

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-EIGHTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

November 1982

IV

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tel. 723.54.32

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-EIGHTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

November 1982

IV

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

The proceedings of the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
List of representatives and substitutes	8
 Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings :	
Seventh sitting	12
Text adopted	15
Eighth sitting	18
Ninth sitting	21
Text adopted	26
Tenth sitting	27
Texts adopted	31
Eleventh sitting	34
Text adopted	37
Twelfth sitting	38
Texts adopted	42
 Official report of debates:	
Seventh sitting	46
Eighth sitting	71
Ninth sitting	95
Tenth sitting	127
Eleventh sitting	151
Twelfth sitting	175
 Index	 202

LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSSENS Hugo	Socialist
BONNEL Raoul	PVV
DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
Mrs. HERMAN-MICHELSENS Lucienne	PVV
MM. MANGELSCHOTS Jan	Socialist
MICHEL Joseph	PSC
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP

Substitutes

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	Socialist
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
HOYAUX Jacques	Socialist
LAGNEAU André	PRL
STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP
VAN DER ELST Frans	Volksunie

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BERRIER Noël	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF/CDS
DURAFFOUR Paul	Soc. (App.)
FRÉCHE Georges	Socialist
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
MAYOUD Alain	UDF
OEHLER Jean-André	Socialist
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
PONCELET Christian	RPR
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
SPÉNALE Georges	Socialist
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
VIAL-MASSAT, Théo	Communist
WILQUIN Claude	Socialist

Substitutes

MM. BARTHE, Jean-Jacques	Communist
BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BEIX Roland	Socialist
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BERTILE Wilfrid	Socialist
BIZET Émile	RPR (App.)
DELEHEDDE André	Socialist

MM. FORTIER Marcel	RPR
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
JAGER René	UCDF
JOXE Pierre	Socialist
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LE MONTAGNER Louis	UCDP
MÉNARD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left
PROUVOST Pierre	Socialist
ROSSINOT André	UDF

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ALTHAMMER Walter	CDU/CSU
BARDENS Hans	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
GESSNER Manfred-Achim	SPD
JUNG Kurt	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
MÄNNING Peter	SPD
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hermann	SPD
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
SPRUNG Rudolf	CDU/CSU
UNLAND Hermann Joseph	CDU/CSU
VOHRER Manfred	FDP

Substitutes

MM. BAHN Egon	SPD
EICKMEYER Karl-Arnold	SPD
HACKEL Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
HORN Erwin	SPD
JÄGER Claus	CDU/CSU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
Mrs. PACK Doris	CDU/CSU
MM. PENSKY Heinz	SPD
RÖSCH Klaus	FDP
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHLÜCKEBIER Günter	SPD
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
SCHWARZ Heinz	CDU/CSU
TOPMANN Günter	SPD
WITTMANN Fritz	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AGRIMI Alessandro	Chr. Dem.
ANTONI Varese	Communist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FORMA Renzo	Chr. Dem.
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
Mrs. GHERBEZ Gabriella	Communist
MM. MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
MONDINO Giorgio	Socialist
PECCHIOLO Ugo	Communist
PETRILLI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
RUBBI António	Communist
TRIPODI Antonio	MSI-DN
VALIANTE Mario	Chr. Dem.
VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM. AJELLO Aldo	Radical
AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
BENEDIKTER Johann Hans	SVP
CAFIERO Luca	PDUP
CALICE Giovanni	Communist
CONTI PERSINI Gianfranco	PSDI
DELLA BRIOTTA Libero	Socialist
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
GUNNELLA Aristide	Republican
MARTINO Leopoldo Attilio	Communist
ORIONE Franco Luigi	Chr. Dem.
PATRIARCA Francesco	Chr. Dem.
POZZO Cesare	MSI-DN
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
Mrs. ROSOLEN Angela Maria	Communist
MM. SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STERPA Egidio	Liberal

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. BERCHEM Albert	Dem.
MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
THOSS Maurice	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM. GLESENER Jean-Pierre	Soc. Chr.
HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
PRUSSEN Robert	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
van den BERGH Harry	Labour
van EEKELEN Willem	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA

Substitutes

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth	Labour
MM. BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
MERTENS Chel	Democrats 66
van der SANDEN Piet	CDA
van der WERFF Ymenus P.W.	Liberal
WORRELL Joop	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Mr. Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Thomas COX	Labour
Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr. James HILL	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
Mr. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr. Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr. Maurice MILLER	Labour
MM. Fred MULLEY	Labour
President of the Assembly John PAGE	Conservative
Lord REAY	Conservative
MM. Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Thomas URWIN	Labour

Substitutes

MM. David ATKINSON	Conservative
Ronald BROWN	SDP
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Anthony DURANT	Conservative
Kenneth EASTHAM	Labour
Robert EDWARDS	Labour
Sir Russell FAIRGRIEVE	Conservative
MM. Raymond FLETCHER	Labour
Edward GARRETT	Labour
Harry GOURLAY	Labour
Ralph HOWELL	Conservative
Lord McNAIR	Liberal
Mr. John MORRIS	Labour
Lord NORTHFIELD	Labour
MM. John OSBORN	Conservative
Laurence PAVITT	Labour
Keith STAINTON	Conservative
John WILKINSON	Conservative

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 29th November 1982

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|---|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Resumption of the session and adoption of the minutes.2. Examination of credentials.3. Address by the President of the Assembly.4. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 925). | <ol style="list-style-type: none">5. Revision of Rules 10, 14, 29, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40 and 43 of the Rules of Procedure (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 931</i>).6. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 934</i>). |
|---|---|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session and adoption of the minutes

The President announced the resumption of the twenty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly.

The minutes of proceedings of the sixth sitting on Thursday, 17th June 1982, were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stating that that Assembly had ratified the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 7.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, and subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of:

- Mr. Hackel as a substitute member for the Federal Republic of Germany in place of Mr. Lorenz;

- Mr. Schwarz as a substitute member for the Federal Republic of Germany in place of Mr. Hans-Werner Müller;
- Mr. Hengel as a substitute member for Luxembourg in place of Mr. Krieps.

4. Tributes

The President paid tribute to Mr. Calamandrei, Vice-Chairman of the Italian Delegation, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, Mr. Gonella and Mr. Périquier, former members of the Assembly, and Mr. Mendès-France.

5. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

6. Observers

The President welcomed as observers Mr. Syse and Mr. Berge of the Norwegian Storting.

7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session

(Doc. 925)

The Assembly agreed to the draft order of business for the second part of the session.

8. *Changes in the membership of committees*

In accordance with Rule 8 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees proposed by the Netherlands Delegation:

- Mr. Aarts as alternate member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in place of Mr. van der Sanden;
- Mr. van der Sanden as alternate member of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges in place of Mr. Aarts.

9. *Revision of Rules 10, 14, 29, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40 and 43 of the Rules of Procedure*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 931)

The report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was presented by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Pignion and Brown.

Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution.

The draft resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This resolution will be published as No. 68)¹.

10. *Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 934)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur.

Mr. Pignion, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Grant, Smith, Atkinson, Müller, Spies von Büllenheim and Morris.

Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Osborn, Rubbi, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Jager, Mrs. Knight, MM. Cavaliere and Hardy.

The debate was adjourned.

11. *Date and time of the next sitting*

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 30th November, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.10 p.m.

1. See page 15.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Kittelmann <i>Pensky</i> (Männing) Müller Reddemann <i>Eickmeyer</i> (Schulte) Spies von Büllesheim	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens <i>Van der Elst</i> (Bonnell) Dejardin Michel	Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Sprung)	MM. <i>Eysink</i> (Aarts) van den Bergh <i>Blaauw</i> (van Eekelen) Stoffelen
Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Unland Vohrer	Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Tummers) Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Caro Duraffour <i>Jager</i> (Jeambrun) Lagorce Pignion	MM. Bernini Cavaliere De Poi <i>Orione</i> (Foschi) Fosson Mrs. Gherbez	MM. <i>Brown</i> (Beith) <i>Atkinson</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett) Cox Grant Grieve Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins
Federal Republic of Germany	MM. <i>Martino</i> (Pecchioli) Rubbi Valiante	MM. <i>Stainton</i> (Hill) <i>Morris</i> (Lord Hughes) <i>Osborn</i> (Jessel) Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Garrett</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller Mr. Page Lord Reay MM. Smith Urwin
MM. Ahrens Althammer Böhm Büchner Enders Gessner <i>Rösch</i> (Jung, Kurt)	Luxembourg Mr. Thoss	
The following representatives apologised for their absence:		
Belgium	MM. Spénale Valleix Vial-Massat Wilquin	MM. Forma Maravalle Mondino Petrilli Tripodi Vecchietti
France	Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg
MM. Baumel Berrier Frêche Jung, Louis Mayoud Oehler Poncelet Schleiter Sénès	MM. Bardens Schmidt, Hermann	MM. Berchem Margue
	Italy	Netherlands
	MM. Agrimi Antoni Bonalumi	Mr. Scholten

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RESOLUTION 68***on the revision of Rules 10, 14, 29, 34, 35, 36,
38, 40 and 43 of the Rules of Procedure***

The Assembly,

DECIDES

To draft Rules 10, 14, 29, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40 and 43 as follows:

1. *Rule 10*

Paragraph 6 shall read:

“ The six Vice-Presidents shall then be elected on the same ballot paper. Those who on the first ballot obtain the votes of a number of Representatives or Substitutes equal to more than half the number of the Representatives to the Assembly shall be declared elected. If the number of those elected is less than the number of vacancies to be filled, a second ballot for the remaining vacancies shall be held following the same procedure. If a third ballot is necessary, those candidates who then receive the greatest number of votes cast shall be declared elected. In the event of a tie, the candidates senior in age shall be elected. The Vice-Presidents shall take precedence in accordance with the order in which they have been elected and, in the event of a tie, by age. ”

Paragraph 7 shall read:

“ If the number of candidates does not exceed the number of posts to be filled and there are no objections, the candidates shall be declared elected. In this case, the Vice-Presidents shall take precedence in accordance with their age even if they have not been nominated simultaneously. ”

2. *Rule 14*

Paragraph 1 shall read:

“ The Presidential Committee shall consist of the President of the Assembly, who shall be Chairman ex officio, his predecessors as long as they remain Representatives or Substitutes of the Assembly without interruption, the Vice-Presidents, and the Chairmen of the permanent committees. If absent, or unable to discharge his duties, the President may be replaced by one of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, and the Chairman of a permanent committee by a Vice-Chairman of that committee. The President may invite the Chairmen of the political groups to attend meetings of the Presidential Committee. ”

3. *Rule 29*

Paragraph 2 shall read:

“ Amendments must be signed by their author. Amendments shall, if time permits, be printed and distributed before their consideration by the Assembly. The President shall have the power not to select amendments for consideration if, in his opinion, there has not been adequate time for members of the Assembly to study such amendments. ”

Paragraph 3 shall read:

“ Amendments shall relate directly to the text which it is sought to alter. Unless otherwise decided by the President of the Assembly, they shall relate to only one paragraph at a time. ”

Paragraph 8 shall read:

“ The reference back of an amendment to committee may always be requested and shall be obligatory if requested by the Chairman or Rapporteur of the committee. ”

The French text of paragraph 9 shall read:

“ Le renvoi d'un amendement à la commission n'interrompt pas nécessairement la discussion. L'Assemblée peut impartir à la commission un délai dans lequel elle devra présenter ses conclusions sur les amendements renvoyés. ”, the English text not being revised.

Add a paragraph 10 as follows:

“ When amendments are being considered, unless the President of the Assembly decides otherwise, the only members who may speak shall be the mover of the amendment, or another member speaking in its favour, one member opposed to the amendment and the Rapporteur or the Committee Chairman. ”

4. *Rule 34*

Rule 34 shall read:

“ 1. The Assembly shall vote by sitting and standing except in cases where a roll-call vote or secret ballot is required.

2. The Assembly shall vote by roll-call:

(a) when an absolute majority is required, in accordance with Rule 35, 1 (a), of the Rules of Procedure;

(b) on the draft reply to the annual report and on a draft recommendation or opinion considered as a whole, whenever five or more Representatives or Substitutes present in the chamber so desire;

(c) in other cases, whenever ten or more Representatives or Substitutes present in the chamber so desire.

3. The roll shall be called in alphabetical order, beginning with the name of a Representative drawn by lot. Voting shall be by word of mouth and shall be expressed by “ Yes ”, “ No ”, or “ I abstain ”. Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast. The President shall be responsible for the counting of votes and shall announce the result. The votes shall be recorded in the minutes of the proceedings of the sitting in the alphabetical order of Representatives' names.

4. Voting on nominations shall take place by secret ballot. Only those ballot papers bearing the names of persons who have been duly entered as candidates shall be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the number of votes cast. ”

5. *Rule 35*

Rule 35 shall read:

“ 1. The majorities required are the following:

(a) for the adoption of amendments to the Charter, for the adoption of a motion to disagree to the annual report or to any part of the report or for the adoption of a request for urgent procedure without prior reference to committee: a number of Representatives or Substitutes equal to more than half the number of Representatives to the Assembly;

(b) for any other decision: a majority of the votes cast;

(c) for appointments other than those provided for in Rule 10 above: an absolute majority of votes cast at the first ballot and a relative majority at the second ballot.

2. Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast. ”

6. Rule 36

Rule 36 shall read:

“ 1. The Assembly shall not take any decision by roll-call unless more than half of the Representatives to the Assembly or their Substitutes have signed the register of attendance provided for in Rule 24 above.

2. All votes other than votes by roll-call shall be valid, whatever the number of Representatives or Substitutes present, unless, at the request of a Representative or Substitute before the voting has begun, the President has ascertained that the number of Representatives or Substitutes who have signed the register of attendance is less than a quorum.

3. In the absence of a quorum, the vote shall be postponed. It may be taken at any time once there is a quorum. Any matter on which it has not been possible to vote before the end of the part-session in the absence of a quorum shall be referred to the Presidential Committee, which shall decide whether the text should be put to the vote at the next part-session of the Assembly or referred back to committee. ”

7. Rule 38

The French text of paragraph 4 shall read:

“ Un groupe ne peut comprendre moins de neufs Représentants ou Suppléants ”, the English text not being revised.

8. Rule 40

Paragraph 1 shall read:

“ Committees shall examine questions and documents which are referred to them by the Assembly or by the Presidential Committee. ”

9. Rule 43

Paragraph 6 shall read:

“ Any request for urgent procedure without prior reference to committee shall be put to the vote by roll-call. Its adoption shall require a favourable vote by a number of Representatives or Substitutes equal to more than half the number of Representatives to the Assembly. ”

EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 30th November 1982

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism (*Resumed debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 934 and amendments*).

2. Address by Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the Appendix

3. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of the General Affairs Committee proposed by the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany:

- Mr. Rösch as a member in place of Mr. Kurt Jung;
- Mr. Böhm as an alternate member in place of Mr. Lorenz.

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration proposed by the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany:

- Mr. Schwarz as an alternate member in place of Mr. Müller;

and by the Luxembourg Delegation:

- Mr. Hengel as a member in place of Mr. Krieps.

4. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 934 and amendments)

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: Dr. Miller, MM. Michel and Büchner.

Mr. Pignion, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speaker: Mr. Brown.

In accordance with Rule 24 of the Rules of Procedure, the President directed Mr. Brown to resume his seat as he had not signed the register of attendance.

Speakers: MM. Böhm, Prussen and Benedikter.

Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Urwin and Brown.

Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur, and Sir Frederic Bennett, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

5. Address by Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence

Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Hernu replied to questions put by Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Vohrer, van den Bergh, Morris, Cavaliere and Wilkinson.

6. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism

(Vote on the draft recommendation Doc. 934 and amendments)

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

1. In the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "very" and "many".

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere, Dejardin and Lagorce.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 11) was tabled by Mr. Spies von Bülllesheim and Mrs. Knight:

11. In the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "very".

Amendment 11 was not moved.

An amendment (No. 12) was tabled by Mr. Spies von Bülllesheim and Mrs. Knight:

12. In the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "negative" insert "as well as probable".

Speakers: Mrs. Knight, Mr. Dejardin; (point of order): Lord Reay, Mrs. Knight, Sir Frederic Bennett; MM. Dejardin and Lagorce.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

2. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "designed" and insert "intended".

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere, Dejardin and Lagorce.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

3. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "might cause those negotiations to fail" and insert "would cause those negotiations to fail and would".

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere, Morris and Lagorce.

The amendment was agreed to.

Consideration of the draft recommendation was adjourned.

7. Date and time of the next sitting

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Enders <i>Horn</i> (Gessner) <i>Rösch</i> (Jung, Kurt) Kittelmann Müller Spies von Büllenheim	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens <i>Van der Elst</i> (Bonnel) Dejardin <i>De Bondt</i> (Mrs. Herman-Michielsens) <i>Hoyaux</i> (Mangelschots) Michel Mrs. Staels-Dompas	Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Sprung) Mr. Unland	MM. <i>Eysink</i> (Aarts) van den Bergh <i>Blaauw</i> (van Eekelen) <i>van der Werff</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Tummers) Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra
	Italy	United Kingdom
France	MM. <i>Orione</i> (Antoni) Bernini <i>De Poi</i> (Bonalumi) Cavaliere <i>Benedikter</i> (De Poi) Fosson Mrs. Gherbez	Mr. <i>Brown</i> (Beith) Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Cox Sir <i>Russell Fairgrieve</i> (Grant)
MM. Baumel Berrier Duraffour <i>Jager</i> (Jeambrun) Lagorce Pignion <i>Ménard</i> (Schleiter) <i>Bassinat</i> (Spénale)	MM. <i>Martino</i> (Pecchioli) Rubbi Tripodi Valiante Vecchiotti	MM. Grieve Hardy <i>Howell</i> (Sir Paul Hawkins) Hill <i>Morris</i> (Lord Hughes) <i>Durant</i> (Jessel) Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Pavitt</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller Mr. Page Lord Reay MM. Smith Urwin
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Althammer <i>Pensky</i> (Bardens) Böhm Büchner	MM. <i>Prussen</i> (Berchem) Margue <i>Glesener</i> (Thoss)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Vial-Massat Wilquin	MM. Schulte Vohrer
MM. Caro Frêche Jung, Louis Mayoud Oehler Poncelet Sénès Valleix	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy
	MM. Ahrens Männing Reddemann Schmidt, Hermann	MM. Agrimi Forma Foschi Maravalle Mondino Petrilli

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 30th November 1982

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>1. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism (<i>Resumed consideration of and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 934 and amendments</i>).</p> <p>2. European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia (<i>Presentation of and debate on the</i></p> | <p><i>report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 927 and amendments</i>).</p> <p>3. Address by Mr. Fioret, Under-Secretary of State to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.</p> |
|--|--|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. *Adoption of the minutes*

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. *Attendance register*

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. *Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism*

(Resumed consideration of the draft recommendation, Doc. 934 and amendments)

Consideration of the draft recommendation was resumed.

An amendment (No. 9) was tabled by Mrs. Knight and others:

9. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "Europe's security" insert "and deploring the growing evidence of Soviet involvement with and funding of pacifist movements pursuing unilateral disarmament in the West".

Speakers: Mrs. Knight, Mr. Hardy, Mrs. Knight (point of order) and Mr. Lagorce.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

4. In the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "in East and West".

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere and Lagorce.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

8. In the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "anyhow".

Speakers: MM. Hardy and Lagorce.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

5. In the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "third world" insert "including the Latin American countries".

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere, Lagorce, and Urwin (point of order).

The amendment was negated.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

6. In the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "each Western European country" and insert "a few Western European countries".

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere, Blaauw and Lagorce.

The amendment was negated.

An amendment (No. 14) was tabled by Mr. Lagorce:

14. Add an eleventh paragraph to the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows:

“Regretting that Recommendation 379 on the activation of the WEU Council and its dependent bodies has not been effectively followed up by the Council.”

Speaker: Mr. Lagorce.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 15) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

15. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “Follow attentively and encourage participating states” and insert “Demand that participating states strive”.

Speakers: MM. Hardy and Lagorce.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 10) was tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim and Mrs. Knight:

10. In line 3 of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “level” to the end of the paragraph.

Speakers: MM. Spies von Büllenheim, Cavaliere, Lagorce and Spies von Büllenheim.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 16) was tabled by Mr. Lagorce to the French text only:

16. In line 4 of the French text of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “*que tant que*” and insert “*qu'aussi longtemps que*”.

Speaker: Mr. Lagorce.

The amendment was agreed to.

Amendments (Nos. 7 and 13) were tabled respectively by Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Smith:

7. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add “within the time limit laid down in the NATO decision of December 1979”.

13. In line 4 of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “attained” add “within the framework of the NATO twofold decision of December 1979”.

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere, Smith and Lagorce.

Amendment 7 was agreed to.

Amendment 13 was not moved.

The vote on the amended draft recommendation was deferred.

4. Address by Mr. Fioret, Under-Secretary of State to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Mr. Fioret, Under-Secretary of State to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Fioret replied to questions put by MM. De Poi and Page.

5. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism

(Vote on the amended draft recommendation, Doc. 934)

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 388)¹.

Speakers (explanation of vote): MM. Blaauw, Rubbi and Lord McNair.

6. European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 927 and amendments)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Lord Reay, Rapporteur.

Mr. Berchem, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Atkinson, Vecchiotti, Dr. Miller, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Cavaliere, Lord McNair, MM. Michel, McGuire and Bassinet.

Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Garrett and Reddemann.

The President announced that due to an accident Mr. Möllemann, Minister of State at the German Foreign Office, would not address the Assembly as planned tomorrow, and expressed his best wishes for a speedy recovery.

Lord Reay, Rapporteur, and Sir Frederic Bennett, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

¹. See page 26.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

1. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "the occupation of Lebanon by the" insert "PLO".

Speakers: Mr. Cavaliere and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 20) was tabled by Mr. Blaauw:

20. In line 1 of the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "it" insert "anyhow".

Speakers: MM. Blaauw, Grieve and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 19) was tabled by Mr. Blaauw:

19. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "unity" to the end of the paragraph.

Speakers: Mr. Blaauw, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Blaauw.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

2. Leave out the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Speakers: Mr. Cavaliere, Lord Reay and Mr. Cavaliere.

The amendment was negatived.

Amendments (Nos. 18 and 3) were tabled respectively by Mr. Enders and Mr. Cavaliere:

18. Leave out the ninth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

"Welcoming the fact that the final act adopted by the heads of Arab states at their meeting in Fez on 9th September 1982 contains elements of substance which show considerable progress towards the application of Resolution 242;".

3. In the ninth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "considerable progress towards the application of Resolution 242" and insert "progress towards the re-establishment of peace in the Middle East".

Speakers: MM. Enders, Cavaliere and Lord Reay.

Amendment 18 was agreed to.

Amendment 3 was not moved.

Amendments (Nos. 4 and 21) were tabled respectively by Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Blaauw:

4. Leave out the tenth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

21. Leave out the tenth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Speakers: Mr. Cavaliere, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Reddemann.

Amendment 4 was negatived.

Amendment 21 was not moved.

Amendments (Nos. 22 and 26) were tabled respectively by Mr. Blaauw and Mr. Bassinet:

22. In line 1 of the eleventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "the only" and insert "an".

26. In line 1 of the eleventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "only" and insert "most important".

Speakers: MM. Blaauw, Bassinet, Grieve, Blaauw, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Durant.

The amendments were negatived.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

5. At the end of the eleventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add "provided it abandons its military structure".

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere, Vecchietti and Lord Reay.

The amendment was negatived.

Amendments (Nos. 13 and 14) were tabled by Lord McNair:

13. In line 1 of the twelfth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "not" insert "finally".

14. In line 2 of the twelfth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "problem" to the end of the paragraph and add "and may meanwhile have disadvantageous consequences for the host countries;".

Speakers: Lord McNair and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The amendments were negatived.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

6. After the fifteenth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Condemning recourse to chemical weapons and the continual massacres of the civilian population in Afghanistan,”.

Speakers: Mr. Cavaliere and Lord Reay.

The amendment was agreed to.

Amendments (Nos. 7 and 10) were tabled respectively by Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Dejardin:

7. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “aimed at” to the end of the paragraph and add “solving the problems which now constitute obstacles to the re-establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East;”.

10. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after “applying” insert “United Nations resolutions on the Palestinian question, including”.

Speakers: Mr. Cavaliere and Lord Reay.

Amendment 7 was negatived.

Amendment 10 was not moved.

An amendment (No. 23) was tabled by Mr. Blaauw:

23. In line 2 of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “the” insert “present, internationally-recognised”.

Speakers: MM. Blaauw, Vecchietti and Lord Reay.

The amendment was negatived.

Consideration of the draft recommendation was adjourned.

7. Date and time of the next sitting

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 1st December, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.55 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	MM. <i>van der Werff</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen
MM. Adriaensens <i>Van der Elst</i> (Bonnell) <i>De Bondt</i> (Mrs. Herman-Michielsens) Michel Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. <i>Orione</i> (Antoni) Bernini Cavaliere De Poi Fosson Mrs. Gherbez MM. <i>Martino</i> (Pecchioli) Rubbi Tripodi Valiante Vecchietti	Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Tummers) Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra
France		United Kingdom
MM. Lagorce Pignion <i>Bassinat</i> (Spénale)		Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Cox Sir <i>Russell Fairgrieve</i> (Grant)
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	MM. Grieve Hardy <i>Atkinson</i> (Sir Paul Hawkins) Hill <i>Morris</i> (Lord Hughes) <i>Durant</i> (Jessel)
MM. <i>Pensky</i> (Bardens) Böhm Büchner Enders <i>Horn</i> (Gessner) Kittelmann Müller Reddemann Spies von Büllenheim <i>Hackel</i> (Sprung) Unland Vohrer	MM. Berchem Margue <i>Prussen</i> (Thoss)	Mrs. Knight Mr. McGuire Dr. Miller MM. <i>Garrett</i> (Mulley) Page Lord Reay MM. Smith Urwin
	Netherlands	
	MM. <i>Eysink</i> (Aarts) van den Bergh <i>Blaauw</i> (van Eekelen)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Mayoud Oehler Poncelet Schleiter Sénès Valleix Vial-Massat Wilquin	MM. Jung, Kurt Männing Schmidt, Hermann Schulte
MM. Dejardin Mangelschots		
France		Italy
MM. Baumel Berrier Caro Duraffour Frêche Jeambrun Jung, Louis	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Agrimi Bonalumi Forma Foschi Maravalle Mondino Petrilli
	MM. Ahrens Althammer	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 388***on the problems for European security
arising from pacifism and neutralism***

The Assembly,

Considering that the development of neutralist and pacifist movements in Europe and throughout the world makes it all the more necessary to examine the justification of the security, defence and disarmament policy pursued by the western countries;

Noting that deterrence, which is the basis of this policy, depends largely on the existence of strategic nuclear weapons;

Considering that implementation of the NATO twofold decision of December 1979 is encountering negative reactions from citizens of WEU member countries;

Welcoming the opening of the START negotiations – including the part of the Geneva negotiations on so-called Eurostrategic weapons – and the resumption or revival of other negotiations designed to reduce the level of forces and armaments in Europe and elsewhere;

Considering that unilateral initiatives in disarmament matters would cause those negotiations to fail and would jeopardise the foundations of Europe's security and deploring the growing evidence of Soviet involvement with and funding of pacifist movements pursuing unilateral disarmament in the West;

Considering that pacifist movements are entitled to call for new initiatives from the members of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact to achieve substantial progress in the negotiations on disarmament;

Considering that assistance to the third world is morally, economically and politically essential for all industrialised countries, quite apart from any considerations relating to their defence budgets;

Noting that the situation of each Western European country forces each country to shape its defence policy and attitude towards disarmament according to its own particular conditions and strongly influences the course followed by pacifist movements;

Considering nevertheless that any serious progress towards European political union requires close co-ordination of national policies in these fields;

Considering that WEU is an appropriate framework for consultations between the European members of the Atlantic Alliance on all matters relating to defence and disarmament;

Regretting that Recommendation 379 on the activation of the WEU Council and its dependent bodies has not been effectively followed up by the Council,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Demand that participating states strive to ensure the success of the various ongoing negotiations on the limitation or reduction of armaments and forces in Europe and in the rest of the world;
2. Announce its unambiguous support for any proposal for the complete renunciation by the United States and the Soviet Union of medium-range nuclear weapons or, failing that, for the establishment of a true balance at the lowest possible level and to agree to the deployment of such weapons on the territory of member countries only as long as this goal has not been attained within the time limit laid down in the NATO decision of December 1979;
3. Ensure that full, accurate and objective information on the levels of forces and armaments of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact is regularly made public;
4. Ensure that in any event Western Europe's development assistance policy is pursued and strengthened, particularly in the framework of the European Communities;
5. Effectively concert the defence policies of member countries and their positions towards disarmament with a view to working out a European approach to such matters.

TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 1st December 1982

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia (*Resumed consideration of and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 927 and amendments*).
2. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1983 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 932 and amendment*).
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 – the Auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presen-*
- tation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 926 and addendum*).
4. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1982 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft opinion, Doc. 933*).
5. State of European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 936 and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia

(Resumed consideration of and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 927 and amendments)

Consideration of the draft recommendation was resumed.

An amendment (No. 15) was tabled by Lord McNair:

15. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after "people" add "and to all foreign minorities in Lebanon which require it".

Speakers: Lord McNair and Lord Reay.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 11) was tabled by Mr. Dejardin:

11. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "to complete" to the end of the paragraph and insert "and to publish in full the conclusions of the inquiry into the massacres at Sabra and Chatila".

Speakers: Mr. Dejardin and Lord Reay.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 24) was tabled by Mr. Blaauw:

24. In line 3 of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add "call on the Lebanese Government to complete their inquiry into the Beirut massacre and to publish a full report on the inquiry".

Speakers: Mr. Blaauw, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Blaauw.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 16) was tabled by Lord McNair:

16. After paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

"Remind the Lebanese Government of its obligations under the universal declaration of

rights towards those whom it has arrested or detained;”.

Speakers: Lord McNair, Mr. Grieve and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 17) was tabled by Lord McNair:

17. Leave out paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper and insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Request the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

(i) urgently to study the feasibility of removing from Lebanon all Palestinians who are willing to leave and of transporting them, without prejudice to their eventual destination, to any countries willing to receive them, and

(ii) to implement such a plan if found to be possible,

while nevertheless reaffirming its belief that eventually a Palestinian homeland is both inevitable and desirable;”.

Speakers: Lord McNair, Mr. Wilkinson and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

8. After paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Call for the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan;”.

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere, Vecchietti and Lord Reay.

The amendment was agreed to.

Amendments (Nos. 25, 27 and 9) were tabled respectively by Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Wilkinson and others and Mr. Cavaliere:

25. Leave out paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper.

27. In line 1 of paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “Government” and insert “régime”.

9. In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, after “connection with the Afghan Government” insert “and to assist the Afghan resistance movement”.

Speakers: MM. Bassinet, Wilkinson, Cavaliere, Dejardin and Sir Frederic Bennett.

Amendment 25 was negatived.

Amendments 27 and 9 were agreed to.

An amendment (No. 28) was tabled by Mr. Wilkinson:

28. In paragraph 9 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “financial” to the end of the paragraph and add “and technical assistance to Pakistan and food aid to Afghan refugees”.

Speakers: MM. Wilkinson, Dejardin and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 12) was tabled by Mr. Dejardin:

12. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 10 as follows:

“Should either of the belligerents not agree to negotiations, envisage restrictive measures, if not an embargo, on deliveries of military equipment, arms and munitions to either of the belligerents, Iran or Iraq.”.

Speakers: Mr. Dejardin and Lord Reay.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 389)¹.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Vecchietti.

4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1983

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 932 and amendment)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Stoffelen, Pignion, Enders, Sir Paul Hawkins, MM. Prussen and Martino.

Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft budget.

¹. See page 31.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Stoffelen:

1. Under Head I – Expenditure for Staff – reduce the total amount by F 26,000, the sum proposed to maintain the salary of the Clerk at its present level of Grade A7, step 6, plus 1 %.

Speakers: MM. Stoffelen, Pignion and Adriaensens.

The amendment was agreed to.

Speakers: (points of order) MM. Garrett and Wilkinson; (explanation of vote) MM. van der Werff and Grieve; (point of order) Mr. Stoffelen; (explanation of vote) Mr. De Poi.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft budget.

The amended draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1983 was agreed to.

5. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 – the Auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 926 and Addendum)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Durant and Mr. Stainton.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the motion to approve the final accounts.

The motion to approve the final accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 was agreed to unanimously.

6. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1982

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft opinion, Doc. 933)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Stainton, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Dejardin, Sir Paul Hawkins, Mr. Durant and Mr. Smith.

Mr. Stainton, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft opinion.

The draft opinion was agreed to. (This opinion will be published as No. 29)¹.

7. Date and time of the next sitting

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.

1. See page 33.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Müller Reddemann Spies von Büllesheim	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens <i>De Bondt</i> (Bonnell) Dejardin	Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Sprung) Mr. Unland	MM. <i>Eysink</i> (Aarts) <i>Worrell</i> (van den Bergh) <i>Blaauw</i> (van Eekelen) <i>van der Werff</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen
Mrs. Herman-Michielsens		Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Tummers)
MM. <i>Hoyaux</i> (Mangelschots) Michel	Italy	Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra
Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Antoni Bernini <i>Orione</i> (Bonalumi) Cavaliere De Poi Forma <i>Giust</i> (Foschi) Fosson	United Kingdom
France	Mrs. Gherbez	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) Sir Frederic Bennett
MM. Caro Jung, Louis Lagorce Pignion Sénès <i>Bassinnet</i> (Spénale) Valleix	MM. Pecchioli <i>Martino</i> (Rubbi) Tripodi Valiante Vecchiotti	MM. Cox <i>Wilkinson</i> (Grant) Grieve Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins
Federal Republic of Germany		MM. Hill <i>Morris</i> (Lord Hughes) <i>Durant</i> (Jessel)
MM. Ahrens <i>Horn</i> (Bardens) Böhm Büchner Enders Gessner <i>Rösch</i> (Jung, Kurt)	Luxembourg	Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Eastham</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller
	MM. Berchem Margue <i>Prussen</i> (Thoss)	MM. <i>Garrett</i> (Mulley) <i>Stainton</i> (Page)

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Schleiter Vial-Massat Wilquin	MM. Schmidt, Hermann Schulte Vohrer
MM. Baumel Berrier Duraffour Frêche Jeambrun Mayoud Oehler Poncelet	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy
	MM. Althammer Kittelmann Männing	MM. Agrimi Maravalle Mondino Petrilli

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 389***on European security and the evolution
of the situation in South-West Asia***

The Assembly,

Recalling Recommendations 341, 349, 361, 371 and 386;

Deploring and condemning the massacres in Lebanon from 16th to 18th September 1982;

Nevertheless welcoming the determination shown by the Lebanese people to restore national unity;

Welcoming the presence of French, Italian and United States armed forces to protect the civilian population;

Considering that the occupation of Lebanon by the Israeli and Syrian armies makes it impossible to restore unity and terminate the acts of violence being committed there;

Considering further that a settlement of the Palestinian problem is one of the prerequisites of the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East;

Considering that this settlement implies the application of Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council, Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and recognition of the right of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers and of the right of the Palestinian people to independence and sovereignty;

Considering that the continuing establishment of Israeli settlements on the West Bank is an obstacle to the restoration of peace and casts doubt on the will of the Israeli Government to achieve this;

Welcoming the fact that the final act adopted by the heads of Arab states at their meeting in Fez on 9th September 1982 contains elements of substance which show considerable progress towards the application of Resolution 242;

Noting that recent events show more clearly than ever that the Palestinian people needs a homeland;

Considering that at the present juncture the PLO is the only organisation which can speak for the Palestinian people;

Considering that the dispersal of the Palestinian people in the Arab countries will not solve the problem but will create unacceptable conditions for the persons concerned;

Welcoming the declaration by President Reagan on 1st September 1982 as an essential contribution to the restoration of peace in the area;

Considering that the pursuit of the war between Iran and Iraq is a serious threat to the security of the whole area;

Condemning the continued Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan as a serious violation of the Charter of the United Nations, a grave threat to the countries in the area and a negation of Soviet proposals for demilitarising the Indian Ocean;

Condemning recourse to chemical weapons and the continual massacres of the civilian population in Afghanistan;

Reaffirming the close relationship between the security of Europe and the peaceful solution of conflicts which upset political balances in the Middle East and South-West Asia,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Reaffirm the support of all its members for any initiative aimed at applying Resolution 242 and its radical opposition to the establishment of further Israeli settlements on the West Bank;
2. Urge the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon except if their presence has been requested by the Lebanese Government;

3. Use all the means available to member countries to support the restoration of the Lebanese state;
4. Supply humanitarian aid to the Lebanese people and to all foreign minorities in Lebanon which require it;
5. Urge the Israeli Government to disclose without delay what it intends to do with those imprisoned during the occupation of southern Lebanon;
6. Urge the Israeli Government to allow the International Red Cross immediate and full access to those imprisoned during the occupation of southern Lebanon, to arrange their earliest possible release and to publish in full the conclusions of the inquiry into the massacres at Sabra and Chatila; and call on the Lebanese Government to complete their inquiry into the Beirut massacre and to publish a full report on the inquiry;
7. Demonstrate its belief that the question of Palestinian refugees cannot be solved by dispersing them but only by the early establishment of a Palestinian homeland;
8. Call for the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan;
9. Urge member countries to refuse any connection with the Afghan régime and to assist the Afghan resistance movement as long as there is Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan;
10. Increase member countries' financial and technical assistance to Pakistan and food aid to Afghan refugees.

OPINION 29***on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU
for the financial year 1982***

The Assembly,

Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;

Having taken note of the contents,

Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated except to note that the financial provisions for 1982 assume an inflation factor of 8 % for the United Kingdom and 13 % for France and allow for no growth in real terms. However, the Assembly still awaits the results of the study made by the Council in 1981 on the efficiency of the ministerial organs.

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 1st December 1982

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>1. State of European security (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 936 and amendments</i>).</p> <p>2. Address by Lord Belstead, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.</p> | <p>3. The Falklands crisis (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 935</i>).</p> |
|---|--|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. State of European security

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 936 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur.

4. Address by Lord Belstead, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom

Lord Belstead, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Lord Belstead replied to questions put by Mr. Smith, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Prussen, Hardy, Cavaliere and Wilkinson.

5. State of European security

(Debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 936 and amendments)

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Smith.

Mr. Berchem, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Pecchioli, Dejardin, Prussen, Dejardin, Dr. Miller, MM. Wilkinson, Rösch, Baumel, Pignion and Caro.

Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur, and Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

Amendments (Nos. 1 and 6) were tabled respectively by Mr. Dejardin and Mr. Pignion:

1. Leave out paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“ Recalling its Recommendations 254, 278 and 288 on the accession of Spain to the North Atlantic Treaty approved by the majority of the then Spanish Parliament; ”

6. In line 2 of paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “ parliament ” to the end of the paragraph.

Speakers: MM. Dejardin, Pignion, Wilkinson and Cavaliere.

The amendments were negated.

An amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mr. Pignion:

7. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "not only" and insert "particularly".

Speakers: MM. Pignion and Blaauw.

The amendment was negated.

An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Mr. Rösch:

8. In line 1 of paragraph 1(a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "satellite".

Speakers: MM. Rösch, Grieve and Blaauw.

The amendment was negated.

Amendments (Nos. 2, 5 and 4) were tabled respectively by Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Urwin and others and Mr. Morris and others:

2. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

5. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

4. Leave out paragraph 2(a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"(a) to invite Spanish liaison officers to be appointed to all appropriate NATO command headquarters;".

Speakers: MM. Dejardin, Urwin, Morris, Wilkinson and Cavaliere.

Amendment 2 was negated.

Amendment 5 was not moved.

Amendment 4 was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Dejardin:

3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "despite the general recession" to the end of the paragraph and insert "by restructuring defence budgets so as to strengthen the operational elements of conventional forces without, because of the economic, social, and general budgetary recession, having to increase these budgets in real prices, whilst actively pursuing arms control negotiations in all forums."

Speakers: MM. Dejardin and Cavaliere.

The amendment was negated.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

In accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, Mr. Dejardin called for a roll-call vote but, failing to secure the support of four other members, the request could not be upheld.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 390)¹.

Speakers (explanation of vote): Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and Mr. Urwin.

6. *Date and time of the next sitting*

Speaker: Mr. Cavaliere.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 2nd December, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.10 p.m.

1. See page 37.

APPENDIX

Name of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Müller Reddemann	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens <i>Van der Elst</i> (Bonnell) Dejardin	Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Sprung)	MM. <i>Eysink</i> (Aarts) <i>Worrell</i> (van den Bergh) <i>Blaauw</i> (van Eekelen) Stoffelen
Mrs. Herman-Michielsens	MM. Unland Vohrer	Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Tummers)
MM. <i>De Bondt</i> (Mangelschots) <i>Steverynck</i> (Mrs. Staels-Dompas)	Italy	Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra
	MM. Antoni Bernini <i>Orione</i> (Bonalumi) Cavaliere Forma	United Kingdom
France	Mrs. Gherbez	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)
MM. Baumel Caro Pignion Valleix	MM. Pecchioli <i>Romano</i> (Rubbi) Triodi Valiante	Sir Frederic Bennett
		MM. Cox <i>Wilkinson</i> (Grant) Grieve Hardy
Federal Republic of Germany		Sir Paul Hawkins
MM. Ahrens Böhm Enders Gessner <i>Rösch</i> (Jung, Kurt)	Luxembourg	MM. Hill <i>Morris</i> (Lord Hughes) <i>Stainton</i> (Jessel)
	MM. Berchem Margue Thoss	Sir <i>Russell Fairgrieve</i> (Mrs. Knight)
		Mr. <i>Eastham</i> (McGuire)
		Dr. Miller
		Mr. Page
		Lord Reay
		MM. Smith
		Urwin

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Schleiter Sénès Spénale Vial-Massat Wilquin	Italy
Mr. Michel		MM. Agrimi De Poi Foschi Fosson Maravalle Mondino Petrilli Vecchietti
France	Federal Republic of Germany	
MM. Berrier Duraffour Frêche Jeambrun Jung, Louis Lagorce Mayoud Oehler Poncelet	MM. Althammer Bardens Büchner Kittelmann Männing Schmidt, Hermann Schulte Spies von Büllesheim	Netherlands
		Mr. Scholten

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 390
on the state of European security

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the continued increase in the ocean-going capability of the Soviet navy and concerned at the increased opportunity this provides the Soviet Union to project its power, particularly in unstable parts of the world;
- (ii) Believing therefore that more attention should be paid to maritime surveillance;
- (iii) Recalling its Recommendations 254, 278 and 288, welcoming the accession of Spain to the North Atlantic Treaty with the full approval of that country's democratically-elected parliament, and hoping that European security will be strengthened in due course through the integration of Spanish forces into the military structure of NATO;
- (iv) Recognising the important special nature of the contribution to allied defence made by many of the smaller countries of the alliance through their geographical position as well as through their defence effort;
- (v) Noting, however, the small proportion of national product devoted to defence by certain allied countries, including those with above average per capita income;
- (vi) Welcoming the increased emphasis being placed on conventional defence but reiterating its view that a balanced security policy must be designed to prevent all war, not only nuclear war,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments, acting where appropriate in the North Atlantic Council:

1. To improve further existing NATO and bilateral co-operative arrangements for NATO-area and world-wide surveillance of Soviet naval vessels, surface and sub-surface, and of other militarily-significant Soviet vessels, in particular through:
 - (a) stressing the need to make use of all surveillance resources – satellite, airborne, surface and sub-surface, shore and bottom-based;
 - (b) remedying shortages of modern maritime patrol aircraft, and retaining in service adequate numbers of diesel-electric submarines and frigates;
 - (c) modernising NATO surveillance co-ordinating centres, and improving communications links between these centres and between them and national centres;
2. To co-operate fully with other NATO governments:
 - (a) to invite Spanish liaison officers to be appointed to all appropriate NATO command headquarters;
 - (b) to plan and adjust command arrangements to accommodate the contribution of Spanish forces to NATO;
3. To urge on all allied countries the need to maintain and improve the defence effort, despite the general recession, and at the same time to pursue actively arms control negotiations in all forums.

TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 2nd December 1982

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The Falklands crisis (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 935*).
2. Energy requirements and the security of Europe – Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 930*).
3. Booklet on WEU and its activities (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 928*).
4. Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 929*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. The Falklands crisis

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 935 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Smith, Mrs. Gherbez, Dr. Miller, Mr. Caro, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Sénès and Grieve.

Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

In accordance with Rule 29 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the President declined to put to the Assembly the amendment tabled by Mr. Caro which members had not had adequate time to study.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 30 votes to 5 with 4 abstentions; 11 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote. (This recommendation will be published as No. 391)¹.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Caro.

4. Energy requirements and the security of Europe – Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 930)

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Syse (*Observer from Norway*).

1. See page 42.

Mr. Gessner, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Jager, Martino and Worrell.

Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: Dr. Miller and Mr. Forma.

Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur, and Mr. Valleix, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 392)¹.

5. Booklet on WEU and its activities

Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion

(Presentation of and debate on the reports of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Docs. 928 and 929)

It was agreed to hold a joint debate on the two reports of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

The reports of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments were presented by Mr. Berchem, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The joint debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Page, Mrs. Knight, MM. Romano and Urwin.

Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

In accordance with Rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the motion for an order presented by Mrs. Knight and others on a telex wire service, Document 939.

The motion for an order was agreed to. (This order will be published as No. 57)¹.

The Assembly took note of the reports of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

6. Close of the session

The President declared the twenty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly closed.

The sitting was closed at 1.25 p.m.

¹. See page 43.

¹. See page 44.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 7 by roll-call on the draft recommendation on the Falklands crisis (Doc. 935):

Ayes	30
Noes	5
Abstentions	4

Ayes:

MM. <i>Mertens</i> (Aarts)	Mr. <i>Edwards</i> (Hardy)	MM. <i>van der Werff</i> (Scholten)
Ahrens	Sir Paul Hawkins	Smith
Sir Frederic Bennett	Mr. <i>Howell</i> (Jessel)	Stoffelen
MM. Berchem	Mrs. Knight	<i>Glesener</i> (Thoss)
Caro	MM. <i>Eastham</i> (McGuire)	Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i>
Cavaliere	Margue	(Tummers)
Cox	Dr. Miller	MM. Unland
<i>Blaauw</i> (van Eekelen)	Mr. Page	Urwin
Forma	Lord Reay	Valleix
Gessner	Mr. <i>Lemmrich</i> (Reddemann)	Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra
Grieve		

Noes:

MM. Antoni
<i>Martino</i> (Bernini)
Dejardin
Mrs. Gherbez
Mr. Rubbi

Abstentions:

MM. <i>Jager</i> (Jeambrun)
Sénès
<i>Bassinat</i> (Spénale)
Vial-Massat

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 391***on the Falklands crisis***

The Assembly,

- (i) Firmly condemning the armed invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina on 2nd April 1982 in flagrant violation of international law and of the statement by the President of the Security Council the previous day;
- (ii) Taking note of the rapid and effective operation of European political consultation leading to the statement of condemnation issued by the Ten on 2nd April and the declaration of economic sanctions on 10th April;
- (iii) Taking note of the agreed statement of the President of the United Nations Security Council on 1st April and of Security Council Resolution 502 of 3rd April 1982, but regretting that the Security Council was unable to ensure implementation;
- (iv) Regretting that the initiatives of the United States Secretary of State, the President of Peru and the Secretary-General of the United Nations failed to secure a negotiated withdrawal of the Argentine forces;
- (v) Welcoming the position adopted by the United States and by NATO after the failure of the attempted negotiations;
- (vi) Regretting that the Council was not convened in application of Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (vii) Welcoming the determined and successful action taken by the United Kingdom to restore international order in application of Resolution 502 of the Security Council and in conformity with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter;
- (viii) Deploring the loss of life that resulted from the conflict;
- (ix) Concerned at the weakening of allied forces in the North Atlantic Treaty area following the necessary deployment of larger British forces outside the area for the long-term defence of the Falkland Islands, and noting that NATO can learn many lessons from the conflict;
- (x) Concerned at the deterioration in relations between the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and Latin America,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments to seek agreement in the European Community and in NATO on the following objectives:

1. Measures to be considered by NATO countries within the treaty area to compensate for the deployment of British forces outside the area as long as these forces are necessary for the defence of the Falklands;
2. The early restoration of good relations between the countries of the alliance on the one hand and of Latin America on the other, and in particular the normalisation of relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina;
3. An urgent study by NATO of the lessons it can learn from the conflict including:
 - (a) the need for consultation and decisions not only on developments beyond the NATO area which may threaten vital allied interests, but also on those which may threaten national interests in cases of self-defence, even if the Soviet Union is not involved;
 - (b) the need for proper assessment of voluminous and conflicting information to permit the early identification of attack;
 - (c) the performance of defence equipment;
 - (d) the need for a common and restrictive policy on the export of defence equipment to non-allied countries.

RECOMMENDATION 392***on energy requirements and the security of Europe – Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements***

The Assembly,

Considering the need for close relations between Western European countries and Norway on such subjects as security, economic, energy, space and other research and development policies ;

Considering also the relationship between the Norwegian energy supply and other important energy resources outside Western Europe and the fact that before 1990 more Norwegian gas cannot be available to replace all or part of Soviet gas ;

Aware of the risk of all Western European countries importing concurrently their energy supplies from outside Western Europe and of the wastefulness of duplicate pipelines ;

Considering that Western Europe and the United States do not always make the same analysis and do not always have the same view of East-West economic relations ;

Considering the need for a close study of European energy requirements in the next decades so as to ensure Europe's energy supplies, particularly natural gas, essential for its security ;

Considering also the need to study the present rôle of COCOM, the co-ordinating committee of the allied countries which supervises high technology and defence exports to Eastern European countries, and to update COCOM's list of prohibited items,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Promote and reinforce relations between Norway and the other countries of Western Europe in security, economic, energy, space and other research and development policies;

2. Promote studies on:

(a) European energy requirements in the next decades and the consequent problems for Europe's security and defence;

(b) high technology exports to Eastern European countries liable to have military applications;

(c) the possibilities of setting up an interconnected intra-European gas pipeline network;

and report to the Assembly on the results of these studies;

3. Promote an energy policy designed to guarantee member countries regular and adequate supplies of energy to meet their security requirements.

ORDER 57
on a telex wire service

The Assembly,

DECIDES

That the Presidential Committee should institute a study, as a matter of urgency, into the cost and practicability of instituting at the Palais d'Iéna a telex wire service, which would be available to delegates for the submission of press reports to the Press Association, Reuters, etc. in their home countries, with the intention that this might operate as from the summer Assembly in 1983.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 29th November 1982

SUMMARY

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Resumption of the session and adoption of the minutes.2. Attendance register.3. Examination of credentials.4. Tributes.5. Address by the President of the Assembly.6. Observers.7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 925).8. Changes in the membership of committees. | <ol style="list-style-type: none">9. Revision of Rules 10, 14, 29, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40 and 43 of the Rules of Procedure (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft resolution</i>, Doc. 931).
<i>Speakers:</i> The President, Mr. Grieve (<i>Chairman and Rapporteur</i>), Mr. Pignion, Mr. Brown, Mr. Grieve (<i>Chairman and Rapporteur</i>).10. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee</i>, Doc. 934).
<i>Speakers:</i> The President, Mr. Lagorce (<i>Rapporteur</i>), Mr. Grant, Mr. Smith, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Müller, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Mr. Morris, Mr. Osborn, Mr. Rubbi, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Jager, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Hardy.11. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. |
|--|--|

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session and adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

I declare resumed the twenty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union, which was adjourned on Thursday, 17th June 1982, at the end of the sixth sitting.

In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the sixth sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings ¹.

1. See page 14.

May I stress to all representatives and substitutes who are taking the place of representatives the importance of signing the register of attendance, because, as well as notifying us of their presence here, it is the basis for the quorum of the Assembly. Therefore, I ask all representatives to ensure that they sign the register.

This is an important matter because difficulties arise during roll-calls if members wish to vote but have not signed the register either in their capacity as representatives or on behalf of representatives whose place they are taking as substitutes for this session. I urge members to be sure, not only today but throughout the week, to sign the register before they enter the hemicycle.

3. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the examination of the credentials of new representatives and substitutes appointed during the adjournment of the Assembly whose names have been published in Notice No. 7.

The President (continued)

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, those credentials are attested by a statement of ratification communicated to me by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, with the exceptions of Mr. Hackel and Mr. Schwarz, substitutes in the German Delegation, and Mr. Hengel, substitute in the Luxembourg Delegation. Those members were nominated after the adjournment of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Those three appointments have been made in due form under Rule 6(2). None has been contested. It is now for the Assembly to confirm the credentials, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

If the Assembly is unanimous, we may proceed to ratification without prior reference to a Credentials Committee.

Is there any opposition?...

The credentials of Mr. Hackel, Mr. Schwarz and Mr. Hengel are therefore ratified by the Assembly, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. On behalf of all members, I extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues.

4. Tributes

The PRESIDENT. – Since our last sitting, we have learned with great sorrow of the death of our colleague Senator Calamandrei, Vice-Chairman of the Italian Delegation and a member of our Assembly since 1976.

We mourn also the loss of three former colleagues. Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, a member of our Assembly from 1965 to 1970 and former President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; Senator Gonella, a member of our Assembly from 1955 to 1972 and from 1976 to 1978; and Senator Périquier, a member of our Assembly from 1969 to 1980.

We remember also the late Pierre Mendès-France who, in the name of France and as President of the Council, signed the Paris agreements of October 1954, from which came Western European Union.

May I, on behalf of the Assembly, offer our sympathy to the families of the deceased colleagues and to their national delegations.

I ask you to observe a minute's silence in their memory.

(The Assembly stood in silence)

5. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – It has become commonplace to begin each of our part-sessions of the Assembly, coming as they do at intervals of six months, with some comment on the great changes which have taken place since we last met, both within and without our member countries – and, unhappily, usually also any new problems which have arisen among members of the North Atlantic Alliance itself.

In this connection, the new leadership in the Soviet Union may prove of profound significance for us in the West. It is of course too soon yet to judge. It may mean a hardening of tension rather than a relaxation, but if, as I believe, it could lead to new opportunities for further détente and the exploration of further opportunities for multilateral arms control and disarmament measures, both nuclear and conventional, we should be ready to respond to any dialogue or negotiations which seem possible with a joint and positive response.

Indeed, with our NATO partners, we should now be engaged upon a full survey of possibilities so that any real initiative by the Soviet Union is not lost because of delay, hesitation or disagreement among us on how to proceed.

In passing, I was disappointed to learn that the tripartite negotiations to seek a comprehensive test ban treaty, which I was involved in initiating, have been abandoned by our American friends – both by President Carter and by President Reagan. Unfortunately, by way of contrast, the international recession, with its catastrophic consequences for employment and all forms of social and economic progress in all our countries, shows no sign of abatement.

Understandably, at times like these, when governments, no matter how mistakenly, are hell-bent on maximum economies, it is difficult in democratic societies to secure popular support for additional defence expenditure, no matter how essential that might be to give credibility to deterrence and to raise the nuclear threshold, as General Rogers, SACEUR, has urged.

Indeed, in most of our member countries in the last year or two, there has been a most impressive growth of genuine concern about the increase of nuclear armories and fear that one day, with cataclysmic consequences, nuclear weapons might be used. The whole concept of deterrence has been covered by complacency and new efforts are needed if the new generation of voters in Western Europe are to be persuaded that, at least for the Soviet Union and the United States, a rough nuclear balance can be a factor for stabilisation and peace.

The President (continued)

It is above all essential that urgent steps be taken and perhaps new machinery devised to restore relations between Western Europe and the United States from their current all-time low to those of mutual confidence and understanding.

As well as widely divergent views on attitudes to Eastern Europe and related questions such as the pipeline, the Middle East, South America and GATT, there have been misunderstandings and lack of co-operation which could and should have been avoided.

I believe that in all these matters, vital to the existence of the alliance, Western European Union, particularly this Assembly, has a part to play which I doubt whether any of us can pretend is having much impact on events at present or indeed for many years.

This is probably the last time I shall have the privilege of addressing you as your President, as the rules, very sensibly, prohibit the President from participating in debates. Accordingly, I venture to make a couple of personal observations about our work here and the prospects of WEU.

It is now nearly thirty years since WEU was set up in its present structure by the modified Brussels Treaty in 1954. I strongly commend all members and indeed all interested in European political questions to study the excellent information document produced by Mr. Berchem for our Committee for Relations with Parliaments, which sets out both our historical involvement and our current problems.

I wonder whether we should not now, through a joint study between the Assembly and the Council, involving also, if they are willing to participate, the European Economic Community and European Parliament and NATO and the North Atlantic Assembly, examine how best we can proceed in the difficult years ahead to give a proper assessment of European defence and foreign policy problems. While, of course, we must be fully aware of and give full regard to events outside Europe, I have always been convinced that we have a particular European perspective on defence and related matters and that WEU is the proper and indeed at present the only focus for the formulation of any joint policy.

In addition, although we can all agree that it was right to give up to NATO, the Council of Europe and the EEC its defence, social and economic responsibilities, the Council of WEU retains a potential political rôle as co-ordinator of defence and foreign policy which it seems reluctant to undertake. I am sure that in the Assembly we would wish for a more positive

response to the dialogue we seek to have with our ministers in the Council. Also I believe we have to consider whether all the organisations and functions set up in 1954 are appropriate today. I know that it is relatively easy to set up an international committee or agency and practically impossible, because of the vested interests that have developed, to close one down. I was, after all, present in the United Nations when the easy way out of a motion from the Maltese delegate led to the mammoth and still continuing process over fifteen years of the law of the sea studies.

Nevertheless, I hope that the Assembly, with the support of the Council, will give consideration before our thirtieth anniversary to a revised basis and rôle for WEU which will permit us to give a new focus to the development of a genuine Western European defence and foreign policy.

Of course if such considerations lead to a need to amend the treaty – which is probably desirable – I hope that we may also change the provision that our delegations here must be the same as those to the Council of Europe and also consider the possibility of inviting other NATO European members to adhere to our treaty. After all, our treaty is much more far-reaching in its obligations than that of the North Atlantic Treaty itself.

However, I know that both these propositions are very old because I originally proposed them here twenty years ago and they have often been advocated in the Assembly in the past.

Finally, I would say a word about the excellent staff that we have in the Assembly. Few people realise I think how few permanent staff we have. In expressing my thanks as President for the excellent service I have received, I would also pay tribute to the many people on whom we have to call as temporary staff to permit us to run as smoothly as we do these part-sessions of the Assembly. It also needs to be said that both the permanent staff, certainly during the Assembly period, and all the staff are working under very difficult physical conditions and we do not have available to us here all the facilities that the Assembly itself really needs.

The other thought I would leave with members of the Assembly, a problem for my successors, is that it is in a way a tribute to the Assembly that the great majority of its personnel have been with us for twenty or more years; and there will come a time quite soon when many of the senior staff will be retiring and there will be a great number of vacancies to be filled. Equally, the actual work load on the senior A grades is particularly heavy when, as now, we have, for example, three of a very small number away through illness.

The President (continued)

It is for these reasons – and I say this with members of the permanent representatives of the Council present – that, with the support both of the Budgetary Committee and the Presidential Committee, I have stressed our priority in budgetary provision to have a new A3 post to get some younger people in, so as to provide for the future and also to aid with the present work load on our senior staff.

I feel that I have been privileged to be your President for three years and I should like to thank you all for the great co-operation and friendship that I have enjoyed. I hope that all of you will be coming tonight to the dinner when, as a very great compliment to the Assembly, we shall have as our guest of honour Mr. Mauroy, the Prime Minister of France.

6. Observers

The PRESIDENT. – I should now tell the Assembly that we are privileged to have with us Mr. Syse and Mr. Berge, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Norwegian Storting, who are attending our session as observers. On behalf of the Assembly I should like to welcome our colleagues and hope their attendance will prove fruitful and interesting. Representatives will know that one of our committees was very warmly received when it paid a visit to Norway recently, and one of the reports to be dealt with in this session touches very much on that experience.

7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session*(Doc. 925)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session, which appears in Document 925 dated 12th November 1982.

Does anyone wish to raise any objection or raise any points on the draft order of business?...

Are there any objections?...

As there are no objections, the draft order of business is adopted.

8. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT. – We have now to deal with changes in the membership of committees. During the adjournment, certain nominations

to fill seats which have fallen vacant have been made to the Presidential Committee by the Netherlands Delegation. These provisional nominations are set out in the Appendix to Notice No. 7. They are now submitted for the ratification of the Assembly in accordance with Rule 8(3):

Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments: Mr. Aarts as alternate member in place of Mr. van der Sanden.

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges: Mr. van der Sanden as alternate member in place of Mr. Aarts.

Is there any opposition?...

These nominations are agreed to.

9. Revision of Rules 10, 14, 29, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40 and 43 of the Rules of Procedure

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 931)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on the revision of Rules 10, 14, 29, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40 and 43 of the Rules of Procedure and vote on the draft resolution, Document 931.

I call first on Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur of the committee, who, I might say, has done a sterling job on behalf of the Assembly in the difficult matter of the rules. Unless there are objections, I propose that the Assembly consider all the amendments together. I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I shall certainly be the first to endeavour to comply with your own abjuration to us to be as brief as possible, Mr. President. At the risk of slightly prolonging my presentation of my report, I feel that I should be failing in the duty that I owe to the Assembly and the affection that I owe to you if I did not, as the first member of the Assembly to present a report this afternoon, say, as this is the last part-session at which you will preside, how much I amongst many others of your colleagues have appreciated the tact, determination, care and devotion to duty with which you, Sir, have conducted your period of three years as President of this Assembly.

I am quite confident that when the history of Western European Union comes to be written your presidency will be one of those that will be remembered for serving the cause for which all of us find ourselves here today, as we do so often during the year, and have over the years.

Mr. Grieve (continued)

For me personally as one of your compatriots it has been a pleasure to be a member of this Assembly under your presidency.

I propose to deal with the matter which I have to present to the Assembly as briefly as possible this afternoon. The rules of procedure are the tools by which we work. I am lucky to be presenting these proposals this afternoon rather than on the last day, which sometimes is the case. Usually by that time there are about two members present and if anyone asks for a roll-call we are in considerable difficulty. However, members are awaiting much more interesting reports than mine, which is as dry as dust.

It behoves us continuously to have our rules under scrutiny because they always fall behind the practice of the Assembly. One of the major measures of amendment is aimed at bringing our rules of procedure into accord with practice that has prevailed often for many years and to bring them into accord with what is necessary for us to be able to conduct our proceedings as speedily, expeditiously and justly as possible.

With the exception of one or two drafting amendments – such as bringing the French text into conformity with the English text where there has been a diversion or ambiguity – all of the proposed amendments have the aim of bringing our rules up to date.

The first amendment is to Rule 10, dealing with the election of the Bureau. The sole force of the new amendment is to provide that, when elections to the vice-presidencies are simultaneous, the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents shall be that of age. I do not think that anyone will quarrel with that. It simplifies what was a rather recondite and difficult question whether the order of seniority was to be of election or of age.

The next amendment, to Rule 14, deals with the Presidential Committee. Hitherto, all ex-presidents have been members of the Presidential Committee. It was pointed out in the Assembly and in committee some time ago that this could have results that no one would wish. For instance, Mr. A, having been President of our Assembly for many years, in the year after his presidency had ended would no doubt have a valuable contribution to make as a member of the Presidential Committee. But suppose that thereafter he lost his seat in his own parliament or, for any other reason ceased to be a member of our Assembly, perhaps for years; it would be wrong for him to come back and automatically be a member of the Presidential Committee. The proposed amendment to Rule 14 provides

that ex-presidents shall be members of the Presidential Committee so long as they continue to serve continuously as members of the Assembly. Once they cease to serve as members of the Assembly, that right to serve on the Presidential Committee has gone.

The next two amendments are to Rule 29. The first is intended to simplify the text, principally in paragraph 2. The considerations are the same as the present paragraph 2 but they are very much simpler and much more clearly set out. What we seek to achieve is a description of the present position. It remains possible, at the President's discretion, for the Assembly to consider amendments that have not been reproduced. Even if an amendment has been reproduced, it may be so complex and difficult that the President ought to have the power to say that it ought to be considered and put over to a future session. This clarifies the matter and enshrines that presidential discretion.

The restriction on the numbers participating in debates on amendments is drawn from the rules of the Council of Europe, one in favour, one against, with again a discretion to the President to vary that rule if he deems it necessary, a discretion which at Strasbourg is given to the Assembly but which is exercised by the President. We have thought it right to give that discretion to the President directly.

The next matter concerns Rule 34, dealing with methods of voting. Here we have approached the revision of the rules with two aims in mind – the clarification of presentation of amendments and provisions in such a way that the Assembly is not obliged by its rules to spend time on a roll-call vote when very few members desire such a vote. We propose that paragraph 1 shall be a clear and positive statement of principles with votes to be taken by sitting and standing unless the rules provide otherwise. We are sweeping away the complex procedure in paragraph 2 when ten members demand a roll-call vote but the vote is stopped unless seven of those members are present to request a roll-call vote. The ten members must be physically present in the Assembly. Before a roll-call vote is held on a draft recommendation or opinion it will be necessary for five members to make a request to that effect. Previously the opposition of only one member could have made a roll-call vote necessary and that, as many members will have experienced, has unnecessarily prolonged our proceedings.

In some cases the Assembly cannot and should not vote by roll-call. When we are amending the charter or disagreeing to the annual report, we ought to do so by an absolute majority of more than half the members of the Assembly.

Mr. Grieve (continued)

The only way of establishing this majority is by roll-call. Similarly, we are proposing to continue the rule by which a roll-call vote on any matter takes place if ten members request it. In the case of a draft reply to the annual report or a draft recommendation on the opinion as a whole we suggest that a roll-call vote should be held only at the request of five members. That is the substance of the amendments to Rule 34 and I commend them to the Assembly.

Rule 35 deals with majorities. The only proposal we have here removes from the French text a word not found in the English text and which has no meaning. It is supererogatory. The rule is also perfected by the inclusion of a reference to the absolute majority required under Rule 43.6 dealing with urgent procedure.

Rule 36, which we recommend for amendment, deals with the quorum. Again our proposals are largely clarificatory. The existing paragraph 2 is illogical as drafted. It suggests that the request for a count validates a vote other than a vote by roll-call. It is, of course, the result of the count which does so.

Paragraph 3 is to be deleted. It is a relic, a coelacanth. It is a reminder of the days when voting by roll-call was a means of establishing whether a quorum was present. By an earlier amendment of the rules we have decided that a quorum is established by signing the register under Rule 24. The amendment to new paragraph 3 does no more than restate existing paragraph 4.

Rule 38 deals with political groups. The effect of this paragraph is to ensure that not only must there be the requisite minimum number to found such a group but there must be such a requisite minimum number for the continuation of such a group. There was in the existing rule an ambiguity which we have cleared up.

Our amendment to Rule 40 proposes that matters may be referred to committees by the Presidential Committee as well as by the Assembly. That is no more than a completion in the rules of the power already given to the Presidential Committee under Rules 14.2 and 16.2. Such a rule also prevails in the Standing Committee of the Council of Europe.

Rule 43 deals with urgent procedures. The committee's proposed amendment to paragraph 6 is intended to clarify the position for the relevant committee vis-à-vis a request for debate under the urgent procedure. Paragraph 5 permits the adoption of urgent procedure by a simple majority of votes cast, after which the

matter is referred to a committee, which will then report. Paragraph 6 distinguishes the case when a demand for urgent procedure is to be debated but when there is no reference to a committee. As the rule is drafted, that can be done only by a majority of more than half the members of the Assembly. Since that can be established only by a roll-call vote, the amended rule says so.

I have spoken rapidly about matters which are not without complication and which are designed to improve our ability to deal with the matters that come before us in the Assembly and to facilitate our work. The job of keeping the rules in accordance with the needs of the times is the constant preoccupation of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, over which I have had the honour to preside for four years. I believe that the committee has done a good job on the series of amendments. The committee was unanimous in recommending the amendments to the Assembly.

I pay tribute to the expert help that we have received from Mr. McKay and Mr. Mouliès, the Clerk of the Assembly. I also thank the experts from the British, French and German Parliaments. I hope that my words are not inadequate to my task. I commend the amendments to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Grieve. I personally thank you for your kind references to me and I thank our colleagues for the kind way in which they received your remarks. I add my personal thanks to Mr. McKay from the British Parliament and Mr. Tribondeau from the French National Assembly for the great help that they have given us in the examination of our rules. I thank you, Mr. Grieve, for the work that you have done over many years, both here and in the Council of Europe in trying to persuade us to take a more exact and proper course in our proceedings. I have tried to follow that example when in the chair.

We now have a debate on Document 931. Mr. Pignion is the first speaker, to be followed by Mr. Brown.

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should first of all like to add my congratulations to those just expressed to you by Mr. Grieve, on the contents of your address, your report, as it were, on your period of office. I concur with Mr. Grieve's remarks and would assure you that we shall always remember with great appreciation the kind, firm and very discreet manner in which you have unfailingly exercised your authority.

Mr. Pignion (continued)

I do not wish to speak at length or to be disagreeable but, respectful as I am of the Rules of Procedure, there are two points in the report to which I should like to draw the Assembly's attention.

Firstly, I wonder whether these amendments to the Rules of Procedure will give more meaning or weight to our votes. In particular, have we not somewhat shirked the question of the existence of a quorum, which we considered important? It is quite possible for there to be a large number of signatures on the attendance register, but only a few delegates present in the chamber when voting takes place.

I think this amendment is extremely dangerous, because we are a consultative, not a decision-making assembly. It is therefore extremely important that the outside world should know the actual voting figures per delegation, not whether we adopted a motion by a relative or an absolute majority.

It is to this point, namely the amendment to Rules 34 and 36 of the Rules of Procedure, that I wish to draw this Assembly's attention. Is it right – this is a very serious question – to amend the rules about voting, just when we are trying to restore WEU to its full importance?

We should also consider how much weight would be attached by the Council to any decision adopted somewhat lightly, I mean without an absolute majority, without the certainty of its having obtained the broad approval of the delegations. The Council can take us seriously, and we can criticise it, only if our votes are truly representative.

With regard to the attitude of the Council, we should remember what happened to the Vecchietti report and how the Council treated our recommendations then.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am not proposing an amendment. All I want, if you agree with me and think we should continue to attach great importance to having a quorum, is to refer the draft back to the committee with these amendments – unless the committee dealt with it long ago. I have to admit that the report has only just reached me, so that I have not had time to study it thoroughly and have prepared this intervention very quickly in order to draw your attention to the importance that we should continue to attach to the methods of voting. That is why I am in favour of referring the draft, or at least the rules I have mentioned, back to the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Pignion.

I call Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate Mr. Grieve on his excellent report. Several items are of interest. Mr. Grieve said that the rules and regulations were the tools by which we worked. I agree, but I am always a little worried when lawyers begin to improve them for my benefit.

I draw Mr. Grieve's attention to the first paragraph, Rule 10. In his explanatory memorandum Mr. Grieve says that the purpose of the amendment is to specify more clearly. The words "and there are no objections" appear in the amended rule. In the existing rules that occurs only on one other occasion and that is in connection with the President. There can always be an objection in that case.

I do not understand what paragraph 6 means when it refers to there being only sufficient candidates for the same number of places for Vice-President.

I take it that his committee has examined the phrase closely. Perhaps he would let me know what he means by "no objections". Is it an objection to the man or to having no vote or that there are insufficient candidates for the places? What must one do in this Assembly if one wishes to take advantage of the words in new paragraph 7, "if there are no objections"?

I read the explanatory memorandum about Rule 29 to find out what it meant. What Mr. Grieve is trying to say is that the President should be able to put amendments to the Assembly as a group, instead of one by one. He says that that will save time. In my reading of Rule 29, paragraph 3 relates to the tabling of an amendment to a paragraph. Paragraph 3 determines whether the President will rule it in order or out of order. Mr. Grieve's report changes that paragraph into an operative paragraph for voting procedure. Voting procedure is dealt with in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Rule 29 and any amendment to allow the President to act on the amendments that have been made must be made to paragraphs 4 or 5. Paragraph 3 is simply the part of paragraphs 1 and 2 that determines the amendments, who can put in an amendment, and the scope of the amendment when it is tabled.

I was especially worried about Rule 34, because Mr. Grieve said that he was sweeping away requirements. Paragraph 1 of new Rule 34 states:

"The Assembly shall vote by sitting and standing except in cases where a roll-call vote or a secret ballot is required."

That is certainly mandatory for the annual report and the word "required" should be replaced by the word "necessary". If it is "required", one must ask who requires it and

Mr. Brown (continued)

when it is required. Paragraph 2 of Mr. Grieve's proposals shows where that shall be done.

One matter that Mr. Grieve left out – that he swept away – is the importance of the annual report. Paragraph 3 of Rule 34 says that the vote on the annual report requires a mandatory roll-call. Mr. Grieve left out that rather important element. Why was it left out? If we accept his proposals, one may be able to move the rejection of the annual report and it may be carried by only one vote. However, there may only have been half-a-dozen people present. Perhaps Mr. Grieve could explain whether he believes that omission to be an advantage.

I read Rule 36 with great interest. Mr. Grieve's explanatory memorandum states that he wishes to replace the word "majority". He says that the new wording makes it much clearer. I looked for the word "majority" in the existing rule because I did not remember it. Perhaps Mr. Grieve can point it out to me. All that appears are exactly the same words that he proposes. The exception is the word "of" between the words "half" and "the". I agree with his improvement of the grammar. He added the words "to the Assembly" after the words "the representatives". I do not disagree with that. Perhaps Mr. Grieve will explain what he means by getting rid of the word "majority" and inserting the same words as were there previously.

In the new paragraph 3 Mr. Grieve proposes to eliminate a phrase in the existing rules that I believe to be helpful. If we do not have a quorum, the President can give a specific commitment as to when a vote could take place. The present rule states "until a subsequent sitting of the same part-session". Why does Mr. Grieve believe that the wording is loose now? He talked about people frustrating matters and he explained why his proposals would stop that. However, now someone may oppose an item in terms of a quorum merely to ensure that it will not be voted upon. According to Mr. Grieve's new proposals the vote can be taken at any time. I should be interested to know why voting at any time is better than voting at a specific time.

I was not clear about Rule 40 and I hope that Mr. Grieve can help me on it. Why did he argue in his explanatory memorandum that, according to Assembly procedure, if an item is referred to the committee it should be preceded by a general debate? It is clear that anything referred to the committee shall be referred either from the Assembly or from the Presidential Committee. Why does the change in Rule 40 make it easier to refer items to the commit-

tee? It has caused no trouble during the years that I have attended the Assembly. Perhaps Mr. Grieve can explain how it precludes a general debate if the item does not arise in the Assembly in the first place and if the Presidential Committee is used to circumvent the committee. If an item is raised at the Assembly and then someone moves that it be referred to the appropriate committee, as is allowed in the rules, why does Rule 40, as amended, make it easier to do that now? Why does it save the Assembly's time to eliminate a general debate?

I hope that Mr. Grieve does not mind my raising these matters, but when the rules are changed, we should treat any changes seriously and not raise further problems for ourselves because of the looseness of the changes and their inability to cover some odd incident, only to give us more confusion later on.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Brown.

There are no amendments tabled.

Does anyone else wish to speak before I call on the Rapporteur and Chairman of the committee to reply?...

I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I am grateful for the questions raised by Mr. Pignion and Mr. Brown. On Mr. Pignion's first point, the quorum was dealt with by our earlier amendment. The quorum is now decided not by the number of persons present in the Assembly but by the number that sign the register. Therefore, the rules require consequential amendments to deal with that situation. That amendment, which I think we made well over a year ago, was designed to avoid the situation in which, for tactical reasons, people moved amendments and then rushed from the chamber so that there would be no quorum to decide on a controversial report.

The committee considered in considerable detail all the points raised by Mr. Brown. On Rule 29, it has long been the practice to put amendments en bloc when there is no opposition in the Assembly. That proposal therefore simply accords with the present practice on voting.

As for Rule 34, on methods of voting, the substantial change is not on the matters which call for a roll-call vote as of right – that carries on exactly as before – but it provides that before a roll-call can be demanded on any matter other than one which is specifically provided for in the rules, that roll-call vote shall be supported by no fewer than five members present.

That seems a wholly reasonable approach. Otherwise, any one member has the right and

Mr. Grieve (continued)

the power to hold up the proceedings of the Assembly – which, after all, meets only twice a year and has to deal with a considerable amount of business.

As for Rule 36 – the change in the time when a matter shall go over if there is no quorum – I commend this as a common sense change. At present the President is obliged to send the matter to the next part-session. Thus, if a matter before the Assembly this week could not be decided through lack of a quorum, the vote would have to be taken when we met in June next year. This change will enable the President to put the matter to the Assembly at any time – for example, in the current week – when enough members are present to form a quorum. That seems eminently designed to facilitate our work. I hope that Mr. Brown and all my colleagues are satisfied that this is a desirable amendment.

It is not for me to suggest that we have now achieved the perfect rules for a perfect Assembly. No assembly is perfect, and I am the first to agree that rules are never perfect. There are always bound to be instances when we might amend the rules to advantage. After all, we have a Committee on Rules of Procedure precisely for that purpose.

My committee, with the help of experts, after considerable debate, puts these rules before the Assembly, as we believe, for the benefit of the Assembly, to expedite our work and to make us more efficient. I hope that I have satisfied all members that the Assembly should approve the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Grieve. As you rightly say, we have not reached and never will reach perfection of rules to suit all our circumstances. I can think of several rules that you might wish to consider and I am sure that the committee will want to take up a substantial number of the matters raised today.

Although, strictly, I should put the draft resolution as a whole, since some points have been raised on individual rules, I intend to ask whether there is objection to each of the rules in turn. If objection is taken to one rule, I shall ask the Assembly to vote on that rule; at the end I shall put the whole document, as amended if it should be amended, for the Assembly's final approval. Does that practice commend itself to the Assembly? Thank you.

Is there any objection to the proposed change to Rule 10?...

Rule 10 is agreed to.

Is there any objection to the proposed change to Rule 14?...

Rule 14 is agreed to.

Is there any objection to the proposed change to Rule 29?...

Rule 29 is agreed to.

Is there any objection to the proposed change to Rule 34?...

Rule 34 is agreed to.

Is there any objection to the proposed change to Rule 35?...

Rule 35 is agreed to.

Is there any objection to the proposed change to Rule 36?...

Rule 36 is agreed to.

Is there any objection to the proposed change to Rule 38?...

Rule 38 is agreed to.

Is there any objection to the proposed change to Rule 40?...

Rule 40 is agreed to.

Is there any objection to the proposed change to Rule 43?...

Rule 43 is agreed to.

Mr. Grieve, you have performed a massive exercise in silencing your critics. I congratulate you.

I therefore put to the vote Document 931 as a whole. The draft resolution is the text of all the proposed changes.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft resolution is agreed to unanimously¹.

10. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 934)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism, Document 934.

Before I call upon Mr. Lagorce to present his report, I understand that some substitutes have put down their names to speak but do not represent absent representatives. No substitute may take any part in our proceedings, under

1. See page 15.

The President (continued)

Rule 7, unless he has not only taken the place of a representative but has signed the register in that capacity. So I would ask all who are not themselves representatives before they put down their name or seek to speak to ensure that they are properly described as being in place of a representative.

I now call Mr. Lagorce to present his important report.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the growing activity of pacifist and neutralist movements led Mr. Lemoine to ask our Assembly to consider the political aspect of this problem. That is the subject of the report which I have the honour to submit to you on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

While I am glad to submit my first report to this Assembly under your chairmanship, Mr. President, this pleasure is clouded by my regret – which I think everyone shares – at the fact that you will soon be leaving the chair.

Neutralism is neither neutrality nor pacifism. Born with the cold war, it at first rejected the idea of belonging to either of the two dominant blocs and ultimately arrived at the concept of non-alignment. But this original neutralism has changed radically since the 1950s; being opposed only to the Atlantic Alliance, it regards its dissolution as the condition for collective security and proposes, for Western Europe, a deterrent defence system which could only be international.

Pacifism, an older movement, gives first priority to peace and its basic argument is that nothing can justify the sacrifices entailed by a war, especially a nuclear war. Its basis can be summarised in a sentence: “anything, anybody, but not war”. Its first slogan was: “not a penny, not a man for national defence under a capitalist system”. Its first – sublimely utopian – strategy, an international general strike, has never been applied.

Moral rather than political, pacifism – and thus the reverse of neutralism – as practised, for instance, by the adherents of the peace movement, ultimately leads to the defence of peace becoming a pretext rather than an aim. Today, non-violence, the rejection, with or without qualification, of nuclear weapons, the undertaking not to be the first to use them, together with all forms of unilateral disarmament, form part of the pacifists’ stock-in-trade.

This pacifism even extends to the East. This is, actually, an interesting phenomenon, since it might later help to bring minds closer together on questions vital for peace. Such prospects,

encouraging though they are, need to be examined without too many illusions because pacifist demonstrations which, though controversial, are allowed in the West, are still regarded as seditious in the East, where severe action is taken against them.

It looks as if the popularity of these huge and sometimes tumultuous pacifist gatherings and attendances at them will increase in 1983. But while the actual number of people participating in them is large, they never represent more than a small fringe of the population. Furthermore, their impact, while relatively strong among young people, is much less among the other age groups. Lastly, more attention is paid to them in political quarters, which are influenced to a greater or lesser degree by the possible imminence of elections.

Be that as it may, pacifism raises questions which it would be morally unacceptable and politically rash to leave unanswered, in view of their intrinsic importance and of the political weight of those who ask them.

Three obvious points emerge from these anxious questionings. It is right to want peace; it is reprehensible to go on spending enormous sums on armaments when so many peoples and so many human beings are in need. Lastly, even if it is temporarily unavoidable, the balance of terror cannot be the sole and permanent pillar of a precarious, constantly threatened state of non-war. All this, it must be admitted, is true. But should we, unilaterally, break up the Atlantic Alliance, disarm, give up our national and collective security systems and resign ourselves to being “better red than dead” when we are in danger of being both “red and dead”? I do not think so.

The only consistent and logical answer to the neutralist and pacifist questions, of which we cannot afford to underestimate the significance or overestimate the influence, is a steady stepping up of our efforts to achieve a balance of the forces deployed, limit armaments and create an economic system which is fair to the third world. There, and there only, we have, at one and the same time, the aim and the means of real pacifism and genuine peace.

In nearly every field today the forces of the Atlantic Alliance are outnumbered by those of the Warsaw Pact. My report, and the table annexed to it, confirm these observable facts. There can thus be no question, as things stand, of any unilateral partial disarmament, which is an absolute incentive to aggression or dictatorial action. The only realistic pacifist solution is still the effective, persistent and unfaltering combination of a genuine disarmament policy with a defence policy capable of maintaining the security of Europe by the existence, at every

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

military level and at every stage in time, of a credible deterrent force.

This is the first point which has to be brought home to neutralists and pacifists. And the Council of WEU is the body best qualified to succeed in doing so, if the participating governments will take concerted action without abandoning any essential aspect of their national sovereignty.

All this, admittedly, is easier said than done. But there is already a certain easing of the situation, which may be helped on by the changes in political leadership in the Soviet Union. Let us think about this without too many illusions or too much distrust.

We also have to meet the pacifist and neutralist argument concerning the perils and general destructiveness of war. Whether nuclear or not, and whether we win or lose, any European war will be a world war for the third time. It will destroy, along with members of the forces and the civilian population, property both within and outside the combat areas, and the philosophical and moral values which, for us, make life worth living.

Until disarmament is finally achieved, within the limits of essential national and international security requirements, it will not be possible to relinquish the full deterrent value of the flexible response. On the other hand, everyone, irrespective of opinions and blocs, must make every effort to ensure that strategic armaments shall never be used in war, before being destroyed by everyone simultaneously. Hence the vital necessity of getting negotiations under way, of concluding, without unilateral concessions or any accentuation of existing imbalances, satisfactory limitation agreements – especially, and above all, those concerning the SS-20 and similar missiles.

But these essential East-West agreements are not the only ones which must be sought and concluded. The European neutralist and pacifist reaction is also, in our opinion, partly due to the American dominance in NATO, in the Atlantic Alliance, on both the monetary and economic planes. Both the manner and aims of this supremacy must be re-examined and modified. A new basis must be found for relations between the United States and Europe, and this not only on the military plane.

For its part Europe, in the framework of WEU, must conclude more far-reaching, more concrete and, in a word, more effective agreements. This will increase their ability to resist what appears to be the Soviet's primary aim – namely, without a war, to force the nations of Europe to give up some of their internal and

external sovereignty. That is what is referred to nowadays, in political parlance, as Finlandisation or satellisation.

Two problems are liable to arise: that of Western Europe's inability to finance its security on its own and that of the reaction of the United States, which would certainly not tolerate the Finlandisation of Europe from Gibraltar to Shannon and Sweden.

These are the neutralist and pacifist questions which have to be answered. They may be expected to crop up again in 1983. The timetable shows when the peaks of these activities will occur; December 1982 in Holland, May 1983 in Sicily, 12th December 1983 in all capitals.

Our task – over and above the specific action required of each government – is to offer an answer to their questions and not to wage all-out war against their ideas. This dialogue is a necessary and delicate matter. On the basic issue our position is clear-cut. Western Europe wants peace to be maintained and strengthened, and wants disarmament – all of it fully and genuinely, as soon as possible. But it wants real results, not just more speeches. Consequently, the international situation at all levels involves a time factor and requires the means described in my report, because it is necessary, first, to balance the forces, establish security and co-ordinate the gradual process of disarmament.

This timetable and this method will be met with scepticism and sometimes anger among pacifists and neutralists, many of whom are tired of the shillyshallying of the past. We must nevertheless remain firm in our determination to act, to keep to our intellectual and political course, and to implement the stages and conditions which I have enumerated in the draft recommendation, the supporting arguments, the conclusions and the comparative table in the report which I have submitted to you. Any other attitude would be unpardonably remiss and would result in dangerous failure.

Let us also bear in mind the fact that the neutralist and pacifist movements are both idealistic and manipulated, that their activities proceed by fits and starts, or have at least done so up to the present, and that they represent a minority in our countries. Their ideals are high-minded and should be given a hearing. But this does not mean that we have to be ruled by them. Neutralism and pacifism must in no circumstances mean surrendering to the principle that might is right.

(Mr. Pignion, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Lagorce.

I call Mr. Grant.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – We are all grateful to Mr. Lagorce for having done such a conscientious job on an extremely important subject. I can tell him at once that, subject to certain amendments which I hope will be moved tomorrow, I can certainly accept the broad principle of his report. In spite of Mr. Lagorce's excellent speech, I feel that his report does not give as complete a picture of the so-called peace movement as I would have wished.

Everyone wants peace. No one in this Assembly, no one in the world, apart from a minority of suicidal maniacs, wants anything else. The difference is not between wanting peace and wanting war but about how to maintain that peace that we all desire. The peace movement believes that peace can be maintained by the unilateral abandonment of nuclear weapons – overlooking the fact that twenty million people were killed in the last war by conventional weapons, overlooking the fact that the Soviet bloc has a preponderance of such conventional weapons, as a glance at the appendix to the report makes clear, and overlooking the fact that a world war has been prevented for thirty-seven years only because the nuclear deterrent has maintained the balance of power.

The peace movement is made up of many genuine and sincere people. One group within that movement is the youth of our nations. Understandably, young people are anxious because, thank God, they have never experienced the horrors of conventional war. There are other sincere people who make up this movement and many of them are the clergy of various denominations, who are emotionally pacifist. Indeed, some are openly pacifist.

The only reply I would make to them, which I think will be understood by my English-speaking friends, is to quote the short ditty by Hilaire Belloc, himself half French:

“Pale Ebenezer thought it wrong to fight
But Roaring Bill, who killed him, thought it right.”

There are others who are not pacifist who also adopt the cause of the peace movement. They sincerely base their case on three arguments. These are sincere arguments but wrong and illogical. First, they will argue that the cost of nuclear deterrence is not sustainable. This overlooks the fact that the cost of the nuclear deterrent is a small proportion of the defence budget and, in Britain, is about the equivalent of perhaps a moderately extravagant London borough's budget. Secondly, it is

suggested that, if one country sets an example morally, that example will be followed by others. There is not a shred of evidence to suggest that any other country on earth, let alone the Soviet bloc, would be the slightest bit impressed or would change its policy one iota if Britain or any other country unilaterally gave up its nuclear forces. Thirdly, it is argued that to abandon one's nuclear defences is somehow to make one's nation safe from nuclear war – declaring oneself a nuclear-free zone. Again I suggest that this defies the evidence of the history of warfare since the dawn of mankind. Only one nation on earth has suffered nuclear attack and that is Japan, a country that did not possess nuclear weapons.

To pretend that one can make an area safe by putting up a notice outside a country or town which states “This is a nuclear-free zone” is as idiotic as pretending that a notice outside one's house will provide protection from a nuclear holocaust.

There is a more sinister element. It is suggested that the peace movement attempts to influence the Soviet Union. The report is wrong in paragraph 26 to suggest that the Soviets are disturbed by the movement. On the contrary, I believe that it suits their purpose well. It is significant that the movement rose in the 1950s and 1980s when there was a danger that the Soviet Union did not have nuclear superiority. The attempts by the good ladies from Scandinavia to take the movement into Russia ended in fiasco.

Sir Frederic Bennett, the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, recently published a dramatic booklet in which he revealed vividly the way in which the Soviet and communist movements had winkled their way into the peace movement through CND.

He said that in Great Britain about 20 % of the key positions in the movement were occupied by communists, but that only 0.5 % of the British people ever voted communist.

Soviet so-called diplomats have been ejected from Portugal, Denmark, Norway and Holland for deliberately meddling through the KGB in the peace movement. The Dutch security services have recently revealed dangerous infiltration by Soviet intelligence agencies. The NATO Secretary-General has said that about \$15,000,000 has been spent by the KGB on boosting the peace movement. If that does not prove that the peace movement helps the Soviets, I do not know what does.

The price of liberty is eternal vigilance. When one drives through the north of France and through other parts of Europe one sees millions of graves. They are the awful evidence of the perils of conventional war and of

Mr. Grant (continued)

the folly – no doubt well-meaning – of neglecting the defence of freedom and the maintenance of the balance of forces in the world. I pray to God that we do not make the same mistakes again.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Grant, for not having overrun your time. I assume that Mr. Mulley, as President, would have asked speakers to keep to their allotted time so that we do not fall behind in our work.

I call Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Like my colleague Mr. Grant, I am interested in the document, which has much to commend it. I am a little anxious that it does not contain enough about the so-called peace movement. I hope that amendments to be tabled today or tomorrow will be accepted.

Peace movements almost inevitably are unilateral in their approach. Unilateral disarmament is one-sided. Those who promote and activate the peace movement make a significant contribution against what they purport to sustain. I put such people into three categories.

First, and the most sinister, are those who are motivated by evil. They support peace movements because of their political ideology. In their hearts they would like Europe to become communist. Secondly, there are the naïve who join peace movements. They are prepared to pay any price for peace. They have a pathetic faith in the response that they think unilateral acceptance will bring about. Thirdly, there are the young and the most important group. They pose more of a problem. The young have great ideologies. They cover the whole political spectrum. They are not necessarily left wing or supporters of socialist governments. They have been brought up in a world of peace. Even their parents were probably born either towards the end of the war or since. They have never known the type of war in which many of us fought in 1939-45. We have no hope of dissuading politically motivated people who support peace movements. We can do little about them except to counter their arguments. The naïve are unable to comprehend what we say. But there are worlds to win with the young. In the West we must spell out more dramatically and intelligently the difficulties that face society in a nuclear age. Our message to the young must be that multilateral disarmament is the only way to achieve disarmament and that unilateralism is the way to disaster. We must convince them that Russia's superiority in nuclear weapons is

paramount and a significant threat to the survival of the West. History shows that in the end the weak succumb.

There is a new man at the head of the Kremlin. I believe that war is not on Russia's agenda, at least not in the immediate future. That attitude may change if Russia faces a weakened Europe. Above all, the Russians respect strength. They despise weakness, but they will do everything possible to encourage the spread of weakness, which emanates from the peace movements.

We must be prepared to counter any attempt at conventional or nuclear conflict. Nothing can justify a third world war, particularly a nuclear war. Only a madman would contemplate that. There must be a balanced and verifiable reduction in armaments and it must not jeopardise the effectiveness of the deterrence policy which has ensured peace in Europe since 1945. We cannot say that too often. With the policies that have served us so well we can do much to guarantee further peace for the next half century.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Smith.

I call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Basically I support the report and its recommendations but I agree that much has been left out. If we did not refer to the omissions we should miss an opportunity and we would not fulfil the hopes which Mr. Lemoine, the French Defence Minister, had when asking the Assembly to examine pacifism and neutralism.

In committee, I complained that the Rapporteur's original draft did not make adequate reference to the means by which the Soviet Union aims to win world war three – not by war, but by subversion, threat and intimidation. The Rapporteur referred to that process in his introductory speech as Finlandisation. Mr. Lagorce referred to that in paragraph 12 of his report. It is an inaccurate description and does modern Finland an injustice. A more relevant reference to the Soviet policy of threat and intimidation in order to achieve its aims would have been the more recent example of the imposition of Soviet will without direct intervention in Poland. At least to date, we have seen an end to the spontaneous popular mass movement against dictatorship without the direct intervention of the Red Army. Perhaps Polandisation is a better description of Soviet intimidation that is achieved more easily by Poland's proximity to the USSR. No doubt Finland and Austria would experience similar intimidation if they attempted to shake off their neutrality. That is what the Soviet Union would wish to achieve in Turkey, Iran, Pakistan

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

and Nepal, which are all on its boundaries. The policy of influence by intimidation, which is behind the massive expansion of the Soviet navy in recent years, is a menacing reminder, behind the mask of a fraternal port visit to toe the Soviet line.

No report before this parliamentary Assembly on the joint themes of pacifism and neutralism would be complete without a warning to the western alliance that it should no longer talk about defending freedom but that it should go all out on the offensive to convince the nations that are not free by our standards, but that are not yet under the Kremlin's sway, that the Soviet Union is no respecter of neutrality and that they must make a choice between freedom and communism before the choice is made for them.

My second reservation about the Rapporteur's report is well known to him because of my comments in committee. There is a lack of detailed reference to any of the pacifist movements in the Soviet bloc. There is a reference to the German Democratic Republic, where I understand that a new law now makes it a crime to wear a badge with the slogan "Swords into ploughshares". The report presents us with an opportunity to note the fate of the Helsinki monitoring groups that were conceived not just to monitor the denial of human rights but to monitor the disarmament aspects of the final act. There is no reference to the Scandinavian peace train of last July. Three hundred women from Norway, Sweden and Denmark believed, naïvely, that they could encourage local people in Leningrad, Kalinin, Moscow, Smolensk and Minsk to join them in rallies against nuclear weapons. However, they did not reckon with Moscow rules, which allowed them to use only Kremlin-approved banners and to travel only by train whereas they wished to march. They were allowed only staged demonstrations with the help of the guiding presence of nineteen observers from the official Soviet peace committee.

The report does not refer to the state-run Soviet peace committee, which attempts to monopolise the public expression of Russian anti-nuclear sentiment by organising stage-managed demonstrations with banners, placards and officially approved slogans.

There is no reference to the fate of the three physicists, two mathematicians, two engineers, doctor, dentist, artist and theologian who, in June this year, established a group for establishing trust between the United States of America and the USSR, independent of professional politicians. When they were asked at their first press conference in Moscow in June about the

possibility of official action against them, a mathematician is reported to have said, "Any action taken against us would only be as a result of a misunderstanding." Misunderstanding or not, two of them have now been imprisoned, one is held in a Moscow psychiatric hospital, another was arrested for anti-Soviet propaganda, others are under house arrest and others have been allowed to emigrate to the West. One of those, Dr. Popov, said in London three weeks ago that the British Labour Party's commitment to remove the nuclear weapon from British soil was "suicidal".

The report does not refer to the Helsinki-based World Peace Council, which is controlled by the international department of the Soviet Communist Party and which indirectly finances the Dutch peace movement. No doubt, if a detailed investigation were undertaken, we would find that it finances many others. It comes within the scope of this parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union to undertake such an investigation. Mr. Lagorce's report would be complete if it contained a recommendation for such an investigation. I hope that he will undertake it himself in view of the themes of his report - pacifism and neutralism.

Any debate on disarmament must be conducted fairly and factually if it is to result in progress. The Soviet Union will not disarm if it believes that it can wait for the West to disarm unilaterally. If the Soviet Union is behind the unilateralist movements in the West, they should be fully exposed. This report represents such an opportunity. I am sorry that the report missed that opportunity and I hope that any amendments to it will try to put that right and ensure that we can conduct a further investigation into who is behind the financing of the unilateralist movements in Western Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, Mr. Atkinson.

I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*). (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am grateful to Mr. Lagorce for presenting this report even if, as we have already heard during the debate, certain additions need to be made. This may be quite true, but I am able to endorse the basic principles of this report, which is all the more remarkable since the Rapporteur's political leanings do not correspond to my own and he comes from a different country. It therefore gives me added pleasure to record my agreement.

An important statement in his report, and one on which I would place particular empha-

Mr. Müller (continued)

sis, is that the thirty-eight years of peace we have had are in fact without precedent in Europe's history and that this peace has endured only because we have had a deterrent and not because of the success of any pacifist or neutralist movements. Politicians should occasionally learn from history. Pre-war history could teach us something, especially if we think of the pacifist movements outside Hitler's Germany before 1939, since we know that these movements, in the Netherlands, for example, helped to foster the conviction of the dictator in Germany that his aggressive foreign policy could succeed. I would remind you what the eminent theologian Karl Barth said at the time, thirty-nine years ago, before this pacifism began, when he warned against an anti-democratic dictator.

I come from a divided country, and I know that a campaign is taking place there which is very firmly based on neutralism and pacifism. It is interesting to note that in the other part of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, a protestant theologian who attended the United Nations disarmament conference pointed out in an interview after he had returned to his country that, although peace must be fought for in the West, a peace movement could never be neutral but must always be on the side of socialism and of the supremacy of the socialism of the Soviet Union. Again, I find this rather reminiscent of the time before 1938, when Willy Münzenberg, then the German Communist Party's chief agitator, was organising peace campaigns and so on internationally even after 1931, as the memoirs of his companion, Babette Gross, reveal. They also reveal how extensively western intellectuals were taken in at that time by some of the slogans of international communism.

In the Federal Republic of Germany today a campaign is under way in schools, churches, art colleges, universities and so on, to recruit people for a peace campaign who do not know history, who reject reality, and who are then used by biased and committed teachers. In a few day's time on 12th December, the anniversary of the NATO twofold decision, there will be a campaign in the Federal Republic of Germany designed to force the authorities not to proceed with the implementation of the decision. The campaign will be prosecuted by means of specific operations organised outside the barracks of the allied forces, as was done two months ago at a depôt in Baden-Württemberg.

Interestingly enough, this campaign is master-minded from the well-known youth centre KOMM in Nuremberg, in my own Land, Bavaria - a centre which has already made the

headlines in the past. The most dangerous aspect of all this is that the media have been very biased in their reporting. At the time of the peace demonstration and the American President's visit, 90 % of the people working on West German television's leading news programme, the editorial staff of *Tagesschau*, which is broadcast by *Westdeutscher Rundfunk* in Cologne, placed an advertisement in the German daily newspapers protesting against the twofold decision. Three weeks ago, the RFFU trade union, which represents the journalists employed by the radio and television stations, decided that there should be a general strike in the Federal Republic if missiles were going to be stationed in Germany, a decision that has not been taken even by other trade unions, representing real workers. The media union took the decision; that shows what kind of people the opinion-formers are.

It is no wonder that a campaign of this kind should rub off on the parties represented in our parliament. A member of this Assembly, Mr. Bahr, for example, wrote in a recent article for *Vorwärts* that the SPD has come closer to saying no to the arms build-up, though he did not say when it would actually commit itself. This shows that a campaign is under way in our country which can only benefit one side.

What the people really think is quite different from what the campaign would have us believe. The International Herald Tribune recently published the results of a public opinion poll conducted in seven European countries and the United States. They revealed that the greatest fear of war exists, not in the Federal Republic of Germany, where most of the demonstrations take place, but in Italy and Spain. More people in the Federal Republic of Germany than in any other country believe that the West is not well enough armed to meet the challenges of the eastern bloc. The slogans constantly used in peace debates and demonstrations paint a completely different picture.

Allow me to make one last comment. Previous speakers have said a great deal about what the KGB and communist organisations are doing. I could add a few items to the list, but I will do no more than emphasise and welcome what has already been said. I should just like to turn the spotlight on the other part of Germany, the German Democratic Republic itself. A manual for the People's Army, published by the German Democratic Republic's military publishing house, states that the greatest danger to proletarian vigilance is pacifism, which is a bourgeois aberration. This shows that double standards are being applied, that this bourgeois pacifism is being encouraged on the one hand and a completely different

Mr. Müller (continued)

position adopted on the other. It will not be forgotten that the Defence Minister of the German Democratic Republic, General Hoffmann, has even gone so far as to eulogise a nuclear war, in which the virtues of socialism could be proved. None of us wants a war, least of all a nuclear war. But we know that the slogan of the North Atlantic pact is that vigilance is the price of freedom. We must always remember this slogan if we intend to maintain peace and prevent war in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Müller.

I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I consider Mr. Lagorce's report to be one of the most interesting we have discussed here in recent years because it analyses a problem which is causing us increasing concern. We are concerned at the spread of a peace movement which is inspired by the best of intentions in the struggle for peace but is in danger of having the opposite effect.

In my own divided country in particular, the fortunes of the peace movement reveal how much more difficult it is to bring home the truth to the free people of our western democracies, where opinions can be freely voiced, where the media are free and where every variety of outlook may be expressed through the media. Let us also remember that although they may talk a lot about peace, in the German Democratic Republic the right to refuse to do military service, for example, does not exist. In the Federal Republic of Germany this right is laid down in Article 4 of the constitution, the Basic Law. In the German Democratic Republic even schoolchildren receive pre-military training. The boys spend their afternoons with the youth organisation, the FDJ, where they again receive pre-military training. Then we can also point out – as Mr. Lagorce does in the appendix to his report – what a huge proportion of the Soviet Union's and the eastern bloc's national product is invested in armaments. They differ from us in all these ways.

Because of our freedom, however, we seem to find it difficult to convince people of our desire for peace. Others may find it strange that, of all countries, the Federal Republic of Germany, where the threat from the East ought to be far more obvious than in other countries, should have a peace movement with disarmament – even unilateral disarmament – as its goal.

There are a number of reasons for this, and they must be explained. First, there is the proximity of the German Democratic Republic. We also happen to speak the same language. This makes it possible for the eastern bloc to influence public opinion and movements like the peace movement in the Federal Republic of Germany through the German Democratic Republic. They can be influenced through funds and through arguments. After all, we allow complete freedom of movement between the German Democratic Republic and ourselves.

The second reason – which is also rightly stressed in the report – is that the Federal Republic of Germany does not have any nuclear weapons of its own and does not want any. But this, of course, makes it much easier to spread the belief in Germany that we are totally dependent on the decisions taken by the United States of America, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons. This creates the feeling in the Federal Republic of Germany that we are at the mercy of the opinions and decisions of the United States far more so than in France or Britain, for example.

The third reason – and this should not be forgotten – is that the Federal Republic of Germany, a highly industrialised and very densely populated country, has a relatively strong green movement, an ecological movement which is stronger than in many other countries. This movement, which also incorporates an anti-nuclear movement, has formed an alliance with the peace movement. Though this is not a formal alliance, it must be realised that what the ecological and anti-nuclear movements and the peace movement have in common is an obvious difficulty in facing facts, the sad fact, for example, that we are being threatened from the East and that, as long as this threat continues, we must be capable of defending ourselves. Moreover, without the peaceful use of nuclear energy, life as we know it cannot continue indefinitely.

If someone tells you – the point often comes up in discussions with representatives of the peace movement – that the Soviet Union is not aggressive, if someone believes that, come what may, the Soviet Union will never start a war with the West and never begin to expand its sphere of influence, that is the end of the argument. There is no convincing someone who cannot face facts. There is unfortunately no doubt that the peace movement has gained a great deal in Germany from its alliance with the green movement. There is absolutely no point in pretending that this is all being master-minded by the eastern bloc. That is certainly not true. The many people, including young people, who support these movements are certainly not being controlled by the eastern

Mr. Spies von Büllesheim (continued)

bloc. In the Federal Republic of Germany, however, we must assume – and this is borne out by numerous studies – that the supporters of the ecology movement and the ordinary members of the peace movement mean well, but that the goals pursued by many of the leaders of the various organisations differ from those of the ordinary supporter of these movements. Their goal is to weaken our defence capability.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we are always wondering how to get over this dilemma. Even Mr. Lagorce was unable to make any practical proposals for action in this sense in his report. We are therefore forced to the conclusion that all we can do is to shoulder the task of convincing young people and peace movement sympathisers by means of frank discussions, however laborious and difficult it may be. We have to do this in view of the fact that until the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to bilateral disarmament and to accept the zero option on both sides, no clear-sighted person can assume that all will be well without our own defence capability.

When this is realised, when young people have also recognised that we must be able to defend ourselves – simply because of the continuing threat – there will be a basis for an understanding with these movements. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

I call Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). – The golden thread of which we must never lose sight is that we are all for disarmament. Some of us believe in disarmament more passionately than others. Nevertheless, what divides many of us is the method of achieving disarmament. There are various ways of promoting multilateral disarmament, and there are those, on the other hand, who favour unilateral disarmament; but it would be a tragedy if in the passion and emotion about method we were to lose sight of the main goal – making the world a safer place in which to live, and it is the world in which we live with which we have to cope.

Unhappily, man has progressively improved methods of destroying creatures and objects in that world and one cannot shut one's eyes to it. Our job is to cope with it and to seek to bring the world back from the brink of self-destruction. This is where the pacifist and the neutralist fail. No amount of sincerity can get over the difficulty that the peace of his conscience is bought at the expense of his non-

pacifist and non-neutralist neighbours. Russia has no intention of disarming unilaterally. Andropov said so in terms last week, and even our most passionate of unilateralist friends do not believe, do not expect and probably do not want the United States to disarm unilaterally. Given that world security is dominated by the world superpowers, that makes our policies, whether to disarm unilaterally or multilaterally, very much on the margin. Nevertheless, that can be very important.

I believe that the concept of a limited nuclear war is almost untenable. It is difficult to imagine a scenario where some form of nuclear warfare in Europe does not escalate to the ultimate scenario; but we cannot exclude it. I fear that the greatest danger at present is the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons, of which, as we know, there are hundreds, almost all in the hands of the United States in Western Europe. There is then the inevitable retaliation. Following retaliation we would have destruction on a mass scale and by this stage most of us would not be in a position to care very much what happened. I firmly believe, therefore, that efforts should be made to concert an attempt to reduce tactical nuclear weapons leading towards their abolition. It leads, inevitably and rightly, to a dependence upon conventional weapons. This is a form of defence that is more expensive; and this is where some of my friends go wrong in that they wish for the abandonment of nuclear weapons and a reduction in arms expenditure.

I believe General Rogers has shown the way in his advocacy of greater dependence upon conventional weapons, but to do this we must will the resources. Given the conflicts in our priorities, are we ready to do this? It is imperative now that in any discussion on disarmament both the British and French capabilities are brought in. Having something to give in return for compliance with a request or demand is a notion familiar to any negotiator, whether in business or as a trade unionist. Having nothing to give makes one very naked, as my compatriot Aneurin Bevan recognised nearly twenty years ago.

The notion that I want to underline is the notion in the preamble that one form of negotiation in disarmament negotiations might jeopardise Europe's security.

We are here because we believe in collective security. We are members of the United Nations for the same reason. Collective security has been the touchstone of our defence. What some of the most passionate advocates of disarmament fail to recognise is that disarmament has foreign policy repercussions. The luxury of a clear conscience, even though it takes the form of sheltering under someone

Mr. Morris (continued)

else's umbrella – provided that the umbrella is held in the garden of the man next door – can jeopardise collective security.

NATO, Western European Union, the idea of working together in the West, have been patiently built up over the years. There have been hiccups. However, disarmament of one form, without a collective approach, could unravel all of this. Unilateralism and the support of NATO are basically inconsistent and it is naïve to quote Norway, with four million people, and to say that, for example, we in the United Kingdom can emulate it without repercussions. The danger I see is that of unravelling NATO and thus placing in jeopardy our collective security.

There is the will for progress in achieving our goal and I yield to no one in my desire to bring about disarmament. We should endorse this report. There are parts of it with which I am not happy but we shall return to them later. Its aim is correct and it would be wrong for us to ignore the danger to world collective security if we tackle this problem the wrong way.

(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Morris.

I call Mr. Osborn.

Mr. OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I, too, congratulate Mr. Lagorce on defining the challenge facing Western Europe. I accept that it is difficult for a socialist, even a French socialist, to tackle this task. This issue gave rise to a constructive debate among christian democrats and European democrats this morning, which has led me to make a personal contribution. I speak as a man of peace who fought in world war two. I was a territorial soldier as well as serving in a regular capacity, and I have studied this problem for over half a century.

I want to deal with the complexity which faces a conservative member of parliament in Sheffield and South Yorkshire generally. Pacifism and neutralism have been a great force in recent history. I have met many church groups, particularly in my constituency, and groups of young people who genuinely believe that they want peace at any price. As Mr. Smith has said, these movements are unilateral and his diagnosis of their nature was profound. I have immense sympathy with these young people.

When I was a schoolboy I was an active member of the League of Nations Association. My father had, before World War I, been to Heidelberg University and my grandparents were Methodists. I was at school at the out-

break of World War II. I watched Coventry being bombed and visited that city on my bicycle a few days later. When I returned after the bombing of Sheffield, the only way I could pass through my city was on my bicycle again.

With respect to my christian and social democrat friends in Germany, it is fair to say that in the 1930s that country had been rearming heavily. Hitler was a dictator not subject to any democratic controls and, perhaps, young people seeking peace at any price paid a horrific price in the war that followed. Sir Anthony Eden was a man of peace but after World War II, as Prime Minister, and subsequently as Lord Avon, he was a believer in peace through strength, not weakness. Perhaps some of the lessons that branded his soul have also influenced my outlook.

Last week Mrs. Thatcher, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, at the opening ceremony of NATO parliamentarians, stressed the importance of an adequate level of defence spending by Great Britain, conventional and nuclear. In pledging Great Britain's determination to meet its obligations to the western world she pointed out that defence expenditure had to be equated with commitments to health and social services and education.

Mrs. Thatcher had recently been to Berlin. I have been to both East and West Berlin on a number of occasions. The importance of liberty and freedom, including freedom of speech, is forgotten until it is lost. The Checkpoint Charlie incidents that have taken place over the years, the existence of the barbed wire and concrete barriers, the iron curtain, the dramatic escapes are perpetual reminders of this, of which too few of our young people are aware. Mrs. Thatcher must have been impressed by her visit.

The sudden war in the Falkland Islands was about freedom and liberty for fewer than two thousand people. It was about their right to live their own lives. That freedom was put at risk by a dictator, General Galtieri, who was not subject to any democratic controls. The Falklands issue is the subject of another debate. I mention this because on the Saturday after the invasion of the Falkland Islands I was subject to all the conflicts of peace and war in my constituency and in the House of Commons. In the debate on the Falklands issue in the House I listened to the socialist opposition condemn my Prime Minister and her ministers for not being prepared. That is to be the subject of inquiries, particularly by the committee under Lord Franks.

On that Saturday evening in April it seemed to me that those who supported Michael Foot, and for that matter Denis Healey, in castigating

Mr. Osborn (continued)

Mrs. Thatcher for not being prepared could not, with logic, castigate me for my attitude towards conventional and nuclear arms. I was meeting my CND groups that night. I have always insisted that the West should be able to stand up to the conventional and nuclear superiority of the Soviet Union. General Rogers has pointed this out to us. We have an appendix on the issue. On that occasion, when I met the CND groups, I chose to use a film.

By contrast I am Chairman of the British-Soviet parliamentary group. You spoke, Mr. President, about the new leadership in the Soviet Union. I have been to the Soviet Union five times in the past twenty years. My last visit was in November 1981. The agenda with Mr. Kuznetsov, right-hand man to Mr. Brezhnev, included Soviet conventional superiority in arms, nuclear superiority and the fact that they were to put down more SS-20 missiles. We also discussed Afghanistan, Poland and the Siberian pipeline.

Talks on differences must be based on strength to be meaningful. However, the carpet had been pulled from under me because Mr. Michael Foot – and I think Mr. Denis Healey was on the delegation – had stated categorically that the Labour Party believed in unilateral disarmament. Mr. Luns has reported on the £15,000,000 spent by the Soviet Union on pacifist campaigns. I wonder how much of that has gone to my part of the world.

In the South American Falklands war the loss of HMS Sheffield was a great shock to the citizens and to industry there. The loss of life and the casualty lists greatly shocked the people in that great city, including the Lord Mayor and the city council. There was launched the HMS Sheffield appeal. What is not realised is that pacifism and neutralism had so gripped the socialist-controlled council that a few years previously HMS Sheffield had ceased to be adopted by the city council, although the links of the citizens and of industry remained strong. Today the services can no longer recruit on public property in Sheffield, for example, at the Sheffield Show. Had I not arranged an engagement in London, I would have addressed the annual dinner of the Sheffield Artillery Volunteers. The Sheffield Territorial Army is strong, as is the dedication of those who seek to volunteer.

I am a great supporter of exchanges between the Soviet Union and the West. Sheffield is twinned with Donets. That twinning continued during the invasion of Afghanistan and the Polish crisis. That put the arrangement under certain strains, which were certainly felt by my conservative supporters.

No pact has any meaning unless it stresses the need for disarmament negotiations to be directed towards a balanced and verifiable reduction of armaments, which should not jeopardise the effectiveness of the deterrence policy that has ensured peace in Europe since 1945. The statement by Mr. President about SALT II this afternoon was obviously a little disappointing.

What disturbs me is that in my city the socialists have forced the university not to invest its funds in companies with interests in South Africa and have condemned the Chamber of Commerce for seeking employment opportunities for local citizens by promoting trade with South Africa. They have also held a conference promoting sanctions against South Africa. I do not condemn or condone apartheid. I have been a director of a South African company. Western Europe's mineral resources come from southern Africa. I make one point: if I support a dialogue based on strength leading to mutual, balanced and verified force reductions with the Soviet Union, so do I resist turning my back on South Africa, for instance.

Morale and conviction are vital if Western Europe is to retain its independence, security and freedom. That can be achieved only from strength, not from weakness. Western European leaders must not be forced to give in to the bully by well-intentioned, religious, fringe, pacifist or green groups, including peace movements.

In South Yorkshire opposition to a nuclear energy programme is parallel to opposition to nuclear defence. The report is a bold effort to examine the idealism that asks for peace at any price, to promote the nuclear-free zone about which the Swedes now think twice, judging from what has happened in the last six months. Such a zone is meaningless unless it is supported by multilateral agreement and the implementation of meaningful, mutual and balanced force reductions.

The report is useful and tries to analyse the undercurrents faced by Europe today compared with fifty years ago.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Osborn.

I call Mr. Rubbi.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to say at once that it seems to me unfair to set the pacifist movement against the Atlantic Alliance and the need for European security. It is true that within the vast and sweeping movement for peace which has been growing in our countries, the United States and Japan over the last three years, and is starting to emerge in completely new and

Mr. Rubbi (continued)

original forms in the East European countries as well, completely antimilitarist views are heard, rejecting all nuclear weapons and calling for unilateral disarmament. I would not agree, however, that these views constitute the main core of the peace movement. If we start from that position I am afraid that we shall fail to understand the truer reasons, the nature and the aims of this mass phenomenon. And it would be difficult to explain why such a wide variety of elements have gradually come together in this movement, ranging from political parties and trade unions to the world of culture and science, large parts of the church world, social and civil organisations and many women and young people. It is a mass phenomenon which in some countries has determined government lines of conduct and in others has exerted a dominant influence.

The peace and disarmament movement springs up and develops in parallel with the growing realisation of the dangers and threats which hang over world peace. Dangers and threats which have never been so close and imminent as in recent years. The reasons for this are the rapid acceleration of the race towards new and ever more terrifying nuclear weapons; the vast quantities of economic, financial and human resources thrown into the armaments whirlpool, while the heartrending imbalance between the industrialised countries and vast areas of backward and underdeveloped countries, with extreme poverty and starvation in some cases, is becoming increasingly tragic and dangerous; another explanation is to be found in the growing number of areas of tension and actual fighting in various parts of the world.

These seem to me to be the reasons for the emergence of the peace movement in recent years, a movement which is completely different from anything which has gone before and is directed towards halting the arms race, promoting disarmament and setting in motion a serious and effective policy of development aid to the third world; towards a peaceful solution for the present conflicts as a consequence of its steady growth. These I would say are the main objectives of the peace movement, and they are sought equally in both the East and the West. Because the outstanding feature of this movement, over and above its pluralistic character embracing many convergent and concurring views, is its autonomy and the determination and ability to act on ideals and moral inspiration in pursuit of aims which do not identify with the policies of the military blocs or with either of them. If this is, and I think it is, the true substance of this movement and these are

its aims it is in our interest to support it and not to be afraid of it.

The objection that what it is doing could cause harm to security and international equilibrium and could encourage tendencies towards neutralism and disengagement from defence is acceptable only if one takes an exclusively military view of security and international equilibrium, based solely on the argument of greater strength, as we heard a few moments ago, and on a rising spiral of the balance of terror to ever higher and less controllable levels. This is not our view. As everyone knows, we Italian communists have no intention of challenging our country's political and military alliances; we therefore do not advocate neutralistic tendencies nor are we unaware of the security requirements of Italy and Western Europe.

On the other hand, we believe that greater security is to be achieved not by adding to the number of nuclear weapons on our continent but through military balance, at progressively lower levels, guaranteeing the security of both sides. That is why we are opposed to the deployment of new missiles and why we are demanding the suspension of work on the base at Comiso in Sicily; that is why we say no to the Pershing and cruise missiles and equally to the SS-20s. For that reason we are in favour of negotiations and negotiations which will produce positive results preventing the deployment of Euro-missiles in the West and will lead to the dismantling of some or all of the theatre missiles in the East.

I believe that we Europeans and above all the governments of the countries most directly concerned should work to ensure that these vital negotiations are not left to the two super-powers and that they themselves are involved as direct protagonists. This overall assessment explains our attitude to the pacifist movements now growing in Italy, in Europe, in the United States and in other parts of the world. An attitude which is not only one of distrust but one of open sympathy. Indeed, we regard ourselves as part of the pacifist movement and feel ourselves committed to making our full contribution to its independent initiatives.

We are convinced that, far from being a threat to security, this movement is a powerful instrument to be used for a policy aimed at disarmament, détente and peace for our continent and the world as a whole.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Rubbi.

I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this is the second change of tune we have had this afternoon. I was glad the last speaker also had

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)

something different to say from what we heard earlier this afternoon.

With all due respect for Mr. Lagorce's report and for all the work he has put into it, I disagree with some aspects of it. I shall explain by making three points. Firstly, I should like to say something about the title of the report. In committee I told Mr. Lagorce that I felt the pacifist and nuclear movement was being confused with the anti-nuclear movement and the peace movement, which is what the report principally concerns. Although Mr. Lagorce himself says in his report that the peace movement and the anti-nuclear movement cannot be equated with neutralism and pacifism in the traditional sense, I do not believe this is reflected in the title of his report. I also feel that the peace movement and the anti-nuclear movement which have emerged in recent years have little or nothing in common with traditional pacifism and neutralism. I believe that what we are talking about is a feeling in favour of the anti-nuclear and peace movement.

The considerable expansion of the freeze movement in America is very important. This at least refutes the claim that the peace movement in Western Europe is primarily anti-American and – as so often suggested – financed by the Soviet Union. There is in fact a growing belief that each country should be able to take its own decisions on its own territory. In Western Europe and America the freeze movement and the peace movement have had a great influence on the thinking and actions of many politicians and their parties, and not only at election time. Nonetheless, Mr. Lagorce is undoubtedly right in saying that in some cases the motives have been purely opportunist.

In the fifth paragraph of the preamble, Mr. Lagorce refers to the danger that might arise from unilateral disarmament. In my opinion, the converse also applies. You could equally well say that there may be a chance of its having a favourable effect on the negotiations. I do not mean that one should persist indefinitely with unilateral disarmament, but in my opinion and that of my party it should at least be tried.

My greatest objection is to paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation. In no circumstances can I or my party agree to the stationing of medium-range missiles on Dutch soil, whatever the outcome of the negotiations in Geneva. We cannot and will not continue to participate in an arms race indefinitely, and certainly not in a nuclear arms race. Unlike the Rapporteur, we do not believe in deterrence through

armament, and we are therefore also opposed to the deployment of these missiles.

Various references have been made this afternoon to the attitude of young people. Today's young people – fortunately, we might say – did not experience the second world war. Is it surprising that so many of them should be opposed to the nuclear arms race? What they have inherited from the older generation does not make the future look too promising for young people: an economic crisis, the prospect of being unemployed for a very long time at least and, on top of that, the prospect of a nuclear war that cannot be won. I do not think we can accuse young people of being naïve or whatever else we might call it.

It has been said this afternoon that young people must be given an intelligent explanation of the fact that the supremacy of the Russians is so great that a nuclear war can be prevented only by deterrence and by armament. All I can say is, will someone begin by giving me an intelligent explanation, because I do not understand either.

Mr. President, I shall vote against Mr. Lagorce's report, but not because my party and I are being manipulated or financed by the KGB. It is two years since my party took the decision which is at the root of my statement this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

I call Mr. Jager.

Mr. JAGER (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Lagorce's report is a quite remarkable document both for the quality of the information which it contains and for the high-minded views which it expresses. In particular, it displays considerable moderation by not condemning the European pacifist movements, in view of the aims which inspire them, while detailing the dangers they represent to the balance of forces in Europe and hence to peace.

Pacifist ideals are, as the Rapporteur emphasises, eminently respectable, even though the means proposed, especially when they involve disarmament or unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons, are extremely dangerous. Admittedly, the pacifist reactions are logical: quite apart from attitudes of principle as regards non-violence or opposition to nuclear weapons, there is the understandable attitude of all those who do not want the defence of everyone else – i.e. of other people – to force them to run risks peculiar to themselves – and Pershing missile bases sited near them may look like the lightning conductor which will attract the thunderbolt. Europe's handicap is its high

Mr. Jager (continued)

population density, which makes it vulnerable both physically and politically.

France would seem to be privileged in this respect, even if its lesser sensitivity to the neutralist phenomenon is attributable, as the Rapporteur points out, to the specific features of its defence policy: as their country has a deterrent capacity of its own, the French do not feel that the deployment of nuclear missiles is a sign of dependence on foreign countries. With regard to the twofold decision of December 1979, France's position is that of a "committed spectator"; a spectator because it does not form part of the integrated military organisation of NATO and because it has its own means of nuclear defence; committed because it considers that, for the alliance to which it belongs to be credible, weapons capable of re-establishing the now seriously threatened balance of forces must be deployed as scheduled.

Neutralism, if it has any meaning, is the desire for the zero option and a significant lowering of the level of conventional forces. But – and I should like to conclude on this point – we must not allow ourselves to be too greatly misled by looking only at the tip of the iceberg: we must not conclude, from the fact that pacifist movements in France do not appear to be on the same scale as in other countries, that mere possession of the nuclear weapon will in itself inspire in the population the spirit of defence without which there can be no credible deterrence. Proof of this is, I think, provided by the results of a strange survey published in France in 1981, which I offer for your consideration.

When asked what the President of the Republic should do if the Soviet army invaded French territory, 63% of those questioned, representing a cross-section of French public opinion, said they hoped that the head of state would immediately enter into negotiations in order to make peace with the Soviet Union; 7% were in favour of using the nuclear weapon; 21% thought that, without using the nuclear weapon, France should nevertheless fight the Soviet Union by all other means. To the question as to whether France ought to declare war on the Soviet Union if it were to invade or attack Poland, Yugoslavia, the United States or West Germany, there was a majority of negative replies, amounting to 78%, 76%, 65% and 59% respectively for the countries mentioned. Lastly, in the event of serious danger of war between the United States and the Soviet Union, 63% of those questioned were in favour of asking the Soviet Union to leave our country out of the fighting, while 22% thought that France should preferably be on the side of the

United States and 1% said preferably on the side of the Soviet Union.

I leave you to reflect on the answers which strike you as the most disturbing. For my part, I merely infer from them that it is essential to strengthen a spirit of defence, by a campaign which must begin in the schools, to make our children realise that the only free peoples are those who clearly demonstrate their unshakable determination to resist.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Jager.

I call Mrs. Knight.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to add to the congratulatory shower which has alighted on the head of Mr. Lagorce on his excellent report. Perhaps I might make one or two comments about the wording, first, of the preamble.

The sixth paragraph of the preamble is rather difficult to get clear in one's mind. If it intends to suggest that peace movements in Europe would be entitled to call for unilateral disarmament initiatives if the Warsaw Pact failed to allow progress in the various disarmament negotiations, I think it is wrong. The eighth paragraph seems to overstate the influence of peace movements. It might be important to look at those two paragraphs again.

Our first problem is to get across the fact that the CND campaigners are not the only ones who care about peace. This is not a case of hard-faced armaments manufacturers versus the sweet, gentle and courageous lovers of peace. We all care deeply about preserving peace and there can be no smugness among the green people and the CND campaigners that they in some way are more lofty than we – holier than thou.

We all care greatly about preserving peace. The argument is not about the end but about the means. Those who feel that peace is best safeguarded by a balance of power have a great deal of evidence on their side. Because of the balance of power, we have had peace for thirty-seven years. A CND campaigner recently said to me: "Yes, we have had world peace, but there have been many little wars in that time." But not one war has been waged against any country that had nuclear power. Not one attempt has been made to overthrow or take over a country that could fight back. That makes part of our case for us.

I have no doubt that Afghanistan would never have been taken over had it been able to stand up to the Soviets. At a recent march organised by the CND in Britain, many little children who could hardly speak for themselves had placards pasted all over their prams saying: "Babies against the bomb". The people who

Mrs. Knight (continued)

push those children and put those notices on their prams should have a look at some of the babies in Afghanistan, as I have done. They should see the poor little mites who have been blown partly to bits by Soviet bombs, sometimes designed to look like toys.

Those babies, who have every right to be against the Soviet bomb, will be maimed for life. Some have had arms or legs blown off by "toys" deliberately placed by the Soviets to lure them into hurting themselves. They should have a voice in this matter, because those babies would not have been mutilated had there been some way for little Afghanistan to stand up to the Soviet attack.

I have no doubt that the Falklands would not have been attacked by Argentina if the latter had thought that Britain intended to fight back.

The Soviets have made constantly and unequivocally clear their intention to overthrow all our nations and impose worldwide communism. Again and again Soviet spokesmen make that perfectly plain. If that is their intention, why do they not do it? They do not do it because it would be madness to attack any of our nations if by so doing they called upon their own heads the terrible threat of a nuclear war. That is what keeps us safe – and it is the only thing that keeps us safe. The strategy of deterrence is to use weapons not as instruments of war but as guardians of peace.

In paragraph 18, Mr. Lagorce's report reminds us that the rise of pacifism "bore its share of responsibility for the weakness shown... towards Hitler". How right he is to remind us of that.

This is the kernel of the reason for the great import of this matter. Those who pursue pacifism, as the CND campaigners do today, make the Soviets very happy indeed. Every CND march or demonstration calls forth smiles in the Kremlin and a round of drinks behind the iron curtain.

It is said that the young are idealistic in their support of CND. That is true, but they have no experience. In the days before the last world war, the young gave comfort to the dictators by a famous resolution passed at the Oxford Union: "That this house would not fight for King and country". It is well known that the passing of that resolution in that great English university contributed to Hitler's belief that he could attack us with impunity.

The report is also right to draw attention to the German socialists of 1870, in so doing reminding us that this is no new problem. The report tells us that those German socialists

risked imprisonment by organising demonstrations. We have the same kind of thing today. In Britain a group of women have recently been sentenced to fourteen days in prison, although there was not the slightest wish to send them to prison and they had every opportunity not to go; but they were determined to be martyrs and eventually there was nothing else that could be done. But their aim is the same as ours. It is only the means that are different.

I wish to make only two other brief points. First, I wish to place on record my anxiety that part of the CND effort is to get rid of nuclear power. I know of no better way to reinforce the certainty of victory against any country than first by denying it weapons and secondly, by denying it power with which to run its factories and its whole internal life. Unless we pursue policies that will bring us nuclear power, we are in very grave danger in the economic and industrial lives of all our countries.

I am sure that all of us here join strongly in calls for multilateral disarmament. That is the aim of us all. I wish to goodness those who have put forward the communist viewpoint this afternoon would try to prevail upon their communist friends to make some advance in multilateral talks. That would be the real way to proceed.

All of us agree that peace is the most desirable objective in the world but those reading Mr. Lagorce's report must recognise that a great barrier to peace are the present peace movements in Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs. Knight.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the spread of the self-styled peace and neutralist movements in Europe and in other parts of the world began with the adoption by NATO, in December 1979, of the twofold decision aimed at restoring the balance of nuclear weapons. I am not sure, however, that – apart from the idealists who can and certainly do form part of these movements and apart from the so-called "apostles" – the purpose of these movements is not so much to eliminate or reduce nuclear weapons as to oppose the NATO decision and the possibility of reaching a balance which the deployment of the SS-20s has shifted in favour of the Soviet Union.

In my view, the greatest danger is that the so-called peace and neutralist movements may create the suspicion that we are not pacifists but warmongers; the greatest danger is that NATO and the Atlantic Alliance may come to

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

be regarded as institutions which are seeking not peace but war. This is extremely serious, particularly as another objective which these movements have partially achieved is that of splitting the United States from Europe and creating very dangerous divisions.

The Rapporteur spoke today of the dominance of the United States which must be resisted. This would take too long to discuss. What has this Assembly done up till now? It has worked for peace and to make its contribution to achieving the aim of reducing both conventional and nuclear weapons; it has made a most valuable contribution. And let it not be said that we, the western countries, are to blame for the failure to achieve much more satisfactory results. When I hear it said, as we have heard once again this afternoon, that we are in favour of reducing nuclear weapons to the lowest level and that we are therefore opposed to NATO's decision to deploy Pershing and cruise missiles; when I hear that we should therefore oppose the installation of missiles at Comiso, I am confirmed in my belief that what is wanted is not parity, or a reduction to the lowest level, but the supremacy of the Soviet Union which has attained this position by taking advantage of the climate of détente and which now hopes to take advantage also of the climate created by the self-styled peace and neutralist movements.

For these reasons, I am also concerned at the part the Soviet Union is playing in fostering the pacifist and neutralist movements. We cannot ignore what the Secretary-General of NATO said when he made precise charges supported by evidence. Furthermore, so-called peace demonstrations attended by tens and tens of thousands – and it is said that one is to be organised with participants from all over Europe and the rest of the world – cannot take place without the vast funds which come, not from collections from individuals, but of necessity from certain powers – or one certain power. So, Ladies and Gentlemen, let us be on our guard because, if we abandon the line we have taken up to now of making our contribution to lowering armaments to adequate levels, we shall simply be giving way and we shall be working not for peace but for slavery and total surrender.

Let these not be regarded as rash or war-mongering statements. They are affirmations from a man who believes in peace, who wants peace but also wants freedom. Let us not separate our aims of peace and security, of peace and freedom, and let us not take any action which might weaken the Atlantic Alliance and play into the hands of those who seek to take advantage of the simplemindedness of some

people and the bad faith of others, to bring the free world to its knees before the Soviet giant.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Mankind should recognise two related overriding needs. The first is to offer more than empty words to enhance world prosperity and make the North-South dialogue reasonable. The second urgent need is for mankind to develop more arms control. We need to come back a great deal further from the brink.

I hope that in committee I have diligently and consistently urged the cause of collective security and disarmament. I am grateful for the opportunity to press that case which the committee led by Mr. Lagorce afforded. I pay my tribute to him. It may surprise some members of that committee to know that I have been critical in the United Kingdom of some of the people involved in the peace campaign. We have heard much about the minority in that campaign who may have been prepared to countenance what happened in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Afghanistan more recently.

I have little respect for those who support enormous military expenditure and the priority given to such expenditure by the Soviet Union. Some peace campaigners slavishly follow the dictates of Soviet foreign policy but while we concentrate on the minority, we should not disdain the majority in that campaign who serve a basic purpose – the instinct of humanity to survive. There is morality in their argument which is enhanced all the time the multilateralists adopt a posture of favouring multilateral disarmament but do nothing to achieve it.

I do not wish to be offensive but Mrs. Knight said that she was a multilateralist. She also said that the only countries attacked in the post-war period were those without the bomb. If that is not an incitement to proliferate nuclear weapons, I do not know what is.

A procession of conservatives have said that they are multilateralists but there is little evidence that their party has done anything about it. For example, the conservatives defend the Trident policy in the United Kingdom. The British Government have not made it clear that that policy means adding to the West's nuclear capacity by more than all the SS-20 missiles in the Soviet Union's possession. That is not sensible multilateralism. The world should come back from the brink.

You may not approve of my next remarks, Mr. President. I am sorry that I must refer once again to Mr. Osborn dragging in South

Mr. Hardy (continued)

Yorkshire politics. Indulging in politics is out of place here. If he wants to criticise the local county council and the labour-controlled council in Sheffield, let him be elected to a local authority and make his criticisms in South Yorkshire instead of here. The government's defence policies might command greater respect in South Yorkshire if the strategic industrial capacity there had not been wiped out. Plenty of people like me in South Yorkshire, who are not on the far left, are extremely critical of the present government.

It is ridiculous for Britain to increase its priority for defence while wiping out its strategically essential industrial base. Just as the government fail to perceive that, so they fail to understand the morality of the young people who wish to survive. There are two arguments about that. The conservative idea of survival seems to be that of a tortoise prepared to adopt an arrogant position while retreating into an irrelevant shell. The other idea is that by argument, effort and determination collective security can be served and multilateral disarmament pursued.

The West has not yet done enough. Western Europe has done far too little to encourage the Americans to cease what appears to be the emulation of a cowboy in a wild west saloon playing poker. We cannot secure meaningful arms control by the economic attrition to which reference has been made. We cannot secure sensible arms control by continuing to try to spend more than those to whom we are opposed. Negotiations and diplomacy, if determinedly backed, would be far more effective and would serve mankind's interests far better.

We have heard about the communist minority in the CND and similar organisations. I do not have any respect for them, but I have respect for the young people in that organisation. I have respect for the genuine pacifist and for some of the people who are almost saints within such organisations. I have less respect for those whose fortunes lie in selling weapons.

If we are to answer the saints, the young and the unselfish, we must use a more logical and moral argument. All that we have heard today from those who rest a poor case behind the multilateral argument will convince none of the young, none of the saints and none of the pacifists. It can contribute nothing to the establishment of a prosperous world where North and South speak together and where we are more interested in ploughshares than in swords.

Mrs. Knight was right to remind the Assembly about babies being maimed and disfigured by conventional weaponry, but we should be considering not just one generation that can be smashed by conventional means, but the weapons now in our hands which can maim and disfigure from one generation to another. Our obligation is not only to our generation but to the generations yet to come. There is no hope for them in much of what has been said today.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

I now propose that the debate and the sitting be adjourned.

11. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 30th November, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism (Resumed debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 934 and amendments).
2. Address by Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.10 p.m.)

EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 30th November 1982

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. Changes in the membership of committees.
4. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 934 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Dr. Miller, Mr. Michel, Mr. Büchner, Mr. Brown, Mr. Böhm, Mr. Prussen, Mr. Benedikter, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Brown, Mr. Lagorce (*Rapporteur*), Sir Frederic Bennett (*Chairman of the Committee*).
5. Address by Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence.
Replies by Mr. Hernu to questions put by: Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Vohrer, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Morris, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Wilkinson.
6. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism (*Vote on the draft recommendation. Doc. 934 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Lagorce, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Dejardin; (point of order): Lord Reay, Mrs. Knight, Sir Frederic Bennett; Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Morris, Mr. Lagorce.
7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

I stress again the great importance of every representative or a substitute in the place of a representative signing the register before, under our rules, he can take any part in our proceedings. No substitute may take any part by speaking or voting unless he has been properly inscribed in the place of a representative. That will be of great importance if we need to use the roll-call voting procedure.

1. See page 20.

3. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day concerns changes in the membership of committees.

The Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany proposes the following changes in the membership of committees: General Affairs Committee: Mr. Rösch to be a member in place of Mr. Kurt Jung; Mr. Böhm to be an alternate member in place of Mr. Lorenz. Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration: Mr. Schwarz to be an alternate member in place of Mr. Hans-Werner Müller.

The Luxembourg Delegation proposes the following change in the membership of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration: Mr. Hengel is to be a member in place of Mr. Kriepe.

Are there any objections?...

The nominations are agreed to.

4. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 934 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The orders of the day now provide for the resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the

The President (continued)

problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism, Document 934 and amendments.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I will take your words to heart, Mr. President, and be very brief.

The report by Mr. Lagorce produces in our minds the possibility of an interesting and comprehensive philosophical discussion of these problems. Pacifism, of course, is not the same as neutralism. I am not a pacifist: I think few people here are pacifists. I can recall Europe in the 1930s. If the allies then had adopted a firmer stance, if the opposition to what was happening in Europe had been stronger, the second world war might have been averted.

Pacifism is also not the same as an anti-nuclear stance. What worries me about the report, excellent though it is, is the assumption in it – the background is accepted – of the almost inevitable conflict which seems to be impending between Western Europe and the Soviet Union. That is a dangerous assumption, because it pre-empt the whole movement which wants peace – without necessarily being pacifist, it certainly wants to avoid a nuclear holocaust.

It is difficult enough in our countries to allay public fears and reduce public opposition to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We know the opposition we face to even the remote possibility of the escape of radiation from nuclear reactors.

We must accept how much more difficult and dangerous it is to have the possibility of a nuclear war when the very purpose of dropping nuclear bombs or of using nuclear weapons is to spread radiation. That is the object and if we have opposition to nuclear power for peaceful purposes when the spread of radiation is very unlikely and a remote possibility, one can imagine the opposition that there is to the possibility of nuclear war. I speak not as a politician but as a physician knowing absolutely clearly that the possibility of survival, the possibility of protecting one's self from nuclear fallout if there were the disastrous effects of nuclear war, is extremely slight and in all probability non-existent.

I would ask the Rapporteur to say whether he feels he has given enough thought to the anti-nuclear movement. I am talking about not the pacifist movement but the anti-nuclear movement and I would draw his attention to paragraph 59 of the English text. I wonder whether the Rapporteur is right in saying that

the demonstrations against nuclear power for war purposes are relatively mild. He does not use those words but he says that the experience of the United Kingdom and France in relation to anti-nuclear reaction is not comparable with the demonstrations in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium or even Italy.

Going by what we have seen of anti-nuclear demonstrations in the United Kingdom, the demonstrations in other countries he mentions must be horrific and I wonder whether he is talking in terms of numbers involved or the nature of the reaction to nuclear power itself. In other words, have the demonstrations in the countries he mentions been bigger or more violent than those in the United Kingdom? Certainly hundreds of thousands have been involved in anti-nuclear demonstrations in the United Kingdom.

This is a good report. It goes into the problems comprehensively, but there is one recommendation that I find almost impossible to accept, recommendation 2. It is an acceptance of a position that we should not be taking. We should be pushing as hard as we can for the abolition of all nuclear weapons and not giving a way out to people who may not have the same views on the dangers of nuclear war as I have and certainly as many people in the United Kingdom have.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Dr. Miller.

I call Mr. Michel.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – To begin with, Mr. President, I wish to add my own compliments to those of the other speakers for the work done by Mr. Lagorce. This is an objective and comprehensive study which won the unanimous approval of the committee. Once again, we have here a complete analysis of the various aspects of pacifism and neutralism.

We must not let our work be influenced by neutralist and pacifist movements. It makes me uncomfortable to read in the report that "they compel us to ask ourselves questions", for we must, on our own initiative and in positive fashion, examine security problems without being directed or constrained by outside movements.

I regret the statement that pacifist movements in the East or West are entitled to call for new initiatives from the members of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact. Perhaps they are entitled to do so, but these are pressure groups. However honourable they may be, they enjoy freedom of expression in our countries, and while it is our duty to protect this freedom within the normal limits of popular

Mr. Michel (continued)

expression, we are not required to recognise the claims of these movements any more than those of the other movements which – and I stress this – are free to express themselves by virtue of the constitutions of our countries.

In the same way, I find it difficult to understand how the pacifist movements of the East and those of the West can be placed on the same footing. No matter what their respective intentions may be, there is nevertheless a difference in their ability to express themselves. In the western countries, a pacifist movement can express itself with complete freedom, can refute, and can express its opinions. In contrast, we observe that in the eastern bloc countries – we saw this after the latest demonstrations by the pacifist movement in Moscow – the members of such movements are candidates for psychiatric wards, which is sad indeed. Therefore, to put them on the same footing does not make sense.

I also regret that, in the report, the committee should have abandoned a project by Mr. Lagorce concerning the transmission of information about pacifist movements. This would have provided us with important elements, particularly concerning the financing of certain pacifist movements. Although this decision was widely approved by the committee, I believe it was a mistake to abandon Mr. Lagorce's proposal, which I thought was a wise one.

Peace? Yes, but not at any price, and not under any conditions whatsoever. We must not be naïve when we talk about peace: we must want it in positive fashion and with all our strength. But, for heaven's sake, let there be times when we say – and assert in a report like this one – that we disagree with the positions adopted by certain pacifist movements. We are not in favour of unilateral disarmament because we are neither naïve nor simple-minded, and because we have no illusions.

Paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation urges the Council "effectively to concert the defence policies of member countries and their positions towards disarmament with a view to working out a European approach to such matters".

If any part of the recommendation can be said to be of fundamental value, it is this in my opinion, for it would lead, in European unity, to a further step forward and to an affirmation that European security can only be achieved in a strong, enlarged and organised Europe. We must not let ourselves be distracted by disruptive movements and we must assert our determination to achieve this security in a Europe acting in concert.

In my view, this is the most important paragraph in the draft recommendation, and I should like to emphasise this once more.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Michel.

I call Mr. Büchner.

Mr. BÜCHNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the draft recommendation and the report not only acknowledge that pacifism is a moral attitude but also take it seriously as a political statement. No campaign is waged against pacifism. There are no polemics, and certainly no disparagement. I welcome this assessment of pacifism and consider it to be the right approach.

In view of the armament trends in the world, it should not come as a surprise to anyone that young people in particular are rebelling against an insanity which consumes enormous sums of money and even then does not make the world a safer place to live in. What is surprising in fact is that the vast majority of people continue to tolerate this unreasonable situation and that more pressure is not brought to bear on the politicians.

I also feel that those who constantly and self-righteously describe themselves as realists must ask themselves whether the conventional development of defence is not now giving rise to dangers which many people believe to be greater than the threat posed by the potential adversary.

The report rightly refers to the pressure being exerted by the peace movements for acceptance as a legitimate force. I believe politics must face up to this challenge. If we are honest with ourselves in this respect, we cannot fail to admit that, so far at least, we have succeeded neither in stopping the arms race nor of course in disarming. It has become standard practice to equate strength with the accumulation of the largest possible number of the most horrifying weapons imaginable. In view of the overall situation in the world, however, I believe this is an increasingly clear sign of weakness and hopelessness, failure and also resignation.

Although I cannot accept in detail all the various conclusions drawn in the report, I do agree with what Mr. Lagorce has said about the paramount importance of negotiations. Negotiations offer the only prospect of putting a stop to a further increase in the number of weapons and their deployment. Unfortunately, doubts about the seriousness and single-mindedness of the negotiations in Geneva, for example, have not diminished in recent months. But in my view, peace movements and efforts to achieve neutrality cannot be blamed for that.

Mr. Büchner (continued)

How can credible negotiations be conducted, how can the desire for peace be demonstrated convincingly, many people ask, when both sides are working feverishly to develop the next generation of weapons and planning armaments budgets for years ahead, involving gigantic sums of money and unlimited rates of increase?

What options do we now have, Mr. President? Our countries have an important contribution to make both through European co-operation and within the Atlantic Alliance. But an alliance must mean more than working together on armaments. The alliance must not continue to mean the acceptance or justification, almost without question, of the development and also the deployment of weapons on its own territory. An alliance in the true sense should also and above all mean sharing the responsibility for disarmament.

Each country must check to see whether everything has been and is still being done in this respect to ensure the positive outcome of the Geneva negotiations. To be frank, anyone who, in connection with the problems of the NATO twofold decision, places the emphasis on the armament aspect and agrees almost without reservation to the deployment of new medium-range missiles is releasing his opposite numbers in the negotiations from their obligations. This attitude will result in further twists of the armaments spiral, in a continued arms build-up in East and West. This is what Mr. Bahr meant. Mr. Müller's interpretation yesterday was wrong. It was also Egon Bahr – I should like to say in conclusion – who pointed out that, at the present level of worldwide armaments, no country could now ensure its own security by its own efforts, however extensive they might be.

Alliances are mutually dependent. They are, as it were, condemned to co-operation – or to increasing the risks still further. This situation, I feel, may provide new opportunities, both in the discussions of the peace movements and in the discussions between politicians and the peace movements. The report might, I feel, have placed still greater emphasis on this aspect.

(Mr. Pignon, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – When I was privileged to present a report to the Assembly in 1980-81 on the state of European security, Document 858, I particularly took disarmament as my theme. To assist in briefing myself I had a number of meetings with ambas-

sadors at the Geneva disarmament conference. I met no one there who wished anything less than successful disarmament discussions.

One meeting stands out in my memory and that was with the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Issraelyan, who was head of the Soviet Delegation. I pressed him hard on reports then current of a number of deaths that had taken place at Sverdlovsk due to anthrax. As the Assembly knows, the United Nations has identified anthrax as an element in chemical warfare. The ambassador's view expressed to me was that he did not understand the matter very well and was not fully briefed on all of the factors involved. In any event, he said, the area was a militarily restricted part of the Soviet Union and no one would be allowed to enter it.

Not surprisingly, I pointed out to him that the free world remained suspicious that Russia had gone back on its undertaking not to experiment with chemical weapons and was undertaking further chemical warfare work. That incident underlines the failure of confidence in what the USSR says. The outside world believes that it does not understand what is taking place.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Forgive me for interrupting you, Mr. Brown, but the Office of the Clerk informs me that you were struck off the list of speakers because you failed to sign the attendance register. You should complete this formality. I am very sorry about this mistake.

I therefore call Mr. Böhm to speak.

Mr. BÖHM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish to refer to just one specific – but, I feel, very important – aspect of Mr. Lagorce's report, the statement it makes on the German question.

Mr. Lagorce says that the dangers of neutralism and Finlandisation he describes do not apply to Germany as a whole to the same extent as the rest of Europe. The prospect of reunification for the German nation would make it easier, Mr. Lagorce goes on, to accept the idea of Finlandisation as a price of reunification, particularly for the citizens of the German Democratic Republic, for whom Finlandisation would mean not less but more freedom.

Mr. Lagorce touches here on one of the motives which undoubtedly play a rôle in the peace movement in the Federal Republic of Germany. This movement is a mixture of Christian or socialist pacifism and opposition to nuclear weapons. It is nurtured by the ecology movement and is exposed to constant attempts by the communists to influence and direct it.

Mr. Böhm (continued)

Some of these attempts have been very successful, principally because of the massive financial backing they have from the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic.

In these circumstances the neutralist-nationalist component may fade into the background, but there is no overlooking it. At all events, we must keep a close watch on these efforts because the question is ultimately whether Germany will be prized out of the western alliance and sucked into the vortex of Moscow politics. The Soviet Union would then have achieved one of the major objectives of its policy towards the West, and the freedom not only of Germany but of the whole of Western Europe would be in jeopardy.

The incipient peace movement in the German Democratic Republic has most certainly faced Moscow with a dilemma: as much as it welcomes and encourages the peace movement in the Federal Republic of Germany, so it finds comparable phenomena in the Soviet sphere of influence objectionable. Moscow could, of course, put a stop to these efforts at any time with the means available to a totalitarian state, if it seemed politically opportune so to do. It must therefore be assumed that the modest degree of toleration was the carefully-calculated result of a painstaking appraisal by the communist leaders.

Thus, in early October of this year, four different groups from the German Democratic Republic were able to attend a meeting in East Berlin of peace movements from East and West, at which it was agreed that the peace movements should co-operate and that a centre for contacts between them should be set up in Sweden. Moscow's aim in this connection, a Swedish participant reported, is to pass the peace movements off as an anti-American protest against nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

This raises a subject which has a greater impact in the Federal Republic of Germany than in Britain or France: the fact that the nuclear weapons stationed or to be stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany are entirely controlled by foreign politicians to whom Germany is not home. The Federal Republic of Germany is thus undoubtedly in a completely different position from France and Britain, for example, whose subjects know that their "own people" control their deterrent weapons and are therefore easier to convince that they would only ever be used to ensure the survival of the people. The suspicion is systematically aroused and fomented among Germans that they will have to submit to peace or war wished on them by others, and this appeals to the

neutralist-nationalist sentiments I have mentioned. It is said, for example, and I quote: "Foreign powers are still storing tons of weapons of mass destruction on German soil." Or, and again I quote: "The Federal Republic is a colony of the United States with a limited say in its own affairs."

The dangers stemming from the awakening of neutralist-nationalist sentiments are recognised in the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. While still leader of the opposition, the new Federal Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, had this to say: "Neutralist German nationalism which sought to establish a socialist republic in the centre of Europe would not only leave Germany's security in the hands of the Soviet Union but from the outset might also mean the end of the Atlantic Alliance."

In situations of this kind politicians always ask: what do the public think? The well-known Allensbach Institute has put the following question to the citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany in recent years: "Which do you think would be the better foreign policy: should we continue to form a close military alliance with the Americans, or should we try to be completely neutral?" In 1975 36 % of the citizens asked were in favour of neutrality. In 1980 the figure had fallen to 27 %. In 1981, the latest year for which results are available, it had risen again to one-third, or 33 %.

It is interesting to look at the breakdown by age groups. In 1981, the latest year for which results have been published, 46 % of the sixteen to twenty-nine year-old age group, 27 % of the thirty to fifty-nine year-old age group and 29 % of those aged sixty and above were in favour of neutrality.

Members may also be interested to know how party supporters decided: 22 % of CDU and CSU sympathisers and 34 % of SPD sympathisers favoured neutrality.

In other words, one-third of the citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany are susceptible to neutralist arguments. But since we know that surveys also reveal that 75 % are in favour of the reunification of Germany, it becomes clear how much scope there is for political agitation between that third and the stated three-quarters of the population. So the approach that the agitators in the peace movement are trying to adopt really does entail political dangers.

If asked why 75 % of the citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany are in favour of German reunification, I would simply say that it is perfectly natural. It would be unnatural for the German people to accept being divided for ever. The fact that the world political situation has not yet permitted reunification

Mr. Böhm (continued)

and that the Germans have recognised this and acted accordingly must not be construed as meaning that they have permanently abandoned the idea of reunification.

It was Konrad Adenauer who introduced a policy which is epitomised by the phrase "freedom before unity". Ladies and Gentlemen, this was the right basic decision to take, and it still is today. But in view of the subjects we are discussing in this debate, we should ask whether we intend to allow German patriotism to be abused by neutralist-nationalist tendencies in future and so to become a danger to free Europe, or whether German patriotism is to remain loyal to the principles of freedom and democracy and thus to the alliance. The policy of the alliance and the policy of the free countries of Europe can help to keep German policy on the right track.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much, Mr. Böhm.

I call Mr. Prussen.

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to congratulate Mr. Lagorce warmly and to thank him for this remarkable document, which is without doubt of capital importance in view of the recent pacifist discussions and demonstrations in many member countries of WEU and NATO.

In his highly interesting report, the Rapporteur has succeeded in highlighting the notions of neutralism and pacifism. He has made clear the beneficial effects which the Atlantic Alliance has had on the Western European countries by banishing, for ever let us hope, the armed conflicts which have torn our peoples for years. He has very clearly shown the need to maintain a relative balance of military forces and a deterrent effect by means of nuclear weapons, whilst seeking the lowest possible level on both sides, and he has drawn attention to the danger of unilateral disarmament.

With the utmost clarity, Mr. Lagorce has laid stress on the terrible consequences of an armed conflict involving either nuclear weapons or conventional weapons – a conflict which would, without the slightest doubt, devastate the whole of Western Europe in the first place. Hence the absolute necessity of emphasising that strategic nuclear weapons must be openly deployed in order to convince any potential aggressor that any action on his part would bring unfailing retaliation.

It is unnecessary to sum up this important report. However, I should like to dwell for a moment on the notion of pacifism, which no

doubt varies from one country to another. I only partly share the Rapporteur's view. Although the presence of idealist elements among these movements cannot be denied, communist infiltration is nevertheless undeniable, and manifests itself in the form of anti-NATO slogans and banners. Pacifist activity was without a doubt helped and stimulated by NATO's twofold decision and the dread of the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons on European soil.

While it is imperative to maintain a dialogue with pacifist movements, their importance must not be overestimated. The 250,000 supporters who were present at Bonn do not represent the whole of Germany, any more than the 300,000 in Rome represented the whole of Italy or the six hundred the whole of Luxembourg. Nor must we forget the large cores within these movements who will not hesitate to travel any distance inside or outside their own countries in order to join a demonstration being held abroad, as was notably the case in Bonn where supporters from all parts of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg gathered.

What use is the collaboration of highly respectable personalities in the pacifist movements mentioned by Mr. Lagorce when their conception of European security finds no echo in the East, when the two sides have totally different concepts of freedom, or when the pacifist movements in the West enjoy complete freedom, in the widest sense of the word, and play into the hands of the Warsaw Pact, whereas they are stifled and oppressed as soon as they surface in the East?

Should they not be surprised at the indifferent attitude to medium-range nuclear weapons of satellite countries like Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Czechoslovakia? These countries are, however, in the same situation as the Western European countries but are given no opportunity to express their fears.

But one cannot deny, by merely disregarding it, the concern felt by the populations of certain European countries which dread the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe close to some town or village, for Europe unfortunately does not have wide expanses or unpopulated deserts at its disposal. This concern must be recognised by Europe's political leaders as well. And it is up to them, if necessary, to come up with alternative solutions to allay public opinion, which is largely in favour of NATO policy.

For years we have been talking about revitalising WEU. Would this not be an opportunity for WEU to show its intention of collaborating

Mr. Prussen (continued)

by actively discussing disarmament problems and missile locations, as is in fact called for under paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation?

No country in Europe intends to attack the Soviet Union or is in a position to do so. All the people in Western Europe aspire only to peace and intend to live as good neighbours with all countries without exception. No one present here is in favour of nuclear weapons or war.

Certain pacifist movements make a great show of the Soviet proposals on disarmament and no first use of atomic weapons, and stress the wish for peace, coexistence and détente.

In the first place, we already experienced a similar situation in 1938 at Munich. Secondly, let me recall that, before the last war, the Soviet Union had signed non-aggression pacts with Finland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Poland. And yet what happened? Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia are now part of the Soviet Union; Poland and Finland had to give up rich territory to the USSR after the war. And finally, the way in which Hungary, Czechoslovakia and now Afghanistan were persuaded of the need for peaceful coexistence has not been very convincing!

Being a realist, I have little hope that this situation will change as long as human rights and the Helsinki agreement are flouted in the eastern countries. Finally, I concur with the opinion expressed by Mr. Bahr who said in Luxembourg, where he had been invited to speak by the pacifist movement, "The atomic weapon exists; it has existed for years; it has succeeded in preserving us from war". Meanwhile, we must get used to the idea of continuing to live with it in peace, in the hope that some day its numbers will be reduced to the lowest possible level. However, talks must continue and NATO's twofold decision must be maintained in order to achieve our objective.

As for Mr. Lagorce's remarkable report, I hope it will be widely circulated, both among political leaders and the more responsible leaders of the pacifist movements, so that they can reflect on its contents and draw the hoped-for conclusions and consequences, in the hope that they will thereby be able to explain the true problems of pacifism in an unemotional and fully-informed manner.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Mr. Prussen.

I call Mr. Benedikter.

Mr. BENEDIKTER (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, to my

mind both Mr. Lagorce's report and most of the statements I have heard here lack something which I believe should form part of any serious debate, and that is a certain amount of self-criticism. The question we must ask ourselves is this: how have the Soviet Union and the forces close to it gained so much influence in the last few years over neutralist and pacifist movements in various Western European countries? The answer is quite simple: the NATO countries and we of this Assembly have completely failed to put our positions across to our own people credibly and convincingly.

Mr. President, perhaps I might make a direct request to you for this organisation to do something about this. I feel that more needs to be done than in the past, because we certainly cannot be satisfied with the picture Western European Union presents of itself. The NATO countries have, in my opinion, been far from successful in their portrayal of the Soviet threat to Central and Western Europe, since many people do not see the threat to peace in the Soviet Union's initial arms build-up or in its consistently high level of armament, but in our own efforts to keep pace which we would all gladly abandon provided that certain conditions were met. Pacifist and neutralist circles want us to forgo these efforts absolutely, even if the conditions are not satisfied.

Secondly, I would say that, through skilful direct influence and the exercise of at least indirect control, the Soviet Union has, in contrast, succeeded in exploiting a tremendous potential for protest, on behalf of its objective of undermining, eroding and weakening NATO.

Thirdly, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the pressure on Poland, the declaration of martial law, the dissolution of the Solidarity trade union have not really had the effect we must have been expecting. For they have not resulted in a weakening of the peace movement in the countries of Western Europe, they have not triggered off a crisis in all these pacifist and neutralist circles or at least prompted them to adopt a more balanced approach in their thinking and their actions. In plain terms, Ladies and Gentlemen, this means that millions of people in Western Europe – and surely this in itself is sufficient cause for concern – continue to advocate unilateral disarmament, thus consciously or unconsciously ignoring the real balance of forces between East and West in Europe.

Nevertheless, Mr. President, I believe it would be foolish to do as some speakers have done and paint the gloomiest possible picture, only to take pot-shots at it. In other words, it would be wrong to overestimate this phenomenon, since the results of surveys in all Western European countries show that almost

Mr. Benedikter (continued)

everywhere the vast majority of the population stand by the NATO Alliance, accept the need for the West to arm to the Soviet level, subject to certain conditions, and would not like to think that the West was for the moment militarily inferior. But simply juggling with statistics – a common pastime – and speculating as certain leading American politicians do about the possibility of a limited nuclear war in Europe are not, Ladies and Gentlemen, conducive to the idea of multilateral disarmament, and this must be made clear to Washington, because ideas and games of this kind result in uncertainty and confusion in our own camp. Still more nonsensical, of course, are statements like those of the former four-star NATO General Pasti, now active as an independent left-wing senator within the Italian Communist Party, who claims that the West is already in a position of military superiority... (*Interruption*)

I know that, and I was going to point out that although Pravda gleefully quoted this claim, it must also be said in fairness that it does not reflect the position of the Italian Communist Party, which has actually dissociated itself from these remarks. I had intended to make this clear.

What I find far worse, however, is that in *Vorwärts* of 12th March 1981 the social democrats' chief thinker, Egon Bahr, would have us believe – and the social democrats here can hardly deny this – that the Soviet Union is already beating a retreat all over the world, while the Americans are parading a policy of strength. Such deliberate political naïvety, Ladies and Gentlemen, would scarcely be worth mentioning if only it had become more generally known that the policy of détente pursued by former United States President Carter and his predecessors was positively exploited and abused by the Soviet Union for its imperialist purposes, in an extraordinary and – I would underline the word – shameless fashion.

Furthermore, despite what dyed-in-the-wool Marxists claim, détente is indivisible, and a special Euro-Soviet relationship, which many people want, must remain suspect as long as it upsets the relationship of mutual trust among NATO allies, which it is bound to do... (*Interruption*)

I will ignore that remark. It is nevertheless reassuring to find that the normative power of reality is increasingly asserting itself, even in countries where an outsider would think the potential for protest was greatest. In 1980 – and I say this in reply to the silly and not very courteous remark made by one member of this Assembly – a survey revealed that only 10 % of

the population of the Federal Republic of Germany believed that the United States of America was the world's strongest military power, while over 50 % ascribed that status to the Soviet Union. The majority of the population is thus beginning to take an interest in military problems in Europe for which the peace movement is partly responsible. This is one of its few positive effects, because people used to pay scarcely any, or, at best, far too little attention to the problems of military policy in particular.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. President, there is no remedy for neutralist and pacifist tendencies in Europe. I believe the only remedy for a disease which may not last long and which also has its positive aspects is a permanent dialogue, permanent confrontation, particularly with those critical elements among the young whom we have to tackle. Disparagement is of little use here and is certainly not a suitable approach.

(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Benedikter. This is the first time that you have addressed us, and I should like to congratulate you on your speech.

I call Mr. Urwin.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – I pay tribute to Mr. Lagorce for his excellent report and I apologise to him and my colleagues in the General Affairs Committee because I could not take part in the discussions while it was being drafted.

Mr. Lagorce has succeeded eminently in drawing our attention to the problems created by increasing development of pacifist and neutralist thinking, which is now highly organised. I do not quarrel with his definition of pacifism and neutralism, although the dividing line must be thin. I reject the objectives of the peace movements, wherever they are founded and operating. I look forward to the day when such a movement can organise a demonstration in Moscow, bearing in mind the severe restrictions imposed there on any demonstration.

Against the background of the creation of new nuclear weapons, the confidence in our ability to maintain the peace is seriously undermined. We should always listen to criticism as well as observing the actions of those who are always prepared to demonstrate, although one can sympathise with them when they foresee the end of civilisation as a result of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This stimulates their increasingly strident calls for a halt to the growth of the nuclear armoury and for the reallocation to social deve-

Mr. Urwin (continued)

lopment and aid to the third world of the resources which are swallowed in the race for superiority between the two alliances.

Total disarmament is an attractive proposition and in an ideal world it should be easily achievable, but voluntary disarmament, either by individual nations or by the decision separately of one alliance or the other, might pose a new threat to world peace if only because of the opportunity then created for the other side to use the threat of its nuclear weapons to blackmail, intimidate and dominate the rest of the world.

It is a sad fact but nevertheless it has to be observed that the failure of the western alliance to produce a formula for disarmament or defence has contributed to a perceptible decline in European support for NATO. Against the ever-increasing demands for an arms freeze, the deployment of the MX system by the United States of America appears to be not only a wantonly irresponsible act but one which is highly provocative of retaliatory measures by the Soviet Union. Apart from the fact that this action appears to be in contravention of the SALT treaty, it also becomes abundantly clear, as a result of exchanges in the British House of Commons last week, that the United States' decision on MX was taken without consultation with the member states of the alliance. Moreover, it was an action that was grossly ill-timed, bearing in mind that it coincided almost exactly with the death of Brezhnev and the emergence of a new leader of the Soviet Union. One would have thought that that of itself provided an opportunity for the practice of olive-branch politics, in other words, to try to get together with the new leadership in the Soviet Union to make an additional attempt, a determined effort, to achieve a balance in the reduction of nuclear forces and nuclear arms.

In any event, the time is now over-ripe for a more concentrated and more determined effort by all concerned to achieve a negotiated reduction in nuclear arms as a prelude to total disarmament; and nothing less than that will serve to appease the vociferous and ever-growing peace movements throughout the member states of the alliance.

I wholeheartedly support the Lagorce report and its recommendations even though perhaps they can be slightly amended to suit perhaps a majority within this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Urwin.

In my temporary absence from the chair I believe that there was a problem in that Mr. Brown was called although he had previously intimated that he did not wish to speak today

because he was not inscribed as a representative. Since then he has been so properly inscribed and I feel that it is only fair to ask him to resume his speech. I believe that he asked originally for only five minutes. Mr. Brown, knowing your exactitude and your punctilious nature, I take it that you will want only four minutes to conclude your remarks. I might also say that that illustrates the operation of Rule 24, which quite expressly says that no representative or substitute in his place should play any part in our proceedings, either by speaking or voting – and voting means also of course by sitting and standing as well as in a roll-call – without having first signed the register and, if he is a substitute, being a properly accredited representative.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – I am very grateful to you, Mr. President. I was saying that the Russian Ambassador had indicated his lack of knowledge about the chemical warfare issue and I went on to say that it was the failure to have confidence in what the USSR said that caused all who valued freedom to be unwilling to give up their defences on the speculative basis that Russia would follow suit.

During my discussions with Mr. Issraelyan I put to him the fact that the British Labour Party at that time was going to consider in October of that year a resolution that the party should support unilateralism. I said to the ambassador: "My colleagues, in October, will be expecting, if that resolution is passed, a response from the USSR. May I ask you, Ambassador, what will be your response?" He looked at me very quizzically and said: "If they pass it, Mr. Brown, we will condemn them." I said: "But they will be looking for a bit more than that, Ambassador. What will be your actual response? What will be Russia's response to the renunciation?" Again he looked at me very quizzically and said "Mr. Brown, we shall condemn them and will promise that we will not shoot our weapons at them first." I believe that that exactly sums up the attitude of the Russians with regard to any other nation going unilateralist and leaving them alone.

I firmly believe that if we are to have peace in the world it will have to come about because of respect for each other. We have had peace in Europe since the second world war because of NATO, not in spite of it. My son has grown up, married and had a family and enjoyed a life that his father, his grandfather and his great-grandfather could not enjoy.

The peace movements were all available at that time. I well remember the Peace Pledge Union, and my colleague Mr. Urwin will remember it. I well remember them all arguing exactly the same cases then as they are

Mr. Brown (continued)

arguing today. But they were no match for the dictators of that day and had it not been for the resolve of a majority in some nations to refuse to be subjugated, we should have been in a very difficult position today, and those very same people would have been unable to pursue the arguments that they are putting today because we would not have that freedom.

However, that does not absolve us from continuing to search for an agreement on disarmament. What are desperately needed are confidence-building measures between the major nations that will allow substantial reductions in our weapons leading to the outlawing of such arms. Recently in my own country Dr. David Owen put forward a far-ranging package for Europe that would be a major contribution to peace. As a social democrat I believe that we must be committed to searching urgently for a solution to get rid of all weapons, but I say to the USSR that, unless freedom is the right of every individual as guaranteed by the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, the future will be bleak.

This morning I heard on the radio that as the Russian response to the situation they have already used, as my colleague Mr. Urwin said, a bit of blackmail by saying that they are prepared to use their weapons to fire at any nation in Europe if any weapon is let off by mistake. I heard that on the radio very shortly and therefore I have not heard the full text, but it seems to fall into a pattern of what my colleague spoke about, how blackmail can be used by those who have these weapons. For the free world simply to opt out of its responsibilities for defending freedom can hardly be described as securing a future for mankind. I still believe that we shall achieve a more secure future by pursuing a policy of arms control and multilateral disarmament that will ensure all nations being a part of the decision to renounce the use of force in solving international problems.

The PRESIDENT. – The general debate having concluded, I now call the Rapporteur, Mr. Lagorce, to reply to the debate and I shall then call the Chairman.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall not of course reply to every speaker, for which I hope they will forgive me. I wish first of all to thank all those who were good enough to find some virtue in my report, and with whose comments I in many cases agree. But I also wish to thank those who have criticised shortcomings or errors which may have slipped into this report, and those who thought I had gone too far or not far enough in my recommendations.

All of which demonstrates that the sole merit of this report, if I may say so, is the fact that it exists and has thus prompted our colleagues to reflect on all the problems raised – as Mr. Müller put it just now – and that it has sparked a wide-ranging discussion during which opinions have been freely expressed and the most divergent views confronted, and I am happy to note the unusually high number of speakers and the quality of their contributions.

In this report I have endeavoured to strike a proper balance between the different opinions and to show moderation. Mr. Jager, who mentioned certain opinion polls which he said should give us food for thought, has been good enough to acknowledge this, for which I thank him. I have tried to achieve, if not a general, at least the widest possible consensus, while at the same time retaining a number of broad basic principles on which I have no intention of compromising. And it is these principles that I should like to set forth rapidly.

The first is, no unilateral disarmament but only multilateral disarmament as demanded by Mrs. Knight and Mr. Michel. I regret to have to say this to Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, with whose generous ideas, disinterestedness and sincerity I am familiar. If disarmament is to be unilateral, let it come from the stronger, let it come from the Soviet Union, not from the weaker, the West. For I must quote history, and I am not the only one to do so: Mr. Prussen and Mr. Brown did so too. I appeal to the men of my generation who lived through the prewar period. I was young then and I was a pacifist. I was one of those who thought, "Pacifists of all countries, unite". We all saw what that came to. We took the first step at Munich, then there was Czechoslovakia and then the war. I was among those who had no wish to die for Danzig. Well, we saw what that led to. Why? Because we were weaker and we were the ones to take the first steps – which merely encouraged Hitlerism.

If my first principle is no unilateral disarmament, only multilateral disarmament, my second principle is no offensive alliances.

On this point, I am replying to Mr. Atkinson. Europe is not expansionist; it is not imperialist. There is no question of preaching a crusade, or some holy war, against anyone. All we want is to defend ourselves, to ensure our security, and to do this together. May I be permitted to express surprise at the omissions criticised by Mr. Atkinson. Admittedly, I did not speak of Poland, or of Czechoslovakia. I did not go into detail, but I did mention pacifist movements in the Soviet Union. I even said that they were regarded as seditious and that they were suppressed. As for the political figures he mentions and of

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

whom I made no mention, it seems to me that this is surely a different matter altogether. It was not so much because they are pacifists that they were imprisoned or molested. This is simply a question of respect for human rights, which is another matter entirely. In any event, Soviet action in connection with these movements, these neutralist movements, runs like a thread throughout the text of my report, alike in the explanatory memorandum, in the introduction, and in the recommendation.

I agree with Mr. Cavaliere in believing that the Soviet Union does not want war but wants to Finlandise Europe, as I said in the oral presentation of my report, even if this term may not be quite to Mr. Atkinson's liking. On the other hand, I would like to thank Mr. Böhm for the pointers he has just given us to the dangers which such a Finlandisation presents for West Germany in particular.

The third principle: our action in favour of peace must be exerted within the framework of WEU. Mr. Lemoine said so a few months ago in a speech that caused something of a stir here. Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy said it again yesterday evening, and I am convinced that Mr. Hernu will repeat it presently. We have an organisation specifically concerned with defence and security problems in Europe. Let us awaken it from its slumber. Why not make use of it? Let us give it back strength and vigour. It seems to me that that is precisely what we are here for. Let us make use of this instrument created for us by the Brussels Treaty and given to Europe, but not used by us as fully as it should be. Mr. Benedikter said so just now. He was right to point out that I may not have expressed this self-criticism meaningfully enough in the text of my report. This is not to say that we must resort to a new EDC, at any rate for the time being. We must move step by step. It is not the time yet for a new EDC.

Mr. Grant has taken me to task for having said, in paragraph 26, that these movements are disturbing. Yes, I believe they are disturbing, both in the East and in the West. They are disturbing to governments and men of good faith for the simple reason that they have a grip on the young. In fact, Mr. Hardy has stressed this. For if these movements emanated from not-so-young people, such as war veterans – who are also entitled to be pacifists since they suffered more than others during the war – they would not disturb governments. For the war veterans are over sixty, and in ten or twenty years' time they will not be here any more, whereas the young, in ten or twenty years, will be running their countries. Consequently, these pacifist and neutralist movements cannot be overlooked, which is why they are a nuisance

to governments, who have to give thought to the problem.

I am indebted also to Mr. Spies von Büllesheim for recognising that it is difficult to make everyone realise the truth. Big demonstrations are planned for 1983. Doubtless there will be slogans and banners. Personally I would be in favour of a pamphlet to counter what the pacifist demonstrators will have to say in their slogans. This pamphlet would simply be a reproduction of the last page of my report, of the table showing the differences existing in weaponry and in all areas between the Warsaw Pact nations and the NATO countries. Only figures would be used because they seem to me to be particularly telling. If the tens of thousands of young people who will be demonstrating were acquainted with these figures and gave them a little thought, they might change their minds.

Another principle is that spelled out by Mr. Morris. I do not agree with General Rogers' proposition to the effect that we must turn to conventional weapons. This would make very big budget demands, yet one could not be certain of any definite result. Surely such an effort would be completely wasted? In any event, that is what we believe.

I have confidence in collective security and in deterrence confined to nuclear deterrents.

And a fifth principle is the importance of negotiating. Many speakers – Mr. Büchner, for example – have underlined this, and I concur with Mr. Rubbi who mentioned the subject too. Pacifists and neutralists are not to be found only among communists or leftists. There are Christians as well, since pacifism forms the very basis of the Christian religion. Was not Jesus Christ the first pacifist? When struck on the cheek, he turned his other cheek. Such is true pacifism.

I agree with Mr. Rubbi that communists are not the only ones. But, of course, it is the Soviet Union which controls these movements and finances them perhaps. I have been criticised for not saying so. But if I did not, it was because things which can be said at a public meeting cannot be written into a report. I did not put it in writing because I was not certain; I am fairly certain, but not entirely, and I did not want my report to contain anything that could be challenged.

No, Mr. Cavaliere, I do not want to fight against United States domination. Mr. Böhm also raised this point, and rightly so. I acknowledge our need for the United States, especially its protective power, but all I want is that we should play our own part in decisions reached by the United States, in the decisions of an alliance. In fact, this could well be what

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

the young blame governments for: letting themselves be dominated and allowing decisions to come from afar and not from their own country. This can foster pacifism. Mr. Urwin spoke of the matter just now, citing what happened in the House of Commons as an example.

I shall conclude by telling Dr. Miller that I do not think a conflict is inevitable between the Soviet Union and the United States. The future of peace in Europe lies in our hands. The first thing is to know how to make use of the instruments we possess. WEU is one of them. I am convinced that, with proper concentration of effort, we could already be reasonably effective in furthering the cause of peace. In any case, we must not give in to blackmail from pacifists and neutralists; and we shall not be surrendering if we act first.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Lagorce, for your report, which has prompted such an interesting debate.

I call the Chairman of the committee to conclude the debate.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Because of the time limits which you, Mr. President, have rightly set I shall not make general comments about the report. As Mr. Lagorce knows, the distinguished French Minister, Mr. Lemoine, having suggested the topic, had the pleasure of proposing Mr. Lagorce to undertake the task. I have never regretted that.

I have several comments to make on the preamble and recommendations. The third paragraph places undue emphasis on the negative side of the NATO twofold decision of December 1979. If one reads it in isolation one has the impression that the decision has no friends. In fact, the present British Government support it and that support was recently endorsed by the Conservative Party Conference. The new Dutch Government have reiterated their support for it in the last few days. The French have made it clear repeatedly that they are not prepared unilaterally to abandon their nuclear deterrent. The Rapporteur has repeated that.

The Italians have also made it clear that they are not prepared unilaterally to abandon the nuclear deterrent. Mr. Cavaliere's amendments make that clear.

I hope that the Rapporteur will think of a way to reflect that view. After all, Europe is still democratic. A clear majority of European governments, supported by the majority of the people, do not agree with the view expressed in

the third paragraph. Left as it is that paragraph exaggerates the claim.

Paragraph 2 of the recommendation contradicts the NATO twofold decision of December 1979. That established a time by which we should have to answer the threat of the SS-20s by putting new weapons into Europe as a deterrent. The paragraph makes the time limit indefinite and is an open invitation to the Soviet Union not to reach an agreement but to go on arguing and stalling year after year while its threat grows. That cannot be what the Rapporteur wanted. It is certainly not what France wants, because France already has its weapons in place. I cannot believe that the French seriously expect the rest of Europe to do without its weapons indefinitely for as long as the Russians continue to argue.

Several semi-philosophical thoughts occurred to me while listening to the debate. There has been much talk of the idealism of the youth movement. We must remember that young people are idealists. Youth is usually idealistic when it takes up a cause. But that does not mean that youth is right. As a young student in West Germany before the war I recall being surrounded by boys and girls of twelve to fourteen. They were ardent members of the Nazi youth movement. They were not Nazi thugs or torturers. They genuinely believed that their country had had a bad deal after the first world war and were determined that their country would be great again. The fact that they were idealistic did not prove that they were right. The result was horrific. The same applies to the young students who took part in the overthrow of the Shah. They were idealistic, but we must remember the result of their idealism. We may compliment young people on being idealistic, but that does not mean that the result of their idealism is what they wish.

Various speakers said that they were not pacifists but anti-nuclear and in the cause of peace would like to replace nuclear weapons with conventional weapons. I cannot understand that argument. Every war, with the exception of what happened when two bombs were dropped on Japan, has been with conventional weapons. The idea that by shifting from a nuclear deterrent to conventional defence one can reduce the danger of war contradicts history.

I remind the Assembly of some remarks made recently not by right-wing Americans but by three prominent Russians. Mr. Andropov has said since he took office that no sensible person or country would support unilateral disarmament. He said: "We are not a naïve people." Someone who has been rightly regarded by the liberal world as a hero who has

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

survived torture and imprisonment in exile and who has finally come to live in the West has commented upon peace movements. He said:

“There are plenty of naïve and frightened people in the ranks of the peace movement. As in the 1950s it probably consists of an odd mixture of communist fellow travellers, muddle-headed intellectuals, hypocrites seeking popularity, professional political speculators, frightened bourgeois and young people eager to rebel against anything. But there is no doubt that this motley crowd is governed by a handful of scoundrels instructed directly from Moscow.”

That was not said by Mr. Reagan or Mrs. Thatcher, but by Mr. Bukovsky when he escaped from the Soviet Union.

A defector, Major Levchenko, who is now in hiding in the United States, was asked to comment. He said:

“Few people who understand the reality of the Soviet Union will knowingly support it or its policies. So by active measures the KGB distorts or inverts reality. The trick is to make people support Soviet policy unwittingly by convincing them that they are supporting something else.”

No one could have summed it up better, except possibly the leader writer of *The Times* yesterday. I suggest that every member of the Assembly should read the article if he wishes to get a balanced view of the peace movements and what we can expect in the months ahead.

The PRESIDENT. – That concludes our general debate.

By a miracle of timing, we have concluded that debate on Mr. Lagorce's important report which, as Sir Frederic Bennett explained, his committee undertook following the suggestion of Mr. Lemoine when he addressed us last year.

5. Address by Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence

The PRESIDENT. – We are now extremely happy to welcome the French Defence Minister, Mr. Charles Hernu. The Prime Minister of France, who did us the honour of being our dinner guest yesterday evening, reminded us of the importance of Mr. Hernu's address today. Mr. Cheysson's speech showed the tremendous support that the French Government are giving to this Assembly and to Western European Union. It is an enormous pleasure and privilege to welcome you today, Minister. We are looking forward to your speech. Your

tremendous co-operation is shown by the fact that you have agreed to answer questions and then to have lunch with some members of the Assembly who have been involved in the preparation of its work.

I now invite Mr. Hernu to address the Assembly.

Mr. HERNU (*French Minister of Defence*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I thank you for welcoming me so warmly and hope I will not cause disappointment.

I am indeed very happy, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, to have been able to accept your invitation this year and thus to be able to speak before your Assembly, and, in keeping with a useful tradition, answer your questions.

For the Assembly of Western European Union is the only European parliamentary body empowered by treaty to debate questions concerning the defence of the countries of our continent. For this reason the French Government attaches special importance to it, and this is attested to by the addresses delivered here by Mr. Cheysson, the Minister for External Relations, last June, before him by Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State, and, recently, by the Prime Minister, Mr. Mauroy.

As far as we are concerned, we shall continue to support the efforts of your Assembly to fulfil its rôle and give WEU its rightful place. This insistence is not accidental. It stems from our analysis of the international context with which the European nations are faced and from our assessment of the possibilities for action by the European states, with due account for the special place which France occupies.

I would characterise the international situation as follows: on the one hand, we are witnessing a continuing, vigorous drive by the Soviet Union aimed at creating a strategic environment more favourable to itself in Europe; on the other, we have the United States where doubts are emerging concerning the extent and nature of its commitment to its European partners. Between the two, but cut off from the United States by the full breadth of an ocean whereas the Soviet Union is so near, are the Western European countries wondering about the ways and means of their security.

As far as the USSR is concerned, I shall merely note – and the first declarations by the new Soviet leadership illustrate this – that the Soviet Union combines pacifist-type actions with an unswerving resolve to use, if necessary, the whole of its military resources, to which steadily-increasing funds have been allocated over the last twenty years or so. Its military

Mr. Hernu (continued)

organisation has been continuously modernised and has become an essential instrument for exerting external influence.

By resorting to these means, which combine diplomatic initiatives with a relentless strengthening of its armed forces, the Soviet Union is pursuing in particular its aim of splitting Europe from the United States with the denuclearisation of Western Europe as the main stage in the process. The SS-20s represent the military means for achieving this split. The SS-20 missile launchers deployed over the whole length of the Soviet Union are capable of striking at most of the cities and industrial or military regions of the world with the exception of those in the American hemisphere. The whole of Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, or nearly three-quarters of the world's population, are within range of these missiles. At the same time, Soviet diplomatic action seeks to prevent the deployment of American missiles in Europe, whereas well over three hundred SS-20s have already been installed. And it is no coincidence that Soviet diplomacy should be endeavouring to get the French and British nuclear forces included in the Soviet-American negotiations. This is one thing on which France will not compromise.

Will there be any major changes in Soviet strategy under Mr. Andropov's leadership? It is doubtless too early to say. But it seems clear that the Soviet Union will regain greater freedom of manoeuvre with the problem of Leonid Brezhnev's succession settled. So it is by no means impossible that positive initiatives may be taken by the USSR in the coming months. But will not any such diplomatic overtures remain subordinate to the attempt to split the European countries from the United States? In any event, it would be foolish to overlook this aspect of things as we stand on the threshold of 1983, which certain American commentators are already calling "the year of the missile", the allusion being to the deployment of Pershing IIs and cruise missiles.

In the face of these Soviet efforts, cross-currents are running through the United States. On the one hand, we have a spectacular increase in military spending after the major cuts made in the 1970s and we note in American leaders a determination to oppose the other superpower in every area. Yet on the other hand we are witnessing a growing movement to freeze nuclear weapons which, it must be recognised, has achieved unquestionable electoral success. Admittedly, this is not a cause of anxiety in itself, inasmuch as these votes can be interpreted as a rejection of unilateral, utopian and dangerous disarmament. Unfortunately,

however, there can be no ambiguity about the statements of four former senior American administration officials published in *Foreign Affairs*: the very ones who presided over the impressive American armament effort of the 1960s; the ones too who unleashed over Vietnam a quantity of explosives exceeding the total for the last world war. These then are the people who explain to us that the European states will, in practice, have to do without America's guarantee of security. Europe would be supposed to confront, virtually alone and without nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union's conventional, chemical and nuclear arsenal, the disproportionate nature of which was only recently described to us by the Pentagon in a widely circulated brochure.

By way of illustration, I shall merely quote here a recent article by Mr. Gerard Smith, a former SALT I negotiator who, in addition to certain unacceptable appraisals of France, tells us that the core of the problem is clear — if war comes, nuclear weapons will be unable to defend Europe. In a way, he is not wrong. In saying this, he goes straight to the heart of the problem: will the European states, especially those without a nuclear force, be able to rely in future on the American security guarantee within the alliance? This lack of certainty in American minds would be less cause for anxiety were not some very official voices tending to sow doubts as to the nature of American plans concerning Europe.

General Rogers, Supreme Commander of the integrated NATO forces in Europe and commanding the United States forces in Europe, has for several months been making declarations laying emphasis on conventional armament. I have no intention of disputing the need to have well-equipped and properly trained conventional forces: this is equally true for France's philosophy as for the strategy of a flexible response. Nor will I dispute the military value of developing conventional weapons that are as accurate and effective as possible. But we find these statements a matter for concern. For it would seem inadvisable to found excessive hopes on a fragile technological lead. The experience of the last thirty years has taught us to beware of such hopes, for the Warsaw Pact forces have invariably been able to catch up on any technological lead, and it has taken them less time to do so each time. In view of the disparity between the conventional arsenals, it would hardly be realistic to dream of upsetting the existing balance of forces in this area. Under these circumstances nuclear deterrence has been and still is the best instrument for preventing conflicts, as has been the case for over thirty years.

And this also is where we fear misunderstandings with certain leading Americans. We

Mr. Hernu (continued)

in Europe know that any war – whether conventional, chemical or nuclear – would be a holocaust. We fear too that any conflict, even a so-called conventional war, with undertakings for no first use of nuclear weapons, would inevitably degenerate into a nuclear conflict. Therefore what we seek is to prevent war. And this, only nuclear deterrence can accomplish. The history of mankind has proved to be a history of wars all too often for us to believe that an effective conventional deterrent exists. To give up deterrence could mean war or slavery. We will not accept either. I note that, in his message to the second extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament in June 1982, His Holiness Pope John Paul II spoke of the moral legitimacy of deterrence. And over-reliance on conventional forces moves us away from deterrence.

The overemphasis on conventional armament as a means of restoring the balance conceals another danger, for it would be unfortunate if overinsistence on the rôle of conventional weapons were to hinder implementation by the allies of the twofold decision of December 1979. Those European countries which have decided not to have an independent nuclear deterrent know that, in the face of such divisive weapons as the SS-20s, the only alternatives are negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union or the deployment of United States missiles capable of correcting the imbalance. As the President of the Republic, Mr. Mitterrand, pointed out in a recent interview, "The only way to prevent the deployment of Pershings would be to succeed in Geneva". Implementation of this twofold decision in 1983 will serve as a test and make it possible to judge the true worth of the commitments freely entered into by the United States and those of its partners party to the 1979 decisions.

Although France is not a member of the integrated military organisation of NATO and has a totally independent nuclear force based on a doctrine which is not the same as NATO's, it has given clear support to these measures taken by its allies.

This whole question is a good illustration of France's special situation within the European system. Our position rests on two principles: independence and solidarity – two terms which are not contradictory, quite the opposite.

Our independence – or what I often call our freedom space – is of course the product of our history and geography. It is based mainly on unflagging determination and effort. A strategy founded on a global deterrent, with our

nuclear forces as its essential element, provides us with the military backing for this independence. This nuclear instrument is the fruit of dogged work, dating back to the early 1950s.

This asset must be continuously consolidated and modernised if it is to remain credible in the face of present or future threats. Thus, by early 1983, three nuclear missile-launching submarines will be permanently operational at sea. To the five existing missile-launching submarines a sixth will be added in 1985 – the Inflexible armed with MIRVed M-4 missiles. In 1994 a seventh missile-launching submarine of a new generation will be commissioned, which will have enhanced performance, particularly in the crucial area of stealth.

On land, the airborne component will be equipped from 1985 onwards with intermediate-range air-to-ground missiles which will give the Mirage IV and Mirage 2000 aircraft extended target range. As I speak to you, the process of modernising the Plateau d'Albion missiles is being completed and meanwhile studies are in progress on a mobile strategic ballistic missile system, the SX. And finally, the Pluton missiles will be replaced, beginning in 1991, by the Hades system whose range will increase from 120-130 kilometres to 350 kilometres.

French research on the enhanced radiation weapon has been conclusive, and we could manufacture and deploy this weapon if this were to be decided. Let me hasten to add that no such decision has been taken.

My intention in proceeding with this enumeration – which is in fact incomplete – is to illustrate the extent and continuity of our defence activities in France.

I could also have mentioned the various conventional armament programmes, stressing the versatility and capabilities of our conventional forces: a navy present on all the oceans, and air-lifted forces deployed not only in Europe but stationed beforehand in the overseas *départements* and territories, or assisting friendly states at their request, particularly in Africa and the Middle East.

All this presupposes appropriate funding, both for the present and the future. The figures for 1982 will be good. For, contrary to what has been said in various quarters, in the final analysis and taking all factors into account, real military expenditure, after allowing for inflation, will exceed 4%. Expenditure on equipment will have increased by over 2%. Proportionately to the gross domestic product, we shall have reached 3.9% or, on the basis of the NATO accounting system to which some of you may be more accustomed,

Mr. Hernu (continued)

the budget implemented in 1982 will represent about 4.2 % of the gross national product.

My budget will not grow to the same extent in 1983, since it will increase at roughly the same pace as inflation. It will therefore maintain the armed forces' purchasing power, and in any case will compel no basic revisions in terms of manpower or programmes. Within this budget, the nuclear forces will account for nearly 30 % of the expenditure for equipment. The credits earmarked for them will rise by 14.4 % and, as new projects are launched, programme authorisations will be up 24.6 %. This will provide confirmation of the pre-eminent, paramount rôle of the nuclear deterrent.

In the spring of 1983, the French Parliament will be discussing the programmes bill to cover the period from 1984 to 1988. This will be an important, a very important time for our country, since the major defence options open to us will be given a hearing in the course of that democratic debate. Although it is still too early to go into details, I can tell you that we have no intention of allowing our effort to flag, and we shall take whatever decisions are needed to maintain in full our ability to fulfil the commitments entered into with our allies and friends in Europe and around the world.

For we could never consider the possibility of a defence system that did not enable us to give practical expression, at the required time, to our solidarity with those who trust us. For us, independence is inconceivable in isolation and neutralism; on the contrary, it thrives on the diversity of the bonds forged with our partners and on strengthening those bonds.

And in this connection, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to reply to three questions:

- (i) How does France contribute to the security of its European allies?
- (ii) What specific rôle can it play to reinforce its contribution?
- (iii) What place can WEU occupy in this context?

Let us run quickly through the broad answers to these three questions.

France's contribution to the preservation of peace in Europe is manifested in several ways. In the first place, and this can hardly be disregarded, the mere existence of the French deterrent force substantially reduces the risk of aggression against the European states.

Indeed a potential enemy would be faced with the major uncertainty which the very exist-

ence of this force would introduce into his calculations. It is, therefore, essential to preserve this element of uncertainty, and not just from a strictly French angle. The disappearance of this factor would do nothing to enhance the security of the European states, quite the contrary.

As regards conventional forces, France has nearly fifty thousand men stationed in Berlin and the south-west of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is our intention during the coming years to increase the rapidity and flexibility of our ability to commit forces beside our allies once the decision is taken. It is with this in mind that the French high command is actively engaged in studies aimed at creating a force of anti-tank helicopters – known by the acronym FHAC – for intervention wherever and whenever necessary. The recent events in the Middle East attest to the importance of helicopter formations in fighting where armour is present in large numbers.

France, as a loyal partner, and who could doubt it, respects the international agreements common to the seven WEU countries: the Brussels Treaty on the one hand and the Washington Treaty by which the Atlantic Alliance was established on the other. As the Prime Minister, Mr. Pierre Mauroy, stated before the National Assembly on 24th November 1982, France honours and continues to honour in full the commitments so entered into with its allies. We also intend to exploit all opportunities for co-operation, especially bilateral co-operation, between the European states. Thus, the President of the French Republic and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany have decided to implement the defence and security provisions of the Elysée Treaty of January 1963. I am convinced that the deepening relationship between Paris and Bonn will have a stimulating effect on bilateral relations between all the European states.

With my colleague the Minister for External Relations, Claude Cheysson – with whom, if I may say so, I work hand in hand since the defence policy that is mine and the government's merely reflects our foreign policy – we are working to expand this network of relations, whose importance cannot fail to increase in these times of uncertainty we are experiencing.

Such a rapprochement will be all the more solid in that it will rest on tangible joint activities, and here I have in mind co-operation in the realm of armaments in particular. Much has already been accomplished between our countries in this field: the Jaguar and Alpha-Jet combat aircraft and the Hot, Milan and Roland missiles attest to the economic, technological and military successes that can be achieved in

Mr. Hernu (continued)

the framework of agreements uniting a small number of mutually complementary partners. We must go further still. Not only for political reasons – whose importance I have already stressed – but also for budgetary and economic reasons, for in view of the cost of developing major future military hardware, co-operation is the only reasonable answer if the European states wish to avoid being dependent on equipment produced by American industry. And the experience which France has gained with its various European partners in this area illustrates the soundness of this approach, provided certain basic errors are avoided: the number of co-operating partners must be limited as far as possible, the running of the programme must be compatible with industrial-type management and requirements must be precisely defined at a previous stage.

This is the spirit in which the government to which I belong wishes to give fresh impetus to co-operation in the field of armaments, on major programmes which our armed forces will need in the coming decades.

Three basic areas of activity seem to me particularly promising.

The helicopter gunship: I stressed just now the importance which helicopter gunships are assuming in modern military tactics. It is therefore only logical that a special effort should be made in this direction. Intensive talks are being held between the military and German and French engineers with a view to defining a common platform and common equipment for anti-tank or tactical support versions of a combat helicopter, depending on national requirements.

The future battlefield tank: France, like other member countries of WEU, will need to replace its present battlefield tanks within the next ten years or so. Accordingly, credits were included in the 1983 budget and will be provided for under the 1984/1988 programmes bill for a definition study of a future tank. The Prime Minister has indicated that we would be ready to welcome co-operation proposals from any of our European partners.

For we do not think that the spirit of the February 1980 Franco-German agreement concerning a future tank is dead: on the contrary, we seek to promote a revival of it.

The tactical combat aircraft: many of our member states will have to replace part of their Jaguar or Phantom combat aircraft by the middle of the next decade. And the cost of replacing them will be all the higher because research and development work will focus largely on entirely new highly sophisticated

technologies. The technological revolution which is taking place at the moment in the aeronautical field requires us, in an initial phase, to manufacture an experimental combat aircraft – which French engineers have already christened the ACX – embodying state-of-the-art technology. Here too credits are provided for in the defence budget. Approaches have already been made in several capitals so that this experimental aircraft should be the fruit of joint efforts, with a view to subsequent construction of the European tactical combat aircraft.

A helicopter gunship, a future battlefield tank, an experimental aircraft: the implementation by the European states of three such important, essential programmes would of course have political and industrial repercussions of the first magnitude, the more so as other projects on a lesser scale are also being discussed among different partners.

This work and these efforts in the armaments field must obey military and industrial imperatives. They consequently bring together different partners, depending on the nature of each project.

Similarly, the content and scope of bilateral consultations on security or defence vary according to the parties involved. Clearly, however, there needs to be a framework within which we can discuss together the problems relating to the defence of our countries.

Some will say that the Atlantic Alliance could be that forum. And it is true that it would be absurd to minimise the indispensable rôle of this alliance that binds together the nations situated on the two sides of the Atlantic. The alliance, however, has a number of internal contradictions – such as the Greek-Turkish difficulties – and a number of problems concerning more particularly the states represented in your Assembly.

The European Community, by virtue of the treaties on which it is founded, is not competent to deal with defence questions. Moreover, the presence of a neutral state makes any de facto extension of its authority in the realm of security problematical.

Western European Union and its Assembly are empowered to deal with military and security problems. Its composition is exemplary since all the members of WEU are members of both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. In this connection it is interesting to note that, from the outset of the Argentinian aggression at Port Stanley, it was the seven member states of WEU that imposed the embargo on arms deliveries to Argentina. For while the embargo had the appearance of a Community decision, several EEC member

Mr. Hernu (continued)

states, not members of WEU, indicated that they would remain aloof from this decision.

It is therefore symptomatic that, in a conflict opposing a member of WEU and an outside aggressor, the members of this organisation should have reacted in very similar fashion. And yet it involved something taking place very far from our Europe.

This identity of view must, a fortiori, prevail in security and defence problems that concern the European continent. The difficulties of the international context must not tempt us to surrender, or raise doubts in Europe, but on the contrary must motivate us to close ranks and state our options clearly.

A year ago, Mr. Georges Lemoine, Secretary of State for Defence, speaking here, made a number of proposals aimed at giving more content to the work of your Assembly and of WEU as a whole, and making it more effective. He suggested in particular that the Standing Armaments Committee should serve systematically as a "design office" for the Assembly, to tackle directly certain fundamental political problems, the independent in-depth treatment of which calls for a self-contained analysis and research service. The balance of Soviet-American conventional forces, an analysis of the pacifist movements, etc., would be among the possible subjects. These suggestions are still on the table and it is up to the parliamentarians and the member states to implement them. For instance, what would there be against placing the Standing Armaments Committee at the service of the Assembly, provided the Assembly and Council of WEU agreed? We support such a reform, which could be very useful even though some may feel it to be modest. I call upon them to show their good will, for it will be difficult for them to convince anyone that major projects in the sphere of defence policy in Europe can be implemented if there is no way of furthering realistic and reasonable proposals.

I note in any case that this year special interest attaches to the work of the Assembly, which augurs well for what is to follow. Indeed, the reports and draft recommendations submitted to you by your fellow-members seem to me to reflect a desire to get to the bottom of the true problems in a practical manner. True, there are some things about which I do not entirely agree. From the intellectual point of view, however, I view this approach as extremely positive and encouraging to those who wish to see WEU and its Assembly occupy their rightful place.

For it is essential that the European countries should make their voice heard, that we

should express together the importance we attach to certain common values. Your Assembly can and must work in concert with the governments of the member states to stiffen in European public opinion the will for peace and security, for dialogue and liberty.

That is what I wanted to say to you today, and I thank you for your attention. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – You can sense from the way in which your speech was received, Minister, how indebted the Assembly is to you for delivering such an important, comprehensive and interesting statement on defence questions, international matters generally and on France's special position. You were clear and challenging. We shall study the text of your speech carefully.

We were much encouraged by your kind remarks about the Assembly's work, although I understand that you do not endorse all the ideas that have been ventilated. We shall want to pursue some of your ideas for closer working relationships between the ministerial and Council organisations and the Assembly itself. As you know, we cannot always persuade the Council to agree with us. We are encouraged by your words.

I think that you made history because one member of the Assembly who intended to put two questions to you wishes to withdraw them because you have already answered them. I hope that members will not ask you to repeat anything, but I am sure that many members will wish to question you. I leave to your judgment whether you answer the questions individually or in a group.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I second your tribute to the Minister, Mr. President. In the last couple of years I have sometimes thought that our Assembly was more a debating chamber than an assembly concerned about defence. The Minister has reassured us.

I intended to ask about France maintaining its nuclear deterrent but the Minister has already dealt with that. France was not called on to endorse the December 1979 NATO two-fold decision, because France already has its own nuclear weapons and is therefore not directly involved. Am I right in believing that France has voiced its support for the 1979 NATO twofold decision?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Frederic.

I call Mr. Vohrer.

Mr. VOHRER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the

Mr. Vohrer (continued)

French Defence Minister's clear explanation and to my mind enhancement of the rôle of this Assembly are of great importance to its members. Having listened very carefully to his remarks, I recognise the great effort that France is making to ensure European security and the breadth of co-operation that is offered here.

I have a question on an area which may have been slightly neglected because so many other questions have been raised, and in which France has taken the initiative on many occasions, namely disarmament. I would be interested to hear from the Minister if his government intends to pursue this initiative at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in Madrid, with a view to a European disarmament conference, and if it intends to follow up the proposal that has already been submitted to the United Nations for a world-wide satellite system.

The PRESIDENT. – I hope that members will not preface their questions with long explanations about how they wish to ask them. I am sure that that is very interesting, but time passes and I hope to include everyone who wishes to ask a question.

I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to ask the French Defence Minister the following question. It would appear that a new debate on military strategy is about to begin within NATO.

What does the French Minister think of the fairly new strategic view recently announced by General Rogers, that there should be a reduction of dependence on nuclear weapons and an increase in conventional weapons and in spending in this area? What does the French Government think of this?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. van den Bergh.

I call Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). – Despite the Minister's impressive and challenging speech, his statement that independence and solidarity do not conflict was not very persuasive. What are the chances of France achieving closer integration with the NATO integrated military structure and possibly full integration at some stage?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Morris.

The next question is from Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – If the negotiations deteriorate and do not culmi-

nate in the zero option, do you think, Minister, that the Pershing and cruise missiles must be installed on the date set by the NATO decision of December 1979?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I appreciate the Minister's commitment both to an enhancement of France's out-of-area intervention capability and of its nuclear deterrent. Will the Minister comment on the official Soviet statement yesterday that if NATO goes ahead with plans to modernise its intermediate-range nuclear forces, the Soviet Union will initiate a launch-on-warning response rather than a launch-on-attack response for its nuclear forces?

The PRESIDENT. – We have given you a rather heavy task, Minister, but perhaps you will reply to that group of questions.

Mr. HERNU (*French Minister of Defence*) (Translation). – Let me begin by giving Sir Frederic Bennett a very positive reply to his question about the decision taken by NATO in 1979. The President of France approved the twofold decision in May 1981.

As regards disarmament, Mr. Mitterrand, when he was a candidate for the presidency of the Republic, devoted a lengthy article in an evening newspaper to explaining what his disarmament policy would be if elected.

Since Mr. Mitterrand has been President, Mr. Mauroy Prime Minister and Mr. Cheysson Minister for External Relations, France has put forward numerous proposals for a European disarmament conference which are under discussion, particularly in Madrid. We are in favour of real disarmament, provided that it begins with conventional weapons and applies, to use a famous, well-known phrase, from the Urals to the Atlantic.

As for my position concerning observation satellites, France obviously supports the idea submitted to the United Nations for an independent international agency. Such satellites are indispensable for control of disarmament.

For the two superpowers a real disarmament conference obviously means one which would at last tackle the real problems and raise the real questions: how many weapons, where should they be sited, and how should they be controlled? Until the opposing sides reply to these three real questions, they sometimes seem to me to be acting like confederates involved in some secret complicity... but perhaps you had better ignore that last remark.

Mr. Hernu (continued)

In regard to the statements by General Rogers, I think I covered the question in my speech. But I would not like there to be any misunderstanding. While I was critical of General Rogers's statements, it should nevertheless be clear that the French Government fully endorses the need to possess modern, mobile, multi-purpose conventional forces with enhanced fire-power.

It is preferable to have a large number of sophisticated conventional weapons rather than large numbers of troops without weapons. I am not saying that we do not need troops. I am saying that we need well-armed troops. And let us not forget that without an iron political will, without a conscious determination to defend our democratic values, without true patriotic feeling, in the broadest sense, for each of our countries and for Europe as a whole, the best weapons are no better than piles of scrap metal; they need to be manned by large numbers of well-trained troops. You can believe me when I say that, as Minister of Defence, I look to the discipline and morale of my troops. This is a most important matter, and it should not be thought of in terms of equipment only.

Turning to General Rogers's statements, I would simply ask why such great emphasis should be placed, at this point in time, on the one aspect at the expense of others. In point of fact, it is all a matter of dialectics – I do read the speeches, you know – so that to emphasise a single aspect, namely conventional weapons, as General Rogers did, is ultimately to cast doubt on the rest – that is to say, on nuclear deterrence as a means of preventing war in Europe.

Essentially, what I want is not that General Rogers express himself differently, but that he include the words that would make his pronouncements more balanced and reassuring. I feel he has said only half; the absence of the other half is indeed cause for concern.

In regard to independence and solidarity, you say you do not see the link I make between them and you find some contradiction in what I say. Let me assure you that, in the view of the French Government and the French people, independence and solidarity are two entirely complementary ideas. This attitude has many advantages. French independence adds a degree of military and strategic uncertainty to the factors the potential enemy must take into account. France, being outside NATO's integrated military structure, is one more uncertain factor for the potential enemy to cope with, and this uncertainty is a fundamental element in risk evaluation. Of course, independence also

has its consequences for us French. I am not putting it forward as an example, or saying that it is better than anything else. When I became defence minister I found France already in possession of its nuclear deterrent and its armaments, and I am not ashamed to say that in this respect I do not take it as a criticism when I am called "minister for same as before". In fact, as far as nuclear matters are concerned, a good "minister for same as before" is what is needed. Even if any changes need to be made, they should be made elsewhere.

This concept of independence does not conflict with that of solidarity. Moreover, very little suspicion can attach to us even in terms of the point you make that every speech by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, Mr. Cheysson, or myself always contains a statement that our purpose is to defend France and its vital interests. The definition of its vital interests – this will take us too far afield, but General Poirier has just written an excellent book on the subject – clearly shows that we are not talking simply about France in its European borders. That is part of the strategic uncertainty we bring to bear. In any case, France is to be trusted.

But, you say, if you are so concerned with independence and solidarity, why not rejoin NATO? Our reason is that, having once withdrawn, for us to rejoin would be in no one's interest and would pose great problems, both technical problems and problems of risk evaluation, particularly as regards thresholds for the evaluation of risks to civilian populations and industries which the potential enemy would have to take into account, as well as problems relating to the cover which our nuclear deterrent can provide. Furthermore, one must even take care that the French nuclear strike capacity is not totalled up with that of one or the other great power, specifically that of the United States, since, for obvious reasons, there can be no question of the Soviet Union in this connection.

As regards the date scheduled for installing Pershing missiles, my answer is plain and simple: yes, these missiles must be installed on the agreed date if the negotiations fail.

Now I come to the last question concerning the Soviet Union's reaction in announcing that it will launch its SS-20s upon a warning of attack. Are you implying that it will launch them if the Pershing missiles are deployed? I assure you I am not trying to be in the slightest bit funny when I ask: who says that is not already the case? What entitles you to say so? With all due respect, it seems to me you put the question rather strangely. After all, it is the Soviet Union that is installing the SS-20s. They are being deployed by the Soviet

Mr. Hernu (continued)

Union, not, to the best of my knowledge, by the Americans.

We know that peace depends on equilibrium, while the risk of war results from military imbalance. Now, the SS-20s already exist. Even if the Soviet Union says it is prepared to site them on the other side of the Urals, that is no great guarantee, because they are mobile and can be redeployed elsewhere. Besides, even behind the Urals, they could not only hit Paris and France but also reach half of Spain and two-thirds of Italy. I think you have answered your own question.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Minister, for your very full answers to a wide range of questions.

Do any other members wish to ask questions?...

I think that we have enjoyed a real picture of French defence thinking, both from your speech, Minister, and from your answers to questions. I can only say again how indebted we are in the Assembly, especially for your presence today, for what you have told us and for the thoughts and information that you have left behind, which we shall want to study. We are grateful for your clear undertaking to continue to follow us and to help us in our work. We are very much obliged; thank you very much. I ask the members of the Assembly to show their appreciation in the usual way. *(Applause)*

6. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 934 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the vote on the draft recommendation on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism, Document 934 and amendments.

I fear that we must now tackle the mundane problem of going one by one through the amendments to Mr. Lagorce's report.

The amendments will be taken in the order in which they relate to the document. If Amendment 1 is agreed to, Amendment 11 falls. If Amendment 1 falls, we shall then take Amendments 11, 12, 2, 3 and 9. I think that that will be enough for this morning.

I call Mr. Cavaliere to move Amendment 1 which reads:

1. In the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "very" and "many".

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to say a few words to tone down the drastic assertions in the third paragraph in the preamble; I would like the words "very" and "many" to be left out. I insist because it is not a large proportion of citizens who are involved but a proportion which might be described as minimal, because these movements have the support of a tiny fraction of the population. I therefore urge that my amendment be adopted.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Under the rules there is one speaker for and one against an amendment, and then the Rapporteur or Chairman gives the Assembly the view of the committee.

Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I cannot accept the amendment tabled by Mr. Cavaliere.

Our colleague believes that only a minority of the population is involved, so I would like to know what his reference criteria are. I myself have no option but to consider the millions of demonstrators who paraded through the streets of various European capitals to protest against the arms race and against the deployment of missiles in the East and the West. As Mr. Lagorce says himself, they are very negative reactions expressed by a large fraction of the population.

If a silent majority exists, it is making a mistake to remain silent. But I am still waiting to see demonstrations calling for the deployment of missiles and a quickening of the arms race. That is why I oppose Mr. Cavaliere's amendment and back Mr. Lagorce's text.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. Lagorce has the floor.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think the Assembly can adopt Mr. Cavaliere's amendment. The term "a fraction" does not indicate whether that fraction is large or not. It leaves things vague and in keeping with the moderation I indicated in my report.

In any case, this amendment is not of paramount importance and I am in favour of its adoption.

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly has heard the opinion of the Rapporteur, who says

The President (continued)

that he is willing to advise the Assembly to accept the amendment.

Objection has been taken to the amendment.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

As Amendment 1 is carried, Amendment 11 falls.

We now come to Amendment 12, to be moved by Mrs. Knight:

12. In the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "negative" insert "as well as probable".

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – I had not intended to move this amendment, Mr. President. I believe Mr. Spies von Büllenheim thought these amendments were coming later in the day and thus is not here. I will move it for him.

The PRESIDENT. – I do not know why Mr. Spies von Büllenheim took that view. I cannot fit the business of the Assembly around the personal arrangements of representatives. We have to do it the other way round.

The amendment has been moved formally. Does anyone wish to speak against it?

Mr. Dejardin, if you wish to oppose, you do not need to tell us each time. You can do so by rising.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it is not for any political reason that I am opposed to the amendment but because, in French – I am not acquainted with the English text – the amendment is somewhat incoherent and means nothing.

"Negative as well as probable" reactions... If there are reactions, then they are more than "probable" from the outset. In my opinion, this means absolutely nothing.

The PRESIDENT. – What is the view of the committee?

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. The amendment as we have it is not what is intended by the movers.

The PRESIDENT. – We have to take it as it is. I am not prepared to accept verbal amendments now.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – I am not proposing an amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Under the rules, there is no scope for any further speeches. There can be a speech for and a speech against an amendment.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – I believe that the amendment has been misprinted.

The PRESIDENT. – I am not aware of that, and it is unfortunate that the sponsor is not here. What is the view of the committee?

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – Further to that point of order, Mr. President. I was asked about the word "probable" and I understood that the clerks at the table realised that they had a misprint and that the word should be "possible" and not "probable".

The PRESIDENT. – That is news to us. We have to take amendments as they are presented. I will accept it if it is a printing mistake made in the office. The amendment should now read: after "negative" insert "as well as possible".

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – The word was "positive". That is the misprint.

The PRESIDENT. – Apparently we now have it right. The wording should be: after "negative" insert "as well as positive".

Mr. Dejardin, I take it that you wish to oppose the amendment.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – There is complete confusion here, and "even a cat couldn't find its kittens" as the saying goes in French.

In any case, the modifications suggested by Mrs. Knight and Sir Frederic Bennett do nothing to change my original point of view. No matter whether one uses "as well as probable", "as well as possible" or "positive" to qualify the expression "very negative reactions", it still means absolutely nothing. I therefore fail to see the purpose of this amendment and cannot support it.

The PRESIDENT. – The fact that some representatives may not find that it adds to the text will influence them in their vote on the matter. I allowed the amendment to be changed only because the allegation is made – I do not know whether it is substantiated – that a mistake was made in the printing. If so, plainly it has to be corrected. In order to avoid that, I will first ask for the view of the committee and then read the amendment as I now understand it to be.

I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – I agree with Mr. Dejardin. The first two word-

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

ings suggested add absolutely nothing to the text. In fact, all they do is complicate it. As for the third drafting, it says exactly the opposite. Consequently, I oppose the three modifications suggested.

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly has the advice of the Rapporteur to reject the amendment. As there is some confusion and I would not want the kittens to get lost, I will read it: In paragraph 3 of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “negative” insert “as well as positive”.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 12 is negatived.

We now come to Amendment 2, tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

2. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “designed” and insert “intended”.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this amendment seeks to correct a serious inaccuracy. In speaking of negotiations “designed to” we anticipate the outcome. The negotiations have an aim but the outcome is uncertain.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – The difference between Mr. Cavaliere’s point of view and mine is the same as that between an optimist and a pessimist. As a socialist, I am an optimist, and therefore I say that these negotiations must succeed.

Moreover, the proposed amendment seeking to substitute *qui ont le but de* for *destinées* makes for ungrammatical French. It should be *qui ont pour but de*. But this may be due to the translation.

In any case, I am against this amendment for the reasons stated by Mr. Cavaliere himself when he argued for his amendment. I prefer to keep to the text proposed by the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. Lagorce has the floor.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Well, well! Mr. Dejardin is substituting for me as Rapporteur!

The expression *qui ont le but de* is incorrect French and should read *dont le but est de*. In any case, though, I prefer the term *destinées*

which is more in keeping with the spirit of the text.

The PRESIDENT. – We will now vote on Mr. Cavaliere’s amendment.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negative.

We can complete Mr. Cavaliere’s list of amendments by asking him now to move Amendment 3:

3. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “might cause those negotiations to fail” and insert “would cause those negotiations to fail and would”.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – The amendment is easily explained, because unilateral initiatives in disarmament matters “would cause” not “might cause” those negotiations to fail and “would jeopardise” not “might jeopardise” the foundations of Europe’s security. It is a certainty, not a possibility.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Morris has the floor.

Mr. MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). – I oppose the amendment. There cannot be certainty in this or many other areas. We are in the realm of conjecture and can never put such matters higher than is represented by the use of the word “might”. To say “would” is to carry the argument no further. We are arguing in a circle.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – I am in favour of this amendment which reflects a firmer stand on our part.

The PRESIDENT. – You have heard the views of the Rapporteur. I put the amendment to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

We shall resume consideration of the amendments and the votes upon them after the break for lunch.

I am sure that members will have noted with appreciation that the Minister, busy though he is, has remained behind to take in some of the flavour of our more routine proceedings. Before he goes I am sure that you would wish me to say again how much we have appreciated his presence, his speech and the answers that he gave to our questions.

**7. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism (Resumed consideration of and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 934 and amendments).
2. European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia (Presentation

of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 927 and amendments).

3. Address by Mr. Fioret, Under-Secretary of State to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.)

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 30th November 1982

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.

2. Attendance register.

3. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism (*Resumed consideration of the draft recommendation, Doc. 934 and amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Hardy, Mrs. Knight (point of order), Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Urwin (point of order), Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Smith, Mr. Lagorce.

4. Address by Mr. Fioret, Under-Secretary of State to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Replies by Mr. Fioret to questions put by: Mr. De Poi, Mr. Page.

5. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism (*Vote on the amended draft recommendation, Doc. 934*).

Speakers (explanation of vote): Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Rubbi, Lord McNair.

6. European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 927 and amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Lord Reay (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Vecchietti, Dr. Miller, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Cavaliere, Lord McNair, Mr. Michel, Mr. McGuire, Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Garrett, Mr. Reddemann, Lord Reay (*Rapporteur*), Sir Frederic Bennett (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Cavaliere, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Grieve, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Blaauw, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Cavaliere, Lord Reay, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Enders, Mr. Cavaliere, Lord Reay, Mr. Cavaliere, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Blaauw, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Durant, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Vecchietti, Lord Reay, Lord McNair, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Cavaliere, Lord Reay, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Vecchietti, Lord Reay.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

1. See page 25.

3. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism

(Resumed consideration of the draft recommendation, Doc. 934 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The first order of the day is the resumed consideration of the draft recommendation on problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism, Document 934 and amendments.

The next amendment is Amendment 9, to be moved by Mrs. Knight:

9. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “Europe’s security” insert “and deploring the growing evidence of Soviet involvement with and funding of pacifist movements pursuing unilateral disarmament in the West”.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – This amendment is of substance. I shall attempt to explain briefly why it should be accepted. Of course the Soviets do not like their close involvement with Western European peace

Mrs. Knight (continued)

movements to be known. Although they try to deny and hide it, there is too much evidence now of the puppet master in the Kremlin pulling at the CND strings for it to be ignored. The report should recognise that.

I have several pieces of evidence. Reference has already been made to a confidential Dutch security report leaked recently and setting out the full extent of Soviet penetration of peace movements in Holland. Names and dates have been given and considerable Soviet involvement has been established. There is soon to be debate about it in the Dutch Parliament.

Portugal, Denmark, Norway and Sweden have each expelled men working in or backed by Soviet embassies for involvement in peace campaigns. A man is not expelled lightly and therefore there must have been cast iron evidence of involvement.

I ask my Dutch colleagues to forgive me for mispronouncing the name of a Dutch newspaper from which I wish to quote. The newspaper is called *Reformatorisch Dagblad*. On 15th July 1981 that newspaper quoted a *Tass* correspondent who said:

"If Moscow decides that fifty thousand demonstrators must take to the streets of Holland to support the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, then they take to the streets. A message through me is sufficient."

In Britain 20% of key CND positions are held by communists. That is said by the *Morning Star*, a communist newspaper published in Britain. No one knows for certain how much money the Soviets contribute to CND, but Dr. Luns, the Secretary-General of NATO, has said that Soviet support for peace movements amounts to at least £6,000,000. That is a substantial sum. Frank Chapple, a trade union leader who is well known in Britain, put the figure far higher. He reckons that the sum involved is about £50,000,000. That means that between £6,000,000 and £50,000,000 of Soviet money supports CND in Britain. When CND is asked about Soviet involvement it flatly refuses to publish its audited accounts. That must give credence to the suspicion that substantial amounts of Soviet money are involved.

A British author, John Braine, is a former CND campaigner. He said that, despite its great protestations of political impartiality, CND is about as independent of the Soviet life as is the dummy of its ventriloquist. Indeed, it provides a textbook example of the way in which communists involved with any movement take it over.

I have informed the Assembly about only a little of the vast amount of evidence available to show that the Soviet Union has much to do not only with the organisation of CND but with its funding. This report will fail in its admirable intentions if there is no reference to Soviet involvement in West European peace movements. That involvement is highly significant and very important.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I do not so much wish to speak against the amendment as to ask some questions about it.

The PRESIDENT. – The rules state that we cannot debate the matter. There is one speech for the amendment and one speech against. Because of the way in which Mr. Hardy has formed his question, I imagine that he is against the amendment. However, he must not debate the matter.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – If another member wishes to oppose the amendment, I shall give way, but if no one wishes to oppose it, I suggest that opposition may be essential unless the Rapporteur or the Chairman can answer some questions. If those questions cannot be answered, the amendment should be opposed. I shall oppose it on that basis.

Mrs. Knight quoted Dutch sources. Like myself, she is an English member of parliament and we have no means of checking the accuracy of the report. I accept that Mrs. Knight quotes a Dutch newspaper. I know nothing about that Dutch newspaper, but I know about some British newspapers. Those newspapers are not always reliable, especially when dealing with such a sensitive matter. Therefore, it might be useful if the Rapporteur or the Chairman could confirm the accuracy of the Dutch newspaper report. If they cannot do so, the matter should be left in question or should be referred to the committee.

Mrs. Knight also quoted the *Morning Star*. I do not read the *Morning Star* very much, because I do not have much faith in that newspaper or the political stable from which it comes. Therefore I regret that a conservative member should pay such tribute to that newspaper.

The result of the amendment, especially if the Rapporteur cannot answer my question about the reliability of the facts presented to us, will be not to damage or embarrass CND but to push the young enthusiasts and perhaps some of the idealists who are not so young closer to the Communist Party than they are now. The amendment could be counter-productive. For that reason, it might be wise not to press the point too far.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. May I have your guidance on the question, because it is important in the context of what one will say in future debates? Does it pay tribute to a newspaper if one quotes from it?

The PRESIDENT. – That is not strictly a point of order but a matter of opinion. If someone quotes from a newspaper in support of a point of view, one gives credence to the newspaper, at least for that quotation. It does not necessarily follow that one will put one's money on the newspaper's recommendation for the 3.30.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Rapporteur wish to speak to the amendment, which is important?

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – What may be appropriate in the explanatory memorandum need not necessarily be included in the recommendation proper. Mrs. Knight's amendment does not apply to all pacifist movements. As was said this morning, some pacifist movements are in no way financed by the Soviet Union.

Mrs. Knight may be correct, but not 100%. I am personally inclined to support what she says. Nevertheless, since the contents of a recommendation should be firm and precise, and since the committee has not considered the amendment, I shall abstain.

The PRESIDENT. – We have the personal advice of the Rapporteur. I must now put the amendment to the vote. As far as I understand it, the committee has not considered the matter, or at least it has made no recommendations. Therefore, individual members must decide whether they wish to insert the amendment.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 9 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment 4, tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

4. In the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "in East and West".

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this is a very simple amendment. In the sixth paragraph of the preamble, it calls for the deletion of the words "in East and West". It is sufficient to refer to pacifist movements in general, because we can no longer agree if we try to specify. It is inconceivable that the pacifist movements in the East, if any, should be put on the same footing as those in the West.

Quite apart from the "considerate treatment" given in the East, and especially in the Soviet Union, to a few small movements involving a tiny number of people, I believe that it would be wise to refer to peace movements in general. Otherwise, embarrassing confusion would be caused.

The PRESIDENT. – May we have the view of the committee?

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – The words "in East and West" imply that there might – and I stress the word "might" – be pacifist movements in the East. I nevertheless accept Mr. Cavaliere's amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – The amendment is accepted by the committee. I will now put it to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment 8, tabled by Mr. Hardy:

8. In the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "anyhow".

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – The word "anyhow" seems to introduce a grudging note, where we should be as gracious as possible. I hope that the Rapporteur will agree that the word adds nothing to the sentence, which would be clearer without it.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – I accept this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – The Rapporteur agrees. I now put it to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 8 is agreed to.

I do not recall so many technical – or what in English we would call "nit-picking" – amendments before to any document. I shall not have this worry later on, but I wish that committees would give more attention to the final form of their documents so that the Assembly does not have to spend so much time dealing with one word here or changing a verb there. That is a long process and a waste of our valuable time. Of course, some amendments are of substance and must be considered seriously.

I now call Mr. Cavaliere to move Amendment 5:

The President (continued)

5. In the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "third world" insert "including the Latin American countries".

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, when the committee discussed Mr. Lagorce's draft report, I argued that specific reference should be made to the Latin American countries because the term third world countries generally means the African and other countries but not those of Latin America, and Mr. Lagorce agreed with me. That is why I tabled this amendment; my other reason was that as the West's relations with the Latin American countries are at present somewhat disturbed and need to be restored in full, I believe that when we speak of aid to the third world we should add that this includes the Latin American countries.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

May I have the opinion of the committee?

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – I see no point in a special mention of the Latin American countries. The reference is to third world countries in general. With all due respect, I do not support this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I now put the amendment to the vote. Those in favour of Amendment 5 please show by raising their hands.

I hope that no one is voting who is not an accredited representative or representing one, or who has not signed the register. Substitutes may sit here, but they must not vote, and I understand that some have been doing so. That is most improper.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order. It seems to me, Mr. President, that there has already been a breach of rules in the last three votes, since two different members have voted from the same seat. They cannot possibly both be substituting for the same member. Bearing in mind that one vote can bear directly on the result of an amendment, I hope, Mr. President, that you will look into this matter. You may already be aware of the circumstances to which I refer.

The PRESIDENT. – I cannot be, unless matters are drawn to my attention. This morning, before you were here, Mr. Urwin...

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – I was here from the beginning.

The PRESIDENT. – Then you will recall that I said at the outset that no one could play a part in our proceedings in those circumstances. I can only repeat that and leave people to exercise their own responsibility. We cannot have a roll-call on every vote on sixteen amendments, some of which simply delete one word. You must leave me to try to manage the affairs as best I can. I have warned members. I cannot check personally. We have had no close votes, so the matter is academic.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – With respect, Mr. President, I am not suggesting that there should be roll-call votes on this or any other report – not at the moment, anyway. I am simply trying to draw your attention, Mr. President, to what I consider a serious breach of the rules of this organisation – a breach which has occurred within the last ten minutes.

The PRESIDENT. – I have already said that if you give me the circumstances and the names, I can then take action, Mr. Urwin, but without that information, I cannot personally look around to see how everyone votes on every issue. I must try to perform my duties as best I can. We should leave it at that. My message has clearly gone home.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – I am very reluctant to give you chapter and verse, Mr. President, as must be clear from what I have said, but since you request it, I would point out that in the last fifteen minutes, two different members have voted from seat 17.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

We now come to the vote on Amendment 5. I am sure that no one will vote unless entitled to do so.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is negatived.

The next amendment is Amendment 6 to be moved by Mr. Cavaliere:

6. In the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "each Western European country" and insert "a few Western European countries".

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this applies not to all our countries, but only to some because others, as for example Italy, pursue their policy uninfluenced by these movements.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – On a simple linguistic point. With this change, the passage would read: “Noting that the situation of a few Western European countries forces each country to shape its defence policy” and so on. That would surely be ambiguous.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

May we have the opinion of the committee?...

Does Mr. Lagorce wish to offer us any advice?

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – I oppose this amendment. All countries are concerned, and there is therefore no reason to make a distinction. Each country will recognise the relevance to itself. I am, therefore, in favour of keeping the committee’s wording.

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly has heard the Rapporteur’s request that we retain the text. I had better ask representatives to vote by standing and sitting as that is called for by the rules.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 6 is negatived.

We come now to Amendment 14 moved by Mr. Lagorce:

14. Add an eleventh paragraph to the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows:

“Regretting that Recommendation 379 on the activation of the WEU Council and its dependent bodies has not been effectively followed up by the Council,”.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – My Amendment 14 follows the general line of my report, which criticises the weakness of WEU. The best way to criticise this weakness – I would almost call it uselessness – is to recognise that certain recommendations of our Assembly are merely pious wishes of which no account is taken.

I therefore suggest that a paragraph be added to the preamble expressing regret that Recommendation 379 on the activation of the WEU Council – which is our objective – has not been followed up.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

I see no point in asking the Rapporteur for his opinion, as he is moving the amendment.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 14 is agreed to.

We have the privilege of the presence of the Italian Minister, but I believe that it would be convenient if we could fairly quickly complete our amendments and then any vote on the main question could be taken after the address by the Italian Minister.

We come to Amendment 15, tabled by Mr. Hardy:

15. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “Follow attentively and encourage participating states” and insert “Demand that participating states strive”.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – If one were ask a unilateralist what he thought of those who believe in multilateral disarmament, one would often find that he or she would say that he or she was not really interested in peace and not really worried about weaponry and not really keen on armaments control, but was sheltering behind a multilateralist label as an excuse for doing nothing. One might not have to look very far to find people who could be so described.

But there are probably two kinds of multilateralists. There are the negative multilateralists, who are almost fatalist and who are of the kind so often described by those in the peace campaign. But there are – and I hope that there are many in this Assembly – those who are positive multilateralists, who wish to see disarmament in every country, who, whilst retaining a belief in and a commitment to collective security, wish to lower the threshold, who are committed to peace and to securing meaningful multilateral arms control.

To demonstrate that that view is endorsed by this Assembly we should tighten the first recommendation and make it fit the pattern of positive multilateral disarmament demands. I suggest, therefore, that we tighten it by making clear that we wish to see positive and determined efforts to establish meaningful arms control. Such tightening strengthens and makes more effective the first and fundamentally important recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – I fully support this amendment, which strengthens our recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly has heard the view of the Rapporteur. I put the amendment to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 15 is agreed to.

The President (continued)

We come to Amendment 10:

10. In line 3 of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "level" to the end of the paragraph.

I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the half-sentence at the end of paragraph 2, which this amendment seeks to delete, means in practice that as long as there is no renunciation of medium-range nuclear weapons by both sides, nor a balance in their medium-range nuclear weapons, the NATO twofold decision cannot be implemented and medium-range nuclear weapons cannot be deployed by the West on the basis of that decision. I think this half-sentence should be deleted, because otherwise it would undermine the NATO twofold decision.

The PRESIDENT. – If this amendment is carried, Amendments 16, 7 and 13 will fall.

Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 10?...

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, if I understood correctly, you said that if this amendment were adopted Amendment 7 would fall. I do not think this is the case, because they are concerned with two completely different matters.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall look at that again, but the amendments that fall are those that apply to the existing text and if that part of the text is removed, it would appear that they would not fit. I do not want to waste time until I know whether this is relevant.

Is there any opposition to the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?...

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – I would have liked to keep the end of paragraph 2 and add the text of Mr. Cavaliere's amendment.

But you are right, Mr. President. If Amendment 10 is adopted the rest falls. There is, however, nothing illogical in saying "agree to the deployment of such weapons on the territory of member countries only as long as this goal has not been attained" and, if possible, within the time limit laid down in the NATO decision of December 1979.

I am therefore proposing an amalgam between the end of paragraph 2 and the text of Mr. Cavaliere's amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Lagorce.

I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I beg your indulgence once again. I would withdraw Amendment 10 if Amendment 7 were to be carried. I can offer to do so because the two things are closely related. Seeing that the Rapporteur is prepared to accept Amendment 7, I could withdraw my Amendment 10. The same purpose would be achieved, and we should have reached agreement with the Rapporteur.

The PRESIDENT. – If you wish to withdraw that amendment, the other amendments are taken. We cannot be sure whether they will be carried. As you have moved, I must ask leave of the Assembly and whether there is any objection to the withdrawal of Amendment 10.

Is there any objection to the withdrawal of Amendment 10?...

As Mr. Morris objects, I must put the question of its withdrawal to the vote. The Amendment, having been moved, is the property of the Assembly. It is no longer the property of the mover.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Clearly the vote is in favour of withdrawal.

Amendment 10 is withdrawn.

Amendment 16 concerns the French text only:

16. In line 4 of the French text of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "que tant que" and insert "qu'aussi longtemps que".

I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Amendment 16 is simply a stylistic improvement. I fully realise that the French wording is not very elegant, and I do not know how it comes across in translation. The expression *qu'aussi longtemps que* instead of *que tant que*, while perhaps not very satisfactory, is a little better.

The PRESIDENT. – This appears to be an improvement in the French text and not a matter of substance. Can we agree it?

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 16 is agreed to.

We come now to Amendment 7:

7. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add "within the time

The President (continued)

limit laid down in the NATO decision of December 1979”.

With this we can also discuss Amendment 13:

13. In line 4 of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “attained” add “within the framework of the NATO twofold decision of December 1979”.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – The Rapporteur has already accepted Amendment 7. It is essential to set this time limit, otherwise, if the Geneva negotiations fail, we would be helping those who wish to delay implementation of the decision.

The PRESIDENT. – If Amendment 7 is carried, Mr. Smith’s Amendment 13 will fall.

I call Mr. Smith to speak to his amendment.

Mr. SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I am in complete sympathy with Mr. Cavaliere. We should be contradicting ourselves if we did not adopt one of these amendments. I have no objection to Amendment 7 and I would recommend the Assembly to adopt it.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

If not, I ask Mr. Lagorce to address us.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – The wording “within the time limit” proposed by Mr. Cavaliere may be more precise than the expression “in the framework”, but basically it has exactly the same meaning.

I am therefore in favour of adopting Mr. Cavaliere’s amendment, which would then follow on from the rest of paragraph 2, since Mr. Smith agrees.

The PRESIDENT. – I now put Amendment 7 to the vote. If it is carried, Amendment 13 falls.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 7 is agreed to.

Amendment 13 therefore falls.

Because he has been extremely patient, I must now call our guest speaker, Mr. Fioret, the Under-Secretary of State to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to address us. I will take the vote on the draft recommendation to Mr. Lagorce’s document at the conclusion of Mr. Fioret’s speech.

4. Address by Mr. Fioret, Under-Secretary of State to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs

The PRESIDENT. – We are extremely grateful to Mr. Fioret for coming here from Rome at a time when, as I understand it, government negotiations are under way there. We are indebted to Mr. Fioret for honouring his undertaking to address us. I welcome you warmly on behalf of the Assembly and wish you well. We look forward to hearing what you have to say.

Mr. FIORET (*Under-Secretary of State to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should first like to express my sincere thanks to you for having invited me to address this session. Italy looks upon the WEU Assembly as an essential parliamentary forum where the peoples of Europe can regularly debate security, defence, and armaments control. My presence here, like that of the Minister of Defence, Mr. Lagorio, last year, confirms Italy’s complete readiness to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Assembly.

The Assembly’s attentive and expert watch on developments in international relations encourages me to offer a contribution to the present debate, even though the Italian Government has resigned. The international situation in which the European countries now find themselves, the continually increasing number of conflicts and the denial of the aspirations to freedom on the very frontiers of our own territory are all destabilising factors giving grounds for serious concern. The European aim of world stability is therefore confirmed but sounder structures must be established within which the history of the peoples of Europe can continue to be written in security. We must act both for the maintenance of peace and for international détente.

And here I would stress that it is vital for world equilibrium that close and continuous consultations be maintained between Europe and the United States so that the transatlantic dialogue is both comprehensive and productive.

This was the intention behind Italy’s proposal, put into words by Mr. Colombo at Georgetown University in Washington last February, calling for a Euro-American declaration of friendship aimed at strengthening democracy and co-operation on the political aspects of East-West relations, action to help the third world and the co-ordination of the western countries’ economic policies. Transatlantic consultations should therefore be less fragmented than at present; and this requires also greater integration at European level. The West’s strategy should be defined within a

Mr. Fioret (continued)

system of permanent contacts and detailed appraisal of the issues which come up from time to time. This is a move which had produced some results: in October, for example, very frank and effective consultations were held between the sixteen members of the Atlantic Alliance in Canada using a new formula similar to that tried and tested in the Community, the so-called Gymnich formula. In addition, a first Euro-American contact took place at political director level in New York on 30th September. Lastly, the decision to harmonise economic policy with the United States in dealing with the Soviet Union and the eastern countries is particularly important for the West's strategy. In other words, the aim is to strengthen Atlantic defensive capability without thereby sacrificing trade with the East. A number of practical aspects of the problem now have to be discussed in the appropriate places: these range from the export of strategic equipment to credit and energy policy. This overall western strategy can certainly benefit from the results of your work and that of the forthcoming session of NATO.

The serious worsening of East-West relations has unquestionably been a determining factor in the deterioration of the international situation over the last few years which have witnessed alarming violations of the principles on which the United Nations is based and of the undertakings entered into in the Helsinki final act. The continuing occupation of Afghanistan, the situation in Poland and the military build-up in the Soviet Union have created a climate of distrust, to the detriment of overall East-West relations. The causes of these tensions must be eliminated if there is to be co-operation to the advantage of both sides through dialogue and negotiation. The firm position adopted by the West at the CSCE Conference in Madrid during the negotiations on armaments control and in the decisions regarding security is matched by a determination and willingness to help in improving East-West relations. It is to be hoped that the new leadership in the USSR will show the same willingness. In Poland in particular, the sufferings of the Polish people continue to be watched with the deepest concern and the Warsaw authorities are still being called on to put an end to martial law, to free the church and Solidarity. Only an effective return to the principles of respect for the social and civil rights of the individual, in accordance with the spirit of Helsinki, can open the way to fruitful discussion of co-operation in the interests of both sides. In relations with the East, therefore, a consistent line must be maintained, combined with readiness to enter into a frank and constructive dialogue.

In the Middle East, Italy is engaged in intensive diplomatic activity to bring about a peaceful solution of the crisis. On 20th September, the Ten stressed that such a solution, to be agreed with all the parties concerned, including the PLO, must be based on the principle of security for all the states in the region – including the right of Israel to live within secure, guaranteed frontiers, on the principle of justice for all the peoples – including the right of the Palestinians to self-determination, and on mutual recognition by the parties involved. In Lebanon, in particular, since the tragic events of a few months ago, there are signs of progress, thanks to the efforts of the multinational force – made up of Italian, French and United States forces – which is working for peace and stability.

More generally, the American initiative announced in President Reagan's speech of 1st September, the declaration of the Arab countries at the Fez summit on 9th September and other developments now taking place, contain hopeful elements and suggest a growing consensus on the fundamental principles which, in the view of the Ten, must provide the basis for a lasting, fair and peaceful solution to the Middle East crisis. It is our hope that all the parties involved will seize this opportunity to start moving closer together in such a way as to achieve a lasting peaceful solution.

Lastly, it is greatly hoped that the war between Iran and Iraq can be ended by negotiations, on the basis of the United Nations resolutions; it must be stressed that this war is maintaining a dangerous level of tension which threatens peace throughout the Middle East.

In South-East Asia, Afghanistan and Cambodia have been invaded and occupied by foreign powers. There are danger signs in Africa and in Latin America which can make the already unfavourable international situation even more precarious. We Europeans are actively engaged in promoting a political solution to the crises, the development of the North-South dialogue and international co-operation. We are making peaceful use of our political influence to promote peaceful changes and negotiated solutions to the conflicts. Particularly in Latin America, Italy believes that the existing links must be strengthened, using as one means economic development aid, currently under discussion in the Ten.

I believe that this Assembly, which makes a genuinely valuable contribution to European integration, can be involved in the recent Italo-German initiative for a resumption of progress towards European unity. The undertaking given in the Western European Union treaty to work for political solidarity between its members in furtherance of European integration is

Mr. Fioret (continued)

of more immediate importance than ever before.

While maintaining the objective of creating a political community capable of acting powerfully and with authority for Europe in the world all efforts must be directed to giving a real new impetus to European construction. The single document which is emerging shows that there are very wide areas of agreement. Discussion of the European declaration must not therefore be confined to mere statements of principle but must express a genuine political will to set up a Community more unified both internally and in its dealings with the rest of the world. Time for this is short and this adds to the urgency of a further general advance, particularly in view of the probable further enlargement of the Community. The European declaration, which is itself an urgent development, can nevertheless only be a first step in a new direction. What is needed in fact is the implementation of a common programme of political and economic action. And it is in this spirit that Italy proposed that a meeting of the European Council should be convened in the next few months in order to take concrete decisions on the future of the Community.

Italy fully recognises the real contribution which this Assembly has made to the building of a unified Europe. Europe must seek not only to create the conditions for political and economic stability and growth, which of themselves will help to give it greater identity, but also to make an effective co-ordinated contribution to its own security. Herein lies all the historical importance of the rôle of Western European Union which, in common with the Europe of the Ten, has the aim of examining and discussing security in European terms with a view to developing unitary action and nurturing European awareness. The work of Western European Union is therefore wholly compatible with that of other institutions because its purpose is to supplement and further the same progress towards European unity. The Assembly's important contribution in ideas and proposals for the strengthening of European identity emerges with praiseworthy clarity from reports, such as those of Mr. De Poi and Mr. Vecchiotti.

As regards the actual running of the organisation, Italy recognises the relevance and value of the work of the Permanent Council and the Secretariat General in discharging the treaty obligations and in the dialogue with the Assembly, the Armaments Control Agency and the Standing Armaments Committee. In order to continue to work efficiently, the organisation must have the necessary resources. Italy, therefore, believes that the efficiency and rôle of

the various agencies should not be reduced. This applies equally to the Assembly, the Armaments Control Agency, and the Standing Armaments Committee, and the Italian Government will examine with interest the very pertinent proposals put forward by the French Government and the Assembly regarding the Committee.

In view of what has happened in Europe since 1954, Italy, in particular, supports the suggestion made in Assembly Recommendation 380 that paragraphs IV and VI of the list in Annex III to Protocol No. III be cancelled in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article II of Protocol No. III.

In conclusion, I would stress that our Europeanism must be based on an awareness that henceforth we are an essential partner on the international stage in the search for peace. From this awareness stems a commitment to increase European co-operation at all levels and in all institutions; a Europeanism which in order to meet the challenge of the times must be capable of mobilising all live forces and be aware of the new ferments springing up in other European countries where the demand for freedom and progress has assumed dramatic proportions. Let us therefore continue to make our contribution to European unity, to the enlargement of our Community to take in other European countries, to Atlantic co-operation and to the cause of peace and progress in the shared knowledge that we are all working for the great purpose of building a free democratic world. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for your interesting remarks, Minister, and for emphasising the support that we know Italy gives to the Assembly and to other institutions in Western Europe. It also participates in allied activities on behalf of Western Europe. You said earlier that you would answer some questions and that you would prefer to answer each one individually. Therefore, I ask members to put questions.

Mr. De Poi.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, thank you for calling me and so allowing me to say how pleased I was to hear what Mr. Fioret had to say.

I believe that his recognition of the Assembly's positive contribution to the construction of Europe should be emphasised because the position which he took regarding the Western European Union Assembly is to be considered as a commitment, particularly as regards the cancellation of paragraphs IV and VI of the protocol.

I also believe that all this should be taken as an indication of Italy's commitment to press on

Mr. De Poi (continued)

with European construction with both imagination and realism and to do so in the European Council, which will as circumstances require be called on to strengthen co-operation in all existing institutions, and to bring in matters relating to defence and security.

In this context, I should like to ask Mr. Fioret how, in his view, the European declaration includes, and is compatible with, the reinvigoration of WEU, which we all hope for and which you also, Mr. President, looked forward to in your last speech.

Mr. FIORET (*Under-Secretary of State to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs*) (Translation). – May I first thank Mr. De Poi for his kind words.

Italy's European policy follows a clear and definite line and I think I may state with some pride that all political parties in the Italian Parliament have declared in favour of European unity.

I would say straight away and quite clearly that I see no possibility of conflict between the revitalisation of political Europe – European declaration – and the other institutions. We believe that the road to the construction of Europe is bound to be difficult and will have its ups and downs. It is particularly at the less optimistic moments that every effort should be made by all the existing institutions to advance the European idea.

The Italian Government's view is that while there are different institutions, they should be able to come together in setting up a political Europe to add to economic Europe. As WEU is eminently political by vocation, we believe that this is the time for a mainly political revitalisation of Europe. Hence the importance of WEU in keeping alight this torch which we believe cannot be put out and should again light the way to the future for all the peoples of Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Minister.

Mr. Page, will you put your question now?

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – Following that most interesting review by the Minister, as Italy is a Mediterranean country, will the Minister comment on the growing influence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean?

Mr. FIORET (*Under-Secretary of State to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs*) (Translation). – Mr. President, my immediate reply is that, as Italy pursues a policy of peace, we cannot fail to be concerned whenever weapons of war pile up in the Mediterranean. At the same time I would recall that Italy's constant

philosophy is that peace must be sought through security. When we talk of European unity and of full agreement between the European countries of NATO it is our firm belief that a policy directed to strengthening security is also the policy which can preserve peace. The anxieties therefore created by the presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean may be offset in two ways; firstly by working for peace and secondly by being ready to safeguard our security in the Mediterranean zone as elsewhere.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Minister. If there are no further questions, I should like to thank you, Minister, for your interesting, clear and concise statement of the Italian position and for your answers to questions. We are indebted to you. I hope that you will reciprocate by conveying to the new Italian Government, when it is formed, the fact that we welcome Italy's support of WEU and the important part that the Italian Delegation plays in our affairs. (*Applause*)

5. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism

(Vote on the amended draft recommendation, Doc. 934)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the vote on the amended draft recommendation on problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism, Document 934.

Under our new rules, all our votes are now taken by sitting and standing unless five members, on a draft recommendation, or ten, on other matters, demand a roll-call. I understand that there is no demand for a roll-call vote, so we shall take the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

Do you wish to speak, Mr. Blaauw?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I should like to give an explanation of my vote on Amendment 9. Since there is to be a debate next week on this subject in the Dutch Parliament and as long as there is no substantial evidence on the table, we cannot speculate about Soviet involvement in pacifist and other peace movements.

1. See page 26.

The PRESIDENT. – I believe that Mr. Rubbi wishes to give an explanation of his vote.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Speaking for my group I have to explain our vote against. We had intended to vote in favour because we regarded this as a good draft recommendation but some bad amendments and, in particular, the approval of the amendment suggesting that the Soviet Union finances the peace movement have led us to change our minds.

I do not know what happens in other countries – the divided vote shows that views on the subject are fairly uncertain – but as the recommendation refers to the pacifist movement in general it seems to me most unlikely that the Soviet Union finances, for example, the American peace movement. I doubt very much whether the Russians finance Kennedy or McNamara and the same applies to the Catholic movement and many sections of the church working with the Pope's approval. I also doubt very greatly whether the church is financed by the Kremlin and I am certain – as are all my Italian colleagues present today – that this can in no circumstances be said of the movement in Italy: this is a pacifist movement which, as everyone knows, does not identify with either of the two blocs and has even been criticised for its even-handedness.

May I conclude by saying that the statement made here, to which I alluded earlier, is an unacceptable affront to the complete independence of the Italian peace movement and to the generous feelings of the people who have so much support among the Italian nation, because of their deep and sincere conviction and their disinterested desire for peace.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Rubbi. I understand that Lord McNair wishes to give an explanation of vote.

Lord McNAIR (*United Kingdom*). – I should just like a quarter of a minute to explain my failure to vote on the last occasion. I came as soon as the bell rang but found that I was too late. May we be allowed a little longer in future?

The PRESIDENT. – If there is a roll-call vote, a longer time is allowed. I did not want to have the bell ringing throughout the Italian Minister's speech. I had thought that most members would be here to listen to the Minister. However, I can tell you, Lord McNair, that the voting was decisive. Whichever way you voted could not have made a substantive difference.

6. *European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 927 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – We come now to our next item of business which is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia, Document 927 and amendments.

I call Lord Reay to present his report.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – It is a privilege for me to present this report on South-West Asia on behalf of the General Affairs Committee of this Assembly, particularly so since it is the first time I have had the honour of speaking from this podium. Various amendments have been and are being put down, numbering about twenty-eight so far. This report was, however, accepted by the General Affairs Committee by fifteen votes in favour to none against with only two abstentions. I hope, therefore, that this Assembly will resist any attempt to make fundamental changes to the character or balance of the resolution as it now stands.

Reviewing the area covered by the report I should like first to say something about Afghanistan. There the occupation and subjection by Soviet troops remain and must continue to remain unacceptable to western governments. Accordingly, the resolution urges member states to have no dealings with the present régime. The committee also recommends that civilian aid be given to the Afghan refugees, who now number the preposterous total of some 20 % of the country's population. We must admire the generosity which Pakistan, on whom the main brunt has fallen, has shown towards these refugees, although western humanitarian aid has been far from negligible. I believe that there is an amendment proposing military assistance for the refugees. The committee debated this and came out against it after considerable discussion. Certainly I have sympathy with the idea, but I should not like to recommend a departure from the emphasis on the need for a political solution.

The trial of strength in the Iraq-Iran conflict still proceeds without any indication clear enough to be perceived at this distance of what the outcome will be. I have heard criticism that the resolution includes no recommendation to the Council on the conflict. I can think of none, except an invitation to both parties to cease hostilities, an intervention that would not be likely to have any noticeable effect. Clearly, the conflict poses enormous dangers for the Gulf area as a whole but even greater dangers

Lord Reay (continued)

are likely to be posed by its resolution, for the victor – and the victor with the most mischievous designs would probably be Iran – would have his hands free.

In this context I should like to draw attention to paragraph 54 in the report, which makes a point I personally should have liked to be made in the resolution. It says that since there are circumstances in which the United States of America would probably be ready to intervene militarily to protect access to the Gulf oilfields if, for example, a Gulf state turned to the United States of America for help and since Europe's dependence on that aspect is even greater than that of the United States of America, we in WEU should face up to the possibility of such intervention, and it should be a matter to be discussed by all the partners of the Atlantic Alliance.

I should like to devote the major part of my speech to the Middle East, since it is in that sector that a turning point may have been reached. Events in Lebanon in the summer undoubtedly have had the effect of changing public perceptions in Europe and more importantly in the United States of America, both of Israel and of the Palestinians. The Israelis began to be more widely seen as aggressors and Palestinians as a homeless, vulnerable and numerous group not to be dismissed, as Israel had always tried to dismiss them, either as terrorists pure and simple or else as non-existent. "The Palestinians, who are they?", as Golda Meir once said.

Secondly, the events in Lebanon led to President Reagan's initiative of 1st September, which at last seemed to indicate that America – as everyone agrees, the only outside party which perhaps has the capacity to enforce a settlement – was willing to grasp the issue at the heart of the Middle East problem, namely, the political aspirations of the Palestinians, and which in turn the Arabs have shown themselves, and continue to show themselves, ready to use as a basis for negotiation. At present the moderate Arab countries – Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Tunis, Egypt and above all Jordan – are engaged in an intense process of negotiation, on the one hand with the PLO, on the other with the United States of America, to produce in the first instance a negotiating team to represent Jordanians and Palestinians and acceptable to all other negotiating parties, particularly the United States of America.

I should like here to say something about the preamble, which refers to the PLO being the only organisation which can speak at the present juncture for the Palestinian people. I should like those who suggest that the PLO is

not the only organisation to say who they think the other organisations are. What other organisations are there now which could represent the Palestinians? The fact is that if the Reagan plan is not to fail for lack of Palestinians to talk to, the Palestinians must in some way or other be brought to the negotiating table, perhaps as part of a wider negotiating team, or perhaps the PLO will delegate authority for example to certain West Bank Palestinians. But one thing is plain: they cannot simply be ignored or pushed aside and at present they seem to be the only such representative organisation.

I was authorised by the Presidential Committee of WEU to visit Jordan and Egypt a few weeks ago. I have submitted a written account of this trip to the Assembly as an appendix to the report and I now pose the question as I posed it there: should we be optimistic or pessimistic about present diplomatic efforts? I believe the chief doubt centres on the credibility of the American will to push through its own plan, a credibility which is draining away every day that the United States of America fails to respond to Israeli defiance of American policy. It seems inconceivable that Israel would dare to behave with such impudence towards the United States of America, rejecting the Reagan plan out of hand, responding to a request to abandon the settlement policy by announcing further settlements and then following this up with a request for the largest amount of aid – \$3 billion – that it would ever have received in a single year, if Israel seriously believed the United States of America intended to push its plan through. If that is so, plainly the change in American opinion has not been either deep or broad enough for elected legislators to be willing to confront the Jewish lobby in that land composed of ethnic groups. If America lacks the will now to push through its plan the outlook in the Middle East is very ominous. Without American pressure and with American support there is nothing to restrain Israel. The neighbouring Arab countries, for the time being at least, are militarily impotent. It already appears that Israel is starting exactly the same policy of de facto annexation in South Lebanon as it practises in Gaza and the West Bank.

I understand that imports now pass through Haifa, customs dues being paid to the Israeli, not the Lebanese Government.

Military camps are being established and the area developed as a market for Israel's agricultural produce. In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israel will press on with its plan to establish a further hundred thousand settlers by 1985 and so, within three years, unless checked, the process of annexation of the occupied territories will be virtually complete, perhaps for-

Lord Reay (continued)

mally declared, and the area will have become virtually irrecoverable.

In Amman I learnt of the fears entertained with respect to what may happen to the Palestinian population of the West Bank in the wake of such de facto annexation. The Jordanians fear that the Palestinians may be expelled into Jordan, thereby threatening the stability of a country whose population is already 60% Palestinian in origin, and enabling Israelis to say, if that stability were to be undermined: "Look, there is your Palestinian state." If the Americans do not restrain Israel and American credibility is thereby forfeited, the credibility of the moderate Arab leaders who are trying to negotiate with the Americans, who are insisting in their own countries that it is worthwhile doing so, will be gravely undermined.

The radical elements within the PLO and outside it are keeping quiet now only because they believe that the moderates will fail. I suspect that the Soviet Union has a similar attitude: "Let them try to get a solution from America. Let them fail and then they will turn to us."

Let us give all the support and assistance we can to the moderate Arabs – and I include today Arafat in the description – in their search for a diplomatic solution. I found it well appreciated in the Middle East not only that Europe had a position quite different from that of the United States but that Europe had a rôle of its own to play as an influential voice that could, perhaps, have a beneficial impact on American policy and could, thereby, ease the changes in the policy, which are seen as a precondition of progress towards a peace settlement.

In this context probably the single most useful thing that European countries could do now is to agree a greater degree of recognition of the PLO. Some countries within Europe have done more than others. The argument that the PLO could not be recognised until it had renounced terrorism has surely lost validity. The PLO leadership is today pursuing a political solution. It deserves a response from us. These are critical days in the Middle East with more than has been generally perceived hanging on the outcome of events. The recommendation that I have the honour to bring forward is, I believe, basically sound and helpful and I ask for the support of the Assembly.

(Mr. Berchem, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much, Lord Reay.

Before opening the general debate, I propose that, as fourteen members have asked to speak, each should be allowed not more than five minutes.

Are there any objections?...

It is so decided.

I call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – This is an excellent report that successfully encompasses all the problems in the area in question and places them within the perspective of European security. It is no mean achievement. I congratulate our Rapporteur, Lord Reay, upon it. The report emphasises that, in the light of recent events in Lebanon, the war between Iran and Iraq and the situation in Afghanistan and Iran, the need for peace in the Middle East has never been more urgent. It also recognises that the prospects for peace, in terms of relations between Jews and Arabs, are better now than at any time since the foundation of the independent state of Israel. The danger is that in seeking peace both Israel and the Arabs will be immobilised by their own illusions.

It is here that Europe has a rôle to play in bringing both sides to their senses to resolve those differences. The Israeli illusion is that it can get away with annexing the West Bank as its own solution to the Palestinian problem and that time is on its side. The Arab illusion is that western pressure, that is, American and European pressure, will force Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories in return for a verbal recognition of its own right to exist, without the guarantees of peace and security.

The Reagan plan, based as it is on the Camp David accords, provides the best hope and the most credible means available today to dispel both Israeli and Arab illusions and to achieve a lasting peace. As Europeans we should now be seeking to clarify our position on the Middle East and vigorously to pursue clearly and without compromise, first, the unequivocal recognition by the PLO and neighbouring Arab states of Israel's right to exist within secure boundaries. We should make it abundantly clear to the Arabs that no progress can be made without that.

Secondly, we must impress upon the United States that Israel must dispel its own illusions that it can hold on to the West Bank. In these respects time is not our side. The fact that the American presidential elections will be held within two years means that progress must be made within twelve months if it is to be made at all. The prospect of elections in Israel next year means that progress must be made before those elections so that the Israelis will have the

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

choice in that election of holding on to the West Bank or the prospect of lasting peace. That will be the choice.

The dispersal of the PLO has weakened the position of that organisation for the moment. Moderate Arab leadership must seize that opportunity now to face up to these realities. The Fez summit was not encouraging in this respect. In my view the Rapporteur has not failed to recognise this. The solution that we as Europeans should seek should be to encourage all the parties to seek an autonomous, demilitarised West Bank Palestinian state which recognises the rights of Palestinians and Jews alike to live side by side. It may require a peacekeeping force to achieve that, perhaps a European force. I am sorry that Lord Reay's report does not go that far in its recommendations.

I come now to the topic of Afghanistan. The Rapporteur referred to the dilemmas faced by those directly involved – notably the Soviet Union and Pakistan. Current reports in the Soviet Union suggest that the Brezhnev decision to invade Afghanistan in December 1979 was against the KGB's advice – and Mr. Andropov was involved in that. If we believe that we believe anything. That is a classic Soviet disinformation ploy.

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan remains an embarrassment to the Soviets, internationally and internally. The Soviets have lost influence and lost the respect of the Moslem world. I know from my last visit to the Soviet Union just over two years ago that the Russian people are becoming increasingly unhappy about their boys being lost in Afghanistan. Their coffins are no longer brought home.

We must do everything possible to ensure that this Soviet Vietnam results in the same withdrawal as the withdrawal by America from Vietnam. To achieve that the Afghan freedom fighters must be kept supplied with the arms that they need if they are to continue their struggle, which courageously they are prepared to do. The Afghan freedom fighters must work out their internal differences in the face of the common enemy. Without that, what hope is there that civil war will not replace their patriotic war and prevent a solution.

I shall conclude my remarks since I see that you, Mr. President, are looking at your watch. I should have liked the report to contain some clearer and more robust recommendations on both Israel and Afghanistan. I am sorry that I shall not be here tomorrow to suggest appropriate amendments.

I hope that if President Zia of Pakistan is attempting to negotiate a deal with the Soviet Union on Afghanistan he will not sell his soul to the devil. I hope that we, as Europeans, will impress upon him that he has available all the help at our disposal to resolve the refugee problem so that at the end of the day a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan will emerge from the negotiations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Atkinson.

I call Mr. Vecchietti.

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I do not think that our countries can continue simply to reiterate principles and hope for peaceful solutions in the Middle East on which we Europeans are now substantially in agreement. This is confirmed by Lord Reay's admirable report.

This European dimension to a peace policy for the Middle East is an important fact but could easily become a sign of impotence to the rest of the world if it is not translated into an active policy and a European initiative which will at least help in future to remove some of the international components of the present state of insecurity in which all the Arab peoples and the Palestinians have to live, together with the Israelis.

May I explain? For the sake of brevity I shall deal only with Lebanon and the Palestinian and Israeli questions. The unity of Lebanon is threatened by historical, internal divisions. We cannot put an end to them. At the same time, I believe that we should help to free Lebanon from the other threats which hang over its unity and stem from its international situation. It is contradictory to call for the withdrawal of foreign troops – they should of course be withdrawn – if withdrawal is not accompanied by an effective international guarantee of Lebanese unity, if we only help to further the tendency of the Americans and Israelis to make Lebanon their zone of influence, contrary to the wishes of President Gemayel himself; and this puts everything in a nutshell in view of his political origins. Can we in fact stand by while the Americans alone work for mediation between Arabs and Israelis, with the bias fundamentally in favour of the Israelis?

Let us consider the concrete proposals after Reagan's speech. In practice, the United States is calling for a partial diaspora of the Palestinians, which ultimately will be rejected by everyone for a variety of reasons, as it has already been rejected by the Israelis who want total removal, by the PLO and by Hussein himself, both of whom want the opposite.

The Israelis do so in the knowledge that the United States is in no position to force Begin

Mr. Vecchiatti (continued)

to abandon a security policy based on expansionism – as witness the West Bank settlements – which the United States does not agree with but has to accept. How can it allow this policy to be implemented with dollars and weapons which it supplies regularly to Israel?

That these international components of the crisis aggravate and, to some extent, render insoluble the serious internal problems of the Middle East is confirmed by the fact that the willingness now shown by the Arab world at Fez is met by the opposing intransigence of Israel and Syria which, with due allowance for their differences, are both continuing to rely on force relationships and military solutions for the Middle East crisis.

What should we do now? We should prevent any hardening of policies based on the conviction that the Middle Eastern problem must be resolved by force relationships, or the prospect of fresh fighting, made easier to some extent by world tensions.

Among other things this means freeing Israel from the rôle assigned to it by the United States and furthering its independent existence in the Middle East, thus helping the people of Israel and the Arab world, and vice versa, to live together in peace; it also means pressing the United States to free itself from the blackmail of Israeli extremists, which is still continuing even after the Beirut massacres. We can do so by giving credibility in the only possible way to the European policy agreed in Venice, by saying that in the differences which have arisen between the United States and Europe, there is also the specific attitude of the Americans to Israel, to Lebanon and to the Palestinians. We have to make it understood that Israeli policy threatening peace in the Middle East, which it is pursuing, if not with the full consent, at least the decisive material aid received from the United States, can no longer be allowed to add to the serious factors of economic destabilisation which American monetary and commercial policy is creating in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Vecchiatti.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – My first objection to the report is that it has little to do with its title. It has little to do with Europe or South-West Asia. The report is yet another anti-Israel catalogue, at least in its explanatory memorandum. The recommendations are different. I sympathise with some of the recommendations, although the report is yet another example of the incursion by the General Affairs Committee into a subject that should be the

remit of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

I do not think that the Middle East's problems are based on the Arab-Israeli conflict. There has always been strife in the area and there always will be. If Israel did not exist it would have to be invented. Israel is the focus for hatred. Its presence is resented and unacceptable to the Arab states. On numerous occasions attempts have been made to eliminate the state of Israel.

I draw the Assembly's attention to the table after paragraph 27 of the report which lists the number of Arabs in the various areas. In May 1948 about 900,000 Arabs lived in that part of Palestine that became Israel. When the war broke out and Israel regained its independence about 250,000 Arabs remained there. About 650,000 became refugees and have since been used as pawns by everyone. The Arab population of the area has doubled to about 500,000. If one subtracts that 500,000 from the four million Palestinians scattered throughout the area one is left with three and a half million. How could 650,000 become three and a half million? That is a 500 % increase in population.

If the figure is accurate, it means that long before the problem began at least two million Palestinians were scattered throughout the Middle East and perhaps further afield. In other words, it means that there was a Palestinian diaspora long before Israel became a state. Why was there no pressure for independence for Palestinians to bring them back from the diaspora during the nineteen years of occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Jordan and Egypt? Why did it happen only after Israel occupied the West Bank as a result of the 1967 war? There is something ominous and sinister in that. However, we have dwelt far too much on the past where two peoples are disputing an area to which both have a right.

I am not being objective, but if one considers the matter reasonably, the Jews' claim is much stronger than that of the Arabs. However, I do not say that the Arabs have no claim. It has been said in this Assembly that the Arabs are brothers, one people and one nation. The dispersal of one group to another part of the Arab homeland is not the same as what happened to the Jews in the past, with enormous consequences to the Jewish people, not just in recent years but for centuries. We should do something now. I should say immediately that I do not support Mr. Begin or Mr. Sharon. They do not represent adequately either the majority of Israeli people or Jewish people throughout the world. Israel has amply demonstrated its ability to defend itself in war after war. Israel should now take a risk for peace.

Dr. Miller (continued)

I do not agree that the West Bank should be *Judenrein* – free of Jews. Why should any area in the world be *Judenrein*? It is different if Jews are settled on the West Bank from the West Bank being annexed. I do not agree with that, but Jewish people need not leave the area.

The Camp David procedure should be advanced to incorporate the Arab proposals for a Palestinian homeland and Jordan must be involved. I cannot blame Israel for not wishing to recognise the PLO. I wonder whether Lord Reay would find the IRA acceptable as the only organisation entitled to represent the Catholics in Northern Ireland and that it should negotiate with the British Government. It is not surprising that Israel does not accept the PLO, not because of terrorism but because of the PLO's covenant.

It is not beyond the wit of friends of peace to solve the problem. Israel's willingness to enter into negotiations is more likely to be achieved if we adopt a less hectoring attitude towards Israel. Condemnations of Israel merely strengthen its people's suspicion about our real objectives.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Dr. Miller.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman has the floor.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall be brief, not only at your request but also because, as far as I am concerned, there is nothing but good to say about Lord Reay's report and it would be superfluous to repeat its praises here today.

The title and content of the report suggest a somewhat broader recommendation than the one before us. Various people have expressed great regret at this. I too regret it, but I can well understand it, because at the time when the report was drawn up the situation in Lebanon was the focus of world interest and political concern. And quite rightly so. Let us hope that interest is not on the wane.

With regard to the recommendation, I can be brief. I support it, indeed I support it heartily. I would just like to make one small reservation about paragraph 8. I think paragraph 8 should be seen in the light of the current situation, but we must reserve the right to go somewhat further than paragraph 8 recommends if the situation in Afghanistan should change.

The good and, in my view, very important points in the recommendation are those concerning the continued existence of Israel within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers

and recognition of the PLO as speaking for the Palestinian people. This means that the PLO must be involved in the peace negotiations. I would like to ask those who object to this – and we have just heard one of their spokesmen – what they themselves have in mind. Lord Reay made the same point in presenting his report: whom do they see, in the present situation, as entitled to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians? The question has become more and more difficult because of the events of recent months. The Palestinians are now even more widely dispersed than before. What organisation other than the PLO could be involved in a matter so important for the Palestinians? We cannot negotiate without the Palestinians!

The recommendation also mentions a Palestinian homeland. I think this is one of the most important things in the recommendation. A solution to the problems and suffering of the Palestinian people is in my opinion impossible unless a homeland is created. Nor is any peace possible in the Middle East without a solution to the Palestinian problem.

I have already said, Mr. President, that our attention must not slacken. It is true that the initial shock to world opinion brought about by the suffering in Lebanon in recent months has somewhat abated, but we politicians must in any event ensure that our own attention does not slacken and that permanent peace is achieved in the Middle East. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am sorry but I cannot agree with Lord Reay, because his report and draft recommendation are not at all balanced. It seems to me that, in this document, we show all our scorn and flourish our strength against the weaker but are forbearing if not compliant towards the stronger and the overbearing. It would appear that peace in the Middle East is upset and threatened exclusively by the Israelis, who are blamed for the Lebanese tragedy, while we pretend to forget that the Israelis intervened when there were already two big foreign armies – the Syrians and the PLO – in that country.

During the fighting in Lebanon, 543 PLO arms and ammunition dumps were discovered in Lebanon: It required 4,303 lorries to remove them. Just think: there were only 5,630 tonnes of ammunition, 1,300 armoured vehicles, 33,303 light weapons, 215 mortars, 62 Katyusha rocket launchers, 88 field guns, 190 anti-aircraft weapons and so on, not to mention various other kinds of equipment!

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

What did we do to avert the tragedy in Lebanon before the Israelis intervened? We did absolutely nothing; and in the draft recommendation we call for the withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces from the different parts of Lebanon, forgetting that there are still armed PLO bands which should be called on to withdraw.

As I have tabled a number of amendments to which I shall be able to speak, I shall simply say that the Middle East tragedy is of course the conflict between Israel, the Arab states and the Palestinians but the Palestinians have not been helped at all by the Arab states. We can even stress that none of the Arab states said anything in support of the Palestinians when they were about to be completely shut up in West Beirut. And we are blinking the fact that there are much more serious problems, such as the war between Iran and Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan and so on. We have forgotten all this. This Assembly made a splendid show of righteous indignation immediately after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. We talked, we heard representatives of the Afghan resistance movement, we even adopted a draft recommendation saying that our countries should give the resistance fighters military aid by supplying arms. Now, on the other hand, we are saying virtually nothing. This being so, Ladies and Gentlemen, it seems to me that we are now raising our voices against the weak or the not so strong, and we are failing to put forward just demands or to take appropriate measures against the overbearing and the strong; and this I feel is not to the credit of the Assembly. That is why I am opposed to the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

I call Lord McNair.

Lord McNAIR (*United Kingdom*). – I shall confine myself to the thinking behind my Amendment 17, which is a plan to remove at least some Palestinians from the deadly peril in which they now live to somewhere safer.

The shocking outburst of ferocity on 16th to 18th September in Chatila and Sabra – that explosion of naked blood lust – was not as surprising to those who have studied the modern history of Lebanon as it was to the world at large. It is simply the latest chapter in a grim story of vendetta, an ethnic blood feud which has been raging for several years between the Lebanese and the Palestinians. To argue about who started it or why is pointless. We can leave that to the historians; that is their job. We should be concerned with how to prevent a repetition of those appalling days and nights.

There is a large number of Palestinians in Lebanon who have been there for a long time and who are well integrated into the economy and society. Those people, dotted about inconspicuously, are not at risk, but the plight of the refugees – one must distinguish between Palestinian refugees and the PLO – is now all but desperate.

Old people, many of whom have been refugees for thirty-four years, the women whose husbands or sons of breadwinning age have been killed, imprisoned or evacuated, the children who were born in the camps and know no country but Lebanon – those are the people I am talking about. There may be 200,000 of them, in grave physical danger, living in appalling squalor and dependent on the niggardly charity of the world governments which keep UNRWA perpetually on the brink of bankruptcy.

In the face of that human misery, should we touch wood, keep our fingers crossed and hope for the best, or should we try to devise some plan to move those people out of danger and into some temporary refuge where they will at least be safe?

I have spoken so far from the point of view of the Palestinians, but the Lebanese also have a point of view. We all want to see the Government of Lebanon restore its authority over its territory and return to the prosperity which Lebanon once knew. The Lebanese have many home-grown problems of their own, but the influx of Palestinians into Lebanon in 1948 and 1967 and most of all in 1971 after that black September has posed an additional problem with which Lebanon manifestly cannot cope. That is the second reason for my Amendment 17. If time permitted I could go into the question of where the Palestinians could go and how they could be taken there, but that would all be covered by the feasibility study for which I am asking.

If this proves negative, if the Secretary-General of the United Nations decides that it simply cannot be done, there is little we can do but pray. But before we resign ourselves to that and before we abandon these people to their fate, whatever it may be, ought we not at least to find out whether there is or is not anything we can do to ensure their safety?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Lord McNair.

Mr. Michel has the floor.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – In congratulating Lord Reay on his report I would say that he has done well in performing what might be described as an impossible task. Indeed, I believe it was impossible to produce a

Mr. Michel (continued)

perfect report on such different subjects as the Afghanistan affair, the Iraq-Iran conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian problem.

South-West Asia is an explosive mixture of races, peoples, sects and religions, where it is not easy for the idea of homogenous national unity to take root. What is needed, therefore, is a large dose of realism, rather than theories, in attempting to solve problems that arise in the Middle East.

The great principles so far enunciated, especially United Nations Resolution 242 of 22nd November 1967, have been recognised in theory, affirmed and reaffirmed. But in fact they have been constantly violated, with the same consistency – I might add – as the principles themselves have been affirmed.

Let me therefore put two questions to the Rapporteur. Might it be possible, for this region, to conceive of a multifederal solution? In each of the existing states, whether Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Egypt or the Gaza Strip, would it be possible to protect a sub-nation, in this case the Palestinians, by giving it responsibility for a sub-region in the framework of a federal state?

This would resolve, at one and the same time, the problem of the state of Israel and that of Palestinian nationality or sub-nationality. The same solution would apply to Jordan. There would be the Jordanian state and the Palestinian sub-nation within Jordan, on the West Bank. Lebanon would lend itself to this solution, which, though admittedly complicated, may nevertheless be realistic.

I therefore put these questions to the Rapporteur, who has been responsible for carrying out detailed observations on the spot. This is a case where complicated solutions, if applicable, ought to be made possible by the will to implement them and by the credibility of those who assume responsibility for them.

Can Europe, at this time, take the initiative for such a solution and has it the strength or authority to do so?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Michel.

I call Mr. McGuire.

Mr. McGUIRE (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, as you have asked speakers to be brief, although I asked to speak for ten minutes, I shall speak for a shorter time.

First, I am pleased that it was a British colleague who moved this report and I want to add my congratulations to those that have been expressed to Lord Reay. I am glad it was a

British colleague who did so because of something on which this report touches in its historical outline, the Balfour Declaration. Certainly, British representatives do not need to be reminded that it was as a result of that declaration that many of the seeds of this conflict in the Middle East were sown. That declaration said, amongst other things, that it favoured the creation in Palestine of a national home for the Jews, but it also explicitly gave guarantees for the Arabs. Certainly those guarantees have gone out of the window and we need to remind ourselves of that from time to time.

I do not want my words to be construed in a sense unkind to the Jews but because the Jews seized the opportunities given to them by the Balfour Declaration the British Government of the day in 1939 had to make another statement, because they could see how events were going, events which have since unfolded as a complete tragedy for the Palestinian people. As Lord Reay has said, there are people who have been forgotten, whose rights were queried when a famous leader asked: "Who are the Palestinians? They do not exist. There never was such a people or such a state."

My pleasure in speaking in this debate is that over the years – and I have been a representative for only a short time – we have had a sea of change. At one time one could not talk about the Palestinians because one identified them with the PLO. I have said in this chamber, as I have said in the Council of Europe chamber, that I longed for the day when the leader of the PLO would come in front of us as other leaders have come and we could question him about the motives and so-called covenants of the PLO. The PLO is the only recognised organisation representative of a dispossessed people. I welcome very much what my colleague Dr. Miller said. The great thing that has happened is that there has come a sea of change and many good people in Israel and good Jewish people outside can see that they have been locked into a system which in the end, I believe, will destroy those qualities which we identify with the Jews.

I want to quote something that appeared in *The Guardian* yesterday. There has been a recognition of the problem of recognising the rights of two groups of people who have a historic claim to that land. If people can prove uninterrupted occupation of a homeland going back thousands of years, it will take a lot to convince me that their claim is inferior to that of any other group of people who, I recognise, have a claim too.

A long time ago a Jewish President of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Dr. Judah Magnes, said this, warning those who sought

Mr. McGuire (continued)

political domination in an exclusively Jewish state:

"We seem to have thought of everything – except the Arabs... But the time has come for the Jews to take into account the Arab factor as the most important facing us. If we have a just cause, so have they. If promises were made to us, so they were made to the Arabs. If we love the land and have a historical connection with it, so too have the Arabs... If we wish to live in this living space, we must live with the Arabs."

To the outside world the solution is plain. It must involve acceptance of both claims, the renunciation by each state of any wish to dominate and deny the rights of the other. Times are changing but certainly in the recent past whenever anyone put forward the point that there was a claim by the Palestinians and the Arabs immediately the PLO was thrown up. They were spoken of as the people who sought the destruction of the state of Israel.

We have to turn the question round and ask whether the initiative for this solution, for bringing together those who must talk about this, should come from a people who have been derided, whom some have wanted to extinguish altogether. Should it come from a people who have been robbed of their land, their birthright and identity and driven into refugee camps? I say that the recognition of this, and the initiative, must come from that section of the Jewish people who I think are represented in my quotation from Dr. Magnes. I believe that there is a magnanimity among the Jewish people, a recognition that there is a problem. If they were to translate that into positive action, we should begin to see a difference. People have to get round the table and acknowledge that both sides have a historic claim. They have to begin the first steps down what may be a stoney road but what is the only realistic path. There has to be an acceptance of the problem. Only then can we hope for peace to return to the Middle East.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. McGuire.

Mr. Bassinet is the next speaker.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Lord Reay's excellent report has the virtue of presenting the fullest possible picture, in respect to European security, of the situation not only in South-West Asia but also in the Middle East. It therefore seems reasonable to suggest that he change the title of his report to read "The evolution of the situation in the Middle East and South-West Asia", because it does indeed deal with the Israeli-Arab conflict,

the war between Iraq and Iran, and the military occupation of Afghanistan.

At this time it is important to recall the European initiatives aimed at promoting the search for peaceful solutions to these conflicts. With regard to Lebanon, the Europeans, in the framework of the European Communities, firmly condemned the Israeli invasion as of 9th June last. At its last part-session in June, our Assembly also had occasion to express its wish that Lebanese sovereignty should be respected and to reaffirm the need both to ensure the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to recognise the right of the state of Israel to exist within secure, internationally-recognised frontiers.

Finally, I would like to remind you of the special rôle played by France, the United States and Italy in the evacuation of Beirut and in the re-establishment of the conditions necessary for any gradual return to peace.

I would, however, like to say something more specific about the Afghanistan question. As Mr. Hernu, the French Defence Minister, reminded us here this morning, the recent changes in the Soviet leadership compel us to consider the probable development of the situation in rather different terms from those of Lord Reay's report. After all, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan has clearly not enabled the Soviet Union to achieve the aims it set itself.

For one thing, stabilisation of the Afghan régime is impossible in the present context because, from the outset, the Soviet intervention encountered large-scale Afghan resistance, the strength and determination of which has increased rather than diminished with time. This resistance should be given the widest possible support from outside Afghanistan, since it is an essential element in bringing about the necessary change in Soviet policy.

Secondly, the Soviet Union has not achieved its aim of stabilising and normalising the situation, since prolonged military occupation inevitably produces deviations. The Soviet army of occupation has proved no exception to this rule, and Moscow now finds itself bogged down in a situation the logic of which is difficult to reverse.

Given this double setback, and the emergence of Mr. Andropov at the head of the Soviet Communist Party, it is possible that the situation may change. The change of leadership has altered the internal situation in the Soviet Union and may make the time right for a change in policy towards Afghanistan.

Such a change might correspond both to the convictions of the new leaders and to the recog-

Mr. Bassinet (continued)

inition of the need to end the present deadlock. While the direction of the change cannot yet be ascertained with certainty, it must necessarily have a direct effect on East-West relations, in particular European security.

Finally, in their Afghanistan policy the Russians have been little inhibited by European reactions, which must therefore be deemed inadequate. They are nevertheless aware that any progress in the negotiations which they wish to see succeed in Europe depends partly on a move towards normalisation of their relations with Afghanistan and therefore on a return to normal in that country.

Nevertheless, while Europe may have reason to congratulate itself on a softening of the Soviet attitude towards Afghanistan, it will nevertheless have to remain vigilant in its relations with the Soviet Union. As the President of the French Republic reminded us in a recent interview, the Soviet Union "will wish to maintain its area of influence, guarantee its security, continue its ideological and political progress on all continents. These are permanent factors in the power game. To forget them would be fatal".

Europe will therefore have to remain firm in its negotiations with the Soviet Union while taking account of changes in the Soviet attitude towards Afghanistan. In remaining firm in its relations with the Soviet Union, Europe must nevertheless see its means of action at their true value. In this sense any general or generalised embargoes or bans, whether they are aimed at the Soviet Union or at the present Afghan régime, seem unrealistic.

Mr. President, I will leave it at that. In view of what you said, I have kept my remarks as brief as possible.

(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Bassinet.

Mr. Garrett has the floor.

Mr. GARRETT (*United Kingdom*). – I welcome Lord Reay's statement about the Israeli attitude towards the PLO. It was a correct statement and he made it at the earliest opportunity. It is difficult to speak on this subject without some emotion, bearing in mind that my generation, the United Kingdom forces and the allies, fought to rid Europe of tyranny and in doing so saved the lives of millions of Jewish people, some of whom went to Israel and are now prominent citizens there.

It is hard also to realise that the British forces who fought for them are in some cases the same forces who were killed in Palestine separating Palestinians and Israelis. It is disheartening to realise that there are leaders of the Israeli Government who were terrorists and who were responsible for killing some of my comrades in arms, using methods that were not considered humanitarian.

I welcome this criticism of Israel's rôle in recent events in that unhappy part of the Middle East. I dissent from the criticism expressed by Mr. Atkinson, who made attacks, albeit muted, on the American attitude and rôle in that part of the world. I do not think that the Americans want to play a major military rôle in that area, because American public opinion is still conditioned by the horrors experienced in Vietnam. They will not play a major fighting rôle.

The present American administration can play a part by being bold and courageous in attacking the powerful Israeli lobby in the United States of America. The Americans must be much tougher and stronger when dealing with the Israeli Government. If they were, some of the tension would disappear.

I agree with Mr. McGuire of the United Kingdom. He summed up accurately the history of the situation.

We have not yet discussed Iran. The Assembly must produce a separate report on the relationship between Iran and Iraq and other Gulf states. The report mentions that, but a more detailed report is required. We would be enlightened by such a report.

I hope that the report under discussion is read avidly by the Israeli Government and the PLO. Sooner or later they must gather round the same table. If the Assembly can assist in that, it will be a step in the right direction.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Garrett.

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to thank Lord Reay for his balanced attitude to the conflict between Iraq and Iran. I would also like to thank him for paying particular attention to the minorities in that area – the Kurds, the Baluchis, the Arabs in Iran and the Palestinian Arabs, who are scattered throughout many Arab states.

Admittedly, I would have been a little more grateful if he had also mentioned the oppressed, down-trodden Jewish communities in the region, which either still exist in what are

Mr. Reddemann (continued)

sometimes dreadful conditions or have been scattered by fanatical majorities.

Having said that, I must straight away express a certain regret that the analysis in regard to Israel and its neighbours is too one-sided and that a multitude of facts have been selected only in order to prove a previously determined viewpoint.

I do not wish to go at length into the history, but having, for example, mentioned the fact that there were conflicts between the Arab and Jewish communities from 1920 onwards, the report should at least have pointed out as well that before these conflicts there were attempts by Arabs and Jews to bring about a community of interests in their area, and that it was only the publication and finally the implementation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement that drove a wedge between Arabs and Jews in the region and finally made them enemies.

To take another point, when I read that "dreadful Jewish terrorists" blew up the "harmless" King David Hotel, there is of course some truth in it. But it would have been appropriate for the report also to mention that this was not some harmless tourist hotel but the then headquarters of the British occupying forces. That would have made the judgment a little more sober.

I would also have found it more acceptable if the report had mentioned the fact that the original Palestinian state, which the United Nations wanted, did not materialise simply because the Arab states prevented it, and not because of any Israeli occupation of the West Bank or the Gaza Strip in 1948.

I believe the following point is also vitally important. If we are in the process of apportioning blame, I am surprised at the passage in the report which says that in September 1970 Jordan was forced to "dispose of several of these movements" by force. The fact that this amounted – as we know very well today from Arab sources – to the death of some twenty thousand people is one of those dreadful things from the past that the report ought to have mentioned. Instead, the report peremptorily demands that the Israeli Government alone report on the equally dreadful massacres in the Beirut refugee camps. No such demand is addressed to the Lebanese Government, although everyone knows that the massacres were carried out by Lebanese – unfortunately, I fear, with the tacit connivance of various Israeli officers.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am afraid the report and the conclusions based upon it, are all too one-sided, and we are thereby missing our

opportunity to promote a rational dialogue between the two sides. When I consider that of the sixteen paragraphs of the preamble thirteen are de facto directed against Israel, while the whole subject of Afghanistan, with all its horrors, is mentioned only briefly in a single paragraph, and the conflict between Iraq and Iran is dealt with in very feeble terms, I have the impression that this is not a report and recommendation on the situation in South-West Asia, but a report and recommendation aimed specifically at attacking Israeli policy.

If – and I conclude on this point, Mr. President – we take it into our heads that we must impose more severe conditions on a friendly, democratic state than on other states which, as dictatorships, pursue thoroughly imperialist objectives in that region, we are free to do so. But I would like to ask whether it is morally justified and politically advantageous.

The PRESIDENT. – Thanks to the cooperation of members, we have concluded the general debate.

We have still to hear the Rapporteur's reply. The Chairman of the committee may also comment and we must tackle at least some of the twenty-eight amendments to the report tonight, because tomorrow's agenda is full.

The Assembly will share my anxiety about the events that give rise to a report that I must now make and that affects tomorrow's business. I have received a letter from the German Ambassador to London, who is the Federal Republic's representative on the Permanent Council. He says:

"I have to inform you that due to an accident the Minister of State at the German Foreign Office, Mr. Möllemann, will not be able to address the Assembly as planned on 1st December.

The Minister of State instructed me to express his deep regret and to let you know, Mr. President, that he would very much welcome the opportunity to attend the meeting and to convey to the Assembly the continued interest and esteem which the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany attribute to its work. The Minister of State would highly appreciate it if his remarks could be passed on to the honourable members of the Assembly and if his hopes could be expressed at the same time that at a forthcoming meeting a German minister will again be able to attend a session of the Assembly."

I am sure that we all understand the seriousness of the accident, which is not so serious as to require a long stay in hospital but which means that he cannot contemplate a journey to

The President (continued)

Paris. We regret the circumstances and, on your behalf, I have sent a message through the ambassador saying that we understand the circumstances that prevent his attendance and wish him a speedy recovery. We hope that a German minister will address the Assembly soon.

I am sure that members would wish us to record our pleasure in that the new German Government are continuing to play an important part in the work of the Assembly and of Western European Union. I believe that I should let you know how this will affect our programme tomorrow. It gives us some more time for our overloaded agenda.

I now ask the Rapporteur to reply to the debate. He will be followed by the Chairman of the committee.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – We have got through the general debate amazingly quickly. That must be a tribute to the chair, although it is a pity that members have had only five minutes in which to speak. The subject was very complicated and I sympathise with those members whose time has been curtailed, although I had much greater latitude. I shall not say very much now.

I thank members who took part in the debate, especially those who agreed with everything I said, including Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. McGuire and Mr. Garrett. I am grateful for their support. I was also pleased that even Dr. Miller was not entirely negative towards the recommendation. Dr. Miller asked me whether I would recognise the IRA as the only available representatives of Catholics in Northern Ireland. However, the IRA cannot be compared with the PLO. Catholics in Northern Ireland have long been represented by democratic political parties. They were represented in all the assemblies in Northern Ireland and at Westminster. Therefore, it was possible to talk to Catholics in Northern Ireland through a democratic organisation.

It is a fact of today that the PLO is the only body available to speak for the Palestinians. Jordan will not assume that function because of the Rabat decision of 1974. Under that decision, Jordan and all the moderate Arab states decided that the PLO should be recognised as the only legitimate representative of Palestinians. That decision may have been wise or unwise and it may be regretted or not regretted today, even by some of those who took the decision, but those countries must be committed to the decision. Unless we accept that talks with the PLO can proceed, no one else will speak on behalf of the Palestinians and,

therefore, negotiations will not get off the ground and the Reagan plan will be a dead letter. For those practical reasons, the PLO must be recognised.

Mr. Reddemann complained about the bias of the report. He considered that far too much of it was devoted to the Middle East. At present, the Middle East, out of all the other areas covered in the South-West Asia description, has reached the most critical position. Europe has vital interests and a rôle to play. There has been a strong feeling that Israel should not continue to flout United Nations resolutions and entrench itself in the occupation of territory that we do not consider belongs to it and that it obtained through war.

As to the treatment of amendments, I put myself in your hands, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for the tremendous work that you did in committee, Lord Reay, in preparing this report and in the long travels that you undertook on behalf of the committee.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – The Rapporteur has already clarified his position. I share his position, as does an overwhelming majority of the committee. The report represented a genuine consensus and cooperation after lengthy discussion in committee. The product is before us today. That will have an impact on the many amendments that have been tabled, to all of which I must give a stock answer. They all re-raise proposals, not for the second but possibly for the third time, that were considered in committee, voted upon and rejected. We are now returning to the same process.

Apart from the detailed amendments, the substantial criticism is that not enough of the report deals with Afghanistan. One has some sympathy with that view, but the difficulty is that WEU gave a remit to the Rapporteur to include all of South-West Asia. That included the three crisis spots, one of which is Afghanistan, but no one in this Assembly from any political party believes that we have much influence over the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. All that we can do is to urge a political settlement and the removal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in order to allow that country to regain its status as a non-aligned, independent country. No amount of preambles, considerations or recommendations will enable us to say much more. All that we wish to happen in Afghanistan is that the Russians should stop doing what they have been doing. It is difficult to fill two pages with observations on that subject.

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

More particularly, the United Nations General Assembly has just voted, only one vote different from its decision after the invasion two years ago – including the third world, the non-aligned nations and the rest – to call on the Soviet forces to leave Afghanistan so that it may regain its status as a non-aligned nation. We can only echo what the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly have done. If their persuasion has no effect, I place little reliance on WEU achieving the miracle of changing Russian intentions. All that we can do is to endorse what those other bodies have done.

The Rapporteur has faithfully reported the situation over Iran and Iraq. Again, we can only express the hope that the fighting will stop; every other international body has been doing the same, without success, for many months. But one cannot fill a complete report with that statement. Therefore, the suggestion that the report concentrates too heavily on the Israeli problem can be answered only by saying that Europe – especially France and Britain – have a special historical responsibility for events in the Middle East. It is therefore natural that we should concentrate our energies where everyone, including the Arabs, admits that we have a rôle to play.

At the height of recent events, President Reagan launched a new initiative which was generally welcomed, but welcomed on one condition – that nothing could be worse for stability and the chances of peace than that that initiative should fail. That would achieve the worst of all worlds, since the moderate Arabs who still wish to obtain a reasonable settlement would be quite discredited.

When he launched that initiative, President Reagan was praised by this Assembly and other organisations, but history will not praise him if he does not follow up his verbal initiative with positive action.

My final question is rhetorical. When those who take a different view from that of the Rapporteur say that the PLO and the Palestinians should leave Lebanon, some of us would like to know where they think the Palestinians should go. If it is said that they should go home, to which home should they go?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Frederic.

That concludes the debate on this important report from the General Affairs Committee.

We must now begin, although we shall not be able to conclude tonight, consideration of the twenty-eight amendments which have been

tabled. In accordance with our rules, they will be taken in the sequence in which they relate to the text. We shall begin with Amendment 1, followed by Amendments 20, 19 and 2. Amendments 18 and 3 will be taken together and I shall ask the mover of each to speak, but if Amendment 18 is carried, Amendment 3 will fall.

Amendments 4 and 21 will also be taken together and if Amendment 4 is carried, Amendment 21 will fall. Amendments 22 and 26 will be taken together; if Amendment 22 is carried, Amendment 26 falls. We shall then consider in order Amendments 5, 13, 14 and 6. Amendments 7 and 10 will be taken together; if Amendment 7 is carried, Amendment 10 will not be voted upon, although in each case I shall call the mover.

Then we shall take Amendment 23, followed by Amendment 15. Then comes Amendment 11, the French version of which has been revised since it was first issued. That will be followed in order by Amendments 24, 16, 17 and 8. We shall take together Amendments 25 and 27; Amendment 27 will fall if Amendment 25 is carried. Then we shall take Amendment 9, which will also fall if Amendment 25 is adopted. The last two amendments are Amendments 28 and 12.

I shall not expect to get through all the amendments tonight. I certainly would not wish to sit beyond seven o'clock. However, since the business could take two-and-a-half or three hours, we should not put off starting it until tomorrow.

I call Mr. Cavaliere to move Amendment 1:

1. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "the occupation of Lebanon by the" insert "PLO".

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the fifth paragraph of the preamble states that the occupation of Lebanon by the Israeli and Syrian armies makes it impossible to restore unity and terminate the acts of violence being committed there. But, before the Israelis intervened in Lebanon, this Assembly ignored the existence of a powerful PLO army. Everyone knows that after some 8,000 fedayeen had left Beirut there were still several thousands of them in other parts of the country. Why not say so, then? Why not say, "Considering the occupation of Lebanon by Syria, Israel and the PLO, etc."? Otherwise the facts are being ignored. Whether there are a few thousand or a few hundred does not matter. It is the principle that matters and I believe that this should be recognised by the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

May we have the opinion of the committee?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I begin with a remark that the Assembly will hear me say with great frequency: it is a regrettable fact that this point was debated and voted upon at considerable length in the committee. The majority decision was against the amendment, as it was against virtually all the succeeding amendments. This report represents the best possible reconciliation of differing points of view on a controversial matter. I would oppose amendments which upset the balance on either side of what was finally achieved after particularly long debates.

There is simply no comparison between foreign forces and men who have been driven to go there because they have nowhere else to go. I would ask those who say that the PLO should go to say where they are supposed to go to. That is a question I asked a few moments ago. Therefore, since the committee discussed this over again I can only say that the committee considered this matter carefully and came to a very clear majority decision that this wording represented a fair reconciliation of view in the circumstances. Therefore, I can only say that the committee advise the rejection of this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Frederic.

The Assembly has heard the reasoning behind the proposal from the Chairman that the amendments should not be adopted. I now put Amendment 1.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

We now come to Amendment 20, tabled by Mr. Blaauw:

20. In line 1 of the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "it" insert "anyhow".

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – This amendment is brought in because, although it is probably said by the Chairman of the committee that it is all very balanced and that this is a compromise text because of the differing views, we now get the impression that unity in Lebanon is possible only when the Israeli and Syrian armies are withdrawn from there. I do not myself agree with that, because previously when there was an Israeli and a Syrian army in Lebanon we could not speak of real unity in that country. More has to be done in Lebanon than the withdrawal of the Israeli and Syrian armies. That is why I propose to put in the word "anyhow" after the word "it" and before "impossible".

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Blaauw.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – The word "anyhow" adds absolutely nothing to the text. It is a nonsense. In English it has no meaning at all. Therefore, I am opposed to the amendment because I prefer that our texts should be in decent English.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Chairman or Rapporteur of the committee wish to speak?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I had hoped that Mr. Hardy would oppose this because only a short time ago he proposed the removal of the word "anyhow" because it was meaningless and misleading. I supported him against some others because I took the same view. I do not think that this amendment would achieve anything at all and therefore I have to join in what was said earlier – that this is an amendment that should be rejected.

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly has heard the motion proposed and opposed.

I put Amendment 20 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 20 is negatived.

We come now to Amendment 19, tabled by Mr. Blaauw:

19. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "unity" to the end of the paragraph.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – In the same sentence we have the impression that when Israeli and Syrian armies are withdrawn from Lebanon there will be an end of violence there, violence probably happening even at this moment. I do not believe that that is true. The attack on the Druze village was by Christian militia against other Lebanese people, and the Israeli army had to come between them. I do not believe that in the future it will be necessary for foreign armies to be between the different groups, the different minorities in Lebanon, but I believe also the idea that by ending all foreign occupation all acts of violence in Lebanon will end is wishful thinking. More has to be done, and I think we shall be doing our duty more if we delete the words "and terminate the acts of violence being committed there".

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

Can I have the opinion of the committee?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I believe that Mr. Blaauw has misunderstood the phrase. The committee did not suggest

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

that when the Israeli and Syrian armies left acts of violence would necessarily stop. We did something far less strict than that. We said that we hoped that such acts would stop but that we knew that it was impossible for them to stop as long as those armies are there. That is beyond dispute. We have not said that all acts of violence will stop when Israeli and Syrian forces leave. We have said that it is impossible for those acts to be stopped as long as those armies remain there. That should be abundantly clear to anyone, whatever his political view on this controversial subject. Therefore, the committee would wish this amendment to be rejected.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – Mr. President, may I seek your guidance on the English language? When one reads this sentence it just connects two things, unity and termination of acts of violence and with the word “and” we put it on an equal footing in my sentence, as I see it. I seek your guidance in this, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – That is not a point of order. I am not the honorary draftsman to the committee. Representatives must interpret texts as they themselves read them. As a matter of the English language it is clear what is meant. Whether it is actually right or wrong I am prohibited by the rules from expressing an opinion. Certainly, as a matter of English it would be possible to terminate acts of violence. On the other hand, it may not be possible; but I am prohibited from having an opinion. As a matter of English I cannot rule it out of order. Those who have a very sensitive ear for the English language probably may have to vote against your amendment, Mr. Blaauw, for that reason – or perhaps for it. We cannot have a vote on that ingenious point of order.

I put Amendment 19 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 19 is negatived.

We come now to Amendment 2, tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

2. Leave out the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, if the interpreter’s translation of Sir Frederic Bennett’s reply to my comments on Amendment 1 was correct, Sir Frederic Bennett apparently complained that amendments were tabled after the debate in committee or that rejected amendments had been resubmitted.

I cannot accept this complaint and I am surprised at the use of such words. Even if certain amendments were tabled and rejected in committee, each one of us is entitled to table them again in the Assembly without being criticised by anyone and least of all by the committee Chairman.

I now wish to speak to my second amendment, which proposes that the seventh paragraph of the preamble be left out. My intention can be understood by referring to the previous paragraph which states that a settlement of the Palestinian problem is one of the prerequisites of the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East. The seventh paragraph seeks to indicate how this objective is to be achieved and goes into what I regard as unnecessary detail. My view is that a settlement can be reached in so many ways, by so many means and by so many routes which are not necessarily those enumerated in the paragraph in question.

If the seventh paragraph of the preamble is left out, the principle will be stated and the way will be left open for all useful measures, and all ways and means of achieving a solution to the Palestinian problem.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone want to speak against the amendment?...

If not, I ask Lord Reay to comment.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – I am strongly opposed to this amendment. I am surprised that Mr. Cavaliere should have proposed it. We are dealing here with the preamble and this is the only place in the document where we mention the principle of mutual recognition – the recognition, on the one hand, of Israel’s right to exist within secure internationally-recognised frontiers and, on the other hand, the right of the Palestinian people to independence and sovereignty. This double recognition is a key to European policy in the Middle East. This is the only place in the document where this recognition is mentioned and it would be to remove the heart of the matter if the paragraph were deleted. Considering that the right of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers was something that Mr. Cavaliere asked for in committee, it surprises me that he should try to secure the deletion of this paragraph now.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Reay.

Mr. Cavaliere, do you wish to comment?

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – May I be permitted to clarify one point. It is not true that I tabled amendments in committee, where I made a short speech, touched on two or three points, said that I had to leave and voted.

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

It is completely untrue to say that amendments were tabled and rejected and that I spoke on the problem and made these requests.

The PRESIDENT. – It would help our proceedings if we did not have too much harking back to what was said in committee. It is the right of any member of the Assembly to table an amendment. It is my unfortunate task to say whether it is in order and, if so, to call it. It is then open to any member to oppose it and then for the Rapporteur or the Chairman of the committee to give the committee's views. It is obviously relevant for the Chairman to say that the committee considered a point and took a different view from that expressed in the amendment. We do not want a rehearsal of what was said in committee. With twenty-eight amendments we have plenty to get on with without a return of what must have been a fascinating discussion.

We will now vote on Amendment 2.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

We come now to the first of the joint discussions. I will call Mr. Enders to move his amendment, and then Mr. Cavaliere to introduce Amendment 3. Clearly, if the amendment tabled by Mr. Enders, Amendment 18, succeeds, Amendment 3 will fall. On the other hand, if Amendment 18 is not carried I will put Amendment 3 to the vote. I now call Mr. Enders to move Amendment 18:

18. Leave out the ninth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Welcoming the fact that the final act adopted by the heads of Arab states at their meeting in Fez on 9th September 1982 contains elements of substance which show considerable progress towards the application of Resolution 242;”

Mr. ENDERS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the ninth paragraph of the preamble gives the impression that the final act of the Fez Arab summit conference of 9th September 1982 is largely identical to United Nations Resolution 242. That is not the case. It contains substantial differences, as well as substantially positive elements. The purpose of my amendment is to refer in the text to the “elements of substance” contained in the final act of Fez. The amendment is thus designed to correct a false impression.

The PRESIDENT. – I now call Mr. Cavaliere to introduce Amendment 3:

3. In the ninth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “considerable progress towards the application of Resolution 242” and insert “progress towards the re-establishment of peace in the Middle East”.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I must observe that even if the proposals in the final act of the meeting of heads of state in Fez represents some progress towards the restoration of peace, rather than towards the straightforward implementation of Resolution 242, it is equally true that they cannot be regarded as virtually decisive progress. A small advance has been made, but there is still a long way to go.

The PRESIDENT. – I will put Amendment 18 first. If that falls, I will put Amendment 3. If there are two members wishing to speak against either or both amendments, I will call them.

Since no one wishes to speak, I will ask the committee for its guidance.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – Having listened to Mr. Enders, I am inclined to think that the wording of his amendment is, perhaps, better than the text. Accordingly, I would be prepared to recommend the Assembly to accept it. That would involve the retention of the reference to Resolution 242, which it is important to retain here. The significance of that is that the resolution contains the principle of recognition of the state of Israel. That is the specific point that we wanted to include.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Reay.

I put Amendment 18 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 18 is agreed to.

Amendment 3 therefore falls.

We come now to Amendment 4, tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

4. Leave out tenth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

We can also discuss Amendment 21, tabled by Mr. Blaauw:

21. Leave out the tenth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

If Amendment 4 is carried, Amendment 21 falls.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the amendment in question simply calls for the deletion of the tenth paragraph because the Palestinian problem has always

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

been clear, as has, therefore, the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people. Consequently, I feel that it is superfluous to say that recent events have shown up the problem even more clearly.

The PRESIDENT. – I shall now permit Mr. Blaauw to speak in support of Amendment 21.

He does not wish to speak, so I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – There was considerable discussion in committee and the preliminary clause was altered several times. We came to a compromise on whether we should refer to “homeland”, a sovereign state, or something else. A middle course was chosen to establish that the Palestinian people needed a homeland. Since so many members argue that the Palestinians have had to leave place after place, we should grant them a homeland. There is unanimity and in committee once we used the word “homeland” there was no dispute. I do not refer to any one person in that context.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, please forgive me for enquiring about the exact meaning of the term “homeland”. In the usage with which I am familiar, it means a post-colonial country in Africa dominated by the Republic of South Africa. Is that how the term “homeland” is to be used in the case of the Palestinians? If not, how am I to understand it? I would really like an explanation before I decide how to vote.

The PRESIDENT. – I am having to deal with points of order that I never thought of. I feel that I am being subjected to a vigorous examination in the use of the English language. I advise members to consult Fowler’s “Modern English Usage”. The word “homeland” means where people live. For example, I regard England as my homeland. I cannot go beyond that and I do not know whether that will help members make up their minds. Apparently, Mr. Hardy regards Yorkshire as his homeland. It is difficult to give a firm ruling. I do not wish to set a precedent for my successors. We must decide on the simple proposition of whether to retain paragraph 10. Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Blaauw propose that it should be left out.

We will now vote on Amendment 4.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is negatived.

Amendment 21 therefore falls.

We now come to Amendment 22, tabled by Mr. Blaauw:

22. In line 1 of the eleventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “the only” and insert “an”.

With this we shall discuss Amendment 26, tabled by Mr. Bassinet:

26. In line 1 of the eleventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “only” and insert “most important”.

There is a slight difference in the two amendments, but if Amendment 22 is carried, we cannot deal with Amendment 26.

Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – The PLO comprises several organisations. So long as it is well knit there should be no problem in referring to it as the “only” organisation. At present the PLO is not well knit. Even Mr. Arafat cannot get his people to agree on a political approach to the Palestinian problem. It is better to have some room for manoeuvre and to talk about the PLO as “an” organisation instead of the “only” organisation.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Bassinet, will you speak to Amendment 26?

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – I do not find the present wording satisfactory. To adopt it would be to prejudge not only the present but also the future political situation of the Palestinian population.

The PLO is a military organisation. It clearly represents the Palestinian fighters. It is tied to a specific period. It set itself up and was set up in order to destroy the state of Israel. Its past must inevitably weigh upon its future.

What is necessary, indeed indispensable, today, is negotiation between the representatives of Israel and the provisional representatives of the future Palestinian state. This raises problems of prior mutual recognition. If you recognise the PLO in advance as sole representative of the Palestinian people, you remove the incentive for this organisation to recognise the right of the state of Israel to exist.

Mr. President, I have tried to be brief, but I feel that the wording I am proposing is more satisfactory than the original.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Bassinet.

Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I have one question to ask about the proposed amendments. Can any other organisations speak for

Mr. Grieve (continued)

the Palestinians? I know of none and I doubt whether any of my colleagues know of any. We should, therefore, preserve the original text.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – What about the state of Jordan? Half of its population consists of Palestinians.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – The clause was changed in committee and the words “at the present juncture” were inserted. That did not rule out the possibility and perhaps even the desirability of another organisation being involved in future. At present the PLO is the only organisation involved. That was proved most recently by the Arab League Delegation, led by the King of Morocco, which has a representative of the PLO on its team which is touring the West. I am still waiting, as I waited in committee, for anyone to tell me what other organisation is involved. Until someone can do that, the Assembly should deal with reality. The reality is that at the present juncture the PLO is the “only” organisation involved.

The PRESIDENT. – Two alternatives to the original text are proposed – Amendment 22 moved by Mr. Blaauw and Amendment 26 by Mr. Bassinet. If Amendment 22 is carried, Amendment 26 falls. If Amendment 22 is defeated, I shall put Amendment 26 to the vote.

Mr. DURANT (*United Kingdom*). – I do not challenge your ruling, Mr. President, but there is a fundamental difference in meaning between the amendments. Your interpretation that if Amendment 22 falls, Amendment 26 should also fall...

The PRESIDENT. – You misunderstand me, Mr. Durant. I said that if Amendment 22 is carried, Amendment 26 falls. If Amendment 22 is negatived, I shall put Amendment 26.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 22 is negatived.

Therefore, I now put Amendment 26 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 26 is negatived.

We now come to Amendment 5, tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

5. At the end of the eleventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add “provided it abandons its military structure”.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it has, of course, to be recognised that at the present juncture the PLO is the only organisation which can speak for the Palestinian people. But it is a single organisation which incorporates several organisations; and it incorporates them because it is a military organisation. Because it has set up a military organisation it has become the only one. It seems to me, however, that if the PLO really wishes to represent and speak for the whole Palestinian people, it will have to change its structure. I request that the PLO be recognised as the only organisation which can speak for the Palestinian people on condition that it abandons its military structure and becomes a political organisation which will not, as at present, prevent the emergence of other organisations, precisely because of its military structure.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

I call Mr. Vecchietti.

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I am opposed because I am amazed that Mr. Cavaliere ignores, for example, what happened in Italy as in France, in both of which there were national liberation committees which were political organisations with a partisan structure varying in both membership and organisation. The same applies to the PLO; it is a multi-party political organisation – roughly so, because they are shadow parties which could foreshadow the shape of the future Palestinian parliament – which later took on a military structure, not to be identified with the Council of the PLO. The two are quite separate and to treat them as one and the same is to ignore the history of the European resistance.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Vecchietti.

Lord Reay has the floor.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – This amendment is nonsense. If the PLO is the only organisation that can speak for the Palestinians, that is the position whether or not it abandons its military structure. Perhaps one country may not wish to speak to it unless it abandons its military structure, but that is not what the preamble says. However, even if Mr. Cavaliere had said what I believe he would have wished to say, I am not sure that I could have recommended his amendment. The PLO pursues a political course. What does Mr. Cavaliere mean by “political structure”? Who must be satisfied whether that military structure is abandoned? The matter raises too many difficult questions, and I must recommend that the Assembly vote against the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Reay.

We will now vote on Amendment 5.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is negatived.

We come next to Amendments 13 and 14 by Lord McNair, as follows:

13. In line 1 of the twelfth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “not” insert “finally”.

14. In line 2 of the twelfth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “problem” to the end of the paragraph and add “and may meanwhile have disadvantageous consequences for the host countries;”.

Lord McNAIR (*United Kingdom*). – Amendments 13 and 14 were put in as one amendment. Would it save time if I spoke to both amendments and we have one vote on them?

The PRESIDENT. – Of course. Thank you.

Lord McNAIR (*United Kingdom*). – Amendment 13 is a paving amendment that makes way for my Amendment 17. If we pass Amendment 17, this paragraph in the preamble would be slightly inconsistent. I ask only for a small change, so that the paragraph would read:

“Considering that the dispersal of the Palestinian people in the Arab countries will not finally solve the problem and may meanwhile have disadvantageous consequences for the host country;”.

We could lose the words “unacceptable conditions for the persons concerned”, because some of the persons concerned are defenceless Palestinian women and children who would find it wholly acceptable to live in a safe place rather than where they live now. In this whole horrible imbroglio there are no ideal and quick solutions. We must always choose between two undesirable alternatives. For many, temporary dispersal in safe countries would be less undesirable than being left in Lebanon.

The PRESIDENT. – It was not evident at the table that Amendments 13 and 14 were linked with Amendment 17.

If we do not carry Amendment 17, does that mean that Amendments 13 and 14 will not be put?

Lord McNAIR (*United Kingdom*). – No.

The PRESIDENT. – May we take Amendments 13 and 14 separately?

Lord McNAIR (*United Kingdom*). – Yes.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against Amendments 13 or 14?...

May I have the view of the committee?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I have consulted the Rapporteur, and we cannot accept the amendments. First, the word “final” is similar to the question of the word “anyhow” that we had earlier. The dispersal of the Palestinians either will or will not solve the problem, and the addition of that word conveys no extra meaning.

I have seen the fate of the Palestinians, as a result of what happened on the West Bank and elsewhere, when they have been dispersed throughout Arab countries. I have seen them in the camps. I believe that the right wording is that adopted by the committee, which is “unacceptable conditions for the persons concerned”. I do not think that the almost unctuous phrase “may... have disadvantageous consequences for the host countries” covers the appalling conditions which these people have to endure if they are sent away from their homes, quite apart from the fact that the difficulties in the host countries are a secondary matter compared with the conditions of the Palestinian people if they are further dispersed.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Frederic.

Unless Lord McNair objects, since either or both of his amendments could be incorporated, I shall put both amendments separately to the vote.

We will vote on Amendment 13.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 13 is negatived.

I now put Amendment 14 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 14 is negatived.

We seem to be making very good progress, so I suggest that we take the next group and finish tonight with Amendment 23.

We thus come to Amendment 6 by Mr. Cavaliere, as follows:

6. After the fifteenth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Condemning recourse to chemical weapons and the continual massacres of the civilian population in Afghanistan;”.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Chairman of the General Affairs

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

Committee said, when winding up the general debate, that none of us could believe ourselves capable of exerting, not a decisive, but even a significant influence on what is happening in Afghanistan; this confirms my view that we are only prepared to raise our voices against the weak. Seeing that the second paragraph of the preamble condemns the massacres in Lebanon from 16th to 18th September 1982, I believe that the Assembly cannot fail to mention other massacres brought about by the use of chemical weapons and the destruction of whole villages which have taken place and are still taking place in Afghanistan. It would be quite unpardonable for the Assembly to say nothing about this and to reject my amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

May we have the view of the committee?

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – This is a good amendment. It answers the objection in the debate that not enough is said in the document about Afghanistan and that we were not recommending enough action in that respect. I therefore recommend that the amendment be accepted.

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly has heard the view of the Rapporteur and the fact that he has recommended acceptance of the amendment. I shall therefore put it to the vote. I am sorry to give members all this physical exercise of getting up and down, but I did not draft the twenty-eight amendments.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 6 is agreed to.

Congratulations Mr. Cavaliere.

The next amendment is Amendment 7 by Mr. Cavaliere:

7. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "aimed at" to the end of the paragraph and add "solving the problems which now constitute obstacles to the re-establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East;".

With this we may discuss also Amendment 10 by Mr. Dejardin:

10. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after "applying" insert "United Nations resolutions on the Palestinian question, including".

If Amendment 7 is carried, Amendment 10 will not be put to the vote; if Amendment 7 falls, I shall put Amendment 10 to the vote.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – The action to be supported should not be directed solely to the application of Resolution 242 but to all the other elements and all the other aspects of this complex question which relate to the restoration of lasting peace. I feel that my wording is more complete.

The PRESIDENT. – Will Mr. Dejardin now move Amendment 10? Apparently, Mr. Dejardin is not here, so he cannot move his amendment.

Does anyone wish to oppose Amendment 7?...

No. I therefore ask for the opinion of the Rapporteur.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – I think that the text as it stands is precise and has something specific to say, whereas Mr. Cavaliere's amendment seeks to be more general and vague. I think it better to leave the text as it is, with the mention of Resolution 242. Otherwise, there would be no record of our opposition to the establishment of further Israeli settlements, and the recommendation should record that opposition. I therefore recommend that the amendment be rejected.

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly has heard the view of the Rapporteur.

We will now vote on Amendment 7.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 7 is negatived.

Amendment 10 is not moved, so we come to Amendment 23 by Mr. Blaauw, as follows:

23. In line 2 of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "the" insert "present, internationally-recognised".

I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – It is obvious that all foreign forces have to be withdrawn from Lebanese soil, but with the existing wording there is a possibility for the Syrian Government to rely upon history and say that they are in Lebanon not at the request of the Lebanese Government but on behalf of the United Nations as a kind of peacekeeping force. To circumvent this possibility, I propose to insert after "the", the words "present, internationally-recognised" and then continue with "Lebanese Government". Then, there would be no problem in relation to the Israeli forces and the Syrian forces.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Blaauw.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I asked for the floor to speak against because I think that there is a risk of creating some confusion. The American, French and Italian troops went to Lebanon at the request of the government of that country, because the situation was one of urgency and because the United Nations was not in a position to deal with such an emergency. But our government also expressed the view that it would have been better if there had been no gap and the United Nations had been able to intervene as such.

The Security Council can of course adopt measures which, at a given time, may not coincide with the views of the individual governments. As this is a resolution which only the Security Council can implement I would not wish us – and this is only a hypothesis – to exclude the Security Council.

The PRESIDENT. – What is the opinion of the committee?

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – This amendment is really unnecessary. There is no problem over the present Lebanese Government. There is a recognised Lebanese Government. We do not go around referring to the present, internationally-recognised Italian Government. We refer simply to the French Government or the Italian Government. Another objection is that the amendment could exclude the possibility of a future government. By referring to the present government, it could exclude the possibility of some future Lebanese Government. For both those reasons, I suggest that the amendment be rejected.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Reay.

I now put to the vote Amendment 23.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 23 is negatived.

We have made good progress, and I should like to thank all concerned for their co-operation in the rather difficult task of getting through a large number of amendments.

I propose that we do not proceed further tonight but that we begin tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock with Amendment 15 in the name of Lord McNair. I hope that that will be convenient. If there were an overwhelming wish of the Assembly to meet at an earlier hour and if anyone wished to move accordingly, I would consider it. Otherwise, I declare the debate adjourned.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 1st December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia (Resumed consideration of and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 927 and amendments).
2. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1983 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Document 932 and amendment).
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 – the Auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 926 and addendum).
4. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1982 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft opinion, Document 933).
5. State of European security (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 936 and amendments).

I hope that this evening members will also table any amendments that they want to be considered in tomorrow's business, so that they can be circulated and available in the morning.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I am sorry to interrupt at this point, but I did not hear what you said about the tabling of amendments. Could you repeat it? There is too much noise.

The PRESIDENT. – I have asked members to retain order in the remaining minutes of the sitting. I was expressing the hope that, if there are further amendments to the budgetary matters in particular, they will be tabled at the earliest possible stage so that they can be prepared and considered early tomorrow. Obviously, there is more time for the amendments on the other reports and although, for self-evident reasons, I would not wish to encourage

The President (continued)

the unnecessary tabling of amendments – we do not lack them normally – it is helpful to get them into the office in time for them to be duplicated. This enables members to consider them in good time. I hope that any amendments relating to the substantial and important budgetary business will be tabled tonight or first thing tomorrow morning.

Are there any objections to the proposed orders of the day?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.55 p.m.)

Lord McNair (continued)

moment for me because it may enable me to start this morning with a winner. I cannot believe that anybody can possibly oppose this amendment.

Paragraph 4, unexceptionable in itself, says that we should recommend that the Council should "supply humanitarian aid to the Lebanese people". Of course, but why stop with the Lebanese people? Lebanon is full of voluntary agencies which are doing their best to supply humanitarian aid to other people as well. There are, for example, two hundred and thirty-seven thousand Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA, and an unknown number who are not registered with UNRWA; and UNRWA itself has told us after a careful count that it believes there are sixty thousand of these people who are homeless. So surely we extend our humanitarian aid to anybody in Lebanon who needs it.

The reason for the wording of my amendment – "all foreign minorities in Lebanon" – is simply that there may be other groups of people of whom I am ignorant but who need humanitarian aid. Surely we must extend it to anybody who needs it without any discrimination on grounds of race, religion or anything else.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose this amendment?...

May I have the view of the committee?

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – Clearly the amendment is well motivated. I do not believe that it is the intention of the committee that any group within Lebanon requiring aid should be excluded. Perhaps there is no danger in it. One wonders, on first reading the phrase, what is meant by "foreign minorities". However, Lord McNair has explained it satisfactorily. The committee has not had the opportunity of considering this. I would not expect there to be any opposition.

The PRESIDENT. – You have heard the Rapporteur say that he does not know the view of the committee because the issue was not put before it, but that personally he has no objection to the amendment.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 15 is agreed to.

I have already pointed out that members should vote only if they are inscribed on the register, either as representatives in their own capacity or as substitutes duly accredited for today's sitting.

I now ask Mr. Dejaradin to move his Amendment 11:

11. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "to complete" to the end of the paragraph and insert "and to publish in full the conclusions of the inquiry into the massacres at Sabra and Chatila".

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – The wording of the last sentence of paragraph 6 seems to me rather obscure in recommending the Israeli Government to complete the inquiry into the Beirut massacre.

Our recommendations are addressed not only to the Council of Ministers but also to the general public. The public, however, is well informed about the Sabra and Chatila massacres. Are we implying that there is something else? That a huge general massacre took place in Beirut and that an inquiry other than the one by the Israeli Government commission is going on? I would like the recommendation to be more precise.

As to the inquiry itself, it is, as far as I know, well on the way to being completed. What one should ask of the Israeli Government, therefore, is to publish the conclusions of the commission of inquiry into the Sabra and Chatila massacres in full. Let me repeat: these are events known to the public, on which it is therefore possible to express an opinion. That is why I would like them to be referred to explicitly, although I am not opposed to an additional reference to other events or inquiries currently taking place.

That is the reason for Amendment 11.

The PRESIDENT. – If there is no one seeking to speak for or against the amendment, I will ask for the view of the committee.

Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Dejaradin has made a good case for his amendment. It would involve leaving out the reference to the completion of the inquiry, but I do not think that it is necessary to call for that. Obviously, it will be completed. It is probably a good thing to refer to the massacres at Sabra and Chatila in terms rather than more generally by speaking of the Beirut massacre. For those reasons I recommend acceptance.

The PRESIDENT. – I put the amendment to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 11 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment 24:

The President (continued)

24. In line 3 of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add "call on the Lebanese Government to complete their inquiry into the Beirut massacre and to publish a full report on the inquiry".

I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – It is useful and necessary to have the results of the inquiry being held in Israel. It is important to know who is responsible for the massacre and the extent, if any, of the Israeli involvement. We have adopted an amendment, which I fully support. There is an inquiry being held by the Lebanese Government and since the Israeli inquiry cannot question citizens of Lebanon it is important that we know the story from the other side of the border, in Lebanon. That is why I move the amendment asking the Lebanese Government to complete the inquiry and publish the findings.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Blaauw.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – If I say that we do not wish to accept the amendment I do not intend to suggest that we differ from Mr. Blaauw. Factually I do not believe that the Lebanese Government are holding an inquiry. They have announced that they have arrested some Lebanese citizens. My most recent information is that the Lebanese Government feel that since they were not in being at the time and the area was under the control of the Israeli forces – whoever was responsible for the massacre – under the terms of the Geneva Convention the forces in control of an area are responsible for what happens. We await Israel's report. I ask Mr. Blaauw not to press his amendment because it asks the Lebanese Government to complete an inquiry which they have not undertaken to conduct. I have asked about it in the last three or four days and I do not see how today we can call on a government to complete such an inquiry. Perhaps later when the Israeli inquiry is published, we can tell the Lebanese Government that they have an obligation to conduct an inquiry. The amendment is not realistic. I am not making a moral judgment about who was responsible for the massacre, but just stating the facts.

The PRESIDENT. – There seems to be some dispute about the facts. I shall permit Mr. Blaauw to make an observation before the vote.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – Opinions differ. I am told that the Lebanese Government did not start an inquiry so we cannot ask

for a complete report. The Chairman of the committee and I differ in our opinion and therefore I should like to press the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on Amendment 24.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 24 is agreed to.

The next amendment is Amendment 16:

16. After paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

"Remind the Lebanese Government of its obligations under the universal declaration of rights towards those whom it has arrested or detained;"

I call Lord McNair.

Lord McNAIR (*United Kingdom*). – Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the recommendation mention the people detained by the Israelis. That expresses a genuine interest. It is not propaganda. We are interested in everyone who is deprived of liberty. It is not disputed that the Lebanese Government have arrested many people. In the gentlest possible way I seek to remind them that they have obligations toward the people whom they have deprived of their liberty.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – On the face of it no harm can be done by reminding any government of their obligations under the universal declaration of rights. There will be unanimity about that in the Assembly. The danger of such an amendment is that it implies that the Lebanese are in dereliction of their obligations. That must be clear to them and to many others. We should not need to remind any state or authority of its obligations unless we suspect that there is dereliction, or have evidence of it.

We should be careful when making such moral observations about the government of a country which has been appallingly and horribly victimised by the influx of enormous numbers of Palestinian refugees. As a result, the country has been torn apart by war and large parts of its territory have been laid waste or destroyed.

I have enormous sympathy for the Lebanese Government in their task of reconstruction. This is not the appropriate time to make such observations to the Lebanese Government,

Mr. Grieve (continued)

although on the face of it there seems to be no objection. I oppose the amendment and I hope that the Assembly will oppose it because of the appalling ordeal to which the Lebanese people have been subjected through no fault of theirs.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Grieve.

Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – We are in some difficulty because of the previous vote. If the previous amendment had not been carried, we might have been prepared to accept this. We have called on the Lebanese Government to complete an inquiry into a matter for which they are not responsible. The amendment again picks on the victims. We seem to be forgetting who is to blame. We can blame the Palestinians, the Syrians and the Israelis but the victim is certainly Lebanon. To call on the Lebanese Government twice shows that we have our priorities wrong.

The amendment would cause offence to a country which is doing its best under appalling conditions, which include foreign occupation. The Lebanese Government have little ability to act in the way that they might wish to act. Most of Lebanon is occupied by a foreign army and is likely to be so for several months. We should not ask them to do this when all they want is to be left alone.

The PRESIDENT. – I shall put the amendment to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 16 is negatived.

We now come to Amendment 17:

17. Leave out paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper and insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Request the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

- (i) urgently to study the feasibility of removing from Lebanon all Palestinians who are willing to leave and of transporting them, without prejudice to their eventual destination, to any countries willing to receive them, and
- (ii) to implement such a plan if found to be possible,

while nevertheless reaffirming its belief that eventually a Palestinian homeland is both inevitable and desirable;”.

Lord McNair.

Lord McNAIR (*United Kingdom*). – I spoke yesterday about the thinking behind the amendment. Many members who are in the hemicycle today were not present yesterday, but I cannot repeat my arguments. I draw attention to two important qualifications. The first is contained in the words: “all Palestinians who are willing to leave”. There is no suggestion of a Stalinian mass deportation of people who do not want to move. We are simply throwing a lifeline to people who can grab it if they wish.

The second important qualification is in the phrase “without prejudice to their eventual destination”. All that means is that in the great homeland controversy the amendment is neutral. It is not for the moment meant to be a substitute for the final settlement of the dispute. I hope that I have made that clear by adding, since the matter was considered in committee, that the Council should nevertheless reaffirm “its belief that eventually a Palestinian homeland is both inevitable and desirable.” That is my opinion and it was certainly the opinion of the Chairman and the Rapporteur.

I have pushed the idea in various forums and, as time goes on, it is gathering support. From experience, I can tell you from where the opposition comes. It is usually opposed by people who are so determined to have a PLO-dominated sovereign state on the West Bank tomorrow, or sooner if possible, that they do not mind how many more martyrs are created in the process. We already have too many martyrs. I prefer my Palestinians alive.

Moreover, if we consider the entire recommendation, we are not giving the Council very much to do. The paragraph that I wish to replace tells Council members to demonstrate their belief in something. What will they do when they reach that paragraph? Will they adjourn their solemn meeting, pick up their placards and march seven abreast down the Avenue du Président Wilson or will they smile at each other and move quickly to the next paragraph? I have enough respect for the Council to believe that it prefers to have something to think about.

You will no doubt be told that this amendment was rejected in committee by seven votes to five. In other words, the committee barely had a quorum. This Assembly is not a rubber-stamp organisation. Each member has his own judgment that he should use. If you are the people whom I believe you to be, colleagues, you will support this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord McNair.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – This amendment is full of pious hopes and vain liberal wishful thinking. The proposal is impotent because it uses phrases such as “request urgently to study the feasibility”, “willing to leave”, “without prejudice” and “nevertheless”. If they are willing to leave, there is nothing to study, because they will go anyway. That has never been the problem. We have never had, nor can it be envisaged immediately, the homeland that Lord McNair wishes us to reaffirm. The sentiments are fine and noble but they are hopelessly woolly. I do not commend them to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – It is unfortunate that Lord McNair tried to interpret the motivation of those who opposed the amendment, including the majority of the committee at the Council of Europe. This is his third, fourth or fifth bite at the cherry. The motivation for the opposition is not that which he ascribed to anyone in this Assembly – the creation of martyrs in order to force a return to the West Bank. The motive for voting against the amendment in the past, apart from the lack of reality to which Mr. Wilkinson referred, is that it is inhumane to move people who have already been moved forcibly, exiled, driven and harassed, to yet somewhere else.

It is all very well to say “remove them if they are willing” but, as Mr. Wilkinson said, if they are willing to move, they will find somewhere and do so, whatever the Secretary-General says.

It is pathetic that those unhappy people are going back to the West Bank. It is their only home and they are trying to build something for themselves in the massacred villages. To suggest now that we shall support their removal is inhumane. I do not like the word “removal” in relation to human beings. We could have made available every facility, but the Lebanese made it clear that they would be only too ready to help those people. However, the amendment implies that they must be moved elsewhere. That is rather cruel, because they have nowhere else to go. One of the most pathetic pictures that I have seen is those people trying to build huts in villages that were destroyed because they are their only home. For those reasons, not those put forward by Lord McNair, after a long debate the committee rejected the amendment. I hope that, for humanitarian reasons, the Assembly will support the majority vote in the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – I did not infer that Lord McNair was making improper allegations about

members of this Assembly. If I had, I should have called him to order.

We now come to the vote on Amendment 17.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 17 is negatived.

We now come to Amendment 8:

8. After paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Call for the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan;”.

Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Amendment 8 proposes the insertion of a new paragraph in the draft recommendation proper.

As there is already a call for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories, we believe that the Assembly, in order to avoid appearing weak and compliant towards the strong, should reiterate the call for the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan. It may be asked what purpose this might serve. My view is that by so doing we shall be confirming a stand taken earlier by this Assembly and that such confirmation is useful, regardless of what results our demands may produce.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

Mr. Vecchietti?

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I do not think that any parallel can be drawn between the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

If, therefore, Mr. Cavaliere is prepared to delete the adjective “immediate” from his amendment we shall vote for it. This qualification makes the withdrawal of the Soviet forces harder rather than easier, and this is not what we want, as we said in the documents for our congress of the biggest communist party in the western world.

But if Mr. Cavaliere insists on retaining the word “immediate”, which I repeat has a negative and not a positive effect for the Afghan people, we shall vote against.

The PRESIDENT. – I am not inclined to accept amendments to amendments. These amendments were tabled yesterday, and members have had plenty of opportunity to table amendments in writing, so I cannot accept draft

The President (continued)

amendments. The amendment will have to be voted on as it stands.

May we have the opinion of the committee, please?

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – This point is not entirely ignored in the recommendation as it stands, because the fifteenth paragraph of the preamble says that the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is “a serious violation of the Charter of the United Nations”. However, I do not have any objection to the amendment. The committee did not consider it in those terms.

The day before yesterday the United Nations made exactly this demand for the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Perhaps it is not so bad a thing if we include this amendment in the recommendation proper. For that reason, I am happy to recommend its acceptance.

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly has heard the speeches for and against the amendment and the views of the committee. We will now vote on Amendment 8.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 8 is agreed to.

We come to Amendment 25:

25. Leave out paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper.

With this we are taking Amendment 27:

27. In line 1 of paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “Government” and insert “régime”.

and Amendment 9:

9. In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, after “connection with the Afghan Government” insert “and to assist the Afghan resistance movement”.

I shall ask the movers of each amendment in turn to propose their amendment and I shall then put Amendment 25 to the vote. If that is carried, the other two amendments fall. If it is defeated, I shall then put each in turn.

Mr. Bassinet.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – My Amendment 25 seeks to delete paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation which seems to me illogical.

Everyone agrees that the Afghan Government exists only because of the occupying army. Consequently, if relations are to be

broken off, the break should be made with the occupying power, rather than in any relations with the Afghan Government, which has no legitimacy of itself. Now, nobody is suggesting breaking off relations with the Soviet Union. I really cannot see what could justify breaking off relations with the Afghan Government, whose only good and loyal support is an occupying army.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Bassinet.

I now call Mr. Wilkinson to propose Amendment 27.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – The term “government” in this context is the most monstrous misnomer. The Babrak Karmal régime – that is the word I would insert – was put into power by the naked use of military force, subversion and intimidation by the Soviet Government. Without the intervention of the Soviet armed forces and the murder of Hafizullah Amin, the present régime would not be in power in Kabul. That régime does not even control the countryside, which means that it does not control about three-quarters of Afghanistan.

Since all the member countries of WEU have no diplomatic relations with the régime in Kabul, we should not call it a government but a régime. Then there would be no suggestion that the country has self-determination, which is what we seek for the Afghan people.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson.

I now call Mr. Cavaliere to move Amendment 9, which will be put to the vote if Amendment 25 falls.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the purpose of my amendment is to remind the Assembly that, when our disapproval was livelier and more vehement, we adopted a recommendation which, with the Soviet forces still in Afghanistan, called on our governments to help the resistance movement and even to supply arms. Now that we are discussing the whole problem again, it would be right and proper to add that the Afghan resistance should be assisted as long as the Soviet occupation continues.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

Does anyone wish to speak against any of the three amendments?...

Mr. Dejardin?

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I oppose Mr. Cavaliere’s amendment.

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

What is commonly referred to as the "Afghan resistance" is made up of widely differing interests. There are of course democratic resistance fighters, but there are also people whose purpose is to maintain feudal privileges. As much as I am disposed, out of ideological commitment, to support resistance fighters struggling for the freedom of their people and for democracy, I refuse to accept some kind of amalgam which would mean helping those who are defending feudal privileges that have nothing to do with human rights and freedoms. That is why I oppose this amendment. I repeat that the Afghan resistance includes different movements which, moreover, do not always agree among themselves.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

Are there any other speakers against?...

May we have the view of the committee on all three of these amendments?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I will do my best to reply to all three comprehensively. The committee was unanimous in debating a paragraph of this sort. Earlier criticism, which we have tried to redress, was that too little of the report dealt with Afghanistan. I hope that we will not, therefore, remove a whole paragraph, because that would mean even less devoted to this subject, and it would completely upset a unanimous agreement reached after much argument. Therefore, it was very strongly the view of the committee that we should not remove a fundamental paragraph dealing with one facet of the Rapporteur's report.

Coming next to Mr. Wilkinson's amendment, I have considerable sympathy with him. I am making no accusation of typographical errors when I say that I believe that it was the intention of certainly most members in the committee to refer to the Afghan Government as a "régime", because that is what we do in all our reports when there is in existence an authority which is not recognised. Certainly, in my mind and my conscience, as I believe with everyone else, it was thought of as being a régime, because it is not just a matter of Western European countries not having recognised it. With the solitary exception of the Soviet Union and its most intimate satellites, the whole third world, the whole non-aligned world, has refused to accept that there is an Afghan Government at the present time. I would hope, therefore, that the committee would accept what I would regard as almost a drafting mistake, because I do not believe that there was one member of the committee who intended to refer to the Afghan Government with a capital "G" as

something that was generally recognised. Certainly, I would favour acceptance of Mr. Wilkinson's very small but very factual and deserved alteration which does not alter the principle at all.

Turning to the next amendment, Mr. President, you have asked for the opinion of the committee and I have to give it. My view in committee was in favour of Mr. Cavaliere's concept but I have to tell him that when he left, after a long debate which went on much longer than any of the others, a compromise was reached in which we did not call for assistance to be given to the Afghan resistance movement. As Chairman, therefore, I can only say – as I have tried to do when it was the other way round – what was the view of the committee. There was a majority vote in the committee. Obviously, nobody here is tied by it but nevertheless as Chairman – and the Rapporteur felt the same as I did – we took a responsibility for accepting a consensus and although I am not urging one way or the other, I have given the view of the committee. The Rapporteur and I feel that in those circumstances we should abstain without any attempt to bring pressure on anybody, having merely reported the facts as they were.

The PRESIDENT. – I have now to put the three amendments. If Amendment 25 is carried, the other two will not be put. If it is not carried, I shall put first Amendment 27 and then Amendment 9. The committee recommends that Amendment 25 be rejected and Amendment 27 accepted for the reasons given; and in the case of Amendment 9 some compromise appears to have been reached which apparently does not include this amendment.

We vote first on Amendment 25.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 25 is negatived.

We now vote on Amendment 27.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 27 is agreed to.

Finally we vote on Amendment 9.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 9 is agreed to.

We come now to Amendment 28:

28. In paragraph 9 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "financial" to the end of the paragraph and add "and technical

The President (continued)

assistance to Pakistan and food aid to Afghan refugees”.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I believe that this is a much more important amendment than it may seem at first sight. After this amendment paragraph 9 of the draft recommendation would read:

“Increase member countries’ financial and technical assistance to Pakistan and food aid to Afghan refugees.”

This amendment conveys much more precisely the intention of the original paragraph 9, because in practice it is not feasible, nor do I believe that it is even right, for member countries of WEU to transmit financial assistance to refugees. That never has been the practice nor would there be the infrastructure to transmit non-military technical assistance to refugees.

What refugees require, of course, is food aid, and this amendment would ensure that food aid was available to Afghan refugees wherever they found themselves. In other words, the refugees in Iran would at least be eligible for food aid under this provision and not merely the Afghan refugees in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province in Pakistan.

This amendment also recognises the financial and technical burdens which the Government of Pakistan itself has to bear to meet the needs of the refugees. It is a considerable financial burden to support the three million or so refugees in the Frontier Province and Baluchistan. The infrastructure is overstrained and non-military technical assistance is required by Pakistan to meet that infrastructural support which is necessary for the welfare of the refugees. In short, this is a more precise and more accurate and therefore ultimately a more helpful amendment for the refugees themselves.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?

Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – While I have no objection to encouraging food aid to any refugees, Afghan or otherwise, I must express strong reservations about financial and technical assistance to Pakistan. Pakistan is far from being a democracy, and human rights are not guaranteed. Mr. Zia’s régime has no connection with the principles of democracy which we defend here and at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.

The wording “financial and technical assistance by member states to Pakistan”, without further explanation, opens the door to all sorts

of things. Let us not forget there has been talk of a Pakistani atomic bomb. Weighing up the pros and cons, I am forced with regret to conclude that the balance is negative, and I therefore oppose the amendment as formulated.

I would be in favour of food aid to refugees. Unfortunately, I cannot accept the term “financial and technical assistance” in the case of an undemocratic country like Pakistan.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

May we have the opinion of the committee?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – The amendment conveys the feeling of the committee. Those of us who have been to the camps appreciate that there is simply no way in which the refugees living on the ground and in tents can be directly assisted. Mr. Dejardin is allowing his imagination to run away with him. As I have seen for myself, Pakistan is having to keep these people alive and to undertake vast new irrigation plans so that the refugees can continue to live without clashing with the local tribesmen whose grazing land has been utterly destroyed by the influx into a poor area of between three million and four million people. Pakistan administers this aid only within the ambit of the relief bodies, including the International Red Cross, which have all reported that they are having complete co-operation from the Pakistan Government, both in technical matters and in food aid. Pakistan is still making itself responsible, out of its small exchequer, for providing about one-third of all that is necessary to keep alive the three-and-a-half million refugees. It is not in anyone’s mind to think about providing facilities for them to have an atomic bomb. I regard that as going rather beyond the concept of the report. Speaking for the committee, I think that the amendment is better in the light of what has happened. We recommend the acceptance of the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 28 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 28 is agreed to.

We come to the final amendment, Amendment 12:

12. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 10 as follows:

“Should either of the belligerents not agree to negotiations, envisage restrictive measures, if not an embargo, on deliveries of military equipment, arms and munitions to either of the belligerents, Iran or Iraq.”.

Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President it is impossible to report on European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia – a new name to me – without dealing with the problem of the Iran-Iraq conflict in the recommendation proper. This is why I have tabled Amendment 12.

I had the choice between a brief, meaningless formulation and an expression of my basic conviction. I realise the first alternative would have been acceptable to most if not all members, while the second was less likely to receive similar support. However, true to my usual practice, I have preferred to state my position frankly.

In the Iran-Iraq conflict we have a heavy responsibility. In the debate last January on repression in Iran, Mr. Garrett, referring to this conflict, said that if we western countries stopped supplying arms and ammunition to the belligerents, who have no war industry of their own, the fighting would stop for lack of arms and ammunition. If it continues, it is because it provides the arms merchants of Europe and elsewhere with an extremely attractive market.

Our choice is between the private interests of a few individuals and the moral interests which it is our constant duty to defend here in this Assembly. I therefore propose that, unless the belligerents agree to negotiations, our member countries should stop supplying them with military equipment, arms or ammunition, since they reject peace and prefer to go on massacring both troops and civilians, which means, in the final analysis, their own youth.

Mr. President, what I find a little disturbing is the absence from the recommendation of any reference to the Iran-Iraq conflict and our uncritical acceptance of an immoral situation in which we pretend to ignore a conflict that is taking a heavy toll in human lives.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment recommending the inclusion of additional paragraph 10?...

If not, I will ask for the opinion of the committee.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – I cannot recommend acceptance of the amendment. It represents a completely new idea that has not been discussed in the committee or dealt with in the report. It would not be right for us to adopt such a sweeping amendment on the spur of the moment without having a more thorough study. I do not believe that many of us know who is supplying what arms to whom. For that reason, if no other, I would not recommend acceptance of the amendment.

Further, if we were, without any proper study and quite superficially, to reach a conclusion of

this kind, one of the consequences would be that the belligerents would be forced, at a stroke of the pen, to be wholly dependent on supplies from other sources. That might not be at all desirable for European influence in that area. I cannot see the advantage of accepting the amendment, but I see dangers in it and accordingly recommend its rejection.

The PRESIDENT. – I will put the amendment to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 12 is negatived.

That concludes our consideration of the amendments.

We now vote on the draft recommendation as a whole, as amended.

Under the rules, all of our votes are by sitting and standing unless there is a demand for a roll-call vote. I have had no such demand.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

Mr. Vecchiotti, do you wish to speak?

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I wish to explain my vote. In committee, I voted for the text submitted to the Assembly. I have abstained solely because a number of amendments have been incorporated which, rather than helping towards a political solution for delicate questions, are liable to aggravate a situation which we reject and with which, as everyone knows, an essential part of the documents is concerned.

Let me state quite clearly, therefore, that we are in favour of the original text and that we have abstained solely because of a number of amendments which are not for peace but quite the opposite.

The PRESIDENT. – I see no other member wishing to intervene, so we shall proceed to the next order of the day.

4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1983

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration
and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 932 and amendment)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs

1. See page 31.

The President (continued)

and Administration and vote on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1983, Document 932 and amendment.

I call Mr. Adriaensens.

Mr. ADRIAENSENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the budget before the Assembly amounts to about 14,000,000 French francs for the financial year 1983, an increase of approximately 14 % over 1982.

The budget includes some new expenditure, for the creation of a new A3 post, the alignment of the remuneration of the Clerk of the Assembly with that of the Clerk of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the upgrading of a B3 post to B4.

The creation of an A3 post figured previously in the draft budget for the financial year 1981 but was not accepted by the Council. The comment at the time was that “the grade A3 post is to allow a young official to be recruited to assist committee officials in their work. The fact that only one grade A official is assigned to each committee makes it difficult for the Office of the Clerk to fulfil its tasks.”

Difficulties resulting from the prolonged absence due to illness of several grade A officials within the Office of the Clerk have shown how essential the creation of this new post is.

Similarly, the 1981 budget also asked for the remuneration of the Clerk of the Assembly to be aligned with that of the Clerk of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. It seems only fair that the Clerk of our Assembly should have the same conditions of employment as the Clerk of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, of which we are also members.

As for the other budget heads, the only increases have been those necessary to cover the predicted percentage increase in the cost of living.

So far the Council has been unable to let us have its unofficial reaction to the budget because the meetings of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee could not be held until very late in the year. We shall not know the Council's decisions on the budget until after the part-session.

I know how much our own countries are seeking to restrict their budgets at the present time and to keep the budget of the co-ordinated organisations to a minimum. I would nevertheless argue in favour of the new expenditure

contained in this budget, and I believe the Assembly will agree that it is necessary for the proper functioning of our organisation. After all, the work of the Office of the Clerk is handled by a staff of no more than twenty-seven, which is minimal in comparison with other assemblies.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Adriaensens.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I want to make a few remarks about the budget for the financial year 1983. I speak not as Chairman of the Socialist Group but as a Dutch parliamentarian. I shall, therefore, continue in Dutch.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). – Mr. President, I will begin by thanking the rapporteurs and the staff of the Assembly for all the work they have done in preparing these accounts. I feel it is now essential for the governments to provide financial proof that they mean it when they say they attach very great importance to the activities of Western European Union and the Assembly. It is equally essential for our Assembly to emphasise that it intends to exercise its budgetary rights. This means that we intend to assume our own responsibilities and not leave it entirely to our governments to decide on and adopt our budget.

This brings me to the only remark I wish to make about this budget. It concerns a matter which we really should settle for ourselves. I am referring to European salaries, or more specifically top European salaries in general, and the salary of the Clerk of our Assembly in particular. As I speak, the statement made by the Dutch Government last week and the ensuing debates in the Lower House are still in the forefront of my mind. The alarming state of the Dutch economy is characterised by a disturbingly high level of unemployment and a very serious public financing deficit. One thing on which the government, the government parties and the opposition agree is that, according to their financial capacity, all Dutchmen must accept a reduction in income of at least 2 %. The government and the majority in the Lower House agreed that, socially, it was completely unacceptable for the lowest incomes to be cut by some 4.5 % or more, while incomes of over 100,000 guilders, equivalent to about 256,400 French francs, should be left roughly as they are. There must be a substantial improvement in the lowest incomes, and the highest incomes must be reduced by a larger percentage than the lowest.

All this encouraged me to carry out the study of top European salaries which I mentioned at

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

the meeting of the Presidential Committee on 14th October. It proved to be an extremely difficult exercise. It is easier to find out how many polar bears there are in Greenland than how high top European salaries are. The study, completed yesterday, revealed the following. The salaries of European officials are linked. The members of the staff of the Council of Europe, Western European Union, NATO, the European Space Agency and OECD are paid on more or less the same salary scale, which is the responsibility of an international committee called the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts. The committee comprises representatives of the governments of the member countries, representatives of the general secretariats of the organisations concerned and representatives of the staff committees of these organisations. The salaries of the staff of the European Community institutions are about 10 % higher than salaries in the other organisations.

What are the results of all the committee's discussions so far? The salary scales run from A1 to A8 in the case of European Community staff and from A7 to A1 in the other organisations. Senior and top-level officials of the European Community institutions are in grades A3, A2 and A1.

Starting salaries are a minimum of 282,038 French francs per annum for an A3 official, 340,070 French francs per annum for an A2 official and 382,910 French francs per annum for an A1 official. On top of this there are all the allowances, and salaries rise substantially with years of service. The tax rate is 0.0 %.

The salary scales in the Council of Europe and Western European Union run from A1 to A7, A7 being the highest grade. The Clerk and the secretaries of committees are in grade A7 and grades A6 and A5 respectively. A distinction is made here between nationals and non-nationals of the country in which the official has to work. In both cases officials receive a separate household allowance.

For purposes of comparison with the salaries I shall be mentioning in a moment, I will first tell you what a minister and an under-secretary, also known as a junior minister, earn in the Netherlands, inclusive of all allowances. A minister earns 171,701 guilders and a junior minister 151,131 guilders. For the purposes of this comparison, I will convert these into French francs. I assume that everyone is interested in these figures. A minister earns 429,252 French francs and an under-secretary 379,827 francs. As I have said, the secretaries of committees are usually in grades A5 and A6. If they are nationals, their minimum

income is 256,829 French francs for grade A5, 293,320 French francs for grade A6 and 321,103 French francs for grade A7. These salaries rise substantially with years of service. The salaries of non-nationals may rise to 346,548 French francs in grade A5, 366,167 French francs in grade A6 and 423,025 French francs in grade A7.

Mr. President, what does all this mean? It means that the secretary of a committee earns gross, that is before tax, more than a member of the Lower House in my country. A member of the Lower House earns the equivalent of 231,025 French francs. The secretary of a committee earns about half as much again as a Dutch member of parliament, who works between 60 and 70 hours a week. It also means that some secretaries of committees earn as much as an under-secretary or minister in my country. There has been no real analysis and comparison of duties, but – with all respect, and I should like to emphasise that – I believe that a junior minister or a minister has far more responsibility and has to work far harder than the secretary of a WEU committee. Furthermore, an under-secretary or minister pays tax, up to as much as 70 %. European officials pay 0.0 % in tax.

There must be a clamp-down on top European salaries. They must be brought more closely into line with the kind of salaries earned in our countries. I call on members to bring this subject up in their national parliaments too.

I should now like to refer to our Clerk. To avoid any misunderstanding, I have a great deal of respect and admiration for him. Nothing of what I am about to say must be construed as a personal attack. On the contrary, I have tremendous respect for him. But I do not see why his A7 salary should be still further increased to the same level as that received by the Clerk to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, who certainly has far more responsibilities. The staff of the Council of Europe is many times larger than that of Western European Union. I think it is unfair and unjustifiable to propose that the salary of our Clerk should be increased by 26,000 French francs to give him an income, including allowances of 424,300 French francs, possibly plus compensation for increases in the cost of living. His gross income, that is before tax, would then be about twice as high as that of a Dutch member of parliament and approximately as high as that of a minister in my country who, however, pays as much as 60 % to 70 % tax, while the Clerk, if I am not very much mistaken, pays no tax at all.

Mr. President, this a question of distributive justice. We must be quite frank about this.

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

The credibility of our Assembly is also at stake. I therefore hope that the Assembly will approve my amendment, which proposes that the Clerk's salary should not be further increased.

Thank you very much, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Stoffelen. You must move your amendment at the appropriate time. Although I do not wish to become involved in the argument, you referred in passing to the House of Commons. It may not be a matter of satisfaction to you, but the salaries of both our members of parliament and our ministers are substantially less now than those in the Netherlands. That may be a little comfort to you.

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall not embark on a critical examination of a difficult budget, but I think some comments are called for despite some initial hesitation on my part because of their possible impact on our Assembly and the Council.

First, we are talking about what is essentially a technical budget bearing on a very small sum, within which it is difficult to suggest a different distribution among budget heads.

Second, all our governments, for very understandable economic reasons, are most anxious to cut their financial commitments to the bone, and consequently to reduce – at least in constant value terms – the budgets of the international organisations to which they contribute. In this respect the French Government is very little different from any other. Prudence and modesty would therefore dictate that I should vote for budgetary documents without comment.

I have nevertheless decided not to maintain a low profile, for reasons which I shall now explain.

The first concerns our budget as a whole.

No one will deny that in comparison with the budgets of other European or Atlantic organisations, ours remains extremely modest. Now, the budgetary problems of the member states cannot always be invoked as grounds for reducing the allocations for our organisation. Indeed, in the long term, such a trend is liable to create an unbridgeable divide between the aims of WEU and the means at its disposal. Our Assembly must be firm in drawing attention to its needs and insist that the means provided by the Council are adequate for its work.

We must be all the more determined, as we are constantly asserting that WEU remains the only organisation with responsibility for defence matters and that we cannot continue to see its budget reduced.

Finally, these budget restrictions may lead to an actual reduction in our means of action and, consequently, in the activity of our organisation. I do not wish to believe that this reflects a concerted or deliberate attitude. Whether one likes it or not, it is budgetary resources which, in the final analysis, express the importance attributed to our organisation. We must ensure that the Assembly's means of action accord with the conception which our governments have of it. Our attachment to the modified Brussels Treaty should lead us to take the initiative and demand from the Council the means necessary for its full application.

In its reply to Recommendation 379, submitted by our colleague and friend Mr. Vecchiotti, the Council appears to respond more or less favourably and more or less clearly to proposals, adopted unanimously by our Assembly at its last part-session, aimed at adapting WEU's activities to the needs of a new international situation. We must not be satisfied with words of good will. Statements must be backed up with the corresponding financial resources.

Our attitude to the budget and, I repeat, our determination in seeking improvements vital for the proper functioning of our Assembly, will carry at least as much weight as adopting a recommendation.

As for our possible activity, need I remind you that there can be no international organisation without a proper secretariat. Now, as Mr. Stoffelen has reminded us, the secretariat of our Assembly consists of twenty-seven persons whose competence and devotion each of us has often had occasion to appreciate.

In this respect, let me once again ask our Rapporteur, Mr. Adriaensens, a question which has been bothering me for a very long time and which does not concern WEU alone. As Mr. Stoffelen has just stressed – and I shall not repeat his arguments, which are very close to my own except for certain comparisons of function and remuneration – it is desirable that we should at last be able to concern ourselves with the careers and remuneration of our staff. Let me remind you that we put this question once before to the Council in 1979, when it replied by stressing the extremely difficult and delicate nature of the research to be carried out at this level. You will find that recommendation, and the Council's reply, in the annex to the budget document. The reply, which has remained without effect and which provided for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to study the problem, dates, I repeat, from 1979.

Mr. Pignion (continued)

We need to reaffirm our wish for a committee to examine both these career problems, and those I have raised with the Bureau, which include questions of career, remuneration and promotion.

The staff of our Assembly constitute a body in which opportunities for promotion are very limited indeed, being restricted to occasions when posts become vacant through the retirement of the oldest staff members. As a result, most, or at least many, of our staff have been at the top of their grade for very many years and can expect no promotion before reaching retirement age.

I regret that the Bureau of the Assembly was unable to give a more favourable response to my requests, particularly the fact that the reply given to me pre-empted the Council's responsibilities and anticipated its attitude. The Bureau itself has no financial responsibility, and I would like the Council to assume its full responsibility in the matter, without our anticipating decisions and likely or possible refusals. If we anticipate refusals our Assembly will be failing in its parliamentary vocation. Moreover, as a socialist, I cannot accept that we should resign ourselves to a policy which allows no opportunity for promotion.

Those are my comments on the budgetary documents before us. I would like them to be accepted, if not this time, then at least in the near future, so that I do not find myself in 1985, six years after its adoption, having to refer again to the recommendation on the prospects, life and career of our staff.

The PRESIDENT. — I pay tribute to Mr. Pignion's great interest in the conditions of our staff. One of the most interesting features of the Assembly, as I said in my opening remarks, has been the long service that we have had from so many of our staff. That will create problems if a great number of people all retire at the same time. If there is so little movement at the top, there are few promotion opportunities unless new posts or regradings are created. All of us will wish to assist Mr. Pignion in his endeavours along these lines if we can.

I call Mr. Enders.

Mr. ENDERS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, in conjunction with this debate I should like to raise a matter which is of direct concern to members. I have been attending sessions of this Assembly for many years. We have had many a high-ranking politician here, we have had major debates, and we have discussed many controversial issues. But the seats, Mr. President, are the most primitive I have ever come across

anywhere. They do not conform to the natural posture of the body. Mr. President, you may have noticed various members holding their sides or backs because the pain has become almost unbearable.

Why is this? The reason is that the design of our seats is completely wrong. The benches are too narrow and so do not give the thighs any support. The desk top is too far away. If you want to write something, you have to sit right forward, and your elbows and forearms are left hanging in the air. The seatbacks do not give any support. In fact, the upper edge impinges on the shoulder blades. In other words our seating is unsatisfactory in every way.

I would also point out that the seats have no arms, so there is nothing to lean on. Hence my very modest request that we should give some thought to having chairs or other seats that are rather better for our posture and for our health.

As regards our health, I must also point out that the stairs leading up here are too narrow, and it would be easy to stumble. Quite a number of members have only just been able to stop themselves falling.

I realise, Mr. President, that we are guests in this chamber. We appreciate the hospitality we receive here. Nonetheless, during our deliberations on the budget, we should consider whether something cannot be done while we are here. Improvements must be made which would help us and perhaps enable us to attend debates longer. More members would then stay in the chamber, and we would not have so many leaving at an early stage because they find it impossible to sit here any longer. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. — We do not have armrests in the House of Commons either, but I do not want to make too much of our hardships.

This is a serious point. This building is made available to us only by courtesy of the French Council to whom it belongs. We incur an enormous expense at each session by installing the interpretation arrangements. One of the difficulties to which I referred in my opening remarks is created by the physical arrangements for our staff, both permanent and temporary. Although Mr. Enders may say that members are not given the comfort they would like, I assure him that the working conditions of our temporary staff are very spartan indeed. I hope that Mr. Ender's plea will be heeded and that more money will be made available to improve these matters, but it would probably mean going somewhere else, if there were anywhere else to go.

The next speaker is Sir Paul Hawkins.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – I was advised that I could make a speech on both documents together. I want to deal first with the document relating to our own budget. I cannot agree with Mr. Enders's last comments because we have to put up with considerably worse conditions in the British House of Commons. I have got used to them. The seating here is considerably softer than I am used to.

I am surprised to find myself in complete agreement with the Chairman of the Socialist Group of the Netherlands. First, Document 932 shows no increase in costs except for inflation and except for the additional post which we, in our wisdom, thought wise to add to the establishment. Here, I must say I believe an additional post was necessary. My very good friend, Mr. Huigens, and others have been ill, Mr. Huigens for a very long time after a serious back operation. We should have one spare person to take charge of committees in that absence.

I dispute the high level of international salaries, without attacking anybody who is one of our very small staff. When it produces a figure for all permanent officials, including secretaries and typists, of about half as much again, and more than half as much again, as is paid to a member of parliament in the British parliament and when the new appointment which I work out at over £32,000 or £33,000 a year is more than our Prime Minister gets, this subject needs consideration. Our parliaments cannot go on appointing people on these high scales, because to do so perpetuates the original inflation of their status and salaries. I do not know anything about the details, but if we are to run this Assembly with the respect of our own parliaments, this aspect must be looked into fast.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Prussen, do you wish to speak?

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – After listening to Mr. Enders, whose criticism is fully justified and appears to meet with unanimous agreement, I propose that one or other session of the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union should be transferred to Luxembourg, where we have a very pleasant chamber at our disposal, with every possible technical facility.

The PRESIDENT. – That is an interesting suggestion but I do not know who would pay the costs of the transportation of all our staff and documents. That is a matter that the Council of Ministers may wish to consider.

Does anyone else wish to take part in this stage of the budget debate?

I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I can say at once that the Italian Communist Group will vote for the draft budget for 1983, despite the fact that we – and not we alone – have quite a number of criticisms.

Furthermore, members of the Assembly will remember that in recent years we have always taken the opportunity to submit proposals seeking to change the budget drafting procedure, just as we have several times regretted the fact that the budget could not be calculated in some way other than a straightforward adjustment for inflation. Nevertheless, we have many times heard speeches here, supported by numerous arguments, alluding to the political value of our Assembly, and to its status as the only political forum in Europe where defence and armaments questions are discussed and leading, therefore, to a call for funds on a scale to match this basic political vocation.

As we know, expenditure is 14.9% higher this year than in 1982, and that almost four-fifths of the total is accounted for by expenditure on staff. I wish to state clearly that I agree with what the Rapporteur said concerning and in favour of the staff. A fresh feature of this budget is that it incorporates new proposals for expenditure amounting to 427,000 French francs. There is a note to the file on this subject which reads: "This proposal is included in the draft budget at the request of the Presidential Committee". These new items have been inserted following a decision of the budget committee of the WEU Council. There is however a further note to the effect that: "if the real increase is less than the estimate, the balance may not be used for other purposes". This means that even these new items do not escape from the old procedures.

Mr. President, I have mentioned these few points showing that our "malaise" is still with us, in order to express the hope, in assembly, that the proposal put forward in committee by the Rapporteur and supported by other members for the holding of a seminar to review WEU expenditure will be approved.

Such a seminar could provide an opportunity not only to raise but also to define and clear away problems and thus to restore to the Assembly its proper political rôle.

To this end, as well as voting in favour, we wish to say that we are prepared to work for such changes.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Martino.

I call Mr. Adriaensens.

Mr. ADRIAENSENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I feel that the answer

Mr. Adriaensens (continued)

of the Rapporteur and Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to the various comments we have heard is very simple. After all, most of these comments do not fall within our committee's terms of reference and must be passed on to the Presidential Committee. I am sure that those who have made these comments will repeat them at the meeting of the Presidential Committee on Thursday afternoon.

As for Mr. Stoffelen, I am convinced that, if we ever need a rapporteur to count the polar bears in Greenland, he will be the right man for the job. He said it was more difficult to find out about the salaries of European officials than to count polar bears in Greenland. Having heard his report, however, I believe he is very well-informed. I should like to make a general comment on this. I do not think this is a matter for the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to discuss, because we are solely concerned with the accounts and the budget. I personally believe that this subject is one that could well be discussed in all our countries. Perhaps it would also be possible to talk about it in the Council of Europe and the European Community, so that our respective governments, who are asking the officials of our national administrations to adjust to the situation, can advocate the same for European officials, but by common agreement.

As regards the officials of WEU, I would merely point out that their salaries would normally have been adjusted to the increase in the cost of living on 1st July 1982. However, this adjustment has not yet been made. I believe that Mr. Stoffelen is also a member of the Presidential Committee, and we can therefore discuss this matter further at the committee's meeting on Thursday afternoon. To conclude, I have one further remark to make on this subject, since we are beginning to make comparisons today. We all know that parliamentarians do not all receive the same salary. A Belgian parliamentarian, for example, has to manage on far less than his Dutch counterpart. We also know that, as an incentive to work for European institutions, officials had to be offered high salaries. Otherwise, no one would have been prepared to undertake this work. But the general problem of adjustment is something for the governments and the Council of Ministers to settle.

We agree with Mr. Pignion's comments on career structure. This problem is considered in greater detail in the report by Mr. Stainton, who will be saying more on the subject in a moment.

I do not think any more need be said about Mr. Enders's statement. That is a budgetary

matter. Perhaps we can ask the French Government to modernise the furniture in the chamber and then wait and see what the answer is.

From Sir Paul Hawkins's speech I gather that he agrees the additional A3 post is necessary. We therefore hope that the Council of Ministers will react positively.

I shall not comment on Mr. Prussen's suggestion that the Assembly meetings might be moved to Luxembourg or elsewhere.

I am very happy that the representative of the Communist Group, Mr. Martino, has also agreed to the budget.

That, then, Mr. President, is my reply to the various statements that have been made. I do not know whether we can discuss Mr. Stoffelen's proposals straight away.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Adriaensens. I thank you as President because, uniquely in this institution, the President is made responsible for the financial accounts of the Assembly. We are grateful to you for the work done by you and your committee.

Sir Paul Hawkins mentioned the serious illnesses of some of our staff. As well as Mr. Huigens – who I am glad to say is making good progress after a long illness – the head of the French translation service, Mr. Mayault, has been seriously ill and is still in hospital. A further senior grade officer, Mr. van't Land, has been ill for more than two years. That has placed a serious extra load on the remaining staff. In expressing on your behalf our best wishes for the recovery of our invalids, I couple with such sentiments our appreciation of the extra work undertaken by other members of staff. I hope that members of Council will note the considerable difficulties, physical and financial, under which we sometimes operate.

We now come to Amendment 1 :

1. Under Head I – Expenditure for Staff – reduce the total amount by F 26,000, the sum proposed to maintain the salary of the Clerk at its present level of grade A7, step 6, plus 1 %.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to begin by clearing up a misunderstanding. In my statement I spoke about European salaries in general. I then referred specifically to the Clerk's salary. I pointed out that European salaries and their general structure are a matter for the Co-ordinating Committee of the Government Budget Experts. I said that top European salaries before tax were even higher than the "high" salary of a member of the

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

Dutch Lower House and as high as or higher than the salary of a minister or under-secretary in my country and, I believe, in many other countries. I said that there was no longer any justification for this. It is a question of social justice.

I therefore began by asking members to raise this matter in their national parliaments. It is inconceivable that a parliamentarian should see something wrong with the incomes situation, lean back, do nothing and say, "My government will do the necessary". I cannot imagine any parliamentarian adopting so passive an attitude.

I then spoke about something which is not primarily a matter for the Co-ordinating Committee but for the Assembly itself. I asked members whether or not they thought that the post of the Clerk of this Assembly – once again, I say this with all due respect – was as arduous as that of the Clerk of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. May I, Mr. President, put this question separately to each member? Do you really think that is the case? Do you know how many members of staff there are here? If I am not mistaken, there are twenty-eight. At the Council of Europe the number is far higher. Anyone who is familiar with the responsibilities of the Clerk of the Assembly of WEU – and yet again, I say this with all due respect – must surely admit that the post of Clerk of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe carries far more responsibility.

What we are talking about here is our budget, for which we are responsible. We have here a proposal on which we must take a decision. This Assembly must vote on a proposal made in the draft budget that a salary which is already extremely high – and I do not begrudge him that in the least – should be further increased by 26,000 French francs. That is why I announced at the meeting of the Presidential Committee in October what I would be doing today. That is also why I found out how the Co-ordinating Committee and my own government stood on this question. I will choose my words carefully: I would be extremely surprised if there was any support for this proposal in the Co-ordinating Committee, and I would be particularly surprised if the Council of Ministers accepted it.

One thing I can say to members: in your own countries you have to explain to people that the economic situation is very bad, so bad that it is generally impossible for incomes to rise. Will you ask yourselves whether you can agree to a 26,000 French francs increase in a salary that is already high and then go home

and tell people again that the economic situation is so bad that they must accept a reduction in their incomes?

(The speaker continued in English)

It is up to us to take any decision on the proposal contained in this document. No one can make a decision for us. I seek leave to alter the amendment so that it reads: "reduce the total amount by 26,000 French francs, the sum in excess of the amount necessary to maintain...".

The PRESIDENT. – It is in order for the Assembly and the Council to determine the grade for staff. The Co-ordinating Committee then determines what salary is appropriate to the grade. Senior appointments are outside the grading system. The Presidential Committee and then the Assembly request the Council to agree that our Clerk should be employed on the same basis as the Clerk to the Council of Europe. The Council declined that request. This year we again asked for that matter of principle to be considered. The amendment proposes that the present position be sustained but that there should be no reduction in the Clerk's salary.

Does anyone wish to speak against Mr. Stoffelen's amendment?...

Mr. Pignion?

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I fully appreciate the argument of our colleague Mr. Stoffelen, but I would nevertheless wish him to withdraw his amendment, because of its very personal nature. I am uneasy about it first of all on the human level. Secondly, it does not correspond to my proposal, which was for a fuller examination.

The personal and individual nature of the measure seems to me contrary to our practice. I fully understand our colleague's reasoning. I do not disagree with the reasoning itself, but I would like him to withdraw the amendment in order to avoid difficulties on the level of personal relations.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Pignion.

It has been made clear that this is not a personal matter. No one wishes any imputations to be made against the Clerk. It is a question of principle, not a question of extra money for the Clerk.

I call the Chairman, Mr. Adriaensens.

Mr. ADRIAENSENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have little to add. This was what the Presidential Committee wanted. It has been included in the draft

Mr. Adriaensens (continued)

budget and was unanimously approved by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. I can do no more than emphasise this. It was what the Presidential Committee wanted. The Assembly has already endorsed the idea. We have simply translated it into figures.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I maintain my amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I put to the vote Mr. Stoffelen's amendment, which proposes that the Clerk's salary be maintained as it is rather than enhanced.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

Mr. GARRETT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. How can we proceed to a roll-call vote?

The PRESIDENT. – A roll-call vote must be requested before the vote is taken and ten members must request it. No such request was made and we cannot decide retrospectively.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Further to that point of order, Mr. President. How can we check that all members were properly signed in? Mistakes occurred yesterday and I was one of those who made a mistake. The vote is so important that we should either have a roll-call or at least ensure that all credentials are right.

The PRESIDENT. – I cannot tell when counting a vote whether all participants have signed the register. A roll-call vote cannot be requested retrospectively. If there had been any doubt about the numbers, I should have insisted on a roll-call. We counted twice and a small majority was in favour of the amendment.

We must now vote on the budget as a whole, as amended.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – You did not ask whether there were any abstentions on the last vote, Mr. President. I should like to abstain.

The PRESIDENT. – I am sorry. Are there any abstentions? There are two.

Mr. van der Werff.

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish to give an explanation of vote. I voted against Mr. Stoffelen's amendment because I felt he had not done enough preparatory work on his argument that there is no balance between the posts of the clerks of the various international organisations. Like Mr. Pignion, I believe that a far

more detailed analysis is needed before we make statements on this subject. Furthermore, I completely disagree with the ideological basis Mr. Stoffelen uses in deciding what is relevant and what is irrelevant.

The PRESIDENT. – The decision can be changed next year if that is wished.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to explain my vote. I voted against Mr. Stoffelen's amendment. I deeply regret that the Assembly committed itself to a vote which I consider to be mean. The salaries of our staff should not be considered against national standards. British members of parliament are probably the least well paid in the world and yet I do not begrudge the salaries of other members of other parliaments.

The PRESIDENT. – Order. You are not explaining your vote, Mr. Grieve, but making another speech.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I am explaining my vote. Salaries should be considered in an international context and against the salaries in comparable institutions. It is wrong that we should demean ourselves, as we have today, by voting to keep the salary of our Clerk lower than the salary of comparable clerks in comparable assemblies such as the Council of Europe. We have perpetrated an act of meanness and I am happy to have voted against it. I deeply deplore what we have done.

The PRESIDENT. – You have misconstrued the vote Mr. Grieve. We were not voting on the level of salaries but on their grading, which is a different matter.

Mr. Stoffelen, do you wish to speak?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – As we all heard, Mr. Grieve insulted me and some other colleagues by talking about a mean act. I cannot accept that. It is up to you, Mr. President, to prevent such accusations.

The PRESIDENT. – I deplore this. I tried to tell Mr. Grieve, but he seemed unwilling to listen, that we did not vote on the general level of salaries but on grades. Although perhaps in Mr. Grieve's opinion such an amendment should not have been moved, it was perfectly within order to move it.

I call Mr. De Poi.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Yes, Mr. President, I have asked for the floor to explain my vote because I consider that the dignity of this Assembly requires that the debate should proceed with limits and terms more appropriate to a parliamentary assembly, in substance as well as in form.

Mr. De Poi (continued)

I consider, in fact, that some of the views expressed by Mr. Stoffelen are contrary in substance to what we all recognise as being the dignity of this Assembly and its status, which matches that of its officials. I do not believe that we can conceive of solving our countries' budget problems by cheeseparing on a few minor items.

This seems to me to be not so much a budgetary matter as a matter of policy and I therefore confirm my vote against.

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly will now vote on the draft budget in Document 932 as amended.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1983 is adopted.

5. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 – the Auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 926 and Addendum)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 926 and addendum.

I call Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur of the committee, to present the report.

Mr. ADRIAENSENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, permit me first of all to thank Miss Cohen and her staff for the manner in which they deal with our financial problems and accounts. Document 926, which is before us, contains the report of the President of the Assembly and that of the auditor for the financial year 1981. The balance of income over expenditure, which amounts to 795,827 French francs, represents a saving of 7.32 % on the revised budget of 10,866,000 French francs.

This saving is due to several factors. First, the fact that one member of staff is on long-term sick leave and his salary is repaid to the Assembly by the insurance company. Second, the promotions from grade A5 to A6 requested as of 1st January 1981 were not approved by

the Council until 1st December 1981, which also resulted in a saving. Finally, the Council did not approve the Assembly's budget until November 1981, which prevented the commitment of certain expenditure.

I therefore ask the Assembly to adopt the following motion :

“ The Assembly,

Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1981, together with the Auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the financial regulations,

Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility. ”

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Adriaensens.

I call Mr. Durant.

Mr. DURANT (*United Kingdom*). – I shall not make a speech but I wish to ask some questions about the provident fund. This matter is explained in the accounts, which have been approved by the Comptroller and Auditor-General of the United Kingdom, Mr. Gordon Downey.

As I have not given notice of the questions, I shall understand if I receive full replies to them later. How many people remain in the provident fund? When will that number become zero because of retirements and people dropping out? Will there be any difficulty at the end of the provident fund because it may be short of money to protect the few people left in it? That is often the problem with a declining pension fund. Will it be possible to transfer members from the provident fund to the main pension fund, or are there legal difficulties?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Durant.

I call Mr. Stainton.

Mr. STAINTON (*United Kingdom*). – I shall try to answer Mr. Durant's questions. I cannot answer them in detail but I can at least point the way. When the pension fund was created in 1974, staff in the co-ordinated organisations could decide whether they wished to validate their years of service and enter the pension scheme or to validate only part of their years of service and thereby remain in the provident fund. They could also choose to maintain their money in total in the provident fund.

I hope that my distinguished colleagues will understand that crude numbers will not suffice in reply, because there are two separate categories – those who remain wholly within the provident fund and those who remain in only part of it. However, I have noted Mr. Durant's questions carefully. I am sure that the Comp-

Mr. Stainton (continued)

troller and Auditor-General of the United Kingdom, who signed this document, would have expressed reservations had it been clear that the accumulated provident fund would be inadequate. However, Mr. Durant's question was valid.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Stainton. I agree that Mr. Durant's questions are important and a supplementary written reply will be sought. Unfortunately, I have financial responsibilities here as President. No doubt we can have a discussion when we get the additional information.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

The Assembly must now vote on the motion to approve the final accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 in the addendum to Document 926.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The motion is adopted unanimously.

6. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1982

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft opinion, Doc. 933)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1982, Document 933.

I call Mr. Stainton, Rapporteur of the committee.

Mr. STAINTON (*United Kingdom*). – There is a certain lack of elegance in being asked to address oneself to ministerial organs. It is almost comparable with the embarrassment suffered by a senior minister in the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence who goes by the title Minister of State for Procurement.

I shall try to put these figures into perspective alongside those presented earlier to the Assembly. The total cost of WEU is about £4,000,000 a year, about £1,000,000 of which is devoted to the Assembly itself. Over that, as we have shown in recent voting, the Assembly has a fair degree of control. However, on the other £3,000,000, we are merely invited to express an opinion.

In the remarks prepared with the figures, I have deliberately trailed my coat. In particular, I draw attention to paragraph 9, where I remark that in 1981 the Council undertook a study of the ministerial organs of WEU with the aim of achieving greater efficiency. The outcome of that report has not been communicated to the Assembly. Reference was made to that fact in the draft opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs for the financial year 1981. We can hear the reverberations of that situation currently.

I refer, for example, to Mr. Tanghe's report, Document 875, which was a reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council, wherein Mr. Tanghe concluded with a recommendation questioning the extent to which the controls provided for in Protocols Nos. III and IV should be maintained and the corresponding decisions called for in accordance with Articles II and V of Protocol No. III.

More recently, we have had Recommendation 380 on the basis of Mr. Prussen's reply to the annual report of the Council, in which it is expressly stated as a recommendation to the Assembly:

“Believing that several arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty no longer serve any useful purpose, and noting the Council's view that ‘in applying the provisions of Protocol No. III and its annexes, account should be taken to the fullest extent possible of the evolution of the situation in Europe’.”

May I accost you, Mr. President, with your own words when you opened the Assembly on Monday? You then remarked, among a number of other interesting observations:

“Also I believe we have to consider whether all the organisations and functions set up in 1954 are appropriate today.”

We are struggling against this background of lack of communication between the Council of Ministers and the Assembly, in particular in regard to the future of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, and the work load of the Standing Armaments Committee. I am sure that, were another year to elapse without a comprehensive communication from the Council to you, Sir, in your rôle as President, there might be the same rather heated exchanges when that event again comes around.

The additional memorandum which appears with my report has to do with WEU staff. In this context, I should like to thank Mr. Pignion – I am sorry that he has departed – for his remarks. Within international bodies such as WEU the retirement age is sixty-five, irrespective of sex. There is a good argument in

Mr. Stainton (continued)

any event for flexibility and I should have thought, given the background of unemployment throughout Europe, that an imperative was placed upon the Council of Ministers perhaps to consider reducing the age to sixty.

Observing the connection with experts employed by the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments, my impression is that most of these people join the staff on contracts for the rest of their careers. They are frequently recruited having served in high positions in the armed forces of their respective nations and already have pensions from their previous employment. They join WEU, in terms of one of those two agencies, at respectable levels of salary, attracting full pension rights.

Given the question marks which are already over those two bodies, it must seriously commend itself to the Council that, instead of engagement for the rest of their careers, thought should be given to fixed-term contracts only, perhaps for three or five years, when these people are so recruited, if indeed we shall need more in future.

I hope that those few brief remarks will precipitate an interesting debate.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Stainton.

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have read with great interest the opinion drawn up by Mr. Stainton on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, and I have noted a number of rather unfortunate elements.

Perhaps it is because my country is currently providing the Chairman-in-Office of WEU that I feel myself less bound by constraints of etiquette in stressing the Council's apparent lack of interest in the opinions published by the Assembly, particularly on the subject in hand. I am very sorry if I am causing distress to any of my colleagues, but I sometimes have the impression that the Council and the delegates of the ministers consider the Assembly as a toy for the parliamentarians to play with and do not accord it the importance due to a parliamentary assembly.

Admittedly, we have no right of sanction over the executive. And more's the pity, for it deprives us of a power of persuasion of a different order to that conceded to us at the present time.

I read in Mr. Stainton's opinion, with reference to Recommendation 340 on staff careers,

adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1979, that "the Council considered our conclusions with great interest" but that, according to paragraph 3, "there have been no developments since".

The Council thinks our reasoning is correct but that we are not competent enough to deal with this matter; it alone is sovereign and has the necessary intelligence to deal with such matters. However, it does not follow up the Assembly's arguments with any practical action. That is highly regrettable for the very reputation of our parliamentary Assembly, composed as it is of parliamentarians responsible to their national parliaments, their own electorates and their own public.

Mr. President, essentially I am concerned less with the Council's lack of attention to our work than with the fundamental problem of the issues causing concern to the staffs of the co-ordinated international institutions. It is perhaps the case that, at WEU, too few staff members are aware of their potential power, and do not dare to undertake industrial action. However, in another assembly, the Council of Europe, we have already had work stoppages, and according to my information the staff of WEU feel no less concern.

Of course we know that our governments are extremely careful about expenditure on the financing of international organisations. No doubt the 1983 budget does not reveal this, but with our experience as politicians and administrators at various levels we can easily anticipate that, unless there is a budget supplement the year 1983 could witness restrictions and cuts. Now, everyone knows that the easiest way out is to make the staff bear the brunt of such cuts.

I am not seeking to defend high salaries, since I am basically concerned with the situation of the lower grade staff. Is it true or not that there is a latent threat, for example, to the staff's expatriation allowances?

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to end by referring to the vital rôle which we representatives of democratic countries recognise that the various trade-union organisations play in the age in which we live, in 1982. I find it surprising to note, in international institutions, a continued reluctance on the part of the employer to engage in consultations, not to mention negotiations, with the organisation that represents the staff of the institution. That is why I have devoted the essential part of my speech precisely to the right of those working in our institutions to negotiations or, at least, consultations.

The PRESIDENT. – Before calling Sir Paul Hawkins I should like to welcome the United

The President (continued)

Kingdom Minister of State, Lord Belstead, who is to address us this afternoon. He has come to get the flavour of the Assembly. Lord Belstead, we welcome you and thank you for coming in for part of this morning's session. I had hoped we might have got on to the more interesting question, from your point of view, of the state of European security. I would like to say how much we welcome your presence and how much we are looking forward to hearing you speak shortly after the luncheon interval.

I call Sir Paul Hawkins.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). — Thank you, Mr. President, for calling me yet again on budget matters. Document 933 is more important than the last document, which created so much heat. The two are linked and as Mr. Stainton has taken away the only joke I had about “ministerial organs”, and looking into them, I will omit that. I believe that these ministerial organs are out of date and should be radically changed. I am convinced that considerable savings could be made to the benefit of this Assembly so that some of the money saved could be spent on our Assembly's work.

To comment on the factual and very restrained — I think rather too restrained — Document 933 by my colleague Mr. Stainton, may I say at once how glad I am that Lord Belstead is present. No doubt he will take some words back to the Council of Ministers because I was going to address my remarks to the ambassadorial bench which I thought was getting very thin.

I am glad to hear that somebody will take words back to the Council of Ministers, because it is clear that 75 % of total WEU expenditure is on these three organs, as they are called, the Secretary-General's office in London, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments. I understand from Mr. Stainton's document that for years, although charged to do so, this Assembly has not commented on the ministerial expenditure. I congratulate Mr. Stainton on his courage in doing so, though hampered in the extreme, I believe, by lack of detailed information. I have no idea of how the Secretary-General spends the £1,000,000 plus, or how his staff of forty-eight employ themselves. We have in this building only twenty-eight staff. We have no details of the Secretary-General's expenditure.

To concentrate for a few minutes on the Armaments Committee and Agency, in passing, as Mr. Stainton has said in paragraph 7 of his report, we do not have access to the auditor's report or the final accounts. Here again the problem is emphasised. We just do not have the information upon which to base praise or

criticism. I urge the Council of Ministers to trust us more and give us information about how these bodies spend the money and what work they do. We know what is laid down in the Brussels Treaty and the protocols, but are they not somewhat out of date today? Even in this particular case, with no information, even the most trusting person like myself feels slightly suspicious.

I also draw attention to what Mr. Stainton says in his report, that he has not even had reported to our committee the outcome of the 1981 ministerial investigation. I do not charge those bodies with extravagance, because Mr. Stainton states in paragraph 4 that they have kept within the inflation rate, although I understand that he could not believe the facts when he first found them; but the inflation rate, horrific though it may have been during the past decade, was correct. However, I again criticise the lack of information. It is unbelievable that we should still have roughly the same structure for bodies that we created twenty-five years ago. Is it right that the Brussels Treaty and protocols, if I am correct in my information, should still be insisting on inspections of weapons and weapons production as if the present good allies still had recent enemies in their midst?

So I urge the Council of Ministers to give us the facts and figures. Let them tell us how they spend their money and say whether the work of their organs is vital today, or whether they are just a home for retired military personnel.

Could not this money be spent more usefully, possibly in co-ordinating with us and, recalling the debate we had yesterday about the peace movement, in trying to explain to sincere young men and women who are dedicated to peace, as we are, the facts of life about Russia and their aims, seeking to explain what happens to people behind the iron curtain, and how weakness by peace-loving democracies brought about Hitler's war from 1939-45 and all the horrific consequences? That expenditure, if it could be saved from the ministerial organs, in conjunction with them, could be spent on exposing some of the evil people who have gained control of certain movements in our democratic country. They have infiltrated their ranks, not only with ideas but with money, from far away.

I am sorry to hear, Mr. President, that you will shortly be leaving your post. I think that we have all been delighted to have you preside over our deliberations in the past two years. Yours has been a benign, gentle, yet guiding hand that has been of immense benefit to WEU. You would earn our undying gratitude if, in the time left to you in your high office,

Sir Paul Hawkins (continued)

you would insist, badger and pin-prick the Council of Ministers to come clean, to reorganise their organs – a terrible phrase – and give us the facts on which to base future budget debates.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Paul, for your kind personal remarks. I shall make it my business to ensure that all members of the Council of Ministers are aware of your pointed comments which, I think, merit a reply.

Mr. Durant.

Mr. DURANT (*United Kingdom*). – I shall not delay the Assembly long, because Sir Paul Hawkins has said most of what I wanted to say. I rise to support Sir Paul and Mr. Stainton.

It is interesting to note that 76 % of the total cost of WEU is accounted for by the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments. We know little about them and their work. What disturbed me was Mr. Stainton's remark in paragraph 13 which says:

“Whilst it can be argued that it must be left to governments to decide whether they consider that after more than twenty-five years of existence the structure of the organs of WEU is satisfactory, such a view must severely curtail the effective comment of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.”

I am a member of that committee and I feel powerless to ask questions and thus to know what goes on.

I believe that it is time that this Assembly had a discussion, a meeting or a report on the work of these two committees so that we know what they do, where their expenditure goes, whether they are up to date and whether they need revision. It is not unreasonable, after twenty-five years, to ask such pertinent questions. To sit on the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration with the ability to carry out such a limited degree of examination makes it almost a waste of time.

I support Mr. Stainton's work and was alarmed very much by his comments in paragraph 13, which have summarised most of my anxieties.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Durant. I call Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – This is an age of economic recession throughout the democratic world and pressures are on governments, particularly governments who send members to WEU and the Council of Europe, to cut back, hold, and to stop increased expenditure. It is understandable because economies

are being practised in the administrations of the various home countries. In this Assembly we are being pressed over some of the work that we undertake as an organisation because, allegedly, of a lack of funds. Yet, as my colleagues have pointed out in their speeches, 76 %, if not more, of the expenditure of WEU goes on the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments. I submit that this is perhaps one of the greatest financial scandals in Europe.

WEU is fully accountable where we are concerned. We are elected representatives; we come here and debate. It has been alleged by at least one member that the Council of Ministers does not take too much notice of the motions that we pass. However, we fulfil a rôle and in my view make an important contribution by way of expression of opinion on some of the most vital issues of the day vis-à-vis defence and the security of the free western world. We do not know what these organisations do, where the money goes, or anything. We are not talking about small amounts of money. We are talking about an administration that is colossal in comparison with the tiny cadre of people who operate WEU in this building.

This morning we have had an embarrassing debate on the salary of the Clerk. I regret that. My vote was against the increase, not because I am against the Clerk but because I believe that the whole of WEU finances need reforming. I am against certain increases being made until that is done. It is not the staff of this Assembly that causes anxiety. I had in mind the abuse involving the other two organisations. We hear that many of those appointed to well-paid contracts in connection with those organisations are already persons of some eminence, with good pensions as the result of previous engagements. They are doing extremely well. I say nothing against them personally, because they have proper contracts concluded by member countries and the Council of Ministers presumably has some kind of supervision. If we knew that the rôle of these organisations was relevant and crucial, I would certainly be voting in favour of them.

When I was a member of the Budgetary Committee for a short while, when I first joined this Assembly, I made some inquiries and asked whether the system could be explained to me. I was told: “Well, this was needed immediately after the second world war and today the rôle is rather symbolic.” It is a very expensive symbolism indeed. If I were a German or Italian delegate – those countries were the adversaries of my country and the low countries of Europe during the second world war – I would be deeply offended by the perpetuation of this activity, because we are all allies

Mr. Smith (continued)

today with one common aim – the preservation of democracy and the West against the ever-encroaching challenges of the East.

In those circumstances I am glad that my honourable friend, Lord Belstead, the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, is here because I plan, if I am lucky enough to catch your eye this afternoon, Mr. President, to ask him a number of questions on this subject. I hope that his officials will note that possibility.

I echo Sir Paul Hawkins's sentiments about your excellent presidency, Mr. President. I hope that you can take up the matter. Perhaps in the spring or autumn next year the Assembly can debate the issue thoroughly. We should ask the Council of Ministers to consider that. In an age when we should all be practising economy, it is a travesty that we should have to debate the expenditure of such a large sum. In view of the criticisms that I have heard in the Assembly and outside, I hope that those responsible will take the complaints seriously. As an elected representative of my parliament and as a delegate here I shall not let the matter rest. I shall return to it time and again if nothing is done.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Smith.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

I have said that I shall draw the Council's attention to the arguments. I cannot guarantee what replies I shall receive. I hope that Lord Belstead's lunch will not be spoilt by the threat of the questioning to which he will be subjected this afternoon. British ministers are used to rough usage and I have no doubt that he will cope with the questions.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Stainton.

Mr. STAINTON (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the opportunity to say a few words in conclusion. I welcome the robust contributions from Mr. Dejaradin and from my colleagues Sir Paul Hawkins, Mr. Durant and Mr. Smith. However, in part, they succeeded in misleading themselves. Much data is available in relation to the Standing Armaments Committee and the Council, but it is insufficient to determine efficiency criteria. That is what most interests us.

Increasing symbolism is attached to the Standing Armaments Committee. The embargo on the size of German warships was recently removed. In the listing in Annex IV of Protocol No. III, helicopters are specifically excluded and torpedoes are not mentioned. That does not merely underline Sir Paul's observation about symbolism, but it brings the

whole purpose of the Committee into that much more question.

The reports indicate that Mr. Tanghe's assessment of the Standing Armaments Committee was probably right. Its work load is, indeed, too light to justify the organisation as it stands. One detects a movement in the glacier. I refer to Recommendation 381 which suggests that the Council should invite the Standing Armaments Committee and its international secretariat to assist the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in preparing the second part of its report on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology.

I shall not read out the whole of the Council's reply, but the first paragraph states:

“The Council will consider the Assembly's interesting request to invite the Standing Armaments Committee and its international secretariat, in fields within their competence, to assist the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.”

At least that shows a sign of yielding. The glacial age is on the point of departing.

I took note of your observation, Mr. President, about conveying our views to the Council. On behalf of the Assembly I should like to place on record the request for an in-depth study in the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments by one of the Assembly's committees. I ask you, Mr. President, to draw the Presidential Committee's attention to the contents and the tenor of this morning's debate in the hope that it will endorse our recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Stainton. I thank you for the time that you have devoted to considering these issues. I hope that members of the Council will note that we look forward to the outcome of their considerations. Not only the Science Committee could benefit but other committees may be able to draw on the expertise of the Standing Armaments Committee.

We shall now vote on the draft opinion in Document 933.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The draft opinion is agreed to¹.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. See page 33.

The President (continued)

1. State of European security (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 936 and amendments).
2. Address by Lord Belstead, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
3. The Falklands crisis (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on

Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 935).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.)

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 1st December 1982

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. State of European security (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 936 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Blaauw (*Rapporteur*).
4. Address by Lord Belstead, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
Replies by Lord Belstead to questions put by: Mr. Smith, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Prussen, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Wilkinson.
5. State of European security (*Debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and*
vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 936 and amendments).
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Cavaliere.

Speakers: The President, Mr. Smith, Mr. Pecchioli, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Prussen, Mr. Dejardin, Dr. Miller, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Rösch, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Caro, Mr. Blaauw (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Cavaliere (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Rösch, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Morris, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Cavaliere; (explanation of vote): Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Urwin.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

I also draw the attention of representatives and substitutes to the rules that require them to sign the register before they enter the hemicycle and certainly before they take part in our proceedings either to speak or to vote. Substitutes may take part only if they are taking the place of a representative.

3. State of European security

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 936 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The first order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the state of European security, Document 936 and amendments.

Many speakers have been inscribed for this debate and for the subsequent debate on the Falklands dispute. Under Rule 33, I shall exercise my discretion and I propose a five-minute limit on speeches. Is that agreed?...

I do not propose to restrict the time of rapporteurs, but it would meet the wishes of the Assembly if rapporteurs would confine themselves to fifteen to twenty minutes in their opening remarks. The Council of Europe provides a residual half an hour for general discussion. The more time that rapporteurs take to introduce matters, the less time they will have to reply.

I now call Mr. Blaauw to introduce his report.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – This general report from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments follows the tradition established in the first years of the committee's existence, first, I believe, by my own country-

1. See page 36.

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

man the late J.J. Fens and shortly afterwards by yourself, Mr. President, when successive reports on the state of European security would deal with a number of different topical subjects. The present report, in fact, constitutes something of a progress report on the work of the committee over the past year and the conclusions that it has drawn.

In introducing it, I start with the last chapter of the explanatory memorandum, where the committee refers to recent speeches by SACEUR, General Bernard Rogers, stressing the importance of conventional defence. Since the committee's report was adopted, General Rogers has returned to his theme in his speech to the North Atlantic Assembly on 19th November. I think General Rogers has a most important message, but in trying to put it over he has the unfortunate habit, shared by too many senior military commanders, of trying to persuade his public audience into supporting a necessary defence effort by overstating the nature of the threat. Speaking in London, General Rogers said:

"Considering threat capabilities, NATO now faces imbalances of more than two to one in virtually all areas of force comparison. Soviet military spending consumes about 14 % of its gross domestic product, well over twice the percentage of GDP which... the United States devotes to defence."

This is an oversimplification of the present situation.

We would really have to be managing our affairs extremely badly if, as General Rogers claims, NATO faces imbalances of more than two to one "in virtually all areas of force comparison".

There are, of course, well-known areas where NATO has an advantage and, as the committee's report points out, apart from submarines, the naval comparison is still advantageous to NATO.

This brings me to the second chapter of the committee's report which describes the constraints, particularly the geographical constraints, within which the Soviet naval forces have to operate, and a likelihood therefore that a "surge" deployment, both of submarines and of surface vessels, to the open oceans would almost certainly have to be attempted by the Soviet Union if ever it were to contemplate hostilities involving naval warfare. It is for this reason that NATO maritime surveillance in peacetime, carried out with little publicity twenty-four hours a day and every day of the year, is of such importance to defence - it can surely provide valuable warning time of any

premeditated naval attack. The committee's conclusions are in paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation before the Assembly which stresses the importance of combining all surveillance resources, of remedying shortages of maritime patrol aircraft and of retaining in service adequate numbers of properly balanced naval forces which must include modern diesel electric submarines and frigates.

The third chapter of the committee's report draws on information gathered by the committee, or by myself, during recent visits to Iceland, Canada, Denmark and Portugal, and, I might add - although the committee's report does not mention it because the visit was now more than a year ago - to Luxembourg.

I shall not take the Assembly's time by repeating the information in the report. In paragraph 3 of the recommendation, the committee stresses the need for all allied countries to maintain and improve the defence effort. While General Rogers's call for a 4 % annual increase in defence spending in real terms every year until the end of the present decade is unrealistic in the present economic climate, there are countries, including some with a relatively high income per head of population, whose defence expenditure is well below the average for NATO and WEU.

The pattern is illustrated at Appendix III to the committee's report. Although the committee appreciates the contribution which, thirty-seven years after the end of World War II, Canada is still making to allied defence in maintaining an armoured brigade and three squadrons of aircraft on the mainland of Europe, we cannot fail to note that that country devotes a smaller proportion of its GDP to defence than any NATO country except Luxembourg, although it is among the four wealthiest in terms of income per head of population.

Paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation also calls, of course, for the active pursuit of arms control negotiations in all forums. The committee has covered these fully in two reports by Mr. Mommersteeg and Mr. Vohrer to the spring session and intends to report again on nuclear arms control negotiations at this time next year, but I draw attention in passing to Mr. Andropov's speech to the Soviet Central Committee on 22nd November when he said:

"But let no one expect unilateral disarmament from us. We are not naïve people. We do not demand unilateral disarmament from the West. We are for equality, for consideration for the interests of both sides, for honest agreement. We are ready for this."

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

I can assure the Assembly that the committee will follow very closely the development of East-West relations in arms control in the course of next year.

I note too that, since the report was adopted, the Portuguese Parliament has adopted the laws on national defence and on the armed forces, the latter on two occasions as the constitution requires for it to enter into force, because of President Eanes's intervening veto. As the report points out in paragraph 3.30, the legislation defines more clearly the authority of the Ministry of Defence over the armed forces and it is expected that reorganisation of the army in particular will lead to its reduction to twenty-six thousand men from its still inflated size inherited from a colonial era. This necessary reorganisation will release more funds for modern equipment, but Portugal is a far from wealthy country and will continue to need the help of certain allies for much-needed re-equipment.

The committee hopes that it will be possible to undertake its postponed visit to Spain in the autumn next year. The visit was postponed because of the Spanish elections. When, in due course, the armed forces of that country are brought into the NATO structure, there will be a significant enhancement of the allied conventional capability.

Lastly, Mr. President, the committee's report draws attention to the priority given by France to its nuclear weapons programme, although the trend in NATO is to stress the importance of conventional defence. I was particularly struck by the frank speech of the French Minister of Defence, Mr. Hernu, when he addressed this Assembly yesterday, when he explicitly took a different line from General Rogers, saying:

"In view of the disparity between the conventional arsenals, it would hardly be realistic to dream of upsetting the existing balance of forces in this area. Under these circumstances nuclear deterrence has been and still is the best instrument for preventing conflicts, as has been the case for over thirty years."

Nevertheless, I welcome the strong public endorsement which Mr. Hernu has given of the double NATO decision of December 1979, and his insistence on the need to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles if the negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union fail to correct the severe imbalance in this field. The committee will certainly examine in more detail the conflicting phrases of Mr. Hernu and General Rogers in its report next year.

Not to forget my own national tongue I conclude by saying something in Dutch.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). – It is essential that a balanced defence be designed to prevent war in general, not just nuclear war. The prevention of war therefore means the elimination of all kinds of imbalances, and there is a great need for this at all levels. One of these levels is maritime surveillance, which is discussed at some length in the report. If a potential enemy has the impression that his armed forces somewhere in the world are being watched in some way by a possible future adversary, this acts as a kind of deterrent – an obstacle to be overcome when he is deciding whether or not to go to war. Maritime surveillance is a form of deterrent, at a low level perhaps, but it is a level which we must not overlook and to which we must constantly pay attention.

Of course, there is also a train of thought as regards deterrence between armed forces, countries and groups of countries, concerning the balance between knowing and not knowing. One form of deterrence is the fact that one does not know precisely what one's potential adversary is doing or what weapons he may have available at the moment. But we should continue with maritime surveillance so that we may be sure what a potential enemy can and cannot do at sea. Conventional deterrence naturally forms part of the deterrent. This is partly what General Rogers said in his speech. A flexible response means being able to respond at all levels. It means being able to respond adequately to a conventional attack, to a conventional threat, without having to resort to military means at too early a stage. A flexible response must not only have military credibility; it must also be credible to the general public.

Mr. President, I should like to refer to another part of the recommendation, namely defence spending. At the moment, asking for money for defence in the various countries is not popular. Asking for more money for defence is certainly unpopular. Nor will you find any such request in the committee's recommendations. But now that expenditure is under pressure, now that it is logical for the unemployed to question defence spending, the committee feels there is a need to improve understanding of this expenditure by providing adequate information. The public must also be shown that this money is being spent properly. People must appreciate that we shall be discussing within NATO – and, of course, in the narrower context of WEU – the best way of spending this money on the tasks to be performed at both national level, as between the various branches of the armed forces, and international level.

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

In fact, the committee itself pointed this out during its visit to Portugal. If Spain becomes a full member of NATO, if Portugal restructures its armed forces, should the same rule apply, so that a contribution is made to army, navy and air force, or should there be concentration and specialisation? This is a good moment to discuss these matters, so that even people who dissociate themselves from it come to accept defence as right and logical.

Another point that WEU and NATO bring out but that always goes wrong is that we should reduce our expenditure by standardisation, so that our requirements are the same and we can have co-operation between our defence industries. It is a pity that the initial co-operation on certain projects is now being stopped because countries insist on their own national policies. I take this opportunity to make an urgent plea against this ruinous course.

The PRESIDENT. – We have noted your desire, Mr. Blaauw, to conclude your speech in Dutch, although certainly I admire your fluency in English. It recalls an instance when it was mandatory for all Frenchmen to speak French. An American general in Berlin tried to learn French but after some months his French compatriot who spoke perfect English said: “You have done very well and have worked very hard but I really cannot stand your French any more. I wish you would talk English again.” It is very nice to have such multilinguists as yourself, Mr. Blaauw, in our Assembly.

**4. Address by Lord Belstead,
Minister of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
of the United Kingdom**

The PRESIDENT. – I now have great pleasure in calling the British Minister of State, Lord Belstead, who in the British Government has taken on the particular responsibilities – I hope that they are not too onerous for him, he has so many other duties – of looking after our interests in Western European Union and who has come to address us. He has taken the first opportunity since he took his position to do so, although some of us will remember that at short notice he deputised with great competence for Douglas Hurd, whom we all remember, when we had the joint meeting between our committees and the Council of Ministers last summer. It is a great privilege to call Lord Belstead to address us. He has kindly undertaken to answer questions at the end of his speech. Lord Belstead, we give you

a warm welcome and I invite you to come to the rostrum.

Lord BELSTEAD (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I am honoured to have the opportunity to speak now after the important opening speech of Mr. Blaauw on the subject of the state of European security, a speech that I enormously enjoyed but that I cannot emulate in two different languages, for which I must apologise.

Thank you, Mr. President, for your kind words of welcome. Although this is my first visit to the Assembly, I know that the way in which you have presided has been much appreciated. A politician must be a man for all seasons. As a former Secretary of State for Defence in Britain you have demonstrated your qualities of determination and resolution. You are also kind and wise and I acknowledge the success of your presidency, and I know the warmth of feeling for you among members of the Assembly.

It is right that in this historic city we should, for a moment, pause and remember the enormous historical importance of WEU and the Brussels Treaty. This Assembly represents the first organisation to be established to maintain the collective security of Western Europe. With malice to no one and with threats to no one, the founders of WEU determined to unite to defend the cause of freedom, and their vision has been fully justified and has been realised in the success of NATO in keeping the peace for nearly forty years.

Also this is the only European parliamentary forum empowered by statute to address defence matters. This is of great importance and will continue to be so. But it is also important to be realistic about the aims we pursue here. Recommendation 365 was right to acknowledge that “for greater effectiveness the material organisation of collective defence is undertaken in the wider framework of the North Atlantic Council and the Independent European Programme Group”. We cannot consider collective defence adequately without giving full weight to the contribution of the United States.

If I have understood correctly the views expressed in the Assembly in recent years, the Assembly now believes that, twenty-eight years after the Brussels Treaty was modified, the time has come for some adaptation. The message which emerges from Recommendations 365 and 380 is that the political situation has evolved since 1954 and the Assembly therefore questions, for example, the need to defray so many of WEU’s limited resources on checking on member governments’ armaments. This was a point made by Sir Paul Hawkins this morning.

Lord Belstead (continued)

Checks on armaments data lie at the heart of arms control negotiations with the Warsaw Pact, but the records of the member states of WEU are not closed books and I am sure that it is right that the Council should be giving careful thought to Recommendation 380.

In the preamble to Recommendation 380, the Assembly urged that WEU should be adapted to the needs of the 1980s. With this the Government of the United Kingdom agree. However, I do not mean to imply support for complete revision. For one thing, the United Kingdom Government, along with our European partners, regard the mutual defence commitment in Article V of the Brussels Treaty as of fundamental importance. It is a commitment that uniquely expresses our support to each other as Europeans.

I think also of the particular commitment of my country to maintain forces on the continent of Europe. I should like to take this opportunity to emphasise that the United Kingdom will remain true to its commitment to keep at least fifty-five thousand troops and RAF Germany on the continent.

A series of editorials in *The Times* has recently advocated a change in British strategy that would lead to a reduction in BAOR. We should not believe everything we read in the newspapers. I can say unequivocally that the British Government reject those arguments that ignore three elements in our current strategy.

The first element is the straight military fact that there is no adequate substitute for forces on the ground on the central front. BAOR and RAF Germany are in the right place for the forward defence of Britain and the alliance as a whole. If anyone seeks to argue the case on grounds of cost, I tell you that to return forces to the United Kingdom and to house and train them with all the necessary support would cost more than maintaining our forces in Germany.

Secondly, the need for the future is not to reduce our forces on the central front but to modernise them to enable them better to give a bloody nose to any thrust from the Warsaw Pact. That is why BAOR is being reorganised into three strong armoured divisions.

Thirdly, those who believe that the military operations in the South Atlantic may lead to a major shift in British defence strategy are wrong. The Falklands experience taught us a great deal, but it was achieved without drawing British forces away from Germany. The focus of British defence policy will continue to be the Soviet threat and our commitment to NATO, and so to the Brussels Treaty, remains as firm as ever.

I should congratulate Mr. Lemoine on injecting into our agenda the idea of an Assembly study of pacifism and neutralism. I also congratulate Mr. Lagorce on his excellent report. I am happy to say that most of the conclusions in his paper are welcome to the United Kingdom Government, particularly the stress on the need for disarmament negotiations to be directed towards a balanced and verifiable reduction of armaments which should not jeopardise but enhance the effectiveness of the deterrence policy, which has preserved peace in Europe for forty years.

When we can limit and reduce forces in a way that will genuinely calm fears about one side attempting to steal a march on the other, when we can limit forces in such a way that each side is confident that the other can be made to stick to an agreement, and when an agreement gives each side the right to maintain forces of virtually equal size, we shall have taken an important step to maintain and improve our security. Arms control agreements that close off new avenues of potential military expansion and greater expenditure would be useful. If they achieve this result and also enable us to cut back the numbers of existing weapons, they are doubly welcome.

The current negotiations in Geneva and Vienna are important. The West's proposal in the INF talks for a zero option, in which neither side would have any of the intermediate-range land-based missiles in question, must surely be the safest outcome. If the latest Soviet news agency reports about policy on "launch-on-warning" are to be taken at face value, the Russians would be taking a dangerous and irresponsible line. Over the last five years the Soviet Union has attempted to drive a wedge between the United States and Western Europe by holding the latter but not the former at risk from INF missiles stationed well back in the sanctuary of the Soviet Union. The Russians are desperate to preserve that menacing position. In the START talks we also see most welcome United States proposals for reductions in current levels in strategic nuclear systems focusing on those that offer the greatest threat to continued stability, the intercontinental ballistic missile forces. But it is not just in nuclear weapons that the West has taken the lead in pressing for disarmament.

We continue in Vienna to try to persuade the Warsaw Pact countries to agree to far-reaching cuts in conventional forces in Central Europe and in July this year the West put forward imaginative new proposals designed to overcome some of the obstacles which the eastern bloc said made further progress unlikely. We still await a positive response from the Warsaw Pact.

Lord Belstead (continued)

A further initiative that serves as proof of western intentions is the proposal, by France, that there should be a conference on disarmament in Europe. We believe that a series of binding and verifiable confidence- and security-building measures, provided that they apply to the whole of Europe, for which such a conference would aim, would help to stabilise the military situation in any future crisis and help to reduce the chances that the other side could successfully prepare for attack surreptitiously.

When we look at the spectrum of arms control activities and radical western proposals for further arms control, it is clear that the West is in serious pursuit of measures that would aid our security. I underline Mr. Blaauw's valuable report when I say that we shall not lower our guard, but we shall continue to work for greater security through more effective arms control.

Finally, and briefly, because I know that we are debating this subject this afternoon, I should like to say a few words about the Falkland Islands. On 4th November my country voted against the United Nations resolution, sponsored by Latin American countries, but emanating in fact from Argentina. Many of our friends and allies, either by joining us or by abstaining, also declined to support it. I understand that Mr. Hernu yesterday referred to the fact that all Britain's friends in WEU initially supported the sanctions against Argentina imposed through Community procedures. I pay tribute to the fact that all those countries also abstained on this resolution. That solidarity was greatly appreciated in Britain and gave us great encouragement. I realise that in some cases it was not easy for governments to reach their decision.

You will, I am sure, understand our distaste when a country, which only seven months previously had broken off negotiations in the United Nations, called for those negotiations to be resumed as if nothing had happened. I shall say no more about why we and sixty-three other countries refused to support the resolution.

What of the future? It is too early to make any predictions about the Falklands. Our primary task remains that of reconstruction and rehabilitation, of clearing up the mess and repairing the damage caused by invasion. A good start has been made, but much remains to be done, not least in the clearance of the many uncharted mines still scattered around the islands. We shall naturally be consulting the islanders about their own wishes for their political future. But they will need time to recover from the trauma of the invasion before they can

consider calmly and seriously what options they would like to discuss with us.

Meanwhile, we hope that some initial decisions on economic development can be taken in the near future, again in consultation with the islanders.

Lastly, I make it clear that Britain does not consider that the present hiatus in our relations with Argentina should in any way affect our determination to preserve and increase our good relations with the rest of Latin America. I do not believe that these have been seriously affected by the recent crisis. Many countries of the South American region did not support Argentina's unlawful resort to force in pursuit of her claim. We have received many indications of the willingness of many Latin American countries to continue our good relations and to build upon them. This we shall do, in co-operation with our European friends and partners, to the best of our endeavour.

Here in Europe, where for so many years we have faced the possibility of war, let us continue to work for peace. When we witness the fate of ancient civilisations, whose people unwillingly remain within the Soviet orbit, we have no option but to remain ever vigilant. But at the same time we must continue to work for a mutual reduction in armaments, upon which can be based a more assured and lasting peace. In WEU, together, we are able to pursue these questions, upon which so much depends for our future, and I thank you for enabling me today to address the Assembly. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly's response shows how much we appreciate your contribution, Lord Belstead. The Assembly also appreciates Britain's full commitment to Western European Union. Britain is unique in that it has specific obligations under the Brussels Treaty. We are indebted to Lord Belstead for coming to address us and for agreeing to answer questions. We realise that ministerial commitments and commitments to the second chamber in Britain – I shall not refer to that as the House of Lords – mean that he must leave shortly after four o'clock. We appreciated that he came to listen to our debate before lunch. He was one of the few representatives of the Council of Ministers to listen to the Assembly's strictures and we hope that he will ensure that notice is taken of them. I invite questions.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – In his excellent speech the minister referred to the heavy cost and outdated symbolic nature of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments. He heard members criticise them this morning.

Mr. Smith (continued)

Will he definitely undertake to raise the matter in the Council of Ministers to try to bring our practices up to date and to save taxpayers' money?

Lord BELSTEAD (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – My answer to Mr. Smith's question is "Yes". The Council considered the matter carefully and I assure Mr. Smith that the issue will be raised, if not by someone else, by me. I referred to the matter on one aspect of expenditure in my speech. I know that the Council will consider it when it discusses the three main areas of Council expenditure.

The PRESIDENT. – I remind my colleagues that a Western European Union rule states that all decisions of the Council, unlike the Assembly, must be unanimous. That sometimes presents problems. We are putting a great deal of money on your powers of persuasion, Minister.

Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister rightly paid tribute to the support that Britain received during the recent unhappy Falklands episode. We need not go through all the reasoning that led us to receive such gratifying support, not only on self-determination but on the rule of law, in both the Council of Europe and here. The recent vote at the United Nations and Britain's approach to the matter is not understood generally as much as it is in Britain. Would the Minister elaborate on those points, not so much for the benefit of his British colleagues but more generally, as the United Nations is a much wider forum than WEU?

Lord BELSTEAD (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Mr. Hernu was good enough to say yesterday that solidarity with Britain on this issue extended to an abstention by Western European countries on this resolution. Perhaps it would not be too tedious if I replied to Sir Frederic Bennett's point quickly. I can speak only for Britain, but I suspect and expect that the feeling extends to all the countries that took such a view. The two main reasons why the resolution was unacceptable are embedded in the principles of the non-use of force and the right to self-determination. The resolution refers only to the de facto ending of hostilities in the South Atlantic. The Argentine Government have never said definitely that that government ended its case with the conflict. That is not a good basis upon which to restart negotiations.

As to the principle of self-determination, the British Government believe strongly that the

people of the Falkland Islands – there are only a few and they have never raised their hand against other people – should be allowed, in freedom and in peace, to decide their future. The resolution contains an offhand reference to due account being taken of the islanders' requests. That is very different from Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, which talks about the sacred duty of countries such as Britain, which is responsible for the Falkland Islands, to ensure that the interests of the people are paramount.

If one reads the resolution carefully and can decipher the references to previous resolutions, it is clear that what Argentina means by "negotiations" are negotiations to ensure that Argentina has sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. Britain believes that to be a pre-determination of negotiations and we shall not enter into such negotiations.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Prussen.

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, for some time now people have been questioning whether WEU's existence within Europe and within NATO serves any purpose. I intended to put certain questions to the Minister on this subject, but his speech was so clear and objective, and so well argued, that they no longer seem necessary.

However, I have another question to ask him. What is the position of the British Government in regard to the proposal by senior French ministers to review present European defence and give it a more European character?

Lord BELSTEAD (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – It would be impertinent for a representative of the British Government to comment on the statements of French ministers. I am content to say that the British Government will consider with the greatest interest any opinions expressed by members of the Assembly about Mr. Hernu's speech, as with all other speeches made here. Of course the British Government welcome everything that the French Government have done and their important contribution to the security of the free western world.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – As did many of my colleagues in opposition, I deplored the Argentine aggression and supported the dispatch of the task force. Lord Belstead is aware of my question. Paragraph 5.17 of the report on the Falkland Islands, which we shall consider later, mentions a matter that has received no publicity in Britain. It is certainly not covered by official secrets legislation. The

Mr. Hardy (continued)

paragraph states that before the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands, Uruguay...

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – Paraguay.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – The paragraph has been corrected. I am most grateful for my colleague's assistance, but the country was Uruguay, which was involved in joint naval exercises with Argentina and which learnt of the impending aggression. Uruguay asked whether the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands wished to leave before the invasion.

Would Lord Belstead shed light on this matter before we proceed to our debate? When was that information first obtained by British forces? Has that information been passed to the Franks Commission and will it be considered by that commission? Will the Foreign Office be prepared to make a full statement about this matter in the United Kingdom, since we should not have heard about it here first?

Lord BELSTEAD (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I have journeyed from London today to face a formidable question from a member of the House of Commons – a question, however, of which Mr. Hardy was good enough to give me notice before we came into the chamber this afternoon.

I have four observations to make in reply. First, as the report fairly says, this statement is derived from press reports. Therefore, I think that those responsible for the press report itself must be asked where the information came from. I should be extremely surprised if it were possible in some strange way for the Uruguayan navy to send a special naval signal to the people of the Falkland Islands on the date apparently recorded in that press article.

What is certain, however – this is my third point – is that the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, has spoken in public about the first occasion when she was aware that an invasion of the Falkland Islands was on the way. As everybody knows, the Prime Minister has now given evidence to the Franks Commission, sitting in London, about all the events leading up to and contributing to the crisis.

We must now wait for the final answer to Mr. Hardy's question until the Franks report is produced, which I understand is intended by the end of this calendar year.

The PRESIDENT. – Perhaps I should explain to those who are not fully familiar with the Franks Commission that it is a committee headed by Lord Franks who has been appointed by the British Government to examine how and in what circumstances for Britain the Falklands

crisis arose. It has taken evidence from many quarters and we look forward to its report in January.

Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – In his speech and later, in reply to a precise question from Mr. Smith, Lord Belstead said that he will raise with the Council of Ministers the question of reducing expenditure on the Agency for the Control of Armaments – and the idea of some savings met with some applause.

Now, if there is any real intention of strengthening WEU, which we are continuously hearing praised to the skies as the only institution with responsibility for defence questions, does not the Minister believe that the problem is more complicated and that what must be put to the Council is the need to restructure WEU completely, including both the Assembly and all the Council bodies, in such a way as to provide it with the means required for it to work more and more effectively?

The PRESIDENT. – Order. Mr. Cavaliere, you must ask a question. The Minister may miss his plane because of the length of your contribution.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Does he not think, for example, that the location of the Secretariat-General in London represents a dispersal of effort and that concentration in one place might really break down all the barriers which now separate the Council and Assembly of WEU?

I put the question to draw attention to the fact that the problem is more complex and not limited to that of the Agency.

Lord BELSTEAD (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – As I said, the Council is giving careful thought to this important proposal that we should carefully consider how money is spent – a matter on which I heard important speeches at the end of this morning's session. Mr. Cavaliere understandably asks whether this means looking into the structure of WEU. I in no way depart from what Mr. Cavaliere said, because in my speech I ventured to give one example where it is right, I think, for the Council to be looking – as it is – at the effect of Recommendation 380 of this Assembly. Therefore, I do not disagree with Mr. Cavaliere.

As to whether it would be right geographically to remove the secretariat from London – indeed, to remove the presence of the Assembly from here in Paris – that is a matter for the Assembly and for the Council of Ministers. All that I can say on this interesting as well as happy day for me in this beautiful city is that

Lord Belstead (continued)

on personal grounds I should be the first to be sad if the Assembly did not continue to meet in Paris.

I should also be the first to be extremely sorry that when I leave I shall miss the important debate on Mr. Cavaliere's report on the Falkland Islands, which I have read with great interest and which I admire for the clarity of its views.

The PRESIDENT. – I greatly regret that you have to go, Minister, because you have all the makings of a good member of the Assembly – not least in the diligence of your attendance since you have been here. I agree that the headquarters issue needs to be thought out if anyone gives any thought at all to the future of this organisation.

I now call Mr. Wilkinson to ask the final question. I know that, being a reasonable man, he will simply ask his question without giving the history of it beforehand.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I thank Lord Belstead for recognising the mutual defence commitment in Article V of the Brussels Treaty, but would he think a little more deeply about what Mr. Smith said about the arms control mechanism? Would he please put to his fellow members of the Council the fact that that mechanism should represent the evolution of our alliance as it is now rather than past antagonism? Having lifted the limitation on German naval armaments, could the Council now allow Germany to show its strength in political and military terms? In other words, could we get away from the restrictions on German armaments, because German arms commitments are crucial to the alliance and will be increasingly so?

The PRESIDENT. – Before I ask the Minister to reply, I would make clear that he is in no position to reply on behalf of the whole Council but naturally will give his own personal opinion, which I hope and suspect will not be dissimilar from mine; but of course he is not here speaking on behalf of the Council. This must be the last question, as the Minister's plane has to leave shortly.

Lord BELSTEAD (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – As this is my last answer in the Assembly this afternoon, Mr. President, and as you were kind enough to make some generous remarks about my being well-fitted to be a representative in the Assembly but you did not explain why you thought that, my mind went to an aphorism that I once heard, which was that the sign of a perfect parliamentary answer, at any rate in the British Parliament, was that it

added nothing whatever to what had already been said. I shall not, however, follow that line, because my answer to Mr. Wilkinson is that of course it is for the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on this issue to make clear its own views and wishes. However, I hope that in my speech this afternoon I made clear where the heart of the British Government lies on this matter.

The PRESIDENT. – Lord Belstead, I have said that we would have liked to detain you not only for the rest of the day but for tomorrow because you have the makings of an excellent member of the Assembly. We are extremely indebted to you for giving us the views of the British Government and at the earliest opportunity participating fully in the work of the Assembly of WEU after being given by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom responsibility for WEU affairs. We recall with pleasure the competence and willingness you showed in May last year immediately you were given this charge. You came to us in Lancaster House and performed with great distinction. We are much indebted to you and we warmly hope that you will continue to play in the Council the part that we expect, having had the almost unique opportunity among your ministerial colleagues of hearing the views of the Assembly on the shortcomings of the Council. We hope that you will see that those shortcomings are brought to their notice. We thank you very much and wish you bon voyage.

5. *State of European security*

*(Debate on the report of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments
and vote on the draft recommendation,
Doc. 936 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the debate on the important report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the state of European security and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 936 and amendments.

I remind those who were not here that in their absence we passed the resolution that all speeches on this report and on the report on the Falklands be limited to five minutes. Mr. Smith has asked for only five minutes. Those who have asked for ten minutes will have their time reduced to five minutes.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I shall be extremely brief but I wanted to make a short contribution having participated in the committee discussions on Mr. Blaauw's interesting report. On the first day of this Assembly we

Mr. Smith (continued)

debated the rôle of the peace movements and the difficulties that they pose to our member countries. Many speeches called attention to the massive nuclear capability of the Soviet Republic. This report by Mr. Blaauw is most useful in calling attention to one aspect of the Warsaw Pact expansionism on armaments, and that is the growth of the Soviet navy. We are fortunate in that Mr. Blaauw has been a professional naval man during his career and understands the rôle of warships of all kinds. His report, which I commend to those representatives who have not gone through it in detail, makes sober reading. There is no doubt whatever that the Soviet navy has expanded to an alarming degree in the course of the last decade or so and that in certain circumstances it poses a considerable threat to the peace of the world.

The report concludes that there should be a balanced security policy on the part of the West to prevent war, not only nuclear war, and it suggests, too, that there should be much better NATO surveillance of Soviet naval vessels and their activities in various parts of the world. I am sure that this is an objective to which we all subscribe, and to which all our respective governments subscribe, but, because of the economic circumstances plaguing so many nations, it may be difficult to provide the surveillance necessary if it is to be done professionally and with full confidence. However, I greatly hope that member governments will take due note of the problem and do what they can to improve the situation.

I am also glad that Mr. Blaauw calls attention to the fact that a number of advanced countries are spending a disproportionately small amount of their gross national product on the defence of the free world. I hope that some of these lessons will go home in those countries. With him and other members of the committee I visited Canada earlier this year. I notice that in paragraph 3.9 of the report Mr. Blaauw speaks of the Canadian situation and notes that only 1.8 % of their gross national product was spent by the Canadians on defence. If some of the ships we saw when we went to Halifax, Nova Scotia, are any indication, I fear for the capability of the Canadian navy to play its part if there were to be an emergency, which we sincerely hope there will not be. I am certain that reports of this kind can do nothing but good in sharpening up the approach of member countries of Western European Union not only in understanding the difficulties and sectors of defence where we are concerned in opposition to the Warsaw Pact countries but also the problems that can arise in a modern technological age and the need to be in advance of developments.

Mention has been made of the Falkland Islands, which we shall debate later this afternoon. That conflict above any other in recent times emphasised that the rôle of naval forces is not spent, is not out of date, and that a war could be won or lost by the activities of the naval forces of the countries involved. Therefore, I commend this report to representatives as one of the committee which supported it, and we should congratulate Mr. Blaauw on the work he has done.

(Mr. Berchem, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pecchioli.

Mr. PECCHIOLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to congratulate the Rapporteur for the interesting documents he has produced for the Assembly. I must add, however, that Mr. Blaauw's report and – even more obviously – the draft recommendation do not cover or, in my view, fail to deal acceptably with the political conclusions and proposals which should have been included.

I am thinking in particular of the following questions: First, regarding the entry – still only potential – of Spain into NATO, the report, while acknowledging the existence of a number of problems, does not point out the possible destabilising effect of the installation of military bases at Ceuta, Melilla and the Chafarinas Islands – claimed by Morocco. The report does not state clearly that, at the time of the Algerian war, the alliance excluded overseas territories from the NATO area and that this line must now be maintained in order to prevent the emergence of new tensions in a part of the Mediterranean where stability is vital for European security.

Second, the report quotes the McNamara proposals concerning the commitment to no first use and to those of General Rogers for a 1 % increase in defence budgets for the construction of weapons capable of striking at the launching points of any second wave, offering the East as a bargaining counter the elimination of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe.

Nothing is said, however, of the increasingly urgent need to rethink and review more closely the whole of NATO strategy, its nuclear strategy in particular and, in this context, its conventional strategy also.

I believe such a review to be urgently required because of the dangers stemming from the rapid technological progress of nuclear weapons, the fact that the flexible response cannot be controlled and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, from McNamara's own proposals and the vote in favour in the referendum on freez-

Mr. Pecchioli (continued)

ing nuclear stockpiles in eight out of nine American states, from the various proposals advanced in Europe and from the growing public concern in our countries.

What I want to say is that, within the overall international situation, which remains very threatening for European security also, what is most important is the search for political solutions. Efforts should therefore be directed not to the arms race but to political measures aimed at checking the present trend towards increasingly uncontrollable levels of nuclear armaments and to working for the gradual, controlled mastery of battlefield and theatre nuclear weapons, while maintaining a balance and guaranteeing the security of everyone.

These points are given very little mention in the report and are almost completely missing from the draft recommendation.

Both documents put the accent on armaments and not on the problem of their control and reduction, in both East and West, which are vital for European security. We cannot therefore concur in the omission of any reference to the need for action to ensure the success of the negotiations which are now assuming fresh importance in the light of some interesting new developments in Soviet politics.

I am referring to the Geneva negotiations on Euromissiles with a view to reaching agreement for reconsideration of the twofold decision taken in Brussels and the current deployment of SS-20s and also to the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, with a view to achieving a successful outcome and passing on to the second stage of arms reduction.

Lastly, it is certain that measures for security at sea must be thoroughly discussed for the sake of general security. I do not dispute that improvements in the surveillance and tracking system are required. However, the report over-emphasises the growing naval strength of the USSR and only mentions in passing that, except in the case of nuclear submarines, NATO still holds a marked superiority; in so doing it fails to give enough importance to the real political problem which – even in the case of Soviet naval power – is to work everywhere for new and adequate confidence-building and mutual security measures – for the seas as elsewhere – with guarantees for freedom of navigation for all, within the overall context of safeguarding peace.

That is why I, in common with my fellow Italian communists, will not vote for the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Pecchioli.

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Since the drafting and, if I may be permitted to say so, the adoption of Mr. Blaauw's report, a lot of water has flowed under the bridges of Paris and of Europe, and particularly those of Spain.

Since then – and I can understand that this was not the outcome Mr. Blaauw, unlike myself, was hoping for – the Socialist Workers' Party of Spain won a resounding victory in the democratic elections of 28th October. We must not forget that the victory of this party in Spain was the victory of a party that had campaigned openly and militantly against Spanish accession to NATO. We are therefore justified in considering that the Spanish people has made its choice in full knowledge of the facts. That does not mean...

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. Papandreou conducted the same election campaign in Greece, but his country did not leave NATO.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. Prussen, please leave democracy to the Spaniards. Do not try to impose your own views on Spain.

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – It is the same thing in Greece under Papandreou.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Let us leave Papandreou out of it. He has enough problems as it is. Luxembourg has too, particularly in social affairs, you know as well as I.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Dejardin has the floor, and I would ask you not to interrupt him.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. As I was saying, since then Spain has made a choice. Mr. Felipe Gonzalez has announced that a referendum will be held so that the Spanish people can indicate whether they want Spain to join NATO or not, and I hope they will be allowed that freedom.

Yesterday, moreover, having previously heard Mr. Lemoine, we heard Mr. Hernu, the French Minister of Defence, expound the basic tenets of his position, following Mr. Pierre Mauroy. It is a position in favour of WEU and the strengthening of WEU, and one which was also expressed not long ago in this Assembly by the representatives of the Italian Government.

We thus seem to be witnessing the emergence of a will to reactivate WEU, and I am glad of it, because I am convinced that it may provide Europe with a means of loosening what I consider to be the excessive grip of the United States

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

on European defence, and also of preserving ourselves from a possible recurrence of the American military adventurism we have seen in the recent past.

We have always maintained that it is vital for Europe to assert its identity. We have also said, in this Assembly, that this can only be achieved through the concept of joint defence. WEU can provide the essential core for the development of such a European defence identity.

Mr. President, should we not therefore consider inviting other countries to join the WEU club, as provided for in Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty? Since we are determined to involve Spain – and other countries, I suppose – more closely in European defence, why not openly invite Spain, and, for that matter, Portugal and Mr. Papandreou's Greece – begging Mr. Prussen's pardon – so that the core can be strengthened to form the definitive nucleus of a positively asserted European defence structure? This is the viewpoint on which my amendments are based.

Finally, Mr. President, it is stating the obvious to talk of a budgetary crisis in each of our member states. All our governments are economising and cutting social welfare budgets. It is unacceptable, as I have already said, to demand social welfare sacrifices from workers and the working class as a whole, while at the same time seeking to increase military expenditure.

I, like others, am therefore conscious of the need to restructure our defence expenditure. Why does not Mr. Blaauw, who is, I believe, a former military man well-acquainted with military circles, assert more firmly the imperative need to put an end to waste? We all know what is going on in our own armed forces in this respect. Why not rather call for a restructuring of the defence budget to strengthen the operational elements of our conventional forces? And I say conventional forces, Mr. President, because I for one have not changed my mind since last May. I say no to the military nuclearisation of Europe, no to the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe, and I am not prepared to go back on that.

Mr. Pecchioli has already drawn attention to the report's failure to mention current arms limitation negotiations.

It would seem that the Rapporteur made his choice at the outset. We had two alternatives: either to emphasise the struggle for peace through negotiations, or to go along with those who call for frantic rearmament regardless of the social and political costs.

Mr. Blaauw and the committee have made their choice. That choice is not mine.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – Among the report's many attributes is that it does not substantiate the cynical view that the man on the shop floor is the last person to produce an objective, balanced and intelligent account. Mr. Blaauw's experience as a naval officer has proved invaluable in drawing up the report.

The report makes a welcome change from the recent emphasis on the nuclear option. It stresses conventional defence, about which I have always been positive. Field Marshal Lord Carver has said that the urgent need is for NATO to abandon the concept that it can avert conventional defeat by initiating nuclear war. He has said that that would result in an even greater defeat. He said that politicians and officials must stop thinking that the existence of nuclear weapons of any kind means that they can economise on conventional forces. That view, from a former chief of the defence staff in the United Kingdom, must be taken seriously.

The report covers all alliance countries. I hesitate to say that any alliance country is better than another. I accept that Canada is somewhat deficient in its contribution, but Canada's large neighbour makes a reasonable contribution about which we can be pleased. Canada probably depends upon the United States.

Our European security rests as much upon the will to defend ourselves as upon the means. The will often depends upon the means that we choose. There is no doubt that the free peoples of Europe intend to defend themselves if their security is in jeopardy and their interests are in danger.

The report is calm and reasoned. It is unlike the anti-Soviet hysterical reports produced in recent months. The Rapporteur brought out that our best chance of obtaining a reasonable response from others is by being reasonable ourselves and by understanding the problems of others. Unfortunately, the other fellow is sometimes unreasonable from the beginning.

When Lord Carver talks about politicians and officials he emphasises that decisions must be taken by politicians, not military men. An eminent philosopher Walter Lippman said many years ago that wars should not be started by old men for young men to fight. If he were alive today he would know that if a war began today and ended in a nuclear response every one of us would be involved. We should all be

Dr. Miller (continued)

at risk – not of losing a piece of land or sovereignty, but of extermination.

Mr. Blaauw's report touches old and new ground. With no reservation I ask the Assembly to support the report. An amendment is to be moved later, but it is of little consequence and Mr. Blaauw can deal with it. I congratulate Mr. Blaauw on his excellent report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Dr. Miller.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I warmly congratulate Mr. Blaauw on his admirable report. It draws attention to the fact that, although NATO enjoys modest superiority at sea, that superiority is being eroded gradually by the Soviet naval construction programme. Mr. Blaauw rightly emphasised the importance to NATO of adequate surveillance facilities, but surveillance presupposes an ability to match the enemy capability, of which warning is given. The Soviet naval construction programme is a serious matter.

Mr. Blaauw talked about the new nuclear-powered Kirov guided-weapon cruisers and about the Udaloy and Sovremenny guided-missile destroyers. He talked of the Kiev class aircraft carriers. Until now, NATO's superiority in naval air power has given it the edge.

The report also warns us that the Soviets are designing a new class of strike carrier that might be comparable with NATO's strike carrier. Surprisingly, the report does not mention the Typhoon class of Soviet ballistic-missile submarine, which is deeper-diving and faster than anything in NATO and which will come into service next year. It will be equipped with independently-targeted 5,000-nautical-mile-range ballistic missiles. The Soviets have built up a major naval threat during the past twenty years that has given a global reach and an ability to project military power worldwide in support of its political objectives.

Mr. Blaauw was quick to emphasise the importance of the northern flank. It would be damaging if Canada withdrew its contribution to enforcing the northern flank. I welcome the contribution of the Dutch marines and I bring to the attention of the Assembly the fact that the Arctic training of British marines and some paratroopers in Norway made them as effective as they were during the Falklands operation.

Paragraph (vi) of the preamble is extremely important because it emphasises that enhanced conventional defence will raise the nuclear threshold. However, it also reiterates the crucial need to have a balanced security policy to

deter war. The Soviet Union is now engaged in a massive propaganda campaign to prevent the modernisation of NATO's intermediate-range nuclear forces. If cruise missiles and Pershing IIs are not deployed at the end of next year, it would be the most damaging blow suffered by the alliance since its inception. It would occur simply because of political intimidation by the Soviet Union.

I bring to the attention of members of the Assembly a little red book entitled "The Peace Movement in the Soviet Union". Its author was Vladimir Bukovsky, who spent twelve years in Soviet labour camps and psychiatric hospitals. If anyone doubts the purpose behind the organisation of the peace movements, he should read this book. The peace movement was intended by the Soviet Union to intimidate the West and to deny us the option of modernising our nuclear forces and to put us within the Soviet sphere of influence. The threat is as strong as that.

The report is timely, comprehensive and well researched. I support it wholeheartedly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson.

I now call Mr. Rösch.

Mr. RÖSCH (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I will begin by contradicting Mr. Dejardin. He said – or at least this is what I gathered from the interpretation – that he believed Spain would retain its freedom and not join NATO. I must categorically reject this contention, because it implies that a country which belongs to NATO has lost its freedom. This is an incredible claim. I am sorry that Mr. Dejardin is no longer in the chamber. It seems to be the fashion to make speeches here and then to leave the chamber without taking part in the debate.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Spain is mentioned in Mr. Blaauw's report. Spain's accession to NATO is unquestionably important and significant in many respects. There is also an internal factor which makes it important for Spain. For the sake of Spanish democracy it is to be hoped that the integration of the Spanish generals and the Spanish military into NATO and international organisations will result in the stabilisation of the domestic situation in Spain and also in the defusing of the tension there.

We take decisions here which concern NATO, without really mentioning WEU, and this is indeed a defect in the report. What is to stop us considering or even demanding Spain's accession to this Assembly, for example – although not, as Mr. Dejardin suggested, as some kind of alternative to accession to NATO? I

Mr. Rösch (continued)

feel that Spain should join WEU as a member of NATO. This does, however, presuppose something which is long overdue and has been referred to several times – the adjustment of the Brussels Treaty to the historical facts.

We talk here about the contribution various countries make to the defence of freedom. It is said that there are countries which could do more in this respect. Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to ask a straightforward question in this context: how is someone like myself, born in 1945, on the one hand to justify the fact that as Germans we are expected to participate in European defence and the resulting costs, and on the other to accept that, within WEU for example, conditions are not equal? Let me make myself quite clear. I am referring to a historical inconsistency which must be removed if WEU as an institution is to be raised to a new level and to develop differently in the future. I therefore believe that by amending and updating the Brussels Treaty, we could achieve a situation in which WEU's activities would have a broader base.

As regards the subject in hand and the chart showing per capita expenditure on defence which Mr. Blaauw has kindly appended to his report, I should like to say in all humility that such comparisons, being based on statistics, are questionable because they frequently do no more than compare defence budgets, ignoring the fact, for example, that in my country everything to do with war victims – pensions and everything else covered by this large section of the budget – is included in the social security budget, whereas I know that in most European countries such expenditure – “veterans’ salaries” and so on – is included in the defence budget. The same is true of certain transport facilities and much else connected with defence in my country. So I think that in comparisons of this kind we should not simply be comparing the various budget appropriations but also what is covered by each of these appropriations.

To conclude, I should like to suggest to Mr. Blaauw that he reconsider the inclusion of the word satellite in his list of surveillance resources, in other words, the assumption that we should undertake surveillance with satellites. I would remind you that all the countries represented here recently agreed at the UNISPACE international conference that we should not use or abuse this new medium for military purposes. Furthermore, our position is that there should be international monitoring of satellites by the United Nations, and that is very important in this context.

I therefore believe that we would be tipping the baby out with the bathwater, as they say, if

in one place we call for surveillance by satellites while in another we say we should be trying at international level to keep space free of military activities. I would ask Mr. Blaauw to consider this.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Rösch.

I call Mr. Baumel, who has just joined us.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I think there must be some mistake in the title of Mr. Blaauw's report. While it contains some extremely useful details and excellent paragraphs, it should really have been entitled the state of European maritime security, since three-quarters of it are devoted to the very important matter of the security of sea routes and European defence, but it entirely fails to cover the subject referred to in the title, namely the state of European security.

In my opinion, therefore, the problems of European security, which are particularly acute at the present time, should be dealt with in a further report.

We are meeting in what is, in view of certain declarations, a crucial period. We have had a very clear Soviet warning about the SS-20s and Pershings. The meeting of defence ministers is taking place almost at the same time as our own. I think that even this Assembly, which seems to have no sense of urgency about the immediate defence problems that arise, ought to take heed of certain factors.

The first of these, which is painfully obvious but still needs to be mentioned from time to time, is that never since 1939 has European security been under such serious threat. And I mean, never. Never has Europe, with the exception of France, put so little into its defence effort. Let me declare right away, as a French delegate, my full approval of the excellent speech by the Minister of Defence, Mr. Hernu. In France, at least, there exists a very broad and very deep national consensus about these problems.

But apart from repeated and largely unheeded appeals by French Government representatives like Mr. Lemoine and Mr. Hernu, we do not find, either here or in other WEU bodies, any real desire to take account of these warnings and to implement the very reasonable and very useful proposals that French military and government leaders are constantly putting forward.

Forgive my none too diplomatic language, but I think WEU is suffering from a heritage of original sin deriving from the manner and conditions in which it was set up. Looking at WEU without any animosity or prejudice, but

Mr. Baumel (continued)

with the objectivity of an entomologist observing an insect under the microscope, we can see that it is an organisation largely paralysed from the outset by the attitudes and behaviour of some of its members.

Take the Germans. Obviously, the Germans can hardly accept that the basic reason for the establishment of WEU was to try and tie down Germany in a system from which it would – even if it does not admit it – very much like to free itself.

Then there are the British, whose attitude towards continental Europe remains the one we have been familiar with for centuries and who, quite naturally, look much more towards the United States than towards any hypothetical European defence system.

Furthermore, for some time now certain pacifist or neutralist ideas have been slowly eroding our positions, and these ideas are now to be found here beside us, on our own benches.

All this, of course, scarcely encourages our Assembly or organisation to take the real defence decisions necessary for our security. The issue around which speeches, statements, actions, proposals and initiatives have been revolving for years is whether, in the final analysis, Europe wishes to assume responsibility for its own defence, independently from or alongside any contribution from its transatlantic allies. We French, above and beyond our political differences, do not as yet have the impression that many Europeans wish to do so.

Moreover, attitudes in this Europe of ours actually vary greatly. First of all, the old military powers, with centuries of diplomatic and military activity behind them, quite naturally bring to these issues determination and a sense of tradition. I am referring primarily to the United Kingdom, France and Germany. In the course of centuries these countries have known dangers, conflicts and wars that have forged in their peoples a strong collective sense of the need for defence; and this, despite appearances, is reflected in the state of public opinion.

Other states, which I shall not name, have a much weaker policy. They have no great traditions, owing their origins to some extent to accidents of history and the desire to conciliate France and Britain. On these issues they obviously cannot demonstrate the same firmness, the same determination, or the same will to ensure their security. They lack both the necessary means and – what is much more serious – the necessary attitude of mind.

Any country can have an army, but that army must serve some purpose other than

mounting a guard of honour in front of the royal palace. The destiny of armies is to fight and, probably, in many cases, to take punishment and be partly wiped out. "War is war", as a character in Giraudoux's *Siegfried* puts it. Armies are built to face everything war brings, not to be marched about like tin soldiers. Their structure is geared to the concepts of modern strategy, not that of the last century or the second world war. Some documents submitted to us are so backward-looking they tend to remind us of what we were reading twenty years ago, which sets us back a few years as regards the state of the Atlantic Alliance.

Unfortunately, times have changed. We have to realise that whatever the ideas advanced by this or that party to disguise certain external purposes, particularly the much-discussed ideas of General Rogers, the problems in fact present themselves differently.

As Mr. Hernu quite rightly said yesterday, General Rogers's statement contains nothing to shock us, except that it is totally unbalanced and that, by dint of concentrating solely on the problem of conventional armaments and discreetly ignoring every other aspect which is in our view more important, the impression is given, indirectly, that we are avoiding the other aspect and ignoring what we do not dare to maintain and defend.

That, needless to say, is not the French attitude, and it is perhaps one of the things that ought to lead us to rethink our position. Is there, or is there not, any chance of getting anything out of WEU but meaningless recommendations that are never acted on? That is the basic question.

Has WEU any real will to act other than through sittings, sessions, meetings, speeches and trips? WEU can, of course, continue to exist without such a will. The organisation does not cost much and, after all, does not bother anyone, not even our potential enemies.

In that case, however, the countries that wish to stand guard over Europe and are ready to fight must take the necessary steps among themselves, through more restricted agreements, while remaining in WEU. This is the direction we will probably have to take, sooner or later; otherwise we shall be wholly in the hands of the Atlantic Alliance and subject to all its uncertainties. For some of us Europeans, that is an option we reject.

Those are the general points I wanted to introduce into the discussion, and I shall leave it at that.

Mr. Blaauw's report is an excellent working document, and my comments are in no way

Mr. Baumel (continued)

directed against it. It discusses certain hypotheses and provides some very useful information, but, in my view, it misses the point of its own title: it does not deal with the state of European security. It is merely an extremely interesting examination of certain limited aspects of European security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, Mr. Baumel.

As you were not present at the beginning of the sitting you did not know about the time limit of five minutes per speaker, which is why I let you have two minutes extra. However, your speech was most interesting.

I now call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Baumel has put me in something of a quandary. Either I repeat what he has already said, or I have to change my speech entirely. Despite this I shall attempt, in a few minutes, to explain why it is difficult for me, as I previously explained to the committee, to concur with the Rapporteur's view of the draft recommendation. I do this, moreover, with much regret, both because of the regard I have for him personally and because I fully appreciate the enormous amount of serious work that has gone into researching and compiling the report.

This report analyses three vital aspects of the state of European security, within the limitations described by Mr. Baumel: maritime surveillance, national contributions to allied defence, and NATO strategy with regard to conventional weapons.

On the first point I have little to add, except that we would be wise to look carefully at all the consequences of recent maritime expeditions to see whether the surveillance and means at our disposal enable us to cope with the various peacetime eventualities, and whether they are adequate to ensure defence preparations in a more troubled period.

Second point: "national contributions to security" - leaving the expression in quotation marks, in view of what Mr. Baumel has just said. The discussion here revolves mainly around the future participation of Spain. I am not among those who get excited or hot under the collar at the prospect. What does bother me somewhat is that WEU, through the indirect medium of a report, is taking a position on a matter of Spanish internal policy.

If I were Spanish, and inclined to be generous, I would think that a great deal of attention was being paid to me, and this would embarrass me because my affairs are my own

business. Were I less generous, I would think about taking advantage of all the attention being paid to me to see, in view of the apparent need for my services, whether I could possibly negotiate some advantage for myself. In any event, I think this is a case of interference in the internal affairs of Spain, and I shall not rub salt in the wound by reminding you of certain recent statements by Mr. Felipe Gonzalez, whose present official position is now common knowledge.

Leaving aside his criticisms of the North Atlantic Treaty, I shall simply quote what he said about it: "The only reason for the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty is to build a defence system against a possible attack by the forces of the Warsaw Pact."

That, as a previous speaker remarked, is no trifling matter. But what interests me most in Mr. Gonzalez's comments on joint European defence is his statement that he is firmly convinced there are other arrangements, apart from the Atlantic Treaty, that can cope with the dangers threatening us.

He ended by saying, "We wish to encourage the project of joint European defence. Admittedly, it will be hard to achieve, but it is something to aim towards." I fully endorse this, since I too believe that is where our future lies.

The third point - and I am almost finished - concerns a strategic issue we have just been dealing with. I refer to the statement by General Rogers.

Yesterday Mr. Hernu told us everything we need to know about French deterrence policy. This policy does not exist in isolation, however. France belongs, not to NATO, but to the Atlantic Alliance and to WEU, and if we are to draw from Mr. Blaauw's report elements for an evaluation of General Rogers's statement, of his theories and of our own discussion, then after having listened to Mr. Mauroy and Mr. Hernu we could say, as Mr. Baumel just pointed out, that WEU is more alive than it has ever been and is the right place for a wide-ranging reappraisal in the search for a defence philosophy and a resources strategy.

We should then no longer have our own national views, or our views reflected through NATO or the Atlantic Alliance, and we in Europe could finally get a clear idea of what it is we want to achieve. We are now asking ourselves questions about our defence. Either I am mistaken, or that is indeed the stage we have reached. What we need to do - and Mr. Baumel whose general approach I do not share at all, stressed this - is to fall back on our own resources and, in all our discussions and research, turn towards solutions which would

Mr. Pignion (continued)

enable us to take a firmer hold on our own destiny as Europeans.

This is what the French Government is constantly repeating in its determination to secure the defence of Europe, on the basis of its deterrent force, which, as it said again only yesterday, is not purely national but one means linked to others. I would therefore like us to direct ourselves to such a reappraisal and the search for a solution at European level.

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— Thank you, Mr. Pignion.

I now call the last speaker on my list, Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Blaauw's report prompts me to make three sets of comments which I would like to develop briefly. But let me first congratulate the Rapporteur on his work.

This report is indeed vital for an understanding of the subject, and I for one believe its contents, in terms of the information provided and, above all, the general argument, are in line with what is needed to organise European security.

My comments refer to three areas: the potential strength of the Soviet navy, Spanish membership of NATO, and organisational problems concerning the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces.

As regards the strengthening of the Soviet navy's ocean-going potential, the report has the basic merit of stressing its scale, providing up-to-date information, and showing the extent of what — despite all that has been done — remains a permanent imbalance whatever the strategic dispositions of the Warsaw Pact or of NATO.

The fact remains that the capability required by the western countries is that of appropriate response. The flexible response to which Mr. Blaauw referred a little while ago — that is, the ability to respond at all levels without exception — is the very foundation of a strategy capable of coping with any problems or possible developments. But such response capability also assumes the implementation of unilateral or bilateral programmes for the production of suitable matériel.

In this context, is there not a case for putting more emphasis on the use of missiles against surface vessels and for strengthening our potential in that area? Recent events have shown the importance of the problem.

My second comment concerns Spanish membership of NATO.

Spanish membership has been an accomplished political fact since last June, as a result of that country's application. Several other countries have given their opinion on the matter, and the French Parliament, for its part, has pronounced in favour of Spanish membership. Obviously none of our member countries would agree to indulge in the unacceptable practice of interference in the internal affairs of another state. Here, however, Mr. Blaauw — and I agree with his reasoning on this — is simply anticipating hopefully, having regard both to national political realities and to European security needs. On this view, there is no risk in a political assembly like ours taking a position in favour of Spanish integration in NATO, or at any rate in the alliance.

As regards the balance between nuclear and conventional forces, provisional programmes, which are subject in each of our countries to budgetary constraints, may undergo some modification here and there, even in the middle of a financial year, and I do not think it is the rôle of members of this Assembly to indulge in political debates that are more the province of national parliaments.

I believe, however, that whatever action is taken, whether nationally or at the level of the NATO integrated forces, should always be based on an additional analysis aimed at developing a common strategy and policy. We know that concerted effort and complementarity are indeed possible at European level. And the European framework will show whether our organisation, whose brief is to examine defence problems, can remain up to its task.

I consider that the report before us is a bold and lucid response to the tremendous challenge facing European security; it does not deal with that challenge in full, as such a report would require much more time. Bearing in mind the terms of reference of the parties involved, this is an eminently political issue with which WEU is entitled to deal. But its work must be dominated by a sense of political purpose. Mr. Blaauw's report, approved by the committee, is part of this approach, and I shall therefore vote in favour of it.

(*Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT. — That concludes the debate on the report.

I will now ask the Rapporteur whether he wishes to respond and, after that, the Chairman of the committee.

I call Mr. Blaauw to respond .

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). — There have been many questions and in the time available I

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

hope that those who do not receive replies will forgive me. I thank all those who have expressed appreciation of the work done by the committee.

Mr. Smith spoke of the maritime section of the report. It is true that it is a "blue water navy" now in the USSR, and it has grown year by year. That means that the "blue water navy" is now capable of coercing less capable states.

The Falklands war is evidence that we must pay more attention to the importance of missiles, both in defence and attack. That issue will be dealt with when we discuss the Falklands report.

Mr. Pecchioli was the least positive of those who spoke about the report. That was because nothing was said about the nuclear problems. The report deliberately omitted that. The next report, which has already been set out by the committee, will deal with nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy and questions posed by the balance of power.

Much has been said about maritime surveillance. It had been thought that we would have a separate report on that subject but the committee decided to combine it with other issues. That is why it has received greater emphasis than other current defence problems.

Mr. Pecchioli also spoke about Spain and NATO. The committee decided to go to Spain to talk about Spain's admission to NATO. That visit was postponed because of the political change in Spain. However, we decided to include in the report some of the problems that will be raised when Spain enters NATO. That will be elaborated in the next report after our visit to Spain. I agree that it could raise tension in the Mediterranean area in relation to Spain's admission, but we should not be afraid of creating tension by the steps which we take.

Mr. Dejardin also spoke about the Spanish issue. When Spain did not have a socialist government WEU and other bodies welcomed Spain's possible membership of NATO. After one election we should not change that idea. We should be a little more careful and we should not think about dragging Spain in by its hair. We should be happy to have Spain in NATO. We should welcome it as a free country that will help strengthen the alliance and its defence posture.

Article XI of the Brussels Treaty was mentioned by many speakers. I do not say I should not like Spain to be a member of WEU, but there has not been much movement by Spain in that direction. During our visit to

Portugal some people thought that Portugal should join WEU. I have no objection to that, but that does not mean that Portugal should be a member of NATO. NATO members are equal partners in an organisation which has proved to be good for us and we should continue it.

I thank Dr. Miller for what he said. I have read his amendment carefully and I have changed my mind about it. I now welcome it.

Mr. Wilkinson said that the report omitted to mention the Typhoon class. The Typhoon class is not particularly suited to a blue water navy. The Typhoon is a strategic ballistic submarine. It is a problem for the western alliance and for the anti-submarine warfare specialists in NATO. It will continue to be a huge problem because of the extreme depth to which it can dive, but I do not think that we should have mentioned it in the report.

Mr. Wilkinson also referred to the northern flank. We cannot withdraw from our commitment, but we must consider how to support our Anglo-Dutch marines if there is a problem there. I support the Bukovsky report. It is interesting and I have a copy of it in my library at home.

Mr. Rösch has already dealt with the questions raised by Mr. Dejardin. I agree that WEU should be a platform dealing with Europe's defence. I applaud the possibility of other countries being involved in the Brussels Treaty. I shall not go further into that, because the European Parliament also considers European defence, although it calls it European security. The matter has been mentioned before and will be again. I agree that satellites pose a problem. The French Government favour a world satellite system for surveillance. At present only two countries, the United States of America and the USSR, are involved.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). – Mr. President, I shall continue in my own language because Mr. Baumel also spoke in his own language, and a fine speech it was too. But he was very harsh in what he said, as he himself admitted. He did not use diplomatic language. I am therefore sorry he is not in the chamber at the moment, because I should like to use the same undiplomatic language in answering him. I am also sorry that he was not present when I made my opening speech. He just came in while the debate was in progress, said his piece and left.

Mr. President, what he had to say was quite refreshing but very traditional. There was not much novelty in what he said, we had heard most of it before. But when Mr. Baumel says that the title of the report is wrong, I have to

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

point out to him that he is not keeping up with events, because reports have had titles which did not tally before now. I have only to think of a report we adopted this morning. Its title concerns South-West Asia but, when I read the recommendation, I have the impression that it concerns a smaller area than the whole of South-West Asia.

Mr. President, I was particularly stung by one of Mr. Baumel's remarks. He said that armies should not be used solely to guard royal palaces. I assume that this remark was not meant personally because if there is one army that is extremely unsuitable for guarding royal palaces, it must surely be the Dutch army. Dutch soldiers are well known for their appearance. It is nothing to boast of and does not exactly make them suitable for standing guard outside a palace. I find Mr. Baumel's remark rather painful, because it means that he was attacking the smaller countries, who sometimes do things on a relatively more national basis. I wish to register a protest against this. Danish soldiers, Norwegian soldiers, German soldiers and Dutch soldiers are not tin soldiers. Every individual who is called upon by his parliament to join the armed forces is extremely important to the defence of the treaty of Western European Union, to which we all subscribe. As far as Mr. Baumel is concerned, I will leave it at that.

The PRESIDENT. – Order. – Time is becoming short. If we are to complete dealing with the report today, we should be given the chance to proceed to the amendments. I know that it is difficult for a rapporteur to do justice to all the speeches, but we are behind time. You, Mr. Blaauw, took twenty minutes or more to introduce the debate and I hope that you can soon conclude your remarks.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I shall restrict my remarks.

Mr. Baumel made a lengthy speech and I should like to answer him at length. He had some thoughts about Spain. I agree with the idea of a common European defence, as proposed by Mr. Gonzalez. Mr. Lemoine made a speech here a year ago about WEU and unfortunately a couple of weeks later Mr. Cheysson's speech weakened WEU. We must think about what to do with WEU and that will be mentioned in future reports.

I thank Mr. Caro and I agree with almost everything that he said.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Blaauw. I apologise for asking you to curtail your speech, because the report is important. In view of your experience as a Dutch naval officer, I know that you wished to reply fully to

each speech, but time is not on our side. Our time is restricted to two-and-a-half days. I am sure that the Chairman of the committee will want to speak, but he will wish to make a short speech if he wants the report to be approved.

I call the Chairman, Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to touch very briefly on two points which have been the subject of discussion and of some criticism. First of all, the call for the strengthening of conventional armaments. In my view, this is a most important point because war cannot be deterred by nuclear potential alone. In fact, when a country with weak conventional defences is about to be overwhelmed it will of necessity use nuclear weapons if it has them. We wish to avoid this at all costs by achieving parity of nuclear weapons to offset the Warsaw Pact's enormous advantage in conventional weapons.

My second point concerns Spain. We do not of course seek to interfere in the internal affairs of that country which of its own free choice decided to join the Atlantic Alliance and later planned to integrate its forces with those of NATO.

However, until the victors of the recent Spanish elections take the opposite decision to withdraw from the Atlantic Alliance it seems to me that we must call for decisive implementing action, so that the new Spanish Government understands that Western European Union attaches great importance to Spain and to its integration in NATO. If we fail to make this clear we shall virtually be giving the new Spanish Government an incentive to implement its electoral programme.

We hope that the Spanish socialists will follow the example of their Greek counterparts who, when our committee visited them during the election campaign, told us that if they won they would take Greece out of NATO and the Atlantic Alliance – but they have not in fact done so. In the hope that the Spanish socialists will follow suit, I believe that this point must be emphasised and that we must declare that we wish to go forward, believing that Spain can contribute to the security and defence of the western world.

The PRESIDENT. – That concludes our debate on this report.

We must now consider the eight amendments that have been tabled. Amendments 1 and 6 will be taken together because they relate to the same paragraph. Amendments 2 and 5 are identical in effect and will be discussed together with Amendment 4. If Amendment 1 is agreed to, Amendment 6 falls. If Amendment 2 is agreed to, Amendment 4 falls. I hope that

The President (continued)

we can conclude our discussion on the amendments and vote on the draft recommendation before I close the sitting at 6 p.m. or shortly after. We shall debate Amendments 1 and 6 together, then Amendment 7, then Amendment 8, Amendments 2, 4 and 5 together and finally Amendment 3.

I call Mr. Dejardin to move Amendment 1, as follows:

1. Leave out paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Recalling its Recommendations 254, 278 and 288 on the accession of Spain to the North Atlantic Treaty approved by the majority of the then Spanish Parliament;”.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – A dangerous business. I have already explained my position on Spanish entry into NATO. I consider that, given the result of the election held on 28th October, the argument in paragraph (iii) has been overtaken by events. With due respect to our Chairman, Mr. Cavaliere, the Spanish Parliament, which gave as the text stands its “full approval”, has been disavowed by the electorate. As democrats, we are bound to take that into account. Do we intend to force the hand of the Spanish people? Mr. Cavaliere admitted as much. It is not up to us to help Mr. Gonzalez’s government to implement its election manifesto, was what he said. No statement – or confession – could be clearer. My concern is to respect the desire democratically expressed by the Spanish people during the election.

The comparison with Greece is not valid. To withdraw from an integrated NATO military system is one thing; to join it is quite another. As I have already said, Spain can very well contribute to the defence of the western world via a European defence arrangement without being linked to NATO. That is the basic purpose of Amendment 1.

The PRESIDENT. – As this is a joint debate, I ask Mr. Pignion to move Amendment 6, which is as follows:

6. In line 2 of paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “parliament” to the end of the paragraph.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Amendment 6 is even simpler and more logical than Mr. Dejardin’s. In order to avoid creating difficulties for the present Spanish Government, it does not even refer to the previous parliament.

We simply note a state of affairs. The third paragraph of the preamble would then read:

“Recalling its Recommendations 254, 278 and 288, welcoming the accession of Spain to the North Atlantic Treaty with the full approval of that country’s democratically elected parliament.”

I think this very simple formulation is consonant both with our concern not to interfere in the internal affairs of Spain and, from the stylistic point of view, with our desire for brevity, since everything is said in the three recommendations referred to.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose either of the amendments?...

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I certainly wish to oppose them, because it would be extremely damaging if either amendment were passed. Mr. Pignion’s amendment may be acceptable, but the Assembly must express its view about the impact on European security of Spain’s accession to NATO. It is not an interference in Spain’s internal affairs to recall the welcome that we gave, rightly, to Spain’s accession to the alliance and to admit a hope that European security will be strengthened in due course when the referendum has been accorded an affirmative vote to ensure Spain’s accession to NATO and to express the opinion that the integration of Spain’s forces into NATO’s military structure will enhance our security. Those are all positive, sensible and rational expositions of our view of Spain’s accession. I ask the Assembly to oppose both amendments.

The PRESIDENT. – May we have the view of the committee?

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – The committee considered Mr. Dejardin’s amendment and voted against it.

It did not discuss Mr. Pignion’s amendment, because it was not tabled; as however the whole question was dealt with when the committee examined Mr. Dejardin’s amendment, I believe I can say that a majority of the committee is also against Mr. Pignion’s amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I am sorry; I misunderstood. I thought that the committee had not considered it. Apparently the committee would be against both amendments by a majority. Thus, the Assembly has the unfortunate task of making up its own mind.

We will now vote on Amendment 1.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

We will now vote on Mr. Pignion’s amendment, Amendment 6.

The President (continued)

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 6 is negated.

The next amendment is Amendment 7, to be proposed by Mr. Pignion, as follows:

7. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "not only" and insert "particularly".

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Yesterday we heard the French Defence Minister, Mr. Hernu, state how much importance he attached to giving priority to strategic nuclear weapons.

We are well aware of the need to strengthen conventional defences but, as I mentioned earlier on, we also want the priorities to be those that normally apply to this strategy of deterrence.

That is why I feel Amendment 7 to be important.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Pignion. Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment ?...

May we have the view of the committee ?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – We had a long discussion in the committee about what wording we should use in paragraph (vi) of the preamble. We had considered the wording at earlier stages, and there was finally a huge majority in the committee for the words "not only". I should like to keep those words, so I am against the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Blaauw. The Assembly has heard the views of the committee and of the mover of the amendment.

We will now vote on Amendment 7.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 7 is negated.

We now come to Amendment 8, from Mr. Rösch, as follows :

8. In line 1 of paragraph 1 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "satellite".

I call Mr. Rösch.

Mr. RÖSCH (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in view of the time, I would merely point out that I did try in my statement to explain why we should not include a reference to satellites. We call for disarmament throughout the world, and we say

we intend to exclude space from military activities. All member countries of WEU support this view – at the UNISPACE conference, for example – and have signed treaties to this effect.

In another body, that is to say, within WEU itself, we are now being asked to call for the use of satellites for military purposes. I consider it impossible for us to take such a decision.

It is true to say – as Mr. Blaauw's report does – that there must be surveillance from the air, and that can be done with AWACS, for example. But against the background of the debate on the use of space I regard it as a grave mistake for us to call for the use of satellites in space for military purposes in the present debate. WEU and the Assembly would quite simply be making a mistake if they adopted Mr. Blaauw's report as it stands.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – My submission to my colleagues is as simple as it could be. Do we truly believe that Russia and its satellites will abandon any possibility of using any weapon, and should we deprive ourselves, by striking out this part of the recommendation, of the chance of using one such important means of defence? It is absolute nonsense, and I hope that the Assembly will reject it.

The PRESIDENT. – May we have the opinion of the committee ?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I am sorry to disagree with my friend Mr. Rösch. I fully agree that satellites should not be used as a means of delivering weapons, but when we eventually have arms control and verification we shall need surveillance and we shall need a full picture of the world. For that, we need satellites. Satellite surveillance would benefit the civilian population.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Blaauw, for a very clear opinion from the committee.

We will now vote on Amendment 8.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 8 is negated.

We now come to Amendment 2, plus Amendments 5 and 4 as follows :

Amendment 2, by Mr. Dejardin :

2. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

The President (continued)

Amendment 5, by Mr. Urwin and others :

5. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

Amendment 4, by Mr. Morris and others :

4. Leave out paragraph 2 (a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

“(a) to invite Spanish liaison officers to be appointed to all appropriate NATO command headquarters ;”.

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Amendment 2 follows from the very logic of our whole idea of political democracy. In view of the current situation in Spain, it seems to me absurd, if members will pardon the expression, to call for the immediate appointment of Spanish liaison officers, and to plan and adjust command arrangements, when sharp political controversy is taking place and the political forces now in power stated during the election campaign that they were opposed to Spanish membership of NATO and have announced a referendum.

To call for the immediate appointment of liaison officers is illogical and, in any case, politically absurd.

The PRESIDENT. – Amendment 5 is the same, and I ask Mr. Urwin or one of his colleagues who tabled it to speak.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – You are absolutely right, Mr. President, as anyone can see that the terminology used in these two amendments is exactly the same. That would appear to point to some lack of communication between the proposers and sponsors of these two amendments.

There is nothing much that I can add to the eloquent presentation made by my colleague Mr. Dejardin except to say that it seems to me to be somewhat presumptuous of this Assembly to accept the recommendation contained in Mr. Blaauw's report so far as Spain is concerned when, as the Rapporteur himself acknowledges in his report, a referendum is to take place in Spain on the question of membership of NATO. In those circumstances, it is incumbent on us to pay more respect to the decisions announced by the new Spanish Government and not to try to influence their situation in advance of the national referendum that they certainly propose to hold.

The PRESIDENT. – I now call Mr. Morris or one of his co-sponsors to move Amendment 4, which will be put to the vote only if one of the other amendments is negated.

Mr. MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). – I would, of course, support Amendments 2 and 5 initially and would move mine only if those were not carried. It would appear to me that there is a difference in tone between the body of the report and the preamble and the welcome given to Spain in the preamble, for which I voted, and the much firmer tone of the recommendations. I do not want to diminish by one iota our welcome to Spain to join NATO. It would be good for NATO and good for Spain too. I try to follow Spanish affairs reasonably closely and spend some time there.

Without the implications and complication of the Spanish election, it seems to me that paragraph 2(a) is not sufficiently diplomatic. Anyone with any experience of diplomacy would resent the words calling for Spanish liaison officers to be appointed forthwith. It is peremptory in tone and it would be wrong for this Assembly to agree to that wording, particularly at this time.

Paragraph 2(b) is not so offensive. It anticipates the Spanish decision, but in terms of diplomacy it has the flavour of indelicacy about it. According to a report in *The Times* today of a speech by the new Spanish Prime Minister, he says that he will maintain the promise repeated during the last election campaign to hold a referendum on the subject, while a report in the *Financial Times* is rather different and states that he skirts round the issue of NATO membership, saying that he would respect only his commitment to the electorate. Whichever it is, there is uncertainty.

There is to be a referendum. Having now welcomed Spain and reiterated that welcome today, it would be quite wrong for us to interfere, or be seen to interfere, in the internal affairs of a country that is about to make up its own mind in a referendum. Therefore, I certainly hope that the Assembly will carry Amendments 2 and 5, and, if not, carry my more limited amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose any one of these three amendments ?...

Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – On rather similar reasoning to that on which I opposed the previous amendment to paragraph (iii) of the preamble, I again oppose this group of amendments, particularly on the way they were moved by my colleague Mr. Morris, whose appreciation of defence matters I greatly welcome. However, I feel that it does not do any harm for the Spanish Government to be made totally aware of the view of the other interested European governments within NATO, and particularly WEU governments, and their opinion

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

of the importance of Spain's accession to NATO.

I believe that it would not do any harm in the interim period before the referendum for Spanish liaison officers to be appointed to NATO command headquarters. That would enhance Spanish understanding of what NATO membership means in the military community. Nor would it do any harm for NATO and the Spaniards – because this could only be a joint effort – to see how Spanish accession to NATO could be implemented in the command arrangements of the allies. I do not believe that either of those things would be in any way an interference in Spain's internal affairs.

We would not be seeking to influence the referendum, but I believe that we would be improving the understanding of NATO within the Spanish military community, and we would be facilitating Spain's eventual accession to the NATO Alliance if that were the ultimate decision of the Spanish people in their referendum. Therefore, I urge the Assembly to oppose these amendments.

The PRESIDENT. – May we have the opinion of the committee?

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think that I can speak for the majority of the committee, even though the matter was not raised there, in favour of Amendment 4. The committee discussed Mr. Dejardin's Amendment 2 and came down strongly against it for the reasons just given by Mr. Wilkinson and which I gave in my reply. Let us not go into internal questions; let us say that the procedures following from Spain's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty must be carried forward. The decisions to be taken subsequently by the Spanish people and then their government will be fully valid and will certainly not be contested by anyone; but until those decisions have been taken, and we hope they never will be, I believe that we are not interfering in that country's internal affairs if we keep to the terms of the recommendation. The same objections obviously apply also to Mr. Urwin's amendment which is exactly the same as that of Mr. Dejardin.

The PRESIDENT. – I now put Amendment 2, which is identical to Amendment 5.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

Amendment 5 therefore falls.

I have now to put Amendment 4, tabled by Mr. Morris.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

We now come to the final amendment, Amendment 3, to be moved by Mr. Dejardin, as follows:

3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "despite the general recession" to the end of the paragraph and insert "by restructuring defence budgets so as to strengthen the operational elements of conventional forces without, because of the economic, social, and general budgetary recession, having to increase these budgets in real prices, whilst actively pursuing arms control negotiations in all forums."

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – It is a matter of choice. As I said in my speech, it is quite wrong for responsible politicians here in Paris at WEU to call for a large increase in military expenditure in real money terms, while at the same time, faced with the budgetary difficulties of their own governments and parliaments, accepting cuts in social expenditure.

I suggest we change our approach and call for a restructuring of defence budgets in such a way as to strengthen the operational elements of our conventional forces. This would obviate the need, in a general situation of cuts in social and economic expenditure, to increase military budgets in real money terms, while permitting the active pursuit of arms control negotiations in all forums. Such an approach seems more positive and realistic than calling for an increase in military budgets here in WEU and possibly having to vote against it in our own national parliaments.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 3?...

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the committee discussed this amendment at length and the majority voted against.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for a reply which was a model of brevity. We have had the amendment proposed. I ask you to vote on Amendment 3.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

We now come to the vote on the draft recommendation in Document 936, as amended. Unless there is a demand for a roll-call vote, the voting will be by sitting and standing.

Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I do not know whether the Assembly will agree with me, but in a matter of such importance, involving an address to Spain and an increase in military expenditure, I would like it to take its decision in full consciousness of its responsibility.

I therefore request a roll-call vote and hope my request will be supported by another nine members.

The PRESIDENT. – Our rules now demand that a request for a roll-call vote should be supported by five members. Do we have five members supporting that request? There are not five members in support of the request for a roll-call vote, so we vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted¹.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN, do you wish to speak?

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Dutch socialists abstained during the voting on Mr. Blaauw's report, not because they disagree with the broad lines of the military and technical recommendations, in particular, but because they feel that this Assembly would do better at the moment to refrain from giving advice on Spain's accession to NATO.

As regards paragraph 3 of the recommendation, they believe that the level of defence spending must be considered against the background of other realities, especially economic and social ones.

Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone else wish to contribute?

Mr. Urwin?

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – I regret that I felt compelled to vote against the proposal rather than abstain, for the reasons that I explained in proposing my amendment. I refer to my comments about Spain, and I feel that there would have been much more widespread support if the amendments, especially Amendments 2 and 5, had been accepted.

¹. See page 37.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – Tomorrow we have a lengthy programme and we may have to sit late. I propose that we should not terminate the sitting at one o'clock but continue until we finish, because I know that my colleagues have engagements elsewhere later.

Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I propose that tomorrow's sitting be brought forward to 9 a.m. in order to avoid undue delays.

The PRESIDENT. – That is a sensible suggestion, but we have such a thin audience that I feel it would be difficult to communicate such a sentiment. I would, therefore, ask everyone to be brief tomorrow. If I were not to adhere to the proposal to sit at ten o'clock, there would not be many members present to listen to the presentation of the first report.

I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 2nd December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. The Falklands crisis (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 935).
2. Energy requirements and the security of Europe – Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 930).
3. Booklet on WEU and its activities (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 928).
4. Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 929).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.10 p.m.)

TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 2nd December 1982

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. The Falklands crisis (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 935 and amendment*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Cavaliere (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Smith, Mrs. Gherbez, Dr. Miller, Mr. Caro, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Sénès, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Cavaliere (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Caro (explanation of vote).
4. Energy requirements and the security of Europe – Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 930*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Bassinet (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Syse (*Observer from Norway*), Mr. Jager, Mr. Martino, Mr. Worrell, Dr. Miller, Mr. Forma, Mr. Bassinet (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Valleix (*Chairman of the Committee*).
5. Booklet on WEU and its activities; Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion (*Presentation of and debate on the reports of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Docs. 928 and 929*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Berchem (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stoffelen (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Page, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Romano, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Stoffelen (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
6. Close of the session.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

I would again stress the importance of each representative or substitute signing the register before entering the hemicycle and certainly before seeking to take any part in our proceedings.

¹. See page 40.

3. The Falklands crisis

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 935 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT. – The first order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the Falklands crisis and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 935 and amendment.

I call Mr. Cavaliere, the Chairman and Rapporteur of the committee, to present his report.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are discussing the Falklands crisis some six months after the British victory over Argentina and the cessation of hostilities. This enables us to take a much calmer view and certainly free of the emotions which were to be expected while the conflict was in progress.

I would first like to make the point that dictatorships are always bad and a source of conflict and grief; this general rule applies also to the Argentine dictatorship which held on to power, particularly over the last few years, by a recourse to terror, as demonstrated by the some ten thousand people who have disappeared and whose many common graves have recently been

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

discovered, and by the invasion of the Falklands, as a way out of the serious problems the régime was experiencing with public opinion and a way of using nationalist sentiment to restore unity and solidarity behind the dictatorship. In paying my respects to the victims of that war and in sharing their sorrow, may I blame those victims on the dictatorship and on the mad decision to use force to settle an international dispute.

Europe and the free world in general reacted firmly, but once again United Nations appeals and resolutions had no effect because, as on other occasions, Argentina took no notice of them. Thus, all the efforts of the then American Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, and of the President of Peru had failed before the British forces counter-attacked to restore international order which had been broken. And it was because the aggressors felt that they were safe that the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General also came to nothing.

I therefore consider Britain's intervention to have been justified because it had become necessary to break the chain of events endorsing the fact that the use of force and the action taken had not been resisted in practice. This justified Britain's intervention to restore the order which had been violated, to implement United Nations Resolution 502 and to apply the principle of legitimate defence in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. And I wish to repeat here my hope that the example of the Falklands will discourage other attempts to use force to resolve this or that dispute.

While it is right to stress once more that European solidarity was complete and that the various organs of the Atlantic Alliance gave the matter their fullest attention and condemned what had been done, the actual events and their consequences require the closest scrutiny. I do not know whether this conflict could have been avoided once it had become clear that the Argentine Government intended to use force and to invade the Falklands. I say "it had become clear" because it seems to me that there were many warning signs. I shall not go back into ancient history but to an article printed in the Argentine paper *La Prensa* in January, which said that an Argentinian invasion of the Falklands could be regarded as a certainty and would in any case take place before the 150th anniversary of Britain's occupation of the islands, that is before January 1983. A specific warning sign, therefore; but there were others, ranging from the episode of the workmen who went to South Georgia on 19th March to dismantle some buildings bought by an Argentine company, to the fact that they were carried

there aboard an Argentine naval vessel and the fact that they hoisted the Argentine flag as soon as they landed, and many other signs which should have served as a warning and should have put an end to all doubts regarding the true intentions of the Argentine Government, when, with only twelve workmen still ashore, the ship "Endurance" left Port Stanley to land twenty-one British Royal Marines who were to force the remaining workmen to leave South Georgia. In fact, the twenty-one marines could not land because three Argentine naval vessels appeared. I think that these warnings should really have raised the alarm. In addition, the press published another interesting report which was not denied: on 29th March some of the men who had taken part in joint manoeuvres between the Uruguayan and Argentine navies had asked the Falkland Islanders whether they intended to leave before the invasion.

We cannot, of course, be certain but I believe, Ladies and Gentlemen, that if, after all these warnings, the United States President had been urged more strongly to intervene and if his telephone call to General Galtieri had been made a few days earlier, before the ships carrying the invasion forces set sail, the dictator may have stopped short and have abandoned his wild action. If the European institutions, such as the EEC, had been able to warn the Argentine dictatorship that any aggression would meet with an appropriate response, possibly, if not almost certainly, the Junta would have held back and would not have gone on with the invasion. Consequently, if the various organs of the Atlantic Alliance had been put, not perhaps on the alert, but at least in motion to warn the Argentine dictatorship, all this might not have happened.

We must therefore be more watchful and recognise the need to collaborate more closely, to exchange ideas and consult together more swiftly and more often, in order to render European unity much more effective.

The military lessons were set out in the speech made by the United Kingdom Minister of Defence to the North Atlantic Assembly a week or two ago. This was very interesting information and I have tried to add some other points, so I feel there is no need to dwell on the different aspects of the military lessons. It is unquestionable, however, that if Europe and the Atlantic Alliance wish to play a defence rôle and maintain security, it is necessary not only to restore the nuclear balance and strengthen conventional forces but also to bear in mind that the situation has changed greatly since the Atlantic Alliance was formed; the dangers are not those which might arise in the present NATO area, but which might arise anywhere in the world; and these are very real dangers if only because so many upheavals are

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

taking place, because the Soviet Union has infiltrated in all directions and is exerting its political influence throughout the world and because the presence of the Soviet fleet in large numbers is a threat on all the seas and oceans of the world. The overwhelming supremacy in nuclear submarines should be sufficient to put us on our guard and to convince us that a closer watch must be kept on what is happening below the tropic of Cancer.

This is why consultations should take place whenever anything happens which might affect western security. Such happenings need not necessarily involve the Soviet Union; events taking place in all parts of the world without Soviet involvement can pose just as great a threat to Europe's security and equally call for consultations in the Atlantic Alliance and NATO, together with compensatory measures if one or more allied countries have to intervene in the particular area to safeguard the security of the free world.

This seems to me what is happening and what can happen again. NATO must therefore look into the problem of compensatory measures to fill the gaps which have been created and which will continue to exist because the United Kingdom will have to keep a large force on the Falklands to maintain order which has been restored.

Approaching my conclusion, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to mention as my last point the subject of relations between the Latin American countries and the members of the Atlantic Alliance. The events in the Falklands have undoubtedly soured those relations and made them more tense. I am well aware that while all the Latin American countries supported Argentina over the aggression, they are now equally unanimous in wishing to restore normal relations of co-operation with the western countries as well as between the United Kingdom and Argentina.

Negotiations were in progress and, even after the fighting had started, when it became clear that Argentina would be defeated, the United Kingdom put forward proposals. The appendices include a document on the subject. These proposals are still rejected by Argentina but it seems to me that there are no reasons for not resuming negotiations. The United Nations resolution of 5th November calls for this.

I understand the United Kingdom's special position and how difficult the situation is, especially when there is a call for the immediate resumption of negotiations. This will not come about easily but I think it necessary to reaffirm the principle that when disputes drag

on efforts should be made to resolve them by negotiation, starting without preconditions on either side. Negotiations should be resumed at a completely neutral level.

The United Nations document declares that the parties should take due account of the interests of the population and I think that this aspect should be stressed, emphasising its importance and emphasising also that the wishes of the inhabitants are in themselves significant, justified and important.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I consider that I have produced a full report for your consideration. I wish to thank all the authorities who have provided me with material and information and to thank Mr. Whyte for his invaluable assistance. I would conclude with the hope that from the events described will spring the conviction that the countries of Europe must collaborate more closely, while continuing to maintain and reaffirm the principle that any use of force is to be condemned and that legitimate defence is sacrosanct.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

We now begin the debate and, as we decided yesterday, speeches will be restricted to five minutes because we are running extremely late. I hope that all members will adhere to the limit.

I call Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Millions of words have been written and spoken about the Falkland Islands conflict since the end of hostilities and doubtless we shall hear and read millions more in the months and years ahead. But nothing can disguise the fact, and it cannot be reiterated too often, that the Falkland Islands were and are a British responsibility and that the wishes of the Falkland Islanders remain sovereign. Had we abdicated our responsibility and given way to force, we should have betrayed the essence and meaning of democracy and our belief in it. In the end, our retaliation was most successful. Our action freed the islanders and gave real hope and encouragement to all those who believe in the preservation of freedom.

Most important, it helped to strengthen the resolve of those who were prepared to resist aggression wherever it appeared. Had we failed to respond, the world would have been a far darker and less safe place. It matters not that only a few people were involved in a little, geographically inconvenient South Atlantic location. It was the principle that was at stake. The principle is always paramount in such matters and the principle for which we fought was that the Falkland Islanders should be allowed to determine their own future.

Mr. Smith (continued)

This is an interesting report. I congratulate Mr. Cavaliere on the effort that he has put into its preparation. He always conducts these matters with the utmost thoroughness. I agree with much of what he said, but I part company with him on three points.

First, I do not believe that, even with the benefit of hindsight, there was any real evidence that the Argentines fully intended to invade the islands. That matter has been investigated judicially in Britain and the report of the investigation should be published before the end of the year, as Lord Belstead said yesterday in his excellent speech.

Secondly, Mr. Cavaliere perhaps exaggerates the damage done to the relationship with Latin America. It is true that some Latin American countries were fairly vocal in their support of Argentina during the conflict, but the support was more vocal than material. They gave little support to Argentina during the conflict and there has been minimal damage to those relationships. Certainly there are fences to be mended, but I believe that they can be mended, with all countries apart from Argentina, very quickly indeed.

As for future negotiations and the relations between my country and Argentina and the future of the Falkland Islands, we greatly favour a resumption of normal political, commercial and economic relations with Argentina, but I am sure that my government could not countenance negotiation about the Falklands while Argentina will not renounce the use of force, agree that the hostilities are finally over or take into account the wishes of the islanders, and while it still insists that any negotiation should lead only to the transfer of sovereignty.

That is not good enough. The Argentines must see sense. The more that we in the European countries can make them realise that negotiations must be fair and sensible, the better chance there is of stability in that part of the South Atlantic. At the end of the day, Argentina has been taught that aggression does not pay. It is a lesson that the rest of the world would do well to mark and learn.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Smith.

I call Mrs. Gherbez.

Mrs. GHERBEZ (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have listened closely to Mr. Cavaliere's speech on his report and I appreciate its contents, but I have considerable doubts and reservations concerning his assessments and suggestions. I have the same doubts and reservations concerning the draft recommendation.

We were firm and remain firm in our condemnation of Argentina for its invasion of the Falklands, for its refusal to comply with several United Nations resolutions and for the horrible misdeeds of the military régime in that country, as proved by the unknown fate of the people who have disappeared – misdeeds which have roused the deepest emotions in us. But in our view, the United Kingdom is equally to be condemned for having failed to seek and further a negotiated settlement to the dispute before or at least during the conflict.

This view is confirmed by the veto on the United Nations draft resolution calling for a cease-fire and the immediate, simultaneous implementation of Resolutions 502 and 505. This is serious and it must be a matter for concern that a negotiated solution is still being refused, as shown by the United Kingdom's opposition to the latest United Nations resolution which calls for "appropriate measures to find a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)".

This is not a matter of minor importance because destruction, ruin and grief could have been avoided and because it raises the more general and difficult problem of other sovereignty disputes which have already arisen or may arise in various parts of the world, in connection for example with the limits of territorial waters and of the continental shelves specified in the rules for the new convention on the law of the sea.

I think that the experience should have taught us something and that it should now be apparent to everyone that either efforts to resolve such disputes by negotiation should be supported, thus avoiding conflicts, stopping them in time and developing new co-operative relations with the countries involved or we shall move towards a dangerous escalation of potential sources of conflicts in many parts of the world.

While we agree that the allies should consult together when a crisis develops anywhere – and it should be recalled that this did not happen in the case of the Falklands – we consider that, in the above context, the conclusions drawn from the conflict are dangerous and in conflict with the basic principles of the alliance and the Brussels Treaty, particularly as regards the proposal to compensate in Europe for military commitments entered into by allied countries in crises developing outside the area defined by the North Atlantic Treaty. The chief reason for this is that Atlantic mutual assistance takes effect in the event of "aggression or threat to the security" of a member country within the alliance area, which certainly does not apply to the case of the Falklands or other similar mili-

Mrs. Gherbez (continued)

tary commitments by countries outside the NATO area.

Secondly, compensation involving the assignment to NATO command of member countries' reserves in such cases would change the relationship between the integrated command structure and the national defence system, and would change the basis and quality of the whole of the alliance's defence system.

Thirdly and most important, compensation in cases like the Falklands is bad and unacceptable because it would in practice alter the nature and the defensive rôle of the alliance, so that its purpose would no longer be to meet threats to member countries but to control and impose solutions by force in conflicts which may arise with or between third world countries, when it should be borne in mind that their progress and the development of co-operative relations with them are of vital importance for Europe and for its rôle of promoting peace and progress in the world.

Europe can help to achieve international control and the reduction of armaments by working for development and can help in eliminating the bloc mentality and in establishing new and more enduring world balances; but the right way to achieve this is by negotiation and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

For these reasons, in view of the context and prospects, we cannot accept the line taken in the report and in the draft resolution as now proposed, and we shall vote accordingly.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mrs. Gherbez.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*).— This is a report that will be kept by historians and by people who are interested in some of the political events of the twentieth century for a long time. It makes an excellent commentary and reference to a part of recent history in which directly in some way or other every member of the alliance was involved. I congratulate the Chairman and those who assisted him on bringing in this report. I shall not weary the Assembly with a long catalogue of the events themselves. I wish to confine my remarks to asking a question and making a comment.

Will Mr. Cavaliere disclose the sources of paragraphs 5.16 and 5.17 of the report in which there is an allegation that Uruguay indicated in some way that the invasion was coming before that information reached the British Foreign Office? Whether it reached the

British Foreign Office and was lost is another question, but will Mr. Cavaliere disclose the sources? Will he also comment on the reply given to Mr. Hardy yesterday to the question he asked of Lord Belstead? Will Mr. Cavaliere comment on Lord Belstead's answer? I know that the Franks Committee is sitting. Nevertheless, some information has been disseminated in recent weeks. I, and I am sure all of us, would like to know whether there is any truth in the allegations that the British Government knew of the situation, of the possibility, well before the invasion took place.

My short comment is that I agree with the views of my colleague, Mr. Smith, and others who have said that the successful British possession was perfectly justified. I agree with that entirely. It is, however, fortunate for the United Kingdom that the Soviet Union did not veto the motion which became Resolution 502 of the Security Council. It looked as though the imprimatur of respectability was given to the invasion by that resolution. Nothing of the kind. Had that resolution been vetoed by the Soviet Union, Britain would still have been justified in retaking something which was British and had been removed from her by aggression; and in spite of the United Nations declaration we would still have been right.

The tragedy of the campaign is that it might have been prevented. There were negative signs which the Argentines picked up which seemed to indicate to them that Britain was not really interested in the future of the islands. What do we do now about the situation? Here is the crux of the whole matter. There must soon be a dialogue with Argentina. I accept the points made by Mr. Smith that we are still very hurt and that the Argentines still voice expressions which indicate that their intentions are not entirely gone. None the less, there must soon come a dialogue with Argentina.

There are nearly 5,000 British troops on the islands, 8,000 miles from home — for 1,700 people. Surely, we cannot envisage this kind of logistic problem going on indefinitely. One could quite easily make calculations showing that if every family on the island were given even £1,000,000 — and of course the families must be involved in this and must have a big say in what their future is to be — that would be very much cheaper for Britain. That course would be cheaper than to continue indefinitely trying to defend islands which are so far away, and I do not believe that there would be any difficulty whatsoever — or, at least, the difficulties could be overcome — in arriving at a *modus vivendi* as a solution to this problem. These are colonial possessions — there is no doubt about that — but they are colonial possessions where the people of the colony want to

Dr. Miller (continued)

maintain the status quo, and that is very different from other colonial situations where peoples in colonies wish to have their freedom.

This Assembly should be looking carefully at the propositions which are coming from countries which are friendly towards Britain. We must pay due regard to the way in which members of the alliance stood by Britain and assisted her in the crisis in which she was involved. Those members of the alliance who have shown their solidarity and their friendliness to Britain should be listened to when they ask for a dialogue with the Argentines.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Dr. Miller.

Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish first of all to thank Mr. Cavaliere for his very important report and for the completely objective way in which he has framed it.

I shall confine my remarks to a point which seems to me essential – not that the others are less so – namely, the rôle of WEU.

Whatever may be the results of the analyses, we are rightly very exacting in this report about the rôle of the EEC, the Atlantic Alliance and NATO. But, in my opinion, we are not sufficiently so as regards that of WEU. It is a commonplace that one must put one's own house in order before asking others to do more, or to do it at the same time. As is rightly stated in the preamble to the recommendation – and our Rapporteur refers to this in his text – the Council of WEU was not convened in connection with the Falklands crisis.

The embargo was decided upon in April 1982 by the EEC, or rather by the members of the EEC because, as Mr. Cavaliere notes in paragraph 4.7 of his report, this is not a matter for the EEC since, according to Article 113 of the Rome Treaty, the EEC has no defence responsibilities. In my opinion, these responsibilities are entirely within the rôle of WEU.

Going on to note the haphazard fashion in which the decisions to lift the embargo were made, one after the other, without consultation, and recalling Mr. Pym's assertion, included in the report, that "the haste shown by France, Germany and Holland in resuming arms contracts amounted to giving the thief a premium after all", I observe a lack of consistency among the views expressed for which I personally hold the procedure responsible. Treaties exist; let us apply them.

Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty, which is the basic charter of our organisation, states that at the request of any of the contracting parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise.

The plea of extraterritoriality in relation to the geographical area covered by WEU automatically lapses with this treaty which, I would remind you, was modified in 1954. We could therefore have made a useful contribution merely by realising that, on this simple matter of imposing and lifting the embargo, which I have taken as an example, WEU could not only have organised consultations but could also have established a common political line, since an important factor in the strategic and economic interests of one of the contracting parties of WEU was involved.

I agree that we should call upon NATO and the EEC to do more – and I support the draft recommendation on this point – but I should not be completely satisfied unless we called upon the organisation which we represent here to do more as well. That is why I have taken the liberty of submitting an amendment to this effect at the last minute, hoping that it is not too late.

The PRESIDENT. – It is certainly too late to table amendments now, because there would be no time for them to be circulated and studied.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – It may well be correct that there was no consultation, as envisaged in the Brussels Treaty, between the powers. However, all of the powers concerned in this Assembly are also members of the Ten and there was considerable continuing consultation with the European ministers during all of this period. In any event, at an early stage it was referred to the Security Council where, again, consultations were continuous. It may well be that there ought to be yet another meeting with the same ministers, but wearing different hats.

Although I realise why it cannot be, I would have liked this debate to be held after the Franks report, because that would have enabled us to look at matters in greater depth when we had the facts set out objectively by a judicial body.

As for the naval lessons, I have little doubt that the next British defence review will take into account what Mr. Cavaliere said. We shall have to look at the requirements of our navy to meet the unexpected without inter-

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

fering with NATO commitments. I have no doubt that such lessons are being taken to heart.

Dr. Miller raised a point that had puzzled me and on which Mr. Hardy questioned the Minister yesterday. I say this with no significant criticism of the report, but had there been an indication at the point where it speaks of press reports telling us from where they were drawn, we might have been a little less puzzled. It is important that when in a report of this nature it is stated "press reports said" we should be given some guidance. I have done some detective work and have found out that this is from the copy of *The Economist* to which there is a reference earlier. It was 19th June, so it was not a last-minute revelation. The only reference is to *The Economist* on 19th June 1982, page 49. It says:

"The Uruguayans had asked if any Falklanders wanted to be lifted off by air 'before the invasion'. It was the Uruguayans, intriguingly, with whom the Argentine fleet had been sailing 'on manœuvres' the week before the start of invasion week."

Dr. Miller and I will have to pursue our inquiries with *The Economist*, because it is not obvious how they asked, whom they asked, whether they used a loud-hailer during manœuvres or used some other method of communication. That is the only reference to the point.

I was in South America when the invasion took place. I have no doubt that this was a very unpopular and repressive military régime that was on the point of falling by popular revolt. Only forty-eight hours before the invasion I saw a television programme showing massive anti-Galtieri riots in the streets of Buenos Aires. There were 2,000 arrests of trade unionists and others. Most people do not need to know a great deal of history to know that when repressive dictatorships are in trouble at home they are only too inclined to engage in foreign adventures. The same crowds who were shouting against Galtieri were shouting in a different way forty-eight hours later.

It was interesting to hear the comments of some neighbouring states. In private they were very different from the expressions of Latin American support that we heard. I will not embarrass those concerned by mentioning them, but they were numerous and significant. Argentina is not the most popular country on the South American continent. Up to the last moment the Chileans were not sure whether they were to be involved in the conflict because of the Beagle Islands. There was not massive

behind-the-scenes support for Argentina. There was a great deal of fear about the form the aggression might take.

Yesterday Lord Belstead spoke of self-determination being the overriding factor for the islanders. He spoke of the needs and interests of the islanders being taken into account. For that reason, especially while the current régime exists in Argentina – which has become increasingly under suspicion for some appalling acts recently – there can be no question of discussing the islanders' future forthwith. Unless the United Nations resolution is meaningless, any negotiations would fail at present and would be bound to be repudiated by all the political parties in Britain.

Even more important than self-determination is that aggression must not be allowed to succeed if we can stop it. To our endless cost we failed to learn that lesson in the 1930s. Unfortunately, we cannot always succeed in that. For example, no one is powerful enough to ensure that Soviet aggression does not succeed in Afghanistan. The Afghans do not seem to be doing too badly in terms of the cost of that adventure.

Argentina has signed a peace treaty and has agreed not to use force in regaining the Beagle Islands. That is positive step towards security in that part of the world.

It is always difficult to speak about a subject that is so important and close to us. I thank the Rapporteur and all the European countries for their understanding and support during a difficult time.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Frederic.

Mr. Sénès.

Mr. SÉNÈS (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the draft recommendation on the Falklands crisis submitted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is an explosive and dangerous subject. It defends a thesis which we need to analyse before stating the reasons why we feel obliged to abstain from voting on it.

The address given by Lord Belstead yesterday from this rostrum does not change our views. The draft recommendation submitted to us suggests that the Falklands conflict was a violation of international law. It presents the measures taken by the Ten as sanctions against this violation and calls upon us to applaud Britain's firmness.

This would suggest that the purpose of the United Kingdom's intervention was not to

Mr. Sénès (continued)

defend national interests but to enforce observance of universal principles: as if in some way Britain were acting on behalf of the Security Council with the support of the United States, Latin America and its European allies.

I do not, of course propose to go into detail about the attitudes adopted by France in the statement made by the Ten on 2nd April nor about the support which it gave to the United Kingdom in this matter, especially by applying an embargo against Argentina. But it did not adopt this line of action on the grounds referred to in this recommendation. It did so not because it supported the United Kingdom's arguments in its long-standing fundamental dispute with Argentina concerning the sovereignty of the Falklands, but for two very specific reasons. The first was that Argentina took the initiative in resorting to force, in which respect it was obviously in the wrong. The second reason was referred to by the Prime Minister, Mr. Mauroy, in the address which he gave on 20th September 1982 to the *Institut des hautes études internationales*, when he said: "Our country is also loyal to its commitments in WEU. We gave proof of this loyalty in connection with the Falklands conflict. We consider that the bonds between the member states of this old alliance should be strengthened."

To return to the crux of the matter, I note that Mr. Cavaliere's recommendation calls upon NATO to take measures to compensate in Europe for the British forces sent to the Falklands. It is by virtue of the modified Brussels Treaty that the United Kingdom has to maintain its forces on the mainland of Europe. Why should NATO be called upon to do the job of the Council of WEU?

It seems to me even more serious to call upon NATO to make a "study... of... the need for consultation and decisions" on developments not covered by the North Atlantic Treaty in order to defend "national interests". This means asking an organisation with integrated military forces to take decisions which are not within its competence. It means, in fact, directly involving the member countries of NATO in issues such as Vietnam or the Falklands, where no treaty obligation exists.

France is a party to the consultations between European members of the alliance in the framework of WEU. It wishes to remain in this framework. But I find it hard to understand a recommendation which calls for greater solidarity from our countries and is addressed to the implementing body of an alliance which is not involved in the matter, rather than to the body responsible for establishing this solidarity.

This means that I cannot support either the points of the preamble which are given as reasons for the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments' recommendation, or the recommendation itself. The purpose of my abstention is not to question our solidarity with the United Kingdom but to point out that this solidarity is based on certain foundations which Mr. Cavaliere's recommendation appears to disregard.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Sénès.

I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*).— I congratulate the Rapporteur, Mr. Cavaliere, on his balanced, fair and extremely informative report and thank him for it. We are greatly in his debt. I shall confine my observations to two issues. I was surprised and sorry to hear Mr. Sénès say that he would abstain on the draft recommendation. Argentina's act was a violation of international law. That cannot be questioned. The invasion of the Falkland Islands was a defiance and breach of the law of nations and we must not forget that war was waged in defiance and breach of the laws of war. Even today the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands and British forces there are being maimed and killed by mines sown by the Argentines all over the islands without a plan or map of where they are placed. That is a breach of the Geneva convention. It is inconceivable to me and all my fellow countrymen that in the light of such happenings and whilst the Argentines still refuse to declare the state of hostility to be at an end, despite our many invitations for them to do so, we should be asked to enter negotiations.

Negotiations can take place only when hostilities are at an end. The Argentines are saying to the world: "We have tried to get what we want by force. We have failed, so give us what we want by negotiation." That is intolerable and unacceptable. I hope that our allies, who stood so firmly by us in the heat of the hostilities when the Argentines invaded, will continue to show to the United Kingdom that understanding and tolerance to which it is entitled so long as the Argentines refuse to declare hostilities to be at an end.

To what end are the negotiations directed? The negotiations are for a transfer of sovereignty. The Argentine claim to the Falklands is completely spurious. The islands were claimed for the British Crown in the seventeenth century – that has been said over and over again in international assemblies. They were briefly occupied by France and Spain in the latter half of the eighteenth century. They

Mr. Grieve (continued)

have been under the British Crown, with British settlers, since 1833. If the sovereignty of the islands, which have been in our possession for 150 years, is to be challenged because at some previous time they were occupied by other powers, the sovereignty of almost every island in the world would be challenged. Many of the states of the United States of America could be claimed for Mexico and Spain.

In 1842, my great-great-grand-uncle, Admiral Sir James Ross, the polar explorer, wintered in the Falkland Islands in the third year of his great Antarctic voyage. He described it as "this vile place". Few of us would wish to live there, but those who are settled there desire to inhabit it. The United Nations principle and the international principle of self-determination require that the islanders' wishes should be paramount and to describe this as a colonial matter is nonsense. There was no indigenous population of the Falkland Islands, but there was of Argentina. However, the Spaniards exterminated it in order to take over the territory.

It was said that my ancestor wintered there because it was such a terrible place that none of his crews would desert, having already spent three winters in the Antarctic. When he went to the islands, they already had a British governor and administration and there were British settlers whose descendants live there to this day. They are entitled to live there in peace. If the Argentines believe that they have a claim to the Falkland Islands, they should take it to the International Court at The Hague, which they have never been willing to do.

I hope that the moderate proposals of our Rapporteur will be approved fully by the Assembly. I congratulate him on and thank him for those proposals and I thank all of our allies for their support and aid in dealing with that naked aggression, which we were well able to deal with. We have learnt many military lessons from it, as Mr. Cavaliere said in his report, and I trust that we shall take them to heart in preparing ourselves for any future cases when we may have to meet aggression, from wherever it comes.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Grieve.

Mr. Durant and Mr. Hardy are not present, so we have reached the end of the list of speakers of whom I was notified. Therefore, the general debate is closed and I ask Mr. Cavaliere to reply. I am sure that he will try to be brief. However, it would be wrong if we did not all congratulate him and his associates on an important and informative report.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, my sincere thanks for your congratulations but unfortunately I have the duty of replying. I should first like to thank all speakers, both those who have expressed reservations and criticisms and those who have given me their full support.

I would like to say to Mrs. Gherbez that I did not wish to criticise the attitude of the United Kingdom because, apart from the fact that the negotiations called for by the United Nations resolution of 1975 were started and then broken off because of the massacre by the Junta of over ten thousand *desaparecidos*, it must be remembered that the attempts made in turn by Mr. Haig, the President of Peru and the United Nations Secretary-General failed, not through the fault of the United Kingdom, but because Argentina rejected every reasonable proposal put forward.

You should consider, Mrs. Gherbez, that Argentina even rejected the concrete proposal made by the United Kingdom on 17th May, to the effect that they were willing to hand over the administration of the Falklands to a United Nations nominee provided Argentina would immediately withdraw all its invading forces.

I consider, therefore, that there are no grounds for condemning the British Government. Mention was made of the veto imposed on the resolution of 4th June; but it has to be remembered that by 4th June everything which was to happen had happened, the irrevocable step had been taken and, by then, I feel that nothing could have been expected from the Spanish and Panamanian draft proposals. The responsibility lies with those who, while there was still time, remained deaf to all appeals and proposals.

I would also like to clarify a point to Dr. Miller and Sir Frederic Bennett. The explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.17, states clearly that the information came from the press and specifically from *The Economist* of 19th June 1982. Yesterday, the British Minister admitted that there were press reports; these will be sifted together with all other material by the commission which will then announce its findings. But the Rapporteur had to give due prominence to all the possible elements in order to complete the relevant chapter. I therefore have nothing to add to what is in the report.

I cannot reply in detail to all the comments made but perhaps I may be allowed to say to Mr. Sénès and Mr. Caro that there is no question of WEU's competence for compensatory measures because the United Kingdom did not remove any forces stationed in Europe. It is a matter, therefore, of measures to compensate for forces earmarked for assignment to NATO

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

command. This must be done, not so that NATO shall change its structures and become an offensive instead of a defensive organisation but because whenever a member country has to intervene, not under NATO authority, but outside the area, the necessary compensatory measures must be taken so that any threat within the NATO area can be met.

I would again like to say to Mr. Caro that we feel obliged to express our disappointment that the Council did not meet. The Council says that no one asked it to; but action can be taken independently when such important issues are involved and events are escalating in a way which directly affects European security.

I remain convinced that negotiations are still necessary because relations between the Latin American and the western countries have seriously deteriorated and I applaud the step taken by the European Parliament to convene a joint meeting, to be held in Brussels in spring 1983 between the European Parliament and the Joint Latin American Parliament. If we want to look to our security, these relations must be restored to full normality and an end must be put to the situation which is imposing such sacrifices on the United Kingdom. In other words, the dispute over the Falklands must be ended once and for all by the conclusion of a treaty which, in my view, must determine the issue of sovereignty and must enshrine the right of the peoples to have their wishes respected.

Let us hope that this will come about as soon as possible for the sake of general calm and peace.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

That concludes the debate.

Only one amendment has been tabled, by Mr. Caro:

1. In the draft recommendation proper, after "Recommends that the Council", add a new paragraph as follows:

"Ensure in future the full exercise of the important provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty, with particular regard to paragraph 3 of Article VIII, so that the Council of Western European Union may act in emergencies by being convened immediately in the event of a threat to peace in whatever area this threat should arise;"

However, Mr. Caro did not table his amendment until 10.40 this morning, forty minutes after the debate began and less than half an hour before it ended, and there was not time for it to be circulated. It is an important amend-

ment, and in the time available members could not possibly study it.

Therefore, under Rule 29, I have decided that it cannot be selected. It would have been in order, but we cannot have amendments when there is no time to circulate them. After all, this is the fourth day of our meeting. Had we not been running late, this debate would have taken place yesterday anyway. It is therefore only right to rule it out of order on the ground of insufficient time.

As members know, all our votes now take place by sitting and standing, unless there is a request for a roll-call. I have such a request. Are there five members present who support the call for a roll-call vote?

As five members are standing, we must proceed to a vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Grant.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	39
Ayes	30
Noes	5
Abstentions	4

The draft recommendation is therefore adopted².

Representatives will know that the quorum is determined by the number on the register, and more than half the representatives signed the register, although for reasons which I cannot explain not all of them are present.

Is there any explanation of vote?

Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President, for kindly reading out the text of my amendment and thus ensuring that it will be included in the minutes. I am only sorry that it could not be debated, as this would probably have allayed the fears of some of our colleagues; it could then have been adopted by a very large majority.

The text under discussion has two major aspects: on the one hand, solidarity with the United Kingdom and, on the other hand, the strengthening of all the international bodies res-

1. See page 41.

2. See page 42.

Mr. Caro (continued)

possible for security. I feel that this debate should be resumed.

My vote supporting the draft recommendation is in favour of solidarity with the United Kingdom, but I am sorry that WEU has not become aware of its rôle, failing which, sooner or later, the Ten or the EEC will endeavour to deal with defence problems, and this will be mainly our own fault. We shall then have to accept the consequences of our attitude.

The PRESIDENT. – I understand your wish for your amendment to be taken, but we cannot conduct our business if amendments are handed in within a few minutes of the termination of the debate. That is an impossible practice.

4. Energy requirements and the security of Europe – Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 930)

The PRESIDENT. – We now turn to the next order of the day which is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on energy requirements and the security of Europe – Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 930.

I call Mr. Bassinet to present the report.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report which I have the honour to submit this morning to your Assembly is the result of the visit made to Norway last September by our Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

The report was originally to have been entitled "European security and technological developments in Norway"; your committee decided to change the title and with it, obviously, the subject of the report. It seemed to us more expedient to adopt the following title "Energy requirements and the security of Europe – Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements".

This alteration seems more consistent with the situation arising from plans for the Siberian pipeline to bring Soviet gas to Western Europe. One of the committee's aims, following this visit to Norway, was in fact to take stock of the Norwegian Government's energy policy and to

examine the possibility of replacing energy supplies from Eastern Europe.

In this oral report I should like to emphasise some of the points contained in the written report, without, of course, quoting it in full. I shall begin by making a few general remarks about Norway's external political situation.

Following a referendum in 1972, Norway refused to join the EEC. This did not prevent it from seeking to develop its economic relations with the Community, as demonstrated by the statement made by the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Svern Stray, on 4th December 1981:

"The mutual economic dependence between Norway and the Economic Community is increasing. This applies to fields such as oil and gas, industrial establishments and shipping. In 1980 a good 70 % of Norwegian exports, including oil and gas, went to the Economic Community countries and 48 % of our imports came from the Economic Community area. The Community is accordingly our principal trading partner and the most important market for our merchant shipping services."

But Norway's closest ties have, of course, been established with its Scandinavian neighbours.

Norway's attitude towards the United States and the USSR occupies an important place in its foreign policy. Geography and geopolitical considerations are weighty factors. The existence of a common border with the Soviet Union and the presence of the Kola military complex are sufficiently well known for it to be unnecessary to press this point further.

Development of oil and gas operations and the prospect of new oil and gas discoveries both off Norway north of the 62nd parallel and in the Barents Sea have added to the significance and sensitivity of the northern part of Norway.

Norway joined NATO in 1949. In his report entitled "The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands", submitted to our Assembly in April 1980, Mr. Ahrens quite correctly evaluated the Norwegian military forces and the problems presented by the great length of the country in relation to their own numbers.

As we know, the Norwegian Government does not authorise the permanent stationing of foreign troops or of nuclear or chemical weapons on Norwegian soil. The only exercises held are combined ones of the Norwegian military forces and those of various NATO countries. Exercises are not held, however, in the province of Finmark, where there is a common

Mr. Bassinet (continued)

frontier of two hundred kilometres with the Soviet Union.

Throughout its visit your committee concerned itself particularly with the policy of scientific research and technological development pursued in Norway. It paid special attention to the Norwegian defence research establishment and the Institute for Energy Technology, whose activities embrace all energy sources: oil, gas, coal and also nuclear energy and renewable energy sources. We likewise took a particular interest in research projects which are the subject of international co-operation, very often with assistance from Norsk Data.

But, as I said earlier, I should like to revert for a few moments to Norway's contribution to Europe's energy supplies. More than half of the total amount of energy consumed in Europe is imported, but the degree of dependence of the various countries differs greatly. Only two member countries of WEU, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, have sufficient resources of their own to be overall net exporters.

The policies pursued to reduce this dependence on imports differ from country to country: use of nuclear energy, diversification of the fuels used, a greater or lesser degree of reliance on coal and recourse to different producer countries. But there is a clear division between the haves and the have-nots – the countries asking for common policies and supply lines, without which a return to nationalism would inevitably be encouraged. It is in this sector, as Mr. Tindemans, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council of Ministers rightly said, that a return to nationalism is most threatening.

Diversification of energy sources and less dependence on oil imported from outside Europe are, however, two constant factors in energy policies; this explains the rapid increase since 1970 in the use of natural gas, encouraged by the discoveries made in the North Sea. It is in this context that the contracts for the supply of Siberian gas were drawn up and concluded, making the Soviet Union – together with Norway and Algeria – one of the three main non-WEU gas suppliers from 1990 onwards.

The question of the possible replacement of gas from the Soviet Union by Norwegian gas has been raised several times. The reply from the Norwegian authorities is a clear no, and this is corroborated by many studies and by expert opinion. Norway does not intend to speed up the exploitation of the deposits on which it is drawing at present, and the new gasfields will not come on stream before 1990-92.

In any case I think it would be more appropriate to ask how excessive dependence on one of the non-WEU supplier countries can be avoided. The fact is that the output from the new Norwegian deposits will quite simply and naturally compensate for the drop in production from the deposits – whether at Groningen, Frigg or Lacq – which will then be running out. Norwegian and Soviet gas supplies are therefore not complementary.

To set one against the other would inevitably mean changing the pattern of use of the different energy sources in the various member countries – in other words, changing energy consumption habits. Such a decision – and there are no indications of its being envisaged – could not possibly produce any results for more than a decade.

The disagreement on this question between the member countries and the United States has been reflected in the imposition and subsequent lifting of embargoes, the circumstances of which are fresh in everyone's minds and do not need to be restated.

These are the points and remarks that I wanted to make before quickly presenting the main lines of the recommendation unanimously adopted by the committee.

Apart from the need to promote and reinforce relations between Norway and the other countries of Western Europe, your committee thought is expedient to ask the Council to promote studies on European energy requirements in the next decades and the consequent problems for Europe's security and defence – that is, in accordance with our Assembly's responsibilities; to promote studies on high technology exports to Eastern European countries liable to have military applications and, lastly, to promote studies on the possibilities of setting up an interconnected intra-European gas pipeline network, which raises the very practical question of connecting up the United Kingdom's gas pipeline network to the one which links the rest of Western Europe.

Lastly, your committee thought it expedient to call for the promotion of an energy policy designed to guarantee member countries regular and adequate supplies of energy to meet their common security requirements.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Bassinet, and thank you for the excellent report that you have prepared for our consideration.

It is a great pleasure for me now to welcome one of our Norwegian observers, who has kindly responded to our invitation to attend. I made a brief reference to him in my opening speech on Monday. I invite Mr. Syse to take part in our debate.

Mr. SYSE (*Observer from Norway*). – Thank you, Mr. President. Allow me to express my pleasure at being here and having the opportunity to follow your work and deliberations. Having read the excellent report submitted by Mr. Bassinet and having heard him speak today, I am pleased to note that the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions might have considered its visit to Norway this summer interesting and useful. I am sure that it has helped to give the participants a more comprehensive understanding of the Norwegian Government's general policy on energy matters and of the rôle that Norwegian energy resources may play in European energy supplies.

It might be useful for me to say a few words about how we think Norway can contribute to the energy supplies of Western Europe. It is correct to say that we have huge gas resources. We have one major gasfield and we have touched one more. For the one that we have, it is almost proved that it could not be on stream until 1990 at the earliest.

That is not because of Norwegian reluctance to develop the field but for practical, technological reasons. As for size, we have estimated reserves to be one thousand six hundred billion cubic metres of gas. Producing from this field at a rate of 4 % a year would yield sixty billion cubic metres of gas a year, which is one-and-a-half times the volume of the Soviet contract. We are talking about a major gasfield.

Let me say a word about the characteristics of this field. It is located in deep water – more than three hundred metres. The reservoir is in a shallow rock depth beneath the sea bottom. To add to the complexity, under the gasfield there is a thin layer of oil. It is a relatively thin layer, about twenty-five metres at one end and six to ten metres at the other. Since this field covers nearly seven hundred square kilometres, it contains about two hundred million tons of oil. As a long-term reserve, it is important that this oil is developed. We shall need three or five years more just for further exploration of the field and to develop the necessary technology. In addition, we have a development programme and we have reached the year 1990 with that.

My main point is that this field cannot be developed in time to fulfil Europe's need for gas now. But it is an important contribution to the security of gas supplies, because we know that we have this field and when European gas suppliers enter into supply contracts with the East they know that Norway will be able to supply new gas in continuation of the Soviet gas. I believe that we are on the right track, Europe and Europe's oil producers together. I assure you that we shall not drag our feet in developing new gasfields.

We also have a new gasfield in the northern part of Norway, about which we do not know so much. We shall expand exploration with the aim of bringing the field to the market in the 1990s. People often say to us that if we do not produce this gas now there will be no market for it in the 1990s. That contradicts the other view that one would need this gas for security reasons. The size of the market in the 1990s is bound up with the consumer knowledge that there will be gas. If consumers in Europe think that there will be no more gas in the 1990s, why should they convert to it? But if they know that the gas is available and not only from the Soviets, there is a standard for the gas market.

I have been talking exclusively of Norwegian gas because Norway is big in gas but only a marginal supplier of global oil. Production today is about five times the volume consumed in Norway. The production of oil is an important factor in the Norwegian economy but it is as a gas supplier that Norway may contribute, and wants to contribute, substantially to meet European energy requirements.

All of the Norwegian gas that could technically be produced before 1990 has already been sold to European buyers. The Norwegian Government has a positive attitude to further deliveries of Norwegian natural gas to Western Europe in the 1990s. I regard that as our main contribution to western strength and unity.

(*Mr. Gessner, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Syse, thank you very much for your address, which has been an important and valuable supplement to the report submitted.

The next speaker is Mr. Jager.

Mr. JAGER (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Rapporteur must be congratulated on his interesting report and explanatory statement, both as to the usefulness of the information it contains and as to the quality of its analyses. The report is admirable because it puts the problem of the contribution of Norwegian gas to Europe's supplies from the aspect of East-West economic relations as well as in the more general framework of energy policy.

The lifting by Mr. Reagan of the embargo on supplies for the Siberian gas pipeline on 13th November last does not mark the end of the debate on the western strategy which the Americans wanted to establish as regards East-West trade.

I think Mr. Bassinet's report shows that the Siberian gas pipeline is a necessity, in view of Europe's limited resources and, in particular,

Mr. Jager (continued)

the time required to bring the Norwegian deposits on stream, of which we have just been informed by our guest, whom I welcome from this rostrum on behalf of my colleagues in the Assembly. The greater dependence to which the pipeline might lead can therefore be reduced only by better co-ordination of European policy regarding stockpiling and the interconnection of transport networks. But the central problem is not increased dependence, which will remain relatively tolerable, even for gas, for which it is likely to amount to 20-30 %, depending on the countries concerned. The important thing is whether or not the Siberian gas pipeline helps to strengthen Soviet military potential.

For it is the duty of our Assembly to examine, quite independently of our American ally, to what extent Europe can establish an economic strategy towards the East which is both realistic and mutually acceptable. From this point of view the gas pipeline crisis demonstrates the fumbling approach of the western camp, each country tending to pursue and justify policies which are all too readily aligned with its national economic interests: why should the Europeans stop exporting their technology with a view to safeguarding their uncertain energy supplies, while the United States continues to export its grain?

Furthermore, we must be prepared, if not to face an overall financial crisis with the eastern bloc, at least to work out a common attitude as regards the most heavily indebted countries, especially Poland; we shall then have to find ways of keeping politics and finance apart so that we can handle the debt without underwriting the political régimes.

In all these fields – technology, agriculture or lending – the Assembly of WEU can play a useful part by encouraging the establishment of an overall strategy capable of counterbalancing a clearly more coherent Soviet strategy. This is not so easily done, because even though I believe few of us would deny the existence of adverse effects connected with East-West trade, these are only perceptible in the long run and are difficult to assess accurately. On the other hand, the cost of a policy of export or credit restriction is keenly felt straight away in terms of lost contracts and the resultant disappearance of jobs in particularly important sectors.

The strengthening of the rôle of COCOM – apparently desired by the committee – and, more generally, control over our East-West trade call for difficult negotiations to which our discussions could undoubtedly contribute by furnishing public opinion with the necessary information.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much.

The next speaker is Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to comment briefly.

First, I wish to congratulate Mr. Bassinet on his interesting and well-argued report and I would then like to deal particularly with some passages in the draft recommendation which read: “Aware of the risk of all European countries importing concurrently their energy supplies from outside Western Europe and of the wastefulness of duplicate pipelines...” and “Considering the need for a close study of European energy requirements in the next decades so as to ensure Europe’s energy supplies, etc.”.

The reasoning behind these points is that the new Norwegian gas will not be available until 1990 and, therefore, as the facts show, energy materials will unavoidably have to be imported from East Europe. While all this shows that it is both right and opportune to call for studies of energy requirements over the coming decades, of the resultant problems for European security and defence and of the feasibility of setting up an intra-European gas pipeline network, there is a possible danger of moving towards self-sufficiency which is even more anachronistic today when energy and economic problems are closely intertwined with Europe’s security and defence problems.

We are, for example, wholly convinced of the need for alternative energy sources in order to ensure constant, reliable supplies.

This is not to be interpreted – and is not intended to be so – as playing down the necessity and advisability of increasing the West European countries’ own capacities and the sources of energy. On the contrary, this policy must be pursued both to cut costs and reduce and possibly eliminate waste by using energy sources in a rational manner.

However, while on the one hand it is right to work for Europe’s security and defence, it is equally true on the other hand that we must never be less than fully committed to working for the defence of peace as the greatest benefit to mankind; but this will certainly not be achieved by a policy of self-sufficiency and calls rather for the development, in both the energy and economic fields, of co-operation with, for example, all the countries round the Mediterranean and in particular with the Arab countries and even the Soviet Union. For these reasons, Mr. President, if the draft recommendation remains in its present form, which fails to take enough account of the link between

Mr. Martino (continued)

energy and co-operation for economic development, which obviously requires interexchange between countries, we shall have difficulty in giving our full support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much.

I now call Mr. Worrell.

Mr. WORRELL (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am a little hoarse. That is not because we made a trip to Norway – that was some months ago – but because I have caught a cold. I hope what I say will be intelligible all the same.

May I, before dealing briefly with a number of points in Mr. Bassinet's brief but extremely informative report, first of all congratulate him on his excellent document, which was produced in such a short time. During our committee's visit to Norway the importance of the relationship between Norway and Western Europe again became apparent, not only in connection with the problems of peace and security but also in connection with the co-operation keenly desired by Norway in the field of economic relations and the problem – both short-term and long-term – of energy supplies.

It must be clear that the energy question is not a separate problem for each country. During the next few years, in particular, the utmost effort must be made to safeguard the energy supplies of each of our countries by consultation and co-operation in Western Europe. Norway, especially, with its natural energy sources, will be able to make an important contribution to the solution of this problem. The utmost effort will be required of us all to find practical solutions through co-operation and consultation if we are faced with another energy crisis.

The Rapporteur is therefore quite right to stress the importance of trying to bring the solution of the energy problem nearer by means of co-operation and mutual agreements. We are unfortunately still far from having a European energy policy. That is one of the reasons why it is important for us to consolidate and extend contacts with countries in Northern Europe. That is also why a co-ordinated programme for energy saving and the use of alternative energy sources should be embarked upon in Europe.

I think we have to admit that, while we are spending a great deal of money on all kinds of energy programmes, nuclear power stations and all kinds of research, there is as yet no co-ordinated programme for energy saving. Demand for energy has admittedly decreased

appreciably, but this is the result of our economic problems rather than of an effort to economise. That is precisely why a co-ordinated approach to the search for alternative energy sources is called for.

A considerable amount of attention is paid in the report to the problems of the so-called Russian pipeline for supplying gas to Western Europe. The Rapporteur rightly mentions the fact that our countries – despite our common recognition of the risk – are not always happy about the United States Government's attitude. There is a difference in their analysis, leading to different views with regard to the economic and technological aspects of the East-West relationship, so that ultimately we do not reach the same conclusions. The fact that the United States Government finally abandoned the sanctions against firms supplying parts for the Russian pipeline is to be welcomed. Better late than never, you might say. But this is also an indication of the way in which the United States Government thinks it has to decide on questions of energy and security in Western Europe.

To put it mildly, the policy of the United States Government is not very consistent when it steps up grain shipments to the Soviet Union to an extremely high level at a time when Western Europe is being threatened with sanctions. I therefore agree with the Rapporteur that it is much more important, as we have seen in the past, for Western Europe to realise that a certain risk attaches to energy supplies both in general and in particular with regard to our security and economic interests. This is not primarily because of the Russian pipeline, which involves only 4% of total energy supplies, but problems could certainly arise if at some future date there were to be a combination of possible sanctions by the Soviet Union and sanctions imposed by the Middle East, such as we have seen in the past. If these were to coincide, that might have major consequences for our security in Western Europe. It is therefore important that new contracts should be distributed as widely as possible among our member countries. At the same time there must be a prospect of a genuine European energy policy. Co-operation in this field should enable us to contain possible future problems.

Finally, I should like to say something about the problems of nuclear energy. In the report the Rapporteur expresses some regret that the economic situation has caused delays in the extension of nuclear power stations. Of course some people regret this, but perhaps we can also do some rethinking during the lull. Many people in our countries are very worried about the problems of nuclear energy. The problem of waste causes us as much concern as that of security. It is not only the ring-leaders – or

Mr. Worrell (continued)

whatever this Assembly calls them – of action groups, but a great many other people who are seriously worried, not only about their own situation but also about that of future generations. It may be of economic importance in the short term to build all sorts of nuclear power stations, but in the longer term we must also realise what we are doing to the next generation and what we may be saddling it with. For we have not yet mastered the problem of waste. It is therefore extremely important to devote our attention to the problem.

I will conclude with one last remark. It would also seem important for us to give joint consideration to the position as regards nuclear planning in our countries. We have a major problem there in connection with cross-frontier relations. We in Europe must realise that when a nuclear power station is sited in one country, it has far-reaching consequences for another country. It is necessary not only for governments but also for population groups to be aware of these matters and to be given a say, because the problems of nuclear energy, the problems of waste and the problems of security do not stop at the frontiers but extend beyond them.

(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Worrell.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – The Assembly and the whole of Europe are aware of Norway's contribution to energy requirements, as well as its valuable contribution to western defence and security. However, I wish to talk more generally. We all accept that it will not be long before European gas and oil reserves are finished. We know that they are finite and we must be prepared for the production of energy in the next century, not only for our security but for our continued existence as industrial nations and the maintenance of a reasonable standard of living for all our people.

The report asks from where Europe must import its oil. It is significant that, according to information that I received from the head of the Atomic Energy Agency of the OECD, no OECD country is building an oil-fired power station. They are all building stations fuelled by coal or nuclear energy.

If we neglect nuclear power, our children and grandchildren will be in danger of lacking the means of maintaining their standard of living. The present Chairman of the British Central Electricity Generating Board, Sir Walter Mar-

shall, an eminent physicist who used to be Chairman of the Atomic Energy Authority, said at a forum in London a week ago today that he did not envisage any radical change in the nuclear production of energy from fission to fusion for more than a hundred years – despite the fact that not long ago it was assumed that fusion, which is a very safe method of producing power, would be with us much sooner. Therefore, we must concentrate on the methods of producing power and energy that we have at the moment.

We have coal. Unfortunately, few countries have the stocks of coal that are available in Britain, but those which do – Australia, the United States of America, Poland and one or two others – must produce coal for their energy requirements. A man whose name may be known to some members – the communist president of the Scottish miners, Mr. Mick McGahey – has said that the last thing we should do with coal is burn it because it is valuable for so many other uses.

We should not be afraid of going ahead with our nuclear reactors. Some of us visited the reactors at Tricastin three weeks ago. France is now producing nearly 40 % of its energy by nuclear means, and the proportion will be more than 80 % by 1990. We must not eschew this method. We can experiment with other methods, I agree – sea and wind power, biomass and so on – but they are far in the future.

We now have a method of producing power cheaply and cleanly, a method which can be used by advanced nations – nuclear power. I know that there are objections and problems in some countries about the production of power by nuclear means. One is waste disposal. I hope that the Rapporteur will take on board, and that the Assembly will take cognisance of, the fact that methods must be developed of disposing of nuclear waste as safely as possible. We should not neglect production by nuclear means.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Dr. Miller.

Mr. Forma has the floor.

Mr. FORMA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall deal briefly with a number of points, which I would have liked to develop more fully, concerning the draft before the Assembly and the excellent report produced by Mr. Bassinet, whom I congratulate. May I also say how pleased I was to hear the Norwegian Observer's contribution to our meeting.

Admittedly, we are concerned with only one very special aspect of the energy famine which has not only Europe but the whole world in its grip; only one aspect of this catalyst vital to our lives and our defence and of this thorn in our

Mr. Forma (continued)

flesh which bothers us so much that it is very frequently discussed here.

Mr. Bassinet has dealt with one particular geographical aspect of the problem but has skilfully fitted it into the overall background, extending to the whole world, which the committee was able to consider from the standpoint of industry and the territorial distribution of production and from the standpoint of security which depends on all the rest. Mr. Bassinet brings everything back to the willingness of the parties and to the need to study the whole problem together, to combine all the different interests in a single higher interest.

In recent times, some differences have arisen concerning what is wanted in this and other fields. This morning we heard Mr. Cavaliere's report. Much has been said here about what has happened in connection with the Siberian gas pipeline and about the interference which has occurred, with varying degrees of acceptability. It seems that the problem is now being resolved. The latest information indicates the withdrawal of certain unacceptable measures. The Norwegian problem is parallel to the others. I cannot say whether one is more reliable than the other, or whether armed protection – because this too was discussed during the committee's visit to Norway – is enough to guarantee that country's production. Certainly, as the Rapporteur said, our sources must be interconnected. And in the event of the failure of one source the others must be capable of filling at least part of the gap in order to avoid sudden shutdowns of European production. Ways and means of ensuring this were discussed at NATO headquarters in Norway and this is not a subject for discussion here.

Basically, from what we read in the report, it seems to me that there is not much difference as regards reliability between the Baltic and the Siberian gas and that the other suggested alternatives – for example, concerning gas from Alaska – should be examined and borne in mind, but with the required measure of caution. The basic idea to emerge from the report is that Europeans must realise that they are faced by a common problem. They must not selfishly try to grab a few tonnes of gas or coal for the use of a single country.

We too often look upon our Europe and our land as a geographical expression. I think we should always remember that we must not be what Lamartine said about my country – a geographical expression. We must be one people on one land, with one common determination; in that way we shall go forward to solve the problems of which Mr. Bassinet and others have spoken.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Forma.

That concludes the list of speakers. I will ask the Rapporteur whether he wishes to reply and will then call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – I shall begin by thanking the various speakers who have had nothing but kind words for my report, which touched me deeply.

Mr. Syse, our guest, emphasised in his address the importance of Norway's gas reserves. He stressed that from the point of view of the security of our supplies these represented a potential beyond 1990, but he did not speak of a possible increase in production during the next few years. The remarks I have just made from the rostrum are thus in line with his statement.

Mr. Jager emphasised the fact that Siberian gas and gas from Norway were complementary. He regards the Siberian gas pipeline project as a necessity and does not believe that our dependence in terms of supplies will increase when it comes into operation. It is true that the proportion of energy supplies represented by Siberian gas will be around 5 % for France or the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance.

He raised the delicate question as to whether the pipeline would increase the Soviet Union's military strength, but without providing a clear answer. He also stressed the contradiction between the United States' embargo decision and its continuing grain exports to the Soviet Union. He clearly stated the problem represented by the need for a common policy on the one hand, the assertion of sometimes more selfish national interests on the other.

Mr. Martino made a number of remarks with which I concur, but I have to admit that I do not understand his conclusion. Like him, I do not believe there will be any new gas from Norway until 1990 and I think we need to diversify our sources of supply and avoid waste and duplication. I also agree with him about the need for co-operation with the Mediterranean countries. In this connection I emphasised, both in my written report and from the rostrum, that part of the gas supply to Western European countries comes from Algeria, in particular, and that it was therefore necessary to diversify by obtaining supplies from the Soviet Union.

On the grounds that the recommendation does not mention everything, Mr. Martino concludes that it is not altogether satisfactory. He must be well aware, as a party politician, that one cannot put the world to rights at every congress. Similarly, in a recommendation,

Mr. Bassinet (continued)

unless we are going to make it bigger than all the volumes of the Encyclopedia Britannica put together, we cannot depart from the committee's terms of reference, namely the security of Europe, and the energy requirements linked with the supply of Norwegian gas – that was the purpose of our mission – and also the specific problem strongly emphasised both from the floor of the Assembly and in the press as well as in the debates following the conclusion of the various contracts with the Soviet Union – namely whether or not there is a possibility of substitution. During the discussion, nobody mentioned the supply of gas by Algeria to countries such as Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and France. Once more, I have to admit that, from the preliminary arguments which he put forward, I did not understand Mr. Martino's conclusion.

Mr. Worrell said that he agreed with the points made in the report. Apart from the problems directly connected with gas policy, he made much of the question of nuclear power stations. It is true that analyses differ concerning the use – whether brought forward or delayed – of nuclear power situations. We ought perhaps to examine this question in future, because energy supplies have a very direct bearing on the security of our countries. They are in fact fully within the mandate of this Assembly.

Dr. Miller emphasised that Europe's gas and oil reserves are limited. It all depends on the time scale adopted. While there should be no difficulty up to 1990, a real problem will undoubtedly arise after the year 2000 or 2010. He therefore wanted us to consider the possibility of greater reliance on nuclear energy and coal, known world reserves of which are in excess of foreseeable consumption for the next six hundred years. These are interesting suggestions, which might well be the subject of a future debate and a future report.

Mr. Forma underlined the need for diversification and interconnection of our sources and hence of our supply networks, a suggestion we heartily support. He also referred to the possible supply of gas to Western Europe from Alaska. We have not yet found the technical solution to the transportation of gas from the fields which may be developed in Alaska in the future. As he said in his conclusion, when faced with a common problem, Europeans are sometimes too inclined to set it in a purely national context. There can be no strictly national solution to the collective security of energy supplies.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Bassinet.

I call the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I do not wish to prolong this debate in view of the time and the approaching end of the session. Anyhow, practically everything has been said and I shall confine myself to a quick review of a few major points which show how important our vote is.

Our committee worked hard in Norway this summer and without wishing to offend anyone – especially Mr. Syse, who has, unfortunately, had to leave us – I can say that all our meetings began by our Norwegian hosts referring to “our little country, Norway...”. It is true that Norway is a small country, though in terms of energy it is a colossus. However – as a first point of contrast – Norway rightly wishes to adapt its industry to the growth in its energy capacity based on gas, but without stepping up this growth to an extent which would force it to resort to large-scale imports of industrial equipment. That is a natural and perfectly understandable attitude, backing up a strategic choice which consists in deferring the full output of the Norwegian gasfields for the next few years.

Mr. Syse told us just now in fact that Norway, with an annual production capacity of sixty billion cubic metres – one-and-a-half times that of the Soviet Union, which is forty billion – represents a considerable potential, carrying us into the 1990s, with substantial supplementary resources to continue meeting Europe's requirements.

A second observation: this report introduces a view which differs somewhat from the way in which we have dealt with energy problems in our debates hitherto. Not content with choosing between new or alternative forms of energy, or between this or that supplier, we now have to set our discussions in the context of the future – of a timetable envisaged in terms of a generation, or even several generations. For WEU this is a completely new approach, neatly defined in the draft recommendation, the specific purpose of which is to instigate studies in this direction. It is vital for us to avoid the hit-and-miss approach which followed the 1973 oil crisis, with the situation alternating between relaxation and tension. We must tackle the problem squarely in terms of our generation, that of our children and perhaps with an even longer-term view than that.

Lastly, some further aspects were dealt with during our mission. I am sure you read the Rapporteur's comments on Norsk Data with interest, and I am sure you also took note of Norway's research structures, its Royal Council and other bodies, representing a considerable research effort. The Rapporteur's statement

Mr. Valleix (continued)

– with which I hope Mr. Martino will concur – should enable us to reach a unanimous conclusion. This emerges unmistakably from the proposals submitted to us, about which I do not think anyone could have any conscientious scruples.

On the one hand, I regard it as crucial to avoid dissipation of our efforts, especially with regard to gas pipeline networks and possible interoperability, and on the other, I believe that WEU should officially raise the problem of “energy and security”.

Whether in terms of strategy or, of course, of disarmament, any steps we might take to ensure the defence of our countries would be pointless if we were “sterilised” from the outset as regards energy supplies. That is why stating the problem in terms of security, energy, timing and possible sources of supply in the coming decades is genuinely relevant to the rôle of WEU.

I therefore hope, Mr. Martino, that you will accept the replies given you by our Rapporteur, because in my opinion there are no fundamental divergences between your analyses.

I should also like to repeat my congratulations to our Rapporteur, who has been very kindly and ably assisted in his work by Miss Berès, whom we likewise thank. We regret, of course, the absence of our Counsellor, Mr. Huigens, to whom we again send our best wishes, hoping to see him again in January.

Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you again for your attention at the end of the session and I hope that, if possible, the Assembly will adopt the recommendation unanimously.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Valleix.

That concludes the debate.

There are no amendments.

I ask the Assembly to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 930. Unless there is a demand for a roll-call vote, we shall vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

My congratulations to the Chairman and the Rapporteur.

5. Booklet on WEU and its activities

Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion

(Presentation of and debate on the reports of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Docs. 928 and 929)

The PRESIDENT. – We now turn to the next orders of the day, the presentation of and debate on the reports of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments on the booklet on WEU and its activities and on the conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion, Documents 928 and 929.

If the Chairman agrees, it might be convenient to take the debates together. I will, of course, call each of the Rapporteurs to present his report. Is that agreeable? Thank you.

I have also received notice of a motion in the name of Mrs. Knight and some of her colleagues concerning the installation of telex in the office. I wonder whether she might refer to that in her remarks and I will put the motion formally, as I am permitted to do by the rules, at the end of our proceedings.

I had the Presidential Committee begin studies on this matter a year ago. It has had some experts in and there are further meetings this month on how to introduce more modern technology, as well as telex. No doubt Mrs. Knight will bring in this aspect when she speaks.

I ask Mr. Berchem to introduce his report. May I say how valuable this document is. I know that all those concerned with European political matters will agree.

Mr. BERCHEM (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the booklet which I have the honour to submit to you on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments is not new to you. An initial outline was in fact submitted to you in December 1981 and a provisional text in June 1982. The final text of this booklet, which scarcely differs from the June draft, does not call for any lengthy comments, but I should like to enlarge on a few points in response to the wishes of our Assembly.

In June I expressed my gratitude to all the members of the WEU international secretariat, which had given me valuable assistance. I shall take this opportunity to clear up certain misunderstandings which arose during the discussion of the WEU budget. The expenditure comprises the operating cost not only of the Assembly but also of the bodies originating from the Brussels Treaty and its application. Several senior officials kindly suggested improve-

1. See page 43.

Mr. Berchem (continued)

ments to the text submitted in June, all of which, as you will see, I have been able to include. I do not wish to repeat the whole list of persons to whom I am indebted; but I wish to express my thanks to the Secretary-General of WEU and all those members of his staff who have been kind enough to re-read the text with such care. They have suggested amendments which have improved the content of the booklet.

But the main difference between the final text and that of the draft submitted to you in June relates to the end of each chapter. As I was then asked to do, I had a collection made of all those recommendations adopted by our Assembly since its establishment which relate to the various organs of WEU, namely the Council, the Secretariat-General, the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the Standing Armaments Committee and the international secretariat itself. I found that in many cases these revealed a veritable doctrine of the Assembly, which has undergone little change since 1955 and which has consistently aimed at asserting the responsibilities of WEU and has called for them to be actively fulfilled by all its various bodies. It was therefore easy for me to select a number of recommendations in order to highlight this doctrine. I naturally then went on to pick out the essential points of the Council's replies to these recommendations, which show that there is in fact also a Council doctrine with regard to WEU and its organs and that this is by no means the same as that of the Assembly. One had only to bring these texts together and compare them, without the benefit of any comment at all by your Rapporteur, in order to reveal the existence of a political debate which has been in progress for twenty-seven years, but has produced few changes in the respective positions of the Council and the Assembly.

In so doing I had no intention of meddling in matters which form part of the responsibilities of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments or the General Affairs Committee. I was not trying to defend a thesis, but simply to provide objective information. Within the limits of a short booklet, I have quoted texts. That they speak for themselves is a fact beyond my control, but I think that to reproduce them is fully in accordance with the duties of a committee whose job it is to inform public opinion about the activities of the WEU Assembly.

I should like, lastly, to thank the President, Mr. Mulley, who kindly wrote an introduction to the booklet at the request of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. It was intended that this introduction should be printed on a separate sheet which was to have been inserted

in each copy of the booklet, but could also have been distributed on its own. I am sorry that circumstances beyond everyone's control prevented it from being printed before the session. It has been distributed only in a roneoed form which cannot be inserted in the booklet but I understand that it will soon be printed and can be included in the booklet after the session.

I should also like to thank the two delegations which have kindly undertaken to translate the booklet into German and Dutch. I believe we shall also manage to have it translated into Italian, so that it will be possible to provide the necessary information on WEU in the official languages of all the member countries. This will have to be done if we want to reach parliamentarians, the press and ultimately public opinion in all these countries.

The report contains a short introduction mentioning the sources drawn upon, but has little to say about the history of WEU and the Brussels Treaty, other than a brief summary in the chapter on the origins of WEU. The treaty was subsequently modified by various protocols more precisely defining WEU's responsibilities and areas of competence as well as its operation and relations with the other European organisations.

Still within the framework of WEU proper, Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty set up the WEU Council, which is composed of ministers and representatives and is able to exercise its functions continuously. The Permanent Council, composed of ambassadors or permanent representatives, meets in the United Kingdom, at the seat of the organisation, in London, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General of WEU.

Another chapter deals with the Agency for the Control of Armaments, whose function is to provide the Council with data allowing it to guarantee that all the member states follow a policy of peace whilst reinforcing their security and encouraging the progressive integration of Europe. In the exercise of its institutional tasks, the agency is responsible directly to the Council of WEU.

Next comes the Standing Armaments Committee, SAC, which was set up by a decision of the WEU Council of 7th May 1955 in application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. Unlike the Agency, it is composed of representatives of the WEU member countries who may be either their permanent delegates or other senior officials under the chairmanship of the representative of each country in turn. Its main aim is to develop consultations and co-operation in the armaments field in close liaison with NATO.

Mr. Berchem (continued)

The operation of the Agency and the SAC is clearly described in the booklet.

The Assembly, in turn, is composed of representatives of the seven member countries, and you are very well acquainted with their rôle, their powers and their methods of work.

As you know, the texts submitted by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments do not have to be formally adopted. I hope nevertheless that the booklet which I have the honour to submit to you today will meet with your approval. It was produced in order to meet a need expressed by us all. I hope that I have complied with your wishes.

My last remark concerns the cost of the booklet, which, owing to its format, was a good deal cheaper to print than the usual documents.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Berchem, for all the work that you and others have done to present such a good booklet.

I call Mr. Stoffelen to present his report.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I do not intend to speak for more than a few minutes. I thank the Rapporteur and the secretariat for their excellent work on the information booklet. I wish to present my progress report on conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion. In June I had the honour to present my report, as now, during the last few minutes of our sitting. I tried to make it clear that we must do everything that we can to make our work more efficient. The sad fact is that the follow-up to our reports is rather poor. Public awareness of the existence of Western European Union, not to mention its aims, is almost nil.

Today I wish to make a few suggestions about how we work. We can attract the interest of European members of parliament and journalists only if we restrict ourselves to topical subjects such as European defence. We must restrict ourselves to matters strictly connected with the contents and aims of the Brussels Treaty.

We could produce interesting reports on several aspects of political life, but I do not think that that would necessarily attract journalistic interest. We cannot expect colleagues and journalists at home to pick up our reports if they have no political relevance. We must restrict the number of reports that we produce. How many members of the Assembly read all the reports? How can we expect colleagues at home to read them? I doubt whether they do. We must try to restrict the number of documents that we produce. I said that in

June and later we dealt with the subject in the Presidential Committee. It is no use complaining about existing practice during the last minutes of a sitting if we do not then make changes. Members must remember what we say, even in the last minutes, and they must restrict themselves.

This is my last progress report on the committee. Two are enough. We intend to analyse the follow-up to two topical reports on the relationship between security and peace movements. We intend to discover what lessons, if any, can be learnt from the follow-up. This week we tried to deal with eleven reports in three days. We did that successfully. We all want to do everything that we can to ensure that there is a follow-up in our national parliaments and in the Council. Our wonderful week in Paris should not be regarded just as a pleasant time but as a useful week. We need a follow-up for the sake of European defence.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Stoffelen.

There are no draft recommendations attached to the reports. We do not vote on them but they are debatable. I hope that both reports will be debated because they are valuable to our future work.

Mr. Page is the first speaker.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – On a hot sunny afternoon in California, an American friend of mine addressed a great conference such as this and there was only one person left in the audience. Like me, he spoke briefly, walked to the edge of the platform, held out his hand and said: "Thank you, sir, for staying to listen to my speech. May I ask who you are?" The man replied: "I, sir, am the next speaker."

It is a tragedy, to use a big word, that there are so few people here to listen to our discussion on the two reports, which are the shop windows through which people can look at the activities of Western European Union. I am sad that both the benches at the back and those at the front are rather empty.

I had prepared rather a good speech, but I shall cut most of it, which is bad luck for you and for me, because I wish to say something rather new and different from what the two Rapporteurs said. It does not matter very much whether there are no reports of our activities in the ordinary newspapers. It does not matter at all. This is a specialist organisation whose job is to appeal to defence specialists – parliamentary specialists, academics, researchers, our parliamentary colleagues and, of course, governments and ministers. I should not be surprised if there were a conference of brain surgeons in Paris now, but there will be no

Mr. Page (continued)

reports about the technique of brain surgery. The only report that we shall hear is of a leading brain surgeon being found at the Crazy Horse with a beautiful actress. That will be news. I am not worried that we do not receive much press publicity, although I am glad that Mr. Hernu's speech received so much good publicity. Two of our sister organisations have hit the front pages during the past five years – the Council of Europe when Miss Brigitte Bardot attended a debate on seals and the IPU conference in Rome when Mr. Yasser Arafat addressed it.

We must increase the specialised knowledge of those to whom we should appeal. I congratulate Mr. Berchem on his splendid and interesting booklet. All delegates should be examined on that booklet before they are allowed to take their places here. I have learnt much about WEU from the report and I was ashamed of how little I knew. As to Mr. Stoffelen's report, may I ask you, Mr. President, to pay attention to paragraph 19 where we ask that the rules should be changed so that the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations is allowed to make reports and recommendations.

I have a good idea only about once every two years – longer than the period of pregnancy of elephants – but I have one important thought to put to you now for serious consideration. We must increase the knowledge of our work among our parliamentary colleagues. Half the substitutes should be allowed to attend the Assembly for only one meeting. They would not take part in the committees but would be allowed to attend our assemblies so that in two or three years we could have three hundred or four hundred more parliamentary colleagues who knew about our work and who could go back to the parliaments as defence specialists and put across the message. That would be very valuable in extending the influence of Western European Union.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Page.

Mrs. Knight has the floor.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – I am well aware that if I speak for longer than about two minutes it will not be the next speaker who will wait alone in the chamber but the caretaker. I congratulate my two colleagues, Mr. Berchem and the respected and excellent Chairman of our committee, Mr. Stoffelen, on their work on an information report and on a report that contains much wise guidance in the form of recommendations. The report is correct to urge us to debate topical subjects and to keep our reports limited. We should suggest that one subject is left open so that we can debate immediately an urgent matter that has cropped

up. However, all that we do here is not well served by the arrangements now available to publicise our work. The report that we are considering is entitled: "Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion". We have no adequate means by which to do that. The committee – I am sure that I say this with the support of my Chairman – is conscious of the vital need for good press communications. The report reflects our anxiety about that.

However, we go on and on about the matter and nothing is done. There are excellent press representatives here sitting just around the corner who are ready to listen to what we say. However, during the past week when I have tried to communicate what I wish to say to newspapers in the West Midlands, one could not do that through the press representatives here. The more enquiries that I made, the more astonishing I found the position. An excellent press person here told me that the only way in which I could be certain that a report of our proceedings would get into the British newspapers was to take a taxi to Reuters myself with a copy clutched in my hot little hand. That is absolutely ridiculous. How many members of this Assembly have time, when they have to attend debates and votes, to go to an office far from the chamber?

Several colleagues and friends have supported a motion asking you, Mr. President, in your vital capacity as Chairman of the Presidential Committee, to institute a study as a matter of urgency into the installation of a telex. Delegates would then be able to submit reports to the Press Association, Reuters and other international press organisations which cannot receive news at the moment.

A whisper can go around the world if it has the necessary technological amplification and publicity aids, but the most powerful voice in Christendom will stay for ever enshrined in earshot if there are no means of carrying it forward. I beg the Assembly to listen to the words of the committee, which are expressed on behalf of all its members. I hope that urgent and earnest attention will be given to this vital way of making our activities known throughout Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – As I have said, we are already studying the possibility of a telex, not just for delegates' speeches to be submitted but for our general use throughout the world. I am not sure that it would result in more publicity, because the agencies are represented here. They report everything they want to report. I am afraid that the speeches of some delegates may not be of sufficient interest to command the attention of the news agencies. However,

The President (continued)

we shall certainly examine the matter if the motion is passed.

I call Mr. Romano.

Mr. ROMANO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I agree that the importance of the subject before us must not be underrated. Let us, however, console ourselves with the thought that the problem is not confined to WEU but affects generally all the institutions where policies are formulated and where ideas, approaches and ideological attitudes are compared. Political debate exists to the extent that it is communicated; consequently, in our days, politics are tending to take on the dimensions and characteristics of a public performance. The mass media, the press, radio and television, rather than assemblies and parliaments are now becoming the scene and basic tools of politics – and we should not be displeased by this. This is not happening, however, without serious risks that politics may become no more than mere propaganda.

Let us look at Mr. Stoffelen's report. In my opinion it reflects very well the feeling of frustration, which we all share to some extent even if we do not always admit it, that WEU has not been given the public attention and place which it deserves. Obviously, when seen from within and by the people involved, all work is important and is never properly recognised; but unquestionably, among the international organisations, WEU has created a very limited, or virtually no impression, and this perhaps is precisely where the problem lies. I do not know whether the Committee for Relations with Parliaments is the right place for this but that is not important. I think that, all things considered, Mr. Stoffelen has identified the substance of the problem in his report; he offers an analysis of the way WEU operates and a criticism, for those who care to read, of its line of action and work, which are of course partly governed by its statutes.

But, says Mr. Stoffelen, if no new policies are discussed and topical issues are not debated, the debates themselves are very unlikely to arouse any echo in the press, among the general public or in national parliaments. It is difficult not to agree with this conclusion. I agree with Mrs. Knight's proposal for the installation of a telex: I might even have signed it if I had been asked; I also agree with Mr. Stoffelen and all his proposals for the Presidential Committee, the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, the chairmen of national delegations, and so on. Of course, I am rather doubtful as to the results they will achieve; clearly the problem is not one of instruments, because the instruments are there. The problem is one of

content; failing a radical change in WEU's life and image, it will be difficult to change its relationship with the general public. This I believe to be an essential aspect of the matter. It is not a question of means or of instruments but of the content and political substance of our work.

I think that WEU should perhaps, at least once a year, break its routine and should promote something different, to deal with a single, specific issue of the most immediate concern. For example, the emergence of the pacifist movements is something completely new in Europe. Let us organise a debate on that subject. But this involves the governing bodies of the Assembly and any regulations which apply. I realise that this is difficult but the authorities should set themselves to studying the problem, if need be taking the advice of communications experts to find out the best way of doing so.

Finally, we all feel that something must be done and I can endorse all the demands made in Mr. Stoffelen's report and by various speakers.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Romano.

Mr. Urwin has the floor.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – I am sure that my friend and colleague Mr. Stoffelen will forgive me and understand my reasons for not dwelling lengthily on his report. I say only that I completely accept everything he has said on the stimulation of interest in the activities of Western European Union in its present form; but perhaps it is about its future form that we have to be objective. There is one aspect of the situation on publicity for the organisation, and especially participation within it, on which I have said from time to time that it is to some extent wrong to expect respective member states of the Council of Europe who are members of the WEU Assembly to send the same delegation. It has occurred to me more than once that if this were not so, provision could be made for the selection of people from within the parliaments of the member states who are regarded as specialists in defence matters.

It has always seemed to me that there is a weakness in our system here because it appears that quite a number of members of parliament come to this Assembly who have little or no interest, or perhaps just a passing interest, in any aspect of defence at all. I believe that this would lead to some improvement not just in the quality of debates but additionally by having a material effect on the attendance at the sittings of the plenary sessions of this important organisation. There are those of us

Mr. Urwin (continued)

here who recall quite easily – after all, it is a fairly recent event – that we used to sit from Monday to Friday in plenary session.

Then, because of sparse attendance on Friday morning, with no one hanging around to participate in anything that happened after lunch-time, the powers that be, in their infinite wisdom, decided that we should truncate the meeting time and reduce it to four days. In effect, it is only three days by the time we get started on Monday afternoon; so that we have tried in some way to meet the requirements of some people. One has to understand that when we leave our mother country on a Sunday, as I and many others have to do, to get here on Monday morning, occasions will arise when people arrive later than Monday morning, and will have to depart earlier than Thursday lunchtime to attend to their constituency responsibilities.

Before this week I had thought that WEU was arriving at a kind of watershed. Admittedly, there is little interest in our debates, even by the press. It is largely only on those occasions when we have important ministers addressing the Assembly that we get any publicity at all. In this context, my confidence in WEU, which was tending to ebb just a little, has been reinforced this week by the very important and objective things that have been said to us by successive ministers – by the French Prime Minister, Mr. Mauroy, by the Defence Minister, by the British Minister of State yesterday, and other important ministers including prime ministers. Not long ago Mr. Mitterrand, President of the French Republic, noted the importance of the rôle of WEU. Other prime ministers, too, have made similar comments, but it appears that, while we have this moral support, not enough attention is paid by some member governments to the importance of WEU.

I feel indebted also not only to our two Rapporteurs this morning, who for obvious reasons have had perhaps to shorten their contributions, but also to you, Mr. President, for the substantial contribution you have made to the restoration of confidence in the rôle of WEU and the work that it does. I thought your remarks in your opening address on Monday morning were significant for the future developing rôle of this organisation. Here again today we have the benefit of this important written contribution in your name, which is intended to be regarded as an introductory document on the information report presented by Mr. Berchem. We have to pay much more attention to these important remarks that you, Sir, especially have made this week. I regret that I had not appreciated until this week that you are nearing the

end of your presidential term. Perhaps I could have hoped that you had offered these remarks at the beginning of your term rather than at this time. Nevertheless, they lose none of their value by their timing.

It is beyond question that WEU is the only organisation in Europe in the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty to have any responsibility for defence. I regret that I am speaking longer than I had hoped but I believe that our credentials are impeccable; but we have to ask ourselves whether we are keeping abreast in Europe itself. Since 1948, since the formation of WEU and perhaps more especially since the modification of the Brussels Treaty in 1954, it is sad that it appears that WEU is one of the lesser known organisations in Europe, and yet at the same time it ought to be regarded as the most important European organisation in relation to its responsibilities on defence.

I again express my disappointment at the flirtations that we have conducted from time to time with the concept and the idea of European union. I am sure we all readily recall the De Poi report of not long ago. I was one of those who opposed the whole concept of what was contained in that report and there have of course been predecessors of Mr. De Poi who addressed themselves to the same question. At that time I entered a caveat in the form of an amendment suggesting that we should consider setting up a sub-committee to deal with all these difficult problems that were raised by our Italian colleague, Mr. De Poi, in that important report. I believe, especially in the light of this week's events, that we should give more serious consideration to how we handle this question on an ongoing basis. We simply cannot afford to leave it as it is now, especially after the lead that we have been given by yourself, Mr. President, and by other important people.

Whoever might want to stake a claim to taking up this question on a more progressive, ongoing basis, I float the idea that the Presidential Committee might seriously consider establishing a more or less permanent sub-committee, which would have direct responsibility for examining the whole situation of WEU, how it can be improved, how our activities can be made more interesting, and the strengthening of the organisation at the same time.

I humbly apologise for having taken so long but there is so much of importance in these two excellent reports that I feel, Mr. President, that you will readily accept my apologies.

The PRESIDENT. – I am sure no one would have wanted you to curtail your remarks, Mr. Urwin. I thank you for your kind personal references. Your constructive suggestion is one which should certainly be taken up, and I shall

The President (continued)

endeavour to get colleagues interested in what you propose.

I call Mr. Stoffelen to reply to the speakers.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – First, I want to thank the President and colleagues who have made pleasant remarks about the activities of the two Rapporteurs, and express thanks for the kind words on the quality of the information booklet. I do so on behalf also of the Rapporteur, Mr. Berchem.

Mr. Page, eloquent as usual, spoke about shop windows and made one remark upon which I must comment. He compared us in a way with brain surgeons, although I am not sure whether that was his intention. At least we agree about the need to make our work better known by our colleagues. But we are parliamentarians; we are representing the people and I cannot see how parliamentarians, representatives of the people, would not wish to let the people know what we are doing. If we are discussing relations between European security and peace movements, we are dealing with public matters.

Mr. Page and Mr. Urwin spoke about the make-up of delegations to the Council of Europe and WEU. Our treaty lays down how delegations should be made up. There have been problems on this issue over the years. Several delegates do not have a special interest in European defence and that has some effects. I cannot see any solution to this other than that we should ask the Presidential Committee to study the matter again.

I agree with the proposal made by Mrs. Knight who has, unfortunately, had to leave early. We have to improve our work, but our work cannot be known if there are no technical means of allowing it to happen. We certainly need telex and I ask my colleagues to support the motion. Even if we do improve our technical methods but do not change the image of WEU, we shall have a problem. We cannot do more than our best. Let us do that. I thank all of my colleagues who have participated in the debate.

The PRESIDENT. – I, too, regret that only at the end of the week we should be discussing the important subject of how we conduct our affairs. I must remind members of the committee that they are members of national delegations and of the other committees.

It is no good advising us on procedure if people are sitting on committees and voting on two or more reports. We have to be consistent. Mr. Stoffelen knows that this item is on the agenda of the Presidential Committee this

afternoon. We shall see how far we can proceed with these interesting ideas.

It is outside the scope of the Assembly, the Presidential Committee or the Council to change the basis of our delegations. This is written into the treaty. A change would require an amendment of the treaty, with all of the ratification processes needed in all parliaments. I first suggested it over twenty years ago but so far no government has been willing to initiate that procedure.

We must now examine the motion for an order tabled by Mrs. Knight and others on a telex wire service, Document 939.

I put formally the motion:

“That the Presidential Committee should institute a study, as a matter of urgency, into the cost and practicability of instituting at the Palais d’Iéna a telex wire service which would be available to delegates for the submission of press reports to the Press Association, Reuters, etc., in their home countries, with the intention that this might operate as from the summer Assembly in 1983.”

The Presidential Committee has already begun studying this matter and we can include this point. There may be difficulties about installing telex in this building because it does not belong to us, but we could do it in the adjacent premises. The subject of the cost would have to be taken up. We might not get a warm response from the Council to a request for a telex service relating only to this narrow point.

Does anyone object to the motion?...

The motion for an order is agreed to¹.

I must also ask whether there are any objections to the reports that have been presented by Mr. Berchem and Mr. Stoffelen. If there are no objections, the Assembly takes note of these reports, dealing with improving relations between the Assembly and the public.

6. Close of the session

The PRESIDENT. – I now declare closed the twenty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union, thanking in particular those who have remained to the end. I wish you all a safe journey back to your own countries.

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 1.25 p.m.)

1. See page 44.

INDEX

INDEX OF PROCEEDINGS

I - First part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session II - Second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session

	Page		Page
A			
Accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1981			
Presentation of the motion to approve the final -	II - 144		
Debate on the -	II - 144-145		
Vote on the motion	II - 145		
Address by:			
The Provisional President	I - 60-61		
The President	I - 61-63 II - 47-49		
Mr. Tindemans	I - 65-68		
- Questions and answers	I - 68-71		
Mr. Cheysson	I - 93-95		
Mr. Leister	I - 151-155		
- Questions and answers	I - 156-159		
Mr. Hernu	II - 83-88		
- Questions and answers	II - 88-91		
Mr. Fioret	II - 101-103		
- Questions and answers	II - 103-104		
Lord Belstead	II - 154-156		
- Questions and answers	II - 156-159		
Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council			
Presentation of the report	I - 83-85		
Debate on the report	I - 85-87		
Amendment 1 by Mr. De Poi	I - 90		
- Adoption of the amendment	I - 90		
Amendment 2 by Mr. De Poi	I - 91-92		
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 95		
Amendment 3 by Mr. De Poi	I - 95-96		
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 96		
Amendment 4 by Mr. De Poi	I - 96		
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 96		
Amendment 5 by Mr. Prussen	I - 90		
- Adoption of the amendment	I - 91		
Amendment 6 by Mr. Cavaliere	I - 91-92		
- Adoption of the amendment	I - 95		
Vote on the amended draft recommendation	I - 96-97		
Attendance lists	I - 18, 25, 32, 38, 44, 52 II - 14, 20, 25, 30, 36, 40		
B			
Booklet on WEU and its activities			
Presentation of the report	I - 216-218 II - 193-195		
Debate on the report	I - 218 II - 195-199		
Budget of the Assembly for 1983			
Presentation of the -	II - 136		
Debate on the -	II - 136-141		
Amendment 1 by Mr. Stoffelen	II - 141-143		
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 143-144		
Vote on the amended draft -	II - 144		
Budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1982			
(see: Opinion on the -)			
C			
Committees			
Nomination of members to -	I - 87		
Changes in the membership of -	I - 89, 223 II - 49, 71		
Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion			
Presentation of the report	I - 218-221 II - 195		
Debate on the report	I - 221-223 II - 195-199		
Credentials			
Examination of -	I - 61, 196 II - 46-47		
D			
Disarmament			
Presentation of the report	I - 106-108		
Debate on the report	I - 108-111, 112-119		
Amendment 1 by Mr. Hardy	I - 119		
- Adoption of the amendment	I - 119		
Amendment 2 by Mr. Hardy	I - 120		
- Adoption of the amendment	I - 120		
Amendment 3 by Mr. Hardy	I - 120		
- Adoption of the amendment	I - 120		
Amendment 4 by Mr. Beix	I - 119-120		
- Adoption of the amendment	I - 120		
Amendment 5 by Mr. Vohrer	I - 119		
- Adoption of the amendment	I - 119		
Amendment 6 by Mr. Vohrer	I - 119		
- Adoption of the amendment	I - 119		
Vote on the amended draft recommendation	I - 120-121		

	Page
E	
Energy requirements and the security of Europe - Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements	
Presentation of the report	II - 185-186
Debate on the report	II - 186-193
Vote on the draft recommendation .	II - 193
European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia	
Presentation of the report	II - 105-107
Debate on the report	II - 107-117
Amendment 1 by Mr. Cavaliere	II - 117-118
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 118
Amendment 2 by Mr. Cavaliere	II - 119-120
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 120
Amendment 3 by Mr. Cavaliere	II - 120
- Amendment not moved	II - 120
Amendment 4 by Mr. Cavaliere	II - 120-121
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 121
Amendment 5 by Mr. Cavaliere	II - 122
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 123
Amendment 6 by Mr. Cavaliere	II - 123-124
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 124
Amendment 7 by Mr. Cavaliere	II - 124
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 124
Amendment 8 by Mr. Cavaliere	II - 131-132
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 132
Amendment 9 by Mr. Cavaliere	II - 132-133
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 133
Amendment 10 by Mr. Dejardin ...	II - 124
- Amendment not moved	II - 124
Amendment 11 by Mr. Dejardin ...	II - 128
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 128
Amendment 12 by Mr. Dejardin ...	II - 134-135
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 135
Amendments 13 and 14 by Lord McNair	II - 123
- Rejection of the amendments	II - 123
Amendment 15 by Lord McNair ...	II - 127-128
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 128
Amendment 16 by Lord McNair ...	II - 129-130
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 130
Amendment 17 by Lord McNair ...	II - 130-131
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 131
Amendment 18 by Mr. Enders	II - 120
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 120
Amendment 19 by Mr. Blaauw	II - 118-119
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 119
Amendment 20 by Mr. Blaauw	II - 118
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 118
Amendment 21 by Mr. Blaauw	II - 120-121
- Amendment not moved	II - 121
Amendment 22 by Mr. Blaauw	II - 121-122
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 122
Amendment 23 by Mr. Blaauw	II - 124-125
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 125
Amendment 24 by Mr. Blaauw	II - 129
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 129
Amendment 25 by Mr. Bassinet	II - 132-133
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 133
Amendment 26 by Mr. Bassinet	II - 121-122
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 122

	Page
Amendment 27 by Mr. Wilkinson and others	II - 132-133
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 133
Amendment 28 by Mr. Wilkinson ..	II - 133-134
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 134
Vote on the amended draft recommendation	II - 135
European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	
Presentation of the report	I - 205-208
Debate on the report	I - 208-213
Amendment 1 by Mr. Hardy	I - 215-216
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 216
Amendment 2 by Mr. van Eekelen .	I - 214
- Adoption of the amendment	I - 214
Amendment 3 by Mr. van Eekelen .	I - 214-215
- Adoption of the amendment	I - 215
Amendment 4 by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and Mr. Urwin	I - 214
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 214
Vote on the amended draft recommendation	I - 216
Evolution of the situation in Poland	
Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee	I - 64
Presentation of the report	I - 147-150
Debate on the report	I - 150-151, 159-163, 165-167
Manuscript amendment by Mr. Michel - Adoption of the manuscript amendment	I - 168
Amendment 1 by Mr. Pignion	I - 168
- Adoption of the amendment	I - 168
Amendment 2 by Mr. Pignion	I - 168-169
- Adoption of the amendment	I - 169
Amendment 3 by Mr. Pignion	I - 169
- Manuscript amendment by Mr. Michel	I - 169
- Adoption of the amended amendment	I - 170
Manuscript amendment by Mr. Michel - Adoption of the manuscript amendment	I - 170
Vote on the amended draft recommendation	I - 170

F

Falklands crisis	
News agency report	I - 96
Previous question	I - 138, 139
Presentation of the report	I - 140-141 II - 175-177
Reference back to committee	I - 141-143
Debate on the report	II - 177-184
Amendment 1 by Mr. Caro	II - 184
- Ruled out of order	II - 184
Vote on the draft recommendation .	II - 184-185

	Page
H	
Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	
Presentation of the report	I - 97-100
Debate on the report	I - 100-104
Amendment 1 by Mr. Blaauw	I - 104
- Adoption of the amendment	I - 104
Manuscript amendment by Mr. Antoni	I - 104-105
- Ruled out of order	I - 104
Vote on the amended draft recommendation	I - 105
I	
International aeronautical consortia - guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982	
Presentation of the report	I - 171-173
Debate on the report	I - 173-179
Vote on the draft recommendation .	I - 179
M	
Middle East	
(see: Situation in the -; European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia)	
N	
Nuclear weapons	
(see: Problem of - in Europe)	
O	
Observers	I - 63 II - 49
Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1982	
Presentation of the report	II - 145-146
Debate on the report	II - 146-149
Vote on the draft opinion	II - 149
Order of business	
Adoption of the -	I - 63-64 II - 49
Orders of the day	I - 12, 22, 30, 36, 42, 48, 195-196 II - 12, 18, 21, 27, 34, 38

	Page
P	
Poland	
(see: Evolution of the situation in -)	
Political activities of the Council - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	
Presentation of the report	I - 73-76
Debate on the report	I - 77-82
Amendment 1 by Mr. Blaauw	I - 82
- Manuscript amendment by Mr. Vecchietti	I - 82
- Adoption of the amended amendment	I - 82
Vote on the amended draft recommendation	I - 82
President	
Election of the -	I - 61
Address by the -	I - 61-63 II - 47-49
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	
Presentation of the report	I - 121-124
Debate on the report	I - 124-137
Amendment 1 by Mr. Gessner	I - 144
- Withdrawal of the amendment ...	I - 144
Amendment 2 by Mr. Pignion	I - 144-146
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 146
Amendment 3 by Mr. Mommersteeg	I - 144
- Adoption of the amendment	I - 144
Amendment 4 by Mr. Mommersteeg	I - 145-146
- Adoption of the amendment	I - 146
Vote on the amended draft recommendation	I - 146-147
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism	
Presentation of the report	II - 55-56
Debate on the report	II - 57-70, 71-83
Amendment 1 by Mr. Cavaliere	II - 91-92
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 92
Amendment 2 by Mr. Cavaliere	II - 93
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 93
Amendment 3 by Mr. Cavaliere	II - 93
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 93
Amendment 4 by Mr. Cavaliere	II - 97
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 97
Amendment 5 by Mr. Cavaliere	II - 98
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 98
Amendment 6 by Mr. Cavaliere	II - 98-99
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 99
Amendment 7 by Mr. Cavaliere	II - 100-101
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 101
Amendment 8 by Mr. Hardy	II - 97
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 97
Amendment 9 by Mrs. Knight and others	II - 95-97
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 97
Amendment 10 by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim and Mrs. Knight	II - 100
- Withdrawal of the amendment ...	II - 100
Amendment 11 by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim and Mrs. Knight	II - 91
- Amendment not moved	II - 92

	Page
Amendment 12 by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim and Mrs. Knight	II - 92-93
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 93
Amendment 13 by Mr. Smith	II - 101
- Amendment not moved	II - 101
Amendment 14 by Mr. Lagorce	II - 99
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 99
Amendment 15 by Mr. Hardy	II - 99
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 99
Amendment 16 by Mr. Lagorce	II - 100
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 100
Vote on the amended draft recommendation	II - 104-105

R

Report of the Council, twenty-seventh annual -

(see also: Application of the Brussels Treaty; Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields; Political activities of the Council)

Presentation by Mr. Tindemans	I - 65-68
- Questions and answers	I - 68-71

Revision of the Rules of Procedure

Reference back to committee	I - 194, 195-196
Presentation of the report	II - 49-51
Debate on the report	II - 51-54
Vote on the draft resolution	II - 54

S

Session

Opening of the -	I - 60
Adjournment of the -	I - 223
Resumption of the -	II - 46
Close of the -	II - 199

Situation in the Middle East

Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure	I - 71-72
Presentation of the oral report	I - 179-181
Debate on the oral report	I - 181-183
Amendment 1 by Mr. Blaauw	I - 197
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 197
Amendment 2 by Mr. Blaauw	I - 198-199
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 199
Amendment 3 by Mr. Blaauw	I - 199
- Withdrawal of the amendment	I - 199
Amendment 4 by Mr. Blaauw	I - 200-201
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 201
Amendment 5 by Mr. Blaauw	I - 201
- Withdrawal of the amendment	I - 201
Amendment 6 by Mr. Blaauw	I - 201-203
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 203
Amendment 7 by Dr. Miller	I - 201-203
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 203
Amendment 8 by Dr. Miller	I - 203-204
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 204

Page

Amendment 9 by Dr. Miller	I - 204
- Withdrawal of the amendment	I - 204
Amendment 10 by Mr. Dejardin	I - 197-198
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 198
Amendment 11 by Mr. Dejardin	I - 198-199
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 199
Amendment 12 by Mr. Dejardin	I - 199-200
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 200
Amendment 13 by Mr. Dejardin	I - 200-201
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 201
Amendment 14 by Mr. Dejardin	I - 201-203
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 203
Amendment 15 by Mr. Dejardin	I - 204
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 204
Vote on the draft recommendation	I - 205

State of European security

Presentation of the report	II - 151-154
Debate of the report	II - 159-169
Amendment 1 by Mr. Dejardin	II - 170
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 170
Amendment 2 by Mr. Dejardin	II - 171-173
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 173
Amendment 3 by Mr. Dejardin	II - 173
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 173
Amendment 4 by Mr. Morris and others	II - 172-173
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 173
Amendment 5 by Mr. Urwin and others	II - 172-173
- Amendment not moved	II - 173
Amendment 6 by Mr. Pignion	II - 170
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 171
Amendment 7 by Mr. Pignion	II - 171
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 171
Amendment 8 by Mr. Rösch	II - 171
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 171
Vote on the amended draft recommendation	II - 173-174

T

Telex wire service

Motion for an order	II - 199
- Adoption of the order	II - 199

Texts adopted :

Recommendations

- 378 - Evolution of the situation in Poland	I - 19
- 379 - Political activities of the WEU Council - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	I - 21
- 380 - Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	I - 28
- 381 - Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	I - 29
- 382 - Disarmament	I - 34

INDEX

	Page
- 383 - The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	I - 40
- 384 - Evolution of the situation in Poland	I - 45
- 385 - International aeronautical consortia - guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982	I - 46
- 386 - Situation in the Middle East	I - 55
- 387 - European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	I - 56
- 388 - Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism	II - 26
- 389 - European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia	II - 31
- 390 - State of European security .	II - 37
- 391 - The Falklands crisis	II - 42
- 392 - Energy requirements and the security of Europe - Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements	II - 43

	Page
Resolution :	
- 68 - Revision of the Rules of Procedure	II - 15
Opinion :	
- 29 - Budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1982	II - 33
Orders :	
- 56 - Situation in the Middle East	I - 20
- 57 - Telex wire service	II - 44
Tributes :	
To Mr. Calamandrei	II - 47
To Sir Geoffrey de Freitas	II - 47
To Mr. Gonella	II - 47
To Mr. Périquier	II - 47
To Mr. Mendès-France	II - 47

V

Vice-Presidents	
Election of -	I - 63, 137-138

INDEX OF SPEAKERS

I – First part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session II – Second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session

	Page		Page
A			
Mr. Adriaensens (<i>Belgium</i>):		Mr. Baumel (<i>France</i>):	
Budget of the Assembly for 1983 ...	II - 136, 140-141, 142-143	European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	I - 212
Accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1981	II - 144	State of European security	II - 164-166
Mr. Althammer (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):		Mr. Beith (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Evolution of the situation in Poland	I - 159-160	Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	I - 129-130
Mr. Antoni (<i>Italy</i>):		Mr. Beix (<i>France</i>):	
Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	I - 101-102, 104, 105	Disarmament	I - 115-116, 119
Disarmament	I - 108-109	Lord Belstead (<i>Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom</i>):	
Mr. Atkinson (<i>United Kingdom</i>):		Address by –	II - 154-156
Point of order	I - 143	Replies to questions	II - 157-159
Evolution of the situation in Poland	I - 150-151	Mr. Benedikter (<i>Italy</i>):	
Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion	I - 221-222	Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 77-78
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 58-59	Sir Frederic Bennett (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia	II - 107-108	Situation in the Middle East	I - 71-72, 192-193, 197-198, 199-200, 203
B			
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (<i>Netherlands</i>):		Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	I - 81-82
Evolution of the situation in Poland	I - 161-162	Disarmament	I - 114, 120
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 65-66	Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	I - 128
European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia	II - 110	European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	I - 213
State of European security	II - 174	Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 82-83, 92
Mr. Bahr (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):		Question put to Mr. Hernu	II - 88
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	I - 126-127	European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia .	II - 116-117, 118-119, 121, 122, 123, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134
Mr. Bassinet (<i>France</i>):		Question put to Lord Belstead	II - 157
European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia	II - 113-114, 121, 132	Falklands crisis	II - 180-181
Energy requirements and the security of Europe – Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements	II - 185-186, 191-192	Mr. Berchem (<i>Luxembourg</i>):	
		Booklet on WEU and its activities ..	I - 216-218 II - 193-195
		Mr. van den Bergh (<i>Netherlands</i>):	
		Disarmament	I - 110
		Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	I - 127-128
		Situation in the Middle East	I - 185
		Question put to Mr. Hernu	II - 89

INDEX

Page	Page
Mr. Bernini (Italy):	
Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council I - 85, 97	Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe I - 131-132
Mr. Blaauw (Netherlands):	
Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council I - 80-81, 82	Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council I - 86
Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council I - 100-101, 104	Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe I - 134
Situation in the Middle East I - 188, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203	Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ... II - 99, 104
European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia . II - 118, 119, 121, 122, 124, 129,	Budget of the Assembly for 1983 ... II - 143
State of European security II - 151-154, 167- 169, 171	
Mr. Böhm (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ... II - 74-76	
Mr. Brown (United Kingdom):	
Disarmament I - 110-111	Point of order I - 164-165
International aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn from the collo- quy on 9th and 10th February 1982 . I - 175-176	Revision of the Rules of Procedure . II - 52-53
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ... II - 74, 79-80	
Mr. Büchner (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ... II - 73-74	
C	
Mr. Caro (France):	
State of European security II - 167	Falklands crisis II - 180, 184-185
Mr. Cavaliere (Italy):	
Application of the Brussels treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council I - 87-91	Disarmament I - 118-119, 119- 120
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe I - 137, 146	Falklands crisis I - 140-141, 143 II - 175-177, 183- 184
Question put to Mr. Leister I - 157-158	Situation in the Middle East I - 184-185
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ... II - 68-69, 91, 93, 97, 98, 100, 101	Question put to Mr. Hernu II - 89
European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia . II - 110-111, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123-124, 131, 132	Question put to Lord Belstead II - 158
State of European security II - 169, 170, 173	
Mr. Cheysson (Minister for External Relations of the French Republic):	
Address by – I - 93-95	
Mr. Cox (United Kingdom):	
Point of order I - 106	
D	
Mr. Dejardin (Belgium):	
Disarmament I - 109	Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe I - 130-131, 145
Evolution of the situation in Poland . I - 169	Situation in the Middle East I - 182-183, 186, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201-202, 203-204, 205
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ... II - 91, 92, 93	European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia . II - 128, 132-133, 134, 135
Opinion on the budget of the minist- erial organs of WEU for 1982 II - 146	State of European security II - 161-162, 170, 172, 173, 174
Mr. Della Briotta (Italy):	
Situation in the Middle East I - 179-181, 192, 201, 202-203, 204	
Mr. De Poi (Italy):	
Question put to Mr. Tindemans I - 68	Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council I - 79-80
Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council I - 90, 91, 92, 95, 96	Question put to Mr. Fioret II - 103-104
Budget of the Assembly for 1983 ... II - 143-144	

	Page
Mr. Durant (United Kingdom):	
Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion	I - 222
European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia .	II - 122
Accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1981	II - 144
Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1982	II - 148
E	
Mr. Edwards (United Kingdom):	
Address by the Provisional President	I - 60-61
Examination of credentials	I - 61
Election of the President	I - 61
Mr. van Eekelen (Netherlands):	
Question put to Mr. Tindemans	I - 69
Question put to Mr. Leister	I - 156
Situation in the Middle East	I - 181-182
European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	I - 205-208, 213, 214, 215-216
Mr. Enders (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Disarmament	I - 117-118
European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia .	II - 120
Budget of the Assembly for 1983 ...	II - 139
F	
Mr. Fiandrotti (Italy):	
Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	I - 97-100, 102-103, 105
Mr. Fioret (Under-Secretary of State to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs):	
Address by -	II - 101-103
Replies to questions	II - 104
Mr. Forma (Italy):	
Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	I - 101
Energy requirements and the security of Europe - Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements .	II - 190-191
Mr. Fosson (Italy):	
Disarmament	I - 116-117

	Page
Mr. Fourré (France):	
International aeronautical consortia - guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982	I - 174-175
G	
Mr. Garrett (United Kingdom):	
Situation in the Middle East	I - 201, 203, 204
Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion	I - 221
European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia .	II - 114
Point of order	II - 143
Mr. Gessner (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	I - 91, 97
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	I - 144
Mrs. Gherbez (Italy):	
Falklands crisis	II - 178-179
Mr. Grant (United Kingdom):	
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 57-58
Mr. Grieve (United Kingdom):	
Revision of the Rules of Procedure .	II - 49-51, 53-54,
European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia .	II - 118, 121-122, 129-130
Budget of the Assembly for 1983 ...	II - 143
State of European security	II - 171
Falklands crisis	II - 182-183
H	
Mr. Hardy (United Kingdom):	
Disarmament	I - 113-114, 119, 120
Situation in the Middle East	I - 198-199, 202
European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	I - 208, 215
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 69-70, 96, 97, 99
Question put to Lord Belstead	II - 157-158
Sir Paul Hawkins (United Kingdom):	
International aeronautical consortia - guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982	I - 177
Budget of the Assembly for 1983 ...	II - 140
Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1982	II - 147-148

	Page		Page
		M	
Mr. Hernu (<i>French Minister of Defence</i>):		Mr. McGuire (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Address by -	II - 83-88	European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia	II - 112-113
Replies to questions	II - 89-91	Lord McNair (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Lord Hughes (<i>United Kingdom</i>):		Situation in the Middle East	I - 187-188
Point of order	I - 170	Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 105
J		European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia .	II - 111, 123, 127-128, 129, 130
Mr. Jager (<i>France</i>):		Mr. Maravalle (<i>Italy</i>):	
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 66-67	Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	I - 128-129
Energy requirements and the security of Europe - Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements	II - 187-188	Mr. Martino (<i>Italy</i>):	
Mr. Jessel (<i>United Kingdom</i>):		Budget of the Assembly for 1983 ...	II - 140
Point of order	I - 63	Energy requirements and the security of Europe - Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements	II - 188-189
Mr. Kurt Jung (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):		Mr. Michel (<i>Belgium</i>):	
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	I - 134-135, 145	Evolution of the situation in Poland	I - 147-150, 166-167, 168-169, 170
Questions put to Mr. Leister	I - 158	Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 72-73
Evolution of the situation in Poland	I - 162-163	European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia .	II - 111-112
European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	I - 209-210, 214	Dr. Miller (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
K		Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	I - 125-126, 145
Mrs. Knight (<i>United Kingdom</i>):		Situation in the Middle East	I - 191-192
Question put to Mr. Tindemans	I - 70	Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 72
Evolution of the situation in Poland	I - 165-166, 170	European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia .	II - 109-110
Situation in the Middle East	I - 184	State of European security	II - 162-163
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 67-68, 92, 95-96, 97	Falklands crisis	II - 179-180
Booklet on WEU and its activities; Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion	II - 196	Energy requirements and the security of Europe - Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements .	II - 190
L		Mr. Mommersteeg (<i>Netherlands</i>):	
Mr. Lagneau (<i>Belgium</i>):		Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	I - 121-124, 135-136, 144, 145
Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion	I - 222	Mr. Morris (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Mr. Lagorce (<i>France</i>):		Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 62-63, 93
Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	I - 86-87	Question put to Mr. Hernu	II - 89
Question put to Mr. Leister	I - 156	State of European security	II - 172
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 55-56, 80-82, 91, 92-93, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101	Mr. Günther Müller (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):	
Mr. Leister (<i>Minister of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany</i>):		Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	I - 132-133
Address by -	I - 151-155	European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	I - 208-209
Replies to questions	I - 157, 158-159		

	Page
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 59-61
Mr. Mulley (United Kingdom):	
Address by the President	I - 61-63 II - 47-49
Election of Vice-Presidents	I - 63, 137-138
Observers	I - 63 II - 49
Examination of credentials	I - 196 II - 46-47
Tributes	II - 47

O

Mr. Osborn (United Kingdom):	
Question put to Mr. Tindemans	I - 70-71
Question put to Mr. Leister	I - 156
International aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982	I - 173-174
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 63-64

P

Mr. Page (United Kingdom):	
Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	I - 79
Question put to Mr. Fioret	II - 104
Booklet on WEU and its activities; Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion	II - 195-196
Mr. Pecchioli (Italy):	
State of European security	II - 160-161
Mr. Pignion (France):	
Question put to Mr. Tindemans	I - 70
Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	I - 77-78
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	I - 144-145, 146
Evolution of the situation in Poland	I - 168-169
European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	I - 216
Revision of the Rules of Procedure .	II - 51-52
Budget of the Assembly for 1983 ...	II - 138-139, 142
State of European security	II - 166-167, 170, 171
Mr. Prussen (Luxembourg):	
Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	I - 83-85, 90, 92, 96
Situation in the Middle East	I - 182
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 76-77

	Page
Budget of the Assembly for 1983 ...	II - 140
Question put to Lord Belstead	II - 157
State of European security	II - 161

R

Lord Reay (United Kingdom):	
Situation in the Middle East	I - 183-184
European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	I - 211-212
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 92
European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia .	II - 105-107, 116, 119, 120, 122, 124, 125, 128, 132, 135
Mr. Reddemann (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	I - 80
Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	I - 85
Point of order	I - 105, 106
Situation in the Middle East	I - 186-187
European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia .	II - 114-115, 121

Mr. Romano (Italy):	
Evolution of the situation in Poland	I - 166
Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion	II - 197

Mr. Rösch (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Evolution of the situation in Poland	I - 160-161
State of European security	II - 163-164, 171

Mr. Rubbi (Italy):	
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 64-65, 105

S

Mr. Scholten (Netherlands):	
Disarmament	I - 112-113

Mr. Schulte (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Revision of the Rules of Procedure .	I - 195-196

Mr. Sénès (France):	
Question put to Mr. Tindemans	I - 70
Falklands crisis	II - 181-182

Mr. Smith (United Kingdom):	
Disarmament	I - 114-115
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	I - 133-134

Page	Page
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 58, 101
Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1982	II - 148-149
Question put to Lord Belstead	II - 156-157
State of European security	II - 159-160
Falklands crisis	II - 177-178
Mr. Spies von Büllesheim (Federal Republic of Germany):	
International aeronautical consortia - guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982	I - 176-177
Situation in the Middle East	I - 189-190
Revision of the Rules of Procedure ..	I - 194
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 61-62, 100
Mr. Stainton (United Kingdom):	
Accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1981	II - 144-145
Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1982	II - 145-146, 149
Mr. Stoffelen (Netherlands):	
Booklet on WEU and its activities ..	I - 218 II - 199
Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion	I - 218-221, 222-223 II - 195, 199
Budget of the Assembly for 1983 ...	II - 136-138, 141-142, 143
Mr. Syse (Observer from Norway):	
Energy requirements and the security of Europe - Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements ..	II - 187
T	
Mr. Tindemans (Belgian Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council):	
Address by -	I - 65-68
Replies to questions	I - 68-71
U	
Mr. Urwin (United Kingdom):	
Points of order	I - 63-64, 90, 95, 105 II - 98
Question put to Mr. Tindemans	I - 69
Situation in the Middle East	I - 72, 188-189
Political activities of the Council - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	I - 78-79
Falklands crisis	I - 141-143
European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	I - 214
Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism ...	II - 78-79
State of European security	II - 172, 174
Booklet on WEU and its activities; Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion	II - 197-198
V	
Mr. Valleix (France):	
Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	I - 103-104, 105
Questions put to Mr. Leister	I - 156
Energy requirements and the security of Europe - Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements ..	II - 192-193
Mr. Vecchiotti (Italy):	
Political activities of the Council - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	I - 73-76, 81, 82
Situation in the Middle East	I - 190
European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia ..	II - 108-109, 122, 125, 131, 135
Mr. Vohrer (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Disarmament	I - 106-108, 118, 119
Question put to Mr. Hernu	II - 88-89
W	
Mr. van der Werff (Netherlands):	
Budget of the Assembly for 1983 ...	II - 143
Mr. Wilkinson (United Kingdom):	
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	I - 146
Question put to Mr. Leister	I - 156
International aeronautical consortia - guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982 ..	I - 171-173, 177-179
European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	I - 210-211, 215
Question put to Mr. Hernu	II - 89
European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia ..	II - 131, 132, 134
Point of order	II - 143
Question put to Lord Belstead	II - 159
State of European security	II - 163, 170, 172-173
Mr. Wittmann (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	I - 124-125
Mr. Worrell (Netherlands):	
Energy requirements and the security of Europe - Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements ..	II - 189-190

