europe and the United States about their respective activities outside Europe, first because of the world dimension of the Soviet threat in the last fifteen years and second because of the new shape of the North-South confrontation since the end of the colonial empires. The development of crises in Central America last year and the contradictory reactions which they aroused, together with the feeble western reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan and the seizure of Cambodia by Vietnam, a Soviet ally, led to misunderstanding and a serious lack of trust on all sides;

(c) *relations with the Soviet Union and its allies* because, for reasons which vary from one country to another, the European members of the Atlantic Alliance had often attached special political and economic importance to the idea of détente in East-West rela-

tions whereas in the United States involvement in a process of negotiations made it pay insufficient attention to checking the military build-up of the Soviet Union leading to a preponderant lead in some sectors and an overwhelming one in continental-range missiles. The massive deployment of these missiles in Europe, the invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet pressure which led to the takeover in Poland on 13th December 1981 and the increasing number of actions by the Soviet Union or its allies in Asia, Africa and Latin America led to the belief that détente was a lure to allow the Soviet Union to pursue with less risk a policy of strengthening its armaments and of direct or indirect intervention. Nevertheless, Europe and the United States tried, each on its own accord, to preserve the elements of the policy of détente which corresponded to its own interests. This could but lead to a series of misunderstandings or even clashes between the United States and its allies;

- (d) finally, *economic co-operation* because the crisis the world over since the end of 1973 makes it more necessary than ever to co-ordinate remedial measures. These relate to the monetary field, the Achilles' heel of the free trade system defined in the GATT agreements and the Kennedy negotiations, particularly since all reference of western currencies to an objective and unquestionable standard, like the former gold standard, has disappeared; to credit, where the utmost uncertainty has prevailed since annual inflation rates in most western countries reached 10% or even far more around 1980; to international trade since the rise in unemployment has led many to elude GATT rules by various means and, finally, to energy since the great "everyone for himself" in 1973, whose devastating effects on western cohesion have just been described by Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State, in the second volume of his memoirs.

17. All these factors render more essential than ever the need for stronger co-operation as everyone now realises. But there seems to be no attempt on either side of the Atlantic to reach a global definition of it. In his famous Philadelphia speech, President Kennedy referred to a western community based on two pil-

lars, one European, the other American. The European pillar has never really been built, except in the economic field, thanks to the development of the European Communities, and to some extent in the field of the ten-power political consultations. But the weakness of this pillar is perhaps one of the reasons why this view of a balanced political and economic edifice has never corresponded to the facts.

18. The absence of a global definition of co-operation between Europe and the United States has helped to aggravate a crisis of confidence. It is difficult to specify when this crisis began and to what event it may be attributed. The French decision to leave the NATO integrated military organisation, the Vietnam war and the opening of direct negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union were obvious contributory factors, but there is no doubt that the emergence in the United States of reactions which, if not isolationist, around 1970 were and sometimes still are hostile to the maintenance of American forces in Europe, and the weaknesses of which President Carter's administration was accused, at least during its first three years in office, led Europeans to wonder about the permanency of American support, particularly the military presence in Europe, itself a guarantee in their eyes, and probably also in the eyes of the Soviet Union, of the credibility of American undertakings with regard to Europe's security.

19. The Republican administration, now in office for a little over a year, has attempted to remedy this situation. It has to a certain extent succeeded. But the way in which the European effort is presented falls well short of inspiring in American public opinion the confidence necessary for the development of co-operation with the United States.

20. The effect of the demonstrations in many European countries at the end of 1981 against the deployment of Tomahawk cruise missiles and continental-range Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, accepted by the governments which subscribed to the NATO twofold decision in December 1979, and several attacks on Americans assigned to NATO has been to make the United States question the determination of Europeans to ensure their own defence. Bitter memories of the Vietnam war, while not turning American society away from all external commitments, have nevertheless convinced the United States that it could not defend a population which did not want its assistance. Many signs have made it think that this has now become the case in Western Europe.

21. The conclusions which your Rapporteur has drawn from his contacts with the American authorities are in no way negative. The United States administration is very well informed of

the whys and wherefores of European reactions. However, in a democratic society as it exists in the United States there is a permanent need to make an often reticent Congress and a public opinion which is insufficiently informed on both sides of the Atlantic share one's views. It is for the European partners of the Atlantic Alliance to define their own positions clearly, as these are after all as respectable and valid as those of their American partners, and to explain the underlying reasons. At the same time the European countries will have to make a better presentation of their contributions to the common defence effort.

III. Economic and monetary problems

22. There is no doubt that since 1973 Western Europe and the United States have been aware of the seriousness of the crisis through which the western economy is now passing and the need to counter it. On both sides of the Atlantic, it is clear that:

- (a) *the West's energy supplies* are still a vital problem, although lower oil costs, the development of nuclear energy and the discovery of vast new resources offer better hopes for the next decade, but the problem of dependence on the Middle East remains;
- (b) *an economic revival* is essential in order to combat growing unemployment which is now so high that it is jeopardising the West's political stability and the support of the western peoples for the values which the West claims to defend. It should be noted moreover that the problem is very similar on both sides of the Atlantic;
- (c) the continuation of *inflation* at the rate current throughout most of the western world between 1975 and 1980 has become intolerable. There has been a marked recovery in 1981 in many countries but the annual inflation rate in some European countries is still more than 10 %, which makes it difficult for them to help to restore order in the international monetary system. Admittedly, no one is considering reverting to the gold standard, but the re-establishment of world monetary order guaranteeing adequate stability in relations between the various currencies is part of everyone's programme because the distortion of international trade due to variations in exchange rates has gone

beyond the level that national economies can tolerate. However, although the essential aims are the same for everyone, priorities are not always the same, nor are they synchronised.

23. (1) Since the Republican administration took office, the United States seems to have been giving *priority to the fight against inflation and the recovery of the dollar*. Thus it has allowed or even encouraged the banks to apply extremely high interest rates and basic rates rose as high as 18 % in the United States in autumn 1981 and, although they have varied somewhat since then, they are still very high. A consequence of this was that economic recovery was held back and it may now be wondered how far the priority given to stabilising the dollar will not lead the United States administration, in its concern to reduce expenditure all round, to delay the efforts it had undertaken to catch up with the Soviet Union in the armaments field.

24. The United States budget for 1983, presented by Mr. Reagan to Congress on 8th February, makes provision for a deficit of some \$100,000 million, while continuing to give priority to fighting inflation and the recovery of the dollar, which is justified in view of the recession and provided firms do not borrow for the sole purpose of increasing their share of the market by absorbing their competitors. But at the slightest sign of economic recovery, the large slice of savings taken by federal loans is liable to lead to another rise in interest rates, although the public debt is already over a trillion dollars. American experts did not fail to underline an apparent contradiction between the expansionist policy of the White House, maintaining the promised reduction in direct taxes and social expenditure and an increase of 18 % in military expenditure, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Federal Reserve System's concern for monetary orthodoxy. Mr. Volcker, President of the Federal Reserve System, is in fact refusing to relax his credit policy until the government and Congress start to make effective reductions in a growing budget deficit.

25. The debates which have just ended in Congress left the government project practically intact since budget cuts were kept to a minimum. In the defence field, which is vital for Europe, these cuts did not even reach 1 %. In other words, interest rates are liable to stay high and the dollar will probably continue to be most attractive in the world currency market, with all the inherent disadvantages for the more sensitive European currencies, with dollar investments being preferred for a long time to come.

26. As the General Affairs Committee was told in Washington, the United States adminis-

tration does not have an interest rate policy but an overall economic, monetary and budgetary policy. Whatever the short-term drawbacks for European currencies may be, it must be noted that if the United States failed to offset a policy of high budget deficits by measures of this kind it would have to make drastic cuts in a budget which had the merit of trying to reduce the Soviet Union's comfortable lead in the defence field.

27. (2) On the other hand, some European governments, although long divided over the priority to be given to *fighting the crisis*, now seem to consider that the fight against unemployment should be given first priority. This has led them to adopt a policy diametrically opposed to that of the United States since the tendency is to facilitate credit at home and grant very cheap credit to their foreign customers so as to stimulate consumption through greater budgetary expenditure, a higher standard of living and social expenditure, and exports, even if this means allowing their currencies to slide.

28. There are certainly considerable differences between the European countries, but rising unemployment seems to be leading them, one after the other in spite of attempts at monetary recovery which have sometimes been successful, particularly in the United Kingdom in 1981, to take decisions which are hardly likely to ensure monetary stability. Inter alia, this is the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom which decided, in mid-January 1982, to lower their interest rates in order to stimulate their economies and fight unemployment. But with the strengthening of the dollar such attempts are liable to fail. Yet the rising dollar helps European sales abroad and increases exporter's profits. But the European governments are above all afraid that it may also encourage inflation imported in the form of a rise in the cost of products purchased abroad, even if lower oil and raw materials prices due to the generalised recession limit this phenomenon considerably, at least for the time being.

29. The instability of exchange rates and of American interest rates is therefore considered a threat to the Common Market's trade interests and an obstacle to the co-ordination of economic and monetary policies leading to a recovery in the growth rate and a victory over inflation. Thus, there have been realignments in the central rates of the European monetary system within a few months. This instability, which has sometimes involved a doubling up of interest rates, has inflicted a "dollar shock" on the European economies of a magnitude similar to that of the "oil shocks" of 1974 and 1980, and reduced to naught the governments' efforts to re-establish their economic growth by pre-

venting them, for instance, from reducing the cost of credit. Thus, at a time when American policy is aimed at stabilisation or even a rise in the dollar, European policy of stimulating employment has the opposite effect, thus contributing further to the rising rate of the dollar and a drop in the exchange rates of European currencies, weakening European positions in the world. One consequence of this policy is to increase Europe's energy problems since the price of oil is fixed in dollars.

30. However, this American policy cannot be considered from a solely European point of view or even from a solely western point of view. Its effects have also reduced the means of action on the world market of gold-producing countries, particularly the Soviet Union, which has thus been forced to draw heavily on its gold reserves to buy dollars at a time when rising interest rates on the American market have lowered the price of gold from about \$ 800 an ounce in 1980 to about \$ 350 at the beginning of 1982, in order to obtain the foreign currency needed for its purchases of grain or to help its satellites to meet their overwhelming commitments to their western creditors. It is therefore understandable that a policy of loans or cheap credit extended by the United States' European partners to the Soviet Union and its allies is rather irritating for the United States, which had hoped that its firm monetary policy, at the cost of major sacrifices on its part, would have had more effect on the Soviet Union and induced it to change the course of its external policy and military effort if it had not received indirect assistance from European members of NATO.

31. In such matters, no one can say who is right or who is wrong, but it may be noted that different policies, pursued without sufficient consultation among the western partners, have weakened the hoped-for political effects of the American measures, slowed down the revival of western economic activity and provoked unnecessary resentment between the transatlantic partners.

32. (3) Although the crisis has led to a drop in *energy consumption* in most western countries, there is still a danger of the stabilisation of oil prices resulting from the reduction of consumption, the development of new oil resources, particularly in Mexico, Gabon, Cameroon and Nigeria, and natural gas in the North Sea being jeopardised by the rise in the dollar. Economic recovery would be difficult because it would be followed immediately by a rise in energy prices which would endanger it.

33. The United States, which has domestic resources for most of its energy requirements and can, if necessary, increase its oil production at short notice, therefore tends to attach less

importance to the question of energy supplies, whereas certain European countries, having only very limited resources on their own territory, felt they had to make major sacrifices in order to ensure their energy supplies. This is the case in particular for Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy.

34. The fact that these countries, and France in particular, have made a considerable effort to develop the production of other sources of energy, including nuclear energy, presents few disadvantages of an international nature. However, it should be recalled that there are still sizeable world oil reserves: while prices have dropped in spite of the almost total interruption of Iranian deliveries and a more than two-thirds cut in Iraqi supplies because of the war between the two countries, and also in spite of the cuts in output decided upon by OPEC, it is unlikely that prices will rise very much in the next few years even in the event of economic recovery.

35. It is not therefore surprising that the United States was disturbed about the signing of contracts between Belgium, France, the Federal Republic and Italy and the Soviet Union for deliveries of natural gas. Indeed the United States authorities consider these contracts involve a number of risks which they did not fail to emphasise:

36. (i) Although in most cases the countries concerned are not considering procuring more than 5% of their energy requirements in this way, their decision involves long-term measures to convert part of their industry to this form of energy, as well as large-scale investment for its transport and distribution. They are thus providing the Soviet Union with the possibility of cutting off their supplies overnight on one pretext or another and consequently exercising economic and possibly political pressure on them which is liable to endanger Atlantic cohesion.

37. (ii) These drawbacks were said to be even greater since the oil pipeline to be built should come into service in 1986 for a period of twenty-five years. The United States fears that such contracts make the signatory countries unduly dependent on the Soviet Union and it suspects Europeans of giving economic advantage precedence over their foreign policies towards the Soviet Union.

38. (iii) The contracts they have signed not only allow the Soviet Union to acquire equipment for research on and the exploitation and transport of natural gas which is the result of advanced technology without anything valid in exchange but also provide it foreign exchange which frees resources for military use.

39. (iv) These investments beneficial to the Soviet Union are generally granted at interest rates far lower than current market rates and even less than the erosion of western currencies. This allows the Soviet Union to obtain modern equipment very cheaply.

40. (v) The interests at stake are so great that the contracting parties cannot be expected to participate in any policy of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union or its allies. It was moreover hardly a month after the Polish takeover that France, which had not hesitated to denounce Soviet responsibility, signed its contract.

41. (vi) In view of the vast reserves of natural gas recently discovered in the British, Danish, Dutch and Norwegian sectors of the North Sea, this investment diverts the capital of signatory countries from truly western resources where it could have been used for offshore natural gas prospecting, drilling, transport and distribution. Present estimates are that this offshore natural gas would cover more than thirty years' consumption for the whole of Western Europe if it made these admittedly heavy investments. The United States for its part says it is prepared to supply Europe with the gas it might require during the period 1982-85 when investment would not yet be profitable.

42. These various factors illustrate the surprise and displeasure of the United States at the reluctance of the countries owning these resources to exploit them and at the haste of others to conclude contracts with the Soviet Union which they consider both politically dangerous and economically unhealthy.

43. (4) To these differences should be added *trade* difficulties in a period when the crisis is making all countries try to protect their domestic markets and develop external trade at heavy cost. Monetary disparities already help to distort the rules of free competition. Protectionist practices, often covert so as not to seem to violate GATT rules, exist and are increasing on both sides of the Atlantic, and mutual accusations, founded or not, are multiplying.

44. Thus, although the United States' overall position towards Europe is positive, the EEC's external trade deficit with the United States being \$ 13,000 million, the European Community is often held responsible for the trade difficulties and discriminatory practices of which the United States feels it is the victim. It considers Europe, and to a far greater extent Japan, are becoming a threat to American industry, agriculture and commerce.

45. One of the more serious issues is that of European agricultural products and foodstuffs said to benefit from subsidies and public assistance. It is the Community agricultural policy

that is thus called in question, Europe having in fact become a major exporter of grain, sugar, dairy products and probably soon Mediterranean products on the international market, hence the American request for a GATT tribunal to be set up to condemn the policy of Community subsidies for flour, sugar, poultry and pasta. It should be noted that opinions on the subject differ somewhat depending on whether the EEC is considered as a state-type entity or as a sort of cartel of states.

46. The second subject of discord is the iron and steel industry: faced with a sudden surge of European and above all Japanese steel exports to the United States because of competitive prices due to the rise in the value of the dollar, the American iron and steel industry has complained about dumping and the subsidies granted to the iron and steel industry in eleven countries, mostly European. The European Commission has responded by pointing to the low volume of steel exports in 1980, which are now taken as a reference point, and to the large demand for steel tubes which cannot be met entirely by American industry. The dialogue on these points has not been favourably concluded and should be pursued.

47. Finally, the United States criticises the EEC countries for their policy of export credits at rates which they consider too low and consequently liable to jeopardise free competition. The United States is urging the OECD countries to raise the cost of credit when exporting to third-world and Warsaw Pact countries: difficult negotiations are soon to open in the OECD between the signatories of the arrangement for granting credit for exports. In the first case, only economic reasons are advanced, whereas the EEC considers that credit granted to third-world countries forms part of their policy of development assistance. The search for means of avoiding a trade war between the two sides of the Atlantic is now at the hub of increasingly frequent talks between Americans and Europeans. These difficulties undoubtedly stem from a more general opposition: the EEC and the United States do not share the same diplomatic and strategic view of international relations. Priorities are not the same, particularly with regard to the North-South dialogue.

48. Can it be claimed that the same is true in East-West relations? Trade with the Soviet Union and its allies is thus a particularly delicate aspect of the Euro-American dispute. In this case, in fact, there are many connections between truly political concerns and those relating to the economy.

49. Consequently, while American public opinion was annoyed that Europe would not take sanctions, except in March 1982 to reduce by 25 % Community imports of fifty-eight libe-

ralised Soviet products, i.e. a reduction of 1.34 % in the total volume of EEC imports, after the takeover in Poland on 13th December 1981, European public opinion on the contrary did not take President Reagan's decisions very seriously when on 29th December he announced sanctions against the Soviet Union by postponing the signature of long-term contracts for so-called strategic goods, but in no way interrupting deliveries to the Soviet Union under earlier contracts. Neither effective economically nor clear politically, such practices have cast doubt on the credibility of a policy of sanctions. Moreover, the European governments were apparently not consulted or informed by Washington, which presented them with a fait accompli. However, the situation subsequently improved on the occasion of the special meeting of the North Atlantic Council in January 1982, although no clear-cut economic measures were adopted with regard to the Soviet Union.

50. In these various fields, it is evident that it is essential to co-ordinate decisions taken or to be taken on either side of the Atlantic. With OECD, GATT, Cocom and meetings between governors of central banks, all the requisite machinery for consultations exists and is apparently used. But in the last resort it is often considerations of particular short-term interests or even internal policy that seem to decide the governments. No international institution can solve this problem as long as there is no firm and lasting desire on all sides to do so. Yet everything indicates that the economic crisis has curbed any inclination on the part of the Western European and United States Governments to take effective account of the interests of their western partners. But now is the time when co-ordination of measures taken or, above all, yet to be taken is more than ever necessary to maintain the economic cohesion of the West which alone can allow the crisis to be overcome, or at any rate its effects to be attenuated, and to avoid the crisis leading to a dangerous political and military weakening of the Atlantic Alliance.

IV. Defence and security

51. The United States had to intervene in the two world wars because it realised that its own security might be jeopardised by events outside the western hemisphere. Looking back, it may be regretted that in 1918 it did not draw the consequences of the obligations stemming *nolens volens* from its position of the world's leading economic and hence political power and that a strong isolationist trend based on memories of the past rather than current realities prevented it from occupying its due place in the then collective security system. At least the second world war and the development of

nuclear strength, the conquest of space and mastery of modern technology can leave it no illusions. Although a remnant of isolationism sometimes breaks the surface of the collective American attitude, it is no longer a rational choice and has been deliberately rejected by all those who have exercised responsibilities in the United States since the end of the war.

52. Moreover, the people of the United States have little doubt about the existence of Soviet imperialism which threatens the international balance, world peace and the security of the United States although at times they may have wondered whether the measures taken by successive United States Governments to counter this threat were really adequate at the time.

53. On these two points, therefore, there has, since 1947 at any event, been a deep-rooted convergence of views among the very great majority of Western Europeans and Americans and almost all their political leaders. This is a fundamental factor on which joint security is based, particularly as the American leaders, and apparently the great majority of public opinion, are convinced that safeguarding the independence and freedom of Western Europe is essential for the security of the United States itself, perhaps less for strategic reasons than for economic, political and cultural reasons. This is why the United States has made and is continuing a considerable effort, accompanied by major sacrifices, to ensure the security of Western Europe at the same time as its own.

54. This underlying fact must never be forgotten when tackling the problems now facing co-operation between Europe and the United States in the fields of European defence and security. There are five closely-linked but nevertheless separate fields: the maintenance of an American military force in Europe, the deployment of continental-range missiles on European territory, the search for agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of conventional and nuclear armaments in Europe, the reciprocal confidence of Americans in the determination of Europeans to defend their freedom and of Europeans in that of the Americans not to sacrifice Europe's security to that of their own territory, and finally sharing the burdens imposed by joint defence. A sixth point deals with arms co-operation.

1. *The presence of American forces in Europe*

55. Europe's defence is mainly ensured by American strategic nuclear armaments. These are comparable to Soviet strategic nuclear armaments and ensure that the United States has a second strike capability in the event of the Soviet Union trying to destroy its nuclear

means. Its main strength is constituted by 36 submarines carrying 576 missiles, most of them with multiple warheads, about 316 long-range nuclear-capable bombers and 1,052 intercontinental missiles, most of which also have multiple warheads¹.

56. This is a considerable force. Nevertheless, it is faced by a Soviet force of 84 submarines carrying 950 nuclear missiles, 150 long-range, nuclear-capable bombers and about 1,398 surface-to-surface intercontinental ballistic missiles, most of them with multiple nuclear warheads. In other words, American strategic nuclear strength is not greater than that of the Soviet Union and the new administration has started to modernise it, particularly by starting work on 8 nuclear submarines of a new type each carrying 24 Trident missiles.

57. Its aim being to deter a potential adversary, the slight numerical inferiority of the American strategic force is of no consequence insofar as it is deployed so as to be able to inflict serious damage in response to a first strike by the Soviet Union, as is now the case. These are the terms of its protective rôle for Europe since the Soviet Union cannot risk a nuclear war which would devastate its entire territory. The latter's policy is therefore to dissociate this highly deterrent force from the defence of Europe, which American diplomacy has never accepted.

58. The guarantee given both to the Europeans and to the Soviet Union that this strategic nuclear force is really intended for the defence of Europe is the presence of far from negligible American forces in Europe: 219,729 men in the army and 54,000 in the air force. They have short-range tactical missiles with nuclear warheads. In addition, equipment is being stored for substantial reinforcements.

59. However, some segments of American public opinion and Congress are now asking for a substantial reduction in these forces and they have many arguments in favour of such a reduction:

- (i) Europeans should be urged to make a greater effort to increase their contribution to their own security;
- (ii) it should allow significant savings to be made and improve the American balance of payments, which might foster lower interest rates in the United States;
- (iii) since such forces would obviously not be capable of winning against a

1. All figures in this chapter are taken from "The military balance 1981-82" published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in 1981.

massive Soviet offensive, they would be hostages and a smaller force would reduce the number of hostages without diminishing the deterrent effect of the American presence in Europe;

- (iv) a reduction might be offset by planning for reinforcements to be brought in quickly from the United States in the event of emergency.

60. At present everything indicates that the United States administration does not share this view and it has said so strongly, most recently through the person of Mr. Eagleburger, Under-Secretary of State, speaking to the Senate Armed Services Committee. His main arguments were :

- (a) far from encouraging Europeans to make an additional effort, a large-scale withdrawal of American forces would discourage them and make them seek a semblance of security by other means;
- (b) the savings made would be slight in view of the large contribution made by the countries where forces are stationed – mainly the Federal Republic – to their cost, and the balance of payments between the United States and Western Europe is clearly to the advantage of the United States;
- (c) the Soviet Union might also interpret withdrawal as a demonstration of a weakening American determination to defend Europe and consequently these forces would be more like hostages and less deterrent.

61. It is obviously in Europe's interests for these forces to be kept at their present level, and it therefore has every advantage in demonstrating as clearly as possible its own determination to take part in the defence of its territory in order to strengthen the impact of the arguments of those who stress the deterrent and non-hostage nature of the American force in Europe, which introduces the question of sharing the financial burden of joint defence.

62. In this connection mention should also be made of the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. The allied participants have agreed not to undertake unilateral reductions prior to a positive outcome of these talks.

2. *The deployment of continental-range missiles*

63. In Western Europe, the presence of American forces and their retaliatory capability in the event of conventional or limited nuclear attack are an essential part of Europe's secur-

ity. Anything that disconnected, i.e. separated, Europe's security from that of the United States would allow a potential enemy to speculate on the possibility of waging and winning a war limited to European territory and would destroy the deterrent effect of United States strategic nuclear weapons.

64. The fact that the Soviet Union deployed first SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and then since 1977 SS-20 missiles with multiple nuclear warheads capable of reaching, from Soviet territory, almost any point in Western Europe has been a matter of particular concern to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance who have since lost no opportunity of drawing the attention of the American authorities to the fact that they had no weapons in Europe capable of countering the SS-20. This meant that the Soviet Union could hope that the United States would not endanger the security of its own territory by using strategic nuclear weapons to counter an offensive limited to European territory.

65. In December 1979, the North Atlantic Council decided to take up the challenge by installing on the territory of the European members of the Atlantic Alliance missiles capable of balancing the strength the SS-20 gave the Soviet Union: Pershing II continental-range ballistic missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles. However, at the same time the North Atlantic Council decided to ask the Soviet Union to stop deploying the SS-20, in which case the Americans would not deploy the Pershing II and Tomahawk.

66. If Europe's means of defence, which have been inadequate and which it was hoped would be improved in 1983 with the deployment of the Pershing II and Tomahawk, remain unchanged, one may wonder whether American public opinion would agree to maintain American forces on European territory as hostages of the Soviet Union. If these forces, which provide the link with the American strategic deterrent, were withdrawn from Europe, Western Europe's security would no longer be guaranteed.

67. Since then, the Soviet Union has used all the means at its disposal to confirm the situation it had thus created, on the one hand by speeding up deployment of the SS-20, of which there are now more than 300 in Eastern Europe, on the other by fostering through active propaganda all movements of public opinion in Western Europe against the deployment by the United States of weapons capable of retaliating against the SS-20 and, finally, by calling for the ratification of the SALT II treaty, suspended by President Carter following the invasion of Afghanistan. It now seems that in spite of the Polish crisis the United States is prepared to

resume these negotiations. The negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) started in Geneva in December 1981 and were suspended for two months in March 1982. In fact, the negotiations are still in a preliminary stage and statements by both sides are obviously aimed at defining maximum positions in order to tackle the serious talks from a position of strength.

68. The Soviets asked for inclusion in the negotiations of the French and British nuclear forces which these countries regard as strategic weapons. The eighteen French missiles on the Plateau d'Albion are in fact the only western continental-range missiles deployed in Europe. France, which considers its deterrent force to be both a national and minimum one and whose missiles are in the process of being modernised, was not at all prepared to enter into such negotiations and the United States did nothing to persuade it to do so. Moreover, the Soviet Union wished the negotiations also to cover the NATO forward-based systems which consist mainly of aircraft, most of which are dual-capable. Mr. Brezhnev at various times proposed a moratorium on the deployment of INF. The latest version was his proposal of 16th March to freeze the number of INF in the European part of his country, which would perpetuate, until the conclusion of a hypothetical Soviet-American agreement, the Soviet Union's present near-monopoly in this field.

69. On the American side, it must be noted that the administration showed no weakness. President Reagan envisaged renouncing the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe only in the framework of the zero option, i.e. the total dismantling of all continental missiles in Eastern Europe, whether SS-20s, SS-4s or SS-5s. He announced that he would not be satisfied with a mere transfer of these missiles eastwards in view of the ease with which the Soviet Union could move them a few hundred kilometres to the west and the difficulties and delays in bringing modern missiles from the United States to Europe. Everything indicates that such firmness is essential if the Geneva negotiations are to achieve anything other than the renunciation by the West of a capability similar to the Soviet missiles. There is no reason to think that the United States administration would be prepared to change its opinion on this point.

70. Some of these Soviet proposals have been given credence in Western Europe. A series of demonstrations against the deployment of American missiles in Europe were held in autumn 1981, culminating in most European capitals in November. They were led in certain countries by the local communist parties and in others they were dominated by political or religious

associations which cannot be suspected of complicity with the Soviet Union but which were driven by a real aversion to nuclear weapons. They question the notion of deterrence by horrible weapons often insufficiently explained and the large amounts of money spent on them. Whatever the reasons, these demonstrations, which were often massive and widely reported in the press, were interpreted in the United States as being hostile to NATO and the United States and provided encouragement for supporters of the withdrawal of American forces from Europe and opponents of the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. There were still very vivid memories of this in the United States in spring 1982, as members of the General Affairs Committee who were there can testify.

71. It is encouraging that many of those who demonstrated against nuclear weapons also rejected the Soviet moratorium proposal as a propaganda move. These groups also expressed doubts, however, about the negotiability of President Reagan's zero option.

3. The search for agreement on arms limitation

72. It is easy to be ironical about the number of negotiations now being conducted actively on arms limitation. Apart from the INF negotiations in Geneva to which your Rapporteur referred above, mention may be made of: the MBFR talks which have been pursued in Vienna for many years without reaching agreement even on the data of existing forces on both sides; the CSCE which has stopped at confidence-building measures designed only to strengthen détente, whose very foundations have been undermined by Soviet initiatives in Afghanistan and Poland and non-respect by the Soviet Union and its allies of its principles; SALT II on intercontinental-range nuclear missiles, which agreement is effectively applied, although the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union led the United States to postpone its ratification; the conference of the United Nations Disarmament Committee, which for years has kept to vague generalities, and the special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, the next of which is to be held in June 1982.

73. Irony would be unacceptable and it is precisely because the United States takes these negotiations seriously that it has not allowed itself to make concessions which might have produced results which although spectacular would have been dangerous for the Alliance. Emphasis should be placed on the prominence given to these negotiations in consultations in the framework of NATO and the respect shown by the Americans for the views expressed by their allies.

74. In none of these cases has the United States administration considered or *a fortiori* accepted concessions which might have offered it immediate advantages but at the cost of dissociating Europe's defence from that of the United States. The continuity of American views and actions here is particularly remarkable since internal forces have often urged it to seek rapid and spectacular conclusions from which the administration in office might have derived immediate political advantages. Suspicion which has sometimes been voiced in Europe in this connection has proved groundless and it is only fair to underline this, while the Americans on the contrary have sometimes, particularly in the case of the CSCE, followed their European allies in spite of serious hesitation on their part because they did not wish to give the impression that they were refusing forms of détente in which Europe seemed to believe although they themselves had little confidence in them. Subsequent events proved that these apprehensions were at least partly justified.

4. The breakdown of defence costs

75. The problem of sharing the cost of defending Europe between the European and American partners of the Atlantic Alliance has been a particularly delicate aspect of relations between Europe and the United States for a long time. It is quite clear that after the second world war the United States bore the main burden, whereas Europe's return to prosperity called for a fairer division. It is equally understandable that in a time of economic and financial difficulties this question of cost-sharing should become particularly acute.

76. The problem is even more complex since the United States assumes commitments throughout the world and certain European countries have military commitments outside Europe, which is not the case of others, whereas the Atlantic Alliance covers only a limited geographical area. To what extent is it then legitimate to place military expenditure in Europe and in the rest of the world on the same footing?

77. Second, the larger industrialised countries, starting with the United States, invest almost entirely, or at any rate to a very great extent, in their national industries, which imposes no burden on their external balance of payments, while others have to purchase abroad a fairly large, and sometimes considerable, part of the equipment and weapons required for their forces. For this, they generally turn to their allies who are better placed and who hence derive commercial benefits from the purchases of their partners.

78. Third, in future the North American allies are likely to devote more resources to

civil defence and air defence in view of the growing threat from Soviet air forces and cruise missiles.

79. Fourth, comparisons vary considerably according to the facts on which they are based: in absolute figures¹, as a proportion of gross domestic product, as a proportion of the increase in GDP or in terms of per capita gross domestic product. Further account has to be taken of reference years and the continuity or discontinuity of the proportions established. It has thus been possible to make the comparisons in the table hereafter.

80. Simplified to a maximum for ease of reference, the table shows that between 1971 and 1979 the United States' share in the military expenditure of the countries of the Atlantic Alliance fell sharply whereas the military effort of Japan, which is not a member of the Alliance, rose, without, however, in proportion to its population and wealth approaching that of the members of the Atlantic Alliance. This partly explains the strength of Japan, which bears less of a military burden, in international competition. Again a comparison with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact member countries would show that the financial and human burdens they bear are in all respects far heavier than those of the countries of the Atlantic Alliance. Finally, your Rapporteur has not analysed the figures for the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance: they would show major disparities and diverging trends. These two factors are not directly concerned with his subject.

81. But he considers it essential to recall that in view of the increase in Soviet weapons all the members of the North Atlantic Council accepted, in 1977, the principle of an annual increase of 3% in constant terms in their military expenditure up to 1984, and this undertaking was renewed in 1979. Yet this promise has been followed up in only a few member countries of the Alliance while others, because of their economic and financial difficulties, have on the contrary continued to allow their military expenditure to slide. One of the merits of the present United States administration is clearly to have reversed the tendency which had persisted until 1979 and to have energetically and successfully in a reticent Congress, defended a budget aimed at improving the defence effort.

82. Without wishing to criticise the policy of one or other European country, your Rapporteur

1. Figures in this paragraph are taken from the United States Department of Defence publication "Report on allied commitments to defence spending - A report to United States Congress" by Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defence, March 1981.

	1971				1979			
	United States	Other members of the Atlantic Alliance	Japan	Total	United States	Other members of the Atlantic Alliance	Japan	Total
1. GDP (in 1979 constant dollars) (000 million).....	1,821	2,166	648	4,631	2,355	2,778	1,011	6,144
2. Population (millions).....	207.1	330	105.7	642.7	220.58	347.71	115.8	684.1
3. Per capita GDP (\$)......	8,793	6,553	6,132	7,209	10,678	7,989	8,636	8,982
4. Total defence expenditure (1979 constant dollars) (000 million).....	140.11	82.35	5.60	228.05	118.38	97.03	9.56	224.96
5. Total defence expenditure as % of GDP.....	7.1	3.6	0.9	5	5.2	3.4	1	3.7
6. Total active duty manpower (thousands).....	3,831.7	4,258.5	258.9	8,349.1	3,024	4,062.9	264	7,350.8
7. Total active duty manpower as % of population.....	1.85	1.29	0.24	1.3	1.37	1.17	0.23	1.07
8. Per capita defence expenditure (in 1979 constant dollars)	677	250	53	355	537	279	83	329

teur underlines the magnitude of the American effort and the firm language used by the United States Government in face of public opinion and Congress, which were strongly tempted to attribute responsibility for the Alliance lagging behind to the inadequate part played by their European allies. However this may be, a European effort and respect for the undertakings entered into in 1977 would be of great assistance to this administration in pursuing a policy which would perhaps associate Western Europe's security more closely than ever with that of the United States.

5. Arms co-operation

83. The present American administration has shown its willingness to pursue vigorously the ongoing attempts to improve the two-way traffic of transatlantic arms co-operation. It puts more emphasis, however, on industrial co-operation, such as the teaming up of industries in the production of components, than on other means of a division of labour. This approach might produce practical results as it is likely to be patterned according to existing skills and capabilities in the various countries. Yet, your Rapporteur feels from past experience that the two-way street cannot flourish without continued government support in persuading industry to give up part of their activities in return

for the benefits of shared research and development and larger scope for series production. Emphasis on industrial arrangements should therefore be no substitute for governmental activity. The same applies to overcoming Congressional pressures against procurement of European equipment.

6. Mutual confidence

84. The analyses which make up the present chapter show clearly that Europeans have no reason to doubt the determination of the United States Government to maintain forces in Europe, to negotiate a reduction in these forces or the limitation of their nuclear armaments only in order to attain a lower level of balance ensuring Western Europe's security and to do nothing which would separate Europe's defence from that of the United States or make less improbable a limited armed conflict in Europe in order to ensure theoretically much greater, but in fact illusory, security for American territory.

85. The main obstacle to this policy is the limited confidence which American public opinion, shocked by the Vietnam war and by setbacks in Iran and elsewhere, now has in the determination of Europeans to ensure their own defence. Apparent or real opposition to a

number of affairs outside Europe have been a contributory factor, as well as the demonstrations against the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in November 1981 whose magnitude seems to have struck American public opinion, some countries' failure to implement the North Atlantic Council's 1977 decision to increase military budgets, or others' trade policy towards the Soviet Union and its allies.

86. The necessary effort to re-establish a situation, which admittedly is not seriously jeopardised for the moment but which might be if present misunderstandings increase or worsen, must therefore be made in both Europe and the United States. Your Rapporteur does not therefore feel he should conclude his remarks about his talks in New York and Washington on a note of alarm but on a serious warning that can be fully effective in the United States itself only if it is first heeded in Europe.

87. Conversely, European sensitivities should also be spared. American defence policy seems to centre on two points: the survivability of the retaliatory strategic forces and the provision of an incentive to the Soviet Union to engage in substantial reductions by means of a determined American armament effort. The second of these objectives is most liable to arouse European apprehension. Therefore it would be desirable for new defence spending to be linked to specific programmes and capabilities of the Warsaw Pact in order to avoid stimulating a new spiral in the arms race. In addition, it would be desirable to draw up an agreed document on the present and future balance of forces which could be released to the public.

V. *Relations with the Soviet Union and its allies*

88. For reasons of society, history, civilisation, political habits and economic tradition and structure, the nature of the Soviet challenge is not understood in the same way in Europe as in America. Nor do the European countries themselves all share the same approach. The presence of *communist* ministers in the French Government and the existence of a powerful *communist* party in Italy are often interpreted in America as a sign of strong Soviet influence in these two countries, although here too there is a great difference between the administration, more sensitive inter alia to the reality of these countries' contributions to the Alliance's military effort, and public opinion, which is often inadequately informed.

89. Furthermore, the evolution of East-West relations in the last ten years, often covered by the vague word *détente*, has not always been understood in the same way in the United States and in certain European countries. For many Europeans *détente* was a new-style relationship between Eastern and Western Europe thanks to which trade could be increased to the benefit of the economies of all concerned and exchanges of persons and ideas could be developed leading to a more liberal trend in Soviet society and a relaxation of the Soviet grip on the people's democracies. Sacrifices were made by European members of the Atlantic Alliance, including the Federal Republic, particularly concerned by such a trend because of its responsibilities towards the whole German nation. It is not therefore surprising that the European members of the Atlantic Alliance should have set great store by the application of the Helsinki final act and the pursuit of the economic, cultural and above all human aspects of *détente*.

90. There were certainly fewer illusions on the American side about what it was possible to expect of the Soviet Union and its allies, and the United States followed rather than preceded its allies in Helsinki. But *détente* had other advantages for the United States: mainly it allowed a direct dialogue to be started with the Soviet Union at political level to avoid any crisis in international relations becoming too serious and leading to a direct confrontation between the two great powers and, at military level, to achieve a limitation of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, with a view to maintaining security based on mutual deterrence and at the same time limiting the expenditure involved in increasing and improving nuclear weapons. It is certain that some results have been achieved in these two respects. All are not satisfactory as may be seen from the present imbalance in continental-range missiles or the outbreak of disputes over their interests outside Europe, but although the conference to verify the application of the Helsinki final act held in Belgrade was a failure and the one held in Madrid, after dragging on for more than a year without achieving anything, was adjourned in April 1982 until some vague date in the autumn, the negotiations between the two great powers on the limitation of nuclear armaments seem about to be resumed in summer 1982.

91. These general considerations seem largely to explain the misunderstandings which have emerged over certain matters in the last two years.

92. Different assessments have emerged mainly on two occasions: the invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979, and the Polish coup d'état on 13th December 1981. Each time Europeans had the feeling that the United

States had been too slow in marking its determination to oppose the Soviet initiatives and then, afterwards, without consulting its allies, it had reacted with more vigour than they thought necessary in face of a *fait accompli* at the risk of jeopardising the advantages they hoped to draw from *détente*. The Americans for their part thought European reactions showed great weakness, but the Polish affair hardly delayed the opening of the Geneva negotiations on theatre nuclear weapons.

93. (i) *Afghanistan* has been occupied since 29th December 1979 by Soviet troops who are fighting a resistance movement which includes practically the whole population. Clearly it may be thought that this operation is a failure for the Soviet Union since it is caught up in a struggle seemingly without solution. However, the struggle remains within tolerable limits for the Soviet Union since, with 90,000 men, it is managing one way or another to remain in Afghanistan.

94. On the other hand, its position there considerably weakens the West's allies in the Middle East, particularly Pakistan. It also gives the Soviet Union a position of force within reach of the Gulf where it exercises an indirect threat at a time when the war between Iran and Iraq is making the area particularly vulnerable. Finally, the fact that, in the end, the West was incapable of reacting constitutes a considerable success for the Soviet Union and severely weakens the impact of statements that the United States and *a fortiori* Europeans may make about this area.

95. Immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States Government nevertheless decided to build up a large armed force capable of intervening at very short notice to ensure the security of western interests in the Gulf area and Europe was asked to take part in this force. The Europeans did not commit themselves, although certain countries considerably increased their naval presence in the Indian Ocean, whereas the United States considered, not without reason, that it was Europe's oil supplies rather than the United States' that came from the Gulf area. At present, the build-up of the United States rapid deployment force is being pursued at what seems to be a satisfactory rate, and it is widely considered by American public opinion as one of the very unfairly-shared burdens shouldered mainly by the United States for the benefit of mainly European interests.

96. (ii) *Poland*: The main difficulty raised by the Polish problem in relations between Europe and the United States stems from the policy of sanctions referred to by President Reagan in his speech on 29th December and which the United States is considering strengthening, having

noted that the dictatorship established in Poland on 13th December has remained inflexible. The Ten envisaged no sanctions in their decision of 4th January, although they firmly condemned the indirect intervention of the Soviet Union in Poland. At the most, the Ten announced that they would concert with the United States to avoid anything liable to jeopardise its action. In other words, they would not take part in the sanctions. In February, however, the Ten decided to reduce Community imports of Soviet goods by 1.34 %, a barely symbolic figure.

97. Similarly, at the special NATO meeting, economic measures were agreed upon such as freezing any further official credits to Poland for the purchase of goods other than food products and the suspension of negotiations intended to change the dates on which Poland's external debt fell due in 1981. Finally, since February there has been a succession of European and American missions in the United States and in Europe to reach joint decisions, particularly on meaningful reductions in the credits granted to the Soviet Union. The difficulties encountered by Europeans and Americans in reaching agreement on such matters have been noted above.

98. In fact, in both Europe and America, relatively firm statements conceal a practice of mentioning sanctions but doing nothing that might affect each one's specific interests.

99. Although consultations had been held with increasing frequency for more than a year, decisions were taken unilaterally by the United States, and Europe used this as a pretext for not being associated with them. The apparent result is to have doomed in advance any attempt to take concerted and consequently effective action in response to the coup on 13th December.

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100. Relations with the United States and its allies are still fundamental for the security of Europe and the West as a whole, and NATO is the natural forum for these consultations. It is very important for both the United States and the ten countries of the European Community to enter these consultations with a willingness in principle to adjust prepared positions after receiving the reactions from their other partners. Otherwise consultations have no meaning. For strategic commodities there is, of course, Cocom which keeps an up-to-date list of products which the West undertakes not to deliver to the eastern countries. There are probably more deep-rooted reasons for the "transatlantic misunderstandings" with which

the Alliance must continue to operate with little hope of overcoming them once and for all.

101. What is important, therefore, is to avoid a proliferation of unilateral measures which so to speak take the other allies by surprise, which was the very reason for the more regrettable misunderstandings and tension in recent years. Your Rapporteur is in no way suggesting the creation of new institutions. Those which exist are quite ample. But he believes they should be used more systematically than in the past so as to avoid unilateral positions being announced to public opinion which may give the impression that there are serious differences between the members of the Atlantic Alliance. It would therefore be most useful to explore the suggestions made by Ministers Genscher and Colombo to provide for more informal contacts between the Ten and United States representatives. This could be done at both the ministerial level and at the level of the Political Committee of European political co-operation with the aim of discussing general policy objectives thus promoting better understanding. New institutional links should be avoided.

VI. *Problems outside Europe*

102. The Atlantic Alliance covers a specific area and the member countries are not bound to consult each other about matters outside that area. However, since the Suez affair in 1956 members know that they cannot risk embarking upon operations abroad without a minimum of prior agreement. Further proof of this was the Vietnam war, during which Europe moved progressively away from the cause upheld by the United States. Consultations between the member countries of the European Community have since developed considerably and in many cases the representative of the country exercising the chairmanship has been able to speak for all the EEC countries in the United Nations. Furthermore, the reciprocal exchange of information between European and American members of the Atlantic Alliance has been developed, particularly in the framework of bilateral talks. However, exchanges of views have not been sufficiently numerous or rapid to avoid unilateral action by one or another leading to misunderstandings or crises in relations between Europe and the United States. Often the Ten have not been able to express a unanimous view. It may be noted however that tension has not been so widespread as in the past.

103. The principal difficulties now facing the West are in two areas:

(a) *The Middle East*

104. The Middle East is a particularly sensitive area for the whole of the western world, particularly Europe, because most of Europe's oil supplies come from the Gulf. There is great political instability in this area relatively close to the Soviet Union which in recent years has been active on the diplomatic scene. The invasion of Afghanistan, too, brought the Soviet army much closer to the mouth of the Gulf and the sources of oil consumed in Europe, thus giving the area even greater importance.

105. This instability and the threats to the region represented by the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the build-up of the Soviet navy and the establishment of naval posts of supply in the Indian Ocean where Soviet aircraft carriers often cruise, or even ships with a landing force capability, have led to a build-up in United States naval strength, too, and also in that of certain Western European countries, including France. The United States apparently welcomes unreservedly this European participation in the security of the area. But the main step taken by the Americans has been the creation of a rapid deployment force on American territory including forces of all arms, well-trained and capable of intervening at very short notice if necessary.

106. (i) *Israel and the problem of the Palestinians* is a particularly sensitive subject. The efforts announced by Europeans and Americans to restore fair and lasting peace suffer from their evidently different approaches. The 1978 Camp David agreements between Egypt and Israel were negotiated and signed under the sole aegis of the United States and Europe was reserved in its endorsement of them. The American veto on sanctions against Israel following its annexation of the Golan Heights, although the United States condemned Israel's decision, contrasts, in appearance at least, with the positions adopted by the Ten at the Venice meeting to recognise Palestinian right to self-determination and the right of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation to take part in negotiations. Such divergencies are detrimental to the West's credibility in the area. Both European and American positions recognise the need to restore peace on the basis of recognition of Israel's right to exist and the right of Palestinians to self-determination. In the past, many Europeans and the Americans did not have the same order of priorities, but recently their views have grown closer together. The policies of the Begin Government tend to erode support for Israel. On the other hand, acute divergencies among the Arab countries make spectacular initiatives seem inopportune.

107. Insofar as the United States seems to have little faith in global negotiations and

agreement, at least in the near future, it is trying to work on Israel to ensure respect for the Camp David agreements and moderation in any operations on the West Bank and in South Lebanon and on those Arab countries over which it can hope to exercise some influence to make them accept a specific settlement for each problem. It is afraid of European initiatives which, designed to treat the Palestinian problem as a whole, would in fact make a solution more difficult. Conversely, the United States unreservedly welcomes the participation of several European countries in the United Nations force in South Lebanon and even more in the one in the Sinai which is to guarantee respect for the territorial clauses of the Camp David agreements. It is an important new development that European countries are willing to share part of the responsibility for maintaining stability in the area.

108. (ii) The assassination of President Sadat showed that *Egypt*, linchpin of a policy aimed at restoring peace in the Middle East, was threatened, although the new Egyptian Government seems to be continuing the policy begun by President Sadat. It cannot ignore attempts at subversion by *Libya* which considers itself practically at war with the United States since the United States air force shot down two Libyan aircraft which attacked its planes in 1981 during United States manoeuvres to demonstrate opposition to Libya's unilateral decision to extend its territorial waters. The United States has accused Libya of being responsible for numerous attacks, particularly against American diplomats in Europe, and has severed diplomatic relations. The Europeans have not followed suit. In view of the traditional relations which some of them have with Libya, the evolution of intra-African relations in which Libya played, still plays or may one day play a rôle, particularly over Chad, Tunisia and even the Western Sahara, and certain pacifying gestures made by Libya recently, the European countries the most concerned are reluctant to envisage a break with Libya, whether or not they are convinced of Libya's responsibility in certain terrorist attacks.

109. (iii) *Saudi Arabia* is another pillar of western security in the Middle East and it too seems threatened. The military assistance granted to it by the United States is strongly contested by the Israelis and the Saudi Arabian Government for its part cannot envisage pursuing a policy leaning too strongly towards the West as long as the Palestinian question has not been settled. In recent years, it has made a major contribution to preventing the price of oil rising even higher, although this factor is now less decisive since the drop in the price of oil is largely due to worldwide over-production in view of slackening demand.

110. (iv) The war between *Iraq and Iran* is the fourth sector of uncertainty in the Middle East. So far, there have been no clear signs of Soviet intervention and the western countries, anxious not to allow the war to spread, have remained completely neutral. No one seems to have the wherewithal to convince the Iranian Government to accept the Iraqi Government's overtures.

111. (v) Similarly, recent events in *Syria*, with the uprising of certain factions of the population, have aroused no noticeable divergencies between the European and American partners and they all seem to be looking for a way to achieve Syrian disengagement in Lebanon and the restoration of the latter's sovereignty, thus implicating Syria, the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Israel. In spite of Soviet support for the Syrian Baath régime, there seems to have been general agreement that abstention was the only reasonable policy.

112. At the present time, therefore, there seem to be no deep-rooted differences between American policy and the policies of the European members of the Atlantic Alliance in the Near and Middle East. The principal difference seems to relate to the place which should be granted to the PLO in an agreement which the Europeans more than the Americans consider should be of a global nature if it is to last. However, to maintain this situation, exchanges of views on this area must be pursued in order to avoid remaining differences of opinion degenerating into confrontations.

(b) *Latin America*

113. The economic difficulties which have arisen throughout the world have hit Latin America particularly hard and revolutionary movements have sprung up almost everywhere, endangering the weaker régimes, as in Uruguay. Authoritarian governments have taken over in some of them, such as Chile and Argentina, whereas revolutionary movements seem to be making considerable headway in the smaller Central American countries able to receive Soviet assistance relayed by Cuba.

114. The United States is certainly extremely sensitive about events on the American continent where, since the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, it has been relentlessly opposed to interference on that continent from any foreign power. This applies in particular to Central America, where the United States has considerable economic, political and strategic interests. This has led the United States to grant political support or even military assistance to régimes which it considered capable of maintaining order and stability, sometimes at the expense of the freedom of the people and even the most fundamental human rights.

115. This is another question on which European public opinion may express its disagreement with American policy and European governments make known their objections. The first has not been lacking in recent months and some governments have gone even further, particularly the French Government which, in January 1982, announced its decision to supply the Government of Nicaragua, which itself supported an uprising by part of the population of El Salvador against its government, with arms to the admittedly limited value of \$ 25 million. This decision certainly sparked off unfavourable reactions from the United States Government which itself provided the El Salvador Government with a few military advisers, but above all it caused a storm in American public opinion which saw the government of a friendly allied country deliberately taking what it considered to be the side of Fidel Castro and the Soviet Union. The fact that President Mitterrand's visit to the United States in March 1982 led France to postpone the date of deliveries of arms to Nicaragua only partially solved a problem which was above all one which brought European intervention in Central American affairs where, in any event, it could not hope for very great results.

116. This in no way means that the United States has been insensitive to the reactions of its European allies, but the proximity of the threat it feels prevents it from acting in accordance with the same criteria as certain Europeans who are tempted to consider that the underlying cause of the trouble in Central and Latin America stems not from Soviet intervention through an intermediary country but from deep-rooted economic and social injustice and readily believe that an internal political change would be likely to solve the problem.

117. For the United States, on the contrary, events in the area are vital and it must first safeguard its national security, which does not necessarily preclude support for defenders of freedom and, if need be, social change allied with economic development. But it is not always easy to find a way to safeguard security and democracy, often endangered by economic difficulties, social inequality and anarchy. This twofold concern explains its economic and military support for El Salvador and the formation of the Central American Democratic Community on 19th January 1982 with Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador. There is a plan for \$ 350,000 million of economic assistance to this community and \$ 182,000 million of military assistance.

118. It was found possible to hold elections in relatively satisfactory conditions, in spite of the activities of armed rebels, in the country where there is the most disturbance, El Salvador, on

28th March 1982. The results showed the size of the forces most favourable to the restoration of democracy, economic recovery and social justice, to which the United States has decided to give its support. The elections to the constituent assembly allowed more than a million and a half electors to vote, probably representing about 70 % of citizens of electoral age, in spite of the rebels' attempts to impose a boycott, thus far exceeding all hopes. 40 % of the votes were for the Christian Democrats of Mr. Napoléon Duarte, who can hardly be left out of the government since presumably the United States will provide the financial assistance necessary only if he is included.

119. The situation was not the same in Guatemala, where the elections on 7th March 1982 seem to have been held in highly questionable conditions, which led to another military putsch which, on 23rd March, brought to power a team of officers apparently more determined than their predecessors to launch a real appeal to the electorate to restore a constitutional régime and encourage the economic and social transformations the country needs. After some hesitation, the United States seems prepared to grant assistance to this new team which appears to represent the country's best chance of avoiding dictatorship and civil war.

120. The time seems particularly unsuitable for Europe to become involved in Central American affairs at a time when the United States for its part seems about to find local political forces which have sufficient popular support and have the aim of making the economic and social transformations necessary for providing democracy with sound foundations, while excluding Soviet and Cuban influence. It is not sure that they will succeed, but it is certainly not for Europe to make them fail. Europe seems well aware of this since on 30th March 1982 the European Council, at the close of its Brussels meeting, stressed its concern about developments in Central America, emphasising that they stemmed from serious economic problems and social inequality aggravated by the world economic situation, and declared itself ready to associate itself with the Nassau group of countries (Canada, Colombia, Mexico, United States and Venezuela) in their policy of development assistance for Central America.

121. It should be added that in the dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the Falkland Islands, like the United Kingdom's European partners, the United States, often accused of providing undue support for authoritarian Latin American régimes, has sought to secure a solution of this crisis through mediation and strenuous negotiation. It is assumed that if these efforts fail the United Sta-

tes will support the United Nations resolution and, therefore, the British position, for, if it does not, relationships within NATO will be imperilled. In general, countries in both Western Europe and North America should in their policies stress the inhabitants' right to self-determination.

*
* *

122. But co-operation between Europe and the United States cannot be limited, in the third world, to trying to halt Soviet expansion. It is also essential to co-operate in the *North-South dialogue* which Europe is trying to develop with a view to meeting the economic challenge of underdevelopment. Generally speaking, Europeans are more receptive to the idea that North-South economic interdependence must be organised so as to improve forecasts of trade patterns and to stabilise the international economic environment. They are in fact often inclined to think that one of the main problems in international relations is the instability of the third world and North-South relations, hence their desire to increase assistance and revive the North-South dialogue in order to encourage the resumption of international trade. The Americans, on the contrary, often give priority to the importance of East-West relations and see no reason to interfere with free trade. Inter alia, they have reduced their contribution to the budget of the World Bank and the International Development Agency.

VII. Conclusions

123. The main question now raised by relations between Western Europe and the United States is to what extent the picture of a western world based on two equal pillars once evoked by President Kennedy still meets the wishes of both Europe and the United States. The question is a legitimate one in that on the European side institutional unity has made but little progress and has produced unified views on no more than a few mainly economic matters, and on the American side the priority once given to the dialogue with Western Europe, although still strongly asserted by the administration, sometimes seems to fade away when confronted with other necessities at the level of public opinion.

124. Yet the Committee's recent contacts in the United States allow it to state that at present there is no crisis in relations between

Europe and the United States. But there are many problems – and your Rapporteur has tried to describe and analyse the main ones – which, taken together and dramatised when blown up by public opinion, are liable to stir up serious misunderstandings and even sharp opposition which might be catastrophic for the joint security of the western world, i.e. for world peace and for the economic recovery which is being sought on both sides of the Atlantic.

125. Close consultations between allies seem more necessary than ever if such a development is to be avoided. They are certainly held and, from OECD to NATO including the IMF and the World Bank, there is no lack of appropriate institutional frameworks. Suggested improvements therefore concern two aspects in particular:

126. First, consultations should be permanent and automatic. This is far more a question of practice than an institutional problem and bilateral talks can help just as much as international institutions. It is above all a matter of preventing decisions being taken which might take other partners by surprise and cause unnecessary frustration and premature reactions.

127. Second, the fact that we are dealing with democracies where the decisions of the executive depend closely on the representatives of public opinion. As an American Congressman the Committee met pointed out, it is for these representatives to keep in touch with public opinion and to inform and guide it. Parliamentarians on both sides of the Atlantic should do some soul-searching to determine how far they fulfil the rôle that is theirs for the benefit of the Atlantic community as a whole and hence of their own electorates which, whatever the specific concerns of individual western nations, can hope to safeguard their freedom and prosperity only in the framework of western security and general economic recovery.

128. The western summit meetings to be held in Versailles and Bonn in June 1982 should provide an opportunity for reasserting these principles by North America, Europe and Japan. But it is in everyday practice rather than at large international meetings that transatlantic relations should be improved. Although it is true that its global responsibilities, particularly in the field of security, underscore the leading rôle which the United States can be expected to play, many worldwide problems cannot be solved satisfactorily except in close co-operation with Western Europe.

*European-United States co-operation for international
peace and joint security*

AMENDMENT 1¹
tabled by Mr. Hardy and others

1. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ weapons ” to the end.

Signed: Hardy, Miller, Urwin, Stoffelen

1. See 6th sitting, 17th June 1982 (amendment negatived).

*European-United States co-operation for international
peace and joint security*

AMENDMENTS 2 and 3¹
tabled by Mr. van Eekelen

2. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:
“ Welcoming the outcome of the meetings of heads of state or government at Versailles and Bonn which reaffirmed the solidarity and cohesion of the free world in maintaining peace and international security as well as in promoting economic co-operation based on respect of the principles of GATT, ”.
3. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 4 and insert a new paragraph as follows:
“ 4. To ensure that NATO governments continue to base their public assessments of the balance of forces on a common document along the lines of their recent publications; ”.

Signed: van Eekelen

1. See 6th sitting, 17th June 1982 (amendments agreed to).

*European-United States co-operation for international
peace and joint security*

AMENDMENT 4¹

tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and Mr. Urwin

4. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “regretting” and insert “noting”.

Signed: Baarveld-Schlaman, Urwin

1. See 6th sitting, 17th June 1982 (amendment negated).

*Evolution of the situation in Poland*REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Michel, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee: Sir Frederic Bennett (Chairman); MM. De Poi, Urwin (Vice-Chairman); Mr. Ahrens, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Berrier, Bertile, Conti Persini, De Bondt (Alternate: Michel), Della Briotta, van Eekelen (Alternate: Blaauw), Gessner, Hardy (Alternate: Hill), Kurt Jung, Lagneau, Lagorce (Alternate: Baumel),*

Lord McNair, MM. Mangelschots, Mommersteeg, Günther Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann (Alternate: Böhm), Thoss (Alternate: Berchem), Valiante, Vecchiatti, Wilquin.

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.

Draft Recommendation

on the evolution of the situation in Poland

The Assembly,

Recalling its Order 53, Recommendations 370 and 378 and the statement by its Presidential Committee of 8th January 1982;

Considering that the measures taken by the Polish Government, particularly on the occasion of 1st May 1982, to alleviate the state of siege fall far short of meeting the three conditions set by the North Atlantic Council on 11th January 1982 for re-establishing normal relations with Poland;

Regretting that the economic measures agreed by the North Atlantic Council to back up these conditions have not been applied more strictly;

Welcoming the fact that participants in the Madrid conference have refused to pursue their work in the circumstances created by the crackdown on 13th December 1981;

Noting that events in Poland on 1st, 2nd and 3rd May and recourse to further measures of constraint show that the Polish Government has found no means other than force to impose a policy rejected by the great majority of the population,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that consultations between the European and American members of the Atlantic Alliance are pursued and strengthened with a view to co-ordinating the measures taken and to be taken in respect of both Poland and the Soviet Union in order to convince them to meet the conditions set by the North Atlantic Council for re-establishing normal relations with Poland, i.e.:
 - (a) the de facto and de jure abolition of the régime imposed by martial law in Poland;
 - (b) liberation of all political prisoners;
 - (c) resumption of the dialogue between the government, free trade-unionism as formerly embodied by Solidarity and the Catholic church;
2. Assert that if these conditions are not fulfilled the resumption of the Madrid conference on the application of the final act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe would be seriously imperilled.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Michel, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. When it adopted Order 53 on 3rd December 1980, the WEU Assembly decided to instruct its General Affairs Committee "to follow developments in Poland and to report to it on this question at the next part-session". At the same time it requested its President "to convene an extraordinary session forthwith should the independence and sovereignty of Poland be jeopardised by an armed foreign intervention". The General Affairs Committee then asked Mr. Hanin to present at the June 1981 session a report on developments in Poland and, after a substantial number of amendments, the Assembly adopted the recommendation presented by the Rapporteur on behalf of the committee.

2. It may be wondered whether the events in Poland since 13th December 1981 called for a speedy reaction from the WEU Assembly or not. Although the case of armed foreign intervention could not be invoked and consequently the second part of Order 53 was not applicable, there could be no doubt about the first part since the presentation of Mr. Hanin's report in June 1981 in no way terminated the mandate of the General Affairs Committee to follow developments in Poland. Moreover, this mandate was renewed by the Presidential Committee on 8th January 1982.

3. The General Affairs Committee adopted a preliminary report submitted by your Rapporteur on 19th January 1982 and the Presidential Committee, under the procedure provided for in Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in turn adopted the corresponding recommendation in London on 8th February (Recommendation 378). However, it was clear that it would be difficult to merely ask the Assembly, at its June 1982 session, to ratify a text adopted by the Presidential Committee on 8th February. This text would have to be brought up to date to take account of subsequent events and of the reply of the Council to the statement adopted by the Presidential Committee on 8th January.

4. There is obviously no question of going back over the aspects of the problem already handled by Mr. Hanin in Document 870. The aim is to examine the evolution of the situation in Poland since the summer of 1981 and its implications for Europe. Indeed, while events in Poland since 13th December 1981 have been the subject of many declarations and positions

adopted by several European parliamentary or intergovernmental institutions, the present document will endeavour to situate these events in the framework of WEU's specific competences.

5. Had it been a strictly internal Polish matter, WEU would have had little to say. The infringement of human rights, political and trades union freedoms within a country which is not a member of WEU does not concern an organisation whose responsibilities are primarily directed towards collective defence and security. It would be more a matter for the Council of Europe or the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation. However, insofar as an internal situation in a country which is not a member of WEU may create a "situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability", Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty authorises the WEU Council and hence the Assembly to examine the matter. There is no denying that this is the case for the situation in Poland.

6. *A fortiori*, insofar as there is outside intervention in Poland, WEU is concerned. Yet while it is clear that there has been no armed intervention, it is no less evident that events in Poland since 13th December seem to be the result of the steady pressure the Soviet Union has exercised on the Polish authorities. In fact, this is hardly challenged by those who advise the governments of Western Europe to abstain from any reaction to events in Poland since their aim is to maintain peace, which clearly shows that they consider that the situation in Poland has not remained a purely internal matter but places at stake what they consider to be the essential interests of the Soviet Union.

7. Further, if it is considered that the cohesion of Western Europe is an important factor of its security and that any reactions by European countries towards the Polish affair might, if they diverged, jeopardise this cohesion, it may be seen that from this point of view too the security of Western Europe is affected, which also justifies the inclusion of the Polish question in the agenda of our Assembly.

II. Events in Poland

1. Evolution of the internal situation from June to December 1981

8. Three main factors have influenced internal developments. First, Poland's growing eco-

conomic difficulties. Its debts in the West have risen considerably, now amounting to some \$ 27,000 million, and Poland has had to ask for a deferment in the payment of its short-term debts to western banks, which had been granted to a very large extent before the crackdown on 13th December 1981. In addition, the food position deteriorated significantly making it necessary to introduce strict rationing in December 1981 and shortages extended to most basic consumer items. Finally, output was gravely jeopardised by the sharp deterioration in social reactions and the multiplication of disputes between the state and Polish workers. It is difficult to say which came first, the economic crisis or the political crisis, but the correlation between the two is obvious. For the Poles, economic difficulties have confirmed the bankruptcy of the régime. But at the same time they have provided the government with an excellent pretext for gaining acceptance of strict measures which have been presented as being essential for the necessary economic recovery of the country.

9. This must be stated clearly. It is evident that a meaningful economic recovery was essential and that this was not facilitated by the situation in Poland before 13th December. Some of the claims made by the unions affiliated to Solidarity were hardly compatible with this requirement. However, insofar as a dialogue was still possible and had been effectively started between Solidarity and the government authorities, it was possible to appeal to the very real patriotism of the Polish people to ask it to make the sacrifices necessary for maintaining the country's economic independence and restoring credit. By electing to use force, the Polish Government has certainly not chosen the best course to secure the effort and sacrifice necessary. On the contrary, there is every indication that the atmosphere created by the crackdown on 13th December makes it impossible for the government to appeal to Polish national cohesion and patriotism and it has thus placed itself in a position which will prevent it from achieving the necessary recovery.

10. The second factor is the remarkable development of Solidarity which managed in 1981 to represent practically the whole Polish nation. It extended to both farm workers and students and the state had recognised its representative nature. However, its extension made it more difficult to retain cohesion.

11. Solidarity held its first congress in Gdansk from 5th to 10th September and then from 29th September to 7th October 1981. A wide range of trends emerged at this Congress and on 29th September a majority voted to penalise the leaders of the union accused of accepting a compromise regarding the self-management of firms without consulting union

members. Nevertheless, on 7th October Mr. Lech Walesa was elected President of the union with 55 % of the votes which showed that those most in favour of caution and moderation remained in the majority in Solidarity and it was thus possible to continue a dialogue with the state authorities.

12. Among the decisions reached at this congress, emphasis should be laid on the request for a referendum on the self-management of firms and the adoption of a message to the workers of eastern countries expressing Solidarity's support for those who were working for trades union freedom and asking them to call for free elections. Finally, the Solidarity congress adopted a programme for the radical transformation of political and economic life in Poland, turning resolutely towards democracy.

13. Subjects of discord within Solidarity were more a question of timing imposed by the country's economic and social position than of aims pursued. Whereas Mr. Walesa had a majority in favour of advancing progressively in order to avoid perturbing the economy by a growing number of strikes, a large minority called for the immediate exploitation of the advantages gained. These divergences led to uncertainty in Solidarity's action. For instance, on 28th October the union called for a one-hour warning strike which was followed throughout the country but, on the 29th, it asked its members to stop all strike action immediately.

14. Several times proposals were made by certain leaders of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), as by Mr. Stefan Olszowski on 22nd September in favour of the formation of a national front combining the party, the Catholic church and Solidarity. On 4th November, General Jaruzelski received together Mr. Walesa and the Primate of Poland, Monsignor Glomp, to propose the formation of a Council of national agreement between the government, the church and Solidarity. Negotiations to this effect were opened on 17th November. This demonstrates that the possibilities of dialogue between the state and Solidarity were far from exhausted on 13th December and on that date the Polish Government was following a course which could allow the whole Polish nation to take part in the necessary effort of economic recovery provided, on its part, it was prepared to make meaningful concessions where freedoms were concerned. It might be wondered however whether outside considerations did not prevent it from making such concessions.

15. For a long time, thanks inter alia to Cardinal Wysziński, Primate of Poland since 1949, the Catholic church had remained the only social organisation independent of the communist party. Until the creation of Solida-

ity, it considered it was the sole defender of the identity and sovereignty of the Polish people, its freedom and human rights.

16. As from 1980, the Polish church upheld the claims of Solidarity which corresponded to these values: it could not remain outside the new movement. In 1981, particularly after Lech Walesa had been received by the Pope in Rome on 15th January, the Polish episcopate abandoned its traditional discretion and demonstrated its support for Solidarity more clearly. During the crisis, it tried to protect Solidarity, moderate its claims so as not to make them incompatible with state requirements and to serve as a mediator between the trade union and the public authorities.

17. Lech Walesa remained in close touch with Cardinal Wyszynski and always followed closely his advice about the need for moderation, particularly in the Bydgoszcz affair in March 1981. He maintained this privileged relationship with Archbishop Glemp, the successor to the Primate of Poland who died on 28th May. Moreover, he had both socialist and catholic advisers, such as Professor Gerek and Mr. Kurowski, the economist, who had a strong influence in Solidarity. The Catholic church was thus able to remind Solidarity of the need to avoid going too far or making exaggerated demands so as not to endanger the internal stability and sovereignty of Poland vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. On the other hand, in February 1981, it confirmed its moral support for the peasant union whose legality the Supreme Court had just denied, and it upheld Solidarity's claims against censorship and for the freedom of the press and radio. It took a public stand at the side of Solidarity when Archbishop Glemp celebrated a solemn mass before all the delegates to the trade union's first national congress in September.

18. The Catholic church's relations with the government were more delicate. On the one hand, the church had remained in contact with the authorities: for instance, the joint church-state committee met on 23rd March. But several times the church also warned the authorities of the dangers of an authoritarian policy. Thus, in February 1981 Cardinal Wyszynski declared that:

“the use of force, pressure, threats or irritating propaganda does not lead to domestic peace but, on the contrary, to further tension and protest.”

In November, the Catholic church remained silent about the question of a national coalition and, on 8th December, Archbishop Glemp warned members of the Sejm about the serious consequences of passing a law giving the government exceptional powers.

19. The third factor was the crisis in the Polish Communist Party (the PUWP). At a meeting of the Central Committee on 9th and 10th June, Mr. Kania had managed to avert the request of a minority which wished to renew the leadership of the party. He then stated that there was no valid alternative to the line of socialist renewal. The party held an extraordinary congress from 14th to 20th July during which the some 2,000 delegates, for the first time elected by militants, voted – for the first time too by secret ballot – to re-elect Mr. Stanislas Kania as First Secretary of the party. Finally, on 25th September the Sejm adopted a bill on self-management. After voting against the government bill, the members adopted an amended text which had the prior agreement of the leaders of Solidarity.

20. Everything then indicated that the socialist renewal announced by Mr. Kania was winning the day but on 18th October Mr. Kania was placed in a minority in the Central Committee and obliged to resign from his duties as First Secretary. The Prime Minister, General Jaruzelski, took over. Today, it appears clear that General Jaruzelski already then had the firm intention of using every means at his disposal to terminate the policy of compromise and democratisation thitherto followed by Mr. Kania. Already on 28th November, he had asked the Sejm to vote a law giving the government full powers, inter alia allowing it to suspend the right to strike. On 7th December, the Sejm, whose members had received a warning letter from the Polish Primate, Archbishop Glemp, rejected the government's proposal, and this created a situation which, to say the least, was unusual in a country of Eastern Europe. This did not prevent the police from intervening on 2nd December to evacuate the firemen's cadet school in Warsaw which had been occupied since 18th November by striking cadets and since the National Committee of Solidarity, at its meeting in Gdansk on 12th December, had decided to organise a national referendum on the exercise and methods of power, the government retaliated by imposing martial law on 13th December and setting up a Military Council of National Salvation under General Jaruzelski composed exclusively of officers. Many Solidarity leaders and intellectuals were arrested on that day.

21. It therefore seems that the main purpose of the government takeover on 13th December was not to correct a jeopardised economic situation but to solve a political crisis by restoring the absolute authority of the state and of the party over the country. The dismissal of Mr. Kania on 18th October had left the leadership of the Polish Communist Party in the hands of a team determined to employ every means to achieve this aim.

2. *The December 1981 crisis*

22. The deployment of strength which was to allow the government to quell all opposition started in the evening of 12th December 1981. During the night, the headquarters of Solidarity were occupied by the police and some union leaders were arrested. In a broadcast on Sunday morning, 13th December, General Jaruzelski proclaimed martial law and announced the arrest of extremist leaders of Solidarity, who were to be judged in a military court, and of several dozen people responsible for errors committed in the seventies, including the former First Secretary of the party, Edward Gierek.

23. The same day, the new Military Council of National Salvation decreed the suspension of union activities. A single radio and television programme was instituted and all regional stations were closed. This programme was directed by people in military uniform appointed by the authorities. All other journalists were sent on leave. Polish air space was closed to international traffic and all flights by LOT were cancelled and very strict measures taken to halt movement in the country. All the leaders of Solidarity were arrested. A curfew was imposed from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. and all connections with the outside world were cut off. Use of the telephone was tightly controlled and limited. Public meetings, entertainment and strikes were banned. All civil servants were placed under the orders of the army. All weapons had to be handed into the authorities and it was forbidden to leave national territory. All persons over 17 years of age could be detained for the duration of martial law by simple decision of the militia and visits to frontier areas were made subject to authorisation. Teaching establishments were closed and the press was banned except for the official organs of the Communist Party. Many sectors of the economy including transport, communications and energy sources were placed under military control and the death sentence was proclaimed for all who refused to serve under the regulations covering civil defence and militarised service. The meeting of the Sejm to be held on 15th December was adjourned.

24. In spite of the censorship, some information reached the West about the crackdown on 13th December. Solidarity seems to have been caught napping. The arrest of its leaders and the impossibility of communicating from one town to another prevented it from organising a response. But there were spontaneous manifestations, particularly in a large number of factories which were occupied by striking workers, as for instance the tractor factory in Ursus in the Warsaw area where the Solidarity office launched an appeal for a general strike, and

several other places, including the naval shipyard in Gdansk, the Nowa Huta factory and several mines in the Katowice area. It took several days and the intervention of large numbers of armed forces backed by armour to winkle out the strikers from the premises they were occupying. According to the government, the cost of this action was 7 deaths, 404 wounded and 3,500 arrests. In fact, the number of victims was probably far greater although accurate figures cannot be given.

25. As a result, active resistance practically stopped in the last days of December 1981 and in the first days of January the resumption was announced of a number of activities and the limited relaxation of certain measures such as the curfew. Thus the use of force by General Jaruzelski and the Polish army succeeded, thanks to its surprise effect, in reducing to silence and disorganising Solidarity without having to call for the direct intervention of the Soviet Union, and established a dictatorship in Poland which is still in place and which there is no reason to think will be terminated in the near future.

3. *The question of Soviet intervention*

26. The Soviet Union has never made any secret of the fact that it was not prepared to accept the evolution of Poland towards a pluralist régime, be it political or unionist, and it has exerted steady pressure on the Polish authorities for them to use every means at their disposal to repress the movement started by Solidarity in 1980, without hesitating to wield the threat of direct intervention should the Polish authorities not achieve this result. Obviously we can only know about the pressure that has been made public but there are enough pointers to be able to deduce what more discreet intervention there has been, particularly if account is taken of the memories of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 in the minds of the Soviet and Polish authorities.

27. As early as 4th March 1981, Soviet and Polish leaders met after the 26th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet leaders then insisted that the course of events be reversed in Poland. Soviet warnings have been multiplied since June. For instance, on 5th June, after the release of the last persons imprisoned in Poland because of their opinions, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party called upon the leaders of the Polish Communist Party to wage effective war against counter revolution. Mr. Gromyko, Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, went to Warsaw from 3rd to 5th July and reaffirmed that Poland was, is and will be a lasting link in the socialist community. On 14th August, Mr. Kania and

General Jaruzelski went to Crimea at the invitation of Mr. Brezhnev and on the 15th subscribed to a communiqué denouncing the various destructive actions of forces hostile to socialism in Poland, underlining that the USSR was surveying the situation attentively and very seriously.

28. The Solidarity Congress in September was sharply condemned by Tass which described it as an anti-socialist and anti-Soviet orgy and on 10th September Moscow called upon Warsaw to take immediately energetic and radical measures against anti-Soviet manifestations. Finally, on 11th December Tass accused Solidarity of preparing to overthrow the government. Conversely, from the moment General Jaruzelski had accomplished his coup d'état on 13th December he had the steady support of Moscow, which was confirmed *inter alia* during his visit to Moscow on 2nd and 3rd March 1982. As from 13th December, Moscow had made it known that it considered this to be an internal Polish matter and the Soviet press has steadfastly accused the United States and its western allies of encouraging Solidarity to rebel against the authorities and of intervening in Poland's internal affairs.

29. Admittedly there is nothing to indicate that the Soviets envisaged immediate military intervention in the 13th December takeover. No special movement by Soviet troops was monitored by the United States which, for its part, felt no need to place United States forces in Europe in a state of alert. Yet Soviet intervention in Polish matters has been evident throughout the crisis. It is more than probable that Soviet pressure and the threat of direct military intervention convinced General Jaruzelski to effect a coup d'état on 13th December. The presence of Soviet elements in Poland has since been reported on several occasions although it cannot be claimed that there has been large-scale intervention.

30. In the present state of knowledge of the situation in Poland obviously nothing can be said about the exchanges between General Jaruzelski and the Soviet leaders, but the facts themselves show that very strong pressure has been brought to bear, leading, *inter alia*, to the elimination of Mr. Kania and the concentration of power in the hands of General Jaruzelski who seems to have been more receptive to Soviet pressure than the other leaders of the Polish party. This intervention was emphasised by the United States President, Mr. Reagan, in his speech on 29th December and by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the European Community countries when they met in Brussels on 4th January 1982.

31. While it is therefore difficult to give an opinion on the policy pursued by General Jaruzelski and whether it corresponds to deep-

rooted convictions or his concern to avoid for his country – and at the same time for Europe and the world – Soviet military intervention, it is far less difficult to note that this policy has been imposed by the Soviet Union which, beyond doubt, is truly behind the seizure of power on 13th December and subsequent events. To close one's eyes to this on the grounds that it is an internal Polish matter is tantamount to taking shelter behind a legal position which may perhaps be comfortable but which in no way corresponds to reality. This is why the Polish question is of interest to all Europeans and concerns WEU.

4. *Evolution of the situation since 13th December 1981*

32. Four months after the establishment of the state of emergency on 13th December, the situation in Poland has changed little. The "state of war" was confirmed by the Sejm on 25th January and although certain restrictions on the freedom of the population have been eased and the number of political prisoners dropped from 6,000 to 3,000 between January and April, the government is mainly supported by the military and police system it has set up. It has no social foundation and Polish society is proving increasingly hostile: practically no intellectuals or artists support the régime, the television is boycotted, and resistance, although passive, is increasingly visible in spite of the apparent "normalisation". Outward signs are the spread of clandestine masses, strikes and symbolic gestures such as the presence of factory delegations at the christening of Walesa's new-born child in Gdansk on 20th March.

33. The military authorities are increasing their efforts to give the impression that the country has returned to work again in an atmosphere of calm. But they are systematically continuing repression, particularly by asking for "declarations of loyalty" from civil servants, workers, journalists, artists and teachers, by militia operations to enforce martial law, by imprisonments and condemnations – for instance, 150 members of Solidarity have been condemned for having organised strikes or other protest movements since 13th December – and by encouraging opponents of the régime to emigrate. Finally, after the establishment of military control over key sectors of industry, agriculture in turn has been placed under army control. However, it very quickly became apparent to the authorities that they could not use the full force of the army to eradicate pockets of active resistance: this was done in January by militia shock troops, for instance during the violent demonstrations in Gdansk on 30th January.

34. General Jaruzelski defined the three main aims of his policy in his speech in the Sejm on 25th January as:

- (i) re-establishment of state authority;
- (ii) development and enhancement of democracy on the basis of national understanding in which connection he considered contacts with the church but not with Solidarity;
- (iii) revival of the national economy.

At the same time, he announced that the state of war would be terminated as soon as possible but that any action by anti-state forces would harden the position. There could be no question of reverting to the pre-August 1980 position or to the pre-13th December "anarchical" situation but General Jaruzelski promised to return to a "front of national understanding" without Solidarity but with civil committees of national salvation which have been set up everywhere and which include members of the three legal parties. As the days pass, this "understanding" draws closer to the Polish United Workers' Party, under the control of the army, satellite groups and unrepresentative civil committees, whereas Solidarity no longer has any legal existence and "social committees" set up in firms are visibly intended to take its place. Its President, Lech Walesa, and his colleagues are still in captivity.

35. The Polish Communist Party, after losing members and suffering divisions, is now being built up again and is moving out from under the wing of WRON (the Military Council of National Salvation) to assume a leading rôle on the lines of the Soviet model. At the seventh plenum of the party central committee on 24th and 25th February, it made its first task the stabilisation of its membership after 600,000 had left it. At the same time, it carried out an internal purge, from the bottom to the top. Its statutes, made more democratic at the last congress, were suspended to make it easier to regain control. A timetable and a long-term programme of action adopted by the political bureau in March confirm that the leading rôle is now in the hands of the headquarters. However, all the WRON leaders are members of the Polish United Workers' Party and loyal to the interests of the "socialist camp". Nevertheless, there still seems to be some dissension in the junta between those in favour of repression and who have the support of Moscow, General Jaruzelski and his supporters who are believed to adopt a "centrist" position and the "moderates", who are in favour of major reforms. Dissension is mainly over information and propaganda. The isolation in which the government is trying to keep Poland helps to strengthen the people's hostility towards the govern-

ment. 21 newspapers, more than 705 journalists and the journalists' association have had to stop work.

36. The "democratic process" referred to by General Jaruzelski in his programme speech is thus aimed only at re-establishing the supremacy of the Communist Party and Poland's membership of the Warsaw Pact. The government is consequently isolated from society with which it no longer has any means of organising a dialogue.

37. To revive the national economy, there has been talk of reintroducing certain forms of market economy, as Hungary has done in the last ten years. On 26th February, the Sejm adopted the principle of economic reform based on independence for firms, self-financing, financial profitability and self-management. But the consequences were a sharp rise in prices, which increased three- or fourfold at one fell swoop on 15th January following the freeing of prices decided upon on 3rd January, and the 71% devaluation of the zloty. Although the aim of these measures was to eliminate the black market, it should be recalled that price increases were the cause of rioting in both 1970 and 1976. Moreover, the control assumed by the army over all sectors of the economy, including agriculture as from April, and the absence of freedom of expression contradict this policy and demonstrate that the first aim of the takeover was not economic reform but political control. In a way this was moreover what Mr. Obodowski, Polish Minister for Economic Affairs, admitted in his first interview in the western press on 25th March: "Martial law cannot reform the economy. Nor does it solve political problems. However, all these questions can be solved in an atmosphere where law and order prevail as a result of the introduction of martial law."

38. In fact, since the beginning of January the economic situation has worsened: imports from the West fell by 50% in February and exports by 10%. In spite of increasing coal output and better discipline, the shortage of raw materials and spare parts is causing considerable difficulties; Polish industry is running at half-capacity, factories are closing down or slowing down output and the GNP, which fell by 25% in 1980, is expected, according to official estimates, to fall by between 15 and 20% in 1982. It is not known how far estimates take account of the generalised passive resistance which the authorities call laziness and which is still to be found.

39. Polish leaders see their position further weakened by the Polish debt to western countries. They have asked for moratoria not only on the capital which is due to be reimbursed but also on the interest. In the negotiations on

this subject, they have not failed to point out that western economic pressure could but strengthen Poland's dependence on the Soviet Union and lead to social unrest which might delay the end of the state of war. In this way they probably hope to soften the western attitude for, in spite of its present development, trade with Comecon cannot entirely replace what the Polish economy derives from co-operation with the West. Since 6th January, Poland has been increasing its trade and financial agreements with the Soviet Union and Comecon and one might say that the Polish economy is being reintegrated into the Soviet orbit since the assistance granted is conditional. But to a considerable extent Polish industry depends inherently on imports of equipment from the West, and the slow-down of external trade is further aggravating economic paralysis, unemployment and the disastrous fall in the standard of living.

40. Mr. Rakowski, Deputy Prime Minister, said on 20th January that Poland would have to face at least five difficult years in order to straighten out its economy and, in April, General Jaruzelski announced that economic austerity measures would last until 1990 at least.

41. Everything shows that the measures taken in Poland since January 1982 were not designed primarily to effect an economic recovery but rather to restore political order and put an end to contestation, considered too dangerous. The official line of preventive action to avoid civil war already proves to what extent economic recovery is secondary. For many Poles, in fact, 13th December was not the culminating point of the open conflict between the authorities and the trade union but the moment chosen by the authorities to end the free trade union experiment and the democratisation which it has always refused.

42. On the other hand, following the crack-down on 13th December, the Polish episcopate quickly reacted, declaring on 15th December that it was convinced the nation would not take a step backwards and that it could not give up the democratic renewal announced to the country. Its action has since been concentrated on the following aims:

- an end to the state of siege which it has called an infringement on freedom;
- more humane conditions of detention for those in prison and their early liberation;
- restoration of statutory activities for trade unions, particularly Solidarity, essential for a balanced social life.

43. In fact, at the beginning of January the Catholic church seemed to be the only possible

instrument for mediation: religious services were the only public gatherings allowed. However, priests were arrested and all were subjected to restrictions on their movements. This is because, since 13th December, the church has been the only obstacle to normalisation, and although the Primate has not preached active resistance or called for a radical condemnation of the takeover which some had expected, there was no question of co-operation with the state as long as a state of war lasted.

44. The church was probably above all anxious to prevent blood being shed, but it had to bear in mind that resistance could lead to violence, and it therefore sought political détente, an amnesty, a revival of Solidarity. For this, it was prepared to start talks. On 9th January, Archbishop Glemp met General Jaruzelski. The joint church-state committee met on 18th January. But at the end of January the Polish episcopate showed its disillusionment; its protests were not preventing the government from continuing to make arrests or having the "declaration of loyalty" signed against which it had been protesting since December.

45. The attitude of Pope John Paul II, whom Archbishop Glemp visited at the beginning of February, came up to the expectations of at least part of the clergy and the episcopate who no longer had any hopes about the government's good will. For John Paul II, in fact, there was no question of relinquishing any of the conquests of the last sixteen months.

46. The first meeting of the plenary conference of the Polish episcopate on 2nd March and the sermon given by the Primate on 7th March showed that the Polish church endorsed the position adopted by the Pope: "tell the truth" and stop compromising. Henceforth, the church is a possible but uncompromising interlocutor for the government. The military and political authorities still have to accept such mediation, i.e. go back on the measures taken on 13th December, for the very purpose of avoiding negotiations with Solidarity. There is thus no reason to hope that mediation by the Catholic church is foreseeable in the coming months.

47. At the time of writing, it is still possible to wonder about the reasons, scope and consequences of the measures announced by the Polish Government on 1st May. These include freeing a further contingent of political prisoners to reduce the number from about 3,000 to some 2,000, ending the curfew, re-establishing long-distance telephone calls, lifting the requirement for prior permission to hold meetings of authorised associations and relaxing some foreign trade restrictions. An indication that the state of war is not at an end is that

these steps towards relative liberalisation were announced as tentative and liable to be revoked if need be, even by regional or local authorities. These are slender concessions indeed after almost five months of iron rule.

48. Nevertheless, they show a tendency on the part of the Polish authorities to move towards relaxing the state of war while at the same time appealing to the good will of the Poles. The government may have the impression that it is being partly successful, particularly since the announcement on 28th April that Mr. Kerlaj, President of Rural Solidarity, endorsed the régime – freely or by force – and that other leaders might thus be encouraged to do so. But the announcement by the underground press that Solidarity had been reorganised in secret by some of the trade union's regional presidents who had eluded the police since 13th December indicates that Solidarity and the Polish people will not rally to the régime so easily. It also appears that, however limited, the sanctions applied by the West and in particular Poland's difficulty in arranging to repay its external debt encouraged the government to adopt a more liberal approach in the hope of bending the West's relatively firm stand. Finally, the government hoped to take the sting out of a possible boycott of the official demonstrations on 1st May and more particularly the demonstration prepared by the clandestine leaders of Solidarity for 13th May.

49. In any event, measures for relaxing the state of war announced for 1st May are not likely to change opinions about developments in Poland since 13th December. Normalisation is the same as was imposed in Czechoslovakia after the fall of Dubcek. Its imposition will have to be prolonged and with particular severity since the government stands alone in a society which rejects it and the inflexible deployment or even use of force remain its only means of achieving its ends.

50. The demonstrations which took place in almost all the main Polish towns on 1st, 2nd and 3rd May confirmed this view in three essential respects. It was evident, in spite of all the means available to it, that the government was unable to mobilise the people but Solidarity, although threatened, succeeded and this clearly showed the failure of the régime set up on 13th December. Finally, the precariousness of the relaxations in the state of siege allowed for 1st May has been proved since the previous, or more severe, conditions have been reintroduced in all these towns. Hence there is clearly little chance of certain forms of freedom being effectively restored if the government fails to reach agreement with the truly representative factions of the Polish people, Solidarity and the Catholic church.

5. *The Soviet attitude since 13th December*

51. The military takeover on 13th December was considered by the Soviet Union as a step towards regaining the unity of the socialist community. However, the official position was expressed only in an article published in Pravda on 10th January by a member of the Central Committee. The Polish crisis was analysed as follows: "The Polish crisis is mainly the result of concerted and systematic activities by reactionary forces inside and outside the country seeking to undermine the institutional bases of the Polish state and its social régime". No further mention was made of errors attributable to the Polish Party and Government. Full responsibility for the crisis was placed on "the enemies of socialism". Inside the country, "Solidarity extremists had already, under the authority of Washington and other NATO capitals, shared out portfolios in the government which was to take over in Warsaw after the overthrow of the present régime". Outside the country, the United States wished to make Poland a "hotbed of destabilisation" and seemed determined to "pursue an undeclared war against this socialist country". The takeover had therefore averted such a situation, which corresponds to the explanation given by the Polish Government.

52. Contacts between Poland and the Soviet Union were resumed in January at every level. The Ministers of Trade and Foreign Affairs and a member of the secretariat of the PUPW each went in turn to Moscow during the first week of January in order to normalise relations and obtain additional economic assistance. On 6th January, a protocol on trade and payments for 1982 was signed. It included privileged conditions for paying the difference in the cost of reciprocal deliveries. In 1981, the Soviet Union supplied Poland with 60% of its raw materials imports and 90% of its energy and food imports to enable the Polish Government to keep its head above water, while Polish deliveries fell by 50%. The same was true of credits. It seems clear that the Soviet Union will have to pay a high economic price for restoring order in Poland, and the Polish crisis may have serious drawbacks for the Soviet bloc, quite apart from the effects of western reactions. Poland is the Soviet Union's second trading partner and it is understandable that Mr. Brezhnev's confidence and Moscow's political and economic support for the Polish Government are still tinged with doubt.

53. Moreover, the Soviet press soon showed a degree of impatience with the tolerance of Polish leaders for Walesa and Solidarity and with open-ended normalisation. In February, it re-emphasised the evolution of the situation in Poland and expressed two main concerns:

anti-socialist opposition hardly seems to have abated, witness the incidents in Gdansk, Poznan and Warsaw; the PUWP was weakened during the period leading up to 13th December and is far from having recovered its lost positions. In fact, the Soviets have difficulty in hiding their concern about the relaxation of emergency measures too soon. In the absence of a political solution, they have had to acknowledge that for the time being only the army is capable of maintaining order in Poland and putting the country's economy back on the rails. General Jaruzelski's visit to Moscow on 2nd and 3rd March showed that he remained loyal although his government had visibly not managed to eradicate the counter-revolution. However, there are signs of suspicion about the military power and the desire for the PUWP to resume its leading rôle. Moscow openly supports the most uncompromising trend among the Polish leaders. Thus, in recent weeks the Soviet Union has been visited by Mr. Kociolek, First Secretary of the PUWP, Mr. Orzechowski and Mr. Siwak, who are among the most hostile to any form of opening and liberalisation. The Soviet press never mentions the promises of "renewal" which even General Jaruzelski has made, nor the possible reconstitution of trade unions. The Soviets therefore seem to expect General Jaruzelski to restore order in the most orthodox manner while respecting their wishes unconditionally.

54. In the meantime, the Soviet Union has promised to increase the value and quality of its economic assistance to Poland. After lending \$ 3,700 million in January, it is reported that \$ 1,700 million were lent in March following General Jaruzelski's visit so that Poland might pay the interest owed to European banks. In exchange, Poland is to reorganise its economy in order to rebalance its trade.

55. Where the western countries are concerned, the Soviet Union adopts different positions according to whether it is dealing with the United States or with Europe. It reacted to the various western statements by a violent attack on the United States and an attempt to deter Europeans from taking economic retaliatory measures, while endeavouring to divide them. For instance, Moscow had a moderate reaction to the ten-power declaration on 4th January. Pravda protested at the Ten's threats and warnings, reproached them for deliberately dramatising the international situation, but mentioned their "attachment to maintaining co-operation, even economic, with the socialist states".

56. The Soviets used sharper language about the United States. In January, Pravda accused the United States of blackmailing the European Governments by threatening to abandon the Geneva negotiations on the limitation of inter-

mediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The Soviets did not fail to emphasise that the most severe sanction taken by Washington, which concerned the Siberian oil pipeline, in the long run affected Europe more than the Soviet Union. But the NATO declaration of 11th January showed that there was still agreement in the West; it was therefore considered to be an "unacceptable interference in Polish affairs" running counter to all the principles of international relations. Accusing the United States of violating the Helsinki agreements by "supporting the plot by counter-revolutionary forces to overthrow the authorities in Poland", Pravda made little mention of sanctions, or stressed that their effects were quite negligible, particularly if they were not followed by the Europeans.

57. It seems that the Soviet Union's main aim was to minimise the political impact of American sanctions by making sure of western food assistance in Poland and forestalling Poland's failure to pay its debts to the West, since Poland's bankruptcy would endanger the credit of the whole Soviet bloc and Moscow's ability to borrow on western markets. At the same time it emphasised that the Europeans were liable to lose positions in Soviet external trade which might be difficult to recover. But the Soviet Union for its part has serious reasons for wishing to maintain these trade links at a time when it is experiencing growing economic difficulties. In other words, a meaningful concerted policy of western sanctions is not necessarily condemned to remain without effect on Moscow, nor on Warsaw.

III. *Western reactions*

1. *The western position in 1981*

58. The seizure of power on 13th December occurred at a time when the members of the Atlantic Alliance had had ample opportunity to consult with each other on the measures to be taken in the event of Soviet intervention in Poland. They had done so moreover in the North Atlantic Council and in the course of political consultations between members of the European Community. Not very satisfactory results had been achieved however in the course of these consultations because of difficulties in relations between these countries and differences over problems concerning their joint defence. Public opinion had just become aware of the overwhelming superiority of the USSR in continental-range missiles in addition to its clear lead in conventional armaments and the consequential threat to Western Europe. Although the American administration seemed prepared to make the necessary effort to deploy

continental-range nuclear weapons in Europe in the relatively near future, European opinion proved to be sharply divided over the expediency of such action. Relations between Europe and the United States suffered a serious setback from this in spite of the apparent unanimity achieved at the NATO ministerial meeting in December 1979 on the deployment of these weapons.

59. Neither the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan nor Soviet threats to Poland prevented the development of campaigns against the deployment of NATO's new weapons in many countries of Western Europe although it was common knowledge that the West's inferiority in the field of defence considerably weakened any protests it might voice against Soviet expansionism. Yet it cannot be said that western reactions have had no effect on Soviet policy. However weak they may have been, the measures taken, particularly by the United States, after the intervention in Afghanistan and the warnings given in 1981 regarding Poland have probably helped to persuade the Soviet Union to play for time in the Polish crisis and to avoid direct military action. It may therefore be thought that if the West had been more firm and more united its deterrence would have been far more effective. In the end, the widespread pacifist demonstrations in Europe at the end of 1981 and the negative reactions they aroused in the United States helped to convince the Soviet leaders that the international situation in December 1981 was not too unfavourable to a show of force in Poland.

2. *The United States position*

60. The deterioration of co-operation between the United States and some of its European allies certainly explains to a very large extent the divergences that quickly appeared over the way to respond to the demonstration of force in Poland on 13th December. Admittedly, immediate reactions were fairly convergent. There was near unanimity on both sides of the Atlantic in condemning the methods used by General Jaruzelski. However, from the moment there was question first of denouncing the responsibility of the Soviet Union in Polish affairs and then of defining a joint policy for the West to meet the new situation, very serious differences came to the fore.

61. The United States reacted very quickly to the introduction of military rule in Poland and on several occasions President Reagan strongly condemned the repression exercised by the Polish Government. Speaking in Los Angeles on 29th December, he spelt out a number of sanctions. Referring to the heavy and direct responsibility of the Soviet Union for the

repression in Poland, the United States President announced that his country was taking the following steps:

- (i) requirement of licences for the export of an expanded list of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union and suspension of all such licences for a wide range of material including pipelayers;
- (ii) suspension of the issuance or renewal of export licences to the Soviet Union for computers, electronics and other high technology items;
- (iii) suspension of all service to the United States of the Soviet airline Aeroflot;
- (iv) closure of the Soviet purchasing commission in the United States;
- (v) postponement of negotiations on a new long-term agreement for the sale of American grain to the Soviet Union;
- (vi) suspension of negotiations on a new United States-Soviet maritime agreement and a new régime of port access controls for all Soviet ships when the current agreement expires on 31st December;
- (vii) non-renewal of United States-Soviet exchange agreements soon to expire, including those on energy, science and technology.

The United States President added that his country would make a complete review of all other United States-Soviet exchange agreements and should other measures prove necessary he was prepared to take them. American decisions would be determined by Soviet actions.

62. In the same statement, President Reagan nevertheless said the United States wished to maintain "a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with the Soviet Union and... a high level dialogue. But we are prepared to proceed in whatever direction the Soviet Union decides upon - towards greater mutual restraint and co-operation, or further down a harsh and less rewarding path". Finally, President Reagan at the same time said that the Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, had been in contact with the United States allies about the measures being taken to explain why such action was essential at the present time.

63. It is not unimportant to note that these measures were planned far more as means of pressure on the Polish and Soviet Governments than as reprisals as such since, on the one hand, the United States Government announced its

intention to relax them or tighten them depending on the evolution of the situation and, on the other hand, they in no way affected the instruments of the political dialogue between the two superpowers. Destined to demonstrate the determination of the United States, they left it the possibility of giving the Polish people the benefit of this firmness by not burning bridges for the pursuit of the follow-up conference in Madrid on the application of the Helsinki final act, nor for the SALT negotiations.

64. By their very nature, these measures can be effective only if the United States' European allies adopt similar ones, or at least do not thwart them, and thus demonstrate that they share the United States' determination and do not wish the Soviet Union to evade the effects of the American decisions by turning to European suppliers. Here it may be wondered whether the consultations between the United States and its allies were as far-reaching as President Reagan gave to understand.

65. Admittedly, the Polish question was on the agenda of the NATO ministerial meeting in June 1981 and of all the meetings between members of the Atlantic Alliance throughout the year, but the announcement of these measures seems to have preceded any true consultation of the United States' European allies. However, these decisions were announced on the eve of the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of ambassadors which had been convened mainly to examine the situation in Poland and at which the American representative presented and commented on the decisions by President Reagan stopping short, however, of formally asking the European members of the Alliance to endorse them. However this may be, and in view of the statements by President Reagan between 13th and 29th December, it cannot be claimed that this was a unilateral step about which the United States' partners knew nothing until the last moment.

3. *European reactions*

66. For their part, the countries of Western Europe have shown little unity and in general have been far less firm than the United States in their reactions to the repressive moves on 13th December. Although all expressed disapproval of the Polish Government's policy, several voiced their disapproval so as not to involve the Soviet Union and no true retaliatory measures have been decided upon by the European members of the Atlantic Alliance.

67. The NATO Council meeting on 31st December allowed the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to inform his colleagues of the content of the message from

Chancellor Schmidt to Mr. Brezhnev and the answer he had received, and to describe the discussions Vice-Chancellor Genscher had held in Bonn on 30th December with Mr. Rakowski, the Polish Deputy Prime Minister. At this meeting, Mr. Genscher was said to have asked the Polish Government to take three specific steps: end martial law, release those interned since 13th December and re-establish the dialogue between the government, the Catholic church and Solidarity. All the western countries seem to agree on this expression of their requirements with regard to the Polish Government, as is testified by the declaration adopted by the Ten on 4th January 1982.

68. The joint declaration adopted on 4th January by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the ten member countries of the European Community is appended to the present document. They were outspoken in their disapproval of the Polish Government's action and launched a pressing appeal to restore the dialogue between the state, the church and Solidarity. However, they were far more cautious in their attitude towards the Soviet Union since they merely "note with concern and disapproval the serious external pressure and the campaign directed by the USSR and other Eastern European countries against the efforts for renewal in Poland", which is a particularly restrictive way of describing Soviet responsibility in this matter. Regarding retaliatory measures, the Ten merely "take note of the economic measures taken by the United States Government" and show no sign of adopting parallel measures. Finally, they decided to propose an early resumption of the Madrid meeting to discuss developments in Poland. All in all, the statement adopted at the ten-power meeting stops well short of the positions adopted by President Reagan and there is no question of retaliatory measures against the Soviet Union. However moderate the declaration may have been, the Greek Government disavowed its Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who had endorsed the ten-power declaration.

69. At the very time the Brussels meeting was being held, General Jaruzelski was giving the ten ambassadors whom he had convened a negative answer to these requests. This was the first time however that a head of government of a country of Eastern Europe had thus recognised ten-power Europe as a political entity. However, General Jaruzelski's conditions for releasing some of those detained were that they should abstain from any political action, the others being certain of lengthy detention or exile, and there was no question of the government holding conversations with the former leaders of Solidarity.

70. On 5th January, Chancellor Schmidt went to the United States where he had a leng-

thy discussion with President Reagan, in the course of which he undertook, on behalf of the Ten, to take no measures liable to detract from the effects of the measures decided upon by the Americans but there was no question of them taking similar measures, which strictly limited the scope of this undertaking. Finally, France and Greece are reported to have been against sending Mr. Leo Tindemans, new President of the Council of the Community and Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Warsaw and Moscow to inform the Polish and Soviet Governments of the joint positions adopted by the Ten. It is believed that some members of the European Community wished to denounce the Soviet intervention in Poland and draw the practical consequences thereof, but their views failed to gain acceptance at the meeting in Brussels.

71. Europe's inability to define a policy in the Polish question, in spite of the ample time the Europeans had to work out a joint reaction, is most disturbing because it helps to isolate Europe from the United States. When Afghanistan was invaded, the Europeans had no hesitation in accusing the United States of being too weak, but its weakness was largely due to the element of surprise which left it no time to consult its allies beforehand or to build up its forces in the Middle East.

72. This was not so for Poland and there would have been ample grounds to be gratified had Europe not been struck by unbelievable paralysis with the result that the Americans may be justified in wondering how far Europe is composed of allies it can trust. In this respect, the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 11th January 1982 did not dispel all ambiguity about the way in which the European members of the Atlantic Alliance intend to be associated with the measures taken by the United States which, they admit, are justified.

73. Further, if Europe one day intends to change the major division imposed on it by the Soviet takeover of the countries occupied by the Red Army at the end of the war, it will obviously not succeed by closing its eyes to a Soviet policy of using force to maintain its domination. The solution is to be found in an evolution such as Solidarity thought it could start in Poland, which may open the door for a future reunification of Europe, otherwise this may occur under the pressure and domination of the Soviet Union.

4. Western positions since the NATO meeting on 11th January 1982

74. The ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 11th January 1982 was the

occasion of a confrontation between the United States and its European allies and a joint declaration was drawn up which, although couched in moderate terms, was at least more specific about sanctions than the ten-power declaration, at any rate about the list of measures considered, because less was said about their implementation. This time, Greece refused to endorse the sections of the declaration which appeared to be a global condemnation of Poland and the Soviet Union. However this may be, the United States could consider that its allies had undertaken to act – in the long run at least – and progressively to set up machinery for sanctions against Warsaw and Moscow should the situation not improve in Poland or, a fortiori, grow worse. For instance, the allies decided to suspend all trade credit for Poland, except for food products, and to hold negotiations on the repayment dates of the Polish public debt due in 1982. Finally, they declared that they were prepared to continue and increase humanitarian assistance to the Polish people. The EEC for its part decided on 23rd February to grant emergency assistance of 8 million European currency units. On 14th January, the western countries in effect suspended until further notice their negotiations with Poland on rescheduling payments due in 1982, i.e. \$ 3,500 million. However, the agreement on consolidating amounts due in 1981 was not called in question. The western countries, including the United States, have in fact been cautious and have not started procedure for declaring that Poland had broken off payments. But the western banks agreed to reschedule the Polish 1981 debt, i.e. \$ 2,400 million, only if Poland settled arrears of interest due on the part of its debt which was not guaranteed by western governments. This matter was settled on 6th April and the reimbursement of the debt rescheduled, reimbursement of the capital being set to start on 1st January 1986. This agreement should allow them to consider possible requests for further loans to Poland.

75. The European Community is obviously determined to apply the decisions taken on 11th January where Poland and the Soviet Union are concerned, but to interpret them restrictively. Thus, on 25th January it was decided at the meeting of the ten Ministers for Foreign Affairs to halt supplies of cut-price food products to Poland: the DM 84 million thus saved will be used to finance the direct distribution of foodstuffs to the Polish people through the intermediary of international organisations such as the International Red Cross.

76. Similarly, it decided to impose trade sanctions on the Soviet Union between 16th March and 31st December 1982: these sanctions involve restrictions on imports of a list of

fifty-eight products. The volume of imports concerned is about 1.34 % of its total imports from the Soviet Union whereas in February the Commission had proposed a 3.5 % reduction. Furthermore, the NATO declaration specified that each of the allies would act according to its own circumstances and legislation when taking any measures against the Soviet Union. In February, only a few European countries decided to follow the NATO advice. These measures were little more than gestures, more symbolic than constraining. For instance, the United Kingdom on 5th February and the Federal Republic on the 17th decided to restrict movements of Soviet diplomats on their territory. These decisions by Western European countries took account of the fact that, far from improving as promised, the situation in Poland was growing even worse and the British Government considered the West should keep more constraining measures in reserve, "real sanctions", in case new developments further aggravated the Polish crisis. This attitude was welcome in Washington because the United States had, until then, had every reason to fear that its relatively firm decisions were not being followed, in spite of the NATO declaration.

77. The United States tried to persuade its European partners to take more effective measures against the Soviet Union, including the cancellation of the agreements for building the gas pipeline intended to supply Europe with Siberian gas, the abolition of low interest credits for Soviet imports and additions to the list of products which may not be exported to the Soviet Union. A delegation led by Mr. Buckley visited various European capitals for this purpose, apparently without much success. The Europeans in fact noted that the United States was not restricting its exports of grain to the Soviet Union, although they accounted for more than 70 % of American sales to that country. The United States Government had at that juncture precluded any further embargo on grain sales, thus considerably weakening its arguments in European eyes.

78. However, since January the United States Government has shown its determination to tackle the question of Poland in all its talks with the Soviet Union, inter alia at the meeting between Mr. Haig and Mr. Gromyko in Geneva on 24th January and at the CSCE conference in Madrid. Although he did not cancel his meeting with Mr. Gromyko at which they were to fix the date for resuming the SALT negotiations, Mr. Haig in fact shortened it and insisted that the Polish question be tackled. Thus he met the wishes of the Europeans who were insisting on the East-West dialogue being continued, and also of certain American Republicans such as Mr. Kissinger who were calling for the suspension of all negotiations between the

two countries. But President Reagan did not wish to link the arms limitation negotiations with the evolution of the situation in Poland. The talks on the limitation of continental-range missiles are therefore to resume on 20th May and those on strategic weapons in August.

79. The Madrid conference, which had achieved no significant results in 1981, was resumed on 9th February. It allowed the Western European countries to stress that events in Poland since 13th December were so many violations of the Helsinki final act and to denounce violations of human rights. The Americans had made it understood that they would refuse to discuss any other matter covered by the CSCE as long as the situation in Poland did not take a positive turn. Thus, they refused to take part in committee work, attending only plenary sessions in order to be able to denounce the state of war in Poland. The decision on 12th March to suspend the Madrid conference until 9th November was in fact a compromise which met the wishes of the Soviet Union, which did not want the conference to end with recognition of another failure or to be centred on the Polish question, and also the wishes of the West, which could not agree to the conference being continued without taking account of events in Poland.

IV. *What Europe can do*

80. While it is clear that the West is determined not to use force to check the repressive steps that were taken in Poland on 13th December, that it has never thought of doing so nor allowed the Poles to believe that it would do so, it nevertheless has considerable means of exerting pressure on the Soviet Union and the Polish Government which may have an important effect as the recent past has proved. Admittedly, a break in relations of all kinds with the USSR and its allies is probably not desirable insofar as such relations allow western positions, and the possible consequences of a policy that might not take account of them, to be made known.

81. However, the pursuit of the Madrid Conference which was suspended in February and is to be resumed in November 1982, raises a special problem. In their declaration on 4th January, the Ten had called for the support of neutral countries for the Polish question to be placed on the agenda of that meeting. The Soviet Union and its allies were not prepared to open a debate which could but strongly challenge the events of 13th December and the measures since taken by the Polish Government. It was therefore out of the question for the West to agree to take part in a meeting which no longer made sense. As Mr. Hanin

had recalled in his June 1981 report, the final act of the Helsinki Conference banned any recourse to the threat or use of force, any intervention by a foreign power in the internal affairs of a signatory state and committed all participants to respect human rights within their frontiers (Preamble, Article II, VI and VII). It is clear that these provisions have been transgressed. It was therefore not possible to consider continuing a conference to follow up the application of the final act of Helsinki with powers that refused to agree to examine a case of flagrant violation of this international agreement and it was natural for the western governments to make the inscription in the agenda of the Madrid Conference of the examination of the situation in Poland a *sine qua non* of their participation in that conference. There is no reason why their attitude should change in November if there is no significant change in the situation in Poland.

82. In economic matters, the measures taken by the United States Government hardly affect the immediate interests of the United States or its trade with the Soviet Union in the near future. However, they have definite advantages because of their variety, moderation and the way in which the United States intends to shape their application according to the development of the situation in Poland. The fact that the United States has already undertaken to apply them leaves room for regret that Europe was not consulted sufficiently before the United States decision, but it would also be desirable for Europe to apply them since otherwise these measures would be deprived of much of their effectiveness. Indeed, it is clear that the Soviet Union and its allies, starting with Poland, need to maintain and develop their relations with the West and they are prepared to make certain concessions to this end. Hence, if the West manages to define a joint policy in this connection, it will have a means of pressure whose importance must certainly not be exaggerated, but nor must it be minimised. The North Atlantic Council declaration of 11th January at least had the merit of setting out minimum conditions which Poland should meet in order to resume "constructive political and economic relations with the West". It was urged "to end the state of martial law, to release those arrested and to restore immediately a dialogue with the church and Solidarity". Although the application of martial law was relaxed slightly for 1st May and although many political prisoners have been freed since January, these conditions are still fully valid if normal relations are to be resumed with the Soviet Union and Poland.

83. A distinction should be drawn however between the concerns of the Polish people, the

interests of the Polish state and the aims of the Soviet Union. In the first case, the humanitarian steps started before 13th December, including the distribution of food or day-to-day consumer items to the Polish population, should in no way be called in question insofar as one may be certain that the items collected in the West are effectively distributed in Poland by independent organisations such as the International Red Cross. In the second case, measures of economic and financial assistance had been taken or planned, inter alia to facilitate the reimbursement of the Polish debt, before the takeover on 13th December. But in present circumstances it is difficult to see why exceptional measures should be maintained to assist the Polish Government. That government and those who have brought pressure to bear on it must shoulder their responsibilities in the situation they have created. It is admittedly not a question of forcing the Polish state into bankruptcy, which would be disastrous for everyone and detrimental to international order, nor of placing it entirely in the hands of the possible Soviet lender who would see this as a further opportunity of tightening the grip on Poland. Negotiations for rescheduling repayments of the Polish debt were probably necessary, but such measures must not be taken as assistance to the Polish Government until it has fulfilled the three conditions laid down by the North Atlantic Council on 11th January.

84. Finally, where the Soviet Union is concerned the General Affairs Committee noted during its recent visit to the United States that the latter's government took a very serious view of the fact that its European partners had continued to conclude long-term agreements with the Soviet Union which might make them unduly dependent on it, to grant privileged terms of credit and to supply items which might be used for military purposes. The committee also saw that American complaints were not directly linked with the Polish affair but rather the process of détente begun in Helsinki. The United States' European partners do not necessarily share this point of view but if they wish to be better understood by the Americans they must be more specific than before, in the framework of the Ten for instance, about tangible, effective means of pressure and the precise conditions in which such measures might be terminated. Only a readiness to suspend the application of current contracts, to refuse privileged credit terms and the supply of material usable for military purposes can allow Europe to agree with the United States on fixing the conditions for terminating such measures. This would help to improve relations between Europe and the United States and strengthen western pressure on behalf of the Polish people.

85. Finally, the Polish affair should remind Europeans that since the end of the second world war Soviet policy in Europe has not changed a great deal, which means that it is above all in the field of defence and security that Europe must try to terminate as quickly as possible the position of inferiority in which it found itself in December 1981. This means that the countries of Western Europe must make a greater military effort and accept the deployment on their territory of missiles capable of deterring the Soviet Union from attempting any form of attack. Failing this determination, the credibility of even joint statements about Poland would be considerably weakened.

86. The West's inferiority in the field of armaments, the signs of its weakening determination to ensure its defence and to provide itself with the wherewithal to do so, deprive even the strongest statements by Western European governments of much of their weight, whereas those by President Reagan obtain a special hearing in view of the recovery he has effected in the United States defence effort. There must be equivalence of words, decisions and means if the policy of brutal repression applied in Poland since 13th December is to be swayed.

87. That is an aspect of the problem that concerns WEU more particularly and which the member countries of that organisation do not seem to have fully realised. At the last session of our Assembly, the Secretary of State to the French Minister of Defence emphasised the importance he attached to our organisation and gave useful and considered advice on the direction to be given to its parliamentary work. It is however surprising that no government felt the need to invoke Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and ask for the WEU Council to be convened immediately after the events on 13th December 1981, which undoubtedly

endangered the peace and economic stability of Europe.

88. It is not possible for Europe to remain indifferent to events in Poland since 13th December and a deep-rooted movement of solidarity towards the Polish people has been felt throughout our countries, as instanced by the multiple appeals to muster humanitarian assistance for the Polish people. There is even less reason to halt this assistance since the material situation of the Polish people has been deteriorating ever since. But solidarity would have no meaning if it were not carried over into the political field, not in the sense of retaliation against anyone, but to help Poland maintain its independence and the Polish people to retain the rights they had gained during the 1980-81 crisis. Poland's serious economic difficulties must not be taken as a pretext for restoring by force a dictatorship whose aims are in no way economic but solely political and which is not in a position to appeal to the nation to accept the sacrifices necessary for the country's economic recovery.

89. This means that Europe does not have to consider the present situation as an irreversible established fact which might possibly be penalised by retaliatory measures of shorter or longer duration, but on the contrary as a point in time when it is still possible to act to bring about a relaxation of martial law and to provoke or to encourage a return to the policy of dialogue pursued by the Polish Government up to 13th December. Europe must therefore try to act effectively and this can be done only through close co-ordination of the measures the United States and the countries of Western Europe take in regard to the Soviet Union and Poland in the economic and political fields, particularly with regard to the resumption of the Madrid conference, and in the defence field.

APPENDIX I

***Statement by President Reagan
on the decisions taken against the Soviet Union
following events in Poland,
Los Angeles, 29th December 1981***

The Soviet Union bears a heavy and direct responsibility for the repression in Poland. For many months the Soviets publicly and privately demanded such a crackdown. They brought major pressures to bear through now-public letters to the Polish leadership, military manoeuvres, and other forms of intimidation. They now openly endorse the suppression which has ensued.

Last week I announced that I had sent a letter to President Brezhnev urging him to permit the restoration of basic human rights in Poland as provided for in the Helsinki final act. I also informed him that, if the repression continued, the United States would have no choice but to take further concrete political and economic measures affecting our relationship.

The repression in Poland continues, and President Brezhnev has responded in a manner which makes it clear the Soviet Union does not understand the seriousness of our concern, and its obligations under both the Helsinki final act and the United Nations Charter. I have, therefore, decided to take the following immediate measures with regard to the Soviet Union:

- All Aeroflot service to the United States will be suspended.
- The Soviet purchasing commission is being closed.
- The issuance or renewal of licences for the export to the USSR of electronic equipment, computers and other high-technology materials is being suspended.
- Negotiations on a new long-term grains agreement are being postponed.

- Negotiations on a new United States-Soviet maritime agreement are being suspended, and a new régime of port-access controls will be put into effect for all Soviet ships when the current agreement expires on 31st December.

- Licences will be required for export to the Soviet Union for an expanded list of oil and gas equipment. Issuance of such licences will be suspended. This includes pipelayers.

- United States-Soviet exchange agreements coming up for renewal in the near future, including the agreements on energy and science and technology, will not be renewed. There will be a complete review of all other United States-Soviet exchange agreements.

The United States wants a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with the Soviet Union. We intend to maintain a high-level dialogue. But we are prepared to proceed in whatever direction the Soviet Union decides upon towards greater mutual restraint and co-operation, or further down a harsh and less rewarding path. We will watch events in Poland closely in coming days and weeks. Further steps may be necessary and I will be prepared to take them. American decisions will be determined by Soviet actions.

Secretary Haig has been in communication with our friends and allies about the measures we are taking and explained why we believe such steps are essential at this time.

Once again I call upon the Soviet Union to recognise the clear desire of the overwhelming majority of the Polish people for a process of national reconciliation, renewal and reform.

APPENDIX II

***Declaration adopted by the ten Ministers
for Foreign Affairs of the European Community,
Brussels, 4th January 1982***

1. The Ten utterly disapproves of the development of the situation in Poland.
2. They have noted the declarations of the Polish leadership of its intention to maintain national independence and to re-establish in the near future liberty and the process of reform, as well as resuming the dialogue with the various elements of the Polish nation. Unhappily the Ten must note today that, contrary to these declarations, what has taken place has not been dialogue but repression, bringing in its train violations of the most elementary human and citizens' rights, contrary to the Helsinki final act, the United Nations Charter, and the universal declaration of human rights.
3. The Ten, therefore, appeal urgently to the Polish authorities to end as soon as possible the state of martial law, to release those arrested and to restore a general dialogue with the church and Solidarity.
4. The significance of these grave events extends beyond Poland itself. The inability of the system in Eastern Europe to accept the modifications necessary to meet the legitimate aspirations of the people is such as to endanger public confidence in the possibility of co-operative links with the East, and thus seriously to affect international relations: In this context the Ten note with concern and disapproval the serious external pressure and the campaign directed by the USSR and other Eastern European countries against the efforts for renewal in Poland.
5. This already grave situation would be further aggravated if it led to an open intervention by the Warsaw Pact. For this reason the Ten wish to issue a solemn warning against any such intervention.
6. The Ten are totally in sympathy with the Polish people and are willing to continue the direct humanitarian aid to them.
7. The Ten have taken note of the economic measures taken by the United States Government with regard to the USSR. The Ten will undertake in this context close and positive consultations with the United States Government and with the governments of other western states in order to define what decisions will best serve their common objectives, and to avoid any step which could compromise their respective actions.
8. Developments in Poland constitute a grave violation of the principles of the Helsinki final act. The Ten, therefore, consider that the Madrid conference should discuss them as soon as possible at ministerial level. The Ten will make approaches to the neutral and non-aligned states to propose an early resumption of the Madrid meeting.
9. The Ten will work in the United Nations and its specialised agencies for a denunciation of violations of human rights and acts of violence.
10. Other measures will be considered as the situation in Poland develops, in particular measures concerning credit and economic assistance to Poland, and measures concerning the Community's commercial policy with regard to the USSR. In addition, the Ten will examine the question of further food aid to Poland.
11. The Ten have called on the Polish authorities, both nationally and through the presidency, to lift the abnormal and unacceptable restrictions which have been placed on the work of embassies, representatives of the media, air services and other communications in Poland.
12. The Ten will study what can be done to alleviate the situation of Poles outside Poland who do not wish to return to their country under present circumstances.

APPENDIX III

*Special ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council,
11th January 1982**Declaration on events in Poland*

1. The allied governments condemn the imposition of martial law in Poland and denounce the massive violation of human rights and the suppression of fundamental civil liberties in contravention of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the final act of Helsinki.

2. The process of renewal and reform which began in Poland in August 1980 was watched with sympathy and hope by all who believe in freedom and self-determination; it resulted from a genuine effort by the overwhelming majority of the Polish people to achieve a more open society in accordance with the principles of the final act of Helsinki.

3. The imposition of martial law, the use of force against Polish workers, with the thousands of internments, the harsh prison sentences and the deaths that followed, have deprived the Polish people of their rights and freedoms, in particular in the field of trade unions. These acts threaten to destroy the basis for reconciliation and compromise which are necessary to progress and stability in Poland. They are in clear violation of Polish commitments under the Helsinki final act, particularly the principle relating to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Developments in Poland demonstrate once again the rigidity of the Warsaw Pact régimes with respect to those changes necessary to meet the legitimate aspirations of their peoples¹. This endangers public confidence in co-operation between East and West and seriously affects international relations.

4. The allies deplore the sustained campaign mounted by the Soviet Union against efforts by the Polish people for national renewal and reform, and its active support for the subsequent systematic suppression of those efforts in Poland. These acts cannot be reconciled with the Soviet Union's international undertakings, and in particular with the principles of the final act of Helsinki, especially those dealing with sovereignty, non-intervention, threat of force, and self-determination. The Soviet Union has no right to determine the political and social development of Poland.

5. The allies call upon the Polish leadership to live up to its declared intention to re-

1. The Greek Delegation has reserved its position on this sentence.

establish civil liberties and the process of reform. They urge the Polish authorities to end the state of martial law, to release those arrested, and to restore immediately a dialogue with the church and Solidarity. Only with reconciliation and genuine negotiation can the basic rights of the Polish people and workers be protected, and the economic and social progress of the country be secured. Poland could then expect to enjoy fully the benefits of stability in Europe and of constructive political and economic relations with the West.

6. The allies call upon the Soviet Union to respect Poland's fundamental right to solve its own problems free from foreign interference and to respect the clear desire of the overwhelming majority of the Polish people for national renewal and reform. Soviet pressure, direct or indirect, aimed at frustrating that desire, must cease. The allies also warn that if an outside armed intervention were to take place it would have the most profound consequences for international relations.

7. In their communiqué of 11th December 1981, NATO Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to work for a climate of confidence and mutual restraint in East-West relations; what has since happened in Poland has great significance for the development of security and co-operation in Europe. The persistence of repression in Poland is eroding the political foundation for progress on the full agenda of issues which divide East and West.

8. The allies remain committed to the policies of effective deterrence and the pursuit of arms control and in particular have welcomed the initiatives contained in President Reagan's 18th November speech. The Soviet Union will bear full responsibility if its actions with regard to Poland and its failure to live up to existing international obligations damage the arms control process. A return to the process of real reforms and dialogue in Poland would help create the atmosphere of mutual confidence and restraint required for progress in negotiations in the field of arms control and limitations including the Geneva talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces due to resume on 12th January.

9. In view of the grave developments in Poland, which constitute a serious violation of the Helsinki final act, the allies agreed that the

Madrid conference should deal with the situation as soon as possible at the level of Foreign Ministers.

10. The allies will also intensify their efforts to bring to the attention of world public opinion and international organisations, including the United Nations and its specialised agencies such as the International Labour Organisation, the violation of human rights and acts of violence in Poland.

11. Each ally will, in accordance with its own situation and legislation, identify appropriate national possibilities for action in the following fields:

- (a) further restrictions on the movements of Soviet and Polish diplomats, and other restrictions on Soviet and Polish diplomatic missions and organisations;
- (b) reduction of scientific and technical activities or non-renewal of exchange agreements.

Meanwhile the allies emphasise:

- their determination to do what lies in their power to ensure that the truth about events in Poland continues to reach the Polish people despite the obstacles created by the authorities in Warsaw and Moscow in direct contravention of their obligations under the Helsinki final act;
- their resolve that the quality of their relations with the military régime in Poland should reflect the abnormal nature of the present situation and their refusal to accept it as permanent;
- their willingness to contribute, with other governments, to the solution of the problem of Polish citizens now abroad and unable or unwilling to return to their own country¹.

12. The allies recognise the importance of economic measures to persuade the Polish authorities and the Soviet Union of the seriousness of western concern over developments in

¹ The Greek Delegation has reserved its position on this paragraph.

Poland, and stress the significance of the measures already announced by President Reagan¹.

13. Regarding economic relations with Poland, the allies:

- noted that future commercial credits for goods other than foods will be placed in abeyance;
- noted that the question of holding negotiations about the payments due in 1982 on Poland's official debts should, for the time being, be held in suspense;
- affirmed their willingness to continue and increase humanitarian aid to the Polish people for distribution and monitoring by non-governmental organisations to ensure that it reaches the people for whom it is intended;
- noted that those allies which sell food to Poland will seek the clearest possible Polish commitments with regard to the use of the food¹.

14. In the current situation in Poland, economic relations with Poland and the Soviet Union are bound to be affected. Soviet actions towards Poland make it necessary for the allies to examine the course of future economic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union. Recognising that each of the allies will act in accordance with its own situation and laws, they will examine measures which could involve arrangements regarding imports from the Soviet Union, maritime agreements, air services agreements, the size of Soviet commercial representation and the conditions surrounding export credits¹.

15. The allies will maintain close consultations on the implementation of their resolve not to undermine the effect of each other's measures.

16. In addition to agreeing to consult on steps to be taken in the near future, the allies will also reflect on longer-term East-West economic relations, particularly energy, agricultural commodities and other goods, and the export of technology, in light of the changed situation and of the need to protect their competitive position in the field of military and technological capabilities¹.

¹ The Greek Delegation has reserved its position on these paragraphs.

APPENDIX IV

*Statement by the Presidential Committee
of the WEU Assembly, Paris,
8th January 1982*

1. The Presidential Committee had been convened as a matter of urgency to assess the situation in Poland in the light of the Assembly's Order 53 passed on 3rd December 1980 and its Resolution 370 adopted on 18th June 1981.

2. It noted with satisfaction the reply of the Council to Written Question 228 put to the Council on 15th December 1981 by the President of the Assembly in which the Council states that it shared the President's and the Assembly's grave concern at events in Poland.

3. The Presidential Committee was pleased to note the fact that member countries and their allies have effectively pursued their consultations on the serious situation created by the introduction of martial law and repressive measures in Poland on 13th December 1981 and welcome and endorse the joint declaration of the Ten on 4th January 1981. It also expressed its hope that the meeting at ministerial level of the Council of NATO due to take place on 11th January will take further positive steps to achieve agreement on a joint position.

4. The Committee invites the Council to examine the consequences of events which have taken place in Poland from the point of view of the security of Europe as well as the measures to be taken to meet that challenge, while wishing that everything possible should be done to alleviate the sufferings of the Polish people and if possible to create conditions in which they can make further progress towards the achievement of improvement in their economic and political circumstances. This would involve, in the opinion of the Committee, as a matter of urgency, the restoration of trade union rights and the process of economic and political reforms, the end of martial law, the liberation of political prisoners and the resumption of the dialogue between the representatives of Solidarity, the church and the state authorities.

5. The Committee expressed the wish that the Council should do all it can to keep the Assembly informed of its decisions and of developments in its consultations.

APPENDIX V

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

*to the statement by the Presidential Committee
on 8th January 1982*

The Council have taken careful note of the statement on the situation in Poland sent to them on 8th January 1982 by the Presidential Committee of the Assembly.

They welcome the Committee's support of the position expressed by the Foreign Ministers of the member states of the European Community in their declaration of 4th January 1982 in Brussels.

The Council wish to draw the Assembly's attention to the declaration which the North Atlantic Council, meeting in extraordinary ministerial session, published in Brussels on 11th January 1982. As indicated in that declaration member governments condemn the imposition of martial law in Poland and denounce the massive violation of human rights and the suppression of fundamental civil liberties in contravention of the United Nations Charter, the universal declaration on human rights and the final act of Helsinki. They urge the Polish authorities to live up to their declared intention to end the state of martial law, to release those arrested, and to restore immediately a dialogue with the church and Solidarity. They call upon the Soviet Union to respect Poland's fundamental right to solve its own problems free from foreign interference.

The member countries of WEU have since remained in close contact with their European and Atlantic partners. They have continued to consult with them on developments in the Polish situation and on the measures to be taken in consequence, which have been examined by the North Atlantic Council on 23rd January and by the Foreign Ministers of the member states of the European Community on 25th January in Brussels. These subjects will also, as previously announced, be reviewed at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 3rd February.

Member countries of WEU together with other western countries have discussed amongst themselves Polish and Soviet violations of the Helsinki final act and intend raising the subject at the resumption of the CSCE meeting in Madrid on 9th February.

The member countries of WEU will continue to play an active part in the current consultations and the Council will not fail to inform the Assembly of further developments.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 3rd February 1982.

APPENDIX VI

RECOMMENDATION 378

*on the evolution of the situation in Poland
adopted by the Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly,
London, 8th February 1982*

The Assembly,

Recalling its Order 53 and Recommendation 370;

Considering that the existence of a military dictatorship in Poland constitutes a flagrant violation of the final act of the Helsinki conference;

Considering that Poland's serious economic difficulties do not justify the replacement of the dialogue between the state authorities and Solidarity by a policy of repression;

Considering that the public acts of the Soviet Union reveal interference in the internal affairs of Poland and pressure on the Polish Government for the establishment of that dictatorship;

Noting that the situation thus created in Poland is such as to cause Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty to be applied;

Regretting that no member government of WEU has judged it necessary to examine in the framework of the Council the implications of this situation for the security of Europe;

Believing that as long as repression persists in Poland there can be no question of re-establishing normal relations with Poland and its allies, starting with the Soviet Union;

Firmly recalling that the re-establishment of such normal relations depends on:

- (a) the termination of martial law in Poland;
- (b) the release of all political prisoners and in particular of Solidarity members;
- (c) the resumption of the dialogue between the government, Solidarity and the Catholic Church,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure close exchanges of views between the European and American members of the North Atlantic Alliance in order to co-ordinate measures taken and to be taken in respect of both Poland and the Soviet Union in accordance with the statement of the North Atlantic Council of 11th January 1982;
2. To this end, continue to work out in the most appropriate European framework a joint policy towards the Soviet Union and Poland, particularly in economic and financial matters, in both the long and short term;
3. Further, invite member countries to suspend economic and financial assistance to Poland in present circumstances;
4. Also invite member countries to pursue and develop their humanitarian assistance to the Polish people insofar as it does not strengthen the authorities responsible for the military coup d'état on 13th December 1981;
5. Meet to follow closely the development of the situation in Poland and hold a continuing dialogue with the Assembly on this question;
6. Conduct talks with the countries of Eastern Europe on the application of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe particularly in connection with serious examination of events in Poland.

APPENDIX VII

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹*to Recommendation 378*

1. In their reply to Recommendation 378 the Council would like to draw the attention of the Assembly to the continuing and intensive consultations which took place within NATO, in the European Council and between members of WEU.

The NATO meeting of 11th January resulted, as the Assembly is aware, in broad agreement on an attitude to be adopted towards Poland and the Soviet Union.

In their reply on 3rd February to the statement by the Presidential Committee of the Assembly on 8th January 1982, the Council already stated that the member countries of WEU have remained in close contact with their European and Atlantic partners.

The European Council renewed its call to the Polish authorities to end with the minimum delay the state of martial law, release those arrested and restore a genuine dialogue with the Church and Solidarity.

A further exchange of views with the transatlantic partners regarding the western position is ensured through consultations in the NATO Council.

2. Joint policies in the economic field towards the Soviet Union have been worked out in the framework of the EEC as is shown e.g. by its decision to restrict imports from the Soviet Union. Western countries have decided with regard to Poland that the question of the rescheduling of Poland's 1982 official debts should for the time being be held in suspense. They also took restrictive measures concerning officially backed credits, including the decision not to make any new credits available to Poland at the present time. For the longer term it should be noted that during discussions of the European Council on 29th and 30th March 1982, the heads of state and of government discussed the basis on which East-West economic and commercial relations had been conducted. The heads of state and of government agreed that these questions, including the important and related question of credit policy, should be the subject of careful study by the European Community and by their own and other governments, both nationally and internationally and in close consultation with other members of the OECD. Thus the EEC introduced a proposal in this organisation to upgrade the Soviet Union from the intermediate to the relatively rich category for export credits.

3. Member countries of WEU as well as other NATO countries have suspended economic and financial assistance to Poland on the understanding that no basis for the re-establishment of normal relations and consequently for continuation of such assistance exists as long as no positive development takes place in Poland to end martial law, release those in detention and restore a genuine dialogue with the Church and Solidarity.

4. In their communiqué on 4th January, Foreign Ministers of the Ten declared their total sympathy with the Polish people and their readiness to continue their direct humanitarian aid to them. The NATO Foreign Ministers affirmed during their 11th January meeting their willingness to continue and increase humanitarian aid to the Polish people for distribution and monitoring by non-governmental organisations to ensure that it reaches the people for whom it is intended. Furthermore, EEC Ministers concluded on 27th January that the funds which were released by their decisions should be used to finance humanitarian assistance in the form of gifts.

It should be noted that both the EEC and NATO countries specifically stipulated that such aid should be channelled only through non-governmental organisations and be conditional on it reaching the Polish people.

5. WEU member countries have met regularly and are continuing to do so, either through the medium of the WEU Council or in other multilateral fora, to discuss the situation in Poland. The Council will not fail to inform the Assembly of further developments.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th May 1982.

6. WEU member countries were represented at ministerial level at the resumption of the CSCE meeting in Madrid in February of this year. Regrettably the violations of the principles of the Helsinki final act, of which the repression in Poland constitutes a particularly grave element, had not only prevented the Madrid meeting from achieving positive results, but also put at risk the entire CSCE process. WEU member countries as well as other member countries of the EEC, which remain committed to the continuation of the CSCE process, have expressed the hope that, when the Madrid meeting resumes in November, the prevailing circumstances would be more conducive to the achievement of a positive outcome.

Evolution of the situation in Poland

AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3¹
tabled by Mr. Pignion

1. After the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Recalling the decisions taken in the framework of European political co-operation; ”.

2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ in respect of both Poland and the Soviet Union in order to convince them to meet the conditions set by the North Atlantic Council ” and insert “ in respect of both the Polish and the Soviet Governments in order to convince them to meet the conditions set by the North Atlantic Council and the European organisations ”.

3. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“ Continue for its part to consider regularly the application of European measures and possibly envisage further measures designed to attain the aims set out in the previous paragraph; ”.

Signed: Pignion

1. See 5th sitting, 16th June 1982 (amendments 1 and 2 agreed to; amendment 3 amended and agreed to).

***International aeronautical consortia –
guidelines drawn from the colloquy
on 9th and 10th February 1982***

REPORT¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions²
by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Valleix (Chairman); MM. Lenzer, Wilkinson (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman), Adriaensens, Amadei (Alternate: Cavaliere), Antoni (Alternate: Martino), Barthe, Fiandrotti, Forma, Fortier (Alternate: Bassinet), Fourré,

Garrett (Alternate: Lord Northfield), Hawkins (Alternate: Sir Russell Fairgrieve), McGuire (Alternate: Morris), Manning, Prussen, Spies von Büllesheim, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Topmann, Worrell.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

*on international aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn
from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982*

The Assembly,

- (i) Conscious of the political will it has consistently demonstrated through the organisation in the last ten years of no less than five symposia so as to promote improved co-operation and collaboration in the conception, design, development, production and procurement of high technology defence equipment, especially missiles and aircraft;
- (ii) Reaffirming its belief that the ensuing military benefits of such collaboration, namely enhanced co-operation, interoperability and where possible standardisation in equipment of the armed services of the western Alliance, would to a large extent offset the advantage of commonality of armaments currently enjoyed by the forces of the Warsaw Pact;
- (iii) Aware that the military aircraft, space and guided missile sectors of European industry play an increasingly important social and economic rôle in many regions of Europe in maintaining employment and in stimulating new technological developments, especially in times of recession;
- (iv) Recalling that the incentive for international collaboration in the aeronautical industry must be not just the economic and political advantages for governments, or the military benefits for armed forces but the commercial interests and industrial development of participating aerospace companies;
- (v) Convinced that existing institutions such as the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) of NATO, the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) of Western European Union and the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) should be made to operate effectively and their work harmonised, particularly as many of the same people are involved;
- (vi) Recognising that aeronautical collaboration has taken place within a variety of industrial organisational structures from simple prime and sub-contractor relationships through joint companies to complete industrial consortia and that the organisational requirements for one particular aerospace project do not necessarily lend themselves to another;
- (vii) Considering that families of aircraft and of military aerospace equipment represent a cost-effective return on investment, not least for the smaller countries of Europe, and that to this end existing consortia such as Airbus Industrie and Panavia offer the basis for further projects;
- (viii) Appreciating that the fiscal, legal, and financial environment within which transnational consortia have to operate impose impediments to aeronautical collaboration in Europe not shared by competitor aerospace companies in the United States and that the objective for Western Europe should be to provide itself with a comparable industrial aeronautical capability;
- (ix) Convinced that the pursuit of a genuinely balanced North Atlantic market for high technology defence equipment with the United States of America demands not only enhanced collaboration among the member states, but also a change in American policy towards a satisfactory opening for European production,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Strengthen the effectiveness of the Standing Armaments Committee as an agency for the promotion of co-operation, interoperability and where possible standardisation in defence equipment of the WEU countries by increasing the SAC's establishment of expert staff and enhancing the level of political support accorded to its work by the governments of the member nations of WEU;
2. Persuade the governments represented in WEU to reinforce the vital function of the Independent European Programme Group in harmonising national operational requirements and re-equipment timescales on a European scale by assigning the chairmanship of the IEPG to a defence minister on a rotational basis and by regular progress reports by the IEPG to the Assembly of WEU;
3. Seek to make the most effective use of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) since a concomitant to the mutual defence commitments of the Atlantic Alliance must be a common approach not just to strategy but to matériel procurement and logistics;

4. Reinforce political will within the WEU nations at the highest governmental level to pursue a collaborative approach to the re-equipment requirements of the European armed forces of the Atlantic Alliance by placing policies for the achievement of a balanced and equitable European and Atlantic-wide market for armaments firmly on the agenda for heads of government meetings and for the more regular and routine meetings of Alliance defence and foreign ministers;
5. Urge defence ministry staffs of the WEU countries to bear in mind, in addition to the operational requirements of their individual national armed forces, criteria such as overseas marketability of defence equipment, the need to control costs by avoiding a higher degree of technical sophistication than that required to achieve substantial superiority over any likely threat, and the benefits, both industrial and military, of securing other Alliance nations to share in the production and procurement of the high technology defence equipment;
6. Promote the earliest possible involvement of industrial interests including existing European consortia in the conception and definition of future aerospace projects either nationally or through the European Defence Industrial Group (EDIG) or preferably both so as to achieve a market and commercial orientation of such projects from the design stage, the first and foremost of which should be a new European combat aircraft;
7. Press the national governments within WEU to pursue industrial policies towards the aeronautical sector more favourable to the development of an independent European capability in aerospace than to the costly maintenance of purely national aerospace capabilities and to ensure to this end that a collaborative strategy within Europe be maintained involving the fullest utilisation of existing consortia for the design, development and production of new aeronautical projects;
8. Invite the member governments of WEU to reaffirm to the European Communities the need for carefully-considered proposals to be put to the Council of the EEC for the establishment of a harmonised framework of company law and of harmonised tax systems so as to facilitate the operation of transnational consortia within the EEC;
9. Emphasise strongly to member governments of WEU the importance of applying the family of aircraft concept in the European framework whenever excessive competition is liable to weaken Europe's industrial potential;
10. Impress upon the governments of the member nations the need to make clear to the Government of the United States that the evolution of a balanced and equitable Atlantic-wide market in military aerospace products is a paramount political necessity, which will also require the support of Congress for the lifting of restrictions on European imports such as the Speciality Metals Amendment.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In its reply to Recommendation 362 on international industrial consortia and collaborative arrangements for the production of high technology military equipment, the Council observed that "the development of co-operative armaments programmes is, moreover, a long and arduous task requiring, in the countries concerned, consensus with regard to industrial, economic, military and political interests. Co-operation in the matter of armaments is more readily achieved by pragmatic and patient endeavour than by declarations of principle, whose limitations have been shown by past experience".

2. It has been with the objective of promoting European consensus and the reconciliation of national industrial, military and political interests within the WEU member states in the pursuit of improving interoperability and standardisation of defence equipment within the western Alliance that the Assembly of Western European Union and its two committees most concerned, namely on Defence Questions and Armaments and on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, have sponsored no less than five specialist symposia in the last nine years culminating in the colloquy at Lancaster House, London, on international aeronautical consortia from 9th to 10th February 1982.

3. Whereas the first colloquy in Paris in 1973 was very much concerned with the American challenge to the independence and even survival of the European high technology defence equipment industry for which the prescription was essentially collaboration or extinction, collaboration has now become a fact of life for the aerospace companies of Europe. "Co-operate or die", in the words of Mr. Lemoine, French Minister of State for Defence, is a principle which has been fully recognised by the European aeronautical industry for a long time, and a whole catalogue of famous collaborative projects now in service like the Alpha-Jet, Jaguar, Puma, Lynx, Gazelle, Hot, Roland, Milan, F-16 and Tornado offers tangible testimony to the effective translation of that principle into practice.

4. As a result there are companies, consortia and industrial groupings in the European aeronautical sector fully able to compete in terms of performance and cost with their American counterparts. This process has been much

aided by the conscious decisions of successive United States administrations, and particularly that of former President Carter, to promote a transatlantic dialogue over the procurement within the western Alliance of sophisticated military equipment. The two-way street has passed from a declaration of principle favoured by forward-thinking academics, like Thomas Callaghan of Georgetown University, and campaigning politicians to a practical reality. Of course, the dominance of the United States aerospace industry persists as does the imbalance of trade in aerospace products, particularly in the civil sector, although even this, following the success of Airbus Industrie's A-300 European Airbus, is diminishing.

5. The argument has therefore shifted dramatically over the course of the last decade. The merits of European collaboration no longer have to be argued. The awesome costs of developing and producing modern aeroplanes, missiles and spacecraft have long since been evidently beyond the capabilities of all but the three or four richest European nations. Even they have appreciated that in most instances, unless a large export market can be assured to amortise development costs, there is no alternative to the industrial benefits of shared development expenditures, long production runs and technology transfer inherent in collaborative programmes. For the smaller European nations the collaborative imperative is even more stark, since without collaboration their aerospace-related industries could not survive.

6. What remains to be studied are the mechanics of co-operation. A whole generation has elapsed since the inception of the first European collaborative projects such as the Concorde, Transall and Atlantic. *Ad hoc* co-operation has been replaced by the consortium approach to collaboration and by families of armaments and United States-European collaboration. The arrangements utilised for the joint development and production of various European aerospace projects have already been described in Document 863, the report on international industrial consortia and collaborative arrangements for the production of high technology military equipment dated 1st December 1980. The Lancaster House colloquy, by bringing together ministers, civil servants, serving officers of the armed forces, industrialists and politicians involved or interested in the procurement process, provided an

almost unique opportunity to assess on a European scale the progress and the impediments which attend aerospace collaboration today, and to draw appropriate conclusions.

7. The broad themes of the recommendation to Document 863 were endorsed by the colloquy, such as the more effective utilisation of existing institutional frameworks for collaboration rather than the establishment of new bureaucratic structures, the importance of a commercial orientation to collaboration from its inception and an approach to partnership with United States aerospace companies which, whilst not protectionist, recognises the importance of retaining multiple independent design and development capabilities within Europe.

II. *The political principles of collaboration*

8. The colloquy was privileged to be accorded important contributions by three Ministers of State, Mr. Hurd, of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr. Lemoine, of the French Ministry of Defence, and Viscount Trenchard, of the British Ministry of Defence, as well as opening speeches by the President of the Assembly of WEU, a former British Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Mullett, and by the Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions of WEU, Mr. Valleix.

9. Whereas the 1973 WEU colloquy took place with the American technological and productive challenge to the European aerospace industry very much in mind, the 1982 Lancaster House colloquy of WEU was held in the recent aftermath of the imposition of martial law in Poland and with the memory of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan still very much alive. The political and military arguments in favour of enhanced collaboration for the production of high technology defence equipment are therefore even more telling, especially since the economic recession has made budgetary constraints upon equipment programmes particularly severe because at the same time, according to Lord Trenchard, the cost of an aircraft and its weapons is escalating at 5 % per annum more than the rate of inflation.

10. The scale of the Soviet challenge was well described by Mr. Valleix who reminded the colloquy that the Soviets "have built up an arsenal far greater than they need to defend their national territory and extending well beyond a persevering determination to catch up with western technology. On average, Soviet expenditure is increased by 5 % per year in constant terms, representing 11 % to 13 % of the gross national product." This corresponds

with estimates in the United States Department of Defence's publication entitled "Soviet Military Power" which adduces to the Soviet Union an average of 12 % to 14 % of its gross national product to defence spending, excluding the space and science expenditures which are, of course, also of profound military significance. In the words of Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger's preface to this booklet "the growth of the Soviet armed forces is made possible by the USSR's military production base which continues to grow at the expense of all other components of the Soviet economy. There are 135 major military industrial plants now operating in the Soviet Union with over 40 million square metres in floor space, a 34 % increase since 1970".

11. Since, to quote Mr. Valleix again, "the challenge of the Soviet Union is today the main concern of Europeans, and not without reason" it is crucial that the most efficient use be made of the western democracies' politically limited financial resources for defence. The rôle of aerospace collaboration in this respect was well summarised by Mr. Lemoine at the colloquy when he said that: "These high aeronautical development costs in relative terms (they have also been increasing by leaps and bounds in absolute terms over the last few years due to new technology) are making it less and less possible or realistic to go it alone and more and more vital to engage in international co-operation through adequate consortia... It was not by chance that the first generation of international co-operation schemes launched fifteen to twenty years ago involved almost exclusively the aeronautical and missile industries. But what was then merely a trend has now become an absolute necessity."

12. Even the United States is no longer able to "go it alone" in the development and production of all the high technology weaponry its armed forces need to meet the Soviet challenge. From the European perspective Lord Trenchard was right to warn that "unless Europe can maintain leading positions in a large portion of the defence industries the two-way street between the United States and Europe will not work well, and if the two-way street does not work well wider aspects of the defence of the West and of agreement between the United States and her NATO partners and the free world will be harder to achieve". From the American perspective the situation was starkly stated in T.A. Callaghan's West Point paper of June 1981 entitled "The Structural Disarmament of the West. Our Most Critical Defence Industrial Challenge". In it the famous author of the Callaghan report to the State Department of 1974 advocating the two-way street forcefully describes the position faced by Europeans and Americans alike: "If

we accept the fact that we are dependent militarily upon our allies for our own military security, then we must also accept the need for defence industrial interdependence. If we persist in pursuing an autarchic defence industrial policy – refusing to be dependent upon any ally for weapon development, production or support – then we shall become increasingly vulnerable militarily, because (i) we will have set ourselves a task our defence industrial base cannot perform; (ii) our allies' military capabilities, readiness and war reserves will continue to decline, and (iii) we (like our allies) will find it impossible to climb out from the quicksand of structural disarmament."

13. The possibility of the "structural disarmament of the West" in face of the Soviet challenge is inherent in the relative price effect whereby the cost of sophisticated weaponry escalates more than the rate of inflation, and considerably more than the 3% increase in defence expenditure in real terms to which the NATO member countries are committed to aim. In the words of Lord Trenchard, "without constantly increasing defence budgets in real terms we are all faced with a steady reduction in the numbers of aircraft, ships and tanks that we can afford". As the Warsaw Pact is deploying new equipment of ever greater sophistication in ever growing numbers, this is a state of affairs to which the heads of government of the western Alliance, as stated in the draft recommendation, must address themselves as a matter of urgency.

14. The potential of defence equipment burden-sharing inherent in an equitable two-way street and Alliance-wide collaboration in the field of aerospace weaponry was analysed by Mr. T.A. Callaghan Jnr. in his contribution to the Europe-America Letter of March 1982 which summarises admirably some of the basic political arguments inherent in the Lancaster House colloquy discussions. "The defence of the West could be immeasurably strengthened and the danger of continental and intercontinental nuclear war greatly reduced", Mr. Callaghan argues, "if the allied heads of government were to agree at the Bonn summit to pool their efforts and resources, and to create a credible, collective conventional force for the defence of Europe. This would require agreement also on a collective defence-industrial effort within Europe, and between Europe and North America. With half again as many people, and more than twice the GNP of the Warsaw Pact, a NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional balance could be achieved *without economic strain* – if the financial burdens, and the economic benefits (jobs and technological pride and progress) were equitably and efficiently shared."

15. Burden-sharing in co-operative weapon production and in aerospace collaboration

demands military flexibility in having for political and economic reasons to impose upon the national military staffs compromises in operational requirements. This should be achievable since, in the words of Mr. Lemoine, "we are contemplating a common potential theatre of operations where possible personal differences of concept must be reconciled if we are to go ahead with the co-operation we must indispensably engage in to keep within our defence budgets... The other compromise – the industrial one – is much more difficult to achieve because it implies mutual sacrifices. In particular, France feels a sense of solidarity with so-called less industrialised countries that are insistently asking the big European nations for a minimum degree of technology transfers to assist their infant industries and bolster their decision-making autonomy and independence, which they want just as we do. In short, we must not deny to them that two-way traffic which we Europeans were not able to obtain from the United States; on the contrary, we must endeavour to establish it between big and less-industrialised countries within Europe." In other words there is a need for an intra-European two-way street between the large and small countries of Europe just as much as there is for a transatlantic two-way street between North America and Europe.

16. Cost control is an essential interest for all Alliance nations in the procurement of defence equipment. In the judgment of Lord Trenchard it can best be achieved if each country, and indeed to a large extent each company within each country, selects areas where it has a lead technology and develops them. Each nation should avoid spending money on the industries where it is competitively weak and should in turn seek co-operation in those areas with other countries. In Lord Trenchard's view the savings inherent in productive specialisation outweigh the consequent loss of competitive stimulus to efficiency. "I believe", he argued, "that we shall only make international collaboration work better if we exercise a greater degree of self-discipline in selecting a smaller number of areas in each country where we will apply our inevitably limited research and development resources..."

17. The politics of collaboration cannot be complete without a political appraisal of the institutional framework within which collaborative projects are undertaken. Lord Trenchard echoed the sentiments of the draft recommendation to this report and of the previous report on international industrial consortia of December 1980 when he emphasised that "there is more hope that the discipline of the profit and loss account will drive industrial companies into more and more international collaboration on an industrial basis than that major new ini-

tiatives on a government-to-government basis on their own will be successful". Nevertheless, governments have a rôle to play as we have seen over the failure to sell Tornado to other than the armed services of the three manufacturing partner nations, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Lord Trenchard was right to observe laconically that "the problems of sales to third parties with all the security and foreign policy problems they sometimes produce need much more consideration at the formative stage of a collaboration". Furthermore, although it is right to put more faith in commercial incentives to collaboration than in governmental or institutional pressures, these official frameworks for collaboration do merit serious political attention. Mr. Lemoine was to be applauded therefore for reminding the colloquy "that France's aeronautical economic policy consists of promoting European co-operation both in all official frameworks and by encouraging the work of the European Defence Industrial Group of European industrialists (EDIG) - the unofficial industrial opposite number of the Independent European Programme Group - as well as by urging French industry to participate in international consortia".

18. Finally it is clear that the work of WEU in promoting collaboration has had some political success but further progress is essential. First, the Council has finally agreed that National Armaments Directors should as a rule give preference to future collaborative equipment selected in the framework of the Independent European Programme Group rather than competing non-European equipment. Secondly, the determination of the General Rapporteur to see a more effective rôle for both the IEPG and also for the SAC of WEU was echoed at the colloquy by Mr. Hurd, although the example he gave of the European combat aircraft remains tragically nugatory owing to a lack of funding and political will on the part of the potential partner nations. "In 1981", Mr. Hurd reminded the colloquy, "the Assembly passed Recommendation 368 which asked WEU member governments to harmonise specifications so that development of a new combat aircraft would proceed and to demonstrate, in the framework of the Standing Armaments Committee and of the Independent European Programme Group, their interest in its development. The Council in reply told the Assembly that the next generation of combat aircraft was being actively discussed by the French, German and British Governments. Interest shown by various European governments was such that a project group had been set up within the IEPG to facilitate concerted action and exchanges of information." Abortive examples of this kind heighten disenchantment with the work of the IEPG and increase the importance of the draft recommendation to this report demanding that

the chairmanship of the IEPG be assigned on a rotational basis to a defence minister, a view echoed by Mr. Holst in his evidence to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in Paris on 17th November 1981 when he said that "a meeting of state secretaries constitutes the highest body of the IEPG. It provides political guidance to the work of the organisation and is convened at least once a year in the country which has the chair... the position of state secretary does not exist in many of the member countries. They have in many instances been represented instead by senior civil servants. However, this state of affairs has made it more difficult to generate political impetus and momentum in the organisation. It is possible that the annual meeting should be specifically designated a ministerial session in order to ensure such impetus." Indeed it should, but the outcome of the work will still depend on the political will of the national governments represented.

III. *The viewpoint of government officials on collaboration*

19. A number of distinguished civil servants and serving officers participated in the colloquy and papers were read by Mr. Barnes, Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser (Projects) at the British Ministry of Defence, by General Barbato, Director-General Armaments (Aerospace) at the Italian Ministry of Defence, by Ingénieur Général Cauchie, Director for International Affairs at the French Ministry of Defence, by Lieutenant-Colonel De Winne, Assistant to the National Armaments Director at the Belgian Ministry of Defence, and by Dr. Schomerus, Ministerialdirigent, Federal German Ministry for Economic Affairs. In addition there were a number of interventions by prominent officials from the floor, notably by Mr. Plantey, Head of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU, an expanded version of whose observations has been added to the record of the colloquy as an appendix.

United States-European collaboration

20. Mr. Barnes' paper on the possibilities of joint co-operation between the United States and Europe was invaluable. He recalled the fact that, of the total expenditure on defence equipment by all members of the Alliance, the European share is just under 40% and that the vast majority of the remainder is spent in the United States, whereas in other NATO expenditures the European share is no less than over 66%. Of the world armaments market about a third is held by the United States, a third held by the USSR and a third by the European

nations. Inasmuch as European collaboration has contributed to these achievements it should be extended particularly in the fields of guided weapons and space technology in which progress towards effective collaboration had been slower than with aircraft.

21. Mr. Barnes reminded the colloquy that "the prospect of collaboration with the United States cannot be set aside for two reasons. The first is the sheer size of the potential markets which can be opened up, both within the United States itself and within its overseas customers. The second is that the cost of the research, development and evaluation which precedes production is reaching proportions which even the United States finds hard to afford – especially if the production run is effectively limited to its own offtake and if other overseas markets (excluding the North Atlantic Alliance) are small."

22. There is nothing new in collaboration between the United States and individual European countries. Anglo-American co-operation in World War II initiated the process, then came the licence production by the Glenn Martin company of the B-57 version of the English Electric Canberra for the United States air force, followed by the V/STOL development based on the Kestrel and Harrier, leading first to the AV8-A and subsequently to the AV8-B. The General Electric-SNECMA CFM-56 powerplant is another example of successful United States-European collaboration and it should not be forgotten that European countries have contributed very usefully to the Shuttle and the related Spacelab programme. Eloquent testimony to the quality of the European contribution to the Shuttle and Spacelab programme was given during the visit made by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions of WEU to the Kennedy Space Centre in July 1981.

23. An important initiative was launched by the administration of President Carter whereby Dr. Perry, the Under-Secretary for Research and Engineering in the Department of Defence, sought to extend the principle of transatlantic collaboration by allowing more than one country to participate, thereby furthering the cause of interoperability within NATO.

24. The idea he promoted, the family of weapons concept, had its origin in the Anglo-French helicopter package of the late 1960s. In the case of a two-system family of weapons the United States would develop one weapon and Europe the other, with the assurance that the other partner in each case would adopt the product for his own armed forces and would refrain from applying government funds for a rival system. The sole example of such a family of weapons to date is in the field of air-

to-air guided missiles, where the United States is developing a medium-range weapon (AMRAAM) and the Federal German Republic and the United Kingdom are in the early stages of a project for a short-range missile (ASRAAM). There is another family potentially in prospect in the field of anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW) but this is not yet certain. Present plans would be for a European consortium to develop and produce a medium-to long-range ATGW and for the Americans to develop and produce a short- to medium-range ATGW.

25. A feature of the family of weapons concept if it comes to fruition is the right of each side to establish second sources for production under licence rather than just to buy off the shelf what has been produced on the other side of the Atlantic. Similarly, it may be easier for European firms to act as sub-contractors to a main contractor in the United States.

26. Dual production and sub-contracting do not depend exclusively on the family of weapons concept. The F-16 aircraft programme is an example where production takes place both in Europe and the United States, the development and initial production having been undertaken in the United States. The AIM 9L Sidewinder air-to-air guided weapon is another example, as is the NATO Sea Sparrow. For the future another programme which is likely to have an element of European manufacture is the multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS).

27. The principal prerequisites for worthwhile transatlantic industrial collaboration are in Mr. Barnes' view those listed below and in the view of the Rapporteur they are essentially the same as for effective European collaboration:

- (i) the armed forces have to agree on the type of equipment needed and on when it has to enter service;
- (ii) the industries of the participating countries have to see mutual commercial advantage in collaboration;
- (iii) there has to be agreement between the respective governments on such issues as funding, research and development levies, technological and design property rights, financial and economic guidelines and the conditions to be met for sales to other countries.

28. Whereas the experience of collaboration in Europe has been to reinforce the stability and security of aerospace programmes – Concorde and Tornado are the two most obvious examples – political and in particular parliamentary pressures on transatlantic colla-

boration, together with the partisan lobbying of legislators by parochial interest groups in the United States have had an adverse effect. When it comes to defence appropriations Congressional opinion understandably tends to be more favourable to the all-American product than to its United States-European collaborative or purely European counterparts. Damaging initiatives like the speciality metals amendment are a typical manifestation of this protectionist type of Congressional behaviour, which is perfectly understandable in the American political context. Likewise, the paucity of funding for the British Aerospace Hawk trainer to meet the United States navy's VTXTS trainer requirement is regrettable but comprehensible. A clear exception is provided by European equipment which performs in a way no American equipment can match. So the swing-wing Tornado failed to be selected as an enhanced tactical fighter (ETF) for the United States air force, but the AV8-B Super Harrier V/STOL aircraft was the enthusiastically expressed selection of the United States marine corps. To its credit the United States administration takes a more enlightened attitude towards the two-way street but its determination to assist requires constant political reinforcement at top governmental level by European nations.

The Italian viewpoint

29. Uniquely among the participants General Barbato saw the steady trend in the Italian aeronautical industry towards the fulfilment of multinational operational requirements on the basis of European collaboration and even of international integration, as "part of the more general political and cultural context moving towards the constitution of a united Europe, integrated in its varied national components, but also obeying undoubtedly precise technical, economic and industrial demands", which are:

- (i) the reduction of the development costs borne by a single country;
- (ii) technology transfer;
- (iii) enhanced export potential.

30. General Barbato recalled that Italy had been participating in international programmes and particularly European programmes in the military field for the last twenty years. He listed the activities concerned as follows:

- licence production of the F-104G Starfighter aircraft;
- the servicing and refurbishing of the Nike missile;
- the development and production of the Panavia Tornado aircraft;

- the joint development and production between Aeritalia and Embraer of Brazil of the AM-X light attack-reconnaissance aircraft to replace the F-104G and Fiat G-91 from 1987 with the 70 % Italian and 30 % Brazilian funding corresponding to the two nations' respective requirements for the aircraft;
- the definition and feasibility studies on the EH-101 anti-submarine helicopter between Agusta and Westland of the United Kingdom for a possible replacement of the SH-3D and Sea King helicopters currently in service with the Italian navy and Royal Navy respectively.

Other projects such as the Aeritalia G-222 medium-range transport aircraft, the SIAI Marchetti SM-260M basic trainer, the Aermacchi MB-339 jet trainer, the Agusta A-109 and A-129 helicopters and the Spada/Aspide surface-to-air guided missile system have been carried out on a national basis since they are fully within Italian industrial and financial resources.

31. For the future international collaboration, particularly European collaboration, represents in General Barbato's view the future for Italy in the military aeronautical field; certainly for all major programmes. In this respect an air defence aircraft would be required to replace the F-104S interceptors by the end of the century. General Nench admitted that the timescale of the Italian requirement for a new fighter was different from that of the other interested countries since the Italian air force believed it should retain its present equipment until 1995. General Barbato admitted that the size of the new programme "makes a national self-contained development practically impossible considering the financial resources that Italy would be able to devote to it. The pursuit of European collaboration with the assumption of the (existing) possibility of agreeing common or at least similar requirements with the partners and taking into account the other European countries' need for a new fighter aircraft is particularly important". Should this attempt fail, production under licence would represent the only possible solution (obviously excluding direct procurement abroad) since the operational requirement would remain on a national basis. However, General Barbato expressed his disapproval of such a possibility since it "would interrupt Italy's fruitful European integration process being carried out today in the military aeronautical area and would slow down the progress of national industry. It would also be detrimental to potential European partners because of the reduced number of new fighter

aircraft to be produced and [because of these partners] having to forego both the Italian financial contribution and the Italian industry's technological and productive contribution." It is difficult to emphasise strongly enough the wisdom of General Barbato's remarks about a new combat aircraft for Italy which apply equally forcefully and relevantly to Italy's potential British, French and German partners.

The mechanisms of collaboration

32. Ingénieur-Général Cauchie listed the criteria by which countries choose international co-operation for carrying out armaments programmes. They are as follows:

- (i) the cost of developing the equipment concerned must be high;
- (ii) it must be a specific item and the dependence of the co-operating partners must not have unacceptable repercussions on other major national programmes;
- (iii) co-operation must allow the capability of each partner country to be increased or at least maintained;
- (iv) the requirements of each partner must not involve constraints on the independence of the other partners, for instance where exports are concerned;
- (v) there must be agreement on simple and efficient management.

The first precondition is self-evidently met in the case of advanced aerospace programmes. The second, third and fourth criteria involve the definition of specifications, work-sharing and accommodating the divergent interests of the partners which all necessitate political will to overcome the inherent problems. Finally, the meeting of the fifth condition by means of satisfying the needs and demands of government, industry and the military customers is the essential prerequisite for successful collaboration.

33. Prime contractorship by an existing company with the administrative organisation of one of the two countries acting as executive agency is the simplest and most direct form of collaboration which has worked well as in the cases of the Avions Marcel Dassault-Bréguet Aviation/British Aerospace Jaguar offensive support aircraft and the Aérospatiale/Westland Lynx and Gazelle helicopters. For the Jaguar the United Kingdom was responsible for the Adour engine with the executive agency and the industrial prime contractor company Rolls-Royce/Turboméca coming under British law,

while the airframe was produced under the guidance of a French executive agency and with a French registered prime contractor, SEPECAT. Perhaps the best system of all was to have two complementary programmes as with the Gazelle and the Lynx helicopters for which the executive agency and prime contractor were French in the first case and British in the second. It is clear that a partnership of more than two countries makes the effective management of such a system difficult.

34. Another method of collaboration is to establish special bodies for the purpose. Under the guidance of a policy steering committee of equal members which unanimously decides the guiding principles of collaboration, the participating governments may decide to establish a programmes office from their national Defence Ministries to manage the programme. This body may or may not have legal status. If not, as in the case of the Franco-German programmes office for missiles, notice and administrative implementation of the necessary contracts are ensured by the Defence Ministry of the national host country acting as contracting agency on the instructions of the programmes office. Conversely, in the case of Tornado it is an official agency, NAMMA, which acts as executive agency and which has been given the legal status of NATO for that purpose.

35. Parallel with this state organisation the industrial companies concerned form a consortium governed by the laws of the country in which it is located. In the case of Franco-German missiles the consortium is Euromissile, grouping together the appropriate divisions of SNIAS and MBB under the aegis of an economic interest group (GIE) under French law, a method which allows companies to combine their efforts to attain a joint aim while retaining their independence and without the constitution of capital. In the case of the Tornado programme a limited liability company, Panavia GmbH, was established under German commercial law grouping together the British Aircraft Corporation, Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm and Aeritalia.

36. The advantage of the first type of organisation is simple and efficient programme management equivalent in efficiency to a purely national programme. The advantage of the second system is that it permits greater account to be taken of the interests of all the participants. Nevertheless, equitable work-sharing at both the development and production stages is difficult to achieve whether it is done on a division of man-hours basis or by an apportionment of workload on a financial basis. In the first case differences in productivity between participating countries are the problem. In the second case the difficulty lies in fluctuating

exchange rates. Whichever basic method is adopted, and in spite of the meticulous application of compensating formulae, perfect fairness in work-sharing is never attainable. However, over the duration of a programme the gains and losses probably cancel each other out and if personal dedication to the common objective inspires the programme it should transcend the arguments and tribulations of working together.

37. One further difficulty, as Mr. Plantey observed, is inherent in the operation of international consortia, namely that they function in a transnational economic, fiscal and contractual environment but are subject to the juridical regulations and administrative methods of their host country. The harmonisation of European company law has not kept pace with progress in the field of international aeronautical collaboration. In this respect Mr. Valleix believed that the European Communities and WEU should initiate a dialogue on the rationalisation of the legal framework required on an EEC basis to facilitate the work of international European consortia.

The perspective of the smaller nations

38. Lieutenant-Colonel De Winne of the Belgian Ministry of Defence expressed views typical of the smaller countries of the Alliance when he stressed that "the emphasis is more and more on the economic effects of armaments expenditure. Henceforth the national defence investment budget will not only have to be used to ensure procurement of the best possible equipment, [but also] the most suitable [weapons] for fulfilling its tasks and at the lowest price. It will furthermore and increasingly have to gain economic returns from expenditure by safeguarding the technological basis of national industry and avoiding the export of hours of work."

39. The principal weapon systems procured by Belgium are in fact developed and produced abroad like the Sea King helicopter or produced under licence nationally or in co-operation with allies like the F-16. Belgian aeronautical firms mainly produce component parts developed abroad. By participating in NATO, Belgium undertook to fulfil certain tasks in the overall framework of NATO strategy and consequently to equip itself with appropriate weapons in accordance with the principles of complementarity and interoperability. The main objective is to make the NATO Alliance's joint interests coincide with Belgium's own national interests. To this end the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is responsible for the overall management of work carried out in the principal armament groups covering land, sea and air systems plus such

aspects as research, communications, electronics and liaison with industry.

40. Since military requirements stem from two main sources, the evolution of the threat and technical progress, Belgium suffers from distinct disadvantages like other smaller countries of the Alliance. It does not have the capability to assess the totality of the threat and has to rely on intelligence supplied by the larger countries through the Alliance as and when they see fit. Furthermore, the advanced technology required to meet a sophisticated new military threat is beyond the means of smaller countries like Belgium. Even in less sophisticated areas within Belgium's industrial and technical capabilities such as in command and control systems there is a strong possibility that larger countries will impose their national equipment as a NATO standard in order to promote the global interests of their major manufacturers.

The difficulties and problems of co-operation

41. Dr. Schomerus of the Federal German Ministry for Economic Affairs insisted that it was important for the difficulties and problems involved in co-operative projects to be talked over in a prudent and objective way for a number of reasons. First, problems are everyday occurrences in co-operative projects. Secondly, experience has taught that they can be mastered. Thirdly, they must also be mastered in the future because Europe has no alternative to co-operation. There is no problem that should justify abandoning European co-operation. Fourthly, there is no reason to belittle the shortcomings inherent in co-operation. If the concrete difficulties are studied carefully there should be no question of jumping to false conclusions.

42. Some of the problems can be simply listed:

- (i) effective collaboration is predicated on achieving consensus between the partners on the specifications of co-operative projects and the operational requirements to be met by them. Many complicating factors necessarily enter into the process of achieving consensus such as the distribution of rôles within the Alliance, and differences in existing equipment stocks, their capabilities and replacement timescales;
- (ii) collaborative projects are funded not only by the industrial participants but by the partner governments. Different national financial, budgetary and parliamentary appropriation

considerations inevitably have to be reconciled. Differences of national economic and industrial policy present problems also. For example, the West German Government, unlike those of the United States and other European countries, is willing to provide export credits only at the market rate. On the industrial plane nationalised companies in a collaborative arrangement may have access to capital resources and enjoy a degree of insulation from the commercial disciplines expected for a private sector partner company;

- (iii) political differences towards the exploitation of export markets can cause serious tensions between collaborative partners unless identified and clearly accepted at the outset of a co-operative project;
- (iv) the maintenance of an existing consortium in times of budgetary constraint may pose particular problems as the manufacturing phase of the project for which it was created is run down. Consortia ought to envisage a continuing rôle for themselves: build up their own capital and be ready to finance private venture projects either themselves or with funding from their parent companies before specific requests for proposals (RFPs) on behalf of national Ministries of Defence are issued. Furthermore, national Ministries of Defence must issue RFPs to existing consortia and not just to national companies;
- (v) the challenge of cost control is one of the most important facing European partners in collaborative projects which has not been adequately recognised in the law. European collaboration has broadly been successful in the aerospace sector but co-operative projects must be competitive not just technically but commercially also. This is the lesson of the Tornado experience from which determination should be heightened to extend the Airbus Industrie family of aircraft and to build a new European combat aircraft.

IV. *The industrial dimension to collaboration*

The collaborative experience so far

43. Dr. Hall of British Aerospace gave a clear and direct exposition of the practical industrial experience and lessons of collaboration from

the viewpoint of his company, which has an unrivalled background in both co-operation with the United States since the 1950s and the development by the Glenn Martin Company of the Canberra bomber, and also of co-operation within Europe from the 1960s onwards over such projects as the Concorde, Jaguar, Tornado and Airbus.

44. In the sixteen years since the start of the Jaguar project there has been little need to alter the basic industrial arrangements. The management organisation was kept simple. The French registered management company placed contracts for the airframe while at the same time having essentially no full-time central staff. This solution to collaboration between two partners would certainly still suggest itself in similar circumstances in the future.

45. The Tornado programme presented different challenges not merely because the aircraft was to be built and procured by three countries, but because it was necessary to share design leadership effectively and to move closer to full weapon system prime contractorship. In this respect the Panavia consortium is not only the central source of contracts for Aeritalia, MBB and BAe, but has gone on from responsibility for design and series production of the IDS Tornado to extensive responsibilities for spares and support and for purchasing the production Turbo-Union RB-199 engines. This arrangement demonstrated its flexibility by additionally undertaking from 1977 the development and production of the air defence variant of the Tornado for the Royal Air Force, with a Panavia project directorate based at Warton.

46. The Panavia ground rules for co-operation were laid down in 1969 when the partners agreed "to endeavour to work in association and in complete harmony, making the best use of their respective means and experiences". The terms of agreement were clearly drawn up with great foresight, since despite many changes in circumstances they have remained essentially unaltered, and have meaningfully guided the successful day-to-day industrial co-operation on Tornado for the last thirteen years. There is little doubt that in similar circumstances in the future, the Panavia solution would offer a proven means of managing a major multipartner weapon programme.

47. On the technical side of collaboration it is obviously simplest to co-locate an integrated engineering team for the limited period of the few weeks required for design definition. Alternatively, where design leadership is shared, an effective method is to allocate to partners areas of systems design responsibility (SDRs). The nominated partner holds lead responsibility for that area, which might for

example be wings, avionics or propulsion, and has to generate specification documents, ensure engineering integrity and represent the consortium to the customer and suppliers. Authoritative joint technical reviews ensure the integration of the allocated area into the design as a whole.

48. Another unglamorous but essential tool for collaboration is a common set of engineering standards for drawings, small parts, materials and processes, which ensure consistency throughout the project no matter where a component of the weapon system is designed or manufactured. The Panavia standards which are essentially metric are being considered by other authorities for further applications outside the Tornado programme. Through its Tornado experience British Aerospace is now conversant with the United States military specifications requirements which, with the appropriate NATO standardisation agreements (STANAGs), are incorporated into the Panavia standards. From its Jaguar experience British Aerospace is thoroughly familiar with the French system of air *règlements* also.

49. A further tool of international industrial co-operation is the process of controlling the procurement of equipment which can make up a third or more of the value of the aircraft. Contrary to traditional practice for British military aircraft of having a large amount of government-furnished equipment, the IDS version of the Tornado has almost all its equipment purchased by industry, by Panavia. To ensure effective financial control a comprehensive procurement system has been established, dealing with the many difficulties of purchasing across national boundaries. An associated mechanism is the arrangement whereby, although all contracts are placed in the name of Panavia, the purchasing staff of the partner companies undertake the normal buying function by means of an agency agreement.

50. As the Tornado comes into service with four allied flying services and as the benefits of joint training at the Trinational Tornado Training Establishment (TTTE) at RAF Cottesmore become increasingly appreciated, the improved commonality of spares and support will encourage the extension of such standardisation not just to future projects but to the area of aircraft external stores and armament, without which complete weapon system standardisation cannot be achieved and without which the essential military goal of total interoperability cannot be realised.

Cost control in international aerospace consortia

51. Mr. Klapperich of Panavia drew on his deep experience of the Tornado programme as

ex-Finance Director and latterly as Managing Director of Panavia to present a highly detailed and most carefully researched paper addressed to the problems of cost control of sophisticated weapon systems whose escalating costs are becoming a limiting factor in defence policy, even for the governments of rich nations who are beginning to question whether they can continue to afford to procure the most sophisticated weapons to meet their defence requirements.

52. A major defence programme can be divided into two main phases: project preparation including the concept definition phase, identifying requirements, potential solutions, specifications and cost estimates, and the project implementation phase with its requirement to control costs within the budgetary and funding limits laid down.

Project preparation phase

53. The essential mission requirements must be analysed and a careful cost-effectiveness study of the alternative solutions undertaken. The requirements and specifications derived from these must be kept as simple as possible to achieve the vital mission objectives. Even at its inception the programme must be viewed in its overall perspective and savings in development and unit production costs should not be made at the expense of greater penalties in life cycle costs. In addition there is the need to seek international partners with whom to share the development costs and with whom to achieve economical production runs.

54. An important feature is the early definition of the main principles of co-operation and their clear expression in a memorandum of understanding (MOU). Again the Tornado programme provides an excellent example with the MOUs on both the governmental and industrial sides forming a solid basis of agreement which remains valid for running the programme today. An international aerospace programme if it is to be successful further requires that the governments concerned exercise flexibility in aligning their requirements and timescales. This is essential if they are to provide industry with a unified specification. Otherwise industry is obliged to reconcile by technical innovation, at far greater cost, differing operational requirements. This factor has been one of the most successful aspects of the Tornado programme. By contrast, the failure to reconcile operational requirements and timescales has been one of the most depressing features of the tragic obstacles which still prevent the launching of a new European combat aircraft project.

55. So far the major factors influencing programme cost have been governmental, but as

the project enters the definition phase these become a joint responsibility between government and industry. Government must be flexible to take advantage of minor specification changes which can yield major cost savings. In establishing programme monitoring and control systems, governments must take heed from the top-heavy bureaucratic example of NAMMA and resist the temptation to duplicate management and control functions which industry must in any case operate to control the programme. A far more efficient approach is for government and industry to agree clear programme goals and objectives and for government to exercise control by commercial means through the strict application of incentive and penalty contracts.

Project implementation stage

56. At the conclusion of the project preparation phase a weapons system is well defined in terms of design and proposed programme. Most of the decisions which will ultimately affect the overall cost of the programme have been made. The remaining cost control functions are normal to manufacturing industry and consist of controlling work in progress within the funding limits laid down. In addition, cost consciousness should be instilled at all levels of engineering. At the design stage the use of exotic or rare materials can be avoided and modern automatic production processes should be utilised to minimise the impact of increases in labour and material costs. Above all, the chief complainant about cost escalation in aerospace projects – the government – is actually often the worst culprit in precipitating cost increases by insisting upon expensive specification and programme changes. For maximum economy, deviations from the predetermined programme must be kept to an absolute minimum.

Financial advantages of the concerted approach

57. The financial advantages of sharing development costs are self-evident, but the benefits of concerting the functions of manufacture and supply between partners ensures that because of the enlarged production run the average aircraft price for each of the participating governments is well below that which they could have obtained from an individual national programme. Taking a typical national programme of 300 aircraft, an international programme with two further partners would save each nation more than 50 % on development and about 20 % on production as compared with a purely national programme.

Examples of cost control from the Tornado programme

58. The factors which have acted in favour of cost stability on Tornado are the following:

- (i) early agreement by the participating governments and armed services on the performance and design requirements which have remained relatively unaltered;
- (ii) the single source principle whereby airframe, equipment and engine manufacturers were selected early on for the duration of the programme. As a result Panavia obtained as early as 1970 firm option prices for all high value equipment items, which constitute about 40 % of the quoted production price;
- (iii) a clearly-defined and budgeted breakdown of the work to be done in each programme phase. The achievement associated cost and programme control was monitored in terms of the agreed milestones which also formed the basis of reporting to the customer and of annual overall programme cost reviews;
- (iv) the establishment as early as possible of firm, fixed price contracts for equipment and supplies. These principles were already generally in force during development and were applied even more vigorously in the production phase;
- (v) detailed matters such as strict configuration control and standardisation of technical and commercial documentation received careful attention throughout the programme.

A cost-efficiency analysis of Tornado

59. The ratio between development, production, and the support of a weapon system during its lifetime is generally of the order of 1: 3: 7. Intensive trials of a weapon system at the development stage, even if apparently costly, will therefore be amply rewarded by disproportionately large savings in cost in the production stage and more especially in the in-service support stage. This has led to the very important move away from target procurement cost as the design objective to the far more significant objective of low life cycle cost.

60. The goal of low life cycle cost was pursued from very early in the Tornado programme which envisaged on condition maintenance procedures and considerable reliance upon au-

omatic test equipment. As a result the reliability and maintainability record of the aeroplane has proved even better than planned. In addition, a high degree of commonality between the partner nations' versions of the IDS and the air defence variant, together with common technical documentation, crew training and centralised cost control have all contributed to improved standardisation and interoperability within NATO and greatly reduced support costs.

61. In order to monitor development costs of the Tornado checkpoints were agreed between the customer governments and Panavia and funding limitations contractually settled accordingly. Panavia contained in real cost terms the cost of the first flight of the first prototype in 1974 within the limits predicted in 1971. Likewise, a financial limitation was established for the overall development programme with a given number of flight test hours. Panavia contained the real cost of this programme by the planned end date of May 1978 within the cost predicted in 1971.

62. As far as the price of the production aircraft is concerned, the German Tornado Project Director stated in December 1980 that the aeroplane's cost remained stable in real cost terms (that is excluding the effects on inflation and exchange rate fluctuations) from 1970 till 1980 when a 17% upward adjustment in basic price had to be made largely to meet additional performance requirements. The same evidence of basic cost stability is illustrated by the fact that Panavia in 1976 was able to grant the customer binding option prices (i.e. maximum prices) for the total quantity of production aeroplanes and subsequently to maintain the quotation for each batch of aircraft within or below the relevant share of that overall maximum price. At present 648 out of the total of 805 aeroplanes are covered by this arrangement. It is doubtful whether the cost escalation of comparable American programmes such as the Grumman F-14 Tomcat or the McDonnell Douglas F-18 Hornet has been any less. Above all, the experience of the trinational crews who operate Tornado confirms that it represents a worthy testimonial to the merits of European collaboration and deserves to be precursor of other such international collaborative projects.

Co-operation in military aeroengine manufacture

63. Mr. Péquignot, Assistant Director-General for Programmes of SNECMA, observed that there is no co-operative engine programme outside the framework of a co-operative aircraft programme. Co-operation in the military aeroengine field is radically different from that

in commercial aeroengines. In the commercial sector to ensure a profit between 2,500 to 3,000 engines must be sold and therefore installed on several different types of aircraft.

64. The Tyne and Larzac consortia were the collaborative enterprises in the military field in which SNECMA has been principally involved with four other partners: with Rolls-Royce in the United Kingdom for the Tyne; with Turboméca in France and MTU and KHD in the Federal Republic of Germany for the Larzac. There are two Larzac assembly lines: one in France and one in Germany. So far 850 Larzac engines which power the Franco-German Alpha-Jet light trainer and attack aircraft have been delivered on schedule and at quoted prices. Joint development is now in hand of the improved Larzac 04 X with prime contractorship resting in the Turboméca/SNECMA team.

65. Mr. Péquignot was sceptical of the benefits of collaboration in military aeroengines. He believed it increased development costs and that with multiple assembly lines production and final assembly tooling were also more costly. Furthermore, each manufacturer had to ensure for himself at least one major prime contractorship for each generation of powerplant or risk losing his independent design and development capability.

66. Mr. Malroux, Vice-President of SNECMA, cited the CFM-56 as an example of commercial success which owed its origins to the requirements of the market and not to the execution of an intergovernmental agreement as was the case with Concorde. The CFM-56, which was originally launched as a commercial programme, now had an important additional military application in re-engining Boeing KC-135 tankers. 1,800 units to date have been sold and the programme is well on its way to a break-even point of 2,500 engine sales.

67. In the view of Mr. Malroux the essential factor for the success of the CFM-56 project is that it has been the product not of a consortium but, on the contrary, of "bilateral and voluntary co-operation between two engine companies which have convinced themselves that their long-term interests and their respective strategies coincide on a given market, and this without sacrificing any part of their independence, creativity potential and ability to sell and manufacture separately".

68. The selling price of the CFM-56 does not arise from an aggregate of the respective costs of partners enjoying a de facto monopoly situation but from the competition of the market place. The 50 : 50 division of production responsibility was not arrived at on the basis of costs, as for Concorde, but on the basis of the tasks to be

discharged and, correspondingly, the financial proceeds.

69. Programme management and contracts with customers are carried out by a joint company, CFM International, which is not an entity external to the two parent companies but an operation in which the operating services and management organisation of both SNECMA and General Electric are closely associated.

Helicopter collaboration

70. Dr. Jones, Technical Director of Westland Helicopters, stated that so far international collaboration in the helicopter field had been successful. The licence construction of primarily Sikorsky and Bell designs from the United States gave way for Aérospatiale and Westland Helicopters to the Anglo-French family of helicopters – the Lynx, Puma and Gazelle. This in turn was to be followed by the products of the quadripartite helicopter agreement of the late 1970s between France, the Federal German Republic, Italy and the United Kingdom whereby their respective Ministers of Defence undertook to meet their armed forces' future helicopter requirements among themselves.

71. Italy and the United Kingdom have similar requirements for a new anti-submarine helicopter for the 1990s. Project definition took place up to March 1982 under two government-to-government memoranda of understanding. To hold and manage the contract Agusta and Westland Helicopters formed a joint company, European Helicopter Industries Limited, registered in London. The helicopter is known as the EH-101 but the future of the helicopter is in doubt since the joint naval orders anticipated for the EH-101 are considerably below the level necessary to amortise investment in the project. However, the combined market potential for this class of helicopter, both civil and military, is up to ten times the combined defence requirements of the United Kingdom and Italian Governments. Investigations are proceeding into the possibility of launching the EH-101 as a joint venture combining private industrial risk capital with an element of government-sponsored military funding.

Co-operation in missiles and spacecraft

72. Mr. Douset, the Assistant Director-General of SNIAS, opened his remarks by reminding the colloquy of the difficulties as well as the often quoted advantages of collaboration. In the missile and space field a difficulty is that the European industry is dispersed. There are almost twenty principal missile cons-

tractors and even more leading firms engaged in space activities. In spite of the fact that most of them are jealous of their technical competence and have their own products, effective co-operation has taken place particularly in anti-tank guided missiles. The first generation of these, such as the SS-11, Swingfire and Vigilant, were purely national programmes. Of the second generation, the Euromissile, Hot and Milan Franco-German missiles dominated the market, particularly as British Aerospace Dynamics Group built the Milan under licence. For the third generation, the Euromissile Dynamics Group consortium had been formed between the two original Euromissile partners, SNIAS and MBB, plus British Aerospace Dynamics Group to develop a single family of successors to Milan, Hot and Swingfire and to furnish the European portion of any transatlantic anti-tank guided weapon co-operation. Furthermore, the governments created a single management agency for this third generation ATGW collaboration entitled the Franco-German Programme Office (BPFA).

73. In surface-to-air guided weapons progress towards collaboration has been very limited with the exception of the Franco-German Roland system produced by Euromissile. Competitive national systems like Rapier and Crotale have been strongly placed in this market.

74. In the anti-ship missile sector there has been no co-operation beyond the Anglo-French agreement for British licence production of Exocet and the Franco-Italian alliance between Oto Melara and Matra to produce Otomat.

75. In airborne guided weaponry BAe and Matra co-operated to produce Martel. However, of the next generation of air-to-surface guided weapons, the BAe Sea Eagle is a purely national programme. In air-to-air guided weapons the AIM 9L Sidewinder is being built under licence in the Federal German Republic, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom. Beyond that particular programme there is the prospect of the United States-European AMRAAM-ASRAAM air-to-air guided family of weapons co-production.

76. In space, European co-operation in the 1970s was a model of flexibility and success. The European Space Agency (ESA) was the umbrella organisation for most European space developments but it has never precluded the separate activities either of national space agencies like the French *Centre National d'Études Spatiales* (CNES) or of individual aerospace companies. As a result, a degree of effective European specialisation in the space field has grown up, albeit within a highly collaborative framework. Thus France, under the sponsorship of CNES and with the principal participa-

tion of the SNIAS, SEP and Matra industrial companies, has concentrated largely on the Ariane launcher programme. The Federal German Republic with MBB-Erno has been more involved in Spacelab, whereas Italy with Aeritalia and Telespazio and the United Kingdom with British Aerospace and Marconi Space Systems have concentrated on communication satellites.

77. Nevertheless, there are serious drawbacks to the organisation of Europe's space efforts. As the ESA charter specifically precludes military space developments, Europe lags woefully behind the other two superpowers in this vital strategic field of high technology. There is also unnecessary duplication. The Franco-German television satellite and the European L-Sat are clear examples of conflicting programmes, as is the development by CNES of the Spot earth resources surveillance satellite which duplicates part at least of ESA's potential activity in the remote sensing field, leaving it to concentrate primarily on an oceanic surveillance satellite. As to the consortia like MESH, STAR and COSMOS, their longevity testifies to the logic of the consortium approach to international high technology developments as in the space field.

78. Finally, Mr. Dousset summarised the key prerequisites to success in forming international consortia as follows:

- they must first meet the interests of manufacturers;
- greater coherence in the laws and regulations under which international consortia have to operate must be evolved;
- common or at least compatible technical standards must be ensured. The work of the Association of European Aerospace Manufacturers (AECMA) in this regard has been admirable;
- operational requirements, re-equipment timescales and programme specifications must be harmonised;
- the law of *juste retour* is too inflexible to form the basis of equitable work-sharing, which can only be established by a process of give and take, preferably over a family of joint projects;
- consortia should be formed to last so that companies' experience of working together can be built upon and not wasted;
- the prime contractor must be the firm which is the best placed industrially and which has the greatest interest in the programme;

- there must be a single marketing organisation to create a community of interests between consortium companies and to discourage the development of competitor programmes by any of the partners.

V. Conclusion

79. The Lancaster House colloquy validated and endorsed the recommendations both of Document 863, the report on international aeronautical consortia of December 1980, and the findings of previous WEU colloquies. Sound military, economic and industrial logic must now impel the European nations of the western Alliance not only to reinforce collaboration among themselves but also, having forged a stronger, more advanced and more unified industrial and technological base in Western Europe, to extend further collaboration with Western Europe's Alliance partners in North America. Such transatlantic partnership is increasingly one of equals and is in the interests of the nations of Europe and North America alike. The alternative would be to succumb to collective weakness in face of the undoubted Soviet challenge and to expose the western democracies to indubitable and unjustifiable danger.

80. Inspiration for the principle of aerospace collaboration is continued in the masterly synthesis of the General Rapporteur of the 1976 WEU aeronautical colloquy at Toulouse. His guiding concepts, so widely quoted by Mr. Valleix at Lancaster House, are well worthy of repetition. Their validity is undiminished by the passage of time. They are:

- first, that there will be no aviation market for Europe unless it can assert a European political purpose;
- second, that the European market will not find strength in resorting to protectionism;
- third, that progress should be made pragmatically, step by step, through better co-ordination and resorting to solutions of the Airbus Industrie type;
- fourth, that programmes should be judiciously selected and involve whole families of aircraft;
- fifth, that co-operation should be established with the United States on a basis of equality and reciprocity and not on a basis of offset production;

- sixth, that the European market alone is inadequate, at any rate to justify civil aircraft production, and that European industries should therefore break into the American market and win their place on the rest of the world market.

81. As a clear message full of conviction and confidence to conclude these guidelines from the Lancaster House colloquy, Mr. Vergnaud's masterly precepts from the Toulouse colloquy of six years ago cannot be surpassed and should stand as the final word upon our deliberations in Lancaster House on 9th and 10th February 1982.

***Harmonisation of research in civil and military
high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh
annual report of the Council***

REPORT¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions²
by Mr. Fiandrotti, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Valleix (Chairman); MM. Lenzer, Wilkinson (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman), Adriaensens, Amadei, Antoni (Alternate: Martino), Barthe, Fiandrotti, Forma, Fortier (Alternate: Bassinet), Fourré, Garrett (Alternate:

Lord Northfield), Hawkins (Alternate: Sir Russell Fairgrieve), McGuire (Alternate: Morris), Manning, Prussen, Spies von Büllenheim, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Topmann, Worrell.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the need to ensure a better place for Europe in industrial and trade competition with the United States and Japan;
- (ii) Considering how fast technology evolves and the difficulty member countries experience in keeping abreast with progress in the various fields of advanced technology;
- (iii) Considering the need to develop and produce high technology weapons capable of ensuring a balance of forces with the Warsaw Pact;
- (iv) Considering the budgetary difficulties of member states and the problems they consequently have to face because of the sharp rise in the cost of research and development of modern weapons;
- (v) Considering that greater harmonisation of the research and development efforts of the member countries, in spite of disparities in the relevant budgets, and more intensive European co-operation would allow these difficulties to be overcome more easily;
- (vi) Noting the part of the Council's twenty-seventh annual report on scientific, technological and aerospace questions and the indications it gives on energy and security on the one hand and space activities on the other;
- (vii) Considering the reply of the Council to Recommendations 331 and 365 and the statements by Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the French Minister of Defence, to the Assembly on 3rd December 1981,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Invite the Standing Armaments Committee and its international secretariat, in fields within their competence, to assist the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in preparing the second part of its report on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields;
2. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to draw up a list of military research and development programmes which, because of their cost, technical complexity or special interest, might be worthwhile matters for European or international co-operation;
3. Study the possibility of increasing the security and energy interdependence of member countries;
4. Invite the governments of member countries :
 - (a) to decide on a choice of projects for European co-operation in fields such as micro-electronics, biotechnology and maritime, nuclear and space technology;
 - (b) to implement these projects with the greatest flexibility and also perseverance in bi- or multilateral frameworks;
 - (c) to make provision for training the corresponding experts;
 - (d) to promote exchanges of research workers between European countries, thus enabling the setting up of European teams ;
 - (e) finally, to ensure the financing of these projects.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Fiandrotti, Rapporteur)

I. Introductory remarks

1. At the committee meeting on 18th March 1982, your Rapporteur submitted a working paper and explained that in view of the complexity of the subject and the interviews yet to be arranged with the competent authorities, he preferred to present the report in two parts, a general part and one going into more detail on the harmonisation of research with particular regard to the military applications of high technology.
2. As stated by Dr. David Beckler, the Director for Science, Technology and Industry of the OECD, international co-operation on and/or co-ordination of research in high technology fields which have military applications is an exceedingly complex topic, conceptually and technically. Implementation of such co-operation and/or co-ordination encounters many obstacles and difficulties. These include the international sharing of information classified at national level, co-operation with university research, the wish of private bodies and firms to take part and commercial interests. Mention should also be made of the foreseeable complexity of the institutional structures which would be needed to implement a programme covering several areas of research with a large number of possible military applications.
3. Your Rapporteur will first consider the general civil organisations and fields where harmonisation is tried or applied.
4. Much multilateral work is done in the scientific and technological fields in the United Nations and in many regional organisations. In 1979, the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology recommended setting up an intergovernmental committee on science and technology for development, a United Nations centre and an interim fund of \$ 250 million.
5. A United Nations conference on the exploration and peaceful use of outer space (Unispace 82) will be held from 9th to 21st August 1982 to discuss the application of space science and technology for solving the problems of developing countries. Your Rapporteur examines this in Chapter VII.
6. The United Nations Committee on the peaceful uses of outer space is a major element in international space relations.
7. In the United Nations framework there are UNESCO, the World Health Organisation, the World Meteorological Service, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the United Nations Environment Programme and its earth watch project, and many others.
8. Your Rapporteur does not wish to discuss them all but only those directly related to Western European activities. As all international activities in research and development originate in the national framework, he will first give a short general outline of such activities in the member countries.
9. Since the 1960s, scientific research and development in all member countries of Western European Union has evolved along more or less the same lines. The scientific and technological budgets in our countries grew very rapidly. In the 1970s, new problems arose because of the scarcity and rising cost of energy resources and minerals and environmental problems. The economic recession, unemployment and other social questions required ever-increasing budgets which in turn demanded other savings.
10. The structure of technological policies in WEU member countries follows one of two general models. In the British system, decentralisation is the rule and in the continental countries, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, concerted action is more generally applied. In the latter context a minister is responsible for the co-ordination of all or most of the government's scientific and technological policies, i.e. he is responsible for balancing the scientific and technological efforts undertaken in the different fields of governmental civil activities.
11. In the *United Kingdom* research and development activities are discussed and decided upon in the separate departments. The basis is a customer-contractor principle according to which the departments, being the customers, conclude agreements with the contractors to provide the necessary research and development on a contract basis. An important rôle within the department is played by the chief scientists and their staffs. Some departments, for example the Department of Industry and especially the Defence Department, also have their own laboratories and research establishments.

12. The Department of Education and Science provides the budgets for the universities. There exist several research councils such as the Medical Research Council, the National Environment, the Agricultural, the Social Science Research and other general councils, such as the Science Research Council. Some co-ordination is achieved by the Advisory Board for the Research Councils. The money for these councils too is provided by the Department of Education and Science. On the military side there are many centres, units and establishments for research and development such as the Royal Aircraft Establishments, the Propellants, Explosives and Rocket Motor Establishment, the Admiralty Surface Weapons Establishment, the Royal Signals and Radar Establishment and the Telecommunications Laboratories.

13. In *Belgium* the Minister in charge of Scientific Policy is the co-ordinator of all governmental scientific and technological policies. He has a relatively small budget for national programmes and the development of "centres of excellence" in several disciplines. He is also in charge of the Belgian space efforts. Research programmes start mostly at the request of the ministerial departments and often are carried out in universities and scientific establishments. There are also the national fund for scientific research and funds for specialised activities such as medicine, agriculture, etc. For aerospace matters, there is the Belgian civil and military aviation research group. Most of the military research is done at FN Herstal.

14. In the *Federal Republic of Germany* the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology has a task of co-ordination and initiates government-sponsored research activities. For these activities the Ministry has a fairly large budget which is mainly used to finance and manage important industrial projects and the principal establishments for nuclear, aeronautical and space research. Apart from extending and raising the level of scientific knowledge, an important aspect of the Federal Government's research and technological policy is to maintain and increase the efficiency and competitiveness of the Federal economy.

15. Research and development in the universities is primarily the responsibility of the Länder which are also responsible for 50 % of the funding of the German scientific research establishment. The other half is financed by the Federal Government which is also politically responsible for the activities of the Max Planck Institute and the Fraunhofer Institute. The latter is mainly concerned with technological developments and, to a lesser extent, with basic science.

16. The Federal Government takes account of the wide-ranging aspects of foreign policy in the development and execution of its research and technology policies. It considers international co-operation is essential for financial and economic reasons and also in questions of development aid.

17. As more than two million people will be seeking employment in Germany in the 1980s without there being any reduction in the older working population, two million more jobs will have to be created and this can be done only by establishing advanced technology industries. Special attention is therefore being paid to microelectronics, software technology, communications techniques and information technology.

18. Another important field of research and development is oceanography and oceanographic technology. Deep-sea drilling techniques are being promoted in industry and in the universities.

19. About one-tenth of the total research and development expenditure of the Federal Government is earmarked for defence purposes, i.e. development of the Tornado, Alpha-Jet, artillery rocket systems, AWACS and sea mines in shallow waters.

20. In *France*, a Minister of State is in charge of scientific research and technological development. The expanded Ministry manages its own budget, which has been greatly increased (30 %) this year. It now has a budget of \$2,800 million. Planning, which has gained new impetus, gives particular prominence to activities linked with research and technology. A bill has been tabled in parliament containing guidelines and programmes for France's research and technological development.

21. Considerable sums of money are allocated to the various research establishments and institutes which include the Atomic Energy Commissariat, which handles both civil and military work, aerospace research and development establishments, the National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS) and the National Institute for Health and Medical Research (INSERM) whose activities are more specifically civil.

22. The National Centre for Scientific Research also distributes large sums and assists research and development in the universities.

23. In France, with effect from 1985 the total amount spent on research should be 2.5 % of the gross domestic product as compared with 1.8 % at present. 36 % of total allocations for research and development are and will be earmarked for military research. A special effort is being made in certain sectors of scientific and

technological innovation: energy, biotechnology, electronics and the technological development of industrial materials. The number of research workers in the public sector is growing at a rate of 4 to 5 % per year.

24. During the Committee's visit to *Italy* in March 1981, the then Minister for the Co-ordination of Scientific Research and Technology indicated that a large part of his Ministry's budget was earmarked for industrial innovation and therefore industrial applications rather than fundamental research. The latter is carried out mainly in universities and co-ordinated by the National Research Council. A major contribution to Italian research and technology is made privately by industrial companies. The Ministry for the Co-ordination of Scientific Research and Technology tries to co-ordinate private and public research and development efforts. Apart from civil research, the Ministry also promotes military research activities. In many sectors such as the aeronautical sector the two types of research are closely related. An example is the development of the AMX interceptor, the Italian air force's future tactical fighter. Civil and military research are also closely related in optics, electronics, radar systems and in fields such as lasers and microelectronics. Further developments in telecommunications are of great interest, especially through satellites.

25. In the *Netherlands*, the separate post of Minister for Science Policy was abolished in May 1981 when a new government took office. All authority vested in this minister was transferred to the Minister of Education and Science who is now also responsible for the co-ordination of science policy. The departmental unit for science policy is maintained as a separate entity. Within parliament the Commission for Science Policy has been maintained. In order to improve the use of technology for industrial renovation a project group is to be set up, as a result of recent discussions between the Minister responsible for science policy and the Minister for Economic Affairs, to put forward within a year proposals for a technology policy. The Minister of Education and Science will also remain in charge of a certain number of establishments such as TNO. A bill on the reorganisation of this establishment is being considered by the Council of Ministers and will be submitted to parliament in the course of 1982.

26. Apart from conventional technology, special attention is being given to new developments such as electronic data-processing and biotechnology. Three microelectronics centres have been set up in close co-operation with the three technological universities and TNO. As in the case of *Italy*, the *Netherlands* Government is interested in an integrated

industrial and technological policy in the framework of the Communities in order to meet the challenges of the United States and Japan.

27. As the government is very reticent about nuclear energy, only small sums of money are being allocated to research and development on fast breeders for example. More funds are earmarked for new energy technologies. In 1981 the total government budget for science and technology was some F1. 3,215 million, of which F1. 1,450 million was earmarked for research and development at university level. Only some F1. 83 million was assigned to research and development for defence purposes. Industry's research and development expenses amounted to F1. 3,360 million.

Defence outlays

28. As the major military power in the Atlantic area the United States devotes 15 % of the total federal budget to defence. To maintain its technological challenge in all areas, it spends about 13 % of defence funds on research and development, which is nearly half of all federal research and development. The defence budget now is \$180 billion. At the other extreme is Japan which for historical reasons has maintained a low defence establishment since the end of the second world war. In 1981 defence expenditure was \$11.5 billion, and only 1 % of this was for research and development.

29. There are major differences between the WEU countries in research and development spending for defence purposes. Belgium spends only 0.5 % of its budget on defence research and development, the Netherlands 4.5 %, Italy 3 %, Germany 10 %, France 36 % and the United Kingdom 54 %. Recent trends for research and development spending indicate that it is falling in the Federal Republic of Germany, rising in France and levelling off in the United Kingdom.

30. The following three countries spend broadly the same amounts on defence: France \$26 billion, the Federal Republic \$25 billion and the United Kingdom \$28.66 billion. In Germany, 5 % of the total defence budget is spent on research and development. Both France and the United Kingdom devote 10 % or more of defence outlay to research and development.

II. Scientific research and development and the European Community

31. Until 1974 the three communities – economic, coal and steel and Euratom – had only sectorial research and development programmes

for nuclear energy, coal, steel and agriculture. In 1974 the Council of Ministers decided that the scope of Community activities should be extended to the entire scientific and technical field with a view to promoting industrial and agricultural competitiveness, improving living and working conditions, and reducing energy dependence. The Council of Ministers excluded from the general programme all research and development involving military or industrial secrecy. On this basis the Commission then worked out and implemented a range of sectorial research and development programmes.

32. In 1981 it proposed that all these programmes should be integrated in an overall strategy aimed at:

- (i) promoting the scientific and technical potential of the Community;
- (ii) improving the competitiveness of Community agriculture and the self-sufficiency of Europe;
- (iii) contributing to the development of the third world;
- (iv) making research priorities more relevant to the present and future needs of industry and making access to research results easier for enterprises;
- (v) making the necessary technology available to essential industries in good time;
- (vi) concentrating efforts on new technologies such as biotechnology, information-processing technologies and communications;
- (vii) facilitating the achievement of objectives of common interest;
- (viii) having the Community intervene when for reasons of scale national resources cannot cater for major technological programmes and where smaller member states might otherwise be at a disadvantage or a regional imbalance arise.

33. To this end, it was proposed to incorporate existing programmes relating to energy, raw materials, etc., in an outline programme specifying what action should be taken or considered in the light of the choices made by the Community. Furthermore, programmes policy would be enhanced by action to stimulate scientific efficiency and the development of specific projects.

34. These general principles were discussed in the scientific and technical research commit-

tee (CREST) and the consultative committee on industrial research and development (CORDI).

35. All scientific and technical activities must be carried out or developed on the basis of the three treaties, whether it be a matter of the activities of the research centres at Ispra, Petten, Karlsruhe and Geel, shared-cost action, also called indirect action, concerted action or action by COST (European co-operation in scientific and technical research¹). Other forms of intervention are used for agriculture under Article 41 of the EEC treaty, computer science, textiles, demonstration projects and scientific and technical questions under the ECSC treaty. Finally, new means are being considered for stimulating the efficiency of the EEC's scientific and technical potential.

36. In science and technology the Community is mainly concerned with applied research. Its activities are classified under three different headings: direct action, indirect action, and concerted action².

37. Direct action means the Community's own research activities carried out by its own research workers in the abovementioned four facilities with more than 2,000 employees.

38. Indirect action covers projects for research carried out under contract by public bodies or industrial firms in the member states. Generally speaking, half the funds are provided by the Community, the other half from national sources. Research under contract is an important means of co-ordination and allows use to be made of the research teams and laboratories of the member states.

39. Concerted action covers programmes drawn up by common agreement. The various parts are financed entirely by the member states and are carried out under their responsibility. The Commission co-ordinates the work and the exchanges of information.

40. For Community programmes the Commission is assisted by advisory committees on programme management and by concerted action committees composed of experts from member states appointed by their respective governments.

41. Your Rapporteur believes that co-ordination should be achieved through the Community on the basis of comparisons between national and Community policies in order

1. The committee also has non-EEC member countries such as Austria, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. COST is a co-operation scheme distinct from the Communities although its secretariat is largely provided by the secretariat of the Council of Ministers of the Community and by the Commission.

2. See Appendix I.

to examine the desirable orientations of scientific and technical activity, taking into account existing strengths and weaknesses. The combined objectives of the member states should be clearly defined. This should be done in the long-term Community outline programme to be drawn up by the Commission. Once this has been done, the choices between national, international and Community level action should be considerably easier.

42. The Community outline programme should be reconsidered periodically in order to make the necessary adjustments. This should facilitate the decision-making process, especially with regard to human and financial resources, the budget and annual allocations for science and technology at Community level. Generally speaking, the planning of the scientific and technological activities of the Community should take into account the need for greater mobility among the scientific community and make Europe's productive capability permanently adapted to the changing circumstances of competition.

III. Trends in budget appropriations

43. Over the period 1970-80, budget appropriations in the Community as a whole recorded an average annual growth rate of about 12 % in nominal value and 0.5 % in real terms. The increase in real terms occurred mainly after 1978. However, this increase in government research financing in real terms for the Community as a whole conceals two different trends in individual countries. There was higher growth than the average Community rate in the Federal Republic of Germany (2.9 %), Ireland (6.2 %) and the Netherlands (1.2 %). There was a decline in Belgium (-2.9 %), France (-0.1 %), Italy (-1.4 %) and the United Kingdom (-0.7 %). Since 1980, with the exception of Belgium, the latter (i.e. France, Italy and the United Kingdom) have increased their research and development budgets.

44. Government financing of civil research and development accounts for about three-quarters of national science and technology budgets. For the individual member states, civil budgets are 48 % in the United Kingdom, 66 % in France, 90 % in the Federal Republic of Germany and exceed 95 % in the other WEU countries.

45. For joint action at the level of the European Economic Community, the most important civil research objective is energy. Up to 72 % of the overall Community's 1980 research and development budget of more than 300 million accounting units was for energy research with particular regard to thermonuclear fusion

for civil purposes. The United Kingdom and France do not allow this research to be extended to the defence field.

46. On 8th March 1982, the Council of Ministers responsible for research and technology in the Communities adopted a new five-year thermonuclear fusion programme for the years 1982-86 with a total budget of 620 million accounting units. In addition to the ten Community members, Sweden and Switzerland are associated with the European effort. This will allow Europe to maintain a sound position on thermonuclear fusion vis-à-vis the United States, Japan and the USSR.

47. In order to avoid duplicating research in this field, the possibility has been left open for co-operation with the United States and Japan and even, in the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, with the Soviet Union.

48. The objective of the Community budget is to build an experimental thermonuclear reactor before the year 2000. The joint European Torus (JET) now being built at Culham in the United Kingdom will take half of this budget. The other half, some 300 million accounting units, is to be spent on fusion research in national laboratories and on studying development of the next European Torus (NET) should Europe have to go it alone after all.

49. The Council of Ministers has also discussed the joint strategy proposed by the Commission. Thus, it adopted the principle and method of preparing the general outline programme and took options for Community research and development activity in the eighties.

50. 16.1 % of the Community's research budget for 1982 is earmarked for industrial technological research, 4.2 % for environmental research, 0.7 % for raw materials, 0.8 % for agriculture, 64.9 % for energy and the rest, 13.3 %, for miscellaneous purposes.

51. It is still difficult to judge whether the new guidelines proposed by the Commission will ultimately be accepted by the member governments. Even if the Community strategy is adopted, its financing might be difficult to arrange as long as the budgetary problems of the Community, especially the British contribution, have not been settled. Furthermore a decision to increase the Community resources might be required.

52. On the other hand, the member states are well aware of the dangers of Japanese and American competition. If no action is taken this challenge could not be met and the outcome for Europe's world economic and industrial situation would be serious.

53. All countries are preparing innovation plans for their industries, especially a technological revolution in new sectors of high technology. In an interview in "30 days of Europe" in January 1982 the President of the Commission, Mr. Thorn, stated that Europe should take the initiative in new sectors of high technology not in a national, but in a Community framework.

54. Although Western Europe spends about the same amount of money (about 40,000 million accounting units) on research and development as the United States and more than double the amount for Japan (about 15,000 million accounting units) which has nearly the same number of scientists and engineers as Western Europe (370,000 versus 363,000), its technological results are often not comparable to Japan's. What is now happening in Japan was predicted some seven or eight years ago and the efficiency of its industry has led to Japanese superiority in several important fields. The rôle of government should also be recognised; through its economic and tax policies and through government-sponsored research and development and technology transfer, it has provided significant assistance.

55. Since the end of World War II the Japanese Government has formulated a series of long-range economic plans designed to accelerate economic growth. The seven-year plan covering the period 1979-85 has now reached the half-way point. The plan projects total anticipated growth over the period and ancillary plans are then developed to facilitate the achievement of the overall target, including the necessary restructuring of industry. For example, at the present time twelve industries¹ are considered to have high growth potential.

56. Government-sponsored research and development is designed to help high growth industry to expand. At the same time government financial assistance is provided to help in the transfer of labour and capital out of the "troubled industries" through retraining programmes, compensation for scrapping equipment, partial payment of salaries while industries are entering new fields, etc. The projects largely relate to the development of new technologies in the electronics and machinery industries. For instance, the government wishes to give Japan world leadership in computer technology by 1990.

57. In Europe the governments and industrial authorities have often been unable to meet the scientific and technological challenges with which our society is confronted. The evolution of the organisation of public research and development, especially at university level, is

much too slow; there is a considerable dispersion of effort, each country pursuing the same research and development activities. Moreover, conditions do not allow early returns on the results of basic or applied research. Finally, there is an inadequate relationship between public research, industry and commerce.

58. Government financing for international co-operation has a number of special features worthy of examination. Appropriations for research and development in the Community account for about 1.5% of total government research and development financing in the member states. In the period 1970-80 the average annual growth was 5.3% in real terms; this percentage is considerably higher than the corresponding figure for government research and development spending in the Community. Research projects financed by the Commission were 2% down on 1978 in current value. This decrease is mainly due to indirect action projects since it was often difficult to obtain decisions in the Council of Ministers on new projects in time. The reduction mainly affected energy projects.

59. Apart from co-operation within the Community there is also multilateral co-operation in four priority fields of research: defence, space, general promotion of knowledge and industrial technology. These fields absorbed some 85% of all government funds for multilateral co-operation in 1980. Space occupies a privileged position in total budgetary appropriations allocated by member states to this research sector and in total funds allocated to multilateral co-operation concluded through the European Space Agency.

60. In certain member states appropriations for research and development co-operation in the defence sector cannot be singled out from the total amounts allocated to defence. Furthermore, the nature of co-operation in this research sector differs according to the size of the member states concerned. In general, smaller states practise multilateral co-operation whereas larger member states prefer bilateral agreements.

61. The reasons for the small percentages of total government research and development financing, either in a Community or in a multilateral framework, reside in the nature of co-operation. First, Community research and development was originally conducted only in certain sectors in accordance with the treaties. Second, Community research or multilateral co-operation are only complementary to national research and development. Third, co-operation often concerns projects which are too big or too costly to be financed by any one country. Fourth, the mobility of scientists and specialists can also be promoted through semi-

1. See Appendix II.

nars and other complementary activities. It is clear that different countries have different priorities and it is the task of the Commission to select the common goals.

IV. *Industrial innovation*

62. In all industrialised western countries committees have been formed and studies made on how to prepare for the changes and challenges expected in the 1980s and 1990s. Governments are strongly aware that they should work actively towards a restructuring of their industrial and technological potential. Technological innovation is one of the major therapeutic agents for current economic ills and one of its most important beneficial effects is to achieve and maintain a high level of international competitiveness for a nation's goods.

63. Not all economists are convinced however that innovation is the main part of the story of economic growth. Many believe that its most important source in the post-war period was capital formation, accounting for approximately 40 % of actual growth. But productivity change due to innovation might be the second main source of growth and it can account for 30-35 % of present growth.

64. Within the Communities the innovation policy undertaken by national governments might become a source of friction however. In comparing national budgets with the Community budget it is obvious that the member governments play an important rôle in the process of innovation. The industrialists' policies are a crucial factor in innovation. For instance, in West Germany the government has long been aware of the crucial importance of technical change for industrial performance and for many years this has been an integral component of Federal government policy. There is therefore a close relationship in West Germany between government, industry and university. Government innovation policy has largely been limited to the development and successful use of the infrastructure essential for providing the conditions under which innovation can flourish in both large and small firms.

65. In France, the programme-law places emphasis on the idea of long-term growth programmes, concentrating the means available in public research bodies, university laboratories, national firms, research centres and private firms for the attainment of major objectives. Furthermore, the resources made available for basic research are to be increased at a rate of 13 % per year.

66. If these different policies are followed, they might well become an obstacle to achieving a Community policy for research and development. The special assistance given to

certain industries might lead to unfair competition and protectionist measures for the home market. Innovation policies might well therefore lead to the erection of non-tariff barriers if national innovation policies are not harmonised.

67. Your Rapporteur is aware that many other aspects could be dealt with in this section on industrial innovation but the main point he wishes to bring out is the danger that innovation policy might become an obstacle to harmonisation.

V. *Harmonisation within the OECD*

68. On 19th and 20th March 1981 the OECD Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy met at ministerial level under the chairmanship of Mr. Aigrain, then French Secretary of State for Research and Development, and Mr. van Trier, then Dutch Minister for Science Policy. The theme of the meeting was science, technology and innovation for the 1980s - Prospectives on the national and international level. Three subjects were discussed: innovation policy, future consequences of science and technology and international collaboration. The meeting ended with a ministerial declaration on future policy for science and technology which represented a commonly-agreed set of principles and orientations for the science and technology policies of OECD member countries. It was recognised that all member countries were faced with common challenges such as the slow-down in economic growth, high levels of unemployment, low rates of productivity increase, persistent inflation, structural imbalances in the economy, increased energy prices and environmental problems. Science, technology and innovation had a vital rôle to play in the resolution of these difficulties and in responding to the needs and aspirations of society. Many forms of international co-operation could promote progress in science and technology. Finally, a number of recommendations were made on the future rôle of the OECD in science and technology policy.

69. During the meeting it was made clear that the industrial countries should take the change and challenge of the 1980s seriously and work actively to develop their technological potential. This would take time but the 1980s should be considered as a transition period leading to the 1990s when the rewards of meeting this challenge would be reaped.

70. The overall priorities of the member countries were identified by the OECD in the following figures which represent an average of member governments' research and development expenditure: defence and aerospace 43 %;

energy and infrastructure 19 %; industry and agriculture 13 %; health and welfare 10 %; advancement of knowledge 15 %. However, the priorities vary considerably between countries. Thus, although the governments of France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom all spend the same total amount on research and development, expenditure is allocated quite differently. France and the United Kingdom specialise in defence and aerospace; Japan in industry and agriculture; and Germany in energy, infrastructure, health and welfare.

71. Defence and aerospace represent about two-thirds of specific government research and development funding in the United Kingdom, about one-half in France, one-quarter in Germany and less than one-sixth in Japan. In France and the United Kingdom the defence departments also act as procurement agencies for civilian space and aeronautics research and development contracts with industry. Some government laboratories undertake both types of work. For instance, in the United Kingdom, defence aviation establishments work on aerospace research and development for both military and civilian purposes.

72. On space research and development the United States spends the most in both absolute and relative terms. Of the other four countries, France, Germany and Japan spent about the same in both absolute and relative terms and the United Kingdom slightly less.

73. On energy the Federal Republic, followed by the United States and France, spends the most since energy has become the number one objective of government research and development funding. For the United Kingdom, which has both coal and oil resources, the percentage remained about the same during the 1970s. Of all research and development expenditure on energy, about 80 % is still earmarked for nuclear research and related projects.

74. All OECD countries face common problems of inflation, high energy costs, increasing social demands and unemployment. Within the OECD Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy member countries exchange views on ways to promote innovation for their mutual benefit and to make structure adjustments to meet increased technological competition. The committee has completed several long-term studies of East-West technology transfer and of North-South technology transfer. It pays particular attention to the effects of such transfers on the structure and economy of OECD member countries.

75. On 1st April 1982 the OECD Council decided to set up a Committee on information, computers and communications policy to ex-

amine the social and economic impact of data flows and the spread of information technology. This is a sign of the increasing importance given to this area by the OECD and its member countries. The OECD thus remains a focal point for international discussions on these subjects.

76. As the OECD brings together the European, North American and Pacific centres of western strength it offers a unique opportunity for information exchange and consensus building among countries with a great commonality of interests.

77. There are however other instances where the incentive for co-operation is largely political or military, such as within the NATO framework. One lesson learnt from the past is that there is a need for a pragmatic approach and that an institutional approach might not be the appropriate solution for certain situations. A second lesson is that there is a need for continuity over a period of years.

78. The OECD has drawn some lessons¹ from co-operation developments over the past ten years and identified a number of elements influencing the success of co-operative activities. Some are of a general nature and others more specifically related to research or to technological development.

79. The *general conditions* have been described as follows: (i) a political context of intergovernmental co-operation activities is essential because of its political implications; (ii) a similarity between partners is important as there should not be too pronounced differences in their scientific and technical development; (iii) the aims of the joint action should be clearly defined at the outset and should also be fairly ambitious as they are justified precisely because not feasible on a national basis; (iv) it is necessary to recognise the importance of having a general mechanism of contacts and discussion for launching, defining and mounting joint research centres; (v) the definition of an institutional framework demands a detailed budgetary analysis; (vi) as the most flexible arrangements are often the best, any mechanism which allows direct co-operation between national research establishments is preferable to setting up an international organisation; whatever the institutional approach, the decision-making body should be allowed the utmost initiative; (vii) a balance should be established between-equity – returns in relation to investment – and efficiency – entrusting work to the most competent; (viii) appropriate provision should be made for management, accountability and responsibility in halting or redirecting work.

1. Science and technology policy for the 1980s, page 152 et seq.

80. The special conditions for *co-operation in science* should contain the following elements: (i) a balance must be struck between national and international programmes which should be complementary; (ii) the international research programme should provide extra training for national experts; (iii) the institutional structure should be kept flexible, free from internal red tape and provide a maximum delegation of responsibilities; (iv) to achieve financial stability, approval of budgets extending over a number of years is essential.

81. Specific conditions have to be fulfilled to achieve success in *high technology co-operative activities*: (i) thorough market research is needed before a project is undertaken; (ii) a single centre of industrial decision requires either a joint enterprise or acceptance of a prime contractor and subcontractors; (iii) the number of participants should be limited as otherwise it would be difficult to arrive at a sound decision-making process; (iv) a joint development in high technology calls for integrated international participation from drawing board to execution; (v) operational responsibility should be left to industry without intervention by civil servants who should define and finance the programme and eventually evaluate the results achieved.

82. Several examples have shown that there are no clear-cut divisions between scientific and technological co-operation. Atomic energy in Western Europe for instance started off as scientific co-operation in the 1950s¹ but has now become an industrial activity within the framework of the national state. Co-operation is still predominant in areas such as nuclear waste disposal or radiation protection. A similar development took place with regard to satellites which have now become a more commercial activity. On the other hand, scientific collaboration in fusion research is still the order of the day because commercial exploitation of fusion power is still many years away.

83. The OECD has some twenty years' experience as a forum for exchanging thoughts on governmental policies, and especially in this context, in the scientific and technological fields.

84. One of the prime aims of the science and technology policy of its member countries today is to strengthen their international industrial competitive position. There are, however, many areas in which extended international co-operation in science and technology could

prove mutually beneficial. At the ministerial meeting in March 1982, a number of suggestions were made on possible areas of increased co-operation; they are: (i) the promotion of mobility of scientists and engineers between member countries; (ii) very large-scale scientific and technological undertakings needing very expensive equipment; (iii) "generic" technologies which affect a wide range of industrial sectors such as corrosion prevention and control, welding and joining and radiation processing - these are areas of fundamental scientific research leading to expensive technological problems; (iv) technologies for the public service sector such as refuse disposal arrangements, sewage-processing facilities, resource recycling programmes, etc.; (v) research to improve the scientific basis of national regulations concerning health, safety and the environment; (vi) evaluation of the possible repercussions of new technologies on the economy, the environment and society, especially those which affect several countries; (vii) satisfying the needs of developing countries and establishing North-South scientific and technological relationships.

85. The above examples are not an exhaustive list of possible areas for co-operation on which interested countries might eventually make specific proposals after having judged their merits and the costs of co-operation.

VI. *The International Atomic Energy Agency*¹

86. Safeguards under the non-proliferation treaty consist of material accountancy, containment and surveillance. They should allow any diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful activities to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices to be detected at an early stage and hence discourage diversion because of the risk of detection. Article III of the non-proliferation treaty dealing with nuclear safeguards states in paragraph 4 that non-nuclear weapons states party to the treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article. It is therefore the basic obligation of every non-nuclear weapon party to conclude a safeguards agreement.

87. The IAEA was set up in 1960 in order to ensure safeguards through documentation of facilities showing stocks of nuclear fuel; it describes the way nuclear fuels should be stocked and kept under seal and finally how inspections should be conducted. All transport of nuclear fuel should be registered and special cameras and radiation detection instruments are used when fuel is transported. However, the Agency is not a police organisation but an alarm system which draws the attention of its

1. The wartime participation of European teams in the Manhattan atomic bomb project is a very good case of transatlantic co-operation in the scientific and technological field.

110 member countries to the fact that possibilities for developing atomic weapons exist in this or that country.

88. The Agency has some 120 inspectors to control its 800 establishments all over the world. It has set up a Senior Advisory Group for Safeguards Implementation which gives directives to the inspectors in order to protect producers of nuclear power plants against the leakage of their industrial or commercial secrets. The Agency has a board of governors consisting of representatives of 34 countries, half from the developed northern part of the world and half from the developing countries of the southern hemisphere.

89. The third world countries have stressed time and again that Article IV on the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy has been largely ignored. However, the northern countries are not inclined to expand the activities of the IAEA very far. Moreover, many of its representatives are against the growth of international organisations.

90. The Agency has set up a Committee on Assurances of Supply whose task is to bring countries supplying nuclear technology – Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States – closer to the needs of the developing countries wishing to establish nuclear power plants. Discussions are being held to improve the predictability of supplies and avoid them being interrupted.

91. The IAEA is also attempting to establish a scheme for international plutonium storage and the management of spent fuel.

VII. Reply to the annual report of the Council

Energy and security

92. The committee appreciates the Council taking such interest in the committee's reports and recommendations on energy and security, the European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments and the future of European space activities. Nevertheless, the committee is not entirely satisfied with some of the Council's replies which, although factually correct, do not indicate the reasons why, for instance, a common energy policy still cannot be developed – what practical constraints prevent the attainment of such a policy which has been proclaimed ever since the first energy crisis in 1973. Energy policy guidelines for the decade up to 1990 have been agreed but the reply does not indicate what they are and how stringent they should be.

93. Addressing the European Parliament on 24th March 1982, Mr. Tindemans, Chairman-

in-Office of the Council of Ministers, said: "It is in the energy sector that a return to nationalism is probably the most threatening."

94. The Assembly recommended that the western world determine an acceptable threshold of safety and security for its imports of energy or rare raw materials from eastern bloc countries. This is a most important issue for the European governments which may well be a source of differences between Europe and the United States. The Council merely stated that the question should be examined carefully and that diversification of sources of supply would be desirable.

95. In Siberia, the Soviet Union has one of the biggest gas reserves in the world and wishes to use this to best avail. Its gas exports produce the hard currency necessary to buy technologically-advanced equipment and essential foodstuffs. Contracts have been concluded with five Western European countries to construct a double pipeline from the Siberian gasfields inter alia to Germany, France and Italy. The contract covers a period of 20-22 years, and gas will be delivered within 6-10 years. In economic terms, there are positive arguments to accept such a barter deal: gas against pipelines. It is advantageous for the Western European countries and the Soviet Union. It helps to diversify the energy supplies of the countries concerned and produces hard currency for the Soviet Union. If Western Europe failed to conclude or terminated the contracts, its exports to the Soviet Union would fall as the Soviet Government would have less money to pay for them. Third, the export of Soviet gas would expand world supplies of gas and would thus ease the pressure on gas prices.

96. A geopolitical argument is that opening up Siberia and its gasfields will provide the Soviet Union with many new minerals and energy resources, thus reducing the Soviet Union's need to turn to other countries for its energy supplies.

97. There are also strategic arguments for the export of Soviet gas. As mentioned by the Council, it is a means of diversifying Western Europe's sources of supply, making Europe less dependent on supplies from the Middle East. The manufacturing of pipelines is of great importance for the European steel industry which is now in a difficult period. To import gas also avoids Western European stocks being depleted.

98. The United States Government has invoked two strategic arguments against this reasoning, namely that the western-financed pipeline system provides the Soviet Union with an important strategic asset which, in case of crisis or war, it can use for its own purposes.

Second, if the Soviet Union had to build this pipeline alone it would be unable to use much of its steel production for defence purposes, for instance. The United States Government has also emphasised that Western European countries should avoid economic dependence on the Soviet Union. In 1986, the earliest date for the finished pipeline, the Federal Republic of Germany and France would depend on Soviet exports for 30 % of their gas consumption. For the Federal Republic, this would represent about 5 % of its total energy consumption.

99. The American Government has also pointed out that in the British, Dutch and especially Norwegian sectors of the North Sea there are still unexploited gasfields. New techniques for drilling up to a depth of some 10 km might open up many of the deeper gas reserves and thus make the need for Soviet gas even more questionable.

100. Your Rapporteur thinks that these considerations should play an important rôle in defining European policy on energy and security.

101. Referring to the Council's same reply on energy and security your Rapporteur would mention the dangers of a growing use of fast-breeder reactors as the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation study has shown that it might be well nigh impossible to preserve a firebreak between nuclear power technology and nuclear weapon capability. This statement was made by the United States Government in the discussion of this study and has not been challenged by other nuclear weapon states. The concern for the future – in case of processing spent fuel elements followed by the storage of separated plutonium – should be to adopt the best technical safeguards and institutional measures to increase the protection of such material against diversion, which may be done covertly or overtly by national governments as well as by criminal elements.

European aeronautics

102. Your Rapporteur does not wish to discuss this subject in much detail as Mr. Wilkinson, in his report on the colloquy on aeronautical consortia, will certainly touch on many of the elements referred to in the reply of the Council. His only comment is that the NATO or European organisations with activities in the field of standardisation of armaments or common armaments production have very little to show although the Standing Armaments Committees of WEU and NATO were formed more than 25 years ago. He is therefore rather sceptical about the results of the project group established for the European combat aircraft within the framework of the Independent European Programme Group. The question which Mr. Wilkinson should answer is whether

the composition of these committees should not be drastically overhauled. During the last session of the Assembly it was suggested that ministers or secretaries of state should from time to time attend such meetings in order to demonstrate the political willingness of the member countries to achieve results. However, the political will can be expressed even at the highest level without practical results being achieved. For example, three times it was decided at the highest possible level that France and Germany should join in building a tank. This idea started in the early 1960s, continued in the 1980s and at the last Franco-German summit the political will to build such a tank on a joint basis was expressed. However, no results are yet in sight.

Space activities

103. Your Rapporteur wishes to point out regarding the European Space Agency's future activities in the 1980s that there seems to be a feeling in the larger ESA countries that it would be less cumbersome if they started up their own national programmes again, basing them on ESA's achievements. This feeling certainly exists in Germany which, with France, has now embarked on its own television satellite. As the Council states in its reply to Recommendation 369 on the future of European space activities, ESA is essentially a research and development organisation and should not undertake commercial programmes. But this line of reasoning is not entirely correct. Firstly, the ESA convention states clearly that national programmes should be brought into the ESA framework to become European programmes. If, as in the case of Spot, national programmes are carried out because other member states do not wish to participate, only then should the Agency assure liaison between national programmes.

104. Larger countries should not forget that their own developments are possible only because of work done within the ESA framework and that it is contrary to the spirit of the convention to exclude smaller countries from the industrial benefits of ESA's research and development. It is regrettable that France and Germany are building the TV-Sat since a joint design would have been cheaper and technically more advanced. The problems which have arisen could moreover have been solved earlier. For instance, it is a pity that Italian technology, which is available, is not being used in the Franco-German satellite.

105. Europe has to work as a unit if it hopes to obtain its share of the market; there is expected to be a huge market in telecommunication satellites in the 1980s and the

1990s. At one point the OTS was the most advanced satellite in the world but if the Europeans want to safeguard this lead they will have to work together. This is the basis of the long-term and short-term proposals for future activities of the Agency.

106. The short-term plan goes up to 1985 and the long-term programmes, although not yet fully defined, extend into the 1990s. The financing of these plans is based on a percentage of the GNP and on participation in clearly-defined programmes.

107. In the case of Ariane there is a clear borderline between the development and operational phases. For the latter, Arianespace has been set up and ESA will deal with further research and technology.

108. In the field of satellites the borderline is not so clear because of continual developments, as in telecommunications for instance. The frequency bands in satellites are becoming more and more sophisticated; for its new satellites ESA is developing the 12 to 14 gigahertz bands and for the new L-Sat this will be in the order of 20 to 30 gigahertz.

109. From NASA's experience one can see how dangerous it is to abandon certain developments. After building experimental telecommunications satellites NASA was ordered to leave their further development to industry. However, industry did not take up the challenge as it is not inclined to invest large sums in such long-term projects. The United States therefore lost its lead in this field to Europe and Japan; now NASA is again receiving research and development funds for telecommunication satellites.

110. The Meteosat programme consists of two satellites now in orbit and three or four more meteorological satellites of the same type which have to be built. Germany plays a key rôle in the setting up of a European system of operational satellites as it has to contribute 25%. If the German Government agrees to the system being set up, this will be of worldwide importance. Even the Russians are interested and in the EEC framework the system could be incorporated in development aid arrangements for the African countries.

111. In the long run, the Meteosat system will be incorporated in the earth observation programmes. ESA is first preparing the ocean monitoring satellite system, the memorandum of understanding for which will be signed in 1982 and the first satellite will be launched in 1987. The second step will be the earth observation programme. The ocean monitoring satellite will cost some 300 million accounting units.

112. As Marecs is now finalised it is to be incorporated in the Inmarsat system.

113. The present ESA budget is fixed arbitrarily at 450 million accounting units (at 1980 value), an amount on which a viable organisation can hardly live with a baseline programme. A valid and effective space programme for Western Europe cannot be implemented over the next ten years unless it is based on space projects which are of interest to the member countries, science and industry. To base space policy on a sum fixed arbitrarily in advance might strangle the Agency's lifeline and eventually threaten its survival. Without the Agency, space Europe would no longer exist. This inverse reasoning is due to the present unwillingness of member governments to earmark funds for new joint projects. There is also growing competition from ambitious national space programmes of some important Western European countries, the United States and Japan.

114. As the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions has already often stated, contracts for both civilian and military space programmes should be placed with European aerospace companies. In order to survive, these industries must have new programmes to meet United States and Japanese competition. European-made communications and observation satellites could be designed to meet the needs of NATO and its member countries. If orders in these fields were placed, the European aerospace industries could become more competitive with the United States industries.

115. As far as Ariane is concerned, after his visit to the United States and NASA in July 1981, your Rapporteur wishes to draw attention to the fact that the United States space shuttle will represent a formidable alternative to Ariane and other space vehicles. Although still under development, great progress is now being made and the American shuttle will certainly start a new era in space developments. Within two or three years it might become operational and the advantages over existing space vehicles will become clearer as the shuttle takes off like a rocket, operates in orbit as a spacecraft and lands like an aeroplane.

116. The second conference on the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space, Unispace 1982, which will be held in Vienna from 9th to 21st August 1982, is actively being prepared by ESA and its member countries. Common positions on the major issues on the agenda of the conference have now to be formulated. How would it otherwise be possible to show the developing states the real and potential advan-

tages of European space science and space applications?

117. ESA has already some experience in collaboration with third world countries and it should enlarge upon the advantages of further co-operation in space. The European example has shown that such a co-operation is possible and beneficial for all member countries whatever the different stages of industrial development.

118. ESA could also act as a consultant to any country wishing to invest in the installation of telecommunication, meteorology and remote-sensing services.

119. As space is inherently a world-wide activity, it is logical that the United Nations should play a major rôle in multilateral co-operation. This is already being done in the World Meteorological Organisation, the World Weather Watch and its work on the Global Atmospheric Research Programme. Other examples are the International Telecommunications Union and the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation which has led to the establishment of Inmarsat.

VIII. *Conclusions*

120. The committee's three principal ideas for action by the Council are set out in the recommendation.

121. First, it wishes the Council to authorise the SAC to help it to prepare the second half of this report. This request is based on the Council's reply of 18th November 1981 to Recommendation 365 on the application of the Brussels Treaty in which it stated that it might examine the possibility of co-operation between the SAC and a committee of the Assembly and on the statement made to the Assembly on 3rd December 1981 by Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the French Minister of Defence.

122. With reference to the Council's reply to Recommendation 331 stating that the Council would consider the possibility of allowing the SAC to work on subjects which may be suggested by the Assembly, the committee thinks it is justified in asking the SAC also to draw up a list of military research and development programmes.

123. Second, it exposes anew the dangers of over-dependence on Soviet gas while there are still many energy resources to be developed in Western Europe.

124. Third, the committee has set out its proposals with a view to achieving the much needed harmonisation of European research and development efforts. It does not wish to fit all activities into a strait-jacket of one organisational type but seeks practical ways of achieving common solutions taking into account the fact that together France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom spend 80% of Western Europe's research and development funds.

APPENDIX I

Community research, development and demonstration activities April 1982

		1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
1. AGRICULTURE, FISH							
1.1. Programmes for coordinating agricultural research	AFP	5 A	19,702 ME				
1.2. Coordinated action in the fisheries sector	AFP			75 ME			
2. INDUSTRY							
2.1. B C R							
2.1.1. Community Bureau of References	CCR	4 A	2,902 ME		13 P		
2.1.2. Community Bureau of References	AFP	4 A	10,3 ME	14 P			
2.2. Conventional technologies							
2.2.1. Steel	CECA	*	19 ME	19 ME			
2.2.2. High temperature materials	CCR	4 A	16,631 ME		63 P		
2.2.3. Textiles	AFP				3,9 ME		
2.2.4. Foodstuffs	AFP	3 A	0,287 ME	1 P			
				0,67 ME	1 P		
2.3. New technologies							
2.3.1. Bio technologies	AFP			8 ME	3 P		
2.3.2. Data processing	CCR	4 A	16,007 ME		69 P		
2.3.3. Data processing	AFP		5 A	25 ME			
2.3.4. Microelectronics	AFP			40 ME			
2.3.5. Remote sensing from space	CCR	4 A	20,507 ME		97 P		
3. RAW MATERIALS							
3.1. R & D in the field of raw materials	AFP			54 ME	19 P		
4. ENERGY							
4.1. Nuclear fission							
4.1.1. Reactor safety	CCR	4 A	174,962 ME		718 P		
4.1.2. Safety of thermal water reactors	AFP	5 A	6,3 ME		3 P		
4.1.3. Safety of nuclear materials	CCR	4 A	23,153 ME		115 P		
4.1.4. Management and storage of radioactive waste	AFP	5 A	43 ME		10 P		
4.1.5. Fissile materials control and management	CCR	4 A	23,085 ME		112 P		
4.1.6. Support to safeguards	CCR	4 A	6,951 ME		25 P		
4.1.7. Plutonium fuels and actinide research	CCR	4 A	60,764 ME		207 P		
4.1.8. Nuclear measurements	CCR	4 A	48,051 ME		184 P		
4.1.9. Reactor development and advanced technologies	AFP		0,995 ME	0,837 ME			
4.1.10. Operation of the HFR reactor	CCR	4 A	54,591 ME		88 P		
4.1.11. Decommissioning of nuclear power plants	AFP	5 A	4,7 ME		3 P		
4.2. Radioprotection							
	AFP	5 A	39 M 68 P				
		5 A	59 ME		64 P		
4.3. New forms of energy							
4.3.1. Solar energy	AFP	4 A	46 ME	9 P			
4.3.2. Solar energy	CCR	4 A	25,588 ME		117 P		
4.3.3. Solar energy	PD	5 A		22,5 ME			
4.3.4. Geothermal energy	AFP	4 A	18 ME	7 P			
4.3.5. Geothermal energy	PD	5 A		22,5 ME			
4.3.6. Hydrogen production, energy storage and transport	CCR	4 A	16,934 ME		79 P		
4.3.7. Utilization of hydrogen	AFP	4 A	8 ME	4 P			
4.3.8. Systems analysis	AFP	4 A	6 ME	9 P			
4.4. Nuclear fusion							
4.4.1. Controlled thermonuclear fusion	AFP	5 A	190,5 ME	113 P	113 P		
				113 P	301 ME		
4.4.2. Thermonuclear fusion technology	CCR	4 A	28,839 ME		124 P		
4.4.3. JET	EC	5 A	195 ME	150 P	319 ME		165 P
4.5. Coal							
4.5.1. Mining methods - Product upgrading	CECA	*	18 ME	14 ME			
4.5.2. Gasification and liquefaction of solid fuels	PD	5 A		50 ME			
4.6. Hydrocarbons							
	PD	*	23 ME	23 ME			
4.7. Energy conservation							
4.7.1. R & D programme	AFP	4 A	27 ME	6 P			
4.7.2. Demonstration project	PD	4 A	65 ME				
5. AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES							
5.1.1. Science and technology for the benefit of developing countries	AFP			40 ME	9 P		
6. HEALTH AND SAFETY							
6.1. MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH							
6.1.1. Cellular ageing	AFP	4 A	0,4 ME				
6.1.2. Extracorporeal oxygenation	AFP	4 A	0,36 ME				
6.1.3. Thrombosis. Hearing. Perinatal monitoring. Quantitative electrocardiography	AFP	4 A	2,32 ME	4 P			
6.1.4. Health problems. Health resources. Personal environment	AFP			20 ME		310 P	
6.2. Hygiene and security							
6.2.1. Effects on the health of workers of occupational hazards	CECA				9 ME		
6.2.2. Ergonomics and rehabilitation	CECA	5 A	13 ME				
6.2.3. Industrial hygiene in mines	CECA	5 A	7 ME				
7. ENVIRONMENT							
7.1.1. Environmental protection	CCR	4 A	37,568 ME		174 P		
7.1.2. Environmental protection	AFP			42 ME	16 P		
7.1.3. Control of pollution in the iron and steel industry	CECA	5 A	19 ME				
7.1.4. Aids to coastal navigation	AFP			21 ME	1 P		
8. GENERAL INTEREST ACTIVITIES							
8.1.1. STID	AFP			15 ME			
8.1.2. Automatic translation	AFP	3 A	3,75 ME				
8.1.3. EUROTRA	AFP			61 ME		38 P	
8.1.4. Exploiting research results	CCR	4 A	1,673 ME		8 P		
8.1.5. FAST	AFP	5 A	4,4 ME		10 P		
8.1.6. Provision of scientific and technical services	CCR	4 A	9,904 ME		52 P		
8.1.7. Training	CCR	4 A	3,638 ME		17 P		
8.1.8. Scientific and technical education and training	AFP			6,8 ME	6 P		

NB This table does not include studies, nor activities not programmable in the medium term which are dependent on the budgetary process.

AFP	Shared cost action	*	Annual budget appropriations
CCR	Joint Research Centre	A	Total duration of programme, in years
CECA	European Coal and Steel Community	M	Millions of Units of Account
PD	Demonstration project	ME	Millions of ECU\$
EC	Joint undertaking	P	Number of Community staff
	Programme decided upon by the Council	⊙	Revision
	Programme approved by the Commission		

APPENDIX II

***Japan: Industries considered to have
high growth potential¹***

Housing
Environmental protection
Urban redevelopment
Labour-saving equipment
Industrial recycling equipment
Communications and data processing
Leisure
Ocean development
Nuclear power
Highly-processed foods
Medical equipment
Fashion and apparel

1. Source: Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan.

*Harmonisation of research in civil and military
high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report
of the Council*

AMENDMENT 1¹
tabled by Mr. Blaauw and the Liberal Group

1. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add “ and report to the Assembly within a year ”.

Signed: Blaauw and the Liberal Group

1. See 2nd sitting, 15th June 1982 (amendment agreed to).

The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe**REPORT¹**

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. Mommersteeg, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 4 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman); MM. van den Bergh, Mayoud (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Bahr, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bernini (Alternate: *Martino*), Bizet, Blaauw, Bonnel, Cox (Alternate: *Brown*), Dejardin, Duraffour (Alternate: *Baumel*), Edwards, Fosson (Alternate:

De Poi), Grant (Alternate: *Hill*), Kittelmann, Lemmrich (Alternate: *Wittmann*), Maravalle, Ménard (Alternate: *Louis Jung*), Pecchioli, Pignion, Prussen, Hermann Schmidt, Scholten (Alternate: *Mommersteeg*), Smith, Steverlynck, Vohrer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

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Introductory Note

In preparing this report, the Rapporteur had interviews as follows:

7th February 1982 – Rodmell

Dr. Mary Kaldor, National Council Member, European Nuclear Disarmament.

8th February 1982 – London

Mr. Michael Legge, Head of DS 17, Ministry of Defence;

Mr. John Weston, Head of Defence Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office; Mr. Richard Gosney, Assistant for Nuclear Arms Control.

4th to 6th April 1982 – Washington

The Rev. Peter G. Henriot S.J., Director, Centre of Concern;

Mr. Robert Grey, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Dr. James Timbie, Special Adviser; Major McCracken;

Mr. Robert Bell, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff;

Mr. Frank Gaffney, Senate Armed Services Committee Staff;

Mr. Robert Dean, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State;

Mr. Adam Kline, Counsel, House Armed Services Committee Staff;

Mr. Robert Huber, Staff Consultant, House Foreign Affairs Committee;

Mr. Ronald Lehman, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy;

Colonel C.C. Thudium, TNF Modernisation, Department of Defence; Mrs. Elaine Bunn;

Mr. Lee Minichiello, Director of START Task Force, Department of Defence; Mrs. Sally Horn;

Ambassador Theodore C. Achilles, Vice-Chairman and Director of the Atlantic Council; Ambassador Kenneth Rush, former Deputy Secretary of Defence, Ambassador to France, Germany, Chairman of the Atlantic Council; Lt.-Gen. George M. Seignious, US Army (Retd.), former CinC SAC, Chief of Staff SHAPE; Mr. Joseph J. Wolf, former Minister on Delegation to NATO; Mr. Francis O. Wilcox, Director General of the Atlantic Council.

The committee as a whole met in London on 8th February when it was addressed by Mr. Christoph Bertram, Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, on the subject of the report. It discussed an outline of the present report.

The committee met in Canada from 8th to 12th March where it was addressed by:

The Hon. J. Gilles Lamontagne, Minister of National Defence;

Mr. P. de W. Mathewson, Chief, Policy Planning, Department of National Defence;

Mr. T.C. Hammond, Director, Defence Relations Division, Department of External Affairs; Mr. John Legg.

The committee also met with Mr. Marcel Prud'Homme, Chairman of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence of the Canadian House of Commons and members of his committee and of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Canadian Senate, and with Mr. Len Hopkins, Chairman of the Canadian Parliamentary Delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly, and members of his delegation.

The committee met at the Headquarters of NATO, Evère, Brussels, on 19th April when it was addressed by Dr. Fredo Dannenbring, NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs; Admiral Robert H. Falls, CF, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee; it proceeded to SHAPE where it was addressed by Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Terry, RAF, Deputy SACEUR; Lt.-Gen. Gariboldi, Italian Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics; Air Vice Marshal Tony Skingsley, RAF, Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans and Policy; Colonel Peter Heck, German Air Force, Nuclear Policy

Section; Colonel John Craig, USAF, Nuclear Policy Section; Colonel Roelef Ubels, Netherlands Army, Arms Control Section.

The committee met finally in Lancaster House, London, on 19th May 1982 when it adopted the report as a whole.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials, senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the committee and replied to questions.

The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation
on the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe

The Assembly,

- (i) Believing that the balance of all nuclear forces can be assessed only as a whole, but noting that the Soviet Union has a disturbing superiority in heavy intercontinental missiles and in intermediate-range forces, while the United States lead in total numbers of nuclear warheads has been reduced;
- (ii) Believing that arms control and adequate defence measures are two sides of a balanced security policy designed to prevent war, not only nuclear war;
- (iii) Stressing the importance of the conventional component of the NATO deterrent forces;
- (iv) Reiterating its belief that the NATO dual decision of 17th December 1979 remains the basis both for adjusting the imbalance in intermediate-range forces, an imbalance which has been increased by the deployment of 300 SS-20s so far reported, and for negotiating the zero option;
- (v) Regretting that SALT II remains unratified although at the time of its signature endorsed by the Assembly and all NATO governments as a step in a necessarily continuous process of strategic arms control negotiations, and that nearly three years have elapsed since its signature without further progress;
- (vi) Believing that in view of the mutual benefits of such control the strategic arms reduction talks should be opened urgently and pursued independently of other aspects of East-West relations, and welcoming therefore President Reagan's speech of 9th May 1982 calling for them to open at the end of June, and making realistic proposals for significant reductions of strategic nuclear weapons;
- (vii) Hoping also that the opening of those talks will have a beneficial effect on the INF negotiations which must be conducted in the framework of START;
- (viii) Stressing the need for a verifiable comprehensive test ban in order to block the development of ever more sophisticated nuclear weapons;
- (ix) Stressing the importance of concrete confidence-building measures of the type agreed at Helsinki as a precursor and complement of balanced reductions in the armouries of both sides;
- (x) Seeing in most peace demonstrations both in Europe and the United States, an expression of deep and justified concern about the dangers of an unrestricted arms race and the possibility of nuclear war;
- (xi) Regretting however the unilateral trends and over-simplifications apparent within movements which ignore the need for military stability, both nuclear and conventional, and for objective analysis of the facts in order to negotiate reductions;
- (xii) Welcoming the publication of "NATO and the Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons" for which the Assembly has repeatedly called, and believing that a continuing effort must be made by governments and parliamentarians to inform the public objectively about the nature of the threat and the basis of allied defence and arms control policies;
- (xiii) Regretting that in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union public opinion has no opportunity to discuss freely the concepts on which European and international security should be based,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

A. Call on member governments acting in the North Atlantic Council,

1. To continue the present much improved close and continuous consultations to ensure that an agreed allied position is maintained on all aspects of nuclear deterrence and nuclear arms control;
2. To ensure that preparations continue in the countries concerned for the deployment from 1983 of the agreed levels of ground-launched cruise and Pershing II missiles less any reductions previously agreed in the INF talks;

3. To press for the earliest agreement in the INF talks on the zero option for land-based missiles, and the step-by-step pursuit of these talks to include other weapons systems, and the eventual inclusion of battlefield systems in these or the MBFR talks;
 4. To welcome the resumption of the SALT process through the proposed opening of START in June, and to press for the closest linking of these to the INF talks and the continued mutual respect of all SALT limits during the negotiations;
 5. To give increased emphasis to the negotiation and adoption of effective procedures for verification, as essential for any agreement on arms control and reduction;
 6. To ask the United States Government to examine seriously Senator Jackson's proposal for a joint United States-Soviet Union command post in a neutral country to deter the possibility of war by accident or miscalculation;
 7. To bring up to date and publish from time to time on an agreed objective basis the NATO comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, and to urge the Soviet Union to be equally forthcoming and objective in publishing force comparisons;
- B. Call on member governments to pursue active information policies, to ensure that public opinion is objectively informed both about the nature of the threat and about the purposes of allied defence and arms control and reduction policies.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Mommersteeg, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. The committee produces this report on nuclear weapons following two earlier reports and Assembly recommendations on the subject¹. On 21st October 1981, the Presidential Committee at short notice requested this committee to prepare a preliminary version of the present report for discussion at the December 1981 session, but the committee found itself unable to comply in the time available. The Assembly, however, on 2nd December 1981 adopted a further recommendation on the subject² on a motion for a recommendation with urgent procedure which had been tabled by a number of representatives³.

1.2. Since the committee last reported in June 1981, there have been a number of significant developments. On 2nd October 1981, the Reagan administration plans for modernisation of United States strategic forces were announced and there have been extensive committee hearings on the subject in the United States Congress. The Reagan administration defence policy as a whole emerges in the record \$ 258 billion defence budget for fiscal year 1983 put forward in February this year, an increase of \$ 62 billion over the \$ 194.6 billion of the last Carter defence budget for fiscal year 1982. Soviet deployment of the SS-20 continued steadily, numbers rising from 220 when the committee last reported to 300 by 16th March when Mr. Brezhnev offered a unilateral freeze. NATO continued methodically to implement its December 1979 decision to deploy up to 572 intermediate-range missiles in Europe while negotiating to secure mutual reductions; the NATO Nuclear Planning Group on 21st October 1981 referred to zero-level deployment as "a possible option under ideal circumstances".

1.3. More slowly than its defence policy, the Reagan administration has begun to formulate its arms control policy with the zero option proposals for what it calls the INF talks put forward by President Reagan on 18th November 1981 followed by the resumption of these bilateral talks between the United States and

1. SALT and the British and French nuclear forces, Document 859, 17th November 1980 (Recommendation 360); Talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe, Document 879, 3rd June 1981 (Recommendation 367).

2. Recommendation 375 on negotiations on theatre nuclear forces.

3. Document 900.

the Soviet Union in Geneva on 30th November (they had been briefly begun at the end of 1980 under the Carter administration), and their adjournment for two months on 16th March. NATO continues to link the INF talks to others on the limitation of strategic weapons (now called START) but the United States has not yet announced a date for their opening (expected "in the summer"). Nor has the United States administration completed its review of other related arms control topics such as nuclear test bans and outer space.

1.4. The intervening period has also seen the appearance of more numerous official publications from both East and West on the levels of forces, particularly nuclear forces. Particularly significant for European politicians has of course been the manifestations of various forms of popular opposition to nuclear weapons which culminated in mass demonstrations in a number of Western European countries in October and November 1981 and which may be seen again in June during the NATO summit. These movements now find their counterpart in the United States and have inspired a number of resolutions tabled in the Senate.

1.5. The committee reviews these various developments in the following pages, paying particular attention first to a careful examination of the nuclear balance.

II. Levels of nuclear forces

(a) Information sources

2.1. The year since the committee last reported has seen some growth in official publications and statements, some now from the Soviet Union as well as the West, on the levels of forces of the two sides. Unprecedented were the two substantial pamphlets "Soviet military power", published by the United States Department of Defence in September 1981, and the rejoinder "Whence the threat to peace", published in six languages by the Soviet Ministry of Defence and released with a full western-style press conference in Moscow on 15th January 1982. These two particular documents, with their coloured illustrations, are public relations exercises clearly aimed at western public opinion; the most significant deduction to be made from their appearance is a recognition by both the United States and the

Soviet Union that there is a victory to be won in persuading that opinion. The West does not have any comparable access to public opinion in the Soviet Union, nor, if it did, could that opinion play any rôle like that of public opinion in the West.

2.2. The United States document is devoted exclusively to a description of Soviet military capability, which is impressive, but makes no attempt to compare it with NATO military capability either in the areas where NATO is inferior, or in those where it is superior. The Soviet publication, written as a reply to the United States document, concentrates on describing the size of the United States and in some cases British and French forces, and NATO forces as a whole, but also provides a few comparisons of the forces of the two sides. It claims, in its introduction, to present "alongside data provided by competent Soviet quarters, some facts and figures of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies and of its official United States sources, none of which can be suspected of the least sympathy for the Soviet Union". The data in both publications portrays the adversary's military power in maximum terms, but there is no reason to doubt their validity within these limits; they tally with other well-known sources.

2.3. The long-awaited NATO comparison of the forces of the two sides¹, agreed by the NATO countries, was finally published on 4th May: "NATO and the Warsaw Pact - force comparisons." The committee warmly welcomes this objective comparison of forces agreed by 14 countries. Although published after the bulk of the present report of the committee was drafted, the data in the NATO study broadly confirm data used in the present report, from other authoritative sources, when the particular definitions and categories used in the study are taken into account. The study confirms the well-known areas of NATO inferiority and superiority, but where Warsaw Pact superiority is claimed, the proportions are more moderate than those of some official United States statements.

2.4. The basis on which the NATO study is prepared should be understood. In particular, because France does not participate in the integrated military structure of NATO, all French forces are excluded - in terms of its defence expenditure in 1981 inclusion of the French defence effort would result in an increase of some 10 % in the defence effort of the rest of NATO, and a larger proportional increase in conventional forces present in Europe and of

course an increase in NATO's nuclear forces. The study avoids, as far as possible, political assumptions and scenarios concerning in particular reinforcements, and is therefore limited to forces assigned to NATO on the one hand and Warsaw Pact forces primarily designated for use in Europe. It is thus concerned with the forces in position in Europe with their planned establishment of manpower and excludes all British, Canadian and United States forces stationed on their own territories, and excludes Soviet forces in the Moscow, Volga, Ural and all trans-Ural military districts. The categories in which forces are compared are also, in some cases, different from those of longer established sources as the annual report of the United States Secretary of Defence or the IISS Military Balance. Thus, strategic nuclear forces in the NATO study include more than the SALT-counted forces (adopted in the report) - it includes Soviet Backfire, United States FB-111A aircraft and the British Polaris missile force, whereas these in other studies have usually been considered in the European INF (long-range) context. Usefully, the NATO study includes figures for total numbers of warheads on the strategic forces, showing NATO superiority of some 9,100 to 8,400 on the definitions employed, comparable information has been given in the past in annual reports of the United States Secretary of Defence, although omitted this year in Mr. Weinberger's first report.

2.5. The usual official annual and other reports have been available to the Rapporteur in preparing this report. They include the following (dates of the latest reports given in brackets):

- United States Secretary of Defence annual report (for fiscal year 1983, 5th February 1982);
- United States military posture prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (fiscal year 1983, February 1982);
- Arms control impact statements submitted to Congress by the President of the United States (for fiscal year 1982, February 1981);
- Strategic weapons proposals - hearings of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the foreign policy and arms control implications of President Reagan's strategic weapons proposals (3rd-13th November 1981);
- United Kingdom statement on the defence estimates (April 1981)

In addition the well-known IISS Military Balance has of course been heavily drawn upon.

1. For which the Assembly has repeatedly called in Recommendations 367 and 375.

Other sources, which include articles by Soviet military commentators, have been noted where used.

(b) Categories of forces

2.6. As the committee has stressed in past reports, the concept of nuclear balance can only be viewed as a whole; any attempt to assess balance in separate categories for strategic weapons (by which is usually meant the inter-continental weapons of the two superpowers) and theatre weapons raises the following objections:

- so-called theatre nuclear forces are strategic as far as the Europeans are concerned because they can be used to attack European cities;
- 400 of the 5,200 United States Poseidon SLBM warheads, classed as strategic in the SALT context, are in fact assigned to SACEUR and targeted by him as part of his theatre forces;
- many Soviet strategic weapons could be used against Europe, and indeed the Soviet SS-11 and SS-19 ICBMs in the Ukraine are known to be dual-capable, targeted at will on Europe or the United States (as are some submarine-launched missiles, e.g. those in the Baltic), so that in military terms one consequence of the deployment of the SS-20 against Europe has probably been to increase the threat to the United States through the retargeting of SS-11s and SS-19s on targets in that country;
- United Kingdom and French nuclear forces, although regarded as strategic by those countries, are of course counted by the Soviet Union as part of the total threat from theatre weapons; moreover, the United Kingdom weapons are assigned to SACEUR for similar purposes to the 400 Poseidon warheads mentioned above;
- the optimum military response to a threat from a particular weapon is not necessarily by means of a weapon of comparable range or characteristics; NATO has always relied in part on United States strategic systems to counter the threat from Soviet theatre systems and any attempt to achieve a separate artificial theatre balance would weaken the essential linkage with major United States nuclear forces on which deterrence is based.

2.7. With the advent of serious negotiations on nuclear weapons limitations in the SALT process, however, a distinction between categories of weapon systems had to be made *for the purpose of the negotiations*, and for several reasons: to attempt to negotiate a package of limitations covering all weapons systems would have been too complicated, and would have delayed or prevented agreement; France and the United Kingdom were not prepared to see their relatively small nuclear forces limited in any way - at least not while the superpowers retained much larger forces; the European countries in particular were anxious to keep what the Soviet Union called forward-based systems out of the early SALT process.

2.8. Thus for the purposes of negotiations on arms limitations a category of strategic weapons has been defined, which could be better termed SALT-counted weapons - these are the weapons of the two superpowers, based on their own territory or in submarines, which are capable of reaching the territory of the other superpower.

(c) SALT-counted systems

2.9. The table on the Soviet and United States strategic systems covered by SALT, at Appendix II, shows that while the Soviet Union has a 31 % lead in numbers of launchers and aircraft (2,500 against 1,900), the United States has a 24 % lead in numbers of warheads (8,700 against 7,000) - a measure of the number of targets that can be attacked simultaneously.

2.10. These crude totals represent the maximum number of deployed systems - not all on either side would be immediately available for use. The submarine-launched missiles in particular depend on the submarines being at sea. Probably an absolute maximum of two-thirds of the United States force would be at sea at any one time; the Soviet pattern of deployment is much lower, perhaps less than one-third actually on patrol at any one time. Both of these proportions could be raised in a period of tension.

2.11. The crude totals hide significant asymmetries in the forces of the two sides. The Soviet Union has 400 more ICBMs than the United States. These are inherently more accurate, and more vulnerable, than the submarine-launched missiles. One of the Soviet ICBMs - the SS-18 - is very large with a throw-weight in excess of 7,000 kg compared with less than 1,000 for the United States Minuteman III. The SS-18 is reported to exist in various models with warheads ranging from 2 to 50 megatons, and one model with an accuracy supposedly as good as about 200 metres CEP.

These characteristics of the SS-18 have given rise to speculation about the possible vulnerability of the United States Minuteman missiles to a first strike from the Soviet Union.

2.12. However, to provide something like a 90 % probability of destroying a Minuteman missile in its silo, the Soviet Union would have to fire two warheads in ground burst mode against each silo. To attack the whole United States ICBM force would require a strike by 2,100 warheads aimed at the missile fields. This has been estimated in many studies to produce anything from 800,000 to 20 million dead as incidental collateral damage¹. As the ground burst needed to crack missile silos produces a maximum amount of radioactive fallout, there would inevitably be far higher casualties from radioactivity over a period of many weeks following such a strike. Even then, anything up to 10 % of the ICBM force could be expected to survive, and the whole of the United States submarine missile force, with 5,000 warheads, would be intact and available for retaliatory strikes against the Soviet Union.

2.13. In fact, the other asymmetry in the United States favour in having some 5,000 warheads on submarine-launched missiles compared with only 1,300 for the Soviet Union, is that the United States is in a far better position to deliver a devastating second strike from its highly-survivable submarine forces.

2.14. Public debate on the issue of United States superiority or inferiority in strategic weapons was heightened most recently when at a press conference on 31st March President Reagan was quoted in response to a question as saying:

“On balance the Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority, enough so that there is what I have called, as you all know, several times, a window of vulnerability...”

The Soviets' great edge is that they could absorb our retaliatory blow and hit us again...”

President Reagan was immediately challenged by two Senators who have favoured strong defence programmes against the Soviet Union. Senator Henry Jackson, on 4th April, said:

“In the aggregate we have the capability now of deterring the Soviets... The qualitative advantages that we have, both in our bomber force and in our submarine force...”

1. See in particular “The Effects of Nuclear War”, United States Congress Office of Technology Assessment, May 1979, pages 81-90 “Case 3: a counter force attack against the United States”.

balance Soviet advantages in heavy missiles. Senator Patrick Moynihan, the same day, said:

“Either side could destroy the other side in a counter-strike.”

2.15. The official figures published by the United States Department of Defence, confirmed by the Rapporteur's discussions in Washington, show clearly that the United States still has a lead in the total number of warheads in its strategic systems. The understandable anxieties of the United States military authorities at the state of the balance arise from three factors. First the overwhelming nuclear superiority enjoyed by the United States after completion of the Kennedy programme of Minuteman missiles and Polaris submarines, and which it enjoyed again when it was the first to deploy multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), which increased four- or five-fold the total numbers of warheads in its forces, had been eroded by the Soviet Union which has overtaken the United States in numbers of missiles deployed, and considerably reduced the gap in total numbers of warheads. Secondly, the United States is understandably concerned at the characteristics of some of the very heavy Soviet ICBMs, in particular the SS-18 with its enormous throw-weight and warhead. The characteristics of this missile cannot be explained except on the assumption that it was designed as a counter-force weapon to destroy Minuteman missiles in their silos. Thirdly, the underlying concern of the United States is with the relative age of the weapons systems in service: 450 of the Minuteman missiles date from 1966, the remaining 550 from 1970; the Polaris SLBM dates from 1964, the Poseidon from 1971. Against this the Soviet ICBMs SS-17, 18 and 19, all date from 1975 and two of the SLBMs from 1977 and 1978. The fear that the technology of deployed systems might be overtaken by the momentum of the more recent Soviet programmes, has been the spur for the United States strategic modernisation programme.

(d) United States strategic modernisation programme

2.16. A major modernisation programme for the United States strategic nuclear forces has been in existence for some years, and was drawn up in detail in the last year of the Carter administration. The version as presented by the present administration in the annual report of the Secretary of Defence, Mr. Weinberger, for fiscal year 1983 (February 1982) is described here.

(i) ICBMs

2.17. The programme to fit a heavier Mark 12A re-entry vehicle with a higher yield war-

Characteristics of chief United States and Soviet Union ballistic missiles

	Year first deployed	Range km	Throw weight tonnes	Warheads
<i>United States:</i>				
<i>ICBM</i>				
Titan II	1962	15,000	3.4	1 × 9 mt
Minuteman II	1966	11,300	0.5-0.7	1 × 1-2 mt
Minuteman III	1970	13,000	0.7-0.9	{ 3 × 165 kt ; 3 × 350 kt
MX ¹	1986			3 × 350 kt
<i>SLBM</i>				
Polaris	1964	4,600	0.5	3 × 200 kt (not MIRV)
Poseidon	1971	4,600	0.9	10 × 50 kt
Trident C-4	1980	7,400	1.4+	8 × 100 kt
Trident D-5 ¹	1989	11,000		14 × 150 kt
<i>Soviet Union:</i>				
<i>ICBM</i>				
SS-11	1966	10,500	0.7-0.9	{ 1 × 1-2 mt 3 × 100-300 kt (not MIRV)
SS-13	1968	10,000	0.5	1 × 1 mt
SS-17	1975	10,000	2.7	4 × 900 kt; 1 × 5 mt
SS-18	1975	10,500	7.6	1 × 18-25 mt; 8 × 2 mt; 1 × 10-50 mt
SS-19	1975	11,000	3.4	6 × 550 kt 1 × 5 mt
<i>SLBM</i>				
SS-N-5	1964	1,120		1 × 1-2 mt
6	1969	2,400	0.7	1 × 1-2 mt; 2 × 3 kt range (not MIRV)
8	1972	8,000	0.7	1 × 1-2 mt
17	1977	5,000	1.4	1 × mt range
18	1978	8,000	2.3	3 × 1-2 mt

1. Not yet deployed.

head to 300 of the 550 Minuteman III is nearing completion – a total of 900 warheads. A new, heavier and more accurate, ICBM – the MX – has been under development for some years. Its gross weight will be 87,000 kg compared with 35,000 for Minuteman III, and overall length 21.6 metres compared with 18.3. It will be MIRVed, capable of carrying up to 12 Mark 12A re-entry vehicles (the SALT II limit is 10). The programme calls for the production of 100 missiles, an initial 40 to enter service in late 1986 in a provisional basing mode. The plan of the Carter administration for a multiple protective shelter basing

scheme was cancelled; the Reagan administration proposed that the 40 early production MX should be placed in specially strengthened Minuteman silos pending a final decision on a basing mode to be chosen from: deep basing (storage in a deep underground cavern); ballistic missile defence (possibly with ABMs); or continuous patrol aircraft (maintaining the MX airborne over the United States in special aircraft from which it could be launched).

2.18. More recently the proposal for early deployment of 40 MX in specially hardened Minuteman silos has been pronounced unsatis-

factory. There is clearly considerable confusion in Washington about the likely final basing mode for the MX and Congress has so far refused the administration's request for funding for production of the missile, pending final decision on basing. Research and development continues.

(ii) *Sea-based missiles*

2.19. The Trident C-4 SLBM with eight warheads has been progressively entering service in 12 out of the 31 Poseidon submarines which are being refitted – the twelfth should be finished in late 1982 or early 1983.

2.20. The larger Trident-class submarine, with 24 instead of 16 missiles in the earlier submarines, is about to enter service – the first was delivered in October 1981, a total of 9 have been authorised, funds for two more are requested in fiscal year 1983 and procurement at one per year is programmed up to fiscal year 1987.

2.21. An improved Trident II (D-5) missile is now to be developed for the Trident-class submarine with increased range and 14 warheads instead of 8 in the C-4. It is due to enter service in December 1989. This missile will have improved accuracy providing “a capability to attack the full spectrum of targets from a reliable and enduring platform”¹.

2.22. In addition “nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missiles will be deployed on attack submarines beginning in fiscal year 1984. These weapons will provide some near term hard target kill capability, while contributing to a strategic reserve”¹. The numbers of SLCM to be deployed are not specified in the Secretary of Defence's report but administration spokesmen have confirmed that there will be several hundred.

(iii) *Airborne systems*

2.23. There are three programmes for improving the existing force of B-52 strategic bomber aircraft. In the first place, air-launched cruise missiles are to be fitted to existing B-52G and B-52H aircraft, beginning in 1982. Secondly, 100 of an improved version of the new B-1 bomber, cancelled by President Carter, to be known as the B-1B, are to be produced, the first entering service in 1986. The B-1B will also carry air-launched cruise missiles, of which a total of over 3,000 is to be produced.

2.24. Finally, an advanced technology bomber (ATB), incorporating stealth characteristics (making it difficult to detect by radar), is to be developed to begin entering service in the 1990s.

1. Secretary of Defence annual report to Congress, fiscal year 1983, page III-59.

(iv) *Warheads*

2.25. The strategic modernisation programme, together with the programme for deployment of cruise missiles in Europe, will require the production of large numbers of new nuclear warheads. The total inventory of all United States nuclear warheads on all types of weapons is variously reported at from 24,000 to 25,000. According to press reports¹, Mr. Charles Gilbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Materials in the United States Department of Energy, implied in Washington on 28th February 1982 that the total stock of United States nuclear warheads was to be increased from the present 24,000 to about 40,000. Other reports, however, refer to the production of about 17,000 new warheads to replace existing warheads in a stockpile of 25,000 without significant net increase in total numbers. President Reagan's warhead production programme signed on 5th March 1982 included only about 380 more warheads than the programme for increased production signed by President Carter in October 1980.

(v) *Miscellaneous*

2.26. The strategic forces modernisation programme also involves considerable improvements to command control and communications arrangements for strategic forces, designed primarily to ensure survivability of the command system. The importance of this programme for a stable deterrent has been stressed by the administration. The programme also provides for the study of ballistic missile defence – various ways in which ICBMs might be protected involving special basing modes in deep underground caverns or possibly a return to the abandoned anti-ballistic missile defence.

(e) *European systems*

2.27. The problem of describing the levels of intermediate-range nuclear weapons – weapons in range of Europe, which are not intercontinental (SALT-counted) weapons – is immensely complicated because of the large variety of different weapons systems that could be taken into account; the dual-capability of many of them (capable of delivering conventional or nuclear weapons) and the difficulty of deciding on the range of weapons systems to be included (over 1,000 km? over 500?...). There is the question of including or excluding British and French strategic systems. These are relatively small forces; the two governments have made it clear that they are not prepared to negotiate

1. The Guardian, 1st March 1982; International Herald Tribune, 23rd March 1982.

Historical levels of SS-4, SS-5 et SS-20 missiles

Year	Total of SS-4 and SS-5	SS-20	Total missiles	Total warheads ¹	Total yield MT ²	Total equivalent megatons ³	Notes
1962	200	—	200	200	200	200	Period of SS-4 and SS-5 build-up
1963	700	—	700	700	700	700	
1964	800	—	800	800	800	800	Probably over-estimate
1965-1967	750	—	750	750	750	750	
1968	725	—	725	725	725	725	
1969-1971	700	—	700	700	700	700	
1972-1976	600	—	600	600	600	600	
1977	600	(20)	620	660	609	617	
1978	590	100	690	890	635	675	Start of SS-20 deployment
1979	590	120	710	950	644	692	
1980	440	160	600	920	512	576	
1981	380	230	610	1,070	483	575	
1981 ⁴	350	250	600	1,100	462	562	

Source : Successive editions of IISS Military Balance.

1. Assuming 3 warheads on all SS-20 missiles, but ignoring any reloads.
2. Assuming 1 MT on SS-4, SS-5 warheads; 0.15 MT on SS-20 warheads.
3. Total of Y_i where Y is yield of each warhead in MT.
4. Figures from NATO NPG communiqué of 21st October 1981.

any reductions in their modest levels, at least while the levels of the nuclear weapons of the superpowers remain substantially greater; moreover, French nuclear weapons are not assigned to NATO. On the other hand, Soviet military planners cannot be expected to exclude these weapons in their assessment of the threat.

2.28. There are in fact two distinct problems to be addressed in describing the levels of these weapons. On the one hand, there can be a relatively short and clearly-defined list of weapons systems that could be the subject of negotiations on reductions in the INF talks. Such lists are a matter for the negotiations. On the other hand, an attempt can be made to describe the levels of all nuclear weapons systems in the area.

2.29. The simplest statement of levels concerns surface-to-surface missiles with ranges in excess of 1,000 km because these are the most threatening weapons as far as NATO is concerned, with very short flight times giving no warning of arrival and capable of destroying both military and civilian objectives anywhere in Europe. In this category of weapon system, the Soviet Union, according to western figures of March 1982, has 300 SS-20s (with a total of 900 warheads); 275 older SS-4 and 25 SS-5 missiles. NATO has none.

2.30. This is not, however, a meaningful representation of a balance. Soviet intermediate

and medium-range ballistic missiles are deployed in three main areas: European Soviet Union (Byelorussia and Ukraine, where they are clearly targeted on Western Europe); each side of the Urals (the so-called "swing position" where they are in range of South West Asia and Europe); Asian Soviet Union (Tomsk area, and Chita area near the Chinese frontier). Of the SS-20s, about one-third, and of the SS-4 and 5, about one-quarter are said to be deployed in the Asian Soviet Union where they are not in range of Europe¹. Historically, since the early 1960s, the Soviet Union has had 600 SS-4s and SS-5s deployed, of which 450 were in range of Europe, and, according to NATO figures for March 1982, these have been replaced by the SS-20 on a one-for-one basis thereby increasing the total number of warheads although actually reducing the total yield of the weapons — while the accuracy has increased — see table. There is evidence that the SS-20 launcher has a refire capability — i.e. that several missiles could be fired successively from one launcher — but it would not be cost-effective for the Soviet Union to deploy several missiles with each launcher. Missiles cost many times

1. However, the NATO publication NATO and the Warsaw Pact — force comparisons of 4th May 1982 shows the SS-20 with a range of 4,600 to 5,000 km. At the lower range, missiles in the Tomsk area could reach Norway, Denmark and Turkey; at the higher, Benelux and Germany also.

more than launchers. In the absence of evidence of production of significantly more SS-20 missiles than the 300 launchers observed by satellites, official United States and NATO figures have not increased the estimates of SS-20 levels beyond the numbers of observed launchers.

2.31. During the 1960s and 1970s, NATO clearly considered that the threat of the SS-4 and SS-5 was offset by other NATO weapons, including nuclear-capable aircraft; United Kingdom and possibly French nuclear weapons, including strategic weapons; part of the United States strategic weapons including those Polaris submarines assigned to SACEUR which were the precursors of the present 400 Poseidon warheads mentioned in paragraph 2.5 above. The net increase in the warheads threat to Europe from these three Soviet weapons is about 375 as shown in the following table. NATO has lived with the threat from 450 missiles since 1963, and considered it to be offset by the other weapons.

Nos. missiles deployed			Nos. within range of Europe		
	SS-4, SS-5	SS-20	Missiles		Total warheads
			SS-4, SS-5	SS-20	
1963 to 1976 March	600	nil	450	nil	450
1982	300	300	225	200	825
Net increase increase in warheads 375					

2.32. However, once aircraft are included in an estimate of nuclear weapons systems in Europe, the different possible figures are legion because of all the different criteria for choice of aircraft to be included:

- Which type of aircraft to include in terms of range and payload. If 1,000 km combat radius is the criterion, all tactical aircraft are excluded except the Soviet Su-24 Fencer and the United States A-6; if the threshold is lowered to 500 km, then the Soviet MiG-27 Flogger and Su-17 and Su-7 Fitter are included together with NATO F-104, F-4, Jaguar and Mirage aircraft as well as the A-7 carrier-based aircraft.
- How many of each type should be counted as nuclear weapons systems? E.g. out of 219 Anglo-French Jaguar aircraft, only 80 are said to have been constructed as nuclear-capable aircraft, but only 40 of these are

believed to be assigned to a nuclear rôle. From an external verification standpoint, 219 aircraft might be classed as nuclear weapons systems; from an intention standpoint, only 40 would be.

- Assumptions about numbers of aircraft carriers in range of Europe. The nominal strength of United States aircraft carriers is 2 in the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean; 5 with the Atlantic Fleet. Each carries a total of some 30 A-6 and A-7 aircraft which can be used in a nuclear strike rôle. Nowadays, however, the bulk of these carriers and aircraft in the Atlantic are assigned to (conventional) sea control rôles; at times there have been no aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean. Thus the perceived threat to the Soviet Union can vary from 0 to 238 aircraft (476 nuclear bombs).
- Inclusion of British and French strategic nuclear forces. Whether negotiable or not the Soviet Union must count these as part of the threat.
- Where based? Should dual-based United States aircraft - based in the United States but earmarked for immediate reinforcement in Europe be included? Should similar Soviet aircraft based East of the Urals be included? There is a strong case for including both on the grounds that flying time involved in reinforcement is only a few hours.

One difficulty in equating aircraft with missiles is that aircraft are capable of flying more than one sortie to deliver nuclear weapons.

2.33. For the past year, there has been a new development in that various Soviet experts have begun to publish figures for their estimate of the balance. In May 1981, the Soviet press agency Novosti distributed a short article by Lt.-Gen. Nikolai Chervov quoting IISS Military Balance figures to give NATO 1,550 nuclear means of delivery with ranges from 720 km upwards, in the European theatre. It claimed that these systems could deliver 1.5 times as many warheads as comparable Soviet systems. In a more recent paper entitled "Main regional topic - on the balance of military forces between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO" distributed by Novosti in the week of 5th October 1981, General Chervov provided another estimate of western weapons systems with ranges from 1,000 to 4,500 km comprising United States forward-based systems - F-111 and F-4 aircraft based in certain European countries, the FB-111A fighter bombers

based in the United States and carrier-borne A6 and A7 aircraft, totalling 700 units (without providing a breakdown). United States allies were stated to have more than 300 medium-range delivery vehicles, including more than 160 land- and sea-based missiles. The paper claimed that the total of Soviet SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles did not exceed the NATO total (of 1,000).

2.34. Most authoritatively, Mr. Brezhnev himself in the interview he gave to the German magazine *Der Spiegel* on 1st November 1981 in preparation for his visit to Bonn offered figures closely following those of General Chervov in October:

“If one includes in medium-range weapons the principal nuclear missiles and aircraft of the NATO countries, capable of reaching targets in the territory of the Soviet Union from the territory of Western European countries and the seas washing the coasts of the European continent, i.e. with ranges from 1,000 km upwards (but less of course than intercontinental range), and the corresponding Soviet weapons with similar range stationed in the European part of the USSR, there exists at the present time in Europe an approximate equality in these weapons between the NATO countries and the USSR. The NATO countries have in this area 986 delivery vehicles of which the United States provides more than 700 (F-111, FB-111, F-4 aircraft, aircraft on aircraft-carriers cruising in the seas and oceans surrounding Europe). Further the British capacity represents 64 ballistic missiles and 55 bombers. France has 144 units (98 missiles and 46 bombers).

The Soviet Union has 975 similar weapons. The situation has not changed since the USSR began to replace the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles which were outdated by the improved SS-20 missiles. When we put a new missile in place we dismantle one or two old missiles which, with their launching ramps, are sent for scrap.

The SS-20 can carry three warheads, but their total yield is less than that of one old warhead. Consequently the number of launchers diminished as the old equipment was replaced and, at the same time, the total yield of our medium-range nuclear capacity has been reduced.”

2.35. The Soviet Union has been claiming from about 1979 that a balance existed in medium-range systems in Europe of about 1,000 on each side, and makes the same claim today. But in that period the number of SS-20

missiles deployed has increased from 120 to 300 which, allowing for the simultaneous reduction in the numbers of SS-4s and SS-5s deployed, represents a net increase of 360 warheads in the Soviet force – this considerably weakens the longstanding Soviet claim of approximate balance in the European theatre.

2.36. IISS Military Balance figures for mid-1981 show 1,512 NATO systems for 4,430 Warsaw Pact systems for the European theatre. Calculations from non-attributable United States sources show ratios in favour of the Warsaw Pact ranging from 4:1 to 6:1 with different assumptions. The table at appendix tabulates various assessments of force levels that have been made quoting the source.

2.37. In conclusion, it can be said that no reasonable assumptions support the Soviet figures, although truly worst case assumptions from the Soviet standpoint can show more than the 1,000 systems that the Warsaw Pact claims NATO has. At the same time, the NATO calculations have been including all the presently deployed 300 SS-20s although 100 of these, and some 75 SS-4s and SS-5s are not currently deployed within range of Europe. Certainly too the only western systems that could respond as instantaneously and as accurately to a strike by the SS-20 are the 18 French IRBMs, and of course the United States Minuteman ICBMs. Among the 572 NATO systems to be deployed from 1983 onwards under the 1979 decision, only the Pershing II will have a comparable short flight time response.

(f) British and French nuclear forces

2.38. Since the committee last reported specifically on British and French nuclear forces¹, the United Kingdom has announced its decision to acquire the Trident D-5 missile instead of the C-4 for its strategic replacement programme to be operational by the mid-1990s. The United States C-4 missile has a range of 4,000 nautical miles and is fitted with eight 100 kt warheads. The D-5 under development will have a 6,000 n.m. range and is designed to carry 14 warheads of 150 kt. The design accuracy of the D-5 is intended to be good enough to give it a counter-silo capability against Soviet ICBMs.

2.39. In his announcement in the House of Commons on 11th March 1982, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Nott, said, however:

“The number of warheads that the Trident II-D-5 missile will carry, and there-

1. SALT and the British and French nuclear forces, Document 859, 17th November 1980.

fore Trident's striking power, remains wholly a matter of choice for the British Government. Our intention is that the move to D-5 will not involve any significant change in the planned total number of warheads that we originally envisaged for our Trident I-C-4 force."

2.40. The United Kingdom does not appear to have been specific about the number of warheads the force will carry. Although the missile, and presumably the delivery part of the MIRVed warhead system, are to be procured from the United States, the actual nuclear warheads themselves under the terms of the United States-United Kingdom agreement (and indeed under the terms of the non-proliferation treaty) are to be manufactured and assembled in the United Kingdom, so that they will not necessarily have the same yield as United States warheads for this missile, although a counter-silo capability will remain as the accuracy will be determined by the missile. Assuming that the intention was to fit eight warheads on the C-4 missile, this would increase the total striking power of the British force from the present 64 with the Polaris A-3 missile, to a maximum of 512, although with decoys it can be assumed that not all re-entry vehicles would be warheads. However, Mr. Nott went on to say in response to a question:

"We intend to have approximately the same number [of warheads] as Trident I. So in terms of quantity it is not, in our present planning, an escalation. The number of warheads on the missile need not necessarily be more than we now have on Polaris. That is a matter of choice for the British Government of the time."

2.41. From an arms control standpoint, the picture must be regarded somewhat differently. Under the terms of the bilateral SALT agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, relying on external means of verification, the number of independent warheads in a MIRVed missile is to be assumed equal to the greatest number with which that particular missile has been tested. Under these rules the British Trident force would have to be assumed to carry a total of 896 warheads. The SALT II agreements do not of course apply to the British force, but they have set an international precedent for counting rules with external means of verification. Any future arms control agreement that might apply to the British force would presumably require more intrusive means of verification if it was to be counted as having fewer than 896 warheads.

2.42. The cost of the Trident force of four submarines with D-5 missiles was estimated by Mr. Nott to be £6 billion at 1980 prices and

exchange rates, or £7.5 billion at 1981 prices and exchange rates, which was just over 3% of the total defence budget.

2.43. On 29th October, Sir Philip Goodhart, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Army until his ministerial post was abolished earlier this year, published a memorandum he had sent, prior to his departure from office, to the British Secretary of State for Defence Mr. Nott. In it he recommended that the Trident programme be postponed for four years, and United States cruise missiles replaced in existing submarines instead of on land. The memorandum said:

"It would be quixotic to believe that any alternative left-wing government would divert Trident money to bring frigates into service... A move to roll back the Trident costings could therefore reduce the existing vulnerability of the Royal Navy."

2.44. At relatively little cost, the United Kingdom could retain its present tactical nuclear weapons which include those for strike aircraft in Europe, as well as United States supplied tactical weapons for British army units, and thus retain a finger on the nuclear trigger at the very point where the use of nuclear weapons might have to be initiated. The present uncertainties facing the Soviet Union - the chief justification for the British and French nuclear forces - would remain. In the view of the committee, finance for the Trident programme would be better devoted to maintaining the present level of the Royal Navy's surface fleet.

2.45. Further to the plans for the future of the French nuclear forces on which the committee has reported¹, the present government has confirmed that the sixth, improved, ballistic missile submarine with M-4 missiles will enter service in 1985, and announced: a seventh submarine of a new generation to enter service in 1994; a programme for a mobile ICBM, and a new tactical missile Hades with a range over 250 km to replace Pluton. Development of a nuclear medium-range air-to-ground missile and an enhanced radiation weapon continues.

(g) Battlefield nuclear weapons

2.46. The preceding sections have not examined the relatively short-range battlefield nuclear weapons comprising tube artillery and surface-to-surface missiles with ranges up to about 100 or 150 km. Less information has been available in the past about the numbers of such weapons systems deployed by the Warsaw Pact, or indeed which of its artillery pieces were

1. Document 859, 17th November 1980.

to be assumed to have nuclear ammunition available. All such artillery is, of course, dual capable, having a normal conventional rôle as well. The NATO publication of 4th May 1982 on force comparisons shows an overall NATO superiority of short-range nuclear forces in Europe with 950 for the Warsaw Pact compared with 1,100 for NATO, to which should be added 42 French Pluton missiles. These overall totals, however, are built on large asymmetries with NATO superiority in nuclear-capable tube artillery of 1,000 compared with 300 for the Warsaw Pact, and Warsaw Pact superiority in surface-to-surface missiles of this range of 650 compared with 100 for NATO (plus 42 Pluton). The artillery pieces, of course, are capable of firing more than one nuclear round, although it is unlikely that all of them would ever be assigned to the nuclear rôle simultaneously so that a better measure of balance of nuclear-capable artillery would be the number of nuclear rounds available to each side - information which, if known, is not published. The Warsaw Pact superiority in missiles of this category, with greater range than artillery, gives the Warsaw Pact the advantage of superior target cover.

2.47. A NATO study of future force requirements for nuclear weapons in this category is expected to be completed in the NATO High Level Group once it has finished its studies of the INF forces. The NATO force comparisons referred to above consider the new Soviet missiles SS-22 and SS-23 with ranges up to 1,000 and 350 km respectively in the category of shorter-range intermediate nuclear forces, comparable with the NATO Pershing I. They are linked to the INF problem to the extent that they could be used to circumvent an INF agreement if deployed in forward positions.

(h) Global balance

2.48. A rough statement can be attempted of the global East-West balance in nuclear forces in terms of nuclear warheads, ignoring the large asymmetries in terms of different characteristics of different weapons systems. In the strategic field as has been seen the balance at present favours the United States in a ratio of about 9,000 warheads to 7,000; in the European field, on the basis of the moderate IISS assessment of warheads available, the balance favours the Warsaw Pact by 2,000 warheads to about 1,170 for NATO. On this basis a global balance can be represented by 10,170 for NATO compared with 9,000 for the Warsaw Pact. They take no account of the Chinese nuclear force which is certainly taken into account by the Soviet Union.

2.49. An authoritative statement has recently been made concerning total numbers of warheads believed in the stockpiles of each side. Ambassador Gerard Smith, former Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and chief SALT I negotiator, and President Carter's special representative for non-proliferation, in evidence to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 13th November 1981 said:

“The United States already has an estimated inventory of some 24,000 nuclear weapons, of which nearly 10,000 are for intercontinental delivery systems and many more are stationed in Europe or the Far East within striking distance of the Soviet Union. By contrast the Soviets are believed to have in the order of 16,000 nuclear weapons, some half of which are deployed on systems of intercontinental range.”¹

(i) Comments on nuclear strategy

2.50. It has been a well-known part of NATO strategy for more than twenty years to initiate the use of nuclear weapons should that ever be necessary to arrest a Soviet conventional attack that had not been stopped by NATO conventional forces. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group has at various times considered the options concerning the use of nuclear weapons in different circumstances, and there is nothing new in recent remarks². The widespread publicity they have received is a symptom of present public anxiety about the whole subject of nuclear weapons.

III. Negotiations

(a) Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)

(i) United States position

3.1. The dual decision, taken on 12th December 1979 by the special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers, provided for negotiations on what were then called “long-range theatre nuclear forces” in the following terms:

“Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following

1. Hearings before United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 13th November 1981, page 17.

2. By President Reagan on 16th October and 10th November, by Mr. Haig on 4th November 1981 (see *The Times*, 5th November 1981; *International Herald Tribune*, 11th November 1981).

consultations within the Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose to the USSR to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive consultations within the Alliance:

A. Any future limitations on United States systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems.

B. Limitations on United States and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach.

C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on United States and Soviet land-based long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of *de jure* equality both in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable."

3.2. The bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union formally opened in Geneva a year later at the end of the Carter administration without real business being transacted. They were adjourned, in fact, for a year until 30th November 1981 while the Reagan administration was considering its negotiating position, the NATO Special Consultative Group on negotiations meanwhile co-ordinating positions within the Alliance. On 21st October 1981, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting at Gleneagles in Scotland announced what has become known as NATO's zero option position on negotiations:

"With regard to arms control, Ministers welcomed the recent announcement by the United States Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister on the opening of the theatre nuclear force arms control negotiations in Geneva on 30th November... They noted the substantial progress made by the United States in preparation of these negotiations and fully endorsed the close consultations that are taking place in NATO including NATO's Special Consultative Group... Ministers fully supported the United States commitment to achieve equitable and verifiable agreements, within the

SALT framework, on the theatre nuclear forces at the lowest attainable levels. On the basis of reciprocity the zero-level remains a possible option under ideal circumstances..."

3.3. The United States approach to these talks was then set out in a little more detail in President Reagan's speech to the National Press Club on 18th November 1981 when he revealed that he had sent a message to the Soviet leadership proposing "the mutual reduction of conventional, intermediate-range nuclear, and strategic forces". The first point on the agenda concerning the long-range theatre nuclear force negotiations – now renamed by President Reagan intermediate-range nuclear forces – contained the following proposal:

"The United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles."

President Reagan made it clear that Soviet missiles in the swing position east of the Urals, where they were within range of Europe as well as the Middle-East, would also have to be included in the negotiations:

"Soviet spokesmen have suggested that moving their SS-20s beyond the Ural mountains will remove the threat to Europe... The SS-20s, even if deployed behind the Urals, will have a range that places almost all of Western Europe... all within range of these missiles which incidentally are mobile and can be moved on short notice."

3.4. In evidence to a Congress committee, however, Mr. Eugene Rostow, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, made clear that the scope of the negotiations includes all SS-20s including those deployed in the Far East which are not in range of Europe:

"We are not negotiating – I want you to notice right away – about the weapons facing Europe. They are often called Euromissiles. We are talking and we are going to negotiate about intermediate-range missiles and we are going to negotiate about them on a global basis, because it is not a contribution to world security if these things are moved out of range of European targets so that they are aimed at Japanese targets... The Japanese are immensely conscious of that fact."¹

1. Briefing of the United States House Sub-Committee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 20th November 1981, page 4.

3.5. European attention has not been drawn to the increased threat to Japan represented by the SS-20. The two Soviet missile areas in Asia, where the intermediate-range missiles are out of range of Europe, are in the general area of Tomsk in Central Asia and Chita near the Chinese frontier. The SS-5 missile, with its 4,000 km range in the first of these locations, could threaten China but was out of range of Japan. SS-20 missiles, with a 5,000 km range, can cover the whole of Japan from that area. From the area of Chita, Japan has been within range of the 4,000 km SS-5 since it was first deployed there. The SS-20 is an additional threat. The SS-4 missile, with a 1,900 km range is a threat only to China. NATO has confirmed that the zero option proposal involves Soviet missiles *world-wide*:

“ [Ministers] reiterated their full support for the United States negotiating position... to cancel the deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviet Union eliminated its SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles world-wide.”¹

3.6. In his evidence to the Congress committee, Mr. Rostow made other significant points about the negotiations dealing both with data on numbers of missiles and verification:

“ There is going to be a war of numbers... As you know the Soviets have never taken the responsibility for figures in public before or in the negotiations. Last August we notified them that in these upcoming negotiations we were going to need verification beyond national technical means, and we were not going to negotiate on the basis of figures we had supplied... We have now had a reply from them on the first point, but not yet the second. In Mr. Brezhnev's interview with *Der Spiegel*... and then later in diplomatic and official communications, the Soviets have responded to our question of last August and have said that while they regard national technical means as the primary method of verification in these treaties, that under circumstances of trust, co-operative means to supplement national technical means might be possible... We publish our figures. So far they have not published theirs, but we expect their figures to be published in the very near future, or an attempt at it. ”

3.7. The Soviet publication “ Whence the threat to peace ” appeared shortly afterwards, and it is known that in the Geneva talks the

1. Communiqué of NATO Nuclear Planning Group ministerial meeting, Colorado Springs, 24th March 1982.

Soviet Union has been putting forward its version of the balance.

3.8. The scope of limitations to be included in the treaty, in the United States view, appears to go beyond that attempted in SALT:

“ We will want to know about production of missiles and warheads. We cannot confine ourselves just to what is deployed... If we are going to change the method of counting here from deployed launchers which you can photograph to warheads or even the megatonnage of warheads which you cannot photograph, then you are going to have to supplement the national technical means... The new and creative ideas will be means of co-operation that go beyond the national technical means. Maybe on-site inspections; maybe television cameras. There may be challenge inspections... ”

3.9. NATO has stressed that the INF negotiations must be held in the framework of SALT, now START. Mr. Rostow, addressing this point, said:

“ We are having the negotiations in the same city so that the negotiating teams can talk to each other and co-ordinate. We will have one backstop committee in Washington servicing... both delegations... It may be... that at a given point we could combine them. After all, they are separate only for reasons of historical accident. ”

(ii) *Soviet position*

3.10. The position of the Soviet Union was spelt out publicly in Mr. Brezhnev's speech at the Trades Union Congress in Moscow on 16th March 1982 where he again proposed a freeze on missiles (at a time when the Soviet Union had completed deployment of its 300 SS-20s):

“ The Soviet leadership has taken a decision to introduce, unilaterally, a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear armaments in the European part of the USSR. We are freezing, in both the quantitative and qualitative respects, the armaments of this kind already stationed here, and are suspending the replacement of old missiles, known as the SS-4s and SS-5s, by newer SS-20 missiles. ”

This moratorium will be in force either until an agreement is reached with the United States to reduce, on the basis of parity and equal security, the medium-range nuclear weapons intended for use in Europe, or until the time, if and when, the United States leaders, disregarding the

security of the nations, actually go over to practical preparations to deploy Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles in Europe.

Furthermore, we stated earlier that if the two sides reached agreement on a moratorium, we should be prepared, as a sign of goodwill, to carry out a unilateral reduction of the number of our nuclear weapons in Europe as part of the future reduction agreed upon. Now we have decided to take a new step demonstrating our resolve for peace and our faith in the possibility of a mutually-acceptable agreement. The Soviet Union intends, already this year, unless there is a new worsening of the international situation, to reduce by a certain number its medium-range missiles on its own initiative.

.....

At the same time we regard it as our duty to make the following perfectly clear: If the governments of the United States and its NATO allies, in defiance of the will of the nations for peace, were actually to carry out their plan to deploy in Europe hundreds of new American missiles capable of hitting targets on the territory of the Soviet Union, a different strategic situation would arise in the world. There would arise a real additional threat to our country and its allies from the United States. This would compel us to take retaliatory steps that would put the other side, including the United States itself, its own territory, in an analogous position. This should not be forgotten."

3.11. President Brezhnev responded to certain western criticisms of the Soviet position in a speech to the 19th Communist Youth (Komsomol) Congress on 18th May. Referring to the disputed missiles beyond the Urals he said that no extra intermediate-range missiles would be deployed within range of Western Europe, and implied that limitation and reduction of these missiles in the east could be negotiated only separately with China – the United States has called for them to be included in the bilateral INF talks in Geneva (paragraph 3.4 above). He also made it clear that the unilateral Soviet freeze covered preparations for deployment:

"To facilitate the matter, the Soviet Union has recently unilaterally suspended deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union and decided to reduce their number somewhat. I can say now that

we are in the process of reducing a considerable number of these missiles.

These peaceful concrete acts by our country have been welcomed throughout the world. However, some in the West try to throw doubt on their scope.

For example it is said that the decision of the Soviet Union will not prevent us from continuing to install missiles so that they can "reach", even from beyond the Urals, West European countries. I can declare formally that no intermediate-range missile will be additionally deployed where the Federal Republic of Germany or other Western European countries would find themselves within the limits of their range.

It is also asked if our decision concerning a unilateral moratorium includes also a suspension of preparations for deployment of missiles. Yes it provides also for stopping work on preparing launching sites for these missiles.

One more comment. The Government of the United States insists that the Soviet Union should freeze also, if not liquidate purely and simply, missiles deployed in the eastern part of our country. This really is an absurd demand! Questions concerning these missiles can be settled – their limitation and their reduction. But only by negotiating with those who have the nuclear means which our missiles offset. And, of course, once again on the basis of reciprocity. We do not object to this sort of talks. But it is indisputably a separate question."

(iii) Prospects for INF

3.12. The first round of talks from 30th November 1981 to their adjournment on 16th March 1982 are said to have been businesslike, but the positions of the two sides remain far apart. From the Soviet standpoint, claiming erroneously that there is a rough balance of theatre nuclear forces in Europe, the NATO zero offer appears to be a demand for the dismantling of all Soviet missiles in exchange for agreement not to deploy missiles which NATO does not at the present time possess. From the NATO standpoint, there is an imbalance in theatre nuclear forces, although realistic estimates show that it is not as great as some American claims of 4:1 or 6:1 inferiority had made out. Certainly NATO is concerned at the type of threat posed by the SS-20 which is different in kind from that posed by nuclear-capable aircraft.

3.13. When the INF talks resume in Geneva later in May, the next session is expected to be

devoted to detailed arguments about numbers and types of weapons systems on both sides. The Soviet Union for the first time is beginning to be slightly more forthcoming about the levels of its own forces, as Mr. Rostow acknowledged and as this report points out in the previous chapter. There is, however, a long way to go. Concrete offers on actual reductions which might be acceptable to NATO are not to be expected until later sessions as the deadline at the end of 1983 approaches for the deployment of the cruise and Pershing II missiles.

(b) *START*

(i) *United States position*

3.14. The approach of the Reagan administration to strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union is different from that of previous administrations. Mr. Rostow, in his evidence¹, remarked that SALT II was an admirable solution to the problems of the late 1960s:

“SALT II and SALT I... were based on the notion that there would be a regulation of deployed launchers; deployed launchers could be measured readily by satellite photography, and you did not get into complicated and disagreeable problems of trying to verify the number of the weapons. We knew perfectly well that deployed launchers were not an accurate measure of the destructive power of these weapons. Some weapons were retaliatory, others had other characteristics. Some were accurate, some were inaccurate, some were big, some were small.”

3.15. He outlined the alternative approach:

“What I am trying to do is to devise a new method of counting as a substitute for deployed launchers... Should it be warheads? Should it be throw-weight? Should it be megatonnage? Do we want the treaty to last indefinitely like the ABM Treaty, or do we want a treaty for five years or ten years?... Do we have specific sub-limits in the treaty? How do we deal with bombers when we get away from the deployed launcher counting method?”²

More succinctly:

“Warheads, throw-weight, megatonnage, will it be an overall limit on the destructive power which you can use in any way you see fit or will there be special sub-limits for ICBMs and SLBMs and so on?”

1. Briefing op. cit., pages 15, 16.

2. Idem, page 17.

Chairman Zabloski: and ALCMs? Mr. Rostow – absolutely yes.”¹

3.16. President Reagan, in his 18th November 1981 speech, defined his aims for START:

“We will seek to negotiate substantial reductions in nuclear arms which would result in levels that are equal and verifiable. Our approach to verification will be to emphasise openness and creativity – rather than the secrecy and suspicion which have undermined confidence in arms control in the past. While we can hope to benefit from work done over the past decade in strategic arms negotiations, let us agree to do more than simply begin where these efforts previously left off. We can and should attempt major qualitative and quantitative progress... Let us see how far we can go in achieving truly substantial reductions in our strategic arsenals. To symbolise this fundamental change in direction, we will call these negotiations START – Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.”

3.17. The United States will in fact retain parts of the unratified SALT II agreement, and claim that its strategic arms modernisation programme at the present time does not exceed the SALT limits. Mr. Weinberger has said:

“In selecting our modernisation programme, the primary consideration was to ensure that it met our national security needs. We did not plan this programme so that it would avoid conflicts within our expired SALT I or the SALT II agreements negotiated by our predecessors, nevertheless, it is a fact that this programme will have no near-term conflicts with either of those documents. Accordingly it is consistent with our stated policy that, while our SALT review is underway, we will take no actions which will undercut existing agreements so long as the Soviet Union does likewise.”²

The Rapporteur understands that this self-denying ordinance will be stretched to include at least the opening phase of the START negotiations. However, Mr. Weinberger continued:

“Some concern has been expressed with regard to the arms control implications of the decision to deploy nuclear armed SLCMs on our attack submarines. I would first note that this deployment will occur well after the SALT II protocol would have expired, had that treaty come

1. Idem, page 22.

2. Hearings before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 3rd November 1981, page 5.

into force. Hence, the deployment would have been consistent with the terms of that treaty.”¹

Asked whether that implied that there was no intention to extend that protocol, Mr. Weinberger confirmed:

“I have not seen any such intention... I think on the cruise missile the importance is that this is the one strategic weapon we can get in place quickly.”²

3.18. President Reagan finally outlined his proposals for START in his speech at Eureka on 9th May, when he also expressed the hope that the negotiations would begin by the end of June. As expected, the proposals for reductions and ceilings focused on numbers of warheads, rather than numbers of missiles that previous agreements concentrated on. President Reagan intended “to reduce significantly the most destabilising systems – ballistic missiles – the number of warheads they carry, and their overall destructive potential”. In a first phase, he proposed to reduce ballistic missile warheads to “equal ceilings at least a third below current levels... no more than half of those warheads [to] be land based”. Phase two would aim at “an equal ceiling on other elements of our strategic nuclear forces including limits on ballistic missile throw-weight at less than current American levels”. In a televised press conference on 13th May, President Reagan added that he was also willing to negotiate reductions in bombers and cruise missiles, but had focused on intercontinental ballistic missiles because they were more destabilising.

3.19. Officials had earlier referred to specific figures that did not in fact appear in President Reagan’s speech. It was said that a common ceiling of 850 ballistic missile (SLBMs and ICBMs) would be proposed with a total of not more than 5,000 warheads, of which only 500 warheads could be ICBMs. It was suggested that this would involve a reduction of 1,500 Soviet missiles and 1,300 warheads compared with the reduction of 850 United States missiles and 2,200 warheads, the reductions to be carried out over ten years. It was also suggested that the decision to defer restrictions on missile throw-weight to a phase two represented a victory for the views of the Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, supported by the Chiefs of Staff, against Mr. Weinberger, the Secretary of Defence.

(ii) *Soviet position*

3.20. The public Soviet reaction to President Reagan’s speech of 9th May came in President

Brezhnev’s address to the 19th Communist Youth Congress on 18th May when he welcomed the decision to resume talks to limit and reduce strategic weapons, but complained that the United States proposals would affect the Soviet Union unilaterally while leaving Washington free rein to increase its strategic weapons. President Brezhnev put forward three very general principles for negotiations, including the preservation of positive achievements so far (i.e. SALT II), and proposed a bilateral strategic freeze:

“In the same speech the President [Reagan] said that the United States at the talks would be in favour of substantial reductions. Well, we have always been in favour of substantial reductions of strategic arms. There is no need to persuade us in this respect.

But if one looks at the essence of the ideas voiced by the United States President on such reductions, one reveals unfortunately that the American position is absolutely unilateral in nature. Above all, because the United States would like in general to exclude from the talks the strategic arms it is now most intensively developing.

.....

It is directly prejudicing the security of the USSR and at the same time leaves Washington a free hand in the implementation of American programmes of building up strategic arms.

One can hardly avoid drawing the conclusion that the position stated by the United States President is oriented not to searching for an agreement but to providing conditions for the continuation of Washington’s attempts to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union.

What is needed for the talks to proceed successfully and to bring about an agreement?

To put it briefly, this requires, first, that the talks should actually pursue the aim of limiting and reducing strategic armaments rather than be a cover for a continued arms race and the breakdown of the existing parity.

Second, it is necessary that both sides should conduct them with due regard for each other’s legitimate security interests and strictly in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security.

Lastly, it is necessary to preserve everything positive that has been achieved earlier. The talks do not start from

1. *Idem*, page 13.

2. *Idem*, page 25.

scratch but a good deal of far from use-
less work has been done.

.....

It is likewise very important to effectively block all the channels for the continuation of the strategic arms race in any form. This means that the development of new types of strategic weapons should be either banned or restricted to the utmost by agreed upon characteristics.

.....

We would be prepared to reach agreement that the strategic armaments of the USSR and the United States are frozen already now, as soon as the talks begin. Frozen quantitatively. And that their modernisation is limited to the utmost.

It is also necessary that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union take such actions which would lead to an upsetting of the stability of the strategic situation. Such a freeze, an important thing in itself, would also facilitate headway towards a radical limitation and reduction of strategic arms.

.....

(iii) Prospects for START

3.21. Following the declaration of martial law in Poland in December 1981, the United States had deliberately refrained from announcing a date for the opening of the START talks – the announcement had been expected in normal circumstances when Mr. Haig met Mr. Gromyko in Geneva on 26th January. In his speech on 9th May President Reagan finally announced that he hoped they would begin by the end of June. It is too early to assess the prospects for these talks and the acceptability to the Soviet Union of the increased scope announced by President Reagan.

3.22. Certainly the proposed reductions, although to equal ceilings, would involve greater reductions for the Soviet Union than the United States because they involve categories where the Soviet Union is superior. Thus although a ceiling of 5,000 BM warheads would probably involve a reduction of about 1,800 Soviet warheads and 2,150 United States warheads, the subceiling of 2,500 warheads on ICBMs would involve a reduction of 3,000 Soviet warheads, but would permit an increase of 350 in United States warheads. Phase two limits on throw-weight below present United States levels would affect five models of Soviet missiles all of which exceed the heaviest United States missile – the Trident C-4. As United States Senators Muskie and Kennedy have already pointed out, the proposals would not in themselves prevent the United States modernisation programme

going forward – the B-1 and stealth bombers and sea-launched cruise missiles would be unaffected¹, although the introduction of MX and Trident would require offsetting reduction in existing weapons.

3.23. Some aspects of the strategic weapons modernisation programme may have a negative effect on arms control as the arms control impact statements have implied:

“The Trident II missile and warhead programmes may have some effects which could be adverse from an arms control perspective. The additive effects of two potential advances (Trident II and MX) in United States counter-silo capabilities by the early 1990s could put a large portion of Soviet fixed ICBMs at risk. This could have significant destabilising effects, and thus a potential negative arms control impact.”²

3.24. Certainly, however, President Reagan's proposals are intended to produce a more stable strategic balance at significantly lower levels and are a welcome first step.

(c) Conclusions on nuclear weapons negotiations

3.25. The Reagan administration is facing the Soviet Union with much tougher demands for nuclear arms control than have previous administrations. But the Soviet Union is already on record as rejecting President Carter's proposals for “deep cuts” in 1977, which came as a surprise departure from the outline agreement reached with the previous administration at Vladivostok in 1974. The Soviet Union now has confusing experience in dealing with successive United States administrations which have changed every four years and sometimes more frequently. There are now three outstanding arms control treaties that have been signed by the United States – the threshold test ban treaty signed by President Nixon in 1974; the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty signed by President Ford in 1976; and the SALT II treaty signed by President Carter in 1979 – that have been ratified by the Soviet Union but not yet by the United States despite the urging of its allies. The trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, which had nearly reached agreement in 1980, have been suspended. The

1. But President Reagan subsequently expressed readiness to negotiate reductions in bombers and cruise missiles – see paragraph 3.18 *in fine* above.

2. Fiscal year 1982 arms control impact statements submitted to Congress by the President. Digest prepared by Congressional Research Service, page VIII.

3. A list of certain relevant treaties and agreements is at Appendix V.

shifts in United States policy have not always been the responsibility of the administration in office; changing attitudes in the Senate have been an important factor, but a confusing one from the Soviet Union's point of view.

3.26. Now the West may be faced in the near future with a new Soviet leadership which, for a period of years, while consolidating its position at home, may feel unable to make significant concessions in the arms control field.

3.27. The Reagan administration has taken one year to prepare its position on INF and one and a half years on START. With only three or three and a half effective years in any administration, that leaves only one and a half to two years for serious negotiations with the Soviet Union. However, with its much tougher line on defence, the present administration is in a better position to secure ratification from the Senate of any arms control agreements that it concludes with the Soviet Union.

3.28. Attention has also been drawn recently to the alternative routes for arms control agreements in the United States if there is a risk of blockage through the two-thirds majority requirement for ratification in the Senate. Ambassador Gerard Smith, a former arms control negotiator for several previous Democrat and Republican administrations, in evidence said:

“ But I think this question of whether the United States is able to act through the treaty route is of central importance. I would urge you... to consider the alternative route which the Arms Control and Disarmament Act provides for arms control agreements to be approved by a majority of both houses of the Congress. You will recall that that was the route chosen in 1972 for SALT I... That was not submitted as a treaty... ”¹.

IV. *Public opinion and nuclear weapons*

4.1. There are today many diverse movements in western (and even in some eastern) countries opposing nuclear weapons, some calling for unilateral nuclear disarmament, some for a bilateral East-West freeze or reductions. These movements have found support among many different bodies including some churches, pacifists, ecologists, some representatives of professional bodies such as scientists and doctors, and some political parties. Since it is impossible to arrive at a definition of what constitutes a peace movement which is generally applicable to all

countries and commonly accepted, in this chapter the term peace movement is used for any organisation that advocates some form of nuclear disarmament – be it unilateral, bilateral or multilateral – in its programme. This chapter does not attempt to analyse the specific policy of each movement in detail, but to provide a general summary of the state of public opinion concerning nuclear weapons, and the activities of the various movements. An attempt is made to describe the relationship between the movements and the principal political parties in the WEU countries on the basis of press reports and replies to a questionnaire¹ sent to the parties by the Rapporteur. In their replies they were asked to identify the peace movements in their respective countries which they considered relevant.

(a) *Western Europe*

(i) *Belgium*

4.2. A number of opinion polls in Belgium have shown growing opposition to the NATO decision of December 1979 which would involve the stationing of 48 cruise missiles on Belgian territory². While the NATO decision was endorsed by the Belgian Government, the deployment of 48 cruise missiles on Belgian territory has been accepted in principle only, and with particular reservations. A poll undertaken by the Polling Institute of Brussels University, published at the beginning of October 1981, claimed that opposition to the development of cruise missiles in Belgium had risen from 41.7% in 1980 to 50.2% in 1981. A poll commissioned by two Flemish newspapers, published on 27th October, reported 41.8% of Belgians as viewing deployment of cruise missiles in Belgium as “very unfavourable”, and 24.1% as “rather unfavourable”. “Rather favourable” and “very favourable” views were reported for 13.3% and 5.2% of the population respectively. The poll had covered 1,621 voters between 14th and 18th October.

4.3. On Sunday 25th October 1981, a demonstration in Brussels organised by the *Comité national pour la paix et le développement* (CNAPD) brought about 200,000 persons onto the streets with reports of some thousands remaining behind in stations in Ghent and Antwerp because there were an insufficient number of trains³. Placards carried slogans such as “we want to live” and “give peace a chance”.

1. The questionnaire, a list of parties to which it has been sent and a list of those which have replied can be found at Appendix VI.

2. International Herald Tribune, 3rd October 1981; Economist, 31st October 1981.

3. *Le Monde*, 27th October 1981.

1. Hearing before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 13th November 1981, page 23.

4.4. The theme of the demonstration organised by the CNAPD was "Refuse nuclear missiles in Europe - one step towards disarmament". The organisers had made clear their opposition to Soviet SS-20 missiles as well as to cruise missiles. A delegation was received by Mr. Charles Ferdinand Nothomb, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who expressed his personal gratification that the demonstration had not been organised against NATO.

4.5. The CNAPD comprises some thirty youth organisations and movements, with the Young Socialist Movement being a founder member. The Socialist Party (PS) itself has been regularly associated with the principal demonstrations in aid of peace and disarmament organised by the CNAPD, and this was also the case on 25th October. The PS called on its members to participate in the demonstration and has also furnished organisational assistance for the October demonstration. The position of the Belgian socialists concerning the Geneva talks on INF systems can be found in a motion adopted by the General Council on 8th December 1979 calling for balanced limitation and reduction of INF systems on both sides at the lowest possible level¹. The Social Christian Party (PSC) also officially took part in the peace demonstration of 25th October. Yet the PSC is not a member of the CNAPD nor does it provide any material assistance to peace movements. Many party members are members of certain peace movements, either on an individual basis in groups such as the MCP (Christian Peace Movement), or on an organised basis through the youth organisation (Young Social Christians), which is a member of the CNAPD. The PSC supports any peace movement that is in favour of balanced and controlled disarmament; the party is strongly opposed to any form of unilateral disarmament².

4.6. The Belgian Liberal Reform Party (PRL) on the other hand is firmly opposed to any association with the peace movements; it considers pacifism to be "naïve" and neutralism "unacceptable". It calls for the strict adherence by Belgium to its international obligations, especially towards NATO. The PRL seeks confirmation that Belgium would accept the NATO modernisation programme³.

(ii) France

4.7. France has not participated in the NATO decision on the deployment of cruise missiles, but the present government has given public support to the need to counter the SS-20.

1. PS reply, 26th January 1982.

2. PSC reply, 12th February 1982.

3. PRL reply, 27th January 1982.

France has a significant national nuclear weapons programme.

4.8. A demonstration was organised in Paris on Sunday 25th October by the *Mouvement de la Paix*, the French Communist Party and the Communist Trades Union Federation, the CGT¹. It was also supported by the *Jeunesse ouvrière chrétienne*, by the *Mouvement des Jeunes radicaux de gauche*, by various ecologist movements and Green Peace. Five other peace organisations and the French *Parti Socialiste Unifié* held a press conference on 20th October 1981 to explain that they would not participate in the 25th October demonstration because it was considered pro-Soviet and did not take account of the Soviet SS-20 missiles².

4.9. The demonstration itself, variously estimated at 100,000 by the organisers and over 50,000 in other press reports, was held at the Porte de Pantin. The *Mouvement de la Paix* adopted a Paris appeal calling for a reduction in the number and power of nuclear weapons, the opening and success of negotiations on all medium-range nuclear missiles of concern to Europe, in the first place American and Soviet weapons, the universal prohibition of the neutron bomb and for a part of world military expenditure to be devoted to the fight against hunger and underdevelopment. Some placards read "neither Pershing nor the SS-20". Mr. Jospin, First Secretary of the French Socialist Party, criticised the demonstration for unfairly concentrating on American weapons: "The SS-20 is an immediate direct threat to Europe which must be removed" he is quoted as saying, stressing that a western build-up was an essential pre-condition for obtaining any Soviet concessions.

4.10. The *Mouvement de la Paix*, which comprises communists, socialists, gaullists and christians of the left, was faced with a dilemma after the military intervention in Poland - whether it was possible to separate the fight for peace from the defence of liberty. This debate has set back the activities of the movement which intended to renew its campaign in the spring³.

4.11. Given that the French political parties did not have to take a stand with regard to the NATO modernisation programme, it is not surprising that the controversy over the deployment of INF systems in Western Europe did not enter into the French domestic debate. The Union for French Democracy (UDF) expressed itself against the peace movements which, inspired by illusionary pacifism, negate the exte-

1. *Le Monde*, 27th October 1981.

2. *Ibid*, 22nd October 1981.

3. *Le Matin*, 1st February 1982.

rior threats and are founded on an impossible neutralism. Furthermore, the UDF approves of the NATO modernisation programme¹. The *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR) points out that peace cannot be based on one-sided renunciations and neutralism but only on a global equilibrium of the great powers as well as a regional one. While the RPR sees a global balance between the superpowers, it is concerned about the military superiority of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis Western Europe². The French Socialist Party identifies the "*Mouvement de la Paix*" originating from the Stockholm appeal as the most important of numerous diverse bodies concerned with peace and disarmament in France, and which are considered to have only limited influence. The party maintains relations with most of these bodies on a mutually independent basis, without thereby supporting or attempting to lead them. Membership of the Socialist Party is not incompatible with membership of the peace movements. The Socialist Party prepares its own overall proposals on security and disarmament, discusses them with the various peace bodies, but has not so far sought to draw up a common programme with them. It could do so only if agreement were reached on fundamental points:

- independence of French security policy and the credibility of the deterrent;
- the existence of an unstable strategic balance between the two superpowers and the need to restore at the lowest level the balance in medium-range nuclear weapons which the Soviet Union has upset.

(iii) Germany³

4.12. Germany is in a key position concerning the NATO decision of December 1979 in that the proposal calls for 96 cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II missiles to be deployed on German territory - a larger total than in any other NATO country. Although all parties in the German Parliament have time and again accepted the NATO dual decision⁴, there has been vociferous opposition outside parliament.

4.13. Opposition to the missile deployment has been steadily growing, initially through Protestant church groups which organised a demonstration of 100,000 persons in Hamburg in June

1981, but with growing support from young Catholics, in the Pax Christi movement as well as parts of the SPD party branches. While the opposition CDU continues to support the decision, some young speakers at that party's congress in Hamburg on 4th November 1981, many of whom were not party members but invited to participate in the debate, spoke against the NATO programme.

4.14. Public opinion polls have found varying attitudes in the population as a whole, depending on the formulation of the question put. A survey in July 1981, asking about NATO's missile deployment to counter Soviet systems, found 44 % opposed and 29 % in favour; whereas the question linked to NATO's double track decision to combine deployment with negotiations on reductions found 52 % in favour and 21 % against. The same question put in September/October 1981 (i.e. on the eve of the peace rally in Bonn) resulted in 50 % in favour and 22 % against. On the whole public opinion polls, based on the same questions put over a number of years, clearly indicate that the German population does not wish to disengage from the Atlantic Alliance or become neutral. In November 1981, 53 % of those questioned favoured an Alliance with America (1975: 49 %) while 33 % wanted a neutralist policy (1975: 36 %)¹.

4.15. The tone of demonstrations in Germany, since the advent of the Reagan administration in the United States, appears to have taken on some anti-American attitudes. There was a hostile demonstration of 70,000 during the visit of the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, to Berlin on 13th September 1981.

4.16. One of the largest public demonstrations seen in Germany since the war was organised in Bonn on Saturday 10th October 1981 with an attendance of 250,000. The rally, under the slogan "Against nuclear threat concerted action - for disarmament and détente in Europe", was sponsored and organised by the "action for peace" and "action for reconciliation/peace" service of the Protestant church. 760 different groups decided to participate, among them about 80 extremist groups (including the German Communist Party). Five march columns to Bonn were organised by the communist-inspired committee for peace, disarmament and co-operation; the other marching columns were organised by the Green movement, the socialist youth organisation *Die Falken*, young socialists and the communist-oriented socialist German youth². The main trend of the

1. UDF reply, 26th January 1982.

2. RPR reply, 4th February 1982.

3. See *Le Monde*, 20th October 1981; *The Economist*, 17th October 1981; *The Times*, 5th November 1981; *International Herald Tribune*, 12th October 1981; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 15th June 1981.

4. *Regierungserklärung und Aussprache*, 3rd December 1981.

1. All figures in *Allensbacher Archiv, IfD-Umfragen* 3011, 3060, 3074, 3084, 3098, 3099, 4000, 4103, 4110. See also *The Economist*, 27th February 1982.

2. Written answer by the Federal Government to a parliamentary question (9/841), October 1981.

demonstration appears to have been "stop NATO missiles" with less reference to Soviet SS-20 missiles. Speakers from both the SPD and FDP parties addressed the meeting but in a personal capacity.

4.17. The Communist Party in Germany, which dominates the committee for peace, disarmament and co-operation, remains numerically very small so that although it has been active in organising peace demonstrations, its membership cannot possibly account for the number of people who have become involved. According to the German Government, there is evidence that both the Communist Party (DKP) and the German Union for Peace (DFU) receive regular funds from the German Democratic Republic; yet there is no evidence that the peace movements in Germany have been directly financed by East Berlin or Moscow¹. Thus the government is of the opinion that not all the participants of the various peace movements and demonstrations adhere to communist aims.

4.18. While about one-quarter of the SPD members of the Bundestag have now opposed the deployment decision, both the German Government and the opposition remain committed to the dual decision of deployment and negotiations. Both CDU and CSU in opposition are against the peace movements' goal to obstruct the NATO decision and are therefore not associated with the activities of the peace movements². When Chancellor Schmidt asked for a vote of confidence on government policies in February, his foreign and security policy was included³. In Bonn on 10th November 1981, Chancellor Schmidt is reported as saying⁴ that despite overstatements by individual United States politicians, the "basic position of the German people and the political class is pro-American". The German standpoint was also made clear to President Brezhnev during his visit to Bonn. Chancellor Schmidt stated that the Soviet Union knew that no one could "manipulate" Germany out of the NATO Alliance.

4.19. Although there is a broadly-based consensus in Germany with regard to the NATO dual decision, the vociferous opposition to the missile deployment and other groups advancing the cause of disarmament are not likely to relinquish their activities in 1982. Already, a peace manifesto '82 for Easter has been called for by 28 theologians,

scientists, writers and politicians, including such personalities as the Protestant minister Albertz, the writer Heinrich Böll and the SPD politician Eppler¹. Not only will this peace manifesto be published at Easter but also various marches and rallies are being planned. In early February the first conference for action by various anti-nuclear weapon groups convened in Bonn to co-ordinate their activities for 1982. Although the 600 representatives of about 250 groups could not agree on the impact of the military intervention in Poland on the disarmament debate, it was accepted that major demonstrations should take place in connection with the SPD Party congress in Munich in April and the visit of President Reagan to Bonn in June². At that congress a motion to reject the 1979 NATO decision to deploy missiles was defeated by about two to one on a show of hands, and a proposal endorsed by Chancellor Schmidt supporting NATO strategy but postponing a final decision on missile deployment until late 1983 was adopted by about a two-thirds vote.

(iv) *Italy*

4.20. Until very recently there has been relatively little obvious opposition to the NATO decision which calls for 112 cruise missiles to be deployed on Italian territory. On 2nd October 1981, the Italian Chamber of Deputies rejected a communist proposal to scrap the plan by 261 votes to 192³, although the left wing of the Socialist Party voted with the communists. Work began in November on the site chosen for the deployment of 112 missiles on an unused airport at Comiso in south-eastern Sicily, work for which it is reported the United States is paying \$ 3 million⁴.

4.21. Although there have been demonstrations and marches organised by the Communist Party, like the march for peace between Perugia and Assisi on 27th September 1981 which was also supported by the three major trade unions, the general response has been reserved⁵. A further communist demonstration against the Comiso deployment on 11th October 1981 brought together about 10,000 participants but was not supported by other political parties. Despite the fact that the Italian Communist Party co-operates with other political parties and organisations, on local and provincial level, in various activities concerning the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the promotion of

1. Written answers by the Federal Government to questions on 19th November 1981 (9/1057), 20th January 1982 (9/1287) and 13th November 1981 (9/70).

2. CDU reply, 8th March 1982 and CSU reply, 4th February 1982.

3. International Herald Tribune, 6th-7th February 1982.

4. International Herald Tribune, 11th November 1981.

1. *Die Welt*, 5th February 1982.

2. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8th February 1982.

3. The Guardian, 3rd October 1981.

4. International Herald Tribune, 16th October 1981.

5. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25th and 29th September 1981.

peace, it is not officially represented on the controlling organs of the various peace movements. The party is associated, however, with the broad aims of these movements through its federation of young communists, which organises its activities independently, and other individual representatives. The Italian Communist Party had proposed a moratorium on the SS-20 deployment prior to the NATO dual decision in order to facilitate further negotiations between the superpowers¹.

4.22. Against this background, the size of the demonstration in Rome on 24th October 1981, again organised by the Communist Party, caused some surprise when between 200,000 and 300,000 persons marched through Rome in a column which took six hours to pass². It is said to have been the largest demonstration in Italy for ten years and attracted participation of Protestant churches as well as ecologist groups, and the left wing of the Socialist Party. The organisers delivered a protest "against all weapons systems in Europe, in the West and in the East", to the United States and Soviet Embassies. Placards in the demonstration denounced NATO and the Warsaw Pact and some were anti-American.

(v) Netherlands

4.23. The Netherlands is scheduled in principle to receive 48 cruise missiles on its territory under the dual decision of December 1979. The previous Netherlands Government stated, however, that a final decision on deployment would depend on the results of the negotiations also provided for in the NATO decision. Since the elections in May 1981, the problem of deciding policy on the deployment of cruise missiles has been a factor in delaying the formation of the government, although this issue was not responsible for the subsequently withdrawn resignation of the three party coalition on 16th October 1981. The decision to site or not to site the missiles on Dutch soil has already been delayed twice, pending arms talks between the superpowers. A public opinion poll in April 1981 found 68% opposed to deployment of the missiles in the Netherlands and 28% in favour³.

4.24. The peace movement in the Netherlands has been inspired particularly by the churches, nine of which set up the Inter-confessional Council for Peace (IKV) in 1966. This movement in 1977 launched a campaign on "Nuclear weapons out of the world, and out of the Netherlands first"⁴. A mass rally, organ-

ised by the IKV, took place in Amsterdam on 21st November 1981 at which, according to various reports, between 300,000 and 400,000 people took part. The theme of this rally was specifically to oppose the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands, the three slogans being: (i) We do not want nuclear weapons in Europe - not in the Netherlands, not in any other country; (ii) We want the government to rescind its agreement with the NATO decision; (iii) We want the Netherlands to ask its NATO partners to go back on the NATO decision.

4.25. The NATO Secretary-General, Mr. Luns, accused the IKV of being financed by the Soviet Union, an accusation which was refuted by the Netherlands Minister of the Interior who said that movements of the IKV type "enriched Netherlands parliamentary democracy". Mr. van Mierlo, the Dutch Minister of Defence, took the unusual step of releasing the text of a speech he had made at the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting on 20th October 1981 in which he refuted the suggestion [of Professor Walter Laqueur] that his country was suffering from "Hollanditis". He said in part:

"What we experience in the Netherlands - and in some other countries - is a genuine concern about the destructive potential of nuclear weapons and the frightening perspective of a nuclear war... Some elements of the peace movement may adhere to pacifism and may be far too lenient towards the Soviet Union. But by and large we are dealing with common people who are just afraid, who are concerned with the fierce military competition and the resulting nuclear build-up... We are living with the paradox that only by the threat of direct destruction can we hope to deter war. There are clear signs that the growing awareness of this paradox brings people to the limits of comprehension and acceptance. *If this tide is not turned* this may mean that our democratic systems... will be less and less able to cope with the problem of nuclear weapons."

4.26. The anti-nuclear issue has been carried into the internal debate of the Dutch political parties. Nominally, the liberals are strongly supportive of the deployment decision; the christian democrats (CDA) and the Democrats '66 are split over this question although both favour retaining the threat of deployment as a bargaining chip against the Soviet stationing of INF systems. The Labour Party is officially against the deployment.

4.27. The christian democrats do not officially aid the various peace movements (the three most important being the IKV, the anti-nuclear weapons debate and the anti-neutron bomb

1. Italian Communist Party reply, 3rd March 1982.

2. *Le Monde*, 27th October 1981.

3. *The Economist*, 31st October 1981.

4. *Le Monde*, 22nd October 1981.

movement), but there exist regular contacts with these movements. The CDA has regular discussions with the IKV. The CDA participates in the anti-nuclear weapons debate. Although the CDA offered to explain its defence and security policy at the mass demonstration in Amsterdam on 21st November, this was refused by the organisers. Several CDA members serve on the IKV in a private capacity¹. The Democrats '66 did participate in the Amsterdam peace rally. The Democrats '66 are prepared to provide support for those peace movements which are calling for the reduction of nuclear arms in all parts of the world. They are convinced that some initiatives are badly needed and certain well-defined unilateral steps are not excluded from this concept, provided the broad balance of power between East and West is not essentially affected. In general, Democrats '66 do not provide material assistance for peace movements; they only share in their activities on an ad hoc basis. Like the CDA, Democrats '66 belongs to the anti-nuclear debate, a co-ordinating body which informally discusses actions concerning the reduction of nuclear weapons². The Dutch Liberal Party (VVD), on the other hand, does not co-operate with any peace movement nor does it furnish any assistance. The VVD identifies with the broad aims of peace movements insofar as they concern the simultaneous and bilateral disarmament of the two sides³.

4.28. All main parties in the Netherlands regard continued membership of NATO as a cornerstone of Dutch foreign and security policy. The Labour Party (PvdA), which is opposed to the missile deployment, will remain a critical member of NATO even if the modernisation programme is realised⁴. Although the PvdA is sympathetic to the activities of the various peace movements in the Netherlands and participates in conferences and other activities, it is not officially represented on the controlling organs of the peace movements nor does it provide any material assistance for these organisations⁵.

4.29. In January 1982, Dutch pacifists blocked several special trains carrying munitions for the United States Army in Germany⁶; a step that was condemned by all parties in parliament. Only days later, some 5,000 Dutch protested *against* the blocking of the railways by pacifists⁷. Although there is an active minority

1. CDA reply, 9th February 1982.

2. Democrats '66 reply, February 1982.

3. VVD reply, 24th February 1982.

4. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22nd February 1982.

5. PvdA reply, 10th March 1982.

6. *International Herald Tribune*, 21st January 1982; *Le Matin*, 2nd February 1982.

7. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27th January 1982; *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, 28th January 1982.

which can organise effective public demonstrations against military installations, and although there exists a widespread unease about the stationing of cruise missiles on Dutch soil, the majority of the Netherlands population supports continued membership of NATO as polls have recently indicated¹. Also a new Inter-church Committee for Bilateral Disarmament has been set up which enjoys growing membership. The Labour Party, which participates in the present coalition government, has declared that its ministers will be withdrawn if the government decides to deploy cruise missiles in the Netherlands; the leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party repeated this emphatically on 1st May. The Prime Minister, Mr. Van Agt, said in the United States recently that as long as labour was in the coalition, a positive decision on deployment would be difficult.

(vi) United Kingdom

4.30. The present Conservative Government under Mrs. Thatcher is firmly committed to the deployment of cruise missiles, 160 of which are scheduled to be deployed on two existing military airfields – Greenham Common and Molesworth. A public opinion poll² in April 1981 found 50 % opposed to the deployment and only 41 % in favour, whereas in September 1980 a similar poll had found 43 % opposed and 49 % in favour. Another poll on 26th and 27th October 1981 found 53 % in favour of removing American bases from Britain; 67 % in favour of retaining the British nuclear deterrent and 23 % in favour of its unilateral abandonment; 73 % in favour of remaining in NATO and 12 % for leaving; 57 % thought President Reagan's foreign policy was making nuclear war more likely³.

4.31. In the United Kingdom there exist various peace movements concerned with different aspects of disarmament. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), which was very active prior to the signature of the partial nuclear test ban in 1963, has recently found renewed life, its membership having risen from 3,000 to 32,000 over the last 18 months, with another 200,000 in 1,000 local groups but not paying fees individually to the central organisation. The CND maintains many specialist groups for students, youth, Labour Party, Liberal Party, Christians, teachers and trade unions (some 12 trade unions are affiliated nationally to the CND). At its annual conference in November 1981 four members of the Communist Party were elected to the 20 strong CND national council. The Chairman of CND is a former labour parliamentary candidate. Other

1. NATO Review, October 1981.

2. *The Economist*, 31st October 1981.

3. *The Observer*, 8th November 1981.

disarmament groups are the European Nuclear Disarmament campaign (END), which was founded in April 1980 and which promotes the concept of a nuclear-free zone from Portugal to Poland; and the World Disarmament Campaign (WDC), which was set up by two labour peers, Lords Brockway and Noel-Baker, at the end of 1979. The WDC enjoys the support of a number of religious organisations like the Methodists and the Quakers. The British Peace Assembly (BPA), established in April 1980, is pledged to promote the policies of the communist-dominated World Peace Council. The Chairman of the BPA is also a Vice-President of the World Peace Council.

4.32. The demonstration organised by the CND in London on Saturday, 24th October 1981, assembled 150,000 according to the police but 250,000 according to speakers for the movement¹. Mr. Michael Foot, the leader of the Labour Party, and a number of other labour MPs took part in the demonstration, the aims of which appeared to be broadly anti-nuclear weapons in general, with specific appeals against the neutron bomb and the British Trident programme, as well as expressing opposition to cruise missiles and the Soviet SS-20s.

4.33. The Labour Party is officially represented on the Council of the WDC. Prominent members of both the party and the trade unions are on the council and executive committees of both CND and END in their personal capacity. The party has been officially represented at the conferences and meetings of CND, END and WDC in 1981 and the 1980 and 1981 annual conferences of the Labour Party both carried resolutions supporting the peace movements. The party, furthermore, assisted the peace movements with advice on organisational matters and stewarding of demonstrations. The Labour Party's policy is for a non-nuclear defence posture for Britain within NATO. According to the Labour Party, members and local organisations are encouraged to play an active rôle in the activities of the peace movements².

4.34. The Conservative Party is opposed to the arguments of the peace movements and seeks multilateral disarmament on the basis of balanced reductions. Members of the Young Conservatives helped form an organisation called Youth Multilateral Disarmament to oppose the unilateralist case³.

1. International Herald Tribune, 26th October 1981; *Le Monde*, 27th October 1981; Sunday Times, 25th October 1981.

2. Reply by the Labour Party, 21st January 1982.

3. Reply by the Conservative Party, 27th January 1982.

(vii) *Scandinavia*

4.35. The Scandinavian NATO countries, Denmark and Norway, while participating in NATO's dual decision of December 1979 as members of the Defence Planning Committee, are less directly affected by its implementation because of their long-standing policy of not accepting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime. These countries retain close ties with neutral Sweden in the Scandinavian Council and with Finland in the Nordic Council. In 1963 the former President Kekkonen of Finland proposed the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone – a proposed agreement whereby the Nordic countries would exclude nuclear weapons from their territory and the United States and Soviet Union would undertake not to use nuclear weapons against them. The proposal has been discussed sporadically by the four countries and Iceland, and the proviso formulated that as part of such a plan nuclear weapons should be removed from adjoining territory of the Soviet Union, which at the present time has SS-4 and SS-5 medium-range missiles deployed in the Kola peninsula. No clear statement of Soviet reaction has ever been forthcoming beyond a vague reply by Mr. Brezhnev to a question from a Finnish newspaper in June 1981 to the effect that he could not exclude the possibility of additional measures. The last meeting of the Nordic foreign ministers to discuss the idea was held in Copenhagen in the week of 31st August 1981, apparently without progress being made¹.

4.36. The peace movement in Scandinavia finds support especially from the women, and within the Social Democrat Party. In Sweden, within the Social Democrat Party, there has been growing opposition to the Swedish policy of remaining relatively well-armed despite neutrality, with demands for Sweden to set a good example through unilateral disarmament and the prohibition of armaments' exports. In Denmark and Norway latent anti-Americanism has been fanned following the NATO decision of December 1979 and the announcement on the production of the neutron weapon. Some Danish Social Democrats have formed the Association of Anti-Militarist Social Democrats and the No More War Movement. In Norway there was opposition in some labour circles to the labour government's decision concerning the stationing of equipment in Norway for United States Marines. Women's movements organised a demonstration throughout the Nordic countries on 13th May 1978 which led to a march of some 10,000 in Stockholm protesting against neutron weapons and Swedish military expenditure. In July 1980, a peace petition signed by more than 520,000 women was han-

1. The Times, 7th September 1981.

ded to the United Nations Secretary-General in Copenhagen. Then from 22nd June to 6th August Nordic women's organisations organised the "March for Peace 1981" from Copenhagen to Paris, received with disappointing apathy at its destination¹.

4.37. Recent events, however, have led to a certain disillusionment in Scandinavia. Besides the Polish crisis, in which the Scandinavian countries have taken great interest, the scandal surrounding the Swedish Institute for International Peace Research (SIPRI), a leading member of which has been sentenced for "unauthorised concern for military installations", and the charge that SIPRI publications are increasingly unbalanced in favour of the Warsaw Pact, have resulted in some re-thinking in Scandinavia². Furthermore, the grounding of the Soviet W-class submarine near the Swedish Karlskrona naval base on 28th October 1981, which was boarded by Swedish naval officers who found evidence that it might have been carrying nuclear weapons, may, without having fired a shot, have nevertheless torpedoed the Nordic nuclear-free zone proposal. The Stockholm newspaper *Aftonbladet* wrote: "Overnight the Soviet Union has lost all its credibility" and Mr. Fällin, the Swedish Prime Minister, noted that it was the end of the idea of a "sea of peace"³.

(b) Eastern Europe

4.38. The massive peace and anti-nuclear demonstrations in the Western European countries have not been entirely devoid of echo in Eastern Europe, particularly in East Germany, where the authorities are clearly concerned lest the strong anti-nuclear movement in West Germany spreads across the frontier. A joint German letter, signed by 27 East Germans including Robert Havermann, a 71 year old dissident under house arrest in East Berlin, and some 150 West Germans was sent to Mr. Brezhnev on 13th October 1981 asking the Soviet leader to use his forthcoming visit to Bonn to find a solution to "the present dangerous development". The letter noted the growing opposition to the stationing of American medium-range missiles, to the construction of the neutron bomb and to nuclear weapons now stationed in Europe, and noted that these were claimed to be a response to Warsaw Pact arms efforts including the SS-20 and the Soviet numerical superiority in tanks⁴.

1. *Le Monde*, 23rd October 1981.

2. *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, 5th February 1982.

3. International Herald Tribune, 11th November 1981; *Die Welt*, 5th March 1982.

4. International Herald Tribune, 14th October 1981.

4.39. On Sunday 25th October, the East German Communist Party, SED, no doubt in an attempt to channel any spontaneous disarmament movements to its own ends, organised a demonstration of 50,000 in Potsdam protesting solely against NATO proposals for cruise missile deployment¹. There have been growing demands in East Germany for an alternative to military service in the form of a peace service. As a result of an agreement with the Protestant church, there already exists an alternative service for conscientious objectors in East Germany known as construction troops – but the new request goes further². Addressing theological students at the Humboldt University in East Berlin in September 1981, the East German State Secretary for Religious Affairs, Mr. Klaus Gysi, rejected proposals for a peace service explaining that East Germany was part of the Warsaw Pact and already found it difficult to raise the necessary contingents. A demand for a social peace service, he said, would tend to suggest that military service was anti-social³.

4.40. In early February 1982, it was reported that East Germany's Protestant church has called for moves towards disarmament. An initiative, entitled "Berlin appeal – creating peace without weapons", has been signed by 200 East Germans and has asked for the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons and all foreign troops from both parts of Germany and the conclusion of a peace treaty between the wartime allies and the two German states according to the Potsdam Agreement of 1945⁴. On 14th February 1981, the anniversary of the bombing of Dresden in 1945 which resulted in 35,000 dead, some 5,000 people gathered in Dresden for a peace forum. Under the watchful eye of the state security organs, the predominantly young participants met at a church and gave expression to their desire to have peace education rather than para-military training included in the school curriculum. Furthermore, the question was asked repeatedly why the official party view welcomed the peace demonstrations in Western Europe as progressive while similar activities in Eastern Europe were considered detrimental to peace⁵. Although it is still difficult to gauge the real impact of the East German peace movement, there can be no doubt that the East German authorities are truly worried about the spillover of the West German peace movement to East Germany.

1. *Le Figaro*, 31st October 1981.

2. *Die Welt*, 3rd February 1982.

3. *Le Figaro*, 31st October 1981.

4. *Die Welt* and International Herald Tribune, 10th February 1982; *Le Monde*, 12th February 1982; Financial Times and *Die Welt*, 13th February 1982.

5. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Die Welt*, 15th February 1982.

4.41. On 26th October 1981, the Romanian leader Mr. Ceausescu, in interviews with two West German newspapers, *Frankfurter Rundschau* and *Die Zeit*, was quoted as saying that decisive actions were necessary to stop the nuclear arms race, adding: "This applies just as much to stopping the stationing of rockets produced by the United States as to withdrawing the Soviet rockets". He also expressed opposition to production of the neutron weapon¹.

4.42. It would appear that even in the USSR itself the spread of pacifism cannot be totally contained. The Chief of Staff of the Soviet armed forces, Marshal Orgarkov, warned against pacifism which has affected a part of the Soviet youth and which seriously underestimated the dangers of war². Furthermore, there have been reports that some 38 dissidents in the Soviet Baltic states have called for a nuclear-free Baltic including the adjacent area of the USSR³.

(c) *United States*

4.43. Surprisingly within 18 months of an election campaign fought in part on a platform calling for an increased United States defence effort, both conventional and nuclear, in the face of growing Soviet military power, anti-nuclear weapons movements have been growing in the United States over the last twelve months. As in Europe, the recent nationwide expression of opinion emanates from a wide variety of different movements with many different primary interests. Senator Kennedy has claimed that the nuclear freeze resolution, which he and colleagues tabled in the Senate on 10th March, was endorsed by 32 different movements plus a further 19 religious bodies.

4.44. One of the most noticed nationwide movements is ground zero, founded in 1980 by Roger Molander, an expert on nuclear strategy who served on the staff of the National Security Council from 1974 to 1981 formulating United States policy in the SALT negotiations. The organisation has a headquarters in Washington with a staff of 10 and volunteer staffed branches in 140 cities. The organisation claims to be strictly educational and non-partisan, designed "to pose the straightforward questions across the country as to precisely what is the reality and what are the dangers of a nuclear war"⁴. The movement organised ground zero week from 18th to 25th April 1982, organised demonstrations in more than 600 towns throughout the country and 350 college campuses, but had varying results attracting small

audiences in New Mexico but doing better in Los Angeles. Mr. Molander's book "Nuclear war - what's in it for you?" with the provocative question on the cover "Why do you feel scared with 10,000 nuclear weapons protecting you?" claims to have 250,000 copies in circulation¹.

4.45. A more specialised organisation, Physicians for Social Responsibility, was revived in 1979 by Helen Caldicott, a doctor in a Boston hospital, and now has a membership of 10,000 doctors with 22 staff in its Boston headquarters, 85 branches throughout the country and an annual budget of \$600,000. This movement has organised symposia throughout the United States where members have lectured on the consequences of a nuclear attack; it advocates a bilateral nuclear weapons freeze as a first step.

4.46. There is growing, but far from majority opposition to nuclear weapons among church circles in the United States. 54 of the 301 Roman Catholic bishops in the country are members of the international Catholic peace organisation Pax Christi, and 29 of these bishops have signed a statement declaring that "even to possess nuclear weapons is wrong"². Some leaders of Protestant churches in the United States are also associated with the protests.

4.47. There is a spate of books on the problems of nuclear weapons now appearing in the United States - nearly two dozen are reported in the first half of 1982. Apart from the Molander publication referred to above, considerable advance publicity has gone into selling "The fate of the earth" by Jonathan Schell released at the end of April which is a lengthy description of imagined nuclear attacks on the United States, postulating the extinction of the human race and concluding that there is no safety without complete world disarmament and world government.

4.48. In a mid-term election year, which 1982 is, this widespread demonstration of public concern about nuclear weapons has had a striking impact in Congress. On 10th March, a joint resolution was tabled by the Senators Kennedy (Democrat) and Hatfield (Republican) in the Senate and by Representatives Markey (Democrat) and Conte (Republican) in the House of Representatives, which called on the United States and the Soviet Union to:

- "(a) pursue a complete halt to the nuclear arms race;
- (b) decide when and how to achieve a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and further

1. International Herald Tribune, 27th October 1981.
 2. *Die Welt*, 1st March 1982.
 3. The Guardian, 3rd March 1982.
 4. Time, 29th March 1982.

1. Newsweek, 12th April 1982.
 2. Sunday Times, 18th April 1982.

development of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems; and

- (c) give special attention to destabilising weapons whose deployment would make such a freeze more difficult to achieve.

2. Proceeding from this freeze the United States and the Soviet Union should pursue major mutual and verifiable reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems, through annual percentages or equally effective means, in a manner that enhances stability."

By early April that resolution had attracted the signatures of 22 senators and 150 representatives.

4.49. On 17th March a significantly different resolution was tabled in the House of Representatives by Representative Zablocki, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This called on the United States and the Soviet Union to:

"Immediately begin the strategic arms reduction talks (START) and that those talks should have the following objectives:

1. Preserving present limitations and controls on current nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems while pursuing substantial equitable and verifiable reductions through numerical ceilings, annual percentages, or any other equally effective and verifiable means of strengthening strategic stability.

2. Seeking every possible means to avoid the testing and deployment of new and destabilising nuclear weapons which complicate further progress in preserving deterrence and encouraging strategic arms reduction.

3. Incorporating ongoing negotiations in Geneva on land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles into the START negotiations."

4.50. On 30th March a further resolution was introduced in the Senate by Senators Jackson (Democrat) and Warner (Republican) which proposed:

"1. The United States should propose to the Soviet Union a long-term, mutual and verifiable nuclear forces freeze at equal and sharply reduced levels of forces;

2. The United States should propose to the Soviet Union practical measures to

reduce the danger of nuclear war through accident or miscalculation and to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by third parties including terrorists...

.....

4. The United States should continue to press month after month, year after year, to achieve balanced, stabilising arms reductions, looking, in time, to the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world's arsenals."

4.51. The three texts quoted above are representative of some 25 resolutions now being discussed in Congress. The Kennedy-Hartfield text calls for a global freeze on existing levels of nuclear weapons, preventing further development and deployment, while negotiations on reductions take place. The Zablocki text calls chiefly for the immediate opening of talks on reductions and continued respect for the SALT II limits, whilst seeking to avoid deployment of new weapons systems. Both would inhibit deployment of new United States weapons in its strategic modernisation programme. The Jackson-Warner text calls simply for a freeze in the future after negotiations on reductions and does little more than encourage the administration in its present policies. It was endorsed by President Reagan after publication, although Senator Jackson denied that he discussed the draft with the administration beforehand. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is now engaged in hearings on the progress of the INF talks and will also examine ten of the various "freeze" resolutions and is expected to submit its own compromise text to the Senate before the summer recess.

4.52. Other developments in Congress reported in early May¹ were new demands by a number of senators and representatives for ratification of SALT II as an interim measure. Senator Jackson, in refuting President Reagan's remarks about a Soviet nuclear "edge" as noted elsewhere, has also emphasised the need for contacts between Presidents Reagan and Brezhnev, proposed that the United States-Soviet Union "hot line" be improved and suggested a "joint United States-Soviet command post to deter the possibility of war by accident or miscalculation"² which would be located in a neutral country such as Austria or Switzerland.

4.53. One of the most remarked developments in expression of informed American opinion on nuclear weapons problems was the article proposing a "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons policy³. The four authors have held positions

1. International Herald Tribune, 5th May 1982.

2. New York Times, 5th April 1982.

3. Nuclear weapons and the Atlantic Alliance, Foreign Affairs, spring 1982, by McGeorge Bundy; George F. Kennan; Robert S. McNamara; Gerard Smith.

of high responsibility in the Kennedy administration, three of them directly responsible for defence and nuclear weapons policy. Their opening proposition is as follows:

“ A major element in every doctrine has been that the United States has asserted its willingness to be the first... to use nuclear weapons to defend against aggression in Europe. It is this element that needs re-examination now. Both its cost to the coherence of the Alliance and its threat to the safety of the world are rising while its deterrent credibility declines. ”

They propose a careful study by governments and the public of ways of moving to a new policy:

“ that nuclear weapons will not be used unless an aggressor should use them first. ”

They note current disagreements in the Alliance arising from nuclear policy – disagreement over the deployment of cruise missiles in Europe or the neutron warhead – and note that:

“ Any use of nuclear weapons in Europe, by the Alliance or against it, carries with it a high and inescapable risk of escalation into the general nuclear war which would bring ruin to all and victory to none. ”

The only firebreak is that between any use of nuclear weapons, and all other kinds of conflict. The authors recognise that the original American pledge to the Alliance in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was understood to be a nuclear guarantee, and agree that any modification should not be made without the most careful exploration of its implications. In any case “ it would still be necessary to be ready to reply with American nuclear weapons to any nuclear attack on the Federal Republic ”. It is recognised that a policy of no first use would require improved conventional forces, especially on the central front, but the authors believe that the Alliance can provide them, possibly at a cost greater than the 3 % annual increase in real terms currently agreed for defence budgets, but the article is less certain as to whether the political will exists. It claims, however, that:

“ Once the military leaders of the Alliance have learned to think and act steadily on the “ conventional ” assumption, their forces will be better instruments for stability in crises and for general deterrence... ”.

The authors suggest that such a policy should be seen not as evidence of reduced American interest in the Alliance but that it would draw

new attention to the importance of maintaining and improving the specifically American conventional forces in Europe. They suggest in passing that other policies such as “ no early first use ” might be examined but believe that “ the value of a clear and simple position [no first use] would be great ”.

4.54. Among the advantages of a policy of no first use perceived by the authors would be easier management of the nuclear retaliatory forces it would be necessary to retain which would be reduced to adequately survivable and varied second strike forces, resulting in more modest requirements for modernisation of nuclear systems, although “ it is clear that large, varied, and survivable nuclear forces will still be necessary for nuclear deterrence ” in the conditions of the 1980s. Secondly, a no-first-use policy would go far to meet anxieties on nuclear policy both in Europe and the United States and, thirdly, the authors claim, it would reduce the risk of conventional aggression in Europe. They recognise that even if a no-first-use declaration were made by the allied nuclear countries and the Soviet Union, neither side could act on the assumption that the other would respect it. However “ a posture of effective conventional balance and survivable second-strike nuclear strength is vastly better for our own peoples and governments, in a deep sense more civilised, than one that forces the serious contemplation of limited nuclear scenarios that are at once terrifying and implausible ”. The policy would help in relations with the Soviet Union and open the path to serious reduction of nuclear armaments on both sides. In conclusion, the authors point out that “ there has been no first use of nuclear weapons since 1945, and no one in any country regrets that fact ”.

4.55. The United States administration took the no-first-use article sufficiently seriously for the Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, to refute its argument in his address at the Georgetown Centre for Strategic and International Studies on 6th April 1982, the day before the article was officially released. The expression of opinion as a whole, in the country and in Congress, has already led the administration to give greater priority to its arms control policy culminating in President Reagan’s speech at Eureka College on 9th May in which he proposed that START should open before the end of June – despite the fact that martial law is still in force in Poland.

(d) *International movements*

4.56. The independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues was set up by the former Swedish Prime Minister, Mr. Olaf

Palme, in 1980. It includes the former United States Secretary of State, Mr. Cyrus Vance, the former United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen, Mr. Egon Bahr, a member of the Bundestag, the Netherlands Minister of Social Affairs and former Prime Minister, Mr. Joop den Uyl, as well as Mr. Georgy Arbatov, a member of the Soviet Central Committee and prominent Nigerian and Egyptian members. The Commission held a meeting in Paris concluding on 27th October which called for a reduction in military spending in general, and agreed that the increased defence spending proposed by President Reagan to match Soviet spending was likely to damage the world economy. At its previous meeting in Moscow from 12th to 14th June 1981, the Commission called for a rapid resumption of the SALT negotiations¹.

4.57. The Physicians Against Nuclear War held a first conference in Washington in March 1981 attended by some 40 physicians from 12 countries, including Professor Chazov, President of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences and personal physician to President Brezhnev, and also attended by prominent American and British doctors. The Washington meeting produced an estimate that an all-out nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would lead to 200 million killed and that the 60 million injured would be left without attention as four-fifths of hospital facilities and medical staff would have been destroyed. The meeting concluded that any organised medical response to nuclear war could make "no significant difference to its catastrophic effects". A preparatory group met in Ascot, United Kingdom, on 3rd and 4th October 1981 to prepare the second conference to be held in Cambridge in 1982. The meeting concluded with a press conference addressed by Professor Chazov and the American cardiologist Professor Bernard Lown, who said: "We have to compel society to face the simple fact that nuclear weapons and human beings cannot coexist"².

4.58. A new group was set up on 1st February 1982 in Paris calling itself the *Comité pour le désarmement nucléaire en Europe* (CODENE)³. Representatives of some 20 groups (including pacifists, socialists, communists, women's movements, ecologists) from France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Norway met in Paris for "six hours against war" during which they expressed themselves for a non-

aligned Europe free of all nuclear weapons. Among those present were British and German MPs (Labour and SPD), the Mayor of Saarbrücken and leading SPD opponent to the missile deployment, Oskar Lafontaine, and a member of the Revolutionary Council of Portugal. The committee rejected the stationing of cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in Europe and also the logic of two opposed military blocs. One Dutch representative declared himself in favour of "Finlandisation" if this meant that the Europeans in East and West could work together for their independence. A German representative contended that Poland could not be liberated by Pershing II missiles.

4.59. One international movement that was in existence before the current peace initiatives were founded is the World Peace Council. Established by the Soviet Union in 1949, its task is to spread the communist peace offensive around the globe. For this the World Peace Council, according to United States Government figures, received in 1979 the equivalent of \$49 million from the USSR. Although the World Peace Council has been able to influence some western peace movements¹, there is no evidence that it has been successful in doing so on a large scale.

4.60. Both British based organisations END and WDC¹ work for international disarmament yet they can only claim limited contacts with other European groups. Most contacts are confined to personal exchanges or occasional lectures and goodwill presentations. Notably the desired contacts with Eastern European peace initiatives, which are not officially recognised, are almost non-existent. While the END and WDC are proud of their links with other groups in the western hemisphere the WDC could only comment, after the visit to the Soviet Union by a delegation at the invitation of the official Soviet Peace Committee in December 1981, that "we are also trying to develop these kinds of links with groups in the Soviet Union and this process has been helped by the recent visit to the USSR..."².

(e) *General conclusions on public opinion*

4.61. In the various nuclear protest movements in Western Europe, in the United States, and even sporadically in Eastern Europe, there are many strands in the policies advocated, ranging from unilateral nuclear disarmament to bilateral or multilateral agreements. A common factor in all these movements and protests is

1. *Le Monde*, 17th June 1981; International Herald Tribune, 28th October 1981.

2. Soviet News, Soviet Embassy, London, 6th October 1981.

3. *Le Matin*, 1st February 1982; *Le Monde*, 1st and 3rd February 1982.

1. See paragraph 4.31 above.

2. WDC Bulletin 5, February 1982. For the visit, see also Soviet News, Soviet Embassy, 19th January 1982.

genuine public concern at the threat of nuclear weapons, which has been heightened by imprudent or sometimes misunderstood remarks, in particular by United States leaders, on intricate problems of nuclear strategy. The Soviet Union is well aware of this growing public concern about nuclear policy in the West and has tried to stimulate the protest movements which can but help its information policy aimed at weakening European defence.

4.62. Three specific proposals, referred to in the sections on the various countries concerned above, should be mentioned in this general conclusion. First is the proposal for an immediate nuclear freeze on all nuclear weapons – strategic and European-based weapons. Although there is still an overall United States superiority in total numbers of nuclear warheads, one basis on which Senator Kennedy for example is advocating a freeze, nevertheless such an undertaking could freeze a severe imbalance in the characteristics of certain strategic missiles which are of concern to the United States as noted in paragraph 2.15 above, and would freeze a significant imbalance in intermediate-range weapons systems in Europe. The committee, therefore, does not endorse this proposal, although it does support the early opening of START and the continued respect of the SALT II limits. The second proposal to attract attention is the no-first-use of nuclear weapons proposal which the committee also rejects at the present time. The overwhelming Soviet superiority in certain categories of conventional weapons and forces on the central front has led NATO from the outset to reserve the right to initiate the use of nuclear weapons if a conventional attack cannot otherwise be halted. The large degree of uncertainty which such a policy leaves in the minds of Soviet military planners is an essential part of the strategy of deterrence. A third specific proposal of some of the peace movements is for a nuclear-free zone from the Atlantic to the frontier of the Soviet Union (“from Portugal to Poland” is the alliterative slogan). Such a proposal would do nothing to remove the threat of nuclear weapons from Europe because the whole of Europe is in range of so many nuclear weapons based in the Soviet Union itself.

4.63. While the committee rejects, at the present time, these three themes of the peace movements, in view of the authoritative support for the first two of these proposals – a nuclear freeze, and a policy of no-first-use – it may be desirable for the committee to report in more detail on these subjects in the future.

V. Conclusions

5.1. The committee's principal conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation to which this explanatory memorandum relates as follows:

Draft recommendation:

Explanatory memorandum:

Preamble:

- (i) Chapter II.
- (iv) Chapter II (e); Chapter III (a) (i).
- (v) Chapter III (b) (i) – see paragraph 3.17.
- (vi) Chapter III (b) (i) – see paragraph 3.18 et seq.
- (vii) Chapter III (a) (i) – paragraph 3.9.
- (viii) } See 3.25. The Committee deals with nuclear test-ban proposals and confidence-building measures in another report (Document 909).
- (ix) }
- (x) Chapter IV; see in particular paragraph 4.61 et seq.
- (xi) Chapter IV; see in particular paragraph 4.62.
- (xii) Chapter II (a) – paragraph 2.3 et seq.

Operative text:

- A.1
- 2 Chapter II (e)
- 3 Chapter III (a) (i)
- 4 Chapter III (b) (i), especially paragraph 3.18 et seq.
- 6 Chapter IV (c), paragraph 4.52.
- 7 Chapter II (a), paragraph 2.3 et seq.
- B. Chapter II (a); Chapter IV (e).

VI. Opinion of the minority

6.1. The report as a whole was adopted by 15 votes to 4 with 0 abstentions. The minority objected to the way the report dealt with the peace movements. Some held that the “genuine public concern at the threat of nuclear weapons”, referred to in paragraph 4.61 of this explanatory memorandum, was not in fact genuine. Another minority view held that the report attached insufficient importance to these movements, and was also opposed to paragraph A.2 of the draft recommendation which calls for preparations to continue for the deployment of GLCM and Pershing II.

APPENDIX I

*Recommendations 367 and 375 and the Council's replies thereto*RECOMMENDATION 367¹*on talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe²*

The Assembly,

- (i) Believing that the broad economic and cultural interdependence of Europe and the United States, and their shared concept of an open society, make a frank dialogue between the two both possible and desirable, especially on mutual security;
- (ii) Considering it desirable for the European countries of the Alliance to adopt a common constructive position in that dialogue, the better to influence the United States, in particular on security matters such as long-range theatre nuclear forces;
- (iii) Noting with concern the vast modernisation of Soviet forces, both conventional and nuclear, and in particular the continued deployment of SS-20 missiles at the rate foreseen in Recommendation 360;
- (iv) Reiterating its support for the twofold NATO decision of 12th December 1979 on LRTNF as a realistic basis for negotiating seriously on reductions in the levels of these weapons;
- (v) Believing that such negotiations should provide the political impetus for broad negotiations on the limitation and reduction of all nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical, long-range and battlefield so as to forestall an unrestricted nuclear arms race in an already too dangerous world;
- (vi) Stressing the urgent need for the LRTNF negotiations with the Soviet Union to begin and to be pursued in the general SALT framework, taking into account the whole continuum of nuclear weapons on which deterrence depends, with a view to securing agreement on broad parity with reduced levels of all such weapons in an overall military balance;
- (vii) Aware of the Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces on the central front;
- (viii) Aware that all defence policy must rely on the trust and support of properly-informed public opinion, that that opinion is both concerned and confused about nuclear weapons and calling therefore for objective comparable information to be published on the nuclear balance as a whole as perceived both by NATO and the Warsaw Pact;
- (ix) Welcoming the decision of the United States to embark on negotiations on LRTNF with the Soviet Union before the end of the year;
- (x) Welcoming in particular the readiness of the United States to consult its allies on nuclear policy, in particular in the framework of the Nuclear Planning Group, the Special Consultative Group, and the High Level Group, which enable their European members to participate constructively in formulating nuclear strategy and in the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Call on member governments to urge the North Atlantic Council :

1. To ensure that negotiations on LRTNF reductions in the framework of SALT begin without further delay;
2. To call for the urgent resumption of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms as a whole with a view to securing broad parity at greatly reduced levels of nuclear weapons;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1981 during the First Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session (3rd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 879).

3. To call meanwhile for the continued mutual respect of the SALT II limits and of the SALT I agreement and ABM treaty;
4. To call subsequently for negotiations to secure a balance at much lower levels of battlefield nuclear and conventional weapons;
5. To provide an objective and comparable assessment of the nuclear balance as a whole;
6. To call for immediate pursuit of the proposal for a disarmament conference for Europe.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 367***

1. The Council take note of the ideas expressed by the Assembly in its recommendation on the talks relating to the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces and of the underlying concerns.

The WEU member countries which participated in the dual decision of 12th December 1979 (long-range theatre nuclear forces modernisation and negotiations on LRTNF limitations on both sides) share these ideas as a whole. They insist that the two aspects of this decision must be implemented. In this context, the Council note with satisfaction the intention expressed by both the United States and the Soviet Union to start TNF negotiations on 30th November 1981.

2. The Council continue to hold the opinion that negotiations on the reduction of TNF should take place within the wider framework of the SALT process. They have noted the decision of the new United States administration to observe, in the meantime, limits set by the earlier agreements, which the Soviets apparently also intend to respect.

3. The Council recall that, according to the allies who participated in the December 1979 decision, negotiations on arms control in the field of theatre nuclear weapons should proceed step by step. In keeping with this view, the first of these steps should be centred on the most immediate threat constituted by the Soviet long-range theatre missile systems, particularly the SS-20, which is the most modern and efficient of them.

Subsequent steps could provide an opportunity for extending the range of systems dealt with and increasing the rigour of the limitations sought. In any case, any future limitation of American systems designed mainly for theatre use should be accompanied by appropriate limitations of Soviet theatre systems.

4. The Council consider that it is for the allies who participated in the decision of 12th December 1979, particularly the United States, to provide objective and comparable assessments of the balance of forces which would serve as a basis for negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, they welcome the fact that a new, objective and thorough analysis of the Soviet nuclear threat has recently been made available to the governments represented on the Nuclear Planning Group. They also welcome the fact that the United States Government has published the essentials of this documentation in an unclassified version (entitled "Soviet military power"), to enable the public to be aware of a set of facts, figures, proofs and assessments hitherto available only to ministers.

5. The Council continue to support the French proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe which would seek, in the first instance, to achieve agreement on a coherent set of confidence-building measures which would be militarily significant, binding and verifiable, applicable to the whole continent of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. Taking account of the progress which has so far been possible towards agreement at Madrid on a specific, unambiguous mandate incorporating the above criteria, the Council hope that the eastern countries will now be prepared to resolve the main outstanding issue by agreeing to the application of these confidence-building measures from the Atlantic to the Urals, as proposed by the West, which would be a contribution to a substantial and balanced result of the Madrid meeting.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 22nd October 1981.

RECOMMENDATION 375¹***on negotiations on theatre nuclear forces²***

The Assembly,

- (i) Stressing the continued validity of Recommendation 367;
- (ii) Welcoming the Council's reply to Recommendation 367;
- (iii) Noting with concern the still growing number of Soviet land-based theatre nuclear forces in Europe;
- (iv) Fully aware that public opinion in Europe and particularly youth are moved by feelings of insecurity and are deeply concerned about the present high levels of nuclear weapons and about the dangers of a new and unlimited arms race;
- (v) Believing the growing expression of public concern about all aspects of nuclear weapons reveals also misunderstanding and a lack of objective information;
- (vi) Convinced that governments and parliament should pay continuous attention to the fact that security policy must rely on the trust and support of properly-informed public opinion, thereby stressing the point that only balanced and properly verifiable reductions are compatible with European security, and that such reductions will not be achieved without serious negotiations;
- (vii) Welcoming President Reagan's negotiating proposals of 18th November 1981;
- (viii) Welcoming the opening of talks on theatre nuclear forces in Geneva on 30th November 1981 and the view of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group that "on the basis of reciprocity the zero level remains a possible option under ideal circumstances";
- (ix) Stressing the importance of European-American co-operation in the Special Consultative Group;
- (x) Hoping that the negotiations in Geneva will provide the political impetus for a gradual development of a broad negotiating process on the limitation and reduction of all nuclear weapons and will lead to a decisive turn in the armaments race;
- (xi) Believing that the failure of the major nuclear weapons powers to introduce the reductions provided for in Article 6 of the non-proliferation treaty undermines the aims of that treaty, thereby diminishing the chances of establishing generally-respected full safeguards on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and even increasing one risk of nuclear war,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Call on member governments:

1. To urge the North Atlantic Council to continue to rely on the dual decision of 12th December 1979 on long-range theatre nuclear forces as a realistic basis for negotiating seriously on reductions in the levels of these weapons;
2. To ensure that the public acquires a better understanding of the real situation drawing among other sources on the report to be prepared "within the Alliance as soon as possible which would compare, for the information of the public, NATO and Warsaw Pact forces".

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1981 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session (11th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Motion for a Recommendation tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and others with a request for urgent procedure (Document 900).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 375***

1. The Council take careful note of the views of the Assembly expressed in their recommendation on negotiations on theatre nuclear forces (now known as intermediate-range nuclear forces). The Council echo the opinion of the Assembly on points made in the recommendation, in particular: concern about the growing number of Soviet land-based intermediate-range nuclear systems; the welcome extended by the Assembly to President Reagan's proposals announced on 18th November 1981; the importance of co-operation and consultation between the NATO allies concerned in discussion of intermediate-range nuclear forces in the Special Consultative Group as well as of the exchange of information in the North Atlantic Council.
2. The Council also welcome the attention paid by the Assembly to the importance of the public presentation of the policies of member countries both on defence and deterrence and on arms control.
3. Regarding the Assembly's recommendation that the North Atlantic Council should continue to rely on the double decision of 12th December 1979, the Council recall that it is the declared intention of the NATO allies concerned that they will move ahead with the December 1979 two-track decision on intermediate-range nuclear force modernisation and arms control. They reiterate the view expressed in December 1981 by the allies who participated in the 1979 double decision, namely that the dual-track decision opened the way to reducing the threat to the Alliance through intermediate-range nuclear force modernisation and arms control negotiations and that determination in implementing both tracks of the decision has been a key factor in convincing the Soviet Union to negotiate without preconditions, thus creating the opportunity of achieving genuine arms reductions.
4. The Council attach the greatest importance to the positions and attitudes of the publics in member countries on the subject of nuclear weapons and their arms control. They believe that an important and continuing task is the explanation of the defensive nature of the North Atlantic Alliance, the rationale behind the strategy of deterrence and the essential rôle of arms control. The task of explanation is all the greater in the light of the sustained Soviet propaganda campaign which aims to undercut public support for agreed objectives and policies of the Alliance. In their task of providing their publics with accurate information, members of the Council will rely on material from their own national sources and, for those who participated in the drafting of it, on material co-ordinated and agreed by the allies, in particular the forthcoming report which will compare NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1982.

APPENDIX II

*Levels of United States and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons
(covered by SALT)**United States strategic systems
(covered by SALT)*

	Maximum range (km)	Number	Number of independent warheads each	Assumed total number of warheads
ICBMs				
Titan II	15,000	52	1	52
Minuteman II	11,300	450	1	450
Minuteman III	13,000	{ 250 (160 kt) 300 (353 kt-Mk 12A)	3	1,500 ¹
Sub-total		1,052		2,000
SLBMs				
Polaris	4,600	80	1	80
Poseidon C-3	4,600	304	10-14	3,648
Trident C-4	7,400	160	8	1,280 ¹
Sub-total		544		5,000
BM total		1,596		7,000
Aircraft				
B-52	16,000	316 ²	up to 10	2,000
TOTAL		1,912		9,000

1. On the assumption that the maximum number of warheads are fitted.

2. 570 reported in SALT II data base includes 220 in "deep storage".

Note:

Force loadings for aircraft deduced from total warheads (rounded to nearest hundred).

United States forces estimated at mid-1982.

Source:

- IISS, Military Balance 1981-82.

- United States Department of Defence Annual Reports fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 1983.

- Soviet military power, United States Department of Defence, September 1981.

- Whence the threat to peace, Soviet Ministry of Defence, January 1982.

*Soviet strategic systems
(covered by SALT)*

Type	Maximum range (km)	Number	Number of independent warheads each	Assumed total number of warheads
ICBMs				
SS-11	10,500	580	1	580
SS-13	10,000	60	1	60
SS-17	10,000	150	1 or 4	600 ¹
SS-18	9-10,500	308	1 or 8	2,464 ¹
SS-19	11,000	300	6 or 1	1,800 ¹
Sub-total		1,398		5,500
SLBMs				
SSN-5	1,120	18	1	18
SSN-6	2,400-3,000	453	1	453
SSN-8	8,000	291	1	291
SSN-17	5,000	12	1	12
SSN-18	8,000	176	3	528
BM total		2,348		1,300
Aircraft				
	Combat radius (km)			
Bear Tu-95	5-6,000	105	2-4	330
Bison Mya-4	4-6,000	45	1-2	70
Sub-total		150		400
TOTAL		2,498		7,200

1. On the assumption that the maximum number of warheads are fitted.

Note:

Force loadings for aircraft deduced from total warheads (rounded to nearest hundred).
United States forces estimated at mid-1982.

Source:

- IISS, Military Balance 1981-82.
- United States Department of Defence Annual Reports fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 1983.
- Soviet military power, United States Department of Defence, September 1981.
- "Whence the threat to peace", Soviet Ministry of Defence, January 1982.

APPENDIX III

Levels of intermediate-range nuclear weapons of interest to Europe

Maximum range or combat radius (km)	Assumed warheads per system	Weapons	IISS - Military Balance 1981-82	Lt.-Gen. Nikolai Chervov - Soviet Information Bureau, Paris - May 1981	New York Times 22.11.81		Lev Semeiko ⁽ⁿ⁾ Moscow News 17.1.82	NATO & Warsaw Pact - Force Comparisons 4.5.82
					Soviet figures	United States figures		
5,000	3	USSR: SS-20 ^(a)	200		175	270	"Land-based" 496	300 ^(o)
2,000	1	SS-4	210		340	340		
4,000	1	SS-5	15		40	40		
1,000	1	SS-12	650			350		
1,120	1	SS-N-5	57			157		
4,000	3 or 4	Backfire	65		65	65	"Sea-based" 18	500
2,800	2	Badger	310		310	310		
3,100	2	Blinder	125		125	125	"Air-based" 461	2,500 ^(s)
1,600	2	Fencer	480			480		
720	1	Flogger D ^(b)	500			500		
600	1	Fitter C/D ^(b)	700					
		TOTAL	3,312		1,055	2,537		4,250
		NATO inc.						
1,900	2	France: F-111	156	156	156	156	723	(200) ^(q)
2,000+	4 or 6	F-111A	- ⁽ⁱ⁾		60	60		
750	1	F-4	324 ^(e)	364 ^(e)	324 ^(e)	244 ^(j)		
800	1	F-104	318	318				
1,000	2	A-6/A-7	60 ^(h)	60 ^(h)	60 ^(h)	33 ^(k)		
2,800	2	Vulcan	57	57	56	56	55	(200) ^(q)
950	2	Buccaneer	60	60			46	(800) ^(r)
720	1	Jaguar ^(e)	80	80				
1,600	1	Mirage IV-A	33	33	33	33		
560	2	Super Etendard	12 ⁽ⁱ⁾					
720	1	Pershing I ^(d)	180	180	180	180		180
4,600	1	Polaris	64	64	64	64	64	
3,000	1	M-20	80	80	80	80	80	
3,000	10 or 14	Poseidon ^(e)		80				
		TOTAL	1,142	1,550	1,031	924	986	1,180

Notes :

(a) Since the publication of the respective figures on SS-20 deployment, it has been reported that by mid-March 1982, when the USSR announced a freeze on further SS-20 deployment, the number of SS-20 missiles deployed had risen to 300 (of which 100 were situated west of the Urals, 100 in the so-called "swing position"). The total number of SS-4 and SS-5 has been reduced to 275 and 25 respectively.

(b) Although the Military Balance 1981-82 also lists 165 Fitter A and 400 Fishbed J-N aircraft under long- and medium-range systems for the European theatre, these aircraft are not accounted for anywhere else, and it would appear that both types, although nuclear capable, are not primarily assigned to a nuclear rôle. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of 8th March 1982 reported that some 300 Soviet Flogger and Fitter are stationed in the GDR.

(c) Military Balance 1981-82 assumes 80 nuclear-capable aircraft in Anglo-French inventory of 219. Half of these are assumed retained for a nuclear rôle. See also (m).

(d) 180 Pershing I: 108 United States and 72 West German missiles.

(e) 400 Poseidon warheads are assigned to SACEUR but are SALT-counted.

- (f) Military Balance 1981-82 assumes that (United States-based) FB-111A are not available for theatre use; 60 FB-111A are listed as medium-range bombers stationed in the United States. The precise combat radius of the FB-111A is not available. The Military Balance 1981-82 gives the range as 4,700 km.
- (g) The figure of 364 as opposed to 324 F-4, includes 40 F-4 of the Turkish air force which are presumably not intended for a nuclear rôle. See also (j).
- (h) The number of 60 (i.e. 20 A-6 and 40 A-7) carrier-borne planes is based on the assumption that there are two carriers in the United States 6th Fleet (Mediterranean), and that half the available strike force is retained for nuclear targets on land – see Military Balance 1981-82. See also (k). Assumes no carriers from Atlantic fleet in nuclear strike rôle.
- (i) Assumes one out of two French carriers on station and within range.
- (j) The figure of 224 F-4 comprises European-based planes only while the figure of 324 – see (g) – includes “dual-based” planes normally in the United States but deploying to Europe at times.
- (k) The number of 33 carrier-borne aircraft is based on the assumption that there has been only one United States carrier in the Mediterranean for the past two years – see *The Economist* of 17th October 1981. See also (h).
- (m) Available systems – updated to March 1982 for SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5.
- (n) Data correspond, but with more detail, with figures used by President Brezhnev in *Der Spiegel* interview of 1st November 1981.
- (o) Not all in range of Europe.
- (p) Those used as bombers.
- (q) 200 total for F-111 and Vulcan.
- (r) 800 total all other aircraft.
- (s) WP could employ up to 2,500 aircraft in a nuclear rôle.

Weapon	Range-Combat Radius in km <i>a/</i>	Accuracy and Flight Time of Most Precise Weapons	Warheads per System <i>a/</i>	INVENTORY			WARHEADS <i>a/</i>		Estimated Inventory 1989 if Full Implementation NATO Plans <i>d/</i>	
				Brezhnev <i>b/</i>	IISS	Economist <i>c/</i>	Available	Arriving	Weapons	Warheads
Soviet										
SS-20 missile	5000	10-15 min. 320 m. <i>a/</i>	3	(87) <i>f/</i>	175 <i>g/</i>	175	525 <i>h/</i>	337 <i>h/</i>	200	600
SS-5 missile	4100		1	(40)	40	40	13	13		
SS-4 missile	1900		1	(340)	340	340	340	77	50-200+	50-200+
SS-12 missile	900		1	uncounted	65 <i>i/</i>	350	65	27 <i>j/</i>		
SS-N-5 missile	1120		1	uncounted	39 <i>k/</i>	57	39	8 <i>j/</i>		
Missile subtotal				(467)	659	962	1009	462	200-500+	650-850+
Backfire B bomber	4025		4	(65)	65	65	104 <i>g/</i>	35	100	400
Badger bomber	2800		2	(310)	310	310	248 <i>g/</i>	46	300	600
Blinder bomber	3100		2	(125)	125	125	100 <i>g/</i>	22		
Fencer fighter-bomber	1600		2	uncounted	480	480	192 <i>g/</i>	44		
Flogger D fighter-bomber	720		1	uncounted	0 or 500 <i>j/</i>	500	0 or 200 <i>j, g/</i>	0 or 50 <i>j/</i>		
Warsaw Pact Total Weapons				975 (according to itemized tally 967)	1639 or 2139 <i>j/</i>	2442 with 3502 warheads	1653 or 1853 <i>j/</i>	609 or 659 <i>j/</i>	650 to 900+	1650 to 1850+
NATO										
Perishing 1A missile	720	400 m. <i>m/</i>	1	(0 or 180) <i>n/</i>	0 or 180	180	0 or 180	0 or 91	108	108
Perishing 11 missile (Planned)	1667	10-15 min. 20-40 m. <i>m/</i>	1	---	---	---	---	---	464	464
Cruise missile	2500	1-3/4-2 hrs. 80 m. <i>m/</i>	1	---	---	---	---	---	64	64
British Polaris missile	4600		1	64	64	64	64	26	80	80
French sub missile	3000		1	98	80	80	80	8	18	18
French land-based missile	3000		1		18	18	18			
Missile subtotal				(162 or 342)	162 or 342 <i>j/</i>	342	162 or 342 <i>j/</i>	54 or 145 <i>j/</i>	734	734
US F-111E/F fighter-bomber	1900		2	(156)	156	156	312	45	170	340
US FB-111A	4700		1	(60)	60	60	60	60		
US F-4	750		1	(324)	324	324	244 <i>p/</i>	97 <i>g/</i>	14	
US A-6E/A-7E	900-1000		2	(60)	60	60	33 <i>g/</i>	30 <i>g/</i>	10	
British Vulcan B-2 bomber	2800		2	55	57	56	112 <i>h/</i>	19		
French Mirage IV-A bomber	1600		1	46	33	33	33	6		
NATO Total Weapons				986 (according to itemized tally 863 or 1043) <i>j/</i>	792 or 972 <i>j/</i>	864 with 1109 warheads	746 or 926 <i>j/</i>	148 or 239 <i>j/</i>	904	1074
WARSAW Pact/NATO Ratio				1:1	2.1:1 or 2.2:1	weapons 2.2:1 warheads 3.2:1	2.2:1 or 2:1	4.1:1 or 2.8:1	0.7:1 to 1:1	1.5:1 to 1.7:1

*Based on information in the Christian Science Monitor, November 27, 1981.
 Chart includes only those categories of European-theater weapons covered by Brezhnev in his Nov. 2 interview in Der Spiegel. It excludes any warheads diverted to European theater from central (superpower to superpower intercontinental) systems under SALT. It also excludes weapons under 750- or 720-km range.
a/ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) information, mainly from The Military Balance 1981-1982, unless otherwise noted.
b/ Der Spiegel. Figures for systems apparently included in Soviet reckoning but unquantified are taken from the The Military Balance unless indicated, and put in parentheses.
c/ October 17, 1981 issue of Der Spiegel.
d/ Lawrence Freedman. "Arms Control in Europe," pp. 23-51, published by The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. British and French missiles added on assumption of stability in present deployment.
e/ West German Defense Ministry.
f/ Brezhnev appears to include only SS-20s based west of Urals, excluded SS-20s east of Urals but able to hit Europe. Hence Brezhnev figure half of IISS and Economist.
g/ Economist figure substituted for outdated IISS figure, since IISS Military Balance lists SS-20 numbers at present time, and new deployments added in meantime at rate of one every five days. The Military Balance listed total SS-20s targeted on Europe and China, and Economist used rule-of-thumb Western calculation of two-thirds of total targeted on Europe.
h/ Extrapolated from The Military Balance with Economist update.
i/ The Military Balance, p. 12.
j/ Lower figure if 720-km range systems excluded, higher figure if included.
k/ IISS oral examination. The Military Balance lists both G- and H-class subs, but H-class is counted as central strategic system under SALT, so only the G-class is listed here.
l/ Extrapolated from The Military Balance.
m/ The Modernization of NATO's Medium-Range Theater Nuclear Forces, Congressional report Library of Congress, Dec. 31, 1980, and West German Defense Ministry.
n/ Perishing 1A unable to reach Soviet territory from West German bases. Unclear if it is counted in Brezhnev's numbers, so both variants given here in Brezhnev and IISS listings. Higher number included 108 Perishing 1A's plus 72 1A's from West Germany.
o/ Deducts 80 aircraft actually based in U.S. rather than Europe.
p/ Deducts 27 aircraft on second carrier that has not been in Mediterranean for past two years.
q/ Lower figure than mathematical result of multiplying weapons by warheads, since IISS assumes only partial utilization.

Source: Stanley R. Sloan, "NATO theater nuclear forces: modernization and arms control"; Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 19th February 1982.

B. MANPOWER EFFORT - 1981

	Period of compulsory ¹ military service (months)			Total in armed forces ² military personnel (thousands)	Total armed forces ² (military and civilian) as percentage of active population
	Army	Navy	Air force	(e)	(e)
Belgium	10 ³	10 ³	10 ³	109	2.8
France	12	12	12	575	3.0
Germany	15	15	15	495	2.5
Italy	12	18	12	505	2.4
Luxembourg	voluntary			1	0.8
Netherlands	14-16	14-17	14-17	107	2.7
United Kingdom	voluntary			331	2.1
TOTAL WEU				2,123	2.5
Canada	voluntary			82	1.0
Denmark	9	9	9	32	1.6
Greece	22-32	26	24	186	6.2
Norway	12	15	15	40	2.6
Portugal	16	24	24	90	2.3
Turkey	20	20	20	741	4.4
United States	voluntary			2,120	2.9
TOTAL NON-WEU				3,291	3.5
TOTAL NATO				5,414	2.8

Sources :

1. IISS Military Balance, 1981-82.
2. NATO press communiqué, M-DPC-2 (81) 20, 8th December 1981.
3. Eight months if served in Germany.

e = estimate.

APPENDIX V

List of treaties with nuclear arms control implications

Short title	Date of signature	No. of parties	Nuclear weapons powers which are not parties	Chief provisions affecting nuclear weapons
Antarctic	1st December 1959	21	China	Bans nuclear weapons or tests in Antarctica
Partial test ban	5th August 1963	112	China, France	Bans nuclear tests in atmosphere, under water, in outer space
Outer space	27th January 1967	82	China	Bans nuclear weapons in orbit or on celestial bodies
Tlatelolco	14th February 1967	22	None (Protocol II)	Bans nuclear weapons in Latin America
Non-proliferation	1st July 1968	115	China, France	Prohibits transfer of nuclear explosive devices by a nuclear weapon state to any other state; prohibits nuclear weapons states from assisting non-nuclear weapons states manufacturing nuclear weapons
Seabed	11th February 1971	70	China, France	Bans nuclear weapons on seabed
ABM	26th May 1972	2	(bilateral United States-Soviet Union)	Limits anti-ballistic missiles to two sites
ABM protocol	3rd July 1974	2	"	Limits sites to one
SALT I (Interim agreement)	26th May 1972	2	"	5-year freeze with limits on ICBMs and SLBMs
Threshold test ban ¹	3rd July 1974	2	"	Bans underground tests over 150 Kt
Peaceful nuclear explosions ¹	28th May 1976	2	"	Regulates nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes
SALT II ¹	18th June 1979	2	"	Limits ICBMs; SLBMs; heavy bombers; ASBMs

1. Not ratified by the United States.

APPENDIX VI

*Questionnaire on the attitude of the
principal political parties in the WEU countries
to the various peace movements*

Introduction

Mr. Joseph Mommersteeg has been appointed Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to prepare a report on "The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe". Among other aspects of the subject, the report will study the balance of forces in Europe; the NATO decision on the modernisation of theatre nuclear forces in Europe; and the progress and prospects of the Geneva talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces. It will also examine the state of public opinion on these issues.

In this latter connection, Mr. Mommersteeg hopes to provide authoritative information on the policy of the principal political parties with respect to the various "peace" movements in the seven WEU countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom) or similar movements which advocate nuclear disarmament or disarmament in general (reference in the body of this questionnaire to "peace movements" is to be taken to refer to any such similar organisation).

To provide a factual basis for this assessment, Mr. Mommersteeg has asked for this questionnaire to be sent to the principal political parties represented in the parliaments of the WEU countries. In order to meet the timetable for the preparation of his report, Mr. Mommersteeg would be most grateful if answers to the questionnaire could be sent to the Office of the Clerk at the following address by 1st February 1982:

Office of the Clerk of the
Assembly of WEU
43, avenue du Président Wilson
75775 Paris Cedex 16
Telephone: (1) 723.54.32

Questionnaire

1. Please give the full titles of any peace movements to which replies to any of the following questions refer.

2. Does your party officially support in any way the peace movements in your country?

If so, please state which movements, and whether:

- (a) your party is officially represented on the controlling organs of the peace movement;
- (b) your party has been officially represented at public demonstrations organised by the peace movement – give dates and places of demonstrations concerned;
- (c) your party provides general political support for the peace movement (party resolutions, speakers, participation in conferences, etc.);
- (d) your party has provided any material assistance to the peace movement (finance, administrative facilities, offices, staff, etc.).

3. In the absence of official party support for the peace movement, is it generally known that many members of your party are active in the peace movements? Which movements?

4. Do any other aspects of party policy indicate support for the peace movements in any other particular way? Do the broad aims of the peace movements form part of your party manifesto?

5. (a) Alternatively, does party policy in any way oppose the aims of the peace movements?

(b) Does your party in any way consider membership of or association with the peace movements to be incompatible with membership of the party (specify movements concerned)?

General

Please add any more general comments you may have concerning the policy of your party towards the peace movements, or concerning the other topics to be covered in the report (see Introduction). It would be appreciated if you would send copies of any recent party statements, or pamphlets concerning these issues.

*List of parties to which the questionnaire
was addressed and replies received*

		<i>Replies received</i>
<i>Belgium:</i>	Social Christian Party	x
	CVP	
	Socialist Party	x
	SP	
	PRL	x
	PVV	
<i>France:</i>	RPR	x
	Communist Party	
	Socialist Party	x
	UDF	x
<i>Germany:</i>	CDU	x
	CSU	x
	SPD	
	FDP	
<i>Italy:</i>	PCI	x
	PSI	
	Christian Democrat Party	
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Social Christian Party	
	Socialist Party	x
	Democratic Party	
<i>Netherlands:</i>	CDA	x
	Labour Party	x
	Liberal Party	x
	Democrats '66	x
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Conservative Party	x
	Labour Party	x
	Liberal Party	
	Social Democratic Party	x

The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe

AMENDMENT 1¹
tabled by Mr. Gessner

1. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Welcoming that the United States Government has declared itself ready to respect the SALT II agreements on condition that the Soviet Union does too; ”

Signed: Gessner

1. See 4th sitting, 16th June 1982 (amendment withdrawn).

The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe

AMENDMENT 2¹
tabled by Mr. Pignion

2. In paragraph A of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "A. Call on member governments acting in the North Atlantic Council," and insert "A. Develop a European approach to discussions in the North Atlantic Council so as:".

Signed: Pignion

1. See 4th sitting, 16th June 1982 (amendment negatived).

The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe

AMENDMENTS 3 and 4¹
tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg

3. After paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“ Welcoming the declaration of the United States Government that it will refrain from actions which undercut existing strategic arms agreements as long as the USSR shows equal restraints, and comparable statements of the Soviet Union, and appealing to both governments to formalise those statements at the opening of the START negotiations; ”

4. In the draft recommendation proper, renumber paragraph B. as B.1. and add a new paragraph as follows:

“ B.2. Develop a European approach to the political aspects of the discussions in the North Atlantic Council. ”

Signed: Mommersteeg

1. See 4th sitting, 16th June 1982 (amendments agreed to).

*Application of Order 55 –
Exchange of letters between Mr. Mulley,
President of the Assembly,
and Mrs. Veil and Mr. Dankert,
successive Presidents of the European Parliament*

ORDER 55

on European union and WEU

The Assembly;

Considering that being composed of representatives of the parliaments of member countries gives it exclusive responsibility for ensuring the application of the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly its Articles IV, V and VIII;

Considering that the European Parliament, elected by direct suffrage, is logically the parliamentary interlocutor of the Community bodies;

Noting that in fact the Ten tackle many matters relating to the security of Europe, particularly in their political consultations, but accepting that the Community has no direct responsibility for defence matters;

Considering that progress in co-operation and consultation between the Ten can lead to the establishment of a future European union;

Considering that legally WEU is still the only available instrument for European co-operation in defence matters allowing a dialogue between governments and parliamentarians;

Considering that these facts demonstrate the need for co-operation between the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament and for the establishment of a sub-committee of the General Affairs Committee to keep under review the rôle of WEU in the context of this important report and of further developments;

Considering that co-operation between the two assemblies is their responsibility but must not prejudice any decisions which member countries may take subsequently,

1. INVITES the President of the Assembly to contact the President of the European Parliament to ensure:

(a) that invitations are sent regularly to observers from the European Parliament to attend sessions of the WEU Assembly and to observers from the WEU Assembly to attend sittings of the European Parliament when the agenda includes debates on matters affecting Europe's security;

(b) that a standing committee drawn from both assemblies is set up by the most appropriate means to ensure harmonisation of their work;

2. INVITES the President of the Assembly to make the necessary contacts with the President of the European Parliament with a view to encouraging harmonisation of views on economic and political matters which affect Europe's security.

14th December 1981

.....

At its recent session, the Assembly of Western European Union, in the framework of its debate on the report by Mr. De Poi on European union and WEU, adopted an order on the establishment of co-operation between our two assemblies.

This order, a copy of which I am enclosing, refers to an exchange of observers, the setting up of a standing committee and the harmonisation of views on economic and political matters which affect Europe's security.

The Assembly invited me to contact you to examine these problems and I have therefore asked the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly to get in touch with your secretariat in order to arrange a meeting on a date convenient to both you and I.

.....

(Signed) Fred MULLEY

Mrs. Simone VEIL,
President of the European Parliament,
32, rue de Babylone,
75007 Paris

*
* *

Luxembourg, 8th January 1982

Dear Mr. President,

You were kind enough to forward to me, by letter of 14th December 1981, the order adopted by the Assembly of Western European Union on the establishment of co-operation between our two assemblies.

The matter will be submitted to the enlarged Bureau of the European Parliament which is to be elected at our next part-session, and the President of Parliament will inform you of the outcome of the enlarged Bureau's deliberations on this subject.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) Simone VEIL

The Rt. Hon. Fred MULLEY,
President of the Assembly
of Western European Union,
43, avenue du Président Wilson,
75775 Paris Cedex 16

*
* *

Brussels, 31st March 1982

Dear Mr. President,

Referring to the conversation we had yesterday in Brussels on the subject of the relations between the Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament, I now formally repeat the decision taken by the enlarged Bureau of the European Parliament at its meeting of 28th January 1982:

“The enlarged Bureau,

- having regard to the respective responsibilities of the two assemblies;
- considered that it was not necessary to institutionalise relations with the Assembly of WEU, but
- considered that observers could be sent by either Assembly whenever the debates in the European Parliament or the Assembly of WEU were of interest to either institution;”.

As a consequence of our meeting and the decision taken by the enlarged Bureau, I have now instructed the secretariat of the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament to forward to your secretariat all the documents which may be of interest to your institution.

Equally, I have instructed them to inform you in due course whenever a document relevant to your institution is discussed by the European Parliament and conveyed to them our decision to increase the exchange of views, in particular at the level of rapporteurs.

Finally, may I say how much I enjoyed our conversation.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) P. DANKERT

The Rt. Hon. Fred MULLEY,
President of the Assembly of WEU,
43, avenue du Président Wilson,
75775 Paris Cedex 16

*Replies of the Council to Recommendations 372 to 377***RECOMMENDATION 372¹*****on European union and WEU*²**

The Assembly,

Taking note of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 358 ;

Aware of the interest again shown by certain governments in setting up a European union ;

Noting the development of consultations between members of the EEC on questions of foreign policy ;

Accepting the urgent need for European consultation and co-operation on defence matters for which WEU is the appropriate framework in order to preserve Europe's security and to allow it to play an active rôle in disarmament negotiations ;

Noting nevertheless that the development of co-operation between members of the EEC in the defence field is still encountering difficulties which are far from solution ;

Considering that WEU is still the only available instrument for such co-operation and that the modified Brussels Treaty obliges the seven member countries to use it, but deploring the fact that member countries have so far interpreted this obligation in a formal and restrictive manner ;

Recalling that WEU is indivisible and that the Assembly can play its rôle only insofar as the Council will engage a true dialogue with it ;

Considering that progress in co-operation and consultation between EEC member countries helps to promote the establishment of a future European union ;

Emphasising that WEU is the only forum in which member countries of the NATO integrated military organisation and France can discuss military matters, particularly those relating to nuclear weapons,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Take all necessary measures and action to ensure that the duties exercised by the WEU Assembly under the modified Brussels Treaty are effectively strengthened ;
2. Reform the structure and essential activities of WEU only after a thorough and adequate dialogue with the Assembly ;
3. Hold effective consultations on matters relating to disarmament or the limitation of both conventional and nuclear weapons ;
4. Acquaint the United States Government with the collective viewpoint of all member states on the negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe ;
5. As long as no substantial progress has been made in this field, ensure that Europe provides itself with the means necessary for playing an effective part in measures taken in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance for its own security ;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1981 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session (9th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. De Poi on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 894).

6. In the framework of the European Council, foster the formation of a working group:
 - (a) to define areas in which the European union cannot be established in the framework of the Community ;
 - (b) to examine how the secretariat of the WEU Council can co-operate with that of the ten-power political consultations ;
 - (c) to propose a definition of the respective responsibilities of the European Parliament and of the WEU Assembly in the framework of a European union ;
 - (d) thus to pave the way for establishing a European union based on the harmonisation of the Rome and Brussels Treaties ;
7. Invite countries which are members or which have applied for membership of the EEC to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty, the only present reference of European unity in security and defence matters.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 372***

1. The Council have noted with interest Recommendation 372, which again confirmed at parliamentary level the importance of WEU as the organisation competent, under the terms of its treaty, for European defence problems. Considering WEU's important contribution to the development of co-operation between the member states, achieved through their statutory commitments, in particular to collective self-defence (Article V) and to promoting unity and encouraging the progressive integration of Europe (Article VIII), the Council note with satisfaction the Assembly's recommendation that the duties exercised by the WEU Assembly under the modified Brussels Treaty should be effectively strengthened. In this connection, and taking into account the importance of the positive part played by the Assembly, which is the only European parliamentary body where members of national parliaments discuss, under the terms of a treaty, common security problems, the Council have endeavoured, particularly at the last session of the WEU Assembly, to encourage direct contacts between those responsible within defence ministries of member countries and the Assembly. The latter has thus been duly informed in detail of the main lines of the member countries' military policies in the present state of international affairs.

The Council assure the Assembly that, should the case arise, no substantial reforms of WEU will be undertaken without prior consultation with the Assembly.

2. As regards Europe's part in consultations on disarmament and the control of armaments, the Council assure the Assembly that the member countries regularly and effectively consult within the framework of political co-operation among the Ten, either with respect to specific problems raised at the United Nations and at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, or, more generally, to co-ordinate their policies in multilateral negotiations on such problems.

On matters relating to arms control, consultation takes place at various levels within the Atlantic Alliance, of which the WEU countries are members. In this context, these countries are able to put forward their interests and aspirations in the framework of the regular meetings of the Atlantic Council. In particular, for the question of the limitation of intermediate-range nuclear weapons (INF) an ad hoc body, the Special Consultative Group (chaired by the United States), brings together all the countries which took part in the decision to modernise NATO's intermediate-range nuclear forces for the purpose of consulting closely on, and following developments in, the negotiations which opened in Geneva on 30th November 1981.

3. The Council assure the Assembly that European countries will continue, in the appropriate fora, to seek and implement means of co-operation aimed at co-ordinating their efforts to ensure the most effective use of resources for the defence of the Alliance. The European countries which are members of the integrated military structure contribute also to allied defence by participating in NATO's long-term defence plan (LTDP) which, as all are aware, was approved at the Washington summit in May 1978 and provides for the strengthening of certain fundamental sectors of allied conventional forces. Finally, it is within this framework that direct participation by certain European countries in the recent adoption of a position on intermediate-range nuclear forces has assumed importance. This led to the dual decision of December 1979 to modernise these forces and, simultaneously, to offer to negotiate with the Soviet Union about them.

4. The Council endorse the Assembly's desire that Europe should provide itself with the means necessary for playing an effective part in measures taken in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance for its own security.

5. The Council note with interest the proposals put forward by the Assembly under points 6 and 7 of its recommendation and intend to reply to them carefully when the contacts and conversations now taking place in other fora, and which relate to several ideas underlying these points, are sufficiently advanced to make such a reply possible.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1982.

RECOMMENDATION 373¹

on European security and the South Atlantic²

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising that the countries of the Alliance are highly dependent on imports of petroleum and of certain minerals originating in a few cases from a very small number of countries ;
- (ii) Noting that many of the countries of origin of these raw materials are in areas of local tension where insurgency, subversion, racial tension and potential local conflict pose a threat to continuity of production and local transport ;
- (iii) Aware that the shipping routes for these materials are potentially vulnerable, particularly in straits and narrows in the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the South Atlantic and the Caribbean ;
- (iv) Concerned at the Soviet Union's long-standing superiority in submarines and its large construction programme for ocean-going surface combat ships;
- (v) Observing the expanding world-wide deployment of the Soviet navy with permanent bases in the Indian Ocean, a presence in the South Atlantic and occasional visits to the Caribbean, but aware that in the event of major hostilities in Europe the priority task for Soviet naval forces must be to attempt to prevent the reinforcement and resupply of Europe through the Caribbean and North Atlantic;
- (vi) Believing however that the situation in southern Africa and the South Atlantic should not be interpreted in terms of East-West antagonism, and that the attitude of countries in the area makes it unlikely that European security could be furthered through a search for bases or the extension of military pacts;
- (vii) Convinced that there has to come a fundamental political change in South Africa, based on the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the interest of all the inhabitants of South Africa and in the interest of world peace and that the western world has to do its utmost to promote such a change,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To continue to consult with their allies and seek common objectives in the framework of European political co-operation and in the North Atlantic Council concerning events in any part of the world which may jeopardise the security interests of allied countries ;
2. To give priority to the search for political solutions to reduce causes of local tension and potential conflict, to secure: a settlement of the outstanding problems in the Middle East; the independence of Namibia in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 435; and a just solution based on the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the policies in the Republic of South Africa;
3. To take steps to reduce the vulnerability of their petroleum and mineral imports, where possible and as most appropriate through diversification of the source of supply; the search for alternative materials and energy sources; conservation, recycling and stockpiling;
4. To improve their naval forces with a view to ensuring that those of the NATO countries collectively provide an adequate East-West balance bearing in mind the allied need for substantial anti-submarine forces of all types and ocean-going surface combatants to keep open the sea lanes of communication in contingencies where these may be threatened outside the NATO area;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1981 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session (10th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Dr. Miller on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 888).

5. To use bilateral interservice or intergovernmental channels to make co-ordinated arrangements outside the NATO area:

- (i) for occasional flag-showing naval visits in the South Atlantic and other areas with a view to fostering good relations with the littoral countries;
- (ii) for joint exercises with local navies in appropriate cases;
- (iii) for naval deployments to protect the right of passage of allied shipping in accordance with international law if jeopardised by local conflicts;

6. To support measures of properly verified arms control and disarmament that will preserve a balance of forces, in particular the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America; proposals for a nuclear weapon-free zone in Africa; and proposals to regulate the international transfer of armaments.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹*to Recommendation 373*

The Council have taken note of the remarks expressed by the Assembly in the preamble of Recommendation 373. The various points of this recommendation call for the following observations:

1. The Council of course favour the continuation of political consultations, both in the political co-operation machinery of the Ten and in the North Atlantic Council. Such consultations lead to a better understanding and analysis of situations which have an influence on European security. They help to strengthen the cohesion of the institutions concerned and the stability of international relations. In the same spirit, the member states of WEU intend to continue to consult each other at the appropriate time on situations affecting their common interests, taking into consideration the fact that these interests may be affected by events occurring in other parts of the world, and to work with other countries in order to reduce causes of tension, particularly in the South Atlantic. In this connection, the Council recall the terms of paragraph 9 of the final communiqué adopted at the conclusion of the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 10th and 11th December 1981.
2. The Council totally subscribe to the remarks expressed by the Assembly on the need to find political solutions to crises and conflicts that may occur in the world, particularly in the South Atlantic, and in so doing to abide fully by the Charter of the United Nations. It remains true that the reduction of causes of tension is not solely a political issue. Peace, economic development and progress, social justice, are closely interrelated and contribute to the evolution of contemporary societies. International co-operation must accompany this evolution and at the same time the right of countries to develop their own political and economic systems must be respected.
3. In order to ensure, as far as possible, continuity in the supply of energy for European countries and to reduce the vulnerability of their imports of energy products and raw materials, the Council share the Assembly's concerns and consider that it is desirable to diversify the sources of supply. This supply policy falls within the wider objective of achieving less dependence in energy matters, a more rational and economic use of energy, and finally the development of coal, nuclear energy and other sources of energy that are renewable, such as solar energy.
4. The modernisation of naval forces is a long-term undertaking to which the member countries of WEU remain deeply committed. They are, moreover, conscious of the particular requirement of the tasks performed by the allied navies, especially in the protection of western sea lanes throughout the world.
5. The establishment of a stable and just international order flows from the development and intensification of relations at all levels between states. The Council therefore consider that everything must be done to prevent East/West rivalry from spreading to the third world. It follows that outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, the improvement of international relations calls for initiatives which are based on the consent of the countries concerned and the willingness of others to respect and help them maintain their independence. Such initiatives may be adapted to each case.
6. The Council are naturally anxious to support in the South Atlantic region any measures of verifiable and balanced disarmament.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1982.

RECOMMENDATION 374¹***on the reappraisal of global dangers to western peace and security²***

The Assembly,

Considering that the balance of forces that has ensured peace for thirty years is seriously jeopardised by the accumulation in Europe of Soviet conventional and nuclear arms which the Atlantic Alliance does not have the means of countering at the present time;

Considering that this situation calls for a significant and sustained effort by all the members of the Alliance so that the negotiations on the limitation of armaments may be conducted with determined vigour to allow a balance to be re-established at the lowest possible level;

Considering that this effort must seek to give the Atlantic Alliance the ability to deter any aggression, whatever means a possible aggressor may employ;

Welcoming the efforts made by the United States and by some European members of the Alliance to correct the imbalance;

Regretting that these efforts do not receive adequate backing and are not accompanied by a similar effort by certain other countries;

Considering that the moral cohesion and determination to provide itself with the means necessary for its defence are an essential part of the deterrent exercised by the Atlantic Alliance and that this determination is too easily being undermined by Soviet propaganda, which should and could be far more vigorously rebutted;

Recognising that decisions taken now to strengthen the defensive potential of Western Europe cannot take full effect for several years;

Considering also that present crises in many areas of the world not covered by the Atlantic Alliance constitute a serious threat to Western Europe's supplies of raw materials and energy ;

Considering that the development of Soviet naval power and the system of alliances that the USSR has elaborated in the last ten years increase the risks that these crises involve for international peace ;

Considering in particular that the evolution of the situation in the Near and Middle East can endanger the vital interests of Western Europe and that events in Egypt in October 1981 may constitute serious threats to peace ;

Considering that unless they are accompanied by meaningful consultations between the members of the Atlantic Alliance such crises may divide them and weaken the deterrent capability of the Alliance ;

Considering that Western European interests make it incumbent upon the member countries of WEU " to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability ", according to Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Promote by all means at its disposal the re-establishment of the balance of all military forces between East and West on the lowest possible level ;
2. Promote with no less determination the development of negotiations, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union, on the limitation of armaments, including theatre weapons, with a view to re-establishing this balance ;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1981 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session (11th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 887).

3. Ensure that its members respect the decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council on 19th December 1979 in the field of armaments ;
4. Examine the action to be taken on the study conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee on the European armaments industries with a view to gaining maximum efficiency from military investment expenditure in the member countries ;
5. Ensure that Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty is applied in all circumstances and, to this end, organise within WEU machinery to improve its means for crisis management ;
6. Urge the North Atlantic Council :
 - (a) to consult with each other in the event of a crisis outside Europe endangering international peace ;
 - (b) to strengthen the solidarity of the members of the Atlantic Alliance should one or several of them be compelled to engage their forces for the maintenance of peace and security in areas not covered by the treaty.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 374***

The Council intend to act in order to maintain the global balance of forces – which is the condition for ensuring peace – if possible at the lowest level. In this spirit, the WEU member countries support the holding of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning their respective nuclear arsenals and designed to lead to significant and verifiable reductions and limitations.

The Council, however, are clearly aware of the considerable and continuous growth of Soviet military power and offensive potential which today is evident, in particular, in the sphere of the intermediate-range weapons directly threatening Western Europe. This is especially true in as much as this development of the Soviet arsenal, which affects the overall balance of forces between East and West, adds to the Soviet Union's increasing ability to deploy its potential on a global scale. The WEU member countries are therefore determined to maintain their deterrent potential at the required level.

The Council, at the appropriate moment, will examine in depth and with the aim of efficiency, the action to be taken on the study conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee on the "Armaments sector of industry in the WEU member countries". It is hoped that this study will assist the governments of the WEU member countries to move towards greater co-operation in their programmes and military investment expenditure.

The Council of WEU, which, under the terms of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, are the political decision-reaching body, wish to point out that they have always endeavoured to carry out fully and rigorously the tasks devolving upon them. In this spirit, they pay particularly close attention to the various aspects of the development of East-West relations and in this connection examine the possible sources of tension or crisis and the means of remedying them. This is also true of the North Atlantic Council. It is impossible to dissociate the security and welfare of the peoples living within the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty from events occurring in other parts of the world. The WEU member countries, therefore, support any machinery for concerted political action which would enable a common assessment to be made of crisis situations endangering international peace, whenever they consider it necessary. They point out, however, that it is up to each member country to define the contribution that it can make to establish a more stable and just international order.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1982.

RECOMMENDATION 375¹

on negotiations on theatre nuclear forces²

The Assembly,

- (i) Stressing the continued validity of Recommendation 367;
- (ii) Welcoming the Council's reply to Recommendation 367;
- (iii) Noting with concern the still growing number of Soviet land-based theatre nuclear forces in Europe;
- (iv) Fully aware that public opinion in Europe and particularly youth are moved by feelings of insecurity and are deeply concerned about the present high levels of nuclear weapons and about the dangers of a new and unlimited arms race;
- (v) Believing the growing expression of public concern about all aspects of nuclear weapons reveals also misunderstanding and a lack of objective information;
- (vi) Convinced that governments and parliament should pay continuous attention to the fact that security policy must rely on the trust and support of properly-informed public opinion, thereby stressing the point that only balanced and properly verifiable reductions are compatible with European security, and that such reductions will not be achieved without serious negotiations;
- (vii) Welcoming President Reagan's negotiating proposals of 18th November 1981;
- (viii) Welcoming the opening of talks on theatre nuclear forces in Geneva on 30th November 1981 and the view of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group that "on the basis of reciprocity the zero level remains a possible option under ideal circumstances";
- (ix) Stressing the importance of European-American co-operation in the Special Consultative Group;
- (x) Hoping that the negotiations in Geneva will provide the political impetus for a gradual development of a broad negotiating process on the limitation and reduction of all nuclear weapons and will lead to a decisive turn in the armaments race;
- (xi) Believing that the failure of the major nuclear weapons powers to introduce the reductions provided for in Article 6 of the non-proliferation treaty undermines the aims of that treaty, thereby diminishing the chances of establishing generally-respected full safeguards on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and even increasing one risk of nuclear war,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Call on member governments:

1. To urge the North Atlantic Council to continue to rely on the dual decision of 12th December 1979 on long-range theatre nuclear forces as a realistic basis for negotiating seriously on reductions in the levels of these weapons;
2. To ensure that the public acquires a better understanding of the real situation drawing among other sources on the report to be prepared "within the Alliance as soon as possible which would compare, for the information of the public, NATO and Warsaw Pact forces".

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1981 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session (11th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Motion for a Recommendation tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and others with a request for urgent procedure (Document 900).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 375***

1. The Council take careful note of the views of the Assembly expressed in their recommendation on negotiations on theatre nuclear forces (now known as intermediate-range nuclear forces). The Council echo the opinion of the Assembly on points made in the recommendation, in particular: concern about the growing number of Soviet land-based intermediate-range nuclear systems; the welcome extended by the Assembly to President Reagan's proposals announced on 18th November 1981; the importance of co-operation and consultation between the NATO allies concerned in discussion of intermediate-range nuclear forces in the Special Consultative Group as well as of the exchange of information in the North Atlantic Council.
2. The Council also welcome the attention paid by the Assembly to the importance of the public presentation of the policies of member countries both on defence and deterrence and on arms control.
3. Regarding the Assembly's recommendation that the North Atlantic Council should continue to rely on the double decision of 12th December 1979, the Council recall that it is the declared intention of the NATO allies concerned that they will move ahead with the December 1979 two-track decision on intermediate-range nuclear force modernisation and arms control. They reiterate the view expressed in December 1981 by the allies who participated in the 1979 double decision, namely that the dual-track decision opened the way to reducing the threat to the Alliance through intermediate-range nuclear force modernisation and arms control negotiations and that determination in implementing both tracks of the decision has been a key factor in convincing the Soviet Union to negotiate without preconditions, thus creating the opportunity of achieving genuine arms reductions.
4. The Council attach the greatest importance to the positions and attitudes of the publics in member countries on the subject of nuclear weapons and their arms control. They believe that an important and continuing task is the explanation of the defensive nature of the North Atlantic Alliance, the rationale behind the strategy of deterrence and the essential rôle of arms control. The task of explanation is all the greater in the light of the sustained Soviet propaganda campaign which aims to undercut public support for agreed objectives and policies of the Alliance. In their task of providing their publics with accurate information, members of the Council will rely on material from their own national sources and, for those who participated in the drafting of it, on material co-ordinated and agreed by the allies, in particular the forthcoming report which will compare NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1982.

RECOMMENDATION 376¹*on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology*²

The Assembly,

Referring to its Recommendation 316 on United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology, adopted in June 1978, and the Council's reply dated 16th November 1978;

Considering that some useful progress has been made in the development of European-American links in the military sector of industry;

Regretting that its proposal in Recommendation 316 for a high-level European-United States special committee to promote European-United States co-operation in advanced technology projects had been ignored by the governments concerned, although such a special committee could have played an important rôle in the co-ordination of advanced technology;

Considering the growing need to co-operate for economic, financial, political and military reasons, and, *inter alia*, because of budgetary restraints, with a view to avoiding overlapping in research programmes and needless delays and wastage of necessarily scarce financial resources;

Considering the slow start and development of transatlantic technology transfer because of difficulties in overcoming differences in standards;

Aware of the serious problems between NASA and ESA due to respective priorities with regard to scientific programmes such as the joint international solar-polar mission;

Conscious of the present American administration's stated willingness to inject new life into American-European collaboration in many fields of high technology,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments:

1. To study jointly how to bring military requirements into line with budgetary resources, for instance by the further joint development of new composite materials for military hardware, in order to halt the spiral of ever-increasing costs within military budgets, or by using an existing platform as was the case with the Boeing 707 and the Nimrod for AWACS or could be the Tornado for electronic jamming devices;
2. To study – in comparison with other systems – the various merits of the competing systems offered by the Lockheed/Dassault-Dornier Alpha-Jet trainer, the McDonnell Douglas/British Aerospace Hawk trainer and the Grumman-Beechcraft project for the jet flight training of American navy pilots (VTXTS programme);
3. To bear in mind the need for an up-to-date and as comprehensive as possible European military pilots' training system promoting harmonisation in the training systems and finally conclude that the best system should also be adopted generally in the European theatre;
4. To foster, within the framework of the International Energy Agency related to the OECD, where appropriate, a co-ordinated research and development programme, especially with regard to solar and wind energy which have to be funded by governments in order to avoid developments within national boundaries which fail to take account of developments in the same fields in other countries;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1981 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session (12th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Hill on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 889).

5. To invite the French Government to participate in the efforts in the International Energy Agency towards a collaborative and imaginative research and development programme;
6. To examine and use to good avail work carried out in the United States in its national wind energy programme;
7. To instruct their diplomatic missions in the United States to follow closely developments in respect of:
 - (a) the international solar-polar mission which should have priority for NASA funding as otherwise confidence would be lost in the future of American-European space collaboration;
 - (b) the use of Spacelab components or elements for building and developing future space stations or platforms;
 - (c) the use of European remote-sensing satellite systems first for oceanic observation and later for land resources surveillance;
 - (d) the space telescope programme;
8. With regard to the law of the sea conference, to seek to avoid a split between the policies of Western European nations on the one hand and between the attitudes of Europe and the United States on the other hand, and to reconcile the need for developing countries to have access to ocean resources, with the essential requirement of guaranteed access to scarce minerals vital to NATO's ongoing defence programme.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹*to Recommendation 376*

1. WEU member governments are well aware of the need to contain equipment costs and of the opportunities for economy which might be afforded by the use of new materials or the adaptation of existing weapons platforms. The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) which is the central focus for multinational European equipment co-operation and to which all WEU members belong is actively engaged in identifying opportunities of this type.
2. Member governments naturally examine the systems which industries have to offer but the ultimate decision as to which system best suits their requirements will be made by governments on the basis of their own evaluation of their needs.
3. It is recognised that there are many advantages in co-operation in pilot training and much has been achieved in this field. Pilots and navigators from three member countries together are learning to fly the new Tornado. And by 1984 twelve NATO nations who are members of Eurogroup will be represented at the Euro NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training establishment in the United States where they will undergo training according to a common syllabus.
4. The Council have reservations however about making judgments on the relative merits of different training systems. Nations have developed their training régimes over long periods to meet their perceived needs and the fact that practices differ does not necessarily mean that one system is superior to another.
5. The IEA implementing agreements enable the WEU member countries which participate in that body to co-ordinate work on solar and wind energy conversion systems funded by governments as well as by private enterprise.
6. The IEA implementing agreement on large-scale wind energy programmes already facilitates close co-operation between those states, including the WEU member states concerned and the United States, who have national programmes.
7.
 - (a) The diplomatic missions in the United States continue to follow closely developments in respect of the international solar-polar mission.
 - (b) Under an agreement signed in 1973 the United States Government are committed to using European-built spacelabs, components and spares where these are available in accordance with agreed schedules and at reasonable prices. The United States Government has also agreed not to duplicate the spacelab development.
 - (c) The European Space Agency are completing definition studies of a programme for an oceanic observation satellite ERS-1 which could be launched in 1987. The European partners welcome international collaboration in the development and utilisation of remote sensing of the earth. Later, as these developments become operational the establishment of reciprocal arrangements for the exchange of data or mutual access will be an important goal.
 - (d) The space telescope is due to be launched from the shuttle in late 1985 and will enable extensive stellar investigations to be made from outside the earth's atmosphere. NASA has indicated that it attaches high priority to this project for which ESA will be supplying the solar arrays and faint object camera.
8. Since the announcement by the United States Government in the spring of 1981 of a policy review there have been continuing consultations between European countries and with the United States Government about the Law of the Sea Conference. These exchanges of view have covered inter alia the deep sea mining provisions of the present draft convention. WEU member governments hope that an overall assessment of the balance of advantages of the present draft will be agreed and will continue to try to ensure that the outcome of negotiations will be satisfactory to all parties to the conference.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 7th April 1982.

RECOMMENDATION 377¹***on the implications of the law of the sea conference²***

The Assembly,

Considering that a single comprehensive treaty on the law of sea appears to be the best solution for all 160 participating countries because of the inter-relationship between all uses and activities connected with the oceans;

Aware that this approach to the negotiations on the law of the sea treaty means that vital security interests, commercial, scientific and general maritime interests, as well as environmental protection and dispute settlement procedures are all being interwoven, some interests offsetting others;

Considering that a successful outcome of the law of the sea conference and widespread adoption of the resultant treaty would extend the scope of the law – including agreed procedure for third party settlement of disputes – over two-thirds of the earth's surface and could thus avoid and prevent military conflicts, which is of the greatest interest to the western world;

Considering that all the 200-nautical-mile zones of the countries of the Warsaw Pact, their sea and ocean surfaces, add up to 4.56 million square kilometres whereas the NATO and other Western European countries and Japan together have an ocean and sea area of 28 million square kilometres in the northern hemisphere alone which is of great economic and strategic value;

Aware that the law of the sea conference has sought to cover the navigational, seabed mining and fishing interests of the participating countries although the results now achieved, especially in seabed mining arrangements, lean strongly towards dirigism and protectionism;

Regretting that the negotiations on seabed mining arrangements and related institutional problems have not yet produced results acceptable to the United States and some Western European countries such as Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To examine carefully the convention on the law of the sea as now laid down in the official text of the convention drawn up by the conference and its political and military aspects, since western maritime security requires a generally-accepted convention on the law of the sea;
2. To recognise the legitimate interests of third world countries in seabed mining and acknowledge their share in seabed resources of all kinds as part of the common heritage of mankind and convince them that a generally-accepted convention diminishes the danger of conflicts and promotes the establishment of peace;
3. To promote consultation between the main democratic industrialised countries and between member countries of the EEC on the remaining issues of the law of the sea conference, and especially on the deep-sea mining arrangements and institutional problems, in order to reach a common policy at the next, eleventh session in New York in spring 1982 with regard to acceptance of the results of the law of the sea conference.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1981 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session (12th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 890).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 377***

The Council welcome the interest taken by the Assembly in the third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. They share the views of the Assembly with regard to the great importance of this conference for the political, economic and security interests of the WEU member states.

The governments of the member states are prepared to continue the already existing intensive consultations among themselves and with all other states and groups of states represented in this conference, in order to reach a universally accepted international convention on the law of the sea. These consultations especially include NATO, the European Community and the third world countries.

Member governments are particularly aware of the advantages a new international convention on the law of the sea may have with respect to a better establishment of the rule of law on the world oceans for numerous aspects of the use of the seas outside and within maritime zones under national jurisdiction. Such rule of law can forestall in the future many difficulties and therefore constitutes a factor in maintaining peaceful and friendly relations between states. They are also aware of the importance of such a convention for relations between western industrialised countries and developing countries of the third world.

In spite of the fact that there are many items of the conference which are dealt with in the actual draft convention (of 28th August 1981) in a satisfactory manner, member governments consider, in accordance with the majority of states participating in the conference, that there are still some subjects of the conference which need further discussion. Acknowledging this fact the conference decided at its last session in Geneva in August 1981 to devote part of the 11th Session in New York (8th March to 30th April 1982) to continued informal negotiations.

The future régime for deep seabed-mining is among the subjects needing further discussion. A satisfactory international regulation of deep seabed-mining is strategically and economically of great importance especially for industrialised Western European countries which are highly dependent on imports of raw materials to be extracted from the deep seabed. A generally acceptable treaty is also important to the developing countries, inter alia because of the financial benefits they would gain from the sharing of revenues resulting from the exploitation of the raw materials concerned. WEU member governments are prepared to take part in a constructive manner in the forthcoming consultations and negotiations, with a view to setting up a fair régime for exploitation of the seabed, comprising a system of adequate access that takes into account all interests concerned.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th April 1982.

*Written questions 228 and 229 and reply
of the Council to written question 228*

QUESTION 228

*put by Mr. Mulley
on 15th December 1981*

In its reply to Recommendation 370, the Council stated that "the governments will continue to maintain a regular exchange of views on the assessment of developments in Poland and will consult in the appropriate fora on a common position".

Can the Council say what exchanges of views have been held between its members as a result of events in Poland on 13th December 1981 and what common position has it been possible to adopt?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 17th December 1981*

At their meeting on 16th December, the WEU Council expressed their deep and serious concern about developments in Poland. They assure the Assembly that the member states are in close contact and intend to remain so.

The Council take this opportunity to recall their reply to Recommendation 370 in which it is stated that the governments would continue to maintain a regular exchange of views on the assessment of developments in Poland and would consult in the appropriate fora on a common position.

Thus, the representatives of WEU member countries participated in discussions on the situation on 14th December in the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and on 14th and 16th December in the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. Moreover, the foreign ministers of the member countries participated in the meeting of the Ten in London on 14th and 15th December at the conclusion of which the following declaration was issued:

"1. The foreign ministers of the member states of the European Community are concerned at the development of the situation in Poland and the imposition of martial law and the detention of trade unionists. They have profound sympathy for the Polish people in this tense and difficult time. They look to all signatory states of the Helsinki Final Act to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of the Polish People's Republic. They look to Poland to solve these problems herself and without the use of force, so that the process of reform and renewal can continue.

2. Foreign ministers of the Ten are continuing to follow events in Poland with particular attention, and agreed to remain in close consultation on this question."

QUESTION 229

*put by Mr. Valleix
on 5th May 1982*

Two military transport aircraft, the Franco-German second-generation Transall and the Franco-Italian military version of the regional transport aircraft ATR-42, are to be built in the 1980s.

Are other member countries being invited to participate in the construction of one or both of these aircraft?

What will be the consequences of the construction of the aircraft for a possible military version of the Airbus?

What consequences will building the ATR-42 have for the possible building of a 150-seat Airbus (A-320)?

*
* *

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

Situation in the Middle East

MOTION FOR AN ORDER¹
tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and others
with a request for urgent procedure

The Assembly,
In view of the grave situation in the Middle East,

ASKS THE GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

To present a draft recommendation on that matter during the present part-session.

Signed: Bennett, Spies von Büllenheim, Valiante, Althammer, Eijsink, Atkinson, Günther Müller, De Poi, Reay, Stainton, Hawkins, Knight, Lenzer, Pack, Giust, Agrimi, Sprung, Page

1. See 1st sitting, 14th June 1982 (urgent procedure and order agreed to).

Situation in the Middle East

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION¹
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Mr. Della Briotta, Rapporteur

The Assembly,

Deploring the outbreak of war in the Middle East;

Recalling WEU Recommendations 341 and 349 adopted by the Assembly by overwhelming majorities;

Endorsing Resolutions 508 and 509 of the United Nations Security Council;

Recalling its often-repeated condemnation of acts of terrorism anywhere in the world and asserting that retaliatory military actions, especially those involving the maiming and killing of innocent civilian population, are totally unacceptable;

Noting that the establishment of lasting peace in the area is essential for Europe's security and for stability in the world ;

Regretfully noting that the provisions of the Camp David accord relating to the future status of the Palestinians have still not been carried into effect;

Considering that the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government over the whole Lebanese territory is essential for the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East;

Wishing its General Affairs Committee to follow developments in the Middle East and to report to it at its next session,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Express clearly Europe's determination to uphold Lebanon's sovereignty and to assist in its restoration;
2. Condemn unreservedly the present Israeli aggression and call for the evacuation of all non-Lebanese armed forces from Lebanon other than the United Nations interim force in Lebanon which should be strengthened;
3. Recall that the problems of maintaining peace in the Middle East cannot be solved without ensuring the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination within a national territory and recognising the right of the state of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers.

1. Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee: Sir Frederic Bennett (Chairman); MM. De Poi (Alternate: Cavaliere), Urwin (Vice-Chairman); Mr. Ahrens (Alternate: Pensky), Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Berrier, Bertile, Della Briotta, Conti Persini, De Bondt, van Eekelen (Alternate: Blaauw),*

Gessner, Hardy, Kurt Jung, Lagneau, Lagorce, Lord McNair, MM. Mangelschots, Mommersteeg (Alternate: Scholten), Günther Müller (Alternate: Kittelmann), Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Thoss (Alternate: Glesener), Valiante, Vecchietti, Wilquin.

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.

Situation in the Middle East

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Blaauw, Lord McNair and Mr. van den Bergh

1. In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "war" and insert "hostilities".

Signed: Blaauw, McNair, van den Bergh

1. See 6th sitting, 17th June 1982 (amendment negated).

Situation in the Middle East

AMENDMENTS 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6¹
tabled by Mr. Blaauw and Lord McNair

2. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “especially those involving the maiming and killing of innocent civilian population,”.
3. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “totally unacceptable” and insert “no solution to this ghastly phenomenon;”.
4. Leave out the sixth paragraph of the preamble and insert a new paragraph as follows:
“ Welcoming the progress so far of the Camp David accord and pressing for speedy solutions in that framework to the problem concerning the future status of the Palestinians; ”.
5. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “ aggression ” insert “ and the indiscriminate rocketing and shelling of civilians in the north of Israel by the PLO ”.
6. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert “in mandate, in area of operation and in strength;”.

Signed: Blaauw, McNair

1. See 6th sitting, 17th June 1982 (amendments 2, 4 and 6 negatived; amendments 3 and 5 withdrawn).

Situation in the Middle East

AMENDMENTS 7, 8 and 9¹
tabled by Dr. Miller

7. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 2 and insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Deeply regret the present Israeli intervention in Lebanon while recognising the extreme provocation over many years of PLO rocket attacks on Israeli villages resulting in the death of innocent civilians and call for the evacuation from Lebanon of all non-Lebanese armed forces other than a greatly strengthened and more effective United Nations interim force as soon as possible;”.

8. In paragraph 3 of draft recommendation proper, leave out from “solved” to the end and insert “without recognising the right of the state of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers, and the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination”.

9. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Condemn unreservedly all terrorist activities.”.

Signed: Miller

1. See 6th sitting, 17th June 1982 (amendments 7 and 8 negatived; amendment 9 withdrawn).

Situation in the Middle East

AMENDMENTS 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15¹
tabled by Mr. Dejardin

10. At the end of the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add “due to the invasion of the sovereign state of Lebanon by the armed forces of Israel;”.
11. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “innocent”.
12. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “is” and, at the end, add “implies the *de facto* recognition of the Palestinian people in national rights, as well as the right of each people of the area to live in peace;”.
13. Leave out the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Regretting the refusal of Israel to respect wholly the Camp David accords in not following up the provisions concerning the status of the Palestinians;”.
14. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “evacuation” to the end and insert “of the Israeli armed forces as well as the reinforcement of the United Nations peace-keeping force in Lebanon;”.
15. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Propose the adoption of economic sanctions against Israel, such as an embargo on delivery of weapons and munitions and the import of Israeli products, so long as Israeli troops remain on Lebanese territory. ”.

Signed: Dejardin

1. See 6th sitting, 17th June 1982 (amendments negatived).

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