

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1979

II

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

W E U

PARIS

**ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION**

**43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tél. 723.54.32**

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The Proceedings of the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume I : Assembly Documents.

Volume II : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.



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## LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

### BELGIUM

#### Representatives

<b>MM. ADRIAENSENS</b> Hugo	Socialist
<b>BONNEL</b> Raoul	PVV
<b>HANIN</b> Charles	Soc. Chr.
<b>MANGELSCHOTS</b> Jan	Socialist
<b>PEETERS</b> Renaat	Soc. Chr.
<b>TANGHE</b> Francis	Soc. Chr.
van <b>WATERSCHOOT</b> John	Soc. Chr.

#### Substitutes

<b>MM. BRASSEUR</b> Guy	<b>FDF</b>
<b>DEJARDIN</b> Claude	Socialist
<b>LAMBIOTTE</b> Fortuné	Socialist
<b>MICHEL</b> Joseph	Soc. Chr.
<b>PERIN</b> François	<b>PRLW</b>
<b>VAN DER ELST</b> Frans	Volksunie
<b>VERLEYSSEN</b> William	Soc. Chr.

### FRANCE

#### Representatives

<b>MM. BIZET</b> Emile	RPR (App.)
<b>BOUCHENY</b> Serge	Communist
<b>BRUGNON</b> Maurice	Socialist
<b>DEPIETRI</b> César	Communist
<b>DESCHAMPS</b> Bernard	Communist
<b>FERRETTI</b> Henri	UDF
<b>GRUSSENMEYER</b> François	RPR
<b>JAGER</b> René	UCDP
<b>JEAMBRUN</b> Pierre	Dem. Left
<b>PÉRIDIER</b> Jean	Socialist
<b>PÉRONNET</b> Gabriel	UDF (App.)
<b>PETIT</b> Camille	RPR
<b>PIGNION</b> Lucien	Socialist
<b>SCHLEITER</b> François	Ind. Rep.
<b>SEITLINGER</b> Jean	UDF
<b>SÉNÈS</b> Gilbert	Socialist
<b>TALON</b> Bernard	RPR
<b>VALLEIX</b> Jean	RPR

#### Substitutes

<b>MM. BAUMEL</b> Jacques	RPR
<b>BECHTER</b> Jean-Pierre	RPR
<b>BELIN</b> Gilbert	Socialist
<b>BERRIER</b> Noël	Socialist
<b>BOZZI</b> Jean	RPR
<b>COUDERC</b> Pierre	UDF
<b>DELEHEDDE</b> André	Socialist
<b>DRUON</b> Maurice	RPR
<b>JUNG</b> Louis	UCDP
<b>KOEHL</b> Emile	UDF

### MM. LAGOURGUE Pierre

**LEMAIRE** Marcel  
**LEMOINE** Georges  
**MALVY** Martin  
**MÉNARD** Jacques  
**MERCIER** Jean  
**VISSE** René  
**WARGNIES** Claude

### UDF

**CNIP**  
 Socialist  
 Socialist  
 Ind. Rep.  
 Dem. Left  
 Communist  
 Communist

### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

#### Representatives

<b>MM. AHRENS</b> Karl	SPD
<b>BARDENS</b> Hans	SPD
<b>Mrs. von BOTHMER</b> Lenelotte	SPD
<b>MM. ENDERS</b> Wendelin	SPD
<b>EVERS</b> Hans	CDU/CSU
<b>GESSNER</b> Manfred-Achim	SPD
<b>HANDLOS</b> Franz	CDU/CSU
von <b>HASSEL</b> Kai-Uwe	CDU/CSU
President of the Assembly	
<b>LAGERSHAUSEN</b> Karl-Hans	CDU/CSU
<b>MARQUARDT</b> Werner	SPD
<b>MENDE</b> Erich	CDU/CSU
<b>MILZ</b> Peter	CDU/CSU
<b>MÜLLER</b> Günther	CDU/CSU
<b>PFENNIG</b> Gero	CDU/CSU
<b>REDDEMANN</b> Gerhard	CDU/CSU
<b>SCHMIDT</b> Hermann	SPD
<b>SCHWENCKE</b> Olaf	SPD
<b>VOHRER</b> Manfred	FDP

#### Substitutes

<b>MM. ALBER</b> Siegbert	CDU/CSU
<b>AMREHN</b> Franz	CDU/CSU
<b>BÖHM</b> Wilfried	CDU/CSU
<b>BÜCHNER</b> Peter	SPD
<b>HOLTZ</b> Uwe	SPD
<b>KLEPSCH</b> Egon	CDU/CSU
<b>LEMMRICH</b> Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
<b>LENZER</b> Christian	CDU/CSU
<b>MATTICK</b> Kurt	SPD
<b>PAWELCZYK</b> Alfons	SPD
<b>SCHÄUBLE</b> Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
<b>SCHEFFLER</b> Hermann	SPD
<b>SCHMIDT</b> Hansheinrich	FDP
<b>SCHULTE</b> Manfred	SPD
<b>SPIES</b> von <b>BÜLLESHEIM</b>	CDU/CSU
Adolf	
<b>UEBERHORST</b> Reinhard	SPD
<b>WITTMAN</b> Fritz	CDU/CSU
<b>ZEBISCH</b> Franz Josef	SPD



## ITALY

## Representatives

MM. ARFÉ Gaetano	Socialist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BOLDRINI Arrigo	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
CORALLO Salvatore	Communist
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
GONELLA Guido	Chr. Dem.
MAGGIONI Desiderio	Chr. Dem.
MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
ORSINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
ROBERTI Giovanni	Chr. Dem.
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SEGRE Sergio	Communist
TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.

## Substitutes

Mrs. AGNELLI Susanna	Ind. Rep.
MM. ANTONI Varese	Communist
ARIOSTO Egidio	PSDI
AVELLONE Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
BORGHI Luigi	Chr. Dem.
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DEL DUCA Antonio	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FACCIO Adele	Radical
MM. GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
Mrs. PAPA DE SANTIS Cristina	Communist
MM. PINTO Biagio	Republican
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
ROSSI Raffaele	Communist
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SGHERRI Evaristo	Communist
TREMAGLIA Pierantonio Mirko	MSI
URSO Salvatore	Chr. Dem.

## LUXEMBOURG

## Representatives

MM. ABENS Victor	Soc. Workers
MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
MART René	Dem.

## Substitutes

MM. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
KONEN René	Dem.
SPAUTZ Jean	Soc. Chr.

## NETHERLANDS

## Representatives

Mr. CORNELISSEN Pam	CDA
Mrs. van den HEUVEL-de BLANK Ien	Labour
MM. van HULST Johan	CDA
de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
VOOGD Johan	Labour

## Substitutes

MM. van den BERGH Harry	Labour
KONINGS Martin	Labour
MOMMERSTEEG Joseph	CDA
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA

## UNITED KINGDOM

## Representatives

Mr. Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Julian CRITCHLEY	Conservative
Andrew FAULDS	Labour
Anthony GRANT	Conservative
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
MM. Anthony KERSHAW	Conservative
Arthur LEWIS	Labour
John PAGE	Conservative
John ROPER	Labour
Thomas URWIN	Labour
Kenneth WARREN	Conservative
Phillip WHITEHEAD	Labour
N...	
N...	

## Substitutes

MM. David ATKINSON	Conservative
Gordon BAGIER	Labour
Robert BANKS	Conservative
Robin COOK	Labour
Jim CRAIGEN	Labour
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
Mr. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr. Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Lord McNAIR	Liberal
Mr. Kevin McNAMARA	Labour
Dr. Maurice MILLER	Labour
Lord NORTHFIELD	Labour
Mr. Cranley ONSLOW	Conservative
Lord REAY	Conservative
Mr. Keith STAINTON	Conservative
N...	
N...	



**I**

**MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS**

# FIRST SITTING

Monday, 18th June 1979

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly.
2. Examination of Credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session (Doc. 797).
7. Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee (Doc. 798).
8. Nomination of members to Committees.

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 11.35 a.m. with Mr. Jager, Provisional President, in the Chair.*

### 1. Opening of the Session

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2, 4, 5 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

### 3. Address by the Provisional President

The Provisional President addressed the Assembly.

### 4. Examination of Credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the Representatives and Substitutes listed in Notice No. 1 had been ratified by that Assembly, with the exception of Representatives and Substitutes appointed by the Belgian Chamber of Representatives.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, and subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of the following Representatives and Substitutes appointed by the Belgian Chamber of Representatives :

MM. Bonnel, Mangelschots, Peeters and Tanghe, Representatives ;

MM. Brasseur, Dejardin and Michel, Substitutes.

### 5. Tribute

The Provisional President paid tribute to the late Mr. Fleury, a former member of the temporary staff of the Assembly of Western European Union.

### 6. Election of the President of the Assembly

One candidate only was proposed for the post of President, namely Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel.

*Speakers* : Mr. Périquier and Lord Duncan-Sandys.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the President by acclamation.

Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel was elected President by acclamation.

At the invitation of the Provisional President, Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel took the Chair.

### 7. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

*Speakers* : Mr. Périquier, the President, Lord Duncan-Sandys.

### 8. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

Six candidates had been proposed for the six posts of Vice-President, namely Sir Frederic

Bennett, MM. Mart, Minnocci, Stoffelen, Tanghe and Valleix.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation and that the Vice-Presidents should rank according to age, namely: MM. Tanghe, Minnocci, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Mart, Valleix and Stoffelen.

### 9. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session

(Doc. 797)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session.

A proposal by Mr. Roper to remove the item on SAL/T II and its implications for European security from the draft Order of Business for Thursday afternoon was agreed to.

At the suggestion of the President it was agreed to postpone item 2 on relations with

parliaments from Wednesday, 20th June (morning Sitting) until the beginning of the Sitting on Thursday, 21st June.

Subject to these changes, the Assembly adopted the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session.

### 10. Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee

(Doc. 798)

In accordance with Rule 14 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly unanimously ratified the adoption by the Presidential Committee on 18th January 1979 of Resolution 62<sup>1</sup> on the symposium on a European armaments policy.

### 11. Nomination of members to Committees

In accordance with Rules 39 (6) and 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the membership of the six Committees as follows:

#### 1. COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS (27 seats)

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Bonnel Dejardin Tanghe	MM. Van der Elst Lambiotte Verleysen
<i>France:</i>	MM. Baumel Bechter Boucheny Ménard Péronnet	MM. Bozzi Schleiter Jung Koehl Sénès
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Ahrens Handlos Lemmrich Pawelczyk Hermann Schmidt	MM. Büchner Lenzer Klepsch Mattick Vohrer
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Boldrini Fosson Maggioni Pecchioli Roberti	MM. Corallo Maravalle Avellone Calamandrei Urso
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Konen	Mr. Spautz
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. van den Bergh de Koster Scholten	MM. Koopman Cornelissen van Hulst

1. See page 18.

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Banks Grant Hardy Onslow Roper	Lord Duncan-Sandys MM. Beith Whitehead Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Cook

## 2. GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (27 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Hanin Mangelschots Perin	MM. Michel van Waterschoot Van der Elst
<i>France :</i>	MM. Berrier Brugnon Deschamps Druon Péridier	MM. Bizet Lemoine Grussenmeyer Seitlinger Couderc
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Gessner Mende Müller Reddemann	MM. Schwencke Hansheinrich Schmidt Amrehn Evers Hermann Schmidt
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Ariosto Gonella Minnocci Sarti Segre	Mrs. Agnelli MM. Pecoraro Calamandrei Treu Rubbi
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Abens	Mr. Hengel
<i>Netherlands :</i>	Mrs. van den Heuvel-de Blank MM. Mommersteeg Portheine	Mr. Voogd Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra Mr. Schlingemann
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Faulds Lord McNair Lord Reay Mr. Urwin	MM. Page McGuire N... Atkinson McNamara

## 3. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS (21 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Adriaensens van Waterschoot	MM. Brasseur Peeters
<i>France :</i>	MM. Malvy Péronnet Talon Valleix	MM. Bizet Wargnies Petit Lagourgue

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Lenzer Müller Schwencke Ueberhorst	N... MM. Spies von Büllenheim Scheffler Zebisch
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Bernini Cavaliere Pinto Treu	MM. Boldrini Urso Minnocci Pecoraro
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Mart	Mr. Hengel
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. Cornelissen Konings	MM. Porthoine Tummers
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Bagier Hawkins Lewis Warren	Lord Hughes MM. Onslow Miller Jessel

## 4. COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION (21 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Adriaensens Peeters	MM. Mangelschots Bonnell
<i>France :</i>	MM. Depietri Jager Jeambrun Schleiter	N... MM. Belin Pignion Lemaire
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Ahrens Alber Evers Vohrer	MM. Schwencke Reddemann Bardens Ueberhorst
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Antoni Bonalumi Del Duca Orsini	Mr. Rossi Mrs. Faccio MM. Tremaglia Giust
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Hengel	Mr. Margue
<i>Netherlands :</i>	Mr. Tummers Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra	MM. Voogd van Hulst
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	Lord Hughes MM. McNamara Page Stainton	MM. Kershaw Lewis Lord McNair Mr. Grieve

## 5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES (21 seats)

<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Brasseur Michel	MM. Perin Lambiotte
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	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>France :</i>	MM. Bozzi Lagourgue Lemaire Pignion	MM. Péridier Bechter N... Talon
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Marquardt Schäuble N... Zebisch	MM. Büchner Evers Handlos Pawelczyk
<i>Italy :</i>	Mr. Borghi Mrs. Faccio MM. Giust Sgherri	MM. Cavaliere Maravalle Del Duca Romano
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	Mr. Konen	Mr. Abens
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. van Hulst Voogd	MM. Cornelissen Stoffelen
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Craigen Grieve Jessel Lord Northfield	N... Mr. Onslow Mrs. Knight Mr. McGuire

#### 6. COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS (*14 seats*)

<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Bonnel Tanghe	MM. Dejardin Hanin
<i>France :</i>	MM. Delehedde Visse	MM. Ferretti Jeambrun
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany :</i>	MM. Böhm Enders	MM. Müller Bardens
<i>Italy :</i>	MM. Arfé De Poi	Mr. Borghi Mrs. Papa de Santis
<i>Luxembourg :</i>	MM. Hengel Spautz	MM. Mart Konen
<i>Netherlands :</i>	MM. Schlingemann Stoffelen	MM. Mommersteeg Voogd
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	MM. Kershaw Roper	Mrs. Knight Mr. Craigen

#### 12. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.*



## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. <i>Pawelczyk</i> (Gessner) von Hassel <i>Lemmrich</i> (Lagershausen) Marquardt Mende <i>Lenzer</i> (Milz) Müller Pfennig Vohrer	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Adriaensens <i>Verleysen</i> (Hanin) <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots) Tanghe van Waterschoot		MM. <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Cornelissen) <i>Konings</i> (Mrs. van den Heuvel-de Blank) Mrs. <i>van der Werf-Terpstra</i> (van Hulst) Mr. Stoffelen
<b>France</b>		<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Boucheny <i>Bozzi</i> (Grussenmeyer) Jager Jeambrun Péridier <i>Lagourgue</i> (Péronnet) Petit Schleiter <i>Druon</i> (Talon) Valleix	<b>Italy</b>	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Critchley Faulds Grant Grieve Hardy Hawkins Lord <i>Northfield</i> (Lord Hughes) MM. Kershaw Lewis Page Roper Urwin <i>Atkinson</i> (Warren) <i>Cook</i> (Whitehead) <i>Craigie</i> (N...) Lord <i>Duncan-Sandys</i> (N...)
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>		
MM. Ahrens <i>Büchner</i> (Bardens) Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Enders Evers		
	<b>Luxembourg</b>	
	MM. Abens <i>Spautz</i> (Margue)	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	MM. Fosson Orsini Pecchioli Segre
MM. Bonnel Peeters	MM. Handlos Reddemann Schwencke Hermann Schmidt	<b>Luxembourg</b>
<b>France</b>		Mr. Mart
MM. Bizet Brugnon Depietri Deschamps Ferretti Pignion Seitlinger Sénès	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
	MM. Arfé Bernini Calamandrei Corallo	MM. de Koster Scholten Voogd

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RESOLUTION 62*****on a symposium on a European armaments policy  
Brussels, 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979***

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The Presidential Committee,

Noting the interest aroused by the symposium on a European armaments policy held in March 1977 and the colloquies on a European aeronautical policy held in September 1973 and February 1976 ;

Considering that it is the duty of the European assembly empowered to deal with security matters to organise another symposium with the purpose of helping to define measures to allow the armaments industries of the Western European countries to meet the qualitative and quantitative defence requirements of our countries in the best conditions,

**DECIDES**

1. To organise a second symposium on a European armaments policy in October 1979 ;
2. To contribute, on this occasion, to the commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the agreements modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty.

## SECOND SITTING

Monday, 18th June 1979

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly (*Presentation by Mr. Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 799 and 811*).
2. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council; Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the
20. Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council (*Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments*).
3. Address by Mr. Aigrain, French Minister of State attached to the Prime Minister, responsible for research.

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

#### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

#### 3. Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly

*(Presentation by Mr. Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 799 and 811)*

The Report of the Council to the Assembly was presented by Mr. Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. Thorn replied to questions put by MM. Portheine, Valleix, van Waterschoot, Boucheny, Lord Northfield, MM. Jessel, Dejaradin, Urwin, Vohrer, Mrs. von Bothmer and Lord Duncan-Sandys.

#### 4. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council

*Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council*

#### Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council

*(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments)*

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Minnocci, Rapporteur.

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur.

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur.

The Joint Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Valleix and Périquier.

The Joint Debate was adjourned.

#### 5. Address by Mr. Aigrain, French Minister of State attached to the Prime Minister, responsible for research

Mr. Aigrain, French Minister of State attached to the Prime Minister, responsible for research, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Aigrain replied to questions put by MM. Jager, Bresseur, Warren, Valleix, Scheffler and Minnocci.

**6. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

**Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

**Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

*(Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments)*

The Joint Debate was resumed.

*Speaker* : Mr. Mommersteeg.

*Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speakers* : MM. Druon, Dejardin, Banks, Lord Northfield and Mr. Adriaensens.

The Joint Debate was adjourned.

**7. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 19th June, at 10 a.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 6.45 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance<sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Pfennig Reddemann <i>Scheffler</i> (Hermann Schmidt) Vohrer	Mrs. <i>van der Werf-Terpstra</i> (van Hulst) MM. <i>Porthoine</i> (de Koster) Stoffelen <i>Konings</i> (Voogd)
MM. Adriaensens <i>Verleysen</i> (Bonnel) <i>Brasseur</i> (Hanin) <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots) Tanghe van Waterschoot	<b>Italy</b> MM. Arfé <i>Borghi</i> (Bonalumi) De Poi <i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella) Maggioni Minnocci Pecoraro Roberti Sarti Treu	<b>United Kingdom</b> MM. <i>Banks</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett) <i>Jessel</i> (Critchley) Lord <i>Reay</i> (Grant) MM. Grieve Hardy Hawkins Lord <i>Northfield</i> (Lord Hughes) MM. Kershaw Lewis Page <i>Craigen</i> (Roper) Urwin Warren Whitehead Lord <i>Duncan-Sandys</i> (N...)
<b>France</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b> MM. Abens <i>Spautz</i> (Margue)	
MM. Boucheny <i>Druon</i> (Grussenmeyer) Jager Jeambrun Péridier Petit Valleix	<b>Netherlands</b> MM. <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Cornelissen) <i>Tummers</i> (Mrs. van den Heuvel-de Blank)	
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>		
Mr. Ahrens Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Enders Marquardt Mende Müller		

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	MM. Orsini Pecchioli Segre
Mr. Peeters	MM. Bardens Evers Gessner Handlos Lagershausen Milz Schwencke	<b>Luxembourg</b> Mr. Mart
<b>France</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Netherlands</b> Mr. Scholten
MM. Bizet Brugnon Depietri Deschamps Ferretti Péronnet Pignion Schleiter Seitlinger Sénès Talon	MM. Bernini Boldrini Calamandrei Corallo Fosson	<b>United Kingdom</b> MM. Beith Faulds

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 19th June 1979

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The industrial bases of European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 805*).
2. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council; Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council (*Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments*).
3. Address by Mr. Scholten, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

#### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

#### 3. The industrial bases of European security

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 805)*

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Cavaliere and Konings.

Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur, and Mr. Warren, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

The draft Recommendation was adopted unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 329) <sup>1</sup>.

The President welcomed Mr. Descamps, Minister of State and Chairman of the Committee on National Defence of the Belgian Senate.

#### 4. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council

*Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council*

*Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council*

*(Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions Docs. 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments)*

The Joint Debate was resumed.

*Speaker* : Mr. Enders.

Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Mr. Minnoci, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, and Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, replied to the speakers.

The Joint Debate was adjourned.

#### 5. Address by Mr. Scholten, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands

Mr. Scholten, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Scholten replied to questions put by MM. Konings, Stoffelen, Talon, Roper, Valleix, Druon, Minnoci, Lord Reay, MM. Kershaw, Warren and Lord Duncan-Sandys.

1. See page 25.

**6. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

**Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

**Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

*(Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments)*

The Joint Debate was resumed.

Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Roper, Chairman of the

Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and Mr. Warren, Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, replied to the speakers.

The Joint Debate was closed.

The Votes on the draft Recommendations and Amendments were postponed until the next Sitting.

**7. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance<sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>MM. Lemmrich</b> (Lagershausen)	<b>Netherlands</b>
<b>MM. Adriaensens</b>	Marquardt	<b>MM. Cornelissen</b>
<i>Michel</i> (Hanin)	Mende	<i>Konings</i> (Mrs. van den Heuvel-de Blank)
<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	<i>Böhm</i> (Milz)	<b>Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra</b> (van Hulst)
<i>Verleysen</i> (Peeters)	Müller	<b>MM. Mommersteeg</b> (Scholten)
Tanghe	Reddemann	Stoffelen
van Waterschoot	<i>Scheffler</i> (Hermann Schmidt)	Voogd
	Schwencke	
	Vohrer	
<b>France</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
<b>MM. Boucheny</b>	<b>MM. Arfé</b>	Lord <i>Duncan-Sandys</i> (Beith)
Brugnon	<i>Borghì</i> (Bonalumi)	<b>MM. Banks</b> (Sir Frederic Bennett)
<i>Druon</i> (Grussenmeyer)	De Poi	<i>Jessel</i> (Critchley)
Jager	<i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella)	<i>Cook</i> (Faulds)
Jeambrun	Maggioni	Grant
Péridier	Minnocci	Grieve
Petit	Pecoraro	Hardy
Schleiter	Roberti	Lord <i>Reay</i> (Hawkins)
<i>Lagourgue</i> (Seitlinger)	Sarti	Lord <i>Northfield</i> (Lord Hughes)
Talon	Treu	<b>MM. Kershaw</b>
Valleix		Lewis
		<i>Atkinson</i> (Page)
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	Roper
Mr. Ahrens		Urwin
Mrs. von Bothmer	<b>MM. Abens</b>	Warren
<b>MM. Enders</b>	Margue	Whitehead
von Hassel	<i>Konen</i> (Mart)	<i>Craigen</i> (N...)
		Dr. <i>Miller</i> (N...)

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>MM. Calamandrei</b>
Mr. Bonnel	<b>MM. Bardens</b>	Corallo
	Evers	Fosson
<b>France</b>	Gessner	Orsini
<b>MM. Bizet</b>	Handlos	Pecchioli
Depietri	Pfennig	Segre
Deschamps		
Ferretti	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
Péronnet	<b>MM. Bernini</b>	
Pignion	Boldrini	Mr. de Koster
Sénès		

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.



**RECOMMENDATION 329*****on the industrial bases of European security***

The Assembly,

Considering that the time is ripe to review the results achieved so far by the various forms of European armaments co-operation ;

Considering the military and economic need for Europe to acquire at least cost the means of ensuring its security, a condition of its independence ;

Considering the technical possibilities of member countries and the constantly-rising cost of armaments at the research, development and production stages ;

Considering moreover the importance of the armaments industries in the economies of several member countries and the ability of some of them to produce many types of equipment without international co-operation ;

Considering finally the immediate need to conclude an agreement on programmes for the production of military equipment to be interoperable by the end of the century or standardised wherever possible, taking account of the fact that research, development and production cover a period of from ten to fifteen years ;

Noting Resolution 62, adopted by the Presidential Committee on 18th January 1979, on the organisation of a second symposium on a European armaments policy on 15th, 16th and 17th October for which this report is to be a preparatory document,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Urge member countries to determine the military equipment :
  - (a) to be produced on a co-operative basis ;
  - (b) to be produced with due regard for interface conditions to ensure interoperability ;
  - (c) to be the object of special efforts because of present shortcomings in Europe and their foreseeable importance ;
2. Assess the results and advantages of the various forms of industrial co-operation in these fields to date, together with the difficulties and setbacks encountered ;
3. Define methods of ensuring greater European co-ordination of research and development in such branches of advanced technology as integrated circuits, microprocessors, radar systems, lasers and infra-red sensors for weapons systems ;
4. Improve methods of procuring armaments and, in close liaison with the industries concerned, introduce appropriate measures for facilitating the exchange of know-how and the protection of industrial proprietary rights ;
5. Seek frameworks for lasting co-operation between member countries by forming permanent industrial consortia, concluding European agreements on specifications and replacement schedules for military equipment and working out harmonised methods of financing ;
6. Work out methods and structures to improve decision-taking and production capacity in European co-operation.

## FOURTH SITTING

Tuesday, 19th June 1979

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The balance of force (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 809 and Amendments*).
2. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council ; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council ; Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council (*Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments*).
3. Study on collective logistical support (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 810 and Amendment*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Sir Frederic Bennett, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

#### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

#### 3. The balance of force

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 809 and Amendments)*

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Pawelczyk, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Böhm and Cook.

*Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speakers* : MM. Baumel, Reddemann, Handlos, Mende and Müller.

Mr. Pawelczyk, Rapporteur, and Mr. Roper, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

#### 4. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council

*Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council*

#### *Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council*

*(Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments)*

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation in Document 801.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Druon :

1. In the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "take its place in any future European union" and insert "play a more important rôle as the possibilities of European union progress".

*Speakers* : MM. Druon, Minnocci and Dejardin.

The Amendment was negatived.

*Speaker* : Mr. Roper.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Druon :

2. In the eighth paragraph of the preamble, leave out "leading to integration".

*Speakers* : MM. Druon, Minnocci and Mrs. von Bothmer.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Druon :

3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "to be a positive contribution" to the end of the paragraph and insert "to be a necessary complement to the establishment of a European union".

*Speakers* : MM. Druon and Minnocci.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Druon :

4. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "in the context of direct elections to the European Parliament".

*Speakers* : MM. Druon and Minnocci.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Druon :

5. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "of including WEU" to the end of the paragraph and insert "whereby WEU might better concert security policies as political co-operation between the member states of the EEC develops".

*Speakers* : MM. Druon, Minnocci and Margue.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Urwin and others :

6. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 4.

*Speakers* : Mr. Urwin, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Dejardin, Urwin, Valleix and Minnocci.

The Amendment was agreed to.

*Speakers* (points of order) : MM. Valleix and Grieve.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation in Document 801.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 27 votes to 14 with 5 abstentions<sup>1</sup>. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 330)<sup>2</sup>.

*Speakers* : MM. Reddemann (explanation of vote) and Roper (point of order).

*Mr. Stoffelen, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation in Document 808.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. van Waterschoot :

1. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

"2. Keep the Assembly informed, by whatever means it considers appropriate, of the results already achieved in the study undertaken by the SAC, of the progress made and of the goals towards which its work is directed ;"

1. Voting figures announced in the Chamber were : Ayes 25 ; Noes 16 ; Abstentions 5. After verification of the vote, the result is : Ayes 27 ; Noes 14 ; Abstentions 5.

2. See page 32.

*Speakers* : MM. van Waterschoot and Tanghe.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. van Waterschoot :

2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

"3. Take the fullest account of the Assembly's recommendations in defining any new task allotted to the SAC ;"

*Speakers* : MM. van Waterschoot and Roper.

Mr. Roper proposed a manuscript Amendment to the Amendment, to add the following at the beginning of paragraph 3 :

"Take the fullest account of the Assembly's recommendations and,"

*Speakers* : MM. Tanghe and van Waterschoot.

The manuscript Amendment was agreed to.

The Amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation in Document 808.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 331)<sup>1</sup>.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation in Document 806.

Mr. Warren, on behalf of Mr. Scheffler, proposed a manuscript Amendment to add "further" after "stimulate" in the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft Recommendation.

*Speaker* : Mr. Warren.

The manuscript Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

1. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

"Examine the possibilities of all-European co-operation in energy matters ;"

*Speaker* : Mr. Valleix.

A manuscript Amendment was proposed by Mr. Warren on behalf of Mr. Scheffler to Amendment No. 1, to leave out "Examine the possibilities of all-European co-operation in energy matters" and to insert "examining the possibilities of European co-operation in energy matters" as a new sub-paragraph to paragraph 2.

1. See page 33.

*Speaker* : Mr. Valleix.

The manuscript Amendment was agreed to.

The Amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Lord Northfield :

4. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph as follows :

“(c) co-operation on the safety and environmental impact of nuclear facilities, particularly where they create trans-frontier dangers ;”.

*Speakers* : Lord Hughes and Mr. Warren.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

2. After the new paragraph, add a second new paragraph as follows :

“Start a detailed and continuing dialogue with the oil-producing countries with a view to adjusting production capabilities and requirements ;”.

*Speakers* : MM. Valleix and Warren.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

3. In the original paragraph 3, leave out from “by promoting” to the end of the paragraph.

*Speaker* : Mr. Valleix.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

A manuscript Amendment was proposed by Mr. Warren, to leave out “a merger” and insert “co-operation” in paragraph 3.

*Speakers* : MM. Warren and Valleix.

The manuscript Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation in Document 806.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 332) <sup>1</sup>.

### 5. The balance of force

(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 809 and Amendments)

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

1. See page 34.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Baumel :

1. Leave out the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :

“Noting the East-West economic and military balance, but concerned by the Warsaw Pact’s superiority in several fields on the central front and by the Soviet military doctrine of ‘daring thrusts’ against NATO forces which can be perceived as a substantial threat by the NATO countries ;”.

*Speakers* : Mr. Valleix, Dr. Miller and Mr. Pawelczyk.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Baumel :

2. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble, leave out “approximate” ; after “in the area” insert “and throughout the continent”.

*Speakers* : MM. Valleix and Pawelczyk.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Baumel :

3. At the beginning of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “Urge member governments :” and accordingly leave out “to” in lines one and two of paragraph 1.

*Speakers* : MM. Valleix and Pawelczyk.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Baumel :

4. At the beginning of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert “Urge member governments” ; leave out “allied” and insert “their”.

*Speakers* : MM. Roper, Valleix and Pawelczyk.

The Amendment was negatived.

*Speakers* (point of order) : MM. Valleix, Roper, Mrs. von Bothmer and Mr. Valleix.

Mr. Roper moved the adjournment of the remaining votes on this item until the next Sitting.

*Speaker* : Mr. Pawelczyk.

The motion was agreed to.

*Speakers* (point of order) : MM. Reddemann, Roper and Valleix.

**6. Study on collective logistical support**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 810 and Amendment)*

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Roper, Chairman of the Committee.

The Debate was opened.

*Speaker* (point of order) : Mr. Valleix.

The Debate was closed.

The Vote on the draft Order was postponed until the next Sitting.

**7. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 20th June, at 10 a.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 7.05 p.m.*

## APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. <i>Pawelczyk</i> (Gessner)	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. <i>Lambiotte</i> (Adriaensens)	Handlos	MM. Cornelissen
<i>Michel</i> (Hanin)	Marquardt	<i>Konings</i> (Mrs. van den Heuvel- de Blank)
<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	Mende	Mrs. <i>van der Werf-Terpstra</i> (van Hulst)
<i>Verleysen</i> (Peeters)	<i>Böhm</i> (Milz)	MM. Stoffelen
Tanghe	Müller	Voogd
van Waterschoot	Reddemann	
	<i>Scheffler</i> (Hermann Schmidt)	
<b>France</b>		<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Bizet	<b>Italy</b>	Sir Frederic Bennett
Boucheny	MM. Arfé	MM. <i>Cook</i> (Faulds)
Brugnon	<i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella)	Grant
Depietri	Maggioni	Grieve
<i>Wagnies</i> (Deschamps)	Minnocci	Hardy
<i>Druon</i> (Grussenmeyer)	Pecoraro	<i>Stainton</i> (Hawkins)
Jeambrun	Roberti	Lord Hughes
Petit	Treu	MM. Kershaw
Schleiter		Lewis
Seitlinger		Page
<i>Baumel</i> (Talon)		Roper
Valleix		Urwin
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	Warren
Mrs. von Bothmer	MM. Abens	Whitehead
MM. Enders	Margue	Dr. <i>Miller</i> (N...)
<i>Wittman</i> (Evers)		

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. von Hassel	MM. Pecchioli
Mr. Bonnel	Lagershausen	Sarti
	Pfennig	Segre
	Schwencke	
<b>France</b>	Vohrer	<b>Luxembourg</b>
MM. Ferretti		Mr. Mart
Jager	<b>Italy</b>	
Péridier	MM. Bernini	<b>Netherlands</b>
Péronnet	Boldrini	MM. de Koster
Pignion	Bonalumi	Scholten
Sénès	Calamandrei	
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	Corallo	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Ahrens	De Poi	MM. Beith
Bardens	Fosson	Critchley
	Orsini	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## APPENDIX II

Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on the political activities of the Council — reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council (Doc. 801):

Ayes .....	27
Noes .....	14
Abstentions .....	5

*Ayes:*

MM. <i>Lambiotte</i> (Adriaensens)	MM. Grieve	MM. Minnocci
Arfé	<i>Michel</i> (Hanin)	Page
<i>Banks</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett)	Hardy	Roberti
Bizet	<i>Stainton</i> (Hawkins)	Roper
Mrs. von Bothmer	<i>Konings</i> (Mrs. van den Heuvel- de Blank)	Stoffelen
MM. Enders	Lord Hughes	Urwin
<i>Cook</i> (Faulds)	MM. Kershaw	Voogd
<i>Pawelczyk</i> (Gessner)	Lewis	van Waterschoot
Grant	<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	Dr. <i>Miller</i> (N...)

*Noes:*

MM. Depietri	Mrs. <i>van der Werf-Terpstra</i> (van Hulst)	MM. Müller
<i>Wargnies</i> (Deschamps)	MM. Margue	Petit
<i>Cavaliere</i> (Gonella)	Mende	Reddemann
<i>Druon</i> (Grussenmeyer)	<i>Böhm</i> (Milz)	Treu
Handlos		Valleix

*Abstentions:*

MM. Cornelissen
Maggioni
Pecoraro
<i>Verleysen</i> (Peeters)
<i>Jessel</i> (Warren)

**RECOMMENDATION 330*****on the political activities of the Council —  
reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Welcoming the fact that in its twenty-fourth annual report the Council confirmed its intention to continue "the dialogue with the Assembly on questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, including those dealt with by member governments in other international fora";

Welcoming the content of many replies to recommendations of the Assembly and to written questions put by members, particularly Written Question 191;

Regretting however that the informal procedure employed at joint meetings between Committees and the Council allows too much ambiguity to be left in the replies of the Council;

Welcoming the content of the statements made by representatives of several member governments to the Assembly during the twenty-fourth session, particularly in voicing the wish to make fuller use of WEU for discussing in a European forum all matters relating to Europe's security and for strengthening European co-operation in armaments questions and in disarmament;

Noting that the Council is still "checking regularly that the application of the modified Brussels Treaty is in no way neglected" and that the implementation of the Paris Agreements appeared twenty-seven times on its agenda;

Noting that the Council has demonstrated its good will in agreeing to a substantial increase in the budget of the Assembly, leaving it the possibility of assessing its own requirements, and in the active participation of most member governments in the work of the Assembly;

Considering that since, in due time, WEU will be called upon to take its place in any future European union, the smooth operation of this institution is essential for building a Europe which is master of its destiny;

Aware that such an independent and autonomous Europe can but be a political Europe based on a truly co-ordinated foreign and defence policy leading to integration,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Pursue efforts to extend the dialogue with the Assembly by keeping it regularly informed of:
  - (a) the results of the work of the IEPG;
  - (b) the completed parts of the study undertaken by the SAC which are not covered by military secrecy;
  - (c) matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty included in the agenda of its meetings;
2. Seek a procedure for joint meetings which allows each participant adequate freedom of speech but which also allows the collegiate views of the Council to be expressed;
3. Demonstrate more clearly in its work that it considers the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly Article XI, to be a positive contribution to the establishment of a European union.



**RECOMMENDATION 331*****on the application of the Brussels Treaty —  
reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Noting with satisfaction that the Council, aware that the Assembly is “the only European assembly with responsibilities in the field of defence”, is continuing the dialogue with it “on questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, including those dealt with by member governments in other international fora” ;

Welcoming the meaningful dialogue established with the Council in most cases, in particular through recommendations and replies, and noting in this connection that the Council will invite the Secretary-General of NATO to provide information “in particular when the questions raised relate to matters within the competence of the integrated command structures of NATO” ;

Considering that the essential commitments under the modified Brussels Treaty — automatic mutual military assistance and the maintenance of appropriate levels of forces — retain and must continue to retain all their initial value ;

Noting that the Council considers the Standing Armaments Committee to be “a useful instrument for thought and analysis” but that the organisation of “European co-operation in the field of armaments production . . . is the aim of the independent European programme group in its work”,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Withdraw its refusal to publish in its annual report the true level of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in accordance with the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty ;
2. Keep the Assembly informed, by whatever means it considers appropriate, of the results already achieved in the study undertaken by the SAC, of the progress made and of the goals towards which its work is directed ;
3. Take the fullest account of the Assembly’s recommendations and consider the possibility of incorporating appropriate studies proposed from time to time by the Assembly among the new tasks which the Council is considering entrusting to the Standing Armaments Committee ;
4. Include in future annual reports a section on the work of the independent European programme group.

**RECOMMENDATION 332*****on scientific, technological and aerospace questions —  
reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Welcoming the dialogue with the Council on the policy of member countries in the fields of energy, the aircraft industry, space and other areas of advanced technology ;

Convinced that safety problems in respect of nuclear facilities and radiation, and environmental problems associated with new sources of energy call for solutions which cut across national frontiers ;

Regretting that even the increasingly-serious energy crisis since 1973 has failed to stimulate further pragmatic arrangements for more joint action, co-operation and the definition of a medium- and long-term European energy policy ;

Aware of the enormous sums Western Europe will have to pay for oil and convinced that in the near future oil will have to be replaced by alternative sources of energy ;

Welcoming the increase in European collaboration for the production of civil aircraft, especially Airbus, and hoping that this success will induce governments to promote more intensive European collaboration for the production of a family of fighter aircraft and of helicopters ;

Considering the growing market for European satellites and launchers,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Continue its dialogue with the Assembly but that it enter into more details in its twenty-fifth annual report regarding Western European policies on scientific, technological and aerospace questions, their goals and achievements ;
2. Promote a major concerted research and development effort and launch a co-ordinated programme in :
  - (a) energy-saving technologies to be applied in households and industries ;
  - (b) alternative sources of energy based on new technologies such as non-conventional gas, shale oil, liquified coal, and the use of solar, wind and water energy ;
  - (c) examining the possibilities of European co-operation in energy matters ;
  - (d) co-operation on the safety and environmental impact of nuclear facilities, particularly where they create transfrontier dangers ;
3. Start a detailed and continuing dialogue with the oil-producing countries with a view to adjusting production capabilities and requirements ;
4. Arrange for the next fighter aircraft to be a joint European venture by promoting co-operation between the existing management consortia producing Jaguar and Tornado ;
5. Urge governments to provide the European helicopter industry with orders necessary for uninterrupted development and production ;
6. Promote the series production of Ariane launchers in order to conquer part of the world market for European and non-European satellites and their launchings.

# FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 20th June 1979

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Africa's rôle in a European security policy (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 804 and Amendments*).
2. The balance of force (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 809 and Amendments*).
3. Study on collective logistical support (*Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 810 and Amendment*).

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

### 3. Changes in the membership of a Committee

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following nominations to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments proposed by the United Kingdom Delegation :

- Mr. Banks as a titular member of the Committee in place of Mr. Critchley ;
- Sir Frederic Bennett as an alternate member of the Committee in place of Mr. Banks.

### 4. Africa's rôle in a European security policy (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 804 and Amendments*)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Müller, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : Mr. Grant, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Hardy, Jessel, Hardy, Boucheny, Grieve, Voogd, Brugnon, Page, Mrs. von Bothmer and Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. Müller, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Hardy and others :

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

“Condemning the policy of apartheid as still pursued by the South African Republic as contrary to the principles of democracy and human rights and as a threat to world peace ;”.

*Speaker* : Mr. Müller.

The Amendment was negatived.

*Speakers* (points of order) : MM. Hardy, Urwin, Roper and Grant.

The President directed the Assembly to proceed again to a vote on the Amendment.

*Speakers* : MM. Hardy and Page ; (point of order) : Mr. Roper ; Mr. Müller.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Hardy and others :

2. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add :

“and induce the South African Republic to terminate apartheid ;”.

*Speaker* (point of order) : Mr. Roper.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Boucheny :

4. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add :

“and, taking account in particular of the repeated condemnation by the United Nations of the régime in South Africa, strive resolutely

to restore freedom for all races and ethnic groups in that country ;”.

The Amendment was not moved.

An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Page :

5. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, after the first word “in” insert “and after”.

*Speakers* : MM. Page, Roper and Müller.

The Amendment was adopted.

*Speaker* (point of order) : Mr. Deschamps.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Faulds and others :

3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after “Examine” and add :

“in view of the nature of the constitution and the circumstances of the elections in April 1979, whether recognition can yet be given to Southern Rhodesia or sanctions yet be lifted.”

*Speakers* : MM. Faulds, Grant and Müller.

The Amendment was negatived.

*Speakers* (point of order) : MM. Lewis, Urwin and Deschamps.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

*Speakers* (point of order) : MM. Urwin and Lewis.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote was postponed until the next Sitting.

### **5. The balance of force**

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 809 and Amendments)*

The Assembly proceeded further to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Baumel :

5. At the beginning of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert “Follow efforts by member governments of the NATO integrated organisation”.

*Speaker* : Mr. Roper.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Baumel :

6. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 4 as follows :

“4. Examine the possibility of promoting the early start of negotiations between all states concerned with European security with a view to reducing conventional weapons and introducing confidence-building measures covering the whole European continent.”

*Speaker* : Mr. Roper.

The Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

*Speaker* : Mr. Deschamps.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote was postponed until the next Sitting.

### **6. Study on collective logistical support**

*(Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 810 and Amendment)*

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Order.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

1. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft order proper and insert :

“INSTRUCTS its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to arrange for a study on collective logistical support by member countries for integrated military structures and on that of the French forces, as proposed in Document 810, to be carried out forthwith in accordance with the terms of reference and procedure set forth in that document, and to be printed and published on completion ;”.

*Speaker* : Mr. Roper.

The Amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Order.

*Speakers* (point of order) : MM. Roper and Deschamps.

The draft Order was agreed to. (This Order will be published as No. 51) <sup>1</sup>.

### **7. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*The Sitting closed at 1 p.m.*

<sup>1</sup>. See page 38.

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance<sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. <i>Lemmrich</i> (Lagershausen)	Mrs. <i>van der Werf-Terpstra</i> (van Hulst)
MM. Adriaensens	Mende	MM. <i>Schlingemann</i> (de Koster)
<i>Michel</i> (Hanin)	<i>Böhm</i> (Milz)	<i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten)
<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	Müller	Stoffelen
<i>Verleysen</i> (Peeters)	<i>Spies von Büllersheim</i> (Pfennig)	Voogd
Tanghe	Reddemann	
van Waterschoot	Schwencke	
	Vohrer	
		<b>United Kingdom</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>Italy</b>	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)
MM. Boucheny	MM. Arfé	Sir Frederic Bennett
Brugnon	<i>Borghi</i> (Bonalumi)	MM. Critchley
Deschamps	Maggioni	Faulds
Grussenmeyer	Pecoraro	Grant
Jager	Roberti	Grieve
Péridier	Treu	Hardy
Péronnet		Hawkins
Petit	<b>Luxembourg</b>	Lord Hughes
Pignion	MM. Abens	MM. Kershaw
Valleix	Margue	Lewis
	<i>Hengel</i> (Mart)	Page
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>		Roper
Mrs. von Bothmer	<b>Netherlands</b>	Urwin
MM. Enders	MM. Cornelissen	Warren
Handlos	<i>Konings</i> (Mrs. van den Heuvel-	<i>Craigien</i> (Whitehead)
von Hassel	de Blank)	<i>Atkinson</i> (N...)
		Dr. <i>Miller</i> (N...)

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	MM. Calamandrei
Mr. Bonnel	MM. Ahrens	Corallo
	Bardens	De Poi
<b>France</b>	Evers	Fosson
MM. Bizet	Gessner	Gonella
Depietri	Marquardt	Minnocci
Ferretti	Hermann Schmidt	Orsini
Jeambrun		Pecchioli
Schleiter		Sarti
Seitlinger	<b>Italy</b>	Segre
Sénès	MM. Bernini	
Talon	Boldrini	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**ORDER 51*****on a study on collective logistical support***

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The Assembly,

Recalling Resolution 50 and Order 40 on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts ;

Noting the wide attention attracted by the study on the rational deployment of forces on the central front and the valuable contribution it made to allied defence planning ;

Aware of the need to study fully means of rationalising logistical support for forces of the Alliance, especially on the central front,

1. INSTRUCTS its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to arrange for the study on collective logistical support proposed in Document 810 to be carried out forthwith in accordance with the terms of reference and procedure set forth in that document, and to be printed and published on completion ;
2. DECIDES that the cost of the study shall be met from the ordinary budget of the Assembly.

# SIXTH SITTING

Wednesday, 20th June 1979

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Parliaments and defence procurement (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Doc. 807 and Amendment*).
2. Africa's rôle in a European security policy (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 804*).
3. The balance of force (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 809*).
4. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 802 and Amendments*).

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

*Speakers* (points of order) : MM. Hardy and Roper.

### 3. Changes in the membership of Committees

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following nominations to Committees proposed by the United Kingdom Delegation :

— Mr. Beith as an alternate member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to fill a vacant seat ;

— Lord McNair as a titular member of the General Affairs Committee in place of Mr. Beith.

### 4. Parliaments and defence procurement

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Doc. 807 and Amendment)*

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Maggioni, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Treu, Roberti and Kershaw.

Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

*Speaker* (point of order) : Mr. Hardy.

Mr. Maggioni, Rapporteur, and Mr. Roper, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Schlingemann :

1. After paragraph C of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

“D. To agree to the Assembly of WEU, at its seat in Paris, having access to national data banks, documentation centres and other sources of information on defence-related political matters.”

*Speakers* : MM. Schlingemann, Maggioni, Roper and Schlingemann.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 333) <sup>1</sup>.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Resolution.

The draft Resolution was agreed to. (This Resolution will be published as No. 63) <sup>2</sup>.

*Speakers* (points of order) : MM. Roper, Deschamps, Bagier, Banks, Deschamps, Stoffelen, Roper, the President, MM. Hardy and Bagier.

1. See page 42.

2. See page 43.

### **5. Africa's rôle in a European security policy**

*(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 804)*

*Speaker* (point of order) : Mr. Faulds.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

*Speaker* : Mrs. von Bothmer.

In the absence of a quorum, the Report was referred back to the General Affairs Committee.

### **6. The balance of force**

*(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 809)*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

In the absence of a quorum, the Report was referred back to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

### **7. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 802 and Amendments)*

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Cook, Deschamps, Beith and Pignion.

Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the Committee, and Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Cook and others :

1. At the end of the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add :

“whilst noting that the resources that are absorbed by armaments production limit the investment available for civil production ;”.

*Speakers* : MM. Cook and van Waterschoot.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Roper and Mr. Valleix :

2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “directives” and insert “guidance”.

*Speakers* : MM. Roper and van Waterschoot.

The Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

*Speaker* : Mr. Deschamps.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote on the amended draft Recommendation was postponed until the next Sitting.

*Speaker* (point of order) : Mr. Roper.

### **8. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for Thursday, 21st June, at 9.30 a.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 5.55 p.m.*



## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance<sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. <i>Böhm</i> (Milz)	MM. van Hulst
MM. Adriaensens	Müller	<i>Schlingemann</i> (de Koster)
<i>Verleysen</i> (Peeters)	Reddemann	Mrs. <i>van der Werf-Terpstra</i>
Tanghe	Schwencke	(Scholten)
van Waterschoot		MM. Stoffelen
	<b>Italy</b>	Voogd
<b>France</b>	MM. Arfé	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Brugnon	<i>Borghì</i> (Bonalumi)	MM. Beith
Depietri	Maggioni	<i>Jessel</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett)
Deschamps	Minnocci	Critchley
Grussenmeyer	Pecoraro	Faulds
<i>Lagourgue</i> (Péronnet)	Roberti	<i>Stainton</i> (Grant)
Pignion	Treu	<i>Banks</i> (Grieve)
Valleix		Hardy
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	Lord Hughes
	Mr. Margue	MM. Kershaw
Mrs. von Bothmer		Lewis
MM. Enders	<b>Netherlands</b>	Page
von Hassel	MM. <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Cornelissen)	Roper
<i>Lemmrich</i> (Lagershausen)	<i>Konings</i> (Mrs. van den Heuvel- de Blank)	<i>Bagier</i> (Urwin)
Mende		<i>Craigen</i> (Whitehead)
		<i>Cook</i> (N...)

The following Representatives apologised for their absence

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	MM. Corallo
MM. Bonnel	MM. Ahrens	De Poi
Hanin	Bardens	Fosson
Mangelschots	Evers	Gonella
<b>France</b>	Gessner	Orsini
MM. Bizet	Handlos	Pecchioli
Boucheny	Marquardt	Sarti
Ferretti	Pfennig	Segre
Jager	Hermann Schmidt	
Jeambrun	Vohrer	<b>Luxembourg</b>
Péridier		MM. Abens
Petit	<b>Italy</b>	Mart
Schleiter	MM. Bernini	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Seitlinger	Boldrini	MM. Hawkins
Sénès	Calamandrei	Warren
Talon		

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 333**  
***on parliaments and defence procurement***

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The Assembly,

Having studied the report of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments analysing the rôle of national parliaments in the national defence equipment procurement process ;

Considering that national parliaments and their defence committees, with the exception of those of Germany and the Netherlands, are usually inadequately informed on defence matters ;

Believing that parliaments exercise insufficiently their prerogative to control defence procurement policy ;

Recalling the terms of its Recommendation 197 on military security and parliamentary information ;

With a view to furthering joint production and standardisation of defence equipment in the armed forces of the countries of Western Europe or in the Alliance, taking due account of the military and economic requirements of the Alliance as a whole,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

Invite member governments :

A. To ensure that their parliaments, or where appropriate their parliamentary defence, budget, or other committees concerned :

1. Are fully informed in good time, within the limits imposed by considerations only of external security, not of political or administrative convenience, on all aspects of defence policy, at both the national and allied levels, especially on matters affecting the assessment of the military threat and the choice of defence equipment ;
2. Are enabled to exercise sufficiently close control of the defence budget and appropriations and of all stages of the defence procurement process, so as to improve defence capability and increase standardisation and interoperability of equipment ;
3. Are enabled to compile systematically information on current research and development projects in the national and European defence industry ;

B. To ensure that full information on national defence equipment projects in the planning stages is available to allied governments, and to take full account of alternative defence equipment projects available in allied countries ;

C. To provide as far as possible a common structure for the national defence budgets, national defence equipment procurement processes, and, finally, the procedure for supplying classified information with a view to instituting in the foreseeable future a European policy of common procurement of new weapons systems.

**RESOLUTION 63**  
***on parliaments and defence procurement***

---

The Assembly,

Having studied the report of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments analysing the rôle of national parliaments in the national defence equipment procurement process ;

Considering that national parliaments and their defence committees, with the exception of those of Germany and the Netherlands, are usually inadequately informed on defence matters ;

Believing that parliaments exercise insufficiently their prerogative to control the choice of defence equipment ;

Recalling the terms of its Recommendation 197 on military security and parliamentary information ;

With a view to furthering joint production and standardisation of defence equipment in the armed forces of the countries of Western Europe or in the Alliance, taking due account of the military and economic requirements of the Alliance as a whole,

**CALLS UPON THE PARLIAMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES**

To assert their democratic right and fulfil their democratic duty, where appropriate through their defence, budget, or other committees concerned :

1. To be fully informed on all aspects of defence policy, at both the national and allied level, especially on matters affecting the assessment of the military threat and the choice of defence equipment ;
2. To exercise sufficiently close control of the defence budget and appropriations, of the long-term defence programmes, and of all stages of the defence procurement process, so as to improve defence capability and increase standardisation and interoperability of equipment ;
3. To compile systematically information on current research and development projects in the national and European defence industry ;
4. To collaborate in the compilation and exchange through the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the WEU Assembly of information concerning alternative defence equipment projects available in allied countries using where appropriate the good offices of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly of Western European Union.

# SEVENTH SITTING

Thursday, 21st June 1979

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 803 and Amendments*).
2. Information on defence questions for members of parliament and relations with parliaments (*Presentation of*
3. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 802*).

*and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 800*).

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### 1. Adoption of Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

*Speaker* (point of order) : Mr. Roper.

### 3. Various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 803 and Amendments)*

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Craigen and Kershaw.

The President welcomed Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, former member of the Assembly and former President of the North Atlantic Assembly.

*Speakers* : MM. Périquier, Hawkins, Faulds and Pecoraro.

Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the Committee, and Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Périquier :

2. Leave out the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :

“Considering that there is the utmost interest in maintaining co-operation between Europe and the United States, *inter alia* in order to try to settle any disputes which may arise in certain fields ;”.

*Speaker* : Mr. Périquier.

The Amendment was withdrawn in favour of a manuscript Amendment tabled by Mr. Schlingemann to leave out the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :

“Noting the many statements in the United States in favour of closer consultations with Western Europe in many fields, but deploring that these statements have not always produced results ;”.

The manuscript Amendment was agreed to.

A manuscript Amendment was tabled by Mr. Valleix in the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, to leave out “participation by Europe in” and insert “particularly with reference to”.

*Speakers* : Mr. Valleix ; (point of order) : Mr. Roper.

The President ruled that under Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure the Amendment was not in order.

*Speakers* (points of order) : Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Valleix, Roper, Périquier and Kershaw.

The manuscript Amendment was tabled again by Mr. Périquier.

*Speaker* : Mr. Schlingemann.

The manuscript Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Urwin and others :

1. In the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph 5 as follows :

“5. Consider in view of more recent developments the need for closer consultation on energy problems between the United States and the European countries.”

*Speakers* : MM. Craigen, Roper and Schlingemann.

The Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 334) <sup>1</sup>.

#### **4. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation**

*(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 802)*

*Speakers* (points of order) : MM. Roper and Cook.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 335) <sup>1</sup>.

*Mr. Minnocci, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

#### **5. Information on defence questions for members of parliament and relations with parliaments**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 800)*

The Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Roper and Verleysen.

Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly took note of the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

#### **6. Adjournment of the Session**

The President adjourned the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

*The Sitting was closed at 11.30 a.m.*

1. See page 47.

1. See page 48.

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. <i>Lemmrich</i> (Handlos)	MM. <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten)
MM. Adriaensens	von Hassel	<i>Tummers</i> (Voogd)
<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	<i>Böhm</i> (Milz)	
<i>Verleysen</i> (Peeters)	Vohrer	
	<b>Italy</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
<b>France</b>	MM. Arfé	MM. Beith
MM. Brugnon	Maggioni	<i>Jessel</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett)
Grussenmeyer	Minnocci	Faulds
Jeambrun	Pecoraro	<i>Stainton</i> (Grant)
Péridier		Grieve
Petit	<b>Luxembourg</b>	Hawkins
Valleix	Mr. Margue	Lord Hughes
		MM. Kershaw
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	Roper
Mr. Ahrens	MM. van Hulst	<i>Cook</i> (Urwin)
Mrs. von Bothmer	<i>Schlingemann</i> (de Koster)	Warren
		<i>Craigen</i> (Whitehead)
		Dr. <i>Miller</i> (N...)

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Evers	MM. Roberti
MM. Bonnel	Gessner	Sarti
Hanin	Lagershausen	Segre
Tanghe	Marquardt	Treu
van Waterschoot	Mende	
	Müller	<b>Luxembourg</b>
<b>France</b>	Pfennig	MM. Abens
MM. Bizet	Reddemann	Mart
Boucheny	Hermann Schmidt	
Depietri	Schwencke	
Deschamps		<b>Netherlands</b>
Ferretti	<b>Italy</b>	Mr. Cornelissen
Jager	MM. Bernini	Mrs. van den Heuvel-de Blank
Péronnet	Boldrini	Mr. Stoffelen
Pignion	Bonalumi	
Schleier	Calamandrei	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Seitlinger	Corallo	MM. Critchley
Sénès	De Poi	Hardy
Talon	Fosson	Lewis
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	Gonella	Page
MM. Bardens	Orsini	
Enders	Pecchioli	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 334*****on various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States***

The Assembly,

Noting the many statements in the United States in favour of closer consultations with Western Europe in many fields, but deploring that these statements have not always produced results ;

Also welcoming the fact that the United States Government continues to consider the development of a European union as a favourable factor in such co-operation ;

Considering that, in an unfavourable economic situation, recourse to protectionism would be a serious danger for Europe and noting with satisfaction that the United States, like Western Europe, has set itself the aim of progressively freeing international trade ;

Considering that the creation of the European monetary fund is a major step in the search for the balance necessary for developing trade ;

Considering that Europe's security, based on the Atlantic Alliance, requires improved consultations between European members and the United States on external policy matters ;

Considering that such consultations can be improved to the extent that Western Europe manages to define a joint foreign policy itself ;

Welcoming the success of the SALT II negotiations, but considering that the development of strategic arms limitation talks calls for the adoption of joint positions by the European members of the Atlantic Alliance and particularly with reference to the SALT III negotiations ;

Welcoming the United States' intention to organise a two-way street for trade in armaments but concerned lest such a trend should inhibit European co-operation in this field,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Ensure that consultations between the European members of the Atlantic Alliance allow them, in the presence of their American partners, to uphold an external policy worked out by all the member countries of WEU in accordance with their goals of security and freedom of their peoples ;
2. Study in particular the implications for Europe's defence policy of the Soviet Union's deployment of new weapons ;
3. At regular intervals, make a critical appraisal of the strategic concepts adopted by NATO ;
4. Ensure that the organisation of European co-operation in armaments production is not hampered by bilateral agreements concluded between the United States and several European members of the Atlantic Alliance ;
5. Consider in view of more recent developments the need for closer consultation on energy problems between the United States and the European countries.

**RECOMMENDATION 335*****on political conditions for European armaments co-operation***

The Assembly,

Considering that the production of modern armaments is necessary for the economic, military and political independence of Europe while hoping sincerely that the international community will eventually reach agreement limiting the production of and trade in arms ;

Noting that national armies no longer provide a large enough market for any European country to be able to produce armaments at competitive prices ;

Considering that armaments industries occupy an important place in the economies of several Western European countries where they make a major contribution to the maintenance of employment ;

Considering that it is evident that their work makes a worthwhile contribution to the development of scientific and technical research in many fields and to the maintenance of a high level of technology in Europe, whilst noting that the resources that are absorbed by armaments production limit the investment available for civil production ;

Considering that the course of an armaments policy depends on the co-ordination of defence policies provided for in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty ;

Deploring the extension of trade in arms, particularly to countries in areas where there is dangerous tension ;

Gratified that the independent European programme group (IEPG) has undertaken the important task of co-ordinating the armaments efforts of the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance ;

Convinced that only the firm and steadfast determination of states can allow this work to be developed ;

Noting that the modified Brussels Treaty is the only juridical basis for the organisation of defence and armaments in Europe ;

Considering that WEU will therefore be called upon to take its place in any future European union ;

Welcoming the fact that the task allotted to the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) on 31st May 1976 is guiding its work in this direction,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. In application of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, ensure that European armaments co-operation develops along lines which conform to the latest technological requirements and to the defence policy and strategy applied by the members of the Atlantic Alliance ;
2. Keep the Assembly informed, by whatever means it considers appropriate, of the results already achieved in the study undertaken by the SAC, of the progress made and of the goals towards which its work is directed ;
3. Ensure that the SAC has access to the sources of information it needs so that its study may be completed in the reasonably near future ;
4. Study attentively the results of the study with a view to preparing on this basis guidance to be addressed to the appropriate authorities in member countries and to the European organisations concerned ;
5. Keep the Assembly regularly informed of the progress of work in the IEPG ;
6. Examine the limitations which Europe should advocate in regard to exporters and importers of armaments and itself to prevent the trade in arms stepping up the armaments race, particularly in areas where peace is threatened.



**II**

**OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES**

# FIRST SITTING

Monday, 18th June 1979

## SUMMARY

1. Opening of the Session.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Address by the Provisional President.
4. Examination of Credentials.
5. Tribute.
6. Election of the President of the Assembly.  
*Speakers* : The President, Mr. Périquier, Lord Duncan-Sandys.
7. Address by the President of the Assembly.  
*Speakers* : The President, Mr. Périquier, Lord Duncan-Sandys.
8. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
9. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session (Doc. 797).  
*Speakers* : The President, Mr. Roper.
10. Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee (Doc. 798).
11. Nomination of members to Committees.
12. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 11.35 a.m. with Mr. Jager, Provisional President, in the Chair.*

### 1. Opening of the Session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2, 4, 5 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### 3. Address by the Provisional President

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, as *doyen d'âge*, I feel greatly honoured and very happy to preside — for a few moments of ephemeral glory — over this Assembly, whose twenty-fifth session I have already declared open.

The Romans drew a sharp distinction between the *juniores*, who were characterised by *impetus* — or eagerness — and the *seniores*, who were distinguished by their *serenitas* or wisdom. I shall accordingly try to remain true to this maxim, even though I have the impression that I am still often carried away by *impetus* !

I am particularly happy to begin by congratulating our colleagues who were elected last week to the European Parliament. My congratulations and, I am sure, those of the whole Assembly, therefore go out to Mr. von Hassel, Mr. Alber, Mr. Klepsch, Mr. Schwencke, Mr. Gonella, Mr. Arfé, Mr. Segre, Mr. Abens, and to my French friends, Mr. Seitlinger and Mr. Druon.

Although it is true that delicate problems concerning division of competence have arisen between our two Assemblies, I am sure that the presence of former members of WEU in the Strasbourg parliament will contribute to the improvement of communication and help to resolve a number of these problems.

The *doyen* has two essential functions to fulfil : keeping his remarks brief, so as not to weary his audience, and showing wisdom, so as not to evoke clashes. I wonder which of these two requirements will prove the most difficult to fulfil ! For defence problems have today an essential place among the preoccupations of politicians.

The destabilisation of southern Europe's flank, from Turkey to Iran, is pregnant with risks which are still hard to calculate. The excessive and increasing armament of the eastern bloc countries justifies our disquiet. Mr. Pawelczyk will shortly be speaking to us on this subject. The introduction of increasingly sophisticated weapons — whether we consider the MX missile, the Backfire bomber or the neutron bomb — is liable at any moment to jeopardise the fragile balance of terror. Nor do the disappointing results of the MBFR negotiations and the partial results of SALT II lead us to an optimism which would be described as complacent.

1. See page 17.

*The President (continued)*

I am, however, happy to recall that France is playing a positive rôle in this sphere of détente. More and more countries seem to be accepting the idea of regional disarmament conferences. The Franco-African summit meeting at Kigali has opened up a number of lines that could lead to greater stability on the African continent. Mr. Müller will not contradict me on this point.

But all these facts, of which I have just reminded you all too briefly, show that we have enough to get on with. Our Assembly — the only assembly which is legally competent in the field of defence, as Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Mr. Mulley and Mr. Bernard-Reymond reminded us last year — will therefore have one more chance to prove its worth and to show that it is sticking to its job.

I shall conclude these remarks — for I have already spoken too long — by echoing a felicitous phrase used by Sir John Rodgers at this rostrum last year, when he said: "I am convinced that this session of the Assembly will rise to the occasion and show statesmanship, wisdom and courage". (*Applause*)

#### 4. Examination of Credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Orders of the Day provide for the examination of credentials.

The list of Representatives and Substitutes attending the twenty-fifth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union has been published in Notice No. 1.

Two seats for Representatives and two seats for Substitutes are vacant in the United Kingdom Delegation.

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, credentials were attested by the statement of the ratification of credentials carried out on 7th May 1979 by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and communicated by the President of that Assembly.

As an outcome of general elections, however, the Belgian Chamber of Representatives has nominated members to serve its delegation. There are four Representatives: Mr. Bonnel, Mr. Mangelschots, Mr. Peeters and Mr. Tanghe; and three Substitutes: Mr. Brasseur, Mr. Dejardin and Mr. Michel. As the Senate has not yet proceeded to make nominations, the seven other members of the delegation who are members of the Senate have had their credentials ratified by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

On the other hand, since the nomination of the seven members of the Chamber of Representa-

tatives took place on 10th May 1979 and was notified only after the adjournment in the session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, it is for our Assembly to ratify their credentials in implementation of the provisions contained in Rule 6 (2) of our Rules of Procedure.

It emerges from scrutiny of the credentials received that the nomination of four Belgian Representatives and three Substitutes by the Chamber of Representatives was properly carried out and that no credentials have been contested.

If the Assembly is unanimous, it could ratify them without prior referral for consideration by a Credentials Committee.

Are there any objections to ratification of the credentials of Mr. Bonnel, Mr. Mangelschots, Mr. Peeters and Mr. Tanghe, Belgian Representatives, and to those of Mr. Brasseur, Mr. Dejardin and Mr. Michel, Belgian Substitutes? ...

There are no objections.

Their credentials are ratified subject to conformity with the ratification which will be carried out later by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

I congratulate our colleagues whose mandates have been renewed and extend a hearty welcome to our new colleague, Mr. Michel.

#### 5. Tribute

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, before we begin our deliberations, I must regretfully inform you of the death of one of the members of the Assembly's staff with the longest service. (*The Representatives rose*)

Mr. Henry Fleury, who died at the end of May, was the efficient head of the French verbatim reporting service which has covered our discussions throughout all the sessions of the WEU Assembly since its creation.

We deeply regret the loss of a valued colleague, endowed with outstanding moral and professional qualities, who successfully discharged a task that was often delicate.

I am sure I am interpreting the wishes of the whole Assembly when I express our very heartfelt sympathy to Mrs. Fleury and her children.

#### 6. Election of the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Orders of the Day provide for the election of the President of the Assembly.

*The President (continued)*

In accordance with the provisions of Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure, no Representative may stand as a candidate for the office of President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more Representatives. Representatives who are members of governments are not eligible for nomination for the Bureau of the Assembly.

Moreover, Rule 7 (2) lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

I have received only one candidature — that of Mr. von Hassel of the Federal Republic of Germany.

This candidature has been properly made in the form prescribed by the Rules of Procedure. If the Assembly is unanimous — that is, if there are neither objections nor abstentions — the election of the President could take place by acclamation.

I would remind you that, in accordance with the terms of a decision taken by the Assembly on 30th November 1977, objections to a single candidature can only take the form of presenting an opposing candidate at the proper time and a vote in his favour.

As there is no rival candidate there is no objection to the candidature of Mr. von Hassel.

In accordance with the same decision, however, abstentions in the case of a single candidature may be expressed by handing in a spoilt voting paper, either with the name of the candidate crossed out or with the envelope being empty or containing a blank voting paper.

If there were abstentions, the election would be by secret ballot.

Are there any abstentions in the election of Mr. von Hassel? ...

I call Mr. Périquier.

Mr. PERIDIÉ (France) (Translation). — Mr. President, there is no objection on my part. But I should have liked the candidate to make a statement to us before the vote is taken. It must be recognised that he is in a unique position, for he holds a plurality of offices, he sits in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in the European Parliament — where incidentally he had a seat before — and also in the Assembly of Western European Union.

I, for my part, regret this plurality of offices.

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (United Kingdom) (Translation). — I request the floor, Mr. President, on a point of order.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — One moment, my dear colleague. Mr. Périquier has not concluded his remarks. I will give you the floor later.

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (United Kingdom). — On a point of order, Mr. President. Is it in order to have any discussion on this part of the business?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — There is no provision for a debate on this point, Lord Duncan-Sandys, but I think that an observation can be made. I would however ask Mr. Périquier whether, in making his remarks, he is allowing himself to be led to abstain?

Mr. PERIDIÉ (France) (Translation). — No, Mr. President, but I am raising the question: does it conflict with the Rules of Procedure if a candidate for the Presidency is asked to make a statement? A statement of this kind seems to me normal and natural — precisely in order to give us some guidance in our voting.

If I am told that such a statement is contrary to the Rules of Procedure, I shall bow to your ruling, as is my way, but I would repeat my question, Mr. President: is it really contrary to the Rules of Procedure if a candidate for the Presidency were perhaps to make a statement?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — It has never been customary in this Assembly, Mr. Périquier, for a candidate for the Presidency to make a statement giving the grounds for his candidature. Since there is at present only one candidate, who has accordingly every chance of being elected, I think that the latter could take your observations into account in the statement he will be making after his election.

Mr. PERIDIÉ (France) (Translation). — If necessary, I could then put my question to him when he has been elected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Absolutely. In the meantime, however, your comments are embarrassing the Provisional President, since he is unaccustomed to presiding over this Assembly. I have endeavoured to reconcile your very courteous remarks with the Rules of Procedure. I think it will be possible for you to obtain an answer to your question after the President has been elected.

Mr. PERIDIÉ (France) (Translation). — I certainly did not want to cause you embarrassment, Mr. President, so I shall not press my point.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I note, therefore, that there are no objections to the candidature of Mr. von Hassel, nor are there any abstentions.

*The President (continued)*

In these circumstances, I propose that the Assembly should elect Mr. von Hassel by acclamation. (*Loud applause*)

I note that the Assembly is unanimous. Consequently, I proclaim Mr. von Hassel President of the Assembly of Western European Union for its twenty-fifth session, and I invite him to come and take the Chair, which I have had the honour and pleasure to occupy for a few moments.

I would like to congratulate Mr. von Hassel on my own behalf and on behalf of the Assembly, which is now for the third time showing its confidence in him and the esteem in which he is held. (*Applause*)

(*Mr. von Hassel then took the Chair*)

**7. Address by the President of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. President, I would thank you for what you have done here in opening the twenty-fifth session of our Assembly, and I also thank my colleagues for electing me President.

(*The President continued in English*)

I am grateful to the Assembly for the confidence it has shown in me, and I would assure its members that I shall endeavour to perform my task as I have done during the past two years.

Ladies and Gentlemen, how to ensure peace and order in the world is a problem which has faced Europeans ever since the fall of the Roman Empire. It is now urgent to find a solution, since the very survival of our civilisation is at stake.

After the second world war, a new international order was born under the protection of the United Nations organisation. Noting their declining strength and the magnitude of the Soviet threat, the West Europeans left to the United States the rôle of guardian of international order which, divided, they were unable to play. For its part, at the summit of its power, our great American ally agreed to consider that it now had the duty to contain Soviet expansion and forestall disorder in the world.

This task now weighs heavily on President Carter. The strategic balance achieved by the Soviet Union, the emergence of a great new military power in China, the proliferation of local hostilities and, more recently, the discovery by the oil-producing countries of their economic and, hence, political strength, have heightened the risk inherent in any international action. Furthermore, the differences emerging between certain European and American interests over monetary matters, oil, nuclear energy and the

aircraft or space industries, may urge our countries to take a tighter grip on the defence of their own interests. In short, in a political context that has become singularly complex, Europeans have to reconsider the rôle incumbent on them and resume part of the burden which they have shaken off.

There is, therefore, no task more urgent for our Assembly than to determine the new conditions for European security. However difficult this may be, we must demonstrate our ability to carry out a task which is ours alone. Our silence would be full of guilt if the representatives of our seven parliaments, gathered in the parliamentary assembly officially responsible for defence matters, failed to launch a solemn appeal to the governments to concert their efforts in order to play, in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and in the free world, a rôle which is essential for our common salvation.

Let us assess the threats to which we are exposed before examining the means of meeting them. Napoleon said that war was a simple act, merely a matter of execution. I am not sure he was right. At the very least, war simplifies matters because it causes alliances to be formed and limits confrontation to one between two sides opposing each other in a single conflict.

Similarly, international politics were simpler in the days of the cold war, characterised by very stiff opposition between the two blocs which had been formed. It suffices to recall the Berlin blockade and the Korean war. The world today is not more peaceful : it is more complex. The causes of tension are no longer confined to the aggressiveness of a great power. Many centres of power, of varying importance, conflict with each other or strike up alliances in changing shapes, and East-West clashes have become more indirect. We have entered the era of multipolarity.

More than the economic success of the European Community and of Japan, multipolarity signifies the ideological failure of the Soviet Union.

China's separation from what was the eastern bloc is probably the major feature of post-war history. This ideological failure is also expressed in the national claims of the populations who are not Russian, in the way the Pope was welcomed by the people of Poland and in the revolt of intellectuals against the suppression of freedom. It is accompanied by economic failure marked by a falling GNP growth-rate and rising indebtedness.

The Soviet Union's setbacks do not contribute to our security ; the result is rather for the Kremlin leaders to avert the collapse of the Soviet system by building up military strength. Their setbacks might thus, in my view, foster instability.

*The President (continued)*

After achieving strategic parity with the United States, the Soviet Union seems to be trying to establish its superiority and is consequently turning its full efforts towards technical innovation. Its navy is now sailing all the oceans of the world. Its forces are capable of intervening in any conflict on whichever side the Kremlin chooses to support. Its weapons and military advisers are now in action in areas as remote from Soviet frontiers as, for instance, Ogaden and Eritrea. Military assistance to Cuba allows intervention in Angola through the intermediary of Cuban "volunteers". Support to Vietnam guarantees preferential bases for the Soviet leaders in any future action in South-East Asia.

In short, the Kremlin believes that the Soviet Union's main trump card in the event of serious internal difficulties is to be found in its military strength. This belief is dangerous when fighting is multiplying throughout the world and the arms race is continuing. In Africa, ethnic or religious conflicts, racial problems and doubts about the frontiers of states established after decolonisation provide the Soviet Union with many opportunities of intervening. In Asia, tension between China, determined to make its new power felt, and Vietnam, with an excess of arms and anxious to extend its influence throughout the Indo-Chinese peninsula, has already sparked off a brief war in which the belligerents managed to exercise enough restraint to keep within certain limits in terms of time, area and use of arms.

Further west, the latent conflict between India and Pakistan and the latter's desire to retain the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons, already at the disposal of India, may lead to unforeseeable developments at any moment.

But the most serious danger for us is in the Middle East. Experts consider that the shortage of oil will reach the Soviet Union in a few years' time, when its military strength will be at its zenith as a result of its present strenuous efforts. Soviet leaders will thus be sorely tempted to extend their influence in a politically unstable area in which is to be found a large part of the world's oil reserves.

We must therefore turn our closest attention first and foremost to this area, the resources of which are essential for our economy and the maintenance of our way of life, and the third world.

Disturbances in Iran and Afghanistan, Turkey's difficulties and the conflict between Israel and its neighbours are excellent pretexts for intervention in that part of the world. On the other hand, it is difficult for the United States to maintain its influence in this area. Any action on its part in Iran would trigger off

further rioting and lead to a total halt in oil supplies.

However courageous its signatories, the agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded at Camp David is an important but limited step. Israeli-Arab antagonism persists, the Palestinian problem has not been settled, and the hostility of other Arab countries towards Egypt makes the situation more complex.

Finally, the OPEC countries may decide to pursue a policy which would break the back of Western Europe's industry.

Seeing the conditions of their survival at the mercy of developments which they are powerless to control, should not Europeans make more determined efforts to ensure their security? Should not the Western European Union Council examine these problems more attentively and give our Assembly global views of what a European security policy might be?

*(The President continued in French)*

(Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, in face of the threats just analysed, I personally am convinced that we must promote western solidarity, strengthen the Atlantic Alliance and concert European efforts more closely.

The industrialised countries which enjoy the benefits of a liberal régime constitute, despite the fact that they compete with each other for trade, a group whose members depend on the rest of the world for their supplies and for their outlets. They must therefore try to eliminate sources of tension which might be used by their adversaries. For them, to fight the combined evils of hunger, over-population and illiteracy is not just a humanitarian task. It is clearly in their own interest to be generous.

They must also be realistic and agree among themselves when their economies are threatened by the organised reduction of oil supplies or by the increase in its price. Energy savings are necessary, but are not enough; there must be a concerted policy on supply. We must hope that European initiatives to this end will be worked out in those bodies where these problems are soon to be studied.

Mutual understanding, which is essential in the western world as a whole, is even more so within the Alliance which guarantees our security. New forms of European-American dialogue will have to be worked out if the Atlantic Alliance is to face up to the difficulties stemming from the divergence between the interests of Europe and of the United States. I am not thinking of oil alone. I am also thinking of the failure of the Europeans to adopt a concerted position on enhanced radiation nuclear weapons, which explains President Carter's hesitation about what the newspapers call the

*The President (continued)*

neutron bomb. A resolute stance should have been adopted in favour of this outstanding anti-tank weapon in order to show the Europeans' determination to assure the conditions of their security.

It is therefore regrettable that at this session the Assembly is not able to debate the question of new weapons, which this year is central to the Alliance's preoccupations. We will, however, be examining the agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons being signed in Vienna, at 2 o'clock this very afternoon, by the United States and the Soviet Union.

We can but welcome any measure, however limited, which might slow down the armaments race, but we must bear in mind that the forthcoming negotiations will be concerned with problems which affect Europeans first and foremost. I am referring to the Soviet rockets that are threatening Europe and to the response to this threat which may be found on the one hand in cruise missiles and, on the other, in the independent strike forces of the United Kingdom and France, whose important contribution to deterrence against aggression involving our countries has rightly been stressed by Mrs. Thatcher.

It is therefore essential for Europeans to agree among themselves to make their voices heard by increasing their own contribution to the European-American dialogue. To do this the European countries must concert their efforts more effectively. There are many institutions which can contribute to the process of consultation, since Europe is many-sided and its institutions are complex. What it lacks is political drive resting on a popular consensus.

Elections to the European Parliament by direct suffrage are specifically intended to remedy this failing. It would be regrettable for the newly-elected European Parliament to lose its way in the juridical controversies arising out of its election.

Whilst negotiations between experts may be an occasion for keen discussion, the purpose of debates in the assembly of the Communities should be to establish broad political agreement on aims which will doubtless not be very different from those pursued by our own Assembly. Co-operation should therefore be established between the directly-elected assembly and the assembly which groups representatives from the parliaments of our seven member countries.

The recommendations made by the WEU Assembly and by the assembly of the Communities could clearly prove to be complementary in many respects, with the WEU Assembly discussing the implications of certain problems — such

as energy — from the security point of view, whereas the assembly of the Communities would pay closer attention to the industrial, economic and social aspects.

A concerted approach by the two assemblies might even be envisaged if the European-American differences on energy problems threatened to affect both the firmness of our Alliance and the strength of our economy.

*(The President continued in German)*

Let me in conclusion add a few remarks. Our Assembly is only too well aware how important it is to grapple constantly with the problems raised by European security. Again and again the Assembly calls on the governments of member states to see and deal with this aspect of their work in a wider context. The Council of Western European Union should pay more attention than it has in the past to the recommendations of our Assembly urging it to establish the premises for joint action.

In view of the undertakings to give mutual assistance, and of the broadly homogeneous industrial structure of its members, Western European Union could even become the starting point for fresh initiatives and political moves. No other forum would be more suitable for an exchange of views on European security needs; but, unhappily, we are today without a common position on the matter — and this could jeopardise the efforts we are making to build Europe.

Take the armaments industry as an example. Here all the European organisations appear to be powerless. The independent European programme group is now finding itself facing the same difficulties as the Standing Armaments Committee. Yet surely it is essential that we in Europe should continue to have a sound industrial base, the precondition for research, development and production in the armaments sector. To give expression to its concern about this the Assembly has decided to organise a second symposium on a European armaments policy, to be held in Brussels next October; the Assembly hopes it will have the support of the seven governments and is inviting them to send high-level representatives to this symposium.

Western European Union is not, however, a club for members of the armaments industry. It is, rather, the core of a European organisation whose competence extends to all fields without the member countries having had to give up part of their sovereignty. So far, a limit has voluntarily been placed on the exercise of this responsibility; but if it should prove necessary it would none the less be possible for us, faced with some threat, to take concerted action within the framework provided by Western European Union.

*The President (continued)*

I am quite sure that should there be a serious crisis our countries would have the will, and the intelligence, needed to overcome it. The adaptability of our political system is the source of our great superiority.

Personal freedom, and the basic rights that are worth defending, are in the forefront of all we do. The debates in our Assembly ought, therefore, to find the positive response in the public mind that they deserve. We have felt that our information work should receive greater financial support. We will not flag in our endeavours to bring home to the peoples of Europe the importance of security problems.

In this connection the political groups in our Assembly have an important rôle to play. After all, we here are the representatives of seven parliaments; and we must endeavour to co-ordinate our contacts with our governments and, by using our political expertise, to ensure that in this way concerted European action will, as we all hope, become more of a reality than it has been so far. For me there is no question but that democracy is perfectly capable of defending itself. Consequently, I am also convinced that our appeals will not pass unheeded.

Let me, in conclusion, say a word or two about what is happening in Vienna at the present time, thus picking up the thread of what I was saying earlier. Today the leaders of the two super-powers, President Carter and Mr. Brezhnev, are meeting in Vienna. They will be signing SALT II, the agreement on the nuclear components of the armed forces that has long been under discussion and has attracted both plaudits and criticism. We here do not yet know all the details of this agreement. Although we do not usually adopt a firm position before we have carefully analysed and thoroughly discussed the final texts in our parliamentary assembly, I think the Assembly will join me in expressing the hope that this agreement will reduce the pressures and threats and that it will strengthen peace. And I pray that this hope will find confirmation when we have eventually studied the SALT II documents. It is with this peace in mind that we open today the twenty-fifth session of the Assembly of Western European Union. Thank you. (*Applause*)

*(The President continued in English)*

We proceed with our Orders of the Day and I call Mr. Périquier.

Mr. PERIDIÉ (*France*) (Translation). — I believe that you will in all honesty recognise, Mr. President, that you constitute a unique case to which our Committee on Rules of Procedure should perhaps one day turn its attention.

You are at the same time a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and a member of the European Parliament; and from 17th July next, you will become really and truly a member of the European Parliament. It is not for me to concern myself with this plurality of offices: that is a matter for your own country and your national delegation.

Nevertheless, I would venture to ask one question which does not seem to me to display any feelings of antipathy, for that is not the case. I acknowledge that you have always been an excellent President and I have voted for you, which shows that I do not harbour any feelings of personal hostility towards you.

But if tomorrow the parliament decides to concern itself with defence questions — as it has shown the intention of doing on many occasions — can we rest assured that you will energetically defend WEU and the Brussels Treaty? I have confidence in you, and am sure that you will defend them. If, however, you have a majority against you, what is your position going to be? Do you not think that it will be extremely difficult?

I repeat: please do not see my question as an act of hostility, for if you did so that would cause me distress. But the members of this Assembly none the less have a right to obtain all the assurances needed to show that they have good reason to place their confidence in you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — May I first of all thank you for your frankness and say that I welcome the style we adopt in this Assembly. We debate by argument and counter-argument, we stand, politically, on the one side or the other, and at the same time are courteous in our relations with one another. I believe that this sort of relationship, the style of this Assembly, is good.

Let me, however, now answer your question. Like yourself in France, I am a directly-elected representative; I am a member of the German Bundestag, directly elected in my constituency. This holds good until the end of the life of the parliament in the autumn of 1980.

In addition I am a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. I have cut down on my activities there in order to concentrate on work in Western European Union. I am grateful to you for again electing me President.

You are now asking, Mr. Périquier, "What, Mr. President, will be your attitude in the new European Parliament to which you have been elected, at the head of a list of candidates, when questions are discussed there which ought really to be dealt with elsewhere?" I would say in this



*The President (continued)*

connection that, on other occasions I have repeatedly shown my firm commitment to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in order that the Council of Europe should not, as the European Parliament takes on new life, fade perhaps a little into the background and be neglected by the members of the Community of the Nine. I have made this plain on every possible occasion, and I assume that a similar view is generally held in this Assembly.

There is another thing which I have stressed time and again — and not only recently as President of the Assembly of WEU, but also as one who has been familiar with and has endorsed the Brussels Treaty and Western European Union throughout the years of their political existence, and also as a Minister of Defence, in which capacity I have addressed this Assembly — namely that I am aware of the task before Western European Union and of its importance, and that I know there are bodies which do not have the responsibility which has been placed on us.

Finally, my dear Mr. Périquier, we are, both you and I, politicians, and we ought not to be constantly opposing the European Parliament and Western European Union one to the other; we should also be seeing where we might for once speak with one voice in support of the preservation of peace in Europe. I am going into the European Parliament as one who has had an outstanding apprenticeship here, an apprenticeship which he will not forget. Thank you. (*Applause*)

Mr. PERIDIÉ (France) (Translation). — I simply want to thank you, Mr. President. I am in fact satisfied with your answer.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you for these words of thanks.

I call Lord Duncan-Sandys.

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (*United Kingdom*). — Far from regretting that our President has been elected to the European Parliament, I think that we should all rejoice and feel that this will help to achieve the very thing that you have emphasised, Mr. President, namely, the importance of not having any isolation between WEU and the European Community — not opposing one another, as you said a moment ago, but trying to work together.

I very much hope that you will not try to defend the interests of Western European Union against the Community; and here I disagree with my colleague Mr. Périquier. I believe, on the contrary, that the sooner the Community accepts responsibility for defence, the better it will be for Europe.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Lord Duncan-Sandys.

### **8. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure provides that no Representative may be a candidate unless his nomination is presented in writing by at least three Representatives. Representatives who are members of a national government may not be members of the Bureau of the Assembly.

Furthermore, under Rule 7 (2) substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau.

Nominations have been correctly submitted. They are, in alphabetical order: Sir Frederic Bennett (United Kingdom), Mr. Mart (Luxembourg), Mr. Minnoci (Italy), Mr. Stoffelen (Netherlands), Mr. Tanghe (Belgium) and Mr. Valleix (France). The number of nominations is equal to the number of vacancies.

If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that the election of the Vice-Presidents should be by acclamation. I should make clear that in the case of election by acclamation the seniority of the Vice-Presidents would be decided by age.

Are there any objections to the candidatures submitted?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare elected as Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, in the following order of seniority: Mr. Tanghe, Mr. Minnoci, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Mart, Mr. Valleix and Mr. Stoffelen.

### **9. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session**

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the adoption of the draft Order of Business for the first part of the twenty-fifth ordinary session of the Assembly.

The draft Order of Business is given in Document 797 dated 15th June 1979.

It differs from the previous draft Order of Business by the addition at the end of the sitting on the morning of Thursday, 21st June, of an address by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Mr. Angelo Sanza.

Mr. Roper has asked for the floor.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am most grateful to you, Mr. President, for calling me. As will be seen on the most recent copy of the

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

draft Order of Business, Thursday afternoon's business is proposed by the Presidential Committee to be a debate on SALT II and its implications for European security.

On the earlier copy of the draft Order of Business it will be seen that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments requested that procedure under Rule 43 (5) be used and that we should have a chance this morning to consider under urgent procedure whether there should be a debate on SALT II. The Presidential Committee by written procedure decided to short-circuit the proceedings. I do not wish to question that now. It can be done elsewhere.

I must say that I did not have a chance to discuss this with my Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. We had suggested the item for the agenda in good faith a few weeks ago and we had thought at that time that not merely the text of the SALT II agreement but the supporting statements and documents would have been available before last weekend, so that we could have studied them and made effective comments upon them. The SALT II treaty is probably being signed in Vienna at this moment and it is unlikely that we shall have the relevant copies, data and information that we need even on Thursday next for such a debate. I would hope, therefore, that the Assembly would not proceed with such a debate during this session. This is a matter of very great importance to Europe and we should debate it only after careful consideration.

I would ask today, Mr. President, that we remove from the draft Order of Business the debate proposed for Thursday afternoon; but to be courteous to my Committee I shall put it to those members tomorrow morning and, if they disagree with my view, they will have a right to come back to the Assembly under Rule 43 (5) and ask for the item to be reinstated under the urgent procedure. I hope that that will not be the case, but, as a matter of courtesy to my Committee, I have to raise that possibility.

In summary, I now move that the draft Order of Business be adopted, subject to removal of the business for Thursday afternoon dealing with SALT II and its implications for European security.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roper. I believe that there is full agreement to the proposal. When we put down the Order of Business some weeks ago we had heard that we could have the SALT II papers in time for them to be discussed in the Defence Committee in due course. As this has not been done up to now and we have no papers whatsoever, it is advisable to leave out this paragraph from the Order of Business and strike it from the list.

Is there any objection ?...

If there is no objection, we can cut the whole afternoon sitting of Thursday, 21st June. Is that agreed ? There is no objection.

Does anyone want the floor in connection with the Order of Business ?...

The draft Order of Business for the first part of the twenty-fifth ordinary session is agreed to.

## **10. Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee**

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the ratification of decisions of the Presidential Committee, Document 798. Under the provisions of paragraph 2 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure, the Presidential Committee is authorised, subject to subsequent ratification by the Assembly, to take any steps which it estimates to be necessary to ensure the continuity of action by the Assembly between sessions.

On 18th January last, the Presidential Committee adopted Resolution 62 to organise on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979, in Brussels, a second symposium on a European armaments policy and to commemorate on that occasion the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the agreements modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty. Ladies and Gentlemen, the text of Resolution 62, the organisation of the symposium and the topics of papers, are all included in Document 798, which has been distributed to you.

With regard to those participating in the symposium, who are listed in paragraph 7, it is highly desirable that the governments of member countries take note of the action of the Assembly and nominate as their representatives people of the highest rank. Because of the date of the symposium, the Presidential Committee took this action in order to allow the Committees of the Assembly to undertake their preparations.

Is there any opposition to the ratification of Document 798 ?...

No, then we can vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Resolution 62 on the symposium on a European armaments policy is ratified unanimously<sup>1</sup>.*

## **11. Nomination of members to Committees**

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the nomination of members to Committees.

1. See page 18.

*The President (continued)*

The candidatures for the six Committees of the Assembly have been published in an appendix to Notice No. 1 which has been distributed.

In accordance with the provisions of Rule 39 (6) and Rule 42 *bis* (2) of the Rules of Procedure, these candidatures are submitted to the Assembly.

Are there any objections to the candidatures submitted ?...

The candidatures for Committees are ratified.

The Committees of the Assembly are thus constituted.

**12. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly (Presentation by Mr. Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg,

Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Documents 799 and 811).

2. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council ; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council ; Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council (Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Documents 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments).
3. Address by Mr. Aigrain, French Minister of State attached to the Prime Minister, responsible for research.

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.)*

## SECOND SITTING

Monday, 18th June 1979

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly (*Presentation by Mr. Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 799 and 811*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Thorn (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*).  
*Replies by Mr. Thorn to questions put by*: Mr. Portheine, Mr. Valleix, Mr. van Waterschoot, Mr. Boucheny, Lord Northfield, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Vohrer, Mrs. von Bothmer, Lord Duncan-Sandys.
4. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council; Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council (*Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Minnocci (*Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Tanghe (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Scheffler (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*), Mr. Valleix, Mr. Périquier.
5. Address by Mr. Aigrain, French Minister of State attached to the Prime Minister, responsible for research.  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Aigrain (*French Minister of State attached to the Prime Minister, responsible for research*).  
*Replies by Mr. Aigrain, to questions put by*: Mr. Jager, Mr. Brasseur, Mr. Warren, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Scheffler, Mr. Minnocci.
6. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council; Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council (*Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Mommersteeg, Mr. Druon, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Banks, Lord Northfield, Mr. Adriaenssens.
7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>. See page 21.

### 3. Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly

*(Presentation by Mr. Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 799 and 811)*

The PRESIDENT. — The Orders of the Day now provide for the presentation by Mr. Gaston Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, of the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council, Documents 799 and 811.

I now welcome on behalf of the Assembly Mr. Gaston Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Western European Union, and call him to the rostrum to present the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council.

Please take the floor, Mr. Thorn. (*Applause*)

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — Mr. Pre-

*Mr. Thorn (continued)*

sident, before I begin my speech to your Assembly — having lost count of the number of times I have done so before — allow me to congratulate you very sincerely on your election this morning and to express to you my warm congratulations and best wishes for your years of renewed office.

In accordance with tradition, it falls upon me now — as you have just briefly said — to present on behalf of my colleagues the Council's annual report to your Assembly. This text has been submitted to you ; and I shall endeavour to comment as briefly as possible on Chapter I, which deals more specifically with relations between the Council and your Assembly, and then with Chapters II to IV concerning the Council's implementation of the Brussels Treaty.

The WEU Council has — as I hope the Assembly has recognised — continued to appreciate highly the rôle played by your Assembly in watching over the evolution of the problems of security and European union and in submitting its thoughts to the governments for their attention. For defence questions in particular — which it is the only one of all the European assemblies empowered to deal with — the WEU Assembly of course exercises its powers, but does so above all with a consistency and insight that are quite invaluable.

The Council is therefore fully mindful of maintaining close and constructive relations with your Assembly. Its concern in this respect was specifically illustrated in 1978 by the speed with which the twenty-fourth annual report was communicated and by the care which the Ministers took, in drafting it, to cover the whole of the traditional topics which the Assembly wanted the document to include. It was further illustrated by the information regularly supplied to your Assembly on the state of advancement of the study being prepared by the Standing Armaments Committee on the armaments industry sector in the WEU member countries and, in addition, by the information given in response to recommendations and questions from the Assembly on the status of numerous other issues arising from implementation of the Brussels Treaty, including incidentally — as some of you have noted with satisfaction — matters dealt with in other international institutions.

Lastly, I would stress that the Council has through sundry informal contacts tried to give added depth to the political dialogue with the Assembly : through the working luncheon with the Presidential Committee after the ministerial meeting of 5th June 1978 in Bonn, followed by a joint meeting with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ; a joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee on 3rd November 1978 in Rome ; finally, a working luncheon with

the Presidential Committee after the ministerial meeting of the Council on 16th May 1979 in Rome ; and then a joint meeting with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Chapters II, III and IV of the report deal with implementation of the Brussels Treaty by the Council assisted by its subsidiary bodies.

It is a pleasure for me to emphasise yet again that the modified Brussels Treaty, whose Article V requires the member states to afford each other mutual assistance in the event of aggression, constitutes one of the keystones of the security system of the signatory countries, and we can but deplore once again the number of people who remain unaware of that article's scope.

The validity of all the provisions of the treaty and its protocols, and member countries' determination to fulfil the obligations they have entered into for a period of fifty years, have been reaffirmed in the annual report.

Before outlining the activities of the Council and its subsidiary bodies during 1978, let us note that, as the Assembly is very well aware, the Council is bound under the treaty to avoid duplicating the activities of other international organisations to which its members may belong. Thus it pays particular heed to developments in the field of political co-operation among the Nine and of armaments co-operation in the independent European programme group.

As shown in Chapter II of the annual report on its activities, the Council continued during 1978 to keep a careful watch on application of the provisions of the treaty and its protocols relating to the levels of member states' forces and armaments. I think I can say that the procedures laid down for the purpose functioned normally.

The assistance provided by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, whose activities are related in Chapter III, proved as in previous years most valuable. The Agency discharged its allotted task satisfactorily and efficiently in the sectors it supervises.

In the sphere of armaments co-operation, the Council instructed the Standing Armaments Committee to carry out a study on the armaments industry sector in the member countries, with the proviso that the Committee should avoid any duplication with the work of the Rome group.

As the Assembly has been informed, the legal part of this study has already been transmitted to the Council. Compilation of the economic section is under way. At their recent meeting in Rome, the Ministers reaffirmed the importance attached by governments to the SAC study. When it has been fully completed, the Council will consider the content and the manner in which the Assembly can be adequately informed.

*Mr. Thorn (continued)*

While, as is only natural, questions of implementation of the treaty in respect of defence took up the major part of the Council's activities, it may be recalled that, in the case of foreign policy, the Ministers held exchanges of views on East-West relations at their meetings of 5th June 1978 in Bonn and 16th May of this year in Rome.

Mr. President, I shall of course be at the Assembly's disposal to answer questions on the statutory report, and more generally on relations between the Council and the Assembly. Beforehand, however, let me offer a few brief remarks in my capacity as Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, or, to be more precise, I should rather say, on my own behalf, since, as you know, I am now only responsible for the dispatch of day-to-day business.

It is not, however, about Luxembourg's problems that I wish to address you, but about the major European phenomenon of the recent elections held simultaneously in the nine countries of the Community which are, I believe, of concern to your Assembly.

Of course, your own Assembly is unaffected by elections held in the framework of the Community of the Nine. Indeed, the powers devolving upon you under the Brussels Treaty prevent this, and your democratic legitimacy remains full and entire, and quite unchallengeable. You constitute, I repeat, the only European Assembly having clear and exclusive competence in the realm of defence. There can be no question of detracting from this vital forum in which parliamentarians and ministers from seven Western European countries can talk uninhibitedly about the defence questions which concern us in the highest degree. As members of elected national parliaments you are all, on all sides of the Chamber, democratically and widely empowered to discharge your responsibilities under the Brussels Treaty.

Having thus briefly reminded you of my position as regards the WEU Assembly, I shall endeavour to clarify somewhat my thoughts on three different kinds of problem: the fact of the European elections, the responsibilities of the assembly of the Nine and, insofar as this concerns your Assembly, the place of defence matters in the European Community.

First, the elections just held simultaneously in nine free countries by direct universal suffrage represent, as it were, a world *première*. Mr. President, even though the rate of abstention in some countries was regrettably high, and even though the diversity of national electoral systems did not necessarily result in a proper, or at least

equal and fair, representation of the political forces involved, I believe that the impact on public opinion will have been considerable. The European Parliament, henceforward composed of representatives specially elected to such office at a European level will inevitably and inescapably take on new consistence. In the eyes of the Community's inhabitants, it will be regarded more and more as the true European Parliament, after having been only a European assembly. The main thing is, however, as nobody can gainsay, that the citizens of the nine member countries will know that they have by their freely-cast votes established a parliamentary body to watch over their common interests.

It is, moreover, from this standpoint that we must view the newly-elected European assembly's powers.

One thing is quite clear: the Treaty of Rome, as subsequently completed and modified, confers upon the assembly well-defined and admittedly fairly extensive powers.

In the immediate prospect, nothing will be changed in this respect. It is, however, easy to see that the assembly which has practically doubled its size, and a large proportion of whose members will be able to carry out their duties full time since they will no longer have to fulfil a national mandate as well, will be able to exert its powers more strictly than its predecessor. You will all remember the dispute that arose a few months ago between the European Parliament and the Council of the Communities about the 1979 budget, and was resolved after prolonged haggling in a manner very largely giving satisfaction to the parliamentarians.

It seems to me pretty obvious that the latter, strong in their new electoral mandates, will insist upon full exercise of their budgetary powers under the treaties. Parliament has in many other fields powers of consultation and information, if I may so express myself. It will certainly not fail to use them to the best advantage, and endeavour through persuasion to steer the actions of the Council and Commission along the lines it considers most appropriate.

Will this always serve the common interest? I am not yet sure, for an elected parliamentarian is accountable to his electorate; and it is very possible, if not probable, that many electors will seek to promote narrowly sectoral interests, not necessarily compatible with the common Community interest. We may therefore anticipate sometimes painfully achieved compromises, even inside the parliament and between parliamentary groups, and a considerably increased workload for the Commission and Council of Ministers.

For the latter in particular, it will certainly be compelled to ensure far more regular attendance at presidential level than the one or two

*Mr. Thorn (continued)*

days a month it has hitherto been accustomed to set aside for dialogue with the parliamentarians.

All this still holds many unknown factors, as you have found, and will pose numerous problems during the initial phase. It will be for the parliament and the spokesmen of the Commission and Council to tackle them in a spirit of frankness, and above all in good faith and with determination. Democracy will, in any case, have taken a great step forward with the function of watchdog over the activities of the Commission and the Council and that of making representations to these organs, being performed more by a properly elected body and somewhat less by the numerous lobbies at present installed in Brussels.

I said just now that the newly-elected parliament would not immediately be given wider powers than the one which held its last session at Luxembourg a month ago. This parliament, whatever its democratic legitimacy, is not a constituent assembly and cannot therefore modify the treaty. Nor do I suspect it of wishing to indulge in what some people have termed a *coup d'état*, which would moreover stand no chance of having any legal effects. Recognition of new powers could only be given by a treaty, one agreed to by each of the member countries and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. There is no other way, and any speculation in quest of others would be illusory, not to say disillusioning, whereas speculation lest other ways may be used is more a gratuitous attribution of motives.

Nevertheless it is perfectly natural — and this, too, I have said already and I repeat emphatically — that the newly-elected parliament should ardently desire an extension of dialogue and therefore in some way of its own powers, at any rate so far as the vast majority of its members are concerned, and it is perfectly natural that, strong in the knowledge of having been legitimised, it should mean to enlarge the dialogue. Nothing could really be more legitimate. Every politician, every citizen, has the right to think and say that the existing assembly has enough powers, that it already has too many, and to use the political and legal weapons at his disposal to defend the idea. Yet the same right belongs to every politician, and, all the more so, to every citizen who thinks that increased democratisation of the Community by way of an enlargement of the parliament's areas of competence, and possibly later of its powers, is desirable in the hope of achieving a better balance between our institutions.

Before concluding, I should like briefly to recall two ideas which seem to me self-evident.

Neither the Rome Treaty, nor the other treaties concerning the European Community, touch upon defence problems. The consequence is that the European Parliament will not in future be, any more than it has been in the past, competent to deliberate on them. Defence will therefore remain, for the foreseeable future and in the parliamentary context, exclusively the province of your Assembly.

It seems to me, however — to be as honest as complete, or as complete as honest — that a Community destined to see itself transformed into a European union as the summit meeting had wished — I no longer dare remind you of the 1980 deadline we set ourselves here in Paris — it seems to me that such a Community cannot indefinitely stand aloof — I am weighing my words carefully — from the security problems that are intimately bound up with political ones.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, these are the main remarks which I wished to make; and I await your questions. I thank you for the attention you have given me, and am at your disposal to answer your questions to the best of my ability. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I thank you, Mr. Thorn, on behalf of the Assembly for your report. I note that you are ready to reply to questions. I hope that we shall keep within the time that you have scheduled for your presence here in the Assembly.

I call first Mr. Portheine. He will be followed by Mr. Valleix.

Mr. PORTHEINE (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to put a question to Mr. Thorn, while saluting him as a great European. He too is convinced that WEU must continue to have a certain position within the framework of the Brussels Treaty, with an eye to what is said in the report concerning the European Parliament.

My question is as follows: the SALT II agreements have just been signed. The United States and the Soviet Union are going to begin the SALT III negotiations, which directly concern Europe. Are the governments of the Seven resolved to consider together the implications of these negotiations for their common security? Within what framework will they do so?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Thorn.

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — I would say in answer to the honourable gentleman that the governments of the seven member countries of Western European Union will not, of course, fail to make a joint examination of the SALT agreements.

*Mr. Thorn (continued)*

I may say that there was an obvious first framework for this purpose — that is, NATO, where exchanges of view have already taken place on the perspectives presented by the forthcoming SALT III negotiations. For it must not be forgotten that, in the European context, SALT of course opens up wider perspectives and that our governments are represented in a wider Atlantic group; it is there that, to some extent in anticipation of the event, certain issues have been examined.

If and when the discussions in that organisation or elsewhere raise points that fall within the field of application of Western European Union, it seems to me obvious that the Council and the Assembly of WEU should be called upon to consider them and to express their views.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — It will come as no surprise to the Chairman of the Council if I tell him that I have paid very particular attention to his remarks on certain possible or eventual consequences of the recent elections by universal suffrage to the Assembly of the European Communities. And I take it as a contribution in the form of a very clear affirmation when he states the fact that this assembly cannot, it is true, act in a way which conflicts with the texts, transform itself into a constituent body or do anything which modifies its field of competence.

In the light of this new situation, it is indeed important to confirm in unequivocal terms the tasks of each of our assemblies. You have reminded us how scrupulously the treaties must be respected, both in the case of the European Communities and in that of Western European Union.

In that connection, it goes without saying that in the context of our quite exclusive competence where the defence of Europe is concerned, we are today obliged to put to ourselves searching questions not only on all the problems involved in traditional defence and armaments, but more specifically on those concerning energy. It goes equally without saying that there can be no defence without independence in the energy field and without the guaranteed sources of supply which it offers. I should therefore like to ask the Chairman of the Council two questions. Does he consider it necessary, in the conditions at present prevailing on the oil market, that the European countries should seek to reach agreements with the producer countries and their organisations, in order to replace confrontation with dialogue?

Secondly, what is his judgment on the idea that such agreements should be based on undertakings as regards price and delivery on the part of the producer countries and, on the part of the consumer countries, as regards reductions in consumption and transfers of technology?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Thorn.

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — With regard to the first part of Mr. Valleix's remarks, I think I can say in all modesty that I have provided an answer, I would not claim in anticipation, but I imagined the question would come up, and thought it was essential to adopt a position in my statement on the areas of competence conferred by the treaties. I believe that Mr. Valleix will agree with me when I say that the answer was sufficiently clear, so I need not dwell further on the subject.

Of course, it is perfectly legitimate that you, for your part, should make the link between energy and defence policy or point to their interdependence. As President Harmel used to say: "Nothing stands alone"; and in this field, especially, that statement is perfectly valid.

But I feel somewhat embarrassed about answering this question today, not because of its substance, but above all in view of the circumstances of time and place, since at this very moment the Council of Ministers of the Community is meeting in our town of Luxembourg where it is discussing energy problems and preparing for the European Council, in which I shall have the honour to participate in Strasbourg on Thursday and Friday, and is trying to pinpoint some of the factors involved in this problem, a problem which concerns us all. Accordingly, it would be somewhat rash of me to state my views now. I can however, speaking strictly for myself, tell you that the conference suggested by the President of the Republic between the countries of the Community and the producer countries has aroused great interest among the other Community governments. It is an idea which has in no way been turned down, but the French Presidency, which is representing our interests abroad, is trying to sound out the possibilities in order to see how and when we could meet. And the Government of the Grand Duchy will lend its full support to the proposal.

The efforts that the Community must make to reduce energy requirements, not only to build up stocks, not only to find additional sources of energy, but also by imposing common restrictions while avoiding distortions in the pattern of trade, are absolutely essential. It would be regrettable if our Community, which has missed



*Mr. Thorn (continued)*

quite a number of opportunities since 1973 to elaborate lines for joint action in this field, should fail to seize the present opportunity to define common positions before we are confronted with a crisis which may prove far closer at hand and far more serious than we imagine.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. van Waterschoot.

Mr. van WATERSCHOOT (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I should like to ask the Prime Minister and Chairman of the Council a question of a general nature in the context of his statement, one which impinges on current events in Europe today, and a question that is more important and of a more detailed nature, which concerns the reports that will be presented to the Assembly today and during the next two days.

My question of a general nature is as follows : does the Prime Minister think that the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage is likely to bring about an early extension of its competence into the field of defence ?

With whom would it then discuss these matters on the executive side ?

Could such an extension take place without prior adjustment of the treaties ?

And here is my question of a practical nature : in what manner does the Council intend to inform the Assembly of the work performed by the Standing Armaments Committee and of the results of the study on which it has embarked ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Thorn.

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — With regard to the question of whether the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage is calculated to bring about an extension of its competence to embrace the defence field in the near future, I think that I provided an answer just now : No.

To the question : with whom would it then discuss these matters on the executive side, *mutatis mutandis*, I would say : Nobody.

Furthermore, an extension of this kind could not come about without a prior adjustment of the treaties. I always say, however, out of intellectual honesty, that the whole subject deserves to be reviewed in the light of the treaty on political co-operation. If we want to cover the whole field, we must say to ourselves that, once we have a treaty on political co-operation, it will never be possible to overlook the fact that

the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, inasmuch as they will have to deal with the main political problems, cannot mentally put on one side all problems of security *ad aeternam*. But, *ratione materiae*, there is no problem so far as the institutions are concerned : nothing could be changed immediately and without modification of the treaties — that is, without the agreement of all the parties concerned — and I do not believe that, even at our level, there is the slightest inclination or wish to do so.

So far as informing your Assembly is concerned, I think that I said just now — and I will try to quote my own text, not from vanity but to make myself clear — that when the whole of the study has been completed, the Council will consider its content and form, and will endeavour to find an appropriate way of informing your Assembly. You will object that this formula is evasive, but that is because it was my intention while speaking here to make a statement on behalf of the Seven ; but I got the Seven to agree that they would open a dialogue with your Assembly on this point. As regards the timing and the form, I cannot make a statement *hic et nunc* : we shall first have to consider the matter among the Seven.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Boucheny.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — I should like to ask the Prime Minister whether the Council of Ministers was informed of a letter from General Haig to the Chairman of our Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Mr. Roper, asking whether the restrictions on the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany under the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, were still fully in force.

In fact, in a report we have all seen by the Belgian Senator Mr. Tanghe, Document 808, I read this excerpt from a letter of 27th July 1978 from General Haig :

“... I am prepared to support a request to the Council by the Federal Republic of Germany to delete the restrictions on the construction of naval auxiliary vessels of more than 6,000 tons displacement.”

May I ask the Prime Minister first, whether the procedure employed by General Haig to ask for the lifting of restrictions on German armaments is in conformity with the existing treaties and agreements, notably Article II of Protocol No. III of the Paris Agreements of 23rd October 1954 ; second, whether the Council of Ministers was notified of this step through other channels ; third, whether the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has acted upon General Haig's appeal to it through this curious channel ; and fourth, whether the Council of Ministers considers the procedure followed by this Ameri-

*Mr. Boucheny (continued)*

can officer in requesting the lifting of restrictions on the rearmament of Germany maintained by the modified Brussels Treaty to be acceptable, and whether the Council of Ministers is prepared to bow to such a request.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Thorn.

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — The honourable gentleman will excuse me, but I confess that it is difficult for me to reply in minute detail not to a single question but to a series of questions I did not have time to take down in shorthand.

I believe that the honourable gentleman is referring to paragraphs 14 and 15 of Mr. Tanghe's report, which deal with a possible amendment to Annex III to Protocol No. III of the Paris Agreements.

In this respect, I should remind you of a reply which our Council gave to Recommendation 320 by your Assembly. This reply, in my view crystal clear, reads as follows :

"Annex III to Protocol No. III to the modified Brussels Treaty can be amended by the Council under the conditions and according to the procedure laid down in the treaty itself, in Article II of Protocol No. III. If the required conditions were fulfilled, the Council would have recourse to the procedure laid down in the treaty."

The honourable gentleman asks me whether the Council was informed of the letter from the Supreme Allied Commander Europe quoted in Mr. Tanghe's report. My answer can only be negative : the Council was at no time informed of it.

Furthermore, you will understand, Mr. Boucheny, that it is not for me to pronounce judgment on a document of which in my present capacity I have no official cognisance and which, moreover, because of the way in which it was presented, cannot constitute an element of procedure — or at any rate the procedure very specifically laid down by Article II of Protocol No. III of the Paris Agreements.

I can only at this stage, therefore, confirm the gist of the Council's replies given to this question, since it behoves me to answer you on behalf of the Council and I am unable to add any personal comments at this juncture.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Lord Northfield. He will be followed by Mr. Dejardin and then Mr. Jessel.

Lord NORTHFIELD (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to ask the Prime Minister a question concerning those paragraphs in the twenty-fourth annual report which deal with the European aircraft industry. Throughout those paragraphs the Council still talks of its hopes of total co-operation among the member states in the production of future European aircraft.

Perhaps the Prime Minister will allow me to recall that it is now ten years since I, as only one member of this Assembly, moved a report and recommendation asking the governments to co-operate more closely on the A-300 and on any other aircraft. In those ten years there has been very little progress indeed. First, perhaps, and thanks only to the French Government's determination, we finally have had real co-operation in the production of the A-300 and its sister aircraft. Secondly, we have had rather a failure in total co-operation in the production of military aircraft.

Is the Prime Minister sure that we have now at last learned the lessons of this near failure to co-operate in the last ten, fifteen or twenty years? Can he foresee any real prospect of co-operation in the production of the next generation of fighter aircraft? Is there a real possibility of further co-operation in the production of further civil aircraft beyond the A-300 and its sister aircraft?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — Certainly, in the light of the good — and above all the bad — experiences we have had over the past few years, European co-operation in armaments ought to be extended to cover the complex problems posed by the armaments industry.

If I were a hypocrite I would answer the honourable gentleman that, speaking on behalf of my government, I can promise him that we are resolutely determined to take that path, especially for airborne weaponry, but I fear this will not mean much of a change during years to come.

I believe we are bound to acknowledge that, especially in present conditions, that is, against the background of economic recession, the problem is a particularly complex one, and it is only possible to inch forward slowly. But there is one ray of hope that we may already discern at Community level, in the realm of industrial policy in which the countries are drawing closer together, insofar as there are signs of a growing awareness of our common — not to say Community — interests.

You will understand that a promise by the Government of the Grand Duchy on this subject

*Mr. Thorn (continued)*

would hardly be likely to overjoy the European Community. So I can but share your hopes and assure you of all my good faith and good will.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Jessel... He is not present.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). — I am here, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — I apologise, Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). — I assumed, Mr. President, that you would call Mr. Dejardin next.

The PRESIDENT. — I am sorry, Mr. Jessel. I understand that Mr. Dejardin has withdrawn his question.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). — In the course of his interesting talk, the Prime Minister referred only briefly towards the end to defence. Would he comment further on the suggestion that in future the European Community should take on a defence rôle, bearing in mind that more than one major country in the European Community has a substantial communist element, and also that the Republic of Ireland, which is a member of the Community, has always had a neutral rôle in the cold war over the last decades? Can other member countries be expected to entrust their defence arrangements to the European Community, or would it not be better to continue to work within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Thorn.

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — I think I have already answered this question as best I can — I do not say authoritatively but at any rate pretty clearly. Of course, it will not escape the notice of any member of this distinguished Assembly that I cannot now comment on the defence position, country by country, whether of the nine member countries of the Community or the seven member countries of WEU. I believe we have to make a distinctively institutional approach in this respect and I have tried to avoid the slightest ambiguity. By virtue of the treaties and of the powers devolving on the different institutions, WEU alone is competent in this sphere: defence is not part of the Community area and, for it to be so it is not enough that some of us should want or imagine it so; it would, as you know, have to be unanimous. That would necessitate a change in the treaties, and the ratifications that would ensue. So I do not therefore need to labour the point, but I do, of course, say that when the Foreign Ministers of the Nine meet together,

as they are doing today in Paris, and discuss political co-operation in whatever sector of the world, they cannot disregard the complexity of the security problems bound up with such co-operation without taking the least decision in respect of defence.

I believe we should leave it at that, mindful that there are two treaties governing this area, the North Atlantic Treaty and the WEU Treaty, the Community being quite out of court.

As regards the SALT agreement signed in Vienna today, I venture to remind the Assembly that the necessary contacts had already been made before its signature or before it was ready for signature, that contacts and exchanges of view had been held, and are still going on, in NATO and that, of course, the WEU Council of Ministers should consider whether it ought not to keep your Assembly duly informed so far as it was concerned.

The only chance of avoiding if not a quarrel over the treaties, a quarrel between institutions, is to leave to each one of them the powers vested in it by the treaty.

I think, Mr. President, I have made my meaning quite plain.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Dejardin. I had been informed that he had withdrawn his question. Mr. Dejardin now has the floor.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. Thorn's last answer prompts me to ask a topical question. I know that in our Assembly one must sometimes watch one's Ps and Qs in referring to Europe's armaments policy, and the European integration process desired by the Europe of the Nine and, seemingly, by a number of parliamentarians newly elected to the European Parliament.

I should first like to ask Mr. Thorn how he can conceive observance of the treaties as they stand and maintenance of the existing position within their frontiers, when speaking of joint production of armaments, whereas this might also signify a new form or possibly redeployment of industry in the Europe of the Nine. Perhaps this is the real dividing-line between the different institutions, for the European Community is to my knowledge competent to deal with industrial redeployment.

My question, complementary to Mr. Boucheny's, concerns an event which has seemingly got under the skin of a number of us, the rumpus caused, perhaps unintentionally, by General Haig and his famous letter.

Mr. Thorn has gone some way to allay our disquiet, but I venture to insist on the point by asking him whether the step taken by the Supreme Commander of the NATO forces is or

*Mr. Dejardin (continued)*

is not in conformity with normal procedure and the treaties.

And I ask the Chairman of the Council of Ministers whether such action serves to support more official requests from, say, the government concerned, namely that of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Thorn.

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — I should not like to go further than the answer I gave just now to a question on the same subject. It is difficult for me to pronounce on a document which has not been transmitted to me personally and on which the Council has not deliberated.

The honourable gentleman will understand me ; he could perhaps claim that I am trying to dodge answering a question on a subject of such importance and, however you look at it, as delicate as this. But as I have not been personally seized of the document, and the Council has not discussed it, I cannot give any answer.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Urwin, please, followed by Dr. Vohrer.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — Thank you, Mr. President. I apologise in advance to Mr. Thorn for again raising the question, following direct elections to the European Parliament, of the relative functions of this Assembly vis-à-vis the European Parliament itself. I entirely accept everything that Mr. Thorn has said so far as the Treaty of Rome is concerned, which clearly defines the responsibilities of the European Parliament, both now and in the past, and the responsibilities bestowed upon this Assembly under the Brussels Treaty.

However, I venture to come back to the question for one or two reasons different from those already expounded. Let me preface my remarks by saying that in the recent elections to the European Parliament — and certainly this is applicable to the United Kingdom — there was a genuine belief created in the minds of many electors that a vote for the European Parliament would in effect and in essence mean the strengthening of the defence of Western Europe. This, of course, is totally and distinctly untrue, but it is a belief paramount in the minds of a great many people, conveyed to them by politicians on the rostrum, and sometimes through the medium of the press.

Secondly, there is a quite advanced and popular school of political thought which says that the time is opportune for major new steps

towards complete European unification. Indeed, this afternoon we have before us a report by our colleague, Mr. Minnoci, which includes a recommendation to the effect that the Council should begin studies on ways and means of including WEU in the framework of a European Community whose responsibilities would be extended to foreign and defence policy.

While we are firm in our own resolution about our responsibilities and secure in the knowledge that any such change in the Treaty of Rome would necessarily also involve a change in the Brussels Treaty at the same time, we still have this fairly strong body of opinion which says that there should be changes in the Treaty of Rome to facilitate the preparation of a defence policy within the European Parliament.

It is understandable, certainly in the early stages of the European Parliament and the direct elections, that many parliamentarians will be ambitious — very ambitious, indeed — to extend their terms of reference, even perhaps to seeking to effect changes in the Treaty of Rome. Bearing in mind that the Ministers of the Seven overlap with the Ministers of the Nine, the Foreign Ministers, in each case, may we have an assurance from Mr. Thorn that there will be a vigorous defence, if not a complete guarantee that the Ministers concerned will strive to the best of their ability to ensure the maintenance of the *status quo* in defence policy and the authority for it vested in Western European Union ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Thorn.

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — On the one hand, I should not like to prejudge the debate on certain reports which, if I understand aright, is going to begin within this Assembly ; and it is not for the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to take a position on them.

To revert, however, to this very complex question which I mentioned at the rostrum and which has already been the subject of several questions, I believe I have stated with sufficient clarity that nobody, of course, intended *hic et nunc* to change any part of the powers and responsibilities of this institution, WEU, and of the European Community.

The honourable gentlemen tells me that, during the course of the European election campaign, many electors had the impression that this election to the European Parliament had one meaning or another. I believe that no parliamentarian worthy of the name will ask a representative of the executive to provide an answer about all the disputes concerning intentions which might arise in an election campaign, conducted with varying degrees of effectiveness in the dif-

*Mr. Thorn (continued)*

ferent countries, for otherwise we should never conclude our business in the course of this afternoon.

I presume, alas, that following an election campaign conducted not only in one country but in nine countries of the Community, many people will be disappointed by election promises. I am not responsible for all the promises made throughout the Community.

So far as defence is concerned, I would add *sotto voce* that in the Community we are, alas, bound by the rule of unanimity in all vital issues. That being so, could any self-respecting person be afraid that tomorrow, as though by some miracle, the Community was going to take over in the defence field and thus poach on your preserves? I do not believe there is anybody in this Assembly who can seriously think so.

I would add secondly — and that should give you added reassurance: do you not suppose that the newly-elected parliament, of which I shall be a member next month, will already have other problems to tackle, as it is, problems for which it is competent under the treaty, such as unemployment, inflation, energy, to say nothing of other political problems? Do you not believe that it may have other fish to fry — if you will forgive me the expression — instead of indulging in speculation about a question that is so complex and untimely as that of defence in our present context? Those who are tormented by the possibility of a change in the allocation of responsibilities in the defence field can set their minds at rest and for the moment cease worrying unduly, for there is, believe me, no risk and no danger from that quarter.

The PRESIDENT. — Will you please take the floor, Dr. Vohrer?

Mr. VOHRER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I would like to remind the Chairman of the Council of Ministers that for a number of years now there have been in the Assembly of Western European Union important voices, especially from amongst the French politicians, who have been urging that WEU should form the nucleus of a European defence concept. Would Mr. Thorn consider the prospects of Western European Union becoming the nucleus of a European defence system to have been changed by the fact that the Community is being extended from nine to twelve members? Up to now we have had seven of the nine members here, in future it will be seven out of twelve members, and the relationship which the three potential member countries Greece, Spain and Portugal have with NATO can be judged to vary widely. How then, against this background, would Mr. Thorn assess WEU's chances of becoming the nucleus of a European defence system?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Thorn.

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — Do you not feel that this question, too, is premature in so far as none of the countries which are wanting to join the Community — for we have signed an agreement with Greece, and negotiations with Portugal and Spain are under way — has asked to accede to the Brussels Treaty, while Greece and Portugal, in particular, which are candidates, are already members of NATO?

I am well aware — and you are aware, too — that at a certain juncture the issue of Ireland was under discussion in the public and in the press, since Ireland was at that moment the only member country of the Community which did not belong to WEU. This was an intellectually defensible speculation, since there were solid grounds for raising the question. If I were to draw on the language and linguistic traditions of our Anglo-Saxon friends, I should say: "We shall cross that bridge when we come to it." The possibility exists that, at a given moment, the question of enlargement may arise. Will the problem be discussed within NATO, or will it be raised in another forum with the acquiescence of the new members? Whatever the reply given to this question, I think it will be strictly personal. The new members would prefer to see this problem discussed in one or other of the forums envisaged for the purpose — that is, in NATO or, if need be, in WEU as a second possibility, rather than in the European Community. I am speaking about present attitudes, for nobody can prejudice the future.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mrs. von Bothmer to ask a question.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I must ask to be forgiven if I am perhaps asking a question the Prime Minister has already answered. Things are a little difficult, as the interpreting system is not functioning properly at the moment and we keep hearing two languages at the same time.

Mr. Thorn said that we need not worry about the transfer of defence and security issues to the European Community parliament. There are quite a lot of colleagues in this chamber who are not worried, but hopeful. Only this morning one of our most highly esteemed members pointed out, if I understood correctly, that the situation in which our President finds himself gives rise to the hope that he might, thanks to this link with both parliaments, achieve some progress. Would Mr. Thorn consider this realistic?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Thorn.

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — All I said, Mrs. von Bothmer, was that if anyone is worried, he has no need to be. Have I made myself clear now? (*Laughter*) Not that I share this opinion. I accept that there are unfortunately a great many problems in the Community which we have not yet tackled, although we are one hundred per cent competent to do so. When I see, and when I realise, that the transfer of new problems really requires unanimity — indeed, an amendment to the treaty and its ratification — I can say to your colleague in all good faith that from his point of view he need not for the present worry greatly about new areas of activity which the European Community and the European Parliament would surely not directly take to themselves.

If you are asking me personally, I of course hope that in the long run this Community will discharge its duties not only in the economic field but in the political as well. I have never been able to see how one can cope one hundred per cent with the political objectives if one does not also at least think alike about the problems of defence.

The PRESIDENT. — Finally I call Lord Duncan-Sandys to ask a question.

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (*United Kingdom*). — May I say at the outset, Mr. Prime Minister, that I personally hope that in due course the European Community will enlarge its sphere of action to include foreign affairs and defence? Like you, Mr. Prime Minister, I recognise that that will not happen overnight.

Several times in your replies you have referred to the fact that there are two treaties upon which our defence depends — the NATO Treaty and the Brussels Treaty. I have just returned from a NATO exercise at SHAPE. There was no doubt that one of the matters that exercised the minds of the senior military staff there was the possibility of any delay in the taking of decisions in the event of an attack by countries of the Warsaw Pact. In view of the special position of France, I wish to ask you whether it is quite clear that all the member governments of WEU accept their full obligations under the Brussels Treaty. That treaty provides for greater security than does the North Atlantic Treaty. The latter provides that in the event of an attack, the powers concerned will confer immediately. The Brussels Treaty provides for automatic and unqualified mutual defence in the event of an attack.

It is very important for the NATO staff to know in advance that there is no question in the minds of the French on this point and that they accept without qualification their obligations under the Brussels Treaty.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Lord Duncan-Sandys. I call Mr. Thorn to reply.

Mr. THORN (*Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). — My Lord, as far as I can remember, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking in this very room six months ago, reminded the Assembly that this government, like all governments of WEU, took seriously their commitments under the Brussels Treaty. I have no reason to doubt the degree of seriousness attached to this matter by any government of Western European Union.

The PRESIDENT. — The list of speakers is now finished and we have completed our questions to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers.

I should like to thank you, Mr. Prime Minister, for your speech and for your replies to eleven questions. I think if one carefully studies what you have said, one will see that your sentiments are in defence of this forum and that they are valid to us all. We should like to thank you for the clear-cut position you adopted not only as the Prime Minister of Luxembourg but as the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers. Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister.

#### **4. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

##### **Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

##### **Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

*(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Minnocci. I remind the Assembly that he will be followed by Mr. Tanghe and Mr. Scheffler, and that all three reports will then be discussed together.

I call Mr. Minnocci to present the report of the General Affairs Committee on the political activities of the Council — reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council, Document 801.

Mr. MINNOCCI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, now that the first elections to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage are over, I feel bound to point out that the fundamental issue of European defence, which is our institution's object and *raison d'être*,

*Mr. Minnoci (continued)*

ought now to be approached not by the old-fashioned logic of a collective effort by the states as such but according to the model proposed by the EEC, of an integrated foreign policy and defence system, to be achieved now that the conditions are right for a political reactivation of Europe, albeit experience has shown the limits of purely economic integration.

Even after the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities and despite the growing practice of political consultations among the Nine, Western European Union remains the institutional forum for discussing among Europeans problems of security and collective defence. There is therefore no reason for the misgivings some members have voiced about the present and future rôle of our organisation, in view of the explicit and repeated statements made by the Council in reply to specific questions from members of the Assembly and — let it be said — by the national governments too. From all the statements of position by the governments of member states — I refer to the speeches by the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Bernard-Reymond, the German Foreign Minister, Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, and the Italian Minister of State for Defence, Mr. Mazzola — there clearly emerges a genuine doctrine which sees the amended Brussels Treaty as one of the foundations on which the future European Union must be based, as Mr. Thorn emphasised just now.

In this context I take a positive view of the position adopted by the Council in its annual report where, besides describing the WEU Assembly as the only one entitled to deal with defence matters, it reasserts its willingness to debate with it on the various matters arising from application of the amended Brussels Treaty — including those encountered by member governments in other international organisations — and also its determination to monitor carefully from time to time the application of the treaty. Even if, on this last score, there are some legitimate doubts about the extent and significance of the Council's undertaking to monitor the application of the treaty, such a declaration of political intent, corresponding to a demand that the Assembly has constantly put forward, is to be appreciated favourably. Similarly, a favourable view should be taken of the Council's refusal to consider its powers in defence and armaments to be in any way reduced.

As regards relations between the Council and the Assembly, I think there has been a clear improvement. The Council's answers to written questions and recommendations from the Assembly, especially concerning arms control, the sale of arms to non-European countries and the application of the treaty, have been more spe-

cific and detailed than in the past. The occasional regrettable delays are due, according to the Council, to the difficulty of drafting texts that can meet with unanimous approval, to the necessity of providing adequate information on rapidly developing problems and, finally, to failure by Committees to adopt reports intended for the Council within the prescribed deadlines. While, therefore, the Assembly should ensure better compliance with the Rules of Procedure, the Council must demonstrate, by its diligence, the will to co-operate closely with the Assembly.

The General Affairs Committee has already had occasion to note that the Council has not yet forwarded to the Assembly the first part of the investigation carried out by the Standing Armaments Committee. The Council's excuse — that it has announced its intention of forwarding the Committee's report when it is completed and approved — is unacceptable, since at least the first part, which deals with legal matters that are public knowledge, could be sent to the Assembly straight away.

The Council's preference for informal meetings ought not, I think, to be viewed favourably, since such meetings, which retain the disadvantages of formal meetings under cover of "spontaneous dialogue", enable such prior consultations of governments, which are the basic purpose of the Council's activities, to be by-passed and prevent the individual parliamentarian from knowing whether the answers to his questions reflect common positions of the seven governments or opinions peculiar to each. It is therefore to be regretted that the Council, after having proposed it, should now in practice reject the procedure of joint meetings already accepted by the Assembly.

Participation by Ministers in the Assembly's sessions has been satisfactory and has contributed to the already mentioned improvement in Council-Assembly relations, although an even more frequent attendance by Ministers remains desirable: it should not be overlooked that the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands have not for several years past been represented by their respective Ministers.

The Italian Government, when it assumed the chairmanship of the Council, was, be it noted, represented by its Minister of State for Defence, Mr. Mazzola. Although this was rather unusual, since governments are usually represented by Ministers, the Assembly should take a favourable view of the Italian Government's decision, which emphasises the fact that not only Foreign Ministers, but also those responsible for sectors in any case falling within the scope of the amended Brussels Treaty — as, for example, Ministers of Defence — may appropriately represent their governments.

*Mr. Minnocci (continued)*

Although budgetary matters are outside its terms of reference, the General Affairs Committee underlines the positive decisions taken by the Council to accede very largely to the requests for increases in the budget for political groups and the press, and to leave it to the Assembly to decide how to divide the new appropriations between the two heads.

As to political matters, the degree of co-ordination of the policies of the Western European countries in the various organisations — NATO, EEC and WEU — is fairly satisfactory. On the other hand, the Council, owing to lack of consultations, has not managed to work out a common policy on relations with China or on arms exports.

In terms of the development of a common policy, notable results have been achieved in relations with the African countries: I mention in this respect the position taken on the question of Rhodesia, and on recognition of the rights of the peoples of Zimbabwe, and the adoption of a code of conduct towards South Africa. Having deplored the creation by foreign powers of military spheres of influence in Africa, the Council ought to pronounce itself more definitely on the prospects emerging from military action in the Arabian peninsula, and may rightly draw attention to the indubitable results that have been achieved through consultations among the countries of Western Europe on the question of international terrorism.

In conclusion, the Council's twenty-fourth annual report marks definite progress in co-ordination between the various European institutions which should enable WEU to play a part in the future European union, in relations between Council and Assembly and, finally, in the co-ordination of member states' foreign policies in the various organisations. I therefore call on the Assembly to approve the Council's twenty-fourth annual report. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur, for your report, which will be debated later, jointly with two others.

I would ask those responsible for the budget of the parliamentary Assembly to listen to the interpretations. I have already had several complaints about the very bad technical equipment. I noticed the Secretary-General struggling to find a channel on which he could really understand what was being said in the Assembly.

We asked last year for provision to re-equip the Assembly in this respect. I believe that if they will listen to the interpretations, Representatives will agree that we must have the means for the coming year of overcoming this dif-

ficulty. It is impossible to follow the interpreters. I am hearing two interpretations in my earphones and one direct speaker.

I now call Mr. Tanghe to present the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the application of the Brussels Treaty — reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council, Document 808.

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, anyone going through reports over recent years dealing with this subject will find that the same layout and, very often, the same topics keep reappearing. The chapter headings are indeed regularly the same — activities of the Council of Ministers, the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee. This is of course as it should be, since these are precisely the things in the Council's report that interest your Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. But within these chapters one finds the same reactions and comments recurring, and even the same recommendations.

This is bound to happen, because it is the Assembly's duty to keep an eye on how the Council is applying the treaty, to call attention afresh each time to certain shortcomings, and to lay stress afresh each time on the same points and where necessary to indicate any opportunity there is for improvement.

That said, my feeling is that your Committee can be satisfied with the relations it has with the Council. We have had mostly satisfactory answers to questions we have asked, and there were two meetings with the Council during 1978, though once again the annual report was late in arriving, the chapters with which your Committee is principally concerned reaching to Clerk's Office on 26th March last.

The Council of Ministers has long taken the view that its area of competence includes a discussion of questions raised by the signatory countries, as provided for under Article VIII of the treaty, in connection with situations that could, in whatever area, constitute a threat to peace or a danger to economic stability. Now, one finds that the Council has not entered into any such discussion since Britain became a member of the European Economic Community and joined in political consultation among the Nine. Since 1973 it has been only this Assembly, not the member states, that has raised with the Council of Ministers matters connected with defence policy in general. Our Assembly will therefore have to ensure that it itself calls the Council's attention to all major questions that have to do with the defence of Europe.

In its annual report the Council has, as usual, listed the overall total of British forces stationed on the European mainland at 31st December



*Mr. Tanghe (continued)*

1978 — a total of 59,883 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force. Once again, however, these figures do not match the British commitment undertaken in Article VI of Protocol No. II. I will not bore you further with figures; an explanation of these can be found in paragraphs 8 to 11 of our report. This is why once again, in the first paragraph of the draft recommendation, we ask that the true level of British forces stationed on the mainland of Europe should, at long last, be published in the annual report.

Last year the Assembly, after debating the issue, adopted a recommendation calling for the deletion of auxiliary vessels from the list of conventional armaments that may not be manufactured in Federal Germany. The Council of Ministers has responded favourably to this in its annual report, saying that as soon as the prescribed conditions have been fulfilled it will not fail to put into motion the procedure laid down in the treaty. This could in fact be the position as soon as the Federal Republic of Germany asks for the restriction on building these vessels to be lifted. Indeed, the Supreme Commander of the allied forces in Europe, a recommendation from whom is required under the procedure for amending the list, has, in a letter dated 27th July 1978, expressed his readiness to support such a request by the Federal Republic.

As to the replies given by the Council of Ministers in their annual report on the activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, we might say yet again that there is very little new under the sun. The areas that are or are not open to the control activities of the Agency have remained unaltered. The number of inspections carried out by the Agency shows that generally speaking its work has not diminished.

Let us pause for a moment and look at the Standing Armaments Committee. We have seen that the Council of Ministers calls the SAC a "useful instrument for thought and analysis" that can be used to good purpose by the governments. And like the Assembly, the Council considers that the resources of the SAC should continue to be fully employed, and it is considering giving the Committee new tasks as soon as the present study has been completed. And yet the Council has not accepted our recommendation of last year, in which we suggested setting up a European study centre available to intergovernmental bodies and to the Assembly itself, making use of the resources of both the Agency and the Standing Armaments Committee.

Let us press on with the good work.

Since the Council of Ministers is intending to allocate fresh tasks to the "useful instrument for

thought and analysis" the SAC represents, we see not the slightest reason why this knowledge and experience should not be made available to the Assembly's Committees. Your Committee is therefore proposing the adoption of a recommendation to the Council asking it to consider, as a new task for the Standing Armaments Committee, collaboration in studies suggested by the Assembly.

The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has, for instance, proposed as long ago as 1971 five studies for experts to look at; one of these was to involve establishing, for the long term, a joint programme for the procurement of standardised weapons. This study has still not been undertaken, and the subject would be wholly in line with the competence of the SAC. The same Committee has in the past called on outside experts for reports of this kind, whereas it would undoubtedly have been at least equally effective to resort to the technical expertise of the Standing Armaments Committee.

The Council of Ministers also turned down the Assembly's proposal that the independent European programme group be allowed to report to the Assembly on what it is doing.

We however believe that it is not — as the Council thinks — via national channels that the members of this Assembly should be kept informed of this highly important activity by our seven nations; we should be told about it here as the Assembly, as a body directly interested in European co-operation towards a joint development and production of weapons systems and equipment. This is why we return to this problem in the fourth paragraph of the recommendation, urging the Council to give an account in its annual reports of the work of this independent programme group.

I would end this brief introduction by asking you all to adopt the report and draft recommendation now before you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I now call Mr. Scheffler to present the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on that subject in reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council, Document 806.

Mr. SCHEFFLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report submitted to you on scientific, technological and aerospace questions contains a recommendation in five parts. The explanatory memorandum is subdivided into a general introduction, the discussion of energy problems, the situation in the European aircraft industry and finally space questions. Unquestionably, energy problems stand today in the forefront of international politics. Since 1973, when

*Mr. Scheffler (continued)*

oil, already a world power, was first used also as a political weapon, one might have hoped that — in view of the seriousness of the situation and of the fact that a return to a more untrammelled supply of oil was not to be expected, given the still unresolved political issues in the Middle East — the politicians of the countries dependent on oil would not content themselves with theoretical disquisitions.

There have in fact been a number of studies on energy policy and the energy market, but nowhere has any practical effect yet become apparent. That is why the present report once more attempts to stress the point that any time now lost can be recovered only at great sacrifice.

Your Rapporteur has tried to bring the information available on the application of nuclear energy up to date. In doing so, he was aware that the scale of the task would make it very difficult. Nor should it be forgotten in this connection that violent argument about the use of nuclear energy and about the reprocessing and disposal of nuclear waste has flared up, in many countries of Europe and elsewhere. It is apparent that the political dimensions of this debate have been such that the programmes adopted earlier have been appreciably delayed. I should therefore like to draw your attention once more to the study by the author Simone Courteix on nuclear exports and non-proliferation, of which excerpts are reproduced in the present report. After a careful analysis she ultimately arrives at the conviction that sooner or later general disarmament will be the only alternative to nuclear proliferation.

To many people nuclear energy, even in its peaceful application, is a kind of sword of Damocles hanging over their heads. On the other hand, one cannot fail to see that in a general way the sword of Damocles of a permanent energy crisis, with its associated social and political consequences, hangs over the heads of the oil-dependent countries. This statement is however valid only if the absolute dependence of the industrialised countries continues unchanged. It is time that the available alternative sources of energy were developed and brought into use, and the possibility of saving energy translated into practice.

The subject of energy embraces such a complex area that even in quite a lengthy report only the broad lines can be touched upon, as I have just said. Besides, it has already been the subject of other reports, and more will follow. I am sure that it will be with us for many years to come, and will certainly also be permanently on the agenda of the newly-elected European Parliament. To Western European Union and to the other countries of the western world, the issue

of dependence on oil is not primarily an economic problem, nor one to be assessed exclusively from an economic policy point of view; it is first and foremost a serious problem of security policy. For this reason it has its place in the present report as well.

I do not wish to say anything about Lord Northfield's Amendment 4, already tabled, since he will no doubt be speaking to this himself.

The question of the European aircraft industry, while not without its problems, may in many respects be considered to present more optimistic aspects. If what American economic analysts have predicted is true, then some 6,300 passenger aircraft will have to be produced in the world market for civil transport aircraft between 1979 and 1990, at a cost of \$24,000 million. Of this total Airbus Industrie alone — still according to the American forecast — could count on having roughly 14 to 15 %. The leading position of the American aircraft industry, more particularly of Boeing, would be in no way affected even by a growth of the European share, and indeed it would not be touched at all. It should, however, be made very clear once again that co-operation between American industry and the Europeans would, in many areas, bring exceptional advantages to both, the Americans as well as the Europeans. Unfortunately, it is patent that, for the moment at least, competitive thinking on many issues in this field is still stronger than appreciation of the value of sensible co-operation.

Space questions — and this brings me to the end — have been extensively discussed in several reports, so I can be brief. I am bound, unfortunately, to observe here once more with regret that the mandatory budget for the European Space Agency for 1978 has still not been approved. I dare not even think of the 1979 budget yet. No one can expect that those responsible for European space policy and the space agencies will be able, in such an atmosphere, to provide even tolerably satisfactory solutions to existing problems. It would of course be a fatal mistake to think that space questions nowadays are only a kind of prestige matter and that anyhow 99 % of the problems have been solved. Certainly what the Soviet Union, for instance, has been demonstrating in space technology over the past few days and weeks does not stem from any thoughts of prestige but from the entirely realistic ulterior motives — application-oriented research, and the use of space for military as well as important energy, technological and other scientific purposes.

Projects as big as this can no longer — and let us all be clear on this — be accomplished by individual European nations. That has been made very clear to us by the Ariane and Spacelab programmes with their financial dimensions. It is,

*Mr. Scheffler (continued)*

however, equally clear that the European space industry is entirely capable of qualified participation in such programmes. The report contains detailed data on further activities in this sector, on what is happening in areas that have advanced beyond the stage of research and development and can now be put into practice.

With this I should like to end my brief introduction to the submission of the report, but not without thanking the secretariat for the outstanding manner in which it has accomplished the work involved in its drafting.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I ask you to approve this report. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

We now come to the joint debate on the annual report, with all the documents to which I have already referred.

We open the debate with Mr. Valleix. I suggest that Representatives speak to the amendments they are proposing, because later on they may take the Chair here. Speak to the amendments you have tabled.

Mr. Valleix, please.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I shall try to fulfil this twofold condition. It so happens that it is on Mr. Scheffler's report that I am particularly anxious to express my views and to stress, first of all, its quality, for it brings out so successfully not only the strong points in European co-operation but also, it is true, those points which unfortunately are weak.

Of the strong points, I should like to stress in particular the very good results achieved by the European aeronautical industry, and especially the latest scores marked up by the Airbus Industrie consortium. But we must recall that although this European organisation was able to take approximately 37 % of the market in heavy carriers during the past year, this market has been expanding still further in 1979. We must remember, too, that the output of other forms of aircraft, such as helicopters, has also increased. Thus, in 1977, the French national market — to take this one example — accounted for only 5 % of flights by the helicopters built by the main French constructor, that is by SNIAS. It goes without saying that the contract recently won by SNIAS for ninety air-sea rescue units for the American coastguard helicopter services further increases this proportion.

In other words, Europe's aviation industry — and within it, the French aviation industry — depends very heavily on international markets ;

but these markets are most fortunately in full process of expansion.

That being said, it would serve no useful purpose for me to dwell at length on what is going most favourably ; and it is the current difficulties that I should like to stress. These are in the main connected — as our Rapporteur so admirably brought out — with energy problems.

In this connection, we must recall current European efforts because, as Mr. Thorn, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, stated just now, negotiations are at present under way in Luxembourg itself, and because the French Government has proposed that there should be negotiations, or at any rate preparatory discussions, between the European countries and the oil-producing countries, largely with an eye to the Tokyo meeting. It is apparent that a dialogue between European consumers and the producers may be born of this proposal, which might enable us to arrive at the Tokyo talks with the Europeans in closer formation, if I may so express myself.

The difficulty for us, who speak here on behalf of Western European Union, is all the greater since we must constantly bear in mind that there can, in fact, be no European security unless energy supplies are fully safeguarded. That means secure sources of energy ; moreover, it also means — and I shall be referring to this again tomorrow in my report — safe means of transport and secure communications.

Picking up the idea so pertinently put before us this morning by our President after his triumphant re-election, namely the concept of what might be described as a certain imbalance in the world due to the multipolarity which is becoming apparent, I would like to suggest that it is for Europe to ponder a possibly strategic redefinition of its defence policy. All these are reasons which cause it to pay particular attention to the energy difficulties of our times.

For that reason, I should like to repeat certain points which will figure in the amendments I have tabled.

The purpose of Amendment 1 is to add a new paragraph after paragraph 2.

Our Rapporteur refers to the energy problem in his preamble. It is a problem which held the attention of our Committee, and I myself speak as a member of that Committee. Having reflected upon and recognised since our last discussions in Committee the importance of energy problems as they are coming to be understood in Europe, I should have liked to see some emphasis placed on the possibilities of all-European co-operation in the energy field.

Here I want to refer to certain proposals which I believe to be of Soviet origin, but which have

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

been taken up by the European Economic Communities. Consequently, it seems to me desirable that the recommendation should be given greater substance by taking these proposals into consideration.

Amendment 2 is to add a second new paragraph after paragraph 2 as follows :

"Start a detailed and continuing dialogue with the oil-producing countries with a view to adjusting production capabilities and requirements ;".

There too I think that as proposals have been made along these lines, and as it appears that the European countries can concert to a certain extent with the producer countries, it would be desirable, in order to bring our recommendation completely up to date, for it to be based on topical conditions and, if the Assembly agreed, for it to lay stress on this procedure.

Lastly, in paragraph 3 a third amendment would leave out from "by promoting" to the end of the paragraph.

Paragraph 3 reads as follows :

"Arrange for the next fighter aircraft to be a joint European venture by promoting a merger of the existing management consortia producing Jaguar and Tornado ;".

On this point, I should like to point out to our Rapporteur that here too, although we discussed the matter at length in Committee, it is on reflection clear to me that the term "merger" goes too far. I believe that at a time when, so far as the next fighter aircraft is concerned, difficulty is being experienced in defining exactly what its final characteristics will be, it would be premature to associate this project with the idea of merging two consortia.

For that reason, I would propose that we simply retain the first phrase of paragraph 3 in the recommendation, leaving out from "by promoting" to the end of the paragraph. That is the object of my amendment.

Mr. President, it goes without saying that the quality of this report, the very close reasoning of the explanatory memorandum and the actual conclusions proposed in the recommendation lead me firmly to ask our Assembly to vote in its favour. Ladies and Gentlemen, I hope that you will be able to adopt the amendments I have suggested, for I believe they add to the quality of this report. I would stress once again how important it seems to me that, when dealing with such topical matters, our Assembly itself should adopt recommendations which take the most recent developments fully into account. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Périquier.

Mr. PERIDIÉ (France) (Translation). — Mr. President, I shall confine my remarks to Mr. Minnocci's report. May I therefore very briefly state the reasons why most of the French delegates, particularly the socialists, will not be able to vote for the draft recommendation put to us.

We cannot vote for it because it is a step towards integration, and we consider that contrary to the Brussels Treaty. After all, the Brussels Treaty was the sequel to the European Defence Community which, having integration as its aim, had been rejected by many European countries. This being so, the Brussels Treaty quite obviously could not have the same basis as the European Defence Community and was designed to be a treaty, not of integration, but of co-ordination between the various countries of Europe.

It could be objected, I know, that the Brussels Treaty speaks in two of its articles, to be precise, of a gradual integration ; but mind you, simply as a possibility provided all the countries concerned were agreed. Take a look at the treaty : you will find that the word "integration" is never used by itself, but always preceded by the word "co-ordination". Consequently all the countries had to be agreed. But there is one country that does not agree, as pointed out just now, and that country is France, which has always been opposed to integration. I must emphasise that this French policy reflects the unanimous position of all political parties, both in the government majority and in opposition — it being understood that our reasons are very often not exactly the same.

For the moment France sees no reason to change its position. It therefore stands opposed to integration, and I repeat that a report proposing integration runs directly counter to the Brussels Treaty.

First, we must be told what sort of integration is intended. I put the question to Mr. Minnocci ; I asked him whether he meant integration in the framework of NATO. He merely indicated that he did not. All right, but let him then tell us what integration he means. Six of the seven WEU countries are members of NATO, so that integration in NATO is surely what is meant. Now, once again, that is something France cannot accept. I know very well that Lord Duncanson-Sandys felt obliged to needle France a little by suggesting it would possibly fail to keep its commitments. We cannot accept such a doubt about our country. France has always kept its commitments. True, we are not members of NATO, but we are members of the Atlantic Alliance, and France will assuredly fulfil its obligations under the Atlantic Pact.

*Mr. Périquier (continued)*

And then there is the Brussels Treaty, providing for European co-operation ; I would remind you that it was signed and ratified on the initiative of the French Government, led by Mr. Mendès-France ; it was we who proposed European co-operation. And you may be quite sure, Ladies and Gentlemen, that we shall not fail in our duty of European co-operation, which almost invariably coincides with the defence of freedom and independence.

Finally, there is another reason for us to oppose the report, and that is paragraph 4, which we consider a step towards sabotage of Western European Union.

We really should try and be clear about what we want. Take a look at paragraph 4 and you will see that it stipulates once again that commitments under WEU could be included in the framework of — naturally — a European Community.

We think it inadmissible that it should be our organisation which is envisaging the transfer of its powers to another assembly. I have no axe to grind, because I myself wonder about the future of WEU. But for the time being the Brussels Treaty exists and gives us powers in respect of defence. Consequently it is not for us to transfer our rights, our powers, to another organisation, were it the European Parliament. Oh yes, it may be asked whether WEU should remain in its present form. It may be asked whether it should not be enlarged by co-opting other countries. But that is another matter. It is not for us to take a position in favour of our own suicide. Until such time as another treaty has amended the Brussels Treaty, we should have sole competence in defence. That is what I meant : we do not accept integration ; we will not, for the time being, scuttle our own ship. We shall therefore be voting against Mr. Minnoci's report in its present form. Of course, if it were totally modified by amendments, we might possibly reconsider our opposition.

The PRESIDENT. — It is just past 5 p.m. I informed the Assembly that at about 5 p.m. we should have the address of Mr. Pierre Aigrain, the French Minister of State responsible for research. I am sure that the Assembly will agree that we should interrupt our business in order to listen to his speech. He has also kindly agreed to answer questions.

**5. Address by Mr. Aigrain, French Minister of State attached to the Prime Minister, responsible for research**

The PRESIDENT. — I now have the pleasure and privilege of welcoming you, Mr. Minister, and I invite you to take the rostrum. (*Applause*)

Mr. AIGRAIN (*French Minister of State attached to the Prime Minister, responsible for research*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, you have done me the honour of inviting me to debate questions of scientific and technical policy before your Assembly. I had great pleasure in accepting this invitation, especially as I know how very interested member states' representatives to WEU are in these problems. I am happy to take this opportunity of conveying the high regard which the French Government has for all your activities.

The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions has, since its inception, fully acquitted itself of its double task : of promoting, on the part of the governments of the WEU member states, a common policy of scientific and technological co-operation designed to serve the interests of the construction of Europe as understood in the Brussels Treaty ; exploring systematically the sectors of scientific and industrial activity that best lend themselves to such co-operation.

The numerous recommendations which your Assembly has addressed to the Council of the Union on the Committee's initiative have effectively helped to promote greater awareness of the technological challenge which Europe has to meet if it is to build its own unity, preserve its independence, and provide itself with the means of increasing its security, while respecting the sovereignty of states and their individual statehood.

Your Rapporteurs have had the merit of carrying out their task of reflection and of making proposals not only by analysis of the present situation but also in terms of the medium or long-term prospects for which the European countries' potential for research and innovation should already be being mobilised. They have for instance singled out the decisive importance for the economic future of the western world of key areas such as the peaceful use of nuclear power, the development of application satellites for telecommunications, meteorology, environmental protection and prospection of the earth's resources, the requisite advancement of aeronautics, the potentialities of oceanography, and so on.

Indeed, if Europe wishes to press home its technological abilities in the world in the face of formidable competitors — be they also friends, like the United States and Japan — and hold its own on world markets, it must manage to ward off the effects of the economic crisis by contributing actively to scientific and technical progress, as it has done so often before in its history. In the face of such imperatives as independence in energy supplies, industrial competitiveness, full employment, Europe ought not to rest content with merely reacting ; we should act, and lead the fray.

*Mr. Aigrain (continued)*

Determining the ways and means for the purpose calls for medium-term reflection on scientific and technical research matters. At national level, for example, the French Government will soon be examining the outlines of a ten-year research programme on which work is now actively proceeding.

At European level, in parallel with the efforts undertaken in the framework of the EEC, Western European Union seems to me an appropriate place for forward-looking reflection in line with the specific military and political concerns enshrined in the modified Brussels Treaty. Such reflection is indispensable at a time when the building of Europe has entered an active phase. The scientific and technological future of Europe depends on such discussions being held and it is particularly important that they should do so in European institutions like WEU.

A major trump in defining the main technological guidelines for the future is the fact that the countries of Europe are faced with common problems. This means, at the level of research and innovation, a convergence of views and, sometimes, policies, that can serve as a basis for a Community research and development effort directed towards the same goals and open to international co-operation.

After a period of expansion and very rapid growth, research budgets are being savagely cut back in almost all our countries. According to estimates by the European Community, public funding of research and development in the nine European countries rose by an average of 3.2 % a year by volume at constant values during the period 1970-77. This is a much slower rate of growth than in the past. The options dictated by such moderate growth have led to joint production of heavy equipment too costly for any single country, or stepping up the use of national plant capacity by leasing it to foreign partners.

Examples of such co-operation prove that Europe holds a number of trump cards. You know what these are. I am referring, among other things, to institutions like CERN, which established the credentials of European sub-atomic physics vis-à-vis the United States and whose twenty-fifth anniversary will be celebrated this year; the Von Laue-Langevin Institute, where German, British and French scientists have joined forces on a high neutron flux reactor which is the best of its kind; the European molecular biology laboratory (EMBO) in Heidelberg; the European medium-term weather forecasting centre in the United Kingdom, which recently moved from Bracknell to Reading, and

to which seventeen countries have contributed, etc.

But there are also large-scale installations like JET, the cornerstone of the European thermonuclear fusion programme, or the Franco-German millimetre-wave radio telescope recently decided on, or again the German-Dutch wind tunnel whose construction has just been finished.

These examples, and many more, show the diversity and quality of intra-European co-operative operations in the field of scientific and technical research, fundamental and applied, but they should not blind us to the difficulties and time slippages of Community research. In the Community budget proper such projects only represent 2 % of member states' total research and development expenditure. Nonetheless, although scientific activities occupy a modest place in Brussels, some one-off activities — particularly some of the COST operations — have had a real impact. There too the need for co-operation between partner countries has finally been accepted.

But there is no doubt whatever that it is in the advanced technology sectors — space, telecommunications, data processing, alternative energy sources, aeronautics — that European co-operation is seen at its best, the area where Europe is building its technological future; this is precisely the kind of problem your Committees have often had occasion to deal with in WEU. I would therefore like to dwell on it for a few moments.

Current socio-economic requirements — difficulties in the supply of energy and raw materials, increased competition on foreign markets, the need to enhance industrial competitiveness — place new demands on our countries' research and development efforts.

Several months ago the French Government, in its concern to adapt the public research capability to the country's economic aims, defined a coherent set of measures aimed particularly at promoting a more fruitful dialogue between state laboratories and private enterprise and at enabling state research bodies to pay more heed to the nation's socio-economic needs.

These measures simultaneously bear upon research structures, contractual funding of projects — jointly involving the state, research bodies and private firms — and regional decentralisation of the administration of certain aid procedures.

Nor have space activities been neglected, an area which I would like to stress because for a long time now it has been one of the fruitful sectors of European co-operation and several times last year formed the subject of government decisions redefining its aims.

*Mr. Aigrain (continued)*

France's efforts in space over more than fifteen years — and in passing I would stress the fact that even for countries like ours, which are not pioneers in the space area, it fairly typically takes a period of fifteen years, even in advanced technology, to move from a first essay to the first commercial applications — have today finally borne fruit in the opportunity for new industrial applications that will strengthen our economy and our independence. Let me mention some of the most outstanding of these.

Satellite telecommunications (Telecom system, operational in 1983, an example of co-operation) which will strengthen the conventional national communications network and offer the business world new services (teletyping, automated data file transfers, video transmission) and earth observation (SPOT programme), whose applications were first demonstrated by meteorological satellites and then by the American Landsat satellite, are extremely diversified and in the long term may permit rational management of our surface resources and general environmental control. I should also mention, in passing, the potential benefit of these techniques in the case of developing countries having weak infrastructures spread over vast areas.

Another application is direct television, which is arousing growing interest and is presently the subject of a joint study by the Federal Republic of Germany and France into the possibility of a preoperational system involving a French and a German satellite.

Among these new space applications mention might also be made of the Argos system currently making the headlines, in France at least, which is designed to locate and collect data from units spread over the surface of the globe and is currently used to locate boats taking part in the famous two-way trans-Atlantic race — an anecdotal fact, you may think, but one sailor's life has been saved by it. The system will facilitate, in future, search and rescue operations for aircraft and ships in distress.

These applications have important economic repercussions and may, in particular, result in the creation of many highly skilled jobs. But they do depend on the fulfilment of several conditions I would like to enumerate. Four main ones may be distinguished.

First, a technical condition: operational mastery of space applications demands free availability of the launch vehicles for placing the satellites in orbit. Here, the Ariane programme is the cornerstone of European space policy. Only this co-operative venture has enabled the European countries to secure an independent launch capability. By its choice of this rocket, the governing board of Intelsat gave it international

credibility more rapidly, I believe, than anyone had hoped. Nevertheless, future developments must be planned for and an upgrading of Ariane's performance ratings — adaptation to heavy payloads — if it is to remain competitive with the American space shuttle, at least for its own application purposes — direct television, twinned launching of telecommunication satellites — and, more generally, all geostationary satellite applications for which a launcher of this kind can be economically and technically competitive with the shuttle. This project rightly symbolises the solidarity of which European space policy can be capable. There remains to be set up the company charged with production and marketing of the launcher, and the early stages of negotiations have already produced a protocol of agreement. So everything seems to be going the way we want.

The second condition on which the success of the space applications I have mentioned depends is the maintenance of a very high level of scientific and technical capability. This is necessary in such diverse areas as earth observation, where there is room for active research into the use of all the available frequency, radio, infrared, optical, etc. bandwidths and the production, transmission and interpretation of images.

This research effort is also indispensable in such advanced sectors as materials fabrication in space, experiments now being carried out thanks to Spacelab — and possibly some preliminary experiments will be conducted in the Soyuz satellite in co-operation with the Soviet Union — likewise, the on-board collection of solar energy by satellites and its transmission to earth by microwaves: all things we have to do on our European satellites which constitute much more forward-looking projects.

But I would like to mention a third condition, an institutional one this time, enabling full use to be made of space applications: I refer to the adaptation of state research bodies and of industry to their involvement in space activities.

Last year, for instance, the French Government reorganised the structures of CNES to enable it to develop close relations with users in the French public sector — Ministry of Defence, Post Office and Telecommunications, French television producer company, the National Meteorological Office, civilian users of earth observation satellites — to plan its programmes, forecast long-term space requirements and ensure a steady effort in basic research and to contribute, along with industry, to making full use on world markets of the capabilities and facilities acquired in the last fifteen years.

For their part, manufacturers should be strongly encouraged to step up the export drive and their own export capacity.

*Mr. Aigrain (continued)*

One last condition : space applications ought to be fitted into a framework of broad international co-operation. France conducts such co-operation not only with other European countries but also with the United States and the Soviet Union. But it is more especially the European Space Agency, to which our country makes the largest contribution — about 36 % of the Agency's budget — that is the forcing-bed of co-operation. It has scored outstanding successes — the Symphonie programme, the OTS, followed by the ECS and Meteosat satellites and so on. They bear witness to the quality of our joint effort which is the hallmark of the European space industry. We intend, for our part, to continue such co-operation in the numerous areas of rich potential that space has in store for us.

I have dwelt at somewhat more length on the prospects afforded by space activities because I know that this sector attracts special attention from the members of your Assembly. However, the foregoing conditions on which further development of the new technologies depends, obtain in other advanced sectors besides the particular case of space : I mean, mastery of certain intermediate techniques necessary for the production and development of major industrial innovations. For example, space launch vehicles, Transpac-type packet-switching in the case of data transmission networks like Euronet, drilling platforms and deep sea equipment for exploiting ocean resources, etc. ; maintenance of high standards in basic research ; restructuring of research bodies, and efficient liaison with industry ; finally, pursuance of a policy of international co-operation.

The states of Europe can usefully pool their efforts in these four directions for all the high-technology sectors that lend themselves to European co-operation.

Sorely tried by the present economic difficulties, Europe must give proof, as it has done in the past, of its adaptability, and over and beyond this, its capacity of innovation. The future of the world lies in Europe's hands too. And European science is its surest guarantee. Which means placing our hopes, not in a common scientific and technical policy that still eludes our grasp, but rather in the convergence of national research efforts stemming from kindred spirits of resolution.

This is the way in which French scientific and technical research can make its contribution to the building of Europe, and we stand ready to do so. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does the Minister wish to answer the questions together or separately ?

Mr. AIGRAIN (*French Minister of State attached to the Prime Minister, responsible for research*) (Translation). — With your permission, I shall reply to each question separately.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Jager.

Mr. JAGER (*France*) (Translation). — Following the French authorities' recent decision to restart the Themis programme, I would be grateful if the Minister could tell me what action he intends to take at Community level to develop research on solar energy.

In general, how does he see the Community's prospects in the wider field of the promotion of alternative sources of energy and the rational use of energy supplies ? That is my question to the Minister.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Aigrain.

Mr. AIGRAIN (*French Minister of State attached to the Prime Minister, responsible for research*) (Translation). — As you probably know, among the scientific and technical co-operation programmes conducted under the heading of indirect measures by the European Community in Brussels there is a recent programme on new non-conventional and non-nuclear sources of energy.

This programme is developing smoothly, but is only in its early stages. It is nevertheless an important tool for co-ordinating the work being done in the various countries of Europe. Of course these new, non-conventional sources of energy will today, and probably for several decades to come, account for a very small proportion of the energy requirements of our countries. What we are doing is primarily the exploration of a very wide range of possibilities without at present being able to tell which of them will have economic applications.

In these circumstances there have been very few joint projects and far more tasks which have been shared out among countries. In the field of thermodynamic power stations, however, mention should be made of a power station now being built jointly by the Community countries in Sicily ; it is smaller than Themis but will be finished a little earlier.

Apart from this, there is a large measure of concerted action among European countries designed to ensure, not that everyone produces the same thing, but that different countries pursue complementary paths. This form of co-operation is perhaps not so spectacular, but quite as efficient.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. I call Mr. Brasseur.



Mr. BRASSEUR (*Belgium*) (Translation). — At the end of the sixties, after being considered the driving force behind economic growth and prosperity, science became the subject of serious misgivings on the part both of a large section of public opinion and of the political authorities.

Today, however, scientific and technological research is seen as one of the means with which to relaunch our crisis-bound economy, and has become one element in a wider policy covering even employment policy and the drive to ensure our European independence. But budgets are still very limited in most of our countries and I, like the Minister, regret this.

Furthermore, the situation of research scientists in Europe is still often very precarious, and I am convinced that in this connection there are steps which our governments could take.

At the same time, scientific objectives are shifting towards areas which currently have more to do with the quality of life than with short-term economic fallout.

I am, however, struck by the absence of an overall European policy on research, for example research on energy matters. This has just been referred to.

Does the Minister think that one can conceive of an overall European policy in this area? Does he think it possible to give research workers European status? And, to this end, does he think it possible to set up, within Europe, an organisation responsible for conducting a co-ordinated European scientific policy of this kind? How, as it were, are we to create this scientific and technological Europe?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Aigrain.

Mr. AIGRAIN (*French Minister of State attached to the Prime Minister, responsible for research*) (Translation). — As French Minister of State responsible for research — and my colleagues in other countries no doubt find themselves in the same position — I can of course only regret that present circumstances prevent the release of much larger sums of money for research. But what other head of a ministerial department would not say the same about the funds available for his own department?

Mr. Brasseur's question is whether it is possible to set up, develop and establish institutions responsible for a common European science policy. I shall perhaps disappoint you by replying to this question firmly in the negative. I think that for the time being — but I am not a prophet — the idea is totally unrealistic.

It is my view that such a research policy and a common status for research workers can be envisaged only under the auspices of a govern-

ment of Europe. We in France cannot pursue a research policy except under the auspices of the French Government. Now that is not the situation for the moment, at any rate.

On the other hand, I think we can achieve the same result and the same degree of efficiency through the voluntary comparison and co-ordination of national research policies, backed up by specific co-operation on projects that warrant it.

One can only regret that past efforts to bring about the comparison and co-ordination of national research policies have been insufficient. We have therefore decided to try again, and I believe that on this point most European countries agree with us. So it is probably unnecessary to establish a common policy based on a slow-moving organisation — which is unrealistic anyway — but we can obtain quite as effective a result by other means.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Warren.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, does the Minister agree that, because Western Europe is so strong on science and yet so slow in achieving comparable sales success in its civil and military markets, the governments of Western Europe should do more to encourage European science-based industries to achieve better sales success? How does he think this could be done?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Aigrain.

Mr. AIGRAIN (*French Minister of State attached to the Prime Minister, responsible for research*) (Translation). — Obviously, the success of the products of advanced technology does not depend only on the technology itself. It also depends on marketing ability and after-sales service, on the companies that make the products and on the size of their market. Now, no one would dispute the fact that, in certain areas at least, firms in our countries have in this respect been less dynamic than others.

I think there is a first thing which the governments of the European countries can do and which they have done with great success in certain fields, that is, to open up wider markets, thanks precisely to co-operation in the manufacture of these products wherever this is possible. The success of the Airbus and the almost certain success of the Ariane satellite launcher are typical examples. The same launcher built by a single country would probably have had greater difficulty in gaining a place on the European and, *a fortiori*, the world market.

Moreover, I think that each government, in its own country, is rightly applying stimulatory measures and incentives intended to help those firms whose dynamism in terms of production, marketing and after-sales service is developing

*Mr. Aigrain (continued)*

along the right lines. Nevertheless, I am perfectly aware that, while science and technology are an essential requisite for success, they are not alone sufficient. The best scientific and technological advances, if not subsequently backed up by efficient industrial and commercial structures, do not result in successful advanced-technology industries. In any event co-operation, where possible, is already a very good step on the road to success.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — The Minister will excuse me if I come back to a very specific point.

Does he consider that the present state of European production potential in the field of electronic microcomponents is satisfactory? Is Europe well placed to embark on the technological revolution that can be foreseen in this field? I am thinking particularly of large-scale integrated circuits and bubble memories. Finally, do not our countries still depend too much on an outside contribution in this respect, even if it comes from a great allied power?

The Minister has talked a great deal about space activities. We here are concerned with defence. Obviously everything is linked with research, as the Minister has rightly pointed out. Can he give us further information on this subject?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Aigrain.

Mr. AIGRAIN (*French Minister of State attached to the Prime Minister, responsible for research*) (Translation). — I would distinguish, as Mr. Valleix has done to a certain extent, between two things: scientific ability and very advanced technology.

In this respect I do not think Europe lags behind the more advanced countries, the United States and Japan. At the present time laboratories and firms in several European countries are able to design and build laboratory versions of integrated circuits with a performance and density at least equal to the best in the world.

The position is rather different when it comes to production. It is true that Europe is lagging considerably behind in this respect, owing to its reluctance — which up to a point is understandable — to entrust to countries that are short of manpower the stage in the production of such goods which is technologically the least advanced but highly labour intensive. This has made it difficult for Europe to achieve price competitiveness and thus to obtain as big a share of the market as its American and Japanese com-

petitors. Now this happens to be an area in which economies are particularly great and therefore have a particularly serious effect on prices. This creates a vicious circle — higher prices, lower sales, etc. — which is a real problem that in my view requires that firms and governments should take steps which some governments have moreover already taken.

Provided these efforts continue, I believe the future outlook is, if not rosy, at least not too bleak, since automation of these processes, hitherto carried out in a very automatic manner by unskilled labour, will permit countries with a high level of manpower to regain their competitiveness in this field.

We in Europe, then, ought to be able to regain the necessary competitiveness. The problem is whether the dispersion — not of the market, where there are no customs or other barriers — the dispersion of manufacturing firms is not still a little too great in Europe.

I would not be very surprised to see fresh groups being formed in a few years' time.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Scheffler.

Mr. SCHEFFLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — In view of the Minister of State's account of and emphasis on the outstanding importance of Ariane, I have a quite factual question: if it is a fact that Ariane already occupies such a share in the European economy, and presumably will occupy it on an increasing scale, are there at present any firm ideas about how it is to be marketed? Will this be done by national governments or through ESA, or does Mr. Aigrain envisage still other possibilities?

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Aigrain.

Mr. AIGRAIN (*French Minister of State attached to the Prime Minister, responsible for research*) (Translation). — This is a very important point, of course, which is currently being discussed among the partner countries in the European Space Agency. I think that to ensure the commercial success of a product like Ariane, technical development has to be carried out jointly, so as to share costs and to benefit from all the scientific and technical skills of the member states. Production should be carried out jointly — and this is the purpose of the negotiations currently under way — and marketing should be done as flexibly as possible. It is necessary, in particular, if full benefit is to be derived from joint development of a product of this kind, for each of the member countries to be able to use it for its own requirements.

I think, therefore, that the right legal formula must be found. Negotiations are proceeding and I personally am very hopeful that they will be concluded successfully.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Minnocci.

Mr. MINNOCCI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the French Minister of State for research has in his speech described in detail the various sectors in which co-operation in scientific and technological research is taking place at European level. Europe cannot compete with the United States nor, as far as we know, with the Soviet Union, in the funding of such research. It has at all events been pointed out that the return on the money which Europe spends on research is considerably lower than the return obtained on such research in the United States and the Soviet Union.

May I therefore ask the French Minister of State for research whether he would not agree with me that a more general co-ordination at European level of scientific and technological research would be advisable, possible and necessary, in every single field.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Aigrain.

Mr. AIGRAIN (*French Minister of State attached to the Prime Minister, responsible for research*) (Translation). — You have said that it is not possible for Europe to spend as much as the United States on research and development. No doubt Europe does not spend as much as the United States on research and development today, but taking into account the fact that, one after the other, the countries of Europe are witnessing an increase in the percentage of their gross industrial product spent on research and development, and that this percentage is around 2%, then when all the countries do their bit, Europe will really be very close to the United States, even from the point of view of total expenditure.

It is true that in Europe research has not always had — not in all countries anyway — as much impact on the economy, and on advanced technology firms in particular, as in the United States. I believe, however, that it has had an enormously greater effect than in the Soviet Union. Although the transfer of scientific results to the economy and to business firms is a little too slow in our European countries, we can have the agreeable feeling that there are countries where still less is being done. But this should not satisfy us. We must manage to improve scientific and technological transfer. And here, as I have already said, scientific and technical co-operation in Europe can play a part particularly by providing firms with larger markets and by improving the respect researchers and businessmen have for each other thanks to the examples everyone can find in his neighbour.

I have always been impressed by the fact that French researchers are much more easily convinced of the usefulness of industrial co-operation by the German example, and that French firms are often more easily convinced of the usefulness of co-operation with university researchers when they see the Dutch example. So much the better; everyone stands to gain by making comparisons. We can thus make use of European co-operation in this particular connection.

I would say, however, that it is mainly up to each country, each university, each firm and each research scientist to think about this problem, and I would point out that the organisations which seem to work least well in this respect — and I am thinking of the Soviet Union, whose science is of remarkable quality but technical achievements often tend to lag behind — are those which are most centralised.

Let us not, therefore, push our desire for co-operation so far that we fall into the trap of over-centralisation.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Minister, for addressing the Assembly and replying to the many questions which have been put to you. (*Applause*)

#### **6. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

#### **Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

#### **Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

*(Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. — We now resume the joint debate on the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council and the replies of the Committees.

I call Mr. Mommersteeg and he will be followed by Mr. Druon.

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I want to make one or two comments on the report and recommendation from Mr. Minnocci. I do so not only as a member of this Assembly, but also as an ex-member of the European Parliament.

*Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)*

The first comment I want to make is that the foundation for the existence of this Assembly, and the hub about which the work of this Assembly revolves, is the Brussels Treaty, which as a treaty is unique. Mr. Thorn has also mentioned this, while Mr. Minnocci refers in his report to Article V, the clause dealing with automatic mutual assistance. One might call it a clause that stipulates total solidarity when matters of life or death are at stake. You will not find this in any other treaty.

My second comment concerns European security. This Assembly has the right, and the responsibility as well, of looking not only at our security in the strict military sense but also at the problems of international politics that provide the context for European security.

One has been able, Mr. President — and I do not quite understand why — to detect not only today but earlier as well concern at a lessening of the influence of Western European Union in general, and of this Assembly in particular, that is tied up with the activities of the European Parliament, especially now that the latter has gained new legitimacy through the European direct elections.

Mr. Périquier has already protested about one of the paragraphs in the draft recommendation, or at least explained why he is voting against it. I would point out that there is European political co-operation between the Nine that does not come under the Treaty of Rome, but is a purely intergovernmental collaboration. Certainly in the past the European Parliament has, working on the basis of the Treaty of Rome, been considering the results achieved or not achieved by this co-operation, and in doing so has built up a pattern of relations with the nine Ministers for Foreign Affairs that forms one component of European political co-operation.

Now the purpose of European political co-operation is to arrive at a single voice, to speak with a single voice on the international political scene. Policy on security forms an integral part of international politics. So by the very nature of things the Nine talk within European political co-operation about the problems of security. Take, for instance, the preparations that were made for Helsinki. Soon there will be Madrid, though other areas are affected as well. I assume that the elected European Parliament will be considering these problems, no less than the last one did.

Back in 1973, Mr. President, as Rapporteur of the European Parliament's Political Affairs Committee, I proposed — and this was agreed to after it had been appreciated that security policy was an extension of European political co-oper-

ation as discussed in the European Parliament, and that this was bound to be so in the long run — that there should be an annual meeting between the European Parliament and the Assembly of Western European Union. One may feel, indeed, that the WEU Assembly has the best experts and greatest experience in the sphere of European security policy, which has both political and military aspects.

Now we are six years further on. I do not believe that we are one single step forward on this point. There will have to be far closer co-operation with the European Parliament. I would be very happy if there were at last to be an annual meeting, one where the problems that concern us were discussed as a start on co-operation between us.

*(Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

We have three European institutions — the Council of Europe, Western European Union and the European Parliament — all with different areas of competence. The important thing, in the end, is to arrive at European unity; these three streams must flow into the same river. The way has been pointed.

Mr. von Hassel, who is not here at the moment, occupies a special position in the European Parliament which means that he, certainly as an individual, will have greater opportunities for helping such a dialogue to come about. I appeal to him, through you, to see that it does.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Druon.

Mr. DRUON (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the report presented by Mr. Minnocci deserves close attention, not only because of the pertinence of the remarks it contains regarding the Ministers' report, but also because of the political judgment it makes on the activity of the Council during the past year.

From very careful examination of the statements made to our Assembly by the representatives of the governments and of the text presented by the Council, Mr. Minnocci, in fact, distills a doctrine according to which the member states of WEU supposedly desire full implementation of the Brussels Treaty, whilst at the same time they consider that the commitments involved could become genuinely effective only within the framework of the future European union envisaged at the summit meeting of the Community's heads of state or government held in Paris in 1974.

That, indeed, is one of the conclusions which it is possible to draw from the various statements analysed by the Rapporteur.

*Mr. Druon (continued)*

Fortunately, it is not the only one, for what very often characterises the positions adopted by the governments with regard to WEU is their ambiguity. No institution has ever engendered so many unspoken thoughts.

Accordingly, it would be possible to interpret the various government statements in a significantly different and, to my mind, more satisfactory manner. The governments have recorded the importance they attach to full implementation of the stipulations contained in the Brussels Treaty, and have reaffirmed the need to make use of all its possibilities in pursuing the aim of building Europe.

Now, in contradiction to what Mr. Minnocci implies, there is nothing here to suggest any form of merger between WEU and the Communities in a hybrid institution, without legal basis, whose areas of competence would extend — in defiance of the treaties — to determining a so-called integrated foreign policy and a so-called integrated defence policy, in other words, policies leading to elimination of the sovereign responsibilities of the several states.

The smooth functioning of the European institutions demands, first and foremost, respect for their specific character. It is not by diluting their competence or by disregarding the treaties that we shall secure the progress of a Europe which must be founded on the law.

Security and defence problems have their own individual character. They cannot depend on supranational machinery. By their very nature, therefore, they cannot be solved by some of the procedures which govern the EEC machinery. Moreover, the Rome Treaty itself expressly recognises this, since its Article 223 authorises the member countries to waive its provisions whenever the interests of national defence so dictate. I would remind you of the terms of this article :

“Any member state may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material.”

The treaty setting up the EEC is therefore in no way applicable, even where the purely industrial aspects of defence are concerned.

It is for WEU, and WEU alone, to deal with the co-ordination of European defence policies in all fields of application.

Admittedly, it can only carry out its tasks properly by acting in liaison and, if possible, in harmony with the European Communities ; for

political co-operation at the level of the Nine often impinges on security questions. Conversely, in any serious concerted action on defence problems we cannot disregard the implications of energy, technology and industry for the balance of force and for the maintenance of Europe's military potential at an appropriate level.

Such desirable complementarity between WEU and EEC would, moreover, be better assured if the geographical area covered by the two organisations coincided more exactly. This observation will assume still more importance with the entry of Greece and the foreseeable accession of other Mediterranean countries. It will accordingly be essential to the smooth functioning of each of these organisations and to their mutual reinforcement that WEU should welcome the new members of EEC to its ranks. That is an eventuality that was already mentioned in a previous report and was rejected in Committee after conflicting votes, in surprising circumstances.

It is good to find the same idea expressed once again in the text presented by Mr. Minnocci. In it he proposes that the Council should demonstrate its will to ensure improved application of the Brussels Treaty by stressing the current importance of its Article XI, which provides that :

“The High Contracting Parties may, by agreement, invite any other state to accede to the present treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the state so invited.”

It may be wondered why this idea, which was rejected at the last session, reappears today, apparently with the support of the very same people who first of all repudiated it.

Could it be because at present, under cover of a European union described as an integrated system, with a very precise and explicit reference to the EDC, the accession of new member states to WEU could be looked upon as a possibility, since it would no longer constitute an incitement to affirm an individual European personality ?

Positive as it is with regard to implementation of the Brussels Treaty and its possible extension to cover other states to which we are bound by the most elementary feelings of solidarity, but in our view negative, where its proposals for merging the Brussels Treaty and EEC are concerned, the report presented by Mr. Minnocci is, once again, full of the ambiguities so familiar in our Assembly. The main reservation I would make about the report stems from a certain lack of realism, for it is hard to see how we could integrate defence policies involving the application of strategies for which the centres of decision-making and responsibility are or would be located for some members in Europe and for others outside Europe.

*Mr. Druon (continued)*

These are the comments which have led me to table several amendments, whose acceptance would enable us to vote on texts which would lend themselves to less contradictory or less ambiguous interpretations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, my remarks concern the report prepared by my worthy friend, Francis Tanghe — Document 808.

You may think it strange for Belgians to be at odds with one another. I beg you to see no malice in this, even on the Belgian home front. It is just one parliamentarian belonging to a European assembly commenting on a fellow-member's report. This is what it is all about.

Mr. Tanghe's excellent report, for which we are grateful, contains, despite its brevity, a great many observations, criticisms and analyses. But there are two I feel I must comment on.

My first comment is on a point in paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation concerning the responsibilities and competence of the Standing Armaments Committee. It is to the effect that appropriate studies could be "proposed from time to time" by the Assembly to the SAC.

I find it odd to see in a parliamentary text this expression "from time to time", which is unduly vague. Either we propose studies or we do not, but proposing them "from time to time" does not mean anything except to be a soothing platitude or perhaps arouse suspicion. I think it quite out of place to attempt to enlarge areas of competence, which might lead to a merger. In fact, the SAC has a clearly defined remit. It is an inter-governmental body directly reporting to the Council of Ministers, and it is not for us, with due respect for the separation of powers, to meddle with its functioning.

It is another matter to seek a dialogue with the SAC; and yet another matter to have such a dialogue with the Council of Ministers on the report on the proceedings of the SAC. But to try and take the Standing Armaments Committee for some kind of planning consultants would in my view be highly dangerous. More than one of us no doubt deplore the snail-like pace, if not absence, of effective action by the Standing Armaments Committee, whose task it is to promote a policy of standardisation of European armaments with a view to lower production costs. But taking it for a consultative body for planning might also furnish it with a ready-made pretext for doing nothing effective, or doing nothing at all. Indeed, the world is full of consultants; even our parties and parliaments

are full of them. I have forgotten who said: "The seekers go on seeking, but do they sometimes find?" At all events, I should not like the SAC to be taken for any old documentation centre.

It might perhaps be another matter still to lay on in the Assembly's secretariat a system enabling parliamentarians to have the services of experts, consultants or a documentation centre with clearly-defined tasks.

What this means, Mr. President, is that I cannot accept paragraph 3 as it stands.

Nonetheless, I consider that Mr. Tanghe's report has many positive points, which means I shall abstain in the vote on the text as a whole.

There is, in any case, one point which I should like to bring out and which has already been raised in the presence of Mr. Thorn: I refer to the famous paragraphs 14 and 15.

My colleague, Mr. Tanghe, knows my style: I am a plain speaker; I am no diplomat and do not beat about the bush. I understand that the Supreme Commander or SACEUR, General Haig, was "informed" of paragraph 3. And when I say "informed" it is only a manner of speaking: he was informed by letter of the gist of the recommendation.

I find this extremely embarrassing, for I should not like to feel that I belonged to an assembly which defers to SACEUR like a ward to his guardian. Indeed, there is no place in the grand design of Europe for Europe's being anyone's ward especially anyone outside European territory.

I say it was a blunder, if true, to write to the Supreme Commander, SACEUR. It would be another blunder to have answered the letter or verbal communication.

I believe I am right in saying that the normal procedure should be for the country concerned — in this instance the Federal Republic of Germany — to request SACEUR for an opinion and then for both the request and opinion to be submitted to the Council of Ministers. I think the procedure envisaged is possibly likely to embarrass the German Government. It is certainly not for the parliamentary assembly to short-circuit the normal procedure.

At all events, I consider the action, to say the very least, clumsy and untimely, and am deeply sorry that anyone should go and weep on the shoulder of a guardian when he fails to put across his own view or take action through the normal channels.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). — Thank you, Mr. President. In Document 808 Mr. Tanghe has

*Mr. Banks (continued)*

presented a most interesting report, and he deserves to be complimented on the immense amount of hard work he put into producing it.

I should like to deal first with the first recommendation of the report, that concerning the publication of the figures of the British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe. I believe that the British Army of the Rhine represents a large and important contribution to European defence. I personally am immensely proud of the highly skilled, efficient and professional combat army that we have stationed there. It would be wrong to deduce from recommendation 1 that there is a contrivance on the part of the Council or the British Government to conceal reductions, either in the long or medium term, in the British commitment. I would ask members of this Assembly to recognise that the numbers of our forces which are by necessity deployed in Northern Ireland are, of course, stationed in Europe. The numbers given in the report in fact total 3,243, and that is the quoted number of servicemen at the time of the compilation of the annual report being stationed temporarily in Northern Ireland.

It is this problem which makes the presentation of a figure all the more difficult, because, as I said earlier, forces are by necessity taken to Northern Ireland for short-term deployments. But I should like to stress this important point: they form part of the British commitment to the British Army of the Rhine, and there is no dispute that their equipment and the logistical support which those servicemen require form part of our European commitment. The numbers are not necessarily constant and this is the core of the reason for being unable to produce for the date of the publication of the report a figure which would in any way be accurate on the day on which the report is in fact published.

The total strength tends to vary with these movements of troops on very short-term periods of service in Northern Ireland, but I should like to make it clear that Her Majesty's Government would most likely be extremely helpful in satisfying this point, within the confines of security, if the recommendations with this report are approved.

Paragraph 11 refers to forces remaining under national command. I am not entirely sure what forces this sentence refers to, but I should like to make it clear that logistic forces so deployed are in support of our forces and are assured to SACEUR.

A second point I should like to raise in this short debate refers to the chemical and biological weaponry to which Mr. Tanghe refers near the end of his report. I am very pleased indeed that

he has done so, because I believe it is a subject which deserves our closest attention. The consequences of a chemical or biological use of weapons are every bit as far-reaching as those of nuclear warfare, and yet they do not receive the attention which I believe they deserve. For too long there has been too great a silence on this subject, and I would propose today that Western European Union should take an initiative in Europe to commence talks with the Soviet Union so that we can make a start on protecting mankind through treaty obligations relating to chemical and biological warfare.

That is a wider subject than is contained in this report, but it is an important subject. It is every bit as important as restricting nuclear weapons, and I believe that we need to make an early start on getting something done to ensure that mankind is protected from these devastating and terrifying weapons that are in the world today. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Lord Northfield.

Lord NORTHFIELD (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I should like to congratulate Mr. Scheffler on his report. It is direct and clear in diagnosing what is satisfactory and what is unsatisfactory in scientific, technological and aerospace co-operation among our governments. The recommendations are concrete. Over the years it has been very difficult to extract from governments a concrete reply to the many recommendations which we put before them. I hope that the concrete nature of the recommendations will make governments equally forthcoming in their replies when we finally receive them.

Having offered some compliments, I should like briefly to make two reservations about what Mr. Scheffler has put in his recommendations. First, in the third paragraph of the preamble to the recommendation about nuclear policy he regrets that:

“even the increasingly-serious energy crisis since 1973 has failed to stimulate pragmatic arrangements for more joint action, co-operation and the definition of a medium- and long-term European energy policy.”

I wonder whether he stands by every word of that sentence. It is probably now inaccurate. In the first place, it is true, of course, that Europe has still a long way to go in reaching a common energy policy, but the French Minister of State for research pointed to some co-operation that is already going on in medium- and long-term energy policy.

I wonder whether the Rapporteur has noticed that, on 27th March, the Energy Council of the European Community gave final approval to a new Community scheme for financing national

*Lord Northfield (continued)*

projects in both energy-saving and alternative energy technologies, including solar energy, geothermal energy, coal gasification and liquefaction. In other words, there is a good deal of co-operation about medium- and long-term policies. Also, for the medium term, the Council set in hand the implementation of decisions, taken in March, that member states should reduce their short-term demand for energy this year by 5 %, and by 1985 should limit oil imports to 1978 levels.

Those are very important decisions which the European Community has taken and is now carrying out, and I think it is a little unfair, if I may say so to the Rapporteur, to say that there has been a failure "to stimulate pragmatic arrangements for more joint action".

There have also been decisions on measures which can be introduced in the event of oil supply difficulties facing any nation. In my view, all these things add up to a good deal of help and a good deal of co-operation between the member states. That is my first reservation, and I wonder whether the Rapporteur would like to reflect on it and, in the morning, perhaps, introduce an amendment slightly modifying that paragraph of his preamble.

I come to the recommendation itself. After saying in the second paragraph of the preamble that he is convinced that safety problems in respect of nuclear facilities and radiation and environmental problems call for solutions which cut across national frontiers, the Rapporteur then fails to make any recommendation that the Council do anything about this situation. That led me to table an amendment which effectively asks the Council to co-operate more on the safety and environmental impact of nuclear facilities, particularly where they create transfrontier dangers. I hope very much that he will feel able to accept that amendment in view of his earlier paragraph in the preamble.

The European Community is beginning to co-operate on environmental impact assessment techniques and principles to be followed in determining whether a particular industrial installation should be allowed in any particular location. Consultations on this are going on at the moment.

At the same time, in the Council of Europe I have put down a motion for a resolution on the whole issue of broadening agreement in Europe on the principles to be followed on environmental impact assessment in all the member states throughout Europe and not just in the Nine. It is therefore most important that this Assembly should also return to this subject in this resolution and say that the question of

the location of nuclear installations, particularly where it is proposed near frontiers, demands action by ministers to ensure that cross-frontier dangers are identified and evaluated in advance and that the European environment is properly and fully protected from installations of this magnitude.

My final word concerns another part of Mr. Scheffler's report. I am glad that you are in the chair, Mr. Valleix, because I should like to congratulate France on its attitude on co-operation in aircraft production over the last decade. We have witnessed a sorry history of failure to co-operate over the last years, and that applies in respect of civil and military aircraft.

Thanks to French determination, the skill of French design and the success of French salesmanship, I am able to say that I am proud to have flown in an A-300 owned by an American airline. Sales to American airlines are the breakthrough that aircraft must have in terms of successful civil aircraft production. I pay tribute to the qualities of those concerned in the French industry, qualities which have produced a winner in the A-300 and the other aircraft developed from it. Equally, I deplore the tardiness of the British who, at every point, have lacked faith and the necessary degree of business assessment to support that aircraft. Britain has come in only at the very last minute, and that is not a happy commentary on the state of co-operation in civil aircraft production over the last ten or fifteen years. We might call it co-operation, to use the English vernacular, in the nick of time. It was carried out only just in time to save the position.

But we are faced with the need for a clear statement now, a statement which I was trying to get from the Prime Minister of Luxembourg this afternoon, that the lesson has been learnt at last, and that we can now, on the basis of this beginning of real co-operation, look forward to new civil aircraft and — perhaps this is more important — to the next generation of fighter aircraft in Europe being a truly European project. There is greater danger at the moment that even the present will to co-operate will not endure long enough to make sure that fighter aircraft are covered, and that the next one is jointly developed in Europe.

It is sad that ten years ago, as a Rapporteur, I was urging that the British should have come in much earlier and that we should have shown our European faith and our qualities of business assessment in this civil aircraft project. I am sorry that it has taken us ten years to learn these lessons. I hope that they now have been learned and that the future for true co-operation in European aircraft production is at last assured. (*Applause*)



The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Adriaensens.

Mr. ADRIAENSSENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. Scheffler's report deals with energy, space matters and the European aircraft industry. There have already been many calls to establish a European aircraft industry, and now we are taking the first steps with the Airbus. We ought not to be over-optimistic about this. Present production capacity is insufficient, and this is something to be deplored. There is a Chinese proverb that says that the longest journey begins with the first steps — I hope the WEU Council of Ministers will keep this in mind, and will decide to build a new military aircraft on a joint basis.

In the space field we are less optimistic, because of difficulties in the time schedule. Financial problems are causing dark clouds to lower over European space. This stagnation is a problem for Europe, and we must do everything we can to bring about a change. One bright spot is, perhaps, that thirty-four companies in eleven member countries of the European Space Agency have formed a company called Transpace, which will handle production and marketing of the European Ariane rocket. This agreement came into being during the air show at Le Bourget, so it is quite new. I hope, therefore, that the proposal made in paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation from Mr. Scheffler will soon be put into effect, and that serious production of the Ariane launchers will get off the ground.

Everyone is convinced of the fact that we have energy problems. On the one hand savings will have to be made, and on the other new sources of energy will have to be found. Where savings are concerned the authorities must work out an energy programme aimed at increasing the efficiency of the energy consumed and combating every possible kind of energy wastage. In Belgium the government has set itself the goal of reducing energy consumption. A proposal is to be put before our parliament for a 10 % saving by 1985 and a 15 % saving by 1990. This is based on the assumption of the acceptable growth rate being 4 % at most. I hope this target will be aimed at in all the WEU countries.

Mr. Scheffler mentions, in connection with energy savings, the areas of housing and industry. I would add to these the various means of transport. The very poor level of efficiency of the car engine represents a waste of energy, and we cannot neglect the fact. Making savings is fine, but it does not solve the problem. A shortage of oil is going to face us in the future, so we have to try gradually to get away from the use of oil. In my country, in 1978, 53 % of primary consumption of energy was in the form

of oil. The change-over to the post-oil era therefore needs to be organised right now.

Scientists tell us that controlled thermonuclear fusion represents a virtually inexhaustible energy potential, though there are still a whole range of technical problems that have to be solved. This form of energy cannot be expected to make a contribution sooner than the year 2050. This is why we have to look now for alternative sources of energy. There is, for instance, geothermal power, gasification of coal, wind energy and the like. Solar energy is an inexhaustible source that can provide us with power on a large scale in the future, though present-day systems need to have a sizeable area and pose problems of storing the energy produced. The sun radiates, on to the territory of Belgium, about sixty times more energy than our current total primary energy consumption. We hope that research will help us to make progress in this sphere.

It may be that space technology can play a part in this. Mr. Scheffler has suggested a study of solar energy satellites and possibly the construction of a small prototype. The same idea is featured in the Eurospace report, which offers an estimate of the costs such a prototype would involve. An initial prototype would yield 6 kW of energy, a second — around 1985 — would give 25 kW and so on up to the year 2000 when it would be possible to have a yield of 10,000 megawatts. Eurospace arrives at an estimate of 60,000 million units of account for a development of this kind, not an enormous sum when one looks at the figures for oil prospecting and drilling, for building nuclear power stations and other major projects for generating power.

While we wait for those sources of energy to become operational, we shall have to make the best of the means available to us at the moment — gas, coal, oil and nuclear electricity. I am one of those who believe that the use of nuclear power as an alternative source is irreversible. Of course there are a lot of problems that still need solving if the majority of the population, and even some of the politicians and scientists, are to be convinced about this. There is the matter of radioactive waste, of siting the power stations, i.e. closeness to national frontiers and densely-populated areas, and in particular of supervising the safety of nuclear plants. One can mention Harrisburg in this connection. Direct supervision by a public body is absolutely essential.

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to reiterate what I said last year — that the Council of Ministers ought in their annual reports to give a more extensive account of what has been happening in the past year. The Council should in particular tell us the political motivations that result in a lack of unanimity within the Council. This is something that Mr. Scheffler has, again, complained about.

*Mr. Adriaensens (continued)*

The European governments pay too little attention to the safety aspects when they formulate their energy policy. Why cannot the Council come to agreement, and why does it continue to talk only in generalities without getting down to the real heart of things ?

Once again it is being said that joint action is needed in order, in both the short and long term, to overcome the imbalance between supply and demand for oil and oil products, and to alleviate the pressure on prices. There needs to be a common front on matters of energy, and if this is not possible the Council ought to give us, as parliamentarians, a very full explanation of why this is so. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you Mr. Adriaensens. I also thank Mr. Enders, who is willing not to speak until tomorrow morning, when we wind up the general debate.

#### **7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 19th June, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. The industrial bases of European security (Presentation of and Debate on the Report

of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 805).

2. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council ; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council ; Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council (Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Documents 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments).
3. Address by Mr. Scholten, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 6.45 p.m.)*

# THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 19th June 1979

## SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. The industrial bases of European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 805*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Valleix (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Konings, Mr. Valleix (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Warren (*Chairman of the Committee*).
4. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council; Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council (*Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Enders, Mr. Tanghe (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Minnocci (*Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Scheffler (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*).
5. Address by Mr. Scholten, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Scholten (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*).  
*Replies by Mr. Scholten to questions put by*: Mr. Konings, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Talon, Mr. Roper, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Druon, Mr. Minnocci, Lord Reay, Mr. Kershaw, Mr. Warren, Lord Duncan-Sandys.
6. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council; Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council (*Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mrs. von Bothmer (*Chairman of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Roper (*Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Warren (*Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*).
7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

*The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ? ...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 24.

### 3. The industrial bases of European security

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 805)*

The PRESIDENT. — The first Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the industrial bases of European security and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 805.

I call Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur of the Committee, to present the report.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, before embarking on what I have to say on a subject that is important to our Assembly I should like to thank all those who made it possible for me to accomplish this task. I am thinking first of all of my colleagues in the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, in particular its Chairman, Mr. Warren, but also of its secretary, Mr. Huigens, and most particularly an expert, Ingénieur Général Brindeau, who have assisted me with this work.

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

The report I have the honour to present to you on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions is based upon a self-evidence: Europe will not fully attain independence or express its true personality in international relations until it has mastery of the scientific, technological and industrial means of its own defence.

We are unfortunately a long way from that goal. In fact, if certain European countries, such as France, have equipped themselves, especially in the nuclear field, with an independent research and production capability, it has been at the cost of considerable financial efforts and of a certain lag in conventional sectors. It is a deliberate policy. It is becoming increasingly clear that no European state, in isolation, can hope to develop simultaneously, by its own efforts, all the advanced technologies governing the establishment of a modern armoury. Co-operation becomes an imperative necessity, the compulsory path for the safeguarding of our independence.

The report tabled highlights three major sectors of joint action: research and development in the advanced technologies, indispensable if what we want is for Europe to have a place in all the new fields, to forgo no opportunity and to be nowhere relegated to the rôle of subcontractors or recipients of aid; the conventional armaments industry proper, which can no longer be narrowly organised within a national framework and ought not to be the victim of any abuse of its strength by some external power, be it friendly or allied; and finally the aircraft industries which your Rapporteur has singled out from the other branches of armaments on the grounds of their interlocking civil and military aspects and the model character of some of their programmes.

The pooling of European achievements in the field of advanced technologies assumes at the present time all the greater urgency in that Europe is running into all kinds of economic difficulties whose consequences threaten to be disastrous in the long term to research budgets. But, as Mr. Aigrain reminded us yesterday, our states should, true to their tradition, demonstrate their capacity of innovation. They cannot opt out of their future, of which scientific and technological progress is the surest pledge.

In the matter of co-ordination of research and development your Rapporteur considers the largest concepts ought to prevail. A global approach is called for. The industrial bases of European security do not solely consist of those industries directly engaged in armaments. They extend to the entire economic environment represented by such industries as electronics,

telecommunications and, above all, data processing.

It is on this last point that your Rapporteur would like to dwell awhile. In data processing the action taken so far by the European countries cannot be assessed very positively. Considerable sums have been invested in unco-ordinated national plans for computerisation. The results are disappointing, however. The position of European companies is extremely weak, both in the components and peripheral systems sector and in that of complete systems. The supremacy of IBM, in particular, is consolidated by the lack of standardisation of equipment on a European scale, which ties users to one type of hardware and software, as they are unable to obtain partial replacements for their facilities from other manufacturers. In integrated circuitry, of vital importance to the future, the lag of European firms is estimated at two or three years.

The mutual interactions of defence and data processing cannot be over-emphasised. The American military and space programmes initially provided substantial orders which accelerated the development of the first systems. The programmes not only generated orders for computers but also accompanying research contracts, particularly for components. Thanks to these the United States gained an undeniable lead. In 1969 public expenditure on data processing research in the United States totalled approximately \$10,000 million as against \$1,100 million in France.

Conversely, practically all modern weapons require the support of highly sophisticated data processing, from artillery to aircraft. Sophisticated weapons such as modern aircraft and missiles depend on rapid data processing for action decisions and operational efficiency. A country with an inadequate data processing base can have no credible defence.

Europe cannot therefore allow itself to be permanently dependent on imports of American data processing products for the build-up of its military equipment. If that were to continue the Europeans would carry much less weight in the Alliance and it would become impossible for them to make their interests prevail against the United States.

Failure to supply a timely, or adequate, data processing capability would also involve, in the commercial competition between Europe and the United States, a qualitative lag in weaponry for lack of a sufficiently sophisticated technology of operationally satisfactory data processing components — fire control computers, guidance, etc.

Europe also has to contend with the ongoing transformation in data processing in which a decisive rôle is assigned to mini-computers and

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

telecommunications. In these new areas the Europeans are far from beaten yet. The French peripheral system hardware, for instance, is highly efficient — Logabax, Télémécanique, the CII Mitra series, etc. The Europeans account for 60 % of the mini-computer market. As for software, this is quite often provided by domestic firms. The elements of a powerful European data processing industry therefore exist. They reflect the political will to co-ordinate efforts to breach the American monopoly, more particularly that of IBM.

From this point of view the action of our governments can only be judged with severity ; the setback of Unidata, the splendid isolation of ICL, the CII-Honeywell alliance which threaten to hold back research in the large computer area are negative phenomena. The trend must be reversed.

The difficulties encountered in adoption in the European Community of the four-year data processing development programme unfortunately hardly arouse more than cautious optimism.

Western European Union must, exercising its proper responsibilities, demonstrate the importance of a vigorous data processing and electronics sector having regard to the imperative requirements of European security.

The second area of co-operation dealt with by your Rapporteur has already been the subject of numerous and often controversial studies : it is that of the harmonisation of military equipment programmes. The object of this study is to examine the question, taking fully into account the need to preserve and develop Europe's technological and industrial potential.

Two requirements, often artificially presented as conflicting with one another, need to be borne in mind : military efficiency, and the right utilisation of European production capacities. In order to meet both these requirements, hardware must be designed for joint use by the allied forces. Hence interoperability must remain one of our most fundamental concerns. Yet diversity of capacities and resources, multiplicity of the possibilities of innovation have to be preserved. Hence, too, concentration or monopoly cannot be effective long-term solutions, even though they allow some short-term economies. Standardisation, which all too often leads to excessive specialisation and to the domination of industrial giants, as a rule American, cannot in any case be regarded as the royal road of co-operation.

Besides, in many cases it engenders as much over-cost as savings. It may occasionally be expedient in the Atlantic framework. It is generally more acceptable in the European framework, but it is a case then of co-operation by equals,

based on the consolidation of complementary industrial structures and not on the stifling of the weaker by the stronger.

The report before you analyses a list of basic conditions for such co-operation.

First, a careful balance sheet of what has already been accomplished. Such a balance sheet cannot but highlight regrettable deficiencies, notably the lack of a preferential procurement policy, but it will also bring out the achievements that have to be preserved, one of the most patent of which is the establishment of structures and practices of flexible and diversified co-operation.

Second, our states should harmonise their needs more effectively and systematically than in the past. Research is in progress in IEPG with a view to co-ordinating replacement time-tables and drawing up common specifications. These efforts should be intensified and be given an authentically European tangible expression by the conclusion of firm agreements among Europeans.

Lastly we must learn every lesson from past practices in the industrial setting-up of programmes. The most striking successes have been achieved by industrial consortia enjoying a large measure of commercial autonomy and founding their activity on very precise specifications and guidelines from the government. In this respect an example like Euromissile commands all our attention.

If there is one specific sector of co-operation that deserves special treatment, it will be no surprise to you to hear that it is, of course, aeronautics. In this sector the past few months have rather given us cause for satisfaction, with a remarkable string of orders for Airbus in its current A-300 version and for its later model, A-310.

In the long run, in the military area some prospects of success are emerging for the co-production of a tactical support aircraft for the nineties. Possibilities of co-operation are likewise appearing for helicopters, and France and the United Kingdom have begun serious discussions with a view to launching a joint programme. This is a sector in which Europe has a considerable technological capability — witness the recent purchase by the United States coastguard service of ninety search and rescue helicopters designed by SNIAS.

It is also in this sector that the need for co-operation emerges most clearly. Thus, in 1977, the French domestic market accounted for only 5 % of sales of helicopters by the biggest French manufacturer, SNIAS. Under such conditions it becomes practically impossible to ensure certain productions within the narrow limits of national requirements.

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

The situation in the aviation sector consequently encourages justified optimism. It is noticeable that the successes achieved are largely due to flexible and effective co-operation. Europe undoubtedly has good reason for not excessively systematising its procedures of research, development, industrialisation and production. It must reap the harvest of the diversity and rich multiplicity of its research efforts. Preservation of existing potentials is a condition for the success of future programmes.

A whole doctrine of co-operation could be propounded in this respect. It would, for example, include having a planning bureau like the design team of outstanding individuals brought together for the Concorde project.

Every state owes it to itself and to Europe to maintain and develop its technological activities in respect of research. It is a sector in which duplication, far from being useless, is profitable. On the other hand, in development and production, efforts have to be concentrated by sharing out programmes in one technological area or the various components of one family of equipment.

In sum, four major lines of co-operation might be laid down in aerospace: the creation of an internal European market, supersession of conflicts of interest between airframe, engine and equipment manufacturers, retention of technological know-how, formulation of a long-term strategy.

As regards marketing problems, we should bear in mind the advantages offered to American manufacturers by the immense size of the domestic market. But the existing structure of the air transport market in Europe still escapes the logic of an internal market, both in route allocations and air fares, need I remind you?

As for the harmonisation of producer interests it must be said that the aeroengine manufacturers seek to install their units in the widest possible range of aircraft whereas the airframe manufacturers try to equip their models with the largest possible number of engine types feasible. Harmonisation of these at times antagonistic commercial strategies demands European action. It has been attempted but results are still meagre.

As for retaining European technological know-how, we must, I repeat, safeguard what we have learned from the Concorde experiment — i.e., in particular, keeping the tooling-up facilities but also, once again, stockpiling, so to say, the human capital accumulated in design offices. The necessary technological base for development of a second-generation supersonic

passenger aircraft must also be maintained. As you know, the subject is under review; Europe should not just be on the alert but should participate. Lastly, your Rapporteur emphasises that the necessary pooling of financial efforts and the closer harmonisation of commercial policies should form part of an ambitious plan. The essence of the civil aviation industry in Europe rests upon the Airbus. We must in good time — I say advisedly: in good time — define medium term developments and extensions and examine other possible orientations for future co-operation on it.

The quick survey I have given you does not aim at determining precisely, at this time, the ways and the means of strengthening Europe's defence potential. We cannot preempt the debates or proposals of the symposium our Assembly is organising on this subject in Brussels next October. Besides, the vastness of the subject which your Committee was instructed to study compelled its attention to be confined to the most strictly military areas of co-operation. The recent aggravation of oil supply difficulties reminds us of Europe's heavy dependence in the energy field. In 1977 EEC imports of crude oil accounted for more than 50 % of gross energy consumption. Such a position of dependence is unlikely to change perceptibly in spite of ambitious nuclear programmes embarked upon in the states of Western Europe, especially France. In 1990, just as in 1985, the Community's net oil imports could still account for about 40 % of gross energy consumption.

Only this morning, Mr. President, we were examining in Committee the consequences of these oil supply and transport difficulties upon European security, considering that all the alternative sources currently being envisaged at the scientific stage or in some cases that of development, are mostly not directly adaptable to military requirements.

These then are the general observations I wanted to make in support of the written report before you, containing, besides an explanatory memorandum, as you will have seen, some appendices, one of which is a highly technical one contributed by Ingénieur Général Brindeau.

In short, on the issue which concerns us in this area, as on all those that your Rapporteur has touched upon, Europe must face increased difficulties and new challenges, whilst the demands of independence and economic and social progress bear upon it as weightily as ever, perhaps even more weightily than before. Let us hope this Europe of ours will find in its cohesion and traditional aptitude for innovation, an answer to all those questions which the instability and uncertainty of the contemporary world are compelling it to solve — as a duty

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

it owes both to its peoples and, dare I say it? to its glorious past. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

The debate is now open and I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the problem of European defence is becoming increasingly urgent for us and preoccupying in respect of both objective conditions and the continuing turn of events.

The signing of SALT II has held out the hope of a surer future, but has at the same time, as regards the scope of negotiations for a possible SALT III, already aroused misgivings about the defence of Europe.

The present energy crisis, as well as the acknowledged and proclaimed superiority of the defence set-up of Russia and the Warsaw Pact countries, demand of us ideas and lines of conduct more appropriate to the situation. There should follow the need for ever closer co-operation between the countries of Europe, especially those represented by our Assembly, because the defence of Europe is increasingly becoming our own affair and therefore less dependent on the possibility of external collaboration and intervention.

Now, with due respect to Mr. Valleix, I see a contradiction in his explanatory memorandum. While the preamble and the recommendation proper rightly stress the need for Europe to find ways, by ever closer co-operation, of acquiring the means of ensuring its security as an essential condition of independence, I do not think the memorandum brings out these considerations and concerns.

May I say to Mr. Valleix that I detect in his report a possibly rather excessive spirit of nationalism that is harmful to Europe's unity and interests. He recognises that it is impossible for each country by itself to provide independently for its own defence needs, and he therefore welcomes certain bilateral armaments programmes such as those between Britain and France and between France and Germany, while deploring that there should be no trilateral Anglo-Franco-Germano military programme. But let me say that his regret at the absence of any trilateral collaboration is in violent contrast to the happiness with which he notes, in paragraph 10, that the suggestion in Recommendation 325 to restructure the European armaments industry under the aegis of the European Community would imply a wide interpretation of the field of application of the

Treaty of Rome, already opposed by several governments.

Now, some people would look at this with a sense of bitterness rather than joy or even happiness. Whether the happiness corresponds to a feeling peculiar to French national policy or to Mr. Valleix's own way of seeing, in respect of co-operation in defence and armaments, it conflicts with the general interest in genuine co-operation and an independent armaments policy for the Europe which we represent.

This notion of Mr. Valleix's is again in evidence — indeed, even more so — later on in paragraph 12, where he states that the European Community is an economic not a defence organisation and therefore has to exclude technology for military purposes from its field of interest.

Well, let me express my deepest disagreement. I voted enthusiastically for Recommendation 325 and I consider that, in spite of the difficulties and the reservations of certain governments, we should make a stand on it: if we really want to develop effective collaboration and are concerned about our defence, we must strain every effort towards ensuring that all the countries of Europe without exception are involved in close collaboration. Hence, the European Community, while retaining its particular characteristics, should endorse the recommendation by activating a policy to that end. I see no contradiction here, nor any impingement on the rôle of our Assembly, because our task is precisely to put forward suggestions and propose guidelines for a defence policy, but we do not have, whether as an Assembly or as individual countries, the instruments and the strength for taking practical action.

The problem of the armaments industries, the problem of the requisite defence set-up, is strictly economic, as is also recognised in the report. We should therefore simply ask for implementation of such a proposition, application of the guidelines that we shall lay down, by an organisation capable of carrying out such an armaments policy and translating our directives into concrete terms. I think such an organisation can be none other than the European Economic Community.

This is my conclusion. Thank you, Ladies and Gentlemen. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Konings.

Mr. KONINGS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am glad to pay tribute to Mr. Valleix, our Vice-Chairman and for a number of years past our highly competent Rapporteur on aviation and space matters. This time he has given his report a wider scope, since it has to serve as a basis for the symposium on the armaments industry due to be held in Brussels in

*Mr. Konings (continued)*

mid-October. I would comment, incidentally, that Mr. Valleix has been right in previous years to devote so much attention to aviation and space questions; now we are seeing, with the Airbus and the Ariane rocket, success that a few years ago would have been thought quite impossible. This success is due in part to his hard work towards achieving a closer collaboration in Europe among the countries of WEU and among those of the Common Market. We heard a little while ago that the biggest aeroengine manufacturer in Europe, Rolls Royce, has now signed a contract to supply engines to the makers of the Airbus. This is especially important because up to now Rolls Royce has been taking a very sceptical attitude towards European co-operation in general. I need only mention the agreement between Rolls Royce and Boeing for the new Boeing 757. Naturally all aeroengine manufacturers have to operate on the world market, but up to now the world market has, for Rolls Royce, seemed to be connected more with the United States than with Europe. Anyway, Mr. President, the shortest-lived mistakes are the best ones to make.

It is certainly interesting to see that where building military aircraft is concerned, three-quarters of the manufacturers' output involves European co-operation projects. In the manufacture of tanks and other weapons, this kind of co-operation has hardly begun. What is more, three-quarters of military production, that is to say of aircraft, missiles, helicopters and the like, is made for export. This means that three-quarters of the people employed in the aircraft industry are working for export, and this obviously has a major importance for the balance of payments and for jobs.

One naturally cannot be sure that the work done by Mr. Valleix on the aircraft industry and space industry, and more particularly his efforts to stimulate European co-operation in these fields, will achieve similar results where production for the army and navy are concerned. At all events, we wish him every success in what he is doing.

This kind of co-operation has to come about, Mr. President, because since the 1960s even large countries like the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic have no longer been able to carry the financial burden of developing and manufacturing complete weapons systems. Europe is already lagging well behind in fields other than aviation and space — in computers, communications and other high-technology systems we are unable to compete with the Americans and Russians. We must not forget that the "critical" modern technologies that Mr. Valleix lists in paragraph 27 are extremely important for maintaining our technological

know-how, and thus future European job opportunities and defence capability — including most of all, the mental will for defence.

We are well aware that more and more countries of the third world are in a position to supply more and more products that once could be supplied only from Europe or America. There are major changes under way in the world, and we in the old world must prepare for them. This will not be possible by adopting a protectionist attitude, but only — as the late Marinus Peijnenburg, the Dutch Minister for Scientific Affairs, told this Assembly last November — if the industrialised countries concentrate on innovation in those areas where traditionally and internationally they have always held a leading position... international co-operation is important both for exchanging and acquiring knowledge and for making the vast financial investment involved economically sound.

In paragraph 35 Mr. Valleix says that the industrial base of European defence must not be restricted to aeronautics, telecommunications and computers, but must be expanded to include the advanced technology industries linked with energy. We all know that Europe is very vulnerable in this area, and despite this fact has been unable, within the Common Market, to arrive at a common energy policy.

You can say the same about shipbuilding. Here, too, survival is possible only if both naval and merchant shipbuilding are looked at carefully and as interdependent sectors. Shipping interests cannot, indeed, be looked at in isolation. The situation here is the same as that in the aircraft industry — the industry cannot exist and progress on the basis of a military sector alone or a civil sector alone. The WEU Council and the Council of Ministers of the European Community must try together to arrive at a common shipping policy, and must take account in doing so of both the civil and the military sides. The need for this is pressing, for all European countries are having problems with their shipyards. All the European countries are trying to overcome the problems, in particular the lack of orders for merchant shipping, by placing orders for naval craft. Naturally, each country has its own social responsibilities, and money from the national exchequer must naturally be used in the first place to provide jobs within that country; yet the taxpayer's money might often be much better used if a joint effort were made to solve the problems by seeing them as interdependent.

The five major shipbuilding countries ought, therefore, to decide together on the maximum amount they are willing and able to spend on keeping their shipyards in being. The situation today is that five countries are building the same type of frigate, four countries are building the



*Mr. Konings (continued)*

same type of minesweeper, and each country builds the same kind of patrol boats and small corvettes. If no answer is found to this, then the shipyards of Europe will founder one after the other. Sharing out the work and co-operating on joint projects is absolutely essential. I think the greatest merit of the report is that Mr. Valleix has placed the emphasis firmly on this need.

The collaboration needed in shipbuilding and aircraft manufacture will also need to be followed up if substantial damage is not to be done by competition following on the joint production. We have seen, Mr. President, how when India was wanting to buy a new fighter aircraft, the British Government offered it the Anglo-French Jaguar aircraft while the French Government put forward the Mirage I. The same rivalry was seen when the Arab countries were looking for someone to run their satellite system; then various European countries refused to allow ESA, the European Space Agency, to tender for this, and national firms put in bids. The outcome was that the American firm Comsat, backed up of course by Washington, was able to put in such a favourable bid that the Arab countries now have Comsat as their consultant. It will be obvious that with an advisor like this, European satellites will stand much less chance than American ones on the world market.

I believe therefore, Mr. President, that the Rapporteur and Committee will need to devote attention to these points as well, especially with the symposium in view. Of course marketing military equipment is a political matter, but political consultation is there precisely to find a solution to such problems.

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to endorse the draft recommendation included in the report. I hope that on another occasion our highly capable Rapporteur will take account of the sometimes critical comments I have been making. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Konings.

There are no further speakers on the list and therefore the debate is closed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Without wishing to prolong the debate, I would like nevertheless to convey my pleasure and thanks to the preceding speakers, Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Konings, first of all for their friendliness — I appreciate their fellow-feeling — but more particularly for their contribution to the report.

In reply to Mr. Cavaliere's reference to the SALT II negotiations I would say — to be more precise than I was in my presentation — that our Committee did consider what account it

should take of the efforts now being made to achieve disarmament or arms limitations. For there are obviously two ways of securing peace: one is to give oneself means of defence, and the other is to avoid being attacked. Needless to say, the task of WEU is primarily to look to Europe's defence and, therefore, ensure its security.

So the problem is rather one for the political — or, more exactly, the General Affairs Committee to look into. Self-evidently, we are talking about trends. Once again, whether these are towards a hardening of some opposing weaponry or, on the contrary, towards the lowering of a risk by load-shedding, so to say, these are two aspects which our Assembly has to take into consideration.

As regards the contradictions our colleague picked on, I do not think they are as obvious as he makes them out to be. But this is the good lawyer coming out in him, and we can only be grateful for it. Clearly the explanatory memorandum ought not to be motivated by nationalism — at least I hope not — but should stick to the facts. Equally clearly, what we should be after, on the strategic plane for example, as is the aim of the Atlantic Alliance, is the greatest possible cohesion. But it is likewise clear that the industrial infrastructure of European security should of course be aimed at greater co-operation in the future than in the past. But I wanted on some particular points to remind us of, as it were, the safety-stops, that is, the limits to such co-operation so that it should not be every time a reduction to a unit of one. For several reasons, all drawn from the military sphere in which we operate. To wit, when one side finds it has a weapon unique in a particular aspect of defence or attack, the weapon's very uniqueness becomes a risk: it is neutralised by the very first counter-weapon that can be found. Hence, for both strategical and tactical reasons, some degree of multiplicity of arms is obviously desirable.

Furthermore, turning to research, yesterday's answer by the French Minister, Mr. Aigrain, was very categorical — some might think, unduly so — and interesting to note: to wit, that in research, looking in only one direction is to run considerable risks of failure in terms of the aim in view, because the research is never certain to lead to anything.

Secondly, to do so is to rule out all the pleasant surprises that research is always capable of providing, not necessarily in terms of achievement of the original aim but because research in itself always enriches the field of knowledge and prepares the ground for further research. Even on the industrial plane — either, once again, for reasons of defence or in order to provide opportunities for industrial expansion — it is well to maintain a minimum of diversity.

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

To concentrate one particular type of arms factory in one country only is to run the risk, if the country is wiped out or its military capacity reduced to nil, of simultaneously losing its industrial arms production capacity.

Similarly, from the industrial standpoint, it is self-evidently in one's interest to maintain a certain competition and consequently a certain dynamism in industrial arms production. For all these reasons, what you may sometimes take for some sort of nationalistic demand is, if you like, a kind of limit I have tried to set on our co-operative ambitions, though you are entitled to retort: one cannot support one thing as well as its opposite. My purpose, however, is to maintain the arms potential of European industry in all its rich diversity, it being clearly understood that the report's message is not that we ought to retain, still less multiply, such diversity but, on the contrary, reduce it to a co-operation or harmonisation.

I therefore trust that a further reading of the report will show that, although I did state limits, the whole document opens the door to a will to co-operation.

As to the apparent contradiction in paragraph 10 or 12. I think it is rather beside the point. What we bring out is, as Mr. Thorn himself said yesterday in his capacity as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, that the WEU Assembly is at present solely empowered to deal with military matters. I repeat: solely, at present.

Nevertheless, I agree with Mr. Cavaliere's desire for better economic co-operation, tackling the defence industries by the industrial base and not as the very object of defence. If there is one common ground between us, I think, it would be clear acknowledgment of the specific and, what is more, legal remit of each of our European organisations, whether economic or, like WEU, for defence. It would also behove us not to treat each other as competitors whereas our tasks are plainly complementary. There can be no economic existence and happiness for Europe without protection of the independence and security of Europeans: so much for the defence task. Plainly, there can be neither defence nor security without a solid economic structure: so much for the task of the European Communities.

In these matters, therefore, as was said yesterday, our assemblies in my view only stand to gain by giving themselves the opportunity for mutual exchanges in proceeding about their respective tasks, so that there may not be that kind of hiatus between the economic function of the European Communities and the overriding interest of the defence of Europe as a whole, as dealt with by WEU and postulating a firm European economic capability.

Complementarity being absolutely essential, such a possibility of meetings through the committees or delegates of our assemblies might suggest a means of getting away from the wrong-headed discussion that has, I think, been going on for the last year or two.

Finally, I am grateful to Mr. Konings for his comments, from which I note several points.

Mr. Konings stressed the essential aspect of energy in our debate. We shall have to spend more time on it in future, for I think it would hardly make sense to concern ourselves with the defence of Europe in time to come, whereas we are still wondering about Europe's capacity for independence in energy supplies — to put it mildly.

Mr. Konings strongly emphasised European impotence in the shipping sector at the present time. Quite true, and I think we ought to take a more thorough look at this crucial sector for Europe's economic wealth but also for its independence in security matters. The point ought to be taken up by the appropriate committee in the future proceedings of our Assembly.

I am also grateful to Mr. Konings for mentioning the bottlenecks, if I may say so, in defence, such as those to do with data processing. The whole of Europe's economic policy for micro-processors should, as I said just now when presenting the report, be deployed in Europe.

I think, Ladies and Gentlemen, that this matter needs to be emphasised in our debate, for it is certainly one of the biggest constraints on our economy in defence. Although it may be thought that our American partner and ally is able to cope with many of the necessary supplies, it must also be considered that such a military risk may tomorrow create supply problems. So it is a sector on which we must concentrate, and this is why one of the paragraphs of the recommendation is devoted to it.

Finally, Mr. Konings broached the problem of exports. Here again is a subject deserving deeper thought, for it has to be admitted that American economic policy is not only based on a huge domestic market but also on a huge international one. There are political options to be taken which, notably in respect of defence and armaments, obstruct in Europe the possibilities for sales of existing European products and for what might be European co-operative productions but which we cannot yet agree upon because of political preconditions impeding co-operation, notably, the need to foresee exports if programmes are to be profitable.

What we have here, then, is, I believe, one of those almost fortunate prior constraints on a factual problem that enable it to be approached in a reasonable, positive, pragmatic and not merely ideological manner, so that Europe,

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

without abdicating any of its historical functions as a bearer of civilisation, may draw sustenance from the arms market — which in the last analysis raises a problem of international public morality but also one of Europe's existence and influence in the world.

It would perhaps behove us, more fundamentally than ever before, to reflect in WEU upon a difficult problem which, I repeat, is as much a technical as it is a political, and possibly a moral one.

If I understand rightly, preceding speeches basically favour approval of the report, which does of course pull some of its punches. The recommendation ends by calling on the Council of Ministers to propose certain actions. Needless to say, it will serve as a basis for the symposium in October, and the latter will, I hope, with the very wide scope it allows, as you know, in view of the numerous distinguished persons from widely differing backgrounds taking part, enable much more practical conclusions to be reached on this deliberately provocative and somewhat methodological report. At all events, it is your Rapporteur's intention to assist the symposium in arriving at concrete proposals.

Consequently subject to what I regard as this comparatively modest aspect but one deliberately intended to enhance the quality of the symposium itself, I ask the Assembly to approve the report. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

Does the Chairman wish to speak ?...

You have the floor, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — I am sure that we all wish to pay tribute to Mr. Valleix for his valuable report and for his strong presentation of it this morning. It has shown the happy dissension that the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions enjoys. It is a Committee that brings together the problems of politics, technology, industry and defence.

I think that the Assembly has seen the need for our Committee, but I hope that we shall never confuse our rôle as politicians and our need to develop Western European safety and progress with the rôle of European industrial companies to find and sell profitably into world markets.

Mr. Cavaliere rightly talked about nationalism and pointed out how it can be a danger to both Western Europe and industry. Indeed, that clash was one which cost Europe the chance of selling to the Dutch, the Danes, the Norwegians and Belgians, a European-produced fighter aircraft.

Those countries chose an American one right under our very noses.

However, I am sure that it will be remembered that industry in Europe does not carry a duty to behave like political instruments of the nation states. Governments certainly have a job to do right throughout Western Europe in acting as a customer to encourage their industry.

I think that Mr. Konings illustrated this, and I am only sorry that Mr. Whitehead was unable to take part in the debate to defend his constituency interest in Rolls Royce, which was assaulted by Mr. Konings genuinely and pleasantly.

I do not think that companies carry a duty to follow political rules, but governments carry a duty to try to buy from their own home sources that which those companies produce. For example, the Fokker firm in Mr. Koning's own country has bought Rolls Royce engines for the F-27 and F-28. Rolls Royce certainly does not have a duty to turn back from across the North Atlantic, particularly in the face of the fact that the Europeans' own Airbus industry chose American engines as its first choice.

Therefore, in trying to define the rôle of industry in Europe we must be careful that we do not clash with the interests of industry. We must recognise the task which politicians can accomplish in encouraging industry for the benefit of both industry and Europe. I think that working together politicians and industry can win markets, but we must accept that each has a separate rôle to play if they are to work properly together. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 805.

If the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

*The draft recommendation is agreed to unanimously*<sup>1</sup>.

*(The President continued in French)*

(Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, we have invited the Chairmen of the National Defence Committees. I am therefore very happy to welcome to our Assembly Mr. Pierre Descamps, Minister of State and Chairman of the Committee on National Defence of the Belgian Senate.

I welcome you to our Assembly, Mr. Chairman. (*Applause*)

1. See page 25.

**4. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

**Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

**Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

*(Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the resumed joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council, Documents 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments.

I call Mr. Enders.

Mr. ENDERS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the oil shortage this year has shown mankind in unequivocal manner the immense difficulties that lie ahead. The scale of the problems in financial, economic, social and strategic terms cannot yet be assessed, especially as recent announcements by the OPEC countries herald a new price avalanche coupled with restrictions.

Consumers in the past, in the hope of virtually inexhaustible oil reserves, have been squandering them recklessly. In spite of all the warnings by experts and by the organisations concerned, nature's wealth has often been wasted.

The statesmen themselves drew no long-term conclusions from the oil crisis of 1973-74, and failed to search for solutions going beyond their national frontiers, with the result that the present shortage of primary energy has hit the industrialised states hard and relatively unexpectedly.

The first to suffer from this disastrous development are private families. They had relied on assurances about cheap, clean and comfortable oil heating and are now discovering that there is nothing they can do about excessive increases in oil prices — up to 100 % — or against rationing. People live literally in fear of imminent financial demands that will appreciably reduce their incomes and lower their standard of living.

Yet these costs are only the tip of the iceberg, because the real price rises will come only when the prices of products based on oil — chemicals, pharmaceuticals and fertilisers — have risen. The export of such commodities to the third world, which cannot pay these excessive prices, will raise problems whose repercussions on jobs and economic growth cannot yet be assessed.

Are there, in this difficult situation, any solutions that would ensure our basic energy supplies and get us out of the dilemma? Increased use of nuclear energy would be one feasible way. However, this does not everywhere meet with unanimous applause and certainly not with elation but rather with loud criticism. Nuclear energy nevertheless is a reality of our age, one that can be neither ignored nor silenced.

The opponents of nuclear power stations evoke the possible dangers to man and to the environment. There have been corrosion damage to equipment, leaky valves, the escape of vapour, and finally the accident at Harrisburg. In my opinion safety regulations for the operation of reactors cannot be pitched too high; after all, what is at stake is not only the thermal pollution of rivers or the radioactive pollution of the air, but also genetic damage to living beings.

In view of the dissipation of oil reserves and of the serious misgivings about the unlimited use of nuclear power stations, what prospects are there today of safeguarding the supply of energy for the next few decades? Sheer necessity has forced the specialists in design offices and research laboratories to work out proposals for practical application. Energy saving and heat insulation alone are no panacea for solving the problems of the future. Only the queues at petrol stations in the United States, for instance, have convinced manufacturers of the need to market a car that uses less petrol. If the funds available nationally and internationally, for research into and the development of alternative sources of energy had been as ample as for pilot projects in nuclear energy, we would by now have better fallback options in the energy sector.

Day after day the sun sends forth untold amounts of energy, yet mankind uses them but scantily. No matter in what form, whether on the earth's surface or via satellites, it must be possible to achieve greater efficiency in making use of solar energy. With our economic and scientific potential we can send rockets and space laboratories to distant stars, but we cannot tap the earth's heat a few kilometres below us. And if this state of affairs is unsatisfactory, the use made of energy from the wind and the tides is just as paltry. There is an inexhaustibly vast range of energy sources still untapped and offering us ways of overcoming the crisis.

*Mr. Enders (continued)*

That is why I support in particular the co-ordinated programme for the development of alternative sources of energy called for in paragraph 2 (b) of the recommendation in the excellent report by our colleague Mr. Scheffler. The oil crisis of 1979 compels us to do so, and to do so without delay. Thank you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Enders.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

The joint debate is closed.

Does the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee wish to speak?...

Does the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Mr. Tanghe, wish to speak?

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — For once in a way — but there may not be another time! — my friend and colleague Mr. Dejardin does not agree with the Committee's report. He finds the wording of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation too vague: "studies proposed from time to time by the Assembly".

First, it is not an enactment of law but simply a recommendation to the Council referring very clearly to something the Committee wanted to happen "from time to time", not always. Moreover further clarification is given in paragraph 29 of my explanatory memorandum, for example: "a concerted long-term programme for standardised armaments procurement".

Mr. Dejardin insists that the SAC is not a mere planning bureau. But it is the Council itself which refers to it as "a useful instrument for thought and analysis which can be used to good purpose by the governments". So the Committee's proposal in paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation is to enable the Assembly, as well as the Council, to "use" the SAC "to good purpose".

In regard to paragraphs 14 and 15 of the explanatory memorandum, Mr. Dejardin claims that the Assembly is behaving like a "ward" towards the Supreme Commander by drawing his attention to Recommendation 320 of the Assembly. But it was the Assembly itself which took the initiative, in Recommendation 320, of recommending that the Council "delete the reference to naval auxiliary vessels from the list of conventional armaments that may not be produced on German territory". Subsequently, it was the Committee on Defence Questions itself, at its meeting on 21st June 1978, that instructed its Chairman to draw SACEUR's attention to Recommendation 320 of the Assembly.

By replying so courteously to the letter from the Chairman of the Committee, General Haig did no more than fulfil his duty under Article IV of the Brussels Treaty, which stipulates that, in order to avoid duplication, WEU bodies should "rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters". Article II of Protocol No. III to the Brussels Treaty provides that the list of armaments that Germany undertakes not to manufacture on its territory may be amended by the Council "if in accordance with the needs of the armed forces a recommendation for an amendment to, or cancellation of, the content of the list of these armaments is made by the competent Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation...".

Hence, it was the Assembly itself which, in this matter, took the initiative of proposing the repeal of a wholly obsolete restriction and it was SACEUR who courteously fulfilled his duty under the Brussels Treaty itself.

On paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation, Mr. Banks referred to the efficiency of the British Army of the Rhine and suggested that it was for security reasons, concerning the numbers of British troops transferred from Germany to Northern Ireland, that the United Kingdom had not published the figures asked for by the Committee. However, it is not the figure concerning the troops transferred to Northern Ireland which is considered secret, because it is in fact given in the Council's report. The Committee is not criticising the United Kingdom's good faith in the least and has frequently acknowledged the great value of the British Army of the Rhine. In the recommendation the Committee is simply trying to clear up certain ambiguities in the United Kingdom's implementation of its commitment under Article VI of Protocol No. II to the Brussels Treaty. Your Rapporteur is glad to be told by Mr. Banks that, if the Assembly adopts the draft recommendation before it, the British Government would, seemingly, subject to the exigencies of military security, be prepared to publish the figures the Assembly has for several years been asking for.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I now call Mr. Minnocci, whom I did not see before.

Mr. MINNOCCI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I have asked to speak because I feel it necessary to reply to at least two of the speakers in the debate on Document 801, Mr. Périquier and Mr. Druon.

In point of fact, in his speech yesterday Mr. Périquier made great play of the fact that in the text of my report and the recommendation I had used the word "integration", although I had

*Mr. Minnocci (continued)*

already explained to him I was not referring in the slightest to integration with NATO. I know what France's position is towards NATO ; it is contestable, but obviously I respect it. I was referring to European integration in general. Moreover, in my view such integration will never be achieved without a common policy of the Community countries, that is, a general agreement not only on economic problems but also on those of foreign policy and joint defence. Otherwise, I think any talk of a future European union is quite futile.

Mr. Périquier went on to claim that paragraph 4 of the recommendation constituted nothing less than a flagrant sabotage of WEU. It is in my view quite a different matter. Certainly there is a problem of relations between a European Parliament newly elected by universal suffrage and WEU — it would be futile to ignore it. But my entire report and introductory speech yesterday contradict Mr. Périquier's accusation. In any case, while we do not even want to refer to that, I am quite prepared to accept the amendment tabled by Mr. Urwin and others to delete paragraph 4 of the recommendation, or, as I would prefer, Mr. Druon's amendment.

Mr. Druon dwelt at length on my report, saying some things with which I agree, and misconstruing another part of it. I have no intention of advocating any kind of merger of the Brussels Treaty with the EEC. At all events, I believe that, subject to some of the amendments tabled, the recommendation I have the honour of presenting on behalf of the General Affairs Committee can be accepted.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I think we now have a couple of minutes in which to hear Mr. Scheffler for the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. SCHEFFLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I hope you will not think it is a lack of respect if I cannot devote overmuch attention to the contributions made here on my report. I have noted with pleasure that the major part of these contributions reflected a positive attitude to the report.

I have before me another four proposed amendments to Document 806, the first three from Mr. Valleix. In agreement with Mr. Valleix, I would propose that we proceed as follows :

In Amendment 1 he proposes that a new paragraph be added after paragraph 2. Agreed. I have, however, reservations about the formula "all-European co-operation". I would propose

that we say not "all-European" but simply "European". since WEU does not embrace all European nations.

As to Amendment 2, I agree with its content. With regard to its subject, however, this comes within energy, so I propose that this paragraph be inserted as sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 2 of the recommendation. I ask Mr. Valleix for his understanding.

In Amendment 3, Mr. Valleix has proposed to delete the clause following the word "venture". I believe this would weaken what the paragraph says too much and therefore propose that we keep the clause but say "by promoting co-operation...", i.e. replace "merger" by "co-operation".

That would deal then, with the three amendments proposed by Mr. Valleix. Now Lord Northfield's amendment. I agree broadly with his proposal. In view of the fact that we have inserted Mr. Valleix's amendment, Lord Northfield's amendment would have to be fitted in as (d). This would meet the case.

Another point I must mention is that Lord Northfield made a remark which calls for comment. He thought I had not been entirely fair in saying in the third paragraph of the preamble that too little was being done and there had been no results. I am prepared to modify this by inserting the word "further" before the words "pragmatic arrangements" in the first version in the third paragraph.

This almost brings me to the end. I now only have to consider Mr. Adriaensens, who would like to see the word "transport" inserted among the savings under paragraph 2. This seems logical and rational, and I agree with it.

Mr. Enders' contribution, for which I am sincerely grateful — indeed I am grateful to everyone who has made contributions — comes within the framework of the recommendations under paragraph 2.

I trust, Mr. President, that I have kept within the time allowed me.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur, in particular for your exceptional brevity.

*(The President continued in English)*

It is nearly 11.30 a.m. and the Orders of the Day provide for a speech now from Mr. Scholten, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.

##### **5. Address by Mr. Scholten, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands**

The PRESIDENT. — May I welcome you to our Assembly, Mr. Scholten, and say how extre-

*The President (continued)*

mcly glad we are that you have made the time available to come here to address us? Would you now come to the rostrum and address the Assembly?

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*). — Mr. President, members of the Assembly, I was very pleased, for several reasons, to accept your invitation to address you here today on the defence policy of the Netherlands. First, I have a high regard for the objectives and activities of Western European Union, which fulfils a very useful function as the only European parliamentary forum for the discussion of defence problems. Secondly, I consider it important that Dutch defence policy, for which I have had responsibility since the beginning of last year, should be made more widely known.

I intend first to discuss briefly some of the most important aspects of the policy of the Netherlands, such as its basic elements and objectives, the financing, and the most significant regions in the Dutch defence effort. Next, I shall pause to refer to some of the problems in the national and international area. Finally, I shall devote a great deal of attention to the question of nuclear armaments.

Before considering the more recent developments in Dutch defence policy, it would be advisable, albeit briefly, to consider the basis of this policy and what it aims to achieve. The defence policy of the Netherlands is quite in line with the defence policy of our allies in NATO and is aimed at achieving two interdependent and supplementary objectives, namely, the prevention of war by the maintenance of good defences and, consequently, of a credible deterrent, on the one hand, and the pursuit of détente and arms control and limitation on the other hand.

It is in this way that the Netherlands is trying to maintain its territorial integrity and to preserve its kind of society, which is based on the principles of democracy, personal freedom and the rule of law. The Netherlands alone cannot accomplish these objectives of détente and the prevention of war. The security of our country is linked to that of the other Western European countries and of North America: hence Dutch membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, whose basic principles are our principles, too.

It is now thirty years since the North Atlantic Treaty was concluded. NATO has been of considerable significance during that period. It has made a substantial contribution over the years to the preservation of peace in Europe and, moreover, has had an important rôle in the

process of détente, which has led to a lessening of the cold war and to a certain normalisation of relations between East and West. The history of NATO gives me full confidence in the future of NATO.

Apart from its membership of NATO, the Netherlands endeavours to achieve its objectives through the United Nations. This is not surprising, for both NATO and the United Nations are striving in the first place to preserve international peace and security. Since the second world war, successive governments in the Netherlands, irrespective of their political composition, have vigorously supported United Nations activities for the advancement of peace. For this reason my country decided, at the end of last year, to respond positively to the request from the Secretary-General of the United Nations for an armoured infantry battalion to be made available to the United Nations interim force in Lebanon.

As I have already stated, Dutch defence policy is also aimed at arms control and limitation. In order to bring to an end the very dangerous arms race between East and West, the Netherlands Government endeavour wherever possible to adopt measures for the control and limitation of armaments. Their efforts are directed in particular towards limiting as far as possible the rôle of nuclear weapons in NATO defence.

I should like now to say a few words on the financial side and to start with a quotation from the then Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Mr. Fred Mulley, when he was addressing your Assembly last year. He said:

“There is no clearer way of showing the determination of individual nations to play their full part in the common defence than to find the money for it in the face of competition from all the other calls on the national resources which democratically-elected governments are expected to meet.”

Last year the Dutch Cabinet decided, in line with several other NATO countries, to increase defence expenditure annually by 3% in real terms. This decision was far from simple, since my country, like nearly every country in the West, is encountering serious financial, economic and social problems. Nevertheless, the decision to augment defence expenditure was taken in order to resist, in common with the allies, the threat caused by the disturbingly rapid increase in the military power of the Soviet Union and its allies. Each year the Soviet Union devotes not less than 11% and 13% of its gross national product to its military machine. Military expenditure is increasing annually by 4% to 5% in real terms, and there is no question of any decrease in this growth.

*Mr. Scholten (continued)*

The financial basis of our planning has been considerably strengthened by the increase of 3 % in real terms. It has made possible a proportionally high percentage of capital expenditure, nearly 28 % in the period 1979-83 and 34 % in the period 1984-88. For the Alliance as a whole it will be very important that all countries in comparable economic circumstances maintain 3 % real growth in the coming years.

The additional funds which have become available have enabled several important decisions to be taken about the replacement of old weapon systems. I refer first to the decision we took this year to replace the old Centurion and AMX tanks by 445 new Leopard II tanks. Further, we are modernising our artillery. In addition, our navy is being considerably modernised by a total of twelve standard frigates, which will enter service during the period 1979-83. In 1978 a start was made on the construction of a new submarine. The mid-life modernisation of the Van Speijk class frigates is also of importance, and a decision was taken in December last to procure thirteen new Orion-type long-range maritime aircraft to replace the Neptunes. The air force is introducing the F-16 in replacement of the F-104.

The completion of the large equipment projects I have outlined will undoubtedly contribute to an improvement in the conventional armament of the Dutch forces. It will be an improvement — and I shall return to this later — which cannot be separated from the efforts of the Netherlands to reduce the rôle of nuclear weapons. If only to bring this policy objective nearer, I consider the expenditure of additional sums more than justified.

An increase of 3 % in real terms makes it possible, moreover, to carry out in the more distant future important elements of the long-term defence programme which was also agreed by the Netherlands at the summit conference in May of last year. This programme is not only of significance to long-term planning, but it envisages at the same time improvements in a number of important areas, especially on anti-tank weapons and the reaction time of our first army corps.

Despite all these improvements in Dutch defence, major problems still remain and I shall refer to four of them. With regard to national problems, I refer first to the reaction time of the first army corps, which needs to be improved. This problem has been studied by an international high-level group consisting of representatives of the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. Its findings have been set out in the report, which contains diverse possibilities for improv-

ing the reaction time. Further study is being given to each of these possibilities, and the decision-making process is now in its final stage.

A second problem arises from our ammunition stocks. Although considerable funds have been allocated to increase these stocks, this problem also will require our attention in future. According to current planning, the principal deficiencies will have been overcome by the mid-1980s. Other problems I shall mention concern efforts within NATO to achieve rationalisation and European co-operation in defence.

This is a subject with an international dimension. It is also of special significance for Dutch defence policy. I regard rationalisation as a concept for the co-ordination of all activities, both national and international, which result in a more efficient use of the financial resources allocated for this purpose. That is very important, for one can spend every guilder earmarked for defence only once.

Specialisation includes a redistribution of the tasks and responsibilities in the area of defence among the allies in such a way that every member state can devote itself mainly to those tasks to which it is most suited. However, efforts to achieve specialisation must on no account lead to a weakening of the military potential of the Alliance as a whole. Specialisation, therefore, should be a very gradual process in which military and economic interests are carefully balanced.

Attention is at present being focused on a United States' proposal to promote co-operation in equipment by aiming at the three following objectives, the so-called triad. First is the conclusion of the bilateral understandings between the United States on the one hand and each of its Western European allies on the other. A memorandum of this kind was concluded last year by the United States and the Netherlands. This arrangement provides the Dutch with scope for co-operation in development and production with American industry and also with the opportunity of competing on the American market. Secondly, there is the systematic study of the possibilities of production on both sides of the Atlantic of equipment which has been developed either in the United States or in one or more of the Western European states. Thirdly, there is the establishment of a family of weapons in regard to equipment still to be developed so as to prevent wasting money and to prevent inertia to the simultaneous development of new weapons systems in the United States and one or more Western European states.

It is my belief that this triad provides good opportunities for better transatlantic co-operation in matters of equipment. It prevents duplication of effort in the development of weapons,



*Mr. Scholten (continued)*

makes for economy in expenditure and contributes to the standardisation that is so necessary within the Alliance.

The long-term defence programme is important to rationalisation. In a number of areas it promotes timely co-operation in research, development and selection procedures which I hope will enable a number of separate national projects to be produced. The NATO periodic armaments planning system is of importance for the advancement of rationalisation.

Now a word or two on European co-operation in regard to equipment in the context of the independent European programme group. This co-operative link aims at harmonisation of national replacement programmes, a joint approach to projects and eliminating duplication of programmes of work in the production of arms and equipment. I regret that so far virtually nothing has come of these objectives. Tangible results in regard to co-operation on equipment matters, both intra-European and in the framework of a transatlantic dialogue between the IEPG countries and our American allies, will be achieved only if the IEPG countries can arrive at a greater measure of co-operation than they have yet been able to attain. I am not optimistic about the prospects here.

On later approaches progress in the work of the IEPG is mentioned in the Klepsch report. It is time to give a fresh political impetus to the IEPG.

Despite this disappointing state of affairs I continue to hope and work for more rationalisation and a larger measure of European co-operation in regard to equipment. Now especially, with financial resources becoming more and more scarce, European politicians are under an obligation to their electorate to strive for the most efficient defence policy possible. I know that my endeavours in this respect have the support of the Assembly as witness the theme of the Critchley report on a European armaments policy drawn up in 1978 in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

While speaking on that defence policy I should like to dwell at greater length on problems surrounding nuclear armament. I want to do so for three reasons. In the first place, in accordance with the agreed government programme which forms the basis of the Van Agt coalition cabinet, the policy of the Netherlands, in addition to being directed towards a strengthening of conventional armaments, aims at restricting the rôle of nuclear weapons in allied defence. In other words, we want to be less dependent on nuclear weapons so as to diminish the chance that we ever have to use them. A second reason is that

I consider it important to equate this to some extent with the widely held discussions taking place in the Netherlands in recent years on problems surrounding nuclear armaments in general and my country's share in the nuclear armament of NATO in particular.

In the third place, any western response to the increasing imbalance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the area of medium-range nuclear weapons — the so-called grey area — at present is the most important problem confronting NATO and thus also the Netherlands. We are using various means in trying to accomplish the policy objective of limiting the rôle of nuclear weapons in a responsible way, that is to say, without affecting the security of the Alliance.

I shall mention some of these means. The first means to this end is to maintain and strengthen, where possible, the quality of the Dutch air and conventional armaments of NATO. The stronger these are, the less chance there is of nuclear weapons having to be used in the case of war.

Secondly, I endeavour to restrict the rôle of nuclear weapons whenever the replacement, by modernisation, of an element of the Dutch contribution to NATO nuclear armaments comes up for consideration, by carefully examining whether it is necessary to retain it or whether purely conventional means would suffice. Technological developments may make it possible in future to select conventional alternatives to present-day nuclear arms, for example, air defence and anti-submarine warfare.

The third means employed is the continuation and, where possible, extension and intensification of negotiations between East and West for the limitation of armaments. In this regard I consider the conclusion of the SALT II treaty of major importance in the endeavours to control the strategic nuclear arms force of the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the treaty will certainly not put an end to the nuclear arms race between East and West, it nonetheless places certain limits on the quantitative and qualitative development of the strategic nuclear arms of both parties.

As such, it is an important step forward. Moreover, the SALT II treaty clears the way for negotiations on the SALT III treaty, in which I hope, and expect, the Western European allies of the United States to be involved without directly participating in the negotiations.

This is especially important in view of the developments surrounding the grey area of weapons. In view of its importance, I hope that the SALT II treaty will be ratified quickly by the United States Senate. If this does not happen, it is to be feared that there will be a further increase in the arms race and a serious

*Mr. Scholten (continued)*

deterioration in relations between Moscow and Washington. I also fear that there will be a crisis inside the Alliance. The result will be an even more dangerous world than the one in which we now live.

I in no way rule out the possibility that the conclusion of the SALT II treaty will have a favourable effect on the Vienna negotiations for mutual and balanced force reductions, which have been at a standstill for so long. As we know, it is our aim to bring about a more balanced relationship between the conventional armed forces of the East and West. If this is achieved, it could mean that nuclear weapons could be reduced. The condition for the successful outcome is that the negotiating parties first agree on figures representing the strength of their forces. I am less pessimistic than in the past about the possibility of real progress being achieved in Vienna after the conclusion of SALT II.

The fourth and last means that I would mention is the need to develop initiatives in the context of the Alliance in order to bring about an understanding of my country's attempts to limit the rôle of nuclear arms and to gain support for this. Thus, during the ministerial meeting of the Defence Planning Committee in December 1978, my colleague, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and I proposed that decisions be taken on the replacement and modernisation of tactical nuclear weapons only after all the possible consequences had been carefully studied and evaluated. In our view, this must be done with reference to three criteria: first, the needs of deterrence and defence, particularly in the light of the evolving balance of forces; secondly, the continuing priority for the improvement of conventional defence; thirdly, the possibilities and implications in the area of arms control. The significance of this initiative is not so much in each of the three points taken separately as in their interdependence.

In addition to this initiative to arrive at a most careful and reliable decision-making process for the replacement or modernisation of tactical nuclear weapons, I made a formal proposal during the ministerial meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in Miami last April to terminate the present system of rotating membership of these ministerial meetings. Since the establishment of the NPG in the mid-1960s, nuclear questions have assumed such great importance and the interests of the European members of NATO have become so intense that it is my view that its present limited composition can no longer be justified.

In the Netherlands, especially in recent years, the problems associated with nuclear armaments,

and the Dutch share in NATO nuclear armaments, have been discussed and written about, I dare say, more than anywhere else. A great deal of attention is devoted by the mass media to this discussion. It is not only the various social groups that participate, but also the churches. The Dutch Parliament, too, continues to devote much attention to nuclear questions. For some time now in the Netherlands — and this is influenced partly by the discussion which surrounds the ERFB weapon — there has been reference to a new view of the rôle of nuclear weapons, which, because of their enormous destructive power, raise fundamental questions, not least of a religious and ethical nature. This view places us in a dilemma which existed at the beginning of the 1950s in the Teller-Oppenheimer debate, in which the pronouncement was made that the atomic weapon must make the waging of war impossible and can only fulfil its function of war prevention in a well-considered strategy in which, for the sake of credibility, the operational use of such a weapon must be taken for granted.

Increasingly there is being questioned not only whether the possible use of nuclear arms ought to be rejected but their possession and the threat to employ them. Those who answer this question in the affirmative believe that there is such a qualitative difference between nuclear and conventional weapons that nuclear weapons may not come to be used as a means to an end, even if it is for the prevention of war. They therefore argue for the unconditional, immediate and unilateral banning of all nuclear weapons.

I want to make it perfectly clear that, however much I recognise the risk attached to nuclear weapons, I do not share this view. I am firmly convinced that a policy aimed at the prevention of war and the preservation of peace is in no way served by taking this step unilaterally. Having regard to the present international political situation, there is regrettably little if anything we can do to change the fact that there are nuclear weapons in the world. In the foreseeable future we shall have need of these weapons to maintain deterrence and thus prevent war. This, therefore, is a most important function. Our policy is directed not so much towards the use of nuclear weapons as towards the prevention of their use.

The Netherlands Government will continue to be responsible for the security of the Netherlands, and in carrying out that responsibility it works together with its allies and, where it can, in consultation with its partners to achieve a system of international security in the production of nuclear weapons for the prevention of war, conducted as far as possible to ensure that the dangers linked to this are restricted to a minimum.

*Mr. Scholten (continued)*

My policy is aimed at bringing about as much understanding as possible of our standpoint and at gaining maximum support for it by providing a good deal of information about nuclear problems and by challenging public interest in them. This public interest does not make it easier for us policy makers, but I think that it is a very good thing that discussion on this crucial issue is not restricted to the inner political circles.

The last aspect of nuclear armaments I want to consider is that of the grey-area weapons. As you know, in recent years the Soviet Union has developed new medium-range nuclear weapon systems. Besides new cruise missiles launched from ships and aircraft, and rockets for the land forces, there is the mobile SS-20 rocket, which is equipped with three independently-targetable nuclear warheads. This has a range of more than 4,000 kilometres, which is sufficient to cover the whole of Europe.

In addition there is the Backfire bomber. The swift development of the Russian potential in medium-range nuclear weapons presents NATO with a difficult problem, for it has resulted in a serious imbalance in the grey area, which I fear may have destabilising consequences. Moreover, tactical and strategic nuclear defence must be prevented in all circumstances from becoming unlinked. If they did in fact become unlinked, NATO would no longer be in a position to respond appropriately in the case of a conflict and might be forced into a rapid escalation by the use of strategic nuclear weapons. A development of this kind would be highly dangerous.

At the same time, however, we must guard against the development of an independent Euro-strategic balance of more or less equivalent value to the Russian potential in grey-area weapons. This could equally result in the unlinking that would be so dangerous for our security. I therefore reject both parity and too large a disparity in medium-range weapons. The guarantee given by the United States for the security of Western Europe can function for the future only if the link between tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear defence is maintained. The credibility of deterrence depends on this. Although it concerns the European theatre, the modernisation of tactical nuclear weapons is not a purely European problem. It is a problem for the Alliance as a whole, and it will also have to be dealt with and solved as such.

In this context I say the Netherlands Government was and is fairly strongly opposed to any idea of a European nuclear force. NATO is now considering whether the maintenance of the link between tactical and strategic nuclear defence calls for counter-measures. This is taking place

in the high-level group, which has meanwhile produced an interim report which has been discussed at political level in the Nuclear Planning Group and the Defence Planning Committee. At the same time, however, the aspects of arms control relating to the grey-area weapons are being studied in the context of NATO. As you know, a special group on arms control has been set up for this purpose, and this, as in the case of the high-level group just referred to, will report to governments in the autumn. The problem of arms control in the grey area is very complex, especially because of the large numbers and diverse nature of the weapons system. A decision on the modernisation of tactical nuclear weapons will be possible only after the two reports have appeared and have been related to each other. Weighing findings of the two study groups against each other will be a political problem of the first order.

Finally, I should like to refer to some factors which will play a part in the Dutch decision-making process. First, at the conclusion of SALT II, SALT II must become a reality. Secondly, any introduction of new weapon systems must not be allowed to result in an increase in the number of nuclear warheads in Europe, but rather in a decrease. Thirdly, a study should be carried out to ascertain whether any counter-measures by the West in regard to the increasing threat of Russian medium-range nuclear weapons could result in a shift of emphasis, in the sense that NATO places less stress on short-range weapon systems.

As you are aware, Mr. President, a decision on any western response to Russian activity involving grey-area weapons will certainly not be taken before the end of the year. It will be clear to you from everything I have said about nuclear problems that a decision on a future NATO medium-range potential will be as important as it will be difficult. Such a decision will be of major importance to the entire Alliance.

I am now coming to the end of this address. I have explained how the Netherlands is trying to achieve the basic objectives of its defence policy. I hope I have persuaded you that our armed forces are carrying out their tasks in allied defence in a responsible and loyal manner and that they are making a convincing contribution to the policy of détente and prevention of war. But I hope especially that, by having accepted your invitation to address you here today, I shall have contributed to a greater knowledge and understanding of the policy of the Netherlands as regards nuclear problems in general and reducing the rôle of nuclear weapons in particular. We want to strengthen the security of the western world in general and of Western Europe especially. By doing that we want to preserve the democratic values of our society. We want to maintain peace in Europe and peace

*Mr. Scholten (continued)*

in the whole world. That is our common political task. That task can be fulfilled only with your support as members of parliament. I know that we can count on that support. Thank you very much. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Minister, for your address to the Assembly, and for being kind enough to reply to questions. Up to now I have nine members of the Assembly who wish to put questions to you, and what I therefore have to ask you, Mr. Minister, is whether you wish to reply to each question as it comes up, or to them all at the end.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*). — Separately, please.

The PRESIDENT. — Then I call Mr. Konings. He will be followed by Mr. Stoffelen and then Mr. Talon.

Mr. KONINGS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I want to ask the Minister a question in Dutch, Mr. President, so as to give him a chance to answer in our own language as well.

The NATO partners have agreed with each other to allow an increase of 3 % in their defence expenditure. There is however a clause in the agreement that allows adjustments to be made in the budget if the financial and economic situation warrants this.

I would like to ask the Minister whether he does not think the financial and economic situation in the Netherlands at the moment is such as to call for an adjustment in the budget; if not, could he perhaps tell us what criteria the Dutch Government applies to the financial and economic situation for having recourse to this clause.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Scholten to reply.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — The answer is quite definitely "no", Mr. President. Though the Netherlands has a great many social and economic problems, it is, compared to many other members of the Alliance, in a very favoured position where the national per capita income and the overall trend of its economy are concerned. The abatement to which the honourable member refers relates to countries in a much poorer economic position, such as Portugal and Turkey.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I would like to thank the Minister for an interesting and thought-provoking speech. Following on what he has said about the problems

of nuclear arms, I want to ask him how the Dutch Government sees Europe's rôle in this, against the background of the fact that the interests of the big countries like the United States and Soviet Union do not necessarily coincide with those of the European countries. Is there not a need for the European countries to have more say about the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe? One might think here in terms of a kind of veto, the right to say "yes" or "no".

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Scholten to reply.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I think the importance of security and peace is absolutely the same for large and for small countries. The honourable member is right, however, when he says that there are developments under way in the nuclear problems field. I mentioned these in my introduction.

On his specific question about whether there ought not to be a greater say for, for instance, the European countries, I can set his mind at rest in view of the developing consultation undertaken by the United States on such problems, which has increased considerably in the period just elapsed. There is, for example, the definite promise by President Carter in connection with any future decisions on the enhanced radiation bomb. Close consultation has been promised with regard to both production and use of this weapon.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Scholten.

I call Mr. Talon.

Mr. TALON (*France*) (Translation). — How would the Minister draw the balance sheet of European co-operation in the field of armaments, particularly in respect of competition between the United States and Europe?

Do not the F-16 affair, that of the Orion sea patrol aircraft, and now the affair of the M-113 armoured vehicles, seem too close together to fail to cast doubt upon the willingness of certain European countries to see the establishment of a truly European and really competitive conventional military equipment construction industry?

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Minister, please.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — I did not conceal, in my introduction, that where European co-operation on military equipment — and especially the IEPG — is concerned I do not take all that optimistic a view of the situation today. There are still very great problems. One can however see certain bright spots in the relationship between the United States and Europe — I have mentioned these already, and will not repeat them. The honourable member has men-

*Mr. Scholten (continued)*

tioned the F-16 project in this connection, and this is a very clear example of what can be done in the area of co-operation. In the Netherlands the decision to take part in this project was taken by the previous cabinet. A few days ago, when delivery of the first F-16 was taken at Schiphol, I said that this had been an excellent decision; it means not only a substantial updating of the air force's equipment, but also represents a form of co-operation between European countries that will have great importance for the future.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I call Mr. Roper, who will be followed by Mr. Valleix.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — May I congratulate the Minister on his philosophical remarks? Will he accept that few would disagree with his aim of reducing the risk of the use of nuclear weapons by raising the nuclear threshold through an increase in conventional forces?

I have three specific questions for Mr. Scholten. What does he think would be the effect of the failure of the United States Senate to ratify the SALT II agreement? Secondly, will he confirm that in his opposition to a European nuclear force he is referring to an independent nuclear force, and not to the deployment of nuclear forces in Europe within the Alliance? Finally, he referred to tactical nuclear weapons from time to time. Does he feel that the distinction which has heretofore been made into three categories of strategic forces — TNFs, sometimes theatre, sometimes tactical, and conventional forces — should be replaced by a tetrad, with a fourfold distinction between strategic forces, theatre nuclear forces of a long or medium range, battlefield nuclear weapons, and conventional weapons? Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Minister to reply, please.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — First of all, Mr. President, I would thank the honourable member for his kind words in introducing his question. If, against all expectations, the American Senate were not to ratify the SALT II agreement — which I do not incidentally think will be the case — this would bring about a very serious situation throughout the world, and especially within the Alliance. It would obviously have a very adverse effect on the process of maintaining control over armaments.

When I say I am against a European nuclear force, I mean by that an independent European nuclear force. I was not thinking in terms of the European theatre within the overall strategic

framework. As I see it there has to be an indissoluble link between the three areas I mentioned — the strategic part of nuclear arms, tactical theatre forces and conventional forces.

It will have been realised that what I have been urging is to avoid blurring the line that divides conventional forces from tactical nuclear forces, by calling for less emphasis on battlefield weapons.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you Mr. Minister.

I call Mr. Valleix, who will be followed by Mr. Druon and Mr. Minnocci.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I wish to ask the Minister to be a little more precise in some of his answers, especially about the famous "deal of the century" for the purchase of the F-16s.

Does he consider that the financial inducements offered to the Netherlands for procurement of these aircraft finally correspond to the promises made, apart from any economic benefits?

Secondly, does he not think that his government's purchase of Orion instead of Bréguet aircraft, and the accompanying abandonment of the European co-operative project involving the Dutch firm Fokker, are liable to have unfavourable effects on the European aeronautical industry including also — why not — its Netherlands component?

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Minister, please.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — I can assure the honourable member that the agreements made in respect of compensation for the F-16 project in the Netherlands have been strictly observed by our partners in the contract. Doubts have sometimes been voiced about this in Dutch trade union circles, too, and varying numbers of man-years of work have been quoted in this connection. I can give an assurance, as I did in Amsterdam when delivery was taken of the first aircraft on 6th June 1979, that the purpose of the compensation has so far been entirely fulfilled, and that the higher man-years figures that have been mentioned relate solely to a situation where further F-16 aircraft are sold to third parties, in the order of 1,000.

The honourable member has made a particularly interesting link with a decision that has been made under my responsibility — the decision to buy the American Orion patrol aircraft as a replacement for the Neptune instead of the Bréguet Atlantic, which is still on the drawing-board. I can assure him that this decision was not taken in any anti-European frame of mind, quite the contrary. We did our utmost, as people will know, to take a European line in this respect. Bearing the financial aspects in mind it was

*Mr. Scholten (continued)*

impossible for us to go in this direction. In the year leading up to our decision we had very full talks with the French Government, to look at the possibilities.

The honourable member went on to say something about Fokker. This kind of industrial policy does not come under my remit, but that of my colleague dealing with economic affairs.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Druon.

Mr. DRUON (*France*) (Translation). — Let me not fail to add my thanks to those already offered for the Minister's speech to this Assembly.

My question is on a specific point. At the last meeting of NATO's Defence Planning Committee, the Ministers of the member countries of the integrated command structure stressed the need to modernise long-range theatre nuclear systems.

Does the Minister think that such modernisation will imply financial participation by his country in the deployment of Pershing 2 rockets or a new MRBM? Where, in his opinion, should such systems be located? and does he think that questions relating to the financing and deployment of the new weapons, in response to the modernisation of the Soviet theatre weapons, will cause any discord, or at any rate disagreement, in the integrated organs of the Atlantic Alliance?

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Minister to reply, please.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — The honourable member is unfortunately premature with his question. We are still in the preparatory stages of arriving at a decision, so I cannot at present give any answer. I have already explained that studies are under way, in two different directions. On the one hand there is the high level working group, dealing with the military and strategic aspects, and on the other there is the special group concerned with the equally important aspect of arms control.

Their two reports have to be seen one against the other, and only when these reports are to hand will it be possible to take a decision.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you Mr. Minister. I call Mr. Minnoci.

Mr. MINNOCCI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, France proposed about a year ago a conference of European countries on defence problems. I believe its proposal still stands.

Can the Dutch Minister of Defence give me his opinion on the matter?

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Minister, please.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — The French proposal is basically about disarmament, not about defence. Without wishing to hide behind my colleague on the foreign affairs side, I would comment that this is primarily a matter for him. The French proposal is still being studied, and the Dutch Government has not so far reached any firm decision.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Lord Reay. He will be followed by Mr. Kershaw and Mr. Warren.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). — The Minister stated strongly his belief in the desirability of having SALT II ratified as soon as possible. Since the European NATO countries were not included in the SALT II negotiations and yet may be profoundly affected by the results of the treaty, will he say whether they consulted among each other and, if so, within what framework and with what results?

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Minister, please.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — I am pleased to be able to answer an old colleague of mine from the European Parliament. As to whether there has been consultation between the European countries about SALT II, I can say that there is very close political contact among the European countries on a matter as important as this. Whether this ought to be described using the official word "consultation" I would not venture to say.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Kershaw.

Mr. KERSHAW (*United Kingdom*). — The Minister spoke of the reaction time of the Dutch first army corps and said that it was being looked at from a military point of view to see whether the time for deployment and mobilisation could be speeded up. Are there also considerations in the Dutch constitution which demand that certain processes in parliament or by the Crown or by the government shall take place before this deployment can start? If so, how long do those constitutional processes take?

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Minister, please.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — The matter of the reaction time of the Dutch first army corps in Germany is under study at the moment, and a decision will be taken about this very soon. The fact that this matter is being looked at has nothing at all to do with the considerations mentioned by the honourable member.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Warren.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — May I ask the Minister whether, arising from his

*Mr. Warren (continued)*

important comments on the terrible threat to Western Europe from the Russian SS-20 mobile atomic missiles, he would agree with me that the Russians have achieved a major military advantage over Europe in Vienna this week by securing the agreement of President Carter that strategic arms are those which are intercontinental, whereas, to all of us in Europe the arms which are strategic threats are any which can reach us, and in particular the SS-20, which has been neatly excluded by the Russians from SALT II?

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Minister, please.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — I look at the SALT II treaty from a standpoint different from that of the honourable member. I recognise the dangers he has mentioned; I referred to them in my introduction. I think the coming about of SALT II is of enormous importance for the whole process of mastering and controlling armaments in the world.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Lord Duncan-Sandys.

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (*United Kingdom*). — Reference has been made to three different types of nuclear weapon, the intercontinental, the medium-range and the tactical battlefield weapon. The Minister, I am sure, agrees that there is an overwhelming conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact over the NATO forces. I am sure that he also agrees, in relation to the question asked by Mr. Kershaw — I should like to have the Minister's confirmation — that rapid reaction time is absolutely crucial. Having regard to the overwhelming conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact, it is quite clear — again, I should like the Minister to confirm that he agrees — that the battlefield nuclear weapons will be all-important. But they will be effective as a real deterrent only if it is known that they will be used very quickly.

I understand that the position at the moment is that the Supreme Allied Commander has no authority to use a battlefield nuclear weapon without the prior permission of the NATO governments. I reckon that, by the time they have consulted each other after an attack from the East has taken place, the Warsaw Pact forces will be getting near to the Rhine.

Will the NATO governments therefore recognise the importance of a quick decision in the event of attack, decide in precisely what circumstances battlefield nuclear weapons may be used, and give prior authorisation to the Supreme Allied Commander in that sense?

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Minister please.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — The honourable member's view on this differs quite distinctly from mine, Mr. President. My firm conviction is that we must never reach a situation where the use of nuclear weapons ceases to be subject to political control, but is delegated to military commanders. This would be a highly dangerous and unacceptable state of affairs.

I would agree with the questioner that the reaction time of our troops in the Federal Republic and in Western Europe as a whole is extremely important. I do not agree with him that because of this we ought to put greater emphasis on these battlefield weapons. Precisely in order to avoid lowering the nuclear threshold, an attempt will have to be made in future to shift the emphasis away from battlefield weapons towards other nuclear weapons.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Minister. We have completed the list of those who wanted to ask you questions. Therefore, I should like to thank you again for attending the Assembly and answering so many questions.

#### **6. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

#### **Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

#### **Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

*(Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. — We now continue with the earlier Order of the Day. I propose that we listen to the Chairmen of the three Committees and then see whether we have a quorum to deal with at least one of the documents. If there is no quorum, we must postpone the whole proceeding until this afternoon.

I ask the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee whether she wishes to speak. Mrs. von Bothmer.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it seems to me somewhat strange that we should be re-opening a debate which we have already re-opened three times since we have been here. Yesterday our technicians served us up a dog's dinner on the inter-

*Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)*

preting system and thereby, frankly speaking, gained a black mark for technology ; today I must say that it is we who are earning a black mark, by producing our own dog's dinner of a debate.

On Mr. Minnocci's report, I would like to say briefly that Mr. Périquier's observation — which possibly no one now remembers — was a little exaggerated. It did not present the view of the Socialist Group, but was a very generous blend of French and socialist points of view. This is all well and good, but it is not what we discussed in the Socialist Group. I must therefore defend Mr. Minnocci.

I would like to support Mr. Minnocci's remark in his report that the Assembly has a right to receive, through the Council, the reports of the Standing Armaments Committee, at any rate insofar as these have been produced, even therefore if it is only the juridical part. I can see no reason why one should have to wait for it till a certain stage of completion has been reached, one which might then lead to information in a summarised form that might well no longer give a real picture of the problems.

The dialogue with the Council — even though the Council is very friendly and most obliging — continues to be unsatisfactory, Mr. President. All we get to hear, with this arrangement, is chance opinions expressed by individuals. Pleasant and interesting though this may be, I do not think it is what we had in mind for this exercise. I hope we will one day be able to discuss with the Council how we might improve this dialogue and give it more real content.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mrs. von Bothmer.

I now call the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — May I say how appreciative I am of Mr. Tanghe for once again taking on the responsibility of preparing this report and having done it so well ? I thank him also in particular for defending me this morning against any suggestion that I had acted mistakenly in communicating the views of my Committee to General Haig earlier this year.

I believe this debate, which is coming to its end, is of critical importance, because it shows the central function of our Assembly related to the rôle of the Council. Our Assembly has an essential rôle and we must ensure that it is effective ; but I must draw attention again to the remarks which Mr. Tanghe makes in the

fourth paragraph of his report on the difficulties we have as an Assembly in doing our job as effectively as we should if we receive papers from the Council too late. Again this year the last chapters of the draft report did not reach the Office of the Clerk until 26th March. For example, in 1975 and 1976 the papers reached the Office of the Clerk one month later. Parliamentarians cannot do their job effectively if they do not receive the Council's report in time. Therefore, I am glad to see so many members of the Council's secretariat here listening to me. I hope that they will not merely listen, but next year will be able to act, so that we as an Assembly can do our job as effectively as possible.

I do not make these remarks lightly. We take this seriously and we need time to carry out the necessary analysis and probing so that this debate can be as lively as possible.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I now call the Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Mr. Warren.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, in the cause of shorter speeches and less paperwork, I have nothing to contribute, except to endorse the report produced by Mr. Scheffler.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you so much for those extremely brief remarks.

The joint debate is closed.

I do not believe that we have a quorum. I therefore propose that we break now and reconvene at 3 p.m.

Is that agreed to ?

### **7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT. — I therefore propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. The balance of force (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 809 and Amendments).
2. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council ; Application of the Brussels



*The President (continued)*

Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council ; Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council (Votes on the draft Recommendations, Documents 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments).

3. Study on collective logistical support (Presentation of and Debate on the Report

of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Order, Document 810 and Amendment).

Are there any objections ? ...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ? ...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m.)*

## FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 20th June 1979

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. The balance of force (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 809 and Amendments).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Pawelczyk (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Böhm, Mr. Cook, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Handlos, Mr. Mende, Mr. Müller, Mr. Pawelczyk (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper (*Chairman of the Committee*).
4. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council; Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council (*Votes on the draft Recommendations*, Docs. 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Druon, Mr. Minnocci, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Roper, Mr. Druon, Mr. Minnocci, Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. Druon, Mr. Minnocci, Mr. Margue, Mr. Urwin, Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Minnocci, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Roper, Mr. van Waterschoot, Mr. Tanghe, Mr. van Waterschoot, Mr. Roper, Mr. Tanghe, Mr. van Waterschoot, Mr. Warren, Mr. Valleix, Lord Hughes, Mr. Warren, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Warren.
5. The balance of force (*Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 809 and Amendments).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Valleix, Dr. Miller, Mr. Pawelczyk, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Pawelczyk, Mr. Roper, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Pawelczyk, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper, Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. Pawelczyk, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Roper, Mr. Valleix.
6. Study on collective logistical support (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 810 and Amendment).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Roper (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Valleix.
7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Sir Frederic Bennett, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

May I ask formally whether there are any comments on those Minutes? I would take this opportunity to say that this is the first time I have been in this Chair, and I therefore hope there will be no comments on the Minutes as I would not have the slightest idea how to deal with them. May I accordingly accept that on this occasion, if on no other, there are no comments on these Minutes?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 30.

### 3. The balance of force

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 809 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. — The Orders of the Day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the balance of force and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 809 and Amendments.

The Rapporteur of the Committee, Mr. Pawelczyk, is present, and I now ask him formally to present his report.

Mr. PAWELCZYK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report I have to present is, at the request of the Committee, in two parts. Part I is intended to present a picture of the balance of force between East and West — but not in the customary form, as yet another numerical survey. Instead, the publications of both sides are compared with one another. I have added a bibliography.

In Part II my task was to survey MBFR developments since 1973, to assess them and to outline the future prospects. I have done this, and I ask your indulgence for failing to include the very latest developments. That, as you may well imagine, was not possible for organisational reasons.

*Mr. Pawelczyk (continued)*

Let me, first of all, introduce Part I of my report. The problem is that some believe a balance to exist, others regard NATO as having superiority, and a third group, finally, can show us to be lagging behind. The question arising for the Rapporteur is how these divergent assessments are arrived at. I believe that the principal reason lies in the application of different criteria. For any serious analysis it will therefore be necessary to develop a procedure that takes account, in the assessment, of all substantial factors, of both quantitative and, of course, qualitative aspects.

On the point of capability I should like to cite a few examples, a few factors which need to be taken into account: troop morale, the level of training of troops, ability to mobilise and bring in reserves, geographical conditions in the alliances and in the individual states, tactical and strategic doctrine, command capability, unit mobility, precision of weapons systems and generally the durability of equipment. These are a few factors which belong under that heading. There is another area that we have to take account of — intentions, which have to be assessed. The first things to be taken into account in the potential aggressor's camp are the shaping of public opinion and political decision-making, covert preparations for war, the political and military co-operation of partner states within the alliance, the conviction amongst soldiers and civilians that the preparations for war are justified. In the country under attack, defending itself, what matters is its ability to analyse whether aggression is imminent. This is a quite essential point, because a prompt decision by the political leadership is the prerequisite for the security of one's own country and of the alliance to which one belongs. On this, too, depends the time available for the mobilisation not only of one's armed forces but also of economic capacities and resources. These are some of the reflections involved. Neither of these groups of factors lends itself — if I may put it that way — to storage in a data bank. All you can store in a data bank is numbers, not capabilities or intentions. This does not mean that a numerical assessment of forces is unimportant. We merely have to be aware of the relative value that attaches to numbers if other factors are not taken into consideration.

For any statements on the balance of forces, such as have been published by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, this means that an estimate of this balance is complete and realistic only if three areas are included: first, a comparison of the strength of the armed forces in terms of troop levels, available weapons systems, armaments, reserves and of all other data which can be translated into figures for the forces of both

sides; these constitute a quantitative comparison of forces. Secondly, a comparison of unquantifiable factors which on each side determine operational availability, combat potential and fighting ability of the armed forces, including instruction, level of training, reliability of troops and the technical performance of weapons systems.

These two comparisons must be conditions influencing the conduct of hostilities. Here — and this is the third area — one includes geostrategic conditions, ethnological considerations, technical and scientific potential, the technical and production potential in the armaments field and many other points. These are three areas which have to be assessed alongside one another and then combined to produce an estimate of the situation. Unless we take all three factors into account we cannot arrive at an accurate result. It follows therefore that an assessment of the balance of force embraces many factors. Most publications confine their examination to purely military data, i.e. to a quantitative comparison of forces. They leave the other two factors out of account.

One comment on the availability of sources. Whereas we in the NATO field have a flood of publications at our disposal, we find nothing to match this in the Warsaw Pact. This results, on the one hand, in better chances of making a realistic assessment on our side, because discussion is sparked off by these publications and by dint of these discussions, the reliability of the assessment of the situation is increased. Such discussion also shows what our armed forces are there to do. This kind of open debate provides an opportunity for the public to grasp the essence of strategy, to participate in the discussion themselves and so to identify themselves with it. One finds none of this in the Warsaw Pact countries.

In my report I then compare the following areas: selection and description of publications, assessment of the overall East-West situation, possible Soviet perceptions of the military background, rôle and tasks of the various armed forces, capabilities of the various armed forces, the possible form of armed conflict, and troop levels in Central Europe.

In the report you will find a table which is interesting in that it presents a comparison of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact with the armed forces of NATO and of countries which are neighbours of NATO. What one wants to do is to look at how the other side sees and assesses all this. Whereas we count up the forces of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact to establish a balance of force, the Warsaw Pact countries — in particular the Soviet Union — clearly go beyond this and include in the western side, the NATO side, other military potentials as well. That is unacceptable to us, because it affects

*Mr. Pawelczyk (continued)*

the discussions on questions of parity, particularly in SALT and in MBFR. We must be assertive when we discuss this problem and must allow questions of parity — which will have to be solved if we want to reach agreements on armaments control — to be discussed with our opponents only within the framework of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

In concluding this first part I should like to make a personal comment: comparison of military forces is an important factor in looking at how secure we are within our own alliance. By itself, however, this factor is not sufficient to answer the question of whether or not we have adequate security. After six years of MBFR negotiations in Vienna we have to admit that the two sides are still not using the same criteria for counting numbers. These would include, to take but one example, agreement on which forces are considered as ground forces, which as naval and which as air forces. There is still no clarity on the point. Then there is the fact that nearly all states have conscription. Agreement must be reached on how far national servicemen are used to bring units up to strength.

We have not so far had any discussions on comparing weapons. I personally believe that, if we were to extend to the weapons field the arguments about numbers we are having in respect of manning levels, we would become bogged down in a morass from which we would scarcely be able to escape. There are no parameters for adequately comparing the different tanks and the different aircraft with each other. We would get lost in a welter of technical details which do not have, for an overall political assessment, the value which many people ascribe to them.

Assessing the military ratio of force between NATO and the Warsaw Pact we come to the conclusion that, for the moment, NATO's security is assured. If, however, the Warsaw Pact continues its efforts on the present scale and if NATO does not match them with its own measures, we shall have problems with our security policy by the 1980s. That is why it was right to decide on the NATO long-term programme and to push it through. Improvements are taking place both in the conventional field and in that of tactical nuclear weapons. In the field of strategic weapons the United States and the Soviet Union have come to an agreement on parity. In NATO we are at present negotiating a decision on medium-range potentials, a field where the Soviet Union has considerable superiority. We are hoping that by the end of this year we shall have reached a political consensus which will allow us to propose to the Warsaw Pact a solution to the problem threatening us, by way of negotiations on the

control of armaments. It is my conviction that we must also make it clear to the Warsaw Pact that, unless it comes far enough to meet us, we shall have to ensure a balance by deciding on nuclear options.

NATO cannot be open to pressure. We are seeing to it that the danger does not arise in the eighties either.

In Part II I was called upon to make a few observations on MBFR. I have started by outlining developments since 1973 and have then assessed progress in the negotiations and looked briefly at the prospects. I ask your indulgence for the fact that the most recent developments have not been covered; they are not yet concluded, and cannot therefore be assessed.

Finally, I should like to make three comments on the MBFR section. First, the western initiative and the reply made by the Warsaw Pact in 1978 have resulted in the most important step forward in the Vienna negotiations. Today one takes it that the broad conditions of MBFR policy on the two sides tally. We must not conclude any MBFR agreement which ignores parity. Nor must we conclude any MBFR agreement without due regard for collectivity. What does this mean? There is a lack of agreement about the size of the Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. Figures differ by over 150,000. Until this lack of agreement in discussing data is cleared up there can be no agreement, because agreements cannot be built on mistrust. You cannot build on sand. We hope that MBFR will become a continuing process, in the same way as SALT. If the first agreement in this field is built upon mistrust, it will be unable to develop further. That is why we need clarification on this matter of numbers.

Secondly, there must be no agreement which would give the Warsaw Pact the opportunity of exerting influence in the future on NATO decisions on security policy. This means that decisions must be taken on a collective basis. That is one side. On the other I believe that, while the Warsaw Pact must explain for us the discrepancy between our figures, we should make it clear to the Warsaw Pact that the individual NATO states, even though we make agreements on a collective ceiling basis, have a proportional share in the reductions.

And thirdly, confidence-building measures are just as important as reductions. We must deprive the armed forces in Central Europe of their surprise strike capability. Prior notification of military manoeuvres and troop movements, with observers at certain points where forces are moved into or out of an area, inspire and strengthen confidence in agreements. It may be observed that both sides have recently been

*Mr. Pawelczyk (continued)*

paying greater attention to this factor, which in my opinion is indispensable.

Finally, these three factors are at present being discussed in the MBFR talks. We all hope that the signing of SALT in Vienna will breathe fresh life into MBFR.

Unless the principles of parity and collectivity are observed we shall not approve MBFR agreements. Our impression is that the Warsaw Pact has learned to accept the broad conditions of our concept, and that things are now moving on points of detail as well.

In parallel — and this brings me back to my Part I and to a summing-up — defence efforts must be made on our own side. Without such efforts the policy of armaments control cannot progress. I believe we may say that the states of the West have in the past taken the measures necessary for our security. In the NATO long-term programme we have a new and important decision, capable of preserving our security in the future as well. So we have a firm basis from which to promote the policy of armaments control by equally intensive efforts — which have sometimes been lacking — and to improve stability in Europe by first achieving military parities, and then stabilising these at a low level. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur. I now have to ask for the assistance of the Assembly, not in my name but in that of the Assembly in that we have been allocated by the President a maximum time for this debate, the period between 3 o'clock when the debate started and 4.30 p.m. when there is a further debate and a vote on the preceding report will be taken. We cannot keep carrying on parts of debates to the time for other debates and unless in my remaining time in the chair I get some purely voluntary co-operation, we shall not be able to finish this debate by 4.30 p.m. I am not blaming the Rapporteur, but he has taken half an hour for his introduction. I have a list of seven speakers each wishing to speak for ten minutes, which already takes more than the period up to when the votes on another document are to be taken.

I appeal to all speakers, therefore, to curtail their speeches to five minutes rather than ten. Since I took the chair I have been told that there are two other Representatives wishing to speak and I am told that Mr. Bonnel wants to move no fewer than six amendments. I therefore make an additional appeal to him, as one of the speakers, to incorporate his comments on his amendments in the course of his speech rather than have a series of six comments on six different amendments.

Since I started speaking the name of an eighth speaker has been given to me and therefore if there is to be the slightest chance of our finishing before we are due to proceed to vote on preceding business, I must ask delegates to keep their speeches down to five minutes or even less. I appeal to my colleagues, Mr. Roper and the Rapporteur, also to make their concluding remarks as short as possible — in your interests, not mine, as I shall not be in the chair at that time. It is up to the speakers to see how we get on this afternoon.

As my first speaker I call Mr. Böhm.

Mr. BÖHM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I confess that I am deeply concerned about the West's readiness and capability for defence. The Soviet Union, working as ever towards world revolution, has succeeded in Europe, and especially among many European citizens, in creating an impression of real détente and peaceful coexistence. But while in Europe it is participating in the creation of a zone of seeming peace, in Africa and in Asia it is at the same time endeavouring to gain control of the raw material and energy sources of the European industrialised states. Under the banner of a so-called policy of peace it has achieved alarming successes while broad circles of European politicians are yielding to the impression of peaceful coexistence and relaxing their vigilance.

Mr. Pawelczyk pointed in his report to the difficulties in the present discussion of data in the MBFR context, difficulties which, so far as troop levels are concerned, were dismissed by the Soviet First Secretary Brezhnev with the remark — and I am quoting him — that these were squabbles about the methods of calculating the strength of the forces down to the last cook and medical orderly.

In view of the Warsaw Pact's considerable superiority in conventional forces and of the fact that local wars are fought even in the nuclear age, the greatest possible importance attaches to troop levels and to troop training and equipment. I should like to use one example to show how the Warsaw Pact manipulates the number of military forces actually available and the deplorable manner in which the West has so far reacted to such developments. Even in Mr. Pawelczyk's report I find no reference to the subject I am about to broach.

I should like to draw members' attention to the GDR's "second army", some 500,000 strong, an army which has now been in existence for twenty-five years and which, under the name of "combat groups of the working class", would assure the GDR of a considerable military power even if that country decided to disband the

*Mr. Böhm (continued)*

whole of its National Peoples' Army, which is numerically only half as strong.

This second army has not so far been included in the Vienna disarmament negotiations because there they are counting only uniformed, barracks-based troops but not an army such as the GDR combat groups, organised at the level of factories and administrative bodies, even though in terms of level of mobilisation, training and equipment these are, as in the present instance, of substantial military significance.

Peoples' militias or workers' militias exist in other countries of the so-called socialist camp, too — for instance, 150,000 in Bulgaria, 120,000 in Czechoslovakia and 60,000 in Hungary — though in terms of operational capability these do not in any way stand comparison with the combat groups of the GDR. As a party army of the communist SED these GDR combat groups may best be compared, with regard to their military and ideological strength and importance, to the SA and SS formations in Nazi Germany.

The history of the combat groups goes back to the period following the popular rising in the GDR on 17th June 1953, when they were set up under the title of "SED works combat groups" as so-called "workers' defence units for the protection of the achievements of the workers' and peasants' state".

Today they are organised throughout the GDR as fully mechanised heavy infantry and as special units. This party army differs little from the regular armed forces. It has at its disposal heavy equipment and heavy weapons, 8,500 mortars, anti-aircraft weapons ranging from quadruple AA cannon to 37 mm guns, guided anti-tank missiles of the Sagger type, artillery with direct and indirect sighting, sapper equipment, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, reconnaissance vehicles and signals equipment. The *Allgemeine Schweizer Militärzeitung* reported 485 battle tanks of models T-54 and T-55 as well as 420 light armoured vehicles. This equipment enables the combat groups to fight side by side with the National Peoples' Army and to assume tasks of flank protection and anti-aircraft defence. The combat groups, moreover, go in for military splendour with decorations and a martial appearance. At march-pasts and parades they are no different from the GDR National Peoples' Army in discipline or military bearing. Their structure is aligned on the military system. Major enterprises have their own battalions which — like the regular forces — have their headquarters and supply units. They are capable of operation away from base.

These combat groups, moreover, are a very cheap army for the GDR. Accommodation, supply facilities and food are provided by the

factories or administrative bodies, and the "combat comrades", as they are officially known, are available at any time at the factory or in their homes nearby and can thus be very rapidly mobilised.

To young people and children in the GDR the members of the combat groups are presented as shining examples. Ideological education that teaches hatred, and militarisation of all aspects of life in the GDR, are systematically practised.

Military training has since 1968 been purposefully focused on operational deployment capability; thus from 1973 to 1976 formation training with concentrated attack tactics was carried out, and from 1977 to 1980, and that means today, complex training with concentrated attack tactics, attack, reconnaissance and guard-duty training is taking place. Part of the training, including live firing practice, is done on the training grounds of the Warsaw Pact armies. This training plan proves the operational capabilities of the combat groups. In the Bundestag the Federal Government has stated that employment of the combat groups on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany in the event of a conflict could not be ruled out.

In discussing disarmament and troop reductions in Europe one cannot, one must not disregard the military importance of these combat groups. So long as, through being so-called paramilitary formations, they are not included in the MBFR talks, the danger persists.

Allow me in conclusion to quote some leading GDR military men and GDR politicians specialising in military affairs. East German representative figures in the political and military spheres have recently laid considerable stress on the importance, in terms of operational capability and superiority, of these combat groups. Thus Konrad Neumann, a member of the SED Central Committee's Politburo, had this to say:

"The combat groups of the working class of the capital of the German Democratic Republic likewise see it as their national and internationalist duty further to strengthen the GDR's national defence as a formation and constituent part of the defensive alliance of the Warsaw Pact. Loyal to their oath, they are ready at all times together with all the armed organisations of our workers' and peasants' state and in indissoluble brotherhood-in-arms with the glorious Soviet army, to be a dependable shield for socialism."

Colonel-General Scheibe, head of the security department of the SED Central Committee, declared:

"There has also been good progress in co-operation [by the combat groups] with sections of the National Peoples' Army and the frontier troops of the GDR."

*Mr. Böhm (continued)*

Defence Minister Hoffmann last year said at a grand military and political event in Rostock :

“Whenever the protection of a frontier has to be rapidly reinforced, order in the state maintained, diversionary forces or airborne units smashed, important objects in our own hinterland protected or the operational freedom of the united armed forces ensured, every commander and every headquarters in the National Peoples’ Army and in the Soviet forces group can rely on the formations of our combat groups as operationally effective and reliable comrades-in-arms, as an indispensable part of socialist national defence.”

It is inconceivable that such clear language by responsible GDR figures on matters of security, patently agreed to at the highest political level, should not have the full consent of the Soviet Union. Failure to take our opponents seriously would be tantamount to self-deception, would be judging others by our own hopes and yardsticks. It would be fatal not to bear this in mind in our debate on the report, or in our political actions. Thank you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Colleagues, I am afraid that my powers of appeal for brevity are singularly unconvincing. While I thank the last speaker, the number of speakers has grown from ten to twelve. I am now leaving the chair, and I can only hope that my successor will have more success than I have had. However, I remind you that if speakers take even five minutes each, let alone more, there is no possibility of reaching a conclusion of this debate today, and I believe that many people will be leaving the Assembly.

I mention this as my outgoing remark, because I want this important debate to reach some firm conclusion.

May I appeal to Mr. Cook, as a fellow countryman, to set an example and to make his speech as short as possible.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I shall take due note of your appeal, as I have taken careful note of the many appeals that you have addressed to me in previous debates.

As I understood the last speaker, I gather that he had substantial reservations about the report presented by Mr. Pawelczyk. I was extremely impressed by the report. In view of the three pages of references and sources at the back of the report, I do not believe that it would be too much to describe it as scholarly. To those of us who take part in defence debates in our national parliaments, I believe that the report will be a very useful work of reference in the years ahead.

The report is particularly valuable in that it gives us a clear perspective for the worst case analyses that have become too prevalent in the last two or three years. The impartial analysis presented by Mr. Pawelczyk provides a valuable perspective. We as politicians are in a difficulty in that all the analyses of the level of military balance are naturally provided to us by military intelligence. It would be naïve of us not to bear in mind that to some extent some of those analyses are self-serving.

Those members of the Assembly who have followed the United States defence debates will be aware of the critical rôle played by Congressman Les Aspin. Congressman Aspin a year ago produced a report showing that American intelligence had consistently overestimated the rate of shipbuilding of the Soviets and had overestimated by a factor of two the number of ships being constructed in the Soviet Union.

The one case where they constantly got it right was in the building rate of Soviet diesel submarines, which was the one vessel which the Pentagon was not seeking to construct or build in the United States.

Congressman Aspin drew the natural conclusion that the fact that the Pentagon did not need to seek a budget for the construction of diesel submarines or to justify that cost to the American public enabled it to be more correct and accurate in its estimate of Soviet construction of such vessels.

But I was particularly struck by Appendix I, in which Mr. Pawelczyk presents the perspective from the point of view of the Soviet Union. I was, of course, particularly struck by the fact that in that appendix there is a summary of the Soviet Union’s capability. We in the West often forget that we must take cognisance of the fact that on their other border, on the other side of the Soviet Union, the Soviets face the Chinese empire.

The fact that Sir Frederic Bennett was in the chair reminded me that it is only a year since we debated this issue of arms sales to the Chinese on the basis of a report submitted by him. In that year we have seen the Chinese invade one of their neighbours. Indeed, over the past two decades we have seen Chinese troops deployed in Korea, India, Tibet, Cambodia and now in Vietnam, and I think it is now time that the West began to ask whether we should be quite so willing to supply arms to a country which has quite such a robust attitude to the territorial integrity of its neighbours. But the point that concerns us today is that if the Soviet Union observes the West assisting the Chinese in an arms build-up which the Soviet Union will perceive as a threat to itself, can we expect the Soviet Union to become more positive in the negotiations relating to an arms reduction in Europe ?

*Mr. Cook (continued)*

Here I come to the comments of Mr. Pawelczyk which were contained in the report and in his recommendation to the Assembly. There is no doubt that the process of negotiations in MBFR and the ongoing discussions about the Western Alliance's point of view have greatly added to the cohesion of the Alliance. That is welcome, but it is a rather paradoxical result of negotiations aimed at arms control that they should end with the military alliances taking part in those negotiations having greater cohesion and a greater common point of view than when those associations began.

I depart from the general tone of Mr. Pawelczyk about MBFR which I found unduly positive. It is worth recalling that we began these negotiations with talks about negotiations in 1968. Since 1973 teams from every member country have been sitting in formal session for the greater part of every year and yet those negotiations continue to be bogged down in arguments about definitions. Is it fair to include Russian officers who run military transit, since in Britain and in France part of their job will be done by railway clerks?

Similarly, there is the position of civilian radar operators for the United States Air Force, which in any other western country will be occupied by men in uniform.

One can appreciate the difficulty of these questions. They may be matters of detail, although significant, but I cannot help concluding that the fact that after a decade of talks we are still bogged down in such detail demonstrates a lack of political priority to those talks. It is not easy to see how we can escape from the stalemate which we have got ourselves into. The fundamental difficulty is that the position of the West calls for disproportionate cuts on the part of the Soviet Union. I do not myself see how the Soviet Union can easily concede that position. On the other hand, I do not see how the West can abandon that position, given the Soviet Union's superiority on the central front.

It is therefore very difficult to see how we can escape from the impasse which has existed ever since 1973.

It may be, Mr. President, that there is a pointer to the way out of this impasse in the SALT II negotiations which have now been concluded. It is early yet to reach a balanced view on that agreement and that treaty but I believe the new proposals and verification, when they become widely known, will be accepted as improvements. For instance, I understand that the Soviet Union has now undertaken to give notice to the United States every time it test-fires a missile in order that the United States can get up a U-2 plane to observe. In response

the United States has given the Russians an assurance that it will not code its telemetry so that Russian trawlers can monitor the data on the spot. These are small matters, but they represent a revolution in the attitude of the two powers towards each other. They are important steps towards achieving confidence between the two armed military giants of our time.

Mr. Pawelczyk referred to confidence-building measures. I believe that these may be the necessary groundwork for troop withdrawals, because unless we first tackle the anxiety and fears about the central front, I do not believe that we can reach agreement on troop withdrawals.

There is one remaining problem. I do not think it will ever be easy for the Soviet Union to agree to troop withdrawals from Europe, because the Soviet Union knows that it is only its troops which hold together its eastern empire.

Here we come to another factor in the balance of advantage between East and West which is not referred to in the report but which I believe to be very important.

The Warsaw Pact is held together solely by the military might of the major partner, the Soviet Union. The only two occasions when their troops have actually been used since the war have been against not NATO but two of their own allies, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. By comparison, the Western Alliance is an alliance of democratic states whose support for that alliance is willingly given. That seems to me an immense strength. It is an imponderable factor — we cannot quantify it — but it is a factor which is immensely favourable to NATO.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Cook.

*(Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Baumel has just asked me if he might precede the two speakers whose names are down for now, because his presence is required at the French Parliament. Have Mr. Reddemann and Mr. Boucheny any objections?

As they are agreeable, Mr. Baumel has the floor.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank the honourable gentlemen for letting me take their turn.

I wanted to speak to the report presented by Mr. Pawelczyk, giving us a precise and well-documented status report on the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. I make no bones of the fact that this report creates an awkward problem for the French Delegation. It takes absolutely no account of our country's special position with regard to a discussion to which we are not a



*Mr. Baumel (continued)*

party, although of course we take a great deal of interest in it. The line taken by the Rapporteur is not perhaps very well-chosen in an Assembly and institution whose task it is to rally our seven states around common objectives for security and defence.

Could anyone believe for one second that a text approved by our Assembly, even by a very large majority, would do anything to change the French Government's stance or compel it to modify an attitude adopted long since and approved by a substantial proportion of French public opinion? It surely would be somewhat unrealistic to do so. It would, I think, be more consonant with our interest in this Assembly to frame proposals capable of attracting the greatest possible consensus, and of being actually put into effect by our governments in due course.

The Vienna negotiations do not directly interest France, and that for three reasons. First, the MBFR negotiations are liable to cause a marked diminution of the United States commitment and create serious misgivings about its determination to defend Europe with all the means at its disposal. We are bound to be disquieted by the fact that it is proposed in Vienna to barter the American nuclear weapons against Soviet armoured divisions. This is no real solution, to our mind, nor a genuine disarmament measure, for the reduction of conventional forces and that of nuclear forces each have their own logic.

Under the current terms of the MBFR discussions there is the risk that we shall end up with the withdrawal of a good many American nuclear weapons, which will undoubtedly affect the credibility of a massive strategic nuclear retaliation by the United States in the event of a successful offensive by the Warsaw Pact countries. This would increase, instead of — as the Rapporteur hopes — diminishing the existing imbalance between the two alliances, inasmuch as the Soviet Union, having the geographical advantage of sitting at the gates of Central Europe, would have only a diminished American nuclear force to contend with inside Europe and an American conventional military presence thousands of kilometres away.

To be sure, we are also told that Pershing 2s or MRBMs of a new type will be installed on European territory. But in that case, where is the genuine disarmament we hear about?

France's second fundamental objection to the negotiations in Vienna is that they are being held between blocs — something that we have consistently challenged for thirty years — and that regardless of our differing political allegiances, we are not prepared to alter our

attitude or our foreign policy. The negotiations sanction the hegemony of the United States and the USSR over the European countries of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact.

Insofar as these negotiations, whose outcome depends almost exclusively on agreement between the two superpowers, aim at establishing troop ceilings for all the states of the MBFR reduction area, they tend to institutionalise a collective right for the United States and the USSR to oversee the defence efforts of the countries of Europe. What this comes to in practice is indirectly to concede to the USSR a certain right to monitor the troop levels of Western Europe.

Thirdly, the Vienna negotiations stem from an approach that is incompatible with the effective realisation of the project of European unity.

If the Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux countries, in deciding on the level of their defence efforts, had to observe decisions taken by third parties — in practice the United States in agreement with the USSR — there could no longer be any independent European policy in security matters or even harmonisation of foreign policies. Is that what we want? If so, it is better to say so frankly. We take the very opposite view.

So the Vienna exercise only concerns certain states of our union, not all of them. It aims at establishing in the heart of Europe a special-status area. It is taking place within the rigid framework of the military blocs, thereby helping to consolidate them. It is, to say the least, astonishing that we should be asked to pronounce ourselves without a shadow of criticism in favour of such an enterprise.

Yet the Rapporteur's preoccupations are praiseworthy to the extent that they are addressed to the achievement of disarmament in Europe. In point of fact, the MBFRs, though they are having only very limited success, have served as a framework for American and Soviet initiatives which justify one in not being totally and irremediably sceptical about the prospects of a slowing down of the armaments race in Europe. But the Vienna negotiations certainly will not really put an end, on our continent, to the exceedingly destabilising piling up of conventional armaments.

It is in a different direction that a solution must be sought to the problem of coexistence in Europe, face to face, of two over-armed blocs whose equipment with offensive weaponry is growing incessantly.

From this point of view it is astonishing to find that the Rapporteur has made no mention whatever of the French disarmament proposals

*Mr. Baumel (continued)*

which have been well received in many capitals, whether allied or belonging to the Warsaw Pact. These proposals for a European disarmament conference correspond to the goal pursued by the Rapporteur in that they aim at the establishment of more balanced and tranquil relations between the two alliances. Mr. Pawelczyk claims in his report to echo European aspirations to security and stability on the basis of a reduced level of armaments. Why then does he fail to mention the possibility of a disarmament conference in Europe, a conference which would bring together the signatory states of the CSCE final act and would have as its objective, first of all, to promote mutual confidence between the participants by such concrete measures as a more far-reaching modification of troop manoeuvres and movements? In a second phase such a conference should reach agreement on verifiable constraints on the most destabilising elements in the European military situation, conventional offensive armaments.

These are, I think, a few proposals that would deserve to be discussed, very likely adopted, by the Rapporteur, and that would show how our Assembly endeavours to come up with specific and positive solutions to the problem — and not only by the MBFR settlement. Consequently I suggest that the Rapporteur should be good enough to insert, in the report he has just presented, a reference to the proposals I have put forward.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Baumel, you have only just over-run the ten minute time-limit.

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to thank the Rapporteur sincerely for his report, even though I totally disagree with some of his remarks. I am glad that the Assembly has had such a comprehensive report presented to it on a very complex issue, and that we thus have an opportunity of discussing the whole subject.

Let me base my somewhat different position on statements by the former British Minister responsible for disarmament, Lord Chalfont, on the statements of someone who, after all, comes from the socialist camp and played an extremely important rôle in the Wilson government. I hear Mr. Lewis disputing this, but Lord Chalfont certainly was active in the Wilson government; that, I believe, is incontestable.

Lord Chalfont has given it as his view that one can form a meaningful picture of the overall situation only if one knows the strength of the forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

In this context he quotes a number of figures which surely do not come from any secret service sources but were available to him from his days as the man responsible for disarmament. He observes quite simply that over the past few years the Soviet Union has been devoting between 10 and 15 % of its gross national product to military expenditure, while the United States has earmarked 6 % and the other NATO states 3.5 % of their GNP for defence expenditure. He also observes that the rate of increase of Soviet arms expenditure has at least doubled over the past ten years, while the figures for the western countries, that is, the NATO member states, have remained the same.

He moreover points out — on this point he expressly refers to American sources — that in 1978 the Soviet Union allocated 42 % more to arms expenditure in its budget than the United States. If I may now add that the British White Paper on Defence — a document from the Callaghan government of 1979, from the beginning of this year — reports that since 1968 the Soviet Union has strengthened its armoured formations by 38 % and increased the number of its armoured infantry vehicles by 83 %, while the striking power of the Soviet navy in the Eastern Atlantic increased by 8 % for submarines and by 53 % for other vessels, then one has to note that, according to sources available to us — sources certainly not researched by so-called cold war warriors — quite exceptional efforts have been made in the field of Soviet armaments over the past few years.

We must, moreover, observe — and these figures, too, are plainly unchallengeable — that the number of Soviet long-range missiles has been increased immensely since the SALT I agreement in 1972 — in other words, despite the agreements made at that time — and that there is indeed concern at present lest the Soviet Union, by the beginning of the eighties, might be able to destroy some 60 % of American long-range missiles without exposing itself to the danger of retaliation.

If, in addition, you take the figures which show that the Soviet ground forces, inclusive of the paramilitary formations of the state security service and the Ministry of the Interior, have meanwhile grown to 3.5 million men, whereas on the American side 2.1 million are under arms, and if moreover you consider that some 40,000 Soviet battle tanks are faced by only 10,000 or so on the western side, you will realise that the Soviet Union — and, I must add, the other countries of the Warsaw Pact as well — are quite patently going in for a level of armament which far transcends the normal defence efforts even of a great power.

To my regret I have to note that the draft recommendation submitted contains far too few

*Mr. Reddemann (continued)*

or none at all of these figures, so that on this particular matter we in the Assembly are unable to make the very point that should be made.

Furthermore, I must say that I am sorry that the draft recommendation also contains an ambiguous wording about the military balance, a form of words which conveys the impression that in the final analysis there is after all some kind of military balance in Europe.

That is why I would most sincerely ask the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the Committee to reflect whether they cannot, even at this stage, see some possibility of rewording their draft recommendation in such a way that it brings out the reality of the danger of Soviet attack more fully than is now the case, and that it clearly repudiates all those arguments which suggest that the military strength built up by the Soviet Union is purely defensive. Thank you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In the absence of Mr. Boucheny I call Mr. Handlos.

Mr. HANDLOS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I would like, Mr. President, to comment quite briefly on three points now that the SALT negotiations have been concluded and the entire interest is probably going to be concentrated on MBFR in Vienna. The three points are the discussion of data in Vienna, the planned verification methods and the question of why Hungary is not in the reduction area.

On the first point, we all know that for many years the Soviet Union refused to accept any discussion of data in Vienna. It just did not want to put its cards on the table, it did not want to say what numbers of military personnel are at present in the reduction area. In order to shorten the argument the Soviet Union — as the Rapporteur has already told us today — now declares that parity of troop levels in Central Europe has been approximately achieved; 150,000 men are being spirited away, they are simply no longer to be seen, although we know very well that on the Warsaw Pact side there are at least 150,000 more men in the reduction area than on our side. This will be one of the issues for Vienna — there will have to be an intensive effort on our part to bring about a genuine balance.

As for verification measures, even if during the first phase 29,000 Americans with corresponding nuclear missiles were to be withdrawn, and on the other side 68,000 Russian troops and 1,700 tanks, this would achieve only a theoretical

balance in Europe since it is clear, from the troop manoeuvres of the eastern bloc, that the civil transport capacity of Aeroflot — leaving aside the military air transport capacity — is so great that this theoretical military balance could be upset in favour of the Soviet Union within hours, whereas it would take weeks for the Americans to return across the Atlantic. That, too, should not be forgotten. I repeat that within a matter of hours of an MBFR agreement such a theoretical balance can once more turn into an imbalance in favour of the Soviet Union. Verification in a case like this is exceedingly difficult. The same problems will arise here as in the context of SALT II on the issue of verification; and that is why there is opposition from quite a number of United States Senators.

A third vital point — and this brings me to the end — is the issue of Hungary. Hungary is still not included in the reduction area, and for very definite reasons from the Soviet point of view. Hungary is coming more and more to be a deployment area for the Soviet Union. Hungary thus is a springboard towards Yugoslavia for the day when Tito quits the political stage; it is moreover a springboard towards the Middle East, towards the oil wells; and in addition, because of the ever-increasing military capacity of the Soviet Union in Hungary there is the danger that, after a rapid thrust through Austria, NATO's southern flank could be most seriously threatened. This is another thing we must not forget, because the Soviet Union, even if it fulfils its MBFR commitments, will be entitled to station substantially larger forces in Hungary than has been the case hitherto.

During the next few months and years, while negotiations are proceeding in Vienna, Western European Union should direct its attention to making sure that potential results of the negotiations are not undermined from the outset in such a way that while the forces are theoretically reduced they are then reassembled in the Hungarian plain for possible new ventures towards the West. I therefore believe that we in Western European Union should more than even be guided by the adage that the price of freedom is vigilance. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Mende.

Mr. MENDE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am sorry the communist Senator Serge Boucheny did not speak before me, though his name is on the list of speakers. Nevertheless, I believe I can write a few lines in his communist album, and I hope he will read them. In 1919, the first year of peace, sixty years ago, there were slogans such as "No more war"; those were the days of the

*Mr. Mende (continued)*

foundation of the League of Nations and the attempt to create Europe. There are two names I will mention — Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann. Europe was in a sense the obvious item on an agenda for peace ; after the horrors of the first world war, one wanted to avoid similar experiences for future generations at least. And yet the second world war happened because ideological movements, national socialism in Germany and fascism in Italy, included war as a means of imposing their political and ideological ideas, saw war as the continuation of politics by other means, prepared for it and worked out a European war plan. The end result was the ghastly aftermath of the second world war. The Nuremberg trials were intended to have a deterrent effect and the United Nations were to lay down new principles for the coexistence of nations. And yet we have been saddened by Korea, Vietnam, wars in the Middle East, wars in the Far East, bloody wars in Africa.

Today mankind is making a third attempt to make peace more secure through controlled disarmament. It has to be acknowledged that both the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact have at any rate for thirty years had the effect of providing balance and securing peace in Europe. Our Rapporteur is to be thanked for having collected facts and figures on armaments, for having collated them and drawn up a balance sheet, and it is to be welcomed that our French colleague Baumel has made additional suggestions. Nevertheless, I would warn against dealing solely, when considering the question of disarmament and securing peace, with figures, facts and various possibilities of imposing limitations. We must also include in our calculations the ideological powers of attack inherent in communism. These ideological strike forces of communism make themselves felt in the most varied ways notably as the so-called liberation movements. Let us not forget that the second world war, too, started with certain liberation movements, for the ethnic Germans in Danzig and before that for those in Prague. Liberation movements too, if dressed up in suitable ideological garb are one form of war. I would therefore ask the disarmament experts to include in their considerations the psychological basis of warlike developments. In particular we must allow for the extent to which communist-governed states educate their peoples for militarism and for war, by glorifying force and by a hero cult that goes far beyond reasonable remembrance of the past ; the result is that over there a generation is growing up which does not reject war, but is psychologically conditioned for it. I think we must, alongside the indispensable facts and figures, include this potential for ideological expansion in our thinking about disarmament and about safeguarding peace. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Mende.

Mr. Müller now has the floor.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I find it easy not to mention two points, Mr. President, because these have already been touched on by colleagues in connection with the balance of force in Europe. There is what my colleague Böhm has said on the so-called paramilitary works combat groups, and what my colleague Mende has just been saying on the problem of the psychological-cum-ideological conflict. The Rapporteur himself has rightly pointed out in the introduction to his report that the various factors should be viewed in a world setting, and I should like to add a few remarks myself.

To my mind — and on this point I may even differ from certain colleagues who take a graver view of the situation — we should certainly acknowledge the possibility of using even disarmament negotiations like these as one way to achieve in Central Europe a balance of force such that the risks involved in an attack will be so high that no one will venture to take them, as it would be impossible to calculate just what the results would be for him, or to limit them. One must not, of course, view the situation in Central Europe alone ; it must be pointed out, as the Rapporteur himself has done, that NATO's weak spot is its southern flank. It should furthermore be pointed out that it is especially now, when we in Europe are all worried about energy supplies, that the southern flank, North Africa and the Middle East are of very great importance. We know that the Soviet Union is currently trying to strengthen its own positions outside Europe. We know that the Soviet Union has been engaging in massive military intervention for instance in the area of Ethiopia, that is, in the Middle East. We know that the attempt is now clearly being made to carry a guerrilla war once again from Yemen into Southern Oman, into the Dhufar region, in other words attempts are being made there to circumvent elsewhere the balance existing in Europe.

There are two comments I would like to make in this area. First of all, a statement of fact. We have to recognise that the Soviet Union does not respect even international conventions or treaties. I am thinking of the Montreux Convention, which specifically lays down that aircraft carriers may not pass through the straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. We know that the Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev did pass through these straits from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. An attempt was made to camouflage this by putting trucks on its deck and describing it as a transport, but everyone knew that it was

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

an aircraft carrier. This at any rate is a fact which we should take note of.

My second point is that Soviet strategy should clearly be assumed to have a long-term objective. There was a most interesting talk between von der Schulenburg, Adolf Hitler's ambassador to Moscow, and the then Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in which the spheres of influence in world politics were delineated. The Soviet Union's expansion into Europe was confined to few areas. This was revealed when the army of the Third Reich marched into Poland and the Red Army took up its positions in the East. The Baltic states were declared to be in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. Similarly, the Romanian territory of Bessarabia, part of the present-day Soviet Republic of Moldavia, was assigned to the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. The most interesting part of the conversation between Molotov and von der Schulenburg at that time was Molotov's statement that the main objectives of Soviet foreign policy were not in the direction of the West, the European sphere, where there was then a strong Nazi Germany, but the South, beyond Persia and into the Gulf states. I believe we may see here a certain permanence in Soviet interests. It is not fortuitous that the first treaty of friendship and trade agreement with an Arab country was concluded in 1929 between the Soviet Union and Yemen, and that the People's Republic of Yemen is today one of the spearheads of Soviet policy in the Arabian peninsula. The rebellion in Dhufar in Southern Oman is being fuelled from Yemen, the conflicts between South Yemen, the Peoples' Republic of Yemen, and North Yemen are being directed from South Yemen. Much the same is true for the Horn of Africa, for the conflicts in the region of Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea.

I might mention in this connection that at Yalta the Soviet Union demanded that it should be given the former Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somalia and Libya. When that was rejected the Soviet Union still demanded at the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1946 that at least the Eritrean port of Massawa should be given to it as part of the peace negotiations, to serve as a base for the Soviet Union.

What am I getting at? Soviet policy must be viewed in the long term, it must be seen not only in Central Europe but also outside Europe, with all the effects which such a policy might have on Central Europe. The fact that Soviet warships are in Massawa today, in connection with the civil war in Ethiopia and Eritrea, is no more than the consistent policy that was being pursued in this area as much as thirty or thirty-five years ago. This is something to give us pause, something that really should

induce us to keep the world-wide context in mind in all negotiations on troop level cuts and troop reductions in Europe. I would therefore urge the Rapporteur not just to look at Central Europe but to realise that European security depends also and very decisively, on what long-term Soviet policy is doing on the periphery of Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Müller.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. PAWELCZYK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I should like to make a few remarks on the contributions to the debate, and to thank the speakers for their suggestions; then I must point to my brief which, I believe I described very precisely at the beginning. My job was not to add a further set of figures to the many already available, but rather to interpret and compare various important points that can be gleaned from the publications of the two sides.

I take Mr. Baumel's point; but as a member of the WEU Assembly's Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments I was instructed to concern myself in this report with MBFR as well. That is what I was asked to do, and MBFR operates within certain conditions. I have no objections to bringing other considerations into our discussion. Mr. Baumel knows that I have a great deal of sympathy for the French disarmament proposals; we discussed them together at the North Atlantic Assembly meeting in Oslo. But this was not my brief; my brief was to describe MBFR developments from their beginnings and to append an evaluation. Now to my comments on individual speeches.

Mr. Böhm knows my esteem for him — but on one point we do not agree and I should like to clear it up straight away. When he talks about works combat groups and in the same speech draws a parallel — I hope I got this wrong — with the SA and SS, then this is an insult to the citizens who are press-ganged into the works combat groups. We know that the vast majority of Germans in the GDR do not support their own régime. Mr. Böhm is shaking his head — maybe I misunderstood him — but he did mention those two organisations in his speech, which was concerned exclusively with works combat groups.

I should like to say one or two words more, while we are talking about the works combat groups. It is not the case that the working people in the GDR, people already doing a job, are happy and enthusiastic about doing a second job, that of a soldier, or about continually undergoing training in order — I am quoting

*Mr. Pawelczyk (continued)*

Mr. Böhm again — to become a fighting force almost as good as the National People's Army. All that cannot be true. We all know that the authorities in the GDR, those in power over there, find themselves compelled to introduce military science as a school subject. This is being done not because enthusiasm for the régime is so great but because, in the light of what we know, they believe such instruction might improve willingness to serve the régime. They had to put up with considerable opposition in the GDR to put this into effect. No régime does this sort of thing if people are ready to volunteer to serve it. That is why I cannot agree about the value Mr. Böhm assigns to these organisations.

With regard to the purpose of the MBFR negotiations, the West is concentrating on reducing the armed forces confronting one another, and for this reason it decided from the outset not to demand a reduction of other potentials such as frontier and security forces and so on. Any broadening of the scope of the negotiations to other potentials capable of military use would have resulted in the East counter-claiming the inclusion of other organisations on our side. I might add that the Bundeswehr consists of nearly 500,000 uniformed troops and has over 170,000 civilian staff carrying out various functions. These include jobs which in the Warsaw Pact forces are done by men in uniform.

From these remarks, it follows that those who define the western negotiating position are perfectly aware of the existence of works combat groups in the GDR, but we do not believe that they should be introduced into MBFR. If we included the works combat groups then, as a countermove, other additions would follow. We should be making no progress with this policy, we should not be improving security by one iota. These people are civilians who, in an assessment of armed forces, count as a different and less important category. We ourselves in the Federal Republic employ civilians — I assume the same applies to other NATO states — with functions in the border areas. If we included the works combat groups in the discussion, the basic conditions for the negotiations would be considerably modified and the progress achieved would be called in question. No one in NATO concerned with the MBFR negotiations shares the view that the works combat groups should be included. Mr. Böhm's own government has given him a reply to this effect.

In answer to Mr. Cook, I share his view that we should think very carefully about whether we are conducting our dialogue with China in such a way that we increasingly appear as an exporter of armaments to China. We had

a very full debate here six months ago, so we do not now have to go into all the details.

As for my own opinion, I would say only this. Except in the military field, it is our task and indeed our duty steadily to improve and intensify our relations with China. It is, however, against our interest to support developments that are bound to lead to new East-West confrontations in Europe. This is what will happen if we become purveyors of armaments. We should be presenting the Soviet Union with an opportunity for conducting an entirely different discussion on parity. Speaking personally, I will not be involved in us, by our own actions, handing the Soviet Union the chance to count the Chinese military potential as belonging to the West, and of using this as an arguing point on parities.

It is quite true — and here too I agree with Mr. Cook — that the Soviet armed forces in the Warsaw Pact states have other functions besides military ones; but I think we must not allow ourselves in the MBFR negotiations to give them a bonus, in other words, to let them use reasoning like this for going beyond parity. Quite the contrary, we must hold to our principle of approximate parity.

Now a few remarks to Mr. Baumel. I do not believe that it is the task of this debate, triggered off by my report, to discuss NATO's basic concept on MBFR; that has been decided, we are proceeding in accordance with that concept, and we are pleased that the Warsaw Pact states have at long last accepted essential elements of that concept, making it easier to reach agreement on a first result.

I quite understand that Mr. Baumel wishes the French disarmament proposal to be given due acknowledgement. I have not yet had a chance to read the complete text of his amendments and I am wondering if there might still be a way of somehow paying tribute to the French disarmament concept; for I too believe that this French disarmament proposal contains essential elements that we must take into account. This does not apply to MBFR; nor does that represent the French interest. But I am convinced that in preparing the CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid in 1980 we must include essential elements of the French disarmament proposal. One result might be that we should have to discuss with the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union whether confidence-building measures, which are also an aim of French policy, ought not to be extended geographically as far as the Urals. We know that the Soviet Union has not so far rejected this proposal. But we also know that the Soviet Union has ideas of its own on the area of application stretching as far as the Mediterranean. There are various

*Mr. Pawelczyk (continued)*

suggestions on the table, and in this context the French proposal will be useful in helping us to move forward and thus make a contribution to the stabilisation of security in Europe.

I now come to Mr. Reddemann's remarks. I said at the start that it was not my task to compile a set of figures. I have problems enough when figures are quoted in the way he did with reference to the gross national product. It would then have been necessary to give figures for the gross national product of the Soviet Union and in the United States as well. Of course we both know that the United States GNP is substantially greater. In absolute amounts, allocation of a smaller percentage of the United States GNP to the maintenance and modernisation of its armed forces naturally produces a very different ratio than appears from GNP percentages here. What are we concerned with? We are concerned not with comparisons of gross national products, but with absolute figures. The question is, how much do we in fact spend on our defence efforts? Is it enough to make us secure? Is it in the medium term enough to give us security in the future as well? That is the question we must be asking, that must be the yardstick for the amounts spent.

I spoke a moment ago about the security situation. In my opinion — and this is reflected in the second paragraph of the recommendation — there is parity between East and West if we compare overall potentials, and if we realise that security cannot be assessed on the basis of military potentials alone. But even if I assess the military potentials alone — and only there does the Warsaw Pact have parity, in all other fields it is vastly inferior — the situation is such that security exists at the moment. We shall have security problems in the eighties if we fail to implement the NATO long-term programme or if during the next few years the Soviet Union does not respond to our offer of an armaments control policy and imposes no restraint on itself. If it does not accept the offer, we shall redress the balance by appropriate defence policy efforts in the eighties.

I might mention in this connection that, just at the decisive phase in armaments control policy the government, which rests mainly on my party — we have since then been providing the Federal Chancellor — has in the course of these nearly ten years doubled the defence budget, has fundamentally modernised the arms and equipment programme at a cost of about DM 50,000 million and during that period has made available to NATO the full contingent which the Federal Republic of Germany had been promising since 1956, ever since it became

a member of NATO, without however redeeming its promise. This means that in the seventies we increased the total strength from roughly 460,000 to just 500,000. Judging by the comments I have heard from NATO, none of the leading military or political figures doubts that the Federal Republic makes its full contribution to security.

For Mr. Handlos, one remark on the discussion of data. We are at one in saying that there can be no agreement that sidesteps this discussion. I have dealt with the point at length and do not wish to repeat myself. There was only one remark that I think wrong, when he said "150,000 men have been spirited away". I think our present state of knowledge is such that different criteria for calculation have been applied. We all know, even from within NATO, that there are no two states where the armed forces, subdivided into army, air force and navy, are formed in exactly the same way. This state of affairs exists even within NATO.

In view of the developments we can see in the Soviet Union and among the states of the Warsaw Pact, I do not consider it helpful for us to make, at this stage, polemical remarks on this development. We should clarify the discrepancy with appropriate persistence at the negotiating table. If the Soviet Union withdraws 68,000 men from the reduction area, it is nothing more than a technical event. If a first MBFR agreement leads to this, their return to the reduction area would not be primarily a technical event, it would be a case of serious military escalation. Such steps are not taken from a clear sky but in a period of high tension in the international situation. In other words, a high political barrier is being erected. That is something we should not leave out of account.

On Mr. Müller's points, just the one observation that it is correct that world-wide political developments should be viewed in their totality. I consider, however, that conflict potentials in the world cannot be reduced by broadening the scope of negotiations ad lib. Look for instance at SALT. At one time it was felt that a link should be established between unfavourable developments in Africa and developments in SALT.

There are many problems, and fresh ones will arise in the future. We shall be able to solve them only if we define and clearly delineate each problem area for which we wish to find a solution with the other side, and do not link them with other problems at will. If other serious problems exist — as they do — they must be separately defined and separately discussed and results arrived at. Otherwise we shall not manage to solve the problems between East and West.

*Mr. Pawelczyk (continued)*

If, in conclusion, I assess the position of the Soviet Union in the world as a whole, and take a similar look at the position of the West, I come to the conclusion that the position of the western states is more favourable. What has become of the unity of communism? What has become of the cohesion between Red China and the Soviet Union? Where is the economic strength of the Soviet Union? It intended to overtake us. What has become of this hope in the economic field? If anything the gaps have increased rather than diminished. The Soviet Union has gained a foothold in a few African countries. In some it has lost its influence. I am thinking of Egypt, for example, and might name several other states.

Lastly, I am thinking of CSCE policy. How anxiously we used to follow CSCE policy. Today we may consider that, if anything, the West has benefited more from CSCE than the East. From an overall point of view, therefore, I certainly believe that the West is in a better position vis-à-vis the East. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Now that the Rapporteur has finished, I am bound to point out that we have already considerably overstepped the time-limits allowed in the Orders of the Day. To wind up the debate — and I say “debate” advisedly — on the balance of force, I shall now, with the Assembly’s permission, call the Chairman of the Committee to speak for two minutes. He has promised to be very brief. This will conclude the debate before voting on the other reports on the Orders of the Day.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I hear what you say, and I shall do my best to conform. However, this is an important subject — perhaps the most important that we have to consider this session. Whether or not we agree with the report and with what Mr. Pawelczyk said, we should count ourselves fortunate in this Assembly in having had as our Rapporteur someone who is extremely well qualified as an authority on this subject.

Not only is he chairman of the appropriate committee in the Bundestag, but over the years he has made a study of this extremely difficult subject. As has been said by my colleague, Mr. Cook, the bibliography at the back of Document 809 is extremely valuable. At one time, Mr. President, we in WEU used to publish collections of important documents. Perhaps for economic reasons we can no longer do that, but if we could do so again — and I shall raise this matter in the Presidential Committee — I believe that the list of documents that Mr. Pawelczyk has brought together in his appendix would be

an extremely valuable basic source of material for debates on this subject by our parliaments.

The question of mutual and balanced force reductions in the light of the balance of forces in Central Europe is of very great importance. Certainly it is comparable in standing with the discussions on the SALT agreement which was concluded yesterday. I believe that in spite of what we have heard today, and even though perhaps more voices have been coming today from the Federal Republic of Germany than from other countries represented here, this subject concerns all the countries in WEU.

I hope that this report will stimulate pressure in our national parliaments to ensure that our governments pay urgent attention to trying to find effective solutions to the difficult and sometimes intractable negotiations in Vienna.

Mr. Pawelczyk has given a new stimulus to these negotiations by his report, and in that way he will have achieved an important step forward in terms of the peace of the world. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roper. You have kept within your two minutes.

The debate is closed.

#### **4. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

##### **Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

##### **Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council**

*(Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We now have to take the votes on the draft recommendations in the three reports replying to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council, Documents 801 and Amendments, 808 and Amendments and 806 and Amendments.

Six amendments have been tabled to the draft recommendation on the political activities of the Council, Document 801. We shall take them in the order of the paragraphs in the preamble and the recommendation to which they refer.

I have Amendment 1 from Mr. Druon, reading as follows :



*The President (continued)*

1. In the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "take its place in any future European union" and insert "play a more important rôle as the possibilities of European union progress".

I call Mr. Druon to defend his amendment.

Mr. DRUON (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, in reassuring Mr. Minnocci about the extreme interest attaching to his report, I think that yesterday during the general debate I explained sufficiently clearly the reservations which we might entertain. So I do not need to say very much in support of this amendment.

I was glad to hear Mr. Minnocci say this morning that he did not have it in mind to propose a merger. This is exactly the sense of my amendment. But I do think the idea would be better expressed by the wording which I have proposed, since there is no question of recommending to the Council a merger of WEU in a still hypothetical European union, but of proposing that both WEU and EEC, each in its own sphere of competence, should play their allotted rôles. This in no way goes against our common hopes and needs.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — What is the Committee's opinion on the amendment?

Mr. MINNOCCI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I can accept this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Dejardin to speak against the amendment.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I was not intending to speak, but as nobody else seems to be picking up the gauntlet, I venture to do so myself, because I want to be consistent.

For six weeks throughout an election campaign in Belgium, I loudly proclaimed my hope of one day seeing a united Europe putting a stop to its bickerings, which make it look more like a village writ large than an organised entity.

In this interdependent world, somebody must say so, there are no more independent states; there are, in Europe as in the outer world, no more sovereign states. In the era of the multinationals, when our whole industrial policy is often dictated from decision-making centres outside our own countries and continent, I find completely obsolete all these rearguard actions which, for reasons often of an extremely narrow and national electoral character, seek to rob European youth of the hope that some day nation shall speak with nation, whether they be super-powers or third world developing countries, with one equal voice.

For my part, I support the draft recommendation. I am sorry to see Mr. Minnocci allowing himself to be led astray by this cascade of amendments from our French friends which are, however, as consistent with the positions defended by their government as they are with their own aims during the past few weeks.

As far as I am concerned, I want to say here how much I hope to live one day as a European, and no longer with everyone, Frenchman, Englishman, German or Belgian, keeping to his own small corner. I shall therefore vote against the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Amendment 1, presented by Mr. Druon, to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 1 is negatived.*

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — Mr. President, is it possible to take another vote on this amendment?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I believe there has been no material mistake. The division bells worked properly, and all who wished to vote had a chance to come into the Chamber and speak for or against the amendment. Is there any confusion regarding the vote? (*Cries of No*)

I hear No, Mr. Roper...

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — I hear Yes, but let it pass...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The amendment is negatived.

We come now to Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Druon. I will read it out:

2. In the eighth paragraph of the preamble, leave out "leading to integration".

I call Mr. Druon to defend this amendment.

Mr. DRUON (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, this amendment is to repudiate any concept that tries to found the unification of European policies on what is meant by the term "integration" — that is, as we must honestly admit, an attenuation of national responsibilities. You can hardly speak of strictly European integration as things actually are now.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — What is the Committee's opinion?

Mr. MINNOCCI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I explained in my report, in my presentation to the Assembly and in my reply this morning that, in using the word "integration", I had not the slightest intention of referring to integration with NATO, but to European

*Mr. Minnocci (continued)*

integration, which is quite impossible if it does not also include foreign policy and defence.

I would therefore ask Mr. Druon, if he agrees with what I have said, to withdraw his amendment. If he maintains it, I must ask the Assembly to reject it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mrs. von Bothmer to speak against the amendment.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I would recommend that we keep to the Committee's wording.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Druon to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 2 is negatived.*

We come now to Mr. Druon's Amendment 3. I will read it out :

3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "to be a positive contribution" to the end of the paragraph and insert "to be a necessary complement to the establishment of a European union".

I call Mr. Druon to defend this amendment.

Mr. DRUON (*France*) (Translation). — I shall speak to this amendment because it answers the same concerns as Amendment 1. It is simply a matter of agreed definitions, of leaving no ambiguities. All I am asking in this amendment is for a clear division of tasks between WEU and the other European institutions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

What is the Committee's opinion ?

Mr. MINNOCCI (*Italy*) (Translation). — I oppose the amendment, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Mr. Druon's Amendment 3 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 3 is negatived.*

We come now to Mr. Druon's Amendment 4. I will read it out :

4. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "in the context of direct elections to the European Parliament".

I call Mr. Druon to support the amendment.

Mr. DRUON (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, this amendment simply says that the election to the assembly of the European Communities by direct universal suffrage in no way changes its powers and/or its character.

Consequently, we must not expect any qualitative leap forward in the construction of Europe from this new system of election. This was my reason for tabling Amendment 4.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — What is the Committee's opinion ?

Mr. MINNOCCI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, when the recommendation was approved in Committee the European Parliament elections had not yet been held and it was therefore only possible to speak of a future possibility.

Now that the elections are over I can accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

I accordingly put Mr. Druon's Amendment 4 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 4 is agreed to.*

We now come to Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Druon, which reads as follows :

5. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "of including WEU" to the end of the paragraph and insert "whereby WEU might better concert security policies as political co-operation between the member states of the EEC develops".

I call Mr. Druon to support the amendment.

Mr. DRUON (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, this amendment follows logically on my Amendments 1, 2 and 3. I am not proposing that we should embark on another EDC, as the Rapporteur would like, or seems to suggest, but that the definition should indeed amount to an association of sovereign states labouring towards a progressive rapprochement of their foreign or defence policies.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — What is the Committee's opinion ?

Mr. MINNOCCI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, may I point out that Mr. Urwin and others have tabled Amendment 6 to delete paragraph 4 of the recommendation in its entirety. If that amendment, which should be taken first, were accepted, there would no longer be any point to Amendment 5.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Rapporteur, your President has taken a different

*The President (continued)*

view. Had we voted immediately on Mr. Urwin's amendment and adopted it, we should not have to pronounce on the other two amendments which relate to a paragraph that would have been deleted. When the Assembly has voted on these I shall propose that it decide whether paragraph 4 should be deleted or not.

I think that is the clearest and simplest way of proceeding.

Mr. MINNOCCI (*Italy*) (Translation). — In that case I oppose the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Margue to speak against the amendment.

Mr. MARGUE (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). — Mr. Druon tells us that his Amendment 5 followed logically on Amendments 1, 2 and 3. As these have been rejected, it is only logical for the Assembly to reject Amendment 5 as well.

This is the dividing-line between those who wish to maintain the *status quo* in Europe — that swamp in which we have for decades been floundering and settling deeper and deeper, because some political groups are opposed to further efforts towards union — and those who hope against hope that a policy of merger will inevitably have repercussions in the fields of foreign and defence policy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Mr. Druon's Amendment 5 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

*Amendment 5 is negatived.*

We now come to Amendment 6, tabled by Mr. Urwin and others :

6. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 4.

I call Mr. Urwin.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — This amendment to the recommendation contained in paragraph 4 was in my name and was supported also by a number of members of the Socialist Group. I would, however, expect and hope that it would attract wide support across the political spectrum in this Assembly. Perhaps I may be permitted to explain my reasons, not at too great length, for I appreciate the importance of time for business.

It is clear from the report and recommendations that, despite his protestations, Mr. Minnoccini is suggesting some form of integration of WEU within the European Community so far as that body's responsibilities are concerned to include foreign and defence policies. There was a reference to direct elections to the European Parlia-

ment but it should be clearly understood that direct elections should not and do not change in any way the rôle and function of WEU. I recall with great clarity that during those elections a dual mandate was advocated. In those circumstances, Western European Union and the Council of Europe are now the only assemblies where parliamentarians from national parliaments can meet, and WEU has an even more significant and important rôle as the only forum in Europe where parliamentarians can debate defence matters.

I submit that the importance of these two institutions has been greatly enhanced rather than decreased as a result of the direct elections. WEU has a vital rôle — to supervise the implementation of the mutual commitments of the seven member states who are parties to the revised Brussels Treaty. There is no doubt that the European Parliament will devise its own foreign policy and no one can blame it or object to that ; but one must repeat that the Community has no mandate to deal with issues of European defence.

Yesterday Mr. Thorn made it absolutely clear beyond contradiction that there is nothing in the Treaty of Rome that enables us to commit the European Parliament to interfere as a body in any sense in defence matters and to fulfil the requirements of this paragraph recommendation 4 presents a significant task to parliamentarians in the directly-elected parliament — to change the Treaty of Rome. That would also entail the absolute need to change the Brussels Treaty, not so formidable a proposition but certainly one which would be fraught with great difficulties.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was the linchpin of European defence policy, and I submit to this Assembly that we are treading a dangerous path indeed if, by adopting this recommendation, we are prepared to allocate responsibility for European defence to the European Parliament. It is against this background that I confidently call for support for my amendment to delete paragraph 4.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mrs. von Bothmer to speak against the amendment.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I am sorry, Mr. President, but we have just accepted Mr. Druon's amendments. If I understood correctly that is what has happened. The earlier motion therefore becomes practically irrelevant. But we cannot have a vote on whether we reject the whole paragraph. We have accepted by a majority the amendments tabled by Mr. Druon. These amendments in my view cover exactly what Mr. Urwin is putting forward on behalf of the socialist group.

*Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)*

I find myself in difficulty and do not know what the procedure is under the Rules of Procedure.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Although Mr. Urwin knows that an amendment to paragraph 4 has been accepted, he is proposing rejection of the text as amended.

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, our honourable friend, Mrs. von Bothmer, has spoken on a point of order, but not on the substance of the amendment, and I trust you will allow me to fill the gap.

Mr. Urwin makes much of the fact that — as it is the case — his amendment has a number of co-signatories from the Socialist Group. But not all the signatories are socialists.

I want to point out that, unfortunately, here once again, the Labour Party must not be mistaken for any of the other European socialist parties; and I am sorry to say that its position in the present instance is once more at variance with that of the Belgian French-speaking socialist party. We find ourselves up against a fundamentally political vote, a different conception of Europe amongst one another — the *Europe des patries*, the Europe of nation states, the Europe of private interest and selfishness, a Europe divided or a united Europe capable of playing tomorrow its essential rôle of holding the scales even between the superpowers — a balancing act and of relating to and holding a dialogue with the countries of the third world — and where we stand now, that is impossible.

When Mr. Urwin says that in the newly-elected European Parliament there would not be any more national parliamentarians, it may be true for the British, but happily for other countries, including Belgium, there will be some parliamentarians who will, at our request, accept a twofold mandate. So the argument will not hold water.

And when my honourable friend, Mr. Urwin, says that the WEU Assembly is the only forum in which parliamentarians can discuss defence, I beg to observe that the parliamentary Assembly of WEU is precisely only a forum in which we make speeches, vote recommendations and take votes having no binding character for the Council of Ministers, so that we often utter pious hopes.

If we want tomorrow's Europe to be a reality, I am sorry to say so in the presence of eminent historians, among whom I do not number myself, conservatism has never spelt progress. And in the forward march of history, the European Parliament, by the will of universal suffrage,

will see its powers enlarged, for, such is the ordained path of history, it will have won them.

I, personally, hope we in WEU will not stand aside from the forward march of history, and not hold aloof from the centres of discussion and decision-making. Therefore, I applaud the fact that we are drawing closer together — and the prophecy, which I prefer to the cure; I applaud the prediction of future events. With unqualified enthusiasm, therefore, I support paragraph 4 of this recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Urwin.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. I am sorry that my colleague, Mr. Dejardin, has seen fit to take issue with me in the public fashion in which he has just expressed himself. Mr. Dejardin was not present at the Socialist Group yesterday and, therefore, is completely unaware that the amendment I have proposed was not the work of the British Labour Party within the Socialist Group of WEU but was the product of the whole Socialist Group of WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix on a point of order.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I should like to remind you that it is the rule in every parliament that an amendment for a deletion going further than a rewording takes priority in voting. Consequently, I inform the Assembly that if Mr. Urwin's amendment to delete paragraph 4 is adopted, I shall reintroduce Mr. Druon's former Amendment 5 as a new amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — So you propose this amendment, if Mr. Urwin's amendment is adopted?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — As a new amendment, as it was rejected just now.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Minnocci.

Mr. MINNOCCI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I simply wanted to say that I am opposed to Mr. Urwin's amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation) — Now that everyone is informed, I put Mr. Urwin's Amendment 6 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 6 is agreed to.*

Consequently, paragraph 4 as amended falls.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, would you allow me to move

Mr. Valleix (continued)

again in my own name the amendment properly tabled by Mr. Druon which was set aside just now, whereas the Assembly had not pronounced on the amendment calling for deletion of paragraph 4 of the recommendation?

You might think — as I do — that we should stop treating WEU as some phantom organisation in which we are, so to speak, suspended like acrobats between heaven and earth. WEU exists, with official structures, in accordance with the modified Brussels Treaty, and with a precise remit: either we fulfil it or we do not.

I should hope nevertheless we are able to agree that there are two possible mistakes: one would be to regard ourselves as being already practically in an Atlantic integration; the other would be to regard ourselves as being in advance in a kind of European integration. It happens not to be true in the one case nor the other, *de facto* nor, for that matter, *de jure*.

I trust that Europe will be able to come into being, *de facto* and *de jure*, and if possible from the heart, so that it would not finally behave, so to say, as if it were out of step all the time.

I see no magic solution either in being reduced solely to protection by the Atlantic Alliance and NATO, or in an EDC-type procedure which has, whether or not one regrets it, been rejected in the past and which — as Mr. Urwin reminded us a moment ago — is no part of the present brief of the European Communities.

If tomorrow we want to act differently — I refer to statements in this Assembly yesterday afternoon at nearly the same time of day, by Mr. Thorn — it is up to our states, and, let us face it, us parliamentarians in each of our countries, to make sure there is a change, if that is what we want.

In the current state of affairs I cannot understand our opting out of our task, that of WEU, the clear task of European defence, or on the other hand failing to make this institution work, as it is capable of doing, by failing to propose — and it is in this respect that I think Mr. Druon's amendment is ultimately positive — rather than having a blank space instead of the proposal in paragraph 4 of the recommendation, such apt co-operation that should be beneficial to progress of the European idea on the one hand and of Europe's defence on the other. For the European Communities and WEU must not glare at one another like cat and dog, nor should we appear to think already that the European Communities are replacing us, which would surprise me and is legally meaningless.

I think that Mr. Druon's Amendment 5 does in fact represent a concrete proposal.

Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom). — I have a point of order, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — Yes, Mr. Grieve?

Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom). — As I understand it, my colleague, Mr. Valleix, is now seeking to amend a paragraph which the Assembly has completely rejected. It seems to me that, while that may give him an opportunity to make another speech in the debate, it really serves no useful purpose at all.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, my impression is that this new amendment of Mr. Valleix's is out of order. It is at least my personal opinion.

The amendment he wants to renew in his own name has in fact been rejected by the Assembly, and even the text it referred to has been taken out.

But I want to be very open-minded and consult the Assembly as to whether the amendment is acceptable.

Mr. Grieve has the floor.

Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom) (Translation). — Mr. President, there is nothing left to amend.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — That is what I have just said but the author might reintroduce the text of the amended paragraph as he is doing, but so far I have not been given it.

Mr. VALLEIX (France) (Translation). — There must be no ambiguity about the procedure. Clearly we are perfectly entitled to discuss the acceptability of the amendment I am moving again, just as you are entitled to tell me that the time-limit for tabling amendments has expired.

In this respect I realise my proposal is a shaky one, which is why I defer to the wisdom of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Since the author of the amendment agrees, I think the Assembly is also agreeable.

We shall now proceed to vote on the amended draft recommendation as a whole, Document 801.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

I note that there are.

In that case we shall take a vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Milz.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

*The President (continued)*

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote, after rectification, is as follows<sup>1</sup> :

Number of votes cast .....	46
Ayes .....	27
Noes .....	14
Abstentions .....	5

*The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted*<sup>2</sup>.

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I want to say two sentences on the vote. On behalf of my colleagues Böhm, Handlos, Mende and Müller, as well as on my own behalf, I wish to state that we were entirely in agreement with the intentions of the report. However, as a result of the numerous amendments adopted, the recommendation has acquired an anti-integration character and that is why, in the interests of European unification, we wanted to vote against the motion, which we have now done.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. The next item on our Orders of the Day puts me in a difficult position. I should like you to be not up there in the chair, but down here beside me as Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. I would prefer you to be beside me when we consider the amendments to your report. Will you therefore consider deferring this item until you have left the chair, or is one of your colleagues about to take the chair ?

The PRESIDENT. — Another Vice-President can take the chair while I come to join you.

(*Mr. Stoffelen, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

The next item is the vote on the draft recommendation on the application of the Brussels Treaty — reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council, Document 808 and Amendments.

Two amendments have been tabled by Mr. van Waterschoot. We shall take Amendment 1 first, followed by Amendment 2.

I call Mr. van Waterschoot to support Amendment 1 which reads :

1. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

“2. Keep the Assembly informed, by whatever means it considers appropriate, of the results already achieved in the study undertaken by the SAC, of the progress made and of the goals towards which its work is directed ;”.

Mr. van WATERSCHOOT (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the two amendments relating to the otherwise excellent report by my colleague Mr. Tanghe do not in themselves affect its content. They are formal amendments to the wording of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the actual recommendation. What is involved is a matter of co-ordination, just as it is with paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft recommendation I shall be introducing and speaking to tomorrow on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Since there is no procedure for co-ordinating our work in advance, I thought that submitting these two amendments was the best way of raising the problem of co-ordination, and perhaps of arriving at a full or partial solution. Unhappily I have not had an opportunity to take up contacts on this beforehand. It concerns the line to be taken by the recommendations submitted by the Rapporteur and by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. In both cases it is a question of proposing to the Council of Ministers that our Assembly be told, so far as it is possible and desirable, about the work of the Standing Armaments Committee, and of encouraging the Council to derive maximum advantage from the work of the SAC, to benefit the defence of Europe.

It seems to me basically useful and necessary for there to be a positive and stimulating degree of tension between the executive and the Assembly, ensuring the best possible interaction and co-operation. It is a matter of the procedure for what we are asking the Council to do.

I want to say something, first of all, about paragraph 2. The draft recommendation from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments calls on the Council to communicate to the Assembly the juridical section of the SAC's study on the European armaments industry. In the General Affairs Committee's text, on the other hand, the Council is asked only to keep the Assembly informed, by whatever means the Council itself judges appropriate, of both the results achieved by the SAC study and the present state of the work, and if possible also of the further goals towards which this work is directed. Hence my first amendment, proposing the taking-over verbatim — with co-ordination in mind — of the wording used by the General Affairs Committee, which is as follows :

1. See page 31.

2. See page 32.

*Mr. van Waterschoot (continued)*

"Keep the Assembly informed, by whatever means it considers appropriate, of the results already achieved in the study undertaken by the SAC, of the progress made and of the goals towards which its work is directed ;"

I repeat that this is not a matter affecting the principle, but one of political expediency. As Rapporteur for the General Affairs Committee I have become convinced — everything points in this direction — that if the Council were immediately to publish the juridical part of the SAC study, which is now complete, this would have adverse rather than positive consequences. Publication means, after all, placing before the public gaze. You may be sure that certain governments would think twice before providing further information, certainly if this involved classified or restricted information that might or might not contain military secrets. Even if the governments give their agreement to publication of the juridical part, they will set conditions on further publication. This introduces the risk of the SAC being very cautious in its future work, and of the goal we are pursuing together perhaps not being achieved. I still believe that the wording used by the General Affairs Committee, as set out in the first amendment, will be accepted in this spirit. Our aim is exactly the same — that of a maximum of appropriate information for the Assembly, information that will genuinely promote the policy of European co-operation.

I would add that it would be extremely useful, for the symposium to be held in Brussels in October, if this information could be made available in a suitable form before that date.

On the second amendment, I can be brief, and I am less insistent. It concerns a problem with paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation in Mr. Tanghe's report. Where I am concerned, there is much less question of co-ordination here, there being far less inconsistency between the two texts. There might however be a certain amount of confusion as to the powers of the Assembly and of the executive. The SAC is a ministerial organ, subordinate to and responsible to the WEU Council of Ministers. It would be useful, therefore, to find a form of words that would not give the impression that our rôle, as an Assembly, of monitoring and criticising could be weakened. So it seems to me that paragraph 3 ought to be worded more carefully.

The PRESIDENT. — I fear that you are confusing things.

Mr. van WATERSCHOOT (*Belgium*). — If you prefer to deal now with Amendment 1, would you give me two minutes later to speak to Amendment 2 ?

The PRESIDENT. — Yes, when we come to deal with Amendment 2, but now we are dealing with Amendment 1.

Does anyone else wish to speak to Amendment 1 ?...

What is the opinion of the Committee?... Mr. Tanghe ?

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — We have a saying, Mr. President, that it is only your friends that do the dirty on you. My friend and colleague Mr. van Waterschoot is seeking to amend the text of paragraph 2 of the recommendation.

(*The speaker continued in French*)

He is right in saying that this first amendment is not so much a matter of content as of form. He is a lot more cautious than the Rapporteur. Evidently we both know the Council and its habits.

The Rapporteur had proposed the more general phrase of "communicate to the Assembly the juridical section of the study on the European armaments industry, etc." and the author of the amendment says: "Keep the Assembly informed, by whatever means it considers appropriate, of the results already achieved in the study undertaken by the SAC".

Well, for once I agree with all these courtesies. If the Council will give us what we want, I am prepared to accept Mr. van Waterschoot's amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I put Mr. van Waterschoot's Amendment 1 to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

Now we have to deal with Amendment 2, and I call on you, Mr. van Waterschoot, to support, as briefly as possible, your Amendment 2, which reads :

2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

"3. Take the fullest account of the Assembly's recommendations in defining any new task allotted to the SAC ;".

Mr. van WATERSCHOOT (*Belgium*). — Let me first make a point of order. There is an expression in French *Les peuples heureux n'ont pas d'histoire*. I think that Mr. Tanghe is a happy man. He has accepted this amendment. We have had him fêted some days ago in Belgium for his twenty-five years of parliamen-

*Mr. van Waterschoot (continued)*

tary activity, and that is one of the reasons for his happiness. I shall be very brief Mr. President.

*(The speaker continued in Dutch)*

(Translation). — As I have already said, I can be quite brief about the second amendment. This does not, like the first amendment, concern the need for co-ordination. I feel, however, that the wording of the recommendation from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments could lead to confusion as to the rôle of the Assembly and that of the executive. I would like to support my second amendment as an illustration of a possible more careful though broader wording. I have to add to this that were I submitting it now I would have made it more complete, and would have put in part of the text of the original recommendation, making it read :

“Take the fullest account of the Assembly’s recommendations in defining any new task allotted to the SAC ;”.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?

I give the floor to the Chairman of the Committee and the Rapporteur.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am unable to give the opinion of my Committee, since we have been unable to consider this this morning, but, in the light of what has been said, I suggest a sub-amendment, which would be acceptable to the Rapporteur and, I believe, to myself and Mr. van Waterschoot, to take the first eight words from Amendment 2 : “Take the fullest account of the Assembly’s recommendations” and then continue : “and consider...” and so on as in paragraph 3. I am proposing a sub-amendment to add the first eight words of Mr. Valleix’s amendment as a new introduction to paragraph 3, so that the paragraph would read :

“Take the fullest account of the Assembly’s recommendations and consider the possibility of incorporating...”

The PRESIDENT. — I give the floor to Mr. van Waterschoot to give his opinion on this proposed amendment, but I call first Mr. Tanghe.

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*). — I entirely agree with the Chairman of the Committee.

*(The speaker continued in Dutch)*

(Translation). — There is a proverb that “one good turn deserves another”. We accepted the first amendment.

*(The speaker continued in English)*

Please accept the new wording of the Chairman of my Committee.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. van Waterschoot, could you give your opinion and say whether you would agree to this change in the amendment ?

Mr. van WATERSCHOOT (*Belgium*). — We shall not exchange Flemish quotations, but I am very glad that Mr. Tanghe and the Chairman of the Committee have taken a step in my direction. Yesterday I was quite impressed by the exposition of Mr. Tanghe and I understood that there was quite a background to this problem last year. That is why I stress that I am very glad that the Chairman and Rapporteur have accepted a move in that direction, and I entirely agree with their proposition.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now vote on Mr. van Waterschoot’s Amendment 2 as amended. I take it there is no confusion about the text.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 2, as amended, is agreed to.*

The Assembly will vote now on the draft recommendation in Document 808, as amended.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions and the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ? ...

Are there any abstentions ? ...

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

Next, the report on scientific, technological and aerospace questions, Document 806 and Amendments. Before we deal with the draft recommendation, we shall deal with the four amendments.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. Scheffler presents his apologies ; he is unable to be with us. This is a drafting amendment which I hope you will allow me, Sir, to put forward to improve the text. It is to insert “further” after “stimulate”.

The PRESIDENT. — I put the drafting amendment to a vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The manuscript amendment is agreed to.*

We have to deal with four amendments which have been circulated. Amendment 1 has been tabled by Mr. Valleix :

1. See page 33.



*The President (continued)*

1. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

“Examine the possibilities of all-European co-operation in energy matters ;”.

First we must deal with a sub-amendment which I understand Mr. Scheffler wishes to propose to Mr. Valleix's Amendment 1, to leave out “3. Examine the possibilities of all-European co-operation in energy matters” and insert “examining the possibilities of European co-operation in energy matters” as a new sub-paragraph to paragraph 2.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, let me assure you straight away : I shall be brief on Amendments 2 and 3.

I agree with the Rapporteur's counter-proposal to make my Amendment 1 read as follows : “examine the possibilities of European co-operation in energy matters”, and to insert it in paragraph 2 (c) of the recommendation.

I can therefore go along with this purely formal editorial proposal, and would simply ask Mr. Warren to consider that in using the term “all-European” I had in mind that it is not our practice to deal with the problems of both Europes, East and West.

I also go along with Mr. Scheffler's observation : in the introduction I propose to that clause of the sentence it is wrong to insist on the all-European aspect, East and West.

I would hope, however, that in adopting the term “European” and not “all-European” we agree with Mr. Scheffler. But I also hope that he will also include the idea of studying energy supplies from Eastern to Western Europe, for these contribute about 5 % of our requirements. This means that in peacetime it is a source of supply which costs us less in certain currencies than others do. But it must be realised that if, God forbid, conflicts arose, this source of supply would of course dry up.

So, if the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the Committee will agree to include the idea that the study should also extend in that direction, I go along with the proposals of the Rapporteur.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. Does anyone wish to speak against this sub-amendment ?

I shall put Mr. Scheffler's sub-amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*The manuscript amendment is agreed to.*

That means that the original Amendment 1 falls. Since the proposed amendment, as now amended, refers to the end of paragraph 2, we shall consider that now.

I must therefore ask Mr. Valleix if he wishes to add anything.

Does anyone wish to speak against ? ...

What is the opinion of the Committee ? ...

I take it that the Committee agrees.

I now put to the vote the amendment of Mr. Valleix, as amended.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 1, as amended, is agreed to.*

I now call Lord Northfield to speak in support of his Amendment 4.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). — Lord Northfield has asked me to move his amendment. I do not think that it requires a long speech, because the substance is obvious. I understand that it is generally acceptable. I am told that had the Rapporteur been here, he would have indicated his willingness to accept this amendment on behalf of the Committee. I hope that Mr. Warren, the Chairman of the Committee, will confirm that acceptance. I beg to move.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. In order to avoid any confusion, I shall read the text of Amendment 4.

4. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph as follows :

“(c) co-operation on the safety and environmental impact of nuclear facilities, particularly where they create transfrontier dangers ;”.

Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 4 ? ...

What is the opinion of the Committee ? ...

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — The Committee is in favour of this amendment. I ask you to note that if it is accepted, it will become sub-paragraph (d). I hope that Lord Northfield will be kind enough to raise this subject at the Council of Europe in due course, as I think it has implications for all of Western Europe.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. I shall now put Lord Northfield's Amendment 4 to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 4 is agreed to.*

I now call Mr. Valleix to support his Amendment 2, which is :

*The President (continued)*

2. After the new paragraph, add a second new paragraph as follows :

“Start a detailed and continuing dialogue with the oil-producing countries with a view to adjusting production capabilities and requirements ;”.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, after the total eight minutes I was allowed yesterday afternoon, there is no need for me to revert to this amendment, which I have already introduced and on which I have nothing to add except that I believe the Rapporteur agrees with me.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 2 ? ...

What is the opinion of the Committee ? ...

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — We agree to the amendment. I am sorry, Mr. President, but I was taking advice from my clerk, which is usually contrary to my own. But I want to say that the Committee agrees.

The PRESIDENT. — A perfect clarification. The Committee agrees.

I now put Amendment 2 to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 2 is agreed to.*

I now call Mr. Valleix to move Amendment 3, which is :

3. In the original paragraph 3, leave out from “by promoting” to the end of the paragraph.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, it may be a surprise for you or make your task an easier one, but I support, not my own Amendment 3, but the Rapporteur’s. I therefore submit to the procedure of amendment, or sub-amendment, whichever you wish, now that the Rapporteur has made a counter-proposal.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Warren.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — I am sure that Mr. Valleix is right, and I am sure that Mr. Scheffler is right. I think the proper way of wording this would be to say “by promoting co-operation” as the alternative to the words that have been put down. I hope that we can meet Mr. Valleix on this matter. I think the suggestion of a merger is not what Mr. Scheffler was prepared to accept. I hope that Mr. Valleix will be prepared to accept that instead of the word “merger” we can meet his proposals by the insertion of the word “co-operation”. I hope that

Mr. Valleix accepts this proposal. That is the suggestion of the Committee.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — In a spirit of conciliation I accept the word “co-operation”.

The PRESIDENT. — We can therefore now vote on this amendment as amended, and I ask members to do so by sitting and standing.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — I am sorry, Mr. President, but I wonder whether I might be quite clear about this. I believe Mr. Valleix would be willing to withdraw his amendment if the words “a merger” are changed to the word “co-operation”, and I would hope that that is the amendment on which we are now voting. Could I have that assurance ?

The PRESIDENT. — As I understand it, your suggestion has been accepted by Mr. Valleix, but that means a change in the text, and that therefore means an amendment. To avoid any confusion, I shall read the text of the amendment on which we are now voting. It is to leave out “a merger” and insert “co-operation”. That is the text of the amendment.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The manuscript amendment is agreed to.*

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 806, as amended.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Committee agrees, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I understand that there has been a manuscript amendment from Mr. Adriaensens relating to paragraph 2 (a). I do not know whether you have received it, but, in his absence, perhaps I may move it on his behalf. It is an amendment which is acceptable to the Committee, and it is a very small one. May I do that, please ?

The PRESIDENT. — I think we can discuss only the amendments which have been tabled and supported, and I personally have not seen any amendment proposed by Mr. Adriaensens. I do not see how we can possibly discuss a non-existent document. We should have to delay the whole vote, which would give rise to enormous confusion. I therefore want to go on, if you do not mind, and vote on the draft recommendation in Document 806.

Are there any objections ? ...

Are there any abstentions ? ...

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

1. See page 34.

### 5. *The balance of force*

(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 809 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the vote on the draft recommendation on the balance of force, Document 809 and Amendments.

The first amendment is by Mr. Baumel. I hope he is present. I call Mr. Baumel, or, on his behalf, his Substitute, Mr. Valleix, to support Amendment 1, which I shall read :

1. Leave out the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :

“Noting the East-West economic and military balance, but concerned by the Warsaw Pact’s superiority in several fields on the central front and by the Soviet military doctrine of ‘daring thrusts’ against NATO forces which can be perceived as a substantial threat by the NATO countries ;”.

Do you want to support this amendment, as briefly as possible, Mr. Valleix ?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, as you asked me so nicely to defend this amendment, I acquiesce, but beg you to excuse Mr. Baumel who in view of our timetable has not been able to stay.

This amendment is, in sum, essentially a drafting change, to emphasise the fact that European security mainly rests upon East-West equilibrium, which has to be noted as a fact.

Therefore, Mr. Rapporteur, it might, just when moves of various kinds are being made to promote disarmament, be inadvisable to describe in advance the balance as being in favour of the West, which could only weaken the western countries’ negotiating position.

Therefore also the amendment, which is more editorial than a point of substance, in my view carries a certain political implication I believe to be favourable for the West.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). — I suggest that there is a fault in the wording of this amendment. It is merely a drafting error, but it says : “... can be perceived as a substantial threat by the NATO countries”. It really ought to be, “... can be perceived by the NATO countries as a threat”. Do you follow the difference ? There is no threat coming from the NATO countries ; it is a threat to the NATO countries. The wording would therefore be better, I believe, if it read : “... can be perceived by the NATO countries as a threat”.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. I ask Mr. Valleix, on behalf of Mr. Baumel, to give his opinion on this drafting amendment. I see that Mr. Valleix agrees with this drafting amendment.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Yes.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

May we have the opinion of the Committee on this Amendment 1, Mr. Pawelczyk ?

Mr. PAWELCZYK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I ask that Mr. Baumel’s amendment be negated. This paragraph was intended to show that, taking into consideration both economic and military forces, that is, taken overall, in a global comparison between West and East, we, the West, are in a more favourable position, but that in an assessment of the specifically military ratio of forces in Central Europe the East has a superiority.

If we were to go along with Mr. Baumel’s amendment we should be saying that there is parity in economic power between East and West, and that is not the case.

The PRESIDENT. — I now put Mr. Baumel’s Amendment 1, as amended by the drafting amendment that we have just discussed, to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1, as amended, is negated.

I now call Mr. Valleix, on behalf of Mr. Baumel, to support Amendment 2, which I now quote :

2. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble, leave out “approximate” ; after “in the area” insert “and throughout the continent”.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I think we are dealing with matters important enough for the accuracy of the vocabulary used to be commensurate with the precision of our thinking. To speak of an “approximate” balance of forces is a notion somewhat difficult to grasp, to say the very least : either there is a balance or there is not.

As for the second part of the amendment, it is more important, for it emphasises that Europe’s security rests on the balance of force “throughout the continent”. And in the French text, the word “zone” is obviously ambiguous, for it is not clear to what the demonstrative adjective “cette” refers. Does it mean Europe as a whole ?

Hence I think it would be clearer to reword the phrase as follows : “and throughout the continent”.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

May we have the opinion of the Committee ?...

I call Mr. Pawelczyk.

Mr. PAWELCZYK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I am sorry, but I must ask that this amendment be negated too. I agree with my colleagues that we must operate with clear definitions. On the NATO side, the MBR concept involves the clear idea that we want to establish an approximate balance. I have therefore taken over the exact formula as agreed by NATO and request that we keep to this officially adopted formula as our basis.

If we were to go along with the second amendment there would be a risk of the armed forces of the United States not being included in the ratio. But we want to effect the assessment of our security on the basis of including the United States as well, that is, not on the strength of the European region alone. I therefore ask that we keep to the present version.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Pawelczyk.

I shall now put Mr. Baumel's amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 2 is negated.*

I now call Mr. Valleix to support Amendment 3 :

3. At the beginning of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Urge member governments : " and accordingly leave out "to" in lines one and two of paragraph 1".

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — The reply the Rapporteur has just given is wholly typical of a rather fundamental misunderstanding between us, to say the least. My understanding is, in short, that a WEU report, like Mr. Pawelczyk's, can only be understood in the light of a vocabulary used by the Atlantic Alliance, and particularly by NATO, since *cette zone* refers to the NATO area.

True, my doubt on the application of the word area to the European dimension did not necessarily extend to America. I see we are piling one disagreement upon another, which is going to make voting impossible this evening.

Amendment 3 attributes to the Council a function which stems directly from the Brussels Treaty, namely comparison between member states and their strategy. It is, indeed, for the Council to perform the tasks in paragraph 1, and not for the individual governments.

Consequently, I think there is no dispute between us on the matter ; and if we can agree for once, it will be a red-letter day.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment before I give the floor to Mr. Pawelczyk ?

I call Mr. Pawelczyk to give us his opinion on Amendment 3.

Mr. PAWELCZYK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I say without polemics : we shall agree on one occasion — the sixth amendment. But I am sorry that now I must once again ask that the amendment should not be agreed to. In draft recommendations it is a regular and unvarying formula that the Assembly recommends that the Council urge member governments. We are asking that the member governments be urged to include precisely paragraphs 1 to 3 and not just a part of them. That is where our positions on this issue diverge. My request is that, inasmuch as we are dealing with defence matters, we follow the practice which — I had someone check up on this — we have been following for more than ten years, in other words, that we choose the formula by which the Assembly recommends that the Council urge member states to develop certain activities in matters of defence.

Incidentally, what I have just said applies equally to the next amendment, which links up with this one and has the same meaning.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Pawelczyk.

I now put Mr. Baumel's Amendment 3 to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 3 is negated.*

Mr. Baumel has tabled Amendment 4 :

4. At the beginning of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert "Urge member governments" ; leave out "allied" and insert "their".

I now call Mr. Valleix to support Amendment 4.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. Since we have rejected Amendment 3, Amendment 4 surely falls. One does not now need to introduce the question of urging the member governments, because that is introduced at the beginning of the recommendation. Am I not right in saying that we do not need to consider the amendment in its entirety ?

The PRESIDENT. — I do not completely share your opinion, Mr. Roper. You are right about the first part of the amendment, but not about the second part. There is a difference

*The President (continued)*

between Amendments 3 and 4. Mr. Valleix wishes to support the amendment and would like to see it voted upon. I shall therefore ask him to support it, and after that I shall put it to the vote by sitting and standing.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the first part of this amendment is its own justification as is the Committee's reply.

I would simply add that Amendment 4 also proposes to leave out "allied" and insert "their".

On this point, I await the Committee's answer.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

What is the opinion of the Committee ?...

Has Mr. Pawelczyk anything to add to what he has already said ?

Mr. PAWELCZYK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I have already commented on Amendment 4 when commenting on Amendment 3. I would ask that the original version be allowed to stand.

The PRESIDENT. — I now put Mr. Baumel's Amendment 4 to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 4 is negatived.*

Mr. Valleix, on a point of order.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — By your leave, Mr. President, I will make a simple remark.

At this point in the discussions and in view of the spirit of dialogue shown — irrespective, moreover, of the individual position of some WEU member states — I believe the best solution is to revert to our Rules of Procedure, Rule 36 (1) of which stipulates, on the subject of the quorum: "The Assembly shall not take any decision unless more than half the Representatives are present".

I believe that at the stage we have reached it would serve no useful purpose to continue the discussion irregularly as it is already twenty to seven.

Thank you in advance for considering my point of order.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Valleix is completely right in indicating that for a long time we have had the practice of trying to continue dealing with draft recommendations as long as

no one protests. As Mr. Valleix is apparently protesting against this, my only conclusion is that I must act as prescribed by our rules.

I see that Mr. Roper has something to say concerning Rule 36.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I have, indeed, but what I was wondering was whether, when we are within sight of completing the amendments, it would be possible for us to carry on and complete them. Obviously, when it comes to the vote on the text as a whole, it would be appropriate, as is our practice, to put that off until tomorrow, but we are within one amendment of completing the amendments, and there would be considerable advantage to all members of the Assembly in carrying on. It would be particularly to the advantage of our Rapporteur, who has commitments elsewhere, if we could complete the amendments. I add that Mr. Valleix will get some satisfaction from the Committee when we get to Amendment 6.

The PRESIDENT. — Just to clarify the position, I point out that for three or four years the practice has been to go on although, strictly speaking, there is no quorum. It is possible to continue as long as no one protests. I understand that Mr. Roper is begging Mr. Valleix not to protest, and thus to make it possible for us to go on with the amendments.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Yes, Mr. President, for if Mr. Valleix goes on with his request concerning a quorum, you will presumably have to sound the bell and wait for the appropriate time before you carry out a roll-call, and I suggest that it would be quicker to take the remaining votes on the amendments.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Roper is asking Mr. Valleix whether we can go on with the amendments. Would you comment on that request, Mr. Valleix ?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, my formal comment is that the Rules of Procedure are sacrosanct: they are our common law. This prompts me to make the following remark: I should like to go along with Mr. Roper's proposal. I note we are discussing a very important topic. It is not my intention to minimise Mr. Pawelczyk's report, quite the reverse, nor is it right, as I said just now, for a debate on such a report and on its quality to be conducted irregularly, as it would be at twenty to seven, I find.

Furthermore, as I have been warned by Mr. Roper that I should be given no more satisfaction on Amendment 5, to which I attach great importance, than on Amendment 6, I am very sorry to say that this debate seems to me too important to be held as we are doing now. I want the Rapporteur himself to be better

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

guided by the reactions of a more numerous Assembly, which might possibly sanction similarly, but with greater support, opinions I consider of the utmost importance. Therefore I shall not deal with Amendment 5, which seems to me very important, and cannot be satisfied, I say so straight out, with Amendment 6. I trust therefore that we may be able to consult the Assembly as was done just now in the case of Mr. Minnoci's report — in a very responsible manner. The quality of our work and above all — let us bear in mind — the reputation of our Assembly can only stand to gain from our doing so.

Thank you for giving me a hearing.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mrs. von Bothmer, on a point of order.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I too find it distressing that Mr. Valleix has to run a one-man show here but surely that is not his fault, or ours. When Mr. Baumel, who tabled these amendments, is himself not present, I find that somewhat strange. Evidently they are not all that important to him, and that, at any rate, is indicative.

The PRESIDENT. — I am not sure whether that remark is on a point of order, because apparently Mr. Valleix is asking that we check whether there is a quorum. Therefore I order the ringing of the bell.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I have to tell you that I am speaking on a point of order. I had not realised that Mrs. von Bothmer's was a point of order too.

This being so, I maintain what I said. I do not think it in the interests of the Assembly of Western European Union to take votes — I was going to say, secretly or to slip them through. I consider the importance of our debate deserves better than to be wound up in a botched way this evening. I am not choosing the easy way out; I do not feel that the amendments will be agreed to more readily tomorrow than today; but at least I believe the Assembly will know better what it is doing.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On that point of order, Mr. President. We are aware that Mr. Valleix has a perfect right to raise the question of a quorum, and it would be quite wrong for anyone to object to that. However, rather than delay those who would have to wait a long time while we went through the roll-call, with the reading of every name — and I suspect that Mr. Valleix knows that we have only a small chance of finding a quorum in the building — it might be more appropriate if I were

to get permission to move, and Mr. Valleix were to accept — and we do not require a quorum for this — a motion to adjourn the debate under Rule 32 (1) (c) which takes precedence over all other matters. I move the adjournment of this debate at this stage which will fulfil the objective of Mr. Valleix but will not make it necessary for us to go through the tedious procedure of reading out everybody's name.

The PRESIDENT. — If I have understood you correctly, Mr. Roper, you have just moved the adjournment of this debate until tomorrow morning.

Does anyone wish to speak against this motion?

Mr. Valleix, may I ask you to comment on this attempt by Mr. Roper to meet the difficulty?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I agree entirely.

The PRESIDENT. — I have to ask the opinion of the Rapporteur and Chairman of the Committee. The Chairman has just moved the adjournment of the debate. The opinion of the Rapporteur is exactly the same. Will he give an opinion on Mr. Roper's motion? Does he accept?

Mr. PAWELCZYK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I accept it.

The PRESIDENT. — We have now to vote on the motion to adjourn this debate.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The motion is agreed.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, can I ask you to decide now when we will be voting tomorrow, so that we can ask our colleagues to be here on time.

The PRESIDENT. — I will try to answer this request as soon as possible. We could deal fairly quickly with the report — a study on collective logistical support — if that were acceptable to members of the Committee. If we are able to deal with this item quickly and efficiently, it would relieve tomorrow morning's agenda, but if there are difficulties in doing so it would be a waste of time to ask the Rapporteur and others to speak on the subject.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. We do not need a quorum for the debate and therefore I hope we can complete it. I have prepared a five-hour speech and I am looking forward to giving the whole of the Assembly the benefit of it. The question of a quorum arises only when we give a decision. Therefore, Mr. President, I hope you will stay with me until we finish this item — at about midnight — even though it may not be possible

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

for a decision to be taken ; but that can be put off until tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT. — I would ask the Assembly in general, and especially Mr. Valleix who tabled an amendment, whether we can at least attempt to deal with this subject without encountering any procedural problems. Otherwise, it would be a waste of time. I intend to propose that we deal with this subject if we are sure we do not expect any procedural problems to arise.

I will first ask Mr. Valleix whether he agrees with my proposal to go on to deal with this report, a study on collective logistical support. Does he agree with the chair that we have to try to deal with this subject? Does he object to continuing?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I am in an embarrassing position, since I am only entitled to speak against the motion, but actually would like to speak in its favour: I am for Mr. Roper's proposal.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Before you give your final verdict, Mr. President — which once given I will accept — may I say that when we have completed the debate and vote, Mr. Valleix may well feel it necessary, as on the last item, to refer to the question of a quorum. But before you give your decision I would ask you to read with care what Rule 36 (1) says about the Assembly taking any decision. It would be to the great advantage of those colleagues who might attend in slightly greater numbers tomorrow if we were to complete the debate on this to save time on tomorrow's business.

The PRESIDENT. — Therefore, it would really be a waste of time to continue discussion on this? Therefore, I propose that we have a debate on a study on collective logistical support but do not try to take a decision since apparently Mr. Valleix intends to check on the position about a quorum before the next item.

## **6. Study on collective logistical support**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 810 and Amendment)*

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is therefore the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on a study on collective logistical support, Document 810 and Amendment.

I now call upon Mr. Roper to present, as briefly as possible, the draft order and explana-

tory memorandum on the study on collective logistical support.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I tear up my five-hour speech and I tear up my two-hour speech and turn to my five-minute speech. Perhaps I may help the Assembly a little by saying that I do not intend to intervene as Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments after I have spoken as Rapporteur, which will shorten matters to some extent.

This is an important subject because some time ago the Assembly felt that there were a number of major subjects which should be studied, not just upon the basis of reports prepared by Rapporteurs of our Assembly, but on the basis of commissioned studies. It was one of your fellow countrymen, Mr. President — Mr. van der Stoel, who played an active rôle in my Committee — who first put forward this idea. As you may know, after a number of discussions in 1971 the Committee and then the Assembly agreed that there were five subjects on which we should have some studies from outside before we prepared reports. Two of those have been undertaken. There was a report by General Ulrich de Maizière, former Inspector-General of the Bundeswehr, on the deployment of forces on the central front and, in a rather more diffuse way, various studies on a long-term programme for standardised armaments procurement.

As a Committee, therefore, we ask whether we should start a third study on collective logistical support. An explanation of the need for a study of this kind is seen if we go back to paragraph 43 (iii) of the earlier report of the Committee of 3rd November 1970, Assembly Document 527. I quote the words of Mr. van der Stoel:

“A more intensive effort can however be made to provide an integrated logistical organisation, at least for the WEU forces in Northern Army Group, instead of leaving logistical responsibility in national hands. The Committee knows from practical experience that incompatibility of nationally-supplied equipment has prevented NATO forces from operating as effectively together as they should. The multiplicity of makes and models creates a logistician's nightmare.”

But we are all the time faced with the problem that under NATO doctrine logistics is a national responsibility. In this report we want to examine — I now come to the point raised in Mr. Valleix's amendment — those members of WEU that have decided, rightly or wrongly, to commit their forces to the integrated military command of the Alliance. We realise that France has decided not to participate in the integrated NATO military command. But if we are considering a collective logistics arrangement, it only

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

makes sense to consider those countries that are part of the integrated military command.

Therefore, this proposal in the draft order requests the authority of this Assembly — we must then take it to the Presidential Committee to discuss the financial implications — to arrange, as we did with General de Maizière, an outside study on collective logistical support. We hope that that will be carried out and, as we did in the case of the de Maizière report, bring a report to this Assembly. Thereby, we hope to have an effective and useful debate.

I do not think that I have taken up all of my five minutes. On behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, I beg leave to move this draft order.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roper, not just for presenting the report, but also for that gratifyingly short statement! My compliments.

The debate is open.

Does anyone wish to take part in the debate, Mr. Valleix for instance or someone else? There is no one on the speakers' list. I do not propose to take any decision. Therefore, we are just debating.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — It will be no surprise to anyone that I wish to move an amendment about the French position. It is not, incidentally, a Valleix amendment, since it might equally well be moved by Mr. Baumel, Mr. Péridier or Mr. Depietri.

We can therefore open the debate, if we do not want to let the Rapporteur choke back his speech unspoken which would be intolerable. But in that case I do not see how we can conclude, because we have no more of a quorum now than just now.

You ask me a question, Mr. President. We cannot conduct a full-scale debate, it needs no saying; we can open it, but we cannot close it.

Using the procedure suggested by the Committee Chairman with which I concurred as was only logical for our Assembly's good name, and in agreement with him, or at least with his conclusions — that discussion of his proposal deserves better than a three or four man debate — I myself move the adjournment of the debate

under the aforementioned Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure. This way we shall obviate our sittings, and therefore our sessions from thinning out so badly that no one could take our Assembly seriously in future.

I should be grateful therefore if you would agree with me and Mr. Roper that this is the most dignified way in which we can wind up our proceedings today.

The PRESIDENT. — Apparently there is no one on the speakers' list. Therefore, there is no debate which can be adjourned until tomorrow. We have already decided to take decisions tomorrow morning. There is, therefore, no problem at all and I sincerely hope —

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — There is no problem at all, Mr. President, as long as you announce that the debate is closed.

The PRESIDENT. — I intended to do so. I have just declared the debate open. Since no one is on the speakers' list, my conclusion is that there is no debate. Therefore, I can close it.

#### **7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday 20th June, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Africa's rôle in a European security policy (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 804 and Amendments).
2. The balance of force (Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 809 and Amendments).
3. Study on collective logistical support (Vote on the draft Order, Document 810 and Amendment).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(*The Sitting was closed at 7.05 p.m.*)



## FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 20th June 1979

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Changes in the membership of a Committee.
4. Africa's rôle in a European security policy (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 804 and Amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Müller (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Grant, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Voogd, Mr. Brugnon, Mr. Page, Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Müller (*Rapporteur*); (points of order): Mr. Hardy, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Roper, Mr. Grant;  
Mr. Hardy, Mr. Page; (points of order): Mr. Roper, Mr. Müller, Mr. Roper; Mr. Page, Mr. Roper, Mr. Müller; (point of order): Mr. Deschamps; Mr. Faulds, Mr. Grant, Mr. Müller; (points of order): Mr. Lewis, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Deschamps, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Lewis.
5. The balance of force (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 809 and Amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Roper, Mr. Deschamps.
6. Study on collective logistical support (*Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 810 and Amendment*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Roper, Mr. Deschamps.
7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments? ...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### 3. Changes in the membership of a Committee

The PRESIDENT. — The British Delegation proposes the following changes in the membership of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments: Mr. Banks as a titular member of the Committee in place of Mr. Critchley and Sir Frederic Bennett as an alternate member of the Committee in place of Mr. Banks.

Are there any objections? ...

Mr. Banks is appointed as a titular member and Sir Frederic Bennett as an alternate member

of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

### 4. Africa's rôle in a European security policy

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 804 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. — The Orders of the Day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on Africa's rôle in a European security policy and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 804 and Amendments.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Müller, to present the report.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, this is the second time within a year that we are dealing with African issues. At the session in June last year I already had the honour of presenting to the Assembly a report on the situation in Africa. We had agreed in the General Affairs Committee that this question should be discussed again this year, and we had originally planned to have two reports on the problems of Africa submitted to this plenary session: one report primarily concerned with economic questions, with the economic development of Africa, to be drawn up by Sir John Rodgers and another report, examining the political situation and the political factors in Africa, to be prepared by myself. Sir John Rodgers unfortunately has left the Assembly, so that today I find myself obliged to present you with two reports in one. I should however like to point out straight away that of course the major part

1. See page 37.

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

of the work on the economic aspects was still done by Sir John Rodgers.

I think that recent events are making us realise in Europe how dependent, how difficult and how delicate the situation of the European economy is in certain fields. The — one might almost say — panic-stricken reports we can read in the press every day about oil supplies give us some inkling of what might happen if something similar were to occur with the supply of other raw materials in which Africa plays a very big part. I should like to refer expressly to those passages in my report where I have pointed out that in iron ore for instance, the European Community produces only 2.8 % of world output. For bauxite the figure for production within the European Community is 2.5 % of world production, for lead it is 4.8 % and for zinc 1.9 %. We know that the European Community is, after the United States, the most highly industrialised region of the world and therefore has the greatest requirement of raw materials, but at the same time it is very poorly endowed with them.

Developments have led to the African continent in particular becoming one of the main suppliers of these raw materials to industry in the European Community. One might almost draw a kind of parallel between the North-South relations that link the United States and Latin America and those that link the European Community with the African continent. These relations have developed over a long period, and have proved their worth; they date back to the days the colonial system still operated, and they were carried over, I might almost say, without a break into the post-colonial age in, as I would like to stress, the interest of both sides.

If we examine — and I have set this out in detail — the closeness of the relations in the economic field between the African states and the industrialised countries of Europe, we find that this interdependence is very great indeed. Even the attempts by certain African countries to break off or reduce their relations with the West European countries have failed, in the final analysis, to produce any substantial change. In this connection one might mention in particular Mali, Guinea and Tanzania, which on their own initiative proclaimed that they wished to improve and extend their relations — and especially trade relations with the socialist states of the East bloc and to let these relations supplant their old traditional links. Yet the statistics show that no great changes have come about. The maximum change is an 11 % of Mali's total exports to so-called socialist countries. The states of Western Europe have remained the principal trade partners, even for these countries which had different intentions or at least publicly proclaimed different intentions.

It may be interesting in this connection, and certainly worth mentioning, that in the past few weeks the state of Guinea, which at the dawn of independence for the former French colonies very clearly cut itself off politically from France, has been trying to remove the barriers again and to resume closer relations both with France, the former colonial power, and with the Common Market. These special relations, reflected in the statistics, are reflected also in special economic agreements concluded between the European Community and the African countries in what is known as the Yaoundé Convention, later supplemented by the Lomé Convention. This was widened in the negotiations with what were called the ACP countries as, in addition to the African states, Caribbean and Pacific states came in on a smaller scale.

We know that the revision of the Lomé Convention is at present causing certain difficulties, because the African states are calling for their partners in Europe to make greater contributions in the field of development aid. It should not, however, be overlooked that, by comparison with developments in other areas of developing countries in the world, the Lomé Convention has had an extremely positive effect. In particular the well-established Stabex system, resulting in certain guaranteed minimum prices, has had a very beneficial effect on those states which depend on exports of their raw materials, since they have been able to count on assured earnings, unaffected to the extent they had been before by any fluctuations occurring in prices on the world market.

To sum up this economic part, I should like to say this. Developments over the past few years have shown that there is a mutual interest. The African countries have an interest in marketing their raw materials at stable prices, and in having regular customers; it is in the interest of the European countries to have guaranteed supplies of these raw materials. The African countries, for their part, are interested in receiving development aid and technical assistance from the European states, in order to be able to push ahead with their own development. This they cannot do by themselves; they cannot, as it were, pull themselves up by their own boot-straps out of the problems in which they find themselves during their development stage. They depend on aid and support, and this aid and support can be provided by the European states.

Before turning to the political aspects, I should like to mention one more point in the economic context. Of course it is not just a case of mutual interest; of course there is also a certain selfish interest at various levels. One selfish interest on our part is certainly — we are a body that deals with issues of security and defence policy — that we also depend on these raw material sup-

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

plies for defence, for the armaments industry of Western Europe. I have already, at the start of my remarks, mentioned the very urgent aspects of the present oil supply situation.

On the political aspects of Africa we may say that there have been no very major changes during the past year. In Uganda there has been a most welcome development which all of us, whatever our political views, will surely note with satisfaction, that Idi Amin's rule of terror has been abolished, that Idi Amin can no longer be held up as the prime and horrific example of the violation of human rights in Africa. Since Idi Amin's expulsion we have come to know what previously had often only been surmised or could not be proved : on the evidence of the mass graves found in that country we know how cruel was Idi Amin's reign in Uganda. But the removal of Idi Amin as a "statesman" in Uganda certainly does not mean that the problem of human rights in Africa is solved. We have recently had disquieting reports from other countries. I am thinking, for instance, of what we have heard about "Emperor" Bokassa of the Central African Republic where, according to reports, children and schoolchildren were shot dead because, so it is alleged, they refused to wear school uniform. Such reports certainly cannot give us joy in Europe.

With regard to the world political tug-of-war for influence in Africa, we find that the situation has not decisively changed over the past year. There are still foreign troops in Africa. We know that there are large Cuban units in Africa, we know that there are troops from the GDR in Africa, and that there are a great number of Soviet military advisers in Africa. We know that the centre of gravity of influence has shifted somewhat, that the civil war in Angola, which still played an important part a year ago, has receded ; at least, there are no longer so many reports from that area. We know that, on the other hand, internal conflicts have clearly intensified in the other former colony, Mozambique. We know that those conflicts, which were virulent last year, are continuing. The dispute over the former Spanish Sahara, divided between Mauritania and Morocco and claimed by the Polisario movement, which receives support from Algeria and elsewhere in Africa, still drags on. We know that the conflicts in Chad are continuing. It is often difficult to make out exactly how the battlelines are drawn there. The example of Chad shows that the situation cannot be judged in simple blacks and whites — in the civil war in Chad one of the champions of the power of Islam, Colonel Kadhafi, is actually supporting a group made up of Christians. It is therefore evident that one cannot see things in simple

blacks and whites when making an ideological assessment.

From the defence point of view, we in Europe must still be concerned about developments in the Horn of Africa, where civil war is still being waged in Ethiopia and Eritrea, where the Soviet Union and the Cubans have intervened on a massive scale and where one might well feel that long-term strategic considerations of the Soviet Union may be playing a rôle. I pointed out yesterday, in a different context, that it has long been an aspiration of the Soviet Union to gain influence in the Horn of Africa. At Yalta the Soviet Union was already asking to be given the then Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somalia. This was not conceded, and at the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers the Soviet Union still demanded that at least the port of Massawa in Eritrea be handed over to it to use as a base. If today the Soviet Union is established in that port, if today the Soviet Union has actively intervened in the civil war there with its naval artillery, that only goes to show that it is perfectly possible for long-term strategic aims to be realised thirty-five to forty years later.

Let me now come to a final point — the situation in southern Africa. To us, representing parliamentary democracies in this Assembly, the situation in southern Africa has always been a cause for concern. It is our belief that the policy of apartheid, as practised in South Africa, is not compatible with the political convictions which we in Western Europe stand for. There cannot be different classes of people according to the colour of their skin. On this point we have time and again expressed our misgivings to the Government of South Africa.

Alongside the problem of South Africa there has long been and still is the problem of what used to be Rhodesia and has now adopted the name of Zimbabwe. The problem of Rhodesia has for many years now been the subject of heated debate. There were two different views on how the problem should be solved. There was the view that it could be solved by force, by bloodshed, in order to overthrow the white supremacy in Rhodesia and then possibly establish a dictatorship of a different type ; and there was the other solution, that of trying, through a long and difficult process, to achieve a transition to a multi-racial state, one which would more or less conform to western democratic principles. This was the course taken, and one has to acknowledge with, I would almost say, admiration — without wanting to be misunderstood — the success that has been achieved despite all the difficulties which arose, despite an international boycott by the great powers, by the industrialised states, in following this course which may well lead to the ideal condition of an equal-rights multiracial system in Zimbabwe, as it is called today.

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

I make no secret of my personal opinion. The course that has been taken here and which is not yet finished — that too, I should like to say very clearly — must at all events be preferred to that of violence and bloodshed. I consider that wherever democrats live, wherever they stand up for their ideals, they must encourage every attempt that is made — without violence and without dictatorship — at bringing about certain improvements and promoting democratisation.

In Rhodesia, as it was still called then, elections have been held which have resulted in a multi-racial government with a black majority. As we all know, this does not reflect the ratio of black to white in the population ; but it was a first step in that direction. The Muzorewa Government has been formed, and I believe it should be given a chance to implement its aims, given time.

Now I have only today read in a newspaper that a representative of the so-called German Democratic Republic has assured Mr. Nkomo, the leader of the guerrilla movement fighting the Muzorewa Government, that is, fighting a black government, that the German Democratic Republic is giving Mr. Nkomo's guerrillas every support, because "sham elections" like those held in Rhodesia must not be recognised. Mr. President. I feel almost any other politician has a better right to speak of "sham elections" than, of all people, a representative of the German Democratic Republic, where there are certainly no elections in the democratic sense of the word but where they have real "sham elections" with a 99.9 % turnout.

The observers who were in Rhodesia during the elections, and I have spoken to some of them, consider that by and large — one has to remember that these are the beginnings of democratisation in Africa — these elections were in line with democratic principles and democratic requirements. I will say quite frankly that I should be happy if elections of the democratic status or the level of democracy of those in Rhodesia were held in all African states. We should certainly be further along the road to democracy in many an African state if the same step had already been taken there. Needless to say, this also means that serious consideration should be given to how far this new government in Zimbabwe and how far Muzorewa should be given support, in other words, how far the sanctions taken against that government or against Rhodesia — it was a different Rhodesia with a different government — can now be lifted. I do not think that we can simply say that we had sanctions against Mr. Smith, so why should we now worry about whether to keep up or suspend them when dealing with Muzorewa ? I believe we really have to start to rethink the matter.

I want to conclude with a glance at South Africa and at Namibia. The big question is how the problems of the southern tip of the continent can be solved. We are worried, as I have already mentioned, about apartheid in South Africa. How can we exert an influence, how can we as West Europeans introduce positive features into the debate ? It is my firm conviction that we will certainly not manage to do it by pursuing a policy which drives South Africa or Zimbabwe or Namibia into total isolation. This would strengthen those who, with their reactionary ideas, see South Africa as a fortress and who are not prepared to take decisive steps such as equal rights for the black African population. In other words, this would be a very queer alliance, an alliance of people who oppose apartheid from democratic conviction and who, by making all-or-nothing demands, strengthen those in South Africa who want the exact opposite.

Developments have begun in South Africa which certainly give reason for hope. I refer to the Wiehahn and Riekert reports, the reports of two commissions set up in South Africa and dealing primarily with equal rights in connection with working conditions. That is a big step forward. The new Prime Minister of South Africa has made it clear, in the face of domestic opposition — interestingly enough it comes from the left too, from the white trade unions — that he intends to push through these equal rights in the labour sector. That is a positive step, which should be taken note of, and I feel that in the long term it will help towards changing a system that, because of our democratic principles, we would not wish to endorse.

Recapitulating these features of the South African scene, Mr. President, we can say that any policy of confrontation, that makes all-or-nothing demands will strengthen those people in South Africa who are not prepared to make positive changes. Thus, if one were to meet Zimbabwe halfway and give it a chance of building a multi-racial society, this would exert a positive influence on developments in South Africa as well. But if one were to continue the boycott against Zimbabwe, then the view that can already be heard in South Africa could well become accepted : whatever we do, whatever concessions we make, we just cannot win — so let us cut ourselves off completely and step up the battle. This is not in the interest of the people of South Africa, of Zimbabwe, or of Namibia, nor is it in the interest of the countries of Western Europe. And on this point I would recall the economic factors which are also mentioned in my report.

Let me close by saying that I am certain that a reasonable solution to the problems of Africa and Western Europe can be found only if both sides realise that for the sake of world peace,

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

too, they must achieve positive co-operation, that it is the duty of both sides to make a positive contribution to world politics. That contribution is best made in Africa if intervention from outside is avoided as far as possible, if the African countries are more and more left to take their own paths, paths that do not force them into old or new states of dependence but give them a chance to make their own contribution, along with the other countries of the world. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you for your report, Mr. Rapporteur.

*(The President continued in English)*

I call Mr. Grant to open the debate.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). — In speaking to the wide-ranging and excellent report by Mr. Müller, which I certainly support, I propose to confine my remarks to the subject of Rhodesia. Rhodesia, with the possible exception of South Africa, is the one part of Africa where the racial tensions have been between black and white, whereas elsewhere they have often been between black and black or black and brown.

In my party and in my country I have consistently taken what I think would be described as a moderate stance on this issue. I am bitterly opposed to racialism in any shape or form. Indeed, I have many Asians in my constituency. I was opposed to Mr. Smith's UDI adventure. I have supported economic sanctions as a gesture, even though I doubted their practical effectiveness. I have always believed that the only solution to the problem lay in a settlement leading to majority black African rule.

It is precisely that sort of settlement that has now been achieved. It is a settlement that would have been unthinkable a decade ago before the harsh reality of the Portuguese revolution and other events in Africa stimulated it. Of course the settlement between Mr. Smith and Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues excluded the minorities of Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe, but nevertheless it is progress, I believe of a dramatic nature, given the early history of this unhappy country. The settlement has now been endorsed by the recent elections in Rhodesia.

Were those elections fair and free, Mr. President? Of course they were not ideal, they were not perfect, but where in Africa are elections ideal? At least here in Rhodesia five parties stood for election, seeking the support of the electorate. That contrasts very favourably with the single-party states in most other parts of the African continent. Certainly there were imperfections, but there always are. Indeed, it has been said that in Irish elections the cry used to be: "Vote early and vote often." I do not

believe that, because there are certain imperfections, the whole process of democracy can be said to have failed. If we wait for absolute perfection in elections in Africa — or anywhere else, for that matter — we shall wait for ever and no progress will be made at all.

As Mr. Müller said, a team of observers went out to study the elections. It was led by Lord Boyd, who was himself a distinguished minister for the colonies in my country. I think that he held that office longer than any other person. On its return the team produced a very long and careful report in which it concluded that, in the circumstances, allowing for the fact that there was a war situation and that there was intimidation and that it was not possible to have a full and exact electoral roll, the elections were fair and free. Given all those factors, the team came to that firm conclusion. This judgment was confirmed by a distinguished lawyer, Mr. John Drinkwater, QC, who quite separately investigated the elections and came to the same conclusion in a very carefully prepared report.

What is absolutely clear from these elections in Rhodesia is that Bishop Muzorewa commands wide support within that country — some 67% of the votes. That confirms that the majority — that is, the majority of black people — want the settlement to work and are prepared to accept the inevitable transitional provisions contained therein. It is clear that the majority of people, black and white, in that country want above all else to enjoy peace and stability, to which they are entitled.

As Mr. Müller says, let us give it a chance. After all, what is the alternative? It is continued stalemate, increased bloodshed and increased misery for the people. In paragraph 73 of his report, Mr. Müller quite correctly poses the dilemma. He refers to "the danger of backing a régime which was not sufficiently representative", on the one hand, "and on the other hand of encouraging movements of rebellion which would be representative only of a minority", and which could increase tension. I believe that backing the régime is the lesser of those dangers, and certainly a decision has to be taken.

I hope, therefore, that the European countries will take a strong and united decision to bring this tragic but wonderful country back into full membership of the family of free nations, and I believe that it is in the interests of European security that they should do so. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — The greater part of my remarks, Mr. President, will be addressed along the lines of those of my friend and colleague, Mr. Grant, who has just spoken. But, as a member of the Committee

*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

which accepted the excellent report by Mr. Müller, I want to make one or two points at the start of the debate.

The recommendations and resolutions which are before us are really all that we are, strictly speaking, discussing and voting upon today, and not the text of the report, which we have all had an opportunity to study. In that part of my speech, therefore, I propose to address myself only to the recommendations and the preamble of the report.

I hope that there will not be attempts now, whatever our different points of view, to amend the resolutions and recommendations, because the report was considered several times in the Committee, and I think that our Chairman, Mrs. von Bothmer, would agree that the ultimate result represented a compromise among the various sections and political opinions in the Committee.

This is not, therefore, a matter just of Mr. Müller's recommendations. I would remind him that in some respects they were more acceptable in their original form. What is here now represents not just Mr. Müller's point of view but flies right across the board within the Committee in the various votes which took place in it, and there are one or two small detailed points that I should like to mention.

In the first place, I would ask representatives to glance at the preamble:

"Welcoming the measures taken recently by some African states to establish democratic régimes".

I was impertinent enough in Committee to ask which they were, because I must confess that I have not seen any great evidence of these changes taking place except, oddly enough, in Rhodesia and Namibia, as far as I know the only countries where there has been at least an attempt to establish some kind of pluralist régime. It is true that we have rid Africa of a particular monster in Idi Amin of Uganda, but that in itself does not necessarily prove that that is a trend towards establishing a pluralist, democratic régime there; and the first signs are contrary to that end.

We should, therefore, suspend judgment before patting ourselves too warmly on the back with the thought that Africa generally is moving towards the establishment of what we would regard as democratic pluralist régimes. I have made the point, as has the Rapporteur, that, despite the departure of Idi Amin, there are other tyrants in Africa, notably in the Central African Republic. I wonder what would be the reaction in this country if one-quarter or one-tenth of the horrors perpetrated by that gentle-

man in his country were ever to take place in South Africa or Rhodesia, where the United Nations finds so much to criticise.

My second point concerns the recommendations themselves. Recommendation 2 says:

"Encourage all attempts by African states to base their political régimes on free, universal and pluralist elections".

I agree whole heartedly, but, again as far I know, the only attempts being made to that end at the present time are in Namibia and Rhodesia. Certainly the so-called front-line states, those surrounding Rhodesia, are not basing their political régimes on free, universal, pluralist elections. Without exception they are either dictatorships or one-party states with no possibility of anyone other than a member of the party being elected to the government.

Recommendation 3 says:

"Ensure that a free, universal and pluralist vote is respected in the forthcoming elections in Namibia ;".

Certainly, the preliminaries which were held at least indicated that there were signs that this might be possible, although once again there have been so many occasions in Africa's history where an outgoing colonial power has handed over a copy of parliamentary rules of western countries only to find that these symbols and the practice of democracy lapse very rapidly.

I turn to the question of sanctions. Mr. Grant mentioned the distinguished lawyer and the British Conservative team who went to Rhodesia. There were others. There were three eminently respectable American teams who reported in precisely the same terms and one which included well-known liberals and negroes came back with the same report. There was an unofficial German team and a French team, and they all came back with the same report on the conduct of those elections. It is remarkable that we should even be criticising and suggesting that they were not completely free elections in every sense.

One of the Americans said to me that he had seen people going to the poll who were so anxious to vote that when they were fired on from the bush by terrorists they flung themselves down on their faces, waited till the firing had stopped, then got up and continued on their way to the polls. He told me that he could not imagine people in the United States showing the same eagerness to vote in an election. Considering the conditions obtaining there, it was therefore a remarkable achievement by all the authorities in face of the difficulties put in their way, for they were not encouraged to produce the results that were achieved.

*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

There has been a change of government in Britain and there is a change of direction in regard to Rhodesia's problem. It is a majority government in Britain which henceforth will be dealing with this question. I realise that there are certain inhibitions about very rapid moves because of conferences which are to take place elsewhere on that problem in the very near future. Nevertheless, I cannot myself envisage circumstances in which, in the light of what has happened in Rhodesia, sanctions will be maintained for very much longer.

It would not only be wrong for sanctions to continue: it would be ludicrous, for the United Nations has published an interim report showing that the Soviet Union itself is now the prime breaker of all existing sanctions. Thus, we have the ridiculous situation that the country most ferocious on the question of Rhodesia having to continue to be criticised and against the supply of arms is itself breaking the very sanctions that Britain and America are insisting should continue. There are signs, even in the United States which, after all, is not just a presidential government but where the government is under the control of the Senate and lower house, that, whether the President likes it or not, the lifetime of continuing sanctions is rapidly coming to an end.

I would hope therefore that in Europe and in this Assembly we shall at long last realise that the way to encourage change in Africa and southern Africa is as Mr. Müller has said and that confrontation and threats of sanctions and the use of ineffective sanctions are least calculated to produce change. No country and no people like to be forced to change attitudes by external pressures. That has been shown over and over again. It is rulers of countries who are resistant to change who welcome this kind of pressure, because it makes their task a great deal easier in appealing to the patriotism of their people to maintain their rôle; and if ever there was a clear case it is South Africa where, with confrontation and ineffective sanctions, this will take place.

I have taken a little longer than I had intended because I felt it right that the Assembly should know from the start that there is a new British Government and there is going to be a change of direction in regard to our policies towards Rhodesia. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Hardy and will then call Mr. Boucheny.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — There is a great deal of interest in the detailed considerations dealt with in this report. It confirms the vital importance of Africa as a source of

resources and her importance to Europe. Coming from South Yorkshire where we have an important steel industry, one does not need to be reminded of the vital relevance of Africa to our country. I welcome the underlying assumption that the development and progress of Africa are both relevant and essential to Western Europe, and therefore we welcome the first three recommendations.

Mr. Müller said that some progress had been made in South Africa, and that is true. But the amount of progress which has been made is slight in comparison with that which remains to be achieved. But that progress has been made only because of the pressure from international organisations. Internally, the pressure that is available to the minority is negligible. If we are to see that progress maintained, it behoves organisations such as this to maintain the call for justice and decency in the transformation of South Africa.

I have visited South Africa twice in the last two or three years. I have observed the affluent comfort of its minority. When I commented on the inevitable comparison of, say, Pretoria and Soweto, I was told that the comparison should really be between the urban black and his cousin in the kraal. In fact, the urban black makes such a comparison less and less frequently; nor does he make it where the white worker earns a great deal more than a black man doing exactly the same job.

One can see that hate is becoming almost tangible in the townships and that the black man in South Africa is now beginning to recognise that his servitude is the economic basis of his country. He also recognises that black leaders who perceive these facts do not tend to last very long in any eminence or in any freedom. South Africa cannot be seen as a stable neighbour to any part of Africa or to Western Europe. While the *Broederbond* is supreme, the forces of totalitarian Marxism have a superb recruiting sergeant.

Most of us therefore feel that major change is required and that apartheid is evil. It is a cynical system, and the cynicism is illustrated by the fact that while living is separate, commerce is felt to be above such principles and that the black man's money is as good as the white's — so much so that shopping opportunities in the townships are grossly limited so that black men may spend their money in a white man's shop.

I also visited Namibia last year. I should like to speak about that, but time does not allow it. I only hope that everyone will organise and arrange for the presence of the United Nations there and that there will not be unnecessary quibbling about its composition and size. Both Namibia and the United Nations need a successful development there.

*Mr. Hardy (continued)*

I wish to turn to the major item of the election in Rhodesia. We could debate this interminably, but I shall endeavour to be brief. I should like to give six reasons why I believe recommendation 4 needs to be amended. First, certain allegations have been made about those elections, and the consideration of those allegations has not yet been fully completed. The expression of any firm judgment at this stage would be premature. I hope, therefore, that we shall not take action from which will be inferred approval of those elections.

Secondly, there have been serious doubts and differences of opinion about the election. People were bussed to the polls either by the establishment or by their employers. Whether or not there were acceptable reasons for this, we must find it a cause for hesitation.

Thirdly, the election is said to have been also an endorsement of the constitution of Zimbabwe by the majority. I do not believe that to be a reasonable conclusion. The only direct approval of the constitution was in a referendum of white voters. Clearly, we are expected to overvalue that election.

Fourthly, from studying the results of the election, the poll and the vote for the parties expressed in precise proportion — at least two decimal points according to the Boyd report, to which reference has been made — and given that there was no register and that there is considerable disputation about the size of the electorate in Rhodesia, one sees that that precision is quite astonishing.

I know that observers visited many of the 2,000 polling stations. The Conservative Delegation certainly visited many such places. But the major omission of its visit seemed to have been that of the eight provincial areas in Rhodesia it visited polling stations in only six. It visited twenty-seven stations in Mashonaland, East, thirteen in Mashonaland, Central, but none in Mashonaland, West, and none in the Midlands. I do not wish to overstate that, because in both those areas the UANC majority was substantial.

But, above all, this Assembly must pay heed to the fifth reason that I urge. Tight censorship has been applied in Rhodesia during the last decade. Dozens if not scores of journalists have been expelled. Some publicity was given in the international media to the lifting of restrictions during the election. But that relaxation applied only to the external press. Internal military censorship continued during the election, and I do not believe that we can too easily approve elections that have not been quite as fair and free as might have been the case if internal censorship had not been applied.

Those, then, are good reasons. There is another, sixth, reason which I believe the Assembly should consider. It is obvious that Bishop Muzorewa and his UANC had a successful election, commanding two-thirds of the vote. But we should not overlook either the relevance or importance of the minority or the tribal structure in Rhodesia. That election may have led us to overlook that fact. I shall endeavour to complete my remarks in a moment, but I must say that I believe the tribal structure should not be overlooked.

For example, in the Matabeleland, South, area the UNFP party was in a majority and came narrowly second in Matabeleland, North. In those areas the UANC, with a substantial triumph nationally, managed to secure only 20 % and 40 % of the votes, and that in a very much lower poll than the national average. That suggests to me that we need to be cautious before we rush into approval of the results of an election which, to say the least, deserves to be questioned. If we acknowledge or impute an excessive value and relevance to those elections, if we allow them to push us into a premature judgment, I believe that we shall be destroying the chances of a peaceful and prosperous and multiracial Rhodesia. (*Applause*)

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). — Will Mr. Hardy give way?

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

I call Mr. Boucheny.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. I am not aware of the parliamentary procedure in this Assembly as well as I am of the parliamentary procedure in the House of Commons in London. Mr. Jessel asked whether I would give way, and I gave way to him.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I wanted to ask a question of Mr. Hardy, who, I think, is willing to answer it.

The PRESIDENT. — The register is here.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). — I did not want to register to make a speech, in view of the long list of orators. I wanted to ask a question of Mr. Hardy.

The PRESIDENT. — A very short question.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). — May I ask Mr. Hardy whether he accepts that the purpose of sanctions against the freedom to trade with Rhodesia was to bring about majority black rule in Rhodesia? As we have majority black rule in Rhodesia now, what is the purpose of continuing with sanctions against freedom to trade with Rhodesia?



Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — The major purpose of sanctions is to ensure that there is democracy in Rhodesia and that the majority holds power. What we have seen is an election in which black voters have overwhelmingly subscribed to Bishop Muzorewa's UANC. We need to see whether the UANC will actually be given power as well as votes. If votes are not followed by power, that election is a mockery and will then be part of the destabilisation of Africa, which we have seen in the Horn, to which I should have liked to refer. However, I shall not do so, because I want to conclude my remarks by asking this Assembly to be sophisticated, sensible and decent in its interpretation of the present African situation.

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Boucheny, and then Mr. Grieve.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it has become almost a tradition for WEU regularly to discuss the situation in Africa.

We have already had occasion to point out the seriousness of such political acts; I shall therefore restrict my comments, like the Rapporteur in most of his report, to economic problems.

However, let me say we do not accept that relations between Europe and Africa should only be considered from the standpoint of military and economic strategy. It is unthinkable that the Atlantic Alliance should extend its field of action to Africa, thereby creating a situation fraught with danger for world peace.

Africa is not and must not become an extension of Europe. Yet this is how the Rapporteur sees it which is sheer colonialism. The peoples and states of Africa cannot accept such interference in their affairs. We strongly reaffirm the right of states and peoples to manage their own affairs in the strict interest of their peoples and not in terms of the strategic requirements and economic interests of the capitalist powers.

Mercantile capital policy is hard on the peoples of Europe, but even harder on those of Africa. It is moreover significant, as I was saying just now, that economic questions and raw materials should figure most prominently in the report tabled. What the Rapporteur would like to perpetuate are relations of dominance and subservience. It would be as well for us to take a look at what has happened at the various recent international conferences.

The NATO powers bear a great deal of responsibility for the failure to renew the Lomé Convention, and I am sorry the Rapporteur did not mention it. The negotiations between the Nine and fifty African, Caribbean and Pacific coun-

tries were broken off because of the attitude of the European countries in the European Economic Community.

What caused the break? It was the intransigence, the same which we find in Mr. Müller's report, of the European Economic Community countries towards the legitimate demands by the ACP countries for relations with the capitalist countries taking greater account of their own development requirements.

We find this same intransigence on the part of the European Economic Community in other international contexts, in which I note that: "Europe speaks with one voice" and closes ranks with the United States and the other developed capitalist countries to form a bloc against the developing countries.

This applies to the GATT talks — the Tokyo round — to Geneva, where they are discussing international trade, and also to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD, in Manila, where the imperialist countries, in perfect harmony, tried everything to divide the countries of the third world and refuse their rightful demands.

European policy towards Africa and the third world is to bar the way to these countries' demands and perpetuate underdevelopment and neo-colonial plundering; the European Economic Community is cast in the rôle of the policeman wielding his truncheon.

Mr. Müller's report is perfectly in line with this policy. It constitutes open contempt for Africa, which is considered solely from the point of view of its natural resources and strategic position.

I have made a brief comparative study of the different reports on African problems. I notice a marked trend in them, for which I think the Rapporteur should be given due credit, chiefly attributable to the fighting spirit of the African peoples and the democratic forces of Europe.

Today the accent is on co-operation, and support for South Africa is more mitigated. This is not the beginning of wisdom but rather the inability of the big capitalist companies to go on with their plundering quite undisturbed.

And then come the scandals. The South African racist Vorster is toppled by an enormous financial scandal. This ex-leader of a pro-Nazi para-military organisation had been distributing secret funds in Europe to newspaper editors, to French, British and German politicians and many others, who took the racist's money.

Why does Mr. Müller's report leave all this out? Why not uncover here and there the unavowed and unavowable reasons for supporting the racists of Pretoria?

*Mr. Boucheny (continued)*

While the African countries stagnate in a tragic state of underdevelopment and the intolerable scourges of starvation and illiteracy are rife, all engendered by colonialist thieving and the interference of the imperialist powers, while the African countries cry out for fairer and more stable economic relations, for a new international order in short, the countries of WEU display a stiffnecked intolerance that betrays their true nature of travelling salesmen for the big multinationals mainly bent on making profits.

We want — and are struggling for — new, fair and mutually-beneficial relations with the African countries, free from the taint of colonialism and the aims of military strategy. That is where the proper interest of our own peoples lies, and the countries of the third world wait upon us.

We communists intend to make a big contribution to the development of a new international order, in co-operation with all the forces throughout the world who share that goal. The Italian communists have proposed an international charter of peace and development. We have welcomed this as a positive contribution. Surely, only the forces of progress will be able to establish new relations of friendship and co-operation with all peoples, including those who have shaken off the yoke of colonialism.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Boucheny.

I now call Mr. Grieve, who will be followed by Mr. Voogd. My request is that members cut down their contributions a little, as did the others. Mr. Grieve, please.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President. I shall do my best to comply with your request.

It is very sad that, every time this Assembly debates Africa, we seem to divide upon the strictest possible party lines. As I listened with interest to Mr. Boucheny as he made his impassioned plea for non-interference in the affairs of African states, I wondered how on earth he reconciled that plea with the presence of communist Cuban troops in Mozambique, in Angola and possibly elsewhere in the southern part of the African continent.

As for myself, Mr. President, I should like to congratulate Mr. Müller on what I conceive to be a balanced and reflective report which is an important contribution to the topic of Africa, which is crucial to the peace of the world. Indeed, his report shows the interdependence of Europe and of Africa economically and politically. We cannot resile from that; we cannot go back on it. Africa is essential to us economically. In a

way, Mr. Boucheny implied that in his speech. But we, too, are essential to Africa, and a plea for non-interference would really be a plea to cut oneself off from the enormous demands which are made on free western society to come to the aid of economically feeble countries.

I want to devote some of the few minutes at my disposal to Rhodesia. It is inevitable that a British parliamentarian speaking here this morning should do that. I should like to congratulate Mr. Müller on the whole of his report, and in particular, if I may, on paragraphs 19, 20 and 21, where he analyses the policy of the Soviet Union in Africa as being perhaps directed not so much to a military takeover as to destroying the economic links that free Europe and the free world have with the African continent.

I turn to Rhodesia. Mr. Hardy asked a number of questions about the Rhodesian elections. Mr. President, those questions have been answered. They have been answered in the reports of the Boyd Committee, which went to oversee the elections in Rhodesia, and in the report of my friend and colleague at the Bar of England, Mr. Drinkwater — a most distinguished member of the Bar and a member of the independent Boundaries Commission, which, in my country, has the function of determining how parliamentary boundaries shall be revised in accordance with changes in population. Unanimously and quite independently, they came to the view that the elections had been free and fair elections. That, surely, is something which this Assembly cannot disregard — and, indeed, no Assembly could. It surprises me that Mr. Hardy, if he has studied those reports, should seek to question that.

Mr. Drinkwater set out his own attitude to the task which he had been assigned in the preliminary paragraphs of his report. He said:

“I agreed to undertake this task on a wholly apolitical basis as a holder of judicial office and a member of the Parliamentary Boundary Commission for England because it seemed to me to be in the public interest that I should do so and should report to the Foreign Secretary of the day and make my report available to Mrs. Thatcher.”

His conclusions are clear. He said:

“My task was to observe the election in Rhodesia and to report on the circumstances in which it was held. My conclusions are based on the observations I carried out in Rhodesia before, during and after the election and on the findings of fact and matters of opinion set out in this report... I am of the opinion that, given the circumstances in Rhodesia as I have found them to be, the arrangements for the election were as fair as could reasonably be devised and that they were carried out with thoroughness and care by the officials at all

*Mr. Grieve (continued)*

levels appointed for that purpose... I am further of the opinion that, given the circumstances in Rhodesia as I had found them to be, the election was in the result a free expression of the will of the majority of the electorate."

That, Mr. President, is the considered view, after a lengthy report, of an independent observer who, in his own word, was apolitical. It was, of course, also the view of Lord Boyd of Merton, a distinguished elder statesman in my country, and of those who went with him, including another distinguished lawyer, Viscount Colville of Culross.

The world cannot turn its back on an assessment of that kind. It is perhaps a tragedy that Sir Harold Wilson, when Prime Minister of my country, handed over the question of sanctions to the United Nations, thus devolving what ought to have been the responsibility of the British Government. The result is that all countries that belong to the United Nations and who are represented here have an interest in deciding whether it is right to end sanctions.

It seems to me that in the light of these reports and of the elections there can be only one answer to that question: sanctions should be brought to an end. I urge the Assembly to examine the map of Africa in the appendix to Mr. Müller's excellent report and to consider whether it is possible for one to say, with one's hand on one's heart, that in any of the countries shown there have been elections anything like as free as the elections which have recently been held in Rhodesia and which have brought the black majority to power there.

It surely would be horrifying for the free world if we recognised Ghana, as Ghana has been recognised — and here I echo Bishop Muzorewa's reaction to that — but did not now recognise the free government of Rhodesia.  
(*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mr. Voogd. He will be followed by Mr. Brugnion.

Mr. VOOGD (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — There were two people who voted against this in Committee, Mr. President. It is an open secret that these two votes were cast by Mr. McNamara and myself, and he has authorised me to say so. Why did we vote against, despite appreciation of the great industry shown by Mr. Müller? One can sense a cold war attitude of mind in the report, and one could feel the same when Mr. Müller spoke here yesterday. I take it that no one will suspect me of having any sympathy for any dictatorship, of either the right or the left. I feel not the slightest affinity for such régimes, but the one-sided view that the Soviet

Union is the source of all evil while Western Europe is a shining angel just is not tenable. One need not doubt the noble intentions of all the Western European countries. It is said repeatedly that Africa is a major source of raw materials for Western Europe, and it is then added, as a kind of afterthought, that what is good for the Western European economy is also good for the people of Africa. In paragraph 30 of the report we read "European economic requirements fall in with the true interests of the African peoples themselves". I am still not so firmly convinced of this.

And our second major objection? This is to the mild attitude taken in the report towards the greatest danger, that of the policy of apartheid. Paragraph 96 says: "Finally, the policy of pressure against South Africa and Uganda has produced tangible results which should not be compromised by oversystematic support for the aims of rebel movements". Liberation movements here become "rebel movements". I refuse to dub movements that have no earthly chance of making their voice heard, or their lot more tolerable, as "rebels", a word that anyway has a less disapproving sound about it for me than it has for Mr. Müller. In paragraph 4, one reads: "progress has also been made towards peace based on better respect for human rights, particularly in southern and eastern Africa". I ask myself in perplexity where one can point to "tangible results" in South Africa.

Have the dozens of racist laws of apartheid disappeared? Is the fate Nelson and Winnie Mandela a "tangible result"? And Steve Biko — was his fate a sign of respect for human rights? Is it true that infant mortality among the black population is about four times that among whites? I want to quote something said by the Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister. Answering questions in the States-General, he said that the Nine had made known in Pretoria their concern at the detention of persons on grounds of a political nature. On this occasion the Nine had expressed special disquiet at reports of the imprisoning of children, some of whom were held on Seal Island — and everyone will know what that means.

Finally, I will quote a statement by the Dutch Ambassador at a meeting of the United Nations: "My Foreign Minister stated, when he addressed the General Assembly on 27th September, that the Netherlands will promote and support a policy of increasing pressure on South Africa if the Government in Pretoria continues to refuse to change its inhumane policy of racial discrimination. Indeed, the South African Government has so far not shown any indication that it wants to make such a change. During the past months it has even reinforced its repressive policies." This statement was made not on behalf of a government of left-wing rebels, but on behalf of

*Mr. Voogd (continued)*

a government that certainly cannot be termed progressive; one has, however, to be able to praise one's opponents when they deserve it. I could give further examples, but I shall not. I find hardly anything of what I have just been saying in the report, in the Rapporteur's explanatory memorandum or in the draft recommendation. So I say again that with every respect for the work the Rapporteur has done I find it impossible to endorse the report or vote for the recommendation as it now stands. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Brugnon. He will be followed by Mr. Page.

Mr. BRUGNON (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Müller's report contains some interesting analyses of the new economic relations between the European Community and its African partners, but it repeatedly puts forward extreme views that are hardly compatible with a correct understanding of African problems, especially as far as southern Africa is concerned.

This ambiguity must be cleared up before we can take a decision on the Rapporteur's conclusions.

The economic part of Mr. Müller's study is basically devoted to a historical account and description of the Lomé Convention. Unfortunately the Rapporteur declines to take a position on the present difficulties surrounding renewal of the agreements. He could however have taken the opportunity of stressing the limits of certain government statements on the question of increasing the transfer of resources to developing countries. One of the principal remaining points of fundamental disagreement between the ACP countries and Europe concerns the amount to be devoted in future to the European development fund. This is the main problem that has to be solved in order to achieve more stable, equitable and confident relations between the countries of Europe and those of Africa. Failing an adequate effort on development aid, our African partners, who in many cases are far more seriously affected by the economic crisis than Europe, are suppliers of raw materials for our industries, victims of the increased cost of industrial products, powerless in the face of the investment and production strategies of the multinationals based on our territory, will doubtless be tempted to believe that Europe has not entirely broken with a past of domination and economic subordination.

The Lomé Convention is certainly a positive step and an original attempt to establish fairer relations between the industrialised and the developing countries.

One should not however blind oneself to the inadequacies of such agreements. Stabilisation of export revenue is still confined to the majority of agricultural products, and a possible drop in revenue is considered only in nominal and not in real terms. Now, what counts to the African countries is not a nominal fall in their revenue but rather the loss of purchasing power involved. It would be useful, if time were not so short, to provide some examples of this.

Moreover, the European development fund provided for under the Lomé agreements is, of course, an institution which has proved its efficiency since Yaoundé. But we must not forget that the amount it is now proposed to allocate to this fund by the European countries is scarcely 0.01 % of the budgets of the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United Kingdom together.

The establishment of fairer relations between the African countries and Europe, in the framework of a new international economic order, doubtless requires even more ambitious undertakings and more sustained efforts. To reject this would be to show a narrow understanding of our own interests, as it would, too, if we were to ignore the problem of the western Sahara.

Although the economic dimension is fundamental, it must not lead us to ignore the importance of the political climate in our relations with Africa. Now, if there is one serious political problem which our African partners are asking us to help to solve, it is that of the continued existence of régimes based on racial discrimination in southern Africa. Were Europe to show the same sympathy for the minority governments of Rhodesia and South Africa as does the Rapporteur, it would alienate Africa for a long time to come.

Mr. Müller affirms that progress has been made in southern Africa towards recognition of human rights. It is true that the case of Rhodesia is complicated. The majority in the present government certainly represents the black population. But the key posts — justice, defence, police — are still held by whites who are defending the interests of a privileged section of the population owning 40 to 50 % of the arable land. Moreover, the Patriotic Front was not able to participate in any way in the negotiations leading to adoption of the recent constitution.

Quite obviously, there can, in the absence of a final solution to the Rhodesian problem, be no question of lifting the United Nations sanctions without arousing anger and disappointment vis-à-vis Europe on the part of most African states.

As far as Namibia is concerned, the Rapporteur is right to emphasise the positive nature of the negotiations conducted all through 1978 by the

*Mr. Brugnon (continued)*

five western members of the United Nations Security Council. He refuses, however, to point out that the new difficulties preventing Namibia's accession to independence are essentially the fault of South Africa — a fact that has just been noted with regret by the nine member states of the European Community. We must realise that unless free elections are held under United Nations control there will never be any independence for Namibia.

Finally, as regards South Africa, the Rapporteur is surprisingly indulgent, considering that he is so hard on other African states in human rights matters. Now, human rights are indivisible. We must condemn both Emperor Bokassa and Prime Minister Vorster with equal energy. Mr. Müller claims that South Africa respects the autonomy of the Bantustans, but he forgets to mention that they are simply artificial institutions set up by South Africa in order to make its black inhabitants foreigners in their own country. Nor is anything said in the report about the disgraceful new law the South African Government is preparing to use to stifle the few protests that are still allowed.

There can never be a stable peace in Africa as long as the apartheid régime remains.

By adopting an original and generous policy of development aid, by constantly defending human rights wherever they are ignored, without consideration of ideology or social régime, by working in favour of the application of the United Nations Security Council's decisions, which reflect the agreement of the international community, Europe would be adopting towards Africa an attitude that would be compatible with its traditions and its deeply-felt solidarity with a continent to which it is so closely linked. The Rapporteur, Ladies and Gentlemen, does not seem to be heading in this direction. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Page. He will be followed by Mrs. von Bothmer.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). — In handing yet another bouquet of flowers to the Rapporteur, Mr. Müller, for his excellent report, I hope that you will not mind, Mr. President, if I put one thistle in the middle. It is one criticism of the report and it shows that I am not indulging in total sycophancy. I think that the Rapporteur should have been a little more worried about how the change in the régime in Uganda took place.

We are in danger of setting up a new convention: if a country is nasty enough and weak enough, we can support its invasion from foreign territories. We ought, in all our countries, to

have been a little more worried about this. Indeed, it is totally against the objectives of the OAU that old borders should be changed. But that is my only criticism of this excellent paper.

Mr. Müller was kind enough to mention the work of Sir John Rodgers, and I think that the juxtaposition of the economic and the political side in detail in one paper was particularly valuable. Section V of the appendix shows the dependence of the United States, the West's strongest country, on mineral imports from Africa. It shows starkly what would happen if those imports were denied.

There is a danger, as we saw with Iran, of allowing too much dislike of a régime — I disapproved of the régime in Iran, with its denial of human rights — to encourage a change in that régime which may not result in a better regard for human rights. In the instance of Iran it has resulted in a violent oil crisis throughout the world and increased difficulties, especially in developing countries. The new régime may not be much better than the last. I heard yesterday from medical sources that in the new régime in Iran a local anaesthetic is given to the wrist before it is cut off for theft and other offences. It seems to me to be hardly a major move towards improving human rights in that country.

Many speeches have been made this morning, particularly by British members of parliament, on Rhodesia and Namibia. I agree warmly with the speeches and particularly with that of my colleague in Harrow, Mr. Grant, about Rhodesia. Perhaps I may say something about Namibia, which I visited not long ago. I am glad that the new British Government are trying to blow new life into the plans of the five western Security Council members to get something moving again about elections in Namibia. I believe the trouble in the past has been that a virtual veto has been given through the United Nations, to external groups, particularly to SWAPO, so that if they refuse to take part in elections, those elections are considered to have no validity.

I hope that progress can be made by the five countries, perhaps in renegotiating agreements between Namibia, South Africa and SWAPO, and SWAPO must be told that unless it accepts these new plans, the elections will go ahead and be recognised by the United Nations and the international community.

Turning primarily to Rhodesia, Mr. Hardy had detailed criticisms of how the elections there were held, but those criticisms showed the immense efforts that were made to make the elections fair, free and effective. When he criticises press censorship in Rhodesia, I ask him whether there are many countries in Africa where there is no press censorship.

*Mr. Page (continued)*

In these debates more than in most others we suffer the danger of accepting double standards. One wonders at the speed with which Great Britain, under the new government, and other countries have accepted the new régime of Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings in Ghana, where the preceding president has been executed, compared with the criticism there has been of the efforts to hold elections in Rhodesia.

There was a report in the Observer about a meeting between Dr. Kaunda and Bishop Muzorewa, stating that Bishop Muzorewa has agreed to take part in such a meeting. This could be helpful, but the economics of Zambia and the feeding of her people depend wholly on supplies coming over the bridges to Zambia and supplies from Southern Rhodesia.

Lastly, to my old friend Mr. Voogd, I would say that we are perhaps adopting double standards for South Africa. He talks of political pressure, but he did not mention that in Tanzania, Zambia and Angola.

Mr. President, I am sorry if I have incurred your disfavour but my own feeling is that we should give Namibia and Rhodesia a chance to get on with the job themselves. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I now call Mrs. von Bothmer.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I will not deal with the recommendation which we have discussed in Committee and on which — with a few amendments which are still outstanding and on which we shall have to vote here — we can probably find common ground. I should like to deal with the contents, on which of course I cannot agree with Mr. Müller at all.

He says that conditions in South Africa are improving substantially and that improvements can be seen. I should like to touch on a few things only. At this very time, a law is coming into force in South Africa which prohibits the press from reporting malpractices of any kind and which fines or imprisons anyone reporting malpractices to the press. This stems from the fact that the Mulder affair, to which Vorster has now also fallen victim, was taken up by the Rand Daily Mail. So they want to stifle this sort of thing. With the best will in the world I cannot see this as progress in terms of democracy.

Nor are there any genuine concessions to be observed elsewhere. The Wiehahn commission, which has said that there should be black trade unions, is in a sense making a fuss about this only in order to sooth world opinion. The fact is that the white trade unions in South Africa

have no intention whatever of allowing anything of the kind. They are the more powerful, and they are at the controls. So it will no doubt be a long time yet before anything over there starts moving ; so far it is all on paper.

A serious additional point for us Europeans its that European companies who operate in South Africa and are quite happy to act in accordance with the racial laws, as this assures them bigger profits, and who prefer to ignore and disregard the European Community's code which has been in existence for nearly two years, benefit from the fact that the black workers are not organised and thus are quite unable to oppose them in negotiations.

Where Namibia and Zimbabwe are concerned, it is my belief that no great advance towards independence for the population has been made there either. On the contrary, the Turnhalle Alliance has now been proclaimed as the national assembly, creating a *de facto* situation which makes a balance between the political forces in Namibia seem even more unlikely in the future. I would point out that SWAPO has repeatedly declared, and continues to declare even now, that it would accept elections held under the aegis of the United Nations. But in the present circumstances, with a national assembly already in existence, it is very doubtful whether such elections will take place at all. Be that as it may, the initiative of the Five, which with regard to Namibia was most remarkable and very positive, was turned by South Africa, in a very cunning, boerish way, into a simple farce. Let us make no mistake about it : the Five were sent packing, one has to say it, like a bunch of greenhorns. I do not see how the threads can be taken up there again.

But this means that the situation throughout Africa has taken a disturbing turn for the worse and is now more critical, as the failure of the mission of the Five has given Black Africa new reason to doubt that the western powers are doing anything at all about South Africa.

If one brings up the matter of political prisoners, as Mr. Page has just done again, I have to say that I am very sorry, Mr. Page, but in South Africa children have been thrown in prison and kept there for years. This I find so impossible that I must say that bad though it is that there are political prisoners elsewhere, this really puts the rest in the shade.

To refer to the elections in Namibia as something endowed with legitimacy is, to put it mildly, grotesque. The report mentions that SWAPO is receiving aid from all sides, and all the evil powers are listed : the GDR, Cuba, etc. etc. Very well, that is a fact. But did the Turnhalle operate without any help ? That is what I would like to ask. First of all, it had massive support from South Africa. Police and the

*Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)*

military from South Africa helped the Turnhalle to blackmail the voters and to intimidate them. Agents toured the country, asking the people: Have you got a card yet showing that you belong to the Turnhalle? The people did not know what this was all about; they had to get that card. And, really, if elections are held after that, I cannot regard them as anything remotely resembling democratic elections.

Any comparison with other black African countries is quite simply lame, because here we are dealing with whites who intervened, who did not give the blacks a chance of holding elections on their own.

In passing, I should also like to mention here — because I believe we should not throw dust into each other's eyes — that my German colleagues from the CDU/CSU gave quite vigorous support to the Turnhalle and are still doing so. That too is something that must not be swept under the carpet.

Now to Zimbabwe. Try going there yourself, and find out if the preparations for the elections were democratic. I would doubt whether anybody can really find out anything there. After all, there were not only conservative observers there who said: "everything is fine", because that is what they wanted to see. There were independent observers there too, and they sent reports from Zimbabwe too, speaking of blackmail and of people being threatened if they did not go to vote. The people were intimidated, so they went to vote.

What kind of elections were they? What choice was there for the voters? They could do nothing other than confirm that what was put before them had to happen, that the whites would continue to keep the reins in their hands for at least five, if not ten years, even though, it is true, the President might be black. Surely we all know this; don't let us delude ourselves.

As for the repeated references to disunity among the blacks: there in Zimbabwe, Ian Smith saw to it that the blacks were more and more disunited, as they have been in other countries too. When people suffer hardships and oppression and are unable to move — well, do you really believe they all react in the same way? Everyone will try to find a remedy in his own way. I do not consider that disunity is any argument for us.

I also find it somewhat indecent to go along with the South African arguments which keep referring to "incapable black politicians" unable to run their own affairs. This was not said by the Rapporteur, but it comes up time and again in the discussion. We really should reject this. If, not only in South Africa but in Namibia

and Zimbabwe too, people had made a few years ago the concessions which have now been extracted from them, everything would doubtless have gone a great deal better. Now the cost of it all is a great deal higher, including a cost in blood, and I do not know if one can blame the left, the communists, or anyone else you like to name. I believe that it is largely the fault of the whites who are holding the reins in all three countries.

The Rapporteur says that to have a black government setting a good example and showing tolerance to the whites would be exemplary. That is indeed so; he is perfectly right. Except that up to now this is not the case. In Zimbabwe it is in fact the other way round: there the black majority still has to put up with a white-controlled, even though partially black, government. So we have not yet got that far.

We in Europe should stop toying with these comfortable but fanciful ideas and, where southern Africa is concerned, we should stop being satisfied with set pieces. We should realise instead that if we join in this dirty game the gulf between black Africa and Europe will grow wider and wider, more and more dangerous. It is not a case of us being able to sit here comfortably and be content to just talk about these things; we may yet have to pay very dearly for it.

I hope it is not just the Commonwealth Conference which has so far stopped Mrs. Thatcher from recognising Rhodesia. I hope there will also be a few other obstacles even in the British Conservative Government. Thank you very much. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). — Paragraph 5 of this report refers to the sweeping movement of decolonisation in Africa. In recent years it has been fashionable to decry what Europe has done for that continent. We know that the transition from empire to independence did not always take place peacefully, but in almost every case, African countries were left a standard of living higher — often a hundred times higher — than when the missionaries and explorers first discovered them.

Europe should feel proud of its record in Africa and not be obliged to apologise for it in order to placate something called world opinion. We in Europe have allowed world opinion to be shaped by others for far too long, and the time has come for us to assert the same principles and values that we once attempted to apply to Africa.

This report recognises that the problem of the vacuum in Africa, which decolonisation produced,

*Mr. Atkinson (continued)*

has not yet been solved. Paragraph 19 in particular rightly refers to the mischievous activities and ulterior motives of the Soviet Union and its allies in Africa. Europe in partnership can solve this problem, and this applies not least to Rhodesia.

The result of the recent elections in Rhodesia shows yet again that tribalism reigns supreme in Africa. What has occurred in a western-style election package is the emergence of a majority government representing the major tribe — the Mashona — which is attempting a broadly-based, power-sharing coalition, including minority groups and white representation. The reply to Mrs. von Bothmer is that the continued presence of white expertise is essential if black jobs are to be maintained and the prosperity of that nation assured.

That some minority groups refused to take part in that election was a recognition on their part that they would not win, so they chose the bullet instead of the ballot in order to win. We know that that is not unique in Africa. But what is unique is the nature of the election with a choice of parties and, in view of the circumstances, an acceptably high turnout in the poll. Let this Assembly note the comparison between the 64% poll in Rhodesia Zimbabwe a few weeks ago and the much lower poll in the much more recent elections to the European Parliament, which none of us would dare to challenge.

I find the attitude of the so-called front-line states and other totalitarian states, in refusing to recognise the election in Rhodesia, full of hypocrisy and humbug when they themselves have not held full and free elections for decades. If the West does not recognise the validity of the elections, it will be tragic and will represent a compromising and, indeed, surrendering of the values for which we ourselves stood.

The legality of Rhodesian defence remains a British responsibility. But its acceptance is also the responsibility of Europe and the western world, that is, the free world. In this respect President Carter is running away from that responsibility.

For Europe to succeed in southern Africa requires a solidarity of approach in the recognition of Rhodesia. My hope is that Britain will recognise the newly elected nation of Rhodesia before the autumn, that Europe will do the same thing, and that we shall work together and not against each other in investing and developing the great riches of Rhodesia for the benefit of the Rhodesian people as a whole. That is why I hope that this Assembly will enthusiastically accept recommendation 4 of this

report, which is that the lifting of economic sanctions should now be considered. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Atkinson. We have come to the end of the list of speakers; there is no one else to speak.

Does the Rapporteur wish to take the floor?

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to make just a few brief remarks on what has been said in the debate.

Mr. Boucheny has just apologised to me for being unable to be present. He is a courteous man. Of course I would have enjoyed saying something in reply to his observations. Now that he has left, I will confine myself to one remark: basically he did not say anything substantially new, but merely made a statement which might equally well have been adopted at the last congress of his party. On this point we shall certainly not agree.

As for his remarks — perhaps I may be allowed to add this — to the effect that the African nations are increasingly anxious to join forces of progress in order to cast off colonial dependence, one can only answer that a number of African states which years ago — and now much to their regret — joined the forces of progress have since returned to what I was almost tempted to call the path of righteousness. They have had second thoughts about their relations. I need only remind you of Guinea to which I have already referred.

I should like to comment on something Mr. Brugnon said on the Lomé Convention. The reason I did not specially deal with this is that here we are in Western European Union, where we have to pay particular attention to other aspects. The discussions on the recasting of the Lomé Convention will have to be conducted mainly within the Common Market framework, that is to say in the new European Parliament, too. That is the place for discussing the specific conditions of these agreements. Personally I think things have started on a sound basis. But in all negotiations one side always wants to give one thing while the other wants to take something else. I hope a compromise will be arrived at.

As for the debate on Namibia, South Africa and Rhodesia, the opinions voiced here have differed very widely. I do not want to prolong or exacerbate the debate, so I will add only two or three very brief remarks. I should like to start with what our Chairman, Mrs. von Bothmer, said in commenting on the five western powers. Her precise words have slipped from my mind, but it came to saying that they had stood there like wet poodles. That, my dear Mrs. von Bothmer, is what happens when one makes demands that one cannot push through. That is when you show



*Mr. Müller (continued)*

yourself to be a paper tiger. So in recommendations like those we are to vote on today I always warn against adopting unduly trenchant wording in connection with certain areas, as it then proves impossible to implement them and they really do no good at all.

Of course there is intervention, for instance in the case of Namibia. Mrs. von Bothmer is quite right. But one cannot simply say that SWAPO is being supported by the Soviet Union, the GDR, etc., and that on the other side the Turnhalle Alliance has also enjoyed support. She said the CDU/CSU had supported the Turnhalle. But there is a vast difference between the support given by the GDR and the Soviet Union and that afforded by the CDU/CSU. In the one case it was help in an election campaign, in a political contest such as we have in a democracy; in the other, arms were being supplied. In Europe, too, there are parties and political groups, in our own country as in others, which have not supported the electoral campaign but helped to finance training camps for guerrillas. So we are dealing with totally different kinds of intervention. I admit to them. But some kinds are non-violent, while others support violence.

As to what was said about the Wiehahn and Rieckert report, we do have some experience on this point too. Of course it will be difficult to implement. We know from our own country that trade unions are often more powerful than governments. In our country, too, there is occasional reference to a trade union state. Of course in South Africa there are forces in the white unions which want to keep competition at bay. One can only hope that the government there gets its way. I believe that in the long run the trend is such that it will prevail, even in the case of Namibia where, as Mrs. von Bothmer knows, the changes which have already taken place have actually resulted in whites turning up at the Turnhalle Conference to stage a protest and to berate it for in fact being extreme left-wing. Surely this shows that the course being followed there is basically the right one, a good course to follow, and that in a democracy it is perfectly possible, in the long run, to achieve results through the ballot-box.

One more remark on the elections in Rhodesia. It is always being said that there is no balance. Of course there is not when a white population representing 4% holds 28% of the seats. But during the transitional period this is of course a certain protection for the minority, such as we find also in other parts of the world. Why does no one in the European Community get hot under the collar about the European Parliament elections because we have similar protection for minorities? It might after all be said that these

elections have not been democratic: 60,000 Luxembourg citizens provide one European member of parliament; while 780,000 citizens of the Federal Republic also provide one member of parliament. Here the blacks are in the Federal Republic and the whites, you might say, in Luxembourg. Of course you are laughing ... and it is nonsense. But here we have a unity which is growing. The community of Europe, too, is being reached only by a long and tedious process, which will one day undoubtedly arrive at the principle of "one man, one vote". In Rhodesia, South Africa and other areas it is exactly the same. You should be very careful about assuming the rôle of schoolmaster in other continents when you have, and indeed welcome, similar practices in your own.

What was being said just before the elections in Rhodesia? "The whites will never give up the Defence Ministry". The opponents of the elections in Rhodesia had already been proclaiming: "You see the kind of swindle it is — they are keeping the Defence Ministry." Well they did not keep it! You can see things are on the right road everywhere. I can only hope that people carry on on the right road. It does not help at all to apply the principle of "all or nothing", to demand everything at a given point in time, when in the long term, beset though one may be with difficulties, there is a chance of positive developments.

That is what I wanted to say, in conclusion, about the various points made here. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you very much, Mr. Rapporteur.

*(The President continued in English)*

The Chairman of the Committee does not wish to speak, so the debate is now closed.

Before voting on the draft recommendation we must first vote on the five amendments which have been tabled. I propose that we take them in the following order: Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Hardy and others, and then Amendment 2, also tabled by Mr. Hardy and others. If Mr. Hardy's Amendment 2 is defeated, we shall then vote on Mr. Boucheny's Amendment 4. However, if the Assembly agrees to Mr. Hardy's Amendment 2, Mr. Boucheny's amendment will fall. After that we shall take Mr. Page's Amendment 5, and then Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Faulds and others.

I now turn to the first, Amendment 1, by Mr. Hardy, which reads as follows:

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

"Condemning the policy of apartheid as still pursued by the South African Republic as

*The President (continued)*

contrary to the principles of democracy and human rights and as a threat to world peace ;”.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

What does the Committee say ?

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — May I say something straight away to Amendments 1 and 2 — they go together, and are in fact on the same page. As Rapporteur I am against Amendment 1, but am in favour of the inclusion of Amendment 2.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall therefore vote on Amendment 1.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 1 is negatived.*

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. Earlier this morning I may have displayed in my speech a lack of expertise in the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. It may be for that reason that I now feel somewhat surprised that you did not give me the opportunity to speak to the amendment tabled in my name and those of others. Is it within the rules of the Assembly that members are not allowed to speak to amendments that they have proposed ?

The PRESIDENT. — I beg your pardon, Mr. Hardy. You had already spoken in the general debate, and as far as I could see you included your comments on Amendment 1 in that contribution. I asked whether anyone wanted to speak against the amendment, and there was no one. I then asked the Rapporteur for his view. He said that he was opposed to Amendment 1 but favoured Amendment 2. Therefore, the vote was taken and the amendment has been negatived.

I call Mr. Urwin on a point of order.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. I am sorry to have to disagree with what you have said. I recall with great clarity that just a few minutes ago when you read the amendment you did not ask for anyone to speak for it. You simply asked whether anyone wished to speak against it. In those circumstances, I submit to you, Mr. President, that Mr. Hardy has the right, even though the vote has been taken, to speak, however briefly, to his amendment.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Roper on a point of order.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I draw your attention, Mr. President, to Rule 29 (1), which states that any Representative may propose and speak to amendments. That is contrary to the practice we have accepted for some time by which normally only one speaker is called in favour and one against, before the Committee and the Rapporteur are asked for their opinions. Under the rules it is possible for any member of the Assembly to speak on each and every amendment. I must say, Mr. President, that if you continue to mistreat Mr. Hardy in that way, others will realise that fact and will ask to speak on each and every amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — I did not wish to mistreat Mr. Hardy. If you wish to speak in favour of your Amendment 1, Mr. Hardy, please take the microphone.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. If Mr. Hardy had wished to speak, he should have raised his point of order before the vote. Surely you are not going to suggest that we should go over the vote again. It has been concluded.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — I must first deal with Mr. Grant's point of order. There is no doubt about the facts as Mr. Grant presented them, but I made a mistake. I did not ask Mr. Hardy whether he wished to speak in favour of the amendment. Therefore, I shall again give Mr. Hardy the chance to speak in favour of his amendment. We have already heard from the Rapporteur. We can have the voting again. Mr. Hardy, please.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — I had wished to speak on a point of order, Mr. President, since I wished to extract from you the promise that, after I had finished speaking, the vote would be taken again. I believe that members should carefully consider their actions before voting against the amendment.

I shall not make a long speech, because my contribution in the debate was fairly lengthy. Mr. Müller referred to improvements which had taken place, or which will take place in South Africa. As I said, those improvements, slight though they may be, are taking place or will take place not because of internal pressure but because of repeated calls from international assemblies of this kind. It is therefore essential that this international Assembly maintain its pressure in order to promote in South Africa the change that is in the interest of Africa and of Western Europe.

As I said before, the *Broederbond*, the practice of apartheid, the system that operates in South Africa today, makes the best recruiting sergeant

*Mr. Hardy (continued)*

for the cause of totalitarian Marxism. This Assembly is supposed to stand above all else against totalitarian Marxism. In its own interests and in the logic of its own existence WEU should consider the matter very carefully before opposing an amendment of this kind.

The PRESIDENT. — Since we are going to repeat our procedures on Amendment 1, I must ask whether anyone wishes to speak against the amendment. Mr. Page, please.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). — This amendment is subjective and applies double standards. There is a greater threat to peace because of the existence of Cuban mercenaries, of Libyan troops and arms supplies and of the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia shooting down civilian aircraft. Thank you.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — Yes, Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I want to be clear for the record that you have asked whether anyone wishes to speak against the amendment. May I ask whether you are proposing to ask whether anyone wishes to speak for the amendment? I understand that under Rule 29 we operate a different procedure from that operated under Rule 32. Only on procedural motions do we apply the restriction of having one speaker in favour and one against. On amendments it is perfectly possible for any member of the Assembly to speak either for or against.

The PRESIDENT. — For many years the practice has been to allow members to speak to amendments. If you wish to speak to the amendment, Mr. Roper, please do so.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I did not wish to speak, only to establish the principle for the record. Otherwise a precedent would have been created which would have bound your successors.

The PRESIDENT. — Does any other member wish to speak? ...

Does the Rapporteur wish to speak again?

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I should like to speak again to ensure that everything can fit together consistently and that the procedure is carried through again to its conclusion. Once again I would like to deal with Amendments 1 and 2 together. The reason why I am against No. 1 and for No. 2 is this. I believe that with regard to human rights one might certainly consider making this insertion. But the threat, "as a threat to world peace", seems to me to be presented

here one-sidedly and militarily too and would be a direct incitement to intervene.

The PRESIDENT. — You have heard the Rapporteur. I shall now take the vote again.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 1 is negatived.*

I now call Mr. Hardy to speak to his Amendment 2.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — I formally move my Amendment 2 :

2. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add :

"and induce the South African Republic to terminate apartheid ;".

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. I should be grateful if you would ask whether anyone wishes to speak in support of the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Is there anyone who wishes to speak in favour of the amendment? There is no one who wishes to speak.

Does the Rapporteur agree to it?

I now put Mr. Hardy's Amendment 2 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 2 is agreed to.*

As Mr. Hardy's Amendment 2 has been agreed to, Mr. Boucheny's Amendment 4 falls.

We now take Amendment 5, tabled by Mr. Page. It reads as follows :

5. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, after the first word "in" insert "and after".

Do you wish to move your amendment, Mr. Page?

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). — In moving my amendment, Mr. President, may I point out that I felt that the words "and after" should be included in order to clarify the position, because it is important that if the elections take place under United Nations supervision, they should be recognised and respected afterwards.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak in favour of the amendment? No one wishes to speak.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I do, Mr. President, on a technical rather than a substantive point. Like others, I want to see “free, universal and pluralist” votes in as many places as possible, but in the draft recommendation we are already asking rather a lot of the Council of WEU. We are already asking the Council to ensure that “a free, universal and pluralist vote is respected” in the first election. Perhaps the Council can do that because the member countries are very much involved in those negotiations, but I do not think that it is reasonable to ask the Council of WEU to ensure what happens in elections after Namibia has become independent. It would be impossible for the Council to implement it.

This Assembly, with the great respect that it has for its Council, should not ask it to do things which it is clearly unable to do, in terms of organising elections in a country once it is independent.

The PRESIDENT. — What is the opinion of the Committee? Mr. Rapporteur.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I agree with the motion and am in favour of Amendment 5.

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now vote on Amendment 5.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 5 is agreed to.*

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, you ruled just now that Mr. Boucheny's Amendment 4 was out of order.

May I ask under which of the Rules of Procedure?

The PRESIDENT. — We adopted Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Hardy and others. I pointed out that if that amendment were adopted, Mr. Boucheny's amendment would fall. If Amendment 2 had been rejected, we should then have come to Amendment 4, tabled by Mr. Boucheny.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — That is your view, Mr. President, but it is not Mr. Boucheny's or mine. I therefore ask that we should take the vote on Mr. Boucheny's amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Before the Assembly voted on Amendment 2, I pointed out that it went further than Amendment 4, and that if Amendment 2 were to be agreed to, Amendment 4 would fall. This made good sense. Rule 29 reads as follows:

“If two or more contradictory amendments relate to the same paragraph, the amendment

which differs most from the text of the Committee's report shall have priority over the others and shall be put to the vote first.”

Mr. Hardy's amendment went further than Mr. Boucheny's. Mr. Hardy's Amendment 2 was adopted and therefore Mr. Boucheny's amendment fell. I think that that decision is correct.

We now come to Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Faulds. The amendment reads:

3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after “Examine” and add:

“in view of the nature of the constitution and the circumstances of the elections in April 1979, whether recognition can yet be given to Southern Rhodesia or sanctions yet be lifted.”

I call Mr. Faulds.

Mr. FAULDS (*United Kingdom*). — As you know, Mr. President, I yielded my place in the general debate — I think now somewhat foolishly — because of pressure of time, because there is always the problem of trying to get in as many people as we can. But because I yielded my place in the general debate, I wish now to speak at some length on my amendment. Perhaps I should explain why I find an amendment necessary.

In various of the references to Rhodesia in the report by Mr. Müller I note that the Rapporteur seems to have little sympathy with the liberation forces or their struggle against the Smith set-up. The report makes the mistake we all make every time we discuss this problem. There is no such country as Rhodesia. There is an ex-colony in rebellion called Southern Rhodesia. I just wish we could get that technical matter right. On the fifth page of his report Mr. Müller even refers to subversive movements against the Smith régime. Nowhere does he refer to the armed struggle which precipitated Smith's eventual standing down as a liberation struggle, which it has been and is.

This report, as it refers to Southern Rhodesia, seems to have been written with a bias in favour of recognition of the internal settlement régime and the lifting of the sanctions, or boycott, as the Rapporteur prefers to call it — a gentler word. In recommendation 4, he argues by inference for the lifting of the trade boycott following the elections of April 1979. Why do I believe this not to be advisable? There is considerable doubt about the conduct of the so-called elections. There was no register of African electors, permitting the possibility of personation, which I am told happens occasionally in one or two of the outer islands of Europe and which would permit of other electoral frauds. And there is no general agreement on the total number of Africans who were entitled to vote. Was it the

*Mr. Faulds (continued)*

2.7 million people which is the estimate of the Smith régime, or the 3.6 million which is the estimate of African affairs experts of long experience such as Lord Hatch?

This disparity of totals is most important because on the latter figure of 3.6 million the recorded turnout was nothing like the 64% claimed by the Muzorewa-Smith régime and was much nearer 50% of those entitled to vote inside Southern Rhodesia. And a 50% vote would seem to be a certain guarantee of a continuation of the civil war. What validity does an election have when two of the major political parties are unable to take part in it? Neither Mr. Nkomo nor Mr. Mugabe took part, nor could take part, in the election, because Smith, devious twister as he always has been, having invited them to join in, made it clear they would have to lay down their arms before being allowed back into their own country to conduct a campaign, and since only those very arms of the liberation struggle had made him retract his earlier declaration that there would never be majority rule in his lifetime — indeed, “not in a thousand years” were his words — the Patriotic Front parties were not prepared to throw away all they had achieved with their arms and put themselves under the ungentle persuasion of Smith and his notorious Selous Scouts, whom we have read about, though most of the popular papers avoid reference to their activities.

What about the conduct of the elections? Various observers went out, although not a single European government was agreeable to sending official observers. Much has been said on Lord Boyd's report on the elections. Perhaps some of those here should know that Lord Boyd was a former Colonial Secretary in a conservative government, which may have slightly coloured his views of what is acceptable in Southern Rhodesia. He went out in the company of an assortment of gentlemen most of whom were known for their right-wing views. Indeed, knowing their views on the Smith régime, I could have written their report for them and concocted similar stories in compiling the report. It was no surprise that he found as he did, knowing the gentlemen with whom he was travelling.

Much less publicity, unfortunately, has been given by the press to other reports from other observers of the elections who had strongly contrary and conflicting views of the acceptability of its conduct. They reported intimidation on a very large scale and complained of enforced or directed voting. But what else was to be expected in a country under martial law and in elections overseen both by armed forces and civilian militia dedicated to the Smith régime? I refer, of course, to the other reports, which

I doubt if any colleagues here have read, by Lord Chitnis, a liberal member of the House of Lords, and by the American Bar Association — a legal, not liquid, bar — both of whose reports condemned the conduct of the election and doubted its validity. How many here have read those reports, having been carefully fed the Boyd report by certain parties here?

What of the constitution itself on which the so-called election was fought? That constitution enshrines continued white control in Southern Rhodesia, because the judiciary, the police, the army and the higher ranks of the civil service all remain in white hands — and that white control is ensured for at least not the five years to which Mr. Müller referred, but ten years, and in all probability considerably longer. The elections on that constitution were not, in any case, one-man one-vote, which is the accepted definition of majority rule. Far from it: 4% of the electorate — that is, the whites — were given 28% of the seats in the 100-seat parliament. Mr. Müller went popping off like a string of happy balloons about the ludicrousness of the EEC elections in Europe, but is he maintaining that minor parties control the Assembly in Europe as they do in Southern Rhodesia, which is a logical conclusion from his silly argument? It is nonsense and he knows it.

Most significantly, although the whites were allowed a referendum on the acceptability of the constitution, no such opportunity was allowed to the Africans. When we had a more responsible conservative government in office, under Lord Home, the first requirement he laid down was that any change to be brought about in Southern Rhodesia was to be referred to the Africans for their views in a referendum, and that was the Pearce Commission, and the Africans rejected it. No such opportunity was provided for the Africans this time.

Why do we permit ourselves, because we are in this Assembly, riddled with gentlemen of elderly years and right-wing views in WEU, to be conned by a rigged constitution and these so-called elections? We know that the United States Government has decided not to recognise Muzorewa or to lift sanctions, and it is gradually becoming clearer that the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, who is a most honourable man — and any of us who know him, and I say this with absolute conviction, know him to be a most honourable man — is in no hurry to grant recognition nor to lift sanctions. So why should we in WEU expose ourselves on our own by seeming, in the words of recommendation 4, to be agreeing to the Muzorewa-Smith set-up?

Let us be much more cautious in this matter. There are far too many vital western interests at stake in South Africa and throughout Africa.

*Mr. Faulds (continued)*

Any premature recognition of the internal agreement régime, any rush to resume trade with Southern Rhodesia, might well bring upon us in Europe and our allies in America retaliatory action by countries like Nigeria that would be very damaging to our economies. Nigeria has made that clear in a note to the United States Government which some here may not have read. Remember that European countries — France and Great Britain in particular, and this applies also to Germany — have massive interests in Nigeria, in Zaïre, in Zambia and in Kenya. If we rush to accept the Muzorewa-Smith régime, we may well be making yet another move — and we have done it throughout the years since the war — that propels more African countries to decide that only the Soviets and Eastern Europe are sympathetic to African interests.

We have given the Soviet Union and its friends enough opportunities already in Africa in countries which were predominantly pro-western ex-colonies, forcing those countries into the arms of the East. In an Assembly such as this, where European security is the purpose of our meetings, surely any move that furthers Soviet interests must be avoided.

Perhaps we should occasionally try to see African problems from an African point of view. That is why I urge my colleagues to be much more cautious than to let recommendation 4 go as it stands and why I urge the Assembly to consider most carefully the force of accepting my gentle amendment. Muzorewa may move to change the white-dominated constitution to include the Patriotic Front and so end the civil war which will otherwise certainly continue anyway. Let us keep the pressures on Muzorewa and Smith until the necessary changes are made. They can be made. My amendment at least delays premature gestures and makes such changes possible. I ask my colleagues to consider my amendment to recommendation 4, and to support it. I move. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak on this amendment?

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to do so briefly, Mr. President. I do not want to go over the whole debate, as Mr. Faulds seemed to do. I looked at the wording of recommendation 4, whose phrasing I thought valid and modest. I then looked at the deceptively gentle amendment of Mr. Faulds, which I did not like as much as recommendation 4. I thought that I would wait to hear what exactly lay behind it. We now know what lay behind it, now that we have heard the extravagance of Mr. Faulds' language. What lies behind the amendment is an absolute determination by Mr. Faulds to

resist any attempt whatever to get any movement along the road towards a settlement and peace, which the majority of people in Rhodesia want.

I felt that Mr. Faulds made a grossly unfair criticism of Lord Boyd, whose report I considered to be very balanced and sensible. It was quite wrong to imply that, merely because he was a conservative minister, he would be prejudiced in some way. Mr. Faulds conveniently forgot to mention — I am sure it was a slip of memory on his part — another report by Mr. Drinkwater, which was referred to by myself and by Mr. Grieve. That report came to exactly the same conclusion, and no one can say that Mr. Drinkwater was either a labour or a conservative minister.

Because of the misleading nature of Mr. Faulds' speech, I am strongly opposed to the amendment and I hope that it will be thoroughly and soundly rejected.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

What is the opinion of the Committee?

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — As Rapporteur I would ask that Mr. Faulds' Amendment 3 be negated and the original wording left to stand. I should like to add a few brief remarks on this point. The way Mr. Faulds spoke about these problems was most impressive. He was an honour to his profession in the way he gave a sketch of the characters of this Assembly, and at the same time displayed his talents as a character actor. The only point is that there were contradictions in the way he put things. At first I thought he was trying to show Mr. Nkomo and the Patriotic Front as in fact champions of the British Empire, because they were in reality championing the interests of the British Empire against the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia. Later he moved away from that line and introduced other ideas into the debate; one of these is of particular interest to me, in this particular case I count myself among the progressive forces. I mean his argument about possible blackmail by Nigeria or other African countries if we should dare to make some other recommendation or adopt some other resolution. I feel that one should not allow oneself to be subjected to economic blackmail but should stand by one's views and say what one considers to be right.

What are we aiming at with this recommendation? We do not want sanctions to be lifted today or tomorrow, but as the text says to "examine whether freedom to trade should not be re-established" as this might promote the peaceful development which should eventually be brought to a propitious end. I am therefore, all in all, of the opinion that the original version should be allowed to stand and that Amendment 3 be negated.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. We shall now vote on Amendment 3.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 3 is negatived.*

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 804, as amended.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. Usually you give the figures of the voting. May I ask what the procedure is with regard to a quorum? I thought that we could not vote unless there was a quorum. If we do not know the figures, we do not know whether we have a quorum.

The PRESIDENT. — I am sorry. As long as I have been in the chair, the figures have never been published.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — May I then ask what the procedure is with regard to a quorum? I thought that there had to be a certain number of members present before the vote could proceed. I just wondered whether we had sufficient numbers.

The PRESIDENT. — Paragraph 2 of Rule 36 says that all votes, other than those by roll-call, shall be valid whatever the number of Representatives present, unless before the voting has begun the President has been requested to ascertain the number of those present.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — I am obliged.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. In view of that ruling, I wish to ask for a roll-call vote.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (*Translation*). — I too request a vote by roll-call on the recommendation as a whole.

The PRESIDENT. — A roll-call vote has been asked for by two members of the Assembly. Under Rules 34 and 35, the vote on the draft recommendation must be taken by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

Does any other Representative wish to vote? ...

The voting is closed.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — I have a point of order, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Urwin, please.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — It is a rather difficult question and a somewhat embarrassing one that I wish to raise with you, but it arises from the fact that when the names of at

least two Representatives were called a response was given by Substitutes, and yet on two other occasions the names of Substitutes were called. The inference I draw from that is that in the latter case the signatures of the members concerned had been appended to the roll outside before the voting procedure was commenced. In that situation, are the votes in the two cases I first cited — delegates who responded to somebody else's name — definitely authentic votes?

The PRESIDENT. — Rule 7, paragraph 1, concerning Substitutes, reads as follows:

“Any Representative prevented from attending a sitting of the Assembly may arrange to be replaced by a Substitute. He must give notice thereof to the President, who will in turn inform the Assembly.”

In both the cases that you cited, one of which was Mr. Banks, we were informed that there was a Substitute. Both members informed us they were Substitutes. There is no quarrel.

Rule 36, paragraph 4, reads:

“In the absence of a quorum, the vote shall be postponed until the next sitting.”

There was no quorum. You have a point of order, Mr. Lewis?

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. In order that the position may be clear in the future, may I go further on the point that Mr. Urwin raised? On one occasion I was myself prevented from voting, even though I was present here and said that I was a Substitute, because I was told, rightly, that I had not previously signed the register at the desk outside. I was told that, as I had not signed, I was not properly here as a Substitute. I think we ought to get the position clear for the future, because I was prevented from voting on that occasion and I should like to know the rule. If one is present and says that one is a Substitute, is that good enough?

The PRESIDENT. — I think that, by circular, we might inform all the members of the Assembly that they should register in time on such an occasion, so that these things do not happen and the position is clear. There is no difficulty, I think, in going on with the other two items on the Orders of the Day.

##### 5. The balance of force

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 809 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the vote on the draft recommendation on the balance of force, Document 809 and Amendments.

*The President (continued)*

Before voting on the draft recommendation we shall deal first with Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Baumel followed by Amendment 6, also tabled by Mr. Baumel. Amendment 5 was spoken on by Mr. Valleix yesterday and reads as follows :

5. At the beginning of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert "Follow efforts by member governments of the NATO integrated organisation".

Does anyone wish to speak on this amendment ? ...

May I ask for the Committee's views ?

I call the Chairman, Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I represent Mr. Pawelczyk who has unfortunately had to return home. He was the Rapporteur and I speak therefore as Chairman of the Committee.

The Committee understands why Mr. Baumel, as a Frenchman, felt that this formulation was more appropriate than the original text. Nevertheless, we wish to retain our original text and we cannot accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Does that apply to Amendments 5 and 6 ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — No. I shall have something else to say about Amendment 6.

The PRESIDENT. — The Assembly has heard the view of the Chairman of the Committee.

We shall now vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 5 is negatived.*

We now move on to Amendment 6 tabled by Mr. Baumel as follows:

6. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 4 as follows:

"4. Examine the possibility of promoting the early start of negotiations between all states concerned with European security with a view to reducing conventional weapons and introducing confidence-building measures covering the whole European continent."

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — This amendment has not been spoken to, but in a spirit of friendship I wish to move the amendment on behalf of Mr. Baumel, who is absent. I do not know whether it would otherwise have been taken.

The Committee knows the French interest in this idea of a conference. We think that it is

right that the possibility of promoting an early start should be examined. We are going no further than accepting that the possibility of promoting an early start to such negotiations should be examined. In view of the drafting of the amendment, the Committee is happy to accept it.

The PRESIDENT. — As Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Roper, you have spoken in favour of the amendment, which I now put to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 6 is agreed to.*

We now come to the vote on the draft recommendation in Document 809 as amended.

I call Mr. Deschamps.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I request that the vote on this recommendation be taken by roll-call this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT. — —Mr. Deschamps has asked for a roll-call vote, but since there was no quorum before, there will be no quorum this time, and therefore we shall defer the vote until this afternoon.

### **6. Study on collective logistical support**

(*Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 810 and Amendment*)

The PRESIDENT. — We shall now proceed to vote on the draft order on a study on collective logistical support, Document 810 and Amendment.

First I shall take the amendment which reads as follows:

1. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft order proper and insert:

"INSTRUCTS its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to arrange for a study on collective logistical support by member countries for integrated military structures and on that of the French forces, as proposed in Document 810, to be carried out forthwith in accordance with the terms of reference and procedure set forth in that document, and to be printed and published on completion ;".

Mr. Valleix has informed me that he has had to leave and cannot support the amendment in person. May I have the opinion of the Committee, please ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Speaking to a packed hemicycle at 7.05 p.m. yesterday I indicated our attitude towards Mr. Valleix's amendment.



*Mr. Roper (continued)*

I said that we understood the French difficulties on this matter since France is not part of the integrated military command. However, if there is to be a study of collective logistics, it can unfortunately cope only with those members of WEU whose forces are within the integrated military command. It would therefore be irrelevant to have this interesting study extended to the French forces. We must therefore resist the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — We must now vote on the amendment.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 1 is negatived.*

We shall now vote on the draft order in Document 810 by sitting and standing.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I request a vote by roll-call.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. Unless ten members request to the contrary, the vote is taken by sitting and standing because a draft order is neither a draft recommendation nor an opinion. Therefore the provisions of Rule 34(3), which would otherwise require a roll-call vote, do not apply. We are dealing with an order here, not a recommendation or an opinion.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roper.

I call Mr. Deschamps.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — I still request a vote by roll-call.

The PRESIDENT. — We can have a roll-call vote on a draft order only if at least ten members of the Assembly seek it.

Who supports the proposal for a roll-call? Would they please rise? I see only two members and therefore we shall take the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The draft order is agreed to<sup>1</sup>.*

### **7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Parliaments and defence procurement (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Document 807 and Amendment).
2. Africa's rôle in a European security policy (Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Document 804).
3. The balance of force (Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Document 809).
4. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 802 and Amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 1 p.m.)*

1. See page 38.

## SIXTH SITTING

Wednesday, 20th June 1979

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.  
*Speakers* (points of order): Mr. Hardy, Mr. Roper.
3. Changes in the membership of Committees.
4. Parliaments and defence procurement (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Doc. 807 and Amendment*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Maggioni (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Treu, Mr. Roberti, Mr. Kershaw; (point of order): Mr. Hardy; Mr. Maggioni (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Schlingemann, Mr. Maggioni, Mr. Roper, Mr. Schlingemann; (points of order): Mr. Roper, Mr. Deschamps, Mr. Bagier, Mr. Banks, Mr. Deschamps, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Roper, the President, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Bagier.
5. Africa's rôle in a European security policy (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 804*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Faulds (point of order), Mrs von Bothmer.
6. The balance of force (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 809*).
7. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 802 and Amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. van Waterschoot (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Cook, Mr. Deschamps, Mr. Beith, Mr. Pignion, Mrs. von Bothmer (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. van Waterschoot (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Cook, Mr. van Waterschoot, Mr. Roper, Mr. van Waterschoot, Mr. Deschamps, Mr. Roper (point of order).
8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments? ...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. Following the question of representation in this Assembly which was raised by Mr. Urwin this morning, may I ask whether during the lunch period any consideration has been given to the matter? I do not wish to press you at this stage for a swift response, but may I ask whether consideration can be given to this very important matter? If the President

does not wish to make a comment about the matter immediately, may I ask whether a considered statement could be made at the beginning of the sitting tomorrow morning — that is, if you do not wish to make a comment about it at the present time?

The PRESIDENT. — May I propose to my colleague that he should wait for the return of the President? It is a question which has been put to him, and he will be here at 4 p.m. Would you repeat your question to him, please, Mr. Hardy?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — I am most grateful.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. I assume, therefore, that only those Substitutes whose names have been brought to your attention at this moment will be able to take part in that meeting, your having made that statement?

The PRESIDENT. — I ask you please to put that question to the President.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Yes, but I ask you, Sir — and I ask the chair as a corporate body, whoever is occupying it — to draw the attention of the President to the fact that you read out, as the President always does, this statement at the beginning of the sitting. I assume, therefore, that it must have some importance.

The PRESIDENT. — It will be done.

1. See page 41.

### 3. Changes in the membership of Committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The United Kingdom Delegation has proposed the following nominations : Mr. Beith as an alternate member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to fill a vacant seat ; Lord McNair as a titular member of the General Affairs Committee in place of Mr. Beith.

Are there any objections ? ...

The nominations are agreed to.

### 4. Parliaments and defence procurement

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Doc. 807 and Amendment)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendation and draft resolution, Document 807 and Amendment.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Maggioni, to present the report of the Committee.

Mr. MAGGIONI (*Italy*) (Translation). — There are two major problems of Western European defence for which it has not yet been possible to find a satisfactory solution either in NATO or in WEU, although admittedly many different attempts have been vainly made to find a solution : optimum use of the economic resources available for defence, and standardisation and/or interoperability of armaments.

The main reason for this "historic failure" lies primarily in the absence of any effective union and decisive will among the Western European countries. We know that these two major problems too can only be solved jointly and not out of individual national revenue. Yet, as we know, rationalisation of resources and standardisation are two largely interlocking aspects of the wider long-term process of arms procurement policy.

This policy has, as we also know very well, always been the prerogative of the national administrations, and even today the democracies of the industrialised western world are slow to realise that an overdose of nationalism is bound to jeopardise the defence of a system of alliance ever more closely caught up in a shared international commitment marked by increasing interdependence and called upon to face world-wide economic challenges that cannot be solved at national level.

The WEU Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has for years concerned itself

with various detailed aspects of arms procurement policy, but with particular emphasis on the industrial and purely military sides. We may recall the symposium on a European armaments policy which the Committee organised in March 1977, as well as the second one planned for October of this year, and the report tabled by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the same subject at the last session of our Assembly in November 1978.

The third issue is that dealt with by the Committee in the present report, which looks at military equipment procurement policy in the different allied countries from the point of view of parliamentary control. It is a particular matter of prime importance for our Assembly, charged, as we know, with defence priorities.

As I say, the report aims to give a composite picture of how parliaments in the NATO countries, especially the member countries of WEU, control defence expenditure on the procurement of arms systems and how, in exercising their right and duty of oversight, they influence procurement policy in the direction of joint production, which is to say, towards standardisation and/or interoperability.

The report is certainly not intended to pass criticism or judgment on individual national realities, but to give the Assembly a realistically full knowledge of the theoretical and practical process of arms procurement in the various allied countries and of the part played by the national parliaments, i.e. when and how they intervene, and by virtue of what powers. In the absence of an adequate and exhaustive literature on the subject, the Rapporteur deemed it advisable as well as necessary to collect detailed information about the real situation in each country by means of two interrelated questionnaires sent to the main people responsible.

The first questionnaire was sent to the Ministers of Defence of the NATO countries — except Iceland, which has no armed forces — for them to transmit to the staff directly monitoring the procurement process in each government. The second went to the chairmen of the defence committees of the parliaments of the allied countries or, in default of these, to the committees responsible for approving expenditure on equipment for new arms systems.

It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge in this Assembly the ample and nearly always prompt participation and collaboration I was given by the Ministers of Defence, including the United States Secretary of State, just as I must also thank my colleagues here for the co-operation given in replies to the questionnaire by their countries' parliamentary committees. Only the three southern European countries — Portugal,

*Mr. Maggioni (continued)*

Greece and Turkey — the Belgian Chamber of Deputies, the Canadian Parliament and the United States Senate failed to reply. The conclusions reached in the report can therefore be regarded as broadly representative of the real situation as it exists and evolves in most allied countries.

In their replies to the questionnaires, all the parliaments claimed to have a sovereign and final say in the process of arms procurement policy, which they mostly control through their scrutiny of and annual vote on the budget, although the extent to which such constitutional powers of control are actually exercised varies from country to country, among members of the Atlantic Alliance and the countries of WEU.

Because of the special nature of defence questions — including the delicate aspects to be touched on with due caution, the technical complexity of arms systems, the length of the lead time for decision-making, etc. — the subject matter and actual process of parliamentary control undoubtedly assume particularly difficult aspects and phases.

It should be noted, however, that the various methods and extent of control vary according to the quantity of information available to the national parliaments about the relevant arms procurement policies pursued by their governments or discussed in allied organisations — not to mention the policies of allied countries, in which information is certainly only forthcoming at the cost of more considerable, varied and obvious difficulties.

From replies to the questionnaires, too, there emerges a wide range of parliamentary bodies exercising the dual function of control and information — committees, sub-committees and ad hoc groups. These nevertheless lack the means of carrying out their various functions: the opportunity of intervening through parliamentary questions, surveys, debates and motions.

What seems, however, to be missing in some cases — apart from better use of the instruments currently available to parliaments — is better and continuous co-operation between the executive and legislature in the various countries; in every case it would seem only right and proper to say that the parliaments most satisfied with co-operation in this respect are those of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The arguments used by governments to deal with parliamentary demands for more information on defence policy rely most often, indeed almost always, on the need to preserve a proper degree of secrecy about some of the more delicate aspects and phases of national defence. Indeed,

a satisfactory solution to the problem of secrecy has still to be found in the Alliance countries. As already underlined by Mr. Goedhart in presenting the report on military security and parliamentary information to this Assembly in 1970, parliamentarians who do not have access to classified information are unable to bring more than an incomplete and insufficiently detailed contribution on what is the basic aspect of their constitutional control function.

This underlying situation is complicated by other factors. The situation of members of parliament varies from one country to another, as indeed among members of the same parliament. Given these differences, there is therefore an urgent need for agreeing among the allied countries, to the utmost possible extent, on a number of common criteria — other than the existing NATO procedures for uniform classification of military data — for deciding which national military information can really be made public and which should be restricted on security grounds, and suggesting at the same time standard procedures and safeguards designed to ensure the fullest possible knowledge compatible with an effective degree of security.

The questionnaires also show that the information available to parliamentarians is in most countries barely sufficient for them to have any real impact on the formulation of general defence policy or the size of the national defence budget.

Again, it would seem from the questionnaires that there has never been a case in which the proposals or decisions of members of parliament have had a direct and decisive effect in modifying procurement proposals put forward by the executive. The only exception to this general rule is provided by the United States Senate.

Apart from the quantity and type of information needed by parliaments, the importance of the time factor must also be stressed — i.e. the point in the arms procurement process at which information about the weapons system to be procured is supplied to members of parliament. Many defence committees of European parliaments complain of not being able to deal with the question of equipment for a new arms system except *ex post facto*, i.e. once the administrative decision has already been, or is well on the way to being, taken. This is undoubtedly a serious disparagement of parliament and the national defence committee itself, which is thereby deprived of one of its main constitutional prerogatives. An interesting approach in this respect, i.e. the timeliness of information, is the scrutiny and approval by parliament of multi-annual defence programmes.

Only, this does not happen in all Western European countries, and when it does — as in

*Mr. Maggioni (continued)*

Norway and Italy — parliament is too often only vaguely informed, owing to the committee's lack of specialised staff capable of scrutinising every least detail of each arms system.

Finally, as regards the ability of parliaments to use their control function to influence procurement policies in the direction of greater standardisation of arms in the western countries, the parliaments need to be adequately informed not only about national arms projects but also about projects in allied countries, and of the demands, analyses and appreciations formulated in the Alliance's governing bodies.

Our discussion of the matter cannot be concluded without mentioning the relationship between availability of information and supervisory capability, stressing that in the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom there seems to be a sufficient level of mutual confidence between the government and the opposition parties to permit general requests for information by all parliamentary party formations.

In Belgium and Luxembourg there is apparently no tradition of vigorous parliamentary inquiry in the defence sector. In France, the existing relations between government and opposition members do not allow, but rather exclude, any possibility of agreement on the supply of information to all members of parliament, other than committee chairmen or rapporteurs.

In only a couple of countries — the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany — does parliament seem able to keep a sufficiently tight rein on defence expenditure to be able to influence the process of procurement of new types of arms.

As regards competitive arms projects in other allied countries — systems that could often be chosen instead of purely national ones in order to promote joint productions or improve standardisation — not only are parliaments badly informed but sometimes not even the administrative authorities responsible for the procurement process are fully in the picture.

In order to remedy the unsatisfactory situation highlighted, as I have said, by the questionnaires, your Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has unanimously adopted a set of proposals incorporated in the draft resolution and recommendation submitted for our approval today.

An international arms procurement procedure common to all the allied countries, administered — why not — by a common organisation such as a European armaments agency and subject to international parliamentary control would

certainly be cause for satisfaction. However, since we do not have all this, and until such time as we do, a set of measures could be initiated and defined by the governments and parliaments of the member countries of this Assembly.

First of all, national parliaments should begin to be able to exercise greater control over national arms procurement policies through their involvement not only in defence policy but also in the industrial sector, at any rate in countries in which the arms industry is mainly dependent on public funds. This could entail a greater and clearer involvement in such policy of other committees besides defence and budget committees.

In any event, we are — as I was saying — not talking about the necessity of conceding new powers to parliaments, but of their ability to use the existing instruments to exercise a greater degree of control, such as is the right and duty of any democratic institution.

Lastly, the governments of the member states should also initiate a set of measures to allow parliamentarians to exert, through their supervisory function, greater influence over the standardisation and/or interoperability of arms. Such measures could also include the supply of further information to members of parliament, the greatest possible commonality among the allies of budget structures subject to parliamentary control, and of arms procurement procedures within the respective national administrations.

Last, but certainly no less important, the rôle which this Assembly of ours should be called upon to play: the offer of its good offices and the collaboration of its own Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments for greater disclosure and dissemination among the allies of information on the subject matter of this report. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you Mr. Maggioni.

The first speaker from the floor will be Mr. Treu, followed by Mr. Roberti.

Mr. TREU (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I ought not, I trust, to allow myself to be inhibited by the fact that I am a friend and compatriot of the Rapporteur, Mr. Maggioni, when I begin by saying that the report he has tabled on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is the fruit of patient understanding, and that it paints what I would describe as a rather depressing picture of the position of parliamentarians with respect to information. This is certainly no fault of the Rapporteur, but the result of the differences he refers to in the situation in the various states — different national

*Mr. Treu (continued)*

circumstances and different political configurations within individual countries. It does not take much thought to perceive the differences in this respect between the United States and, say, Germany, France or Benelux. Hence the desired permanent link-up between parliaments and military procurement dealt with in 1957 in Recommendation 9 and in 1970 in Recommendation 197, will not, in my modest opinion, make much headway so long as the political situation in the various countries remains what it is.

Anyhow, I repeat, the merit of the report under discussion is that it gives us a full picture of the situation accompanied by a demand for agreement on cost reductions — in the economic sphere — and the standardisation of military procedures. In fact, WEU, NATO and the Atlantic Alliance ought to have joint operational machinery for their armed forces if this should be necessary — as I hope it never will. Although, as stated in paragraph A. 2 of the recommendation, cost reductions and standardisation are fundamental requirements, we have to remember the political context in which our action should be situated.

What right have parliamentarians in any country to dictate operational options in connection with the arms market? We must also remember that the arms are not just missiles, machineguns, aircraft and ships but comprise a whole range of technologically complex weaponry including certain accessories, or what appear to be such, just as the human body does not consist only of its main organs like the heart and lungs. When I think of these weapons, mentioned in paragraph A. 3 of the recommendation, I have in mind technological research, data processing, computerisation, microcircuitry, all of which are accessories now incorporated in the common system of industrial production.

Allow me to mention one thing that bothers me about an otherwise excellent report. I ask myself within what limits parliaments can — I do not say “will want to” — be informed, and by whom, about those delicate options, often still to be taken, and through what channels ministers of defence, foreign affairs, budgetary affairs or foreign trade can transmit the information to parliament. There are undoubted difficulties, including technical ones. I have had experience of trying to understand technical subjects and failing to obtain explanations. I therefore entertain doubts as to the real possibilities of parliamentarians being given all the necessary information. This might be easier at Community level, where there exist permanent inter-governmental multidisciplinary bodies capable of supplying information. We recently paid a very interesting visit to two big Californian plants: General Dynamics in Los Angeles and Boeing in

Seattle and were able to see for ourselves the enormous range of technological civilisation in the most widely varied sectors.

It is therefore necessary to co-ordinate in a supranational body, the possibility of supplying the individual parliamentarians with information, but this is a pious hope and perhaps just wishful thinking.

I would now pause for a moment to consider the subject matter of paragraphs 25 to 41 of the report. Permit me to read you a few lines from an article in an Italian daily newspaper, also carried by *Le Monde*, about the very recent historic event of the signing of SALT II, an event which will also have momentous consequences for armaments options:

“The involvement of other parties in the US-USSR dialogue might mean for the United States a partial renunciation of its own oversight and a shift — certainly to be desired — towards better understanding between the two blocs. It would, however, apply a kind of distortion to a system of perfect and unchallenged bipolarity... But, leaving aside the unknown factor of China, Europe itself could be threatened by an American policy that tended to move backwards, by eroding the Atlantic consensus, increasingly limited to western security alone. Even this residual tie could be severed by the suspicion that the very dynamic of the SALT agreements, now unstoppable, might, besides proposing successive cutbacks in the arms and strategies of the superpowers, be extended into those grey areas in which the peripheral security of the United States and Soviet Union is guaranteed by means of sub-strategic nuclear weapons...”.

I shall not dwell on the technical aspects considered by the military affairs commentator on this historic Vienna encounter, whether with respect to long-range missiles or to the opening of negotiations for the SALT III agreements, going beyond the disarmament policy that Russia will presumably be following in its own camp. As long as the security of Europe depends on the presence of American and NATO military forces on its territory, Europe's room for manoeuvre will always depend on the use which the United States and the USSR make of NATO and the Warsaw Pact respectively as a function of the politico-military requirements of the new bipolar approach.

This also applies to France. Far be it from me to criticise in the past or the present that great sister nation of ours, but her strategic independence is only credible in the context of a western security structure guaranteed by the United States. It is a vicious circle that seemingly cannot be broken unless Europe takes a fresh look at the whole problem of its security, not so much by resuscitating the hypothesis of another proposal for a European defence com-

*Mr. Treu (continued)*

munity, but in the framework of a body anchored in the new European Parliament.

I thought it appropriate to add to the matters dealt with in the report some comments of a political nature in connection with arms procurement. Arms are not purchased in order to play soldiers but unfortunately they can be used, and in such case they must be used along a line of general political convergence and not as individual nations see fit. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you Mr. Treu. You have overrun your time by two minutes. May I ask the succeeding speakers to keep to the time they are allowed.

Mr. Roberti has the floor.

Mr. ROBERTI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, in my opinion the main obstacle encountered by the Rapporteur and the Committee in dealing with this difficult subject was that of the basic opposition in world policy — between the need and demand for greater and more ample freedom of information on all matters of vital importance to the defence of our peoples, above all the problem of defence and armaments, and the opposing need for the greatest possible discretion, the greatest possible degree of secrecy and therefore the greatest possible dearth of information on such delicate and exacting subjects.

It is a perpetual contradiction, thousands of years old now, and reflects in politics the opposition between the major political systems: western democracy, allowing freedom, a high level of public participation in decision-making and, consequently, a knowledge of everything necessary for reaching decisions, and totalitarianism, which concentrates maximum power in itself and excludes participation in information and control.

It is the age-old opposition between the two systems, which finds its counterpart — if I may be permitted a comparison with unlike kinds of conceptual situations — in the opposition we find, for example, in the field of law between the need for justice and the need for certainty. Justice requires that each individual case should be matched by a tailor-made decision; certainty on the other hand, calls for compulsory, precise, centralised rules regulating all cases in general.

There is no doubt that, of these two systems, we have chosen western democracy, with all its benefits but also its risks. Part of the price we have to pay for democracy is precisely the need to make it possible for all the component parts of democratic states to have a knowledge of the factors and conditions necessary for decision-making.

This then is the basic opposition with which the Rapporteur has had to contend. I am bound to acknowledge that he and his technical assistants have tried to overcome the opposition in every possible way, above all by drawing up a questionnaire which placed the recipients in the position of having to reply and then by analysing the replies in such a way as to derive summarised conclusions such as to constitute the backbone of the document presented to this Assembly.

I declare my agreement with the report, among other things because it seems to me the only way to try and solve this opposition. This Assembly, as an organisation extraneous to the situations in the individual countries, should enounce general rules, rules of conduct, that define situations of absolute secrecy imperative for the very existence of the possibility of defence — and therefore, not to be disclosed and disseminated — information which it is indispensable to convey to the legislators, in whom under our democratic system sovereignty is vested, so that they too can take their decisions. One paragraph of the report stresses that it is advisable that such rules should guarantee secrecy and restrict information, and be drawn up in such a way as to be valid at international level so as not to prejudice the individual, divergent and diversified situations of friction that may arise in different countries, and so as to separate the rules themselves from those who have to apply them. This is the only system we have for achieving a degree of objectivity in all legal enactments and therefore also in this one on the international plane.

Before I conclude, may I mention something about the report that rankled in my mind throughout the debates in Committee. My experience as a national member of parliament, now unfortunately drawing to a close, to my great regret in that I shall above all no longer be able to take part in the debates of this Assembly, which I consider of exceptional importance because it prods individual governments and national parliaments into taking up the vital task that here, as never anywhere else, gets the attention it deserves, of ensuring the common defence of our European homeland and our common European civilisation — my experience, I say, teaches me that national parliamentary controls are usually wielded more with the view to curbing than to encouraging government spending. That is, the various national policies are mainly concerned, depending on the accepted standpoint in each country, with what are known as the government's tasks of welfare, public works, social betterment or, in the all-too-frequent periods of economic and social crisis, with how to weather the crisis, defend the currency and ensure maximum employment.

*Mr. Roberti (continued)*

What worries me however is that by reinforcing control by individual parliaments we may produce the opposite to the desired effect of increasing the cost-effectiveness of expenditure out of individual military budgets on joint European defence. It is a danger I did not fail to stress to the Rapporteur and the Committee, and I see it is felicitously dealt with in paragraph 2 of the recommendation and resolution, which state that the ever closer controls and information called for should be directed so as to improve defence capability and increase standardisation and interoperability of defence equipment. This statement puts my mind at rest because it prevents our joint efforts to increase Europe's defence capability from, curiously enough, having the opposite effect of working as an incentive for limitations on specific arms.

Thus, this formulation in paragraph 2 of the recommendation also enables me to express my full agreement with the report and my congratulations to the Rapporteur and Committee on their work. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Roberti. We are sorry to hear that you will have to leave us in a little while.

Mr. Kershaw has the floor.

Mr. KERSHAW (*United Kingdom*). — I believe the Assembly will be obliged to the Rapporteur and the Committee for having produced this useful report calling attention to a situation which seems to be equally bad in all our countries. It is true that parliaments do not get sufficient information about defence matters. No doubt the reasons will be various and they have been set out very well in the report — considerations of administrative and legislative arrangements of each country. However, defence matters should be included among those on which we parliamentarians get sufficient information.

There is, first, the growing complexity of defence problems. It is no longer easy to grasp all the considerations to be borne in mind in coming to a proper conclusion. In the old days, the number of men with muskets and cannons was adequate as a yardstick for the efficiency of forces, but now extraordinary and esoteric inventions, nuclear weapons so terrifying to our imagination and the religious zeal with which they are discussed — because no proper conclusion can ever be come to on a basis of fact — have obfuscated the situation and made it more difficult for the ordinary person to take part in a discussion of the issues involved or to understand them.

A second point common to all our legislatures is security, both military security — which is obvious — and security on industrial matters,

because many weapons also give to those who manufacture them large industrial prizes. Therefore, to the countries concerned, industrial security is a matter with which we must reckon.

Whatever the reasons, parliamentarians today are starved of defence information, and therefore attendances in debates on defence matters in our parliaments have fallen off sadly, at least in the United Kingdom. I remember years ago when I was first a member of the United Kingdom parliament, defence debates and the debates concerning each service were well attended on both sides of the house. I am sorry to say that over the past few years attendances have fallen markedly. Unfortunately, it often happens that during defence debates members of parliament find themselves addressing a house almost empty, there being present only fellow members waiting to speak. That is not healthy and the report points out that one way in which it can be cured is by having greater reliance on expert committees than we now have in the United Kingdom parliament.

It may be known to the Assembly that recently we have made proposals to make further use of expert committees and we hope to have a discussion on this subject in our House of Commons next week. No doubt that will be a help, but to some extent that might even worsen the situation, because the more information is confined to experts and the more only they are kept informed, the less the parliament and the people understand, and the more they will feel excluded from the debate.

If armaments and defence questions are fully canvassed in one expert committee, say, in the House of Commons, when the time comes to debate the report of that committee on the floor of the house we may well find only members of the committee are there, no one else feeling competent to take part. That is something that we must watch closely so as to ensure that the whole house takes part. In a matter so vital as defence only participation by the people and the parliament in a democracy can support the commitment to a national policy that is so important today. Nevertheless, expert committees are a step forward and I hope that they will have attention. They certainly will in the United Kingdom.

Some speakers in the debate seemed to think it important that parliamentarians should know about alternative defence equipment. I concede that that is desirable but however great the expertise among parliamentarians, I doubt whether we shall be in a position actually to choose the kind of weapons to be manufactured for our own forces. It is to some extent desirable that we should know what weapons other countries have at their disposal and be able to some extent to measure the usefulness and efficiency



*Mr. Kershaw (continued)*

of our forces against them. Whether or not that may lead to standardisation I do not know. Standardisation is something for which Western European Union has called for many years and from a purely military point of view it has obvious advantages, but the difficulties are very great.

Standardisation can in most cases be very much more expensive than producing weapons or projects within one's own territory with one's own expertise. Inevitably, delays will ensue. There will be the need to get different countries to co-operate, which must mean delay and I suppose that it is generally calculated, perhaps not incorrectly, that co-operation between two countries always adds at least 25 % to the cost of a project. If three or more countries participate, the extra cost is probably even greater.

Naturally, standardisation constantly runs up against nationalism, because the manufacture of weapons means employment and money and progress on the industrial front in the country that manufactures them. Therefore, we must always find it difficult to achieve standardisation. No doubt it is right to continue to press for it, but I am sure that the Assembly will not deceive itself into thinking that this report, or any of the many others that we have produced over the years, will induce standardisation to come very quickly.

Interoperability is another very important factor and any country that manufactures its own national weapon and finds that that weapon cannot be used by anyone else, or that ammunition for it can be obtained only from its own depots, is acting extremely unwisely.

With those reservations, and only those reservations, about the difficulty of this whole subject, I endorse what the report has said. I warmly congratulate the Rapporteur not only on the report but on the way in which he presented it. It will be a valuable work for the Assembly to adopt.

*(Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. You will be aware that at the commencement of this afternoon's sitting I raised the question of attendance at and participation in the Assembly. I asked whether any consideration had been given to a matter raised by my colleague, Mr. Urwin, and you said you would respond on this when you resumed the chair at 4 p.m. Briefly, I would ask whether you have considered the matter

that was raised and have any comment to offer thereon.

Before you respond, I draw your attention especially to the fact that members of the staff of the Assembly have to observe the rules of the Assembly, which appear either to have been broken or whose observance has been seriously jeopardised. Do we understand that you approve and regard as legitimate what happened in regard to the signification of attendance and participation in this morning's affairs? In particular, does the chair feel that explanation and clarification are required?

The PRESIDENT. — I shall take up this matter as soon as this part of the Orders of the Day is finished.

The debate is closed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply?

Mr. MAGGIONI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I simply wish to thank those members who have managed to be here on such an oppressive afternoon to take part in this debate. Their contributions have undoubtedly added considerably to the significance of my report.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

The Chairman of the Committee, please.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — As often happens in the Assembly, attendance at a debate or even the number of speakers in a debate is not necessarily positively related to the importance of the subject under discussion. Very often, subjects with considerable importance but no immediate political sex appeal, unfortunately, do not get the attendance or participation they deserve. But that does not reduce by one jot or tittle the importance of the subject we are discussing, because, quite clearly, relations between our parliaments and the essential problems of defence procurement are among the critical problems that we should be considering, both nationally and internationally.

I believe that this Assembly and in particular the Committee of which I am Chairman owe a considerable debt of gratitude to our colleague, Mr. Maggioni, for preparing this important report.

It is a report that will not only have importance to this debate today but will become a working document of value in future. Indeed, I understand that it may well be debated in the national defence committees of a number of WEU countries.

We are also grateful that Mr. Maggioni was assisted in his work by Miss Gusmaroli of the

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

Institute of International Affairs in Rome. They both made an important contribution.

I should like to make several points requiring further consideration. First, as has been mentioned, one of the difficulties in considering defence — it applies to some other forms of public expenditure, but perhaps more in the case of defence where lead times and procurements are so great — is that the pattern of annual budgets, which is how parliaments have traditionally worked, becomes increasingly irrelevant. That is why in a number of countries — Italy, France, the United Kingdom and others — one has a programme of defence expenditure extending over a longer period. It is obviously important to try to look at things over the time horizon at which relevant decisions are made.

Secondly, although the report is frequently critical of the way in which we deal with these matters in our national parliaments, it is not only critical of governments. When parliaments do things wrong, it is not right to criticise governments. It is also right to criticise the parliament for not using its power more efficiently. It is very often the fault of parliaments themselves that they do not use their powers.

Although we feel that the situation is far from satisfactory in a number of our countries, we found during the course of our study that in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands there was an effective system of parliamentary control. Indeed, what we learned of what happened in those countries was an important example to others.

I remember that on one occasion in my Committee we had a most interesting discussion about the number of hours per year which the defence committees met in different countries. I shall not quote the results. They would be far too embarrassing for certain countries, not merely the smallest. One must consider what one means not by merely having a defence committee but how that committee works.

As Mr. Kershaw has said, we in the United Kingdom — I wear my national hat for a moment rather than my Chairman's hat — hope that the changes in our procedures, which will be debated in the House of Commons on Monday, will lead to some improvement.

However, I should like to respond to another comment by Mr. Kershaw. When we now have defence debates in the House of Commons, something which he and I and others perhaps forget is that it is now nearly twenty-three years since the last conscript was recruited into the British army. Whereas almost all parliamentarians in the other countries of Europe have had experience of military service, the vast

majority of those now coming into the House of Commons, particularly in this year's election, have had no personal contact with the services. It is a factor that should be borne in mind when Mr. Kershaw refers to the lesser interest in the services today compared with the time when he entered the house, when almost all members had either served during the war or had undergone post-war military service. That is a contributory factor of some importance.

My other observation is that not merely does one need to have a general defence committee but one needs to integrate it with the detailed methods of budgetary control operating in a parliament. Here, again, the example of what happened in the Federal Republic of Germany is particularly interesting.

My next point is one which is from time to time considered in the report, and it is an extremely difficult and delicate subject. I shall have something else to say about this when we come to Mr. Schlingemann's amendment. That is the relationship between security, not in the sense that we normally use it but in the sense of security of information which should be kept secret, and parliamentary discussion. This is a difficult balance to strike in a democracy. We in this Assembly would be wrong if we did not recognise the difficulties that exist — the inevitable tensions that will exist between a parliament that wants to know and a government anxious that security interests should be protected against the misuse of information.

However, one can look at the amount of information that is available to the United States Congress — here I do not go into the intelligence area but into the defence area — to see that apparently it does not reduce the effectiveness of defence decision-making. On the whole, Europe has some way to go in terms of more open government in this respect.

I turn to the points made by Mr. Kershaw, because underlying this report, discussed in the context of the Assembly of WEU, there is also the theme that has run through so many more of the reports of the Committee that I now chair — the goal of standardisation and the desirability of moving to a common procurement policy as far as we can, with a greater degree of collaboration in Western Europe. Mr. Kershaw rightly said that often collaboration imposed a collaboration premium and that things cost more. On the other hand, research can be spread over a longer run of purchases. It is not always the case that at the end of the day one can get a better buy through collaboration. I believe that it is also the case that although we have had sad experiences of collaboration, we have also had some successful experiences. They do not get the same publicity as the things that go wrong.

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

I know that one of my predecessors in this chair, Mr. Critchley, talked about our being disarmed by inflation. That we must remember in a period when resources for defence may become more and more difficult to obtain. We must see how we can use those resources as effectively as possible.

What we are arguing here is that we believe that insofar as members of this Assembly understand the needs and reasons for standardisation and the moving towards common procurement and interoperability so we should be able to use our influence as parliamentarians in our national parliaments to encourage our governments to follow such policies. Of course there will be national industrial interests and constituency interests operating in the other direction. But we in this Assembly have accepted the need for moving towards greater common procurement. Therefore, we want to find effective ways within our national parliaments in which that input can be introduced, whereby parliamentarians who have been persuaded of the arguments can persuade national governments to buy on a common basis.

As I said at the beginning, this is a matter not merely of major importance for our defence procurement but directly related to the relevance of WEU as an organisation.

We must always find a reason why we meet, not merely why we come to Paris twice a year. We must ensure that the results of our deliberations have an input in the international decision-making process.

That is what we have tried to examine in the report. I hope that, as a result of the decisions we shall now take, we, as members of this Assembly, will be able to go back to our national parliaments and try to influence national policies to achieve the goals that we have agreed here. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before voting on the draft recommendation in Document 807, we must deal with Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Schlingemann and which reads as follows :

1. After paragraph C of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

“D. To agree to the Assembly of WEU, at its seat in Paris, having access to national data banks, documentation centres and other sources of information on defence and defence-related political matters.”.

Mr. Schlingemann, do you want to speak to this amendment ?

Mr. SCHLINGEMANN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — First, Mr. President, I want to congratulate the Rapporteur on an outstanding report.

The only purpose of my amendment is to strengthen his recommendation, in the sense that as our British colleague Mr. Kershaw has already said it will make it possible to obtain more facts, more figures and more statistics.

My amendment further aims at strengthening the position of the Assembly, which has a right to have as much information as possible. It underlines, I feel, the importance of the Assembly.

Thirdly, it represents in my opinion a logical precursor to the report I hope to be submitting tomorrow on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

Finally, I can give an assurance that access to all official figures, data and statistics is — and here I am answering Mr. Roper — subject to conditions dictated by considerations of security.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Schlingemann.

Does anyone want to speak on the amendment ?

May I ask the Rapporteur, Mr. Maggioni, to speak ?

Mr. MAGGIONI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am afraid I cannot accept Mr. Schlingemann's amendment. In Committee last year we had occasion to discuss thoroughly a letter which he kindly addressed to me in a genuinely co-operative spirit. Our discussion showed that it was impossible to accept the amendment because, although extremely interesting, it dealt with matters beyond the scope of the report, which is concerned specifically with national parliamentary control of military expenditure.

In his amendment Mr. Schlingemann extends the area of inquiry beyond that of the control in question. For this reason only, and while I am in favour of the content of the amendment, I think that this is neither the time nor the place to deal with the matters raised in it.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

Now the Chairman, Mr. Roper, please.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I agree very much with what has been said by our Rapporteur, and to reinforce what he has said I would make it clear that we are not at all unsympathetic with the spirit of Mr. Schlingemann's amendment. We feel, however, that it goes beyond the scope of the report

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

we have prepared and that it should be based on another report.

I know of the valuable work which Mr. Schlingemann has already done on the Committee for Relations with Parliaments in studying this matter, and I hope that that Committee will be able to produce a report treating this whole subject of access to information rather more fully and enabling us to have a discussion on this proposal.

I therefore wonder whether, in the circumstances — because we would not wish to vote against what is quite clearly such a good idea — Mr. Schlingemann would consider withdrawing his amendment at this stage in order that it could come back based on a more appropriate report.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Schlingemann, please.

Mr. SCHLINGEMANN (*Netherlands*). — Mr. President, after the most friendly speeches of the Rapporteur and of the Chairman, I withdraw my amendment in the hope that the whole question will be discussed in the future.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Schlingemann.

Amendment 1 is therefore withdrawn.

We now come to vote, first, on the draft recommendation in Document 807.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections? ...

Are there any abstentions? ...

*The draft recommendation is agreed to<sup>1</sup>.*

We shall now vote on the draft resolution by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The draft resolution is agreed to<sup>2</sup>.*

Mr. Roper, please, on a point of order.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am sorry to speak from this bench, but you may know, Mr. President, that Mr. Hardy raised an issue with you, and I think you were about to comment upon it. I wondered whether I could speak further to Mr. Hardy's point of order before you

replied to it, as I, too, raised this matter with your colleague in the chair at 3 o'clock.

The PRESIDENT. — Then please take the floor.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — At the opening of this sitting, I drew attention to the fact that, as always occurs on these occasions, your colleague in the chair fulfilled his obligations under Rule 7(1) and notified the Assembly of the names of those Substitutes which had been handed in, and I said that this had obviously some part to play in the discussion this morning.

I should like to say one further thing on the discussion this morning. I watched the voting this morning extremely carefully, and I do not believe there was any malpractice. I do not believe anybody did anything which was in any way an attempt to defraud the decision. None the less, I think it probably is the case that over the years we have allowed the practice of the Assembly to move some way away from the written rules.

This is, Mr. President, a rather complicated matter, and I should be reluctant if, as a result of something done this morning, we were to rush into a situation without a fairly careful study of the implications. I hope that you will therefore find it possible to give some detailed consideration to a number of the implications of the practice of substitution and perhaps in due course come back and help the Assembly with a clarificatory statement.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Deschamps, please.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — I speak on a point of order, Mr. President.

A certain inconsistency has arisen in the voting and I should like an explanation.

Why should you take a vote by sitting and standing on the draft resolution whereas on the draft recommendation you are trying to take a quick one and almost — forgive me for saying so — hustling it through, as we say.

For the record, I am also against the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Bagier.

Mr. BAGIER (*United Kingdom*). — I rise, Mr. President, because my colleague, Mr. Tom Urwin, raised with you this morning the question of the difficulty we encountered on the question of Substitutes in this vote. I rise respectfully to ask, because I am a Substitute, for some clarification of the exact procedure which should apply.

I notice that at the beginning of each sitting it is reported that the names of the Substitutes will be notified to the President and published

1. See page 42.

2. See page 43.

*Mr. Bagier (continued)*

in the list of Representatives appended to the minutes of the proceedings. Naturally, this is in accordance with Rule 7 (1), which states :

“Any Representative prevented from attending a sitting of the Assembly may arrange to be replaced by a Substitute. He must give notice thereof to the President, who will in turn inform the Assembly.”

My difficulty — and it is on this point that I seek clarification — is in determining whether a Substitute is a Substitute for a sitting or a part of a sitting.

This has placed your staff in some difficulty, Sir. In this morning's voting pattern it was noticed — and I make no accusations of malpractice — that one of our colleagues had signed in already as a full Representative at this sitting. Further, his Substitute had already signed on in that sitting. Therefore two names were appended to that one representation. This must lead to some sort of difficulty for your staff. I therefore ask whether a Substitute when signing in is permitted to do so after the full Representative has signed in for part of the sitting, as opposed to the full sitting.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to support what Mr. Bagier has just said. It would be valuable if we could secure some clarification of this matter. He has referred to a member who signed in beside the member who had signed in as the full member. I am that Substitute. Perhaps it would be helpful for me to explain what happened.

Mr. Critchley originally signed in this morning and it became apparent that he would be unable to be present for the second part of the debate. I signed in as his alternate so that I should be able to vote on his behalf. I put my signature to that piece of paper approximately an hour before the vote took place. There was never any intention that we should both vote. The intention was that I should be able to vote because Mr. Critchley was unable to be in the Assembly at that time.

The PRESIDENT. — Let me deal with the question raised by Mr. Deschamps. We were dealing with the so-called draft resolution. I called a vote by sitting and standing, and, with the exception only of Mr. Deschamps, all were standing. The draft resolution was therefore adopted. If there is any difficulty about this, let us see whether we can deal with it in the Presidential Committee.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I rise again on a point of order.

May I correct a mistake straight away : on the draft resolution I stood up to vote against — contrary to what you have just stated.

Moreover, in the case of the draft recommendation, Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure states that on a draft recommendation the vote shall be taken by roll-call. I repeat : “... shall be taken”.

The PRESIDENT. — No, that is not correct. Let me read again what I told the Assembly. I said that if there were no objections to the draft resolution and no abstentions, the Assembly could save the time taken by a roll-call vote. There were no objections or abstentions, and therefore I am not prepared to take the matter up again. You did not register as being against it, Mr. Deschamps. The draft resolution was agreed to, and I am not now prepared to return to the matter.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — I beg your pardon, but the text is quite clear ; it says : “shall be”, and cannot be set aside in this fashion, especially as I have reason to think, without having the text before me, that a decision was taken to this effect and that there is a directive to the same effect as Rule 34, that a vote must be taken by roll-call.

The PRESIDENT. — I can only tell you that it is for the Assembly to say whether this is correct. We have done it in that way hundreds of times. If you had shown before, Mr. Deschamps, that you objected to it, we should have called for a roll-call vote. I cannot now return to the matter.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. I feel that there is a better way of showing the wisdom of your decision. We had to deal with a draft resolution. Rule 34 (3) states :

“The vote on the draft reply to the annual report, on a motion to disagree to the annual report, or to any part of it, and on a draft recommendation or opinion considered as a whole, shall be taken by roll-call.”

Since the second vote was on a draft resolution, is the situation the same for that as for the draft recommendation ? If not, there is no procedural problem.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Roper, please.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I hope that I may be able to help the Assembly with this complicated matter. My understanding is that when the Assembly is unanimous about a matter, a vote is unnecessary. A vote is necessary only when the Assembly is divided.

If the vote is, therefore, unnecessary, the provisions of Rule 34 (3) do not apply. Therefore, Mr. President, having ascertained, as you

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

did, that there was no one against and no one wishing to abstain, you were able to determine that the house was unanimous and that no question of a vote arose.

The PRESIDENT. — Let us be completely clear on this. First, we dealt with the draft recommendation. I asked whether there were any objections and there was none. We then moved on to the draft resolution, which has never been voted upon by roll-call. I called a vote by sitting and standing. There was one vote against the draft resolution.

Let me now turn to the problem raised by Mr. Roper and Mr. Hardy when my colleague reopened the sitting after lunch. They raised a very important point to which the Assembly will have to pay close attention. In the short amount of time available I have considered some of the problems involved. Those problems have convinced me that it is not a subject with which we can deal satisfactorily today.

Let me detail the issues that seem to arise. First, at what point does substitution occur? Is it when the President makes his usual announcement to the Assembly at the beginning of business, or does it run throughout the duration of the sitting? In other words, can someone returning from lunch at 3.15 p.m. register as a Substitute, or is substitution effective only at the time of a vote or debate?

Secondly, can Substitutes substitute for more than one Representative during a sitting, as has happened? Thirdly, can a Representative speak but leave his Substitute to vote? Fourthly, can a Representative vote as a Substitute when he has been substituted? Fifthly, can a Substitute be put in a vacant seat? The rules say:

"1. Any Representative prevented from attending a sitting of the Assembly may arrange to be replaced by a Substitute. He must give notice thereof to the President, who will in turn inform the Assembly.

2. Substitutes nominated in due form have the same rights as Representatives in the Assembly. They may not, however, be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly."

These are the difficulties arising in procedures which have been accepted for a number of years. I therefore suggest that between now and our next part-session I should study the matter closely, and that at our meeting in November or December, or whenever it is, I should give a considered ruling and suggest to the Assembly for consideration any amendments to the rules of procedure that may be necessary.

However, there is an immediate problem, and I hope that it will help the Assembly if I rule

on this point now. I will accept as valid any substitution notified to me before a vote for the purposes of that vote. As I have said, this is a complex problem. I hope that in the circumstances the Assembly will be content to leave the matter where it is at the moment and to await my suggestions for the improvement of our procedure, to which we have stuck for years.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — I am most grateful for that response, Mr. President, and I hope that in November we shall see some very useful results arising from the promising consideration which you have offered this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

Mr. BAGIER (*United Kingdom*). — I am most grateful to you for that ruling, Mr. President, but I should like to ask for some clarification for the remainder of the sitting. When you said that you would accept a Substitute at any time during a sitting, properly notified to you, were you saying that the original signatory, who had already signed in for that sitting, must also signify to you in some way — I wonder in which way he would do it — that he would no longer attend that sitting and would be replaced by a Substitute? I was thinking of that this morning when we had two names alongside one seat, both with apparent equal rights, according to the chair.

The PRESIDENT. — It is the last name that I accept for the vote. They can both be in here and take part in the debate, but only one has the vote, namely, the last one to inform me that he is the voter.

##### **5. Africa's rôle in a European security policy**

*(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 804)*

The PRESIDENT. — We must now take the next Order of the Day, the vote on the amended draft recommendation on Africa's rôle in a European security policy postponed this morning because there was not a quorum. A roll-call vote has been asked for, but as far as I can see we have no quorum at present.

Mr. FAULDS (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. Before we get to that, may I raise a personal matter about which I really have to make some statement?

I understand that this morning — I did not understand it until this afternoon, a German friend having been kind enough to translate the reference to me — Mr. Müller made some comments about my having been an actor and that therefore my political arguments should be dismissed on that basis. I only raise this matter because I think that it is quite unacceptable in

*Mr. Faulds (continued)*

an Assembly of this sort that reflections should be made on somebody because of his profession.

Actors are sensitive, gentle people, and Mr. Müller only proves what an insensitive lout he is by making such comments. Actors should be treated as the lame, the halt and the blind — except for this actor. This actor can very well hold his own. He is insensitive and not very gentle. But it proves the calibre of Mr. Müller that he makes that sort of comment. If the strength of his arguments is such that he can only rely on personal attacks, that proves the paucity of his arguments. I am not too worried by that because I have known the paucity of his arguments for some years. But this particular actor-politician resents that sort of reference, because he comes from a fairly honourable profession. Not many members of it have had the sense or the intelligence to move into politics.

I think that I can rely on my colleagues, who have known me for some time, as to my proven ability to hold my own and as to the intellectual validity of my arguments. Therefore, I am perfectly happy to take on Mr. Müller and his like. I make the point simply because we know that Mr. Müller — we had an example this morning — frequently provides a presentation that is incoherent, jumbled and inconsequential.

I do not know what Mr. Müller's previous profession was. I do not know whether he was a painter, a plasterer, a plumber, a poulterer or a pyro-technician. It does not matter to me, because I would not make reference to his previous occupation. I do not care what he was, and I would not comment on it if I knew. He was probably better at that job than he is at his present one. That is the only unkind comment that I intend to make. I can well understand why he seeks refuge now in the indeterminacy and the woolliness of his present political position, but he is practising now — or he should be practising — in a more precise and disciplined profession. Perhaps he should observe the good manners required of members of the House of Commons, where we make no reflection on a member because of his profession, because of his personal history, or because of his extra-mural activities. We all benefit, as my colleagues well know, from that restraint.

The PRESIDENT. — Well, Sir...

Mr. FAULDS (*United Kingdom*). — My final sentence is that this member really should learn the basic requirements of civilised parliamentary behaviour.

The PRESIDENT. — And you should stick to the rules, Sir, because according to Rule 29, a Representative who wishes to make a personal

statement shall be heard, but only at the end of the sitting. You may be absolutely sure that if Mr. Müller said something that was not in accordance with the rules of our Assembly, I should have called him to order. Thank you.

I told the Assembly that we must take the vote, and it must be a roll-call vote. We can take the roll-call but, as far as I can see, there will be no quorum.

I call Mrs. von Bothmer.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*). — If there is no quorum, it would be a pity to have a roll-call vote on this, because the report would be away from the table. I would prefer to have it back in Committee so that it could be voted on again. I believe that the Rapporteur would be happy with that.

The PRESIDENT. — As there is no quorum, we cannot vote and you are asking that this be referred back to the Committee?

Is that agreed?...

Are there any objections?...

*The proposal is carried.*

## 6. The balance of force

*(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 809)*

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the vote on the amended draft recommendation on the balance of force, Document 809.

The same rule is to be applied to Document 809. Can we also refer this back to the Committee?

Is that agreed?...

Are there any objections?...

*The proposal is carried.* The document will be referred back to the Committee.

## 7. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 802 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on political conditions for European armaments co-operation and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 802 and Amendments.

I call Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur of the Committee, to present the report.

Mr. van WATERSCHOOT (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I shall try to avoid repeating what is in the rather long explanatory memorandum to the report. Those of you who have taken the trouble to read the report will have noticed that I have tried to analyse as calmly and collectedly as possible what opportunities there are for co-operation on armaments. We all see this co-operation as essential. We have taken a moderate and calm approach to this difficult subject. From the questions put to the Luxembourg Prime Minister, Mr. Thorn, the day before yesterday it is evident that there are differences of opinion as to what Europe means. Some of us want a Europe soon to be integrated on a supranational basis, others will accept a Europe based on co-operation between sovereign states. Such differences of opinion do not rule out an analysis of the facts. Such an analysis ought to show what opportunities there are for progress along the road of co-operation. Here, I have in mind particularly the problems of armaments, and I will pick out two points from the analysis that I think are of fundamental importance. However much real will the various governments bring to the matter of political co-operation, they still give priority to national interests. The direct elections to the European Parliament have demonstrated that in the years ahead there will not be all that much change in the terms of reference of the WEU Assembly. This is no more than stating facts. The European Community will not, now and for the future, have either the capability or the remit to solve problems connected with the defence of Europe. It is this realisation that has led us to the wording of the last three paragraphs of the preamble to the recommendation.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

If I may sum up my remarks on the subject in French, let me recapitulate: so long as the situation remains as it is, it is essential that we should continue to found our activities on the modified Brussels Treaty, which remains the only legal basis for the organisation of defence and armaments in Europe.

Ladies and Gentlemen, this in no way implies taking a stand for or against the future aspects of a European union, which many of us would like to see, but is quite simply a statement of fact; and we may base ourselves on it in thinking that the future European union should not necessarily be founded solely on an extension of the European Communities in their present form to fields not at present within their competence, but possibly also on some form or other of merger — it is too soon to decide which, and even too soon to form a judgment — between the different institutions and treaties on which Europe is founded today.

This was how we envisaged the terms of reference given to the SAC — WEU's Standing

Armaments Committee — on 31st May 1976. The fact that they were given in the framework of WEU and not of the European Communities in no way prejudices the future, but is a fact as respectable as the Lord Mayor of London.

Ladies and Gentlemen, if we now take a cool look at all the statements that came hot and fast during the run-up to the elections to the European Parliament by universal suffrage on 10th June, I believe we can pick out a few essential elements to help us in dealing with our subject. There are, to be sure, on all hands faint impulses towards a joint shouldering by the member states of Europe of the Nine of the problems affecting their security and their armaments policy, but they nowhere add up to a will to achieve. It would be easy to accuse the governments alone of betraying the popular will by not building this Europe that everyone wants, but the way in which the election campaign was conducted and the election results, with the relatively high rate of abstentions noted in nearly all the countries show that although public opinion has also become aware of the issue, enthusiasm for Europe comes under the faint impulses shared rather than a firm political will. But — and this is the first observation that came to mind in preparing the report — a firm will is essential to overcome all the obstacles that stand in the way due to private economic interests as well as traditional ways of seeing and thinking, that still dominate both public opinion and our governments, and most certainly our general staffs too.

In these circumstances, it would be no use advocating a policy that did not take account of them. And our choice, as Rapporteur, very largely approved by the General Affairs Committee, was to stick to the realities of present-day Europe and not ask for anything which was not actually attainable by and acceptable to all our governments.

If you will now look at the operative part of the recommendation on which you will be pronouncing, you will see how far realism and moderation have been uppermost in your Rapporteur's mind.

For example, the first paragraph deliberately only asks the Council to apply the modified Brussels Treaty by ensuring that European armaments co-operation develops along lines which conform to the latest technological requirements. Should it fail to do so, the Council would be seriously guilty in the eyes of the peoples and nations of Western Europe themselves, by letting Europe's security be governed by outdated ideas.

Moreover, making such co-operation contingent upon the strategy applied by the members of the Atlantic Alliance enables it to take in



*Mr. van Waterschoot (continued)*

the members of our organisation who, although they have acceded to the Atlantic Alliance, do not feel able to participate in some NATO activities.

Frankly, we do not think — and our French friends will correct me if I am mistaken — that there are any deep-seated divergences between France's defence policy and that pursued by its WEU partners within NATO.

Mr. Thorn reminded us once again on Monday of a recent statement to our Assembly by the Minister of State, Mr. Bernard-Reymond, who confirmed France's determination to apply the modified Brussels Treaty; incidentally, such determination has never been impaired by a single French government.

There is, I think, a convergence between these defence policies and strategies, even if France refuses to place its co-operation with its allies in the framework of the integrated Atlantic structure.

I have not much to say about the second paragraph of the draft recommendation, for I had an opportunity to express my views yesterday on the amendments I moved to the report and recommendations submitted by my honourable friend Mr. Tanghe.

As some of you know, it was really only after gathering the maximum amount of information on the status of the Council's deliberations and decisions, especially at its last meeting in Rome, that I drafted this paragraph in a way that some people may think over-cautious, but I consider to be realistic in view of the potential and known positions of the Council.

The third paragraph, Ladies and Gentlemen, scarcely needs justification either. Obviously, if the Council assigns to the Standing Armaments Committee a task of obtaining information, it is in duty bound to provide it with the working facilities it needs to perform its task. And it was this very consideration that made us draft this second paragraph so cautiously.

In this respect too, it is by no manner of means our aim to parade any ideological option whatsoever, but to assist the Council and the SAC to act as effectively as possible. Such effectiveness needs to be shown not only in the way in which the SAC carries out its study, but also in the follow-up action that will ensue whenever it is completed. Then there will be no question of letting a very voluminous document be pigeon-holed in our ministries or the Council's archives. But — and this is what justifies the moderation of our tone and our proposal — the Council will have to prescribe a suitable treatment based on our diagnosis, and

the study must be followed up by action on the part of governments and also the European organisations specialising in questions of joint armaments production.

May I be allowed to observe right away that the amendment tabled by Mr. Roper and Mr. Valleix is not, I presume, aimed at weakening determination to ensure that the study by the SAC leads to action. I therefore await with interest what our two colleagues will have to say in support of their amendment.

We thought that the wording of the recommendations, sufficiently precise, whatever name they may be given, could represent the Council's best means of inducing governments to translate — and this is the important point — the results of the SAC study into a common policy.

In conclusion, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would say that it was once again caution that induced us to draft paragraph 5 as we did. We know that the independent European programme group claims to be really independent, which to a large extent prohibits it from having to report systematically to a parliamentary assembly. We must bear in mind that some of its members are not members of WEU. Nevertheless, the Council has always recognised that it had to keep our Assembly informed about the application of the Brussels Treaty, even where this was none of its own doing.

Clearly, the work of the IEPG is an element in the application of the modified Brussels Treaty. Consequently, our Assembly is entitled to be informed of it. But it is also for the Council to determine in what form and in what manner this can be done. It is also the effectiveness of the IEPG that we have in mind in proposing to you a wording allowing so much latitude for freedom of action by the governments.

Finally, the last paragraph in the operative part of our recommendation refers to one of the aims that Europe must, I believe, set itself in defining its armaments policy. Undoubtedly Europe is today, alongside the United States and the USSR, a major armaments exporter, especially towards the third world and regions in which tensions provoke armaments purchases often exceeding the possibilities of countries already very hard put to it to develop their economies and social structures.

Furthermore, such sales of armaments lead in many cases to fresh risks of the extension and worsening of conflicts, whose number and gravity we all deplore. It is not our aim to prohibit European armaments manufacturers from selling what they produce, but merely to prevent Europe from playing an exaggerated rôle in this armaments race and, above all, from helping to encourage a race in armaments sales we all wish to keep under control.

*Mr. van Waterschoot (continued)*

Plainly, a proposal like that in our last paragraph affects some members of WEU more than others, for not all armaments exporters are on the same scale. But it does imply, from all of us, definite self-denial and a certain community of views.

Unless some preference were given to those of our countries which buy weapons from the European armaments exporting countries, clearly the latter would have no reason to submit themselves to a form of European self-denial in armaments sales.

If we want to ensure that Europe should practise moderation in its armaments export policy, we must all assume responsibility for it with all the attendant implications for potential buyer and seller countries. In other words, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am not defending here the interests of any particular country — especially not my own — but I am attempting to consider, on this point as on others, where Europe's genuine interest lies in a situation which for the time being is not always under its control, and which demonstrates the constructive steps we can take in the various fields governing the operational value of prices of economic items.

I hope, Ladies and Gentlemen, that you will support my constant concern for moderation and realism in the context of prospects for the widest possible co-operation by the European countries in armaments, and that you will take a favourable view of this report and these recommendations, and vote for them.

In so doing — and I will conclude with this reflection — you will, I believe, be helping to provide guidance for the symposium to be organised by our Assembly in Brussels next October, and steer it along the path of reason and wisdom, whilst at the same time conferring upon it the maximum possible efficacy in the eyes of our governments and public opinion. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur, for your report.

The debate is open.

I first call Mr. Cook.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I should like to begin by thanking the Rapporteur for the presentation of his report, and I congratulate him on a report of great value to the Assembly. The Rapporteur's remarks about the EEC and its possibly having a defence commitment were translated in the English version as he was speaking with the suggestion that it was important to take a "quiet and moderate" view of this issue. In my country there may be some politicians who hold a "moderate" view of

the EEC, but I think there can be very few politicians within Great Britain, or indeed in any other corner of Europe, who can claim to have a "quiet" view of the EEC. However, if I might slightly amend the translation which was given of the Rapporteur's remarks, I think we can congratulate the Rapporteur on having presented a view of this issue which is "calm and moderate".

I would go along entirely with his remarks about the suggestion which we have heard advanced even within this hemisphere this week — that the EEC should have a defence dimension. Indeed, to some of us it appears that the EEC has at present a substantial number of problems to which it should address itself before it widens its remit. In view of the recent remarks of our new Chancellor of the Exchequer in Great Britain, I hope that I can carry my conservative colleagues with me when I say that one of the areas to which it should address itself is, of course, the budget, since it is not at all self-evident that the present arrangements, whereby the budget gets its largest contributions from the poorest countries, is a fair arrangement. That is one point to which we would expect the EEC to address itself before it attempted to take on board any policy area which would be quite so expensive as defence and all the arms procurement decisions flowing from it. I am therefore totally in agreement with the Rapporteur in his attitude on that matter.

I am also totally in agreement with the Rapporteur on the point on which he concluded, when he warned us against the dangers of the European countries seeking to rationalise their defence industries and seeking to reduce the cost of the procurement of armaments to each national government by exporting arms to other countries and seeking to trade with the third-world countries in these armaments in order to reduce the cost of armaments to themselves. I believe that when we face the question of the export of arms, we have a very heavy responsibility to make sure that those arms are not exported, as the Rapporteur indicated, to areas of tension, where they may help to fuel local arms races.

There is also another factor concerning the arms trade which the Rapporteur did not touch on but which concerns me deeply. It is that many of the countries which wish to purchase arms from us, when they are not areas of tension, are countries where there is a repressive régime. This is, sadly, a problem which is of particular relevance to my country, Great Britain, because, with our unfortunate troubles in Northern Ireland, we have acquired particular expertise and, therefore, particular weapons systems which are attractive to repressive régimes. One has to look only at the list of the régimes which come to Britain to seek to buy arms from us — countries

*Mr. Cook (continued)*

such as South Korea, the Philippines, Bahrein, Indonesia, Brazil — to perceive that not all of those countries are acquiring weapons from us in order to defend democratic values at home. Therefore, I am entirely in agreement with the Rapporteur on that point, too.

Where, however, I part company with the Rapporteur is in the third and fourth paragraphs of his recommendation, where he refers to the economic consequences of defence expenditure and arms procurement. I have strong reservations about these paragraphs, and I have on the table an amendment to them. It may be to the convenience of the Assembly if I make my remarks on that amendment now, in order to save time when we vote on the report.

In the third and fourth paragraphs of the recommendation the Committee expresses the view that arms industries "make a major contribution to the maintenance of employment" and "a worthwhile contribution to... the maintenance of a high level of technology in Europe".

I think that both those points can be contested. What I find particularly interesting is that there is no evidence produced in the report which follows the recommendation, comprehensive though that report is, to support either of those contentions. At no stage in the subsequent fifteen pages does the Rapporteur adduce evidence to support either of those statements.

On the contrary, if we look through the report we find statements entirely the reverse of those sentiments. For instance — and I think it worth while sharing this with the Assembly, because they are important points — in paragraph 10 of his report the Rapporteur observes :

"It is evident that a general slow down in military expenditure might have sweeping repercussions on the growth rate of developing countries if they managed to allocate more of their GNP to productive investment..."

Again, in paragraph 16, the Rapporteur observes :

"... it is clear that the world as a whole is expending too great a proportion of its intellectual, economic and financial resources on the production of armaments which, although leading to useful spin-off in many fields, is in itself sterile. A large amount of money, work and grey matter which might be more usefully employed in research, particularly into new sources of energy, food or medicine, is employed in the manufacture of highly sophisticated instruments..."

I find that I have much greater sympathy with the Rapporteur's views than with the views

expressed in the recommendation of the Committee. Armaments expenditure may be a regrettable necessity ; it may be that it cannot be avoided ; but we need not pretend, as the recommendation pretends, that that expenditure has a positive influence on the economy which has to bear it. Indeed, it is notable that if we look at the countries which over the past two or three decades have spent a high proportion of their GNP on defence and arms procurement, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, we find countries that have had a low growth in their GNP, but when we look at countries such as Japan and Germany, which in the past two or three decades have spent a low proportion of their GNP on defence and the procurement of weapons, we find that they have had a high growth in their GNP. It would be naïve to suggest that all you need to do to achieve a higher growth in your GNP is to cut defence procurement, but that contrast suggests that defence expenditure, arms procurement, does not have the positive stimulus to the economy which the recommendation of the Committee would appear to suggest.

I end by saying that the vision of swords into ploughshares is, of course, an old vision. It is a vision as old as mankind itself. I do not myself read scripture as often as perhaps I should, or as often as I was obliged to do during a Presbyterian childhood, but I do not remember the vision of swords into ploughshares being modified subsequently by a following verse which observed that, of course, in the meantime, the production of swords had a high contribution to make to the maintenance of employment and helped us to make advances in technology.

It was a simple vision. Perhaps the time for that vision has not yet arrived. It may be, perhaps, that, given the expenditure of other countries on swords, we have to maintain our own expenditure. But, Mr. President, I do not think that we should pretend, as the recommendation from the Committee pretends, that the expenditure on swords has anything but a negative impact, or does anything but weaken the economy that has to bear the burden of that expense.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Cook.

I now call Mr. Deschamps.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, now that the SALT II agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, marking a new step along the road of détente and arms limitation, have just been signed ; that the peoples of the world are ardently longing for a world without war, freed from the arms whose destructive capability and monstrous stocks hold a deadly threat over our planet ; that a year ago the

*Mr. Deschamps (continued)*

United Nations, responding to a deeply felt desire of the peoples of the world, adopted a resolution calling on states to disarm, our Assembly has several reports before it, including Document 802 which we are now discussing, all with the same purpose of promoting European co-operation in the field of armaments.

The report under discussion even goes as far as to say :

"It would therefore seem quite logical for these countries to pool their resources, efforts, research and technology for the design, development and production of what might be a uniform item of equipment."

This is an extremely serious matter. Such a wish goes against the current of history and the popular will for friendship between nations.

The arguments invoked to justify such a policy are hypocritical in the extreme. For example, the thesis is backed by reference to the need to consolidate European independence. But this barely conceals the fact that the military co-operation projects in question are an integral part of NATO planning, and the "forward strategy" referred to in paragraph 74 of the report directed against the socialist countries.

The projects are openly aimed at strengthening NATO against a clearly stated enemy: the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries.

In an attempt to justify European military co-operation the report also invokes the need to maintain employment, whereas at the same time other European bodies like the Brussels Commission of the EEC, are advocating and organising the abolition of 140,000 jobs in the iron and steel sector, 15,000 in textiles, the uprooting of vineyards and laying waste of broad sectors of industry and agriculture.

The proposals tabled are exceedingly dangerous for Europe's peace and the world's, for their purpose is to build up arms stockpiles and capabilities, and place at the disposal of the Federal Republic of Germany the very latest weapons, including nuclear weapons.

In paragraph 63 of the report it is stated explicitly that "the essential element... is the strategic nuclear weapon." In fact, the promoters of the report want to go farther, for they propose "concentrating research and production on new weapons", i.e. including the explicitly-mentioned neutron bomb.

Many people in the Federal Republic of Germany are boasting that they already possess the strongest conventional army in Europe. Their aim now is to get hold of nuclear weapons. The

report seeks to enable them to achieve their ends in pursuit of their domineering aims.

What is proposed is another EDC. Reading this report and some others, I have the impression of re-reading, for example, Article 101 of the EDC draft, which stated: "The Board of Commissioners, as the supranational body of the EDC, shall prepare and ensure the execution of programmes for the armament, equipment and supply of the European defence forces... the Board shall: make the best possible use of the technical and economic capacities of each of the member states: ... simplify and standardise armaments." It is almost word for word the same.

In reading the report before us, I also have the impression of re-reading the 1975-76 White Paper on the security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the development of the Federal armed forces, which advocated "co-operation in the fields of armaments" with the chief object of "creating a competitive arms industry".

It is indeed the German model which is being proposed to us for the benefit of the big profit-thirsty capitalist corporations and to the detriment of peace in Europe. That is why we energetically fight such dangerous projects, from whatever institution they may emanate.

We shall therefore vote against Mr. van Waterschoot's report.

We call on the peoples of Europe to organise against this new and serious danger, against this rehashed version of the European Defence Community. Rejected in the fifties, today's new attempt should suffer the same fate. Everything calls for a grand policy of peace. The right to live in peace is essential for all mankind. Therefore, instead of encouraging arms proliferation, the countries of Europe should, on the contrary, ratify the treaties limiting the manufacture of certain arms, and take an active part at the international conference table.

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Beith.

Mr. BEITH (*United Kingdom*). — I have found this one of the most thoughtful, best argued and best written reports in support of recommendations to have come before the Assembly for some time. I therefore direct my attention and that of the Assembly to some of the contents of that report.

I believe that European defence and armaments co-operation and European co-operation on foreign policy are an end in themselves. They have an importance greater than the economic co-operation which is at present the staple diet of the European Community. I agree with the Rapporteur when he says in paragraph 5 :

*Mr. Beith (continued)*

"The fact that Europe has not yet managed to make up its mind about matters as important for its present and its future as its own defence is certainly partly responsible for this relative lack of interest in the European cause among a large part of the population..."

I disagree with him when in the next paragraph he says that

"... the question is whether the preparation of a more elaborate European policy in foreign affairs and defence matters has not become essential to the success of economic and political co-operation..."

I believe that it is the other way round. I do not think that we try to bring about co-operation in foreign affairs in order to make economic co-operation seem worthwhile. Almost the reverse is true. We depend on working together in foreign policy and defence matters, and economic co-operation is desirable both in itself and as a contributor to this.

In common with other EEC member states Britain has just conducted the European elections. Britain's unique contribution to European democracy was to devise a system under which a party could win 14 % of the votes but obtain no seats. That is what happened to my party. But we who took part in those elections found that when we drew the attention of the public to the objectives in foreign policy and defence matters of European co-operation, the wider objectives and the wider ideals of having a Europe which could stand together and not be divided in war met with a far readier response than was accorded to much of the bread and butter argument and the discussion of economic issues.

Co-operation in foreign policy and defence matters is in the interests of the western democracies as a whole, and it must come down to practical details about armaments. The availability within Europe of forces which can be deployed effectively in a limited engagement is of very great importance. I followed the Rapporteur's argument with interest, even though I did not agree with one very important observation that he makes in paragraph 65. He says there that

"... it is not conceivable that the United States should risk the destruction of its cities for the sake of meeting a limited attack on European territory."

That certainly is conceivable, and it has been conceived. If it ever became inconceivable the whole structure of NATO would collapse.

When our General Affairs Committee spent some time in Washington earlier this year, the

question which preoccupied us was whether the Americans were prepared to put their cities at risk in the event of a conventional war in Europe. I think that most members of that Committee will agree with me that we found more readiness and determination on this point than we expected. We were worried about it and we were reassured to some extent. However, we also found some American impatience and concern at the slowness of some European nations in being able to co-operate with their response and to agree on the deployment of strategic weapons in Europe and questions of this kind. There was a readiness by the Americans, but it was coupled with an understandable impatience at the slowness of some measures of European co-operation.

The failure to achieve armaments co-operation owes much to the past, as the Rapporteur said. He talked about past military glories and of the backward-looking views of the military establishments. He referred to the small-nation mentality, which afflicts us all at times, having a powerful effect on us. We have to overcome these factors, and for a number of reasons. One is the broad objective of reducing and halting the arms race. The Rapporteur and my colleague, Robin Cook, referred to this. The desire to reduce the production costs of weapons is one of the major factors in the sales drive for armaments around the world. It is certainly a major factor in my country. We organise big defence sales fairs and we open our doors to almost all comers for the sale of armaments, largely because we cannot afford to go on producing arms at such a heavy cost to ourselves for our own use.

More effective European co-operation concerning production for European use would help to reduce that particular impetus for defence sales. The public is rightly angry and concerned about the extent of the arms race and the diversion of third world resources into armaments.

I have spoken mainly about the report rather than the recommendation because I have a well-established scepticism about what can be achieved here by recommendations. A great deal can be achieved if we make known in our member countries the issues brought out in the report.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Beith.

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall try to be as brief as the last speaker, leaving out anything I might have said about the quality of the report we have before us.

Maintaining a meaningful arms potential in Europe presents, as the Rapporteur has said, a great many economic, military and, especially, political problems.

*Mr. Pignion (continued)*

At the economic level it is first of all to be noted that the arms industry employs a workforce of about a million in Europe, of which 300,000 in France. During the present period of high unemployment there can be no question of jeopardising these jobs, except by framing a recycling policy not easy to put into effect in the short term. These arms firms represent not only a pool of manpower having a generally high level of technical skill, but also a range of high-technology activities in the overall industrial fabric.

The European arms firms find themselves, however, in an awkward fix — as the report says too ; each country tends to develop its own productions without being able to guarantee the manufacturers sufficient outlets, hence a certain number of sales operations of which, in my own country, we take a very poor view.

These are the factors, set out in the report, which force us to look at the problem of European co-operation. As things stand at the moment, it would appear that there is justification for such co-operation economically as well as militarily and politically. I shall not go over what is said in the preamble to the recommendation. The structures are there, and I want full use to be made of them — that is to say, that on the basis of the SAC and the IEPG a deliberately political utilisation will infuse them.

Hence the WEU Council and its Standing Armaments Committee should play a more active rôle. The only current task of the SAC, the study of the armaments industry, is not enough. If we want to go for greater co-operation, this will have to be done through either the SAC or the independent European programme group. They will have to be the framework for harmonising the implementation of a deliberate policy by the WEU countries.

The Rapporteur asked the French Representatives here just now whether they had any objections to his report. Mr. Deschamps had a great deal more to say about this than I shall ; I will merely add that as socialists we deplore the sale of certain equipments or licensing agreements liable to carry consequences of unprecedented magnitude. We denounce this state of affairs in our own country, and we denounce it here. The socialist party adopted in January 1978 a motion on national defence, in which it adopted a very clear stance on the policy of arms sales.

France must declare peace on the world. Disarmament demands first of all a political will. But the socialists also realise that independence demands military capabilities. It is fooling oneself to think in terms of "France alone", the

Maurrassian theme that is being taken up again today in various circles. The socialists therefore accept that France be kept in the Atlantic Alliance, provided total freedom of decision is left to it, the basic guarantee in the military sphere of our independence.

The real problem of co-operation today in a like set of circumstances, mentioned both by the report and, from another aspect, by Mr. Deschamps, is not that of co-operation versus non-co-operation, but of co-operation freely negotiated with partners of equal standing and with no loss of national independence ; for refusing to co-operate in Europe should logically, I should tell Mr. Deschamps, end up with dependence on the United States.

There must therefore — and here I return to the Rapporteur — be the speediest possible development of co-operation within the framework of the existing institutions. This is in my view the only way : give the Standing Armaments Committee, give the IEPG, a stature that will allow them to enter into a dialogue with the United States, without any integration that would alienate national independence but rising above the private interests or selfishness of each of the member countries by creating conditions in which they can co-operate.

I deeply believe that as things are at present this is the only way open to us towards a truly European future in the field of defence and armaments.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Pignion.

The list of speakers is closed.

The debate is closed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply ? Madam Chairman ?

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*). — Perhaps you will allow me to speak first, Mr. President. We thought that it would be more profitable for the Rapporteur to wind up.

*(The speaker continued in German)*

*(Translation)*. — I should like to make only one or two remarks. I am pleased with this report, which provides us with the basis for discussion we need for the symposium in the autumn. I personally fear that we might otherwise very easily find ourselves in a situation where we would be talking of nothing but the production of armaments, their use, etc.

But we need the political aspect of the matter that is raised here. There is a risk of excessive arms production worsening the situation throughout the world — and that is just what we do not want. We must therefore be very careful that we do not, for the sake of safeguarding

*Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)*

jobs in the armaments industry, intensify arms production so as to make national arms production cheaper, and by doing so make the situation in the world worse.

I should like to add a brief word to Mr. Deschamps. Mr. Deschamps knows perfectly well, Mr. President, that we in Germany do not want nuclear weapons — and he himself does not believe we do. But this is being used as an argument by his party. That he is free to do, provided he does not try by doing so to whip up French public opinion, as far as it listens to him, against us Germans. That is not European, that — I am sorry for having to say this — is being chauvinistic.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Madam Chairman.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. van Waterschoot.

Mr. van WATERSCHOOT (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like first of all to say to Mr. Cook that the report does not indeed go into the human rights issue, and I agree with him on the substance. I refer to the brilliant report made eighteen months ago by the present Swiss minister, Mr. Auber, on the human rights problem, which he described as one and indivisible.

So I think that if we do go thoroughly into the subject — and we shall have an opportunity to do so at the symposium in October — more attention must be given to this aspect which is obviously political dynamite, as the President of the United States discovered when he launched his policy two years ago and was forced to note that by dragging their feet and in certain cases biding their time other countries were able to profit from the situation purely economically without imposing the same discipline on themselves. I recognise therefore that it is a problem we can neither brush aside nor ignore in this context.

As for Mr. Cook's economic arguments, I believe that it would take much more careful study to know whether for countries like Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany which have had no great military expenditures to bear since the second world war but did incur heavy costs for their reconstruction and recovery, this fact does account for the very high rate of growth of their GNP. I think the problem is more complex than this, and cannot be reduced to one single parameter.

But I do agree on the need to find, in this argument and in the facts, a demarcation line, very clearly-marked at that, between the contribution of advanced technology research, and military production with its effects on civilian

production. Moreover, it must not be allowed to absorb too big a share of available resources.

On the other hand we are all compelled, as the first paragraph of the preamble expressly says, to voice our profound hope that the international community will eventually reach agreement limiting the production of and the trade in arms.

I personally am an ardent and enthusiastic supporter of the study projects assigned to Professor Leontiev by the United Nations for seeking the means of achieving a programmed cutback not in arms expenditure but in its rate of growth. If we could already arrive at a more moderate growth than now, and gradually zero growth, in armaments, by way of a multilateral agreement, vast resources might be released both for third world development and for higher living standards.

I therefore agree with Mr. Cook and will accept the amendment tabled by him and others to the paragraphs of the preamble.

As for what Mr. Deschamps had to say, I think that all argument about whatever form of European society rests upon a set of value judgments. But Mr. Deschamps' frame of reference is so different from mine that I would not venture to go too deeply into the matter.

I have to thank Mr. Beith for his kind words. I was most interested by his comment concerning Washington. The Americans have no inhibitions about the alternative or the problems raised in paragraph 26 of the report.

Mr. Pignion uttered a very forthright opinion, and I go along with his belief that it is within the framework of existing organisations, including WEU and hence our Assembly, that the dialogue between the United States and Europe must be developed.

I conclude, Mr. President, by saying that whatever type of Europe we may wish to build, and in which we may evolve, defence and consequently armaments problems are among the essential given facts there is no escaping.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur. Before voting on the draft recommendation in Document 802 we must vote on the amendments. We shall take first Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Cook and others, and then Amendment 2, tabled by Mr. Roper and Mr. Valleix.

I call Mr. Cook to support Amendment 1 which reads :

1. At the end of the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add :

“whilst noting that the resources that are absorbed by armaments production limit the investment available for civil production ;”.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — I spoke to my amendment when I made my substantive remarks and the Rapporteur indicated that he was ready to accept it, so I see no reason further to detain the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. — Is the Rapporteur in favour of the amendment ?

Mr. van WATERSCHOOT (*Belgium*). — I am in favour of the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ? ...

The Assembly can vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

I now call Mr. Roper to support Amendment 2, tabled in his name and that of Mr. Valleix :

2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "directives" and insert "guidance".

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — The Rapporteur said in his introductory remarks that he would like a little more information from myself and Mr. Valleix about this amendment, but it sounded as if he were not too unfriendly towards our proposal.

I was a little worried — and this applied also to Mr. Valleix — by the use of the word "directives" in this paragraph. That term has become widely known in the European Community. If the European Community decides upon a directive, it has juridical status in European Community law. It may be that it was not the intention of the Rapporteur to take this in the same juridical sense as applies in the European Community in relation to the views which could be expressed by the Standing Armaments Committee, because under the Brussels Treaty and under international law as it stands at present procurement policy is a matter for individual governments, after the closest possible consultation with their allies.

But defence procurement policy remains the responsibility of sovereign national governments. The Brussels Treaty does not give any power to Western European Union to issue directives on procurement policy.

I hope, therefore, that the use of the word "guidance" will ensure that the results of the studies are passed on to the governments with the strongest support of the Council, but that we shall not be confused by the use of a word which in another context has a specific juridical meaning and which might appear to assume that Western European Union was taking similar juridical powers over member states.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone wish to speak ?...

What is the view of the Committee ?

Mr. van WATERSCHOOT (*Belgium*) (*Translation*). — Mr. President, after Mr. Roper's explanation it seems to me that the word "directives" does have an over-legalistic meaning in the case we are dealing with, and that the English word "guidance" which he proposes does not go against the spirit of the recommendation.

But I am a little more dubious about the French translation which uses the word *orientations*, and I must point out to Mr. Valleix that it is surely weaker than "guidance".

I therefore propose that the Assembly agree the amendment in English and we leave it to the excellent translation services of WEU to find the precise French equivalent.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur. We can now vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 2 is agreed to.*

We can now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 802, as amended by the two amendments.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (*Translation*). — So that there may be no ambiguity, I ask that a vote be taken on the draft recommendation by roll-call.

The PRESIDENT. — You have listened to the request for a roll-call vote. As there is no quorum — there is no doubt about that — the matter must be held over until the next sitting. I expect no quorum tomorrow morning. However, the matter is left over until tomorrow morning's sitting.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I do not want to delay the proceedings, but there is a problem. This report is due to be considered by our symposium in October. Therefore, the normal arrangement that we make, that it be held over until November, is extremely inconvenient. I therefore take this opportunity to plead with all members to support, oppose or abstain, and to be in their places tomorrow morning so that we may have a quorum and either adopt or reject the report. At least we should have a decision that can go forward to the symposium.

The PRESIDENT. — This item will be inserted in tomorrow's Orders of the Day, and we shall see what happens then.



**8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday 21st June, at 9.30 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 803 and Amendments).
2. Information on defence questions for members of parliament and relations with parliaments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 800).

3. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation (Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Document 802).

Are there any objections ? ...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

I must inform you that the Italian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Angelo Sanza, has been unavoidably prevented from coming here tomorrow to address us. I know that members of the Assembly will be as sorry as I am not to hear Mr. Sanza, and I know that we all regret the pressure of urgent business which has prevented him from being with us tomorrow.

Does anyone wish to speak ? ...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 5.55 p.m.)*

# SEVENTH SITTING

Thursday, 21st June 1979

## SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Roper (point of order).

3. Various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 803 and Amendments*).

*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Schlingemann (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Craigen, Mr. Kershaw, Mr. Périquier, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Faulds, Mr. Pecoraro, Mrs. von Bothmer (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Schlingemann (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Périquier, Mr. Valleix; (points of order): Mr. Roper, Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Roper,

Mr. Périquier, Mr. Kershaw; Mr. Schlingemann, Mr. Craigen, Mr. Roper, Mr. Schlingemann.

4. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 802*).

*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Roper, Mr. Cook.

5. Information on defence questions for members of parliament and relations with parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 800*).

*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Schlingemann (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper, Mr. Verleysen, Mr. Schlingemann (*Rapporteur*).

6. Adjournment of the Session.

*The Sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

On a point of order, I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I think I am as well aware as anybody of the very heavy responsibilities and difficulties of your task. I should therefore like to ask your guidance and advice in order to help members of the Assembly and the staff of the Assembly in the future. I do not want to go back over anything which has happened in the past, but I should like to have an assurance from you that in future the agenda of the Assembly will be drawn up in accordance with the rules, in particular Rule 17 and Rule 2.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Roper, I take note of the point which you have raised, and which you raised also at the meeting of the Presidential Committee yesterday evening. I shall certainly ensure that the preparation of the agenda is carried out in accordance with our Rules of Procedure.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Thank you, Mr. President.

### 3. Various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States

(*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 803 and Amendments*)

The PRESIDENT. — The Orders of the Day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 803 and Amendments.

I call the Rapporteur of the Committee, Mr. Schlingemann, to present the report.

Mr. SCHLINGEMANN (*Netherlands*) (*Translation*). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I begin by thanking all those in the United States who gave us hospitality, very lucid information, and took part in highly interesting discussions.

The report I have the pleasure of presenting today was drafted following a visit by the General Affairs Committee to the United States last March. So it was written in April and

1. See page 46.

*Mr. Schlingemann (continued)*

adopted by the General Affairs Committee on 21st May. We are now in June, and there is no doubt that things have been moving since March, and that in many ways the situation I described at the time has altered.

This is particularly true of energy, in the case of which President Carter's decision to subsidise oil imports into the United States was probably not yet taken or, at any rate, not yet known. Nor, of course, had the SALT agreements yet been signed. The Camp David agreements on the Middle East had not yet been given the initial implementation they have since received. Nevertheless, the impressions the members of the Committee were able to derive from an extremely interesting trip, during which they were able to meet representatives of several departments of the American Administration, members of both houses of Congress, and academics, still, I think, remain valid in essentials.

Everywhere in the United States we heard the most qualified authorities express a willingness for close co-operation with Europe, a concern to broaden and deepen consultation in all areas, and a desire to see a united Europe as a partner easier to talk to than a divided Europe could offer. I do not think there is any reason to doubt this good will, which appears to be general.

However, if we go on to analyse the actions of the American Government in the various areas in which it may have been led to oppose Europeans' most fundamental interests, we see that this good will has not always been translated into deeds. Certainly, organs for consultation between Europe and the United States exist, but their proceedings hardly affect the complicated decision-making processes that govern American politics, so much so that Europe sometimes wonders whether the United States is really willing to practise genuine consultation. The most typical example of this was the way in which Europe learned of the United States Government's decision to grant a very high subsidy to companies importing oil into the United States. The decision, which caused a sudden upsurge in prices, was made public the day after a meeting in Paris in a framework deliberately created by the United States as a response to the challenge of the oil shortage with specific reference to energy and oil. There is every indication that such a major United States Government decision was not mentioned at the meeting, although it had already been taken.

We may accordingly wonder what use a consultation can be which is only a sham, and not only does not produce joint action but does not even allow the United States to inform its European partners of decisions it has already taken.

One could quote many such examples notably in monetary matters, foreign policy — whether to do with the Far East, Africa or the Middle East — arms limitations and the progress of the SALT negotiations, or arms procurement policy and standardisation of armaments.

I should not be surprised if some of my colleagues find the present report somewhat ambiguous. The ambiguity lies in the actual practice of co-operation between Europe and the United States. Indeed we have to note, side by side, with the existence of a genuine American desire to co-operate with a united Europe, the clear limits of that desire, which remains subject to national concerns. This ought not to surprise us at all, for we know how much the construction of Europe itself suffers from such discrepancies between words and deeds.

A certain discrepancy will also be apparent between the contents of the explanatory memorandum, which we wanted to be broad enough to comply with the Rapporteur's terms of reference from the General Affairs Committee — to examine the various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States — and the much narrower text of the recommendation itself, which I intended to be addressed, as is only proper, to the WEU Council alone.

If we do not want other parliamentary assemblies to interfere in matters which are the business of the WEU Assembly, I think that we should confine ourselves to areas that fall within WEU's specific terms of reference, that is, we should not try and introduce into our dialogue with the Council problems such as trade, currency or even energy.

The object of the first three paragraphs of the preamble is the willingness for co-operation so evident in the American declarations. The next paragraphs draw attention to a number of points on which there has been most tension between the interests of Europe and those of the United States in the last few months.

Finally, the last group of paragraphs in the preamble express the wish that a European solution be sought to relieve that tension.

To my mind this is not just a flourish of style but an absolute necessity. Even though it may seem that, in several areas, the policy actually pursued by the United States in no way favours European unification, such unification remains, as the Americans know perfectly well, indispensable to the proper functioning of co-operation between Europe and the United States. America needs balance within the western world just as much as we do, because only a Europe sufficiently strong can help the United States Government assert the political will there is no reason to doubt it possesses against the mass of opposing interests.

*Mr. Schlingemann (continued)*

A world power if ever there was one, the United States ought to pursue a world policy, but will be unable to do so unless the weight of domestic policy is offset by a real influence exerted by its outside partners.

To seek a European solution does not mean therefore opposing an American solution to the problems now facing the western world as a whole, but seeking a solution consonant with the true interests of the United States and of Europe.

Moving on to the operative part of the recommendation, you will notice that what is being recommended to the Council is a development of consultations between the European members of the Atlantic Alliance on matters of foreign policy.

In my opinion there is no privileged framework for such consultations. The wider they are, the more they are likely to have some effect, and it is very proper that consultations between the Nine — who will soon be ten, and likely to be twelve in a few years time — should provide the necessary framework.

What must be asked of the WEU Council is simply to see that such consultations are actually held, while accepting to provide a recourse in the event of all the member countries of the European Community not being able to frame a common external policy. This may well happen once it is no longer a matter of economic affairs but of matters more especially concerning defence.

This is why paragraph 2 of the recommendation requests the Council to study the implications for Europe's defence policy of the Soviet Union's deployment of new weapons. There is no sense in closing one's eyes to the reality of the major build-up of medium-range missiles in Eastern Europe over the last few years. It is a serious threat to the credibility of NATO as a whole. The West has the means of countering this, and adapting its offensive capacity so as to maintain the necessary level of deterrence to dissuade the Soviet Union from pursuing an aggressive policy.

Decisions are to be taken to determine the means by which the West will meet the new challenge, and there is no doubt that in this respect Europe has interests and concerns not always identical with those of the United States.

It therefore seems indispensable and urgent that a European policy on the production and deployment of arms be defined as quickly as possible. Otherwise Europe will have missed the bus again, leaving the Americans to take all the essential decisions on European security on their own.

Paragraph 3 calls on the WEU Council to make a regular critical appraisal of the strategic concepts adopted by NATO.

It may appear odd at first sight to ask one western defence organisation to make an appraisal of concepts adopted in another. However, anyone who has just spent some time in the United States will have noticed the activity that reigns in that country constantly to seek and define means of adapting its defence policy to the realities of a changing world and a rapidly evolving technology. History shows us that, in a very general way, the doctrines and concepts adopted by NATO have been conceived and expressed in the United States years before they are taken over by the Atlantic Alliance. This is only right in view of the United States' preponderant rôle in western defence. Nevertheless, it leads one to wonder whether in many cases the doctrines and concepts presiding over the actual arrangements for the deployment of America's forces world-wide do in fact correspond to NATO's official philosophy rather than to a specifically American one.

In other words, we get the impression that America is very often ahead of NATO, and that the NATO Council is in the last analysis only useful in inducing the United States' European allies to follow, because they hardly have any other option, decisions long since taken by the government in Washington. It therefore seems right that the WEU Council, which remains the only specifically European organisation vested under the treaty with powers in defence matters, should undertake a critical appraisal of concepts adopted by NATO. The point is not to oppose it to American concepts but to facilitate NATO's adaptation to the defence policy actually adopted by the United States and, finally, to try and ensure that relations between Europe and the United States in defence matters are something other than a usually futile resistance, whose delaying effects can however be dangerous for both Europe and the United States.

The joint production of arms should, it seems, dominate the work of our Assembly this year. The symposium we shall be holding in Brussels in October is designed to promote such co-operation among Europeans. Quite clearly, co-operation must not be achieved at the expense of either military efficiency or trade between the countries of Europe and the United States. There is not the slightest intention of manifesting opposition to the two-way street proposed by the Americans, or to the bilateral agreements whose purpose is to organise it. However, everyone knows that, up till now, the two-way street has conveyed two extremely unequal flows. The flood of imports of American equipment into Europe cannot be compared with the trickle of arms that America has purchased in Europe during the last few years.

*Mr. Schlingemann (continued)*

It is to the extent that the two-way street does not in fact exist that it constitutes a threat to European co-operation in armaments matters, and the rôle of an institution like the WEU Council should be, in this respect too, to draw up a balance sheet of the existing situation and draw from it the necessary economic and political conclusions for a genuinely functioning two-way street of trade. It is, moreover, quite clearly one of the aims of the study which the Standing Armaments Committee has been carrying out since 1976, and of the independent European programme group. However, what information can be gleaned despite the discretion maintained by all our governments in this area permits one to wonder whether the European programme group is really fulfilling its task and whether there is really any substance to the progress it has achieved towards European co-operation in arms production.

That is why paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation asks the Council to ensure that priority is given to the organisation of European co-operation in the necessary trade between Europe and the United States.

Unless it manages to do so, there will probably be no more European co-operation or two-way street in a few years' time, but simply procurement in the United States of the equipment which Europe needs for its defence, at the expense of both our balance of payments and of employment in Europe.

I hope you will view this report and recommendation as the fruits of a survey I have tried to approach without any preconceived idea and from which I have tried to draw what conclusions were possible for WEU. I therefore hope you will adopt it. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur, for your report.

The debate is now open.

I call first Mr. Craigen. He will be followed by Mr. Périquier.

Mr. CRAIGEN (*United Kingdom*). — There are times when WEU as a body seems almost to be in need of artificial respiration, and in the aftermath of the direct elections to the European Assembly there has probably been much more questioning of the rôle of WEU as a parliamentary forum for the Seven. My own view is that the newly-elected European Assembly will have sufficient problems ahead of it in the next few years and very little time in which to give defence matters the priority which this Assembly would feel that subject deserves. In any case, it is the Commission which initiates and the Coun-

cil of Ministers which decides within the membership of the European Community.

Mr. Schlingemann's report is one of the most significant that we are discussing this week, during which SALT II has been signed in Vienna, because Document 803, in examining the various areas of co-operation with our Atlantic partners, reveals how, after thirty years, the nature of this partnership has changed, and therefore the relationships have altered very significantly.

This morning, Mr. President, I want to move, on behalf of Mr. Urwin and others, Amendment 1: In the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph 5 as follows:

"5. Consider in view of more recent developments the need for closer consultation on energy problems between the United States and the European countries."

I do so because it seemed to us surprising that Document 803 did not contain a specific recommendation on energy matters. After all, in his excellent report Mr. Schlingemann points out the vulnerability not only of Europe but of the United States in oil supply and general energy demand. I should have thought that the burdens of being a superpower were placing the United States in greater difficulty both at home and abroad and that these difficulties had probably been accelerated with the energy crisis since 1972-73.

The whole life style in the western hemisphere is changing. Not only is it changing in this decade; it will change in the one to come. In the United States, as Mr. Schlingemann points out, there seems to be less willingness to see this, far less accept it, and the changes that will be necessary in oil consumption at home.

The report makes the point in paragraph 27 that:

"... because the crisis surfaced through events in the Middle East a political solution appeared possible."

It is not just the cost of the barrel of oil; it is the limited number of barrels of oil likely to be available in the years to come. This is why Amendment 1 has been tabled.

The Schlingemann report refers to possible expansion of nuclear power, but here again it seems that many countries will find their nuclear policy boxed in because, apart from the ecology lobby and security considerations, there are the very heavy capital costs involved in developing nuclear energy. Hence conservation will still be one of the major ways in which domestic economies, whether in the United States or among the European members, will be able to cope with the oil crisis, Sheikh Yamani has said only this week that there is likely to be a fourfold increase

*Mr. Craigen (continued)*

in oil prices within the coming decade. This will bring about profound changes not only in the industrial structures of Western Europe and the United States but in regard to defence procurement and the way in which defence is deployed.

I turn now to some of the observations that Mr. Schlingemann makes in his report about monetary systems. As he rightly points out, there has been considerable pressure on the dollar, and he advances the advantages to Europe of a European monetary system. I do not know whether EMS is likely to present the kind of European strength that he sees in his report. As he knows, the previous government in the United Kingdom took the view that the United Kingdom should stay out of the European monetary system for the time being. The new government, according to the legislative programme announced in May, have indicated that they are reviewing the position. There is, none the less, the problem of convergence within a time scale, and certainly on the basis of the United Kingdom's recent budget it would seem that our government place inflation and combating inflation lower in the priorities than reducing tax. To that extent it would make the problem of convergence in operating a European monetary system far more difficult. As I come from a Scottish constituency, one of my reservations about EMS is the effect it has on peripheral areas.

In concluding my remarks, I want to mention SALT III. Mr. Schlingemann's observations indicate that it is easier for the United States to deal with one Europe than with nine member countries. The trouble is that the separate interests of those nine — and, in time to come, twelve — member countries are much greater than their collective interests. This will be one of the continuing difficulties in transatlantic cooperation in the years to come. If WEU is really serious about its future as an organisation, I suggest that one of the major tasks facing this Assembly in the next few years will be to ensure that there is an adequate input into the SALT III negotiations. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I call Mr. Péridier. He is not here. I therefore call Mr. Kershaw.

Mr. KERSHAW (*United Kingdom*). — Like my colleague the last speaker, Mr. President, I wish to welcome unreservedly the report which has been put before us as being one of the most important that we have been able to consider this week. I consider that the matters which have been so well put together in such an important document as this are really the stuff of discussion which WEU ought to have, and we are greatly indebted to Mr. Schlingemann and his colleagues for having produced it.

Like him, I share the misgivings which he expressed about the Camp David policies pursued so vigorously by the Carter Administration in the United States. Of course, it is at first sight attractive that there should be a peace treaty between opponents of such long standing and hatred as Israel and Egypt.

It is an extraordinary thing that President Carter has been able to get these two countries to come to some kind of accord. But the idea that the Camp David accords and treaties are to lead to something better and more fundamental with the other Arab states is, I fear, an illusion. The accord has made it more difficult for the moderate Arab states to continue in a negotiating posture with the Israelis. It has confirmed the fears of the PLO that it is unlikely to get anything from Israel in the future by negotiation and, therefore, I fear that there will be a hardening of attitude all round.

The fact that one of the side effects of the treaty is that Jerusalem continues to be unnegotiable from the Israeli point of view is not the least of the defects that I see in the treaty. It is not essential, of course, and Egypt can readily come to an agreement which does not include Jerusalem, because, apart from religion, Egypt has no interest in the Jerusalem problem. But to exclude Jerusalem from the negotiations and the final treaty drives a nail into the prospects of further negotiation between the Kingdom of Jordan and the PLO. Therefore, while one cannot but welcome any step forward, I fear that in future Middle East negotiations this will prove a very difficult hurdle.

From the point of view of members of WEU, the general peace of the area is important, particularly because of the energy problem, and in so far as the anxieties and feelings of the Arab states not included in the treaties will be aroused and worsened by the treaties, the position of America vis-à-vis the oil-providing states, and therefore the position of Europe as a whole, has been made worse. Like Mr. Schlingemann, I believe that the oil position has not been improved by what has been done and therefore on political and economic grounds I look forward with a certain gloom to the future because of the Camp David policies.

There is one point on which I should like to take gentle issue with the Rapporteur on Document 803. Paragraph 65 deals with the attitude of the United States Government towards the régime in Iran and states that :

"The United States Government... supported the Shah's régime longer than necessary in spite of the strong internal opposition to the régime."

Of course, in the upshot that statement cannot really be found to be untrue but I ask the Rap-

*Mr. Kershaw (continued)*

porteur to have a qualifying thought in mind. How else can government deal with government except with the government which exists? If we are to have a position in which governments are trying to deal with oppositions and, in the case of Iran, with an illegal, underground, violently revolutionary opposition there will very quickly be a position in which it could justifiably be said that the United States Government or any government so concerned was trying to interfere in the internal arrangements of another country, which is not acceptable under the United Nations Charter, or the way in which we conduct world affairs. So I feel that that sentence is not really justified.

The Shah's régime was the best régime in Iran. It was the only régime there and the only way that we could deal with that country was through that régime. There was no other possibility. I would respectfully point out that in the next paragraph the Rapporteur rightly comments that the Ayatollah Khomeini was given asylum in this country where we are meeting and was enabled to continue a propaganda exercise from here, reflecting no particular credit on the foreign policy of France and having no beneficial effect from the French point of view, for it is not clear that France secured any greater supply of oil, or anything at all, from the results of that policy. But it is clear that the situation has been thrown into very great confusion by what has been done.

I believe that one should excuse the United States Government on this occasion for having supported, as is said, the Shah in his position and we should not condemn the United States for that. There was strong condemnation of the United States Government and it was suggested that had that government persisted in its previous policy, the Shah would not have been overthrown, with consequences which, whatever one's attitude to the régime or the Shah, obviously have been unhelpful to the West.

Finally, I take this opportunity to support what was said by the previous speaker. I very much agree with Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Urwin and his friends, proposing that the problem of energy ought to be tackled by all the nations concerned in a much more forthright way than perhaps it has been up to now.

It has been very difficult for the American people and the United States Government really to come round to the belief that there could be a shortage of energy. One characteristic which has been striking to European visitors to that country for decades is the amount of power of various kinds that has been available, whether in the factory, the home or the motor car. This power, which rested upon vast indigenous

resources, was so freely available that it took some time to be realised that it was no longer freely available. I am sure that the importance of this factor is now sinking into the consciousness of all of us, including the Americans, and we should have a really urgent dialogue on future energy prospects. I hope that the meeting of European heads in Strasbourg, which is taking place today and tomorrow, will address itself very much to this problem, so vital to all members of Western European Union. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Kershaw.

Before we go on with the debate I should like to welcome among us a former member of the Assembly, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas. He was with the Assembly for years and has been President of the Assembly of the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Assembly. Welcome here again, Sir Geoffrey.

I now call Mr. Péridier.

Mr. PERIDIER (*France*) (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, I had thought of asking for the report to be referred back to the Committee. I do not want to bury it for good but I consider that in the present situation it deserved to be reviewed and possibly amplified.

It really is very difficult for us to accept the first paragraph of the preamble of the recommendation :

“Welcoming the desire shown by the United States Government to pursue and to develop its co-operation with Europe in every field ;”

If ever it was impossible to talk about United States good will, it is now. And if we did not know the honourable gentleman to be a manifestly sober person we might wonder whether he was not being sarcastic. Surely if ever there was a time when the United States showed no great good will towards Europe, it is now.

Mr. Carter is discussing the SALT II disarmament treaty but he has not even taken the trouble of consulting his allies in the Atlantic Alliance and yet they had something to say. The best proof that it does interest us is that we have arranged for a debate on SALT II and its consequences in Europe.

There is already talk of SALT III, which would deal with the defence of Europe. But it is being decided unilaterally and once again Europe has not even been consulted.

Mr. Roper, you seem to be shaking your head, but I am saying what I have read in the papers ; you may be more up to date on other matters but let me say what I have to say, for I am coming now to the most serious thing of all — and it does count for Europe — Mr. Carter's deci-

*Mr. Périquier (continued)*

sion for a subsidy of \$5 per barrel of oil imported into the United States. I am saying that this is all the same grave, it is a serious matter for Europe. Not only is it a way of depriving Europe of certain oil supplies which should normally, under a co-operation properly so-called, have been Europe's — let us not forget that the United States is one of the leading oil producers — but what is more serious is that this demagogical decision will create difficulties for Europe.

The rise in the price of oil liable to result is, for Europe and for its countries including Britain, even though it is going to have its own oil, a decision that will send up the cost of living, unemployment and the trade deficit. And that is what is called the desire of the United States to develop its co-operation with Europe!

As for the reception given to our French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. François-Poncet, the least that can be said is that Mr. Carter treated him in an offhand manner. May I remind you, in case some of you have not realised it, that Mr. François-Poncet was not visiting Mr. Carter as French Minister for Foreign Affairs; he went there as the President-in-Office of the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community. And the least that can be said is that he was only granted a few minutes and not listened to. On behalf of the European Community, Mr. François-Poncet talked about energy and Mr. Carter's decision to introduce a \$5 subsidy per barrel of oil imported into the United States, and Mr. Carter talked back about the Middle East, criticising France, it seems, for not having given him enough support in arranging the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. But at what juncture did Mr. Carter permit Europe to take any close interest in that treaty? It was settled by Mr. Carter alone — period. And he thought of Europe when it came to pay the bill. So I say: no, we cannot put up with that.

In conclusion, let there be no misunderstanding about what I think. It is not that we want to bring co-operation between the United States and Europe to a halt. Not at all. Co-operation is indispensable. No, we are not forgetting all we owe to the United States for our freedom and our independence. No, we are not forgetting that the Marshall Plan enabled us to rebuild Europe in the shortest possible time. We are not forgetting all that. We are grateful to the United States for it. But that is no reason why today we should put up with everything they want, everything they say and everything they do. Europe has its say in the matter and I believe that this has to be said.

Hence — and on this point I shall end — I should like the Assembly to accept, instead of

the first paragraph of the preamble, which I feel is out of place in present circumstances, the amendment I have tabled, as follows: "Considering that there is the utmost interest in maintaining co-operation between Europe and the United States, *inter alia* in order to try to settle any disputes which may arise in certain fields", the rest of the recommendation being left unchanged.

I think my amendment is reasonable; it does not oppose co-operation between the United States and Europe; indeed it eagerly advocates it. But, of course, we want it to be clear that Europe is of age and that it is desirable that it be consulted on all international problems by the United States.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

I now call Mr. Hawkins.

Mr. HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). — Thank you, Mr. President. I welcome the report. As the opening remark in the explanatory memorandum says:

"Close co-operation with the United States was not Europe's choice, it was an unescapable necessity."

When I was a prisoner of war and heard that the United States had entered the war, I welcomed it greatly. But in my last two or three weeks as a prisoner of war, as I moved along the road and was shot at by American planes, many of my comrades were killed. I thought that it was perhaps an unfortunate and inescapable necessity. Those are perhaps the two ways in which one is inclined to look at America.

As Mr. Périquier said, America has done great things for Europe. The Marshall Plan was wonderfully long-sighted and visionary. America's belated but final entry into the war was a great necessity for America as well as for ourselves. It saved Europe, and the Marshall Plan put us on our feet. We in Europe must now learn to speak as one united entity if we are to be respected by the United States.

I was not quite sure what the Rapporteur said in his opening remarks. I understood him to say that we should not introduce matters other than defence, including energy. Possibly I misheard him, and perhaps he said that the United States thought that we should not introduce other matters into the report.

I entirely support Amendment 1 in the name of Mr. Tom Urwin to say that energy is one of the matters which has been neglected in co-operation between the United States and Europe. That is possibly because we do not speak with one voice or because we have not set a good enough example ourselves to be able to point out strongly the way in which America con-



*Mr. Hawkins (continued)*

sumes oil at a prodigious rate, far more than Europe. But for one reason or another we must hold urgent talks with the United States when we ourselves have set our own house in order.

That means as our first aim close co-operation over the conservation of oil in Europe and the seeking of further new sources, as well as solving the problems of the safety and waste disposal aspects of the nuclear programme. Until we can reduce the fear of the average man and woman in relation to nuclear power stations, we shall not be able to use one of the major energy-saving resources — namely, nuclear power — to the full. Everybody in every country has seen the way in which the average man and woman reacts against having a nuclear power station put anywhere near his or her home. We must solve the twin problems of the safe construction of nuclear power stations, even if we spend double the time building them, and waste disposal before we can satisfy our average constituent that we have taken every step for his safety.

I want to say a word about SALT II. I do not pretend to know its details, but it seems to me from the report, reading between the lines, and also from what I have learned from my fellow members of parliament, that SALT takes care of a lot of matters between Russia and the United States but leaves Europe in perhaps an even more dangerous situation than it might have been without the agreement. That is another area in which we have not been strong enough in putting our point of view forward as a united Europe.

So, Mr. President, it comes back to this: we ourselves must be strong. We must support all the institutions of Europe. We must speak with one voice on energy and on defence. If anybody suggests that energy is not part of defence, I ask how our planes could fly, how our tanks could go into action, how we could support our troops in the field if they did not know that they had a full supply of petrol and oil.

I do not want to say any more except urge any body concerned with the uniting of Europe — Western European Union, the Council of Europe, the EEC — to bear in mind that we must work closely together and present a united front on external matters, and external matters in relation to the United States are one of the most important.

I once again welcome this report. I understand, though perhaps this is not correct, that Amendment 1 will in fact be acceptable to the Rapporteur. I hope so, because it is a very small amendment, but it concerns one of the most important ingredients of working closely together

with the United States. Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Hawkins.

I now call Mr. Faulds.

Mr. FAULDS (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I want to speak very briefly because I had the pleasure of travelling to Washington with Mr. Schlingemann and Mrs. von Bothmer. It was a very pleasant and companionable trip. Although there were perhaps not enough of us there, I think we made a fairly representative bunch of interested Europeans.

I think that this report which Mr. Schlingemann has drawn up is excellent and I endorse every facet of it, although I think that, because of the historic timing, he did not deal with the energy problem as he should have done. But we remedy that with Amendment 1, and I am glad to hear that there is general support for it.

I particularly endorse Mr. Schlingemann's views on the dangers of the situation in the Middle East. It was interesting that, while we were in America, at every meeting we had this matter came up as one of the main concerns and as one of the main matters to be discussed. What really shocked me — I do not know how my colleagues reacted — was the surprise of the Americans at our variance of views. There was this extraordinary idea that some political genius had evolved a means of settling the Middle East problem — that was the Camp David initiative — and that we Europeans had better drag along because it was the way it was going to work.

I found a degree of political arrogance in that which was not justified by the Americans' knowledge of the situation in the Middle East. There was their disregard, very largely, of the Palestinian problem. When this was drawn to their attention by some of the Europeans at the end of one meeting, "Oh — the Palestinians!" was their view, suggesting that this was not an absolutely essential element in any settlement in the Middle East.

My good friend Tony Kershaw has drawn attention to another element — the exclusion of Jerusalem as an essential prerequisite to any peace in the Middle East. The blindness of the Americans on these issues is really staggering, and I think it is time that we started to be less delicate in expressing our views on these matters. I think the visit was perhaps most valuable in trying to educate the Americans about the realities of the Middle East situation, and about the increasing and fast approaching dangers of a renewal of an explosion of some sort in the Middle East. I hope that our comments on these matters opened a few minds in Washington which seemed to have been pretty closed before.

*Mr. Faulds (continued)*

I want to make just one comment on Camp David. In my view, it was an initiative which was bound to collapse, and the signs are that it is ploughing into the sand anyway. The fact that Israel has the arrogance to continue with the policy of settlements, this colonisation of Arab lands, is unacceptable.

The grave dangers that the Americans want to lead us into if we pursue Camp David are threefold. First, it endangers our oil supplies, and, my goodness, if one has to make that point any more in European assemblies, it is pretty staggering! It is proven that everything that now happens with oil stems from the Americans' initial approach — and ours, let me say, because we were not very bright about the Middle East. We had a leader, Wilson, who was extraordinarily blind about the Middle East — which has in turn led to a situation now where the oil supplies for the West are gravely endangered and will be increasingly so.

Another risk of the Camp David initiative is that it will undoubtedly radicalise a number of the régimes which are at the moment pro-western in the Middle East, and in the Gulf in particular. Once that happens, the economic interests and the oil interests of the West will again be pushed aside. Overall, it will gravely damage western economic and political interests, and it is time that we in Europe started making this argument.

I hope that the lesson of our visit to our Washington hosts was that we are gravely disturbed about this expectation that we latch on to American policy and follow it in foreign affairs matters, and that they really must include us more in their considerations and in their dialogues before they launch major initiatives of the Camp David sort. I hope that the lesson for us Europeans was simpler: that the sooner Europe has the political courage and the political will to set up its own foreign policy, the better for all of us. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

Now Mr. Pecoraro.

Mr. PECORARO (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Thank you for allowing me to speak at this final stage of the debate, because it also gives me the opportunity of expressing my own appreciation of Mr. Schlingemann's report, which, I think, needs no addition; even if I do not agree with it 100%, it has to be said that it gives a very interesting picture on the status of relations between the United States and Europe, especially in the Europe of the Community, and on the ways in which certain problems should be tackled.

I cannot, Sir, subscribe to certain objections and disappointments expressed by the last speakers, especially Mr. Périquier, about the difficulties we sometimes encounter in some of our relations with the United States owing to the rather offhand manner adopted by the State Department and President Carter in relations with Europe. Indeed this often leaves an opening for those who do not want to see good relations between Europe and America, especially the communists, the eastern Europeans and those who prefer there to be a situation of strife and not friendship.

I read Mr. Schlingemann's report attentively and consider that it is broadly acceptable, but I have a few ideas of my own on some of the subjects dealt with. Among the problems underlying the financial and economic crisis we are going through general reference is made to the oil crisis that broke upon us in 1973.

Allow me to invert the order of the factors involved, for I believe the crisis we are facing, dating from 1971 and not 1973, stems rather from the monetary event which occurred under President Nixon, when dollar convertibility was abolished. True, for some years previously practical restraints had been placed on convertibility and the monetarists had prevailed over those favouring the gold standard — I am using technical language, but a few such terms are not out of place in such an important political debate. So the monetarists had won the day, i.e. those who hold that money is a symbol, unlike the advocates of gold who believe that a currency only correctly fulfils its function when it is represented by something held in the coffers of the state. No sooner did this gold parity for the dollar and its associated currencies come to an end on 15th August 1971 than we saw a gradual depreciation of their value, and set out along the present path of galloping inflation. This was, alas, a present for us from the United States. Had that country altered the dollar-gold ratio otherwise, raising it to seventy or a hundred dollars an ounce but maintaining convertibility, we would have had a different but precise reference standard. Today we find the ounce of gold fetches about \$250, and there is no knowing yet where it will end.

I wanted to allude to this because sometimes co-ordination with other countries and with those to whom we are allied, may, on technical problems too, indicate the limitations of our policy, which from the technical or the more strictly economic-political standpoints, enabled a steadier and more rational rein to be kept on the conduct of affairs.

At all events, I take the view that we should always foster our relations with the United States, as everybody has said: the best possible relations which will carry the more weight the

*Mr. Pecoraro (continued)*

faster, more substantial and organised European unification is. Hence we should only propose, as a partner and not an adversary of the United States, a united Europe having a bigger voice, greater strength and greater power, and thus capable of constituting a factor of strength, instead of weakness as it is now.

I end by reiterating my very warm appreciation of Mr. Schlingemann's report, for which I intend to vote subject to Mr. Périquier's amendment. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Pecoraro.

We have now reached the end of our list of speakers and the debate is closed.

Does the Chairman wish to speak ?

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — In view of the pressure of time, Mr. President, I should like to say only a few words. Of course the report does not deal exhaustively with our relations with America. It could not possibly do that — that would be out of the question, nor was that its purpose.

All that we heard and learned during our trip there has been quite excellently reflected by Mr. Schlingemann in this report. The Committee took note of the report with satisfaction.

There were occasions during talks when our American partners told us we were "too European-minded". We on the other hand found that they were "too American-minded". That is something we have to live with.

It is essential that we adopt paragraph 1 of the recommendation, which has a bearing on the extremely important matter of oil — a matter that has become so serious only since our journey. I consider the report to be very good on this.

A brief word on the Middle East : although at times we had the feeling that our American partners, too, were not satisfied with the results of Camp David, or that they knew that far from everything had been settled there and that a great many problems still remained in the background, it nevertheless seemed to us that the political danger, of world-wide proportions, that might blow up in that region was still unfortunately not fully recognised. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you. I see that the Rapporteur wishes to speak.

Mr. SCHLINGEMANN (*Netherlands*). — Thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to say a few words in response to the remarks made in the debate. I wish to thank all the speakers for their very kind reception of the report.

First, I shall deal with Mr. Craigen's speech. I personally was very happy to learn that the new British Government is to study afresh the possibility of Britain's joining the European monetary system. If it did so, that would be a good step towards European unity. It would not, of course, be an ideal step, but it would be a step towards stabilisation and closer co-operation among the members of the EEC. It would also present many problems in the future, but I hope that the system will last for a long time.

I must tell Mr. Kershaw that the American point of view — and I can share that point of view — was that the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was only a first step on the long road to peace in the Middle East. Some of us welcomed that step wholeheartedly, but others doubt whether it is a good step.

To Mr. Faulds I say that in my report I dealt with both aspects of the Middle East without expressing a point of view, because expressing a view was not the aim of my report.

I think, Mr. Hawkins, that there is some misunderstanding, because I said that both parties, the United States and Europe, have great interest in co-operation in matters of energy.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

(Translation). — I should now like to answer Mr. Périquier, whose position I understand. A redrafting might satisfy everyone. If the Assembly agreed, the first paragraph of the preamble would be amended to read :

"Noting the many statements in the United States in favour of closer consultations with Western Europe in many fields, but deploring that these statements have not always produced results ;"

In that case, the world "also" in the second paragraph of the preamble should be dropped.

*(The speaker continued in English)*

I have no problems at all with Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Urwin and others. It is a very good amendment to the draft recommendation. As I said at the beginning, we made our trip three months ago and things have changed since then. I readily accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

Before we vote on the draft recommendation in Document 803, we must first deal with the two amendments which have been tabled, and another tabled by Mr. Valleix a couple of minutes ago.

We must first deal with Mr. Périquier's amendment 2 to the preamble :

*The President (continued)*

2. Leave out the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :

“Considering that there is the utmost interest in maintaining co-operation between Europe and the United States, *inter alia* in order to try to settle any disputes which may arise in certain fields ;”.

Mr. PÉRIDIER has already spoken to his amendment. Do you wish to speak again, Mr. PÉRIDIER ?

Mr. PERIDIER (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the redraft proposed by the Committee satisfies me. Of course, if the Assembly accepted it, I should withdraw my amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Rapporteur proposes that Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. PÉRIDIER should be amended to read as follows :

“Noting the many statements in the United States in favour of closer consultations with Western Europe in many fields, but deploring that these statements have not always produced results ;”.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

I put this amendment to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*The amendment is agreed to.*

(*The President continued in English*)

Now we have a manuscript amendment from Mr. VALLEIX, which reads :

In the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “participation by Europe in” and insert “particularly with reference to”.

Does Mr. Valleix wish to speak ?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Simply in order to clarify the French text, Mr. President, and beg the Assembly to forgive this manner of presentation. The new text would run : “...particularly with reference to the SALT III negotiations” instead of “...participation by Europe in the SALT III negotiations”.

I should be delighted if the Rapporteur would accept this drafting amendment, almost more one of form than of substance, but I believe it renders more faithfully WEU’s effective possibilities, given the respective rôles each of our WEU member countries is known to play. I hope that this text, which is important because it specifies the relations between Europe and the United States, may be adopted this morning, in view of the need for co-operation with our great American ally.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Roper, please.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I do not want formally to raise a point of order, Mr. President, but it is discourteous to the Assembly when Rule 29(2) is not followed. Rule 29(2) states that amendments should be circulated in advance unless they are “proposed in the course of a debate”. My understanding of that is that Mr. Valleix should have referred to his amendment in the debate on Mr. Schlingemann’s report. It does not seem to me that “the course of a debate” is the consideration of the amendments once the debate is over. I therefore find it rather difficult to know on what basis, Mr. President, you find this amendment acceptable, particularly as none of us has seen it or had a chance to consider it.

The rules seem to suggest that the last time that an amendment can be put forward is during the course of a debate, not subsequent to the closure of a debate.

The PRESIDENT. — You are correct, Mr. Roper. I refer to Rule 29. Paragraph 2 states that “Amendments should relate only to the substantive text ;”. It then goes on to say that :

“... they must be signed by their author and, unless proposed in the course of a debate, laid on the table of the Assembly so as to leave sufficient time for them to be printed and distributed before they are discussed.”

In other words, the proposer has not spoken to it, and he can only put such an amendment to the Assembly when he has spoken to it and when it has been tabled in such a way as to give ample time to print and distribute it. I am very sorry, but we have not had the chance to do this, because the amendment was proposed only two or three minutes ago. We cannot, therefore, according to Rule 29, deal with the amendment.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I do not think this amendment is politically so important that we need go so strictly by the Rules of Procedure. I would ask therefore whether we might not make an exception for once and allow something which does not concern the political side of the report just to go through.

The PRESIDENT. — After my experience as President in the chair yesterday afternoon and in the early evening with the Presidential Committee, I must keep strictly to the Rules of Procedure. There was a lot of talk and I was in favour of being flexible. My wish is to be flexible, but if I am, I am criticised. Therefore, I feel that to avoid being criticised, I must not be flexible. We know what is meant here, but I am not prepared to take it into the official document. It is on file that the motion has been put and therefore that will do.

*The President (continued)*

We go on with Amendment 1 in the name of Mr. Urwin.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President I rise on a point of order. Either we go in for courtesies, or we abide by the Rules of Procedure. If we are going to abide by the Rules of Procedure, I find it hard to understand why yesterday, for example, we rode roughshod over Rule 34. That was what was done in the case of Mr. Deschamps's comment.

Mr. President, I really do not wish to see double standards applied in this Assembly, as in the present instance. I appreciate the remarks made by the Chairman of the Committee, for my motion, for whose belatedness I apologise, is designed to enable this important text to be adopted in the best possible form.

I do not intend, believe me, to quibble about procedure this morning, but I think it important that this text should see the light of day. What I would not understand, Mr. President, would be for the Rules of Procedure to be strictly interpreted in some cases and less strictly in others.

The PRESIDENT. — I would not be so strict had there not been trouble yesterday and if I had not been criticised for being flexible. Last night in the Presidential Committee we asked all Representatives to put in amendments in time. Had Mr. Valleix spoken to it this morning, it would have been on the list and we could have distributed the text and it would be absolutely correct. We must continue.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I have a suggestion to make which might help Mr. Valleix. Mr. Périquier, in the course of his remarks, made some comments which *de facto* introduced the terms of this amendment. He did not do so explicitly but a reading of what he had to say suggests that he did so implicitly. Therefore, if this amendment were retabled in the name of Mr. Périquier, it would be possible for you to rule, Sir, that reference had been made to it in the course of Mr. Périquier's remarks.

The PRESIDENT. — My dear colleague, this would not have arisen had you not drawn attention to Rule 29. I am not against voting on this amendment but you have said that Rule 29(2) was detrimental to what we were doing. I try to be flexible, and if you agree, I will put it to the vote.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I would be very happy, Sir, if you were to follow the suggestion I have made because I have proposed something which would be in keeping with the Rules of Procedure and which, while it would not allow an unfair flexibility, would be useful,

as long as Mr. Périquier agrees. I have given the Assembly a solution. I hope it will take advantage of it.

Mr. PERIDIER (*France*) (Translation). — All right, Mr. President, I will retable it in my name.

The PRESIDENT. — If you will take over the whole thing, we agree, but I hope that we can get back to flexibility. I call Mr. Kershaw.

Mr. KERSHAW (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, the text has not been printed or distributed as is required under Rule 29(2).

The PRESIDENT. — As it has been taken over by Mr. Périquier, it has been mentioned in the debate. I shall read this difficult amendment again :

In the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "participation by Europe in" and insert "particularly with reference to".

It is a very simple amendment and we can close the debate on it.

Does the Rapporteur wish to speak ?

Mr. SCHLINGEMANN (*Netherlands*). — I am happy to say I have no objection to this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — The Rapporteur is in agreement.

We shall therefore vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*The manuscript amendment is agreed to unanimously.*

We turn now to Amendment 1 by Mr. Urwin.

Mr. CRAIGEN (*United Kingdom*). — On behalf of Mr. Urwin, I beg formally to move Amendment 1.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Craigen has moved this amendment formally on behalf of Mr. Urwin.

Does anyone wish to speak ? ...

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I wish to speak on this amendment only to say how much I support that part of Mr. Périquier's speech in which he referred to the question of relations with the United States over oil matters, and to make clear to him that I was in total agreement with him on that part of his speech. I disagreed with him when he said that there had not been consultations on SALT, because there have been, in the North Atlantic Council and at the Guadeloupe summit.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone else wish to speak ? ...

What is the opinion of the Committee ?

Mr. SCHLINGEMANN (*Netherlands*). — We can take over the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone else wish to speak ? ...

We shall therefore vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

We now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 803 as amended.

If there is no objection to it and if there are no abstentions and the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ? ...

Are there any abstentions ? ...

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted*<sup>1</sup>.

#### **4. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation**

(*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 802*)

The PRESIDENT. — Since yesterday afternoon there was not a quorum for the roll-call vote on the draft recommendation in Document 802 on political conditions for European armaments co-operation we shall now proceed to vote on that draft recommendation as amended.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I apologise for troubling you again, Mr. President, but it might save the Assembly's time if before starting the roll-call vote you tried once again to ascertain whether there was anybody against or abstaining. If not, we should be able to avoid a roll-call vote.

The PRESIDENT. — The proposal is that if there is no objection and if there are no abstentions, we could agree to the draft recommendation without a roll-call vote.

Mr. COOK (*United Kingdom*). — In support of Mr. Roper, may I say that the Representative who insisted on a roll-call vote yesterday is not in his place today ? Since he was the only person yesterday demanding a roll-call vote, it seems unfair to the rest of us this morning to proceed

to a roll-call vote without asking whether there is any other Representative who wishes one ?

The PRESIDENT. — You are right. The Representative who asked for a roll-call vote yesterday is not present, so we can save time.

Are there any objections ? ...

Are there any abstentions ? ...

*The amended draft recommendation is agreed to*<sup>1</sup>.

(*Mr. Minnocci, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

#### **5. Information on defence questions for members of parliament and relations with parliaments**

(*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 800*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments on information on defence questions for members of parliament and relations with parliaments, Document 800.

I call Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur.

Mr. SCHLINGEMANN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the report which I have the honour to present on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments will, at any rate I hope so, fulfil the promise made to the Assembly on 21st November last. Your Committee then promised to provide you with a study on a better use of defence information, by drawing on computerisation.

The Committee has accordingly studied the two biggest computer centres for storing military data — including the political aspect — in Western Europe, namely those in Paris and Vienna. You all — or at any rate, the members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments — know that for many years past the Assembly has been receiving such information as our governments were prepared to supply, and we are grateful to them for doing so, as well as the information we obtain from more or less private bodies, such as the Institute for Strategic Studies, the Adelphi Papers, the SIPRI publications in Stockholm, and so on.

We have, nonetheless, been thinking that the present method of sending out questionnaires to governments and then awaiting their replies, is unduly time consuming. You have only to ask Mr. Maggioni how long he had to wait for the answers.

1. See page 47.

1. See page 48.

*Mr. Schlingemann (continued)*

This is why the Committee has turned to the computer. The two centres that your Rapporteur visited were set up by the Defence Ministries of the respective countries but although they are still run by the military, they are fairly rapidly becoming somewhat independent because they handle information coming from a whole series of countries, because the information they give is drawn from every available source, and because their users are no longer the government or the army, but to an increasing extent the public — that is, universities, journalists and the like.

I already reported to you in November on my visit to the Paris centre, so I can confine myself here to giving you a few "Viennese impressions". In Vienna — indeed, just as in Paris — I was given an extremely warm welcome. The Commanding Officer of the school, General Kuntner of the Tank Corps, very kindly gave us some of his own time and that of four or five brother officers more specifically concerned with the research centre and the computer: I wish publicly to offer the thanks of the whole WEU Assembly to these gentlemen who, indefatigably and with the utmost goodwill, showed me all the mysteries of their "toy". If you will allow me, I want to say here to our President and our Clerk of the Assembly, that I should like them to pay special attention to these few pages in my report, and draw the necessary conclusions, to which I refer in paragraphs 2.7 and 2.12 of my report.

Besides a short description of these two computer centres concerned with defence problems, the report also provides a brief review of the situation in Germany and especially in the United Kingdom. Apparently it is chiefly the staff who use the computer to prepare documentation for a member of the house.

Lastly, it seems to me very important for our Assembly, and above all its General Affairs Committee and its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, to be able to use computers in preparing their reports. The speed with which the answers are obtained, the mass of, in the final analysis, highly objective documentation that can be supplied without costly, protracted and difficult research and without having to use questionnaires, which give their recipients extra and irksome work — these are so many arguments for the Assembly's Committees to use computers.

The other main aspect of my report concerns activities in the parliaments of our member countries. At long last, after ten years of pessimistic reports, not only by himself but by his predecessors as well, your Rapporteur can record a certain satisfaction on the part of the Committee, with the texts adopted in 1978. This

should induce us — the Committee and all of you who are members of the WEU Assembly — to follow the same road, to go on talking about WEU in our parliaments whenever appropriate debates are held, and to ask questions wherever and whenever possible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I begin by congratulating the Committee under its Chairman, Mr. Jeambrun, for having attempted this year this extremely valuable piece of work. It is, of course, one which I am particularly pleased to see was undertaken, and I say that in view of the close links between the subjects that we are considering here and the subject which was considered in the important report prepared by Mr. Maggioni which we considered yesterday.

Effective control by parliaments over defence can operate at national or international level only if members of parliament have access to appropriate information. I therefore begin by congratulating Mr. Jeambrun, the Chairman of the Committee, for having ensured that this item is on the agenda. I move on to congratulate Mr. Schlingemann for the useful start he has made in studying the question of information for members, and I am glad, therefore, that this is an interim report and an information report. We have not yet come to the stage of making decisions on the matter. We do not have an order for that before us.

We have before us two pilot studies from two of the many institutions which exist in Europe. The Assembly, I believe, is most grateful that this start has been made in the document. These two institutions are representative, and although they are linked through their Ministries of Defence, they have a certain independence, although not perhaps as much as the Committee intended in the request referred to in paragraph 1.4. That certain independence allows access by those who are not in the military service.

I hope that the Committee for Relations with Parliaments will now be able to take this matter further, and I hope, in appropriate ways and times, to make specific proposals on this matter. I believe that we are particularly well placed as a Committee to study the information available to members of national parliaments on defence matters.

We are particularly fortunate that under the Rules of Procedure the delegation secretaries may attend our debates, and I am glad to see that the *doyen d'âge* of the delegation secretaries is attending the debate this morning. They will be able to help us in getting from each of the national parliaments more of the information which is available in each country to enable members of parliament to deal with these matters.

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

They will be able to help us discover whether members of parliament, either directly or indirectly, have access to the libraries and computer data banks of their own Ministries of Defence, or whether they have access, directly or indirectly, to other research institutes sponsored by the Ministries of Defence.

It will be helpful if our delegation secretaries are able, with the secretaries of the Committees, to begin to build up a dossier of information so that instead of dealing with just two of the many institutions we can get the whole of the picture.

It is also important that we should have more information from each country on the truly independent institutions which can provide data. I cannot speak of other countries, but in the United Kingdom we are particularly well served by the Royal United Service Institute and by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, which has a particular section dealing with defence. We are fortunate that the International Institute for Strategic Studies is located in London.

I am particularly glad about one aspect of the report. Mr. Schlingemann has done the Assembly a great service in going beyond the membership of our seven countries in WEU and giving us data about the Austrian research institute. I believe that we should look at other centres outside our membership in order to see what sources of information might be available there. Other such sources may be available outside Europe but before we come to decisions we need to obtain an overall picture.

When we are considering the information available to members of parliament on defence questions we must discover which staff are available to help in the effective establishment of communication between members of parliament and the information sources available. It is not good enough for a member of parliament to be told: "Here is a computer. Get out the information you need."

We need effective staff at international level to ensure an effective interface between man and computer, and I hope that that will also be covered in the fuller report from the Committee for Relations with Parliaments which we look forward to receiving.

Sources are often available to members of parliament, but it is not always easy for them to know how to use those sources. Here we need to look at the staff who are available in different countries to assist us. Arising from that we should be able to make useful recommendations not only to our national parliaments but to the Rapporteurs of our Assembly.

I therefore hope that we shall provide this full study and that we shall be able to assess which of these institutes would be of value to the Assembly. But I should like to suggest to the Assembly and to the Rapporteur that perhaps at this stage it is somewhat premature for him to make the explicit suggestions he puts forward in paragraphs 2.6 and 2.12 in respect of specific institutions and the taking out of subscriptions to them.

We should await completion of the overall study of the total resources available. If the question of subscriptions arose it would be important to have the opinion of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs as well as of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

We are not today considering a draft order. We are considering a most valuable information report. I repeat my expression of gratitude to Mr. Schlingemann for having prepared these two pilot studies which are the first step in an important major study which I believe we are on the point of undertaking on the general question.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Verleysen.

Mr. VERLEYSSEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I want to make one or two remarks about our tasks as parliamentarians, and about the way we can let our activities work through into the national parliaments. I shall, therefore, limit myself to Part III of Mr. Schlingemann's report. I am very grateful for this report, and I would congratulate him on it. I note that at the present time very little attention is paid in the national parliaments to the work we do here. I was extremely sad to hear that our Recommendation 323 on disarmament has been discussed in parliament in only two countries — and that in spite of the constantly rising criticism of the vast outlay on armaments. During the latest session of the Council of Europe, we saw a small but impressive exhibition organised by SIPRI, the research and peace institute in Stockholm. Let me give one or two figures. In 1978 military expenditure throughout the world came to \$410,000 million; that is four times as much as in 1948. In the developing countries, expenditure on armaments is rising much faster than the gross national product. The amount spent on buying arms is three times the total for development aid.

We have, for the rest, taken the report not as a reproach — that too little attention is paid, and too little publicity given, to the work we do here — but as a spur, to do better tomorrow than we did yesterday. We are convinced that this is possible. I would like to suggest an experiment for next year. A few months ago our Assembly addressed a recommendation to



*Mr. Verleysen (continued)*

the United Nations; this asked for the United Nations First Committee to be made into a standing committee on disarmament. The United Nations took our recommendation seriously and has in fact transformed the First Committee into a Committee on Disarmament. We had the good fortune to be present at the first meeting of that Committee, and I want to express here my admiration for the knowledge and skill with which our officials tackle the problems. We, alas, are not involved in this. The Committee's reports contain interesting proposals aimed at removing distrust between the various countries, at preventing certain areas from becoming militarised, at preventing certain areas from being declared denuclearised zones, and at preventing the production, proliferation and use of certain weapons from being prohibited.

We also found the proposals made on behalf of the governments of the WEU countries very interesting. There is a question I would like to ask our colleagues. Who of us knows about these proposals? Who of us knows what reactions there are to these proposals? I am sure that we remain unaware of the efforts being made by our governments and diplomats. We think there is a need to discuss, at the next meeting of the Council, the proposals that have been made at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament by the countries of Western Europe. Once we know about this as parliamentarians, there must be a public debate here on disarmament. I am quite certain that the recommendations that emerged from such a debate would find a response. Further, even, I would take a chance and organise a symposium with the parliamentarians of various countries. This could take place in October. There could then a few months later, on the basis of a full report, be a discussion in the various parliaments about what path to take to achieve disarmament. If we did that, I am convinced that the relations between our Assembly and the national parliaments would improve substantially and that our work would bear fruit.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I have no more requests for the floor.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply?

Mr. SCHLINGEMANN (*Netherlands*). — Mr. President, in the first place, I should like to thank Mr. Roper for his suggestions. Not only as Rapporteur but as Vice-Chairman of the Committee, I can assure him that they will be discussed at our next meeting. I shall be in contact with the Chairman of our Committee, and we shall be very happy to discuss his suggestions at our next meeting. I should perhaps sound a little warning to him. We must of course be careful that, to use a proverb that we have in the Dutch language, we can still see the wood and not only the trees, because I remember that the Paris centre has 400,000 data movements per year, and also that the Vienna institute, in sixteen languages, has a very large number of data movements, etc. But, of course, this can be discussed at our next meeting.

*(The speaker continued in Dutch)*

(Translation). — I would thank my friend and neighbour Mr. Verleysen for his very valuable suggestions, though most of them are really something for the Presidential Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The debate is closed. If there are no observations, the Assembly takes note of Mr. Schlingemann's information report on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

## 6. Adjournment of the Session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, we have reached the end of our proceedings.

Does anyone wish to speak? ...

I declare the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union adjourned.

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 11.30 a.m.)*



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