ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1979

III

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1979

III

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

The Proceedings of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume III : Assembly Documents.

Volume IV : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM.	ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
	BONNEL Raoul	PVV
	HANIN Charles	Soc. Chr.
	MANGELSCHOTS Jan	Socialist
	PEETERS Renaat	Soc. Chr.
	TANGHE Francis	Soc. Chr.
	van WATERSCHOOT John	Soc. Chr.

Substitutes

MM.	*BRASSEUR Guy*	*FDF*
	DEJARDIN Claude	*Socialist*
	LAGNEAU André	*PRL*
	LAMBIOTTE Fortuné	*Socialist*
	MICHEL Joseph	*Soc. Chr.*
	VAN DER ELST Frans	*Volksunie*
	VERLEYSEN William	*Soc. Chr.*

FRANCE

Representatives

MM.	BIZET Emile	RPR (App.)
	BOUCHENY Serge	Communist
	BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
	CARO Jean-Marie	UDF
	DEPIETRI César	Communist
	DESCHAMPS Bernard	Communist
	FERRETTI Henri	UDF
	GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
	JAGER René	UCDP
	JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
	PÉRIDIER Jean	Socialist
	PÉRONNET Gabriel	UDF (App.)
	PETIT Camille	RPR
	PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
	SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
	SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
	TALON Bernard	RPR
	VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM.	*BAUMEL Jacques*	*RPR*
	BECHTER Jean-Pierre	*RPR*
	BELIN Gilbert	*Socialist*
	BERRIER Noël	*Socialist*
	BOZZI Jean	*RPR*
	COUDERC Pierre	*UDF*
	DELEHEDDE André	*Socialist*
	DRUON Maurice	*RPR*
	JUNG Louis	*UCDP*
	KOEHL Emile	*UDF*
MM.	*LAGOURGUE Pierre*	*UDF*
	LEMAIRE Marcel	*CNIP*
	LEMOINE Georges	*Socialist*
	MALVY Martin	*Socialist*
	MÉNARD Jacques	*Ind. Rep.*
	MERCIER Jean	*Dem. Left*
	VISSE René	*Communist*
	WARGNIES Claude	*Communist*

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

Mr.	AHRENS Karl	SPD
Mrs.	von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM.	ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
	EVERS Hans	CDU/CSU
	FLÄMIG Gerhard	SPD
	GESSNER Manfred-Achim	SPD
	HANDLOS Franz	CDU/CSU
	von HASSEL Kai-Uwe President of the Assembly	CDU/CSU
	KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
	LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU/CSU
	MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
	MENDE Erich	CDU/CSU
	MILZ Peter	CDU/CSU
	MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
	PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
	REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
	SCHMIDT Hermann	SPD
	VOHRER Manfred	FDP

Substitutes

MM.	*ALBER Siegbert*	*CDU/CSU*
	AMREHN Franz	*CDU/CSU*
	BARDENS Hans	*SPD*
	BÖHM Wilfried	*CDU/CSU*
	BÜCHNER Peter	*SPD*
	HOLTZ Uwe	*SPD*
	KLEPSCH Egon	*CDU/CSU*
	LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	*CDU/CSU*
	LENZER Christian	*CDU/CSU*
	MATTICK Kurt	*SPD*
	SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	*CDU/CSU*
	SCHEFFLER Hermann	*SPD*
	SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	*FDP*
	SCHULTE Manfred	*SPD*
	SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	*CDU/CSU*
	UEBERHORST Reinhard	*SPD*
	WITTMAN Fritz	*CDU/CSU*
	ZEBISCH Franz Josef	*SPD*

ITALY

Representatives

MM.	ARFÉ Gaetano	Socialist
	BERNINI Bruno	Communist
	BOLDRINI Arrigo	Communist
	BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
	CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
	CORALLO Salvatore	Communist
	DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
	FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
	GONELLA Guido	Chr. Dem.
	MAGGIONI Desiderio	Chr. Dem.
	MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
	ORSINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
	PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
	PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
	ROBERTI Giovanni	DN
	SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
	SEGRE Sergio	Communist
	TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.

Substitutes

Mrs.	*AGNELLI Susanna*	*Ind. Rep.*
MM.	*ANTONI Varese*	*Communist*
	ARIOSTO Egidio	*PSDI*
	AVELLONE Giuseppe	*Chr. Dem.*
	BORGHI Luigi	*Chr. Dem.*
	CAVALIERE Stefano	*Chr. Dem.*
	DEL DUCA Antonio	*Chr. Dem.*
Mrs.	*FACCIO Adele*	*Radical*
MM.	*GIUST Bruno*	*Chr. Dem.*
	MARAVALLE Fabio	*Socialist*
Mrs.	*PAPA DE SANTIS Cristina*	*Communist*
MM.	*PINTO Biagio*	*Republican*
	ROMANO Angelo	*Ind. Left*
	ROSSI Raffaele	*Communist*
	RUBBI Antonio	*Communist*
	SGHERRI Evaristo	*Communist*
	TREMAGLIA Pierantonio Mirko	*MSI*
	URSO Salvatore	*Chr. Dem.*

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM.	MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
	MART René	Dem.
	THOSS Maurice	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM.	*GLESENER Jean-Pierre*	*Soc. Chr.*
	KRIEPS Robert	*Soc. Workers*
	MEINTZ Carlo	*Dem.*

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM.	CORNELISSEN Pam	CDA
	van HULST Johan	CDA
	de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
	SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
	STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
	TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
	VOOGD Johan	Labour

Substitutes

MM.	*van den BERGH Harry*	*Labour*
	KONINGS Martin	*Labour*
	LAMBERTS J. H.	*Labour*
	MOMMERSTEEG Joseph	*CDA*
	PORTHEINE Frederik	*Liberal*
	SCHLINGEMANN Johan	*Liberal*
Mrs.	*van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria*	*CDA*

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Mr.	Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir	Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM.	Andrew FAULDS	Labour
	Anthony GRANT	Conservative
	W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
	Peter HARDY	Labour
	Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Lord	HUGHES	Labour
MM.	Anthony KERSHAW	Conservative
	Arthur LEWIS	Labour
	Fred MULLEY	Labour
	Cranley ONSLOW	Conservative
	John PAGE	Conservative
Lord	REAY	Conservative
MM.	John ROPER	Labour
	Thomas URWIN	Labour
	Kenneth WARREN	Conservative
	Phillip WHITEHEAD	Labour

Substitutes

MM.	*David ATKINSON*	*Conservative*
	Gordon BAGIER	*Labour*
	Robert BANKS	*Conservative*
	Robin COOK	*Labour*
	Thomas COX	*Labour*
	Jim CRAIGEN	*Labour*
Lord	*DUNCAN-SANDYS*	*Conservative*
MM.	*James HILL*	*Conservative*
	Toby JESSEL	*Conservative*
Mrs.	*Jill KNIGHT*	*Conservative*
Mr.	*Michael McGUIRE*	*Labour*
Lord	*McNAIR*	*Liberal*
Mr.	*Kevin McNAMARA*	*Labour*
Dr.	*Maurice MILLER*	*Labour*
Lord	*NORTHFIELD*	*Labour*
MM.	*Dudley SMITH*	*Conservative*
	Keith STAINTON	*Conservative*
	John WILKINSON	*Conservative*

AGENDA

of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session Paris, 3rd-6th December 1979

I. Political Questions

1. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation — *Report tabled by Mr. van Waterschoot on behalf of the General Affairs Committee*
2. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security — *Report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee*

II. Defence Questions

1. New weapons and defence strategy — *Report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*
2. SALT II and its implications for European security — *Report tabled by Mr. Cook on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*
3. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection — *Report tabled by Mr. Banks on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*
4. Definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe — *Report tabled by Mr. Meintz on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*

III. Technical and Scientific Questions

1. Brazilian-European collaborative ventures and the consequences for Europe — *Report tabled by MM. Lewis, Adriaensens, Scheffler and Cornelissen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*
2. Arctic technology — *Report tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*
3. The industrial bases of European security — guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 — *Report tabled by MM. Onslow and Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*

IV. Budgetary and Administrative Questions

1. Budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1980 — *Report tabled by Mr. Alber on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*
2. Accounts of the Administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 — The Auditor's report and Motion to approve the final accounts — *Report tabled by Mr. Alber on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*
3. Draft Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1979 — *Report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

V. Relations with Parliaments

Relations with parliaments — *Information report tabled by Mr. De Poi on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments*

ORDER OF BUSINESS

of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session

Paris, 3rd-6th December 1979

MONDAY, 3rd DECEMBER

Morning 9 to 11 a.m.

Meetings of Political Groups.

11 a.m.

1. Opening of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session.
5. The balance of force :

   Vote on the draft recommendation in Document 809 postponed from the last session.

11.45 a.m.

6. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
7. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation :

   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van Waterschoot on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

   Debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Europe :

   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Meintz on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

   Debate.

2. The industrial bases of European security — guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 :

   presentation of the report tabled by MM. Onslow and Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

   Debate.

   Votes on the draft recommendations.

At the close of the Sitting

Meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

TUESDAY, 4th DECEMBER

Morning 9.30 a.m.

Meeting of the General Affairs Committee.

10 a.m.

1. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security:

   presentation of the report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

   Debate.

11 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1980:

   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Alber on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 — The Auditor's report and Motion to approve the final accounts:

   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Alber on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

   Debate.

   Votes on the draft texts.

3. Draft opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1979:

   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

   Debate.

   Vote on the draft opinion.

4. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security.

   Resumed debate.

   Vote on the draft recommendation.

WEDNESDAY, 5th DECEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. New weapons and defence strategy:

   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

   Debate.

   Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. SALT II and its implications for European security:

   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Cook on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

   Debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. SALT II and its implications for European security:

   Resumed debate.

   Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. Arctic technology :

   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

   Debate.

5 p.m.

3. Address by Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

THURSDAY, 6th DECEMBER

Morning 9 a.m.

Meetings of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

10 a.m.

1. Arctic technology :

   Resumed debate.

   Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. Brazilian-European collaborative ventures and the consequences for Europe :

   presentation of the report tabled by MM. Lewis, Adriaensens, Scheffler and Cornelissen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

   Debate.

   Vote on the draft recommendation.

3. Relations with parliaments :

   presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. De Poi on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

CLOSE OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION

Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly for the Financial Year 1978

THE AUDITOR'S REPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Report of the external Auditor to the Assembly of Western European Union on the accounts for the financial year 1978

General

1. The following financial statements, together with an explanatory memorandum, were submitted to me by the President :

(*a*) Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1978 and financial position as at 31st December 1978 (Appendix I).

(*b*) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1978 (showing also transfers between sub-heads) (Appendix II).

(*c*) Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of Western European Union, London, in respect of contributions to the Assembly of Western European Union budget for 1978 (Appendix III).

(*d*) Account of the provident fund for the financial year ended 31st December 1978 (Appendix IV).

2. My examination of the accounts has been carried out in accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

Summary of Income and Expenditure

(Appendix I)

(*a*) *General*

3. The approved budget provided for expenditure of F 7,979,000 of which F 201,000 was expected to be covered by miscellaneous receipts and the balance by contributions.

4. Actual expenditure in the year amounted to F 7,723,279 including excesses totalling F 100,503 over the budget authorisations for Heads III, V and VI, which were met by savings on Head IV. Income amounted to F 8,068,650 comprising F 7,778,000 from contributions requested and received and F 290,650 from miscellaneous receipts. There was thus an excess of income over expenditure of F 345,371 arising from a bud-

getary surplus of F 255,721 (as shown in Appendix II) and extra miscellaneous receipts of F 89,650.

(*b*) *Pension scheme*

5. In paragraphs 6 and 7 of my report on the Assembly's accounts for 1977, I explained that the cost of pension benefits payable under the common pension scheme implemented in that year by the co-ordinated organisations, Western European Union, Council of Europe, NATO, OECD and the European Space Agency, is charged to the budget of the organisation and that staff contributions made under the scheme are credited to the budget as miscellaneous income. I recorded that staff recruited on or after 1st July 1974 were obliged to join the scheme but that eligible staff employed before 1st July 1974 had until 30th June 1978 to decide whether or not to join the scheme and to surrender sums from their provident fund holdings to meet the cost of validating past service. I also recorded that the sums so surrendered are held in special pension validation accounts by the office of the Secretary-General pending transfer to member governments.

6. During 1978, 21 Assembly staff members decided to join the pension scheme. Their pension contributions for 1978, together with those of the three staff members who joined the scheme in 1977, totalled F 105,922 and are included as income in the Assembly's 1978 accounts.

7. Staff members joining the pension scheme whose provident fund holdings had been reduced by withdrawals and were thus insufficient to meet the cost of validating all their service prior to 1st July 1974 may undertake, under Article 44 of the pension scheme rules, to repay the amount of any deficiency, plus compound interest at 4 % per annum, over a period of five years from 30th June 1978. Repayments under these arrangements are included as income to the budget. In December 1978 the Budget and Organisation Committee approved a proposal to reduce the cost of validation of service prior to 1st July 1974 (see paragraph 11 below) and the reductions were credited to staff members. The amounts due to those staff members making repayments after 30th June 1978 were treated as additional repayments under Article 44 of the pension scheme rules. Total repayments during the year amounted to F 70,260.

8. Pensions paid in 1978 totalled F 80,669 (Appendix II, Head VI). The awards were calculated in accordance with implementing instructions issued by the Secretary-General of Western European Union in pursuance of Article 52 of the pension scheme rules. The Board of Auditors of Western European Union in their report on the 1977 WEU accounts questioned some interpretations of the rules and as a result the Council of Western European Union decided in March 1979 that the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts should examine whether the implementing instructions as a whole were in accord with the pension scheme rules.

Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits

(*Appendix II*)

9. The transfers between sub-heads within the same head of the budget, shown in this statement, were duly authorised in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulations. These Regulations contain no provision for the authorisation of transfers between heads but, in accordance with a procedure approved by the Council in 1973, the Assembly informed the Council in March 1979 that expenditure would be incurred in excess of budget provisions on Heads III, V and VI. The total excess expenditure (F 100,503) was met from savings on Head IV.

Provident fund

(*Appendix IV*)

10. The assets of the provident fund of the Assembly are amalgamated with the assets of the provident funds of the other organs of Western European Union in joint deposits administered by the office of the Secretary-General. The joint deposits were held in various currencies until 31st May 1978 when they were converted to French francs, the currency in which the provident fund accounts of staff members are kept. The whole of the resultant gain on book value was credited to the accounts of staff members at 31st May 1978. But at that date, the staff members' accounts included their contributions made after 1st July 1974. When these staff members joined the pension scheme their post-1st July 1974 contributions became the property of the member governments, who were therefore entitled to the gain on exchange at 31st May 1978 thereon. Correcting adjustments have been made in 1979, including, where necessary, recovery of sums overpaid to staff members who withdrew their balances from the provident fund in 1978.

11. Member governments also became the owners from 1st July 1974 of sums surrendered under the pension scheme from staff members' provident fund holdings in respect of the validation of service prior to 1st July 1974. At 30th June 1974 the market value of the currencies held in joint deposits exceeded the book value of staff members' accounts but those accounts were not written up to reflect the market value at that date. When they were written up on 31st May 1978 the market value of the provident fund holdings had fallen since 30th June 1974. In December 1978 the Budget and Organisation Committee approved

a proposal whereby those staff members who joined the pension scheme and opted to surrender their pre-1st July 1974 provident fund holdings in order to validate their service prior to 1st July 1974 were given the benefit of the higher market value of their holdings at 30th June 1974. This was achieved by reducing the cost of validation of service prior to 1st July 1974. The member governments have therefore borne the loss in market value of these transferred assets between 30th June 1974 and 31st May 1978.

12. The interest earned by the provident fund from 1st July 1974 on validation sums and on pension scheme members' post-1st July 1974 contributions is also due to member governments. Following an observation by their auditors, Western European Union have confirmed that the actual rate of interest earned by the provident fund between 1st July 1974 and 30th June 1978 was greater than the rate of interest used to calculate the sums transferred from members' provident fund holdings to the pension validation accounts. The Assembly have made the required adjustments in 1979 including, where necessary, recovery of sums overpaid to members who had withdrawn the balance of their holdings in the provident fund.

13. The balances in the provident fund at 31st December 1978 on the accounts of Assembly staff members totalled F 1,149,722, including F 267,341 repayable to members who have joined the pension scheme.

14. I have received a certificate from the depositary showing the amount of the joint deposits held at 31st December 1978 and a statement from the office of the Secretary-General confirming the share of those deposits standing to the credit of the Assembly's provident fund in the office's books at 31st December 1978.

15. I wish to record my appreciation of the willing co-operation of the officers of the Assembly during my audit.

Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B.

(Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom)

External Auditor

21st June 1979

Explanatory Memorandum

(communicated by the President to the Auditor of the Assembly in connection with the financial year 1978)

1. The statements attached hereto refer to :

(*a*) Summary of income and expenditure — financial position as at 31st December 1978 (Appendix I) ;

(*b*) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits (Appendix II) ;

(*c*) Contributions (Appendix III) ;

(*d*) Provident fund (Appendix IV).

2. The statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits indicates that a sum of F 255,721 remains unexpended, whereas the final balance of income over expenditure was F 345,371. The difference between these two figures, F 89,650, represents :

	F	F
— Bank interest	78,380	
— Sundry receipts	15,012	
— Sale of publications ..	21,076	
— Contributions 7 % ..	105,922	
— Reimbursement of loans on validation ..	70,260	
		290,650
— Less receipts for 1978 estimated in the budget		201,000
		89,650

Transfers

3. Excess expenditure amounting to F 125,701 has been met by transfer between sub-heads within heads. Nevertheless, excess expenditure resulting from the Assembly's share in the renovation of the committee rooms (Head III), expenditure in connection with the communicating door between the Economic and Social Council and the Wilson Wing (Head V) and expenditure on pensions (Head VI), making a total of F 100,503, has been deducted from the overall amount of unexpended credits in Head IV. The Council has been informed of this.

Contributions

4. All contributions were received from the Secretary-General WEU London before 31st December 1978.

Provident fund

5. The Assembly's funds are incorporated with those of the other organs of WEU and the entire fund is administered by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Clerk of the Assembly.

6. The Secretary-General has continued to receive advice from the advisory panel set up within WEU and from outside bankers on the investment of the funds. These are at present held in French francs with the International Westminster Bank Ltd., London.

7. The Assembly's provident fund has been considerably reduced since the introduction of the pension scheme and on 31st December 1978 amounted to F 1,149,722, as shown at Appendix IV.

8. Some adjustments to the calculation of validation amounts for members of the staff will be dealt with in the accounts for the financial year 1979.

9. The President would like to take this opportunity of expressing the appreciation of the Assembly for the help which was extended to the Office of the Clerk by the United Kingdom Comptroller and Auditor General.

Kai-Uwe von HASSEL
President of the Assembly

18th June 1979

APPENDIX I

Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1978

(in French francs)

Per attached statement

Assessments of member states (see Appendix III)		7,778,000
Miscellaneous		
(A) Sundry receipts		
Bank interest	78,380	
Sundry receipts	15,012	
Sale of publications	21,076	
(B) Pensions		
Contributions (7 %)	105,922	
Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.)	70,260	
		290,650
		8,068,650
Expenditure under budget authorisation (see Appendix II)	7,622,776	
Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Heads III, V and VI	100,503	
		7,723,279
Excess of income over expenditure		F 345,371

Financial position as at 31st December 1978

Assets		
Cash at bank	646,552	
Sundry advances	59,018	
Accounts receivable	145,508	
		851,078
Liabilities		
Accounts payable	505,707	
Excess of income over expenditure	345,371	
		F 851,078

Certified correct:

Kai-Uwe von HASSEL	Francis HUMBLET	Siegbert ALBER
President of the Assembly	*Clerk of the Assembly*	*Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

I have examined the foregoing summary of income and expenditure and the statement of assets and liabilities. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion these statements are correct.

Signed: Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B.

Comptroller and Auditor General,
United Kingdom
External Auditor

21st June 1979

APPE

STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE AN

DETAILS	Total budget for 1978 [1]
HEAD I - EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF	
Sub-Head 1 (*a*) Salaries of permanent establishment	3,488,000
(*b*) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling expenses and French social security	12,000
Sub-Head 2 *Allowances, social charges, etc.*	
(*A*) *Allowances*	
(*a*) Household allowance	127,000
(*b*) Children's allowance	174,000
(*c*) Expatriation allowance	291,000
(*d*) Compensatory rent allowance	10,000
(*e*) Overtime	15,000
(*f*)	
(*g*) Education allowance	55,000
(*h*) Allowance for language courses	2,000
(*B*) *Social charges*	
(*a*) Social security	250,000
(*b*) Supplementary insurance	141,000
(*c*) Provident fund	218,000
(*C*) *Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and departure of permanent officials*	
(*a*) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers	1,600
(*b*) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons	1,500
(*c*) Removal expenses	3,400
(*d*) Installation allowance	4,500
(*e*) Biennial home leave for non-French officials	10,000
(*f*) Medical examination	3,000
Total of Head I	4,807,000

1. Document 750, Amendment 1 and Addendum.

IX II

NEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1978

Transfers +	Transfers −	Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
		3,488,000	3,366,873	121,127
5,722		17,722	17,722	—
		127,000	120,503	6,497
	21,435	152,565	151,951	614
	5,722	285,278	280,171	5,107
		10,000	5,844	4,156
2,523		17,523	17,523	—
825		55,825	55,825	—
		2,000	360	1,640
		250,000	245,908	4,092
		141,000	111,291	29,709
18,087		236,087	236,087	—
		1,600	—	1,600
		1,500	—	1,500
		3,400	—	3,400
		4,500	—	4,500
		10,000	5,776	4,224
		3,000	2,245	755
27,157	27,157	4,807,000	4,618,079	188,921

DETAILS	Total budget for 1978
HEAD II - EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY	
Sub-Head 3 1. *Temporary staff*	
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly	396,000
2. *Linguistic staff*	
(*A*) *Interpretation services*	
(*a*) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly	178,000
(*b*) Interpretation services required for meetings of Committees between sessions	160,000
(*B*) *Translation services*	
Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly	346,000
3. *Insurance for temporary staff*	5,000
4. *Installation of equipment for sessions*	173,000
5. *Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions*	44,000
Total of Head II	1,302,000
HEAD III - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT	
Sub-Head 4 Premises	182,000
Sub-Head 5 Capital equipment	70,000
Total of Head III	252,000

Transfers +	Transfers —	Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	30,000	366,000	362,396	3,604
		178,000	170,409	7,591
	21,715	138,285	115,236	23,049
		346,000	339,492	6,508
		5,000	3,739	1,261
51,433		224,433	224,433	—
282		44,282	44,282	—
51,715	51,715	1,302,000	1,259,987	42,013
		182,000	259,137	77,137
		70,000	71,761	1,761
		252,000	330,898	78,898

DETAILS		Total budget for 1978
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS		
Sub-Head 6	Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents	260,000
Sub-Head 7	Paper, stationery and office supplies	150,000
Sub-Head 8	Printing and publishing of Assembly documents	680,000
Sub-Head 9	Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.	22,500
Sub-Head 10	Official cars	40,000
Sub-Head 11	Bank charges	500
	Total of Head IV	1,153,000
HEAD V - OTHER EXPENDITURE		
Sub-Head 12	Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs	55,000
Sub-Head 13	Expenses for representation and receptions	100,000
Sub-Head 14	Committee study missions	3,000
Sub-Head 15	Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	155,000
Sub-Head 16	Expenses of experts and the auditor	24,000
Sub-Head 17	Expenditure on information	36,000
Sub-Head 18	Expenses for groups of the Assembly	17,000
Sub-Head 19	Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3,000
Sub-Head 20	Non-recoverable taxes	10,000
	Total of Head V	403,000
HEAD VI - PENSIONS		
Sub-Head 21	Pensions, allowances, etc.	
	(A) *Pensions*	
	(*a*) Retirement pension	40,000
	(*b*) Invalidity pension	
	(*c*) Survivors' pension	22,000
	(*d*) Orphans' pension	
	(B) *Allowances*	
	(*a*) Household allowance	
	(*b*) Dependants' allowance	
	(*c*) Education allowance	
	(*d*) Relief allowance	
	(C) *Severance grant*	
	(D) *Payments to member states for validation*	
	Total of Head VI	62,000
	TOTAL	7,979,000

The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1978, a

Kai-Uwe von HASSEL
President of the Assembly

Francis
Clerk of

Transfers +	Transfers —	Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	9,006	250,994	212,873	38,121
8,639		158,639	158,639	—
		680,000	601,123	78,877
367		22,867	22,867	—
		40,000	32,201	7,799
		500	7	493
9,006	9,006	1,153,000	1,027,710	125,290
	9,278	45,722	45,722	—
	8,919	91,081	91,081	—
	915	2,085	2,085	—
	13,014	141,986	141,986	—
	820	23,180	23,180	—
2,809		38,809	38,809	—
	1,214	15,786	15,786	—
32,141		35,141	38,077	2,936
	790	9,210	9,210	—
34,950	34,950	403,000	405,936	2,936
	2,482	37,518	37,518	—
	391	21,609	21,609	—
2,873		2,873	21,542	18,669
2,873	2,873	62,000	80,669	18,669
125,701	125,701	7,979,000	7,723,279	255,721

aid for up to 31st March 1979, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

Siegbert ALBER
Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

UMBLET
Assembly

APPENDIX III

STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY BUDGET FOR 1978

Member states	600ths	Contributions overpaid in 1977	Budget surplus 1977	Main budget for 1978	Net contributions required
		F	F	F	F
Belgium	59	(—) 33,185	(—) 38,262	764,837	693,390
France	120	(—) 67,493	(—) 77,822	1,555,600	1,410,285
Federal Republic of Germany	120	(—) 67,493	(—) 77,822	1,555,600	1,410,285
Italy	120	(—) 67,493	(—) 77,822	1,555,600	1,410,285
Luxembourg	2	(—) 1,124	(—) 1,298	25,926	23,504
Netherlands	59	(—) 33,185	(—) 38,262	764,837	693,390
United Kingdom	120	(—) 67,493	(—) 77,822	1,555,600	1,410,285
	600	(—) 337,466	(—) 389,110	7,778,000	7,051,424

APPENDIX IV

PROVIDENT FUND
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1978

	F		F
Balance brought forward:			
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1978	5,716,755	Transfer to pension validation accounts	5,194,414
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly of Western European Union	359,795		
Repayments of loans by staff members	74,080	Withdrawals	180,502
Interest received during the year	253,675		
Repayment of cost of crediting past service of retired staff member	24,692	Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st December 1978	1,149,722
Gain on valuation at 31st May 1978	95,641		
	6,524,638		6,524,638

Kai-Uwe von HASSEL
President of the Assembly

Francis HUMBLET
Clerk of the Assembly

Siegbert ALBER
Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

I have examined the foregoing Statement. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion this Statement is correct.

Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B.
Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom
External Auditor

21st June 1979

Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly for the Financial Year 1978

MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1978 [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration [2] ***by Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur***

The Assembly,

Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1978, together with the Auditor's Report, in accordance with Article 16 of the Financial Regulations,

Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility.

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. *Alber* (Chairman) ; MM. Jager, Adriaensens (Alternate : Mr. *Bonnel*) (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Ahrens, *Antoni*, Bonalumi, *Del Duca, Depietri,* Evers, *Hengel, Lord Hughes,* MM. Jager, Jeambrun, McNamara (Alternate : *Lord McNair*), Orsini, *Page, Peeters,* Schleiter, Stainton (Alternate : *Kershaw*), *Tummers, Vohrer,* Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Document 815 **9th July 1979**

DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1980 [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration [2]
by Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Summary of Estimates for the Financial Year 1980

Details	Estimate for 1980 F
Head I : Expenditure for staff	5,799,000
Head II : Expenditure relating to temporary personnel	1,682,000
Head III: Expenditure on premises and equipment	367,000
Head IV : General administrative costs	1,358,000
Head V : Other expenditure	947,000
Head VI : Pensions	91,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	10,244,000
TOTAL RECEIPTS	406,000
NET TOTAL	9,838,000

1. Adopted in the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration by 11 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions and approved by the Presidential Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. *Alber* (Chairman) ; MM. Jager, Adriaensens (Alternate : Mr. *Bonnel*) (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Ahrens, *Antoni*, Bonalumi, *Del Duca*, *Depietri*, Evers, *Hengel, Lord Hughes*, MM. Jager, Jeambrun, McNamara (Alternate : *Lord McNair*), Orsini, *Page, Peeters*, Schleiter, Stainton (Alternate : *Kershaw*), *Tummers, Vohrer*, Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra.

N. B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads

Details	Estimate for 1980 F	
Head I — EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF		
Sub-Head 1: Salaries of permanent establishment	4,348,000	
Sub-Head 2: (A) Allowances	789,000	
(B) Social charges	635,000	
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and departure of permanent officials	27,000	
TOTAL OF HEAD I		5,799,000
Head II — EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY		
Sub-Head 3: 1. Temporary staff	510,000	
2. Linguistic staff	872,000	
3. Insurance for temporary staff	5,000	
4. Installation of equipment for sessions	244,000	
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions	51,000	
TOTAL OF HEAD II		1,682,000
Head III — EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT		
Sub-Head 4: 1. Premises	243,000	
2. Work on the building (joint areas)	104,000	
Sub-Head 5: Capital equipment	20,000	
TOTAL OF HEAD III		367,000
Head IV — GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS		
Sub-Head 6: Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents	295,000	
Sub-Head 7: Office supplies and hire of machines	190,000	
Sub-Head 8: Printing and publishing of Assembly documents	800,000	
Sub-Head 9: Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.	28,000	
Sub-Head 10: Official cars	44,500	
Sub-Head 11: Bank charges	500	
TOTAL OF HEAD IV		1,358,000
Head V — OTHER EXPENDITURE		
Sub-Head 12: Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs	77,000	
Sub-Head 13: Expenses for representation and receptions	120,000	
Sub-Head 14: Committee study missions	3,000	
Sub-Head 15: Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	187,000	
Sub-Head 16: Expenses of experts and the auditors	45,000	
Sub-Head 17: Expenditure on information	250,000	
Sub-Head 18: Expenses for groups of the Assembly	250,000	
Sub-Head 19: Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3,000	
Sub-Head 20: Non-recoverable taxes	12,000	
TOTAL OF HEAD V		947,000
Head VI — PENSIONS		
Sub-Head 21: (A) Pensions	91,000	
(B) Allowances	—	
(C) Severance grant	—	
TOTAL OF HEAD VI		91,000

Head I — Expenditure for Staff

Sub-Head 1

SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT

Estimate: F 4,348,000

(*a*) Basic salaries — *Estimate:* F 4,328,000

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
The Clerk	Hors cadre	1	140,000
The Clerk Assistant	Hors cadre	1	301,000
Counsellors	A5	5	1,317,000
First Secretaries	A4	2	451,000
Secretary	A3	1	198,000
Secretaries-Translators/Publications Administrative Assistant/Assistant Translator	A2	3	441,000
Chief Accountant	B6	1	150,000
Personal Assistants	B4	4	455,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists	B3	6	555,000
Switchboard Operator	B3	1	98,000
Head Roneo-Storekeeper	C6	1	86,000
Messengers	C3	2	136,000
		28	4,328,000

(*b*) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling expenses and French social security

Estimate: F 20,000

Sub-Head 2

ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC.

(A) ALLOWANCES

Estimate: F 789,000

(*a*) Household allowance — *Estimate:* F 158,000

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
Clerk Assistant	Hors cadre	1	18,000
Counsellors	A5	4	63,000
First Secretary	A4	1	13,000
Secretary	A3	1	12,000
Personal Assistants	B4	3	21,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists	B3	3	17,000
Head Roneo-Storekeeper	C6	1	5,000
Messengers	C3	2	9,000
		16	158,000

(*b*) Children's allowance — *Estimate:* F 176,000

7,020 F per year per child : 25 ..... F 176,000

(*c*) Expatriation allowance — *Estimate:* F 356,000

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
Counsellors	A5	3	150,000
First Secretary	A4	1	44,000
Secretary	A3	1	42,000
Secretary-Translator / Publications Administrative Assistant / Assistant Translator	A2	2	49,000
Personal Assistants	B4	2	42,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists	B3	2	29,000
		11	356,000

(*d*) Compensatory rent allowance — *Estimate:* F 10,000

(*e*) Overtime — *Estimate:* F 22,000

(*f*)

(*g*) Education allowance — *Estimate:* F 65,000

(*h*) Allowance for language courses — *Estimate:* F 2,000

(B) SOCIAL CHARGES

Estimate: F 635,000

(*a*) Social Security — *Estimate:* F 370,000

27 officials — F 370,000

(*b*) Supplementary insurance — *Estimate:* F 175,000

(*c*) Provident fund — *Estimate:* F 90,000

14 % of basic salaries × 644,000 F — F 90,000

(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS

Estimate: F 27,000

(*a*) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris who are convened for examinations and interviews and cost of marking examination papers

Estimate: F 1,600

(*b*) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons

Estimate: F 1,500

(*c*) Removal expenses

Estimate: F 3,400

(*d*) Installation allowance

Estimate: F 7,000

(*e*) Biennial home leave for non-French officials

Estimate: F 10,000

(*f*) Medical examination

Estimate: F 3,500

Head II — Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly

Estimate: F 1,682,000

Sub-Head 3

1. TEMPORARY STAFF

Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly

Function	Paris: 10 days		
	Daily remuneration F	No.	Total F
Head of the sittings office	525	1 *a*	9,400
Heads of sections	420	2 *a*	35,500
	565	4 *b*	
Sergeant-at-Arms	490	1 *b*	5,900
Secretaries for the Assembly	374	2 *a*	19,200
	490	2 *b*	
Précis writers	374	4 *a*	38,400
	490	4 *b*	
Verbatim reporters	490	12 *b*	115,000
	624	6 *c*	
Assistants	355	4 *b*	140,000
	320	23 *b*	
	239	6 *a*	
	203	10 *a*	
Head ushers	169	2 *a*	3,400
Ushers	157	12 *a*	34,200
	320	4 *b*	
Roneo/Assemblers	157	12 *a*	19,000
		111	420,000

a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside France.
c. Recruited as free-lance staff.

Travelling expenses	F	90,000
		510,000

2. LINGUISTIC STAFF

(A) *Interpretation Services*

(*a*) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly

Function	10 days	
	No.	Total F
Interpreters	12	210,000
	12	210,000

Travelling expenses ..... F 16,000
F 226,000

(*b*) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions ..... F 190,000

(B) *Translation Services*

Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly

Function	Daily remuneration F	No.	Estimate [1] F
Revisers	560 890	3 *a* 4 *b*	175,000
Translators	454 746	4 *a* 4 *b*	160,000
Assistants	355 320 239 203	3 *b* 2 *b* 4 *a* 3 *a*	108,000
		27	443,000

1. Based on 32 days for the revisers and translators.
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside France.

Travelling expenses ..... F 13,000
F 456,000

3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF

Estimate: F 5,000

4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SESSIONS

— Installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment	F 220,000
— Installation of telephone booths	F 14,000
— Installation of a teleprinter "France-Presse" for the Press Service	F 10,000

Estimate: F 244,000

5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING SESSIONS

— Removal expenses	F 6,000
— Medical Service (Doctor and Nurse)	F 6,000
— Hire of typewriters and technicians	F 5,500
— Servicing of lifts	F 6,500
— Cleaning	F 13,000
— Miscellaneous	F 14,000

Estimate: F 51,000

Head III — Expenditure on premises and equipment

Estimate: F 367,000

Sub-Head 4

1. PREMISES

— Hire of committee rooms outside Paris and installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment	F 15,000
— Joint overheads for the premises and insurance	F 200,000
— Minor repairs to equipment and machines and removal of furniture	F 20,000
— Miscellaneous	F 8,000

Estimate: F 243,000

2. WORK ON THE BUILDING
(joint areas)

Estimate: F 104,000

Sub-Head 5

CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

— 18 typists' desks ..... F 15,500
— 1 tape recorder ..... F 4,500

Estimate: F 20,000

Head IV — General administrative costs

Estimate: F 1,358,000

Sub-Head 6

POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH CHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS

— Postage ..... F 171,000
— Telephone..... F 100,000
— Telegrams..... F 9,000
— Transport of documents ..... F 15,000

Estimate: F 295,000

Sub-Head 7

OFFICE SUPPLIES AND HIRE OF MACHINES

— Purchase of roneo paper, stencils, headed writing paper and other office supplies

— Hire of machines for photocopying and printing

Estimate: F 190,000

Sub-Head 8

PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS

— Printing of Assembly documents (includes the record of debates, minutes of the Assembly and Assembly documents)
— Printing of Reports of the Council
— Printing of Texts Adopted
— Miscellaneous — Bulletins, printing of the Agenda and Order of Business of the Assembly, voting lists, etc.
— Reprints
— Brochures

Estimate: F 800,000

Sub-Head 9

PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC.

Estimate: F 28,000

Sub-Head 10

OFFICIAL CARS

— Hire of official cars

Estimate : F 44,500

Sub-Head 11

BANK CHARGES

Estimate : F 500

Head V — Other expenditure

Estimate : F 947,000

Sub-Head 12

TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS

Estimate : F 77,000

Sub-Head 13

EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS

Estimate : F 120,000

Sub-Head 14

COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS

Estimate : F 3,000

Sub-Head 15

OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Estimate : F 187,000

Sub-Head 16

EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITOR

Estimate : F 45,000

Sub-Head 17

EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION

Estimate : F 250,000

Sub-Head 18

EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY

Estimate : F 250,000

Sub-Head 19

CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR

Estimate : F 3,000

Sub-Head 20

NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES

Estimate : F 12,000

Head VI — Pensions

Sub-Head 21

PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC.

(A) *Pensions*

Estimate: F 91,000

(*a*) Retirement pension ..... *Estimate:* F 51,000

(*b*) Invalidity pension ..... *Estimate:* pro mem.

(*c*) Survivors' pension ..... *Estimate:* F 26,000

(*d*) Orphans' pension ..... *Estimate:* F 14,000

(B) *Allowances*

Estimate: pro mem.

(*a*) Household allowance ..... *Estimate:* pro mem.

(*b*) Dependants' allowance ..... *Estimate:* pro mem.

(*c*) Education allowance ..... *Estimate:* pro mem.

(*d*) Relief allowance ..... *Estimate:* pro mem.

(C) *Severance grant*

Estimate: pro mem.

Income

(A) *Sundry receipts*

Estimate: F 100,000

(*a*) Sale of publications ..... F 15,000

(*b*) Bank interest ..... F 75,000

(*c*) Social security reimbursements ..... F 10,000

(B) *Pensions*

Estimate: F 306,000

(*a*) Contributions (7 %) ..... *Estimate:* F 248,000

(*b*) Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.). *Estimate:* F 58,000

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. The draft budget now before you amounts to F 9,838,000. The budget for 1979 amounted to F 8,517,000. The difference is therefore F 1,321,000.

2. *Head I — Expenditure for staff*

The increase (F 802,000) in the estimate for this head takes account of:

(*i*) the effect over a full year of increases granted in 1979 in basic salaries, expatriation and household allowances and contributions in respect of supplementary insurance and social security;

(*ii*) annual increments;

(*iii*) the probable effect of any salary increases in 1980 due to inflation. Increases are estimated at 10 %;

(*iv*) an increase in the salary of the Clerk Assistant. It seems essential to apply to the staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly the normal rule whereby the basic salary of an official (excluding the various allowances) should correspond to his responsibilities and should not be less than that of officials of lower grades. The amount shown corresponds to the application of this rule.

3. *Head II — Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly*

Sub-head 3.1 — Temporary staff

The estimated increase is F 50,000.

Salaries for temporary staff follow the scales applied in the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. In accordance with the decision of the Budget Committee of the Council, the WEU Assembly applies automatically, in the course of the year, all increases in salary scales as and when they are applied by the Council of Europe and the European Parliament.

Sub-head 3.2 (A) — Interpretation services

The increase (F 53,000) in the estimate for this sub-head takes into account probable increases in the scales applied by the co-ordinated organisations for salaries and per diem allowances payable to interpreters.

Sub-head 3.2 (B) — Translation services

The increase (F 49,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to scales applied in the Council of Europe.

Sub-head 3.4 — Installation of equipment for sessions

The increase (F 23,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increase in the cost of installing equipment needed for two part-sessions held in Paris.

4. *Head III — Expenditure on premises and equipment*

Sub-head 5 — Capital equipment

The sum of F 20,000 is for the purchase of a tape recorder and the replacement of eighteen typists' desks for temporary staff.

5. *Head IV — General administrative costs*

Sub-head 7 — Office supplies and hire of machines

The increase (F 9,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the higher cost of paper and office supplies. This sub-head now also covers the hire of a printing machine for addressing envelopes for despatching documents of the Assembly and of an Addressograph machine.

Sub-head 8 — Printing and publishing of Assembly documents

The increase (F 60,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increase in the cost of printing.

Sub-head 9 — Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.

The increase (F 3,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to the higher cost of subscriptions to newspapers, periodicals and reference works.

6. *Head V — Other expenditure*

Sub-head 12 — Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs

The increase (F 77,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to the increase in travelling expenses and per diem allowances.

Sub-head 13 — Expenses for representation and receptions

The increase (F 10,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to rising prices.

Sub-head 15 — Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk

The increase (F 17,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increase in travelling expenses and per diem allowances foreseen in 1980.

Sub-head 16 — Expenses of experts and the auditors

The increase (F 18,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to increases in fees payable to the auditor and experts.

Sub-head 17 — Expenditure on information

When the 1979 budget was drawn up, an estimate of F 300,000 was foreseen. This amount was reduced to F 142,500. It is requested that the amount be raised to F 250,000 in the 1980 budget.

Sub-head 18 — Expenses for groups of the Assembly

There are now five political groups in the Assembly. This sub-head has been increased by F 107,500.

When the 1979 budget was drawn up, an estimate of F 200,000 was foreseen. This amount was reduced to F 142,500. It is requested that the amount be raised to F 250,000 in the 1980 budget.

7. *Head VI — Pensions*

In this budget, account has been taken of only three pensions to be paid : one retirement, one survivor's and one orphan's pension.

8. *Sundry receipts*

Expected receipts in 1980 include :

(*i*) sale of publications ;

(*ii*) bank interest ;

(*iii*) social security reimbursements in respect of staff on sick leave ;

(*iv*) income resulting from the contribution of 7 % from staff subscribing to the pension fund and the reimbursement of loans and withdrawals.

Head I — Expenditure for Staff

Sub-Head 1

SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT

(*a*) Basic salaries

Estimate for 1980	F	4,328,000
Budget for 1979	F	3,754,000
Net increase	F	574,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2.

(*b*) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling expenses and French social security

Estimate for 1980	F	20,000
Budget for 1979	F	14,000
Net increase	F	6,000

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of increased rates payable to temporary staff.

Sub-Head 2

ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC.

(A) ALLOWANCES

(*a*) Household allowance

Estimate for 1980	F	158,000
Budget for 1979	F	135,000
Net increase	F	23,000

This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff.

(*b*) Children's allowance

Estimate for 1980	F	176,000
Budget for 1979	F	170,000
Net increase	F	6,000

This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff.

(*c*) Expatriation allowance

Estimate for 1980	F	356,000
Budget for 1979	F	310,000
Net increase	F	46,000

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of non-French staff entitled to the allowance.

(*d*) Compensatory rent allowance

Estimate for 1980	F	10,000
Budget for 1979	F	10,000
Estimate unchanged		

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the rent allowance now paid and the number of officials qualifying for an allowance.

(*e*) Overtime

Estimate for 1980	F	22,000
Budget for 1979	F	20,000
Net increase	F	2,000

(*f*)

(*g*) Education allowance

Estimate for 1980	F	65,000
Budget for 1979	F	60,000
Net increase	F	5,000

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance.

(*h*) Allowance for language courses

Estimate for 1980	F	2,000
Budget for 1979	F	2,000
Estimate unchanged		

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance.

(B) SOCIAL CHARGES

(*a*) Social security

Estimate for 1980	F	370,000
Budget for 1979	F	275,000
Net increase	F	95,000

(*b*) Supplementary insurance

Estimate for 1980	F	175,000
Budget for 1979	F	150,000
Net increase	F	25,000

(*c*) Provident Fund

Estimate for 1980	F	90,000
Budget for 1979	F	73,000
Net increase	F	17,000

This calculation is based on 14 % of basic salaries for staff having opted to remain in the provident fund scheme.

(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS

(*a*) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers

Estimate for 1980	F	1,600
Budget for 1979	F	1,600
Estimate unchanged		

(*b*) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons

Estimate for 1980	F	1,500
Budget for 1979	F	1,500
Estimate unchanged		

Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff.

(*c*) Removal expenses

Estimate for 1980	F	3,400
Budget for 1979	F	3,400
Estimate unchanged		

Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff.

(*d*) Installation allowance

Estimate for 1980	F	7,000
Budget for 1979	F	4,500
Net increase	F	2,500

Calculated on the basis of possible replacement requirements.

(*e*) Biennial home leave for non-French officials

Estimate for 1980	F	10,000
Budget for 1979	F	10,000
Estimate unchanged		

Based on the number of staff entitled to home leave in 1979.

(*f*) Medical examination

Estimate for 1980	F	3,500
Budget for 1979	F	3,000
Net increase	F	500

Head II — Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly

Sub-Head 3

1. TEMPORARY STAFF

Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly

Estimate for 1980	F	510,000
Budget for 1979	F	460,000
Net increase	F	50,000

The basis of the calculation is two part-sessions in Paris making a total of 10 sitting days.
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

2. LINGUISTIC STAFF

(A) *Interpretation Services*

(*a*) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly

Estimate for 1980	F	226,000
Budget for 1979	F	193,000
Net increase	F	33,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

(*b*) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions

Estimate for 1980	F	190,000
Budget for 1979	F	170,000
Net increase	F	20,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

(B) *Translation Services*

Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly

Estimate for 1980	F 456,000
Budget for 1979	F 407,000
Net increase	F 49,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF

Estimate for 1980	F 5,000
Budget for 1979	F 5,000

Estimate unchanged

4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE SESSIONS

Estimate for 1980	F 244,000
Budget for 1979	F 221,000
Net increase	F 23,000

This calculation is based on the installations necessary for two part-sessions held in Paris.

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING THE SESSIONS

Estimate for 1980	F 51,000
Budget for 1979	F 41,000
Net increase	F 10,000

Head III — Expenditure on premises and equipment

Sub-Head 4

1. PREMISES

Estimate for 1980	F 243,000
Budget for 1979	F 337,000
Net decrease	F 94,000

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the Assembly's share in maintenance costs, the hire of committee rooms and insurance.

2. WORK ON THE BUILDING
(joint areas)

Estimate for 1980	F 104,000
Budget for 1979	—
Net increase	F 104,000

This represents the Assembly's share in work on the committee rooms — air conditioning and sound-proofing — and also work on drainage.

Sub-Head 5

CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

Estimate for 1980	F 20,000
Budget for 1979	F 26,000
Net decrease	F 6,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4.

Head IV — General administrative costs

Sub-Head 6

POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH CHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS

Estimate for 1980	F 295,000
Budget for 1979	F 295,000
	Estimate unchanged

Sub-Head 7

OFFICE SUPPLIES AND HIRE OF MACHINES

Estimate for 1980	F 190,000
Budget for 1979	F 181,000
Net increase	F 9,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 8

PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS

Estimate for 1980	F 800,000
Budget for 1979	F 740,000
Net increase	F 60,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 9

PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC.

Estimate for 1980	F 28,000
Budget for 1979	F 25,000
Net increase	F 3,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 10

OFFICIAL CARS

Estimate for 1980	F 44,500
Budget for 1979	F 44,500
	Estimate unchanged

In the absence of a car belonging to the Assembly, provision must be made for the hire of chauffeur. driven cars for the President of the Assembly and the Clerk.

Sub-Head 11

BANK CHARGES

Estimate for 1980	F 500
Budget for 1979	F 500
	Estimate unchanged

Head V — Other expenditure

Sub-Head 12

TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS

Estimate for 1980	F 77,000
Budget for 1979	F 70,000
Net increase	F 7,000

Travel and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly attending committee meetings, including meetings of the Presidential Committee, are paid by the governments.

The Assembly is responsible for travel and subsistence allowances for visits by the President of the Assembly, Rapporteurs and, on occasion, Committee Chairmen when such visits are connected with the preparation of a report or Assembly business. Journeys by Chairmen and Rapporteurs are subject to the approval of the Presidential Committee.

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 13

EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS

Estimate for 1980	F 120,000
Budget for 1979	F 110,000
Net increase	F 10,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 14

COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS

Estimate for 1980	F 3,000
Budget for 1979	F 3,000
Estimate unchanged	

Sub-Head 15

OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Estimate for 1980	F 187,000
Budget for 1979	F 170,000
Net increase	F 17,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 16

EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITORS

Estimate for 1980	F 45,000
Budget for 1979	F 27,000
Net increase	F 18,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 17

EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION

Estimate for 1980	F 250,000
Budget for 1979	F 142,500
Net increase	F 107,500

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 18

EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY

Estimate for 1980	F 250,000
Budget for 1979	F 142,500
Net increase	F 107,500

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 19

CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR

Estimate for 1980	F 3,000
Budget for 1979	F 3,000
Estimate unchanged	

Sub-Head 20

NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES

Estimate for 1980	F 12,000
Budget for 1979	F 10,000
Net increase	F 2,000

Head VI — Pensions

Sub-Head 21

PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC.

(A) *Pensions*

(*a*) Retirement pension

Estimate for 1980	F 51,000
Estimate for 1979	F 46,000
Net increase	F 5,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7.

(*b*) Invalidity pension ..... pro mem.

(*c*) Survivors' pension

Estimate for 1980	F 26,000
Estimate for 1979	F 24,000
Net increase	F 2,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7.

(*d*) Orphans' pension

Estimate for 1980	F 14,000
Estimate for 1979	F 13,000
Net increase	F 1,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7.

(B) *Allowances*

pro mem.

(C) *Severance grant*

pro mem.

Document 815
Amendment 1

22nd November 1979

Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1980

AMENDMENT 1 [1]

tabled by Mr. Alber

Summary of revised estimates for the financial year 1980

Details	Initial estimate for 1980 F	Amended estimate for 1980 F
Head I : Expenditure for staff	5,799,000	5,799,000
Head II : Expenditure relating to temporary personnel	1,682,000	1,682,000
Head III : Expenditure on premises and equipment	367,000	339,000
Head IV : General administrative costs	1,358,000	1,358,000
Head V : Other expenditure	947,000	947,000
Head VI : Pensions	91,000	91,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	10,244,000	10,216,000
TOTAL RECEIPTS	406,000	406,000
NET TOTAL	9,838,000	9,810,000

Signed : Alber

1. See 11th Sitting, 4th December 1979 (Amendment agreed to).

Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1980

ADDENDUM

Letters from the Secretary-General and the Clerk of the Assembly dated 24th October and 20th November 1979

24th October 1979

Dear Mr. Humblet,

I am writing to inform you that the Council have now examined the WEU Assembly budget for 1980 and, in accordance with the agreed procedure, have expressed a favourable opinion on the budget as amended in Document C-B (79) 16. Two copies of this document are enclosed.

Yours sincerely,

E. LONGERSTAEY
Secretary-General

Encl.

Mr. F. Humblet
Clerk of the Assembly of
Western European Union
43, avenue du Président Wilson
75775 Paris Cedex 16

Paris, 20th November 1979

Dear Secretary-General,

I have the honour to inform you that the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee have today considered the amendments proposed by the Council to the draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1980.

The reduction of Frs. 28,000 in Head III, Sub-Head 4.2 has been approved.

The Presidential Committee decided that the draft budget would be submitted to the Assembly without any further amendments. The draft budget has now been reduced to Frs. 9,810,000.

Yours sincerely,

F. HUMBLET
Clerk of the Assembly

H. E. Mr. Edouard Longerstaey
Secretary-General
Western European Union
9 Grosvenor Place
London SW1X 7 HL

WEU Unclassified C-B (79) 16

Original : English 11th October 1979

Secretary-General's note

WEU Assembly budget for 1980

1. The draft budget of the WEU Assembly for 1980 (Assembly Document 815), circulated under reference B (79) 11, was examined by the Budget and Organisation Committee at a meeting held in London on 4th and 5th October 1979 (BR (79) 2, V — to be circulated).

2. The Committee's conclusions can be summarised as follows :

HEAD I (Expenditure for Staff)

It was noted, from the explanatory memorandum on pages 12 and 13 of the budget, that the estimates included provision for an increase of the salary of the Clerk Assistant and it was recalled that this matter was currently being studied by the Council. Some delegates expressed the view that they would have preferred to see the cost of any increase compensated by economies achieved elsewhere in the budget.

HEAD II (Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly)

Sub-Head 3.5 — Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions

The Committee recommended that this credit be reduced by 5,000 francs from 51,000 francs to 46,000 francs.

HEAD III (Expenditure on premises and equipment)

Sub-Head 4.2 — Work on the building

The credit of 104,000 francs was reduced by 28,000 francs to 76,000 francs.

The original credit was based on the June 1979 estimate of the cost of certain conference room and other work in the shared parts of the Paris offices. The final estimates for this work,

higher than originally foreseen, appeared under Sections B and C in the WEU budget for 1980 (B (79) 10, Part II) where the total of the shared costs was given as 571,000 francs. Delegates were unable to accept that figure for 1980 and it was agreed that the work programme would be spread over the years 1980 and 1981. The overall cost for 1980 was consequently reduced to a rounded-off total of 252,000 francs, of which the Assembly's share would be 76,000 francs.

HEAD V (Other expenditure)

Sub-Head 17 — Expenditure on information

Sub-Head 18 — Expenses for Groups of the Assembly

It was recalled that in the 1979 budget the President of the Assembly had sought to increase these credits from 36,000 francs to 300,000 francs and from 17,000 francs to 200,000 francs respectively. The Council and Assembly had eventually agreed to increase both to 142,500 francs.

In the 1980 estimates, it was proposed that both credits should be raised from 142,500 francs to 250,000 francs. There was almost unanimous agreement that, from a budgetary point of view, the proposed increases were unacceptable. Delegates noted that the combined 1980 estimates of the Paris-based offices of WEU showed an increase of approximately 13 % against 1979 and, subject to confirmation on the part of the Belgian Delegate, they recommended that any increases for these two items should be limited to that percentage. This would mean that the 1979 credits of 142,500 francs would be increased by 18,500 francs to a total (for each) of 161,000 francs instead of 250,000 francs. The reduction for each sub-head would amount to 89,000 francs making a total reduction under Head V of 178,000 francs.

A summary table showing the amended totals for each head is attached. It will be noted that the overall effect of the proposed amendments is to reduce the net total of the Assembly's estimates for 1980 by 211,000 francs from 9,838,000 francs to 9,627,000 francs. The percentage increase, against 1979, falls from 15.51 % to 13.03 %.

3. Subject to the foregoing observations the Committee could recommend the Council to express a favourable opinion on the draft budget of the WEU Assembly for 1980.

4. Under the agreed procedure for the approval of Assembly budgets, given in paragraph 4 of the cover-note of document B (79) 11, the next stage is for the Council to give its opinion on the budget, indicating either preparedness to accept the draft or proposing amendments. That opinion is to be conveyed to the Assembly prior to the next sitting which commences in Paris on 3rd December 1979. After the session, the budget will be referred back to the Council for final approval.

5. The Council's opinion will be sought at the meeting to be held in London on 23rd October 1979.

ANNEX

Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly of WEU for 1980

Proposed amendments

Head	Fr. frs	Fr. frs	Fr. frs
I. Expenditure for staff	5,799,000	—	5,799,000
II. Expenditure relating to temporary personnel	1,682,000	(—) 5,000	1,677,000
III. Expenditure on premises and equipment	367,000	(—) 28,000	339,000
IV. General administrative costs	1,358,000	—	1,358,000
V. Other expenditure	947,000	(—) 178,000	769,000
VI. Pensions	91,000	—	91,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	10,244,000	(—) 211,000	10,033,000
TOTAL RECEIPTS	406,000	—	406,000
NET TOTAL	9,838,000	(—) 211,000	9,627,000

Document 816 **25th September 1979**

SALT II and its implications for European security

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments [2]
by Mr. Cook, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. *Roper* (Chairman) ; MM. *Bonnel,* Roberti (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Ahrens, Banks,* Baumel (Alternate : *Bozzi*), Bechter, van den Bergh, Boldrini, Boucheny, *Dejardin,* Fosson, Grant (Alternate : *Lord Duncan-Sandys*), Handlos, Hardy (Alternate : *Cook*), de Koster, Lemmrich, Maggioni, *Meintz,* Ménard, *Onslow,* Pawelczyk (Alternate : *Büchner*), Pecchioli, Péronnet, Schmidt (Alternate : *Vohrer*), Scholten (Alternate : *van Hulst*), *Tanghe.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Resolution

on SALT II and its implications for European security

The Assembly,

(*i*) Conscious of its authority under the Brussels Treaty as the only European parliamentary assembly with statutory responsibility in matters of defence ;

(*ii*) Having considered the SALT II texts, and the accompanying agreed statements and common understandings, and the evidence given by the United States Administration to the Senate committees ;

(*iii*) Noting that the agreements cannot affect the British and French nuclear forces, both of which make a meaningful contribution to the allied nuclear deterrent, and that the agreements impose no restrictions on mutual assistance in the production of nuclear weapons between the United States and its allies ;

(*iv*) Regretting that it has not proved possible in the framework of SALT II to agree on significant mutual reductions of strategic offensive arms of all types ;

(*v*) Believing however that the broad parity in all categories of strategic offensive arms which SALT II seeks to bring about will increase the stability of mutual deterrence and cannot provide any unilateral advantage for the Soviet Union ;

(*vi*) Concluding therefore that the SALT II agreements should enhance the security of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance and will not in any way diminish the credibility of the United States strategic deterrent ;

(*vii*) Reserving for further consideration in a future report its position on SALT III,

INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENT

To transmit the text of the present resolution and the corresponding report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the President and all members of the United States Senate ;

CALLS UPON THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

To approve the ratification without amendment of the treaty on the limitation of offensive arms signed in Vienna on 18th June 1979.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Cook, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1. The Committee has followed the progress of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) from the outset, and reported frequently on them. In particular it reported on the SALT 1 texts — the (permanent) ABM treaty and the interim agreement and protocol on strategic offensive arms — after their signature in 1972 [1] and reviewed the progress of the SALT II negotiations as recently as October 1978 when it adopted the report prepared by Mr. Baumel (Document 787) on which the Assembly subsequently adopted Recommendation 324 (attached at Appendix I with reply of the Council).

2. SALT II texts, so long in preparation, were finally signed by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna on 18th June and have been published ; the ratification process has begun in the United States Senate with the opening of hearings by the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees in July and the principal Administration witnesses have been heard. No new facts have emerged to cause the Committee to modify in any significant way the conclusions it reached in October last year.

II. *Description of texts*

3. As foreshadowed in Document 787, the texts signed in Vienna comprise three main documents — a treaty of nineteen articles expiring on 31st December 1985 "unless replaced earlier by an agreement further limiting strategic offensive arms" ; a protocol of four articles (expiring on 21st December 1981 unless replaced earlier by a further agreement) imposing temporary limits ; and a statement of principles for future negotiations on SALT III. Additionally, however, there are forty-three pages of agreed statements and common understandings, four pages of data on present weapons inventory and a Soviet statement on the TU-22M bomber (Backfire).

4. The principal provisions of nineteen articles of the treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, as further interpreted by the agreed statements and common understandings, are summarised as follows :

Article I contains the general undertaking to "limit" strategic arms qualitatively and quantitatively, and to "exercise restraint" in the development of new ones.

Article II provides definitions of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, heavy bombers, air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs), launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with multiple independently-targetable vehicles (MIRVs), MIRVed ASBMs, heavy ICBMs and cruise missiles.

Article III provides that on entry into force the aggregate total of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and ASBMs shall not exceed 2,400 and that from 1st January 1981 reductions shall be initiated to reduce that aggregate to 2,250.

Article IV, setting forth limits to quantitative and qualitative improvements, provides that there shall be no new construction of additional, or relocation of fixed ICBM launchers ; no conversion of light to heavy ICBM launchers or of pre-1964 launchers to post-1964 launchers ; and no increase of launcher volume by more than 32 %. There is to be no "excessive" missile storage or rapid reloading capability. No heavier ICBMs than those in service are to be developed ; there is to be no conversion of intermediate- or medium-range ballistic missile launchers to ICBM launchers and only one new type of ICBM — a light one — may be tested and deployed. There is to be no increase in numbers of MIRVs on ballistic missiles beyond the numbers currently tested (ten on ICBMs, fourteen on SLBMs). ASBMs shall not be fitted with more than fourteen MIRVs, nor shall the average numbers of ALCMs with a range over 600 km exceed twenty-eight per aircraft.

Article V provides sub-ceilings on MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, heavy bombers with air-launched cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 km, the sum of which shall not exceed 1,320. Within that total the sum of MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs shall not exceed 1,200 and within that total the number of MIRVed ICBMs shall not exceed 820.

Article VI provides that the limits shall apply both to operational weapons and those in the final stage of construction, in reserve, storage, or under repair, and defines these conditions.

Article VII exempts test and space launchers from the limitations, but prohibits any significant (more than 15 %) increase in their numbers and requires them to be located at defined test ranges. Twelve out of eighteen Soviet fractional orbital missile launchers are to be destroyed within eight months of entry into force.

1. Document 587, East-West relations and defence, Rapporteur Mr. Destremau, 8th November 1972, leading to Recommendation 227 adopted on 6th December 1972.

Article VIII provides that air-launched cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 km shall not be tested from aircraft other than bombers.

Article IX bans the development or deployment of ballistic missiles on surface ships, in fixed position on the ocean bed or on the beds of inland waters; it bans fractional orbital missiles or any nuclear or other weapon of mass destruction in earth orbit; it bans mobile launchers for heavy ICBMs; it bans any SLBMs or ASBMs heavier than the heaviest light ICBM operational with either party at the date of signature. It bans MIRVed ALCMs with a range in excess of 600 km.

Article X specifically permits any other modernisation or replacement of strategic offensive arms.

Article XI lays down the conditions for dismantling or destroying excess weapons, imposing time limits of four months from entry into force for destruction of excess ICBM launchers, six months for SLBM launchers and three months for heavy bombers which are in excess of the overall aggregate of 2,400. Destruction of other excess weapons systems is to be completed by 31st December 1981 and the destruction of prohibited weapons is to be completed within six months from entry into force.

Article XII states that parties shall not circumvent the provisions of the treaty "through any other state or states or in any other manner".

Article XIII contains a customary undertaking for parties not to assume other international obligations which would conflict with the treaty.

Article XIV provides for prompt negotiations after entry into force on further measures for the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, and lays down the objective "to conclude well in advance of 1985 an agreement limiting strategic offensive arms to replace this treaty upon its expiration".

Article XV on verification provides for the use of "national technical means", provides that parties shall not interfere with those means of the other party used "in a manner consistent with generally recognised principles of international law" and prohibits deliberate concealment measures which would impede such verification.

Article XVI provides for the prior notification to the other party of any ICBM launch except for test launches which do not go beyond the national territory.

Article XVII provides for the use of the Standing Consultative Commission established under SALT I to be used for implementation of the treaty, where parties are *inter alia* to exchange information relevant to the treaty and consider other proposals for limiting strategic offensive arms. In particular, the agreed data base is to be up-dated in that Commission.

Article XVIII provides for amendments to the treaty.

Article XIX provides for ratification and duration until 31st December 1985. As in all similar treaties it provides for a right of withdrawal if a party decides that "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardised its supreme interests", but requires six months' notice including a statement of the extraordinary events invoked by the notifying party.

5. *The protocol* imposes a moratorium on certain weapons which will expire on 31st December 1981 unless replaced earlier by further permanent agreements.

Article I is an undertaking not to deploy mobile ICBM launchers, or to test ICBMs from such launchers.

Article II covers cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 km. Sea-launched or land-launched versions are not to be deployed; MIRVed sea-launched and land-launched versions are to be neither tested nor deployed.

Article III prohibits the deployment or testing of ASBMs.

6. The Soviet *statement on the Backfire bomber* states that it is a medium-range bomber, will not be given intercontinental ranges through refuelling or any other means; production will not exceed thirty per year.

7. The texts of SALT II contain a memorandum of understanding providing a *data base* on existing numbers of strategic defence arms, which is to be up-dated on entry into force of the treaty and maintained in the Standing Consultative Commission (see following table).

8. Finally the texts contain the "joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms" which are described in Chapter III (*vi*) below.

III. *Implications for Europe and the Alliance*

(i) The balance of central strategic systems

9. The treaty has a negligible effect on strategic systems currently deployed by either side. Article III obliges both parties to reduce the aggregate number of their strategic launchers to 2,250 by 1981. This will involve a reduction of 254 on the Soviet side, probably ICBM launch-

SALT II data base

	United States		USSR	
	at 1/11/78	at 18/6/79	at 1/11/78	at 18/6/79
Launchers of ICBMs	1,054	1,054	1,398	1,398
Fixed launchers of ICBMs	1,054	1,054	1,398	1,398
Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs	550	550	576	608
Launchers of SLBMs	656	656	950	950
Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs	496	496	128	144
Heavy bombers	574	573	156	156
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km	0	3	0	0
Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs	0	0	0	0
ASBMs	0	0	0	0
ASBMs equipped with MIRVs	0	0	0	0

ers, and a reduction of 46 on the part of the United States, almost certainly heavy bombers which are at present mothballed.

10. The table at Appendix II shows the numbers of strategic offensive weapons held by the United States and the Soviet Union in mid-1979, and the total of independently-targetable warheads according to information in the IISS Military Balance 1979-80, and taking account of the data base given by the two parties in the SALT II texts for numbers of MIRVed missiles. As the Committee previously reported[1] there are many measures of strategic capability — numbers of launchers, numbers of independent warheads, total megatonnage, "equivalent megatonnage" (megatonnage scaled down to calculate the damage likely to be inflicted on area targets). To assess the ability of nuclear forces to destroy protected ICBMs, however, the accuracy (CEP) is the most important single factor, and reliable information on this parameter has not been published.

11. The Committee is satisfied however that in numbers of warheads the United States has at the present time a significant lead of some 9,200 to 5,100 for the Soviet Union — a number which is expected to rise only to 7,500 in the early 1980s. The high average yield of Soviet warheads however, coupled with reports that accuracy of modern missiles may be "approaching" that of United States missiles, has led critics of SALT II to claim that United States ICBMs were vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike, so that the Soviet Union could destroy without warning all United States ICBMs and then hold the West to ransom by threatening destruction of American cities with its remaining forces.

12. This argument entirely overlooks the realities facing military planners. The CEP is the radius of the circle within which only 50 % of missiles can be expected to fall, so that even if it coincides with the radius within which a protected missile silo is vulnerable, an adversary targeting one warhead on each missile silo could expect to destroy only half of them even if all his missiles were entirely reliable. With two missiles per silo the proportion destroyed would only be three-quarters and four missiles per silo would be required to ensure over 90 % destruction. Thus such a hypothetical counter-force strike by the Soviet Union would involve some 4,000 thermonuclear warheads fired against targets in eight different states with a population of thirty million. The "collateral" damage — i.e. the number of civilians killed — would be unlikely to be less than several million. No Soviet military planner could possibly rely on the United States, with over 5,000 nuclear warheads in its strategic submarines remaining intact, to refrain from retaliating against both military and civilian targets in the Soviet Union.

1. e.g. Document 787, paragraph 22.

13. The Committee concludes that although present Soviet construction plans and the provisions of SALT II would permit the numbers of Soviet warheads to approach those of the United States in the early to mid-1980s, and although the Soviet warheads have a higher average yield, this does not necessarily mean that the United States will be "vulnerable" at this time, as certain strategists removed from the realities of military planning have claimed. Rather the Soviet Union, with far fewer numbers of invulnerable submarine-based missiles and surrounded by four potentially hostile nuclear powers must see itself in the vulnerable position. The difference in phase of the construction programmes of the two powers may well lead to a renewed surge of United States superiority at the end of the next decade if agreement on parity of nuclear force at much reduced levels cannot be reached in future SALT negotiations.

14. A related question of vital concern to Europe is whether the NATO strategy of relying on the threat of escalation to deter lower levels of attack remains credible in a period of strategic parity formally recognised by the SALT treaties. Wide press coverage has been given to a statement by the former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, at a symposium on NATO held in Brussels on 1st September. He is quoted as saying that "in the 1980s we will be in a position where (*i*) many of our own strategic forces, including all our land-based ICBMs, will be vulnerable and (*ii*) such an insignificant percentage of Soviet strategic forces will be vulnerable as not to represent a meaningful strategic attack option for the United States".

15. Against this view is to be set the statement on SALT issued by the North Atlantic Council on 29th June :

> "After detailed review, against the background of regular exchanges of views which have taken place within the Alliance throughout the negotiations, the allies have concluded that the new treaty is in harmony with the determination of the Alliance to pursue meaningful arms control measures in search for a more stable relationship between East and West. The allies therefore hope that the treaty will soon enter into force.
>
> This treaty responds to the hope of the allies for a reduction in nuclear arsenals and thus offers a broader prospect for détente. The allies note that the treaty fully maintains the United States strategic deterrent, an essential element for the security of Europe and of North America. They have been given explicit assurances by the United States, which they welcome, that nuclear and conventional co-operation among the allies can and will continue."

16. In the view of the Committee a search for a true counter-force capability — i.e. the capability to destroy with a high degree of assurance in a surprise strike all nuclear missiles held by the other side — could only be destabilising and against the interests of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. The Committee believes that numbers of warheads currently deployed by the United States and those authorised under SALT II provide options for the United States to strike selectively at military objectives in the Soviet Union while retaining in reserve more than 5,000 totally invulnerable warheads in its strategic submarines. President Carter's decision announced on 7th September to prepare for the deployment (after expiry of the protocol to SALT II) of 200 MX missiles in the United States can provide, under SALT II limits, up to 2,000 independently-targetable warheads. With the inherently greater accuracy of land-based missiles, coupled with an invulnerable mode for basing them, these missiles will significantly enhance the capability of the United States strike at military targets in the Soviet Union.

(ii) Implications for levels of British and French nuclear forces

17. Prior to the signature of SALT I in 1972, the Soviet Union asserted, in a unilateral statement, that the United States and its allies were believed to have a total of fifty ballistic missile submarines, with eight hundred launchers, and that if, in the period during which the agreement remained in force, the United States' NATO allies increased the number of submarines in operation or under construction at the date of the signing of the agreement, the Soviet Union would be entitled to increase the number of its submarines accordingly. The United States did not recognise that unilateral statement as forming part of the SALT I agreements.

18. However, the final agreement did allow the Soviets a marginal advantage in the number of launchers, which coincided with the strengths of the British and French forces. This has been construed as an implicit recognition that the British and French forces were factors in the balance.

19. The statements of data appended to SALT II relate solely to United States and USSR systems and this time there is no marginal advantage in numbers conceded to the Soviet side. In this respect SALT II would appear to be more favourable to European interests in that British and French forces are explicitly excluded from the ceilings set by the treaty. Moreover the detailed texts of the agreed statements and common understandings appended to the SALT II treaty leave no room for a unilateral interpretation of this issue such as the Soviet Union attempted after SALT I.

(iii) Non-circumvention and mutual assistance

20. The Committee dealt at length in the previous report on SALT [1] — and will report further in a forthcoming report — on the nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom and the contribution they make to the allied deterrent as a whole. Recent developments concerning these forces will be reported only briefly here.

21. In the report on the military programme 1977-82 submitted to parliament by the French Government on 10th September 1979, the importance of the French nuclear force and its modernisation is clear : "Priority will be given to the new strategic weapons system M-4 scheduled to enter service at the beginning of 1985 on the sixth nuclear missile submarine Inflexible... The S-2 firing units on the Plateau d'Albion will be replaced by S-3 missiles with thermonuclear warheads... at the same time studies will be carried out on the future of the Plateau d'Albion and on a new strategic component for the post-1990 period which could use mobile surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles."

22. As far as the British strategic force is concerned, it appears likely that the present British Government will develop a replacement for the four Polaris-equipped nuclear submarines.

23. Production of the present British force has relied heavily on co-operation with the United States including the mutual exchange of information and fissile material. It is likely that a future modernisation programme will continue to do so. Two provisions of the 1958 United Kingdom-United States agreement on the mutual exchange of information and materials for military purposes — those governing the provision of nuclear fuel for propulsion plants, and the exchange of fissile and other nuclear material for construction of nuclear warheads — will expire on 31st December 1979 unless renewed for a further five-year period as they always have been in the past. The French nuclear force has not relied on continued co-operation with the United States ; nevertheless the option of mutual assistance between allied nuclear weapons powers is not one that the Committee would wish to see foreclosed. Assistance between a nuclear weapon power and a non-nuclear weapon power in the production of nuclear weapons is not however an issue as it is precluded by the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

24. Concern has been expressed in some European quarters that the "non-circumvention" Article XII of the SALT II treaty would impede the mutual assistance that the Committee holds to be necessary : "In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this treaty, each party undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this treaty, through any other state or states, or in any other manner."

25. It is understood that the drafting of this article was the subject of the very closest consultations between the United States and its allies principally concerned, and that the Soviet Union was unsuccessful in securing the insertion of restrictive language in this article. The official interpretation of the United States Administration was given to the North Atlantic Council on 29th June 1979 and was released to the United States Congress in the testimony of the Secretary of State, Mr. Vance, on 10th July 1979 :

> "In the view of the United States, the non-circumvention provision in the SALT agreement simply makes explicit the inherent obligation any state assumes when party to an international agreement not to circumvent the provisions of that agreement. It is a basic tenet of international law that agreements once entered into are to be carried out and not circumvented, and the United States would be so obligated with or without a non-circumvention provision. It is the position of the United States that the non-circumvention provision does not impose any additional obligation whatever on it beyond the specific obligations of the provisions of the treaty and, for the period of its effectiveness, the protocol, nor does it broaden the interpretation of those obligations.
>
> The United States has consulted intensively with the Alliance throughout the SALT II negotiations, recognising the important Alliance interest in the SALT II agreement which deals with the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. In view of the possible implications of the non-circumvention clause for Alliance co-operation, the United States reiterates what it has specifically stated in Alliance consultations during the negotiations, that is, the non-circumvention provision will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and co-operation with its allies, nor will it preclude co-operation in modernisation. The United States believes that, in practice, the non-circumvention provision, which it will apply as stated below, will not interfere with continued nuclear and conventional co-operation with its allies.
>
> As to the issue of transfers, the United States has consistently rejected the inclusion of a provision on non-transfer in the SALT agreement. We have made clear in the negotiating record that transfers of weapons or technology to our allies will continue and cannot, *ipso facto*, constitute circumvention. The United States will deal with future requests for transfers of weapons systems

1. Document 787.

and technology on a case-by-case basis under the SALT II agreement, as it has done in the past. The transfer of weapons systems or technology for systems which were not numerically limited or prohibited by the agreement would be unaffected by the agreement. With respect to systems numerically limited in the agreement, as under the interim agreement, transfers would not be necessarily precluded by the agreement. Of course, requests for such transfers would, in many cases, involve policy issues, and would have to be dealt with in light of the circumstances of the situation and the particular request. This would also be the case if there were no agreement.

The United States will not be able to transfer to its allies or other states those weapons systems or technology uniquely related to such systems, which are prohibited to the United States itself by the agreement. The United States fully accepts its responsibility not to circumvent the agreement. For the United States to supply to other states systems of a type that is prohibited to the United States itself by a provision of the agreement would be a circumvention of the agreement, even if there were no non-circumvention provision.

In accordance with recognised international practice, no third party can be bound or legally affected by the obligations the United States assumes under the SALT II agreement. The United States would reject and would view as inconsistent with the political and strategic purposes of the agreement any attempt by the Soviet Union to raise, on the basis of the non-circumvention provision, questions concerning the activities of states not party to the agreement. In both a legal and practical sense, only the United States is subject to challenge in connection with questions raised by the Soviet Union with respect to the SALT agreement."

26. It is clear that the United States is committed to maintaining existing agreements in the field of mutual nuclear co-operation for military purposes, will deny only technology for weapons which are forbidden to the United States itself under the terms of SALT II, and will consider other requests for modernisation of existing weapons systems on a case-by-case basis when requests are received. The Committee is satisfied that the SALT II text is not an obstacle to the continuance of co-operation between the United States and other nuclear weapons powers in the Alliance.

(iv) Restrictions on cruise missile technology

27. The protocol to the treaty prohibits the deployment before 1982 of mobile ICBM launchers or cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 km on sea-based or land-based launchers. It has frequently been argued that this protocol is hostile to European interests as the cruise missile is an attractive option for modernisation of European nuclear forces.

28. The United States has denied that this protocol will set a precedent for permanent restraint on such technology in the course of SALT III, and its own confidence that the protocol will not be extended is illustrated by the recent announcement that the United States will proceed with the development of the MX mobile ICBM launcher with a view to deployment after the protocol has expired.

29. The option of SLCMs or GLCMs will clearly be a matter for further negotiations in SALT III before the protocol expires, and the Committee in a future report [1] will consider what importance it attaches to these options.

(v) Implications for Soviet medium-range systems

30. Appended to the treaty are two statements on the Backfire bomber. In the first of these President Brezhnev assures the United States side that the Soviet Union "will not increase the radius of this plane in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the United States", and in the second President Carter confirms that the United States enters into the agreement on the basis of that assurance.

31. The agreed statements and common understandings include an assurance by the Soviet Union that it will not produce or deploy the SS-16. The assurance was given as the SS-16, which is an ICBM capable of hitting America, shares the same launcher as the SS-20, which is a MRBM targeted against Western Europe, and its deployment would have posed major problems of verification.

32. In both these examples SALT restricts Soviet deployment of strategic systems which threaten the United States, whilst placing no restraint on parallel systems which threaten Europe. The Committee will deal in detail with the question of the threat from the SS-20 and the Backfire in another report [2] but notes here that these two intermediate weapons systems are not uncountered threats : (*i*) the Backfire bomber has shorter range and less than half the payload of the United States FB-111 A bombers based in the United Kingdom, and (*ii*) the SS-20 represents not a new threat, but an increase in the threat posed by the seven hundred Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missiles since 1959 ; that a

1. On SALT III and the future of the British and French nuclear forces, Rapporteur Mr. Mommersteeg.

2. New weapons and defence strategy, Rapporteur Mr. van den Bergh.

substantial proportion of them have been reported as deployed against China ; and that the present total of the strategic nuclear warheads of the three allied nuclear powers considerably exceeds the total of the Soviet strategic and intermediate-range weapons.

(vi) Guidelines for SALT III

33. The treaty is accompanied by a joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for SALT III on which the Committee will report to the first part of the twenty-sixth ordinary session (June 1980) [1]. The Committee therefore does not examine in detail the implications of SALT III in a report dealing essentially with SALT II, but notes the following points.

34. The guidelines contained in the joint statement are very broad and express the intention of both parties to pursue negotiations for a further reduction in the numbers of strategic arms and for their further qualitative limitation. All paragraphs in the joint statement relate to strategic systems, including even the final provision that : "Each party will be free to raise any issue relative to the further limitation of strategic arms."

35. The main provisions are :

> "*First.* In furtherance of existing agreements between the parties on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, the parties will continue, for the purposes of reducing and averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, to seek measures to strengthen strategic stability by, among other things, limitations on strategic offensive arms most destabilising to the strategic balance and by measures to reduce and to avert the risk of surprise attack.
>
> .....
>
> *Third.* The parties shall pursue in the course of these negotiations, *taking into consideration factors that determine the strategic situation* [2], the following objectives :
>
> (1) significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms;
>
> (2) qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing, and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernisation of existing strategic offensive arms ;
>
> (3) resolution of the issues included in the protocol to the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of strategic offensive arms in the context of the negotiations relating to the implementation of the principles and objectives set out herein.
>
> *Fourth.* The parties will consider other steps to ensure and enhance strategic stability, to ensure the equality and equal security of the parties, and to implement the above principles and objectives. *Each party will be free to raise any issue relative to the further limitation of strategic arms* [1]. The parties will also consider further joint measures, as appropriate, to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war."

36. It is understood that certain European allies of the United States were anxious to exclude any advance commitment on the inclusion of grey area weapons such as MRBMs, but that the inclusion at their insistance of the words "taking into consideration factors that determine the strategic situation" is intended to permit discussion *inter alia* of SS-20, and that the Soviet Union will in any case feel free to raise what is termed "forward-based systems" in view of the words italicised under heading "Fourth" above. Europeans may take the view that "Eurostrategic" weapons cannot be included in the dialogue without some changes in the structure of the talks, at the very least to formalise consultation between America and its European allies. It may also be difficult to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on theatre nuclear weapons without some reference to the British and French nuclear forces. These are options that will be critically examined in the SALT III context ; the Committee is satisfied that in SALT II they remain open.

IV. *Conclusion and ratification of the treaty*

37. The treaty is now before the United States Senate for ratification, a process which is expected to last though the autumn with a final vote at the end of November or beginning of December. To obtain ratification the treaty requires the votes of two-thirds of the Senate, but can be amended by a simple majority.

38. Having reviewed the SALT II treaty and protocol in the light of the interpretative texts (ASCUs) and statements by the United States Administration to the Senate committees, and of the statement issued by the North Atlantic Council on 29th June 1979 [2], it is the opinion of

1. SALT III and the future of the British and French nuclear forces, Rapporteur Mr. Mommersteeg.
2. Italics added.

1. Italics added.
2. Paragraph 15 above.

the Committee that the treaty and the protocol will enhance, and not diminish, European and Atlantic security.

39. The treaty makes disappointing progress towards disarmament, but the SALT process has made a worthwhile contribution to superpower understanding and the terms of SALT II should be broadly acceptable to Europeans. However, even if SALT II is regarded with reservations because of the high ceilings it sets, failure to ratify would damage détente to a degree which is more dangerous than any provision within the treaty.

40. The Committee does not discuss the current ratification debate in the United States Senate, which appears to involve many matters internal to that country, but in view of the importance of ratification for the whole of the Alliance it proposes that a resolution be addressed to the United States Senate to inform its members of the views of the Assembly which has unique competence under the Brussels Treaty to discuss defence. The Committee requests the Presidential Committee to use its powers under Rule 14(2) to adopt the draft resolution as a matter of urgency.

V. *Opinion of the minority*

41. The report as a whole was adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions. The minority stressed that its vote against was not to be interpreted as condemnation of the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union to control strategic nuclear armaments, but was cast because the minority felt the Committee was committing an act of faith in approving the SALT II texts in too much haste.

APPENDIX I

RECOMMENDATION 324 [1]

on the limitation of strategic arms [2]

The Assembly,

Believing that the security of Europe must continue to rely both on a credible nuclear deterrent, i.e. a clearly-demonstrated threat of destruction to the adversary far greater than the stake represented by the territories defended, and on sufficiently numerous conventional forces;

Considering that the United States strategic nuclear forces form the preponderant part of the allied deterrent but that the British and French nuclear forces, through the uncertainties with which they face Soviet planners, make a greater contribution than their size would suggest;

Stressing that the Atlantic declaration made in Ottawa on 19th June 1974 assigns to the British and French strategic nuclear forces a deterrent rôle of their own;

Deploring the inadequacy of progress in détente and concerned by the deterioration of East-West relations;

Welcoming any attempt to curb or stop the quantitative or qualitative strategic arms race;

Convinced of the essential and urgent nature of genuine European concertation on defence matters, for which the WEU Council is the natural framework,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Work together to reach agreement on a common defence policy based on deterrence and taking account of the results of the strategic arms limitation talks;

2. Accept no restrictions, imposed or implied, on the forces of allied countries not directly participating in the talks;

3. Maintain the right of nuclear powers members of the Alliance to provide mutual assistance in respect of nuclear weapons;

4. Look to a co-ordinated effort to re-establish the true balance of nuclear and conventional forces between the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact;

5. Monitor the pursuit, deepening and extension of the process of détente;

6. Ensure that the North Atlantic Council effectively examines every aspect of the strategic arms limitation talks and that the WEU member states may through this channel assert their interests in this field.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (10th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 787).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 324

1. The member governments have recently reaffirmed their resolve to seek further improvement in East/West relations and their continued commitment to a policy of détente as the best means of promoting stable and mutually beneficial relationships between governments and better and more frequent contacts between individuals. Concrete, balanced and verifiable arms control and disarmament measures would in their view contribute significantly to this search for security, stability and peace.

2. In this context a SALT II agreement which contributes to strategic stability, maintains deterrence and responds to the security interests and concerns of the North Atlantic Alliance is considered to be in the common interest. Member governments have recently welcomed the progress made in the negotiations, and have expressed support for American efforts to bring them to a successful conclusion.

3. SALT bears directly on the interest of member governments because of the rôle of American strategic forces in the "NATO Triad" of conventional forces, theatre nuclear forces and strategic nuclear forces, which provide a spectrum of military capabilities enabling NATO to meet aggression at any level with an appropriate response, while also making it impossible for an aggressor to calculate in advance the nature of the response his attack will provoke, or how the conflict may develop thereafter.

4. Conscious of this direct interest, the Americans have kept the North Atlantic Council informed of the progress of the negotiations and, in particular, there have been regular discussions on issues of special interest to member governments of WEU.

5. Notwithstanding repeated eastern assurances that their aim is not to seek military superiority, member governments have continued to note with concern the steady build-up of Warsaw Pact forces and armaments, both conventional and nuclear. In the face of these developments, it remains the view of member governments that there is a need to devote the resources necessary to modernise and strengthen allied capabilities to the extent required for deterrence and defence.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st March 1979.

APPENDIX II

Comparative table of United States and Soviet strategic offensive arms to be limited by SALT I

Levels at mid-1979

	United States				Soviet Union			
	Type	No. of missiles or aircraft	No. of MIRVs each missile	Assumed No. of warheads	Type	No. of missiles or aircraft	Maximum No. of MIRVs each missile	Assumed No. of warheads
ICBMs	Titan II	54	1	54	SS-9	100	1	100
	Minuteman II	450	1	450	SS-11	638	1	638
	Minuteman III	550	3	1,650	SS-13	60	1	60
					SS-17	100	4	270
					SS-18	200	8	1,080
					SS-19	300	6	1,210
	Sub-total	1,054		2,154		1,398		3,358
SLBMs	Polaris A-3	160	1	160	SS-N6	528	1	528
	Poseidon	496	10-14	5,120	SS-N8	266	1	266
					SS-N17	12	1	12
					SS-N18	144	3	432
	Sub-total	656		5,280		950		1,238
Heavy bombers	B-52	365		1,760	Bear	113		
					Bison	43		
					Sub-total	156		500
	TOTALS	2,058		9,200		2,504		5,100

Source : Compiled from data in SALT II texts ; IISS Military Balance 1979-80 ; Report by United States Representative Les Aspin, 5th July 1979.

SALT II and its implications for European security

AMENDMENT 1 [1]

tabled by Lord McNair

1. In the draft resolution proper, leave out "CALLS UPON THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES TO" and insert "EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES WILL".

Signed: McNair

1. See 13th Sitting, 5th December 1979 (Amendment agreed to).

SALT II and its implications for European security

ADDENDUM [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. Cook, Rapporteur

Introduction

1. The Committee adopted its report on SALT II and its implications for European security on 25th September 1979. The document incorporates a draft resolution calling upon the Senate of the United States to approve the ratification without amendment of the SALT II treaty, and in the explanatory memorandum the Committee requested the Presidential Committee to use its powers under Rule 14 (2) to adopt the draft resolution as a matter of urgency [2].

2. At a meeting on 15th October the Presidential Committee decided not to act thus on behalf of the Assembly, and instead placed the item on the agenda of the Assembly for discussion at the second part of the twenty-fifth session. At the request of the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments the report was referred back to that Committee to enable it to up-date the report in the intervening period.

3. In this addendum to the explanatory memorandum the Committee provides additional information, which moreover confirms it in the views expressed in Document 816. As the ratification debate on the floor of the United States. Senate has been delayed until now — it may begin at any time — the Assembly will, as it happens, debate the Committee's report at the most opportune time.

European approval

4. The full approval of the North Atlantic Council for the SALT II texts quoted in paragraph 15 of the Committee's report of course commits the seven governments of the WEU countries, but since that report was adopted statements by President Giscard d'Estaing of France and Chancellor Schmidt of Germany, following their meeting in Bonn on 2nd October 1979, have been particularly noted. President Giscard d'Estaing is quoted as saying in the presence of the Chancellor : "We both judge the ratification and implementation of SALT II as desirable, whatever other problems there may be on the international scene", while Chancellor Schmidt said : "We both stressed how interested we are in the rôle of SALT II for our own security".

North Atlantic Assembly

5. On 10th and 12th September four European members of the North Atlantic Assembly testified before a sub-committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in favour of the ratification of the SALT II treaty. At the Twenty-Fifth Session of that Assembly in Ottawa from 22nd to 27th October 1979, it adopted Resolution 91 on the SALT II treaty [1], which reads, in part, "the Assembly, ... convinced therefore that in providing the framework for a secure and stable strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, the treaty reduces the possibility of nuclear war, contributes to international stability and thereby promotes the security interests of the member nations of the North Atlantic Alliance, ... urges the United States Government [2] to proceed to early ratification of the SALT II treaty, with due respect to all requirements for credible deterrence, stable nuclear balance, and future arms control negotiations...". The resolution was adopted by 71 votes to 0 with 38 abstentions. The abstentions included the United States and French representatives ; eight CDU members of the German delegation ; five Turkish representatives and one Greek.

Report of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee

6. On 9th November 1979 the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, by 9 votes to 6, recommended to the Senate that it

1. Adopted in Committee by 20 votes to 2 with 3 abstentions.

2. Document 816, paragraph 40.

1. Text at Appendix I.

2. Used in the American sense of legislative and executive branch of government.

advise and consent to the ratification of the SALT II treaty. In a lengthy report the Committee concluded *inter alia* that the treaty would :

> "contribute to — not damage — United States national security interests...
>
> With the understandings the committee has recommended relating to the protocol and defence co-operation with NATO, the treaty protects the security interests of America's allies. The committee believes our allies endorse the treaty and desire its prompt ratification because they have concluded that it is in their interests...
>
> The committee's overall judgment is that the treaty is an acceptable balance of compromises by both sides, and that the agreement gives no undue or uncompensated advantage to either party...
>
> The treaty contains useful limitations on the strategic arms of both sides. However, from the arms control point of view, the value of the treaty's limits and constraints is principally in their precedential significance for negotiation of deeper reductions and more stringent controls in SALT III. The committee recommends that the Senate delineate its own goals for more significant reductions and qualitative constraints in SALT III..."

7. The Senate Committee passed some twenty reservations, declarations and understandings relating to approval of the treaty, of which five should be noted. Only two of these would require acknowledgement by the Soviet Union : that the Soviet statement on the Backfire bomber [1] handed by President Brezhnev to President Carter in Vienna on 16th June 1979 be considered part of the treaty and that the "agreed statements and common understandings" (ASCUs) appended to the treaty also be considered part of it. These provisos will not impede the entry into force of the treaty — the ASCUs in particular were signed by both Presidents at the Vienna meeting and are appended to the treaty texts, while the Backfire statement was handed over prior to signature and is also circulated with the treaty texts.

8. The Senate committee proposes that the President of the United States should "affirm that the United States will assure that the Soviet military forces in Cuba are not engaged in a combat rôle nor will they pose a threat to any country in this hemisphere". The Senate committee also recommends that the Senate make a declaration "to ensure that essential equivalence with the Soviet Union is maintained".

9. The last important "understanding", adopted unanimously by the Senate committee on 22nd October, declares that nothing in the SALT II treaty "prevents the United States from continuing existing patterns of collaboration and co-operation with its allies on nuclear and conventional weapons required for the common defence including co-operation on modernisation". The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments particularly welcomes this understanding of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which endorses the position of the United States Administration set forth in the Committee's report [1].

10. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments recalls however that, as stated in its report, two provisions of the 1958 United Kingdom-United States agreement on the mutual exchange of information and materials for military purposes — those governing the provision of nuclear fuel for propulsion plants, and the exchange of fissile and other nuclear material for construction of nuclear warheads — will expire on 31st December 1979 unless renewed, as they always have been for five-year periods in the past.

11. Four Republican senators have signed a minority report to the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, saying that : "While we acknowledge that the treaty contains some positive aspects, it is our judgment, nonetheless, that the SALT II treaty... is detrimental to the security of the United States...".

Conclusions

12. Nothing in the recent events described in this addendum to the explanatory memorandum of the Committee's report leads the Committee to modify the views it expresses in the draft resolution contained in its report ; rather the events confirm the soundness of the Committee's appreciation. The Committee especially welcomes the assertion by the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, referred to in paragraph 9 above, that nothing in the SALT II treaty would prevent co-operation between the United States and its allies on nuclear weapons for the common defence.

1. Paragraph 6 of the explanatory memorandum to Document 816.

1. Document 816, paragraph 25.

APPENDIX

North Atlantic Assembly Resolution 91 on the SALT II treaty

adopted in Ottawa on 27th October 1979 by 71 votes to 0 with 38 abstentions

The Assembly,

Noting that the SALT II treaty is a culmination of seven years of rigorous and complex negotiation by three United States administrations, and represents adherence to the obligation of the two superpowers under the non-proliferation treaty ;

Recognising that the treaty places numerical restraints on Soviet strategic capabilities, in terms of both launchers and warheads, and enhances western capabilities to predict and monitor the development and deployment of Soviet strategic forces ;

Recognising further that the treaty permits the United States to pursue all measures necessary to sustain the strength and credibility of the United States strategic deterrent ;

Assured that neither the treaty nor the protocol will inhibit necessary military and technological co-operation within the Alliance ;

Convinced therefore that in providing the framework for a secure and stable strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, the treaty reduces the possibility of nuclear war, contributes to international stability, and thereby promotes the security interests of the member nations of the North Atlantic Alliance ;

Recognising the SALT II treaty as an essential step towards the goal achieving more substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides during a future SALT III negotiation ;

Convinced that a SALT III negotiation provides the most promising forum for nuclear reductions in the European theatre and that progress in such a negotiation would facilitate collateral progress in related negotiations within the MBFR and CSCE framework ;

Reminded that the twin precepts of the Alliance are defence and détente ;

Recognising that the unanimous endorsement of the SALT II treaty by the leaders of all member states of the Alliance reflects broad-based public support of the SALT process as a central element in the effort to stabilise the East-West military balance and simultaneously to improve East-West relations ;

Concerned, with regard to defence, that failure to ratify the SALT II treaty would have a seriously disruptive impact on the cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance ;

Concerned, with regard to détente, that failure to ratify SALT II would result in a deterioration in East-West relations, potentially negating many of such positive aspects of détente as expanded trade, cultural contacts, and reunification of families ;

Respecting as an assembly of parliamentarians the sovereign right and the responsibilities of the United States Senate to decide on the ratification of SALT II ;

URGES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT :

1. To proceed to early ratification of the SALT II treaty, with due respect to all requirements for credible deterrence, stable nuclear balance and future arms control negotiations ;

2. To undertake SALT III negotiations aimed at accomplishing significant reductions in each side's nuclear forces ;

3. To consult fully and regularly with the allies on all aspects of the negotiations, in particular on those pertaining to theatre nuclear forces.

Document 817 **27th September 1979**

Brazilian-European collaborative ventures and the consequences for Europe

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions [2]
by MM. Lewis, Adriaensens, Scheffler and Cornelissen, Rapporteurs

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. *Warren* (Chairman) ; MM. *Valleix, Lenzer* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Adriaensens (Alternate : *Brasseur*), Bagier (Alternate : *Lord Hughes*), Bernini, *Cavaliere,* Cornelissen (Alternate : *Portheine*), Hawkins (Alternate : *Miller*), Konings, *Lewis,* Malvy, Mart, *Müller,* Péronnet, Pinto, *Schwencke,* Talon, *Treu, Ueberhorst,* van Waterschoot.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on Brazilian-European collaborative ventures and the consequences for Europe

The Assembly,

Considering the wishes expressed by the Brazilian Senate and Government officials to strengthen scientific and technological co-operation between Brazil and the countries of Western Europe;

Convinced that greater international co-operation in advanced technology can but be beneficial for both Brazil and the countries of Western Europe and will help to advance their political and economic positions;

Aware that in recent years Brazil has advanced more quickly than some Western European countries in finding alternative energy resources;

Impressed by the progress of technical development plans in Brazil concerning meteorology and communications;

Conscious of the mutual advantages of collaboration between Brazil and Western Europe in:

(*a*) nuclear research and development;

(*b*) alternative energy resources;

(*c*) space research and development;

(*d*) aircraft development,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments:

1. To improve European co-ordination in respect of existing nuclear research and development programmes in Brazil, with special emphasis on security and safety problems;

2. To co-operate with the Brazilian Government on alternative energy resources;

3. To instruct the European Space Agency to develop closer relations with Brazil with a view to concluding a co-operation agreement with particular regard to the joint use of launch and tracking facilities and the development of remote sensing and direct television satellites;

4. To encourage industrial collaboration with Brazil in developing its next generation of civil and military aircraft;

5. To increase exchanges of experts with Brazil in the field of research and the application of technology.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by MM. Lewis, Adriaensens, Scheffler and Cornelissen, Rapporteurs)

Introduction

1. The Committee wishes to preface this report with its thanks to the Presidential Committee, for agreeing to this valuable visit, to the staff of the Brazilian Embassy in Paris, and especially Mr. de Carvalho Lopes, who helped the Chairman draw up a useful programme. The Ministry for External Relations, the Ministries of Mines and Energy and of Industry and Commerce as well as the governmental and private institutes and firms in Brazil greatly contributed to the success of the visit and the Committee expresses its sincere appreciation for their valuable assistance.

2. The Committee particularly wishes to mention the work done by the Director General of ESA and the Directors of the Ariane programme, external relations and the base in Kourou who prepared and conducted an excellent programme for its visit to French Guiana. It was not easy to harmonise the Brazilian and ESA programmes but the visit went very smoothly.

3. In preparing for its visit the Committee submitted a number of questions for use as guidelines for the discussions in Brazil [1] and was briefed by ESA authorities [2].

4. To all who contributed to the preparation and conduct of the visit [3] the Committee expresses its sincere gratitude.

5. The Committee, on 5th July, had the honour of being received by the President of the Senate, Mr. Luis Viana Filho, in the Palace of Congress, where it met the Bureau of the Senate, the leader of the majority in the Senate, Senator Garbas Passarinho, Professor José Walter Bantista Vidal, and several other senators.

6. The President of the Senate gave a general indication of how parliamentary supervision by committees worked in the Senate and in the Chamber of Deputies. He gave the floor to Senator Garbas Passarinho who said that the activities of the government in promoting research and development were discussed in the appropriate committees as well as on the floor of both Houses of Congress. The government's nuclear programme of course was of special interest. However, the parliament did not have the right to increase or reduce the budget proposed by the government. It therefore had no active rôle in this field but might voice its opinion. Parliament had a more active rôle in the legislative process; laws were proposed by the executive and discussed, but most of the time they were voted in their entirety and amendments might not be made unless approved by the government.

7. The frontiers between a full democracy and a guided democracy were not always very clear cut. The present constitution allowed only two political parties, but the government party controlled both Houses of Congress.

8. However, in several towns and states the opposition party formed the local or regional administration.

9. As there had been an oil crisis since last year the government was to submit to parliament its proposals for handling the new situation more efficiently. The country would continue with its development projects started ten years ago, but certain elements would have to be changed. For instance, parliament would discuss anew the nuclear power stations programme which, when proposed, was estimated at $12 billion but which might now cost some $25 billion. According to the original plans 40 % of Brazilian exports were needed to pay the petrol bill, but with the oil crisis this percentage would certainly be much higher.

10. The President of the Senate wound up the discussion by thanking the Committee for its visit to Brazil and expressed the hope that the contacts established would be fruitful for members' work in Europe.

11. Mr. Valleix, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, gave a presentation to the hosts on the work of Western European Union, its Assembly and Committees.

I. *Brazil, its economy and technology*

(submitted by Mr. Lewis, Rapporteur)

12. Brazil is vast. It covers some 8,510,000 sq.km. with a population of 115 million. The whole of Europe, as far as the Urals, covers 10,240,000 sq.km. and the total population is 628 million persons.

13. On 4th July 1979, during the Committee's visit to Brazil, the President, Joao Figueiredo, addressed the nation indicating that the Brazilian economy should be put on a wartime basis because of the nation's energy situation. During the entire visit the energy situation was very much to the fore as it is threatening the nation's economic and social development. The President considers the energy crisis and increased petrol

1. See Appendix II.
2. See Appendix III.
3. See Appendix I : Programme of the visit.

prices to be major dangers which could result in greater inflation, payments deficits and slower growth. The President said Brazil, like the western nations, should accustom itself to the imminence of living under a wartime economy. Brazil imports some 85 % of its oil and in 1979 expenditure on imported oil was estimated at some $7 billion. A national energy commission is to carry out the new petroleum policy which will include stimulating exploration for petrol reserves and the development of alternative sources of energy.

14. The development of the Brazilian economy in the period 1974-79 raised the gross national product from US$65 billion to more than $100 billion, and the per capita income to some $1,000 per year. Industrial expansion has accelerated greatly over the last ten years but requires an equally rapid growth of imports, especially of machine tools, capital goods, etc., and a boost to exports. The level of exports however remains rather low with inevitable consequences for the balance of payments.

15. Industrial growth in the period 1975-79 was of the order of 12 % a year with special emphasis on the shipbuilding and capital goods industries and petrochemicals. Government policy aims at making Brazil more independent in such fields as aircraft, ships, motor cars, components for the automobile industry, agricultural equipment, and road-making and hydroelectric equipment. Apart from modernisation of the agricultural sector, the main emphasis has been on energy policy which has led to the production of electrical energy generated basically by hydraulic means. However, Brazil remains dependent on oil for transportation and as a raw material for the chemical industry.

16. A great deal of attention has been given to the promotion of science and technology as they form the basis for rapid development of the country. The development of new technologies such as nuclear energy, research into non-conventional sources of energy, space activities and oceanography has also received major promotion by the government during the last decade.

17. The abovementioned fields of research, even if not directly related to productive sectors, were justified not only in terms of the need to follow scientific and technological developments at world level, but also because of their impact on the national development process and on the improvement of the living standards of the entire population. Many of these activities are financed by government funds, either on a yearly basis or in accordance with national three-year plans for scientific and technological development. In many cases foreign resources are also required and international organisations therefore play an important rôle in the national development programme. International assistance comes from agencies such as the United Nations development programme and the Organisation of American States. The need to cut down on imports has led to the adoption of several exceptional measures, including ceilings for government expenditure in foreign exchange. External resources account for some 5 % of financing for research and development projects.

18. In the development of new technologies, nuclear energy accounts for 12.9 % of the budget for scientific and technological development, space activities and sea resources 3.7 %, industrial technology 25.5 %, agricultural technology 13.7 %, training of personnel 26.3 %, regional and social development 7.3 %, and infrastructure 1.9 %.

19. In the discussions between the Committee and Ambassador Baena, Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, it was pointed out that inflation in Brazil is a major problem since it prevents Brazil from finding new markets for its products. Some results have been achieved, especially with ships built in Brazil and aircraft built by Embraer. Brazil has also built a small computer which for the moment is produced mainly for the internal market but which might be exported. Traditionally Brazil is on very good terms with Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa, with which it has commercial relations, and which receive development aid from Brazil.

20. Apart from the Portuguese-speaking countries around the Atlantic perimeter, Brazil also has a close relationship with Nigeria as in many respects they are developing in parallel due to their increasing mutual interests in energy and technology markets.

21. Your Rapporteur wishes to draw attention to an article by Mr. Kerry Fraser in the International Herald Tribune of 27th August 1979. Writing on the Brazilian foreign debt, he stated :

> "Now the largest in the developing world, by year's end the debt will be bucking the $50 billion mark. More important than its size is its weight, and the limit that puts on Brazil's growth.
>
> This year, interest payments will eat up $3.4 billion, and amortisation will cost another $5.9 billion. On top of that, Brazil expects to spend $6 to $7 billion importing oil.
>
> The upshot of all this is that Brazil's hard-currency needs to meet only the debt service and petroleum import costs will most likely exceed the $14-$15 billion that exports will generate in 1979.
>
> The importance of these numbers is fundamental : at the beginning of 1974, when Brazil's net debt — debt less reserves — was only $6 billion, it was able to borrow its way out of the recession that chilled the world economy in the years that fol-

lowed. Now the need to pay for that borrowing looks like one of the country's tightest growth constraints, and the need to repay is going to get greater.

Next year, Brazil will have to amortise $6.7 billion and, in 1981, $7 billion. Only in 1982 does the amortisation schedule begin to taper off to $6.2 billion, but this year's borrowing is already swelling the 1982 schedule because of Brazil's policy of demanding repayment conditions of thirty months' grace on eight-year terms or more.

The problem is that Brazil has to do more than just pay for oil and its debt in order to grow. It has to import as well. Essential raw materials and capital goods cost the country $8 billion in 1978, and though Brazil has invested massively since 1974 in import substitution, its growth is, and will remain, dependent on its ability to import. Given the numbers, that means it is dependent on its ability to borrow and to increase export earnings."

22. The vigour and determination of the Brazilian people was apparent in all the technical programmes examined during the visit. Technical competence is often stretched to the limit, but the huge education programme, with 1.5 million students at universities, is taking Brazil forward to world power status in the twenty-first century.

II. *Energy*

(submitted by Mr. Adriaensens, Rapporteur)

23. Your Rapporteur will start this chapter by underlining that it is of course impossible to discuss Brazil's energy position and policy in their entirety. He will therefore keep to those aspects which were discussed during the visit to the National Commission for Nuclear Energy, the Brazilian Nuclear Enterprises Inc. and the Ministry of Mines and Energy and agencies in Brasilia, such as the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development.

24. At the Nuclear Energy Commission the Executive Director, Dr. Rex Nazaré Aloes, pointed out that the commission had been set up to guide the establishment of infrastructure for nuclear energy. In order to do so the commission, under the basic law of its establishment and the application law, had the following tasks :

(*a*) to assist the Ministry of Mines and Energy with the formulation and planning of national nuclear energy policy ;

(*b*) to promote the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the training of scientists and experts ;

(*c*) to issue regulations with regard to nuclear facilities, materials and the processing of radioactive waste ;

(*d*) to produce papers relating to nuclear energy, set up laboratories and organise research ;

(*e*) to organise prospection for and mining of nuclear ore ;

(*f*) international relations.

25. There are good prospects of being able to mine nuclear ore economically. In 1978, 142,300 tons of uranium ore were mined and, in 1979, about 200,000 tons will be mined. The largest field is near Itatiaia in the north-east.

26. Brazil is to equip itself with pressurised water reactors, the first of which will deliver 624 MW and the others 1,300 MW. A total of eight power plants will be built ; the first should be ready in 1982 and the last in 1990.

27. On 27th June 1975 an agreement was concluded with Western Germany for the supply of these eight nuclear reactors and the construction of plants for processing irradiated fuels and for uranium enrichment.

28. A contract has also been signed with the French firm STEC for a uranium processing plant in the state of Minas Gerais which should become operational in 1979. Its initial annual production will be 500 tons and this will be used to fuel Brazil's first nuclear reactor.

29. In view of the fact that Brazil has no good coal resources and its hydroelectric potential will far from meet its requirements in the years 2000-10, the development of nuclear energy is a necessity. The hydroelectric potential is estimated at 150 gigawatts electricity whereas 350 GWe will be required. Brazil's energy requirements need to be decentralised and, although the Amazon area could probably be self-supporting in energy, it is not possible to transfer energy economically from there to the south of the country. With a population increase of approximately 3 % per year, the energy increase should be 5 % if the present-day standard of living is to be maintained. In order to improve the economic and social position, an 8 % increase is necessary. At present, production is 30,000 MWe ; this should be 60,000 MWe in 1989 and some 120,000 MWe in the year 2000. It is therefore absolutely impossible for Brazil to manage without nuclear energy ; as a complement in the megawatt range, only nuclear energy is capable of providing enough extra power in addition to the hydroelectric and thermal power stations.

30. The Brazilian standard of living will be raised although even in the year 2000 it will not be as high as the present standard in Europe.

31. The following tables are of interest in this context :

Hydroelectric potential in Brazil



Trend of installed electricity generating capacity and forecast and known hydroelectric potential



Per capita energy consumption in Brazil

Year	Primary energy consumption 1,000 tEP (*)	Electricity consumption GWh (*)	Population ('000) (**)	Per capita primary energy consumption tEP	Per capita primary electricity consumption kWh
1967	51,475	34,238	86,907	0.592	394
1968	53,415	38,181	89,299	0.598	428
1969	56,891	41,648	91,756	0.620	454
1970	61,170	45,460	94,282	0.649	482
1971	65,595	50,988	97,332	0.674	524
1972	70,116	57,035	100,051	0.701	570
1973	78,011	65,218	102,828	0.759	634
1974	84,364	72,466	105,669	0.798	686
1975	90,324	80,293	108,579	0.832	739
1976	99,080	88,383	111,624	0.888	792
1977	103,252	99,869	114,785	0.900	870
1978	109,733	110,018	117,655	0.933	935
1979	116,513	122,846	120,596	0.966	1,019
1980	123,713	137,597	123,611	1.001	1,113
1981	131,357	154,724	126,701	1.037	1,221
1982	139,474	171,913	129,869	1.074	1,324
1983	148,092	186,676	133,115	1.113	1,402
1984	157,242	202,767	136,443	1.152	1,486
1985	166,959	220,523	139,854	1.194	1,577
1986	177,275	241,377	143,351	1.237	1,684
1987	188,229	263,199	146,934	1.281	1,791

* As from 1978, takes account of an estimated annual increase of 7 % in the GIP.
** As from 1978, the annual increase in population is estimated at 2.5 %.

32. The National Nuclear Energy Commission is a financially autonomous governmental institution under the Ministry of Mines and Energy. It is directed by a board of five members appointed by the President of the Republic. The number of employees has varied greatly but now totals 528 persons of whom 174 are geologists and 60 engineers. The commission has a budget of $30 million a year.

33. Dr. Aloes is in charge of licensing, the basic objective of which is to ensure the safe and regular operation of nuclear installations. As in other countries, about ten years elapse between the preliminary studies for the site of a nuclear power plant and its licence for full power operation.

34. The nuclear programme began only recently so there is not yet a waste problem, but this of course will arise and the commission is preparing the storage of nuclear waste. The main purpose of the commission's activities is to prepare development of the necessary know-how. For this purpose Brazil has some 500 post-graduate students. They are in Brazil's eighteen universities and some are at American, German, French or British universities. The greatest number is now in Germany. Once the necessary knowledge of pressurised water reactors has been attained, the commission intends to continue with new power plants such as the fast breeder.

35. Apart from collaboration with Germany, Brazil has collaborative projects with Chile on

radiological protection, with Argentina on heavy water reactors, and with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna on safeguards, physical protection and future storage of waste materials.

36. From 1982 onwards Brazil will need enriched uranium provided by Urenco : the Netherlands, West Germany and the United Kingdom.

37. Brazilian Nuclear Enterprises Inc. implements the nuclear energy policy in the industrial sector. The Committee was received by its President, Ambassador Paulo Nogueiro Batista, who stated that as a state company Nuclebras was responsible for the prospection, extraction and enrichment of uranium and other nuclear materials.

38. The company, directly or through its subsidiaries, alone or in association with private firms, operates the industrial plants for the nuclear fuel cycle and for the production of components for nuclear power stations and reactors. Apart from these tasks, it also provides incentives for research and development of nuclear reactors and the nuclear fuel cycle. The first enrichment plant, a small plant mainly for research, will be ready in 1985 ; the operational plant will be ready in 1990.

39. The first reactor, called Angra I, was built by Westinghouse as a result of a call for international tenders. No Brazilian equipment or engineers were involved in the building of this unit. Since then the government has decided on the nuclear programme of eight power stations and, in accordance with the agreements with KWU, more and more equipment and engineering will be Brazilian, including the manufacture of boilers.

40. Angra II and III are now being built, some 34 % being of Brazilian manufacture. In the case of both nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, capital investment is very high. Nuclebras is being careful not to adopt a too rapid programme as the nuclear industry in Brazil would be unable to cope with such a situation. It is foreseen that the eight big nuclear power stations will be ready in the early 1990s. If this is so, then the increase in electric power of 10-12 % a year would enable the government to cope with a demographic growth rate of 3 %.

41. Heavy investment in energy not only causes many problems, mainly financial, but also raises staff training problems. Brazil needs its oil for transport ; it is now consuming some 10 million tons of fuel per year. There are plans to replace oil by alcohol from sugar cane or fuel extracted from coal.

42. A great deal of research and drilling for oil is taking place in Brazil but no more than 350,000 to 400,000 barrels of oil a day are produced. $1 billion is now being invested in oil exploration.

43. $4.5 billion will be spent on hydroelectric power in the basic plan for scientific and technological development. An important part of the energy budget is also allocated for research on and development of fuel from sugar cane or manioc alcohol. A barrel of fuel from alcohol costs $31 compared to $20 for a barrel of normal oil.

44. An important task of Nuclebras is uranium prospection. In 1979 uranium ore extraction will total 193,800 tons and Brazil may one day become an exporter of uranium. Prospecting for thorium is also planned.

45. It is considered that the light-water reactors will be sufficient until the year 2030 ; after that the fast-breeder reactor or fusion will need to come to the fore.

46. The immediate goal set by the government is to achieve a sufficient output of electricity for the country in the 1990s, 15 % of this being nuclear.

47. Nuclebras has a work force of some 4,000, one-third of whom are of university level. It depends on the government for funding and its President is appointed by the President of the Brazilian Republic.

48. Nuclebras is laying special emphasis on quality guarantee and control. This guarantee applies to technical norms, processes and routines. Scientists and technicians are being trained in Germany and German rules on quality guarantee and control are being followed.

49. During the Committee's meeting with members of the Brazilian Senate, it was pointed out that Brazil should be able to "grow" its oil. It has very long experience with the production of sugar cane and there are forests of babachou (coconut) and fields of manioc. Production could amount to some 4,000 million litres of oil but the technological process needs to be improved. There were also other natural tropical oils which could be used instead of petrol. 1 % of the national territory would be sufficient if this type of "fuel growing" was promoted and accepted. Nevertheless, the eight nuclear power plants remain a necessity if a sufficient level of electricity production is to be attained, especially in the southern industrial states. This programme will cost $10 billion and a parliamentary study is now under way, initiated by the opposition groups in Congress.

50. Dr. José Israel Vargas, Industrial Technology Secretary at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, stated that tests had been made with mixtures of petrol and alcohol since 1974 and a

mixture of 18 % alcohol and 82 % petrol on which to run cars had been arrived at and this is what is now used in cars. About 1,500 government vehicles are run on 100 % alcohol fuel. The Sao Paulo Volkswagen "Beetle" output for Brazilian use is alcohol powered. Engine adaptation is simple and cheap. The government hopes that in 1985 it will be possible to have some 1.7 million out of 8 million cars driven on pure alcohol, although by 1985 there might be about 10 million cars in Brazil. Cars with diesel engines present a more difficult problem but here too progress has been made and vegetable oils mixed with alcohol might be a solution. The break-even point for production is $30 a barrel. Several countries in Latin America and South-East Asia are interested in this development, but it is quite clear that sugar cane and other products involved have to be produced without imported fertiliser.

51. Ambassador Baena, Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, pointed out that historically relations between Brazil and Western Europe had been very close and in general Europeans had a better understanding of Brazilians than the Americans. However, where nuclear energy and the contacts with Urenco countries were concerned it was rather difficult to explain the Brazilian position. Brazil started its $20 million nuclear programme because it needed nuclear energy for the economic and social development of the country. The South American nuclear-free-zone treaty of 1967 [1] was not yet in force as the conditions of the two protocols attached to it, one with regard to nuclear powers and the other to outside powers, had not been signed and ratified by all ; Brazil had done so, Cuba had not. Brazil did not wish to accede to a treaty which stipulated that a nuclear-free zone applied only to countries which did not possess nuclear weapons. For that reason Brazil had not signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as it was discriminatory and moreover did not prevent proliferation. Brazil would accept universal control by the agency in Vienna.

1. A treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty) was signed in February 1967 by twenty-two Latin American countries ; twenty countries have now ratified it (Argentina has signed but not ratified, and Brazil has ratified but reserved her position on peaceful nuclear explosions). Britain and the Netherlands have ratified it for the territories within the treaty area for which they are internationally responsible. Britain and the Netherlands have signed Protocol I (which commits states outside the region to accept, for their territories within it, the treaty restrictions regarding the emplacement or storage of nuclear weapons) ; France has not ; the United States has announced its intention of doing so. The United States, Britain, France and China have signed Protocol II to the treaty (an undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the treaty) ; the Soviet Union has not. An agency has been set up by the contracting parties to ensure compliance with the treaty. (The Military Balance, 1979-80, page 75).

52. The Brazilian Government was not planning to build an atomic bomb and would not be able to do so in the next five to ten years in any case.

53. The Ambassador said that Brazil had good relations with all ten of the Latin American countries on its borders.

54. The President of the Republic's speech of 4th July has led to the establishment of a national energy commission supervised by the Vice-President and involving many important government agencies and ministries. The President called it a "wartime situation" as Brazil cannot function without oil at acceptable prices.

55. Your Rapporteur now wishes to make the following comments.

56. Brazil depends on petroleum for 43 % of its energy needs. Its oil-geared economy uses 1.13 million barrels per day, a rate that has been increasing by 10 % a year. Domestic production of crude oil is 168,000 barrels per day and about 960,000 barrels per day are imported.

57. The Brazilian Government is giving top priority to its search for a solution to the oil crisis. It has promised a series of "wartime" economy measures, the first of which freezes imports at the present 960,000 barrels per day. A high-ranking national energy commission has been created to establish and enforce a policy that would make the country less dependent on imported petroleum.

58. The commission's long-range goal is the utilisation of alternative energy sources such as the sun, wind and tides. It also intends to speed up and expand Brazil's gasohol plan, develop shale oil and coal gasification projects and push for greater use of hydro-power.

59. The Brazilian Government recognises that "oil is still the cheapest form of energy available" and consequently the best means of conserving it and finding new domestic reserves will be the commission's main concern.

60. The state oil company's $1 billion exploration and production budget will be increased and drilling by foreign oil companies will be encouraged.

61. The alcohol plan is designed to substitute not only for gasoline but eventually for a good part of the diesel and fuel oil consumed as well. For four years now Brazil has been mixing home-grown sugar cane alcohol to gasoline at rates of up to 18 %, which regular car engines can absorb without adjustment.

62. As the world's largest sugar cane producer, with plenty of arable land left, Brazil is in the enviable position of growing its own source of renewable energy. It will take some years to

solve the problems connected with alcohol and to plant enough cane — or other crops — to supply all the alcohol needed, but the government has just budgeted $5 billion for its nationwide alcohol-as-fuel plan.

63. As part of the second stage of the plan, cars, starting with government vehicles, will be powered solely by alcohol. About 2,000 prototypes are being tested and the big car manufacturers in Brazil — Volkswagen, General Motors, Ford, Chrysler and Fiat — are prepared to start assembly-line production of alcohol-fuelled cars as soon as they are assured a fuel supply. The members of the Committee used such a car during the visit.

64. For petroleum derivatives that cannot be manufactured from alcohol, mainly lubricants, specialists are experimenting with castor oil. Brazil currently produces about 61 % of the world's supply. Castor oil has proved an even better lubricant than petroleum products in a series of tests.

65. Until recently, the development of solar energy was held back by lack of funding and the relatively high cost of silicon components in South America. Expansion of Brazilian equipment production is expected to make costs competitive, possibly as early as 1985.

66. As in other nations, the rising cost of petroleum has produced renewed interest in tapping Brazil's shale oil deposits, the world's second largest after Canada.

67. Petrobras, the state oil company, is already squeezing 1,000 barrels of oil a day out of shale at an experimental station, and intends to build a refinery in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul that will extract 50,000 barrels a day by 1985.

III. *Space developments in Brazil*

(submitted by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur)

68. On 4th July the Committee was received by Dr. Nelson de Jesus Parada, General Director of the Space Research Institute in Sao José dos Campos in the state of Sao Paulo. He began by outlining the history of space developments in Brazil. Originally they came under the Ministry of the Air Force, then under the office of the President, and later the National Security Council.

69. Since 1979 all space activities are co-ordinated by the Brazilian space activities commission, the chairman of which is the joint chief of staff of the armed forces. The commission is normally known by its abbreviation Cobae and co-ordinates aspects of national security as well as the utilisation of space for civil purposes. A different institute has been established for each of these two activities : the civil one is called the Institute for Space Research and the other the Space Activities Institute.

70. The Institute for Space Research (INPE), under the guidance of the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development, has activities, tasks and programmes, as shown in the tables hereafter, which do not duplicate the work of the other institute with which it has direct collaboration in rocket development, especially with regard to propellants.

71. Brazilian space activities started in 1965 with sounding rockets and launching facilities at Natal. In 1985 a first small meteorological satellite will be launched. Meteorology has first priority because of the importance of weather forecasting for agriculture and because of the extraordinary climatological influences which the Pacific and the Atlantic have on Brazil.

72. In remote sensing special attention is being paid to forestry, agriculture and pollution. The operational cost of these application satellites is about $1 million a year, part of which can be recovered by selling satellite images to agricultural or forestry institutes in Brazil and abroad. Until 1985 the information will be obtained from the NASA Landsat satellite. Once the French earth resources satellite, Spot, becomes operational Brazil hopes to obtain information from that source and already has an agreement with France on its use.

73. The staff at INPE numbers some 1,000, of whom 400 are Bachelors of Science and 200 Ph. Ds. The budget is $30-40 million a year. With this budget it hopes to be able to acquire the necessary knowledge to build its own satellite system.

74. At the Space Activities Institute of the Aerospace Technical Centre of the Brazilian Air Force the Committee was received by Colonel Sergio Xavier Ferolla. This centre is under the Air Ministry which deals with civil as well as military aerospace activities. The Air Ministry also supervises the aircraft industry. The centre's objective is to combine aeronautical and space research and development with the training of aeronautical engineers. Its rôle is also to stimulate the development of the aeronautical industry and handle the certification of aircraft. For this purpose it is divided into five institutes. The aeronautical technology institute is a college which trains engineers for electronic, aeronautical and mechanical engineering as well as for airport infrastructure engineering. It provides training up to Ph.D. level. The second is the institute for research on and technological development of airframes, engines, aerodynamics and metallurgy, for instance. The third is the space activities institute and is especially res-


INPE
Space activities
Missions
Programmes
Space and atmospheric science
Space applications
Space systems and technology
Space science
Meteorology
Technical and graduate courses
Remote sensing
Satellites
Astrophysics
Geomagnetism
Ionosphere
High atmosphere
Plasmas
Basic meteorology
Climatology
Applied meteorology
Image production
Mineral resources
Agronomical and forestry resources
Maritime resources
Land use
Sensor technology and devices
Materials science
Digital and analogical systems
Satellite ground stations
Satellite technology
Computer science
Systems engineering
Orbital mechanics
Space geodesy
Combustion processes

Space activities in Brazil (1979)



ponsible for rocket developments. The fourth institute works on the development of aeronautical and aerospace standards. The fifth is responsible for furthering co-ordination in the Brazilian aerospace industry and the certification of aircraft.

75. The government intends to create a sixth institute which will be in charge of test ranges, guarantees of quality and the introduction of new methods in industry.

76. Half of the centre's budget is paid by the federal government and the other half by state governments, government organisations and industries.

77. A programme is being set up to convert aircraft engines to use ethanol ; it is planned to use existing engines and adapt them to this type of fuel. At present it is not possible for Brazil to produce new engines. Perhaps at some stage it would be of interest to co-operate with engine manufacturers outside Brazil.

78. In general, special emphasis is laid on adapting existing technology to circumstances peculiar to Brazil and manufacturing cheaper spare parts, or changing designs of certain types of hardware so that they are not too sophisticated and are simple and convenient to use.

IV. *Technology applied to the economic infrastructure*

(submitted by Mr. Cornelissen, Rapporteur)

79. In order to achieve a sound infrastructure the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development has undertaken a number of priority projects such as the establishment of an electricity network and scientific and technological bases for the development of transportation infrastructure, of which the Amazon highway is an example. The Brazilian railway network and maritime and river transportation also have high priority.

80. Air transport is also of great importance in this vast continent. In order to fly its own aircraft the government has established the Brazilian Aeronautical Corporation called Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A., usually known as Embraer. The Committee visited this company in Sao José dos Campos on 4th July. It was received by the President of Embraer, Mr. Ozires Silva, who began his address with a brief history of the company.

81. Embraer was created on 19th August 1969 and became operational in January 1970 to promote the development of the Brazilian aircraft industry. The government owns 51 % of the voting shares but only 14 % of the Embraer stock ; the remaining shares are held by more than 175,000 Brazilian companies. It has a work force of some 5,000 people. Since 1971 it has built some 1,800 aircraft of various types. The first type to be built was a nationally-designed agricultural aircraft, which was followed by the Bandeirante commuter aircraft. The latter was also built as a transport aircraft for the Brazilian air force.

82. In August 1974, Embraer signed a comprehensive co-operative agreement with the Piper Aircraft Corporation involving the assembly and manufacture of Piper aircraft. It now produces and markets these aircraft in Brazil while Piper Aircraft Corporation markets Embraer's aircraft Bandeirante. In early 1975 Embraer negotiated a contract with the Northrop Corporation for manufacturing components for the United States company's Tiger II combat aircraft in Brazil.

83. In the same year the Brazilian air force selected the Italian Aermacchi jet trainer and ground attack aircraft. Embraer is building this aircraft under licence from Aermacchi for both Brazilian and foreign air forces and to date some 120 have been produced.

84. At present the Brazilian economy is about one-tenth the size of that of the United States. If it were about the same, the Brazilian aviation fleet would probably be equal to that of the United States. However, the government tries to ensure that the capacity of the Brazilian aeronautical industry meets the national demand to a high degree. At the same time export sales are promoted, especially of the Bandeirante transport aircraft, which has been sold to several countries.

85. Embraer has developed a new executive aircraft, the EMB-121. This type of aircraft is already in service with the Brazilian air force for transporting high-ranking military and government personnel.

86. The greatest asset of Embraer is of course its growing home market. Plans are being formulated for a thirty-seat transport aircraft to help develop internal communications in the 1980s.

87. Within the framework of the national development plan the work of the National Institute for Research in the Amazon area is of prime importance. On 9th July, the Committee visited the institute in Manaus and had a discussion wih its Director, Professor E. Salati. The main purpose of the institute is the establishment of a co-ordinated system for acquiring the necessary information for planning public investment for infrastructure in the Amazon area.

88. The total surface of the Amazon area is some 5 million sq.km., which represents some 60 % of the total surface of Brazil. About 70 % of the Amazon area is covered by tropical forests. Depending on the type of forest, timber pro-

duction could be either 250 cu.m. per hectare or, in the case of open tropical forest, 120-150 cu.m. per hectare. With the price of timber at some $15 per cu.m., the Amazon forest has a theoretical value of $1 billion. The opening up of this forest and its permanent exploitation would therefore constitute a very important source of income for Brazil.

89. The institute has established a number of divisions, each of which covers a specific type of research : agronomy, medicine, ecology, botany, technology, phytochemistry and fishing.

90. In agronomy the purpose of the institute is to find the best combination of crops and eventually cattle raising, exploring an integrated and continuous form of cultivation, and at the same time maintaining a constant recycling of nutriants.

91. In tropical medicine a special study is made of new diseases, most of which are found only in the Amazon area and are of a parasitic nature. The institute tries to prevent the spread of parasitic diseases through the study of contamination and hygienic conditions. A main source of concern is uncontrolled leprosy.

92. The ecology department studies the interface between the exploration of the forest and neighbouring regions in order to maintain a balance and a natural recycling of the area.

93. In the botany division research is done on soil chemistry and physics. As the fertility of tropical soil is low this research is necessary to provide the relevant scientific support needed for the proper management of land and forest. A large-scale dispute is being waged as to whether the tropical forest should be replanted by a hetero- or a homogeneous forest. Several major projects are now under way to ascertain which would be best. The most satisfactory solution will probably be a mixture of the two.

94. The Amazon has 2,000 species of fish, only 32 of which have so far any commercial or nutritive value.

95. It has also more than 60,000 species of plants and 200 species of insects. Thus, it is obvious that a great deal of research has to be undertaken to prevent any disequilibrium of the forest which could result in great damage.

96. In the field of technology, studies are being made on the use of carbons available in plants and how to obtain hydroelectric power from the Amazon. The river is very deep and flows at a speed of 3-5 km. per hour.

97. In the field of fishery, the institute studies the possibilities of using fish other than the thirty-two species mentioned for commercial or nutritive purposes. It has already recommended to the government that it ban any fish exports as the local population needs the fish as protein, meat in the area being too scarce and too expensive. Much of the fishing potential of the Amazon region is concentrated in the Holm Lakes. It might be possible to install fish farms in these lakes, which would be of great advantage to the economic development of the region.

98. The institute employs some 200 researchers of whom twenty are of Ph.D. level and twenty of M.Sc. level. It works in collaboration with many similar institutes in other parts of the world, especially in California and some European countries, for instance the Ford Foundation, the Max Planck Institute, the World Wildlife Organisation, the United Nations, FAO and the Organisation of American States. The institute would need some 1,500 researchers in order to carry out all its research as it wished to. Its basic budget is some 110 million cruzeiros. Its total budget from all sources, federal, state and private, is some 200 million cruzeiros a year.

99. The National Institute for Research in the Amazon Region is a subordinate unit of the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development.

100. On 6th July 1979, the Committee met with the President of the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development, Professor Mauricio Matos Peixoto, the Director, Professor Amadeu Curi, and the Superintendent for International Co-operation, Dr. Dourimar Nunes de Moura.

101. Dr. Nunes de Moura said it was the Council's task to assist the Minister of Planning in the preparation and follow-up of basic plans for scientific and technological development as well as in the analysis of scientific and technological sectorial plans and programmes. It proposes norms and instruments for the support of scientific and technological research of interest to the social and economic development of the country. It also provides financial and technical assistance for research projects and promotes the training of personnel in the field of science and technology.

102. The Council has a special committee which deals directly with Amazon development and which is now preparing new legislation for submission to Congress at its next session. This legislation will set out rules governing the exploration and exploitation of the area.

103. A big new dam for hydroelectric purposes is to be built at Tucuruy, creating a lake of 200,000 hectares with 1.3 million cu.m. of forest.

104. In order to attain the goals set, a major training programme has been established because Brazil has a serious lack of qualified manpower. In 1950, the universities had some 100,000 students and now have 1,500,000. This tremend-

ous increase has not been achieved without great difficulties, an experience shared by European universities.

105. The Council's activities also extend to other fields of infrastructure. The oil crisis forced the country to take a new look at its transportation system which has resulted in a proposed new plan for electrifying the railways and for building new railways in certain areas of the country. It has adopted a policy of gradually transferring heavy transport to the railways and to sea and river transport.

106. In many metropolitan areas public transportation systems are now being developed and introduced. Formerly, with oil at only $2 a barrel, it did not make much sense to invest heavily in subway, trolley bus or other public transport systems. Now, however, this will all change very quickly.

107. Because of the high rate of inflation not all plans for the period 1974-79 have been accomplished, but approximately 60-70 % of the goals have been attained. The National Council is working not only with the research councils of the Brazilian states but also with research councils in other countries, such as France on solar energy, Britain with the Royal Society and the British Council on metallurgy, and the United States on computers, a field in which Brazil hopes to become self-sufficient. It is clear that the modernisation of its planning and industry will require a high number of computers. Small computers are already being built and medium-size computers are being developed.

108. When the Committee met with Dr. Vargas, Industrial Technology Secretary, on 5th July, he too pointed out that one of the bottlenecks in the implementation of the development plans was the lack of qualified staff. The tremendous expansion of the universities has resulted in little attention being paid to basic university research. Post-graduate courses should be expanded, as should basic science courses and studies. For instance, for its nuclear programme Brazil will need some 10,000 engineers and scientists : 3,000 highly qualified and 7,000 at a lower level.

109. Unlike France, Brazil does not have a system of specialised high-level schools but all training is at universities, some of which are good and some bad. The universities are federal, state or private, the latter being mainly mediocre and expensive. There are usually ten candidates per place for the federal universities. Improving the level will mean investing in quality. In Brazil the percentage of girls attending university is very high. Those who take post-graduate courses prefer to go to Europe, especially to Germany and France, depending on their speciality. Normally they do not go to other Latin American countries.

110. Where the Amazon project is concerned it is not difficult to find young people who are prepared to go and work there.

111. Dr. Vargas explained that the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development has a counselling committee called the Scientific and Technological Council which handles political, scientific and technological matters. It is composed of thirty members and one of its main functions is to co-ordinate all segments of the scientific and technological complex. In industrial technology this co-ordination is very complex as there are numerous research institutes under different federal and state government agencies. Moreover, the technological demand covers all industrial activities. The secretariat for industrial technology of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce plays a very important rôle in guiding the efficient use of industrial technology developed in federal- and state-financed institutes.

112. Brazil uses 1.8 % of its national product for research and development and is trying to reach the same level as Europe, i.e. some 3 %, but in fact it should use more. The main part of the budget is used for research and development in energy and agriculture. The money comes of course from taxpayers, but a large part is ploughed back in the industrial and agricultural sectors.

113. The second five-year plan from 1979-83 will soon be implemented. Whether it will be possible to finance it is of course a difficult question because high inflation might create disturbances in the allocation of resources.

V. *The Ariane launch base at Kourou*

(submitted by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur)

114. The Committee visited the Ariane launch base from 9th to 12th July 1979. Prior to the visit the Committee was briefed by ESA representatives : Mr. R. Orye, Head of the Ariane Department, and Mr. J. Arets, Head of the International Affairs Branch [1].

115. In Kourou the Committee was received by the ESA representative in French Guiana, Mr. Max A. Hauzeur, Mr. Arets, and by representatives from the Guiana Space Centre, Mr. P. Bescond, Deputy Technical Director, Mr. R. Legrand, Head of Public Relations, and Mrs. B. Martin, Public Relations Officer.

1. See Appendix III.

116. The Committee visited the technical installations near Kourou, including the control centre, the Ariane site and assembly facilities, the technical centre, the radar centres and the other launching facilities [1].

117. During the discussions Mr. Hauzeur gave an outline of the present position and future of the Ariane programme [2].

118. He stated that the Ariane programme was at present the Agency's largest programme ; it had been in existence for nearly seven years and would cost some 700 million accounting units. About fifty European firms were involved. All ten ESA member countries participated, but France was the leading partner with a 62.5 % participation. France acted through CNES (*Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales*), which had overall responsibility, and SNIAS, which was the main manufacturer.

119. The Ariane launcher was of conservative design and not a new development in the manufacturing of launchers. It should be a reliable vehicle. The order to launch Intelsat V with Ariane was of the greatest importance for the morale of the people working on it. Many parallel activities were now taking place in Guiana and Europe in order to prepare for the first launch in November. There would be four qualification flights before the operational flights started.

120. The Deputy Technical Director, Mr. Bescond, explained the missions of the Guiana Space Centre. The centre's first mission was to provide the necessary logistic support to prepare the vehicle for launch. The centre provided all necessary ground facilities, assembly halls, launch towers, the propellant supply network, and maintenance and operating teams.

121. The centre's second mission was data collection. Radars and optical tracking facilities, as well as high-speed cameras, followed the behaviour of the launcher in flight and could improve or verify its performances. The so-called internal data from the launcher to the ground station were also collected. Data processing was carried out at the centre.

122. The third mission concerned the prevention of accidents involving property and persons which might be caused by the use of spacecraft. Safety regulations were applied ; people at the centre should be protected and the destruction of the vehicle was envisaged should the flight become dangerous.

123. The Guiana site had been chosen for several reasons, the first being that satellite launchers could take full advantage of the sling effect produced by the earth's rotation. As Guiana was located near the equator, heavier satellites could be launched at lower fuel cost than from the Kennedy Space Centre. Launches could be made in all directions without endangering any population centres. In the United States satellites for polar orbit had to be launched from the Vandenberg Space Centre in California ; the Kennedy Space Centre could not be used. Moreover, French Guiana had no earthquakes or tidal waves, but did have stable weather and a low density of population. It also had a good road network, an international airport, a deep-water harbour and good telex and telephone connections, and was free from heavy air traffic and busy shipping lanes. Finally, politically speaking, it was also very stable. The disadvantages were that it was far from Europe and had no industrial infrastructure, which meant that transport costs were high and a large stock of spare parts had to be kept. It had only very small numbers of trained personnel.

124. The budget of the space centre was Frs. 140 million per year ; the personnel numbered 600 : 300 from France and 300 local. Companies working on Ariane had some 150 people living in Guiana and, in addition, there were 140 hospital personnel and firemen. All in all they made Kourou a small town of about 7,000 people.

125. The centre stretched 55 km. along the coast and about 25 km. in depth, which made it equivalent to the surface of the Island of Martinique. The Directorate intended to reduce the cost of the programme and the number of staff. In particular it wished to hand over to the French administration those infrastructure tasks which the centre had had to assume as they would not have been carried out otherwise.

126. Of course the tracking range for a rocket like Ariane required more than the tracking station located at Kourou. An agreement had been concluded with the Brazilian Government for a telemetry receiver station in Salinopolis and for a telemetry tracking and radar station in Natal ; on Ascension Island, NASA and the United States Defence Department stations guaranteed observation of the end of the third stage propulsion of Ariane.

127. Replying to questions, Mr. Hauzeur and Mr. Bescond said that the Ariane programme was a European programme, but as France was the main financer SNIAS was the main contractor. However, when real operations started non-French personnel would also be present, including representatives from British Aerospace, which manufactured the launching table, German engineers from ERNO, and Belgians for the control system for liquids. With one country having leadership, management was much easier.

1. See maps (*a*) and (*b*) at Appendix V.
2. See Appendix IV.

All personnel had been extensively trained and American procedures were being used. However, American technical assistance would not be provided, nor was anybody from CNES trained in the United States.

128. Once Ariane became operational industrial arrangements would be made to manage Ariane launchings. The rôle of ESA would then be mainly one of co-ordination and promotion.

129. The Committee was very pleased to have an opportunity of visiting the Kourou base and the Ariane launcher pad. The Agency's space activities are of great political importance which will certainly grow in the years to come. Its space programmes will benefit ESA member countries, developing countries and more advanced continental-size developing countries like Brazil; they will improve living conditions through weather forecasting and pollution control; they will lead to industry manufacturing high-quality products in space. For all these reasons, the Committee and the Assembly will continue as in the past to give all their support to the Agency, its work and its programmes.

APPENDIX I

Programme of the visit to Brazil and French Guiana

1st-12th July 1979

Sunday, 1st July

4 p.m.	Arrival at Rio de Janeiro International Airport.

Monday, 2nd July

2 p.m. - 6 p.m.	National Nuclear Energy Commission, 8616 Estrada Bandeirantes, 2000 Rio de Janeiro. Briefing by Dr. Rex Nazaré Aloes, Executive Director.
7 p.m. - 8 p.m.	Meeting at the Méridien Hotel.

Tuesday, 3rd July

2 p.m. - 6 p.m.	Nuclebras, Praia do Flamengo 200, Rio de Janeiro. Briefing by Ambassador Paulo Nogueira Batista, Director.

Wednesday, 4th July — Sao José dos Campos

9 a.m. - 11.30 a.m.	National Space Research Institute, Avenida dos Astronautas 1758. Briefing by Dr. Nelson de Jesus Parada, Director General.
11.30 a.m. - 3 p.m.	The Brazilian Aeronautical Corporation (Embraer), Avenida Brigadeiro Faria Lima 2170. Briefing by Mr. Ozires Silva, President.
5 p.m. - 7 p.m.	Space Activities Institute, Aerospace Technical Centre, Rua Paraibuna. Briefing by Colonel Sergio Xavier Ferolla, Director.

Thursday, 5th July

9.30 a.m.	Arrival at Brasilia.
11 a.m. - 1 p.m.	Palace of the National Congress, Senate. Meeting with Mr. Luis Viana Filho, President of the Senate, his Bureau and other senators.
4 p.m.	Ministry for External Affairs, Palacio Itamaraty. Briefing by Ambassador F. A. Baena, Secretary General of the Ministry.
5.30 p.m.	Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Esplanada dos Ministerios. Briefing by Dr. José Israel Vargas, Industrial Technology Secretary.

Friday, 6th July

10 a.m.	National Council for Scientific and Technological Development, Avenue W. 3 Norte, Quadra 507, Bloco B. Briefings by : — Professor Mauricio Matos Peixoto, President ; — Professor Amadeu Curi, Director ; — Dr. Dourimar Nunes de Moura, Superintendent for International Co-operation

Saturday, 7th July

5 p.m.	Arrival at Manaus.

Monday, 9th July

10 a.m. - 1 p.m.	National Institute for Research in the Amazon Area, Estrada do Aleixo, P. O. B. 478, Manaus. Briefing by Professor E. Salati, Director. Visit of the laboratories of the Institute.
11 p.m.	Arrival at Cayenne, French Guiana. Departure for Kourou.

Tuesday, 10th July

	Visit of the Guiana Space Centre, Kourou.
10 a.m.	Briefings by : — Mr. M. Hauzeur, Director of ESA in Kourou ; — Mr. P. Bescond, Deputy Technical Director of CNES in Kourou.
11 a.m.	Committee meeting.
11.30 a.m.	Visit of the control centre.
2.45 p.m.	Visit of the Ariane launching pad and other installations.
5.30 p.m.	Briefings by : — Mr. Hauzeur ; — Mr. Bescond ; — Mr. Arets (international affairs) ; — Mr. Laroumanie (economic and social aspects) ; — Mr. Eliès (financial aspects) ; — Mr. Niel (operations) ; — Mr. Morain (installations). Questions and answers period.

Wednesday, 11th July

7.30 a.m. - 3.30 p.m.	Visit of installations and the Iles du Salut.

Thursday, 12th July

9 a.m. - 1 p.m.	Visit to Sinamary.
2.30 p.m.	Departure for Cayenne.

END OF VISIT

Participants

MM.	WARREN - Chairman	(United Kingdom)
	VALLEIX - Vice-Chairman	(France)
	ADRIAENSENS	(Belgium)
	CORNELISSEN	(Netherlands)
	KONINGS	(Netherlands)
	LEWIS	(United Kingdom)
	MINNOCCI	(Italy)
	MÜLLER	(Federal Republic of Germany)
	PÉRONNET	(France)
	SCHEFFLER	(Federal Republic of Germany)

APPENDIX II

Points for discussion in Brazil

I. *General policy*

1. How can the political aims of Brazil's scientific and technological programmes be defined? What general policy has been followed in the modernisation of Brazilian science and technology in the 1970s ?

2. What is the political organisation — federal and provincial — and which ministers are responsible for the activities concerned ?

3. How is the federal research budget established and what course is set for it in the near future ?

4. In particular, the Committee is interested in problems of energy — especially new sources of energy and nuclear energy for peaceful purposes — oceanography and space. Could a brief review be given of Brazilian policies in these fields ?

5. To which of the above sectors did the Brazilian Government give priority during the 1970s and to which fields will it give priority during the 1980s ?

6. What is the place of metallurgy, synthetic fibres and electronics in the overall policy ?

7. What part is played by state-owned industry and what part by private industry ? How can governmental action be defined ?

8. Which industries are state-owned, which industries are part state-owned part private, and which industries are to remain fully private ?

9. What is the part played by American and European industry in the industrial development of Brazil ?

10. Could a breakdown country-by-country be given of Europe's rôle ?

11. What is the part played by Latin American countries ?

12. What is the Federal Government's attitude towards collaboration with the Western European countries in the near future ?

13. In which fields is European collaboration sought especially ?

14. Are special ties being developed with the Common Market and, if so, in which direction should they be developed ?

15. What is the opinion of the Brazilian Government on the 1958 Antarctic treaty, the 1963 Moscow test ban treaty, the 1966 outer space treaty, the 1968 non-proliferation treaty, the 1970 seabed treaty and on developments in the Law of the Sea Conference ?

16. Is there a special institute for applied research and development in the field of aircraft construction, engine development and aeronautics in general ?

17. What types of aircraft are being planned for the 1980s ?

18. For which other forms of transport do special institutes exist ?

19. What is the future of jet-powered trains, hovercraft, electric cars ?

II. *The Ministry of Mines and Energy*

20. What is the rôle of the Ministry in the overall development of Brazilian research and technology ?

21. What is the relationship between the Ministry and the universities and other institutes of learning ?

22. What is the rôle of the state-owned research institutes ?

23. What is the rôle played by the institutes for fundamental research, institutes for applied research and development, and institutes concerned especially with environment and the well-being of the population ?

Energy

24. What is now the total electricity generating capacity in Brazil ?

25. Of this capacity what percentage is generated from nuclear sources ?

26. How much of the capacity of nuclear generators and electricity is under construction and now operating and completed ?

27. What is the estimated requirement for generating capacity of electrical energy required in 1980, 1985, 1990, and what percentage of this will be nuclear generating stations ?

28. Which are the utilities ordering, constructing and operating power stations ? What are their relationships ?

29. What is the capital of these electrical utilities and the method of raising funds ?

30. What is the annual budget in nuclear research ?

31. What are the capital assets now employed on nuclear research ?

32. Which companies, consortia or groups are the main constructors of nuclear power stations ?

33. Is research being carried out on new sources of energy, solar energy and geothermal energy ?

34. What has been done in the field of radioactive chemistry and the utilisation of radioelements in order to fight air and water pollution ?

35. What is the uranium fuel situation in Brazil ?

36. There is a comprehensive American report on the nuclear reactor choice which states that the uranium supply will probably not keep pace with the continued growth of burner-converter capacity beyond the year 2000. What is your opinion ? Should a crash programme on fast-breeder reactors be started now ?

37. The United States has already 183 light-water reactors either built or on order. As it is likely that in the near future the main European countries will also be using this type of reactor, what is your opinion on its safety in view of the recent report on it by the United States Atomic Energy Commission ?

38. Most European electricity boards consider it of great importance to be in the same technical community and that for this reason all European countries should order light-water reactors. Do you agree with this opinion ?

39. Could you give an indication on the future of :

(*a*) the advanced gas-cooled reactor ;

(*b*) the liquid metal-cooled reactor ;

(*c*) the high-temperature reactor ;

(*d*) the steam-generating heavy-water reactor ;

(*e*) fusion ;

(*f*) safety studies ;

(*g*) major research facilities in Brazil ;

(*h*) applied nuclear work (radio isotopes, radiation techniques) ;

(*i*) non-nuclear work, especially on the environment ;

(*j*) the financing of industrial research and development activities in Brazil ;

(*k*) marketing ;

(*l*) international relations between Brazil and Europe ?

III. *The Ministry of Industry and Commerce*

40. What is the task of the Ministry in promoting industries in modern technology ? On which industries is emphasis laid ?

41. What is the relationship between the Ministry and international oil companies ?

42. What influence does the Ministry have on oil-finds in Brazil ?

43. Does an import-export bank exist to assist industry ?

44. Could an outline be given of the development of the electronic and of the computer industry ?

45. Could a short history be given of federal activities in these fields ?

46. What is the share of the American computer industry in the number of computers in use ?

47. What is expected to be the trend in the 1980s ?

48. Is collaboration sought with Western European computer companies ?

49. What is Brazilian policy on software ?

IV. *Oceanology*

50. What is Brazilian policy in the field of oceanology ?

51. What is the budget trend and how do figures for oceanology compare, for instance, with those for nuclear energy or space ?

52. How much is spent on submarine research, how much on experiments in fish ranching in shallow waters, on drilling and basic research on the continental shelf, on research ships and the operation of marine centres ?

V. *Space*

53. When was the Brazilian space institute established ? Its aim is to promote a comprehensive programme for telecommunications by satellite ; what progress has been made towards reaching this goal ?

54. What relationship is there with the parliamentary commissions ?

55. What is the rôle of the universities in the establishment and execution of programmes ?

56. Where international co-operation is concerned, Europe, ESA and Brazil have signed agreements on space collaboration. What does this involve ?

57. Will Brazil participate in the space shuttle ; is it planning to use this space shuttle and, if so, what are the programmes ?

58. In which other international space programmes is Brazil participating ?

59. With which Western European countries is Brazil developing space co-operation and in which special fields ?

VI. *Discussions with parliamentarians*

60. What parliamentary supervision is there of the industrial activities of the government and the increasingly specialised administrative machinery in the complex modern state ?

61. Can the parliamentary committees follow the rapid development of technology and what machinery is there to help the parliamentarians in the Federal and Provincial Parliaments to fulfil their tasks ?

62. Is technological policy worked out only by the government or do the parliamentary institutions also play a rôle ?

63. Science policy is the end product of a process of interchange between scientists, the university, industry and government. What rôle does parliament play in the definition of this policy ? Is there any difference where the formulation of technological policy is concerned ?

64. How are the committees informed of the specific subjects of research and development being followed by scientists ?

65. How do the parliamentary committees supervise public expenditure on research and development ?

66. Is there an effective international exchange of views on science and technology at the parliamentary level ? More especially, do the committees have contacts with the corresponding committees of the Latin American countries and the American or Canadian Parliaments ?

67. The Committee is especially interested in problems of energy — in particular nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, oceanography, space research and aircraft construction. Could a brief review be given of the activities of the competent parliamentary committees ?

68. To which of the above sectors did the committees give priority during the 1970s and to which fields will they give priority during the 1980s ?

69. What priority does parliament give to environmental problems ?

70. What are the budget trends ?

71. How is the influence of the parliament brought to bear on nuclear activities ? Has a comprehensive and systematic programme been submitted to parliament ?

APPENDIX III

Briefings by Mr. R. Orye, Head of the Ariane Department, and Mr. J. Arets, Head of the International Affairs Branch of ESA

Paris, 18th January 1979

Mr. ARETS. — I wish to begin by saying very briefly how pleased our Director-General is that your Committee is to visit the Kourou base and how happy he will be to welcome you to Kourou on that occasion.

This decision to visit the Kourou base is yet another demonstration of the interest taken by your Committee and the WEU Assembly in the activities of the Agency and such steps provide us with extremely important support. We often feel in fact that the European Space Agency, in a field which is no doubt limited but nevertheless important, makes a contribution to the building of Europe. But on the other hand we also often feel that public opinion and sometimes even governments are not always sufficiently aware of this contribution to the building of Europe. Consequently, any gesture by such an important assembly as yours showing its interest in our efforts to this end is of major importance for us.

Mr. ORYE. — I will very rapidly remind you of the context of the Ariane programme and its development ; I will say a few words on the operational phase and then describe in more detail the facilities which your Committee will visit in French Guiana.

The objective of the Ariane programme is to have available at the end of 1980 a European launcher for European programmes, for member states' programmes and also for third-party programmes so that we can offer launch services in a competitive environment.

To achieve this objective we have first of all tried to minimise the risks of overrun, of time overrun and of financial overrun. To this effect we have made systematic use of whatever technology, test facility or manufacturing facility was available in Europe. We have, for instance, both for engines and for tanks reused the technology which was used in the French Diamant programme. We have reused electronic equipment which has been used both in European programmes and in the French ballistic missile programme. We are using an inertial guidance system which is very similar to the one used in the British Harrier, made by Ferranti.

We have called on CNES, which successfully managed the Diamant programme and has long experience in launcher programmes, to be in charge of the management of the Ariane programme. In Guiana the CNES management team will of course be there, as will be the range team because the French national authorities are the operators and owners of the launch site.

A very great effort has been made on the quality insurance and reliability problem, which even the Intelsat technicians judged sufficient.

Ariane is a three-stage launch vehicle ; its objective is to launch a mass of 1,700 kg into geosynchronous transfer orbit. For your information, Intelsat V weighed slightly more than 1,700 kg, but we have been able to make some minor modifications in Ariane to meet the performance requirement of Intelsat V.

The programme started in July 1973 ; after the design and testing phase there will be four flight trials in the period 1979-80 on which I will give you more information later.

All ESA member states participate in the financing of this programme. France pays most : 62.5 %, the next largest contributor is Germany with 20.12 % and the other European member states pay the remainder. At the beginning of the programme the financial envelope was set at 2 billion — 2,060 million — French francs, which corresponded at that moment, in the 1973 economic conditions, to 370 million accounting units. Roughly speaking the accounting unit is now 5.56 French francs, or about $1.25. Through inflation this financial envelope has risen from 2 billion to more than 3.5 billion, which is not a negligible increase, but it has been approved by member states.

On top of this initial envelope member states, the participants, have committed themselves to contribute in the same proportion to a margin for technical contingencies of 20 %. This margin is there to cope with problems which can normally be expected during a development programme of this scope.

In terms of organisation there is a programme board, as we have for all our programmes, which is in charge of the management and supervision of the programme. All member states are represented on this programme board by delegates. CNES has been entrusted with the management of the programme. The European Space Agency is in charge of controlling the execution of the programme.

Although making forty firms in ten different countries co-operate has created some problems. I think it can be said that the problems have not been very great and all these firms are now co-operating very smoothly.

The dynamic tests on the complete vehicle were completed in the middle of 1977 ; the electrical tests on the complete vehicle were completed in the first quarter of 1978. The propellant mock-up launcher will be on the launch pad until early April ; by the middle of April it will have been disassembled and sent back to Europe where we need it for something else. But you will see the Guiana space centre facilities, the Ariane facilities, general facilities for everything, but you will not see the launcher and I do not think that seeing it in its crate is very impressive.

Coming back to the progress of work, the test firing is now planned for November and I will tell you later on why we have lost a couple of months on the first firing. On the first stage we have had in fact only one major problem which I can say is now solved. We have been obliged to change the material used in the engine, in the nozzle of the engine, because the initial material could not withstand a very high thermal and vibrational environment. We have changed the material which has been tested successfully. At the moment the first stage for the first launch, which we call L 01, is in the process of being manufactured. There have been two types of problem : problems with sub-systems — valves, pressure reducers and things like this — which have taken a lot of time but which have not created basic problems. There was also an incident during one of the test firings in Vernon. The incorrect functioning allowed a very large quantity of gaseous hydrogen to accumulate, which is very dangerous when mixed with liquid oxygen, and when the engine was turned on the mixture exploded. This damaged the engine. It did not damage the test facility, but the stage itself was damaged quite a lot. We had to wait until we received another stage from the manufacturer before we could resume testing and this, unfortunately, interrupted the test programme for several months. The interruption in the test programme has forced us to delay the first development launch, initially scheduled for July. We tried for some time to have it in June ; we had to go back to July, and have now been obliged to shift it to early November 1979.

I think I can turn immediately to the schedule of test firings because as far as electrical systems, vehicle equipment bay and fairings are concerned, ground qualification is completed. We no longer have any problem in this area. L 01 is thus postponed until November, the second firing to March (L 02 was initially planned for December 1979 and has been postponed until March), L 03 is postponed from May 1980 to June 1980, and for the last test firing, L 04, we feel we can maintain the initial date of October 1980.

The objective of the test firings is not to fly payloads but to qualify the launch vehicle, but we — the delegations and the Council — considered that it would be a pity not to offer passenger payload rides and where we have no passenger whatsoever, except for the technological capsule on the first, we have Firewheel which is a scientific experiment made by the Max Planck Institute in Germany together with Amsat, which is a satellite made by the radio amateurs and will be Oscar 9 ; as you know, radio amateurs have quite a series of satellites and are at number 7 or 8 and this one will be number 9.

On the third firing we have in fact a double passenger : first, we have accepted the request made by the Indian space authorities to fly a technological telecommunications satellite. Apple stands for Ariane passenger payload experiment. It is a simple telecommunications satellite which has already gone through part of its qualification tests. The second passenger on L 03 is the second unit of our Meteosat programme, which is to be flown on top of Apple.

On the last firing we shall fly Marecs, which is our maritime communications satellite. Marecs A will be the passenger on L 04 and we might have other passengers, but today we cannot say much more on this except that we shall fly Marecs in October next year.

To conclude on the time-scale, our objective, i.e. to have Ariane available at the end of 1980, and not only available but also proven, remains unchanged. Our first operational user is probably going to be Exosat, which is scheduled for April 1981. We have a six-month margin between our last development firing scheduled for October and the first operational launch scheduled for April 1981.

Financially speaking, although we have not been able to remain within the 100 % limit, the initial budget envelope, we have today been obliged to ask for only 4.7 % compared with a margin of 20 %, which means that we are still well within the financial commitment made by member states for the development of this programme.

For the operational phase the ESA member states last year approved the manufacture of five operational launch vehicles — five on top of the prototypes L 01, L 02, L 03 and L 04. The operational vehicles are for launches in the period 1981-83. The first is Exosat, an ESA scientific satellite, which is scheduled for launch in April 1981 ; Marecs B, the second satellite of the maritime series, is to be launched in the second quarter of 1981 ; and at the last Council meeting it was decided to launch Sirio II, which is a satellite built in the Italian Sirio programme. This is a slightly different mission : Sirio and Marecs will be placed in orbit by a dual launcher, about which I will say something later.

ECS-1 is the first unit of the European communications satellite programme and is scheduled for launch at the end of 1981. From 1983 onwards it will be put at the disposal of the European postal authorities.

The French national earth observation satellite called Spot is scheduled for launch at the end of 1983.

After a two and a half year period we have managed to convince Intelsat to place a firm order for two launches and I can tell you this has required quite an effort not only by the executive, not only by CNES, but specially by the European governors on the Intelsat board, who are all members of the European postal authorities. They have been extremely helpful and have been working very closely together. We owe part of this success to them.

In the ECS programme there are four satellites to be launched : we have three more users — ECS-2, ECS-3 and ECS-4. In the near future a decision is to be taken in France on the construction of two telecommunication satellites. Telecom I would have to be launched by Ariane in the period 1982-83. This means that we are coming very close to the point where we have to order a new series of five launchers. In December we in fact informed our authorities, our delegations, that a decision would be needed on this so that we can meet probable requirements up to the end of 1983.

There are two points I should like to mention in terms of competition : Ariane can lift 1,700 kg. The first thing to be said is that in the early 1980s there will be several satellites weighing about half that much. Satellites like ECS, Marecs and, for instance, the Canadian Anik C and the Arab satellites (Arabsat) will all weigh about half, unfortunately slightly over half, the performance capability of Ariane and we have therefore asked for and received authorisation to develop a dual launch system.

A dual launch system allows the simultaneous launch of two smaller-class payloads by means of one Ariane without these payloads constraining each other in any way. We expect to have it available and qualified by the end of next year and will use it with Marecs B and Sirio in mid-1981.

Unfortunately these payloads are slightly higher than half the Ariane performance and this has led us to propose to the Ariane programme board and to the ESA Council a programme — a rather modest programme — for Ariane performance improvements which would raise the performance from 1,700 to 2,300 kg, probably in two steps. This improvement can be achieved by rather simple means. We first intend to add two boosters to the first stage. It is a classical approach ; people always start building a launcher and then in order to increase the performance they add boosters. We intend to increase the propellant capability of the third stage just by adding two tons of propellants, lengthening the tanks by about one metre, again a rather simple modification. We would also have to make a small modification to the first stage, not in the engine, but we have to increase the combustion pressure. This would enable us to go from 1,700 kg to 2,300 kg and we plan to have these modifications available at the end of 1982 or in 1983. However, this is not an approved programme ; it is now under discussion ; we shall be seeking approval from our authorities in mid-1979. Provided we get this approval we feel that by the end of 1982, when Arabsat and Telecom I and ECS-2 will come up for launch for instance, we shall be able to offer, not a better launcher, but a launcher of a higher performance, the unit cost of which will have practically not gone up.

With regard to the launch facilities I have to make a distinction between the Guiana space centre, which is a general facility, and the Ariane launch base. The Guiana space centre is located in French Guiana, in a town called Kourou. It is very close to the equator and allows us to make maximum use of the earth's velocity and also minimises the degree of manoeuvre to be made before getting into orbit. The centre has a technical rôle and a logistic one. Technically it will provide radars, which allow the launcher to be tracked, and telemetry receivers which will show exactly what is happening on board ; it has an operations centre and a very complex transmission network ; it has a very complex safety system because both people and facilities have to be protected against a possible malfunction of the launcher ; it has a meteorological system, etc. In terms of logistics it has transport facilities and can provide accommodation ; it has a fire-fighting system ; there is a hospital and everything. There are about 650 people working in the Guiana space centre. Roughly speaking there are 100 CNES staff, the other 550 being local industrial manpower.

The Guiana space centre is now practically ready to ensure the Ariane launchings. We are requalifying the centre as it has been without any large-scale launchings for a couple of years ; four sounding rockets are to be launched before Ariane.

The annual budget is about 160 million French francs, mainly for running the base — salaries, electricity, things like that. A small proportion is allocated for investments and upkeep of facilities. About 70 % of the cost is financed by France and about 30 % by the other member states of the European Space Agency. This agreement was signed in 1975 and is in force until 1980, the end of the Ariane development.

Under a new agreement for the financing of the Guiana space centre after the Ariane development phase, now under discussion, France would pay about one-third from its national budget and the remaining two-thirds would be divided between the ESA member states, France included. It will be related to the Ariane industrial return or the gross national product or probably a combination of both. ESA has a small liaison office in Kourou in view of our launchings there.

For Ariane, there is the Ariane facility which is basically composed of what we call the Ariane launch site, the tower and the control centre. There are some additional facilities such as a telemetry station which will be installed on the Brazilian coast.

We have radar and telemetry facilities in French Guiana but we also have two stations in Brazil and are using a NASA station in Ascension Island. We have an agreement with Brazil for the construction and operation of a facility in Natal. Natal is a military range on which high-performance radar already existed. We have funded the installation of a telemetry system compatible with the Ariane launch telemetry system and in exchange for this system the Brazilians have built general facilities like roads, etc. ; they are carrying out the operations free of charge.

We have also a mobile station near Belem, which is a little to the north. This station has been installed on a semi-permanent basis to have a better coverage of the early phases of flight. In the early phases of flight the Kourou and Cayenne stations see the rocket only from the back. Radio transmissions through flames being somewhat difficult, we therefore have a sideways facing station in Belem and use existing NASA and United States DOD facilities in Ascension Island. All these facilities are practically completed. We are carrying out transmission tests. The Ariane launch site itself is completed ; we started the erection of this propellant mock-up only when the facility was finished. We are also building a facility to allow the preparation of payloads of the Ariane class. This is called the EPCU which stands for *"ensemble de préparation de charge utile"*. All this will be completed at the end of the year. The Ariane launch site cost roughly 180 million French francs and to this should be added the value of what was recovered from the old ELDO facility. The additional facilities cost 40 million French francs and the payload facilities 15 million French francs. Of course the Guiana space centre has cost far more than this.

In reply to questions, Mr. ORYE said the nominal duration of firings of the third stage is 560 seconds. A month after the abovementioned incident we had a 500-second firing time. This was done to make sure that nothing was wrong with the stage design itself. We have had several of these ; the exact accumulated firing time is several thousands of seconds.

On costs, the ESA Council has adopted a pricing policy for ESA missions and for ESA's member states' missions based on Delta-class launchings. The missions will have to cost 24 million accounting units, whereas missions which are to use the full Ariane capacity will cost 32 million accounting units. This is for ESA missions and for member states' missions, but of course in a competitive world you have to adapt your prices as far as economically possible. For Intelsat for instance we have adopted quite a different approach ; as we were starting from a weak position in respect of NASA we could not afford to demand a higher price than NASA. We decided to offer at marginal costs and made an offer of this at $20 million, which in the meantime we have brought up to $21.5 million. This policy has been approved for Intelsat and the Ariane programme board authorised us to sign the Intelsat contract based on this policy. For a very small increase in cost — not even half a million accounting units — the dual launch system will allow us to launch two ECS-type satellites. This of course improves our status very much.

With the down-range station network we cover the totality of the booster phase. There is not a single second during this 800 seconds which is not covered by telemetry reception and by radar. We see the vehicle all the time. We cannot afford not to see it. With a small number of launchings you have to get all the information you can and we have a continuous coverage of the launcher trajectory. What happens after injection into transfer orbit is no longer the launcher authority's business — it is the satellite people's business. Now they have their own network for tracking their satellites between injection in transfer orbits, firing of the apogee motor and manoeuvres in orbit. There are no dark areas so far as the launcher is concerned.

We have a general and a specific co-operation agreement with Brazil, the specific agreement being for the use of the facilities in Natal and near Belem. From the co-operation which we have had so far, it can be said that the Brazilians are certainly very, very keen to co-operate with Europe.

On possible accidents occurring during firings, I should mention that the Guiana space centre has a safety system and a safety officer. Guiana is very well situated because most of our launchings are into geostationary orbit, which means that you have to launch in an easterly direction and therefore you immediately fly over

the sea. The only things you have to do are to protect Kourou itself (which is about 20 km from the launch site) in the very early stages of flight and avoid the vehicle going off-course, in the direction of Brazil or somewhere else. In both cases, with very precise radar systems, optical systems, we can track the vehicle, we can predict the impact point, should anything happen at any time, and it is possible for the safety officer to destroy the vehicle before it can reach a position from which it can do real damage to people or indeed to facilities.

Certainly we are condemned to succeed on L 01, but still it is a development firing. We are very well aware of the psychological importance of this first launch, especially after the very unlucky experience with the previous European launcher programme. We are not taking any risks on this first launch. We go through a very, very extensive ground testing programme ; we go through a very tight quality assurance programme and I think we have a very reasonable chance of having a successful first flight. But then I think we all have to be realistic. If we were sure that the first flight would be a successful one, why would we have test flights ? We feel we can launch in November of this year.

The question of insurance in case something goes wrong with the payload has arisen for the Intelsat V satellite. We first of all offered a free reflight should the launch be totally unsuccessful, provided the user is willing to pay an insurance premium, which we feel should not exceed 10 %.

We have also considered the possibility of a partial failure. We have devised a scheme whereby we would have proportional, pro rata, compensation in the light of the usefulness of the spacecraft actually placed in orbit. We have of course not agreed to be responsible for consequential damages arising from non-use of satellites ; we would only accept direct consequences.

We have no real active control over the vehicle. We track it and receive all the telemetry data from it but cannot influence its behaviour except for safety reasons. We can either stop or interrupt propulsion or break up the vehicle, but we cannot from the ground intervene if one of the vehicle functions does not work. In this case the system is lost — the flight is lost.

Relative to the financing of the Guiana space centre beyond 1980 and its commercial aspects, an investigation is being conducted as follows : France would pay one-third from its national budget and ESA (France included) would pay the remaining two-thirds, the key to each country's share being the gross national product or its industrial return, or a combination of both.

The first production series of five Ariane launchings in the period 1981-83 is considered a promotional series. In this period 1981-83, Europe has to make an effort to promote its launcher. NASA has decided that in this period 1981-83 it would have a fixed pricing policy for the shuttle launchings, but after this period, from 1984 to 1992, its prices would be adjusted to cover total cost, including whatever losses it might have incurred during the first three years.

Europe should be able to keep Ariane going, make sure that it works, make sure that we can sell it not only for our own programmes, which is a rather simple objective, but also for non-ESA, non-member state programmes.

In the Agency, as in the CNES moreover, we of course use solid propellants, but for other purposes. In civil applications, liquid propellants will always be used for launchers. For several reasons, the liquid propellant creates an environment which is generally much less hard than the solid propellant and it also has a better performance.

For the improved Ariane, first, we wish to minimise the modifications to the launcher proper. For instance, the addition of boosters hardly modifies the launcher. The only thing which has to be decided is how to attach them. This is not a simple matter but it is not very complicated either.

The lengthening of the third stage of course modifies the launcher. The increased thrust of the first stage obtained by regulating the engine differently makes no change to the equipment proper.

Once we have developed this new version the modified third and first stages will certainly become the standard version. There is no point in our producing two types of launcher in parallel, particularly for short production runs.

We are of course aware that in order to export launchers and certainly also satellites we shall have in certain cases to seek special financial terms at least as advantageous as those offered by the American EXIM bank. The matter is being studied. We have had contacts with the European Development Bank but in this case I think assistance is possible only in the case of exports to African countries. Finally, this is certainly an important point because we know, for instance, that when the Brazilians called for offers from American and European industry two years ago they for their part wished no payment to be made before the satellite was completed. This called for pre-financing with a search for the best financial terms and here I think an effort should be made to set up appropriate machinery ; on the American side EXIM certainly provides very strong support.

Geographically, the industrial breakdown does not change very much between the development and production phases. France contributes

62.5 % in the development phase and since the production contracts were signed its share of the first series has diminished slightly and now amounts to 57 or 58 %. The share of the other member states has not changed much either. We have increased the share of Italian industry because its contribution to development was of a special kind in that Italy is building a technological capsule used only in the development and not in the operational phase, and we wished to increase its share in the manufacture proper of the launcher. So there has not been a very great change. I must nevertheless tell you that even countries which contributed only a relatively low percentage to work on Ariane have provided considerable support. For instance, Ireland, which took no part in the development phase, has joined the Ariane programme for the production phase. A country like Belgium, which had 5 % of the work, has always been a very sound supporter of the Ariane programme and Switzerland too has always been very much in favour of the programme.

Where military satellites are concerned, we have no military users, but a distinction must be drawn between passive and non-passive application. I do not think we should be kept out of sales of Ariane launchings for military satellites used for peaceful purposes, such as observation and communication satellites. We have established preliminary contacts with NATO, for instance, offering Ariane for the next generation of NATO communication satellites. As you know, NATO is now in its third generation of communication satellites and is considering introducing its fourth generation, probably as from 1984.

Where satellites are concerned, an effort is being made by manufacturers to compete for NATO 4, and where launchers are concerned, we have made preliminary contacts with the NATO agency responsible for satellites to see if it will consider Ariane. We see no reason why we should not sell Ariane for the launching of a NATO satellite and I think that if the French military authorities subsequently wished to place military communication satellites in orbit (and here I really am giving my personal view) there is no reason why Ariane should not be used to launch them. A Telecom satellite is not an aggressive system; this is the limit between peaceful and non-peaceful.

Relative to ESA funding for Ariane, we have no basic problems. ESA has been living without a proper budget for 1978, but this does not involve Ariane, nor spacelab, nor the applications programmes. It involves ESA's general budget and its scientific programme. For instance, the Ariane programme board voted the Ariane development budget and the Ariane production budget for 1979 in early December 1978 and all is going smoothly financially.

Ariane has a twofold origin. It stems from the wish of most European nations to have an autonomous and independent launch capability and to launch their satellites the way they want and not the way the Americans want. This will, for instance, avoid situations such as that of Symphonie where NASA forced the French and German authorities to locate Symphonie where NASA wanted and not where the Europeans wanted, that is, so as not to cover certain parts of Eastern Europe and not to cover one or another area. The other point is that it will be very difficult to export a European satellite system without a European launching system being available. Of course, NASA would say "But we will launch any system you want", but once things really become difficult, when the competition really becomes tough, no holds will be barred, as we have seen with Intelsat. We have had all kinds of arguments with which they have tried to eliminate us from the Intelsat V race. When involved in this kind of competition, it is not always technical objectivity which is used.

Kourou is very close to the equator. Basically, the launcher brings an object from one speed to another and if you launch on the equator you make maximum use of the rotation of the earth, which is of course zero at the poles. The second advantage is that if you launch from the equator you have to make fewer corrections and you can therefore make more use of the rocket performance just to boost useful payloads into orbit.

ESA has been in touch with the Arab countries, both with ASCO, the Arab Satellite Communications Organisation, and with its consultant, Comsat General, to ensure that when tenders are called for by the end of this year Ariane will be among the launch vehicles taken into consideration. With the Arab countries there is reasonable progress. We are using the same approach with Iran but, of course, it is perhaps not the right moment. In South America, Colombia intends to set up a communications satellite system either for Colombia alone or for the Andean nations. An effort is now under way to have a consulting firm appointed and there is, for instance, a French group bidding for this consultancy task. Australia is also thinking of putting up a satellite for telecommunications and television and also for linking its embassies in that part of the world through a satellite. They are considering 1985. We have had and still have contacts with them for the possible use of Ariane and the United Kingdom industry, for instance, has been very active in terms of satellites. The Nordic countries, as you may know, are very actively considering setting up a direct television broadcasting satellite system in 1984-85 ; one option is for four or five satellites. This satellite would be an extrapolation of what we call an ESA H-sat — the heavy satellite. While

no decision has been taken, it might lead to an experimental direct television satellite and ESA is in contact with the Nordic authorities for Ariane.

Indonesia wants to build a second-generation Palapa satellite system for 1982-84. We have been in direct contact with them and with the American firm which built the first-generation satellite to make sure that in the call for tenders — it is an absolute necessity to be in the call for tenders — Ariane is included as one of the possible launch vehicles. The second step of course would then be to sell the Ariane launcher rather than another launcher.

ESA has started a long-term study of the competition between Ariane and the shuttle, and the long-term future of Ariane. What will space in Europe be like in 1990 or in 1995 ? There will be competition for Ariane from the shuttle, but until 1986-87 either this version or the improved version of Ariane will still be used.

The Russians, in my opinion, will not have a reusable shuttle in the very near future. They will continue to use conventional launch vehicles. It is not sure that the shuttle will reduce launch costs. Only experience and time will show whether the shuttle is really going to reduce launch costs. The launch cost for spacelab is not all that low. The conventional launcher will continue to exist.

In their long-term studies on solar satellites, for instance, the Americans see the need for heavy-lift vehicles, completely different from the shuttle, very big launchers with an even better engine able to lift 1,000 tons or so. In building a solar satellite, a structure some 10-20 km long, the shuttle will not be powerful enough to place it in orbit. The shuttle will be used for other purposes, obviously for manned flight, for spacelab, but not to lift heavy payloads. The shuttle on its own cannot reach geostationary orbit ; an additional stage is needed. They use what they call the SSUS — the solid spinning upper stage — to go from lower orbit to geostationary orbit.

This is a very interesting long-term question. Europe has to make up its mind in the next couple of years : What does it want to do after Ariane ? Ariane is not eternal. ESA has to decide whether it wants to opt for a next-generation launcher and what we should do in the next ten, fifteen or perhaps twenty years to come. A launcher takes a long time to build. If you look at the cryogenics you can say that before Ariane will be really qualified it will have taken more than ten years to get the cryogenics working ; the same is true for the shuttle and the same will be true for the next-generation launch vehicles. Launch programmes are long and it is not for nothing that they are expensive.

Mr. ARETS. — With regard to co-operation with Brazil and in view of the fact that you will be going there shortly, I would mention that last year the Agency signed a co-operation agreement with Brazil mainly relating to the installations needed for the Ariane tracking operations. On that occasion, our delegation, under our Director-General, had an extremely warm welcome in Brazil and there were definite signs of interest in co-operation between Europe and Brazil in space matters.

At that very moment, Brazilian efforts to call for tenders for a Brazilian satellite, the Brazilsat, were broken off and put into deep freeze for an indefinite period, but not less than two years, mainly for financial reasons. It is therefore probable that in the coming months or perhaps during next year a further effort will be made by Brazil to revive the idea of a Brazilian communications satellite which, in view of the size of the country, is clearly very largely justified.

In such a context, space Europe must certainly try to play a rôle both in ensuring the use of an Ariane launcher and also in allowing European industry to try to win this kind of call for tenders for the supply of the satellite itself. Here Europe must make a promotion effort and it is not always easy to know what part the Space Agency should play, what part industry and what part the national organisations.

But we feel that the effort is so great that everyone must take part and that there can be no exclusivity. Where we are concerned, therefore, we are striving to strengthen contacts and co-operation with Brazil and we are considering sending a small delegation to Brasilia in the next few months when an additional clause to the principal agreement for setting up a secondary station is signed. We hope to take advantage of this journey to revive, so to speak, co-operation with Brazil, particularly with a view to Brazilsat. You may find this information useful in the context of your own visit to Brazil.

I also wished to mention a treaty on responsibility prepared in the framework of the United Nations which has been signed and ratified by most states, and in any event the member states of the Agency. Quite recently, the European Space Agency, with the agreement of the member states, naturally, declared that it agreed to this treaty on responsibility being applied to its work. This lays down the responsibility of the launching state or international organisation and such juridical responsibility is thus now governed internationally by this treaty.

I also wish to comment on marketing problems. I think that when we talk about marketing space activities there is the problem both of the launcher and of the satellite. A

satellite of American manufacture can of course be launched by a European launcher and European satellites by American launchers or the shuttle, but it is quite evident that work in these fields must be pursued in parallel and here again we come back to the difficulty of each party's rôle because although, where promoting the activities of Ariane as a launcher is concerned, it is quite obvious that the Space Agency has a well-established rôle since it is responsible not only for developing the launcher but also for producing it, this is less obvious in the case of satellites since the Agency's rôle is limited to developing satellites and it is not automatically responsible for producing satellites for export.

So how can this promotion be done ? There are various possibilities. When we have the opportunity, we present the Space Agency in other countries so as to increase credibility in Europe's space capability. We try to give demonstrations ; for instance with the Meteosat satellite placed in orbit a year ago we made a number of demonstrations in African countries with a mobile reception station which we moved from place to place so as to show these countries what use they can make of this satellite.

We are studying financial problems, obviously major problems, but we are of course encountering the difficulty encountered by all international organisations in this field and one point to which I venture to draw your attention is the need, where promotion is concerned, to adopt a European approach. Off the record, I will tell you something that happened a year or two ago.

Mr. Orye referred several times to Arabsat, the satellites which the Arab countries are considering developing and launching in the next few years. To this end, they have set up an Arab satellite communications organisation, ASCO. One of the main problems for the Arab countries is obviously the lack of qualified staff and in order to proceed with their work they therefore need a consultative body. They put out a call for firms or other bodies to act as consultant to ASCO for a five-year period. Our position was as follows : where the European Space Agency is concerned, we proposed that member states make a single offer to ASCO under the aegis of the Agency with contributions *inter alia* from national space organisations and firms particularly competent in this field, but to make a single offer to the Arab countries.

Among United States firms, a single company has been set up : Comsat. Our appeal was not heard and there were three national or bilateral European offers to the Arab organisation. Comsat was chosen as consultant. Obviously no one can say that, if made, a single European offer would have been preferred to the American one. It may perhaps be thought that if a single European offer had been made there might have been a joint European-American consultancy, but I think that in any event it may be considered that Europe's chances of success would have been greater if a single offer had been made representing ten or eleven European countries rather than having competing national European offers to the Arabs as compared with a single offer by Comsat whose reputation is of course established. Since you asked me to speak frankly, I will tell you about problems facing us which at the very least warrant reflection in Europe.

In reply to the question about Canada : Canada is not a member state of the European Space Agency but a co-operation agreement was concluded with it very recently. We do not yet know exactly how to describe Canada's relationship with the Space Agency for as you know there are member states and, under the Convention, associate states, but the juridical position of Canada is merely that of a co-operating country. This co-operation agreement with Canada allows it *inter alia* to be kept informed of our activities, commits it to take part in some of them, particularly the general ones and future programmes, and also allows it to take part in some programmes. Among other things, Canada has already shown its interest in the Agency's work on remote sensing and on direct television satellites.

Finally, I wish to say another word about the question of military satellites. Here, in a field in which the WEU Assembly is particularly interested, I think the basis of our Agency, under Article 2 of the Convention, is to work to peaceful, solely peaceful ends. It is therefore a definite feature of the Convention and the fact that countries like Switzerland and Sweden take part in our work is obviously not alien to this insistence on pursuing such aims. We are therefore in a position where we can have no dealings, near or far, with military activities and I remember that in certain resolutions or other texts of your Assembly sent to us for the information of our member states there were remarks or questions touching on the military aspects of your work in the space field. There are some misgivings here, which is understandable in view of the membership of our organisation.

Nevertheless, there is another equally evident side to the problem : as Mr. Orye said, if we develop the Ariane launcher and in other fields we develop a satellite capability and if an organisation like NATO decides to acquire space means, this should not mean, under the pretext that the Agency has an exclusively peaceful rôle, that all space supplies should be American. Here there is therefore a problem which must be viewed from every angle, but I can only give you a picture of the position of the European Space Agency.

APPENDIX IV

The Ariane programme

(a) *Milestones in the Ariane programme*

20th December 1972 : European Space Conference

The research ministers of the member countries of ESRO and ELDO meet in Brussels.

The Europa II and III programmes are abandoned. France proposes a new launcher project : Ariane (formerly L III S).

30th July 1973 : European Space Conference in Brussels

The Ariane programme is adopted, along with the spacelab (European orbital laboratory flown on the United States space shuttle) and Marots (maritime communications) programmes. These programmes are to be carried out within the frame of a European Space Agency, a single organisation covering the activities of ESRO and ELDO.

December 1973

The international arrangement on Ariane comes into force with France financing 62.5 % of the programme. The total development cost is 2,472 MF, which includes a 20% contingency margin.

The *Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales* (CNES) is prime contractor for the programme, in which ten countries participate.

1974

Industrial contracts are started.

31st May 1975

Establishment of the European Space Agency.

1974-75

Development and qualification of the launcher's sub-systems.

Mid-1976

Start of "dynamic mock-up" tests by the industrial architect, *Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale.*

April 1977

Start of "electrical mock-up" tests.

Mid-1978

Shipment to the launch base at Kourou of an example of Ariane for the "propellants mock-up" operations (finalisation of procedures for erecting the launcher in the tower, tank filling and draining tests, vibration and climatic environment tests).

First tests of the stages

— 13th December 1977 : 1st stage, L 140

— 31st January 1978 : 2nd stage, L 33

— 10th January 1978 : 3rd stage, H 8 cryogenic)

Qualification firings

— November 1979 : First launch Ariane L 01

— March 1980 : Launch L 02

— June 1980 : Launch L 03

— October 1980 : Launch L 04

Operational firings

Starting early 1981.

(b) *Present position and future of the Ariane programme*

(February 1979)

Ariane programme

In 1973 the member states of the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) decided to develop the Ariane launcher. ESRO has since become the European Space Agency (ESA), an intergovernmental organisation composed of eleven European member states (most of them members of the European Community) and whose aims are essentially the development of spacecraft and their launch systems for peaceful ends. ESA is developing the Ariane launcher, originally designed to place a 1,500 kg payload in a transfer orbit of 200/36,000 km.

The development work started in July 1973 with the target of having an operational launcher available by the end of 1980.

The constant progress so far achieved has been built up on a prudent design approach based on technologies acquired in Europe through experience with civil and military programmes and on the maximum use of existing facilities and installations.

The guaranteed performance (in geostationary transfer orbit) has been raised to 1,700 kg

during development, thus exceeding the initial objective by 200 kg.

Taking advantage of the experience gained by CNES in its highly successful Diamant launcher programme, the European Space Agency entrusted CNES with the management of the Ariane project.

I. *Main tests*

As well as the numerous sub-systems development tests (engines, electronic equipment, structures), the Ariane programme development work is based on a large number of overall tests:

— "dynamic" tests of the launcher held between mid-76 and mid-77 ;

— "electrical system" tests which, after the setting up of the facilities, started in April 1977 and ended in November 1978.

Concurrently, the development of the propulsion systems for the three stages has given rise to the following main tests :

— A series of ten cluster tests, G1 to G10, of the four engines of the first stage. The conclusion of this series was highly satisfactory and was followed by the M1 firing of the first stage to full flight standard in mid-December 1977 (111 s), the M2 firing on 9th March 1978 (122 s), and the M3 firing in mid-June 1978. These firings, which in other respects were perfectly satisfactory, had to be stopped before reaching the nominal duration (143 s) as a result of a defect in the graphite of the throat of the engine nozzles. After changing this material the M4 firing, which completed the development of the first stage, was fully successful (143 s) in early December 1978.

— An M1 firing of the second stage on 31st January 1978 (138 s), an M2 firing on 31st March 1978 (138 s), and an M3 firing on 14th August 1978 were all highly successful. They followed a series of firings of the propulsion system which were also very satisfactory. The first qualification firing Q1 also took place and the second firing is planned for February.

— Two long-duration firings of the third stage on 10th January 1978 (250 s) and on 2nd February 1978 (550 s) with normal cut-off on depletion of the propellants.

The third stage, equipped with battleship tanks replacing the light flight tanks, was also subjected to a successful firing of 250 s, and three firings of a nominal duration (over 500 s).

As a result of faulty ignition of an engine, a stage firing at the end of November 1978 caused an explosion which damaged the third-stage propulsion bay without affecting the test stand. This accident, which does not put in question the design of the flight stage, has caused the suspension of the development tests on the third stage with flight tank until May 1979. Development testing of this stage with the battleship tank will be carried out concurrently and without a break between now and June 1979.

Testing of the other sub-systems (equipment bay and fairing) are completed.

Finally, at the Kourou launch base, after satisfactory tests of the launcher check-out system, the finalisation of the launch site, which was more difficult than expected, was completed in December 1978. The "propellant mock-up" tests which are currently being carried out will enable a check to be made of the launcher/launch site interfaces and the launch procedures, as well as helping with the training of the launch team.

The technical difficulties referred to above have led to an adjustment in the time-table of test flights, which are now as follows :

— L 01 3rd November 1979 ;

— L 02 March 1980 ;

— L 03 June 1980 ;

— L 04 October 1980.

It will be seen that the initial programme target of the launcher being developed by the end of 1980 has every chance of being met and that there is a substantial margin in relation to the date of the first operational launch requested (15th April 1981).

II. *Planned launches*

While the first launch, L 01, will carry only a technological capsule and ballast, the following launches, L 02, L 03 and L 04, will be used for launching, in addition to the Ariane technological capsule (ATC), the following satellites :

— Amsat (radio-amateur satellite) and Firewheel (Max Planck Institute experiment) on the second test, L 02 ;

— Meteosat-F 2 (European meteorological satellite) and Apple (Indian experimental communications satellite) on the third flight, L 03 ;

— Marecs-A (European maritime communications satellite) on the fourth test, L 04.

At its 24th meeting on 25th and 26th April 1978, the ESA Council decided on the production of a first series of five operational launchers to be used for the following programmes: Exosat (scientific satellite being developed under an ESA mandatory programme), ECS-1 (first European point-to-point satellite communications system), Marecs-B (European maritime communications satellite), Spot (experimental earth resources observation satellite). The last launcher will serve as a back-up.

In addition, at its 35th meeting on 7th December 1978, the Intelsat Board of Governors decided to place with ESA one firm Ariane launch order and an option for its Intelsat V series of satellites, after two and a half years of keen competition with the space shuttle.

Finally, at its 28th meeting on 12th and 13th December 1978 the ESA Council approved the launch by Ariane of the ECS-2, ECS-3 and ECS-4 satellites which will be exploited by Eutelsat.

Consequently, a second series of five or six launchers will be put into production at the end of 1979.

III. *The potential market — satellites of all kinds — for the Ariane launcher*

In view of the world programmes which can give rise to Ariane launches during the 1981-90 decade and allowing for the back-up launchers needed in the event of possible launch failures or in-orbit satellite malfunctions, it is a reasonable estimate that the Ariane market will represent a requirement over the next ten years of forty to some fifty launch vehicles.

This estimate is based mainly on the setting up of European space systems to which Europe is already committed, or which are very likely to be decided within the next three years, and on the export prospects for space systems.

In the case of systems in the first group, launches have been assumed between 1981 and 1990 of :

— two or three ESA scientific satellites, the first of which has already been decided (launch in 1981) ;

— the follow-on satellites of the French earth observation programme which may comprise two further units to ensure continuity of the exploitation and evolution of the system ;

— one or two ESA earth observation satellites ;

— three Meteosat satellites to provide continuity of meteorological observations over the decade ;

— two technological satellites to experiment the techniques and systems needed for materials processing in space, a new space application likely to develop considerably over the period 1990-2000 ;

— four ECS satellites (in 1981, 1982, 1985 and 1986 respectively) and three Marecs satellites (in 1981 and early and late 1982 respectively) ;

— satellites for the Telecom-1 project proposed by the *Direction Générale des Télécommunications* in France and intended mainly to assure numerical transmission between firms. This project, not yet decided, might require the placing in orbit of three satellites for the period concerned ;

— seven satellites for the requirements of three direct television broadcasting systems in Europe ;

— three to four additional application satellites.

With regard to the export of space systems, Iran, India, the Arab League and certain South American countries have already indicated their intention of equipping themselves by 1981-83 with national or regional satellites to meet their requirements.

The development prospects for direct television broadcasting satellites in particular were bolstered at the World Administrative Radio Conference on satellite broadcasting held in Geneva in January 1977. The extent of the requirement was such that when planning orbital locations and frequency channels for these satellites, it was necessary to limit requests from each country to four or five television programmes. There is no doubt that the operational demonstration of such a powerful instrument as television broadcasting by satellite may expedite projects in a considerable number of countries, even if the timetable is still very unpredictable. This could be the case in Europe as soon as one country decides to use such a system, but would also apply to the Middle East, including Saudia Arabia, and to South America and to Africa, particularly in countries where the ground infrastructure is still non-existent or concentrated at a few places.

With regard to exports, the following launch assumptions are made for the 1981-90 decade :

— five to ten satellites for establishing two to four national or regional telecommunications systems ;

— four to eight satellites for the establishment after 1983 of two to four direct television broadcasting systems ;

— two to four satellites for international Intelsat and Inmarsat telecommunication systems.

In view of the possibility in some cases of placing two satellites in orbit with a single launcher, these assumptions taken together point to a requirement of between thirty-six and forty-six launchers.

Combined with a launch success probability factor of 90 % — as for American launchers — necessitating four to five back-up launchers, the estimate therefore ranges between forty and some fifty launchers.

IV. *Ariane's chances of competing with the United States shuttle*

With a few months to go before the first test flights of the shuttle — the new space transportation system developed by the United States — and the Ariane launcher developed by Europe, commercial satellite promoters who need to schedule their launches at the present time are hesitating a great deal before making up their minds.

Although NASA, which has had a monopoly of the launch market, enjoys an unquestioned technical reputation with users, the latter are nonetheless concerned about the technical novelty of the shuttle and would like, before making a choice, greater certainty about the time schedule, costs and environmental conditions for their payloads.

The Ariane programme and the shuttle programme, born of very different motivations and ambitions, have however a common purpose, i.e. the launching of application satellites. But, while the shuttle is well-suited to low-orbit missions, this is not so much the case for geostationary orbits since it requires an additional powered stage. While its lift-off mass is ten times greater than Ariane's, its performance in geostationary orbit is only twice as good. Ariane is also particularly suitable for the sun-synchronous orbits required for earth observation satellites.

The fact that the two programmes differ in complexity means that they have progressed differently. It may be noted in particular that :

— all of the complete flight configuration tests of the three Ariane stages took place in December 1977 and January 1978 at nominal thrust ; the first test of the shuttle main engine at nominal thrust is not scheduled before February or March 1979 ;

— of the four Ariane qualification tests one or even two failures would have only little impact on its operational availability. On the other hand a single orbiter will have to be used for complete qualification of the shuttle system (six flights) and also for the first eight operational flights up to 1981. An accident in flight, even without being catastrophic, would have an immediate and considerable impact on the shuttle's operational availability.

On the financial plane a very aggressive pricing policy, strongly criticised moreover in the United States, has led NASA to grant particularly low prices during the 1981-83 period, a revision at the end of 1983 being subsequently designed to strike a financial balance over these three years plus a further nine.

In spite of that the price quoted by the shuttle for a satellite of the Intelsat V class ($22.5 million at mid-1977 prices) is very close to the marginal cost of Ariane ($22 million dollars at mid-1977 prices) including an insurance policy (10 %) providing a free reflight in the event of failure.

In view of these remarks and the fact that the history of transportation has shown that whenever a technological change occurs the bringing into service of a new concept always takes a great deal of time and effort and never replaces the conventional one outright, it is fair to assume that the coexistence of Ariane and the shuttle on the applications satellites market of the next decade should not prove detrimental to either system.

V. *Uprating of Ariane*

CNES has proposed to ESA a programme for uprating the launcher in order to improve Ariane's competitiveness.

Its main features are :

— a scheme to reduce production costs ;

— a performance improvement programme (to raise the capability in transfer orbit from 1,700 to 2,300 kg) without significantly increasing the unit cost of the launcher.

This performance increase relates mainly to the simultaneous launch of two satellites of the Thor-Delta PAM or STS-PAM class, and the launch of future direct television satellites, and is obtainable easily by modest changes to the

launcher (the addition of two small solid boosters, an increase in 10 % of the Viking engine thrust level, lengthening of the third-stage tank) ;

— a study programme on the parachute-aided reuse of the L 140 first stage of the launcher whose production cost is almost half that of the total vehicle cost.

This overall programme under study by the Ariane Launcher Programme Board should be decided in the second half of the year so that launches to the new standard can be carried out in the second half of 1982.

VI. *Cost of the development programme*

The estimated development cost was fixed at 2,060 million French francs (370.89 MAU [1]), plus a margin of 20 % of this programme cost for technical contingencies, making a total of 2,470 million francs or 445 MAU (at January 1973 prices) or 4,388 million francs (658.3 MAU) updated to July 1977 economic conditions.

It can be estimated that the cost-to-completion of the Ariane programme will remain within this envelope since, less than a year before the first launch, less than a half of the contingency margin is expected to be used by then.

1. MAU = millions of accounting units (1 AU = 5.55 French francs or $US 1.08).

APPENDIX V

(a) Map of French Guiana



(b) Map of Guiana Space Centre



Document 817
Amendments 1 and 2

5th December 1979

Brazilian-European collaborative ventures and the consequences for Europe

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2[1]

tabled by Mr. Cornelissen

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after "emphasis" add "on safeguards against the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and".

2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "and military".

Signed: Cornelissen

1. See 14th Sitting, 6th December 1979 (Amendment 1 agreed to; Amendment 2 withdrawn).

Relations with Parliaments

INFORMATION REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments [2]
by Mr. De Poi, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. *Jeambrun* (Alternate for Mr. Visse) (Chairman) ; MM. *Schlingemann*, De Poi (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Arfé (Alternate : *Borghi*), *Böhm*, *Bonnel*, Delehedde, *Enders*, *Glesener*, *Kershaw*, *Meintz*, *Roper*, Stoffelen (Alternate : *Lamberts*), Tanghe (Alternate : *Dejardin*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Information Report

(submitted by Mr. De Poi, Rapporteur)

I. *Relations with European assemblies*

1. Hitherto, the Committee for Relations with Parliaments has been in touch with all parliamentarians from member countries and hence the representatives to the two other European assemblies who are members of parliament of signatory states of the modified Brussels Treaty.

2. Since the election of the assembly of the Communities by direct universal suffrage, this situation has changed radically ; some three hundred representatives to that assembly are not members of national parliaments and therefore cannot always be kept informed of the work of WEU. The Committee has consequently asked your Rapporteur to examine the problem.

3. Obviously the matter cannot be discussed in depth in time for this session, but the report to be submitted in spring 1980 will set out all the solutions found by the Committee. The question will of course be studied within the limits of the terms of reference of the Committee and hence from a purely technical standpoint, without reference to political or other aspects which would be the responsibility of one of the other Committees.

4. The Committee will therefore merely study how to keep representatives to the European assemblies informed of the work of the WEU Assembly : direct contacts, contacts through the intermediary of officials, or by sending documents, etc.

5. At the time the ECSC assembly was being transformed into the assembly of the Communities, the bureaux of the three assemblies met in January, February, May and October 1957. Meetings between the Clerks of the three assemblies were held in 1956 and 1957 and, more recently, the three Presidents met in 1971 and 1978. The purpose of all these meetings was to solve the problem of co-ordination between the assemblies, their respective responsibilities or preparation for the unification of the European assemblies, while the meetings of Clerks were intended to avoid the same subjects being dealt with in more than one assembly at a time.

6. In 1977, the Conference of Presidents of European Parliamentary Assemblies set up a European centre for parliamentary research and documentation (for the moment a mere network to facilitate the exchange of information between the staffs of national European parliaments and of European parliamentary assemblies) staffed by senior officials from the parliaments of European countries and the three European assemblies. Through this centre, permanent contacts are maintained between officials.

7. Finally, documents are exchanged between the three assemblies to allow each one to be informed of the work the others have carried out, but in view of the volume of such documentation, which is sent to the Offices of the Clerks, in practice only the documentation services read these texts.

8. Since the assembly of the Communities had held only one working session before this report was prepared, it will not be possible to propose solutions to the problems of concern to the Committee until the summer 1980 session of the WEU Assembly. But your Committee is already of the opinion that meetings between the three Clerks and meetings of the three bureaux (in practice the President and one or two other members of each bureau) would be useful for maintaining contact and avoiding duplication in the work of the three organisations whose aim is the unification of Europe.

II. *Activities of the Committee*

9. At the last session of the WEU Assembly, from 18th to 21st June 1979, preparations were already being made for the symposium on a European armaments policy, held from 15th to 17th October this year, and the texts transmitted to the parliaments of the WEU member countries were therefore the recommendations in the three reports which provided a basis for the symposium :

— 329 on industrial bases of European security ;

— 333 on parliaments and defence procurement ;

— 335 on political conditions for European armaments co-operation.

10. The Chairman of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Mr. Jeambrun, sent Committee members a letter suggesting questions to be put on these three texts. To date, questions have been put in the Belgian, French and United Kingdom parliaments.

11. Nevertheless, the total number of interventions recorded by the Committee secretariat for the period 21st June 1979 to 1st October 1979 is rather impressive in spite of the parliamentary recess and the renewal of two governments : by 1st October, fifty interventions had been recorded and Collected Texts 30 includes texts which are

often of great importance. In particular, your Rapporteur wishes to draw attention to a long statement by a Belgian Senator, Mr. Lahaye, who, although not a member of the WEU Assembly, nevertheless described the history of WEU and its various organs. This statement deserves to be widely circulated [1].

12. The problem of responsibilities of the various European assemblies continued to concern members of parliaments, particularly since the direct elections to the assembly of the Communities. An interesting answer by the French Prime Minister, Mr. Barre [2], on 29th September 1979, spells out government opinion in member states on the responsibilities of the various assemblies.

13. Several questions on the WEU Standing Armaments Committee drew the attention of members of parliament to the study which the Committee has been carrying out since 1977 on the armaments industries of member countries (see Document 731, II B 3). This study analyses the conditions for reorganising the European armaments industries with a view to greater co-operation.

14. The Committee paid an information visit to Franche-Comté on 29th and 30th October. A meeting was organised between members of parliament and university and press representatives in order to make WEU and its Assembly better known.

1. See Appendix IV.
2. See Appendix V.

APPENDIX I

Table of action in the parliaments of member countries

(Totals by country for each session)

Recommendations adopted in	Member countries							
	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total
1956	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
1957	4	0	1	0	0	5	2	12
1958	2	0	3	0	0	4	3	12
1959	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
1960	3	12	2	8	0	3	1	29
1961	0	2	0	3	0	6	0	11
1962	2	4	4	6	2	3	10	31
1963	0	0	13	22	1	2	3	41
1964	4	14	9	11	1	5	2	46
1965	0	11	12	24	0	5	28	80
1966	2	12	12	49	1	4	18	98
1967	14	9	22	29	2	6	16	98
1968	6	14	20	22	1	16	47	126
1969	11	15	17	8	0	4	36	91
1970	3	15	15	7	2	3	10	55
1971	0	4	19	9	0	6	10	48
1972	0	6	2	1	0	1	0	10
1973	0	4	2	6	1	0	0	13
1974	0	1	3	13	2	0	0	19
1975	10	28	8	19	3	11	3	82
1976	16	40	13	14	2	3	8	96
1977	4	18	4	15	1	1	14	57
1978	17	49	12	21	4	10	14	127
1979	9	34	7	3	0	1	10	64
Total	107	292	212	290	23	99	235	1,258
Annual average	4.46	12.10	8.83	12.09	0.96	4.12	9.80	7.49

APPENDIX II

Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1977

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session
June 1977	297									—	23
	298	x				1				1	
	299	x				2			2	4	
	300					1			2	3	
	301					1			2	3	
	302		2			1			2	5	
	303									—	
	304					2			2	4	
	305					1			2	3	
	306									—	
Nov. 1977	307	x				1				1	34
	308	x				1	1			2	
	309	x				1		1		2	
	310	x				2				2	
	311	x		1		1				2	
Other action			4	15	4				2	25	
June 1978	312									—	33
	313	x	2	2					2	6	
	314	x	2	2		1	2	3	2	12	
	315		2			2				4	
	316									—	
	317		2			1				3	
	318	x	3	1		1			2	7	
	319									—	
	320									—	
	321					1				1	
Nov. 1978	322					1				1	94
	323	x		6		1				7	
	324					1				1	
	325			7	2	1		2		12	
	326	x	2		4	3			2	11	
	327									—	
	328	x		2	2	4	2	2	4	16	
Other action			7	26	4	4		3	2	46	
June 1979	329	x	2	1	2				2	7	64
	330									—	
	331			2						2	
	332									—	
	333	x	2	1					2	5	
	334									—	
	335	x	2	4					6	12	
Resolution 63						3				3	
Other action			3	26	5			1		35	

APPENDIX III

Visits by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments

22nd February 1963	Paris
10th October 1963	Rome
11th-12th November 1964	Bonn
28th-29th April 1965	The Hague
15th-16th December 1965	Brussels
30th October-1st November 1966	London
23rd-24th November 1967	Berlin (Regional parliament of Land Berlin)
2nd-3rd April 1968	Luxembourg
26th-27th March 1969	Rome
27th-28th October 1969	Paris
14th-15th April 1970	Bonn
1st-2nd April 1971	Rome
4th-5th November 1971	Bonn
24th-25th February 1972	The Hague
18th-19th September 1972	Florence (Regional parliament of Tuscany)
1st-2nd May 1973	St. Hélier (Regional parliament of the States of Jersey)
15th-18th October 1973	Munich (Regional parliament of the Free State of Bavaria)
8th-10th July 1974	Palermo (Regional parliament of Sicily)
27th-28th October 1975	The Hague
11th-12th May 1976	Luxembourg
25th-26th November 1976	Brussels
9th-10th May 1977	Rome
3rd-4th November 1977	Bonn — Wiesbaden (Regional parliament of Hesse)
31st May-1st June 1978	Paris — Cergy/Pontoise
3rd November 1978	Rome
3rd-4th May 1979	The Hague
29th-30th October 1979	Besançon (Franche-Comté region)

APPENDIX IV

Speech by Mr. Lahaye in the Belgian Senate on Western European Union

6th June 1979

Mr. LAHAYE. — It is now clear that the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage will not solve all the problems of Europe's future. It was still possible a few months ago to believe that the newly-elected parliament might be able to take wide-ranging steps to become something of a European constituant assembly, taking its election as a basis for dealing with European affairs as a whole. It is now evident that this will not be so, for during the electoral campaign certain governments had to promise not to increase any of the assembly's responsibilities, particularly in defence matters. The European Parliament will remain, and for a long time to come, whether we like it or not, the parliament of the European Community. The day European union is achieved, will it become the parliament of that union ? It is to be hoped so, but a policy cannot be based on what, at the present juncture, is only a hope.

On the contrary, we must face the facts. The first is of course the existence and text of the Rome Treaty. It and it alone is the present basis of the responsibilities of the European Parliament. But that does not mean that Europe does not exist in other fields, particularly that of defence. But there it is based on other texts and other principles. So far, the only basis is the modified Brussels Treaty which set up Western European Union (WEU) and its Assembly. Perhaps one day we shall witness a merger of the treaties and organisations, giving the European union of tomorrow, or, more probably, the day after tomorrow, a unified structure. But we are not entitled to act as if this were already so.

Western European Union was instituted by the Paris Agreements of 23rd October 1954 modifying the Brussels Treaty of 17th March 1948. The Brussels Treaty linked the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries to face any threat from Germany. The Paris Agreements, on the contrary, associated Germany and Italy with a defence alliance which henceforth united seven European countries. After the rejection of the proposed European Defence Community by the French parliament, the question was to provide a framework for and limitations on the rearmament of Germany and Italy and to allow these countries to take part in defending Europe against a threat that was considered to come mainly from the Soviet Union. For this purpose, Germany was called upon to join the Atlantic Alliance, it being understood that it first belonged to a truly European organisation and that it would give its European partners a certain number of guarantees, without mentioning the principle of supranationality.

The main part of the modified Brussels Treaty is Article V which defines the obligations of its signatories as follows :

> "If any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other high contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power."

It is thus far more binding than the North Atlantic Treaty, which contains no provision for automatic assistance in the event of attack.

Article VIII of the Treaty created a Council "so organised as to be able to exercise its functions continuously ... to consider matters concerning the execution of this treaty and of its protocols and their annexes". The Council was to take decisions by unanimous vote except for application of the protocols concerning the level of armaments and their control. Article IX makes it incumbent on the Council to report to a parliamentary assembly composed of representatives of the seven member countries in the Assembly of the Council of Europe.

The responsibilities of Western European Union are general but their exercise may be entrusted to other organisations : for instance NATO for questions relating to integrated defence, the Council of Europe for social and cultural matters and the EEC for economic matters. It has retained the exercise of its responsibilities in questions relating to the limitation and control of armaments and for the joint production of armaments and it is empowered to resume the exercise of its responsibilities in the event of an organisation with a larger membership appearing to be unable to exercise them. This might *inter alia* be the case of NATO since the North Atlantic Treaty covers only a limited geographical area, whereas consultations between the members of the WEU Council may cover any area of the world whatsoever.

The limitation and control of armaments

Each year, member countries have to provide the Council with statements of their forces and armaments on the mainland of Europe. An

Agency for the Control of Armaments is responsible for verifying these statements in respect of armaments. However, a number of special commitments apply to the Federal Republic of Germany which, under the treaty, undertook not to produce certain conventional weapons and above all any atomic, biological or chemical weapons. Application of these bans is ensured by the *Agency for the Control of Armaments* which has the wherewithal to carry out documentary and on-the-spot checks. WEU is in fact the only effective guarantee of the non-production of atomic weapons by the Federal Republic of Germany.

In May 1955, a *Standing Armaments Committee* was set up, associating the defence staffs of member countries with a view to the joint production of military equipment. The aim was to allow European armaments industries to reorganise themselves in terms of a market sufficiently vast to allow the armies of member countries to procure equipment which would no longer, in the main, be purchased from the United States. In fact, the Standing Armaments Committee has so far played only a very limited rôle because an attempt was made to organise the co-production of armaments in the framework of NATO and not in a European framework. So, in spite of the creation of the independent European programme group (IEPG), co-operation in this field has remained meagre, contrary to the wishes frequently expressed by certain governments and by the WEU Assembly.

What has WEU done ? It played an important rôle in the development of Franco-German relations and in the solution of the Saar problem, up to the signing of the treaty of friendship and co-operation between General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer.

Inter alia, the WEU Council helped to bring the British economy closer to that of six-power Europe until the United Kingdom joined the European Community.

Where defence policy is concerned, WEU has maintained a close link between France and its partners in the Atlantic Alliance since France's withdrawal from the NATO integrated military structure.

From a technical standpoint, the control of armaments has worked perfectly satisfactorily. However, from the moment France started to build up a nuclear force, it refused to allow controls to be applied to this force. There are now signs that the Government of the Federal Republic is feeling some aversion for what is considered to be the discriminatory treatment to which it is subjected. Its reservations concern the restrictions on its right to manufacture conventional weapons.

All the member countries seem to consider that the treaty, particularly Article V, is an important part of their security. This is specially the case of the Federal Republic since it is the only text by which the other member countries are firmly committed to defending the Federal Republic in the event of attack. Such a binding article as Article V implies continuing co-operation between all its signatories and mutual confidence which can be based only on respect for the treaty as a whole.

Twenty-five years' application of the modified Brussels Treaty have led to the relinquishment of some of WEU's work in favour of other European or Atlantic organisations. On several occasions, France has made proposals for stimulating the activities of the WEU Council both as a forum in which Europeans should effectively examine among themselves problems relating to their common security and as a centre for intra-European co-operation in the production of armaments. The most notable attempt to concert defence policies was made by Mr. Jobert in an address to the WEU Assembly on 21st November 1973.

It was followed by parallel proposals by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Van Elslande, concerning the joint production of armaments. But although they have never rejected these proposals, the other member states have never followed them up either but, on the one hand, have sought to develop political co-operation in a framework closer to the European Communities — "nine-power political consultations" — and on the other to develop armaments co-operation in a framework closer to NATO — first "Eurogroup", in which France refused to take part, and then the independent European programme group in which France does take part.

To date, the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance have attained worthwhile results in the co-production of armaments only through agreements with which firms were directly associated. No European organisation can really claim to direct this joint production.

In spite of the absence of political will shown by the majority of the members of its Council of Ministers, WEU is at present the only truly European organisation with responsibilities in defence matters. It is distinct from the Atlantic Alliance and is based on the principle of unanimity which preserves the freedom of decision and action of its members.

Further, WEU opens the way to close co-operation on a truly European basis in the field of armaments production and is a factor of détente and peace of considerable importance because it forbids the Federal Republic to produce nuclear weapons. Indeed, it provides the Soviet Union with the guarantee that Germany will respect the non-proliferation treaty and also

assures Germany's partners that no switch in the foreign policy of the Federal Republic can give it the power to jeopardise the balance and peace in Europe.

There seems to be no doubt that WEU will be maintained until the treaty expires in 2004. But it is certain that the most is not being made of all its inherent possibilities. A revival of its activities might shape a different course for Western Europe.

The WEU Assembly for its part has always asked the Council to apply the modified Brussels Treaty in full, together with its protocols. This will be seen again at the next session, to be held in Paris from 18th to 21st June, since the agenda includes three reports designed to prepare for a vast symposium to be held in Brussels in October, bringing together parliamentarians, civil servants and representatives of industry to study the prospects of joint production in Europe. One report concerns parliaments and defence procurement, the second the political conditions for European armaments co-operation and the third the industrial bases of European security.

Is it once again to discuss matters so closely related to Europe's security without the Council, duly represented by some of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs or Defence of the seven member countries, playing a real part in a debate on essential questions raised by parliamentarians and on the texts of recommendations ? Or will the ministers again prefer to rely on the Permanent Council, which meets at ambassadorial level, to spend months working out written replies concealing, under the stratagems of diplomatic language, the fact that it is constantly evading its responsibilities ? Yet the Council is informed in advance of the texts submitted by the Committees in plenary assembly and there is no reason why it should not prepare its participation in the debates without infringing the unanimity rule imposed on it by the treaty.

If the Council agreed to make this effort, parliamentarians would feel less as if they were addressing shadows and, back in their own countries, they might be able to transmit to their colleagues who appointed them as their national parliaments' representatives to the WEU Assembly worthwhile information about Europe's prospects in the fields of defence, armaments and security policy. Could we not, for our part at least, ask our government to do its utmost to ensure the full application of both the spirit and the letter of a treaty which institutes as a basis of Europe's defence policy a dialogue between representatives of governments and of parliaments ?

.....

APPENDIX V

Question put by Mr. Odru in the French National Assembly on the defence responsibilities of the assembly of the European Communities and reply by Mr. Barre, Prime Minister

Question put by Mr. Odru (15th September 1979)

Mr. Odru complains very strongly to the Prime Minister about the decision to include in the agenda of the assembly of the European Communities a debate on Community programmes for arms supplies. This decision was taken in Paris by the Bureau of the European assembly under the chairmanship of Mrs. Veil. But according to the Rome Treaty defence questions are not within the purview of that assembly. They are the responsibility of each national government. Hardly three months after the elections to that body, therefore, the French Government is revealing its intention, concealed from the French people at the time of the electoral campaign, to drag our country further towards supranationality. It is scorning the statements, now proved untrue, by the President of the Republic that the French Government would oppose any extension of the powers of the European assembly at the expense of the French parliament. Common programmes for arms supplies, like programmes for the standardisation or interoperability of armaments, are but the first step towards undermining any authentic national defence and establishing a so-called European defence for which a whole campaign is still being orchestrated. In fact, true national defence cannot be envisaged without a national policy for the production of armaments. Consequently, Mr. Odru asks the Prime Minister to indicate as a matter of urgency whether or not he intends to ensure that the Rome Treaty is respected by having the question of common programmes for arms supplies removed from the agenda of the European assembly.

Reply by Mr. Barre, Prime Minister (29th September 1979)

The question put by the honourable member seems to confuse government policy with the internal procedure of the assembly of the European Communities. Here it is recalled that the Communities and their institutions are not part of the institutional order of the French Republic, as the Constitutional Council confirmed in its decision of 30th December 1976. The inscription by the enlarged Bureau of the assembly of the European Communities of an oral question for debate on common programmes for arms supplies in the framework of industrial policy can therefore in no way be assimilated to the French Government's action in this field. In its relations with the assembly of the European Communities, the government intends to abide by the provisions of the treaties and the constant practice which has been established since their signature.

In the case raised by the honourable member, he notes that the decision of the enlarged Bureau of the assembly of the European Communities was taken in accordance with Rules 12 and 47 of the Rules of Procedure of that assembly which in turn were adopted in accordance with Article 142 of the Rome Treaty. The consequence is that it is in correct application of the treaties that the assembly of the European Communities is master of its agenda without other institutions of the Communities and the governments of member states having any say whatsoever. As the honourable member knows, the treaties make no provision for the subjects of debates in the assembly to be verified for conformity with the responsibilities of the Communities as defined in the treaties. Nor is there need for such verification since, under the provisions of Article 4 of the Rome Treaty, acts of one of the institutions of the European Communities outside the limits of its attributions have no effect on the others and *a fortiori* on states. Conversely, it has become established custom since the Communities were created, and with the active participation of all political groups represented in the assembly without exception, for the latter to debate questions outside the scope of the treaties but which may be of interest either because they are tackled in the framework of political co-operation between the governments of member states or because they are of special concern to public opinion in each of the states. Any resolutions the assembly may adopt after such debates are without legal effect. The French Government, in the Council of Ministers of the European Communities, has always ensured that this is so.

In the future as in the past, it will continue to refuse to consider in the Council matters which do not conform to the letter and spirit of the treaties, which is the case in point raised by the honourable member. The French Government considers in fact that the item included in the agenda of the assembly of the European Communities relating to the armaments industry, under cover of industrial policy considerations, in fact touches on national defence policies which are outside the purview of the European institutions. It is also the opinion of the governments of the other member states since, in reply to an

earlier written question on an identical matter put to the Council of the European Communities by Mr. Normanton, representative to the assembly of the European Communities, on 14th July 1977, the Council stated that it was not empowered to examine such a matter.

Moreover, the government reminds the honourable member that, at internal French level, it is bound, under Article 2 of Law 77-630 of 30th June 1977 on the election by direct universal suffrage of representatives to the Assembly of the European Communities, to consider any act by that assembly outside the limits of its responsibilities as recognised by the treaties to be null and void where France is concerned. The government will not change its policy in this respect. This reminder and the accompanying details are considered sufficient to calm the concern expressed by the honourable member.

Document 819 **5th November 1979**

Political conditions for European armaments co-operation

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee [2]
by Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mrs. *von Bothmer* (Chairman) ; MM. Sarti (Alternate : *Treu*), *Portheine* (Vice-Chairmen) ; Mr. Ariosto, *Sir Frederic Bennett*, MM. Berrier, *Brugnon*, Deschamps, *Druon*, Faulds (Alternate : *McGuire*), *Gessner*, Gonella, Hanin, Lord McNair (Alternate : *Page*), MM. *Mangelschots*, *Mende*, *Minnocci*, Mommersteeg, *Müller*, Péridier, Perin (Alternate : *van Waterschoot*), Lord Reay (Alternate : *Atkinson*), MM. Reddemann, Segre, Thoss, *Urwin*, Voogd (Alternate : *Schlingemann*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on political conditions for European armaments co-operation

The Assembly,

Noting with interest the work of the symposium on a European armaments policy held in Brussels from 15th to 17th October 1979 ;

Noting that in the opinion of most of the experts consulted only a pragmatic approach is likely to advance European armaments co-operation in the future ;

Convinced, however, that Europe will have to assume increasing responsibility for its own security, particularly insofar as this involves conventional weapons ;

Considering that the production of armaments brings into play a broad spectrum of unequal interests in the various member countries ;

Thanking the Council for having authorised the Head of the International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee to present to the Assembly his conclusions on the juridical obstacles to co-operation reached as a result of the enquiry conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee in accordance with a wish often expressed by the Assembly ;

Recalling its Recommendation 335 ;

Rejecting the assertions in paragraph 4 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 331 and in the corresponding paragraphs of the replies to Recommendations 325 and 330 ;

Recalling that the WEU Assembly is, as explicitly admitted by the Council, the only European assembly with defence responsibilities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Use every means at its disposal to promote co-operation between its members in the production of armaments ;

2. Examine, *inter alia* on the basis of the work of the Standing Armaments Committee, by what means it would be possible to establish in Western Europe, account being taken of the specific responsibilities of each institution :

(*a*) an organisation responsible for gathering and circulating all necessary information on European supply and demand in the field of armaments ;

(*b*) a body responsible for analysing choices of armaments programmes and their overall financial, technical, economic and social repercussions ;

(*c*) appropriate customs legislation for transfers of armaments between Western European states ;

(*d*) appropriate legislation for transnational bodies producing armaments ;

(*e*) legislation designed to promote exchanges of technology between European industries ;

(*f*) legislation and effective action against the illicit production of and traffic in armaments ;

3. Encourage all member states to co-operate by communicating all the information needed to facilitate this work ;

4. Re-examine and explain the positions expressed in paragraph 4 of its replies to Recommendations 325 and 331 and inform the Assembly of developments in the work of the IEPG as it undertook to do in its reply to Recommendation 298.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur)

1. At its session in June 1979, the Assembly adopted Recommendation 335 proposing to the Council a framework for promoting closer co-operation in armaments production. The symposium held in Brussels from 15th to 17th October 1979, and in particular the work of its Working Group II for which the General Affairs Committee had special responsibility, did not incite your Rapporteur to change course in the present report. He is including at appendix the general report submitted by Mr. Schmidt on behalf of Working Group II so that all who are interested may take cognisance of the results of this work.

2. This in no way means that the symposium was not highly instructive, as may be seen from the recommendation accompanying this report. But the lessons learned bring grist and clarification to the direction already followed by the Assembly rather than any fundamental change.

3. As he is appending the general report, your Rapporteur does not consider that he, for his part, needs to review the symposium. He will merely make a few remarks which concern more specifically the recommendation.

4. He first wishes to congratulate and thank the WEU Council for having acceded to a wish frequently expressed by the Assembly, particularly when adopting the report which he already submitted to it on behalf of the General Affairs Committee last June, by authorising Mr. Plantey, Head of the International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee, to describe to the symposium the lessons and experience he had gained in directing the inquiry into the European armaments industries which the SAC [1] had been asked to make, with particular regard to the section on the juridical aspects which has now been completed and transmitted to the governments. Your Rapporteur trusts that it will not now be allowed to gather dust in governmental archives. Our task will be to urge governments to draw the full benefits from it in the years to come.

5. The document which he submitted to us for discussion shows clearly that the European armaments market is far from being just a national market extended to European dimensions and that any differences there may be between the legal position of firms in each country and the obstacles still standing in the way of European co-operation in this field conceal something far deeper: political differences stemming from national traditions and each country's history and freedom in foreign policy and the organisation of its defence. The matters he covers are not legal alone, it is for politicians to seek solutions which can but be political. In this connection, Mr. Plantey gives many useful indications and suggestions, pointing to a series of directions in which immediate progress seems possible and desirable. For instance, there is no reason why the instruments of co-production responsible for manufacturing a given type of weapon should remain subject only to the national laws of the country in which they have their head office. Nor is there any reason why the problem of customs duties on imports of military equipment by our countries should not be settled reasonably and permanently.

6. When considering the present report on 5th November 1979, certain members of the Committee stressed that they did not consider customs obstacles to be a major hindrance to the development of transfers of armaments within Western Europe and that certain countries' administrative and trade practices were also an impediment. The Committee therefore wished the Council to react against a protectionist spirit and protectionist practices in this field of armaments not covered by the Rome Treaty.

7. Similarly, questions raised by technology transfer might, at least within the European Communities, be solved quickly and satisfactorily. Very cautiously, Mr. Plantey concludes that Europe is moving towards a reduction in the unilateral nature of decisions in armaments matters. It is this trend that we must identify and direct.

8. Further, your Rapporteur wishes to underline the importance of the suggestions made by Professor Greenwood on the economic aspects of the problem. He has not hesitated to include them in his recommendation because he felt them to be particularly pertinent and well-suited to what the Assembly might in fact ask of the Council. He wishes to thank their author.

9. In drafting the recommendation which it adopted, the Committee retained the terms which Professor Greenwood had deliberately left rather vague in the paper which he submitted to the symposium: an "organisation" responsible for circulating information, a "body" responsible for analysis. In view of prevailing uncertainty about the attributions of existing intra-European bodies (IEPG, SAC or even the EEC), the results actually achieved by each one and what they are to become, the Committee wished to spell out,

1. Standing Armaments Committee (WEU).

like Professor Greenwood, the functions which it thought ought to be fulfilled without embarking on an institutional debate. Professor Greenwood's paper is, moreover, detailed enough in defining these functions for your Rapporteur merely to refer, in this connection, to the official record of the Brussels symposium and to recall the usefulness for European co-operation of adequate information about armaments requirements as defined by national defence staffs, planned procurement schedules and the capabilities and forecasts of firms producing armaments. This exchange of information is distinct from the function of analysing armaments programmes with a view to informing parties to contracts or markets in this field.

10. This does not mean that the other papers submitted to Working Group II were not most valuable and important, although the subjects and the direction followed by their authors may have been less suitable for recommendations to the WEU Council. They will be published in the official record of the symposium which should be read in conjunction with this report. On behalf of the Committee, your Rapporteur wishes to take this opportunity of conveying his most sincere thanks to all those who contributed.

11. Several of the Council's replies to recommendations adopted by the Assembly at the June 1979 session also relate to European armaments co-operation. They therefore call for a few comments by your Rapporteur.

12. Two points in particular attracted his attention. First, in its reply to Recommendation 330, the Council sets out clearly the way in which it intends to inform the Assembly of the work undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee as follows :

> "At their meeting at ministerial level on 16th May 1979, the Council decided not to circulate the study chapter by chapter. As soon as the complete text is in their possession, the Council will consider the content and appropriate form of the information to be given to the Assembly."

13. This reply might have seemed rather unsatisfactory if, on the other hand, the Council had not authorised Mr. Plantey to address Working Group II of the Brussels symposium on the juridical obstacles to European armaments co-operation. This gesture of goodwill allows the Assembly to defer to a decision, the reasons for which it has difficulty in grasping in view of the Council's laconic replies.

14. Conversely, your Rapporteur must express surprise at paragraph 4 of the reply to Recommendation 331 (referred to in the reply to Recommendation 330) in which it is stated :

> "As stated in their reply to Recommendation 325, it would be difficult for the Council as such to inform the Assembly about the activities of the IEPG, since its membership is different from that of WEU, with which it has no organisational links. However, it is open to members of the Assembly to question their governments on this subject, through their national parliaments."

15. Admittedly, paragraph 4 of the reply to Recommendation 325 expressed a similar position, although less curtly, but since it did not reach the Assembly until just before the June session, your Rapporteur was not able to mention it in his previous report.

16. Without denying possible problems for the Council in reporting to the Assembly on the work of the IEPG, it seems difficult to accept the Council's reply as worded. What is meant by the statement that WEU has no "organisational links" with the IEPG ? The WEU Council agrees to inform the Assembly, insofar as possible, of the way in which questions within its purview are handled in the framework of other organisations with which WEU has no "organisational" links. It has done so on several occasions, as indicated in its reply to Recommendation 298 which specifies that :

> "In their annual reports, the Council provide the Assembly with the appropriate information on their work, together with any information which can be included on matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty by its signatories in bodies other than WEU."

17. What is the reason for its refusal in this specific case ? Is it not thus calling in question its oft-repeated assertion that the Assembly is "the only European assembly with defence responsibilities" ? Or is co-ordination of the work of the various European bodies dealing with armaments so inexistent that it has no information about the work of the IEPG ? This is difficult to believe when it is recalled that it was agreed that the SAC should base its work on the standards laid down by the IEPG.

18. The Council's attitude is all the more inexplicable since it recommends members of the Assembly to question their governments through their national parliaments. If the governments are informed of the work of the IEPG, how is it that the Council is not ? Neither the effective lack of information nor the absence of organisational links is a credible reason for the Council's refusal.

19. Is there not another reason, less easy to admit : that one or other of its members is challenging the right of any European organisation to deal with armaments questions ? This refusal may be justifiable in the case of the

Communities and of the European Parliament in view of the provisions of the Rome Treaty and the supranational nature of these institutions. It is not so in the case of WEU in view of the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and the intergovernmental nature of the organisation.

20. If it were to be thought that this situation might lead to the European Parliament taking over supervision of the work of the IEPG, there is every reason to believe that they would be making a serious mistake. There is nothing to show — and certainly not the replies of the Council — that what is refused an assembly with responsibility for such matters would be granted to another parliamentary assembly without responsibility in this field. Nor is it evident that those wishing to avoid the provisions of a treaty that they have signed would accept controls to which nothing commits them. In view of the difficult situation through which Europe is now passing, there is every reason to fear that what WEU might lose today would be lost by Europe for a long time to come if the transfer of the exercise of the responsibilities of one institution to another was not done in a formal manner.

21. Should the Council maintain its position in this matter, it would be a considerable setback in progress towards European armaments co-operation and would also place in doubt the agreement painfully reached between the Council and the Assembly on their mutual relations.

22. Finally, the Council's reply to Recommendation 335 on the report of the General Affairs Committee on political conditions for European armaments co-operation, although not giving a sufficiently detailed answer to the various points in the recommendation, nevertheless demonstrates that, on the whole, the Council seems to concur with the views expressed by the Assembly.

23. However, in several respects, it did not really reply to the recommendation. For instance, the Council states that :

> "... the SAC was not in a position to submit its final report when the Ministerial Council met in Rome on 16th May 1979..."

but does not say why the SAC was not in a position to submit its report. It is not enough for the Council to consider that :

> "... the first part of the economic study should be completed both swiftly and to the best effect, with the co-operation of the administrations concerned" ;

the Council, or at least its members, should ensure that this co-operation is effectively forthcoming without reservation or limitations.

24. Second, it must be noted that the Council gives no undertaking about what is to be done with the SAC's work, and this makes it incumbent on the Assembly to follow attentively the way the Council follows up this study in practice.

25. Finally, the way in which the Council replies to the sixth paragraph of the recommendation concerning trade in arms constitutes an interesting position :

> "The Council have noted the Assembly's concern regarding the dangers of the trade in arms in areas where peace is threatened. This is an important problem which involves different political factors in each country ; it would be unrealistic to deal with it in the European framework only, since in fact this excludes the principal armaments exporting and importing countries.
>
> On the other hand, bearing in mind its responsibilities in this respect, every European country could draw relevant conclusions from the results of joint action that might be taken between countries of the same geographical area with a view to voluntary limitation of their own imports ; such consultations, which would also bring in the main supplier countries, would indeed make it possible to envisage concerted limitation on the sales of conventional weapons."

But the Council must not be content to express a wish ; it must take the necessary steps to ensure that the wish becomes reality. Of course, such a problem cannot be dealt with "in the European framework only". Nevertheless, this is the framework in which steps might be taken to implement the policy advocated by the Council.

26. During the discussions in Committee on 5th November 1979, the wish was also expressed that the Council deal with the question of traffic in arms — as distinct from trade in armaments — concerning which the Committee believes that the measures taken in each member country to ban or abolish such traffic should be co-ordinated so that Europe plays absolutely no part in operations dangerous for civil and international peace in certain parts of the world, particularly Africa, and for the security of people throughout the world, including Western Europe. Your Rapporteur can but endorse this wish, recalling that when the problems of international terrorism and the protection of diplomats were examined, the Council demonstrated that it considered matters relating to public order to be within its purview.

APPENDIX

General report submitted by Mr. Schmidt, General Rapporteur of Working Group II

Introduction

European policy towards the armaments industry — an ambiguous and often ill-defined notion

The thoughts of Working Group II were dominated by two considerations which were perhaps not sufficiently elaborated but which seem to have played a major rôle in the reasoning of those who spoke.

The first, a real paradox, is that France, now Europe's leading armaments producer, sends 80 % of its exports of military equipment to non-European countries, whereas the EEC absorbs more than half the total of all its sales abroad. This explains France's major reservations towards anything that might limit its freedom of action, at least as long as Europe does not guarantee it the large-scale outlet it needs. Recent experience has shown that there is little immediate hope of this. Conversely, a European armaments policy in which it played less than a full part would have little significance.

The second is that the notion of an armaments market can hardly be applied to Europe. In fact, there is no armaments market in the economic sense of the word, for conventional criteria of supply and demand ultimately play only a secondary rôle and the field in which traditional economic competition comes into effect is in reality very limited. There are certainly large-scale transactions but they are not to be seen in simple operational terms. Even within each country, they introduce many factors whose interaction largely escapes analysis. *A fortiori,* there is no European armaments market since possible buyers negotiate with various entities with which they have different kinds of relationship (diplomatic, strategic, etc.).

This is one of the main difficulties of the subject which the Working Group had to tackle and the very remarkable report submitted by Mr. Plantey on the juridical obstacles to armaments co-operation shed particularly strong light on this aspect of the problem by suggesting, as Professor Greenwood also did, a number of specific measures destined not to unsettle this state of affairs but to make it slightly less complex.

Finally, before going to the heart of the debate, it should be indicated that the opposition, stressed only too often, between exports of armaments and co-operation introduces a debate whose terms are clear only if the subject of arms sales is tackled in an ideological context. In fact, there are many intermediary formulae between co-operation proper and pure and simple procurement, particularly in the case of the European market. Moreover, in the case of regions outside Europe, exports are one of the aims of co-operation. Thus to establish a balance sheet of the relative advantages of each possible form of co-operation, the benefits which one or other co-operating party may derive from exports should be included. A number of examples, such as all recent helicopters (Puma, Gazelle) or Alpha-Jet seem to show that co-operation has actually been a factor which encouraged exports and not the reverse. This aspect should be analysed in greater detail to discover why and to what extent.

Finally, what is meant by co-operation? To avoid confusion, I propose a broad, all-embracing definition of co-operation to include any form of collaboration between firms of different nationalities in the field of military equipment. This approach will make it easier subsequently to distinguish between several types of collaboration, and in particular :

(*i*) collaboration only at the level of exploitation ;

(*ii*) collaboration covering more or less advanced production (co-production) ;

(*iii*) collaboration going back to the pre-design stage.

Within each of these main categories, specific formulae are possible, i.e. different legal solutions according to the legal needs in each case with an equitable sharing of participation.

The report will therefore first : *identify the true obstacles to the development of a European armaments policy ;* and, second : *suggest and promote realistic solutions which should be the most effective way of overcoming the obstacles.*

CHAPTER I

Difficulties and obstacles : true and false problems

If it is accepted that the elaboration of European co-operation between armaments industries is a goal which, in one form or another, might be common to all our countries, the true difficulties in the way of any progress in the organisation of this industry at European level should be identified. Remarks made by those who know the most about the problem indicate that the true difficulties do not necessarily correspond to the objections usually put forward in this field.

The most evident obstacles are legal. They have been studied in depth by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee and the indications which, in one form or another, it has given about the results of this study show that these obstacles are far from insuperable. The political will of states might overcome them if, in many cases, they were not dealing with superstructures concealing other, more deep-rooted obstacles, some of which cannot be put aside so easily : in this field too, law is the visible expression of facts which are sometimes difficult to grasp but whose weight is evident.

Intrinsically more important are the difficulties stemming from the objectively different interests of each of the possible partners in the economic field in the widest sense of the term. In fact, each country has its interests and most authors of papers submitted to Working Group II stressed their legitimacy and the importance for the future of Europe of respecting regional concerns and the economic, social and technological reservations of each state called upon to join a European association which committed its national armaments industry.

In view of this European vocation, three types of contrasting interests may be discerned. First, countries with only a small armaments industry, whose situation and concerns were described accurately in Mr. de Geus' paper. They draw their main supplies from abroad and the aim of the national armaments industry is mainly direct economic profitability. Thus, specialisation by their national industries may offer them interesting prospects, which is obviously not the major concern of the larger industrial powers.

Second, there is the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, Europe's leading industrial power, but whose armaments industry is not yet at the level of industries handling civil production. This leaves Germany greater economic freedom in armaments procurement problems since the armaments industry is not central to the economy. Furthermore, the Federal Republic does not yet have the necessary latitude to become an exporting nation. More generally, the limits imposed on Germany's freedom in its defence policy, particularly because of its place in the western system, induce it to seek greater integration in the military field and, to a certain extent, to subordinate its armaments production to this necessity.

The third type is represented by France, whose aim is to have an independent defence system and whose armaments industry has a very considerable degree of independence. France therefore makes its armaments industry play a very large economic rôle since 42 % of its armaments production is exported and this industry provides an economic lead and technological drive for all French industries (at times, this sector accounted for about 30 % of all sums earmarked for research and development throughout French industry), which is not exactly the case on the other side of the Rhine. It cannot therefore accept co-operation which would limit its commercial or technological freedom, not to speak of the particularly heavy burden of economic and social constraints which it has to take into account.

This diversity of types of industrial situation obviously makes it difficult to find a common denominator meeting the individual interests of the principal partners, particularly since it is not always easy to draw a clear distinction between armaments industries and certain industries of a civil nature. In certain cases, such as the aeronautical or electronic industries, which play a major rôle in France, for instance, but also among the industries of the smaller powers, this intermingling is particularly evident.

Finally, the political aspects, or strategic implications, of co-operation are extremely difficult to tackle from a unifying standpoint if this interpenetration is accepted. Can one reasonably link the problem of the armaments industries with a European industrial policy by normalising the armaments industry ?

This is one of the obvious things at stake in the debate, which is not at all academic, whatever may be said, about the responsibilities of the European Communities and the parliamentary assembly which is to supervise them. Not only are there a number of juridical obstacles in the way of this normalisation, but far more deep-rooted political differences in the highest sense of the word preclude thoughts of being able to go very far in this field as regards the part of the future which can be included in any calculation of estimates.

The last and not the least of the obstacles, quite rightly mentioned in Professor Greenwood's report, arises from the absence of an appropriate framework of assessment allowing an overall opinion to be obtained not only of future operations but even of current or completed operations. The Director of the Aberdeen Centre for Defence Studies makes a number of suggestions which should be examined closely with a view to providing Europe with the instruments of information and analysis which seem essential if there is to be any progress in armaments co-operation. *Inter alia,* it is felt that traditional economic analyses of the "cost-effectiveness" type prove to be quite inadequate insofar as up to now they are incapable on the one hand of taking account of indirect macro-economic factors (employment, industrial structure) and on the other hand of including in the calculation non-economic variables which are more difficult to quantify (independence, power). Finally, short-term advantages perhaps obtained by co-oper-

ation do not necessarily imply an advantageous long-term position. However, it is evident that the objective and full assessment of co-operation already carried out would be, at the very least, an essential prior condition to any serious thinking about future co-operation and its practice since it must take account of the overall interests, not all strictly economic, of each of the partners in order to work out the most suitable formulae for obtaining worthwhile economic results. That is why the methodological research necessary for establishing a framework for assessing objectively the advantages of various co-operative operations, far from being gratuitous speculation, on the contrary constitutes valuable assistance in decision-taking in these matters, and much effort should still be made in this area.

These difficulties seem infinitely more serious than those sometimes put forward when a political rather than an economic solution is being sought to the problem. Thus, the impossibility of finding the framework for common developments does not lie in legal impediments or in so-called ideological incompatibility. Mr. Gazzo's report does justice to these false difficulties by underlining the essential rôle which might be played by European parliamentary supervision if it concentrated on these specific points and thus perhaps helped, at its level, to remove some of the abovementioned obstacles.

CHAPTER II

Ways to progress: concrete measures and flexible solutions

There is no doubt that Working Group II conducted a realistic analysis of the situation and the possibilities available. It is therefore not surprising that most speakers considered that at the present juncture co-operation could only be à la carte. At the same time, they sought wide flexibility allowing changes of partner or other adjustments in the event of an operation proving less interesting than expected for one or other partner. Everyone knows that this has frequently happened in the past.

From a legal standpoint, it was possible to make a few specific proposals concerning *inter alia* the institutional framework in which co-production operations might be carried out. Furthermore, Mr. Plantey suggested a range of interesting, more general juridical possibilities (bilateral harmonisation, diplomatic conventions, etc.). But it is from an economic standpoint that this approach seems the most promising and that an analysis of the present situation provides the greatest number of factors favourable to increased co-operation between European countries. This realistic and flexible approach in no way conflicts — quite the contrary — with more all-embracing views of Europe's development, nor does it prejudge the future of Europe in the armaments field.

But if we wish to be more precise, we must know what is on the à la carte menu, to continue Professor Greenwood's well-chosen metaphor. Three questions then arise: Co-operate with whom? How far? In which sector? But before working out an answer to each of these questions, it should be recalled that any co-operative operation brings into play three separate entities: state governments, defence staffs and firms producing military equipment. In each case, therefore, there is a complex system of arbitration which it would be insufficient — and consequently incorrect — to reduce to the level of states alone.

This having been said, let us take the first question, i.e. who is to co-operate. The first case is co-operation with the United States. Mr. Mayer's paper underlined the general difficulties encountered in all co-operation between Europe and the United States and other speakers such as Mr. Doorenbos and Mr. Damm stressed a few specific aspects relating to trade practices in particular and the establishment of precise co-operative operations.

Generally speaking, the difficulty stems from the *asymmetry*, to use Mr. Mayer's well-found word, between Europe and the United States and between firms on the two continents at the industrial, technological and commercial levels. In general, this asymmetry often means comparatively higher costs for production in Europe. Account should be taken of the remarks by Mr. Deschamps to the effect that co-operation, as seen by certain circles which wished to make a unified Europe the single partner of the United States, in reality fostered American domination over Western Europe. In fact it is the United States that makes the most continuous effort to have a single European partner, but weak because of that, whereas the division of Europe allows it, paradoxically and in many ways, to negotiate better and above all to ensure the survival of its technological capability which would disappear in generalised co-production. Thus, the choice of SNECMA for co-production of aircraft engines is justified by the existence of an independent European industry with Rolls-Royce. Fully open competition in Europe, or generalised co-production with the United States, would probably reduce European firms to a secondary rôle. Any sustained co-operation might then permanently compromise the future of the European armaments industry.

It was underlined that the United States sought merely to purchase patents and that it imposed its language, and those who, like Mr. Wall, advocate the development of the two-way street wish to see it organised on the basis of a prior compromise which, in exchange

for what the United States imposes on Europe would, for instance, have the United States adopt the metric system. But the main thing is to agree on what is counted as procurement on the United States side. It is perhaps too much to wish to include only purchases of weapons systems. But it is certainly wrong to count all the expenditure involved in the American military presence in Europe.

However this may be, Western Europe's research capability must be preserved and close consideration given to the practice of compensation which some wish to be global over a time-span fixed in advance, five years, for instance, and which others wish in every case to be set at a technological level equal to that of the products purchased in the United States.

Intra-European co-operation for its part will probably assume different forms depending on whether it is between large industrial powers or with smaller countries.

When it is a matter of large industrial powers, i.e. mainly the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic and France, the difficulty is to achieve an equitable solution in view of the fact that the industrial development of these three countries has been different or even sometimes divergent, which has led to negative effects, particularly where Franco-British co-operation is concerned. The best approach would apparently be to start co-operation at the preliminary research stage on the basis of a definition of requirements agreed by the buyers and subsequently in a second stage define a method of co-operation ensuring a satisfactory sharing of responsibilities which is, above all, worked out in advance. Here, the formation of a specific firm for the production of each family of armaments is a solution which has proved its worth, not only in the case of Airbus but also for various families of weapons.

In the event of co-operation between the largest and the smallest countries, it is quite evident that it must take a different form, account being taken of the needs and capabilities of each country. The notion of fair return is obviously not of the same importance in this case. But for the smaller countries, what counts first of all is that co-operation should be more attractive financially than the procurement of American equipment, which raises the problem of prices, and the delicate question of compensation. Second, there must be very close regard for the independence of firms and the technological independence of these countries.

Turning now to the actual content of co-operation, most speakers underlined that, to have any chance of success, co-operation had to begin before a country could establish any sort of priority in order, as far as possible, to associate the planned operation with *national honour* (the words are Mr. Wall's). In other words, in most cases, co-operation should start at the design or even pre-design stage (preparatory study stage). It must then cover all production operations and, finally, as Mr. de Geus underlined, if it is to be really effective, it must also extend to the maintenance and upkeep of the equipment produced.

It emerges from these remarks that it is the sectors in which the armaments industry is the most closely linked with civil production, such as the aircraft and computer sectors, where the industry itself is already very largely internationalised, that co-operation is the easiest. In the case of traditional equipment for the army, where firms, often nationalised, are the privileged suppliers of certain national armies, co-operation often proves more difficult and has to be viewed more in terms of technical normalisation than in truly economic terms.

In this general context, naval shipbuilding is an intermediary stage. Obviously the first steps should be taken in areas where co-operation is easiest, particularly as these sectors are probably the ones whose economic and technical future is the most promising. We should therefore not be too disturbed if, for instance, the French army continues for a long time to come to prefer French vehicles and the British army British vehicles.

Conclusions

The search for an operational time scale

The overall thinking of this Working Group was not concerned with the immediate future, which is already fully determined, nor was it concerned with the very long term where anything is possible and where everything may be changed by scientific and technical upheavals which are yet impossible to foresee. It is very difficult today to see what Europe or European co-operation, in any field whatsoever, will be at the end of this century, which is not very far away. But a medium-term horizon, i.e. ten to fifteen years hence, should allow steps to be taken now to set Europe's course for a far longer period. It is in this context that what some may consider to be the rather disillusioned realism of the preoccupations and solutions advocated by this group should be placed.

Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee [2] *by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted in Committee by 16 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mrs. *von Bothmer* (Chairman) ; MM. Sarti (Alternate : *Treu*), *Portheine* (Vice-Chairmen) ; Mr. Ariosto, *Sir Frederic Bennett*, MM. Berrier, *Brugnon*, Deschamps, *Druon*, Faulds (Alternate : *McGuire*), *Gessner*, Gonella, Hanin, Lord McNair (Alternate : *Page*), MM. Mangelschots (Alternate : *van Waterschoot*), *Mende*, *Minnocci*, Mommersteeg, *Müller*, Péridier, Perin, Lord Reay (Alternate : *Atkinson*), MM. Reddemann, Segre, *Thoss*, *Urwin*, Voogd (Alternate : *Schlingemann*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on the impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

The Assembly,

Considering that the maintenance of peace in the Near and Middle East is essential for Western Europe's security and economic prosperity;

Regretting that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, far from establishing internal peace, political stability and a resumption of economic activity in that country, has led to intercommunal and religious strife and created yet another difficult refugee problem;

Considering that the upheaval in Iran in 1978, inspired by revolutionary principles, has further delayed the introduction of democracy and the restoration of national unity;

Noting that the Camp David agreements, while establishing peace between Israel and Egypt, have so far provided no solutions to the main problems in the Middle East, especially the Palestine question;

Considering that solutions which exclude participation by the Palestinian people do not offer them the possibility of exercising their right to self-determination and neglect the underlying causes of the conflict;

Considering that the positions adopted by Jordan and expressed by His Majesty King Hussein in the United Nations on 25th September 1979 constitute a positive step towards peace;

Deploring that the continuing establishment of Israeli settlements on the West Bank only makes more difficult a just and lasting solution to the Palestinian problem;

Welcoming the fact that the Nine have been able to speak with a single voice on Middle Eastern matters on several occasions, particularly on 25th September 1979 in the United Nations General Assembly,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that consultation between its members is extended to cover matters relating to Afghanistan and Iran;

2. Ensure that its members refrain from selling arms to Iran as long as internal strife and armed repression continue in that country and seek a general agreement between armaments exporting countries and the countries of the area on curtailing sales of arms to Iran other than those specifically required for defence against external aggression;

3. Continue to co-ordinate the positions of its members in the United Nations and call for a clarification from the Security Council of the actual implications of Resolution 242;

4. Ask Egypt, Israel and the United States urgently to consult with a view to reaching agreement on a mutually accepted interpretation of the implications of the Camp David agreements;

5. Ask its members to urge Israel immediately to accept the existence of the Palestinian people and to renounce its policy of settlements on the West Bank and commence direct negotiations with valid Palestinian representatives as to a time-table for self-determination of the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip;

6. Ask its members to urge the PLO contemporaneously and reciprocally to declare its acceptance of an independent Israeli state within internationally agreed and defined borders and to urge the immediate cessation of terrorist acts of violence which call into question the validity of any such declaration;

7. Use its best endeavours, if these preconditions are met, to promote a broader-based conference than Camp David including representation from all the countries directly involved in the Palestinian dispute.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1. When Yugoslav General Michailovich was about to be executed at the end of World War II he is reputed to have said, as his own epitaph, that he claimed only to be just one more victim of what he described as the "storm of the world", adding that even though the global conflict had come to an end, many more men, women and children would die violent deaths before the storm abated.

2. Yet not even the most prescient individual would have guessed how long — after "peace" had been attained, at such cost — bitter strife would continue, deriving not only from ideological clashes but including interracial and inter-communal religious and other tensions, affecting every continent and involving the deaths of hundreds of thousands more people, all surely utterly war-weary in the aftermath of the carnage of 1939-46. Yet since then, as soon as one part of the world seems to have regained some degree of stabilisation and freedom from bloodshed, fresh trouble spots have arisen, new "bush fires" have been lit to plague the governments of those nations dedicated to seeking to re-establish some overall global level of security, co-operation and order.

3. Some of the most persistent, intractable sources of new tensions threatening to embroil not just those directly concerned, but the great powers too, have derived from the Near and Middle East ; and at this time the dangers of a conflagration on an ever-widening scale seem to be increasing, rather than waning.

4. Looking eastwards from the Aegean, the Cyprus problem, although forming no part of this report, has to be included in one's consideration of what could turn out to lead to a highly dangerous chain reaction. More in the news, of course, and even more inflammatory, as long as left unsolved, is the Israeli-Arab quarrel, which all the efforts of mediators within and without the framework of the United Nations have failed to resolve. This particular dispute has, ever since the state of Israel came into being, varied between periods of heightening and temporarily reduced tension, smouldering antagonism and actual outbreaks of open conflict. The repercussions have not only affected Israel itself and its immediate neighbours (perhaps most tragically of all that former example of intercommunal peace through compromise — Lebanon). They have also made immeasurably more difficult highly desirable collaboration and genuine friendship between the western world and Muslim countries and Islamic communities, stretching from Morocco in the West to Pakistan and beyond. Needless to add, too, in this context of unsatisfactory relations between the West and much of Islam, the Soviet Union has been able to extend its influence in the whole affected area, because of its championship, however cynical the motivation, of the "Arab cause" as against the alleged injustices perpetrated upon it by a nation — Israel — overtly supported and sustained by capitalist America.

5. Western Europe cannot remain indifferent to developments in the Middle East. Any growth in the Soviet military presence in that area would be liable to endanger the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance system and help to isolate Turkey. The security and economy of Western Europe, the world's leading oil importer, depend on supplies of oil which can come only from the Middle East, which produces 35 % of the world's oil and is by far the leading exporting region. The 1973 crisis showed the close relationship which exists between peace and stability in that area and world prices for oil, on which the West's economy and security largely depend. Finally, the situation in the Middle East and its rôle in the world economy make it a particularly sensitive area in which there is a risk of any tension having unforeseeable repercussions on peace and balance throughout the world.

6. There are of course those — your Rapporteur is not so convinced — who are convinced that the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty has marked a significant step forward towards permanent stabilisation in the area. In the short term of course this is true, in that a state of war between Egypt and Israel, although it has not involved military warfare since 1973, has now formally ended ; and Egyptian aspirations to recover some, if not all, their land lost to Israel in past conflicts has now been achieved too, or, hopefully, is in the process of so being. Also of course the treaty has certainly alleviated Israeli fears of having to fight simultaneously again in the foreseeable future on several fronts. It has also afforded an utterly impoverished Egypt the chance to concentrate on efforts to accomplish economic progress with American assistance. Yet these benefits have only been achieved at the cost of increased hostility among Palestinian Arabs who feel that their cause has been betrayed, have seriously worsened relations between most of the other Arab states and Egypt itself, and have provided new opportunities for the Soviet Union and its backers in the region to exploit anti-western and particularly anti-American sentiments.

7. On any objective analysis it would appear that at best the treaty has acted as a palliative to prevent or inhibit the likelihood of yet another

direct, early Israeli-Arab confrontation. At worst it has provided new elements and causes of instability where too many already previously existed. In the long term the only real and durable solution must lie in an appreciation by all interested parties that the basic causes of the Arab-Israeli quarrels did not suddenly arise with the actual establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, but flowed inevitably from much earlier conflicting policy decisions providing the root cause of the controversy, namely the McMahon letters, the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour declaration. Although many books have since been written to try to explain that these three basic elements in the present unhappy political set-up in the area were not necessarily incompatible, it is a fact that generations of Arabs who have never even read the original documents believe that they have been robbed of rights they thought were guaranteed to them, as the price of their co-operation with the western allies in the first world war in order to defeat the Ottoman empire. Millions of Jews not only living in Israel, Zionists and non-Zionists alike, are also convinced that they *were* promised not just a Jewish homeland within "Arabia", but a separate national state. Hence, it is now academic to continue seeking to reconcile the irreconcilable, to attribute blame for the misunderstandings, or to put the clock back.

8. On the one hand a sovereign state of Israel is here to stay and most Arabs now accept this fact, however reluctantly. On the other hand, lasting peace can never be achieved as long as Arabs continue to believe that Israel is not content with its boundaries as defined and delineated at the time of the state's creation in 1948, or even on a 1967 basis, but is still bent on further territorial aggrandisement, not just seeking territorial concessions in order to safeguard its security. The creation of mutual confidence, through provision of reciprocated positive evidence, between the two sides on both these vital points is a prerequisite of any true settlement. To emphasise this fundamental fact is neither an indication of hostility to Israel, still less of anti-semitism, nor a disregard of the right of an Israeli state to exist in peace and prosperity. Nor on the other hand is it evidence of lack of respect for the best interests of all the Arab peoples.

9. Another new disruptive factor in the Middle East, separate but not altogether unrelated to the Arab-Israeli imbroglio, in effect if not in origin, has been the downfall of the Shah's government in Iran, and its replacement by an extremist, repressive, theocratic régime, leading according to present indications to an ultimate break-up, not only on religious but on ethnic grounds too, of the "Persian empire" as it existed until the recent revolution. In retrospect, surely even the most ardent critic of the Shah's admittedly authoritarian and corrupt government cannot be other than dismayed at what has taken place, and what further miseries lie ahead for His former Majesty's "liberated" subjects.

10. Even the extreme left-wing groups which played a major rôle in the events leading up to the fall of the Shah have had to break with the new régime and in many cases have been among the victims of Ayatollah Khomeini's repressive policies.

11. Looking at the present unhappy Iranian scene one is irresistably reminded of the despairing cry of Madame Roland in the wake of the French Revolution in the eighteenth century : "O Liberty ! Liberty ! How many crimes have been committed in thy name !"

12. One suspects that there are a significant number of disillusioned Iranian nationals who would elaborate on this theme in some updated phrases drawn from a new British best-seller, "The Plague Dogs", by Richard Adams :

> "Freedom, that land where rogues, at every corner, cozen with lies and promises the plucky sheep who judged it time to sack the shepherd ! Unfurl your banner, Freedom...
>
> We are free — free to suffer every anguish of deliberation, of decisions which must be made upon suspect information and half-knowledge, every anguish of hindsight and regret, of failure, shame and responsibility for all that we have brought upon ourselves and others : free to struggle, to starve, to demand from all one last, supreme effort to reach where we long to be and, once there, to conclude that it is not, after all, the right place...
>
> The tyrant wasn't such a bad old sod, and even in his arbitrary rages never killed as many as died in yesterday's glorious battle for liberty."

13. Be that as it may, however desirable, it will indeed be difficult now to restore any government capable of regaining the country's previous cohesion.

14. Only a miracle could now permanently subdue the revived aspirations, at least for autonomy, never other than dormant, of the Kurdish people. Similar considerations apply to the Arab population and the Baluchi tribesmen living along the border with Pakistan — itself also suffering serious risk of fragmentation, threatening to destroy utterly the future coherence of a country that only achieved unity and sovereignty in 1947.

15. There are those who blame the Russians for all that has happened to the detriment of the happiness of the people living in the area. Your

Rapporteur is not noted for holding views sympathetic to the policies of the Kremlin, but to place the responsibility for all that has happened in Iran on Soviet malevolence would be to over-simplify the issue and lead one wrongly to believe that if only the Kremlin could be induced to change course all would be well.

16. After all, the Soviet Union has as much to gain as any other power from the maintenance of stability in Iran and as much to lose from the prevailing chaos, even if it would have preferred to witness the establishment of a strong communist régime rather than a right-wing monarchy. The first signs of Soviet interest in the maintenance of a state emerged in 1945 when, no doubt regretfully, the Soviet Union preferred to withdraw its troops from the northern part of the country which they were occupying in order to avoid confrontation with the United States. It should be added that, having become short of oil, the Soviet Union imports a certain amount from Iran and would have no advantage in seeing this source dry up any more than in the abandon of the vast Iranian natural gas distribution project of which it was to be the main beneficiary.

17. Of course, however, Moscow has lost no opportunity to fan the flames of any hostility against the West, and to seek to exploit resentment whenever or wherever opportunities have occurred. Certainly, too, there can be no doubt that expansionist Russia has taken full advantage of the seeming near paralysis of the West, most notably that of the United States, in order to obtain a stranglehold on Afghanistan, as one more step forward in the furtherance of its historic dream of obtaining direct access to a warm water port in the Indian Ocean, and to provide an easier opportunity than it now possesses to dominate the still fiercely anti-communist Gulf Arab states.

18. These latter and, no less important, Saudi Arabia have so far successfully resisted the contagion of unrest and revolution that has overtaken luckless Iran. Yet it is an open question how long that fragile stability will last, unless the West, especially the United States, adopts a far more constructive rôle throughout the region. Pledges of political and if need be military support for the remaining established rulers are not enough, especially in the wake of the Iranian débacle. The most emotive issue in Arabia, especially in an era of Islamic revival, is not the fear of going communist : it is the finding of an acceptable solution to the Palestinian problem, not just acceptable to Mr. Sadat and Mr. Begin, not even if also grudgingly or reluctantly acquiesced in by the "moderate" Arab states. Their rulers are anyhow fully aware that if they countenance any settlement that fails to meet Palestinian aspirations for a homeland of their own (just as understandable, incidentally, and as creditable as that of the Jews inside and outside Israel to have and keep as such their own homeland), their own positions will be seriously imperilled. For, apart from the inherent feelings of their own indigenous subjects, the whole of Arabia is now infiltrated by dispossessed Palestinians, many of them, because of their superior skills and education as compared with their desert kinsmen, holding positions of influence and importance. Even perhaps the most moderate and pro-West government of all, that of Jordan, has had to come to terms with Palestinian nationalism, or put at risk the survival of the most mature and respected monarchy in the whole Middle East.

19. No, it will have to be the Palestinians themselves who will have to believe they are getting a fair deal. Without this, a continuing and increasing sense of injustice will persist, providing just the climate of opinion in which it is only men of violence who can prosper or offer a solution.

20. There is an old English ditty :

"Yesterday upon the stair,
I met a man who wasn't there.
He wasn't there again today,
I wish that man would go away."

21. Wishes alone, by President Carter, Mr. Begin and Mr. Sadat, that, without firm, fair remedial action, the "Palestine problem" will, if one is patient enough, "go away", are no less doomed to failure.

II. *Palestine*

(i) The origins of the problem

22. Among the innumerable problems stemming from the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, two have still not been solved : that of Cyprus and that of Palestine. Everywhere else, states were eventually established with an increasingly marked national character, and the frontiers separating them are no longer very seriously contested by the states concerned, although certain minorities, particularly the Kurds in Iran, Iraq and Turkey (who have been aptly called the Poles of the Middle East), plus of course the number of Kurds living in the Soviet Union, outside the boundaries of the former Ottoman Empire, are continual sources of unrest and sometimes even civil war.

23. The reason why it has been possible for the Palestinian problem to remain unsolved for more than sixty years is that the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was accompanied by an additional factor : Zionism. In fact, the Zionist movement founded by Theodor Herzl in the last

decade of the nineteenth century adopted as its aim the provision of a new homeland guaranteeing freedom and the possibility to form a nation for the Jewish peoples who had been and were often victims of persecution in the many countries where the diaspora had led them to live. At its first congress, in 1897, the Zionist movement, for obvious historical reasons, chose Palestine as the location of this new settlement.

24. Several reasons militated in favour of this choice : the fact that Jerusalem was the traditional centre of the Jewish religion, and the weakness of the Ottoman Empire whose forthcoming dissolution was to be expected. Moreover, Palestine was sparsely populated, its land was not properly exploited and there was still a small minority of Jews living there : about 10 % of a population of 600,000 inhabitants who were mainly Arabs, mostly of the Moslem faith but with a Christian minority.

25. The actual frontiers of Palestine as originally envisaged by the Zionist movement were rather vague and covered sizeable portions of present-day Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, including the east bank of the Jordan, Golan, the north bank of the Litani, the western part of the Sinai as far as El Arish and Aqaba.

26. The first world war immediately raised the question of the fate of the Ottoman Empire and the allies had to consider what would happen to the Arab territories forming part of this empire well before the peace negotiations.

27. (*i*) On the one hand, the fact that a sizeable proportion of the Arab population had fought on the side of the allies to free themselves from Turkish domination had led the British Government to enter into a number of commitments towards them. These commitments were set out in the correspondence exchanged between Sherif Husain, Emir of Mecca, leader of the Arab revolt, and the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon. In this correspondence, McMahon undertook, on behalf of the British Government, to ensure the independence of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the war.

28. (*ii*) But, at the same time, the British, French, Italian and Russian Governments were negotiating with a view to dividing these same territories into spheres of influence. On 16th May 1916, these negotiations led to a Franco-British agreement known as the Sykes-Picot agreement, from the names of the two principal negotiators, whose contents were published by the Soviet Union immediately after the 1917 revolution. It guaranteed France the northern sector of the Arab countries, Britain retaining the south.

29. (*iii*) Finally, anxious *inter alia* to ensure that it had the support of the Jewish elements of the American people to facilitate the entry of the United States into the war, the British Government embarked on negotiations with a representative of the Zionist movement, Chaim Weizmann, with whom it undertook to encourage the formation of a Jewish entity in Palestine. This undertaking was formally set out in a letter written to Lord Rothschild by the Foreign Secretary, Sir Arthur Balfour, on 2nd November 1921. This letter contained the text of a declaration adopted by the British Government and by which it undertook to use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of a "national home" for the Jewish people in Palestine.

30. The contradictory nature of the various commitments entered into by the British Government with regard to the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire has often been underlined. It may however be pointed out that, while there were contradictions between the interpretations given by the French, the Arabs and the Jews of the commitments which concerned them, such contradictions were not of a formal nature. The League of Nations mandate system in fact allowed the formation of Arab states under League of Nations tutelage, exercised provisionally either by Britain or by France. The fact that these were class A mandates allowed them full independence within quite a short lapse of time. Moreover, the Balfour declaration did not imply the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, the notion of a "national home" being left, perhaps deliberately, vague and undefined.

(ii) Palestine under British mandate

31. Your Rapporteur does not intend to recount the history of Palestine over the past sixty years. He will merely point out that the population of the country increased considerably during that period, rising from 750,000 inhabitants in 1922 to 1,850,000 at the end of 1946. But the Jewish population increased in even greater proportions than the Arab population since it numbered 84,000 persons in 1922 and 608,000 in 1945. This increase was essentially due to very large-scale immigration, there being 316,000 legal immigrants, i.e. with the authorisation of the mandatory power, and some 65,000 illegal immigrants. The Jewish population lived mainly in the towns, which made great strides. But thanks to financial assistance from the international Jewish community this Jewish minority had by perfectly legal means acquired a considerable portion of arable land in Palestine (12 % in 1946).

32. British policy had been to allow a Jewish community to settle in Palestine while limiting immigration so as to avoid a social and national upheaval which would have made the Palestinians a minority in their own country. However, this policy was accepted neither by the Jewish Agency, the political organisation of the Zionist movement, which intended to constitute a true

Jewish state in Palestine at the earliest possible date, nor by the Arab Palestinian people, who found themselves gradually evicted from their lands and economically dominated by a Jewish population which was better adapted to the requirements of a modern economy. In 1938, violence broke out between Jews and Arabs and there were attacks on British forces in Palestine. The Jewish Agency acquired an armed force and other Jewish armed organisations such as the Irgun and the Stern Group had no hesitation in using terrorist methods.

33. Following the second world war, the Palestinian problem assumed new dimensions. On the one hand, the League of Nations had made way for the United Nations and the mandate system was coming to an end. Secondly, the persecution and massacres suffered by the European Jewish community led many displaced persons to try to settle in Palestine at any cost. Several hundreds of thousands were admitted officially but many others moved in without the consent of either the mandatory power or the United Nations. This rapid growth in the Jewish community aggravated the conflicts for which Palestine was the stage and the problem of creating a Jewish state in Palestine presented itself in new terms.

34. Finally, on 29th November 1947 the General Assembly of the United Nations, after a difficult debate, adopted by 30 votes to 13 with 10 abstentions a plan to partition Palestine which was to allow the British mandate to come to an end and two states to be formed in Palestine, one Jewish, the other Arab. This plan provided for a fairly limited Jewish state and for an Arab state ; with Jerusalem, an enclave surrounded by Arab territory, having special status. The whole Palestinian territory was to remain in a system of economic union.

35. As soon as Britain announced that its mandate would come to an end on 15th May 1948, by which date its troops would have completely evacuated the territory, the Jewish military organisations did their utmost to place themselves on the best possible military and territorial footing on the date of partition. To this end, they did what they could to convince the Palestinians to leave the areas which they wished to have incorporated in the state of Israel. They often used force to achieve this, which led to the first Israeli-Arab war.

(iii) The birth of the state of Israel

36. As from its foundation on 14th May 1948 the state of Israel already controlled territories which extended far beyond those attributed to it by the United Nations when the partition plan was adopted on 29th November 1947. The Security Council, ordering a cease-fire on 29th May 1948, and the General Assembly, in Resolution 194, had to recognise a cease-fire line which allowed Israel to control the major part of former Palestine. As regards Palestinian territory remaining under Arab control, the Gaza Strip was transferred to Egypt and the west bank of the Jordan to Transjordan which thereby became Jordan. The armistices signed at the beginning of 1949 between Israel and its Arab neighbours did not modify the division of Palestinian territory, although they did not give Israel a right to the sectors which had not been attributed to it in the partition of 29th November 1947. But they enabled Israel to join the United Nations.

37. The creation of the state of Israel and the armistices far from solved the problem raised by the settlement of an increasingly numerous Jewish population in Palestine. Thanks to a very high birth-rate, the original Palestinian population increased very rapidly, since it amounted to 2,700,000 persons in 1967, i.e. more or less the equivalent of the Jewish population, despite larger-scale immigration due to the exit, often under extreme pressure, of Jewish populations from several recently decolonised countries. Some 400,000 remained in Israel, the rest taking refuge in neighbouring Arab countries.

38. United Nations Resolution 194 provided for the right of Palestinians wishing to return to their homes to be able to do so. But in the long run at least such a return would have made the Jewish element a minority within the very state of Israel, i.e. reducing to nil the effort made by the Zionist movement to give the Jews of Palestine their own state. The cease-fire therefore did not lead to the conclusion of a peace treaty. It was to be fully accepted and respected by neither of the two partners.

39. Furthermore, the Palestinian refugees were beginning to have an increasingly strong influence on the Arab countries where they had settled with a view to rallying them to their cause. Their number and superior cultural level allowed them in many cases to play a leading rôle in these countries, particularly in Jordan : nowadays, throughout Arabia, including the Gulf Emirates.

40. Being anxious to put an end to this permanent conflict whose international nature was becoming more and more of a threat to it, Israel resolved to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956 to do away by force with the threats facing it. A concerted offensive with the United Kingdom and France allowed it to inflict a severe blow on the Egyptian army, the most powerful of the Arab armies at that time.

(iv) The 1967 war and the refugee problem

41. The temporary weakening of Egyptian military strength in 1956 did not however pro-

vide a solution to the problem of Palestine and incidents were not long in resuming and increasing. The decision taken by the Egyptian Government in 1967 to stop authorising Israeli ships to use the port of Elat, the only Israeli outlet on the Gulf of Aqaba and consequently on the Red Sea, was followed by another Israeli offensive. In six days, the Israeli army defeated one by one the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian forces, which allowed Israel to occupy the Sinai peninsula, including the Gaza Strip, the part of Jordan territory on the West Bank of the Jordan and the Golan territory taken from Syria.

42. Henceforth, therefore, Israel occupied an enormous territory, twice the size of that it had acquired in 1949, but in which the Arab minority was far more numerous despite the fact that part of the population of the West Bank had gone into exile and that only some 600,000 Palestinians were still living there. 400,000 Palestinians were living in the Gaza Strip. The number of refugee Palestinians at that time reached a level of 1,600,000, divided mainly between Jordan (800,000), Syria and Lebanon (600,000), Kuwait (150,000) and the Arab-Persian Gulf states. Since then, the number of refugees has increased through natural growth and the difficulties they have encountered in Jordan and Syria have considerably increased the numbers settling in Lebanon (probably 400,000), Kuwait (perhaps 300,000) and the Gulf countries where the development of the oil economy brought about a rapid increase in the need for labour, whether specialised or not.

43. The results of the 1967 war have never been ratified in a peace treaty but the matter has come before the United Nations General Assembly on several occasions. On 22nd November 1967, the Security Council for its part adopted the famous Resolution 242 in which it emphasised the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, called for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 and proclaimed the right of every state in the area "to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries". It also affirmed the necessity to guarantee freedom of navigation through international waterways, to achieve a just settlement of the refugee problem and to guarantee the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area.

44. This text was the subject of various interpretations, particularly about the meaning of the expression "secure and recognised boundaries". Did this mean the 1949 frontiers, which the Arab states would have had to recognise as permanent, or new frontiers to be decided upon and subsequently recognised but which would be better able to guarantee the security of Israel? Was recognition of the state of Israel by the Arab countries to precede the determination of its frontiers and the signature of a peace treaty? These have been the linchpins of the constant subsequent confrontations between Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries and explain the desire, particularly of Jordan, for a United Nations Security Council clarification of Resolution 242.

45. Another consequence of the 1967 war was a large-scale increase in the Arab population within the territory controlled by Israel, which allowed a resumption of terrorist operations on the actual territory of Israel and the occupied territories. In order better to control these territories, Israel set up colonisation centres there, some in the Negev and Sinai regions taken from Egypt, some in the Golan, taken from Syria, but far more on the West Bank.

46. Finally, while letting it be known that it was prepared to negotiate the establishment of a new frontier, Israel has never concealed the fact that it did not consider the old city of Jerusalem belonging to the state of Israel to be negotiable and it set up its government there in order to assert its desire to incorporate the city in its territory. The growing number of "colonies" on the West Bank also made it far more difficult to embark on negotiations jeopardising the permanent nature of its settlement on the West Bank. In September 1979, when the state of Israel authorised its citizens to purchase land on the West Bank freely, 27.4% of this territory — and generally the best land — already belonged to Israelis. The 1967 war therefore considerably worsened the situation prevailing in the Middle East since the birth of the state of Israel and the 1948 and 1956 wars.

(v) The Palestine Liberation Organisation

47. This deterioration was particularly marked since throughout the years the Palestinian refugees had become organised, in the countries in which they were dispersed, and set up combat organisations intended to fight against Israel, several of which however soon clashed with the authorities of the host countries which were not anxious to become involved in an open struggle against Israel.

48. These were often rival organisations not on good terms with each other, thus making negotiations with them no easy task. Some adhered to revolutionary doctrines while others proved more conservative. They were therefore assisted and supported by one or another Arab state. However, relative unity gradually seems to have been achieved around the Palestine Liberation Organisation, set up in 1964, and the use of terrorist methods has diminished considerably, at least outside Israeli territory.

49. However, in several Arab countries, particularly Jordan and Lebanon, the Palestinian

refugees constitute a considerable force capable of bringing particularly strong pressure to bear on the host state as they are highly armed. In Lebanon, the some 18,000 men in the Lebanese army are proving incapable of maintaining internal order and respect for national frontiers by far more numerous Palestinian forces.

50. Two series of incidents have stemmed from this Palestinian action : the first was in Jordan, which, from September 1970 to July 1971, concluded with the putting down of armed Palestinian organisations deriving from other Arab countries by the Jordanian army and, in Lebanon, with a true civil war which led to the occupation of North Lebanon by the Syrian army and the stationing of United Nations forces on the banks of the Litani near the frontier between Lebanon and Israel, thus confirming the *de facto* control of South Lebanon by the Israelis. So Lebanon is still divided, the Christian elements of the population having often sided with the Israelis, while the Moslem elements were on the side of the Palestinian refugees and in 1978 appealed to the Syrian army which was already occupying the north of the country. The very future of the Lebanese state and its unity are therefore now at stake.

51. Moreover, in the absence of other means, the Palestinian refugees embarked on a whole series of terrorist operations not only against Israel but also against those Arab countries which had not given in to their requirements and even against a large number of western countries accused rightly or wrongly of supporting the Israeli cause. However blameworthy these operations may be, they have had the effect of giving considerable international impact to the Palestinian affair. In particular, the extent to which hijacking has been used as an instrument in the fight of the Palestinian nationalist organisations is well-known.

52. Democratic western governments, as part of their political credo, at least overtly condemn resorting to violence and bloodshed as means to a political end, in contrast to negotiated peaceful settlements. Yet it is fair to point out that however much we must all deplore the use of terrorism by the PLO and associated movements to achieve their aspirations, this tactic in the unhappy Middle East scenario is nothing new. Some architects of the present state of Israel, collective and individual members of, for instance, Irgun and the Stern group, have unashamedly attributed their past successes to violence.

53. The trouble is that, just as "one man's meat is another man's poison", one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter : and few of us are free from double standards in this respect. Yet it is true that generally public condemnation, in the West at least, of resorting to violence to achieve political ends, just or unjust, is much more deeply and widely felt than it was thirty years ago ; and the PLO should appreciate this fact, *in their own interests* as well as on moral grounds.

54. There are indications that the PLO is beginning to realise the harm to its international image and aspirations that is caused by indulgence in acts of terrorism, particularly those involving innocent people overseas in no way connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The PLO now condemns hijacking, for instance, hostage-taking at embassies, raids on airports, etc.

55. But there is one important qualification. Any nationalist movement, especially one of necessity widely dispersed and hence without a tight central control, is bound to have undisciplined, extremist elements in its ranks or on its fringes.

56. Moreover, it is not only the PLO but Arabs generally who draw a distinction between politically-motivated acts of terrorism as such and the efforts in Arab lands under alien military occupation, contrary to United Nations Security Council directions, to harass and indulge in hostile acts against those who are in such occupation.

57. Syria and Jordan are still at war with Israel : only a cease-fire across the borders is in force. Thus Arabs in e.g. the Gaza Strip, on the Golan Heights and within the West Bank, who blow up bridges, mine roads, etc., regard themselves just as much resistance fighters and are so regarded by their neighbours, as were the resistance movements of occupied Europe in the last war whom we did not condemn but rather praised and encouraged.

(vi) The present situation

58. The 1973 war was provoked by Egypt, which took the offensive along the Suez Canal and temporarily occupied a portion of the Sinai peninsula. The final defeat of Egypt allowed the government of Anwar el Sadat to open negotiations with Israel which first led to the withdrawal of Israeli forces to a position several kilometres short of the canal banks and then, after difficult negotiations imposed on both Israel and Egypt by President Carter, to the signing in September 1978 of the Camp David agreements by which Egypt recognised the state of Israel whereas Israel undertook to evacuate progressively occupied Egyptian territories and to negotiate a settlement concerning the West Bank with the representatives of the Palestinian people.

59. Some have interpreted the Camp David agreements as a step towards peace which will come about through successive agreements between Israel and its other neighbours. How-

ever, there is some doubt as to the value of this interpretation. In fact, although the 1967 war created a frontier problem between Egypt and Israel, Egypt took in few Palestinian refugees and its government has therefore had a freedom of manoeuvre which the governments of Israel's other neighbouring countries did not have.

60. So now that the Camp David agreements have been signed the situation in the Middle East is far from clear. On the one hand, Egypt, at last at peace with Israel, finds itself isolated among the Arab countries, several of which have broken off all relations with it and some of which are threatening it with hostile operations. On the other hand, the more moderate Arab states are living under the pressure of forces which they cannot indefinitely control and which force them to adopt an attitude of relentless hostility towards Israel, although they know perfectly well that their armies cannot presently or in the foreseeable future tackle Israeli forces.

61. Lebanon, which took part in none of the wars against Israel, now finds itself at the hub of a conflict, sometimes open, sometimes masked, in which Israelis and Palestinians continue to clash despite the presence of United Nations forces. The possibility of a *de facto* sharing of Lebanon between Syria and Israel is far from out of the question. Everything indicates that as long as no solution has been found to the Palestinian problem the unity of Lebanon cannot be restored, and as long as the Palestinians have not found a homeland they will continue to be a permanent threat to the international community and the whole Middle East. But there is nothing to indicate that the desire shown by Egypt to associate the Palestinians with the settlement of its relations with Israel is leading towards the opening of true negotiations since Israel refuses to recognise the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, just as the PLO refuses to recognise that the state of Israel has any claim to Palestine, or any part of it.

62. The only country in a position to help to find a solution to both the problem of the Palestinians and that of Israel's security is Jordan. More than half the 2,900,000 inhabitants of the territory which it claims are of Palestinian origin, whether or not they have refugee status, and it still has legal claim to the West Bank territory occupied by Israel since 1967. Ever since its constitutional arrangements in 1950, it has recognised the right of Palestinians to constitute a national state, even though the 1948 partition made some of them Jordanian citizens. In 1972, King Hussein made clear the choice he would offer them in the event of the West Bank being recovered : return to their country under Jordanian sovereignty, constitute an independent entity federated with Transjordania under a single head of state, or form a separate state.

63. In September 1970, Jordan was compelled, for domestic reasons and because of the increasing number of reprisals carried out by Israeli forces on its territory — following terrorist operations in occupied territory by Palestinians beyond its control — to use force to establish its authority. However, at the Arab summit meeting in Rabat in 1974, the Jordanian state admitted that the PLO was the only representative of the Palestinians. The 1972 proposal and recognition that the PLO was representative were confirmed by King Hussein in the United Nations General Assembly on 25th September 1979, when he said:

> "... Jordan, which I am honoured to represent here today, has a thorough understanding of what is and what is not possible in the context of war and peace in our region. Jordan has always advocated reason, moderation and a search for the possible, both by virtue of its proximity to danger and its close involvement with the train of events from the very beginning. The Jordanian people have always shared the sufferings and aspirations of the Palestinian people. Jordan carried the major burden of the human tragedy that befell the Palestinians, and absorbed the human, economic, social and political results of this tragedy.
>
> .....
>
> Israeli officials have constantly reiterated that Jordan must solve the Palestinian problem by absorbing the Palestinians itself. But the answer to this argument is a very simple one. When we speak of Palestinian rights we speak of a clearly defined territory and an equally clearly defined people who have inhabited that territory on a continuous basis for several centuries. That territory, which lies west of the Jordan River, is Palestine. It is as simple as that. The subject is thus not a matter of terminology or semantics. In 1948, Israel managed to uproot the people from its homeland west of the river. It then took another major step and placed 1.5 million Palestinians under its control. The case of this nation — half in exile and half under occupation — is the case of the Palestinian people.
>
> Playing with words will not solve the problem. Israel must withdraw from the territories it occupied in June 1967, must respect the right of the displaced Palestinians to return to their homeland and must retract its denial of the Palestinians' right to self-determination including their right to establish an independent state if they so wish. We in Jordan, together with the other Arab countries, stand behind the

Palestinians in demanding this right. We support them in the exercise of their free choice and will respect the choice they will make.

.....

The Palestine Liberation Organisation, through its international activities and announced positions in recent months, has proved that it wants to participate, in the name of the Palestinian people which it represents, in steps leading to a just peace which ensures the liberation of the Palestinian people from occupation and the pursuit of a free independent existence within their national homeland.

We in Jordan are co-operating in good faith with the leadership of the PLO and with the rest of the Arab countries for the good of the Palestine people and the Arab world at large..."

64. These declarations, which in every respect conform to the many United Nations resolutions on Palestine, raise the question of what are Israel's true goals. If its intention is to ensure its security, it may be considered that with the Camp David agreements it has every means of doing so, peace being based on sound foundations. Indeed, now the possible danger represented by Egyptian strength is out of the way, the main point of confrontation with the Arab countries is along the 600 km. boundary separating it from Jordan. Peace with that country, giving a territory to the Palestinians (the West Bank), would deprive other Arab countries of any effective possibility of attacking Israeli territory. Whether independent, federated with Jordan or united with it, a Palestinian West Bank would not have the means of becoming a danger for Israel. Moreover, Israel would demonstrate its will not to pursue a policy of territorial extension, whereas its present attitude allows the Arab countries to fear further expansion. The remarkable economic development launched by Jordan leaves no doubt as to its interests and intentions since its continued development depends on the maintenance of peace.

65. If the Camp David agreements prove to be nothing more than a manoeuvre to allow Israel to expand its territory, Israel would bear serious responsibility for prolonging a conflict in the Middle East which has grave consequences for the whole world, opening the region to Soviet influence and, in the long run, endangering its own security to a far greater extent. Several aspects of Israeli policy cannot but make one wonder whether territorial expansion is not one of its aims, and not just the maintenance of military security. These doubts include :

66. (*i*) A comparison of maps of territories under Israeli control since partition of Palestine by the United Nations in 1947 suggests that this is so.

67. (*ii*) Statements by some Israeli leaders and the World Zionist Movement.

68. (*iii*) Israel's armed control of South Lebanon can also be interpreted in this way.

69. (*iv*) But it is mainly Israel's West Bank policy which has raised doubts. Military occupation of this territory was followed by the systematic installation of state settlements which have steadily developed in recent years, even since Camp David. At present, there are 676,000 Arabs on the West Bank, not including Jerusalem, while 12,000 Israelis (2% of the total) have settled there in 127 colonies grouped in three continuous lines parallel to the River Jordan. 27.5% of the territory of the West Bank has thus so far been requisitioned for these settlements, part of which is being exploited immediately, the remainder being held in reserve, seemingly with a view to future extension. In addition, in 1979 the Israeli Government authorised the purchase of further areas by Israelis. Irrigation projects using water from the Jordan and the planting of trees which will bear fruit only in several years' time indicate that Israel does not intend to abandon this territory for some time, if ever. Pressure allegedly brought to bear on the Arab population to leave the area and appeals for the immigration of more Jews to Israel have encouraged Arab fears that Israel's aim is progressively to annex this territory with permanent settlements, the result of which would be to increase the number of refugees in neighbouring Arab countries, thus aggravating economic, social and political problems and permanently jeopardising all hope of peace.

70. (*v*) The wish to annex territory is particularly evident in Jerusalem, although the Arab population there is more numerous (about 60%) than the Jewish population (about 40%). Part of this population has been settled in districts located on former West Bank territory, annexed to the Israeli administration of the city. The Israeli Government has repeatedly proclaimed that it considers its annexation of Jerusalem as not negotiable with any Arab government and at the same time it has extended the administrative boundaries of "Greater Jerusalem".

71. (*vi*) Israel's refusal to negotiate with the organisation which all the Arab countries, including Jordan, acknowledge to be representative of the Palestinians is taken by the Arab world as a straightforward refusal to negotiate and as a deliberate choice of a policy of force.

72. (*vii*) Reference by the Israeli authorities to personal "autonomy" as opposed to an oppor-

tunity, even years ahead, to exercise self-determination for Palestinians can but confirm the impression that Israel does not wish to allow autonomy for territories mainly populated by Arabs. In any event, autonomy without territorial sovereignty would offer no guarantees and would be illusory, whatever terms were used to define it.

73. Thus, in Arab eyes the Camp David agreements emerge more as a diplomatic success for Israel, with American backing having helped to break up the Arab front in exchange for concessions to Egypt alone in a desert area, than a step towards true peace which would necessarily mean granting the Palestinians a status acceptable to them. Jordan's position, its moderate demands and the support it now draws from the PLO make it an essential partner in any peace negotiations. If there is an expansionist Israeli policy it can but be at the expense of Jordan and may lead to the disintegration of that country, which alone is capable of guaranteeing, in the main, the security of Israel, which has nothing to gain in finding itself in direct contact with wealthier Arab countries whose peaceful intentions are less evident.

74. Moreover, the fact that Jordan enjoys the confidence of the Palestinian refugees on its own territory is a factor which should not be overlooked. It is the only country to have granted them its own nationality, although without depriving them of their right to be and want to be Palestinians. This is obviously the reason why, at the time of the uprising of certain Palestinian organisations in 1970, the great majority of the refugees living in Jordan refrained from taking part, unlike those deriving from other Arab countries who did not enjoy the same advantages.

75. Of course, whether fundamentally or as an initial bargaining factor, the PLO's basic approach to possible negotiations with Israel is not the same as Jordan's since the latter seems prepared to accept the *de facto* pre-1967 war frontiers. On the other hand the more extreme PLO leaders talk of the absorption of the whole of 1947 Palestine, including Israel itself, into a new Palestinian state. More moderate Palestinian representatives, in asserting their approval of United Nations resolutions as a basis for a permanent settlement, imply that they intend to start from the frontiers laid down in the 1947 partition plan, which are definitely less advantageous to Israel. Moreover, the PLO has not adopted a final position on King Hussein's 1972 proposals, but it is well aware that, if one day it is to control the West Bank, it will not be able to do without close co-operation with Jordan in every field. This consideration can but encourage a further rapprochement between the positions of the PLO and of Jordan, an obvious sign being the PLO's approval of King Hussein's speech in the United Nations.

III. *Iran*

(i) The geographical and social context

76. Present-day Iran covers a surface of 1,600,000 sq.km., i.e. five times that of the United Kingdom, and forms the heart of the Middle East, since it lies at the centre of the area of contact between India and the Mediterranean, between Russia and the southern seas. However, for geographical reasons it is a difficult region to cross. Although the centre of the country consists of plateaux between 300 and 1,000 m. high, from most of which there is no access to the outside world, its borders consist of mountains which are often more than 4,000 m. high and isolate the Iranian plateau: to the west, the Zagros Mountains separate Iran from Iraq, to the North the Elburz Mountains rise to a height of 5,600 m. between the Caspian and Tehran, the Khorasan in the north-east and the Fars in the south-west.

77. An arid climate makes the coasts of the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf particularly inhospitable and the central plateau includes immense uninhabitable desert areas. Only the lowlands bordering the surrounding mountains are densely populated.

78. This situation is the reason for Iran's very eventful history. Its territory has frequently been invaded by peoples from the north (Mongols, Turks or Russians), from the West (Greeks or Romans), from the south (Arabs) and from the east (Indians), while at other times it has constituted a pole for the expansion of vast empires such as that of the Achaemenids from the sixth to the fourth centuries B.C. or that of the Sasanians from the third to the seventh centuries A.D. These empires themselves did not remain truly Persian and helped to mingle autochtons, invaders and the subjected populations. Nowhere are Iran's frontiers ethnic, linguistic or religious frontiers: Kurds, Armenians, Arabs, Baluchis, Turks and even Farsis are to be found in Iran and the neighbouring countries.

79. The present population of Iran is apparently about 35 million, i.e. an average of about twenty-one inhabitants per sq.km. The population is very unevenly spread out. Certain regions, such as the southern shores of the Caspian, have a particularly favourable climate but, in spite of a high standard of agriculture, are over-populated. Regions situated between the Zagros Mountains and the Iranian plateau or to the north of the plateau towards the Elburz mountains are densely populated. Conversely, the central plateau has a very low population density. The shores of the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf are almost uninhabited apart from the recent spread of oil centres.

80. This breakdown of the population, numerous around the edges and sparse in the centre, does

not favour a centralist political régime, nor does the fact that Iran has emerged from its long history with a population that has very diverse origins, languages and religions. The Iranians proper, who originated in the Fars region, are also to be found in the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. But in Iran there are some six million Kurds in the Zagros Mountains, Turks in Azerbaijan, Armenians on the shores of the Caspian and Mongols and Turks in the north and east of the country, not to speak of a large Arab minority in the Gulf regions. In fact there is no element of the population, not even the Farsis (true Iranians), that has even a 51% majority.

81. Although Farsi is the official language which has been more or less imposed on the whole population, it is not the mother tongue of very many Iranians. Similarly, although apart from the Jews and Armenians or even a few Parsees Islam is by far the dominating religion in Iran, Sunna is widespread only among the Kurds while Shi'a has almost thirty million followers. This is one of the two major Islamic sects which, while sharing the Muslim faith and its sole authoritative exposition, the Koran, differentiate themselves from the Sunnis in their interpretation of the true succession of the Prophet.

82. Also, in the Shi'a sect individual religious leaders, since a final universally acknowledged Imam is still to appear, themselves wield, in the interim, much greater temporal as well as spiritual power over their followers than is the case of the Sunnis. This provides one of the answers to the present absolutist theocratic trends evident in Iran.

83. However, vis-à-vis Kurdish/Farsi tensions, Islamic intersect differences are not the basis of present or past intercommunal hostility. These derive rather from a deep-rooted, historic, and apparently irrepressible sense of a separate Kurdish nationhood.

84. Not so very long ago, the Iranian population was mainly agricultural, but the very rapid growth of large towns meant that in 1979 the proportion of the urban population in relation to the population as a whole was about 50 %. Agriculture, which accounted for 55% of employment in 1956, still accounted for 35% in 1976, while the share of industry rose from 19.5% to 32.3%, and that of services from 23.8% to 33.7%. But agriculture, which in 1959, accounted for 33.3% of the Iranian GNP, accounted for only 9.4% in 1976. In the same period, the share of industry rose from 14.5% to 20.5% and that of oil from 10.7% to 38%, while services fell from 33.3% to 32.1%.

85. These figures show the extremely rapid development of a traditional social system, which was agricultural or even pastoral and nomad, into a modern industrial economy. But this development was far from complete at the time of the 1979 revolution, and very modern industrial sectors still coexist with the most archaic systems of transhumant stock-rearing. Generally speaking, rural society seems to have proved more loyal to the Shah's régime than the urban working class or tradesmen.

86. Note should also be taken of the extreme youth of the population, which is growing very fast. In 1976, 45% of the population was under fifteen years of age, 51% was between 15 and 64 and 3% was 65 or more. This overwhelming numerical preponderance of young people in the Iranian population certainly played a major rôle in recent events in that country.

(ii) History

87. The heterogeneous nature of the population compelled Iranian leaders, particularly the Pahlavi monarchy, to seek the roots of national unity and pride in the country's wealthy past. It will be recalled how much importance the last Shah gave to the festivities celebrating the 2,500th anniversary of the unification of the country by Cyrus the Great. This was not merely an act of propaganda directed at the outside world but perhaps even more an attempt to convince the people of the greatness and permanency of the empire. In fact the extreme ostentation of the occasion proved counter-productive, in providing ammunition for the Tudeh Party in exploiting the grievances of the underprivileged and poor.

88. Incidentally, of the four great empires which dominated Iran in ancient times, only those of the Achaemenids and of the Sasanians were truly Persian. But the Seleucids governed a large part of Iran from Syria while the Parthian Kingdom controlled only the north. Moreover, in the history of Iran there has not been a continuous empire. *Per contra* there have even been periods of complete territorial disintegration, particularly during the Middle Ages when conquest by Arabs, Mongols and Turks in fact destroyed not only the state but the very identity of Iran. Only from the sixteenth century onwards was a Persian empire reconstituted, and it was in the nineteenth century that reasons which were very largely external — the territorial expansion of Russia towards the east on the one hand and the concern of the British Empire to protect the route to the Indies on the other — ensured the permanence of an independent state whose frontiers they determined. In 1921, a coup d'état instigated by Britain and soon accepted by the Soviet Union brought to power, with Reza Shah, a new dynasty which was to remain on the throne until 1979.

89. The Pahlavi dynasty embarked on the quite remarkable task of restoring the Iranian state and adapting it to the requirements of a modern

society and economy. It was helped by the discovery of oil and the considerable development of the oil economy. Reza Shah's sympathy for the European dictatorships which led to his abdication and replacement by his son in 1941 merely speeded up this trend, just as the independence of Iran was strengthened when the United States replaced the United Kingdom as the effective protector of the Iranian monarchy following the second world war and insisted on the withdrawal of Soviet forces which were occupying the north of the country. Since that date, Iran has constantly benefited from large-scale American assistance, in the military field in particular, since from 1974 to 1978 it purchased $20,400 million worth of American weapons, i.e. 40% of total American armaments exports.

90. With the new reign, a series of important reforms were undertaken to accelerate modernisation of the empire, its economic development and the transformation of its society. Oil was a considerable help to the state in attaining these aims. From 1949 to 1953, the Prime Minister, Dr. Mossadegh, brought to power by a coalition of left-wing parties, had attempted to use the wealth of the country's immense oil reserves to the benefit of the Iranian state. He expropriated the principal Iranian oil concessionary, British Petroleum, and set up the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to run all the country's oil industries. Henceforth, the extension of exploited deposits, the increase in oil prices since 1973 and the development of refinery capacity and of the local chemical industries made NIOC a very powerful company. But under United States pressure the Shah dismissed Dr. Mossadegh in 1953, but left the privileges of NIOC untouched.

91. This policy had allowed large-scale investment, not only in the oil industry but also in a large number of other sectors, mainly industrial, designed to prepare the Iranian economy for the requirements of the day when the country's oil reserves were exhausted. This process was speeded up as from 1973 : the iron and steel industry was developed, there were an increasing number of processing industries and nuclear power stations were ordered.

92. In 1963, the Shah proposed by referendum a series of reforms known as the bloodless revolution. They included agrarian reform, the abolition of serfdom, participation by workers in the profits of firms, nationalisation of forests but also the sale of shares in factories belonging to the state to help to finance the agrarian reform. Measures were also taken in favour of the peasants. In 1968, water was nationalised and educational reforms undertaken. Women were granted civic rights in 1967. In short, a considerable effort to transform the economy was accompanied by a whole series of measures intended to transform society.

93. Increased oil output was of course the essential instrument in the country's transformation. In 1977, Iran produced 276 million tons of crude oil, i.e. 9.1% of total world output. It was then the world's fourth producer and second exporter after Saudi Arabia. Its exports went mainly to Western Europe and Japan but it was also Israel's principal supplier. The country's gross national product therefore rose rapidly, increasing from about $50,000 million in 1975 to almost $90,000 million in 1978, giving a per capita GNP of about $2,500 — a figure which placed Iran among the developed countries.

94. However, income was particularly unevenly distributed. The peasants, who formed half the population, remained poverty-stricken whereas those in the upper economic levels such as the administration became fabulously rich. It should be added that expansion did not come about without a high rate of inflation (27.3% in 1977), hence major upheavals in the distribution of wealth.

95. As in many cases, the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 broke out not in a country which was in the midst of economic and social stagnation but in a country which, like France in 1789 or Russia in 1917, had passed the economic take-off point and begun a radical social transformation. It was probably the speed of this trend which in the last ten years led to increasingly numerous reactions from the most varied circles. For instance, the number of extreme left-wing revolutionary groups grew, particularly among students and above all among Iranians living abroad. In Iran itself, while the Shi'ite clergy showed its deep-rooted hostility to the liberal reforms carried out by the Shah, particularly the emancipation of women, the influence of the Communist Tudeh Party was also continually increasing in urban milieux. In general, the peasantry and the army remained loyal to the imperial régime. But there was growing unrest among the ethnic minorities, particularly the Kurds, in spite of the assistance which they received from the Iranian Government intended to weaken Iraq.

96. In its turn, the spread of unrest led the government to take more repressive measures. The secret police (SAVAK) used increasingly reprehensible means of putting down the opposition, the relatively liberal constitution was no longer applied, while corruption among the country's leaders gave a further handhold to revolutionary propaganda.

97. During 1978, the situation worsened continuously until the riots of 8th September during which the army, firing on the crowd in Teheran, killed many people. These riots marked the final breakdown between the imperial régime and the population of the towns, whether tradesmen, proletarians or intellectuals. Henceforth, the Shah's

régime was living on borrowed time. It could no longer count on the army and on 16th January 1979 the Shah had to leave Iran, the power remaining in the hands of the government of Mr. Bakhtiar who was himself soon to be forced to leave the scene.

98. The discontented rallied unanimously to a Schi'ite priest who was particularly respected in the country, Ayatollah Khomeini, who had been living in exile in Iraq and then in the Paris area, and his return to Iran was the principal stage in the establishment of a new régime. Based on very strict loyalty to Islam, the régime condemned modernism in all its forms. The great economic plans and social reforms of the Shah's government were annulled and an attempt has been made to return to the traditional customs of a rural Islamic country. In the process, opposition was encountered both from partisans of the former régime and from the intellectuals, tradesmen and leading economic milieux. The Ayatollah soon attacked not only the partisans of the former régime, army officers and senior officials but also the extreme left wing which had helped to bring him to power, and repression became more cruel and brutal than in the time of the Shah. Summary justice administered by court martials was based on no law or constitutional text.

99. Savage methods of repression have also been used against the increasing number of national revolts. The most serious has been that of the Kurds on the Iraqi frontier against whom the major part of the Iranian armed forces have had to be used.

100. There is also serious economic disorder in the country. Oil production has fallen to such an extent that Iran has had to import refined products during the summer. The equipment programme for natural gas and nuclear energy and most private investment have come to a sudden stop. Trade is in a bad way, unemployment is affecting a considerable number of people and the middle classes seem to have broken with a régime which is ruining them. More than 100,000 Iranians have left the country.

101. After eight months' government, the provisional régime set up by Ayatollah Khomeini seems in an extremely dangerous position.

102. It cannot be claimed that it was established by the Soviets nor that it has fallen into their hands. However, insofar as Iran was one of the bastions of the West's defence against Soviet imperialism, the weakening — not to say collapse — of this bastion endangers the whole balance in the Near and Middle East and the security of the Gulf through which passes the major part of the oil exported by Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.

103. The Shah had in fact afforded considerable assistance in the form of armaments and troups to a number of Arab countries threatened by internal subversion, particularly the Sultanate of Oman and the Emirates. As from 1973, he had managed to dominate the Strait of Hormuz, movements through which he controlled. This power has now virtually disappeared, the Iranian army has been badly weakened and it is not only the future of Iran which is at stake but that of the whole Arab world and hence Europe's oil supplies.

IV. *Afghanistan*

104. With an area of only 650,000 sq.km. and a mixed population of 16 million of various ethnic origins (about 7.5 million Pashtuns, 2.5 million Tadzhiks, 4 million Turks or Mongols, 2 million nomads of various origins and 100,000 Baluchis), Afghanistan is still not a country without importance. It occupies a very special position at the crossroads of the influences competing in Central Asia.

105. It is a country of mountains and high plateaux hemmed in by Pakistan, Iran and the Soviet Union, and has two official languages: the Iranian Farsi and Pathan. Of its population, the very great majority are Moslem, partly Sunni and partly Shi'a ; while several of its elements are still organised on a tribal basis. Afghanistan, which has no outlet on the sea, can communicate with neighbouring countries only over rather high and inaccessible passes and it is Karachi which, thanks to the road over the Khyber Pass, provides its best maritime outlet. In the interior of the country, communications are difficult to say the least. The rare roads and railways linking the principal towns skirt the high mountain chains along the borders of the country and the centre is hard to cross.

106. Afghanistan owes its statehood to rivalry between its neighbours, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, particularly the conflicts between Britain, then ruler of India, and Russia associated with Iran. An area of contact between Russian and British domination, Afghanistan constantly wavered between the two influences. This rôle of buffer state allowed Afghanistan to retain its unity despite a very unsettled history which in 1826 brought to power the Barakzai dynasty, where it remained until 1973.

107. The British withdrawal from India in 1947 and the constitution of Pakistan upset this balance and therefore considerably weakened the solidarity of the régime. Henceforth, no force stood in the way of Soviet penetration, particularly as in 1964 the principal pass linking Afghanistan with Soviet Asia was improved when the Soviet Union, at an altitude of 3,700 m., built a tunnel through the Salang Pass together with a road protected from the snow. From then on, the Soviet Union was Afghanistan's only powerful neighbour and was to carry overwhelm-

ing weight in its internal affairs. During the decade 1953-63, Soviet assistance to Afghanistan already amounted to $1,500 million, compared with $450 million for American assistance and $72 million for Chinese assistance.

108. On 17th July 1973, a coup d'état by Sardar Mohammed Daud put an end to the reign of his brother-in-law, Mohammed Zahir Shah. This bloodless military coup d'état seems to have been quite warmly welcomed by a population which was at the time in the throes of a serious famine.

109. General Daud proclaimed the Republic, while announcing that he intended to have the country follow the spirit of Islam and to be putting an end to a corrupt monarchy. At home, he had a new and democratic constitution prepared and adopted in February 1977, which pledged respect for the two great national languages and for the preponderance of Islam. He endeavoured to maintain a friendly relationship with the Soviet Union and China as well as with India and Iran so as to ensure the necessary support in the constantly prevailing tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

110. This tension was due to the fact that the Pathans occupy territories on both slopes of the Hindu Kush and historically spread across both Pakistani and Afghan territory. But General Daud, in an attempt to maintain the country's integrity wished to grant the Pathans greater autonomy to which Mr. Ali Bhutto's government in Pakistan was opposed as he felt this could lead to an ethnic fragmentation of his own country.

111. General Daud's government was threatened by many attempted coups d'état, there being no less than five between 1973 and 1977. This unrest compelled him to take increasingly strict measures against all opposition forces, including those in the army, and to ban the activities of several Communist and Moslem opposition parties.

112. On 27th April 1978, President Daud's régime was overthrown by another military coup d'état organised by an Armed Forces Revolutionary Council consisting of young officers trained in the Soviet Union and close to the People's Democratic Party which itself did not conceal its sympathy for the Soviet Union and communism as an ideology.

113. This party, set up by Nur Mohammed Taraki in 1965, split into two at the time of the 1973 coup d'état. Part of it, the Purcham, complying with a Soviet directive, agreed to cooperate with General Daud, while the other fraction, the Khalq, remained in the opposition. However, in 1977 the Purcham stopped supporting General Daud and joined the Khalq in the opposition in order to reorganise the People's Democratic Party illegally.

114. It was the assassination of a Purcham leader which, by triggering off a series of demonstrations and repressive measures by the government, was the direct cause of the coup d'état of 27th April 1978. Following the attack on the presidential palace, President Daud, thirty members of his family and most ministers and army leaders were massacred. The constitution was annulled and a strict dictatorship set up, while the country became known as the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

115. Power was in the hands of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council which formed a government under the "chairmanship" of Mr. Taraki. This government claimed to be on the side of Islam, democracy and neutrality but at the same time announced its desire to carry out very large-scale agrarian reforms, oppose the ruling class and carry out nationalisations. A special court of justice was set up to ensure application of martial law and all meetings were banned. Visas were denied to foreign journalists, which meant and still means that only fragmentary and incomplete information is available about events in Afghanistan.

116. In May 1978, a series of co-operation agreements were signed with the Soviet Union and trade between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union increased considerably while relations with Iran and Pakistan soon deteriorated, particularly as these two countries were accused of supporting unrest in Afghanistan.

117. However, it appears that a growing proportion of the Afghan people is, without foreign influence, finding it hard to support the new régime. Insurrections have broken out in many provinces and information obtained indicates that at the present time 50 % of the country is in a position of insecurity whereas 30 % is actually controlled by the rebels. The government has been unable to control more than the towns and the main road from Kabul to the Soviet Union.

118. The régime would most likely not have survived this rebellion in which elements of the Afghan army took part on several occasions without Soviet military assistance, which is constantly increasing. At present, Afghanistan is in the midst of a civil war. Large numbers of Soviet air force units are stationed there and take part in fighting the rebellion, as well as several thousand Soviet advisers, with or without uniform. From information which has reached the West, it emerges that the Soviet units concerned have apparently suffered considerable losses.

119. Furthermore, the government is pursuing an extremely harsh policy of repression aimed *inter alia* at the Moslem clergy, accused of connivance with the new Iranian Government, and the army. Thus the whole Pathan territory

is in the grips of a rebellion except for a few towns which can be kept supplied only by air. But the centre, east and south of the country are also suffering serious unrest and in July fighting broke out near Kabul, where there had already been armed clashes in April.

120. In such circumstances, the Afghan economy is in particularly dire straits since internal communications, poor and sparse at the best of times, are practically cut off. The agrarian reform was carried out in very poor conditions, the threatened landowners having stopped sowing their crops, and the Soviet Union is also having to keep the country supplied. It is therefore directly involved in a struggle where there is every indication that it is in confrontation with the large majority of the Afghan population.

121. It is very difficult to foresee the outcome of a situation in which the government side, while it has considerable military superiority, has not been able to avoid losing control of the major part of the country. The fate of Afghanistan therefore depends essentially on the determination of the Soviet Union to maintain the present régime or accept that it has bitten off more than it can successfully chew.

122. The latest coup d'état — on 14th September 1979 — may perhaps be explained by the deterioration of the internal situation, the spread of the rebellion to sixteen of the country's twenty-one provinces and the flight into exile of some 200,000 Afghans, not to speak of the victims of repression and the some 12,000 persons who — according to Amnesty International — are believed to be imprisoned. Information received so far does not allow a very clear picture to be formed of events leading up to the death of President Taraki and his replacement by a Khalq leader, Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin. The indications are that the Soviet Union played a helping hand in these events, perhaps in order to try to ensure that control was assumed by a leader in whom Moscow had full confidence but who would be prepared to make all necessary concessions to traditionalist circles to divide and put down the rebellion, which tasks President Taraki clearly found were beyond his ability.

V. *Conclusions*

(i) Palestine

123. In all evidence, the Camp David agreements have thrown little light on the very complex situation stemming from the initiatives taken by the Israelis since 1947 and imposed on the Arabs, the development of a PLO which controls no territory but is a dominant force in the whole of Arabia and which all Arab states acknowledge as having the right to represent Palestinians as a whole and the many resolutions adopted by the United Nations but not applied. If nothing else, these agreements should relieve Israel of any immediate fears for its security and this should allow it, if it really wishes, to embark upon negotiations with all the parties concerned to establish, at last, a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

124. Here, Israel must above all think of its own security and the advantages it would derive from peace and a settlement of the problem of the Palestinians. This cannot be achieved by annexations and by the movement of ever-larger numbers of Arabs from the West Bank and the settlement of Israeli colonists in their stead. It will have to recognise that the Palestinians should be its partners, not its opponents, in negotiations on the territory of Palestine and admit that henceforth the PLO has to play an active rôle in attempting to reach a permanent settlement. Taking refuge behind accusations of terrorism or the PLO's alleged wish to destroy the state of Israel will not for long be able to mask a cut and dried refusal to negotiate, based on a position of force which will perhaps not last indefinitely. Israel has every interest in taking advantage of the time gained by Camp David in further strengthening this position in order to negotiate at last.

125. The PLO, for its part, must grasp that wider recognition, not only by Israel but also by the western powers, depends essentially on a total renunciation of violence, at least while negotiations are under way, and also on its recognition of Israel's right to exist within defined, agreed frontiers, although no advantage should be drawn from results obtained by the use of force since 1967, nor even since 1948, except for possible adjustments to meet real security requirements. Your Rapporteur is pleased to note that the PLO seems now to be drawing closer to this position, and also that it is already moving away from terrorism outside territory controlled by the Israelis, as demonstrated at the time of the attack on the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara in 1979 when it made those responsible for the attack give themselves up to the Turkish authorities.

126. Yet it seems regrettably clear that the positions of the PLO and Israel are still too far apart for direct negotiations to be possible: the participation of Arab states involved in the conflict is essential insofar as the PLO needs their guarantee, just as Israel needs to speak to representatives who exercise effective territorial sovereignty. Among them, Egypt (as shown at Camp David) and Syria have specific and limited interests and territorial rights to uphold. Conversely, Jordan, which has rights of various kinds over all the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1947 and whose security and even existence are constantly jeopardised by the continuation of the conflict, the flow of refugees, Israel's claim to the waters of the Jordan, tributaries and the underlying water table of its valley and the need to defend a very long frontier with

a small army, is the true key to the problem. Taking the United Nations resolutions as a basis, it is presenting no territorial claims, but cannot be expected to give up what is essential, i.e. the return of the West Bank to the Palestinians and the right of return or compensation for those who have been expropriated and are still often living in camps. Its credit among the Palestinians makes its participation in any peace negotiations essential. Its moderation and realism are necessary if negotiations are to succeed.

127. In the coming months, Europe's rôle might be to show the United States that a bilateral agreement between Egypt and Israel, even if the rights of the Palestinians are reserved under some bilateral declaration without their participation, cannot establish true and lasting peace in the Middle East but, now more than ever, it is urgent to work out the terms of an agreement guaranteeing the Palestinians the right to self-determination and Israel, within its frontiers, the security it is seeking and which, in any event, the range of modern weapons will not guarantee for long if it is to be ensured by force alone. A favourable situation for such peace negotiations exists today and it is essential to seize the opportunity before it is too late and a further conflict brings about a direct confrontation between the two great world powers, the magnitude of which no one can predict, nor its outcome. Europe for its part has no interest other than peace and stability in the area. Experience drawn from its own history and its knowledge of Middle East problems should allow it to make moderation, realism and respect for the fundamental values which it claims to uphold win the day.

128. For the United States on its own does not have sufficient credibility anywhere in the area to play a decisive rôle necessitating a level of confidence in the judgment, objectivity and sense of purpose which the present administration in Washington clearly does not possess in the Middle East, not even in Egypt and Tel Aviv, let alone Arabia.

129. "Which comes first, the chicken or the egg ?"

130. The application of this ancient riddle to the present complex situation in the Middle East controversy between Jews and Arabs is truly relevant. The only glimmer of hope seems to lie in *simultaneous* declarations by the PLO and by Israel. The first must say it is ready to respect, in peace, the existence of a state of Israel, in perpetuity, within internationally defined and agreed borders, in accord with past United Nations resolutions. A future Israeli Government (since it seems clear that the present one — following on quite unequivocal recent statements by Mr. Moshe Dayan at Strasbourg on 10th October — is unwilling to join in *any* constructive dialogue on the subject) must for its part state it is ready to discuss the future status of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip with accredited representatives of the Palestinian people, which will include an ultimate option for Palestinian Arabs to decide their own future — a formal link with Israel, complete independence, a federation with Jordan, or an acceptance of the suzerainty of Jordan. It must also drop its settlement policy in the West Bank.

131. Both sides should agree to abandon all forms of violence, one against the other, during any period of such negotiation, any transition period that follows, and permanently once full agreement has been reached. General Dayan's resignation within less than two weeks of his hard-line remarks, negative responses to questions, and his exposition of an interpretation of the Camp David agreements wholly at variance with that of the Egyptian Minister of State Mr. Boutros Ghali, also speaking in Strasbourg, goes to show that there are real possibilities of a genuine overall peace settlement if, but only if, there is a readiness to follow the lines of action expounded in the final paragraph of this section of the report.

132. The report of Mr. Dayan's interview with the New York Times bureau chief in Jerusalem after his resignation, published in the International Herald Tribune of 29th October stating :

> "...where my influence stopped was on the final and permanent status of the area, and here, I think, the prime minister and his party, and the (National) Religious Party, their concept is that at the end of the road there should be Israeli sovereignty over all the area, with a most liberal autonomy for the Arabs living there. But the Israeli flag should be all over the area, with no ifs, ands or buts"

provides a new cause for Arab doubts whether there is any serious Israeli readiness to make a fair and just settlement on the West Bank question.

(ii) Iran

133. It is a tragic fact that the revolution, which was not only — it was widely believed — to bring freedom to the people from authoritarian and corrupt rule, but also to secure Iran's independence as a sovereign unitary state despite its varied ethnic composition, should have accomplished precisely contrary results. The inhabitants are less free — and emancipated — than ever before and the cohesion of the state more imperilled than at any time since its inception.

134. No outside interest in the West — or, for the time being anyhow, in the Soviet Union — has received any advantage from the changes — indeed the opposite. Incidentally, in this context,

a new political myth is now nevertheless being propagated, asserting that it is only western powers and in particular the United States that were responsible for favouring and supporting the rule of a "tyrannical Shah". In fact, that ruler was also often welcomed and fêted by East European countries, e.g. state visits to Moscow and Bucharest, and the German Democratic Republic even made him a doctor honoris causa of the Humboldt University of East Berlin.

135. In retrospect it is quite clear that the Shah believed, as other rulers and governments have done, that post-Vietnam America had more muscle and determination to use if need be in support of its friends than proved to be the case. It is sadly true, too, and rather ominous that other countries, in the whole Middle East region and elsewhere up to now friends of the West, and believers in the efficacy of an American shield against the buffetings of the "storm of the world", have suffered a severe shock and have started to think in different terms of how best to safeguard their security. However, to dwell on what has happened, while it has useful lessons for us all, especially our American allies, does nothing in the case of Iran itself to provide any positive new initiative we could take to re-establish the cohesion of the fractured Iranian Empire, let alone in a form that would ensure the democratic rights of the peoples involved.

136. Historically empires containing non-homogeneous populations within their borders have sooner or later had, in order to prevent total disintegration, to resort to repressive policies : or to prevent such disintegration by agreeing to levels of federalism of their component parts that satisfied the national aspirations of each of their component elements.

137. Over the years various methods of providing a cement that would prevent such federalism leading in the long run to separatism have been tried.

138. For instance the Austro-Hungarian Empire held out as long as it did by creating an almost mystical dynastic symbolism. The Soviet Union, last surviving empire in the traditional meaning of the word, has relied on adherence to a common political ideology, Marxist-Leninism ; although here too the signs of decay are increasingly being shown in dissident movement of different types. The Shah put his faith, ill-advisedly, in imagined patriotic fervour for a glorious history.

139. Khomeini, as did the Ottoman rulers at the height of their glory, clearly believes that Islam provides the only cement he needs to maintain a continuing centralised unitary state. Certainly he is temporarily benefiting from a revival of "Islam" throughout the whole Muslim world ; but it has already been shown that this strategy in itself without the brutal use of armed force is insufficient to realise his ambitions to establish a stable despotic theocratic régime.

140. Under such circumstances there is little that Europe can do, at least for the time being, than to match the unfolding tragedy. Any attempt at direct intervention would be counter-productive in that it would only strengthen Khomeini's hand by providing him with a rallying cry of xenophobia, a card he already plays to the utmost.

141. But to stand on the side-lines physically speaking does not mean that we should not, in all ways available to us, express open condemnation of his tyrannical and reactionary domestic policies : because if we do stay silent the many intelligent Iranian men and women who are still endeavouring, at the risk of their lives, to bring about a moderate democratic successor régime to succeed that of the Shah will become disillusioned and seek sanctuary outside Iran as at least 100,000 have done since Khomeini took over, rather than stay behind and endure all the dangers his rule entails for all who oppose his absolutism.

142. Your Rapporteur also believes that in this same context any western power is wrong to supply arms to an already over-armed nation which can only be used either for internal repressive purposes or to threaten the stability and integrity of neighbouring states. Accordingly, it seems regrettable that despite this fact Washington has decided to renew the supply of military hardware.

143. The less there is evidence of external "intervention" as opposed to "influence" to produce the political changes we would favour, the less likely is direct counter-intervention by the Soviet Union. For however many weapons we supply to Khomeini, his country's demoralised armed forces would be wholly incapable of resisting Soviet military intervention, which could only be met by a direct American counter-intervention and a resultant East-West armed confrontation — surely the *last* thing we wish to see just now in the Middle East !

144. This raises the question whether the very unity of the country will survive the present crisis. A strong and authoritarian régime would be needed to ensure the future of a centralised state. A federal system would seem logical in such a vast territory with such varied populations, but it is hard to see how this could be introduced in the material and moral chaos in which the country seems to be living.

145. This chaos and the awakening of the various nationalities in Iran itself is a danger for the stability of the whole Near and Middle East, not only because of the collapse of Iranian power which played a leading rôle in the balance of the region and provided a guarantee of Israel's security but also because the Iranian revolution in 1979 liberated forces which are dangerous for many countries in the region. These include a revolutionary left-wing hostile to the Arab monar-

chies, an Islamic reaction and attitude hostile both to the West and to the industrialisation of Moslem countries and the liberalisation of society and customs and the revival of various forms of nationalism, particularly that of the Kurds, who also form two-fifths of the population of Iraq and live throughout Eastern Turkey and Syria.

146. This collapse of Iranian power has already led the United States to form a mobile force of about 100,000 men stationed in the United States, but capable of intervening in the Middle East at very short notice in the event of disturbances endangering the West's oil supplies. It is not certain that Europe has any interest in following suit, but it probably has no interest either in becoming involved again in supporting an ill-esteemed and unstable régime, *inter alia* by resuming with the Ayatollah's government the sales of arms foreseen in the agreements with the Shah. It is clearly to its advantage to leave the Iranians free to decide for themselves on their fate, régime and leaders, insofar as other powers do not intervene in the country's internal affairs or use its weakness to develop subversive operations in other countries of the Near or Middle East.

147. Also, we in Europe, with our vital close links, economic as well as cultural and historic, with many Muslim countries other than Iran, have to be very, very careful in criticising Khomeini's excesses not to appear to be critical of the world-wide Islamic religious revival which we all ought fully to respect.

(iii) Afghanistan

148. Unfortunately in this case too there is little that can be done, even though the issues involved are much less complex than in regard to Iran.

149. Afghanistan long preserved a precarious independence as a buffer state between Russia and Imperial British India. When Britain left the scene Pakistan was too weak to take over the United Kingdom's rôle. Indeed, because of large numbers of Pathans living on both sides of a frontier only in name, Pakistan has had all its work cut out to hold on to its own territorial integrity along the famous North-West Frontier. The United States attempted to take Britain's place both by supporting Pakistan and affording direct aid, mostly economic, to the Kabul Government. However, as to the latter, it was never a full commitment and never approached the extent of Russian assistance. As to the former, because of successive Indo-Pakistan conflicts, the United States decided that it was not worth offending India, even to maintain, let alone increase, its protective rôle in regard to Pakistan. That position obtains today and Rawalpindi now looks to Peking as its chief ally. But China is neither strong enough nor near enough to act as a counterweight against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. So this small country, despite strong resistance by a majority of its fiercely proud and independent Muslim tribesmen, is facing (unless the Soviet Union as some commentators predict, finds it has bitten off more than it can chew, except at disproportionate cost) ultimate subjection by, and absorption into, the Soviet Empire, as yet another so-called "autonomous people's republic".

150. If this should happen, the next step would be dangerous indeed to western and most especially European vital interests. It is known that within a decade the Soviet Union will need to become a net importer of oil on a considerable scale.

151. Only a weak and divided Pakistan now stands between Russia and direct access to the Gulf area. With a huge and growing naval fleet in being, especially if by then the "festering sore" in Arab-western relations — the fate of the Palestinians — has not been satisfactorily dealt with, it would not be too long before a predominant Soviet presence in the area would exercise a decisive influence on the supply of oil that Europe so desperately needs to maintain let alone increase the standard of living of its own peoples.

152. The United States, a weakened giant, at least under its present leadership, can do little or nothing to dissuade the Russians from their objectives in South Asia : despite the fact that clearly the Soviet action ridicules the concept of genuine détente and is a breach of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act forbidding interference by any signatory state in the internal affairs of any other countries.

153. However, the Americans and the Europeans could do much to delay if not altogether to halt them by increasing not only economic aid but also defensive arms to Pakistan, and — no less important — showing greater understanding for that unhappy country's many difficulties. The excuse used in the past to curtail support for Pakistan — namely that this posed a threat to India with the risk of the latter turning to the Soviet Union for help — is certainly not valid today. The thought that a nation of four distinct ethnic groups, Punjabis, Sindis, Baluchis and Pathans, rift with internal divisions and living with the loss of half its original nation-state, now Bangladesh, taking on India, a country many times its size, about twenty times its population, with greatly superior armed forces in numbers and equipment and infinitely greater industrial resources is laughable.

154. Reports, if true, that Pakistan is seeking to develop a limited nuclear deterrent not because of aggressive intentions against India, already in possession of such a device, but because there is a feeling in Islamabad that, deserted as it sees it by its western friends and surrounded by foes or potential foes in the East, except for China, its very survival depends on its learning to stand on its own feet defence-wise.

Document 820 **3rd December 1979**
Amendments 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7

Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 [1]

tabled by Dr. Miller

1. Leave out the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :

"Welcoming the Camp David agreements as a major step towards overall peace ,".

2. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "and militate against the underlying causes of the conflict".

3. Leave out the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

4. Leave out the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

5. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

6. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "contemporaneously and reciprocally" and insert "immediately".

7. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "internationally".

Signed : Miller

1. See 11th Sitting, 4th December 1979 (Amendments 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 negatived ; Amendments 6 and 7 withdrawn).

Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

AMENDMENT 8 [1]

tabled by Mr. Roper and others

8. At the beginning of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add :

"Either directly or where more appropriate indirectly through the participation of its membership in European political co-operation among the Nine,".

Signed : Roper, Krieps, Flämig, Stoffelen, Lamberts

1. See 11th Sitting, 4th December 1979 (Amendment agreed to).

Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

AMENDMENTS 9 and 10 [1]

tabled by Mr. Corallo

9. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "valid Palestinian representatives" and insert "the PLO".

10. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "terrorist acts of violence which call into question the validity of any such declaration" and insert "any acts of war as soon as the negotiations referred to in paragraph 5 are seriously envisaged".

Signed : Corallo

1. See 11th Sitting, 4th December 1979 (Amendment 9 negatived ; Amendment 10 withdrawn).

Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

AMENDMENTS 11, 12 and 13 [1]

tabled by Mr. Urwin and others

11. In the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "Welcoming" and insert "Noting".

12. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "and" in line 2 to the end of the paragraph and insert "call upon all other arms-supplying countries to impose a similar moratorium".

13. Leave out paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

"5. Ask its members to urge Israel immediately to accept the existence of the Palestinian people and to renounce its policy of settlements on the West Bank and commence negotiations with valid Palestinian representatives to achieve self-determination, including the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ;

6. Ask its members to urge the PLO, also immediately, to declare its acceptance of an independent Israeli state within internationally agreed and defined borders ;

7. Ask its members to urge upon both sides a total abandonment of all acts of violence, which call into question the validity of any such declarations."

Signed : Urwin, Voogd, Stoffelen

1. See 11th Sitting, 4th December 1979 (Amendment 11 negatived ; Amendments 12 and 13 agreed to).

Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

AMENDMENT 14 [1]

tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett

14. At the end of paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, add "and meanwhile call upon all countries concerned to renounce all acts of military violence".

Signed: Bennett

1. See 11th Sitting, 4th December 1979 (Amendment withdrawn).

Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

AMENDMENTS 15 and 16 [1]

tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and others

15. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Ask its members to urge the PLO contemporaneously and reciprocally to declare its acceptance of" and insert "Ask its members to insist that the PLO accept" ; renumber paragraph 6 as paragraph 5 ; and renumber paragraph 5 as paragraph 6.

16. After the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

"Wishing the PLO to recognise Israel's right to the existence and security of a free and independent state and to stop its acts of terrorism, failing which it is not possible for it to take part in negotiations;".

Signed : Cavaliere, Del Duca, Roberti

1. See 11th Sitting, 4th December 1979 (Amendment 15 negatived ; Amendment 16 withdrawn).

Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

AMENDMENTS 17 and 18 [1]

tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and others

17. After the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :

"Concerned that by taking and detaining employees of the United States Embassy, in violation of all principles of international law, Iran may endanger world peace ;".

18. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :

"Ask Iran to free immediately the hostages held in the United States Embassy;".

Signed : Cavaliere, Müller, Mende, Hanin, Roberti, Pecoraro, Treu, Valleix

1. See 11th Sitting, 4th December 1979 (Amendments agreed to).

Document 821 **6th November 1979**

Definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments [2] *by Mr. Meintz, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted in Committee by 11 votes to 2 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. *Roper* (Chairman) ; MM. Bonnel (Alternate : *Verleysen*), *Roberti* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Ahrens, Banks,* Baumel, Bechter, van den Bergh, Boldrini (Alternate : *Bernini*), Boucheny (Alternate : *Jung*), Dejardin, Fosson, Grant, Handlos, de Koster, Lemmrich, *Maggioni, Meintz,* Ménard, *Mulley,* Onslow (Alternate : *Sir Frederic Bennett*), Pawelczyk, Pecchioli (Alternate : *Calamandrei*), Péronnet, *Schmidt,* Scholten, *Tanghe.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on the definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe

The Assembly,

Stressing the important rôle it can play in ensuring parliamentary supervision at European level of collective defence arrangements of the Alliance ;

Considering the proceedings of the recent symposium on a European armaments policy, and in particular its Working Group I ;

Expressing its thanks to all authors of papers and Rapporteurs who contributed to its success,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments

1. To encourage, through their defence procurement policies, the restructuring of the European armaments industry, under the aegis of the industrial policy of the European Community, through the creation of permanent international consortia in Europe leading eventually to fully European corporations for the production of the more sophisticated defence equipment ;

2. (*a*) To foster a policy of European preference for bi- or multilateral European defence equipment projects duly endorsed by the IEPG ;

(*b*) To foster creation of an Alliance-wide market for defence equipment so that dependence upon exports to third countries can be reduced ;

3. (*a*) To keep their national parliamentary defence committees fully informed about future national and allied defence equipment requirements and projects, in particular through the communication to them of the equipment replacement schedules prepared by Panel I of the IEPG and completed by the Conference of National Armaments Directors ;

(*b*) To request the Chairman of Panel I to communicate these schedules to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the WEU Assembly.

Draft Order

on the definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe

The Assembly,

Stressing the important rôle it can play in ensuring parliamentary supervision at European level of collective defence arrangements of the Alliance ;

Recalling the provisions of its Resolution 15 ;

INSTRUCTS its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to invite members of the parliamentary defence committees of the IEPG countries to an annual joint meeting to discuss future national and allied defence equipment requirements and projects.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Meintz, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1. The Rapporteur was requested to prepare a report drawing political conclusions from the proceedings of Working Group I of the symposium on a European armaments policy which the Assembly organised in Brussels from 15th to 17th October 1979. The theme of Working Group I was the title of the present report : "The definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe", and the group had before it as working documents the reports from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on a European armaments policy[1] and the corresponding Recommendation 325[2], and on parliaments and defence procurement[3] and its corresponding Recommendation 333[2]. The following papers[4] were submitted to Working Group I : Three papers on the workings of governmental institutions :

(*i*) Prospects of the work of Panel I of the IEPG — timetable for replacing equipment ; author : Mr. Trevor Knapp, Head of International and Industrial Policy 2, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (Chairman of Panel I of the IEPG) ;

(*ii*) Prospects of bi- and multilateral European co-operation ; author : Ingénieur Général Marc Cauchie, French Permanent Delegate to the WEU Standing Armaments Committee ;

(*iii*) Prospects of the work of the Conference of National Armaments Directors ; author : Mr. John B. Walsh, NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Support ;

and three papers on industrial aspects of co-operation :

(*iv*) An industrial view of the definition of armaments requirements ; authors : (*a*) Dr. Gustavo Stefanini, President and Deputy Administrator of Oto Melara ; (*b*) Mr. Roger Chevalier, Deputy Director General of the Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale ;

(*v*) The rôle of permanent consortia in European co-operation ; author : Mr. F. Striegel, Vice-President, Euromissile.

The presentation of each group of working papers was followed by a general discussion in which several distinguished participants took part.

2. The Committee has selected three main themes which arose from the papers and discussion and presents them as its political conclusions, but for reference a summary of the proceedings of Working Group I is attached at Appendix II in the form of the report to the plenary symposium made by the General Rapporteur of Working Group I — General Freytag von Loringhoven.

II. *Bi- and trilateral co-operation and permanent consortia*

3. The case of a joint production of armaments in Europe has been made long ago as many previous reports of the Committee have testified. The political debate is about how best to organise it. There was a clear consensus in the symposium, which the Committee endorses, that the future of joint production lies along the road already mapped out by several successful projects such as the Hot, Milan and Roland missiles and the Tornado aircraft — in the direction of co-operative production of a particular weapons system by two or three countries at the most, through the constitution of an international consortium of the participating national firms. The days of competitive development of rival military projects by two different countries are over, certainly as far as the more expensive weapons projects are concerned, because they are too wasteful of resources in the costly research and development phase, and lead to too big an initial investment both of resources and prestige for either initiating country to abandon its project if the other is eventually selected for production by other participating countries.

4. While Dr. Stefanini in his paper favoured a plurality of production lines, arguing *inter alia* the immobility of labour as a reason, the Committee nevertheless considers that within the European Community at least the way of maintaining a viable armaments industry within Europe lies through the establishment of international European corporations, the creation of which will require some greater mobility of labour, at least of professional and skilled labour. The Committee reiterates the clause of the Assembly's Recommendation 325, echoed also by the President of the Assembly in his keynote speech to the symposium, which called for the restructuring of the European armaments industry under the aegis of the European Community.

1. Document 786, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley.
2. At Appendix I.
3. Document 807, Rapporteur Mr. Maggioni.
4. For the full text of these papers, see the Official Record of the symposium.

5. The road to this transformation lies through the *ad hoc* international consortia already established by participating firms in two or three countries for specific projects such as those mentioned above. The international juridical framework for co-operation thus established should be made permanent when further co-operative projects can be awarded to the same consortia by the governments.

6. The 1960s saw the concentration of aircraft production in member countries into not more than one or at the most two major firms in each country. The Committee believes that over the next two decades a viable European base for the manufacture of the most sophisticated armaments in the field of aerospace can be maintained only through the establishment of not more than two international European corporations. This development must be actively encouraged through governmental procurement policy and through the industrial policy of the European community.

III. *European preference, exports and the "two-way street"*

7. A secondary theme of the paper by Ingénieur Général Cauchie was that where a bi- or trilateral project had been established and was going into production, or was about to, other European NATO countries — i.e. other members of the IEPG — should be expected to give that project preference to meet their future arms requirements — preference that is over a possible alternative United States product. This gave rise to a discussion of possible price differences and the amount of offset in national production that might be awarded as part of a contract for a rival project. It was noted that within the IEPG there are proposals for subsidising the disadvantaged armaments industry of countries such as Turkey, in particular through the provision of assistance in establishing modern production plants for types of defence equipment which the country has experience of producing — e.g. artillery ammunition. The Committee readily concludes that where the IEPG is providing assistance for a marginal armaments industry there is a strong case for calling for the recipient country to give preference to multilateral European projects.

8. Italy in some ways is a special case in presenting a significant armaments production capacity. The country does participate in certain bilateral and trilateral projects, e.g. the Panavia consortium producing the Tornado, but Italian industry feels that in many cases it fails to secure a reasonable share of production in multilateral projects dominated by the European "big three" — France, Germany and the United Kingdom. An intermediate group of countries comprising Belgium, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian NATO countries have now largely adopted the practice of production under licence of components of weapons projects in which they participate, the recent F-16 deal being the most important example.

9. The Committee urges in its conclusions that when a bi- or trilateral project has duly received the imprimatur of the IEPG, every effort should be made to ensure that it is given preference by other IEPG countries when the time for production begins — the counterpart should be shared production of components or sub-assemblies in countries with an appropriate tradition and capacity ; or assistance to other parts of the armaments industry as in the case of conventional ammunition production in Turkey.

10. There was some discussion of export to third countries — i.e. countries outside the Alliance. On the one hand the principal manufacturing countries of sophisticated weapons systems claim, rightly in many cases, that the procurement requirements of three participating countries are insufficient to maintain an economic production basis. To increase production runs some export will be necessary to third countries. This can raise problems for the juridical terms of the co-operation agreement : one participating country may not be prepared to allow components or sub-assemblies manufactured in its territory to be incorporated in a finished weapons system which another participant wishes to export to some third country to which the first participant for political reasons may well have banned the export of armaments. For some countries freedom to export without agreement of partners is regarded as a condition of participation in a multilateral project. For other potential participants common agreement between all participants for exports to third countries may be regarded as a necessary condition for participation.

11. The Committee believes strongly that the answer lies in greater European preference and in the development of the "two-way street" with the United States so that the market open to initial production from joint projects covers the requirements of the whole of the Alliance. In these circumstances the economic requirement for export to third countries is reduced to political agreement on the foreign policy aspect, either in the North Atlantic Council or in the framework of European political consultation.

IV. *Parliamentary supervision*

12. The Committee recalls the proposals put forward in its report on parliaments and defence procurement[1] and contained in Recommendation

1. Document 807, Rapporteur Mr. Maggioni.

333 and Resolution 63 adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1979. The Assembly in those texts stressed the need for member parliaments to be able to influence defence procurement policy in order to further joint production, and adequately to control expenditure. In the course of discussion in Working Group I the point was again made that international projects, once launched, were more difficult to control from the financial standpoint than purely national projects, because of the international commitment entered into. Only at the European level, it was felt by some speakers, could parliamentary supervision of international projects be properly exercised.

13. The Committee in this report reiterates its recommendation that national parliaments, or their appropriate committees, must receive full and timely information on defence equipment requirements and projects in research and development in both their own and in allied countries. Only in this way can they exert proper influence in the direction of joint production and favour the consolidation of sophisticated defence industries through permanent consortia leading towards the consultation of multinational European corporations.

14. The Committee makes two specific proposals designed to improve the flow of information to defence committees in the national parliaments. It proposes first that the equipment replacement schedules drawn up in Panel I of the IEPG, and completed by the CNADs (described by Mr. Knapp in the paper he presented to Working Group I of the symposium), should be communicated by member governments to the defence committees in their national parliaments, and should further be communicated by the Chairman of Panel I to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

15. The Committee proposes further that it arrange annual meetings with the chairmen and members to be designated of the defence committees in the national parliaments of the WEU countries to review the progress of work in the IEPG and in the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors, with particular reference to the fostering of further joint production schemes based on equipment to be identified in the equipment replacement schedules. It intends further to invite to these meetings, as observers with the right to speak, members of the parliamentary defence committees in the IEPG countries which are not members of WEU, and recalls in this context that it already possesses the necessary authority to do so under the terms of Resolution 15, adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1959 [1]. This resolution was adopted specifically at the request of the Committee which declared that it "would avail itself of this authorisation when defence questions are discussed which affect the interests of the states in question, or when the Committee wishes to know the opinion of observers from other states on the matters under discussion". [2]

V. *Conclusions*

16. The Committee's conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation and draft order which preface this report.

VI. *Opinion of the minority*

17. The report as a whole was adopted in the Committee by 11 votes to 2 with 1 abstention. A minority of the Committee would have deleted the words "under the aegis of the industrial policy of the European Community" in paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation, and the corresponding words at the end of paragraph 6 of this exploratory memorandum, on the grounds that the European Community did not have an effective industrial policy, or the expertise necessary to restructure the defence industry, or again on the grounds that because of the special conditions of the defence industry it would be inappropriate for it to be treated in the same way as other industry.

1. Text at Appendix III.

2. Document 130, Part II (*a*), Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

APPENDIX I

RECOMMENDATION 325 [1]

on a European armaments policy [2]

The Assembly,

Aware that the growing cost of modern armaments technology and current economic trends can lead to unilateral disarmament through inflation in the countries of the Alliance ;

Stressing the need for the joint production of armaments in order to provide interoperability and standardisation of military equipment ; to ensure the survival of a viable European armaments industry ; and lastly a two-way street in armaments with the United States ;

Considering that limited but as yet too slow progress in these directions is now being made in the independent European programme group, in the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors, and Military Agency for Standardisation, in all of which all WEU countries participate ;

Believing that only if the European armaments industry as a whole is restructured on a viable and competitive commercial and industrial basis will adequate progress be made ;

Welcoming the study of the European armaments industry being undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge that efforts to achieve joint production, interoperability and, when necessary for the security of Europe, the standardisation of defence equipment in the European countries of the Alliance be concentrated in the independent European programme group with such assistance as the Standing Armaments Committee can provide ;

2. Give consideration to the restructuring of the European armaments industry under the aegis of the European Community, relying on its responsibility in the fields of industrial and customs policy and research ;

3. Ensure that once the present study of the European armaments industry is completed, full use be made of the resources of the Standing Armaments Committee to assist in the foregoing tasks ;

4. Request the governments concerned to arrange for the IEPG to submit an annual report on its activities to the Assembly.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (12th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 786).

RECOMMENDATION 333 [1]

on parliaments and defence procurement [2]

The Assembly,

Having studied the report of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments analysing the rôle of national parliaments in the national defence equipment procurement process;

Considering that national parliaments and their defence committees, with the exception of those of Germany and the Netherlands, are usually inadequately informed on defence matters;

Believing that parliaments exercise insufficiently their prerogative to control defence procurement policy;

Recalling the terms of its Recommendation 197 on military security and parliamentary information;

With a view to furthering joint production and standardisation of defence equipment in the armed forces of the countries of Western Europe or in the Alliance, taking due account of the military and economic requirements of the Alliance as a whole,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments:

A. To ensure that their parliaments, or where appropriate their parliamentary defence, budget, or other committees concerned:

1. Are fully informed in good time, within the limits imposed by considerations only of external security, not of political or administrative convenience, on all aspects of defence policy, at both the national and allied levels, especially on matters affecting the assessment of the military threat and the choice of defence equipment;
2. Are enabled to exercise sufficiently close control of the defence budget and appropriations and of all stages of the defence procurement process, so as to improve defence capability and increase standardisation and interoperability of equipment;
3. Are enabled to compile systematically information on current research and development projects in the national and European defence industry;

B. To ensure that full information on national defence equipment projects in the planning stages is available to allied governments, and to take full account of alternative defence equipment projects available in allied countries;

C. To provide as far as possible a common structure for the national defence budgets, national defence equipment procurement processes, and, finally, the procedure for supplying classified information with a view to instituting in the foreseeable future a European policy of common procurement of new weapons systems.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1979 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (6th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Maggioni on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 807).

APPENDIX II

Report on the proceedings of Working Group I presented to the symposium on a European armaments policy by General Freytag von Loringhoven, General Rapporteur, on 16th October 1979

Introduction

Working Group I divided its work on the definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe into two parts : the first covering governmental institutions and the second European industries.

In the first paper on governmental institutions, *the work of Panel I of the independent European programme group* — and especially its rôle in setting up a timetable for replacing equipment — was very ably discussed by Mr. Trevor Knapp. The independent European programme group (IEPG) was established in 1976 in order to foster collaboration in armaments production in Europe. Panel I plays an important part in identifying opportunities for such collaboration.

The IEPG has developed a system to tabulate the major equipment replacement intentions of all twelve IEPG nations. The member countries report annually and try to look fifteen to twenty years ahead.

The IEPG system is closely related to the NATO armaments planning review (NAPR). IEPG equipment tables are completed with United States and Canadian information in NATO's Committee of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), and the IEPG, which confines itself to seeking opportunities for purely European co-operation, avoided duplicating work in NATO or Eurocom. Thus, a number of significant potential European projects have been identified. The most important are :

— a new tactical combat aircraft ;

— a new family of European military helicopters ;

— and a third generation of European anti-tank guided weapons.

The work of Panel I of the IEPG has an important part to play in encouraging European co-operation. The exchange of basic information between the allies must take place at the earliest possible date before national plans become irreversible and must cover much longer-term opportunities.

General Cauchie then reviewed the prospects for bi- and multilateral European co-operation, concentrating on those aspects that complemented the overall action being taken by the IEPG or CNAD. The reasons that had progressively strengthened the will to co-operate, i.e. budgetary and technological constraints, operational advantages and politico-economic aspects, were now generally accepted and the question was no longer whether to co-operate but how best to bring co-operation about.

As the global capacity of the European armaments industry exceeded the potential European market, countries were obliged to export if they wished to retain the independence of their defence industries.

The proliferation of small co-operative groups of two or three countries, which General Cauchie described as "primary" groupings, had led to the need for overall co-operation at the European level and to the setting up of the IEPG.

Dealing with the relationship of primary groupings to the IEPG, General Cauchie said that experience had shown that three or four was the maximum number for efficient co-operation. The participation of particular IEPG countries in primary groupings was directly attributable to the sums they allocate to development. In this connection, he noted a statement by Dr. Perry of the United States that as the United States spent three times as much as Europe on research and development, it was unreasonable to expect balanced trade between the two. However, it was for an organised Europe, both in the IEPG and in primary groupings, to urge the United States whose trade with Europe varies from 10:1 to 30:1, depending on the country, to bring its ratio into line with Dr. Perry's figures.

General Cauchie stressed that bi- and multilateral co-operation and the activities of the IEPG had to be complementary, with the one taking full account of the needs and interests of the other. This was the basis of the "European preference" approved by the IEPG whereby countries agree to grant a privileged position to European production in their arms procurement and to keep other IEPG countries informed of their plans.

He concluded that bi- and multilateral co-operation :

— would remain the practical basis for European co-operation ;

— must take account of the IEPG ; and

— must stress the practice of European preference.

In his lecture on the *prospects of the work of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD)* Mr. Walsh described the two main objectives of the CNAD as :

— improved economic efficiency in the use of resources ;
— increased military effectiveness of equipment.

With regard to the former, the CNAD tries to devise methods of co-operation which reconcile the objectives of economic efficiency with the sometimes conflicting objectives of national armaments industries. As to the latter, the great problem of diversity of equipment can be partially overcome by ensuring interoperability which to a large extent covers the operational requirements of standardisation.

Common equipment is certainly better for the efficiency of the military forces of the Alliance, but failing this at least interoperability must be retained as an objective.

Within NATO two new sets of procedures have been set up :

— the NATO armaments planning review (NAPR) ;
— the periodic armaments planning system (PAPS).

The NATO armaments planning review is primarily a scheme to expose opportunities for co-operation. It uses as its point of departure equipment replacement schedules prepared by the independent European programme group (IEPG) and the North American schedules. These opportunities are presented to the nations and follow-up procedures ensure that after consideration by the nations and the NATO military authorities deliberate decisions are made. The NATO armaments planning review has already been conducted on a trial basis and is about to be implemented as a regular procedure.

The periodic armaments planning system (PAPS) is much more elaborate. Its purpose — beyond the NAPR — is twofold :

— to include new types of equipment which would not appear in the replacement schedules ; and
— to start the co-operative process early enough so that national programmes have not progressed to the point where emotional commitments to particular solutions militate against co-operation. Its point of departure is a "mission need" — a qualitative deficiency in military capability or, sometimes, an opportunity offered by new technology. The NATO PAPS is now in a trial phase. Inauguration of PAPS might be possible late in 1980.

As to the so-called transatlantic dialogue, Mr. Walsh pointed out that under the aegis of CNAD the independent European programme group (IEPG) represents the European voice in the negotiations with the North American nations, and that although progress was slow, a number of encouraging initiatives had been taken.

In statements from the floor, Mr. Damm (member of the Bundestag Defence Committee, Federal Republic of Germany) said that co-operation between North America and Europe would only progress if, within the framework of NATO, nations could agree on an intermediate-term production-sharing programme of say five years, covering a whole range of projects, at the end of which there would be a reasonable overall balance between what countries put in and what they got out.

Mr. Mulley (Labour member of parliament, United Kingdom) stated that the military and economic advantages of co-operation were unquestionable and he had no doubt about the existence of the political will to co-operate. There were, however, very real difficulties in the way of co-operation which could not be ignored. These included :

— the genuine difficulty of securing agreement between the military authorities of countries on requirements for common weapons ;
— the difficulty of harmonising replacement schedules which were often dictated by operational imperatives ;
— the understandable concerns of industry and trade unions to secure as much work as possible ;
— the problem of sales to third countries.

He agreed with Mr. Damm that these problems had to be considered in a NATO context and looked forward to the outcome of the "package" proposal for armaments production in the United States and Europe. But he stressed that European industry would not be content to take the rôle of subcontractor and would insist on retaining its design capacity in major areas.

Beginning the group of papers giving the industrialists' point of view, Mr. Stefanini drew attention to the difficulties which stem from the limited mobility of the European labour force and the problem of low volume production.

The time-scaling of production was one of the other subjects of Mr. Stefanini's contribution. In his opinion the replacements of technically similar armaments, for example, main battle tanks, or tracked and wheeled armoured vehicles, produced on similar production lines, should be spread over a number of years in order to ensure regular production capacity.

Sound company planning requires advance notice of armaments replacement programmes — not only national programmes but also the entire European programme. Mr. Stefanini suggested that this information could be channelled through the European Defence Industrial Group. Inter-company agreements could help a great deal in the execution of these programmes and he cited the SNIAS-MBB agreement on Roland and Milan and the Oto Melara/Matra agreement on the Otomat as good examples.

Mr. Chevalier concentrated on *the industrial view of the definition of armaments requirements and procurement* and stated that industry could help governments to reach decisions on armaments by explaining :

— the technical possibilities and limitations ;
— alternative solutions to the problem ; and
— cost information.

Mr. Chevalier then described the four methods of armaments procurement :

— to buy in the United States ;
— to produce under American licence ;
— to develop and produce in Europe ;
— to co-operate with the United States.

The last two possibilities are mainly of interest to us in our efforts to make the "two-way street" between Europe and America a reality.

Mr. Chevalier emphasised the importance of a constant exchange of views between government and industry in bringing about armaments programmes.

On the organisational side, recent experience has shown that the most effective approach is to set up one office on the government side and another on the industrial side. The prerequisite is close co-operation between the two.

Such an approach was adopted in the successful anti-tank weapons programme, with the *Bureau de Programmes Franco-Allemand* on the government side and Euromissile on the industrial side. This experience sets an example for future programmes where a lot remains to be done to achieve co-operation, particularly in the field of tactical aircraft.

In summary, Mr. Chevalier is recommending a more efficient approach to European armaments programmes, and advocating that we continue to seek collaboration with the United States on an equal basis in an attempt to make the "two-way street" between Europe and America a reality.

Mr. Striegel then dealt with *the rôle of permanent consortia in European co-operation* in a very realistic and pragmatic way. He based his lecture on the positive experiences Europe has gained with the programmes or families of programmes :

— Milan/Hot/Roland ;
— Alpha-Jet ;
— Howitzer 70 ;
— Jaguar ;
— MRCA/Tornado ;
— ASSM.

He also alluded to the successful example of co-operation on the civil side, the Airbus programme.

Mr. Striegel covered the type of co-operation in which two or several states — industries and government authorities as well — try to find common solutions to military technical problems.

In order to create the conditions in which co-operation with industry can exist, governments must take fundamental decisions regarding :

— the definition of a project ;
— determination of the quantities for the respective forces ;
— the required financial means ;
— the industrial rights and the technology transfer.

As Mr. Chevalier also stressed, efficient organisations on both governmental and industrial sides are indispensable if co-operation is to run smoothly.

But underlying this co-operation between government and industries there must exist the political will :

— to overcome difficulties ;
— to look for and agree on compromises ;
— to set aside national preferences, and, finally,
— not to attach too much importance to points of prestige.

Over the last four years there has been a tendency to develop co-operation on the basis of a more formal structure, such as Euromissile, Panavia, Turbo-Union and, in the civil area, Airbus. These joint programme companies must be able to manage the programme's

— research and development ;
— production ;
— sales and after-sales.

These joint companies might become a platform for transatlantic co-operation projects too. Alliances of several specialised European companies can challenge their United States counterparts and assert Europe's technical capacities. Furthermore, the joint companies might become one of the ways of realising the political will to

integrate Europe by creating an awareness of a European identity.

In the general discussion, Mr. Boucheny (Communist Senator, France) drew attention to the danger of creating a politico-military organisation that could exercise an influence prejudicial to the interests of peace and also expressed concern at the implications of standardisation and interoperability for employment in national defence industries. French communists were in favour of the defence of Europe provided that it came from purely national resources at which level it would secure public support. In reply, Mr. Walsh (NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Support) pointed out that as far as NATO was concerned, the objective was to obtain more equipment from present levels of expenditure and that the consequences would be increased military capability rather than fewer jobs.

Mr. Vohrer (FDP member of parliament, Federal Republic of Germany) raised the question of exports to third countries and was informed by the industrialists on the panel that armaments companies, whether national or multinational, were subject to national legislation in this field. General Cauchie added that arms sales also had to comply with the United Nations Charter and take account of moves towards disarmament. In co-operative projects, the problem was to reach agreement between the partners to an export policy and this was particularly difficult when sub-systems were made in one country and incorporated in a final product being made in another.

The Chairman then raised a question covered in Mr. Stefanini's paper, namely the flow of information from government to industry. Mr. Knapp replied that projects were not generally ripe for industrial intervention until governments had consulted one another and formed a reasonable idea of the shape, whether collaborative or not, the project would take.

There then followed a discussion of the different structures of ownership of armaments companies in which the industrialists on the panel stated that in co-operative projects there was no discrimination between publicly- and privately-owned companies.

In reply to a question from Mr. Vohrer on the implications of co-operative projects for free competition, General Cauchie said that as Europe had neither the capacity nor the resources to conduct competitive developments in all areas there must be a compromise between competition on the one hand and the direct allocation of work to consortia on the other. Such compromises had worked effectively in the Alpha-Jet and Hot projects. General Klennert (Federal Republic of Germany) emphasised that the top priority was not to produce weapons at lowest possible cost but to provide the means to defend Europe and that the normal rules of competition sometimes had to be sacrified to this wider objective.

Mr. Bernini (Communist member of parliament, Italy) saw standardisation as valuable in helping Europe both to meet its defence needs and to meet the American challenge, provided that it also contributed to maintaining the military balance at a lower level of armaments.

A discussion ensued on the difficulty of *parliamentary control of multinational armaments projects* which Mr. Striegel in his paper, like Mr. Maggioni in the report of the Defence Committee (Document 807), had described as difficult to cancel once started. Speakers agreed that such projects were more difficult to start, requiring greater certainty of costing before governments would commit themselves, but then acquired unstoppable momentum, which could lead both to ultimate satisfaction with a successful product, and to military rigidity and escalating costs.

Speakers elaborated on the point in General Cauchie's paper that European countries should give preference to multilateral European projects even when not themselves participating in the production. The IEPG was studying the possibility of assisting the armaments industry of its less developed members, and as a quid pro quo it was suggested such countries should be prepared to procure equipment produced jointly by other IEPG countries even if the price was not the lowest obtainable.

Conclusions

The different lectures have shown that European co-operation in the field of armaments is not only useful, but necessary to reach the goal of multilateral and hence truly European relations. Furthermore the discussion has shown :

— that European industry has to aim at more effective co-operation and at an efficient partnership with the United States ;

— that the normal rules of competition do not apply to the armaments industry and that parliamentary supervision of multilateral armaments projects should be developed, perhaps at the European level as Mr. Maggioni had suggested in his report, to ensure that value for money is obtained ;

— the desirability of permanent consortia, which would not be wound up on the expiry of particular projects, and which might become joint companies, was clearly brought out, but the desirability of

restructuring the European armaments industry under the aegis of the European Community, as proposed in Mr. Critchley's report, was not discussed in the Working Group ;

— that sales to third countries create political problems and that it would be preferable to increase sales within the Alliance ;

— that collaboration between those members of the IEPG with advanced armaments industries and those that were less developed industrially presented both advantages and problems.

APPENDIX III

RESOLUTION 15 [1]

on the participation of observers in certain meetings of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments [2]

The Assembly,

Considering the interests of member states of NATO which are not members of WEU,

DECIDES

1. That the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments may invite observers to attend its meetings from member states of NATO which are not members of WEU;

2. That such observers shall have the right to speak.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1959 during the First Part of the Fifth Ordinary Session (6th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Patijn on behalf of the Presidential Committee (Document 130 and Addendum).

Document 821
Amendment 1

3rd December 1979

Definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe

AMENDMENT 1 [1]

tabled by Mr. Mulley and others

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "under the aegis of the industrial policy of the European Community".

Signed: Mulley, von Bothmer, Krieps, Stoffelen

1. See 9th Sitting, 3rd December 1979 (Amendment agreed to).

Definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe

AMENDMENTS 2 and 3[1]

tabled by Mr. Baumel

2. In paragraph 2 (*a*) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "endorsed" and insert "examined".

3. In paragraph 2 (*b*), leave out "an Alliance-wide market for defence equipment" and insert "a market for defence equipment in the framework of WEU".

Signed : Baumel

1. See 9th Sitting, 3rd December 1979 (Amendment 2 agreed to ; Amendment 3 negatived).

Document 822 7th November 1979

Arctic technology

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions [2]
by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. Warren (Alternate : *Lord Hughes*) (Chairman) ; MM. *Valleix, Lenzer* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Adriaensens, Bagier,* Bernini, *Cavaliere,* Cornelissen, *Hawkins,* Konings, *Lewis,* Malvy, *Mart, Müller,* Péronnet, Pinto, Schwencke (Alternate : *Scheffler*), *Talon,* Treu, Ueberhorst, van Waterschoot.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on Arctic technology

The Assembly,

Considering that the peoples of the world are justified in examining the use of the earth's natural resources with due regard for the political, technological, economic and ecological implications;

Aware that decisions on exploration and exploitation can be taken only after solutions have been found to human and technological problems in the polar regions;

Conscious of the sustained efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States in this field compared to the lack of progress by the Western European countries in spite of their early start and wide experience of polar technology in the past;

Aware that the WEU member countries have already worked with the Soviet Union and the United States in the framework of the Antarctic Treaty and on certain specified subjects, and would welcome help and assistance from these countries and closer liaison in this field of activity between the USSR, the United States and the WEU member countries;

Considering that several European countries and industries, working in collaboration, have gained vast experience of various aspects of offshore technology;

Considering the Antarctic Treaty to be an excellent example of an actively applied treaty for ensuring and verifying a weapons-free area and therefore of major significance for WEU member countries;

Considering the present state of the Law of the Sea Conference and its possible conclusion in the early 1980s,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Draw the attention of member governments to the need for a wide-ranging programme of collaboration in Western Europe for the development of Arctic technology, for example in the building of ice-breakers;

2. Invite member governments:

(*a*) to draw up mutually-acceptable administrative and industrial guidelines for such collaboration in order to ensure that Europe plays its part in developing the polar regions;

(*b*) to make every effort to ensure that the content of the Antarctic Treaty is not changed, distorted or prematurely terminated at the Law of the Sea Conference, thus preserving an important treaty which ensures and allows verification of a weapons-free area;

(*c*) to adopt a common position at meetings of Antarctic Treaty member states dealing with the exploration for and exploitation of mineral and fish resources.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. Interest in the Arctic and the Antarctic became universal when the international geophysical year was being organised in 1957 and 1958. Polar regions to the far north and far south have since assumed growing importance in both economic and military terms.

2. There are obviously major distinctions to be drawn between the Arctic and Antarctic regions in such terms as foreign and EEC policy, economic and mineral resources and defence. However, your Rapporteur feels that a report on Arctic technology has to embrace both polar regions. The same polar technologies apply, often involving the same countries and the same people, similar problems arise and solutions found for one region might be equally valid for the other.

3. The economics of resources development in the northern and southern polar regions has become a centre of interest for many countries and governments due to oil and natural gas discoveries in the Arctic and the probable existence of mineral resources in the Antarctic, especially as the technological means for developing them have advanced. The fishing of krill (shrimps) in the Antarctic might also be economically viable.

4. The Arctic covers some 11 million sq. km. The Antarctic covers some 13 million sq. km. and is by far the largest single expanse of permanently ice-covered land, three-quarters of the world total.

5. There are many contrasts between the Arctic and the Antarctic. The Arctic is a deep sea, covered with moving, floating pack-ice, surrounded by the continental land masses of America and Eurasia. Its sea ice is reduced by one-half during the Arctic summer and on the land masses a carpet of green tundra spreads over wide areas. The two largest expanses of tundra (treeless, seasonally-frozen Arctic regions) are found in Canada and the USSR. There are approximately two million permanent inhabitants within the Arctic Circle.

6. The Antarctic continent is separated from the six other continents and is much colder and more inhospitable than the Arctic. Ice-covered seas are far more extensive than in the Arctic. In summer, sea ice is reduced by only one-seventh. There are no permanent inhabitants and the first explorer reached the area in 1895 ; a mere 750 scientists and support personnel winter in the area.

7. The Antarctic continent, which is land covered with thick ice, covers one-tenth of the world's land surface, i.e. it is equivalent to China, Argentina, France, Nigeria and New Zealand combined. It is also the world's remotest continent with 950 km. separating it from the nearest land at Cape Horn.

8. According to the Antarctic Treaty signed in Washington on 1st December 1959, Antarctica was dedicated solely to peaceful purposes and its use for military purposes was severely restricted [1]. The main goal of the treaty was to preserve the area south of the 60° line. No member nation was required to renounce its sovereign claims but, on the other hand, no claims were recognised internationally. The treaty contains no provision concerning exploration for and exploitation of mineral resources, nor concerning fish (krill).

9. The Arctic is of the highest strategic importance because of its location between the two major superpowers, the United States and the USSR. There are many radar sites on both sides and the polar routes by air or by sea are the shortest distances between these two nations. In the North American and Eurasian Arctic there are also many military facilities serving as front lines of defence. The tactical significance of the northern Arctic regions depends upon their inclusion within the territorial limits of the two superpowers and Canada. [2]

I. *The Arctic*

(a) General

10. The political situation in the Arctic varies considerably. Denmark, which has sovereignty over Greenland, and the autonomous Greenland authorities are reluctant to allow any scientific research or exploration of natural resources. The Canadians are extremely active in their own region, as are, of course, the Soviet authorities. The Icelandic Government accepts foreign scientific research on matters including physics and its natural hot springs.

11. The political situation in the area has become more tense due to the fact that vast oil and gas reserves have been discovered which could eventually be exploited from "tension leg", platforms, especially in the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. Other exploitable natural resources are gold, silver, copper, iron ore, platinum, tin and coal. It might also be possible

1. See Appendix I.
2. See Appendix IV.

to operate in this area with nuclear-powered equipment. The northern polar region is not open to exploration or exploitation by countries which have no sovereignty or treaty rights.

12. Offshore deposits of oil and gas and their development might still cause many difficulties since the economic zones of the bordering countries have not yet been accurately established.

13. Finally, for the Soviet Union the northern route is the shortest maritime route between its European and Asian harbours. With the development of nuclear ice-breakers the polar route can be kept open for most if not all the year. This means that the Soviet Union is able to move its fleet from Murmansk to Vladivostok. Murmansk is the most important town in the Arctic with 300,000 inhabitants. On the Eurasian side there are some thirty towns of more than 10,000 inhabitants. On the Canadian side the most important town is Inuvik with some 3,000 inhabitants.

14. Some of the richest fishing grounds in the world are in the Arctic.

(b) Alaska

15. The indigenous peoples of the North American Arctic in general and of the United States in particular were largely ignored by governments until the second world war when national defence interests focused attention on the area. The total indigenous population in the entire state of Alaska is about 28,000 Eskimos and 16,000 Indians. Since 1945 changes have been fast and living conditions have improved considerably. Alaska's Eskimos and Indians have full United States citizenship and have been active in obtaining recognition of their rights. In 1971, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act awarded them nearly $1 billion and 161,800 sq. km. of land — 10 % of the state — in exchange for renouncing their original rights. As in other polar areas, modern technology has raised their living standards but at the same time threatened their traditional life-styles.

16. Since 1957, Alaska has provided significant quantities of oil and gas from fields near Anchorage, but Alaskan oil production rose sharply in 1977 with the completion of the 1,300 km. trans-Alaska pipeline from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez, which took nine years to build. The output of the Prudhoe Bay field is more than 1.5 million barrels a day or nearly 20 % of the United States' total production. Other important fields have been discovered near Barrow. Estimates of potential reserves range from 40-120 billion barrels of oil and from 6-14 trillion cu.m. of natural gas. Offshore areas appear even more promising than the land areas ; the Beaufort Sea continental shelf is likely to be among the first exploited in North Alaska.

17. In January 1977 the United States and Canada signed a transit pipeline treaty confirming a policy of non-interference and non-discrimination in respect of pipelines carrying petroleum products across each other's territories. On 8th September 1977 the Alaska-Canadian pipeline project, described as the largest single private energy project in history, was approved by both governments. Until this pipeline is ready the oil deposits from Alaska are transported from the northern slope to Valdez for shipment to other parts of America.

18. Natural gas production at Prudhoe Bay will be delayed for several more years at least, pending construction of a pipeline through Canada to the south.

19. The construction of pipelines in the tundra automatically disrupts the ecological system of the area from which recovery is very slow. The local inhabitants wish to slow down the exploitation of mineral resources in order to be able to establish, in the future, a viable economy, even when the non-renewable resources have been depleted.

(c) Canada

20. Canada's Arctic stores of oil and natural gas are concentrated in two main basins : the Mackenzie Delta/Beaufort Sea, near the Alaskan border, and the Arctic islands in the far north-east, near the Canada-Greenland border. More than half of the reserves in both areas are believed to lie offshore. Recoverable reserves in these areas are estimated at 28 billion barrels of oil and 10 trillion cu.m. of natural gas.

21. The native populations of Canada's Yukon and North Western Territories are estimated at some 12,000 Eskimos and 10,000 Indians. They do not have ordinary Canadian citizenship but a special status under the Indian Act. In Canada, as in the United States, they have made land claims and constitutional issues are assuming an increasing importance in those territories. A special commission on constitutional matters has been appointed by the federal government which is to advise on measures to extend and improve representative local governments in these areas.

22. There has been exploratory drilling for oil and natural gas and an important development programme has been started in areas near the Canadian Beaufort Sea. Exploration on and around the Arctic islands has also revealed more than half-a-dozen oil and gas fields. Parts of the gas fields are offshore in deep ice-covered waters where exploratory drilling has been accomplished from the ice surface in winter. The building of a pipeline is under consideration and the federal government's decision on pipeline

routes is awaited. Consideration is also being given to building combined ice-breaker/tankers for transporting oil to the south.

(d) Greenland

23. Since 1st May 1979, Greenland — a country of some 39,000 inhabitants, mostly Eskimos — has achieved internal autonomy under Danish sovereignty. It had been a Danish colony from 1721 and was integrated in the Danish Kingdom in 1953. Under the internal autonomy legislation the Danish Government is mainly responsible for foreign affairs, defence and monetary policy. The Danish Government also subsidises Greenland's budget with some $250 million annually, but should Greenland's income from mineral resources such as lead, zinc, uranium and oil exceed this amount the subsidy would be reduced accordingly. Six consortia of oil companies have been prospecting the western coast of Greenland and so far the test drillings have been negative, but the Danish Government is convinced that oil will be discovered off Greenland.

24. In 1973 an agreement was concluded between Canada and Denmark on the continental shelf boundary.

25. Although the Soviet Union proposed the creation of a joint Soviet-Greenland fisheries company, this was not agreed to.

(e) Norway

26. In the vast territory covered by the three Arctic provinces Finmark, Troms and Nordland there are only 450,000 inhabitants. Although five nations border the Arctic Ocean, there are only two international land boundaries: Alaska-Canada and, in Europe, the land frontier between Norway and the USSR. The indigenous population consists of some 20,000 Lapps who have their own culture and language which are the same as those of Lapps in Sweden, Finland and the USSR. The Norwegian Government is very concerned about the quality of the environment and the well-being of the indigenous population.

27. On the mainland there is no international political dispute over the development of resources. However, there are differences in the Spitsbergen area concerning the extent of coastal state jurisdiction over the Arctic seas and Norway's claim to exclusive control of the resources of the Spitsbergen continental shelf. It has not been possible to establish a Norwegian-Soviet continental shelf boundary in the Barents Sea. The dispute is whether the equidistant line or the sector principle should be used to mark the boundary between the fishery and continental shelf areas of the two states. 132,000 sq. km. of continental shelf are at stake. Norway established the 200-mile fishing zone in early 1977, as did the Soviet Union in March of that year.

28. The problem of Spitsbergen is far more complicated. Norway's sovereignty in this part of the Arctic is determined by the 1920 treaty on the Spitsbergen (Svalbard) archipelago. The treaty between Norway and thirty-nine other states established Norwegian rule over the archipelago but prohibited military activities on the islands. All WEU countries, except Luxembourg, are among the thirty-nine states parties to the treaty ; the Soviet Union acceded in 1925. All signatories have specific rights including guaranteed access for maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations on a basis of full equality with Norway. Apart from Norway, only the USSR has taken advantage of its treaty right to maintain permanent settlements on the islands. There is a permanent coal mining population on the Soviet concession of some 1,000 sq. km., called Barentsburg. The total surface of the islands is 62,000 sq. km. and some 7,000 sq. km. has been given in concessions for mining. Although many firms also explored for oil in the years 1966-77, no important finds were reported.

29. As the Spitsbergen treaty was drafted before the possibilities of oil and gas exploitation under the seabed were known, it does not include any specific provisions relating to the continental shelf outside territorial waters. All parties to the treaty accept its application to land areas within the specified boundaries and the surrounding four-mile territorial sea. It seems likely that thick sediments with a high petroleum-bearing potential exist on the continental shelf south and south-east of Spitsbergen.

30. Offshore drilling is however not possible until Norway and the Spitsbergen treaty partners reach agreement on ownership of the continental shelf around the islands and the Soviet Union and Norway settle their dispute over the Barents Sea boundary. The United States, the United Kingdom and other European states do not accept the Norwegian claim that the shelf is part of mainland Norwegian territory. Norway itself does not want to allow drilling north of 62° latitude as offshore production south of that is more than adequate for Norway's requirements and its industrial potential.

(f) USSR

31. When technological achievements, especially in aviation, made the northern part of the Soviet Union more accessible, measures were taken to install effective control over the long northern coast, waters, islands and air space of the adjoining Arctic Ocean. The Soviet Union was already a leader in Arctic development, and development of the northern sea route became an important goal in its Arctic policy. Terms such as internal waters, historic waters and closed sea were used by the Soviet Union to describe the type of sovereignty it exerted. The

difficulty is of course that the ice cover is a land-like entity which encloses part of bays and other waters. In general, the Soviet Union maintains its authority over the twelve-mile territorial sea and straits overlapped by the territorial sea. It has also established the 200-mile fishing zone.

32. The indigenous Arctic population in the Soviet Union is some 700,000 people ; the most important groups are the Komi and Yakuty which together number more than 550,000 people. They were already under Russian control in the eighteenth century and are mostly reindeer herders, hunters, fishermen and trappers.

33. The Soviet Arctic contains several large areas that are favourable for oil and gas accumulation. The most important discoveries are made in the Pechora, Ob' and Vilyuy basins. Few of the other prospective Soviet Arctic land areas and none of the continental shelves have been subject to exploratory drilling. One of the major constraints is the high cost of exploitation in the Arctic due to the inhospitable environment, transportation problems and labour supply difficulties.

34. Arctic petroleum production at present satisfies only a small part of the energy needs of the Soviet Union but will provide an increasing share of future energy supplies. Full exploitation of Soviet Arctic deposits will require further expansion of transport means, especially pipelines. Foreign interests might be involved ; the Soviet Union has made several approaches to Japanese industry for the development of three large projects in Siberia. However, no results were achieved as Japanese industry was of the opinion that prospects were not realistic in the areas in view of the lack of water, electricity and transport. Approaches to American industry have also been marking time because of disagreement between the Soviet Union and American industries on gas prices and economic policies. However, western participation in the exploration of the Arctic area will be needed if the resources are to be exploited as the Soviet Union does not possess the required offshore drilling technology.

II. *The Antarctic*

35. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 established a régime of freedom of operation and open scientific co-operation throughout the continent, although no operations were to provide grounds for new or extended claims during the period of application of the treaty, i.e. thirty years. Nuclear explosions and disposal of radioactive wastes in Antarctica are prohibited, although the peaceful and scientific use of atomic devices is permitted.

36. The Antarctic Treaty was originally signed by twelve countries : Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States. In the meantime, nine states have acceded to the treaty : Brazil, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, the Netherlands, Poland and Romania. The treaty provided a legal framework for the Antarctic continent for at least thirty years. This period might allow the signatory states time to establish a mutually satisfactory basis for a permanent settlement of claims. Seven member states, Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom, have long-held claims to parts of Antarctica [1].

37. States which conduct substantial scientific research activities in the area with a permanent scientific station in Antarctica are termed consultative states. These are Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States. During the first ten years after the treaty came into force in 1961, the discussions in the consultative meetings concerned technical, procedural and administrative arrangements for advancing scientific research in the area. Since then recurring topics are environmental transportation activities, exchanges of scientific data, information on expeditions planned, and the effects of possible tourist expeditions to the area.

38. So far no serious political problems have arisen although there are implications for the law of the sea negotiations. Potential resources in Antarctica are fish, whales and krill, a small shrimplike creature some 4.5 cm. in length and weighing about 1.2 gr., that abounds in the Antarctic waters. The geology of the most exposed mountain areas is now being studied and mineral resources are being explored.

39. Research activities in Antarctica are concerned with biology, geology, geomorphology, geography, geochemics, astrophysics, meteorology and oceanography. Glaciology is also very important for determining the history of past climatic variations and trends as revealed by snow accumulation rates. Traverses by cross-country tractor and aircraft have been made from many stations, the most important being by the United States in West Antarctica and the USSR in East Antarctica. These expeditions have revealed that the land mass beneath Antarctica's ice cover is extremely rugged. The thickness of the ice sheet averages 2,000 metres and in places may be more than 4,500 metres. West Antarctica is largely an island grouping and East Antarctica is more truly continental.

1. See Appendix II.

40. It is generally accepted that before the year 2000 both the surface and subglacial features of the continent will be fully explored and accurately mapped. There will then be an adequate understanding of the continent and the technology of travelling and living will allow access to any part of the continent throughout the year. It is even expected that industrial centres might be developed for industries requiring a lot of space, safety of operation, freedom from contamination, large quantities of fresh water or natural refrigeration [1].

41. The Soviet Union employs several hundred scientists, technicians and logistic support personnel in its Antarctic stations.

42. Among the WEU member states, Belgium, France and the United Kingdom have consultative status and the Federal Republic of Germany, which acceded to the treaty on 5th February 1979, hopes to become a consultative member in the near future. Germany will then renew its Antarctic research which started some 100 years ago. The German expeditions to Kaiser Wilhelm II-land starting in 1901, to the Weddell Sea from 1911 to 1913 and the 1938 expedition were especially concerned with oceanographic, glaciological, meteorological and biological research. The expeditions in 1975-76 and 1977-78 were concentrated on research on krill. The establishment of a permanent research station will be prepared and a special ship for polar research is being built. Some DM. 100 million will be invested and the current annual expenditure on research in specialised institutes in Germany, the maintenance of a permanent Antarctic station and the ship will amount to some DM. 30 million.

43. There is also some research and development in the framework of the EEC.

44. International collaboration during the 1957-58 international geophysical year has been continued in Antarctica under the treaty. The United States and Soviet expeditions exchange scientists each year. Other treaty members provide scientists from time to time and all stations welcome visits by other scientists. There is constant and extensive research co-ordination and data-sharing on scientific activities in Antarctica. The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research is the permanent body which promotes this co-operation. As formal inspections are permitted under the treaty, the United States has exercised its rights every two or three years, covering many stations and fixed Antarctic installations. Other member countries have also made a few inspections. So far, none of the inspections has provided any evidence of treaty violations.

1. See Appendix III.

45. In recent years the world-wide search for new resources and the possible implications of a law of the sea treaty have drawn much attention to the potential resources of Antarctica. Its living resources might be exploited commercially, especially fish, whales and krill.

46. During the 1978 meeting of signatories of the Antarctic Treaty to examine conservation of marine resources, a convention was drafted to protect fish resources, especially krill, which might be an important source of world protein. It was proposed that annual catch quotas be established and supervision carried out by inspectors. However, no final agreement was reached because of the reluctance of Soviet, Japanese and Polish fishermen to submit their fishing operations to international supervision and the continuing claims of seven member countries to sovereignty over parts of Antarctic territories.

47. Extensive commercial fishing of krill would certainly have ecological repercussions because krill constitute the basis of the Antarctic food chain. Concern is mounting that Antarctica's resources will lead to a rush to develop them, which could irreversibly damage the world's most untouched ecosystem. If the signatories of the Antarctic Treaty disagreed over fishing and oil drilling rights the treaty might collapse leaving the continent open to chaotic developments and/or superpower rivalry.

48. Although existing claims are frozen for the duration of the Antarctic Treaty, the seven member countries which claim sovereignty over parts of Antarctica remain firm about their long-term territorial rights, probably because of possible economic gains and security considerations. The signatory states have different views on questions of offshore jurisdiction and resource exploitation. If the Law of the Sea Conference succeeds in 1980 they might claim the same offshore rights as coastal nations elsewhere.

49. The American Ambassador to the Law of the Sea Conference, Mr. Elliott L. Richardson, stated at the close of the third conference on 24th August 1979 that solid gains had been made in negotiations on the seabed, the protection of the seabed mining environment, the preservation of whales, and controls on the production of seabed minerals. He was of the opinion that compromise positions would be reached in the March 1980 session. The nations represented at the conference now had the political will to overcome the difficulties which had blocked the road to a treaty.

III. *Technical problems*

(a) Transport

50. One of the most difficult problems to solve in polar regions is of course that of transport.

Here the Soviet Union, through its Ministry of Merchant Marine, possesses a large number of ice-breakers of up to 80,000 hp, the main engines being nuclear reactors and steam turbines. The first nuclear-powered ice-breaker was the Lenin ; launched in September 1959, it was the world's first nuclear-powered surface ship put to sea. It has a crew of about 1,000. Two new ships of the "Arktika" class were commissioned in 1977-78 and one of them became the first ship ever to make its way through polar ice to the North Pole. In the early 1970s three ice-breakers with non-nuclear engines of about 41,000 hp were built in Finland for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has seven other ice-breakers of about 22,000 hp in addition to a fleet of some thirty-three ice-breakers of from 3-5,000 hp, and the Soviet navy has four armed ice-breakers.

51. The United States has two ice-breakers of the "Polar Star" class with conventional diesel engines of about 28,000 hp, one of the "Glacier" class of 21,000 hp, three of the "Wind" class and one of the "Mackinan" class of 10,000 hp and several smaller ones. The ice-breakers are operated by the coastguard which is in charge of ice-breaking activities.

52. In the United Kingdom, the Royal Navy has one ice patrol ship.

53. The Federal Republic of Germany also has an ice-breaker of some 7,000 hp which operates in the Northern Baltic under the Finnish flag and in the Southern Baltic under the German flag. It also has two small ice-breakers of 2,000 hp.

54. The Danish Ministry of Trade and Shipping maintains two ice-breakers of some 10,000 hp.

55. The Canadian Government owns five heavy ice-breakers with engines from 12-24,000 hp. Two new ice-breakers of 13,000 hp are under construction. The ice-breakers are manned by the coastguard or by the Federal Ministry of Transport.

(b) Exploration of polar resources

56. Ice-breakers are essential for acceding to polar regions for purposes of exploration and ice-cutting transport ships will be necessary for bringing in drilling equipment. A project for semi-submersible ice-breaking tankers is being studied in the United States and Canada.

57. In order to operate in the polar environment it is necessary to have an extensive knowledge of the workings of ice-packs, icebergs, their movements and the influence of varying ice temperatures. Icebergs may average 100,000 tons and extend 120-150 m. below the surface of the sea. Because of their size, they could gouge grooves of 10-12 m. in the bottom sediments and destroy both the drill ship and any equipment projecting above the seabed. It is also of major importance to identify the depth of the continental shelf, the base of the continental slope and the seaward edge in the polar regions to be explored. A great handicap is the remoteness of these regions from the principal industrial and commercial centres in America and Europe.

58. In recent years several concepts have been studied for drilling platforms in the polar seas. In shallow waters an artificial island could be built ; rigs could be set up on sea ice but could, of course, be used only in wintertime. For summer drilling a rig could be built on a ship-shape hull anchored at the bottom of the sea. Other possibilities are the use of semi-submersible or fixed monopodes with rotating ice-cutters.

59. In Alaska and Canada several of the above-mentioned types of rigs have been tried, especially in the Beaufort Sea and in the strait between Canada and Greenland. Many of the problems arising in polar regions have been solved, but certainly not all.

60. Several reports by scientific and technical experts of the Nansen Foundation in Norway and the United States National Petroleum Council have concluded that the problems of extracting oil and gas from the polar regions are not insurmountable. Moreover, the technology for deep drilling is advancing world-wide.

61. Special extensive studies are required on navigation and different systems of securing drilling platforms, on diving techniques, supply and safety problems, problems of icing and de-icing, warning systems for collision with icebergs or ice ridges, material tests for corrosion, special protection measures to keep the engines and mechanical parts of the engines in good condition and, finally, human behaviour in polar regions.

62. In the Arctic region, oil and gas are already exploited and exploration is being continued. Possibly there is as much oil and gas in the Antarctic region as in the Arctic, but it will certainly not be exploited until the mid-1980s. Many questions have first to be answered, such as :

- Should oil and other minerals in Antarctica be exploited or not ?
- What are the risks to the environment and to scientific work now being undertaken ?
- How should the ecosystem be conserved and who should police the conservation rules ?
- How important is Antarctic oil and gas in terms of the world's long-range energy needs ?
- How should exploitation be managed, and by whom ?

— Who should be allowed to participate in the exploitation and who should benefit from it ?

— Should there be any sharing of revenue ?

63. In the framework of the United Nations it was suggested that the application of the common heritage concept should be promoted and that an international control authority under the aegis of the United Nations should be established.

64. However, the signatories of the treaty all wish to keep the involvement of non-signatories to a minimum. Member countries laying claim to areas of Antarctica feel that they own the resources in "their" sectors and even the relevant offshore resources. Argentina and Chile have already declared 200-mile zones off their Antarctic claims. Whether the Law of the Sea Conference will result in a treaty allowing economic zones for lands which are uninhabited is not at all sure. The primary conflict is between a common heritage approach with freedom of access and sovereignty claims without freedom of access.

IV. *Military aspects*

65. As remarked earlier, the Arctic provides the shortest route between the two superpowers and lies relatively near to vital centres of power, whereas the strategic rôle of Antarctica is doubtful. The cruising range of nuclear-powered submarines reduces the need for refuelling or other bases. Anything that can be done in Antarctica can be done elsewhere more cheaply since polar logistic costs and supply problems are enormous. Nevertheless it still has some military value because of its position between the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

66. The Antarctic Treaty prohibits any military activity and neither the superpowers nor the other member countries are inclined to start military action in that part of the world. It is not likely that the treaty, especially from this point of view, would be changed, nor have any such proposals yet been made. The Antarctic Treaty régime has often been compared to other partial disarmament treaties, i.e. the moon, outer space and seabed treaties. If this treaty, which has functioned smoothly for more than sixteen years, were violated or terminated before the end of its thirty years' duration, this would certainly have an unfortunate influence on the other treaties.

Conclusions

67. The world and humanity need all the resources the earth can offer. Your Rapporteur is therefore convinced that whatever difficulties polar exploration and exploitation may encounter, they will one day be overcome. The existence of important gas and oil deposits in the Arctic, and probably in the Antarctic, will certainly induce the oil companies to acquire the experience necessary to exploit them.

68. For instance, a United States geological survey has estimated that Antarctica's continental shelf could contain as much as 45 billion barrels of oil, one and a half times the current reserves of the United States.

69. The world will need these gas and oil deposits and governments and industry are convinced that the exploitation of polar technology will have widespread repercussions over the whole spectrum of advanced technology. It may be likened to the spin-off of space and oceanographic exploration. For this reason alone all modern industrialised countries should be interested in these developments.

70. Several European countries already have wide experience of Arctic technology through firms such as British Petroleum which has gained substantial offshore knowledge in developing gas and oil deposits in Alaska. The German Government is also convinced that it has to invest in this field of technology. Scope for European collaboration certainly exists ; there are mutual commercial advantages in several companies collaborating on technical innovations in order to overcome the difficulties of climate and environment. In this context the common development of ice-breakers would be to the advantage of all countries in view of the high costs involved and it might be a useful European collaborative venture further to the German-Finnish co-operation on ice-breakers.

71. In the exploration for and exploitation of gas and oil deposits in the North Sea, several European countries and companies working in collaboration have gained a tremendous amount of experience — although not in polar regions — in the various aspects of offshore technology. Mutually-acceptable terms between governments and industry could certainly be agreed upon if the urgency of Europe playing its rôle in this field was generally acknowledged.

72. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty has kept the Antarctic continent and its waters as a nuclear-free zone, preserved it from commercial exploitation and made it a haven for scientific research on a collaborative basis. According to the treaty and practice in the last fifteen years, this continent offers one of the few instances of the superpowers accepting mutual inspections of their activities. This is of great importance for similar action in disarmament. For the WEU countries, which have accepted mutual inspections, the continuation of the treaty should be considered vital.

73. It is recognised in the treaty that it is in the interest of all mankind for Antarctica to continue to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Appointed observers from consultative treaty powers therefore have the right of free access to any area and may inspect all stations, installations and equipment by air and on the ground.

74. The original text of the Antarctic Treaty is ambiguous about exploitation of resources. It does not refer at all to exploitation of mineral and other non-living resources and the only reference to living resources is a provision to formulate measures for the preservation and conservation of these resources in Antarctica. There is some disagreement about whether exploitation of mineral resources on land or on the seabed would be compatible with the treaty. Some believe that an amendment to the treaty would be necessary as exploitation of mineral resources would disturb scientific research. Moreover, it is not the practice of mining companies to allow on-site inspections which, of course, are necessary for controlling demilitarisation. Nevertheless, other treaty powers believe that economic exploitation is one of the peaceful purposes mentioned in Article 1 and does not therefore prohibit exploration for and exploitation of mineral resources.

75. A parallel may be drawn between Antarctica and the position regarding the international seabed. Both are beyond recognised national jurisdiction and if the Law of the Sea Conference succeeds in setting up international machinery for administering the seabed this might have direct consequences for Antarctica in that machinery of this type might also provide administrative services for the Antarctic. The Law of the Sea Conference would also have an influence on the establishment of economic zones as many mineral resources might be offshore.

76. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to point out that the Assembly's Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is submitting a report on Arctic defence and for this reason he has avoided the detailed military aspects of these questions.

APPENDIX I

Antarctic Treaty

On 1st December 1959, a thirty-year treaty was signed in Washington at the end of a twelve-nation conference on peaceful international scientific co-operation in Antarctica. The twelve original signatories were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Britain, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union and the United States, who have subsequently been joined by Czechoslovakia, Denmark and Poland. The treaty came into force on 23rd June 1961.

The main provisions of the treaty are summarised below :

Article 1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. The contracting parties are forbidden to establish military bases in the area, to carry out military manoeuvres, or to test any kind of weapons.

Article 2. Freedom of scientific investigation and co-operation toward that end should be maintained.

Article 3. Scientific information and personnel should be exchanged by the contracting parties.

Article 4. Nothing contained in the treaty may be interpreted as a renunciation, denial, or support of a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim to territorial sovereignty may be asserted while the treaty is in force.

Article 5. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste shall be prohibited.

Article 6. The provisions of the treaty apply to the land area south of 60 degrees south latitude.

Article 7. Each contracting party has the right to send observers to carry out inspections in Antarctica. Notification must be given of all expeditions and stations in Antarctica.

Article 8. Observers and scientific personnel in Antarctica are subject to the jurisdiction of their own country.

Article 9. The contracting parties shall meet at suitable intervals to consult together on measures for the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the treaty.

In February 1972 the treaty's twelve original signatories concluded an agreement on the protection of seals in the Antarctic, including those in the open sea or on floating ice.

APPENDIX II

Territorial claims in Antarctica



APPENDIX IV

Arctic region



APPENDIX III

Antarctic region



Document 822 **4th December 1979**
Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4

Arctic technology

AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 4[1]

tabled by Mr. Hardy

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "for a wide-ranging programme of collaboration in Western Europe".

2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "for example in the building of ice-breakers".

3. In paragraph 2 (*a*) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "to draw up mutually-acceptable administrative and industrial guidelines for such collaboration in order".

4. Leave out paragraph 2 (*b*) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"(*b*) to welcome and support the draft convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources;".

Signed: Hardy

1. See 13th Sitting, 5th December 1979 (Amendment 1 withdrawn; Amendments 2 and 3 agreed to; Amendment 4 withdrawn).

Document 823 **7th November 1979**

The industrial bases of European security — guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions [2]
by MM. Onslow and Valleix, Rapporteurs

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted in Committee by 10 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. *Warren* (Chairman) ; MM. *Valleix, Lenzer* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Adriaensens, Bagier,* Bernini, *Cavaliere,* Cornelissen, *Hawkins,* Konings, *Lewis,* Malvy, *Mart, Müller,* Péronnet, Pinto, Schwencke (Alternate : *Scheffler*), *Talon,* Treu, Ueberhorst, van Waterschoot.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on the industrial bases of European security — guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979

The Assembly,

Considering that only governments can give the necessary impetus to joint European armaments production and procurement;

Regretting the failure in the mid-1960s and mid-1970s to agree on a joint concept for a European battle tank;

Aware of the risk that if discussions on the future combat aircraft are too protracted, European nations might be forced, for reasons of a credible defence, to buy a ready-made American aircraft such as the Northrop F-18L;

Considering the serious crisis in the European ship-building industries and the possible technological decline as a result;

Welcoming the achievements of existing co-operation in the manufacture of missiles;

Aware that in tele-informatics — telecommunications, computers, advanced components and data banks — European industry is largely being outsold by the Americans and Japanese;

Recalling that WEU is the only European organisation with defence and armaments responsibilities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments:

1. To promote a continuous dialogue between their commanders-in-chief, lower echelon commanders, armaments directors and industrialists in the most suitable framework, and related to the independent European programme group insofar as this is compatible with the Atlantic Alliance;

2. To start discussions now on the battle tank of the 1990s;

3. To bring to a successful conclusion without delay discussions on the successor, for the 1990s, to the Franco-British Jaguar, the F-4F Phantom of the Federal German air force and the further development of the British Harrier;

4. To maintain Europe's warship building capability, to agree on the production of interchangeable components and to promote containerisation;

5. To continue European co-operation in the production of missiles and to promote specialisation by ordering several versions of the same type of missile;

6. To promote greater standardisation of telecommunications equipment and to create a joint integrated digital system for the new command communications which are to be developed;

7. To pursue research and development in such branches of advanced technology as integrated circuits, microprocessors, radar systems, lasers and infrared sensors for weapons systems;

8. To afford support to co-operation in their countries by maintaining existing structures, particularly in the form of permanent European consortia and, whenever possible, by setting up new ones.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by MM. Onslow and Valleix, Rapporteurs)

I. *Introduction*

1. One of the basic aims of Soviet foreign policy has always been to split the transatlantic Alliance between North America and Western Europe. Before the Alliance was formed, the Soviet Union warned the Western European countries against any military alliance. Once the Atlantic Alliance was firmly established, Moscow issued warnings with the introduction of every new sophisticated defensive weapons system and, since Western Europe as a whole concentrated mainly on consumer goods, allowing its civilian and military technology to decline, the new weapons were developed mainly in the United States.

2. When Washington suggested making neutron weapons available to its allies, Soviet leaders brought pressure to bear on the European allies concerned.

3. Now Moscow has again uttered threatening warnings to certain Western European leaders not to deploy the modern Pershing 2 and cruise missiles [1] on their territory as protection against modern and mobile Soviet SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers.

4. Moscow is also trying to split NATO by putting extra pressure on some countries not to accept Pershing 2 and cruise missiles, knowing full well of course that some governments will not accept any missiles on their territory unless a European nation other than a European nuclear power — unlike the United Kingdom or France — also agrees to have them. It is well known that the NATO Scandinavian countries have a long-standing policy of not accepting the stationing of foreign troops and nuclear weapons on their territory.

5. France, a European nuclear power, is no longer part of NATO's integrated military organisation and is not concerned by United States weapons.

6. Your Rapporteurs believe that in order to deter or counter the aggressor all available defence resources should be mobilised. Armaments co-operation is an essential part of the common effort and should therefore be developed systematically, otherwise the European countries will always be forced to purchase much of their weaponry from the United States.

7. The Assembly has often expressed the view in its reports that the European defence posture needs to be maintained and strengthened and that the European technological basis should be broadened and reinforced. The Committee's preparatory report for the symposium on a European armaments policy, entitled the industrial bases of European security [1], submitted by Mr. Valleix, was based on this view. The report raised the question of whether Europe was to use the armaments industries which were the bases of its defence and, in paragraph 27, it summarised the fifteen technologies considered critical.

1. See Document 773.

II. *Proposals on future weapons systems*

8. During the symposium held in Brussels from 15th to 17th October 1979, Working Group III, which was led by the Committee, dealt with research, development and production of armaments systems. During the discussion, at which there were some 100 participants, the following topics were reviewed :

(*a*) the future tank ;
(*b*) future combat aircraft ;
(*c*) building of new naval craft ;
(*d*) missiles ;
(*e*) electronic communications ;
(*f*) future weapons in general.

(a) The future tank

9. On future tanks it was generally acknowledged that there would be no fundamental changes for the next generation, which might be brought into service at the beginning of the nineties. Most experts agreed that, at least for the next battle tank generation, the combat helicopter equipped with canons and guided weapons or high energy lasers was not yet an alternative. The tank provided a unique military capability in support of infantry on land and, although the helicopter could replace some aspects of the tank's rôle by virtue of its manoeuvrability and wide range of possible armament, it would still only work in conjunction with and not replace the tank.

10. This being the case, the selection of the future battle tank will be made in accordance with criteria such as were used in the past but taking account of the interests of the allies as well as of national interests. A great difficulty is of course that no mathematical model has yet been found for an accurate assessment of combat effectiveness.

11. All technical and tactical experience in Europe and in the western alliance as a whole

1. Document 805 ; for the text of the recommendation and the Council's reply see Appendix I.

should be made available to reduce expenditure as much as possible. A way should therefore be found to co-operate in a common defence effort over and above purely national economic interests, thus opening the way to multilateral programmes. The development of a new type of tank would be very expensive and multilateral development should be imposed by governments. Industrial partners should have the genuine will to co-operate on a long-term basis and any limited efforts, whether in time or otherwise, should be excluded.

12. Here it should be noted that in the mid-1960s and mid-1970s abortive efforts were made for the joint development of a battle tank. However, on the central front there are still four different types — American, British, French and German. Considerable progress would have been made if it were possible to reduce this number to one or two European models. This shows the dimensions of the effort to be made.

(b) Future combat aircraft

13. During the discussions at the symposium, no attempt was made to cover the full range of future combat aircraft requirements in Western Europe. The issue was limited to combat aircraft requirements for operations in the battlefield area. On the central front, the only main striking force is the air arm and this is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. The local imbalance of ground forces can only be balanced by air power with its flexibility and quick reaction capability in space and time. The air forces should therefore have offensive support aircraft in their inventory.

14. Battlefield support aircraft must be located close to the front in order to react quickly. In order to survive, they have to be able to fly at a fairly low altitude at speeds of some 900 kph. A third requirement is the need to disperse aircraft in a completely random manner on or outside airfields. This means that any future combat aircraft need at least a STOL capability if not VSTOL.

15. The next joint European aircraft must be planned according to existing military requirements and the different and often paradoxical concepts of, for instance, the Royal Air Force and the German air force should be reconciled. Current joint efforts indicate that this would be possible. Time schedules also should be harmonised. However, a speedy decision is necessary and the future combat aircraft should be designed at a price that the European nations could accept in order to avoid buying a cheaper off-the-shelf aircraft from the United States. The European nations would as a last resort have to accept a United States aircraft if they were too slow in reaching decisions, otherwise there might be doubts about the credibility of European defence.

16. If the aircraft were to be developed as an international collaborative programme, the cost could be reduced both directly through cost-sharing and indirectly through increased sales.

17. Your Rapporteurs wish to refer to Recommendation 332, adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1979, in which the Council was asked to arrange for the next fighter aircraft to be a joint European venture by promoting co-operation between the existing management consortia producing Jaguar and Tornado. The ministers concerned have already discussed this issue several times and your Rapporteurs hope they will ultimately concur with the Assembly' request.

18. In reply to Recommendation 332 on 24th October 1979, the Council referred to this question as follows :

> "4. The Council reaffirm the great importance which the governments of the member states attach to the maintenance of efficient capacities in the aviation and space sector for the future of Europe. The appropriate government departments in France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany are firmly resolved to develop a joint European tactical fighter aircraft for the nineties.
>
> Such a complex venture, which will involve the most modern technologies, poses many difficult problems which the countries concerned have already begun to study. For instance, they will endeavour to harmonise their respective operational requirements and the time factors in order to find a configuration which will satisfy all concerned. In the course of these deliberations, the work will be apportioned between the countries concerned, industrial partnerships established, and the most expedient form of management agreed."

19. In this context it may be of interest to quote also the Council's reply to another part of the Assembly's recommendation to the effect that governments be urged "to provide the European helicopter industry with orders necessary for uninterrupted development and production" :

> "5. The governments of France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy have set up a joint steering committee on the helicopter industry. The committee has concluded its studies on expected military requirements into the nineties. At the present time it is working on a common technology programme which will form the basis for joint action with regard to military helicopters. Only when that programme is ready will it be possible to decide what orders can be provided for the European helicopter industry."

(c) Building new naval craft

20. The problems of naval shipbuilding were necessarily considered within the larger and more complex framework of the shipbuilding industry as a whole. This industry is now passing through one of the most serious crises in its existence. Production has declined from 35-40 million gross registered tons to 20-25 million gross registered tons. There is an unused tonnage of 50 million gross registered tons. The European shipbuilding industry can attain Japan's high level of efficiency only if it manages to make the best use of its overall size. Only then can it develop a programme of specialisation and rationalisation. There is no rationalisation and specialisation in naval construction, i.e. the five major shipbuilding countries are building the same types of frigates, minesweepers and offshore patrol ships. Even within individual countries new naval construction is subdivided between many shipyards. If this trend persists, technological developments might regress rather than advance. In order to arrive at a better product, the standardisation of elementary components and modules and containerisation have to be promoted between the Western European shipbuilding countries.

21. One of the most important problems to be faced at the present time is that of production capacity. Co-operation in Europe is essential since the industry would be better able to produce the necessary components at an economic price at European level than at national level. Sacrifices will have to be made in order to survive.

22. A certain level of standardisation, based on United States standards, has been attained in that all NATO nations respect certain specifications and quality norms.

23. In naval doctrine there is an essential difference between ships for a deep ocean navy and for a coastal navy. It is essential to maintain a deep ocean capability in Europe, otherwise the defence of the North Atlantic routes would be wholly in the hands of the United States.

24. Your Rapporteurs wish to draw attention to the mine counter measure vessel project which is a good example of successful co-operation in a naval programme. This was conducted jointly by Belgium, France and the Netherlands. An overall maritime and naval policy for Western Europe should be adopted and the WEU governments should be reminded of the need to consider both the civil and military aspects of the maritime situation. Failing such a policy, no shipbuilding industry will open its books and show its competitors its plans for the future.

(d) Missiles

25. In the Working Group's discussions on tactical missiles likely to become operational in the 1990s, it was pointed out that, except for very short-range firings, such missiles would probably replace non-guided weapons.

26. The scope for using certain types of missiles will become greater and the reliability of the new missiles will be enhanced by a reduction in the number of electro-mechanical components. The use of a smaller number of very highly integrated components, microprocessors and specific integrated functions will allow the reliability of electronic circuits to be increased to a very large degree. The cost of tactical missiles might be reduced considerably.

27. As far as international co-operation, interoperability and standardisation are concerned, the best solution would probably be for each country to agree to specialise in a certain type of missile and adopt other types of missiles produced in other countries. Interoperability in itself might not produce effective weapons.

28. It would be useful to have several versions of the same missile and this could be a favourable factor for facilitating negotiations for achieving acceptable forms of collaboration. For instance, the replacement for the Jaguar aircraft would have to be equipped with some form of armament for self-defence and/or air-to-air attack. With two different types of warhead, the missiles with which the Jaguar's replacement would be equipped could be extremely effective. The total weight would have to be minimised in order to achieve a multi-target rôle.

29. New technology could lead to smaller missiles capable of performing more than one task, which in turn could well lead to less arguments over different types of future aircraft.

30. Your Rapporteurs wish to point out that in Document 805 on the industrial bases of European security a list was given of European missile programmes.

31. Whether in the future a European cruise missile should be built led to a lengthy debate and the experts could not agree on whether such a missile could be used tactically and deliver conventional explosives. So far the cruise missile, as developed by the Americans, has a nuclear warhead which is the only effective explosive because of the low weight requirement to ensure the missile's invulnerability.

(e) Electronic communications

32. A global defence communication system that would satisfy all the needs of the general staffs and be immune to most threats should be considered beyond reach economically. Nevertheless, important and feasible improvements will be made in the future. New technologies and operational needs together will create the communications of the future.

33. Defence communications span the entire globe and represent many billions of dollars with an inventory of hundreds of thousands of various communication devices and equipment. There are three types of communications: strategic, long distance and tactical.

34. Digital communication will involve more and more integrated communications equipment dealing with message processing. The combination of computer and telecommunication techniques and technologies will constitute a new system of communications which, however, to be functional would require a high level of interoperability. Whenever possible, a certain degree of standardisation should also be sought.

35. The cost of digital technology and advanced signal processing is steadily decreasing. The new powerful tactical communication technology could bring about a revolution in command communications. For using relays by satellite, aircraft or ground installations, there will have to be provision for more data processing. Packet radios will play a major rôle in mobile units.

36. New developments in electronic communications are now possible since the size and weight of tactical equipment have been greatly reduced. Interference and jamming would be made more difficult by virtue of the system's wide geographic spread and the wide spread of data dissemination. Until now there has been very little integration of communications systems, but new technologies would permit an integrated approach which should be adopted by Europe since otherwise it would be overtaken by events in ten years' time. This is especially true for the systems of data handling in the United States with the tracking and data relay satellite system (TDRSS). United States technology is already well ahead of European systems.

37. In the draft recommendation to Document 805, the Assembly already recommended to the Council that greater European co-ordination of research and development should be ensured in such branches of advanced technology as integrated circuits, microprocessors, radar systems, lasers and infrared sensors for weapons systems. It is not acceptable for Europe to remain dependent on imported computer parts for its own military equipment just because they are not produced in Europe at present. This is most important.

(f) Future weapons in general

38. With regard to future weapons, special attention should be drawn to new technology for command and control of the battlefield. This topic is, of course, closely linked to the preceding one.

39. The process of command will be greatly facilitated thanks to new developments such as:

(*a*) microelectronics which will enhance the automatic data-processing capability and flexibility;

(*b*) infrared, radar and thermal imagery which will greatly facilitate surveillance and target acquisition and improve designation activities; remotely-piloted helicopters which will also be able to fly over enemy territory;

(*c*) headquarters which will establish facilities for analysing, storing, presenting and distributing information;

(*d*) precision-guided munitions, multi-rocket systems and remotely-delivered mines to meet enemy attack.

40. The most important piece of new technology is in remotely-piloted vehicles and precision-guided missiles, whose potential when used together is incalculable.

41. Among new weapons which would appear to be indispensable are those which will enable us to discover the enemy's intentions as early as possible and those which will enable us to interfere with his ability to move freely. Therefore Europe requires new technology weapons of surveillance, target acquisition and engagement, together with secure and hardened means of directing them, i.e. remotely-piloted helicopters, automatic data-processing, electronic countermeasures, electronic counter countermeasures and precision-guided missiles, multi-rocket systems, remotely-delivered mines, rapid agents of fire and movement, and all the command arrangements appropriate to them.

42. Your Rapporteurs wish to underline that if there were only one field in which governments could make a start, it should be in this field. There should be a continuous dialogue between ministers of defence, commanders-in-chief, lower levels of command and industrialists. Expense is such that European collaboration here is essential.

III. *Conclusions*

43. The discussions in Working Group III were most competently summed up by Admiral Sir Raymond Lygo, the group's General Rapporteur at the symposium. The text of this summary is appended to the report.

44. Nevertheless, your Rapporteurs wish to draw some conclusions of their own. They wish to point out that the European armaments industry is based mainly in France and in the United Kingdom. In both countries some 60 % of this industry is established in ordnance factories which come directly under the ministries of defence. Most of the work there is carried out at the request of the military. An important part of the remaining 40 % is

established in nationalised industries such as Aérospatiale and British Aerospace, which come under the ministries of industry, and a smaller part is represented by private industry. It is quite clear that the governments, through their ministries of defence, and industry have a preponderant say in the workings of the industries, which justifies WEU's exclusive responsibility for both armaments and defence matters in accordance with the modified Brussels Treaty.

45. In other countries the situation is rather different. In the Federal Republic of Germany only 200,000 persons out of a total work force of 25 million are employed in the armaments industry. This means that armaments represent only 2 % of Federal German industrial production. The main hardware produced are aircraft and tanks. The industry is private but the Federal Government, indirectly, by way of financing, and of course as the main customer, has a say in the type of products. In Italy the armaments industry is of even less importance, and in the Benelux countries only a few larger industries such as Philips work for the military market.

46. In France and Britain especially, but also in the other European countries, governments have a great influence on military production.

47. On the governmental side, first they should support and actively develop the national industrial base in advanced technology. The means to do so are considerable and, as an example, your Rapporteurs can cite the United States where the government, through its specialised agencies, gives considerable impetus to avionics, aerospace and advanced electronics.

48. Second, governments should adopt firm medium- and long-term planning.

49. Third, financing and budgeting should be prepared and established in time.

50. Fourth, for important programmes, an international basis should be laid down. Several joint programmes have already been concluded successfully and your Rapporteurs wish to name as examples Tornado, Airbus, and missile programmes such as Milan, Hot and Roland. On the basis of past experience, the efficiency of this type of programme could certainly be improved.

51. Fifth, the government programme management agencies should improve their efficiency. Government control should be limited using a minimum staff with a maximum of responsibility in the programme control function.

52. Sixth, governments should be aware of the limits of a country of European size.

53. Seventh, transatlantic co-operation on a basis of equality is possible only if there is a balance in the ability to co-operate. In most cases, this means a European, not only a national partner capability.

54. Eighth, the European governments should be willing to co-ordinate licensing and purchasing programmes for United States equipment. Transatlantic co-operation is desirable in carefully selected areas.

55. On the industrial side it should be realised that the funding of applied research and basic technology developments is part of good industrial performance.

56. Industry should anticipate the requirements for future programmes of military advanced technology products.

57. In the case of international programmes, joint transnational industrial proposals should be made.

58. Present management structures for international programmes should be further developed and improved to ensure continuity.

59. Temporary interruptions of international programmes should be avoided by the industrial partners in the sense that labour or other problems in one country should not jeopardise the competitiveness of international programmes. The spirit of international co-operation should prevail in order to establish a firm basis for customer confidence.

60. Although there is much that can be done by industry, your Rapporteurs are convinced that the main impetus has to come from the governments in order to establish a healthy climate for European collaboration. Your Rapporteurs have summed up these considerations in the recommendation to this report.

APPENDIX I

RECOMMENDATION 329 [1]

on the industrial bases of European security [2]

The Assembly,

Considering that the time is ripe to review the results achieved so far by the various forms of European armaments co-operation ;

its Considering the military and economic need for Europe to acquire at least cost the means of ensuring security, a condition of its independence ;

Considering the technical possibilities of member countries and the constantly-rising cost of armaments at the research, development and production stages ;

Considering moreover the importance of the armaments industries in the economies of several member countries and the ability of some of them to produce many types of equipment without international co-operation ;

Considering finally the immediate need to conclude an agreement on programmes for the production of military equipment to be interoperable by the end of the century or standardised wherever possible, taking account of the fact that research, development and production cover a period of from ten to fifteen years ;

Noting Resolution 62, adopted by the Presidential Committee on 18th January 1979, on the organisation of a second symposium on a European armaments policy on 15th, 16th and 17th October for which this report is to be a preparatory document,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge member countries to determine the military equipment :
   (*a*) to be produced on a co-operative basis ;
   (*b*) to be produced with due regard for interface conditions to ensure interoperability ;
   (*c*) to be the object of special efforts because of present shortcomings in Europe and their foreseeable importance ;

2. Assess the results and advantages of the various forms of industrial co-operation in these fields to date, together with the difficulties and setbacks encountered ;

3. Define methods of ensuring greater European co-ordination of research and development in such branches of advanced technology as integrated circuits, microprocessors, radar systems, lasers and infrared sensors for weapons systems ;

4. Improve methods of procuring armaments and, in close liaison with the industries concerned, introduce appropriate measures for facilitating the exchange of know-how and the protection of industrial proprietary rights ;

5. Seek frameworks for lasting co-operation between member countries by forming permanent industrial consortia, concluding European agreements on specifications and replacement schedules for military equipment and working out harmonised methods of financing ;

6. Work out methods and structures to improve decision-taking and production capacity in European co-operation.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1979 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (3rd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 805).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 329

1. The Council recognise the usefulness of identifying weapon systems which can be the object of collaborative production, of achieving improved interoperability where appropriate and of seeking areas where European efforts need to be particularly concentrated. The machinery for this sort of consideration already exists however. Within the Alliance as a whole, CNAD devotes considerable efforts to achieving interoperability in specific equipment areas and is at present testing a periodic armaments planning system designed to improve co-operation between the member countries, particularly by increasing opportunities for standardisation and interoperability of the equipment used by them. As the Assembly is aware, the IEPG bears the main responsibility for identifying opportunities for collaboration in the design and production of defence equipment between European member countries. Its purpose includes the strengthening of the European factor in relationship with America and the maintenance of a healthy European defence industrial base. As part of its work the IEPG also looks regularly at areas of technology in the defence field to which member states should pay special attention.

Furthermore, as the Council observed in their reply to Recommendation 335, the study at present being made by the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU may provide governments with a detailed and comparative analysis of the armaments industries in the member countries and assist them to direct their choices and their programmes towards increased co-operation.

2. Industrial co-operation in collaborative projects has taken several different forms. In every project, the form of co-operative structure adopted must be that best suited to the particular circumstances. The Council believe that the governments, ministries and industries of member states are already fully aware of the advantages and disadvantages of different co-operative structures.

3. European governments are very conscious of the importance of certain areas of advanced technology for both civil and military applications. In this connection they make every effort to extend their co-operation to these particular fields, either under CNAD and IEPG auspices or bilaterally as appropriate, with those nations who have similar interests and requirements. Such co-operation can take the form of information exchange or collaborative research and development for projects. Devising further formal methods for co-operation of this sort does not seem for the time being likely to promote co-operation.

4. All nations have over the years devised procurement procedures best suited to their own circumstances. These are constantly being refined, and both CNAD and the IEPG have done work on harmonising procedures wherever this has been found possible or desirable. Certainly one example is in the field of industrial or intellectual property rights. This is a vital component of co-operation, and a sub-group of CNAD has been examining the problems. The Council do not believe that this work should be duplicated.

5. Permanent industrial consortia may well be established in the future as an effective means of undertaking collaborative armaments projects. However, industrial and management structures must be tailored to the particular circumstances of each project, and, before the establishment of a permanent consortium, the participants would have to be fully satisfied that there would be sufficient long-term work for the consortium, involving, in every case, the same nations and firms. The Council are aware that in CNAD, the IEPG, and FINABEL considerable work is being done on agreeing concepts, specifications and on examining replacement timetables. The framework necessary to encourage co-operation already exists. As with industrial and managerial arrangements, methods of finance for co-operative projects must be flexible and must be those best suited to the circumstances of the project and to the budgetary systems of the participating nations.

6. The Council believe that the necessary framework for decision-making already exists. The governments concerned are necessarily concentrating on the specific problems raised by the consideration of particular projects where their interests and requirements appear to be in sufficient conformity. The Council believe that the improvement and tightening of European co-operation require first and foremost the consideration and setting up of concrete projects rather than the devising of new structures and methodology.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th November 1979.

APPENDIX II

Summary of the discussions in Working Group III by Admiral Sir Raymond Lygo, General Rapporteur

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure for me to be invited here for this symposium as the Rapporteur of Working Group III. It has been a most interesting experience for me personally because it has made me try to reconcile two of my previous existences : as an ex-member of the Admiralty Board of the Royal Navy, and as a Managing Director of a part of the British armaments industry. From my former viewpoint as an ex-member of the Admiralty Board the achievement of a rational approach to arms procurement was made difficult because of the very real differences between the concepts of operation between the Royal Navy and other European navies. And obviously the reconciliation of staff requirements must be the ideal starting point for collaboration. In the second instance, I have come to learn of the very real disappointments that have occurred in British industry which have resulted from the failure to purchase British equipment. On analysis, too often this has been because of the reluctance of industry to get together with its foreign partners and give up a part of some cherished programme. But when you analyse this you find that failure to collaborate was not so much because British industry could not do so, but because of indecision on the part of government.

We have been fortunate to have a balanced cross-view of the whole of the problem in Group III and we have had the opportunity to listen to views from people of quite different backgrounds. Being a simple sailor, I have had to ask myself from time to time the question : What is it we are trying to do in this area of science and technology ? so that I may remind myself of how I might hope to understand and solve the problem. I must confess I have found this difficult to answer and have rather assumed it will be, to be provocative. However, I have assumed it is to examine the harmonisation of European armaments procurement programmes in the light of rapid advances in technology. Why ? Because we recognise that the cost and time of modern programmes is so large that, in general, if we do not harmonise we will finish up by buying American. And why would that be bad ? It would put us in the position of technological satellites and take us out of certain areas of advanced technology, and if this was not a bad enough affront to our dignity, the American concept of what is required in Europe in the eighties may not be correct. But perhaps of even greater importance is the profound effect on the selection of weapons systems any battlefield management system will demand. I do not believe that the full implications of this communications explosion have been generally realised. The management system will demand to interface only with compatible systems. If we are to avoid total confusion we must be a part of this scene from the outset.

Is cheapness/low cost the correct yardstick by which to measure effectiveness ? It has certainly been raised in the discussions within the group. I have in my time been taxed by Ministers of various persuasion with the allegation that "the best is the enemy of the good". My standard reply has always been : "I did not choose the enemy, Minister, you did." And if you choose the best in Europe, or in the world, to be my enemy, then I am afraid I can do no less than ask for the best in return. Not because it *must* be so, but because if I do not, I am evading my responsibility to my men and anyway I know I will probably finish up with less than I need in any event !

This eternal dilemma of the honest military commander is very real indeed because he is closer to the reality of war and he is likely to get killed.

A responsible military procurement authority also has to face up to the very real industrial problem of producing something which is saleable. I have not changed my view since joining industry. The desirability of producing things that are saleable must be good but not, I suggest, at the expense of satisfying the NATO requirement. To do so would be irresponsible. The answer, it seems to me, is to look for ways of providing a capability, which exists in a missile or other system without the expensive and sometimes cumbersome trappings that are necessary to go with it, in the more sophisticated NATO environment. I instance here the possibility of box launching missiles, first introduced by the Russians and which the French have exploited. This enables a small ship, for example, to be given a really serious punch. Of course, it does not have the constant reload or magazine capability of a big ship, but it does possess a very strong capability in a limited sense. This, it seems to me, is one way to try to exploit our systems for export. Not by insisting that our own services take a degraded system. One way of reducing cost might be a frank exchange of ideas between industry and the planning staffs at the conception stage, because there is no doubt that at this point it might be possible to save a great deal of expense merely by explaining the realities and costs of some of the tasks we are set. We

certainly have a long way to go on this in the United Kingdom. There can be, and generally speaking there are, quite often fundamentally different views of the *need* for certain weapons systems. To take the simple example of the naval case, the British primarily are concerned with the defence of the Eastern Atlantic, and that is deep water. It means that they must have ships that will be able to operate within these waters in co-operation with the United States navy. This is for them of fundamental importance. So if you attempt to discuss a system which is not capable of operating in this area, even though it may be capable of operating within the continental shelf or the Mediterranean, it just may not be good enough.

But at least the Royal Navy recognises that it is the weapons system, not the ship, that matters. They came to that fundamental truth with the introduction of the turret at the end of the last century. But I found myself time and again reminding members of my own group that it was a weapons system we should be addressing, and *not* the individual bits and pieces.

In addressing the important topic of standardisation of warships there appeared to be a fairly common confusion that you can switch from building tankers to warships and back again in a short space of time. A moment's thought will demonstrate that this really is not a practical proposition, and therefore the warship building capacity of Europe, which is probably no more than is needed for the event, will need to be preserved at about its present size.

Unfortunately, and quite probably, the commercial facts of life will not make the survival of the broader shipbuilding base possible. Although this is a matter of considerable concern, it is, in a European armaments sense I suspect, nowhere near as critical as the need to maintain our warship building capacity. We agreed that a start could be made in producing a standard range of interchangeable components (pumps, valves, etc.) designed to agreed characteristics, and that containerisation could help.

The air forces of Europe have a very difficult problem on the central front, but the really important question is not so much how they attempt the task but whether they attempt it, i.e. should you risk an £8 million aircraft on a bridge? We were given a personal view of how the important tri-national deliberation should conclude and debated the important question of STOL/VSTOL. We are developing and have developed the most sophisticated battlefield point-defence systems, and they will have mobility. And it is pointless to pretend that the threat to low-flying aircraft is not going to increase dramatically in the next few years. This leads, not to the demise of the aircraft, far from it, but to the development of stand-off systems and also underlines how important it is for aircraft to survive the first exchange, which to me means VSTOL, spell it any way you like, and thereafter to be able to perform a multi-purpose rôle, not because it is so very clever aerodynamically, but because it is equipped with the necessary systems that will give it this capability.

Air forces must look upon the cruise missile, and I use the term in the most general sense, as their ally, not a competitor. There will be a great need for the aircraft that survive to do those things which only aircraft can do best. Our task as designers of armaments should be to ensure they do survive.

Where do we go in the future with the battle tank? What is its rôle? If the history of war teaches us anything, it is that those who prepare for the last one are at a disadvantage. We received a description of some of the options open to fitting guns to the next generation of tanks and quite clearly there must be a great deal of room for argument. We touched on the problem of propulsion, but not directly on the effect that improved infrared seekers might have on the choice.

As a naval officer I reserve my comments, and am probably prudent so to do. But I know this: weapons of all sorts are getting "smarter" and the tank is one kind of metal box that I am uneasy about.

We finished by addressing the future of weapons in general and concentrated on the importance of the man and of human decision-making in any future battle scenario. I agree with most of this, so long as, of course, it is not an excuse for a lack of technical ability. Too often in British history we have found this to be the case.

There is no doubt of the genuine desire that has been expressed in my group for a sane approach to the procurement of weapons systems in Europe and I would sum up our debates as follows:

In summary:

(*i*) Advancing technology will result in smaller, more intelligent missiles; and the use of western know-how applied to guided weapons could be the best way to correct the imbalance of forces between East and West at a price we can afford.

(*ii*) At the moment we are not bad at our job given a line of sight. The next step is to harness surveillance, target acquisition and homing to extend our capability to longer ranges and indirect fire. This will lead to the computerised integration of battlefield intelligence and the automatic selection of channels of fire. The importance of acquiring a common language for

the integration of this information is of vital importance to the continuance of an independent European armaments industry. I really doubt whether many people have grasped this point.

(*iii*) We must start to think total weapons systems and stop considering guided weapons and their vehicles separately.

(*iv*) A modest start must be made in specifying standard, interchangeable components for warships. Containerisation could be helped by the increasing use of data highways.

It is idle to pretend that either industry alone, or the chiefs-of-staff alone, or governments alone, can make this happen. There are too many horses pulling in too many directions. I make no apology to my predecessors in the ministries, neither do I have to apologise to my contemporaries in industry, for saying that the prime responsibility for this must fall to governments. And too often, overburdened Ministers have too little time to really understand the problem. I would suggest that if we are to make a reality of standardisation of equipment in Europe then this can only be done at the highest government level, and I sincerely hope that the time will be provided to make sure that the debate is informed and that the consequences of standardisation are understood. If this does not take place, then I suspect that we shall come back to a forum of this kind in a few years' time and find that very little really and truly has happened except that the explosion in technology and battlefield management has been so great that we will have been left so far behind we will have little choice but to sub-contract from the United States. We must be realistic about this.

What do I carry away from the discussion so far and those which I hope are to follow? A genuine desire to see things better. It must now be matched with a determination on the part of those people who matter to understand the problem better and to come to grips with it.

Document 824 **20th November 1979**

OPINION ON THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1979 [1]

submitted on behalf of
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration [2]
by Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Draft Opinion

on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1979

The Assembly,

Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (*c*) of the Charter ;

Having taken note of the contents,

Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated.

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. *Alber* (Chairman) ; MM. Jager, *Adriaensens* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Ahrens, Antoni, Bonalumi, *Del Duca, Depietri,* Evers (Alternate : *von Hassel*), *Lord Hughes,* MM. Jeambrun, Krieps, *McNamara,* Orsini, *Page, Peeters,* Schleiter, *Stainton,* Tummers (Alternate : *Voogd*), *Vohrer,* Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on improving the status of WEU staff

The Assembly,

Welcoming the decision of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to grant a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for widows of male staff;

Considering that the establishment of a single appeals board would be the logical follow-up to the establishment of a joint section for the administration of pensions;

Again regretting that the Council has still not answered the Assembly's recommendation to set up a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations [1]:

1. The creation of a single appeals board as soon as possible;

2. The creation before 1983 of a joint body for the administration of pensions for staff of the co-ordinated organisations;

3. The establishment of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy and in particular:

— to review the structure of grades;

— to study the possibility of introducing a dual grading system at every level of the hierarchy;

— to study the type and length of contracts;

— to co-ordinate staff rules;

— to review the indemnity for loss of job;

— to study methods of transferring an official from one co-ordinated organisation to another;

— to make clear the financial consequences of their proposals;

II. Invite the Secretary-General to inform WEU officials of all staff vacancies so that they may take advantage of all possibilities for promotion which may arise within the organisation.

1. OECD, NATO, WEU, Council of Europe, ESA.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur)

I. *Budget of the ministerial organs of WEU*

(*i*) *Approval*

1. I have studied the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1979 and have no comment to make for the time being. I therefore submit the attached draft opinion and draft recommendation to the Committee for approval.

(*ii*) *The budget*

2. The total budget of WEU for 1979 as compared to 1978 is as follows :

	Revised 1978 budget		*1979 budget*	
	£	F	£	F
Secretariat-General	666,705		786,660	
Standing Armaments Committee	—	4,815,825	—	5,299,865
Agency for the Control of Armaments	—	10,741,985	—	11,928,930
Office of the Clerk	—	7,778,000	—	8,517,000
TOTAL BUDGET OF WEU	666,705	23,335,810	786,660	25,745,795

(*iii*) *WEU establishment*

3. The total establishment of WEU for 1979 is as follows :

Secretariat-General	48
Standing Armaments Committee	28
Agency for the Control of Armaments	52
	128
Office of the Clerk	28
TOTAL ESTABLISHMENT OF WEU FOR 1979	156

II. *Pension scheme*

4. In his report to the Assembly in June 1977 [1], Lord Selsdon proposed facilitating the application of the pension scheme for WEU staff, on the one hand by setting up a pension unit to manage the pension scheme common to the co-ordinated organisations and, on the other hand, in a second stage, by setting up a joint management fund legally separate from the co-ordinated organisations and having its own staff and budget.

5. The establishment of a joint section for the administration of pensions was agreed upon in May 1978, but this section will not be able to start exercising its duties before 1st January 1980. This delay is due to problems of recruiting an official as head of the section, and consequently the recruitment of other members of the staff had to be postponed.

6. The Assembly realises that this joint administrative section will inevitably run up against difficulties in fulfilling its task in its first years of operation. Such difficulties, however, should not be an obstacle to setting up an independent joint management fund which would be the best guarantee of pensions being paid regularly whatever the ups and downs of one or other co-ordinated organisation.

7. It is also essential for the Council to decide without delay to set up a single appeals board for all the co-ordinated organisations in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 15 of the abovementioned document.

8. Replies to the questionnaire given in Document 783 are appended. It will be noted that WEU will be refunding approximately F 24 million to member governments in respect of validation of pensions.

III. *Careers and conditions of employment for staff in the co-ordinated organisations*

9. In Recommendations 302 and 327, the Assembly recommended that the Council promote, in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations :

> "The establishment as soon as possible of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy."

10. So far, this recommendation has remained unanswered although for more than ten years the Assembly has continuously reported on obstacles encountered by its officials in the course of their careers. Thus, within the Office

1. Document 742.

of the Clerk itself, eighteen of the twenty-six officials have already reached the last step in their grade (some of them several years ago) or will reach it within two years. As matters now stand, these officials can expect no improvement in their career prospects. It is easy to understand the disappointment of officials who have given the Assembly devoted service for many years — sometimes more than twenty — and who should normally be able to have hopes of promotion.

11. The Assembly therefore strongly urges the Council to set up a committee of experts to study the problem of careers and the structure of grades. Consideration might, for instance, be given to the possibility of introducing new categories of grades (there are now four : A, L, B, C), increasing the number of steps in each grade and introducing a dual grading system at every level of the hierarchy.

12. The committee of experts should also study the following problems :

— The type of contract offered to officials on recruitment (at present, an initial one-year contract followed by a contract of indefinite duration).

Might consideration not be given to contracts of fixed duration, five years for instance, for Grade A posts requiring specific technical qualifications ?

13. — Co-ordination of staff rules :

Since salary scales and allowances and the pension scheme rules of the co-ordinated organisations are identical, the rules applying to their staff should be similar.

14. — Indemnity for loss of job :

In January 1972, the WEU Council decided to grant an indemnity for loss of job to any member of the staff holding a firm contract and fulfilling certain conditions [1] :

1. (*i*) who holds a firm contract [1] ;

(*ii*) and whose services are terminated for any one of the following reasons :

— suppression of the budget post occupied by the staff member ;

— changes in the duties of the budget post occupied by the staff member of such a nature that he no longer possesses the required qualifications ;

— general staff cuts including those due to a reduction in or termination of the activities of an organisation ;

— the withdrawal from the organisation of the member country of which the staff member is a national ;

— the transfer of the headquarters of the organisation or of any of its units to another country and the consequent transfer of the whole staff concerned ;

The indemnity amounts to one month's emoluments for each year of service, with a maximum equivalent to twenty-four months' emoluments. Nor must the indemnity represent a greater number of months than the staff member would have had to serve until reaching the age limit for retirement as set out in the Staff Rules of the organisation. Consequently, a staff member having worked for more than twenty-four years in the organisation and finding himself in one of the abovementioned cases without being near to retirement would have no claim to anything more than this maximum amount. It would seem fair to reconsider this matter with a view to taking greater account of the actual years of service by officials in the organisation.

15. — Methods of transferring an official from one co-ordinated organisation to another :

At present, an official wishing to leave one organisation for another is obliged to resign and sign an initial contract with his new organisation. When such a case occurred recently in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly, many problems arose over separation allowances and pension rights, although the official concerned was to take up a post in another co-ordinated organisation.

IV. *Staff vacancies within WEU*

16. The Assembly renews its recommendation to the Secretary-General on the publication of staff vacancies in WEU.

— the refusal by the staff member, where his contract does not cover the point, to be permanently transferred to a country other than that in which he is serving ;

— withdrawal of security clearance on grounds which do not warrant the dismissal of the staff member as a result of disciplinary action ;

(*iii*) and who

— is not offered a post in the same grade in the same organisation, or

— is not appointed to a vacant post in one of the other co-ordinated organisations at a comparable remuneration, or

— if employed in the public services, has failed to obtain immediate reintegration in his national, civil or military administration.

1. A firm contract shall be interpreted to mean a contract made with a staff member on completion of the probationary period. It goes without saying that a staff member who has held a firm contract in a co-ordinated organisation and who has subsequently been offered, either in that organisation or in another co-ordinated organisation, a contract involving a probationary period, shall be deemed to satisfy this condition if such contract is terminated during or on completion of such probationary period.

It has noted with interest the Council's answers to written questions [1] but is convinced that certain posts might have been filled by WEU staff. Internal recruitment would have allowed an official to be promoted followed by a series of other possible promotions.

17. The geographical breakdown presumably has to be as fair as possible. Nevertheless, an official who has acquired wide experience in an organisation and who has the necessary qualifications should be preferred to an official recruited from outside the organisation, whatever his nationality.

1. See Appendix IV.

APPENDIX I

WEU BUDGET ESTIMATE FOR 1979

Proposed expenditure and income

	A*	B*	C*	TOTAL B + C
	£	Francs	Francs	Francs
Salaries and allowances	889,285	6,905,400	14,263,600	21,169,000
Pensions	66,420	421,200	2,007,400	2,428,600
Travel	34,715	84,500	346,000	430,500
Other operating costs	125,995	443,765	546,430	990,195
Purchase of furniture, etc.	4,040	8,500	24,900	33,400
Buildings	—	132,000	241,700	373,700
Total expenditure	1,120,455	7,995,365	17,430,030	25,425,395
WEU tax	304,290	2,389,500	4,893,500	7,283,000
Other receipts	9,650	50,500	95,000	145,500
Pension receipts	19,855	255,500	512,600	768,100
Total income	333,795	2,695,500	5,501,100	8,196,600
NET TOTAL	786,660	5,299,865	11,928,930	17,228,795

National contributions

	600ths	A*	B* C*	Office of the Clerk
		£	Francs	Francs
Belgium	59	77,354.90	1,694,164.84	837,505
France	120	157,332.00	3,445,759.00	1,703,400
Federal Republic of Germany.	120	157,332.00	3,445,759.00	1,703,400
Italy	120	157,332.00	3,445,759.00	1,703,400
Luxembourg	2	2,622.20	57,429.32	28,390
Netherlands	59	77,354.90	1,694,164.84	837,505
United Kingdom	120	157,332.00	3,445,759.00	1,703,400
	600	786,660.00	17,228,795.00	8,517,000

Total WEU budget	£ 786,660 Francs 25,745,795

* A - Secretariat-General.
B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.
C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.

APPENDIX II

Table of establishment

WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

	A[1]	B[1]	C[1]	Total A, B, C	Office of the Clerk	
Secretary-General	1	—	—	1	Clerk	1
Deputy Secretary-General	1	—	—	1		—
Director of the Agency	—	—	1	1		—
Assistant Secretary-General	1	1	—	2	Clerk Assistant	1
A7	—	—	1	1		—
A6	1	—	3	4		—
A5	2	1	6	9		5
A4	—	4	8	12		2 [2]
A3	3	—	1	4		1
A2	2	—	2	4		3 [2]
L5	1	—	—	1		
L4	1	1	—	2		
L3	1	3	2	6		—
L2	1	—	—	1		
B6	—	—	—	—		1
B5	—	—	—	—		—
B4	8	4	8	20		4
B3	7	7	8	22		7
B2	5	—	2	7		—
B1	2	—	—	2		—
C6	—	—	—	—		1
C5	—	—	1	1		—
C4	1	4	—	5		—
C3	8	3	9	20		2
C2	2	—	—	2		—
	48	28	52	128		28

1. A - Secretariat-General.
   B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.
   C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.
2. Including four secretaries Translations/Publications.

APPENDIX III

RECOMMENDATION 327 [1]

on improving the status of WEU staff [2]

The Assembly,

Welcoming the decision of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to set up a joint pensions administration section as a first step towards the creation of a truly independent body to deal with pensions ;

Reiterating its regret that provision has still not been made for a reversionary pension to be granted to the widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for the widows of male staff ;

Deploring the fact that no reply was given to the Assembly's recommendation to set up a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations :

1. The creation of an independent body for the administration of pensions for staff of the co-ordinated organisations ;

2. The granting of a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for the widows of male staff ;

3. The establishment of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy ;

II. Give consideration to using a percentage of the pension validation monies received to create a fund from which interest-bearing housing loans could be made to the staff of WEU ;

III. Invite the Secretary-General to give priority, when vacancies arise, to staff already serving in the organisation in order to ensure maximum career prospects.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 23rd November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (13th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 783).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 327

I.1. In April 1978 the Council approved the 149th report of the Co-ordinating Committee concerning the principle that a joint pensions administrative section should be set up as an inter-organisation unit of the co-ordinated organisations.

The stage now reached in recruiting staff and in the organisation of such a unit makes it likely that it will start work in the course of 1979.

I.2. The Council approved on 21st March 1979 the 161st report of the Co-ordinating Committee concerning the granting of reversionary pensions to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for the widows of male staff with effect from 1st January 1979.

This implies the reopening of the option for those female staff members concerned and includes the appropriate amendments to the Pension Scheme Rules.

I.3. The Council indicated in their reply to Recommendation 302 that the functioning of the machinery for co-ordination was under review by various authorities; this is still the case.

II. The Secretary-General and the Budget Committee are at present considering various solutions to the problem of loans for the construction, purchase or improvement of living accommodation following the introduction of the Pension Scheme.

III. The Council are aware of the limited scope for internal promotion due to the small size of the organisation, the need to respect the distribution of posts as between nationals of the member states and specific technical qualifications for certain appointments.

The Secretary-General, however, while taking account of these restrictions, seeks every available opportunity to promote staff within the organisation.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th April 1979.

APPENDIX IV

Written questions and replies of the Council

(i) Question put by Mr. Stoffelen on the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting and the reply of the Council

Question : The European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting, now being set up near Reading in the United Kingdom, will not be included in the framework of the so-called co-ordinated organisations, the reason given being that Yugoslavia is a member of the centre. Would the Council indicate whether this is correct and, if so, clarify the position ?

What arrangements will be made for careers and conditions of employment of staff in this centre ?

Will this situation delay the working of the centre ?

Reply : While awaiting the decision of the Councils of the five co-ordinated organisations, the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting is represented by an observer in the various co-ordinating bodies, including the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts.

Meanwhile, the Council of the centre has adopted the salary and allowance scales for staff of the co-ordinated organisations serving in the United Kingdom and, in general, the principles governing conditions of employment in the co-ordinated organisations.

The Council are not aware that the present situation has delayed the work of the centre.

(ii) Question put by Mr. Voogd on the number of A and L grade posts which became vacant in 1978 and the reply of the Council

Question : Would the Council inform the Assembly of the total number of A and L grade posts which became vacant in 1978 ?

Of these posts how many were, or will be, filled by permanent officials already working in the organisation ?

How many promotions did, or will, this represent ?

Reply : The total number of A and L grade posts which became vacant in 1978 was six, of which one was on the establishment of the Secretariat-General and the others were posts for experts in the Armaments Control Agency.

The Secretariat-General post has been filled by the promotion of a permanent official already on the staff.

For the organisation as a whole, staff is drawn equitably from nationals of the member states.

Furthermore, in the particular case of the Armaments Control Agency, specific technical qualifications are required of candidates for all appointments to the higher ranks.

These considerations, together with the fact that the total establishment of WEU is not large, tend to limit the scope for internal promotion.

(iii) Questions put by Mr. van Waterschoot and by Mr. Warren on the recruitment and promotion of WEU staff and the reply of the Council

Question 1 : In its reply to Written Question 193, the Council referred to the recruitment and promotion of WEU staff in 1978. Can it indicate how many times Article 43, paragraph (*a*) of the Staff Rules was applied in 1977 and 1978 and, in each case, what were the results of such application ?

In view of the requirement for technical qualifications mentioned in the Council's reply, does the Council not consider a number of years' service with WEU to be an appreciable element of qualifications ?

In view of the proportions which have to be respected among nationals of member states, can the Council not consider a table of establishment which is sufficiently flexible to allow some degree of rotation of neighbouring grades, particularly in the case of A4 and A5 and B3 and B4 staff ?

Does the Council consider it acceptable that officials should have to remain at the same grade for more than ten years with no hope of promotion and cannot it consider introducing a dual-grading system for such officials ?

Question 2 : The personnel question, with specific regard to the WEU situation, should receive the Council's continuous attention. Many posts are fixed in the narrow organigramme of the organisation, depriving, for instance, the assistants of the Assembly's committees of any promotion. Would the Council not consider dual grading or a revision of the organigramme for those who are at the top of their grades ?

Reply : Whenever a vacancy occurs the Secretary-General seeks a solution in the first place under Article 43 (*a*) of the WEU Staff Rules. However, because of the size of the organisation and the limited number of staff available, there is often no serving staff member suited to the vacant post. This meant, for example, that

the two vacancies arising in 1977 had to be filled by recruitment from outside the organisation and in 1978, of the 11 vacancies, only 4 could be filled by promotion within WEU while 7 called for external recruitment.

The number of years served with WEU is of course an important element of qualification, but can only be part of a wider range of considerations. Other important factors are for instance, specialised knowledge of certain aspects of the organisation's work, geographical distribution as between the seven member countries and in a small organisation, working in two official languages only, linguistic balance and capability.

Again, due to the small number of staff involved, the Council have found it impossible to establish a flexible type of establishment allowing for more than a very limited degree of rotation as between neighbouring grades. But the Council fully realise the problems that staff face in such a rigid, indeed virtually unchanging, establishment.

Salary scales for the co-ordinated organisations are so structured as to try and compensate for the limited promotion possibilities. The introduction of a dual-grading system would involve a redesigning of the scales to be applied within the co-ordinated framework.

The Council are not convinced that such a reform would necessarily lead to a solution of the problem. However, one of the co-ordinated organisations has recently sought the opinion of the Co-ordinating Committee on this matter and the Council would of course consider any recommendation the Co-ordinating Committee might submit as a result.

APPENDIX V

Letter from Mr. Kershaw to the Secretary-General on the pension unit and reply by the Secretary-General

13th March 1979

.....

When submitting my report on the opinion on the budget of ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1978, I spoke of the problem of the pension unit for the co-ordinated organisations.

This unit was agreed upon by the Councils of the co-ordinated organisations last May and I was led to believe that this unit would begin to function in the first month of this year.

I am now given to understand that the head of this unit has still not been appointed and it therefore follows that the unit as such does not exist.

I should be grateful if you could let me know the reasons for this further delay and what steps are being taken by the Secretaries General of the co-ordinated organisations to see that this unit is set up within the next couple of months.

.....

(*Signed*) Anthony KERSHAW

22nd May 1979

Dear Mr. Kershaw,

I thank you for your letter dated 13th March 1979 concerning the joint administrative pension unit. There has been, as you said, some delay in appointing the head of this unit, but I am pleased to inform you that these difficulties have now been overcome and that the unit will probably start functioning fully at the end of this year.

Yours sincerely,

(*Signed*) E. LONGERSTAEY

APPENDIX VI

Letter from the Secretary-General to Mr. Kershaw on pension scheme options

Dear Mr. Kershaw,

I refer to your letters concerning the options exercised by the staff members of the co-ordinated organisations in respect of the pension scheme, and my interim reply, No. IX.33, dated 8th September 1978.

The additional information that I have received since the option was reopened in 1979 for female staff members as a result of the 161st report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts (approved by all five councils) is still incomplete and partially not yet released for publication. I regret therefore that I cannot send you the completed questionnaires relating to the other four co-ordinated organisations; however, Annex II to this letter contains some information which I have been able to assess.

I enclose detailed information about WEU in Annex I; you will, however, note from the footnote that the figures are not yet final.

I hope that these two annexes will give you a clearer insight into the results of the introduction of the pension scheme.

Yours sincerely,

(*Signed*) E. LONGERSTAEY

ANNEX I

Western European Union

		SG	ACA	SAC	Assembly	Total
1.	Number of staff employed as at 1.7.79	40	51	27	26	144
2.	Number of staff having opted for the pension scheme with full validation of past service (Option I)	12	32	15	19	78
3.	Number of staff having opted for the pension scheme with partial validation of past service (Option II)	2	—	—	1	3
4.	Number of staff having opted for the provident fund	17	5	5	2	29
5.	Number of staff recruited after 1.7.74 and hence automatically affiliated to the pension scheme	9	14	7	4	34
6.	Number of pensions already being paid to:					
	(*i*) retired/invalidated staff	6	17	8	1	32
	(*ii*) survivors/orphans	2	8	2	2	14
7.	Total amount of money due to governments for pension validation costs:					

Secretariat-General	F.frs	4,383,000
ACA	F.frs	9,651,000
SAC	F.frs	4,425,000
Assembly	F.frs	5,619,000
Total	F.frs	24,078,000

Note: When an agreement with the United Kingdom Government on the social security affiliation is concluded, the option for staff serving in the United Kingdom will be reopened; the figures quoted above are therefore not yet final.

ANNEX II

1. The situation as at 1st July 1979 with regard to the options for the pension scheme for the four co-ordinated organisations : NATO, OECD, ESA and WEU is :

— total of staff members involved in the option 5,715

— opted for the pension scheme 3,285

— opted to remain in the provident fund 2,430

For the Council of Europe a pension scheme has already been in force since 1st January 1967.

2. The total number of pensions being paid as at 1st July 1979 for the five co-ordinated organisations : NATO, OECD, ESA, WEU and the Council of Europe is :

— retirement and invalidity 641

— survivors and orphans 283

APPENDIX VII

Budgetary establishments of the organisations as at 30th June 1978 by countries

Countries	Co-ordinated Organisations															Observers						Total		
	OECD			Council of Europe			NATO + SHAPE			ESA			WEU			ECMWF [1]			EPO[2]					
	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
Germany							181	165	346	164	98	262							97	113	210	442	376	818
Belgium				1	1	2	606	1174	1780	1	—	1										608	1175	1783
Canada							1	—	1													1	—	1
Denmark							5	20	25													5	20	25
Spain										5	—	5										5	—	5
United States	2	—	2				17	1	18	4	—	4										23	1	24
France	645	1043	1688	253	478	731	99	180	279	195	130	325	43	61	104							1235	1892	3127
Italy							146	391	537	35	23	58										181	414	595
Japan	2	—	2																			2	—	2
Luxembourg							143	574	717													143	574	717
Norway							17	54	71													17	54	71
Netherlands							168	313	481	500	331	831							443	272	715	1111	916	2027
Portugal							3	3	6													3	3	6
United Kingdom							10	8	18				12	33	45	67	46	113				89	87	176
Turkey and Greece							46	76	122													46	76	122
Grand Total	649	1043	1692	254	479	733	1442	2959	4401	904	582	1486	55	94	149	67	46	113	540	385	925	3911	5588	9499

1. European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting.
2. European Patent Office.

APPENDIX VIII

Membership of the co-ordinated organisations

Member countries	Organisations					Observers	
	OECD	Council of Europe	NATO	ESA	WEU	ECMWF[1]	EPO[2]
EUROPE							
Germany	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Austria	x	x				x	x
Belgium	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Cyprus		x					
Denmark	x	x	x	x		x	x
Spain	x			x		x	
Finland	x					x	
France	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Greece	x	x	x			x	x
Ireland	x	x				x	x
Iceland	x	x	x				
Italy	x	x	x	x	x		x
Liechtenstein							x
Luxembourg	x	x	x		x		x
Malta		x					
Monaco							x
Norway	x	x	x				x
Netherlands	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Portugal	x		x			x	
United Kingdom	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Sweden	x	x		x		x	x
Switzerland	x	x		x		x	x
Turkey	x	x	x			x	
Yugoslavia						x	
AMERICA							
Canada	x		x				
United States	x		x				
ASIA							
Japan	x						
AUSTRALASIA							
Australia	x						
New Zealand	x						
TOTAL	24	18	15	10	7	16	16

1. European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting.
2. European Patent Office.

Replies of the Council to Recommendations 329 to 335

RECOMMENDATION 329 [1]

on the industrial bases of European security [2]

The Assembly,

Considering that the time is ripe to review the results achieved so far by the various forms of European armaments co-operation ;

Considering the military and economic need for Europe to acquire at least cost the means of ensuring its security, a condition of its independence ;

Considering the technical possibilities of member countries and the constantly-rising cost of armaments at the research, development and production stages ;

Considering moreover the importance of the armaments industries in the economies of several member countries and the ability of some of them to produce many types of equipment without international co-operation ;

Considering finally the immediate need to conclude an agreement on programmes for the production of military equipment to be interoperable by the end of the century or standardised wherever possible, taking account of the fact that research, development and production cover a period of from ten to fifteen years ;

Noting Resolution 62, adopted by the Presidential Committee on 18th January 1979, on the organisation of a second symposium on a European armaments policy on 15th, 16th and 17th October for which this report is to be a preparatory document,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge member countries to determine the military equipment :

   (*a*) to be produced on a co-operative basis ;

   (*b*) to be produced with due regard for interface conditions to ensure interoperability ;

   (*c*) to be the object of special efforts because of present shortcomings in Europe and their foreseeable importance ;

2. Assess the results and advantages of the various forms of industrial co-operation in these fields to date, together with the difficulties and setbacks encountered ;

3. Define methods of ensuring greater European co-ordination of research and development in such branches of advanced technology as integrated circuits, microprocessors, radar systems, lasers and infra-red sensors for weapons systems ;

4. Improve methods of procuring armaments and, in close liaison with the industries concerned, introduce appropriate measures for facilitating the exchange of know-how and the protection of industrial proprietary rights ;

5. Seek frameworks for lasting co-operation between member countries by forming permanent industrial consortia, concluding European agreements on specifications and replacement schedules for military equipment and working out harmonised methods of financing ;

6. Work out methods and structures to improve decision-taking and production capacity in European co-operation.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1979 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (3rd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 805).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 329

1. The Council recognise the usefulness of identifying weapon systems which can be the object of collaborative production, of achieving improved interoperability where appropriate and of seeking areas where European efforts need to be particularly concentrated. The machinery for this sort of consideration already exists however. Within the Alliance as a whole, CNAD devotes considerable efforts to achieving interoperability in specific equipment areas and is at present testing a periodic armaments planning system designed to improve co-operation between the member countries, particularly by increasing opportunities for standardisation and interoperability of the equipment used by them. As the Assembly is aware, the IEPG bears the main responsibility for identifying opportunities for collaboration in the design and production of defence equipment between European member countries. Its purpose includes the strengthening of the European factor in relationship with America and the maintenance of a healthy European defence industrial base. As part of its work the IEPG also looks regularly at areas of technology in the defence field to which member states should pay special attention.

Furthermore, as the Council observed in their reply to Recommendation 335, the study at present being made by the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU may provide governments with a detailed and comparative analysis of the armaments industries in the member countries and assist them to direct their choices and their programmes towards increased co-operation.

2. Industrial co-operation in collaborative projects has taken several different forms. In every project, the form of co-operative structure adopted must be that best suited to the particular circumstances. The Council believe that the governments, ministries and industries of member states are already fully aware of the advantages and disadvantages of different co-operative structures.

3. European governments are very conscious of the importance of certain areas of advanced technology for both civil and military applications. In this connection they make every effort to extend their co-operation to these particular fields, either under CNAD and IEPG auspices or bilaterally as appropriate, with those nations who have similar interests and requirements. Such co-operation can take the form of information exchange or collaborative research and development for projects. Devising further formal methods for co-operation of this sort does not seem for the time being likely to promote co-operation.

4. All nations have over the years devised procurement procedures best suited to their own circumstances. These are constantly being refined, and both CNAD and the IEPG have done work on harmonising procedures wherever this has been found possible or desirable. Certainly one example is in the field of industrial or intellectual property rights. This is a vital component of co-operation, and a sub-group of CNAD has been examining the problems. The Council do not believe that this work should be duplicated.

5. Permanent industrial consortia may well be established in the future as an effective means of undertaking collaborative armaments projects. However, industrial and management structures must be tailored to the particular circumstances of each project, and, before the establishment of a permanent consortium, the participants would have to be fully satisfied that there would be sufficient long-term work for the consortium, involving, in every case, the same nations and firms. The Council are aware that in CNAD, the IEPG, and FINABEL considerable work is being done on agreeing concepts, specifications and on examining replacement timetables. The framework necessary to encourage co-operation already exists. As with industrial and managerial arrangements, methods of finance for co-operative projects must be flexible and must be those best suited to the circumstances of the project and to the budgetary systems of the participating nations.

6. The Council believe that the necessary framework for decision-making already exists. The governments concerned are necessarily concentrating on the specific problems raised by the consideration of particular projects where their interests and requirements appear to be in sufficient conformity. The Council believe that the improvement and tightening of European co-operation require first and foremost the consideration and setting up of concrete projects rather than the devising of new structures and methodology.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th November 1979

RECOMMENDATION 330 [1]

on the political activities of the Council — reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council [2]

The Assembly,

Welcoming the fact that in its twenty-fourth annual report the Council confirmed its intention to continue "the dialogue with the Assembly on questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, including those dealt with by member governments in other international fora";

Welcoming the content of many replies to recommendations of the Assembly and to written questions put by members, particularly Written Question 191;

Regretting however that the informal procedure employed at joint meetings between Committees and the Council allows too much ambiguity to be left in the replies of the Council;

Welcoming the content of the statements made by representatives of several member governments to the Assembly during the twenty-fourth session, particularly in voicing the wish to make fuller use of WEU for discussing in a European forum all matters relating to Europe's security and for strengthening European co-operation in armaments questions and in disarmament;

Noting that the Council is still "checking regularly that the application of the modified Brussels Treaty is in no way neglected" and that the implementation of the Paris Agreements appeared twenty-seven times on its agenda;

Noting that the Council has demonstrated its good will in agreeing to a substantial increase in the budget of the Assembly, leaving it the possibility of assessing its own requirements, and in the active participation of most member governments in the work of the Assembly;

Considering that since, in due time, WEU will be called upon to take its place in any future European union, the smooth operation of this institution is essential for building a Europe which is master of its destiny;

Aware that such an independent and autonomous Europe can but be a political Europe based on a truly co-ordinated foreign and defence policy leading to integration,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Pursue efforts to extend the dialogue with the Assembly by keeping it regularly informed of:

   (*a*) the results of the work of the IEPG;

   (*b*) the completed parts of the study undertaken by the SAC which are not covered by military secrecy;

   (*c*) matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty included in the agenda of its meetings;

2. Seek a procedure for joint meetings which allows each participant adequate freedom of speech but which also allows the collegiate views of the Council to be expressed;

3. Demonstrate more clearly in its work that it considers the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly Article XI, to be a positive contribution to the establishment of a European union.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1979 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (4th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Minnocci on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 801).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 330

1. The Council will do their utmost to maintain and improve their relations with the Assembly and welcome its expression of appreciation of the twenty-fourth annual report and of the content of many of their replies to Assembly recommendations.

It is in this spirit that the Council keep the Assembly as fully informed as possible of the implementation of the mandate given to the Standing Armaments Committee in April 1977. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, at its meeting with the Council in Bonn, on 5th June 1978, was given information on that part of the study on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU which had already been completed.

The twenty-fourth report contained information on the SAC's activities as a whole, including the progress of the study on the armaments sector.

At their meeting at ministerial level on 16th May 1979, the Council decided not to circulate the study chapter by chapter. As soon as the complete text is in their possession, the Council will consider the content and appropriate form of the information to be given to the Assembly. The Council will also continue, as in the past, to keep the Assembly informed of matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty included in the agenda of their meetings.

On the matter of communication of information about the work of the IEPG, the Assembly is invited to refer to the Council's reply to point 4 of Recommendation 331.

2. The Council note the Assembly's concern regarding the procedure for joint meetings. They point out that the Assembly can and does obtain collegiate views from the Council through its recommendations and written questions. Informal meetings complement the written procedure by giving each member of the Council the opportunity to express an opinion on the matters under discussion.

The fact that the subjects raised by the Assembly are communicated unofficially to the Council in advance enables the latter, without prejudicing the informal character of such meetings, to concert their opinions as to the replies to be given. The spontaneity of the discussions, therefore, does not prevent the expression of the collective views of the Council.

3. As the Brussels Treaty states in its preamble, it aims to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe. To this end, the Council keep in mind the opportunities offered by Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th October 1979.

RECOMMENDATION 331 [1]

on the application of the Brussels Treaty — reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council [2]

The Assembly,

Noting with satisfaction that the Council, aware that the Assembly is "the only European assembly with responsibilities in the field of defence", is continuing the dialogue with it "on questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, including those dealt with by member governments in other international fora";

Welcoming the meaningful dialogue established with the Council in most cases, in particular through recommendations and replies, and noting in this connection that the Council will invite the Secretary-General of NATO to provide information "in particular when the questions raised relate to matters within the competence of the integrated command structures of NATO";

Considering that the essential commitments under the modified Brussels Treaty — automatic mutual military assistance and the maintenance of appropriate levels of forces — retain and must continue to retain all their initial value;

Noting that the Council considers the Standing Armaments Committee to be "a useful instrument for thought and analysis" but that the organisation of "European co-operation in the field of armaments production ... is the aim of the independent European programme group in its work",

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Withdraw its refusal to publish in its annual report the true level of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in accordance with the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty;

2. Keep the Assembly informed, by whatever means it considers appropriate, of the results already achieved in the study undertaken by the SAC, of the progress made and of the goals towards which its work is directed;

3. Take the fullest account of the Assembly's recommendations and consider the possibility of incorporating appropriate studies proposed from time to time by the Assembly among the new tasks which the Council is considering entrusting to the Standing Armaments Committee;

4. Include in future annual reports a section on the work of the independent European programme group.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1979 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (4th Sitting.)

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 808).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 331

1. The Council have been informed by the Government of the United Kingdom that they are now able to provide numbers of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in accordance with the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty. The numbers, which will be an average of the force levels over a year, will be published in future annual reports.

2. On the subject of information regarding the Standing Armaments Committee's study of the situation in the armaments industries of the member countries, the Council refer the Assembly to the content of their reply to Recommendation 330. The Council will take a decision on the distribution to be given to the study when they have the complete text in their possession. In the meantime, they will keep the Assembly informed of the progress of the work, as they have done in the past.

3. The Council will consider the possibility of entrusting the SAC with work on subjects which may be suggested by the Assembly. They will make their decisions on a case by case basis, according to the nature of the proposals made and in the light of the SAC's other tasks and of the resources at its disposal, whilst avoiding any duplication of work done by other organisations.

4. As stated in their reply to Recommendation 325, it would be difficult for the Council as such to inform the Assembly about the activities of the IEPG, since its membership is different from that of WEU, with which it has no organisational links. However, it is open to members of the Assembly to question their governments on this subject, through their national parliaments.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th October 1979.

RECOMMENDATION 332 [1]

on scientific, technological and aerospace questions — reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council [2]

The Assembly,

Welcoming the dialogue with the Council on the policy of member countries in the fields of energy, the aircraft industry, space and other areas of advanced technology;

Convinced that safety problems in respect of nuclear facilities and radiation, and environmental problems associated with new sources of energy call for solutions which cut across national frontiers;

Regretting that even the increasingly-serious energy crisis since 1973 has failed to stimulate further pragmatic arrangements for more joint action, co-operation and the definition of a medium- and long-term European energy policy;

Aware of the enormous sums Western Europe will have to pay for oil and convinced that in the near future oil will have to be replaced by alternative sources of energy;

Welcoming the increase in European collaboration for the production of civil aircraft, especially Airbus, and hoping that this success will induce governments to promote more intensive European collaboration for the production of a family of fighter aircraft and of helicopters;

Considering the growing market for European satellites and launchers,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue its dialogue with the Assembly but that it enter into more details in its twenty-fifth annual report regarding Western European policies on scientific, technological and aerospace questions, their goals and achievements;

2. Promote a major concerted research and development effort and launch a co-ordinated programme in:

(*a*) energy-saving technologies to be applied in households and industries;

(*b*) alternative sources of energy based on new technologies such as non-conventional gas, shale oil, liquified coal, and the use of solar, wind and water energy;

(*c*) examining the possibilities of European co-operation in energy matters;

(*d*) co-operation on the safety and environmental impact of nuclear facilities, particularly where they create transfrontier dangers;

3. Start a detailed and continuing dialogue with the oil-producing countries with a view to adjusting production capabilities and requirements;

4. Arrange for the next fighter aircraft to be a joint European venture by promoting co-operation between the existing management consortia producing Jaguar and Tornado;

5. Urge governments to provide the European helicopter industry with orders necessary for uninterrupted development and production;

6. Promote the series production of Ariane launchers in order to conquer part of the world market for European and non-European satellites and their launchings.

---

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1979 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (4th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Scheffler on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 806).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 332

1. The Council are prepared to continue their dialogue with the Assembly regarding policies on scientific, technological and aerospace questions, their goals and achievements, and to comply as hitherto with the Assembly's request for detailed information.

2. Current and future problems of energy supply represent a big challenge which can only be effectively met by a collective and intensified effort. In view of this, the Council attach considerable importance to continuous co-ordination of the energy policy measures of member states. This also applies to research and development.

Particularly of late, member states have increased their co-operation in the field of energy policy, both within the European Communities and the OECD. This relates in particular to energy saving and the use of alternative sources of energy. The Council also attach great importance to international co-operation on matters concerning security in the nuclear field. In all of these fields, efforts are being made in the established agencies to find common solutions to the problems that have emerged as a result of recent events. Consequently, the Council deem it unnecessary for WEU to take initiatives in energy policy matters.

3. In view of developments on international oil markets in recent months, the Council support closer contacts between oil-consuming and oil-producing countries. In this context, they consider discussion of energy matters with the oil-producing countries to be desirable and necessary and welcome steps which can be taken towards that end.

4. The Council reaffirm the great importance which the governments of the member states attach to the maintenance of efficient capacities in the aviation and space sector for the future of Europe. The appropriate government departments in France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany are firmly resolved to develop a joint European tactical fighter aircraft for the nineties.

Such a complex venture, which will involve the most modern technologies, poses many difficult problems which the countries concerned have already begun to study. For instance, they will endeavour to harmonise their respective operational requirements and the time factors in order to find a configuration which will satisfy all concerned. In the course of these deliberations, the work will be apportioned between the countries concerned, industrial partnerships established, and the most expedient form of management agreed.

5. The governments of France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy have set up a joint steering committee on the helicopter industry. The committee has concluded its studies on expected military requirements into the nineties. At the present time it is working on a common technology programme which will form the basis for joint action with regard to military helicopters. Only when that programme is ready will it be possible to decide what orders can be provided for the European helicopter industry.

6. The ESA Council have declared themselves in favour of the industrial production of Ariane launchers.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th October 1979.

RECOMMENDATION 333 [1]

on parliaments and defence procurement [2]

The Assembly,

Having studied the report of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments analysing the rôle of national parliaments in the national defence equipment procurement process;

Considering that national parliaments and their defence committees, with the exception of those of Germany and the Netherlands, are usually inadequately informed on defence matters;

Believing that parliaments exercise insufficiently their prerogative to control defence procurement policy;

Recalling the terms of its Recommendation 197 on military security and parliamentary information;

With a view to furthering joint production and standardisation of defence equipment in the armed forces of the countries of Western Europe or in the Alliance, taking due account of the military and economic requirements of the Alliance as a whole,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments:

A. To ensure that their parliaments, or where appropriate their parliamentary defence, budget, or other committees concerned:

1. Are fully informed in good time, within the limits imposed by considerations only of external security, not of political or administrative convenience, on all aspects of defence policy, at both the national and allied levels, especially on matters affecting the assessment of the military threat and the choice of defence equipment;
2. Are enabled to exercise sufficiently close control of the defence budget and appropriations and of all stages of the defence procurement process, so as to improve defence capability and increase standardisation and interoperability of equipment;
3. Are enabled to compile systematically information on current research and development projects in the national and European defence industry;

B. To ensure that full information on national defence equipment projects in the planning stages is available to allied governments, and to take full account of alternative defence equipment projects available in allied countries;

C. To provide as far as possible a common structure for the national defence budgets, national defence equipment procurement processes, and, finally, the procedure for supplying classified information with a view to instituting in the foreseeable future a European policy of common procurement of new weapons systems.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1979 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (6th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Maggioni on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 807).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 333

A. It is a matter for national parliaments to determine the amount of information required on defence and other matters from governments. Detailed information on the defence budget is generally presented to parliament in nations' annual estimates ; in addition, parliaments may also debate defence policy on publication of an annual defence white paper or policy statement. Parliamentary defence and finance committees may commission memoranda from ministries and question ministers or their representatives and submit reports on specific matters to parliament together with the guidance submitted to them.

B. The principal fora for equipment co-operation are the Conference of National Armaments Directors and the IEPG whose procedures are specifically organised to ensure that members are fully informed of the requirements and developments of other allies. Wherever potential common interests are identified detailed arrangements are made to exploit as far as possible the opportunities arising for collaboration in development or production of equipment.

C. Work is already in progress in the IEPG, CNAD and Eurogroup on exchanging information on different national procedures and bringing them into close conformity where possible. For instance the IEPG has done important work on procurement procedures, CNAD is at present testing a periodic armaments planning system designed to improve co-operation between the member countries and Eurogroup has a committee examining financial planning systems. Although this work is useful, it does not solve the real problems of trying to set up collaborative projects. These problems are not ones of procedures or lack of information, but relate to issues of requirements, costs, industrial arrangements, etc. and they can only be resolved by detailed compromise in relation to the particular circumstances of each project.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th November 1979.

RECOMMENDATION 334 [1]

on various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States [2]

The Assembly,

Noting the many statements in the United States in favour of closer consultations with Western Europe in many fields, but deploring that these statements have not always produced results ;

Also welcoming the fact that the United States Government continues to consider the development of a European union as a favourable factor in such co-operation ;

Considering that, in an unfavourable economic situation, recourse to protectionism would be a serious danger for Europe and noting with satisfaction that the United States, like Western Europe, has set itself the aim of progressively freeing international trade ;

Considering that the creation of the European monetary fund is a major step in the search for the balance necessary for developing trade ;

Considering that Europe's security, based on the Atlantic Alliance, requires improved consultations between European members and the United States on external policy matters ;

Considering that such consultations can be improved to the extent that Western Europe manages to define a joint foreign policy itself ;

Welcoming the success of the SALT II negotiations, but considering that the development of strategic arms limitation talks calls for the adoption of joint positions by the European members of the Atlantic Alliance and particularly with reference to the SALT III negotiations ;

Welcoming the United States' intention to organise a two-way street for trade in armaments but concerned lest such a trend should inhibit European co-operation in this field,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that consultations between the European members of the Atlantic Alliance allow them, in the presence of their American partners, to uphold an external policy worked out by all the member countries of WEU in accordance with their goals of security and freedom of their peoples ;

2. Study in particular the implications for Europe's defence policy of the Soviet Union's deployment of new weapons ;

3. At regular intervals, make a critical appraisal of the strategic concepts adopted by NATO ;

4. Ensure that the organisation of European co-operation in armaments production is not hampered by bilateral agreements concluded between the United States and several European members of the Atlantic Alliance ;

5. Consider in view of more recent developments the need for closer consultation on energy problems between the United States and the European countries.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1979 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (7th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Schlingemann on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 803).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 334

1. The Council wish to remind the Assembly that, in accordance with the purpose for which it was formed, the North Atlantic Alliance seeks to safeguard the security and freedom desired by the peoples of all its member countries. It is the intention of each member state of WEU to contribute, in accordance with the undertakings it has given, to so safeguarding security and freedom.

The Council observe that, in the communiqué issued after its ministerial session of 30th and 31st May 1979, the North Atlantic Council declared that "Ministers expressed their confidence that as the Alliance enters into its fourth decade it will continue to ensure the security of its members by pursuing the complementary aims of deterrence and détente thus contributing to peace and stability". In the same communiqué, Ministers expressed their satisfaction with the past record of close and full exchanges on SALT II within the Alliance. Regular exchanges have therefore taken place between all member countries of the Alliance and hence between all member countries of WEU, and the views expressed by each member have been taken into full account. Consultations on SALT between the United States and its allies which participate in the integrated defence of NATO have been considerably stepped up and are likely to be further intensified *inter alia* through new consultative mechanisms.

2. The communiqué referred to earlier states that Ministers "expressed particular concern about the growing Soviet theatre nuclear capabilities". The countries participating in the integrated defence of NATO are keeping under close scrutiny the implications of the Soviet Union's deployment of new weapons for the security of Western Europe which is inseparable from that of the United States and Canada, and are consulting on measures required to maintain deterrence and defence.

3. A critical appraisal of the kind suggested is carried out at intervals by the competent agencies of the Alliance in which most of the member countries of WEU are represented.

4. As regards the organisation of European co-operation in armaments production, the Council's view is that the bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOU) signed by most members of WEU with the United States do not conflict with the organisation of European co-operation in armaments production because the aim of such MOUs is to promote co-operation in the research, development, production and purchase of conventional defence equipment in order to improve the two-way flow of armaments purchases and to ensure easier access for European manufacturers to the American market.

5. The need for consultation on energy problems between the European countries and the United States is fully appreciated by the governments of the member countries of WEU and is recognised by the agreement reached in Tokyo last June on oil imports over the next five years and by the continuous series of contacts on the subject in the International Energy Agency.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th November 1979.

RECOMMENDATION 335 [1]

on political conditions for European armaments co-operation [2]

The Assembly,

Considering that the production of modern armaments is necessary for the economic, military and political independence of Europe while hoping sincerely that the international community will eventually reach agreement limiting the production of and trade in arms;

Noting that national armies no longer provide a large enough market for any European country to be able to produce armaments at competitive prices;

Considering that armaments industries occupy an important place in the economies of several Western European countries where they make a major contribution to the maintenance of employment;

Considering that it is evident that their work makes a worthwhile contribution to the development of scientific and technical research in many fields and to the maintenance of a high level of technology in Europe, whilst noting that the resources that are absorbed by armaments production limit the investment available for civil production;

Considering that the course of an armaments policy depends on the co-ordination of defence policies provided for in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty;

Deploring the extension of trade in arms, particularly to countries in areas where there is dangerous tension;

Gratified that the independent European programme group (IEPG) has undertaken the important task of co-ordinating the armaments efforts of the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance;

Convinced that only the firm and steadfast determination of states can allow this work to be developed;

Noting that the modified Brussels Treaty is the only juridical basis for the organisation of defence and armaments in Europe;

Considering that WEU will therefore be called upon to take its place in any future European union;

Welcoming the fact that the task allotted to the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) on 31st May 1976 is guiding its work in this direction,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. In application of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, ensure that European armaments co-operation develops along lines which conform to the latest technological requirements and to the defence policy and strategy applied by the members of the Atlantic Alliance;

2. Keep the Assembly informed, by whatever means it considers appropriate, of the results already achieved in the study undertaken by the SAC, of the progress made and of the goals towards which its work is directed;

3. Ensure that the SAC has access to the sources of information it needs so that its study may be completed in the reasonably near future;

4. Study attentively the results of the study with a view to preparing on this basis guidance to be addressed to the appropriate authorities in member countries and to the European organisations concerned;

5. Keep the Assembly regularly informed of the progress of work in the IEPG;

6. Examine the limitations which Europe should advocate in regard to exporters and importers of armaments and itself to prevent the trade in arms stepping up the armaments race, particularly in areas where peace is threatened.

---

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1979 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (7th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. van Waterschoot on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 802).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 335

In their reply to Recommendation 297 the Council explained why they consider it necessary to develop armaments co-operation between European countries and in their reply to Recommendation 325 they described the common European line of approach to offers of co-operation in the framework of the transatlantic dialogue; they also defined the aims which, in their view, should guide the action of member countries, whilst acknowledging the difficulties of such an undertaking, since it is carried out by countries whose armaments industries have widely differing structures and levels of development.

The Council wish to reaffirm the importance they attach to the continuation of the work at present being carried out, with a view to achieving greater harmonisation of national policies which should lead to genuine co-operation on specific programmes; in this connection, they consider that the work undertaken by the independent European programme group and the study at present being made by the Standing Armaments Committee meet the Assembly's concern about the technical and political direction it would wish such co-operation to take.

As the Assembly is aware, only the legal part of the SAC's study on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries has so far reached the Council; indeed the SAC was not in a position to submit its final report when the Ministerial Council met in Rome on 16th May 1979; that meeting did, however, confirm the SAC's mandate and agreed that the first part of the economic study should be completed both swiftly and to the best effect, with the co-operation of the administrations concerned.

When the final report from the SAC is received, the Council will not fail, as was stated by the Chairman-in-Office at the second sitting of the twenty-fifth ordinary session, to consider how the Assembly might be informed of its content and its principal conclusions. It is still too soon, in the present state of this study, to express a view as to the practical follow-up action to be taken. The study may enable governments for the first time to have a detailed and comparative analysis of the armaments industries in the member countries and assist them to direct their choices and their programmes towards increased co-operation.

Within the IEPG, in the expert groups, European countries also continue to study the possibility of joint production in certain sectors of armaments; at the same time, they have started a dialogue with the United States with the basic hope of conserving their share of European interests while co-operating with that country for the production of certain types of armaments.

In their reply to Recommendation 325, the Council stressed the difficulties encountered by some countries which are members of the IEPG but not of WEU with regard to passing on the results of the work of that group to the Assembly of the organisation.

The Council have noted the Assembly's concern regarding the dangers of the trade in arms in areas where peace is threatened. This is an important problem which involves different political factors in each country; it would be unrealistic to deal with it in the European framework only, since in fact this excludes the principal armaments exporting and importing countries.

On the other hand, bearing in mind its responsibilities in this respect, every European country could draw relevant conclusions from the results of joint action that might be taken between countries of the same geographical area with a view to voluntary limitation of their own imports; such consultations, which would also bring in the main supplier countries, would indeed make it possible to envisage concerted limitation on the sales of conventional weapons.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th November 1979.

Definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe

PREVIOUS QUESTION [1]

moved by Mr. Druon under Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure

1. Considering that the definition, production and procurement of armaments are by their very nature inseparable from defence options ;

2. Considering that the Rome Treaty does not give the European Economic Community responsibility for defence matters,

The Assembly decides :

That there is no reason to debate the first paragraph of the operative text of the draft recommendation on the definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Signed : Druon

1. See 9th Sitting, 3rd December 1979 (Previous question negatived).

Document 827 **3rd December 1979**

New weapons and defence strategy

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments [2]
by Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur, and Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Part I adopted in Committee by 18 votes to 3 with 1 abstention, Part II by 18 votes to 1 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee :* Mr. *Roper* (Chairman) ; MM. *Bonnel, Roberti* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Ahrens, Banks,* Baumel, Bechter (Alternate : *Jung*), van den Bergh (Alternate : *Tummers*), Boldrini (Alternate : *Corallo*), *Boucheny,* Dejardin (Alternate : *van der Elst*), Fosson, *Grant,* Handlos (Alternate : *Lenzer*), de Koster (Alternate : *Mommersteeg*), Lemmrich (Alternate : *Kittelmann*), Maggioni (Alternate : *Cavaliere*), *Meintz,* Ménard, *Mulley, Onslow,* Pawelczyk (Alternate: *Scheffler*), Pecchioli (Alternate : *Calamandrei*), Péronnet, Schmidt (Alternate : *Vohrer*), Scholten, *Tanghe.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Introductory Note

In preparing this report, the Committee took evidence from the following experts :

11th September 1978

Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, former Deputy Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies ;

Mr. Robert Shreffler, former Director for Nuclear Planning, NATO International Staff ;

Dr. Pieter Boskma, Physicist, University of Twente.

30th October 1978

Mr. François Tricornot de Rose, former French Permanent Representative to NATO ;

Mr. Uwe Nerlich, Director of the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.*

Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur for Part I, had interviews as follows :

Washington, 12th March 1979

State Department

Mr. David M. Clinard, Deputy Assistant Director, International Security Programmes Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ;

Mr. R. Lucas Fischer, Regional Division Chief, ISP, ACDA ;

Dr. Pierce Corden ;

Mr. Marvin Humphreys, Director, Office of Nuclear Policy and Operations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs ;

Mr. Charles Thomas, Deputy Director, Office of NATO, Atlantic Political-Military Affairs ;

Mr. John A. Froebe, Officer-in-Charge, Defence Policy and Military-Security Affairs ;

Mr. William Newlin, Country Officer for Benelux, Office of Northern European Affairs.

Brookings Institution

Mr. Robert Berman ;

Mr. William Maker ;

Captain Peter Fitzwilliam, United States Navy ;

Colonel Jim Shufelt, United States Army.

13th March 1979

Department of Defence

Mr. Lewis Finch, Director, Nuclear Policy, Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs, International Security Affairs ;

Dr. Milton J. Minneman, Special Assistant to Deputy Under-Secretary of Defence, Research and Engineering, Tactical Warfare Programme ;

Mr. James V. Siena, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence, European and NATO Affairs, International Security Affairs.

14th March 1979

National Security Council

Dr. Fritz Ermath ;

Mr. James Thomson.

Senate

Senator Sam Nunn ;

Mr. Jeffrey Record, Assistant ;

Mr. James R. Locher, Assistant on NATO Affairs to the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

New York, 16th March 1979

United Nations

Mr. Rolf Björnerstedt, Assistant Secretary General, Disarmament Centre.

The Hague, 5th April 1979

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Mr. E. van Vloten, NATO Affairs ;

Mr. B. J. van Eenennaam, Military Co-operation.

Ministry of Defence

Colonel Berkhof.

Netherlands Institute for Peace Studies

Mr. H. Neumann, Director ;

Mr. S. Rosemond, Deputy Director.

Stockholm, 4th May 1979

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Mr. Ove E. Bring, Assistant Legal Adviser ;

Mr. Bo Janzon, Head, Warhead Physics Section, National Defence Research Institute ;

Commodore T. Wulff, Military Adviser ;

Mr. Anders Sandström, Head of Division ;

Mr. Mats Marling, Head of Division ;

Mr. Sture Theolin.

Stockholm International Peace Research Centre

Dr. Frank Barnaby, Director.

The Committee as a whole met in Paris on 7th March 1979 when it discussed an outline of the present report; it met in NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 9th July 1979 where it was addressed by General H. F. Zeiner-Gundersen, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, and by Dr. H. C. Lankes, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs; it met in Bonn on 25th September 1979 where it was addressed by Mr. Andreas von Bülow, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence; the Committee met in Brussels on 17th October 1979 and in Paris on 6th and 21st November 1979 for a preliminary discussion of this report, and decided at the last of those meetings to make public the two preliminary draft recommendations as amended by the Committee. The report as a whole was adopted by the Committee at a further meeting in Paris on 3rd December.

The Committee and the Rapporteurs express their thanks to the Ministers, officials and senior officers who received the Rapporteur or addressed the Committee and replied to questions. The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the Committee.

Nuclear weapons — Note on terminology

The following terms are used in this report with the meanings here given; these correspond for the most part with the terminology of United States Department of Defence reports.

Central nuclear systems: United States and Soviet nuclear weapons systems covered by SALT I and II, i.e. weapons based on the territory of one party, or in submarines, and capable of reaching the territory of the other.

Theatre nuclear forces (or weapons): All nuclear weapons systems of allied and Warsaw Pact countries other than the central systems. These are sub-divided into:

(*a*) *Long-range theatre nuclear forces (or weapons)* or *medium-range weapons:* These are allied nuclear weapons capable of reaching Soviet (as opposed to other Warsaw Pact) territory from their normal position of deployment, and comparable Soviet weapons [1];

(*b*) *Battlefield weapons:* Theatre weapons with ranges less than long-range theatre weapons [2].

The terms "strategic" and "tactical" nuclear weapons have been avoided as far as possible in this report, because the distinction is based on the target engaged rather than the characteristics of the weapon. For the purposes of comparison with other texts "tactical" weapons may be taken to correspond broadly with "battlefield" weapons as defined above, "strategic" weapons with all other categories.

1. Both "medium-range" and "intermediate-range" weapons in United States usage have been included in this category in this report.

2. "Short-range" ballistic missiles and tactical aircraft have been included in this category in this report.

I

Draft Recommendation

on new weapons and defence strategy — modernisation of theatre nuclear forces

The Assembly,

(*i*) Regretting the deterioration in the military balance resulting from the steady increase in levels of many Soviet weapons systems, and deploring in particular the increased nuclear threat posed by the deployment by the Soviet Union of new medium-range nuclear weapons — the SS-20 missile and Backfire bomber — and large numbers of battlefield nuclear weapons ;

(*ii*) Believing it essential for the Alliance to maintain and update whenever necessary a complete range of weapons systems to ensure a credible military capability in all parts of the triad of conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic nuclear weapons on which the strategy of deterrence through a capacity for flexible response is based ;

(*iii*) Believing further that political responsibility for and the risks of this policy must be shared by all countries of the Alliance, in particular, while recognising various national conditions, through readiness to accept the stationing on their territory of such weapons as may be necessary for its implementation ;

(*iv*) Believing the essential continuity between the three parts of the triad would be dangerously weakened if the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20 missiles and Backfire bomber were not to be countered by the Alliance's overall strategic capabilities ;

(*v*) Recalling moreover that the policy of the Alliance is to seek security through détente as well as deterrence, and that reliable arms control agreements and confidence-building measures can contribute as much to the establishment of military balance as the provision of adequate weapons systems ;

(*vi*) Noting therefore that Mr. Brezhnev's speech in East Berlin on 6th October 1979 may be a sign that the Soviet Union now understands that the NATO countries consider the deployment of the SS-20 a serious threat, and is prepared for negotiations on the whole question of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, although many points still have to be clarified,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Call on the North Atlantic Council :

To seek to redress the military balance, now threatened in particular by the deployment of new Soviet nuclear weapons systems :

(*a*) by taking the decisions necessary to ensure that the growing imbalance between Warsaw Pact and NATO long-range theatre nuclear forces is corrected in due course ;

(*b*) by accompanying these decisions by a firm offer to enter into arms control negotiations with a view to limiting long-range theatre nuclear force deployments on both sides ;

(*c*) by continuing to seek agreement on significant reductions in present numbers of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons ;

(*d*) by relying meanwhile on the whole range of existing weapons systems based in Europe, at sea, and in the United States to counter the threat posed by present levels of Soviet weapons ;

(*e*) by seeking any opportunity for agreement on mutual and balanced reductions of central and theatre nuclear weapons and of conventional forces and weapons.

II

Draft Recommendation

on new weapons and defence strategy — the impact of technology

The Assembly,

(*i*) Noting with approval that NATO strategy has placed progressively greater emphasis on the röle of conventional weapons in recent years and that new precision-guided conventional weapons have replaced nuclear weapons in certain specific military applications ;

(*ii*) Recognising that the application of new technologies to defence purposes may have unexpected repercussions on the military balance and on arms control arrangements, and calling therefore for continued proper political control to be exercised over such application,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

A. Call on the North Atlantic Council :

1. To take into account the implications of the application of new defence technologies on arms control negotiations such as SALT III and MBFR ;

2. To continue actively the present policy of replacing nuclear weapons systems by conventional systems where militarily feasible and of equal deterrent value ;

B. Urge member governments :

1. To establish machinery to ensure that the application of new technologies to defence purposes continues to be subject to deliberate and properly informed governmental decision ;

2. To submit annually to their parliaments reports on the arms control implications of all new defence equipment programmes.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur, and Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. This report was originally intended to discuss the implications for allied defence strategy of the modernisation of existing tactical nuclear weapons, including the introduction of enhanced radiation weapons, and the implications of other new weapons systems. Mr. van den Bergh was appointed Rapporteur on 21st June 1978. The Committee began its study of the subject in September 1978 and submitted a preliminary report[1] to the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session, on which the Assembly on 21st November 1978 adopted Order 49[2] instructing the Committee to continue its study of these questions and to report to the next part-session of the Assembly.

2. At its meeting on 7th March the Committee examined a draft outline report from the Rapporteur, who was requested to deal fully with enhanced radiation weapons and to broaden the report to include the effects of the deployment of the Soviet SS-20 medium-range missile with a mobile launcher, and the problem of finding a counter for that weapon. At the Rapporteur's request the Committee subsequently asked for the report to be postponed to the present part-session of the Assembly.

3. Thus a report which was initially to examine the new generations of conventional weapons which have greatly improved accuracy and first-round kill probabilities and the consequences of these conventional developments on programmes for modernisation of tactical nuclear weapons, is also concerned with the politically most topical question of the modernisation of theatre nuclear weapons systems in a more general context.

4. For clarity, in the second draft of this report, discussed by the Committee on 21st November 1979, these two aspects were dealt with in two separate draft recommendations: I. Modernisation of theatre nuclear forces, and II. The impact of technology. Following substantial amendment of the first text by the Committee at that meeting, Mr. van den Bergh resigned as Rapporteur, but was asked to continue to serve in respect of the second draft recommendation, while the Chairman was asked to act as Rapporteur in respect of the first. Accordingly, the explanatory memorandum is now presented in two parts, relating to the two draft recommendations.

1. Document 789, New weapons and defence strategy, Rapporteur Mr. van den Bergh, 31st October 1978.

2. Text at Appendix I.

I. *Modernisation of theatre nuclear forces*

(submitted by Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. *The changing situation*

5. In this section the Committee deals with the long-range theatre nuclear forces. These are medium-range nuclear weapons — weapons which have been excluded from SALT I and SALT II (on which the Committee reports elsewhere)[1] — but which have a range greater than the battlefield nuclear weapons discussed in Part II. 2 (*b*) below — greater, that is, than some 1,000 km. Such weapons, when based in the NATO guidelines area, are implicitly within the scope of the MBFR negotiations, but those based e.g. in France, the United Kingdom or southern Europe on the NATO side, or in the Soviet Union on the other, would not be.

6. The rôle envisaged for theatre nuclear weapons — battlefield and long-range — is described as follows in United States Department of Defence annual report for fiscal year 1980:

> — limited nuclear options designed to permit the selective destruction of fixed enemy military or industrial targets;
>
> — regional nuclear options intended, as one example, to destroy the leading elements of an attacking enemy force; and
>
> — theatre-wide nuclear options directed at aircraft and missile bases, lines of communication, and troop concentrations in the first and follow-on echelons of an enemy attack.

The rôle of long-range theatre nuclear forces in particular is thus described in the fiscal year 1980 Department of Defence programme for research, development and acquisition:

> "Selected employment options or as part of a general nuclear response. These systems are primarily intended for attack of fixed targets, although there are a number of important transient targets such as Warsaw Pact staying and assembly areas..."

7. In the early days of the deployment of nuclear missile systems the United States and

1. Document 816. "Central" weapons are included in SALT I and II weapons — based in submarines or on the territory of one superpower and capable of reaching that of the other.

the United Kingdom had deployed from 1958 onwards medium-range (2,500 km liquid-fuelled missiles — 60 Thor in the United Kingdom, 30 Jupiter in Italy and 15 Jupiter in Turkey. The Soviet Union developed a little later the comparable SS-4 which began deployment from 1959 onwards, and the longer range (3,500 km) SS-5 from 1961 onwards. These liquid-fuelled missiles were quickly regarded as obsolete by the NATO countries because the long time taken to fuel and fire them and the impossibility of protecting them made them very vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike. The Thor and Jupiter were withdrawn from service in 1963 when intercontinental ballistic missiles had become operational in the United States. The Soviet Union however maintained in service a total of some 700 SS-4 and SS-5 targeted against Western Europe, while NATO relied on nuclear capable strike aircraft, and on its superior force of ICBMs and SLBMs to maintain the balance. NATO in these years did not perceive any need to maintain on the mainland of Europe medium-range nuclear missiles comparable to the SS-4 and 5. In 1977 however the Soviet Union began the deployment of a mobile solid-fuel missile, the SS-20, estimated to have three MIRVs, a range of some 6,000 kilometres and much improved accuracy. About 80 are reported to be deployed against Europe at the present time and about 40 against China, while numbers of the obsolescent SS-4 and 5 have fallen to 500 and 90 respectively, of which between 10% and 25% are variously reported to be deployed against China.

8. In the field of medium-range strategic bombers the United States from 1969 deployed the FB-111A with a range of 10,000 km. Sixty-six are now based in the United Kingdom. In 1974 the Soviet Union began deployment of a comparable aircraft, the TU-22 M Backfire, with a range of some 9,000 km but only about half the payload of the FB-111A. About 80 Backfires are now reported to be in service, of which 30 are reported to be assigned to the Soviet naval air force.

9. The introduction of the very modern weapons systems SS-20 and Backfire undoubtedly poses a new threat to the European NATO countries. The SS-20 is a threat of a different order from the long-standing one of the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, because its mobility makes it impossible to include it in the sort of nuclear strike plan which could readily destroy these fixed liquid-fuelled missiles. It is important however not to regard balance between categories of any particular weapons system in isolation. SACEUR as part of his nuclear forces has permanently assigned to him the 64 Polaris missiles of the British strategic submarines and 400 warheads of the MIRVed Poseidon missiles in the United States ballistic missile submarines. The whole of the French *force de frappe* must, in Soviet eyes, be included in the same equation — it includes at the present time 64 submarine-launched missiles, 18 land-based IRBMs and some 40 Mirage IV aircraft [1].

10. At its meeting in October 1978 the NATO Nuclear Planning Group set up a special task force to study the development of a new generation of theatre nuclear weapons, the incentive being largely the advent of the SS-20. The United States has under development three land-based weapons systems which were no doubt considered in the context of a modernisation programme. The Pershing II, with a 1,600 km range, would be a longer-range version of Pershing IA, capable of reaching Soviet territory from Western European bases; it is intended to have much greater accuracy through the use of precision terminal guidance, thus permitting the use of lower-yield warheads and reducing collateral damage. An earth penetrator warhead will be one option and the programme is in full-scale engineering development in 1979. A second alternative is a ground-launched cruise missile of 2,500 km range which will be mobile and this too is now in engineering development. These two weapons are due to be in service in the mid 1980s, with first deliveries in 1983. A medium-range ballistic missile is only in concept design stage; it would be a lightweight missile that could be ground mobile or air mobile and a decision is due in 1980 as to whether the system will proceed to advanced development. In addition a land attack version of a submarine-launched cruise missile, capable of being fired from standard torpedo tubes of conventionally- or nuclear-powered submarines is in full-scale development. A fourth programme for a long-range theatre nuclear missile has been

1. The Soviet view of the balance in medium-range nuclear weapons is stated in part of the article in Pravda of 25th October 1979 by the Soviet Defence Minister Marshal Ustinov, to other parts of which reference is made in a footnote to paragraph 17 below: "... the United States is proposing to build and move near to the frontiers of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries new medium-range weapons systems designed for strategic tasks. In Western Europe it is proposed to install some 600 cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles. Implementation of this plan could be aimed not only at increasing the approximately 1,500 United States forward-based weapons and comparable weapons of the United Kingdom and France which can reach Soviet territory, but in so doing at changing the strategic situation in Europe in favour of NATO...

... Western opinion has also been misled on another important question. The number of medium-range Soviet weapons installed in the western regions is comparable to the number of similar weapons possessed by the United Kingdom and France alone. At the same time hundreds and hundreds of United States nuclear delivery vehicles permanently installed in aircraft carriers cruising not far from Soviet territory are deliberately ignored, as are the air bases of the European NATO countries. If account is taken of all weapons forming part of the forward-based system and intended for use against targets situated in Soviet territory, an entirely different picture is obtained from that painted by western propaganda."

A table comparing long-range theatre nuclear forces on this basis is attached at Appendix II.

deleted from the unclassified version of the United States arms control impact statement.

11. The debate on the appropriate response to the modernisation of medium-range nuclear forces by the Soviet Union has taken on political and military dimensions within NATO. Parallel to the high-level group on theatre nuclear force modernisation, NATO set up a special group on arms control aspects of the problem and these two committees completed their reports on 28th September. A final decision is expected from the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 14th December concerning the right response in both weapons development and arms control proposal terms that should be offered to the SS-20.

12. Press reports since 5th October have made it clear that the NATO high-level group had agreed to recommend to the ministerial meeting of the NATO Defence Planning Committee to be held on 11th and 12th December that a total of 572 medium-range nuclear missiles of a new generation should be deployed in Europe, largely to counter the SS-20. The total would be made up of 464 ground-launched cruise missiles: 160 located at United States air bases in Britain; 96 in West Germany; 48 in Belgium; 48 in the Netherlands and 112 in Italy. The existing 108 American Pershing IA missiles based in Germany would be replaced by a similar number of Pershing II. (The 72 Pershing IA with which German forces are at present equipped would presumably remain unchanged.) The GLCM and Pershing II would have ranges of 2,500 and 1,600 km respectively, and would be capable of reaching targets in the western part of the Soviet Union.

13. All 572 missiles would be American weapons and apparently, in the case of those to be based in Germany and the United Kingdom, would be financed by the United States and would be held and operated only by United States units, the host country contribution being limited to providing perimeter security on the bases. It is not clear whether "double-key" arrangements would operate in other countries. Mr. Harold Brown, United States Secretary of Defence, said at his press conference after the meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in The Hague on 14th November 1979: "I would expect the United States would bear the cost of development and the great bulk of the production costs ["billions of dollars"]... I would expect the other allies to bear a considerable equitable proportion of operating, construction and other costs." It is understood that base construction costs would be shared in a NATO infrastructure programme.

2. *Mr. Brezhnev's speech of 6th October 1979*

14. Mr. Brezhnev then intervened in the debate with a speech in East Berlin on 6th October. It has been carefully studied. By way of preamble he recalled that the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe was a sort of "security charter" for the peoples of Europe, and that the Soviet Union wanted it applied in full. He said that if NATO projects for deploying new types of American missiles in Western Europe were implemented, it would substantially modify the strategic situation on the continent, and claimed that the aim of that programme was to upset the balance of forces established in Europe and to seek military superiority for the NATO bloc. The "socialist states" would then be obliged to take additional steps to strengthen their own security. He stressed that the choice confronted in particular the German Federal Republic. He refuted the claim that the Soviet Union was increasing its military power on the European continent to a level which exceeded its defence needs.

15. Mr. Brezhnev then made a number of specific claims: over the last ten years, in the European part of the Soviet Union, the number of delivery vehicles for medium-range nuclear weapons had not increased by a single missile or aircraft; the numbers of medium-range missile launchers and the yield of their warheads had been somewhat reduced. The numbers of medium bombers had also been reduced. The Soviet Union deployed none of these systems in any other countries. Moreover, for several years the Soviet Union had not increased the numbers of its armed forces stationed in Central Europe.

16. The Committee recognises that these claims, in the terms in which they are stated, are probably accurate ; they correspond with publicly available data on levels of forces. These claims do not however reveal the real increase in the Soviet threat that has occurred because the newly deployed SS-20 is fitted with three MIRVs, leading to a net increase of between 60 and 120 warheads[1] on medium-range missile systems targeted on Europe although the MIRVed warheads have a smaller yield — 150 KT compared with 1 MT for the SS-4 or 5 ; moreover the SS-20 is virtually invulnerable because of its mobility, and is more accurate and reliable, so that the quality of this medium-range nuclear threat has increased much more than the number of warheads would suggest. Over the same ten-year period the number of battlefield nuclear warheads has increased from 3,500 to 7,000. The claim that there has been no increase in Soviet military manpower in Central Europe may be true but ignores the increase in Warsaw Pact main battle tanks in Central Europe from 12,000 to 20,500 in the same period.

1. Depending on assumptions made about numbers of missiles deployed against China.

17. Mr. Brezhnev then made a number of concrete proposals. The Soviet Union would be ready to reduce, compared with present levels, the numbers of medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in western areas of the Soviet Union provided that no additional medium-range nuclear weapons were deployed in Western Europe. He asserted that the Soviet Union would never use nuclear weapons against countries refusing to acquire such weapons and which had none on their territory. The Soviet Union had decided to reduce unilaterally Soviet military manpower in Central Europe and in the next twelve months would withdraw from East Germany up to 20,000 Soviet troops, 1,000 tanks and "a certain amount of other military hardware"[1].

18. The Committee believes the proposal to reduce present levels of medium-range nuclear weapons to merit careful exploration. If agreement can be reached to reduce numbers of the new SS-20 missiles, the threat to NATO would undoubtedly be reduced, but if the offer merely means phasing out of the obsolete SS-4 and SS-5 NATO would not be justified in suspending its proposed theatre nuclear force improvements[2]. In any case an immediate moratorium on further deployments of the SS-20 would be a necessary prerequisite of negotiations in good faith.

19. The unilateral reduction of Soviet manpower in East Germany can only be welcomed, but its implications for the military balance cannot be calculated. Present Soviet superiority would certainly be reduced somewhat if two complete Soviet armoured divisions — to which the figures of 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks could roughly correspond — were completely disbanded. If on the other hand the reduction of 1,000 tanks refers merely to the obsolete T-54/55 tanks, for many of which there are insufficient trained tank drivers at the present time, the effect on the military balance would be negligible. If the 20,000 troops are to be found among administrative or support forces, or if they are to be moved only to Poland[1], the effect again would be negligible.

20. Mr. Brezhnev concluded with proposals for a number of new confidence-building measures for discussion in the CSCE : earlier advance notification of large military exercises ; the notification of exercises involving more than (say) 20,000 (instead of 25,000) men ; the mutual prohibition of exercises involving more than 40,000 or 50,000 men ; advance notification of troop movements exceeding 20,000 men in the area defined in the final act. He reaffirmed earlier proposals for the notification of large sea or air exercises near the territorial waters of the CSCE participants. Some of these proposals can be welcomed by NATO countries and will be examined in the CSCE forum, but the Committee does not make substantive comment on them in this report.

21. In conclusion, Mr. Brezhnev expressed the hope that the important SALT III talks could begin as soon as SALT II entered into force and said that the Soviet Union wished to study in SALT III the possible limitation not only of intercontinental weapons but other weapons, provided that the principle of equal security for all parties was strictly adhered to.

22. The Committee sees in Mr. Brezhnev's speech an indication that part of the Soviet leadership at least may now realise that the NATO countries are seriously concerned at the new threat from the SS-20, and that there would be no benefit to the Soviet Union if NATO deployed 572 medium-range weapons as a result. Mr. Brezhnev's proposals are not as so far presented a sufficient basis for negotiations, but they are sufficiently indicative of a desire to negotiate seriously for it to be worthwhile for NATO to seek that option.

3. *Positions of European NATO countries*

23. The position of most WEU governments on the modernisation of theatre nuclear weapons, and their reactions to Mr. Brezhnev's speech, are becoming known. Germany is in favour of an arms control offer to the Soviet Union intended to reduce the imbalance in theatre nuclear forces, at the same time as NATO approves in principle a modernisation programme on the lines described above, which could be put into production if the arms control proposal is not accepted by the Soviet Union. Germany prefers a United States weapon system based actually on the territory of continental Europe, with a range capable of reaching Soviet, as opposed to other Warsaw Pact, territory. Such a weapon could be based in Germany if other continental countries also accepted the stationing of such weapons on their territory. Speaking in Bonn on 14th October, Chancellor Schmidt was quoted as saying that the Soviet Union had reiterated "We want to bargain". If negotiations with the Soviet Union were successful it might not be necessary "to develop all of [the medium-range weapons], perhaps only many fewer, and in ideal cases none at all. ... I am confident that [Mr. Brezhnev] wants to use the intervening time the way the West wants to use intervening

1. Writing in Pravda on 25th October, Marshal Ustinov, the Soviet Defence Minister, said these withdrawals would be *to the USSR*.

2. In the same article in Pravda, Marshal Ustinov said the offer was to reduce numbers and *yield* of medium-range nuclear weapons — which might suggest that the offer is to reduce only the SS-4 and 5 with their one megaton warheads.

time between a decision and actual deployment — for negotiation."

24. In Bonn on 23rd November Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, claimed that a decision by the Alliance to deploy the new weapons would "take away the basis for negotiations" on the subject. Chancellor Schmidt at a press conference two days later said "I cannot determine that Mr. Gromyko had delivered threats", and expected further negotiations between NATO and the Soviet Union even if the Alliance decided to deploy the new weapons systems.

25. Mr. Simonet, the Belgian Foreign Minister, was quoted in New York on 10th October as saying that NATO faces three options : postpone negotiations on theatre nuclear weapons until NATO forces were modernised to equal those in Eastern Europe ; negotiate immediately and then modernise if negotiations failed ; or proceed in principle with modernisation and negotiate at the same time. Mr. Simonet claimed that President Carter favoured the first, while he himself favoured the third provided that the United States first ratified SALT II.

26. Mr. Scholten, Netherlands Minister of Defence, is also reported to have informed United States officials in The Hague on 23rd October that ratification of SALT II by the United States Senate was necessary before Western Europe could take any decision on deploying new nuclear weapons. A Foreign Ministry spokesman was earlier quoted as saying that the Netherlands favoured urgent investigation of the Soviet offer to negotiate, without that meaning that the December decision on new weapons should be delayed. The Netherlands Christian Democrats called for a postponement of the decision to deploy theatre nuclear forces for two years pending negotiations on the withdrawal of the SS-20.

27. At a press conference in Copenhagen on 23rd November, Mr. Kjeld Olesen, the Danish Foreign Minister, said that Denmark would ask NATO to postpone for six months a decision to deploy the new nuclear missiles, proposing that the Soviet Union during that period suspend production and deployment of the SS-20 and Backfire, and open negotiations urgently, and independently of SALT negotiations, to freeze its current theatre nuclear forces.

28. In contrast with other European speakers, the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, said in Luxembourg on 18th October that Western Europe must not block the proposed deployment of 572 missiles : "Unless we deploy more modern weapons soon, things will get worse... What [President Brezhnev] said must not divert us from our intention." The United States, on 6th November, was reported to have decided not to reply to Mr. Brezhnev's call for negotiations until after NATO had decided on the deployment of the new theatre nuclear forces and had agreed its own arms limitation proposal.

4. *Conclusions on the modernisation of theatre nuclear forces*

29. While the Committee believes that a military response must be provided if the Soviet Union does not halt and reduce the deployment of the SS-20s targeted on Western Europe, it is not persuaded that the response to a specific weapon must necessarily take an identical form. After the deployment of the SS-4 and SS-5 in 1959 and 1961, referred to above, the NATO countries actually withdrew from service the very similar weapons systems which had been operational both in the United Kingdom and on the mainland of Europe, believing that the counter to the SS-4 and 5 lay in quite different weapons systems. There is no obvious logic in 1979 in insisting that the response to the SS-20 must be a NATO variant of the SS-20.

30. The Committee stresses the need to preserve the linkage between all forms of nuclear weapons systems if conventional deterrence fails. This means the option of credible selective responses from battlefield weapons, tactical aircraft, medium-range aircraft, the submarine-based systems already assigned to SACEUR, as well as the United States strategic systems. If the SS-20 is held to be invulnerable because it is mobile, the response in any case must be the option of selective nuclear strikes at other targets, whether airfields or command centres. The "seamless" nature of the allied nuclear deterrent would be better preserved if weapons systems not based on the mainland of Europe, such as the FB-111 medium bomber based in the United Kingdom and Minuteman missile based in the United States (both of which have the required accuracy and responsiveness for selective strikes), were among those which were earmarked — and seen by the Soviet Union to be earmarked — for employment in retaliation should the SS-20 ever be used. Provided the whole spectrum of weapons is included in the equation, NATO is of course in a reasonably strong position — both to deter and to negotiate — because of the present superiority in strategic systems of 9,200 warheads compared with the Soviet Union's 5,100 [1].

31. In any case the time-scale involved in the development of Pershing II and the GLCM does not require a final decision on total numbers to be procured before 1981 or 1982, if then — they are due to begin entry into service ("initial

1. See Appendix II to the Committee's report on SALT II, Document 816.

operational capability") only in 1983, and cannot be deployed in any numbers before the mid-1980s.

32. In the light of all the foregoing considerations the Committee outlines in draft recommendation I the decisions concerning the modernisation of theatre nuclear forces which it proposes should be taken by NATO at its December ministerial meetings. In the preamble the Committee first deplores the increased nuclear threat, described in particular in paragraphs 7, 8, 59 and 60 of this explanatory memorandum. In paragraph (*ii*) of the preamble the Committee recalls the essential elements of the NATO strategy of deterrence relying on a triad of conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic nuclear weapons systems which is described in Part II.1 of the explanatory memorandum.

33. First, there must be readiness to respond to the increased nuclear threat from Soviet battlefield weapons and the SS-20. The Committee asserts (paragraph (*iii*) of the preamble) that the political responsibility for and risks of NATO strategic policy must be shared by all countries of the Alliance, in particular through readiness for its implementation, although various national positions, such as the long-standing policy of Denmark and Norway not to station nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime, have to be recognised. The only candidates for the stationing of 572 GLCM and Pershing II are to be found among the WEU countries, and a majority of the Committee, in approving operative sub-paragraph (*a*), believed that the North Atlantic Council should decide forthwith to procure and station these medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, and which will be necessary to maintain the credibility of the deterrent if present levels of Soviet weapons are not reduced. The Committee recalls that in any case the programme of modernisation of battlefield nuclear warheads referred to in paragraph 61 will be continued. In sub-paragraph (*d*) of the draft recommendation the Committee stresses the "seamless" nature of NATO's possible response to aggression referred to in paragraph 30 above.

34. Secondly, there must be a serious and urgent attempt to explore the intentions behind Mr. Brezhnev's speech in Berlin on 6th October. Paragraph (*v*) of the preamble recalls the importance of détente as well as deterrence in NATO's policy, mentioned in paragraph 44 of the explanatory memorandum, and stresses the importance of arms control agreements which are dealt with in Part II.3 of the explanatory memorandum. In sub-paragraph (*b*) of the draft recommendation the Committee calls for a firm offer to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit medium-range weapons on both sides. The production programme referred to in paragraph 31 above makes it clear that total numbers of Pershing II and GLCM could be reduced below the 572 to be decided on now if negotiations with the Soviet Union secured corresponding Soviet reductions.

35. At his 14th November 1979 press conference, Mr. Harold Brown, United States Secretary of Defence, stressed that "... arguments that have been made urging that long-range theatre nuclear force modernisation be carried through development and production but not to deployment — no decision be taken on deployment — are completely unrealistic. There is no way that the United States Congress or the parliament of any other country would say, 'well, we will spend hundreds of millions or billions of dollars if it were necessary to produce systems and maybe someone will later agree that they might be deployed'", and later that "the Alliance needs to decide on certain numbers and then to build toward those numbers. If negotiations then are favourable, naturally then adjustments can be made."

5. *Opinion of the minority*

36. In draft recommendation I, a minority of the Committee would have replaced operative sub-paragraphs (*a*) to (*c*) with the following text:

> (*a*) by calling on the Soviet Union to agree to an immediate eighteen months' moratorium on the deployment of further SS-20 missiles ;
>
> (*b*) in the event of the Soviet Union agreeing to such a moratorium, by postponing for its duration the decision on procurement of the 572 medium-range weapons which NATO plans to deploy in Europe ;
>
> (*c*) by seeking within that period agreement on significant reductions in present numbers of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons ;
>
> (*d*) by deciding forthwith to investigate seriously, on the expiry of the eighteen-month moratorium and in the light of the military and political situation which will then prevail, the need to procure and station a number of medium-range nuclear weapons which NATO intends to deploy in Europe ;".

The minority believed in particular that it was more important to try to put an immediate stop to further deployment of the SS-20, by calling for a moratorium forthwith, than to decide now on actual procurement of Pershing II and GLCM. The development schedules described in paragraph 31 above make it clear that such a decision is not required before 1981 or 1982, and the overall balance of central and long-range theatre

weapons taken together is still favourable to the West by some 10,600 to 7,300 [1]. The minority believes that a decision on procurement of Pershing II and GLCM taken now might prove irreversible, and would not permit exploration in good faith of Mr. Brezhnev's offer. Another minority believed that a decision to *procure* these weapons should be taken now, but that a decision on the need to *deploy* them should be postponed for two years. Yet another minority would have added a new paragraph urging member governments to agree now on the deployment of long-range theatre nuclear weapons.

II. *The impact of technology*

(submitted by Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur)

1. *Current NATO defence strategy*

37. In the period since the original Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty were signed, NATO strategy has evolved in two directions. Geographically, the original signatories with very limited manpower resources in face of the perceived threat could contemplate only a defence based on the Rhine. But once the Bundeswehr had been formed and taken its place alongside the allied forces in Europe, the geographical strategy, after a brief pause on the river Weser, became a policy of "forward defence" designed to provide a military defence on the very boundaries of the territory of NATO countries, so as not to permit an adversary to seize any territory without first having to initiate the use of military force and so placing the onus of aggression squarely on himself. The Committee has noted elsewhere that the actual deployment of forces in peacetime locations, and the associated installations, have not yet met the optimum requirements of the policy of forward defence.

38. As far as men and weapons are concerned, after toying with the idea in the early fifties of attempting to match Soviet armed manpower, NATO, at a time of unquestioned nuclear superiority in the strategic and tactical fields, turned quickly instead to a policy of reliance on nuclear weapons. In the event of aggression by conventional Warsaw Pact forces in Europe an early and heavy nuclear interdiction strike by the superior tactical air forces was intended to reduce a conventional onslaught to a level at which it could be dealt with by the smaller conventional forces of NATO.

39. With the growth in the numbers of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons in the early 1960s, however, such a policy of massive retaliation soon lost credibility and NATO strategy turned to the concept of flexible response, placing equal emphasis on the triad of conventional forces, battlefield nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons. This policy has required considerable investment in the quality of conventional weapons systems and in the numbers of forces that man them. Today, despite Warsaw Pact superiority in men on the central front, and its overwhelming superiority in tanks, NATO has sufficient conventional forces on the central front to repel any local surprise attack.

40. NATO countries do not however subscribe to any policy of "no first use of nuclear weapons", and the strategy requires that in the event of deliberately prepared aggression involving a superior concentration of conventional forces, NATO has sufficient numbers and range of battlefield nuclear weapons available to initiate their selective employment if that is necessary to contain an attack. Weapons systems are designed and deployed to provide a continuing range of selective options at all levels up to strategic exchange so that a policy of deterrence is credible and effective, in facing any potential aggressor with a risk of having damage inflicted upon him which far exceeds any advantage he might hope to secure through the use of military force.

41. To remain credible this strategy requires the existence of adequate forces in all parts of the triad.

42. This policy is described officially by the United States in the following terms :

> "It has become a truism of modern defence policy that we must maintain military capabilities at the basic levels : strategic nuclear, theatre nuclear and non-nuclear... This administration like its four predecessors has decided that while it cannot and will not neglect our nuclear forces it will keep the barrier to nuclear warfare — primarily in the form of our non-nuclear capabilities — at a high level. The Soviets and their associates, if considering an attack on the United States, its forces and interests, or

1.

	Numbers of warheads		
	Alliance	Warsaw Pact	Source
Central systems	9,200	5,100	Appendix II to Committee's report on SALT II, Document 816
Long- and medium-range theatre system	1,411	2,244	Appendix II, part 1, of present report : "Warheads assumed available"
Totals	10,611	7,344	

its allies and friends, must recognise the possibility that we would make a nuclear response. But we reject nuclear escalation as the sole policy on which to base the planning or use of our forces. We will continue to avoid relying on nuclear weapons unless their employment is clearly in our interest — and in the interest of our allies — or is forced on us by the nuclear actions of others.

Deterrence is usually seen as a product of several conditions. We must obviously be able to communicate a message to the other side about the price it will have to pay for attempting to achieve an objective unacceptable to us. We must have the military capabilities necessary to exact the payment (at a cost acceptable to ourselves), ... at the same time our deterrent message must have some degree of credibility. That is to say both we and our opponent must believe there is a real probability that we will indeed perform the promised action, if required." [1]

43. The corresponding British statement reads as follows :

"The balanced modernisation and improvement which the Alliance is making to its forces are designed to maintain the credibility of the deterrent strategy of flexible response. This calls for the ability to meet aggression in any form and at any level in a way appropriate to the level of force used, and to demonstrate to any aggressor that the risks from aggression far outweigh any prospect of gaining an advantage. NATO ... does need a wide range of forces embracing conventional units, a theatre nuclear capability and strategic nuclear forces. These must be both credible in themselves and sufficiently closely linked together to convince an aggressor that he could overcome one level of capability only at the expense of incurring a response from the next in a process which would continue, if necessary, up to the strategic level." [2]

44. At the same time, explicitly since 1967, NATO has placed equal emphasis on détente and on defence capability. The German defence statement can be quoted in this context :

"The Atlantic Alliance combines defence capability with preparedness for détente to form a well-rounded concept. That concept, upon which the Alliance agreed in 1967 (Harmel report), governs the security policy pursued by the Federal Republic of Germany : preparedness for détente upon the foundation of a secure defence posture." [1]

2. *Technological developments in battlefield weapons*

(a) Conventional weapons

45. The period since the end of the second world war has seen the entry into service of some two or three successive generations of conventional weapons incorporating a whole range of modern technology. The most significant improvements in performance have been made in surveillance and target acquisition systems and, simultaneously, guidance systems. These improvements have resulted from the introduction particularly of miniaturised electronics providing sensors, observation devices and guidance systems which can use radar, infrared radiation and acoustical signals ; lasers have led to entirely new applications of optics, both for range finding and target designation. In addition, however, there have been steady improvements in conventional warheads including the development of miniaturised explosives used in cluster bombs and fuel-air explosives designed to produce high blast effect against personnel in cover. In the words of Mr. William Perry, United States Under-Secretary of Defence for Research and Engineering, it may in the future be possible to see all high-value targets on the battlefield at any time ; to make a direct hit on any target that can be seen, and to destroy any target that can be hit." [2]

46. At first sight the improved lethality of modern weapons might lead to the conclusion that they favour the defender, because an aggressor, having to move, will be more exposed to observation and more vulnerable to attack through lack of cover. Certainly the experience of the 1973 Middle East war showed that very high casualties could be expected in both tanks and aircraft that sought to penetrate defensive screens of modern weapons, but at the same time the expenditure of these weapons was very much higher than had been expected and stockpiles were quickly depleted.

47. The views of the many experts consulted not unnaturally differed to some extent on the overall effects on the military balance resulting from the introduction of the newest generations of conventional weapons. Apart from the 1973

1. Department of Defence annual report, fiscal year 1980, pages 60-61.

2. United Kingdom "Statement on the defence estimates", February 1979, paragraph 119.

1. German "White paper 1979 — The security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the development of the armed forces", 4th September 1979.

2. Report to Congress, 1st February 1978, hearings before Senate Armed Services Committee, Part 8, page 5599.

Middle East war there is no direct experience of the combat use of these weapons. If the allied policy of deterrence continues successfully to prevent the outbreak of war in Europe it may well be that several generations of weapons systems will succeed one another without either side having the opportunity to acquire battlefield experience of their effects. Consequently, military planners can be expected to call for a multiplicity of systems in order to provide insurance against some unexpected shortcomings in any single weapons system that might be found in the inevitable confusion of hostilities.

48. If general conclusions, applicable to the military balance as a whole, are suspect, nevertheless useful conclusions can be drawn from an examination of specific weapons systems in specific applications. In two areas your Rapporteur has encountered general consensus that the improved lethality and acquisition capabilities of modern conventional weapons can make them a preferred substitute for tactical nuclear weapons. In the field of anti-submarine warfare there have been great improvements in target acquisition and location through the use of both passive and active sonar, on a variety of platforms, coupled with elaborate data-processing devices. When combined with the new generation of guided, homing torpedoes, which may themselves be launched from various platforms including surface ships, submarines, helicopters and moored "mines", the effectiveness of these conventional systems is such that the use of a nuclear warhead is no longer a militarily attractive alternative on anti-submarine weapons.

49. In the field of surface-to-air missiles for use against aircraft the improved lethality of the present generation of surface-to-air missiles, combined in this instance with the assessment that large numbers of aircraft in tightly-packed formations are no longer likely to be encountered as targets, have made it undesirable to develop nuclear warheads as well as conventional ones for these missiles. The successor to the NIKE — the long-range surface-to-air missile which has an optional nuclear warhead — will almost certainly rely solely on conventional warheads.

50. In the field of anti-tank warfare the picture appears to be more confused, being complicated by many factors. In view of the overwhelming superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces in tanks on the central front it is an area in which NATO cannot afford to draw the wrong conclusions. The generation of anti-tank guided weapons now in service — such as Tow, Hot and Milan — are extremely effective at ranges from 500 m up to say 4 km. They have a greatly improved first-round hit capability, but still rely on line-of-sight guidance by the user right up to the time of impact. They are very effective in conditions of good visibility where the user himself is in a secure position. Scheduled stockpiles of these weapons have been significantly increased under the European defence improvement programme (EDIP), following particularly on the experience of the 1973 war. NATO is reported not to have a superiority over the Warsaw Pact forces of 2:1 in anti-tank missile launchers [1]. But it would be wrong to conclude that the threat from the greater numbers of Warsaw Pact armoured vehicles is thereby completely neutralised.

51. The more cautious experts have pointed out that these weapons systems cover only the immediate battlefield area up to ranges not exceeding 4 km ; they are severely affected or rendered useless by smoke or fog ; the user of the weapons remains vulnerable especially to artillery fire which could significantly reduce the number of hits obtained ; the effects of the relatively small warhead carried on these missiles is less than that of a modern anti-tank gun, and newly developed armour, reportedly relying on a steel/ceramic sandwich, may make tanks invulnerable to them. Nevertheless the weapons will continue to be effective against the armour of existing tanks, and against the very large number of armoured infantry vehicles possessed by the Warsaw Pact forces.

52. A "fire and forget" terminally-guided anti-tank missile, with some capability for penetrating smoke or camouflage, will be the next generation to be developed but it is still some ten years before it will be in service.

53. Preventing a concentration of armour at greater ranges than those at which anti-tank guided weapons operate is a rôle for ground support aircraft and longer-range missile systems. Here modern weapons offer cluster bombs and cluster mines as well as the United States Copperhead due to enter service in late 1981. This is a cannon-launched guided missile, designed to enable medium artillery to engage tanks at ranges of many kilometres when the target tank is illuminated by a laser designator. This however requires an operator, whether on the ground or in an aircraft, in sight of the tank and is extremely expensive — a cost comparison is given in section (c) below [2] showing that it is not an economic military alternative to enhanced radiation and nuclear weapons for use against a concentration of tanks. Modern ground attack aircraft fitted with conventional weapons are however considered to be very effective against tanks and the new A-10 is specifically designed for con-

1. United States fiscal year 1980 Department of Defence programme for research, development and acquisition. Statement by William Perry, Under-Secretary of Defence for Research and Engineering, to the United States Congress, 1st February 1979.

2. Paragraph 67.

ventional weapons only and does not have the necessary features for the employment of nuclear weapons.

54. In the field of air superiority fighters the same is true of the F-15 aircraft which again has been designed for conventional weapons only.

55. From this review of improvements of conventional weapons systems the Committee draws the conclusion that they can be preferred replacements for battlefield nuclear weapons in certain specific situations, where they present an equal deterrent effect. This "raising of the nuclear threshold" in popular jargon is to be welcomed in that it provides NATO with a more credible conventional defence. The Committee stresses nevertheless that it does not obviate the need for battlefield nuclear weapons without which there would be no continuous spectrum of deterrence between conventional defence and strategic exchange.

56. Other non-nuclear weapons should be mentioned in this section. Although cruise missiles in the sense of pilotless aircraft have been in service with both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces as nuclear weapons systems in the past, a completely new generation of ground-launched, air-launched or sea-launched cruise missiles is now under development exploiting the high efficiency of the fan jet aircraft engine coupled with guidance techniques which will permit both a very low under-radar flight path and greatly increased accuracy on target. While such missiles with terrain contour matching systems may be of interest to some European countries, the very highest accuracy guidance systems involving target area matching techniques are considered by some experts to be prohibitively expensive. Nevertheless, if high accuracy is achieved, the deployment of GLCMs with conventional warheads may become a useful military application against high value targets such as strategic bridges or other vulnerable unprotected targets.

57. Lastly, in the high technology field reference should be made to United States work on directed-energy technology. High-energy lasers are being developed both by the navy and by the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency Programme (DARPAP), and it is officially reported that Tow missiles have been shot down by a laboratory testbed laser. The DARPAP laser programme is concentrating on space defence applications. At the same time DARPAP is working on charged-particle beam concepts to see whether such beams would propagate stably in the atmosphere, and is currently constructing a high-energy advanced test accelerator for this purpose [1]. The same report notes that the Soviet Union is also working on high-energy lasers and charged-particle beams, but considers that the Soviet decision to begin production of a high-energy laser weapon system is premature; the United States is concentrating on technological development in this field for the time being, judging the project not yet ready for production as a weapons system.

58. The Rapporteur is left with the impression that the application of technology to weapons systems is not fully under political control. There is always a risk that a breakthrough in certain areas of high technology might, if applied to defence systems, completely upset the military balance, not necessarily to the long-term benefit of the side first developing it. Stability of the balance might be undermined if one side perceived an overwhelming advantage in a surprise attack. Yet vital decisions on specific directions of defence technology research and development may today be taken in the inner sanctuaries of defence research departments, and not as a deliberate political decision by the cabinet, let alone parliament. The Committee proposes therefore that the NATO countries institute procedures to ensure that the application of technology to defence purposes, particularly long-term applications, with unforeseeable strategic consequences, be subject to deliberate political decision whether in cabinet or in parliament.

(b) Battlefield nuclear weapons

59. Within the last five years there has been a dramatic change in the balance of battlefield nuclear weapons [1], which the Soviet Union was slow to develop, Mr. Khrushchev having claimed at one time that the Soviet Union would not waste fissile material on small weapons, concentrating on strategic weapons with megaton warheads. Five years ago it was estimated that NATO had a 2:1 superiority with 7,000 warheads for battlefield nuclear weapons stockpiled in Europe by NATO, and only half that number by the Soviet Union.

60. Today the United States estimate is as follows:

> "Of the nuclear weapons allocated to tactical use, about 7,000 offensive warheads are in or near the European theatre. We estimate that a larger number of Soviet warheads are committed to the Warsaw Pact." [2]

1. United States fiscal year 1980 Department of Defence programme for research, development and acquisition, February 1979.

1. "Battlefield nuclear weapons" is used in this report to mean allied theatre nuclear weapons based in Europe, but with insufficient range to reach the territory of the Soviet Union, and comparable Soviet weapons.

2. United States fiscal year 1980 Department of Defence programme for defence, development and acquisition, February 1979.

Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces are estimated to have some 1,600 battlefield nuclear missiles with ranges from 15 km to 800 km compared with 400 in service with NATO forces [1], and sources as disparate as IISS, Jane's Weapons Systems and SIPRI in the last two years have reported new Soviet battlefield nuclear missiles SS-21 (60-100 km) and SS-22 (800 km). Press reports have reported these weapons now deployed in East Germany. The superior numbers of Warsaw Pact battlefield nuclear missiles are however offset in part by the numbers of nuclear rounds available for NATO artillery, and by NATO's superior tactical nuclear air strike capability.

61. Partly in the context of the NATO long-term defence programme, the United States has undertaken research and development programmes to modernise warheads for battlefield nuclear weapons. Ongoing programmes include improved nuclear ammunition for 155 mm and 203 mm artillery and for the Lance missile. The object of these programmes is to improve survivability of a weapons system ; to improve the flexibility and effectiveness of employment, largely through providing selective yield warheads which, with a sufficiently accurate delivery system, can achieve the military purpose with lower yield and hence less collateral damage ; and to improve the control and safety of such nuclear warheads through denial and disablement features designed both to ensure that they can be used only when the political decision is taken, and to ensure that they will be ineffective if they fall in the hands of terrorists. One selective-yield warhead can replace several fixed-yield warheads in the stockpiles in Europe, and the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in its communiqué of 14th November 1979 noted the possibility of reducing the theatre nuclear force stockpile in Europe by "some substantial number of warheads" (press reports said 1,000).

62. Battlefield nuclear weapons include free-fall and stand-off bombs delivered by tactical aircraft, and the Pershing IA missile.

(c) The enhanced-radiation reduced-blast warhead

63. In 1977 and 1978 the desirability of developing enhanced-radiation reduced-blast nuclear warhead battlefield weapons became the subject of political debate, some of it emotional, within the Atlantic Alliance. When nuclear warheads are employed in battlefield weapons the principal damaging effects are blast and thermal flash, against both of which steel affords a high degree of protection. Where battlefield nuclear weapons are to be employed against tank concentrations, therefore, relatively high yields of standard fission weapons are required to inflict damage, but have the disadvantage in the European theatre of inevitably inflicting considerable "collateral" damage on the civilian population and ordinary housing over a very much wider area, since these are very much more vulnerable to blast and thermal flash than the steel armour of tanks.

64. Nuclear warheads with deliberately-enhanced neutron emission had been developed and deployed by the United States in the Sprint anti-ballistic missile system to improve its effectiveness in destroying the warheads of incoming ballistic missiles. It was appreciated that the yield in terms of blast of battlefield nuclear weapons employed against targets such as tanks could be considerably reduced if the neutron emission of the warhead was increased, because steel is a relatively poor shield against neutrons. The deployment of enhanced-radiation reduced-blast weapons on the battlefield, it was argued, would provide NATO with a weapon which would prevent the Warsaw Pact from concentrating its armoured forces because of the credible threat of nuclear attack on them that such weapons would pose once the danger of inflicting even more widespread civilian damage had been obviated.

65. An attempt by the United States Administration to consult European allies on the issue, rather than to be seen to be taking a unilateral initiative in deploying a weapon of considerable concern to the European allies, failed to secure immediate explicit support from the other NATO governments concerned, and served instead to stir up considerable public opposition to which the Soviet Union did not fail to contribute.

66. Most recently, on 18th October 1978, President Carter announced a decision to begin production of nuclear 203 mm artillery shells and Lance missile warheads designed for ready conversion to the enhanced-radiation mode by the insertion of special components, the production of only some of which was ordered by the President at the same time. This was interpreted as a minimum production decision to keep the enhanced-radiation option open. Even that minimum decision drew criticism from two NATO governments. On 19th October 1978 a Netherlands Government spokesman was quoted as saying : "The Netherlands Government expresses sorrow at the course of action taken by the American Government. We are asking our Ambassador to seek a fuller explanation from the United States... The weapon is a fact of life but the debate will centre on the issue that we do not want it installed on the Lance rockets in the Netherlands." The Netherlands Government conveyed to Washington a resolution of protest adopted by the Netherlands Parliament. The following month the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr. Frydelund, said in the Norwegian Par-

1. IISS, Military Balance 1979-80.

liament : "... We share the wish which has been expressed by the Netherlands Government that the neutron weapon be drawn into the negotiations on arms control... The Norwegian Government is opposed to production of neutron weapons..." It has always however been Norwegian policy not to permit the stationing of nuclear weapons on its territory in peacetime.

67. From a strictly military point of view there are obvious arguments in favour of deploying the enhanced radiation weapon. One study made available to your Rapporteur compared the costs and effects of using three different weapons against a tank battalion deployed in a 1 km radius : an enhanced-nuclear weapon ; a standard fission nuclear weapon ; and the Copperhead cannon-launched guided projectile — a purely conventional weapon which could be expected to be effective against tanks at similar ranges provided that target designation observation was available. In all three cases any civilians in the area of the tank battalion would become casualties, but the area beyond the tank battalion within which civilian casualties would also be expected could be reduced from over 42 sq. km. for the standard fission weapon to 8 sq. km. for the enhanced-radiation weapon — civilian casualties would be reduced to less than one-fifth. Theoretically the purely conventional Copperhead could be expected to reduce civilian casualties much further — to an area of 0.21 sq. km. — but the cost would be $2 million (more by a factor of at least two than either of the nuclear systems) and 240 rounds would be required — a number which it would be impracticable to deploy because of the target designation requirement for each round.

68. The military advantages of the enhanced-radiation weapon may not however be as clear-cut as some experts are arguing. Greatly improved accuracy in the delivery of standard fission weapons can also permit reduction in yields of weapons employed, and it is in this direction that the modernisation programme is already moving. Moreover, a counter to the deployment of weapons with enhanced-neutron emission could probably be found by incorporating in tank armour materials with large neutron cross-sections at the energies concerned — hydrogen, carbon and boron for example. These materials might be incorporated in plastic or ceramic materials, or in steel, and might be compatible with the new sandwich-type Chobham armour. Moreover, casualties to tank crews by neutron radiation would not all be prompt casualties ; many deaths would occur hours and days after the attack, and the immediate military effect might be less than anticipated.

69. It has been argued that enhanced radiation weapons would raise, or not affect, the nuclear threshold. Because their possible employment would appear more credible to an adversary, the deterrent effect of the weapons would be increased. Your Rapporteur however personally believes that the enhanced-radiation weapon would lower the nuclear threshold.

70. The Rapporteur believes that in the present state of the debate there is no case at present for proceeding beyond President Carter's decision of October 1978, pending the outcome of negotiations with the Soviet Union in the arms control area to which reference is made below.

3. *Arms control negotiations*

71. Despite the plethora of international forums and agreements the content of present arms control arrangements is very limited as many reports of the Committee devoted specifically to the topic have pointed out ; with the possible exception of the partial test ban treaty, the arms control agreements have for the most part served to codify an existing situation. Since the military balance is as much dependent on arms control however as it is on forces and armaments, this report would not be complete if it did not consider essential features of those negotiations that are relevant to the weapons covered in this report, and did not examine certain fundamental concepts.

72. SALT II, on which the Committee has reported elsewhere[1], covers only those central nuclear systems of the two superpowers which are based on the territory or in the ballistic missile submarines of one and are in range of the territory of the other. However, in SALT III, on which the Committee intends to report next year, parties will be free to raise other subjects and hence other systems. The MBFR negotiations cover only the NATO guidelines area and thus exclude weapons based in the United Kingdom, France and southern Europe on the NATO side and in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Romania on the other[2]. In SALT III it will be essential to enlarge the scope of the negotiations to include any nuclear weapons systems not already implicitly covered in MBFR.

73. As far as the MBFR negotiations are concerned[3], NATO has already, in the so-called option 3, offered a reduction of some 1,000 tactical nuclear warheads in a package deal in exchange for the withdrawal of a Soviet tank army. The modernisation of warheads for battlefield nuclear weapons referred to in paragraph 61 clearly makes this a possible offer from the NATO standpoint.

1. Document 816.
2. The status of Hungary has not been agreed.
3. See the report of the Committee, Document 809, Rapporteur Mr. Pawelczyk.

74. Reference should be made in passing to the United Nations conference on specially injurious weapons which has just adjourned, and in the framework of which agreement is now likely on the prohibition of weapons producing non-detectable fragments ; and possibly on limitations on the laying of minefields and booby traps. Agreement has not so far been possible on limitations on incendiary weapons because certain types of these remain a military requirement for many countries. The bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations on a convention to ban chemical weapons have recently been adjourned on an optimistic note.

75. The Committee stresses the importance of taking full account of the arms control implications of the introduction of any new weapons system and draws attention to the very detailed arms control impact statements which, following legislation in 1975, the United States Administration is required to submit to Congress each year [1]. An unclassified version of these statements is made public ; the full classified version is made available to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. They analyse under the following seven headings the possible implications of a large number of nuclear weapons systems :

(*i*) consistency with United States arms control policy and related presidential decisions ;

(*ii*) relation to arms control agreements ;

(*iii*) effect on current and prospective negotiations ;

(*iv*) effect on global and regional stability ;

(*v*) technological implications ;

(*vi*) potential interaction with other programmes ;

(*vii*) verification.

76. The Committee calls for the introduction of similar reports on the arms control implications of all new defence equipment programmes to be submitted by the government to parliament in all NATO countries.

77. The lack of political control over the application of technology to defence purposes has been referred to above [1]. Despite the intricate problems that may arise, the Committee proposes that a study should be made of the possibility of including the implications of technological developments in arms control negotiations — SALT III and MBFR. It is felt that if such an approach is not made, the already insufficient results of arms control negotiations will inevitably be overtaken by the events of future technological innovations in defence.

78. Although the Warsaw Pact countries have undoubtedly introduced a shift in their favour in the military balance, particularly through the introduction of more battlefield nuclear weapons and the SS-20, NATO still has a lead in the quality of its weapons systems. The following quality comparisons of land, tactical air and naval forces, and of basic technology areas, is taken from the United States Department of Defence report [2].

1. See most recently fiscal year 1980 : Arms control impact statements, submitted to Congress by the President pursuant to Section 36 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, March 1979.

1. Paragraph 58.

2. United States fiscal year 1980 Department of Defence programme for research, development and acquisition.

TABLE II-5

NATO-deployed forces — land and tactical air

	Approximate force-size ratio [1] NATO and Warsaw Pact	Quality
Tanks	1 : 2	NATO leads in lethality and envelope
Armoured personnel carriers	1 : 2	Warsaw Pact leads
Anti-tank missile launchers	2 : 1	NATO leads, but losing edge
Artillery tubes and rocket launchers	1 : 2	Equal — USSR leads in diversity ; United States leads in lethality
Combat aircraft (including air defence aircraft) [2]	1 : 1	United States leads

1. Includes France and United States and allied reserve component equipment.

2. Also includes naval aircraft and combat-capable trainers in combat units.

TABLE II-7

Qualitative comparison of deployed general-purpose naval systems

Deployed system	United States superior	United States / USSR equal	USSR superior	Comments
SSNs	x			USSR advantage in maximum speed
Anti-submarine warfare	x			Major efforts under way in both United States and USSR
Land-based naval air			x	
Sea-based air	x			USSR developing in this area
Surface combatants		x		
Cruise missile		x		
Mine warfare			x	CAPTOR technology superior to USSR deployed technology

TABLE II-8

Relative United States/USSR standing in the twenty most important basic technology areas

Basic technologies *	United States superior	United States / USSR equal	USSR superior
1. Aerodynamics/fluid dynamics		x	
2. Communications	x		
3. Computers and software	x		
4. Counter-measures		?	
5. Electrical power generation technology		x	
6. Electronic materials and integrated circuit manufacture	x		
7. Electro-optical sensors (including IR)	x →		
8. Guidance and navigation	x →		
9. High-energy laser technology		?	
10. Hydro-acoustic technology	x		
11. Intelligence sensors	x		
12. Manufacturing technology	x →		
13. Materials (lightweight and high-strength)	x		
14. Non-acoustic submarine detection		?	
15. Nuclear warhead technology		x	
16. Particle beam technology		?	
17. Precision optics	x		
18. Propulsion (aerospace) technology	x →		
19. Radar sensors		x	
20. Signal processing	x →		

1. The list aggregate was selected with the objective of providing a valid basis for comparing *overall* United States and USSR *basic* technology. The technologies were specifically not chosen to compare technology level in currently deployed military systems. The list is in alphabetical order.

2. The list was limited to twenty items so that it would be a manageable size for assessment purposes.

3. The technologies selected had the potential for significantly changing the military balance in the next ten to twenty years. The technologies are not static ; they are improving or have the potential for significant improvements.

4. The arrows denote that the relative technology level is changing significantly in the direction indicated.

* Criteria for selection of basic technologies most important to future military capabilities.

79. NATO therefore has sufficient strength from which to make a positive contribution to arms control negotiations. By introducing the technology factor into appropriate East-West negotiations, on a reciprocal basis of course, a more stable military balance could be achieved and the danger avoided of having new threats arise through the introduction of new technology.

4. *Conclusions on the impact of technology*

80. The Committee's principal conclusions on this part of the report are set forth in recommendation II.

81. In paragraph (*i*) of the preamble the Committee notes the greater emphasis now placed on the need for an adequate conventional defence, referred to in paragraphs 39 and 40 of the explanatory memorandum, and notes that the newer generation of precision-guided munitions have replaced nuclear warheads in the two specific military applications of anti-submarine warfare and surface-to-air missiles, described in paragraphs 48 and 49 of the explanatory memorandum.

82. In paragraph (*i*) of the preamble and in paragraph B.1 of the operative text the Committee calls for member governments to continue proper political control over the application of new technologies to defence purposes ; this matter is discussed in paragraph 58 of the explanatory memorandum.

83. In paragraph A.1 the Committee calls for the implication for arms control negotiations of the application of new technologies to defence purposes to be taken into account, a proposal which is spelled out in paragraphs 77 to 78 above.

84. In paragraphs 48 and 49 of the explanatory memorandum two cases are identified where modern weapons with conventional warheads have replaced nuclear weapons. In paragraph A.2 of the draft recommendation the Committee calls for this policy to be continued where militarily feasible and of equal deterrent value.

85. Lastly in paragraph B.2 the Committee calls for the institution of reports to parliaments in member countries similar to the arms control impact statements already provided by the United States Administration to Congress ; these statements are described in paragraph 75 of the explanatory memorandum.

86. As far as the enhanced-radiation reduced-blast warhead is concerned, the Committee at this time makes no specific recommendation. The Rapporteur considers, in paragraph 70 above, that there is no case at the present time for proceeding beyond President Carter's decision of October 1978.

APPENDIX I

ORDER 49 [1]

on new weapons and defence strategy

The Assembly,

Aware that the present introduction of new theatre weapons systems, in particular precision-guided munitions, and the proposed introduction of others such as cruise missiles and enhanced-radiation nuclear weapons, have many implications for defence policy, strategy and arms control,

INSTRUCTS ITS COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS to continue its study of these questions and to report to the next part-session of the Assembly.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st November 1978.

APPENDIX II

I. *Balance of long- and medium-range nuclear systems for the European theatre* [1]

This table *includes* tactical aircraft in Europe and two United States aircraft carriers, but *excludes* short-range battlefield weapons (artillery and missiles).

NATO long- and medium-range nuclear systems for the European theatre

Category and type	Range (nm)	Inventory	Factors			Warheads assumed available	Indices			Quality index	System utility figure	Operating countries and notes
			Utilisation	Serviceability	No. of warheads		Survivability	Penetration	Flexibility			
SLBM												
Polaris A-3	2,880	64[a]	1.0	0.45[a]	1	28	0.25	0.3	0.1	0.65	18	Britain. MRV counted as single warhead
M-20	3,000	64[a]	1.0	0.45[a]	1	28	0.25	0.3	0.1	0.65	18	France
IRBM												
SSBS S-2	1,875	18	1.0	0.9	1	14	0.15	0.3	0.2	0.65	9	France
SRBM												
Pershing	450	180	1.0	0.9	1	162	0.2	0.3	0.15	0.65	105	United States, West Germany
												United States inventory in Europe 108; German 72 (under dual United States-German control)
Ballistic missile sub-totals		326				232					150	
Land-based aircraft												
Vulcan B2	2,000	48	1.0	0.8	4	152	0.15	0.15	0.3	0.6	91	Britain. Range varies with flight profile
Buccaneer	500	50	0.5	0.8	2	40	0.15	0.15	0.3	0.6	24	Britain
Mirage IVA	2,000	33	1.0	0.8	3	78	0.15	0.15	0.3	0.6	46	France
F-4	1,400	175	0.33	0.8	2	92	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	36	West Germany, Greece, Turkey
F-111E/F	2,925	156	0.5	0.8	3	186	0.15	0.2	0.3	0.65	120	United States. 156 known to be based in Europe
FB-111A	3,000	66	1.0	0.8	4	208	0.15	0.2	0.3	0.65	135	United States. Assumes half United States inventory moved to Europe
F-4	1,400	324	0.33	0.8	2	170	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	68	United States. European-based plus dual-based aircraft
F-104	750	367	0.33	0.8	1	96	0.1	0.1	0.15	0.35	33	Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey
Jaguar	1,000	177	0.33	0.8	1	48	0.1	0.1	0.15	0.35	16	Britain, France
Mirage 5F	650	94	0.33	0.8	1	24	0.1	0.1	0.12	0.32	7	Belgium, France
Mirage IIIE	650	105	0.33	0.8	1	27	0.1	0.1	0.12	0.32	8	France
Carrier-based aircraft												
A-6E	800	20	0.5	0.8	3	24	0.15	0.2	0.3	0.65	15	United States. Assumes 2 carriers in range and half strike aircraft used in nuclear rôle
A-7E	1,200	40	0.5	0.8	1	16	0.15	0.1	0.3	0.55	8	
Etendard IVM	350	24	0.5	0.8	2	18	0.15	0.1	0.2	0.45	8	Assumes 1 out of 2 carriers in range
Aircraft sub-totals		1,679				1,179					615	
Totals, less Poseidon		2,005				1,411					765	

United States central system Poseidon	2,800	(40)			(10)	400	0.3	0.3	0.15	0.75	300	Assumes 400 "central" United States Poseidon warheads allocated to SACEUR strike plan
Totals, with Poseidon		2,045				1,811					1,065	

Warsaw Pact long- and medium-range nuclear systems for the European theatre

IRBM												
SS-5 Skean	2,300	90	0.75	0.9	1	60	0.15	0.3	0.2	0.65	39	USSR
SS-20	3-4,000	120	0.75	0.9	3	243	0.3	0.3	0.25	0.85	206	USSR. Mobile, MIRV
MRBM												
SS-4 Sandal	1,200	500	0.75	0.9	1	337	0.15	0.3	0.15	0.6	202	
SS-N-4 Sark	300	27	1.0	0.7	1	16	0.25	0.3	0.1	0.65	10	USSR. On G-I-class SSB. Assumed deployed in Baltic only
SLBM												
SS-N-5 Serb	700	54	1.0	0.7	1	33	0.25	0.3	0.1	0.65	21	USSR. On G-II-, H-II-class SSB SSBN. Assumed deployed in Baltic only
SS-N-8	4,800	6	1.0	0.7	1	5	0.25	0.3	0.15	0.7	3	USSR. On 1 H-III-class SSBN. Assumed in Baltic and operational
SRBM												
Scud B	185	400	0.75	0.9	1	270	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.6	162	USSR
SS-12	500											
Scud B	185	16	1.0	0.9	1	14	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.6	8	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary and Romania have Scud, but only GDR believed to have Scud B
Ballistic missile sub-totals		1,213				978					651	
Aircraft												
Tu-22M Backfire	3,000+	50	0.37	0.8	5	74	0.15	0.2	0.3	0.65	48	USSR. Long-range air force aircraft only (naval air force aircraft excluded)
Tu-16 Badger	1,650	318	0.37	0.8	4	376	0.15	0.1	0.25	0.50	188	USSR
Tu-22 Blinder	1,750	135	0.37	0.8	3	117	0.15	0.15	0.25	0.55	64	USSR
Su-19 Fencer	600	230	0.19	0.8	2	68	0.1	0.2	0.15	0.45	30	USSR
Su-17 Fitter C/D	325	640	0.19	0.8	2	194	0.1	0.1	0.12	0.32	62	USSR
MiG-23/-27 Flogger B/D	450	1,400	0.19	0.8	1	212	0.1	0.2	0.15	0.45	95	USSR
MiG-21 Fishbed J/K/L/N	350	1,000	0.19	0.8	1	152	0.1	0.1	0.12	0.32	48	USSR
Su-7 Fitter A	275	220	0.19	0.8	1	33	0.1	0.1	0.12	0.32	10	USSR
	275	115	0.25	0.8	1	23	0.1	0.1	0.12	0.32	7	Czechoslovakia, Poland
Su-20 Fitter C	325	35	0.25	0.8	2	14	0.1	0.1	0.12	0.32	4	Poland
Il-28 Beagle	1,400	5	0.50	0.8	1	2	0.1	0.05	0.15	0.3	1	Poland
MiG-23 Flogger B	450	3	0.25	0.8	1	1	0.1	0.2	0.15	0.45	1	Czechoslovakia
Aircraft sub-totals		4,151				1,266					558	
GRAND TOTALS		5,364				2,244					1,209	

* Inventory figure of 64 represents SLBM complement of 4 SSBN. But no more than 2 SSBN are likely to be on patrol, and it is to their 32 SLBM that a 0.9 serviceability factor is applied.

1. IISS Military Balance 1979-80.

II. *Western long-range theatre nuclear weapons presumably included in Marshal Ustinov's total of 1,500*

(see paragraph 9 of explanatory memorandum)

	Total warheads
SLBM	
United States Poseidon warheads assigned to SACEUR	400
United Kingdom Polaris 4 × 16	64
French M-20 4 × 16	64
IRBM	
French SSBS-2 18 × 1	18
Aircraft	
United Kingdom Vulcan 48 × 4	192
United Kingdom Buccaneer 50 × 2	100
United States FB-111 66 × 4	264
French Mirage IV 40 × 4	160
(possibly United States F-111 E/F 156 × 3	468)
Carrier-borne aircraft	
United States 5 carriers (out of 7 in 2nd and 6th fleets)	
A-6 aircraft 50 × 3	150
A-7 aircraft 240 × 1	240
Total:	1,652
(Total including United States F-111 E/F:	2,080)

Document 827
Amendment 1

4th December 1979

New weapons and defence strategy

AMENDMENT 1 [1]

tabled by Mr. Cook

1. In draft recommendation I, leave out sub-paragraphs (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"(*a*) by calling on the Soviet Union to agree to an immediate eighteen months' moratorium on the deployment of further SS-20 missiles;

(*b*) in the event of the Soviet Union agreeing to such a moratorium, by postponing for its duration the decision on procurement of the 572 medium-range weapons which NATO plans to deploy in Europe;

(*c*) by seeking within that period agreement on significant reductions in present numbers of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons;

(*d*) by deciding forthwith to investigate seriously, on the expiry of the eighteen-month moratorium and in the light of the military and political situation which will then prevail, the need to procure and station a number of medium-range nuclear weapons which NATO intends to deploy in Europe;".

Signed: Cook

1. See 13th Sitting, 5th December 1979 (Amendment negatived).

Events in Iran

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr. Adriaensens and others

The Assembly of Western European Union,

Deeply moved and concerned by present events in Iran and by the fact that United States diplomatic officials have been taken hostage, which action is clearly contrary to the universally-accepted standards of diplomatic relations which have always been applied,

URGES the highest responsible authorities in Iran to free immediately the American citizens now detained in the United States Embassy in Tehran.

Signed: Adriaensens, Bennett, Gessner, Grieve, Hanin, von Hassel, Hawkins, Jung, Lambiotte, Michel, Pecoraro Peeters, Reay, Roberti, Schäuble, Tanghe, Valleix, Van der Elst, van Waterschoot, Wilkinson, Voogd

The situation in Iran

MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION

tabled by Mr. Valleix and others
with a request for urgent procedure

The Assembly,

Considering that the continued detention of members of the United States Embassy in Tehran constitutes an unacceptable violation of international law and a dangerous precedent for the maintenance of peace;

Considering that the grave economic and strategic consequences which the events now occurring in Iran could entail for European security;

Regretting that the Council has not felt it appropriate to meet urgently in conformity with paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty to discuss the situation thus created;

Aware that the members of the Permanent Council find themselves together in Paris during the sessions of the Assembly,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Hold an urgent meeting:

   (*a*) to consider the measures that member countries of WEU should take in common to contribute actively to the search for a solution in conformity with international law;

   (*b*) to define, if necessary, suitable action to ensure European security and maintain peace in case of worsening of the conflict;

2. Report to the Assembly the results of this meeting before the end of the present session.

Signed: Valleix, Pecoraro, Roberti, Treu, Berrier, Jessel, van Waterschoot, Kershaw, Grant, Smith, Stainton, Wilkinson

Document 830 **5th December 1979**

The situation in Iran

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION [1]

submitted on behalf of
the General Affairs Committee [2]
by Mr. Grieve, Rapporteur

The Assembly

Considering that the detention of members of the United States Embassy in Tehran constitutes an unacceptable violation of international law and a dangerous precedent for the maintenance of peace ;

Expressing its deep sympathy and solidarity with the government and people of the United States in the emergency thus created ;

Considering the grave economic and strategic consequences which the events now occurring in Iran could entail for European security ;

Noting that the heads of state and government of the member states, meeting in Dublin in the framework of the European Council on 29th and 30th November, issued a statement concerning the situation in Iran,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

1. That it draw urgently to the attention of the governments of the member states the Assembly's support for the European Council's declaration ;

2. That consultations should take place either within the framework of the WEU Council or, where more appropriate, through the participation of its members in European political co-operation among the Nine to determine action on this problem.

1. Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. Members of the Committee : Mrs. *von Bothmer* (Chairman) ; MM. Sarti (Alternate : *Treu*), Portheine (Vice-Chairmen) ; Mr. Ariosto, *Sir Frederic Bennett*, MM. *Berrier*, Brugnon, Deschamps, Druon (Alternate *Valleix*), Faulds, *Gessner*, Gonella (Alternate : *Pecoraro*), *Hanin*, Mangelschots (Alternate : *van Waterschoot*), *Lord McNair*, MM. *Mende*, Minnocci, Mommersteeg, *Müller*, Péridier, Perin, *Lord Reay*, MM. Reddemann, Segre (Alternate : *Corallo*), Thoss, *Urwin*, *Voogd*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

PRINTED IN FRANCE STRASBOURG