

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTIETH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1984

III

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tel. 723-54-32

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The proceedings of the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes;

Volume III : Assembly documents

Volume IV : Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM.	ADRIAENSENS Hugo	SP
	BOGAERTS August	SP
	DE DECKER Armand	PRL
	DEJARDIN Claude	PS
	MICHEL Joseph	PSC
	NOERENS René	PVV
Mrs.	STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP

Substitutes

MM.	BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
	BONNEL Raoul	PVV
	DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
	LAGNEAU André	PRL
	PECRIAUX Nestor	PS
	STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP
	VAN DER ELST Frans	VU

FRANCE

Representatives

MM.	BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
	BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
	BEIX Roland	Socialist
	BERRIER Noël	Socialist
	BOURGES Yvon	RPR
	CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
	FOURRE Jean-Pierre	Socialist
	JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
	JUNG Louis	UCDP
	LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
	MAYOUD Alain	UDF
	PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
	RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.
	SENES Gilbert	Socialist
	VALLEIX Jean	RPR
	VIAL-MASSAT Théo	Communist
	WILQUIN Claude	Socialist
	WIRTH Frédéric	UCDP

Substitutes

MM.	BARTHE Jean-Jacques	Communist
	BOHL André	UCDP
	CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
	DELEHEDDE André	Socialist
	DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
	DREYFUS-SCHMIDT Michel	Socialist
	GALLEY Robert	RPR

MM.	GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
	HUYGHUES des ETAGES Jacques	Socialist
	KOEHL Emile	UDF
	MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist
	MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left
	NATIEZ Jean	Socialist
	OEHLER Jean	Socialist
	PROUVOST Pierre	Socialist
	ROSSINOT André	UDF
	SOUVET Louis	RPR
	VERDON Marc	Socialist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM.	AHRENS Karl	SPD
	ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
	BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
	ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
	GERSTL Friedrich	SPD
	HAASE Horst	SPD
	HORNHUES Karl-Heinz	CDU/CSU
	KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
	MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
	NEUMANN Volker	SPD
	REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
	RUMPF Wolfgang	FDP
	SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
	SCHWARZ Heinz	CDU/CSU
	SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
	UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU
	VOGT Roland	Die Grünen
	ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

MM.	BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
	ERTL Josef	FDP
	GANSEL Norbert	SPD
	GLOS Michael	CDU/CSU
	HACKEL Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
	HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
	JÄGER Claus	CDU/CSU
Mrs.	KELLY Petra	Die Grünen
MM.	KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
	LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
	LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
	SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
	SCHEER Hermann	SPD
	SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
	SCHMITZ Hans Peter	CDU/CSU
	SOELL Hartmut	SPD
	STAVENHAGEN Lutz	CDU/CSU
	WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM.	AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
•	ANTONI Varese	Communist
.	BIANCO Gerardo	Chr. Dem.
.	CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
.	CIFARELLI Michele	Republican
.	FERRARI AGGRADI Mario	Chr. Dem.
.	FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
.	FRASCA Salvatore	Socialist
.	GIANOTTI Lorenzo	Communist
.	GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
.	MEZZAPESA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
.	MILANI Eliseo	PDUP
.	PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
.	RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
.	RUBBI Antonio	Communist
.	SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
.	SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
.	VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM.	ACCILI Achille	Chr. Dem.
	ALBERINI Guido	Socialist
	BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
	COLAJANNI Napoleone	Communist
	FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs.	FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM.	GORLA Massimo	Prol. Dem.
	LAPENTA Nicola	Chr. Dem.
	MARCHIO Michele	MSI-DN
	MARTINO Guido	Republican
	MASCIADRI Cornelio	Socialist
	MITTERDORFER Karl	SVP
	PALUMBO Vincenzo	Liberal
	POLLIDORO Carlo	Communist
	RIZZI Enrico	PSDI
	RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
	SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
	TEODORI Massimo	Radical

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM.	BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
	GOERENS Charles	Dem.
	HENGEL René	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

Mrs.	HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
MM.	KONEN René	Dem.
	LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM.	AARTS Harry	CDA
	van den BERGH Harry	Labour
	BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
	de KWAADSTENIET Willem	CDA
	STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
Mrs.	van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA
Mr.	van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal

Substitutes

Mr.	EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
Mrs.	den OUDEN-DEKKERS Greetje	Liberal
MM.	van der SANDEN Piet	CDA
	van TETS Govert	Liberal
	TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
	de VRIES Klaas	Labour
	WORRELL Joop	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Sir	Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr.	Thomas COX	Labour
Sir	Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
Sir	Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Mr.	Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir	Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr.	James HILL	Conservative
Lord	HUGHES	Labour
MM.	Toby JESSEL	Conservative
	Russell JOHNSTON	Liberal
Mrs.	Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr.	Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Mr.	Maurice MILLER	Labour
Sir	John OSBORN	Conservative
Sir	John PAGE	Conservative
Lord	REAY	Conservative
Sir	Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr.	John WILKINSON	Conservative

Substitutes

Mr.	David ATKINSON	Conservative
Sir	John BIGGS-DAVISON	Conservative
MM.	Robert BROWN	Labour
	Donald COLEMAN	Labour
	John CORRIE	Conservative
	Robert EDWARDS	Labour
	Reginald FREESON	Labour
	Edward GARRETT	Labour
Earl of	KINNOULL	Conservative
Lord	McNAIR	Liberal
MM.	Bruce MILLAN	Labour
	Michael MORRIS	Conservative
	Christopher MURPHY	Conservative
Lord	NEWALL	Conservative
MM.	Stephen ROSS	Liberal
	John STOKES	Conservative
	Stanley THORNE	Labour
	John WARD	Conservative
	Alec WOODALL	Labour

AGENDA
of the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session
Paris, 3rd-6th December 1984

I. Political Questions

- | | |
|--------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Masciadri on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i>
<i>Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments tabled by Mr. De Decker</i> |
| 2. Consequences of the Gulf war | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 3. Deterrence and the will of the people | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Lagorce on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |

II. Defence Questions

- | | |
|------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| The control of armaments and disarmament | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
|------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

III. Technical and Scientific Questions

- | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Military use of space – Part II | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |
| 2. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Hill on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |

IV. Budgetary and Administrative Questions

- | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 | <i>Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |
| 2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1983 – The auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts | <i>Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |

V. Relations with Parliaments

- | | |
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| Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments – Parliamentary action taken on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on European co-operation in space technology | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Hackel on behalf on the Committee for Relations with Parliaments</i> |
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ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session
Paris, 3rd-6th December 1984

MONDAY, 3rd DECEMBER

Morning

Meetings of political groups.

9.30 a.m.

Meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session.
5. Deterrence and the will of the people:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lagorce on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
6. Consequences of the Gulf war:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

Close of the sitting

Meeting of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

7 p.m.

Meeting of the Presidential Committee.

TUESDAY, 4th DECEMBER

Morning 9 a.m.

Meetings of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

10 a.m.

1. Military use of space – Part II:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Hill on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Control of armaments and disarmament:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

3.15 p.m.

2. Address by Mr. Luce, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

3. Control of armaments and disarmament:

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

Close of the sitting

Meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

WEDNESDAY, 5th DECEMBER

Morning 8.30 a.m.

Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

10 a.m.

1. WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Masciadri on behalf of the General Affairs Committee;

presentation of the opinion tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

2. Relations between the Assembly and the Council:

presentation of the report tabled by Lord Reay on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Joint debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance;

Relations between the Assembly and the Council:

Resumed joint debate.

3.30 p.m.

2. Address by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

4.30 p.m.

3. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.

5.30 p.m.

4. Address by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of France.
5. WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance;
Relations between the Assembly and the Council:
Votes on the draft recommendation and draft order.

THURSDAY, 6th DECEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Budget of the administrative expenditure of Assembly for the financial year 1985:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1983 – The auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts:
Debate.
Votes on the draft budget and on the motion to approve the final accounts.
3. Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments – Parliamentary action taken on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on European co-operation in space technology:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Hackel on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.
Debate.

CLOSE OF THE THIRTIETH ORDINARY SESSION

*Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly
for the Financial Year 1983*

THE AUDITOR'S REPORT

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LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY TO THE AUDITOR SUBMITTING THE ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1983 – 9th April 1984.

REPORT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR TO THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ON THE ACCOUNTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1983 – 27th June 1984.

APPENDICES

Appendix I : Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1983.
Financial position as at 31st December 1983.

Appendix II : Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1983.

Appendix III : Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of WEU, London, in respect of contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1983.

Appendix IV : Provident Fund – Account for the financial year ended 31st December 1983.

Letter from the President of the Assembly to the Auditor submitting the accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1983

9th April 1984

Sir,

In accordance with Article 13 of the Financial Regulations of the WEU Assembly, I have the honour to submit to you the accounts for the financial year 1983 in accordance with the statements attached hereto which refer to :

1. (a) summary of income and expenditure – financial position as at 31st December 1983 (Appendix I) ;
 - (b) statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits (Appendix II) ;
 - (c) contributions (Appendix III) ;
 - (d) provident fund (Appendix IV).
2. The statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits shows that a sum of F 1,419,033 remains unexpended, whereas the final balance of income over expenditure is F 754,835. The difference between these two figures, F 335,802, represents the excess of receipts over those estimated made up as follows :

	F	F
– Bank interest	321,046	
– Sundry receipts	20,148	
– Sale of publications	50,673	
– Levy on the salaries of Grade A staff	27,499	
– Contributions 7%	341,111	
– Reimbursement of loans on validation	<u>17,325</u>	
		777,802
– Receipts for 1983 estimated in the budget		<u>442,000</u>
		<u>335,802</u>

3. Excess expenditure under certain sub-heads of the budget amounting to F 234,053 has been met by transfers between sub-heads within the same head. On the other hand, excess expenditure on pensions under Head VI – due to the departure of three officials before the statutory retiring age – amounting to F 134,679 has been deducted from the overall amount of unexpended credits in Head I – Expenditure on staff. The Council has been informed of this.

4. All contributions were received from the Secretary-General WEU London before 31st December 1983.

5. Amounts in the Assembly's provident fund are incorporated with those of the other organs of WEU and the entire fund is administered by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Clerk of the Assembly.

On 31st December 1983 these amounts totalled F 2,437,070 as shown at Appendix IV. On that date there remained two loans to two staff members amounting to F 525,550.

The Secretary-General has continued to receive advice from the advisory panel set up within WEU and from outside bankers on the investment of the funds. On 31st December 1983, the fund was held by Montagu Investment Management Limited in London.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

L. PIGNION
Acting President of the Assembly

Sir Gordon Downey, K.C.B.
National Audit Office
Audit House
Victoria Embankment
LONDON EC4Y ODS

Report of the external Auditor to the Assembly of Western European Union on the accounts for the financial year 1983

General

1. The following financial statements were submitted to me by the Acting President :

- (a) summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1983 and financial position as at 31st December 1983 (Appendix I) ;
- (b) statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1983 (Appendix II) ;
- (c) statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of Western European Union, London, in respect of contributions to the Assembly of Western European Union budget for 1983 (Appendix III) ;
- (d) account of the provident fund for the financial year ended 31st December 1983 (Appendix IV).

2. My audit, which was carried out in accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly, included an appraisal of the Assembly's financial procedures and was supported by such tests of the records and transactions as appeared to me to be necessary.

*Summary of income and expenditure
(Appendix I)*

(a) Financial position during 1983

3. The budget provided for expenditure of F 14,335,000 of which F 442,000 was expected to be covered by miscellaneous receipts and the balance by contributions.

4. Actual expenditure in the year amounted to F 12,915,967. Income amounted to F 14,670,802 comprising F 13,893,000 from contributions and F 777,802 from miscellaneous receipts. There was thus an excess of income over expenditure of F 1,754,835 arising from a budgetary surplus of F 1,419,033 (as shown at Appendix II) and extra miscellaneous receipts of F 335,802.

(b) Pension scheme

5. Under the common pension scheme implemented in 1977 by the co-ordinated organisations, Western European Union, Council of Europe, NATO, OECD and the European Space Agency, pension benefits payable by the Assembly of WEU are charged to the Assembly's budget and staff contributions under the scheme are credited to the budget as miscellaneous income. In 1983 these staff contributions amounted to F 341,111 (Appendix I).

6. Staff members who had been employed before 1st July 1974 and who had decided to join the new scheme were required to meet the cost of validating their past service through surrender of their provident fund holdings. Where, because of withdrawals, the holdings were insufficient for that purpose, staff were required to meet the deficiency, plus compound interest at 4% per annum, by monthly payments over a period of five years from 30th June 1978. In 1983 the final payments under these arrangements, amounting to F 17,325, were credited to miscellaneous income.

*Statement of budget authorisations,
expenditure and unexpended credits
(Appendix II)*

7. The transfers between sub-heads within the same head of the budget were duly authorised

in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulations. These regulations contain no provision for the authorisation of transfers between heads. However, in accordance with a procedure approved in 1973, the Secretary-General informed the Council that expenditure of F 134,679 on Head VI had been incurred in excess of the budget provision for this head, and that this had been met from savings on Head I.

*Provident fund
(Appendix IV)*

8. The provident fund continues to operate for those members of staff who opted to remain affiliated to the fund when the pension scheme was introduced. At 31st December 1983, three staff members were fully affiliated to the fund and two others maintained balances in it. The assets of the provident fund of the Assembly are amalgamated with the assets of the provident funds of the other organs of Western European Union. During 1983 the Secretary-General, who had previously managed the fund's assets, contracted this task to a firm of investment managers. At the end of the year the fund's deposits were held in French francs, sterling, German marks and Japanese yen. Variations in the exchange rates between the French franc and the other currencies resulted in a gain of F 319,200 in the value of the deposits during the year. This gain has been credited to the individual accounts of the members of the fund in proportion to their holdings.

9. I have received a certificate from the fund's investment managers showing the amount of the joint deposits held at 31st December 1983 and confirming the share of these deposits standing to the credit of the Assembly's provident fund at 31st December 1983. This share is equivalent to the balance of F 2,437,070 on members' accounts as shown at Appendix IV. Thus, at 31st December 1983, the assets of the fund were sufficient to meet its liabilities.

10. I wish to record my appreciation of the willing co-operation of the officers of the Assembly during my audit.

Gordon DOWNEY
*(Comptroller and Auditor General,
United Kingdom)
External Auditor*

27th June 1984

APPENDIX I

Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1983

(in French francs)

Per attached statement

Assessments of member states (see Appendix III)	13,893,000
-----------------------------------------------------------	------------

Miscellaneous

(A) Sundry receipts

Bank interest	321,046
Sundry receipts	20,148
Sale of publications	50,673
Levy on salaries of grade A officials	27,499

(B) Pensions

Contributions (7%)	341,111
Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.)	<u>17,325</u>

777,80214,670,802

Expenditure under budget authorisation	12,781,288
--------------------------------------------------	------------

Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Head VI	<u>134,679</u>
--------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------

Total expenditure (see Appendix II)	<u>12,915,967</u>
-----------------------------------------------	-------------------

Excess of income over expenditure	<u><u>F 1,754,835</u></u>
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*Financial position as at 31st December 1983**Assets*

Cash at bank	2,203,525
------------------------	-----------

Sundry advances	206,579
---------------------------	---------

Accounts receivable	<u>130,081</u>
-------------------------------	----------------

F 2,594,185*Liabilities*

Accounts payable	839,350
----------------------------	---------

Excess of income over expenditure	<u>1,754,835</u>
---------------------------------------------	------------------

F 2,594,185

Certified correct :

Lucien PIGNION
Acting President of the Assembly

Georges MOULIAS
Clerk of the Assembly

Dudley SMITH
*Chairman of the Committee
on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration*

I have examined the foregoing summary of income and expenditure and the statement of assets and liabilities. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion these statements are correct.

Signed : Gordon DOWNEY
*Comptroller and Auditor General,
United Kingdom
External Auditor*

27th June 1984

STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE

in French francs

DETAILS	Total budget for 1983 ¹	
HEAD I - EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF		
<i>Sub-Head 1</i> (a) Salaries of permanent establishment	5,404,100	
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades A, B, and C), including travelling expenses and insurance	75,000	
<i>Sub-Head 2</i> Allowances, social charges, etc.		
(A) Allowances		
(a) Household allowance	191,300	
(b) Children's allowance	170,000	
(c) Expatriation allowance	468,200	
(d) Compensatory rent allowance	10,100	
(e) Overtime	33,000	
(f) Guarantee against currency devaluation for non-French staff	-	
(g) Education allowance	130,000	
(h) Allowance for language courses	2,000	
(B) Social charges		
(a) Social security	608,500	
(b) Supplementary insurance	180,400	
(c) Provident fund	112,600	
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and departure of permanent officials		
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers	10,000	
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons	10,000	
(c) Removal expenses	40,000	
(d) Installation allowance	30,000	
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials	15,000	
(f) Medical examination	7,000	
(D) Provision for revising emoluments (salaries, allowances, etc.)	664,800	
Total of Head I	8,162,000	

IX II
 ND UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1983

ancs

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
	118,477		5,522,577	5,522,577	-
			75,000	11,772	63,228
	5,765		197,065	197,065	-
			170,000	166,727	3,273
			468,200	446,652	21,548
	11,475		21,575	21,575	-
			33,000	26,216	6,784
			-	-	-
			130,000	81,243	48,757
			2,000	1,146	854
	25,651		634,151	634,151	-
			180,400	171,979	8,421
	313		112,913	112,913	-
			10,000	7,254	2,746
			10,000	1,410	8,590
			40,000	30,379	9,621
			30,000	6,071	23,929
			15,000	9,457	5,543
			7,000	5,974	1,026
		161,681	503,119	-	503,119
	161,681	161,681	8,162,000	7,454,561	707,439

DETAILS	Total budget for 1983	
<p>HEAD II - EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY</p> <p><i>Sub-Head 3</i> 1. <i>Temporary staff</i> Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly</p> <p>2. <i>Linguistic staff</i></p> <p>(A) <i>Interpretation services</i></p> <p>(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly</p> <p>(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions</p> <p>(B) <i>Translation services</i> Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly</p> <p>3. <i>Insurance for temporary staff</i></p> <p>4. <i>Installation of equipment for sessions</i></p> <p>5. <i>Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions</i></p> <p>6. <i>Provision for revising emoluments (salaries, per diem allowances)</i></p>	<p>682,500</p> <p>270,000</p> <p>300,000</p> <p>573,000</p> <p>5,000</p> <p>350,000</p> <p>82,500</p> <p>164,000</p>	
Total of Head II	2,427,000	
<p>HEAD III - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT</p> <p><i>Sub-Head 4</i> 1. Premises</p> <p>2. Work on the building</p> <p><i>Sub-Head 5</i> Capital equipment</p>	<p>396,000</p> <p>60,000</p> <p>36,000</p>	
Total of Head III	492,000	

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
		17,000	665,500	649,336	16,164
		20,506	249,494	246,243	3,251
	37,506		337,506	337,506	-
			573,000	483,112	89,888
			5,000	3,287	1,713
		5,022	344,978	318,194	26,784
	5,022		87,522	87,522	-
			164,000	-	164,000
	42,528	42,528	2,427,000	2,125,200	301,800
	3,903		399,903	399,903	-
		3,903	56,097	55,410	687
			36,000	26,753	9,247
	3,903	3,903	492,000	482,066	9,934

DETAILS		Total budget for 1983
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS		
<i>Sub-Head 6</i>	Postage, telephone, telex charges, transport of documents	407,000
<i>Sub-Head 7</i>	Office supplies and hire of machines	262,000
<i>Sub-Head 8</i>	Printing and publishing of Assembly documents	1,212,000
<i>Sub-Head 9</i>	Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.	37,000
<i>Sub-Head 10</i>	Official cars	37,500
<i>Sub-Head 11</i>	Bank charges	500
Total of Head IV		1,956,000
HEAD V - OTHER EXPENDITURE		
<i>Sub-Head 12</i>	Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs	110,000
<i>Sub-Head 13</i>	Expenses for representation and receptions	144,000
<i>Sub-Head 14</i>	Committee study missions	3,000
<i>Sub-Head 15</i>	Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	264,000
<i>Sub-Head 16</i>	Expenses of experts and the auditor	62,000
<i>Sub-Head 17</i>	Expenditure on information	230,000
<i>Sub-Head 18</i>	Expenses for groups of the Assembly	230,000
<i>Sub-Head 19</i>	Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere	3,000
<i>Sub-Head 20</i>	Non-recoverable taxes	12,000
Total of Head V		1,058,000
HEAD VI - PENSIONS		
<i>Sub-Head 21</i>	Pensions, allowances, etc.	
	(A) <i>Pensions</i>	
	(a) Retirement pension	166,000
	(b) Invalidity pension	—
	(c) Survivors' pension	36,400
	(d) Orphans' pension	18,600
	(B) <i>Allowances</i>	
	(a) Household allowance	6,200
	(b) Dependants' allowance	9,300
	(c) Education allowance	—
	(d) Relief allowance	—
	(C) <i>Severance grant</i>	—
	(D) <i>Supplementary insurance</i>	3,500
Total of Head VI		240,000
TOTAL		14,335,000

The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
			407,000	374,453	32,547
			262,000	252,779	9,221
		10,398	1,201,602	857,520	344,082
	5,663		42,663	42,663	-
	4,735		42,235	42,235	-
			500	158	342
	10,398	10,398	1,956,000	1,569,808	386,192
			110,000	49,771	60,229
		15,543	128,457	95,881	32,576
	7,723		10,723	10,723	-
			264,000	236,710	27,290
	7,820		69,820	69,820	-
			230,000	213,255	16,745
			230,000	230,000	-
			3,000	697	2,303
			12,000	2,796	9,204
	15,543	15,543	1,058,000	909,653	148,347
			166,000	220,325	- 54,325
			-	-	-
			36,400	38,047	- 1,647
			18,600	19,146	- 546
			6,200	8,158	- 1,958
			9,300	12,048	- 2,748
			-	1,050	- 1,050
			-	-	-
			-	71,821	- 71,821
			3,500	4,084	- 584
			240,000	374,679	- 134,679
	234,053	234,053	14,335,000	12,915,967	1,419,033

983, and paid for up to 31st March 1984, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

APPENDIX III

**STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY
BUDGET FOR 1983**

Member states	600ths	Contributions overpaid in 1982	Budget surplus 1982	Budget for 1983	Net contributions required
		F	F	F	F
Belgium	59	(-) 78,256	(-) 54,619	1,366,145	1,233,270
France	120	(-) 159,166	(-) 111,088	2,778,600	2,508,346
Federal Republic of Germany	120	(-) 159,165	(-) 111,089	2,778,600	2,508,346
Italy	120	(-) 159,165	(-) 111,088	2,778,600	2,508,347
Luxembourg	2	(-) 2,653	(-) 1,851	46,310	41,806
Netherlands	59	(-) 78,256	(-) 54,619	1,366,145	1,233,270
United Kingdom	120	(-) 159,166	(-) 111,088	2,778,600	2,508,346
	600	(-) 795,827	(-) 555,442	13,893,000	12,541,731

APPENDIX IV
PROVIDENT FUND

ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1983

in French francs

	F		F
<i>Balance brought forward :</i>			
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1983	2,741,026		
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly of Western European Union	168,240	Withdrawals	1,029,046
Repayments of loans by staff members	22,700	Management fee	13,431
Interest received during the year	228,381		
Gain on valuation at 31st December 1983	319,200	Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st December 1983	2,437,070
	<u>3,479,547</u>		<u>3,479,547</u>

Lucien PIGNION
Acting President of the Assembly

Georges MOULIAS
Clerk of the Assembly

Dudley SMITH
*Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

I have examined the foregoing statement. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion this statement is correct.

27th June 1984

Gordon DOWNEY
*Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom
External Auditor*

*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1983*

**MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1983¹**

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur*

The Assembly,

Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1983, together with the auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the financial regulations,

Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Beix, Haase (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, Biefnot, Bohl, Enders, Ferrari Aggradi, Foschi, Freeson, Jeambrun, Linster (Alternate: Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges), Morris, Oehler, Pollidoro, Rauti (Alternate: Mitterdorfer), Schmitz, Stokes, van Tets, de Vries.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Deterrence and the will of the people

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur*

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DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on deterrence and the will of the people

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submitted by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur

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III. Western public opinion and the defence of Europe

1. Agitation against Euromissiles
2. Elections in 1982 and 1983 and the defence of Europe
3. Opinion polls
4. Positions adopted by Christian churches

IV. The will for defence

1. Adopted in committee by 12 votes to 3 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. *Michel* (Chairman); MM. *Hardy*, van der Werff (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. *Ahrens*, Sir *Frederic Bennett* (Alternate: *Jessel*), MM. *Berrier*, *Bianco* (Alternate: *Mezzapesa*), *Bogaerts*, *Burger*, *Caro* (Alternate: *Dreyfus-Schmidt*), *Hill* (Alternate: *Ward*), *Lagneau*, *Lagorce*, Lord *McNair*, MM. *Martino*, *Masciadri*, *Müller*, *Prouvost*, Lord *Reay* (Alternate: *Atkinson*), MM. *Reddemann*, *Ruet*, *Rumpf*, *van der Sanden*, *Spitella*, *Vecchiotti*, *Vogt*, de *Vries*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on deterrence and the will of the people

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling its Recommendations 383 and 388 and welcoming the positive replies received from the Council;
- (ii) Considering that fear of the devastating effects of any armed conflict in Europe is still a prominent and justified concern of the peoples of Europe;
- (iii) Recalling that, until more progress has been made in disarmament, the security of Western Europe will be ensured only by deterrence ;
- (iv) Underlining however that while nuclear weapons are an essential means of deterrence, a major contribution is also made by governments and nations showing their determination to defend their freedom;
- (v) Regretting that the failure of the Geneva conference and the Soviet Union's continued deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons together with its refusal to hold negotiations on these weapons on a reasonable basis have compelled the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance to start deploying missiles of similar range in Western Europe in application of the twofold decision of December 1979;
- (vi) Noting that the need to apply this twofold decision has been recognised by all the democratically-appointed governments of the WEU member countries;
- (vii) Hoping that constructive proposals will soon be made to allow negotiations to be opened on the limitation of nuclear weapons of all kinds;
- (viii) Noting that the security of Western Europe forms an inseparable whole;
- (ix) Deploring that this de facto solidarity is not expressed in more intensive consultations on external and defence policies;
- (x) Considering that the improvement of relations between the countries of Western and of Eastern Europe in the context of the CSCE can be a significant help to negotiations on disarmament ;
- (xi) Considering that while effective deterrence is still, as matters now stand, essential for the West's security, this cannot in the longer term be ensured without a radical transformation in the standard of living in the developing countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue to keep European public opinion informed of the dangers to which the world is exposed, of the measures available to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance for countering them and of the type and level of weapons deployed in Europe;
2. Show the cohesion of the alliance and of its European members by making optimum use of the organs of WEU and of the Atlantic Alliance;
3. Concert its views inter alia on the implications of the modified Brussels Treaty for the defence policy of each member and for working out a joint position on the limitation of armaments or disarmament;
4. Continue to apply the NATO twofold decision of 1979 while seeking, with the Soviet Union, ways and means for negotiating balanced and controlled disarmament, particularly in intermediate-range nuclear weapons;
5. In the appropriate frameworks, seek to develop exchanges of all kinds between Western Europe and the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union;
6. Do its utmost to promote the success of current negotiations on disarmament, to encourage the opening of further negotiations on the limitation of nuclear missiles of all ranges and on banning the use of space for military purposes and to develop the North-South dialogue.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. On 30th November 1982, the WEU Assembly adopted Recommendation 388 on problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism based on a report by the General Affairs Committee which your Rapporteur had had the honour to present and in which he defined the notions of pacifism and neutralism and considered that although they were quite distinct they embraced significant convergences in Europe today. In this report the Assembly stressed the gravity of the problems then raised by the development of pacifism in Europe and the need for the Western European states to take them fully into account in order to ensure peace and security, first by demonstrating their desire to do their utmost to ensure the success of the ongoing negotiations on the limitation of armaments and renunciation of the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons targeted on Europe, second by giving public opinion "full, accurate and objective information on the levels of forces and armaments" of both parties and third by strengthening their development assistance policy in order to demonstrate clearly to public opinion that their defence effort was set in the context of a policy which sought to consolidate peace in Europe and throughout the world. In its reply, the Council confirmed that such were indeed the intentions of the seven WEU member governments.

2. Since then, a number of events have occurred which, without detracting from these principles, might guide their application:

3. (i) At the end of 1983 it became evident not only that the Soviet Union was not at all prepared to stop deploying SS-20s in Eastern Europe but that it was starting to deploy new medium-range SS-22 missiles in certain countries in that area. This inevitably led the NATO countries to start deploying Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe in application of the twofold decision of December 1979, and the United States took the first steps in this direction in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic.

4. (ii) By insisting on including French and British nuclear weapons in calculating what the Americans and the Soviets consider as western theatre weapons in Europe, the Soviet Union showed that it had little interest in bringing the negotiations on the withdrawal of such weapons from Europe to a successful conclusion. On the one hand it put forward a prior condition which

was unacceptable politically, i.e. that the United States could negotiate for its allies, which would have meant that British and French forces were merely a back-up for American forces without specific deterrent value of their own. On the other hand, it denied the fact that missiles deployed on submarines cannot be counted as theatre weapons but merely as strategic weapons. Even the French missiles on the Plateau d'Albion cannot be considered, technically, as anti-personnel weapons since the type of nuclear warheads with which they are equipped and their main rôle in France's strategy of nuclear deterrence of the strong by the weak precludes such a rôle. These factors set them apart from the SS-20s and Pershing IIs in all respects.

5. There is every indication that the Soviet aim in adopting this attitude was to stir up trouble among the countries of Western Europe and break the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance, using the agitation of pacifist movements which were calling for nuclear disarmament.

6. (iii) After the deployment of American missiles had started, the Soviet Union announced that it was terminating all ongoing disarmament negotiations. However, this did not affect its participation in the Stockholm conference which was to start in January 1984 covering all problems relating to disarmament in Europe, following a proposal made by France at the Madrid conference on security and co-operation in Europe. Furthermore, the prospect of the MBFR talks on the level of conventional forces being resumed in Vienna in February 1984 seems to be accepted by both the Soviet Union and the United States. The resumption of the negotiations on nuclear weapons therefore no longer seems out of the question although the United States is criticising the Soviet Union for not keeping to its earlier undertakings, as President Reagan recalled on 22nd January 1984, and although the Soviet Union is accusing the United States of having prevented negotiations by the premature deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles on the territory of several of its European allies and is continuing to insist on the withdrawal of these missiles as a prior condition for negotiations.

7. (iv) The continued occupation of and war in Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the spread of conflicts in the Middle East with the formation of a force consisting of detachments from four western countries in Lebanon, the Chad crisis, the continuing highly tense situation in Central America and the landing on and

occupation of the island of Grenada by American forces enhanced the fears of many Europeans that one of these conflicts might deteriorate to a point where it would bring the United States and Soviet Union face to face outside Europe and thus trigger off a major war, this probability being augmented by the fact that the areas concerned are not directly protected by a system of nuclear deterrence, although it is still very improbable that Soviets and Americans will come to grips directly.

8. (v) In 1982, the United States military authorities adopted a new doctrine for the defence of Europe. Drawing the full consequences of the principle of flexible response, the new doctrine was to counter by the most appropriate means any Soviet attack on Western Europe while avoiding the use of their intercontinental weaponry. It was thus a matter of using the most sophisticated conventional weapons, tactical nuclear weapons and, in case of need, European-targeted strategic nuclear weapons to ward off an attack by engaging the enemy forces at the moment they were being concentrated and moved forward, i.e. before being deployed to positions which would make them less vulnerable to such preventive retaliation. NATO did not accept this doctrine but, because it was that of the American military authorities, it is liable to have decisive consequences for all the member countries of that organisation by committing them to action which is both offensive and preventive. One member of the committee pointed out that this difference between the doctrine of American forces and that of NATO was particularly unfortunate in that it was the same American general who commanded American forces in Europe and NATO forces, thus arousing serious and regrettable uncertainty about the true nature of the western allies' strategy.

9. These various factors explain the development of pacifism and neutralism in Europe since 1982. On the one hand the campaign against the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles can now be said to have failed, after reaching a climax in autumn 1983. Conversely, other aspects of pacifist unrest have emerged which are no less dangerous for western cohesion. These the Assembly should examine and assess their implications.

10. The main aspect is probably the growing awareness of the total vulnerability of North American territory to the possible firing of Soviet intercontinental missiles or submarine-launched missiles, and hence the realisation, through the increased risks to European territory, that there has been a remarkable weakening of the cohesion of Euro-Atlantic defence such as it had been guaranteed for more than thirty years. Henceforth, a potential

aggressor is able to speculate on what he knows about the new American strategy and the various reactions of public opinion in Europe and in the United States in order to work out the odds of the Atlantic Alliance not operating effectively, Europe being abandoned in practice by the United States or the American presence in Europe being rejected. The upshot of one or other would leave Western Europe at the mercy of the Red Army and consequently of any political or military pressure exercised by the Soviet Union.

II. *Peace and deterrence*

11. Before considering what is discernable concerning the will of Europeans in security, defence and deterrence, a number of fundamental aspects of relevant European policy should be recalled. First, the aim of European policy is to maintain, strengthen and organise peace. None of Western Europe's present problems can be solved by the use of force and any attempt to do so could but have catastrophic effects for Europe. In this connection, pacifist demonstrations in recent years have revealed a fundamental and quite legitimate aspect of the concerns of Europeans who well know that any war between the two great powers would devastate Europe and kill a large proportion of its population. No political or other goal is worth this price, not even the reunification of Europe, which has been divided for almost forty years, or of any European nation.

12. No absolute distinction can be drawn between a war in which limited use is made of nuclear weapons and a purely conventional war. The second world war, when no nuclear weapons were used in Europe, left more than forty million victims there. Subsequent progress in conventional weapons, greater urbanisation, the ever-greater sensitivity of the people and their dependence on transport, electricity and industry mean that most probably another war, even if relatively short – as experts generally believe but which is far from certain – would leave an even larger number of victims and would ruin Europe's economy for many years.

13. Furthermore, in view of the number of nuclear weapons of all strengths and ranges now deployed in Europe or on the territory of the two great powers, neither of which could possibly support the other taking over the whole continent of Europe, and particularly in view of existing imbalances in purely European-targeted strategic nuclear weapons and chemical weapons and of the existence of national nuclear deterrent forces in Europe, there is every chance of the nuclear threshold being crossed in the event of a war in Europe. No prior understand-

ing, no guarantee and not even partial or total denuclearisation of the European continent in peacetime could prevent this. Any speculation about the possibility of keeping a European war on the conventional level would be, to say the least, extremely risky.

14. The defence policies of the European countries, as well as that which a united Europe might have, can therefore have no aim other than to avoid war or, if hostilities were to break out somewhere, to circumscribe it and prevent it becoming a continental- or worldwide war. This is the principal meaning of the strategy of deterrence to which all members of the Atlantic Alliance have subscribed from the very outset. Deterrence is not designed to ensure political or other advantages for those practising it but solely to avoid war. Disagreements between allies have never been about this aim but solely about the means of attaining it.

15. Today western public opinion has a tendency – the scale of which your Rapporteur will try to assess in the next chapter – to refuse deterrence and consider peace would be better protected by abandoning nuclear weapons or even refusing to defend Europe in the event of aggression from without. This tendency is prevalent in the United States as well as in Europe and is illustrated in several ways which your Rapporteur will examine. It is based on moral disapproval of weapons of mass destruction and on the conviction that accumulating such weapons does not improve the prospects of true peace but increases the risk of war and would make hostilities worse.

16. This argument is not unfounded and your Rapporteur is prepared to subscribe to any proposition for limiting armaments and multi-lateral, progressive and controlled conventional and nuclear disarmament. Inter alia, he welcomes the opening in January 1984 of the Stockholm conference on confidence-restoring measures and on disarmament in Europe, as well as the current American-Soviet talks on the resumption of negotiations, be they on the limitation of intercontinental nuclear weapons or on the deployment of intermediate-range weapons or conventional forces in Europe. He is prepared to admit that for the entire world, expenditure on armaments is an unacceptable waste of material and intellectual resources which would be infinitely better used in trying to solve present international economic problems, relieve underdevelopment and reduce unemployment.

17. However, he feels that no serious start has ever been made with disarmament. This can be done really and truly only if international society is first organised so as to ensure new and more solid foundations for peace. As long as this is not so, deterrence with its stabilising

nuclear elements, will still be essential for maintaining peace. Admittedly, international order based on the balance of terror is far from satisfactory, but it is better than no order at all where one or other may feel he can impose his own order or his own peace. Conversely, within the order guaranteed by mutual deterrence, it is possible to envisage a more satisfactory organisation of international order.

18. There are two essential reasons why this organisation is becoming increasingly urgent. First, nations, particularly in Europe, are finding the financial effort of developing credible and consequently increasingly sophisticated weapons systems less and less bearable. It seems increasingly difficult for some to accept the feeling that their survival depends on the effective deployment of weapons of mass destruction over which they have no control but of which they would be the first victims should these weapons no longer fulfil their deterrent rôle to perfection. The other reason is that conventional and nuclear technological development is progressively calling in question the notion of deterrence. Whereas it was almost absolute while the doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons was one of massive retaliation, certain concepts of deterrence have led the Americans and NATO to resort to the doctrine of flexible response. The deployment of nuclear weapons of various strengths mounted on means of delivery of various ranges has resulted in a loss of credibility for the doctrine of massive retaliation as practised by the United States because it seemed hardly probable that the two great powers would take the risk of causing intolerable destruction on their own territory in the event of an aggression limited in area or by the type of weapons used by the aggressor. This obviously does not apply to France which, in its concept of deterrence of the strong by the weak, has kept to a strategy of massive retaliation against the adversary's demo-economic structure should an independent operation to re-establish deterrence fail.

19. Today it may be wondered whether this doctrine of flexible response is again being called in question by the miniaturisation and improvements due to the enhanced radiation effect of nuclear weapons and by improvements in conventional weapons making the limits of the nuclear threshold less clear-cut. This is the case with the new American air-land battle doctrine which in fact tables on the failure of deterrence and recourse to a near-preventive use of the most modern weapons to counter any serious threat of aggression.

20. The air-land battle is a combat doctrine worked out by the United States TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command). According to General Rogers, this doctrine would help

NATO forces to defend themselves without using nuclear weapons thanks to improvements in conventional weapons. The official United States army handbook (FM100-S), published in August 1982 to describe this doctrine, underlined two crucial elements: early offensive action in order to take the initiative in operations and in-depth attack on the enemy, i.e. action on his areas of concentration and movement, before he can deploy for attack. These notions, which are now applied to all United States army operations throughout the world, were specifically intended for Europe where Warsaw Pact troops were to be destroyed even before being brought in and while still in the distant rear areas of the pact countries. According to the handbook, nuclear and chemical weapons are very suitable for this type of in-depth attack. But the improvement of conventional weapons plays an important part in the new doctrine. In particular, it calls in sophisticated electronic equipment and so-called smart weapons. TRADOC explains that the United States army needs a new doctrine and new weapons systems because of the numerical superiority of Warsaw Pact conventional forces over those of NATO. Otherwise it would be necessary to resort more quickly to nuclear weapons in the event of Soviet attack.

21. This doctrine has given rise to some concern in certain European countries. For instance, Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence, told the WEU Assembly on 30th November 1982 that "to emphasise a single aspect, namely conventional weapons... is ultimately to cast doubt on the rest". In fact, certain observers feel that the corollary to this doctrine is the abandonment of all first use of tactical nuclear weapons or wonder whether it is compatible with the forward integrated defence concept. General Rogers himself in fact spoke of no early first use, which might seem to raise doubts about the American nuclear guarantee in Europe. But according to official American statements this guarantee is in no way at stake.

22. This evolution has led to the progressive weakening of deterrence, which still plays a major rôle and largely guarantees peace in Europe. But this guarantee seems more and more precarious, which probably explains the pessimism of part of European public opinion in face of the risks of war and the conceivable effects of present tension in East-West relations. It therefore means not waiting for deterrence, mainly ensured by nuclear weapons, to have disappeared before negotiating disarmament and organising peace in Europe and throughout the world.

23. However, this should certainly not be done by upsetting the international order

prematurely or unbalancing forces by raising doubts in the minds of possible aggressors about the people's will to defend themselves or by taking unilateral disarmament measures. The two steps would moreover probably be concomitant and any unilateral disarmament would be tantamount to political and military capitulation with incalculable consequences. In addition, is it very doubtful whether such action would avert hostilities.

24. Particularly if, as is likely, they both occurred at once, either of these phenomena would most probably make disarmament negotiations more difficult rather than easier because the potential enemy would no longer see any reason to yield ground if he could achieve his aims without concessions, i.e. obtain military superiority with all the inherent political advantages and thus be in a position to lay down the law throughout Europe. One has only to think back to the years just before the second world war to realise that peace based on such an imbalance would always be extremely precarious and the hope of the other party reducing its military effort merely because we showed no desire to defend ourselves would be little more than a pipe-dream.

25. Consequently, whatever threats there may now be to deterrence and however urgent it may be to bring about true disarmament, deterrence is essential for Western Europe. American public opinion and leaders do not necessarily see the matter in this light and some of their reactions – the American bishops for instance – bear witness to this, as will be seen in Chapter III of this report. They may indeed consider that hostilities several thousands of kilometres from American soil are better than the risk of a nuclear strike against the American continent. The adoption by American military authorities of the air-land battle doctrine appears to indicate that this degradation of the notion of deterrence is already having repercussions on American concepts. It is characteristic that this doctrine, which has been accepted by the United States, should have been refused by NATO, i.e. by the United States' European allies.

26. This difference of view between Western Europe and the United States makes it essential for Europe to retain the wherewithal to act independently in the event of emergency, i.e. to continue to exercise some degree of deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, even if the deterrent value of the American component is declining. In this respect the national character of the French and British nuclear forces is particularly essential since they at least leave the possible enemy uncertain about the type of reaction to aggression. The fact that the United Kingdom or France can decide that since its survival is at

stake the use of these forces might be justified helps to strengthen the alliance's deterrent capability, particularly as any consequent weakening of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the United States may make it hesitate about embarking upon any form of aggression on Western Europe. It is therefore essential for these forces not to be prematurely included in negotiations in which these two countries have not yet been invited to take part, nor should they do so until major cuts have been made by the two countries whose nuclear weapons are by far the most powerful. As stressed by President Mitterrand in his speech to the United Nations on 28th September 1983, the two great powers would have to accept very considerable reductions in the number of nuclear warheads they possess (between 8,000 and 9,000) before the question of France's ninety-eight missiles could be raised. It should be added that the disappearance of French and British nuclear weapons would change practically nothing in the count of nuclear warheads but the political balance and the balance of nuclear deterrence throughout the world would thereby be radically changed. If it is borne in mind that a reduction in the number of French and British nuclear weapons would reduce these deterrent forces to nought, it will be seen that the problem is in fact not one of numbers.

27. Here your Rapporteur wishes to refer to the interesting proposal for restoring deterrence made by General Copel in his very recent book *Vaincre la guerre*. His formula, which is reminiscent of General Rogers' no early first use, is not to pull the nuclear trigger away from home. It emphasises that nuclear armaments should remain purely defensive while strengthening their deterrent rôle since a conventional attack would be met by nuclear means. Such a strategy would imply the production and deployment of the enhanced radiation weapon, the so-called neutron bomb, which alone would be capable of making such retaliation credible because of the limited damage and losses it would cause in the zone in which it would be used. It would require close agreement between the European members of the Atlantic Alliance and is probably worthy of close consideration.

28. But deterrence is not ensured only by missiles with nuclear warheads. It is also ensured by all the other arms which the Atlantic Alliance possesses because it is unlikely that nuclear weapons would be used in cases not considered to be large-scale attacks. To exercise true deterrence, it is essential for the alliance to have retaliatory capability equal to the challenge. Even under the massive retaliation doctrine it was never considered that weapons of mass destruction should be the only ones used, particularly in the case of limited incidents.

29. But above all deterrence is also ensured by the potential aggressor's conviction that the West will actually use the weapons it has in response to aggression. This is one of the essential difficulties raised by any deterrent system: one must be determined to take action in order not to have to do so, and any hesitation increases the danger of actually having to use one's weapons. The psychological factor therefore plays an essential rôle in the success of a strategy of deterrence. But even though the ultimate decision on the use of nuclear weapons is in the hands of one man – the President of the Republic in the case of France – the potential aggressor's conviction that he will take such a decision depends on his assessment of the President's character and of the will of the people as a whole. Such an assessment is based on various factors and particularly how each nation accepts in advance the financial and other sacrifices necessary for maintaining its means of defence or retaliation. In this respect, the curve of military expenditure in western countries is an accurate thermometer of their deterrent capability because of the means made available and the will revealed. The inability of most of them to increase their defence budgets by 3% per year as they had agreed in the North Atlantic Council is cause for anxiety from this point of view.

30. There are other means of assessing the will for defence: for instance, consideration can be given to the type of scenario envisaged by military headquarters in the event of war, the views of military circles as exposed in specialised revues, their circulation among the public and its reactions, the positions adopted by politicians and political parties and the response to them. In short, the effectiveness of deterrence is ensured by the overall attitude of each nation towards defence matters.

31. For governments, this implies that a policy aimed at consolidating peace does not generally involve unilateral or spectacular pacifist-type measures, although there may be cases when such measures can help to end a stalemate and encourage the opening of negotiations on disarmament. But generally speaking for such negotiations to be successful they must be in the interest of each participant and none must hope to disarm the other without disarming himself.

32. For all these reasons, insofar as the European nations' will to defend themselves is accompanied by no aggressive designs, it is a factor of security and of peace and any sign of this will weakening is a threat to peace. This is why the development of what is rightly or wrongly called "pacifist" agitation directed mainly at the deployment of American medium-range weapons in Western Europe in

response to Soviet SS-20s is a source of concern for those responsible for Europe's security, even if they consider that such security can be firmly established only on the basis of negotiated disarmament. The aim of participants in this undertaking was to stop the application of NATO's twofold decision of December 1979 calling for negotiations with the Soviet Union to ban the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and fixing 1983 as the deadline for the deployment of such weapons in Western Europe if the Soviet Union did not agree to start such negotiations. One committee member underlined however that there was some credulity in pacifist movements and that in many cases they were taken in by Soviet propaganda, just as public opinion in many countries was once taken in by Hitlerian propaganda.

33. Agitation did not prevent a start being made with the application of the decision at the beginning of 1984, when it became apparent that the Soviet Union was not prepared to make enough concessions to allow negotiations to be held. But it has already had the effect of seriously placing in doubt the will of the western nations to defend themselves, thus weakening the deterrent value of the West's armaments. It probably even allowed the Soviet Union to feel that, given enough time for agitation to spread, it would manage to paralyse the application of the NATO twofold decision and cause a serious split between the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance. This is why an attempt must be made to assess the reactions of western public opinion in this matter and probably to do more to give it the "defence spirit" which it now sorely lacks.

34. Some members of the committee said they considered British and French nuclear weapons made no real contribution to Europe's security, as the North Atlantic Council had said at its meeting in Ottawa, and that the best way Europe could contribute to a deterrent policy was to develop its conventional capability. This is a perfectly rational view if it is felt that only the United States has to have nuclear weapons and can represent the interests of Europe and of its security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It is not so rational if account is taken of the considerations your Rapporteur has developed above. In any event, it is liable to make Europeans feel that they are no longer master of their fate and are but a toy in the relationship between the two great powers. This could but discourage them from any wish to defend themselves and hence deprive them of their deterrent ability. It seems wholly out of the question that any French Government would endorse such a point of view.

III. *Western public opinion and the defence of Europe*

35. There has been a spectacular spread of pacifist and neutralist movements in recent years which has not failed to attract the attention of the press, government authorities, political parties and even Christian churches and scholars and research workers interested in defence matters and trends in public opinion. As a result, the subjects broached by these movements have played a large part in electoral campaigns, e.g. in the Netherlands in September 1982, in the Federal Republic in March 1983 and in the United Kingdom and Italy in June 1983. They have also been the subject of statements by catholic and protestant church authorities in most western countries. Finally, they have been carefully studied and analysed in numerous press articles and national and international symposia. Thus, your Rapporteur has noted that in the French monthly *Défense nationale* alone, which as its name indicates specialises in defence questions, there were no less than eighteen major articles in 1983 on the Euromissile crisis and the ensuing discussion in the West whereas hitherto there had been very little reference to matters connected with pacifism.

36. This means that your Rapporteur had a wealth of background information, too much even for him to be able to take full cognisance of it before tackling the subject. He believes at least that he has thus managed to obtain more accurate and deeper knowledge than in 1982 of the various aspects of pacifist preoccupations in the West, which was essential for examining their political implications for the Western European countries.

1. Agitation against Euromissiles

37. Since 1979, the prospect of the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe has been the hub of pacifist activity and propaganda in Europe. The subject seemed likely to mobilise a broad section of public opinion since nuclear war, a possibility to be feared but improbable as long as it was linked with an exchange of missiles with nuclear warheads between the United States and the Soviet Union, assumed an infinitely more impressive and more directly threatening shape from the moment missiles with nuclear warheads were to be deployed in a number of Western European countries.

38. Moreover, for a time the prospect of deployment managed to bring pacifists and Soviets together in a joint stand against the NATO decision. Your Rapporteur does not mean that the pacifist movements were mere

auxiliaries, more or less subsidised with Soviet funds, even if this seems, on occasion, to have been the case, but simply that they engaged in a joint struggle against western nuclear armaments. This struggle, which sought to prevent the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe in implementation of the NATO twofold decision, advanced with renewed vigour after the election of President Reagan at the end of 1980, probably because of the bellicose tone adopted by the new president and by his Secretary of Defence, Mr. Weinberger, which was certainly repugnant to a section of European public opinion. It first came to the fore in October 1981. It happened a second time in autumn 1983 over preparatory work for the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles on the territory of certain Western European countries, including the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom. The sites for the first American missiles became the centre of large-scale, impassioned demonstrations, as emphasised by the press. Although one should be cautious about the figures mentioned for the number of demonstrators, it is clear that there were hundreds of thousands, if not millions, and they were extremely determined.

39. The various participants in these demonstrations put forward different kinds of argument which varied considerably from one country to another. Some purely and simply rejected all nuclear weapons. Others considered that the West had not tried hard enough to hold negotiations with the Soviet Union and called for a moratorium on further deployment to allow negotiations to be started on the basis of new concessions to the Soviet Union. These concessions would have involved a different way of calculating the balance of forces, including for instance French and British weapons in the negotiations. Yet others, particularly in the United Kingdom, asked their governments to make a unilateral gesture to start disarmament.

40. In reality, these various arguments worked unilaterally against the West. Admittedly, demonstrators in western cities also clamoured for the dismantling of Soviet missiles. But they had even less chance of making themselves heard since information given by the eastern press made little reference to this aspect of the anti-nuclear demonstrations to which they nevertheless gave widespread coverage. The demonstrations which started in certain eastern countries, including Poland and the German Democratic Republic, were immediately repressed, thus practically reducing an emerging pacifist movement to silence.

41. Moreover, a moratorium on the deployment of western weapons had serious drawbacks insofar as the Soviet Union continued to deploy its own weapons as described by Mr. Hernu,

French Minister of Defence, in a speech to the *Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale* on 15th November 1983:

“... in Europe and Asia, the continuous and unbalanced addition of new means of mass destruction is leading to a profound change in the international balance. More particularly, the number of SS-20 mobile missiles continues to rise: 135 at the time of the famous NATO twofold decision of December 1979 – and I point out that the Soviet authorities then said there was an approximate balance – 297 when President Brezhnev announced a unilateral moratorium on their deployment in March 1982, and 360 today. These 360 missiles carry 1,080 warheads which can strike more than fifty-six European, Asian or North African states in some twelve minutes, including more than two-thirds of the world's population. A particularity of these weapons is that they are keeping the countries of the old world hostage, their security thus being cut off from that of the American continent, which is alone beyond their reach. This is a potentially dramatic situation for those countries which depend entirely on the American guarantee for their security as is the case for instance of European or Asian countries which do not have a nuclear deterrent force.

In face of this the United States and the member countries of the NATO integrated system have come up to the deadline laid down by their sovereign twofold decision of December 1979. After two years of discussions, the Geneva negotiations have produced no satisfactory results. Unless there is a last-minute surprise, Pershing and cruise missiles will therefore have to be deployed. We hope this first step towards correcting the imbalance will, in the long run, allow the negotiations to be based on more solid foundations and lead at some time to an agreement providing for the lowest possible level of armaments. A great country like the Soviet Union cannot avoid this, particularly as the deployment of American missiles would not be a reason for breaking off discussions. The continued deployment of SS-20s – ninety-nine since the negotiations started – was not taken by the United States as a pretext for suspending the Geneva talks...”

42. Consequently, however well-intentioned pacifist agitation in autumn 1983 may have seemed, its military and political repercussions could have been more serious for Europe and for international peace if the governments had

not shown considerable moderation in their reactions to the demonstrations and much firmness in abiding by their December 1979 commitments. However, the magnitude of the demonstrations might leave room for doubts about the will of the people of Western Europe to give their backing to their governments. In any event, the impression they gave American public opinion was that Europeans did not wish to be defended and isolationist trends in the United States were thus strengthened. They probably also convinced the Soviet authorities that a further propaganda effort on their part might swing the balance in their favour. We must therefore delve deeper into the analysis of European public opinion in order to assess its true reactions.

2. Elections in 1982 and 1983 and the defence of Europe

43. The most usual and safest way to ascertain the opinion of the public in democratic countries is obviously to study the way it votes, particularly in general elections. Several of the WEU member countries most concerned by the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles and by pacifist agitation had general elections between summer 1982 and summer 1983: the Netherlands in October 1982, the Federal Republic of Germany in March 1983 and the United Kingdom and Italy in June 1983.

44. Deployment of these new weapons played a prominent rôle in the electoral campaigns in these four countries, although it cannot be said to have overshadowed other topical questions including economic and social matters. This is already a sign of the importance public opinion attaches to this matter and of the limits of this importance; it cannot be said that this alone determined the choice of the electorate.

45. Furthermore, in none of the four countries which held elections in 1982 and 1983 was there a shift in the vote to show a strong trend of public opinion. In the Netherlands, the Christian Democrat Party, which was then in favour of applying the NATO twofold decision, subject to the results of the Geneva negotiations but which still has to reconsider its position on the matter, obtained 29.34% of the votes in 1983 compared with 30.8% in 1981 but the Liberal Party, which was also in favour, obtained 23.07% compared with 17.32% and replaced the Labour Party in the coalition government, although the latter obtained 30.38% compared with 28.29%. It cannot therefore be said that the Netherlands elections showed that public opinion rejected the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in spite of the magnitude of pacifist demonstrations in the country on that occasion.

46. Nor can the elections in the Federal Republic on 6th March 1983 be interpreted as repudiating the parties in government at the time, although they were in favour of applying NATO's 1979 twofold decision, since the number of votes for the CDU/CSU rose from 44.5% in 1980 to 48.8% in 1983, those for the FDP falling from 10.6% to 7%. This coalition therefore remained in power while votes for the party which had demonstrated its hostility to the deployment of Euromissiles the most vigorously, *Die Grünen*, rose from 1.5% to 5.6%, thus marking both the growth in and the limits of its audience among the German electorate. It should be noted, however, that the SPD, whose votes rose from 42.9% in 1979 to 38.2% in 1983, had been in favour of applying NATO's 1979 twofold decision, but had since changed its opinion and finally, at its congress in Cologne in November 1983, it rejected the twofold resolution adopted by NATO in December 1979. It is to re-examine its position on this matter in the coming months.

47. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative Party, which had very clearly stated its intention to apply the NATO twofold decision, won the elections on 9th June 1983, still receiving 42.4% of the votes compared with 43.9% in 1979 and increasing its majority from 332 to 397 seats. Finally, in Italy the Christian Democrats certainly lost some votes, the percentage falling from 38.3% in 1979 to 32.9% on 27th June 1983, but these losses were spread among several parties which did not all have the same position towards this matter. Moreover, none of the major Italian parties has officially rejected the deployment of Euromissiles outright, but none has given its unreserved agreement. It is therefore difficult to draw clear conclusions from the Italian elections on the trend of opinion towards that country's defence policy.

48. Decisive conclusion obviously cannot be drawn from these elections regarding the impact of the deployment of Euromissiles on public opinion in these four countries, but it may be pointed out that in no case did opponents of deployment win elections in those two years and governments democratically formed after these elections consisted everywhere of parties in favour of implementing the twofold decision. We should not therefore be impressed by the scale of demonstrations against deployment in these four countries in autumn 1981 and autumn 1983. It undoubtedly shows the size of a determined minority but certainly does not show the existence of a hostile majority. However, the fact that a silent majority exists, even if it votes, and a zealous minority, indicates that a reversal of the situation is still possible, particularly if there are difficulties in operating the Atlantic Alliance. It is clear that the start in the deployment of Euromissiles on the date

fixed by the North Atlantic Council after these elections represented an initial defeat for opponents of nuclear weapons. But there is no guarantee that this setback is final and the Soviet Union is making no secret of the fact that it is waiting for the right time to launch or foster further anti-nuclear action to improve its moral and political positions and divide the West.

3. Opinion polls

49. The spread of anti-nuclear agitation in Western Europe has led most organisations responsible for analysing the reactions of public opinion to conduct inquiries into the matter. They were urged to do so by requests from the press, governments or associations concerned with Europe's security. Your Rapporteur has been able to examine the results of a number of these inquiries, grouped inter alia by the *Institut français des relations internationales* in its publication *Pacifisme et dissuasion*, by the Atlantic Institute for a colloquy which it is to hold in spring 1984 and by the organisers of a meeting to study France's security and pacifism held in Paris on 14th and 15th September 1983 under the title of *Défense et recherche universitaire*. He is not unaware of the difficulties of analysing and comparing polls carried out in different circumstances, on different dates, in different countries and with different questionnaires proposed to cross-sections of people which do not correspond. In particular, he knows how difficult it is to estimate the intensity of reactions on the basis of answers to questions which leave little room for the expression of more subtle views. He nevertheless thought it interesting to mention some of the results of these inquiries because they check out indications obtained by other means.

50. Thus, a poll carried out in eight countries for the Atlantic Institute and the International Herald Tribune by the Louis Harris organisation asked: "Which of the following are your greatest concerns for yourself and your country?". Of ten possible answers "unemployment" came first in Italy, whereas "the threat of war" came only second in Spain, third in France, the United Kingdom and Norway, fourth in the Netherlands and Italy and seventh in the United States and the Federal Republic. "Nuclear weapons" came second in Norway, the Netherlands and the United States, third in the United Kingdom, fourth in the Federal Republic, sixth in Spain, seventh in France and eighth in Italy. "Inadequate defence" came tenth and last in all eight countries, the other concerns referred to relating to economic or social matters. Your Rapporteur will not give the percentages, which would be particularly difficult to interpret as totals are not the same

in all countries in view of the fact that those questioned could give several answers.

51. Your Rapporteur considers it important, and it corroborates the various poll results that he has been able to consult, that international peace, defence, nuclear weapons and the balance of forces, although real and serious, are not the main preoccupation of the majority of Europeans. A pacifist campaign which has been going on for several years has admittedly managed to draw attention to the threats represented by nuclear weapons in several Western European countries. But the huge demonstrations which have taken place on this subject do not show so much anguish about such weapons as might have been thought. Conversely, the inadequacy of the West's means of defence, a fact stressed by all governments, does not seem very serious to a large majority of Europeans.

52. Answers to a question in the same inquiry: "Which of the following are most responsible for international tension?" are also revealing. In six countries the Soviet military build-up came first, but it came only fourth in France and fifth in Spain, whereas the United States military build-up came second in the Federal Republic, Norway and the Netherlands, fourth in Spain and Italy, fifth in the United Kingdom, seventh in France (the only one of the eight countries to have communists in its government) and eighth in the United States. Among the other answers, it is interesting to note that in France American interest rates and the rôle of the dollar came first and that all countries except Norway attached great importance to insufficient European unity. All except the United States attached little importance to the overconciliatory attitude of European governments towards the Soviet Union, and hardly more to the rise of neutralism and pacifism in European public opinion.

53. The question "Which of the following are most important to western security?" brought out three separate trends. In the answers from the United States, the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom first place was given to "effective United States-European co-operation", in the French, Spanish and Italian answers "strengthened economic unity in Europe" came first, and in the Norwegian and Netherlands answers "productive arms control talks".

54. Another inquiry, based on answers to 786 questionnaires sent to an "élite" in five countries by the Berlin International Institute for Comparative Social Research, the first results of which were published in August 1983, gave a number of interesting indications, although they are not comparable with those given by polls carried out on other bases. In response to the

proposition "Deployment of NATO's intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF, i.e. cruise missiles and Pershing II) should proceed under all circumstances", 65% in France agreed, 30% in the United States, 15% in the United Kingdom and 10% in the Netherlands and the Federal Republic, although the proportion of those who thought that "military strength should be a pre-condition for détente" ranged from 54% in the Federal Republic to 77% in France, i.e. a clear majority in the five countries covered by the inquiry. In any event, the proposition that "NATO INF deployment should proceed under no circumstances" obtained 40% support in the Federal Republic, 30% in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, 15% in the United States and 3% in France, i.e. nowhere did it obtain a majority.

55. However, a number of polls carried out in France between 1980 and 1982 indicate that although a large section of French public opinion trusts the deterrent value of the French nuclear force to avoid a possible attack (62% as opposed to 32% according to a poll published in *L'Express* in May 1980), in November 1981, according to a SOFRES poll published by *Le Figaro*, only 15% of French public opinion considered that "if the Soviet Union were to threaten France directly, every means including nuclear weapons should be used to resist it", whereas 75% considered that an attempt should be made "to negotiate a compromise". In August 1982, a Louis Harris poll published by *Ca m'intéresse* gave similar results: in the event of French territory being invaded by the Soviet army, 42% thought "France should try to negotiate", 39% that "it should defend itself by military means" and 10% that "it should use nuclear weapons". One-third (32%) of those questioned by IFRES for *Le Quotidien* in November 1981 said that if national territory were invaded they would "fight underground", 11% would "adapt themselves to the régime of the invader" and 39% would "go into exile".

56. Your Rapporteur does not know what answers would have been given to such questions in other countries but he feels the reactions of French public opinion somewhat compensate for the distortions which seem to emerge from comparative polls between France and the other western nations.

57. There can be no question here of giving a larger number of poll results or a more elaborate interpretation. But these few indications allow several points to be clarified, the first being that western public opinion is only very partially and very imperfectly reflected by the mass movements which have been seen in recent years. Opinion seems deeply attached to peace but divided over the kind of danger threatening it and the means of countering it.

Above all, people seem to be ill-informed about the political and military facts on which Europe's security depends and fail to provide the basis the governments need for pursuing an effective security and peace policy.

4. Positions adopted by Christian churches

58. On 7th June 1982, in a message to the second extraordinary session of the United Nations on disarmament, Pope John Paul II, after noting that little progress had been made in disarmament although the world wanted both peace and disarmament, gave some of his views on the matter. He said the catholic church deplored the armaments race and urged at least a progressive mutual and verifiable reduction, together with the greatest precautions against possible errors in the use of nuclear weapons. On peace movements, he said it was important to give due consideration, with the caution and objectivity they warranted, to all serious proposals aimed at contributing to real disarmament and improving the atmosphere. He said that in present circumstances deterrence based on balance could still be considered morally acceptable but reiterated his confidence in the force of loyal negotiations which should aim inter alia at a balanced, simultaneous and internationally-controlled reduction of armaments.

59. He then advocated a reduction in the production and sale of conventional weapons throughout the world, as well as of nuclear weapons, and said very particular attention should be paid to their improvement since this was one of the essential dimensions of the armaments race. He considered the work of experts on the link between disarmament and development deserved to be studied and followed up and added that the true cause of our insecurity stemmed from a deep-rooted crisis of mankind. It was no longer possible for rich and poor to live side by side without the emergence of resentment turning to violence.

60. The churches have since made an unusual number of statements about peace in 1983: the catholic episcopate in the Federal Republic, the United States, the Netherlands, the German Democratic Republic, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, Ireland, Belgium, Japan and France, and a number of protestant churches or ecclesiastical organisations. These statements were due to the apparent disarray of public opinion throughout the West, particularly following the discussion about the deployment of Euro-strategic missiles, and by the pastoral concerns of church leaders who are anxious to give their congregations guidance in a matter which is at one and the same time technical, political, military and moral. Generally speak-

ing, these statements avoided taking the easy way out, which would have been to adopt purely moral positions, and to varying degrees they showed a firm determination to respect ethical responsibility in the political and military order.

61. An examination of the various texts emanating from catholic episcopates shows that they reflect two concerns. First, they mark their adhesion to a moral position of the catholic church towards war as defined on 11th June 1982 in a speech by Pope John Paul II to the United Nations General Assembly. Second, they meet the specific preoccupations of the people to whom they are addressed. To refer only to the three texts of which your Rapporteur has direct knowledge, those by the German, American and French episcopates, he has noted a series of converging views, particularly about the following ideas:

- (i) recourse to force is acceptable only in a very limited number of cases, if it spares non-combatants and if it remains proportional to the aggression to which it is responding;
- (ii) nuclear weapons further increase the threat to humanity involved in recourse to force;
- (iii) the aim of any security policy must be the establishment of a system of inter-state relations based on non-violence;
- (iv) deterrence, exercised in particular by nuclear weapons; may be a means of attaining this aim and its only justification lies in the pursuit of action to replace the balance of terror by more just foundations for international peace. It may therefore be a guarantee of peace, albeit precarious, but cannot constitute its lasting basis;
- (v) on the contrary, lasting peace may be based on the promotion of greater political, economic and social justice;
- (vi) efforts must be made to work out non-violent means of solving conflicts.

62. Together with these principles, mention should be made of differences of tone between statements by national episcopates which take account of each country's specific problems. Thus, the American episcopate recommends support for immediate, bilateral and verifiable agreements to stop the testing, production and deployment of new nuclear weapons systems. But its statement draws a clear distinction between recourse to force in general and recourse to nuclear weapons in particular, the latter being justifiable only in response to the

use of nuclear weapons by the enemy. This stipulation, which the American bishops explain is based on specific circumstances which may change or be interpreted differently by people of good will, means condemning all first-use of nuclear weapons.

63. The statement by German bishops of 15th April 1983 associates moral tolerance of deterrence with the following criteria:

- (i) the immunity of civilians;
- (ii) the means considered or used should not make war easier or more probable;
- (iii) the means should be limited to what is essential for effective deterrence;
- (iv) the means should be compatible with the aims of limiting or reducing armaments and effective, bilateral disarmament.

64. The statement by French bishops certainly lays more stress on the fact that, on the one hand, possession of nuclear weapons may provide the Soviet Union, referred to by name, with means of blackmail whereby the advantages of war may be gained without paying the price of launching it and, on the other, the chemical, bacteriological or even conventional forms of modern warfare are just as dangerous as the nuclear form, and a firm stand is taken against unilateral disarmament.

65. The very nature of the protestant churches means that the very numerous statements about nuclear weapons which they have issued in recent years are far more difficult to examine and interpret overall. They of course include most of the points raised by the catholic authorities but are not unanimous on one essential point, i.e. the value of unilateral disarmament initiatives. For instance, on 10th February 1983 the Church of England General Synod negated by only 275 votes to 222 a unilateralist proposal in a draft text on nuclear weapons prepared by its drafting committee. Conversely, in November 1983 the General Assembly of French Protestants passed a resolution calling for a unilateral freeze of French nuclear weapons. Finally, German protestants were extremely divided about the value to be attached to ecclesiastical statements about means of maintaining peace.

66. This report is obviously not a suitable context for a close and critical examination of the positions adopted by the various Christian churches in this field. It can merely call attention to the importance all these churches attach to matters relating to security, deterrence and nuclear weapons and note that although their opinions may have sometimes diverged about how to achieve a peaceful international

order, an area in which moreover they have no specific competence, their reactions closely resemble those of most western governments. As they wish peace to be based on responsible disarmament, i.e. leading to properly-organised peace and international order, in most cases they have remained aloof from the pacifist demonstrations which tried to shelter behind their moral authority.

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67. The various elements available for examining and assessing the reactions of European public opinion to security and defence matters at least allow the pacifist demonstrations in the western countries in recent years to be placed in their proper context. They undoubtedly reflect deep-rooted uneasiness and the resolve of certain groups to oppose the defence policy of the Atlantic Alliance, including the deployment of Euromissiles following the Soviet refusal to hold negotiations on an equitable basis for limiting their number. But they do not show a radical about-turn in regard to their governments' defence policies. Elections in four of the countries where demonstrations were particularly widespread resulted in the election or re-election of representatives of parties advocating those policies. What is known of the trend of public opinion in the United States indicates that NATO-related considerations are unlikely to decide the outcome of the elections to be held at the end of 1984. Non-political organisations dominated by ethical considerations such as the Christian churches have not generally sided with the pacifist movements. In short, movements of opinion in favour of pacifism seem unlikely, because of their intensity or extent, to change the facts of the situation.

68. Nevertheless the deployment of Euromissiles has certainly revealed a feeling of uneasiness which it is politically impossible to ignore. It would certainly be a mistake to consider deployment as the final victory of one side over another and, although it has led to some discouragement among pacifists, they have lost neither their motivation nor their influence over public opinion, which is quite obviously inadequately informed of the facts of security and defence problems. Today's gains may slip away tomorrow if the governments fail to explain their decisions clearly enough and support them with arguments acceptable to the public. Those whose interest is to undermine western cohesion will be quick to exploit any weakening of public opinion in each country in the will to resist any form of pressure or aggression and, if they succeed, they will weaken the deterrent value of the West's forces and consequently, instead of strengthening peace, they will make it more precarious.

IV. *The will for defence*

69. The Soviet Union for its part seems to be showing a flawless will to do everything necessary to ensure its security, maintain its domination over Eastern Europe, including Afghanistan, and further improve its position in the international balance of forces. It is indeed difficult to discern any real hesitation in Soviet opinion towards this policy. Admittedly there are dissidents who strongly criticise the ever-growing militarism in the Soviet Union, but everything is done to control them, in Soviet society at least, and to keep them out either by imprisoning them with or without trial or by making them emigrate. Their action is discredited and presented to the Soviet people as pure and simple treason.

70. In an article in *Le Monde* on 3rd May 1983, members of the *Comité France-URSS* who had been to Moscow reported on the activities of independent Soviet pacifists and the actions brought against them. Part of this report read as follows:

"The Moscow group for the establishment of confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union, set up in June 1982 ... was in favour of disarmament based on détente from the base upwards, an essential condition for détente at the summit ... proposed to encourage the policy of détente ... by pursuing educative action among the Soviet people to make them aware of the realities of the armaments race ... and, while seeking to establish a dialogue with the official peace movement in the Soviet Union, it proposed that citizens reflect on the matter and take independent action... The initiatives taken by the group have drawn continual systematic insults and intimidatory measures by the authorities... The authorities then moved on to open repression. Arrested on 6th October 1982, a member of the group, Oleg Radzinsky, was imprisoned, accused of anti-Soviet propaganda ... and condemned on 13th October 1982 to one year's prison and five years' deportation. To date, eight members have been condemned..."

Furthermore, the West German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of 6th March 1984 relates that five Dutch pacifists, members of the IKV, who visited Czechoslovakia at the beginning of the month to try to hold a symposium there, were expelled from the country, as was a French woman member of the CODEME.

71. Furthermore, Soviet defence policy is presented as being solely to defend peace and

the media depict the Soviet state as having a monopoly of pacifism at home and throughout the world. There are no true elections, public demonstrations of any size or opinion polls to show how far the Soviet public accepts government propaganda, but the reactions of the Russian orthodox church to matters relating to defence and peace conform to the official line in every respect, which allows it to be thought that the Soviet state has largely managed to convince the Soviet people of the soundness of its views or to impose a régime of terror and silence on such a scale that no criticism can be voiced.

72. The situation is not quite the same in the people's democracies, where a few sporadic pacifist demonstrations against nuclear weapons, both Soviet and western, have been held, particularly in Poland and the German Democratic Republic. The catholic church and the Solidarity trade union in the former and the protestant churches in the latter have shown their independence of the political régime and at the same time their sympathy for the demonstrators. However, the official position has always been that, since the state was pursuing a true policy of peace, any demonstration against its defence policy was also against peace. The harsh measures taken against Solidarity by the Polish Government are no secret and it is clear that the catholic church used its influence and margin of freedom of expression to try to protect some degree of freedom in the country rather than endorse agitation whose effects would quite obviously have been nil and might have been further encouragement for the Soviet Union to intervene.

73. The East German protestant churches were associated, particularly in 1982, with the development of a pacifist movement which claimed to be christian. However, measures adopted by the state and the persecution of some of the movements' militants led church leaders to discourage demonstrations. Inter alia, they advised against wearing a badge representing a sword transformed into a ploughshare, inspired by a passage from the prophet Micah, because the badge exposed its wearers to harsh measures by the state.

74. These two examples and other indications emanating from most of the people's democracies clearly seem to mean that, contrary to what has sometimes been said, "pacifism is in the West but the arms are in the East". The deployment of SS-20s by the Soviet Union caused concern and discontent among public opinion in countries under Soviet domination. This discontent may be seen as a form of opposition to that domination since the local authorities firmly repress such reactions.

75. However, at the meeting of the seven Warsaw Pact Ministers for Foreign Affairs which ended on 14th October 1983, the Romanians refused to accept nuclear weapons and announced that they would refuse to endorse the deployment of such weapons in other allied countries of the Warsaw Pact as a retaliation to NATO's deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles. The reason they gave for refusing was that they could not hold weapons of mass destruction because their country had collaborated with Nazi Germany. But it is clear that there were other reasons too for this reaction.

76. These various considerations make one question the solidarity of the eastern countries with the Soviet Union and the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact. But as there is nothing to prove that Soviet society proper has been affected by pacifist movements, one cannot deduce that there has been an actual weakening in the will of the Soviet people to defend themselves. The Eastern European régimes are such that the appearance of cracks in the people's allegiance to official policy, rather than auguring an early change in that policy, which is imposed by the Soviet Union, on the contrary forecasts a hardening of Soviet domination which will allow no criticism of the peace policy which the Soviet Union claims to pursue.

77. It is evident that the western governments do not want to pursue a policy of repressing pacifism, nor can they do so moreover. Even if they have serious reason to think that pacifist demonstrations might undermine their defence policies and jeopardise their deterrent effect, they consider that the only legitimate and, in the end, effective way of combating such an outcome is to accept open discussion with those who do not share their views, provided the latter more or less respect the law which is, on the whole, quite liberal. Certain practices, such as bomb incidents or kidnappings, can never be tolerated, but it must be said that such incidents have been exceptional in pacifist campaigns in recent years.

78. It is, on the contrary, through information and dialogue that the western governments can and must tackle the problem facing them through the spread of pacifist movements and it must be noted that, even if information and dialogue have not always been adequate, they exist in most Western European countries and in the United States.

79. When your Rapporteur speaks of information and dialogue, he does not mean that the European governments should merely uphold their views through the media, for instance, but he considers that many of the pacifists' arguments warrant detailed study and that some of their suggestions are particularly

worthy of being followed up since they respond to the true concerns of public opinion. Your Rapporteur will select three which he finds particularly legitimate and in conformity with the interests of peace: détente, negotiated disarmament and development of the North-South dialogue.

80. The word détente has often been misunderstood insofar as it has been assimilated with a policy of weakness towards the Soviet Union, particularly in the field of armaments and forces. On the contrary, according to your Rapporteur it implies the development of relations with the Soviet Union and its allies in all areas not relating to the balance of forces and is based on the conviction that western régimes have nothing to lose but everything to gain from an increase in such exchanges and the removal of all obstacles. This was clear after the signing of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe in Helsinki on 1st August 1975: the West had hesitated for a long time before embarking upon these negotiations which might have been interpreted as implying the de facto abandonment of some of its legitimate claims, particularly the reunification of Germany, but which were beyond hope, in order to secure a number of undertakings from the Soviet Union and its allies in regard to human rights and freedoms, international trade and measures designed to restore mutual confidence. This led to a text in which the two sides' concessions were balanced but which the Soviet Union and its allies have been unable to apply because their internal régimes could not stand the introduction of certain forms of freedom. In the end, it was the opposition to Soviet domination in Eastern Europe that was thus highlighted.

81. It is not therefore surprising that little valid progress could be made in the subsequent work of the CSCE. At least the Madrid conference which ended in autumn 1983 managed to agree to hold a conference in Stockholm at the beginning of 1984 on disarmament in Europe and mutual confidence-building measures since only here could balanced concessions be expected. It is too early to assess the results of this conference but the very fact that it started at a time when deployment of the first Pershing II and cruise missiles had strained East-West relations and the Soviet Union had just announced its withdrawal from current negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons constitutes a factor of détente, as immediately demonstrated by a Soviet proposal to resume the MBFR talks on limiting the level of conventional forces in Europe.

82. But détente is not merely a matter of multilateral negotiations. It is also practised by

governments in their trade with the Soviet Union and its allies. Admittedly, as the General Affairs Committee said in adopting Mr. Atkinson's report on East-West trade in November 1983, such trade must not help to increase Soviet military strength, nor make the western countries over-dependent on supplies or purchases from the Soviet Union, nor allow unduly advantageous trade conditions for the USSR. However, the development of trade is a good thing in itself: it encourages nations to be more open and, if conducted normally, is a token of peace. Western opinion polls on the interest accorded to this form of détente showed that large majorities were very much in favour of it. The desire to retain armaments at a level sufficient for maintaining balance and peace must not be linked with a refusal to practise détente lest opponents of the western armaments efforts be afforded arguments which might sway more public support to their side.

83. Naturally, disarmament proper cannot and must not be neglected at any price. In no case is it by refusing to disarm that those in favour of unilateral measures can be mollified; on the contrary, by proving that progress can be made towards negotiated disarmament, public opinion can be convinced of the inherent dangers of unilateralism. There is certainly a suspicion, particularly among younger anti-nuclear agitators, that the western governments do not really want disarmament and that the interminable negotiations which have now been going on for more than twenty years in various frameworks and with few results are but a screen to conceal their darker intentions. This idea can be usefully exploited in propaganda aimed at dividing the West and weakening its will to defend itself. The West must therefore make it quite clear that its firm rejection of any unilateral steps which would allow speculation about the weakness of its determination in no way means it rejects disarmament but, on the contrary, is intended to allow true negotiations to promote balanced, verifiable disarmament accepted by all.

84. This can be done only if it is quite clear that the nuclear weapons at the disposal of certain Western European countries, i.e. the United Kingdom and France:

- (i) contribute to the security of Western Europe as a whole;
- (ii) are the minimum credible for a strategy of deterrence and therefore cannot be reduced as long as the nuclear forces of the two great powers remain at their present levels;
- (iii) influence relations between Western European countries only insofar as

the latter have never really concerted their views on defence policy;

(iv) play a deterrent rôle and are used only for defensive purposes.

85. Where nuclear and strategic nuclear bombers are concerned:

- the United Kingdom has 64 sea-to-surface strategic ballistic missiles with a range of 4,000 km, with three thermonuclear warheads per missile, on board four nuclear-propelled submarines;
- France has 80 sea-to-surface ballistic missiles with a range of 3,000 km, with one thermonuclear warhead per missile, on board five nuclear-propelled submarines, 18 surface-to-surface strategic missiles with a range of 3,500 km and 36 Mirage IV strategic bombers.

Where tactical nuclear forces are concerned:

- NATO has 306 surface-to-surface missiles with a range of between 40 and 740 km, 1,910 guns and 603 aircraft whose range of action varies between 950 and 2,500 km;
- France has 42 Pluton surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 120 km and Mirage III, Super-Etendard and Jaguar bombers capable of transporting one nuclear warhead per aircraft with a range of action of 700 km.

86. The means necessary for such government action can be combined only if there is close consultation between the Western European countries on all matters relating to their security and the use of their forces. This is one of the main reasons why, since May 1981, the French Government has been constantly proposing to its partners that new life be injected into WEU which associates seven of the countries most concerned by the security of the European continent and particularly the central area, since it is evident that neither the French and British nuclear weapons nor the conventional forces of the member countries of the organisation could decisively guarantee security in the eastern Mediterranean and Scandinavia.

87. In an address at the opening sitting of the thirty-sixth session of the *Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale* on 20th September 1983, Mr. Mauroy said:

"... I made a precise analysis of our links with our partners in the Atlantic Alliance since everyone can see they are decisive. But France endeavours to maintain other links, in Western European Union, for instance. This European organisation is

the only one which can tackle matters relating to defence and security... France considers that European solidarity enhances Atlantic solidarity without being merged with it. The similarity of the geo-strategic problems facing the European countries should lead them to take specific common decisions. In this respect WEU can be a privileged forum for reflection..."

88. In an article in *Le Monde* on 23rd December 1983, Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, said he placed some hope in the initiative aimed at making a renovated WEU the European pillar of NATO. He stressed that the notion of the defence of Europe should be replaced by that of European defence, but that United States disengagement from the European continent would raise a serious problem in view of the fact that western nuclear power was almost entirely in American hands.

89. The wish in some quarters for rapid strides in disarmament one way or another might give the impression that now is not a very suitable time to reactivate an organisation responsible for Western European security. Your Rapporteur holds absolutely the opposite view, i.e. that real progress towards negotiated disarmament with the Soviet Union requires consultation between European partners to ensure that they reach prior agreement on the implications of their joint security so that it is not jeopardised by a disarmament policy. Talks have been started between France and the Federal Republic on this subject and they already seem to have borne fruit. It is for their partners to say whether they consider the framework of WEU to be really appropriate for developing such consultations. Conversely, a display of hostility in principle towards French and British nuclear weapons can but convince the United Kingdom and France that they must rely only on themselves for their security and it might deter them from playing a constructive part in global negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons. However, certain British members of the committee felt British deterrence was not in itself credible because it could not seriously be thought that it would be used.

90. The third consideration arising from pacifist demonstrations in recent years relates less directly to WEU's responsibilities, although it is no less important. It stems from the irrefutable pacifist argument that expenditure on armaments is a waste of resources that is unacceptable in a world which is suffering from hunger and underdevelopment, particularly since the situation has been aggravated by an economic crisis which has lasted for more than ten years. Apart from the moral value of this

consideration, it also implies that the West is digging its own grave by leaving the underdeveloped countries no choice other than the perpetuation of a situation which is intolerable for them or to revolt against an international order which is unacceptable because it forces this situation upon them. The purpose of this report is obviously not to explore ways of helping the third world to transform its economy but merely to recall the urgent need for North-South co-operation which is also a token of peace.

91. Your Rapporteur wishes to recall that, although military expenditure is an unacceptable waste of resources and energy if security is assured, it becomes a prior condition for any other activity if security is not assured. Consequently, it is not by taking action liable to jeopardise Western Europe's security that the latter can seek to resolve the difficult political, economic, social and moral difficulties now facing it; only by ensuring security can it help to solve all these problems, including that of disarmament.

Deterrence and the will of the people

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2¹

tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

1. In paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “cannot in the longer term be ensured without” and insert “would be based on sounder foundations if there were”.
2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “of all kinds”.

Signed: Cavaliere

1. See 7th sitting, 3rd December 1984 (amendments negatived).

Deterrence and the will of the people

AMENDMENT 3¹

tabled by Mr. Gansel

3. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
“Continue to search for a solution to the intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations taking into account, inter alia, the ‘walk in the woods’ formula;”.

Signed: Gansel

1. See 7th sitting, 3rd December 1984 (amendment negatived).

Deterrence and the will of the people

AMENDMENTS 4, 5, 6 and 7¹

tabled by Mr. Millan and others

4. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “nuclear weapons are” insert “at the present time”.
5. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “refusal” insert “until very recently”.
6. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “have compelled” and insert “led”.
7. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Signed: Millan, Gansel, Hardy

1. See 7th sitting, 3rd December 1984 (amendments negated).

*Rome declaration*¹

1. At the invitation of the Italian Government, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the seven member states of Western European Union met in extraordinary session in Rome on 26th-27th October 1984 to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the modified Brussels Treaty.

2. The Ministers stressed the importance of the treaty and their attachment to its goals:

- to strengthen peace and security;
- to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe;
- to co-operate more closely both among member states and with other European organisations.

3. Conscious of the continuing necessity to strengthen western security and of the specifically Western European geographical, political, psychological and military dimensions, the Ministers underlined their determination to make better use of the WEU framework in order to increase co-operation between the member states in the field of security policy and to encourage consensus. In this context, they called for continued efforts to preserve peace, strengthen deterrence and defence and thus consolidate stability through dialogue and co-operation.

4. The Ministers recalled that the Atlantic Alliance, which remains the foundation of western security, had preserved peace on the continent for thirty-five years. This permitted the construction of Europe. The Ministers are convinced that a better utilisation of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and to greater solidarity among its members.

5. The Ministers emphasised the indivisibility of security within the North Atlantic Treaty area. They recalled in particular the vital and substantial contribution of all the European allies, and underlined the crucial importance of the contribution to common security of their allies who are not members of WEU. They stressed the necessity, as a complement to their joint efforts, of the closest possible concertation with them.

¹ Adopted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence of the WEU member states.

6. The Ministers are convinced that increased co-operation within WEU will also contribute to the maintenance of adequate military strength and political solidarity and, on that basis, to the pursuit of a more stable relationship between the countries of East and West by fostering dialogue and co-operation.

7. The Ministers called attention to the need to make the best use of existing resources through increased co-operation, and through WEU to provide a political impetus to institutions of co-operation in the field of armaments.

8. The Ministers therefore decided to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in particular:

- defence questions;
- arms control and disarmament;
- the effects of developments in East-West relations on the security of Europe;
- Europe's contribution to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance, bearing in mind the importance of transatlantic relations;
- the development of European co-operation in the field of armaments in respect of which WEU can provide a political impetus.

They may also consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world.

9. The Ministers recalled the importance of the WEU Assembly which, as the only European parliamentary body mandated by treaty to discuss defence matters, is called upon to play a growing rôle.

They stressed the major contribution which the Assembly has already made to the revitalisation of WEU and called upon it to pursue its efforts to strengthen the solidarity among the member states, and to strive to consolidate the consensus among public opinion on their security and defence needs.

10. In pursuance of these goals, the Ministers have decided on a number of specific measures with regard to the better functioning of the WEU structure and organisation, which are set out in a separate document.

Institutional reform of WEU

At their meeting in Rome on 26th and 27th October 1984 to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the signatory states decided to make fuller use of the institutions of WEU and, accordingly, to bring the existing institutions into line with the changed tasks of the organisation.

I. Activation of the Council

The Ministers regard activation of the Council as a central element in the efforts to make greater use of Western European Union. In conformity with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, which allows the Council to decide on the organisation of its work and to consult or set up subsidiary bodies, the Ministers decided the following:

1. The Council would in future normally meet twice a year at ministerial level. One of these sessions could take place in a small group with no formal agenda. These meetings would bring together the Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers. Separate meetings of the Foreign Ministers and/or Defence Ministers could also take place, if the member states considered it necessary, to discuss matters lying within their respective area of responsibility.
2. The presidency of the Council will be held by each member state for a one-year term. Meetings of the Council will in principle take place in the country holding the presidency.
3. The work of the Permanent Council will have to be intensified in line with the increased activities of the Council of Ministers. The Permanent Council, mandated to discuss in greater detail the views expressed by the Ministers and to follow up their decisions, will, pursuant to the second paragraph of the abovementioned Article VIII, make the necessary arrangements for this purpose, including as appropriate the setting-up of working groups.
4. The Secretariat-General should be adapted to take account of the enhanced activities of the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council.
5. The Ministers have asked the Secretariat-General to submit, as soon as possible, a report on the work done by the secretariat and to consider what measures might be necessary to strengthen its activities. In this connection, the Ministers stated that any reorganisation in the staffing of the Secretariat-General should take account of the adjustments made elsewhere in the other WEU institutions. They stressed that any proposed

adjustments should not result in an overall increase in the organisation's establishment.

II. Relations between Council and Assembly

The Ministers supported the idea of greater contact between the Council and the Assembly.

Recalling that, under Article IX of the treaty, the Assembly is expressly required to discuss the reports submitted to it by the Council of Ministers on matters concerning the security and defence of the member states, and considering that the practice adopted has enabled the Assembly to widen the topics of its discussions, the Ministers wish to see the Assembly playing an increasing rôle, particularly by contributing even more to associating public opinion in the member states with the policy statements of the Council, which expresses the political will of the individual governments. Accordingly, the Ministers submit the following proposals to the Assembly:

1. In order to improve the contacts between the Council and the Assembly, the Ministers believe there are a number of options, noteworthy among which are:
 - A substantial improvement in the existing procedures for giving written replies to Assembly recommendations and questions. On this point, the Ministers consider that a leading rôle should be given to the presidency, making the best use of the services of the Secretariat-General.
 - The development of informal contacts between government representatives and the representatives of the Assembly.
 - If appropriate, a colloquium involving the presidency of the Council and the committees of the Assembly.
 - The improvement of the contacts that traditionally take place after the ministerial meetings of the Council, and more generally, the improvement of the procedures under which the Assembly is kept informed by the presidency, whose representatives could – between the Assembly sessions – keep the various committees up to date with the work of the Council and even take part in their discussions.
 - The possibility that the Assembly might make use of contributions from the technical institutions of WEU.
2. Convinced that greater co-operation between the Council and the Assembly is a key factor in the enhanced utilisation of WEU, the Ministers underscored the importance they attach to the recommendations and work of the Assembly.

3. Without wishing to pre-empt the decision of the members of the Assembly, the Ministers also stress the value, in their eyes, of developing a dialogue between the Assembly and other parliaments or parliamentary institutions.

4. The Ministers also stated that the member states were always ready to inform their national delegations of their governments' attitude to questions dealt with in Assembly reports and were prepared to offer information to their rapporteurs.

III. Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee

The Ministers also considered the activity of the Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA) and the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC).

1. In connection with the Agency, which was set up in 1954 to monitor compliance with the voluntary arms limitations agreed by the contracting parties, the Ministers underlined the exemplary nature of these commitments, which had instilled confidence among the signatory states and for this reason they acclaimed the work that the Agency had done.

Noting the value of the experience thus gained, the Ministers emphasised the interest that they attached to the development by the WEU member states of reflection on arms control and disarmament questions.

2. As regards the SAC, the Ministers recalled the importance of the tasks defined in the decision of the Council of 7th May 1955 which established this body.

In this connection, they emphasised that the existence of an effective and competitive European armaments industry was a fundamental aspect of Europe's contribution to the Atlantic Alliance. In this context, it seemed very important to them that the seven member states of WEU should be able to harmonise their positions in this sphere and co-ordinate their efforts with a view to increasing the effectiveness of co-operative activity in the various multilateral fora.

3. With the aim of better adapting the institutions of WEU to present and future requirements, the Ministers reached the following decisions.

(a) Noting that the control functions originally assigned to the ACA have now become, for the most part, superfluous, the Ministers decided, in accordance with Article V of Protocol No. III, which allows the Council to make changes to the ACA's control activity, to abolish gradually the remaining quantitative

controls on conventional weapons. The Ministers agreed that these controls should be substantially reduced by 1st January 1985 and entirely lifted by 1st January 1986. The commitments and controls concerning ABC weapons would be maintained at the existing level and in accordance with the procedures agreed up to the present time.

(b) The Ministers have instructed the Permanent Council to define, in consultation with the directors of the ACA and the SAC, the precise modalities of an overall reorganisation affecting both the ACA, the international secretariat of the SAC and the SAC which could be structured in such a way as to fulfil a threefold task:

- to study questions relating to arms control and disarmament whilst carrying out the remaining control functions;
- undertake the function of studying security and defence problems;
- to contribute actively to the development of European armaments co-operation.

(c) As regards the first two functions indicated above, the intention would be to have available a common basis of analysis which could form a useful point of reference for the work of both the Council and the Assembly and also for informing public opinion.

This reorganisation will have to be carried out taking into account, on the one hand, changes in duties resulting first from the reduction and then from the abolition of the control tasks and, on the other hand, the need to have the appropriate experts available.

(d) As regards armaments co-operation, WEU should be in a position to play an active rôle in providing political impetus:

- by supporting all co-operative efforts including those of the IEPG and the CNAD;
- by encouraging in particular the activity of the IEPG as a forum whose main objective is to promote European co-operation and also to contribute to the development of balanced co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance;
- by developing continuing concertation with the various existing bodies.

(e) In this general context, the Permanent Council will also take into account the existence of the FINABEL framework.

(f) In carrying out this overall reorganisation the Permanent Council will have to:

- propose a precise organisation table which will make it possible to define and give a breakdown of the posts required for carrying out the three functions referred to above;
- ensure that the various arrangements proposed remain within the present limits in terms of staff and the organisation's budget, without weakening WEU's ability to play its rôle.

The Ministers asked the Permanent Council to complete its work before their next session. They expressed the wish, however, that

in the meantime a start should be made on all or part of the new tasks as soon as possible.

IV. Contacts with non-member states

1. The Ministers also attached great importance to liaison with those states in the alliance which are not members of WEU.
2. Invoking the relevant provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty, and in particular Article IV, the Ministers pointed out that it was the responsibility of the presidency of WEU to inform those countries on either a bilateral or multilateral basis.

WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Mr. Masciadri, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 14 votes to 1 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy (Alternate: Lord Hughes), van der Werff (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier (Alternate: Baumel), Bianco, Bogaerts, Burger, Hill (Alternate: Ward), Koehl, Lagneau (Alternate: Pécriaux), Lagorce, Lord McNair (Alternate: Murphy), MM. Martino, Masciadri, Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spitella, Vecchiotti, Vogt, de Vries.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling Recommendations 406 and 407;
- (ii) Endorsing the initiative taken by its President when he handed a memorandum to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council on 20th September 1984;
- (iii) Welcoming the wish expressed by the Council to give new life to WEU so as to adapt it to the present requirements of European security and international peace and to develop the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly for these purposes;
- (iv) Considering that giving WEU a new and wider rôle first implies that the Council effectively assume its obligations under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (v) Considering that a concerted approach by the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to matters relating inter alia to the alliance's defence policy and the action those countries pursue outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty is essential for Europe's security;
- (vi) Noting that the increase in informal procedure may help the Council's work but might diminish the commitments of member countries in intergovernmental consultations and relations between the Council and the Assembly;
- (vii) Welcoming the deletion of the list of armaments in Annex III to Protocol No. III;
- (viii) Noting that giving the Council a new and wider rôle means that it must obtain different means of information from those afforded so far by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, in particular to allow it to tackle questions of disarmament and the balance of forces;
- (ix) Considering that the joint production of armaments by WEU member countries is progressing only slowly;
- (x) Considering that the Assembly's activities can be based only on a continuing dialogue with the Council;
- (xi) Welcoming the decisions taken or guidelines adopted by the Council and communicated to the Assembly on 27th October 1984 and the fruitful exchanges of views in Rome on 29th October, but recalling the urgency of reorganising the structure of WEU to allow it meet the new requirements,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Abide by its decision to convene the Ministers of Defence and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of member countries at least twice a year, particularly prior to meetings of the North Atlantic Council;
2. Give the Permanent Council the means to act in application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, and to this end:
 - (a) ask member countries to appoint a permanent representation to the Council in the framework of the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty;
 - (b) give the Secretary-General powers of initiative allowing him to assume responsibility for applying Article VIII;
3. Ensure the existence and operation of the WEU technical bodies in order to obtain the necessary assistance and information to allow it to examine matters relating to the security of Europe in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, events concerning Europe's security which occur outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, problems relating to disarmament and the control of armaments, the prospects of European armaments co-operation and East-West relations;
4. Progressively adapt the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee to these new requirements;
5. While developing an informal dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, as proposed by the Council, retain formal procedure for exchanges between the two WEU organs.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Masciadri, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. After its ministerial meeting on 12th June 1984, the Council gave members of the Assembly a note on the reactivation of WEU which had been prepared by the working group instructed by the Council and the political directors of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs of WEU member countries to examine the prospects for reactivating the organisation. This was the first information given to the Assembly by the Council as such about an undertaking which had been under discussion for many months and started since March.

2. The present study will inevitably be concomitant with the working group's implementation of the principles adopted by the Ministers on 12th June. The Assembly has since received only fragmentary, unofficial information about the progress of the work of the Council and the working group. Your Rapporteur therefore has the impression that at its ministerial meeting in Rome on 26th and 27th October the Council will be able to adopt only decisions of a general nature and that decisions relating to the organisation of WEU will be under study for quite some time. Your Rapporteur therefore proposes to examine the 12th June document in the light of events known at the time of writing in the hope of thus making an Assembly contribution to the Council's examination of the reactivation of WEU while it is still in time to be useful.

3. The Council's note has the merit of raising the question of the reactivation of WEU in political and not merely technical or institutional terms by placing it in the general context of member countries' relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same time it refers to the twofold problem of the relationship between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance on the one hand and ten-power Europe on the other while tackling matters specific to WEU. This note will therefore be the hub of this report.

4. From the very outset WEU has borne the brunt of the divergent interests of the governments which signed the Paris Agreements of 23rd October 1954. These agreements sought to allow the Federal Republic of Germany to be rearmed – a sine qua non for United States participation in the defence of Europe. At the same time, the conditions had to be acceptable to France whose National Assembly, on 30th August 1954, had rejected ratification of the European Defence Community treaty by adop-

ting the previous question. Certain objections of opponents of the EDC to the idea of a "European army" therefore had to be met, ensuring that the new treaty could in no case weaken the Atlantic Alliance or the organisation it had set up at the Lisbon conference in 1952: NATO.

5. WEU therefore involved no military integration, leaving signatories a free hand outside mainland Europe, and associated the United Kingdom with joint security. The Paris Agreements were also cautious to avoid organising security arrangements which were too specific lest the Americans take this as a pretext for losing interest in the defence of Europe. As the note of 12th June recalls, Articles IV and VII of the modified Brussels Treaty established very close links for co-operation with the Atlantic Alliance and NATO. This concern has not at all been forgotten by those who, in 1984, plan to give new life to WEU since they recall that "the proposed reactivation should be seen as a contribution to the cohesion of the alliance itself and not as an attempt to create a substitute for it". At the same time, they have decided to keep the members of the Atlantic Alliance informed of their action.

6. In the newspaper *La Croix* of 11th July 1984, Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External Relations, described his views on the reactivation of WEU within the limits of what he considered to be the present requirements of European security:

"As for the establishment of an integrated common defence mechanism between Europeans and without external assistance, this is not for tomorrow. At present nothing could be more serious than to 'uncouple' the defence of the United States from the defence of the European countries, which need the American nuclear guarantee. In view of the present imbalance of conventional forces in Europe, such uncoupling would place part of Europe under a serious threat. I do not say that anyone wants war; on the contrary both sides, East and West, want peace; but no means of pressure must be allowed to affect the ability of anyone to exercise their free judgment. I therefore think it impossible at the present time to separate European and American means of defence. Consequently, I feel it is dangerous to confuse European defence with the pooling of European means. By all means let us discuss our policies, the

lines we follow and our requirements among Europeans, but it is not the time to proclaim that we and our European partners can ensure our defence alone."

This same concern is expressed in the explanatory memorandum to the Netherlands foreign affairs budget for 1985, which reads:

"The government agrees that specific European aspects of security problems should be examined. As long as European political co-operation provides an insufficient framework, greater use may be made of WEU for consultations on security questions.

.....

The intensification of consultations between Europeans has to be directed towards reinforcing the Atlantic Alliance. Article IV, inserted in 1954, of the modified Brussels Treaty mentions explicitly the close collaboration with NATO. The desired strengthening of the European voice in transatlantic discussions therefore has its limits where the rôle of NATO might be diminished."

Vice-Chancellor Genscher, for his part, wrote in the October 1984 issue of *Europäische Zeitung*, in an article entitled "European security and the revitalisation of WEU":

"NATO is and remains the basis of the security and defence policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. The alliance has ensured peace in Europe for more than a generation.

Europe and America are the two pillars of the Atlantic bridge; they complete each other and need each other. That is why it is of decisive importance for the two pillars to be strong and capable of carrying the weight of the bridge. America wants, as a partner in the alliance, a Europe which is strong and knows what it wants."

7. These statements show that in spite of the economic progress Europe has made since 1954 and in spite of the development of French and British nuclear forces the situation has not changed decisively in security matters. The conditions which presided over the birth of WEU still exist and the very people who at that time feared that the existence of WEU might delay the development of community Europe or jeopardise co-operation in the framework of NATO now have to accept the reactivation of the organisation within the limits imposed by circumstances and by the Paris Agreements.

8. However, while the problems remain, they are no longer the same as in 1954. Western Europe has become a fact and an economic power. National confrontation in that area has diminished and even in defence Europe is no longer a negligible factor. Moreover, there have been ups and downs in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union over the same period with a degree of rapprochement which allowed negotiations to be held on disarmament or, at least, on the limitation of nuclear weapons and then, as from 1976, tension which increased with Soviet deployment of SS-20s in Eastern Europe and, in response, the NATO twofold decision of December 1979 opening the way for the United States to deploy similar missiles in Western Europe.

9. There have also been difficulties in relations between Europe and the United States, first economic, particularly since the monetary policy pursued by the American authorities to the advantage of the dollar has kept exchange rates particularly high leading to difficulties and discontent in Western Europe, the importance of which should not be underestimated. These difficulties also affect defence matters since a section of European public opinion has reacted unfavourably to the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles on European territory on the grounds that it might weaken the deterrent effect of American strategic weapons and make nuclear war in Europe less improbable. Finally, certain American action outside Europe since the Vietnam war has not been well received by European public opinion. Conversely, Americans have frequently raised the question whether it was still essential to maintain more than 300,000 American troops in Europe and influential members of Congress have periodically advocated reducing this force whose presence is nevertheless vital for Europeans since it ensures the credibility of American retaliation in the event of Western Europe being invaded.

10. In these new circumstances, it can be seen that the problem of relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance is no longer quite the same as in the past. As the note of 12th June testifies, there is certainly no question of replacing the Atlantic Alliance by a European defence organisation. There is no question of WEU acquiring its own military headquarters or directly-assigned forces. It is still the Atlantic Alliance and the NATO integrated commands which are intended to ensure the defence of Europe. But co-operation between Europe and the United States will now have a basis which allows Europeans to make their specific concerns carry greater weight within an organisation such as NATO. In order to define this new style of relations between Europe and the United States, it has often been

illustrated by the idea of an alliance based on two equal pillars, one European and the other American. Although President Kennedy was not referring to NATO in his Philadelphia speech but to an Atlantic community which he wished to develop mainly in the economic sphere, this illustration, as Mr. Genscher's article shows, conveys to a certain extent what the Europeans are looking for, even if in fact they still differ over the nature and importance of the European pillar of the alliance. For instance, in an address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in Brussels on 3rd October 1984, Mr. van den Broek, Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, clearly demonstrated that he did not wish to give too much weight to WEU, which he considered should remain a brain-storming and not a decision-taking body, and that he did not intend to subject the attitude of WEU members in NATO to prior consultations in WEU.

11. After the relative failure of the American proposal for a two-way flow of trade between the two sides of the Atlantic, it is mainly in the joint production of armaments that the governments of the seven WEU member countries now seem determined to make rapid progress in true European armaments production. The 9th July 1984 agreement between the Defence Ministers of five European countries, four of them members of WEU, on the production of a joint combat aircraft as from 1995 clearly shows that the will to achieve the co-production of armaments exists.

12. Again, from the very outset WEU was marked by the failure of the European Defence Community. For advocates of setting up a true European army in 1950, the Paris Agreements seemed to fall far short by abandoning the community approach in favour of a firmly intergovernmental organisation. For several years, WEU was able to play a rôle in building Europe by associating the United Kingdom with the European Communities in economic matters and by providing a framework for foreign policy consultations. But WEU no longer has any economic rôle and its political rôle has been considerably reduced by the development of ten-power political consultations. The Western European countries have always opted for the widest possible organisation for organising co-operation and WEU, now the smallest of the European organisations, had lost many of its activities. Some hoped that the development of Community Europe would allow it to assert itself in defence and armaments questions. There have been many attempts to increase the activities of the Communities or of the European Parliament in areas which are WEU's own responsibility, i.e. security and armaments, particularly in the European Parliament.

13. However, they have not succeeded and because of this stalemate consideration had to be given in 1983 to the possibility of reviving the activities of WEU, which the French Government had been suggesting since 1981. Indeed, while there might in the future be a European union covering defence, it could not, for the time being at least, be formed round a single community organisation and particularly not that of the Ten, several members of which in no way wish to join a continental alliance and one of which even wishes to keep well away from the Atlantic Alliance.

14. The purpose of the present report is therefore to try to determine what WEU can do in the framework of an alliance which is still essential for joint security and alongside the European Communities which seek to expand with the addition of Portugal and Spain, and broaden their activities, particularly in armaments matters. This work is parallel with that of the Council and alone can lead to a definition of the form in which WEU is to be reactivated and how it is to be done.

II. *WEU and the Atlantic Alliance*

15. The principles governing relations between WEU and NATO are set out in the Paris Agreements and they have been well shaped by thirty years' practice. Even France's withdrawal from the NATO integrated military commands did not call them in question and no one is thinking of changing them because of the reactivation of WEU which, as the note of 12th June asserts, should be seen "as a contribution to the cohesion of the alliance itself and not as an attempt to create a substitute for it".

16. The deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles, the development of new weapons and the prospects of the arms race reaching into space mean that Europe's security depends more than ever on close understanding with the United States. This understanding must not be challenged. On the contrary, it must be developed in order to meet the threat from without. Although probably less than in the past a threat of military aggression by conventional means, which it now seems possible to counter effectively thanks to the development of new weapons, especially in the United States, it extends to new areas: the security of Europe's oil and raw material supplies, nuclear blackmail to separate Europe from the United States and divide the European members of the alliance, rejection of NATO's defence policy plans by the people of certain European countries.

(a) The United States

17. It is obviously not enough to proclaim that the reactivation of WEU is a contribution to the cohesion of the alliance for it actually to be so. It must also be seen as such by all the members of the alliance, particularly the Americans. At present, however, the United States seems to want its European partners to demonstrate their will to defend themselves rather than to be unduly docile. It no longer takes umbrage at the French claim to a degree of independence but is the first to welcome the determination evident among some of its allies and also to express concern about the demonstrations of hostility to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles which can be seen elsewhere. Consequently, it takes a positive view of attempts to strengthen the European defence effort, including the prospect of reactivating WEU which it sees as an opportunity for Europeans to play a greater rôle in their own security. It is therefore more flexible than in the past towards European armaments co-operation. Realising that its application of the famous two-way street policy falls short of Europe's wishes, it seems prepared to reconsider the matter with its partners in the alliance, its concern being more to secure reliable, united allies than to keep docile customers.

18. On several occasions the United States Government has showed its approval of reactivating WEU, the latest being on 12th July when a State Department spokesman parried Soviet protests at the deletion of Annex III to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty. He said the United States considered the Soviet attacks "unfounded", and added that it supported "current efforts to revitalise WEU". He went on to say that "no aspect of this revitalisation will affect the purely defensive orientation of the Atlantic Alliance" which, there can be no doubt, is also the point of view of the Seven.

19. The argument that a European defence organisation would ultimately encourage the isolationist tendencies which have always existed in the United States holds neither more nor less water than the opposite argument since the lack of an organised European defence effort might equally encourage isolationism based on the feeling that the Americans would be defending Europe in spite of its inhabitants. At the most it may be thought that if the United States faltered – and this would probably be due to something completely beyond the control of Europeans, be it in the rest of the world or within American society – it would be better for Europe to have the best possible defence organisation. But this is not the problem at present: on neither side of the Atlantic is the American military presence in Europe really

questioned and there is no reason to think that WEU's activities might jeopardise this situation.

(b) The European members of the Atlantic Alliance

20. A slightly different problem perhaps arises for certain European members of the Atlantic Alliance such as Denmark and Norway, Portugal and Spain, Greece and Turkey, whose position might be undermined if a European pillar of NATO were to be erected without them. Attention must be paid to this fact, perhaps by associating each of these countries in an appropriate manner with a European security policy, particularly in armaments matters. Although a European security organisation can strengthen NATO's means of defence in the central sector of Europe, it would not be able to do very much to ensure the security of a northern front in Norway or a southern flank in Greece and Turkey. The position of the countries in these two sectors makes them closely dependent on bilateral relations with the United States. This is not so for Portugal or Spain.

21. The Assembly has often invited observers from these various countries and the Council thought of associating them with the work it has undertaken for revivifying WEU, as indicated in the note of 12th June. The modified Brussels Treaty is open to them and the statute of the Standing Armaments Committee allows them to accede to the agreements prepared by the SAC in the joint production of armaments whenever they so wish.

22. The Federal Republic's renunciation of the production of certain conventional armaments, subject to Agency control, for a long time meant refusing any further accessions to WEU which would have increased the number of powers taking part in the controls. Since 27th June 1984, the problem has been solved by the cancellation of the list in Annex III to Protocol No. III, which should facilitate the accession of any of these countries wishing to join WEU.

23. In the immediate future, nevertheless, there can be no question of an adequation between WEU and the European members of the Atlantic Alliance which are better represented in the NATO Eurogroup of which France on the contrary is not a member. This is certainly not liable to jeopardise the reactivation of WEU but may lead to a search for the maximum number of contacts between WEU and the other European members of the alliance or even to facilitating their accession to the modified Brussels Treaty when they express the desire to do so. Spain's request to take part in FINABEL may, for instance, help that country

to move closer to WEU, all of whose members are now members of FINABEL, which groups army chiefs-of-staff of the WEU member countries for defining their army equipment requirements. Moreover, in October 1984 Portugal applied to the WEU Council for membership of WEU. Having only just been informed of application, the Council was unable to adopt a position on the matter at its meeting on 26th and 27th October.

24. The possibility of opening WEU to other European members of the Atlantic Alliance nevertheless raises a few problems. For example it may be wondered whether the control system under Protocol No. III applying to armaments listed in Annex IV to the protocol might not deter some countries from acceding to the modified Brussels Treaty. Your Rapporteur considers the question irrelevant, on the one hand because such controls should not trouble countries likely to be associated with WEU and on the other because there is nothing to prevent them, if necessary, asking not to subscribe to Protocol No. III during the negotiations preceding accession. The question of the controls provided for in Annex IV is worth considering on its own merits but should not be linked with the question of possible enlargement.

(c) The Soviet Union and the eastern countries

25. In summer 1984, the Soviet Union started a vigorous propaganda campaign against the Western European countries and in particular against the Federal Republic. Its main grievances about that country were centred on the lifting of the last restrictions on the production of conventional weapons listed in Annex III to Protocol No. III of the Paris Agreements, the presumed development of Franco-German nuclear co-operation and the reactivation of WEU which, according to Moscow, revealed a revanchist policy in the Federal Republic.

26. In fact, there were not the slightest grounds for any of these grievances since the Soviet Union has no say in the Paris Agreements, the Federal Republic is a signatory of the non-proliferation treaty and its nuclear industries are therefore supervised by the appropriate United Nations agency, and finally the modified Brussels Treaty contains no aggressive provisions. It is clear that these were mere pretexts for the Soviet Union to terminate the policy of détente inaugurated in Helsinki, probably because it held it responsible for the fact that the governments of certain people's democracies were taking initiatives which showed some degree of independence of the Soviet Union. It is typical that following these Soviet attacks the leader of the Unified Socialist Party of the German Democratic Republic, Mr.

Honecker, had to give up his planned visit to the Federal Republic in September 1984, followed by the Bulgarian head of state, Mr. Zhivkov, who was to have visited that country from 19th to 22nd September. Alone among the Eastern European leaders, Mr. Ceausescu, Romanian head of state, who has frequently showed a relative freedom of decision with regard to the Soviet Union, visited the Federal Republic, as planned, in October.

27. However this may be, such a propaganda campaign must not be allowed to influence the present thinking of our governments or jeopardise the prospect of reactivating WEU. If it reveals anything other than the Soviet Union's fear of a trend towards independence among the governments of the people's democracies, it can but be its fear that greater cohesion among the European members of the Atlantic Alliance might enhance NATO's deterrent power. It is just this fear that guarantees Western Europe's security and peace. It may rightly be wondered whether this guarantee is not the true basis of détente based not on speculation about the friendly intentions of one or other side but on the sound reality of mutual deterrence. In any event, it has to be noted that the updating of a thirty-year old treaty on Western European security is being taken seriously by the Soviet Union.

28. The Soviet Union's deployment in summer 1984 of three new types of cruise missile in Eastern Europe can in no way whatsoever be justified by the proposed reactivation of WEU. Nor is it justified by the limited deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles by the United States on the territory of certain WEU member countries, which is merely a response to the deployment of Soviet SS-20s. On the contrary, it is an additional warning to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance, inciting them to assume greater political responsibility for their defence, so as not to be mere pawns in an arms race between the two great powers which is increasingly slipping from their control. It is certainly not by refusing American missiles that the WEU countries can react to the Soviet move, but perhaps by voicing an independent European call for the opening of negotiations on the limitation of Euromissiles.

(d) Joint production of armaments and the rôle of the Standing Armaments Committee

29. Since 1950, the need to organise the joint production of armaments has been emphasised regularly in both NATO and WEU without either of them achieving any really satisfactory results. In the last thirty years, however, many bi- and multilateral agreements have produced highly satisfactory results, among member

countries of both WEU and the Atlantic Alliance.

30. There is every reason to believe that sharing the workload between the five participating countries will raise particularly intricate problems stemming from different technological bases. The industries are not represented in the NATO Eurogroup, the IEPG or the SAC, which no doubt explains why governments use the procedure of reaching direct agreement rather than going through international organisations. Since the governments have opted for the IEPG or Eurogroup for studying military requirements and in recent years have directed the SAC towards studies relating to the armaments industries, should not the SAC, in the attempt to reactivate WEU, be more specifically instructed to ensure a link between industries and governments in order to provide a meeting-ground for those taking part in co-production?

31. The SAC's statute leaves it great flexibility since it may prepare agreements between certain member countries as well as between members and non-members of WEU. The fact that it does not include all the European members of the Atlantic Alliance is not therefore a decisive obstacle to its activities and does not restrict its international secretariat to decisions taken by the WEU Council alone. If this secretariat is to be allowed to play its due rôle to the full, this flexibility should be put to better use than heretofore and it should be allowed to co-ordinate the work of the IEPG, which does not have its own secretariat, the SAC, FINABEL, CNAD and all European bodies concerned with the joint production of armaments.

32. However, current practice seems to bear out the views of advocates of bilateral or ad hoc co-operation between a limited number of countries. France and the Federal Republic, for instance, in the framework of their privileged relationship, have developed various types of armaments, especially helicopters. Although less systematically, many other countries have signed bi- or trilateral agreements, such as the one associating Italy with the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom for the production of the Tornado combat aircraft. Such practice certainly meets a need: in many cases, even the best projects would never get off the ground if the general agreement of the member countries had to be obtained before implementing them. It must be noted, however, that only the countries taking part really consider a project "European" and thus worth being the first choice for their armed forces. As in the case of the "deal of the century", for understandable economic and military reasons WEU member countries have frequently preferred American

equipment to equipment produced by one of their partners but in which they played no part.

33. One of the SAC's rôles might be to promote multilateral programmes and to investigate member countries' programmes for procuring and replacing equipment. As pointed out in the note of 12th June, "the use of new technologies to strengthen conventional defence demands that no opportunity for consultation at European level be overlooked". While in this area "WEU could play a useful rôle as a forum for discussion and a source of political impetus", governments should define this rôle in greater detail. They can obviously hardly do so through the intermediary of the Permanent Council or the Council meeting at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. If it wishes to assume this rôle, the Council will also have to meet periodically at the level of Ministers of Defence, who are much better prepared to work out and take the necessary decisions such as those taken in Madrid in July 1984 for the multi-purpose combat aircraft.

34. Furthermore, a number of proposals were made to the Council in 1983 and again in 1984 by the head of the international secretariat of the SAC for turning the SAC specifically in the direction referred to in the note of 12th June 1984. It is surprising that, as far as your Rapporteur knows, apart from the pursuit of current work, only the proposal for a study of the armaments industry in Japan has been retained so far.

35. It should also be noted that the SAC has been invited by a NATO group to resume the study of a military vehicle which it abandoned several years ago. This is not without importance if it is borne in mind that to date co-operation between NATO and the SAC has always followed the principle that duplication was to be avoided, preference being given to larger organisations, whereas in the present case the principle of work-sharing has been chosen.

36. There is in any event no doubt that the technical development of armaments and their growing cost puts them out of reach of individual European countries and this will be increasingly so. The extremely fast evolution of American and Soviet strategic concepts, from the Rogers doctrine to "star wars", already makes it impossible for each of our countries to go ahead with the urgently-required organisation of truly European research, development and production of the latest weapons. President Mitterrand recently expressed his wish for Europe to produce an observation satellite. This idea should be taken up and studied if we do not wish our security to be entirely dependent on the United States and to lag so far behind technically that it would soon become impossible to catch up.

37. Armaments co-operation is quite a delicate matter since each country's security requirements are closely linked with national economic interests and public or private firms' industrial and financial interests. This intermingling is probably one of the main reasons for the relative failure of organising production through intergovernmental organisations.

38. Plans for reactivating WEU must therefore take the utmost account of these intermingling interests. In this regard, much is to be learned from the agreement concluded on 9th July 1984 between Italy, France, the Federal Republic, Spain and the United Kingdom for the joint production of a multi-purpose combat aircraft for the five countries' air forces. The agreement was concluded by the Defence Ministers of the five countries in conditions very similar to those for WEU's SAC. In April 1983, the air force chiefs of staff of the five countries concerned noted the need for such an aircraft for the last decade of the century to replace the Mirage F-4, Tornado or Jaguar aircraft now deployed by the five countries. In December 1983, the chiefs of staff of the five countries met in Cologne to sign a protocol of agreement defining the operational requirement to be met by the planned aircraft. Experts from the five countries then drew up technical specifications for the future aircraft, which allowed the agreement to be signed on 9th July. Once the Ministers had taken their decision, industry was asked to make specific proposals, while national armaments directors were asked to prepare feasibility studies on the basis of which the Defence Ministers, meeting again in Rome in March 1985, will be able to decide on the production of the aircraft.

39. However, caution is always required in assessing the possible results of a proposal for international co-operation in view of the influence which the armaments industry and all the interests it represents may bring to bear on state policies. A case in point is the Franco-German decision to develop a combat helicopter to be produced by the two countries' industries without taking account of the existence of the helicopter already developed by the firm Agosta in Italy. In such a case, the priority given to bilateral co-operation jeopardises possible multilateral production based on what already exists. One of the main rôles of the Standing Armaments Committee should be to avoid such waste of time, manpower, technical resources and money by keeping an open catalogue of industrial programmes and their state of progress in the various member countries.

40. In order to remove certain misunderstandings, it should be made clear that the interoperability of armaments is first and foremost a military matter and must be

achieved in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. The rôle of the SAC or of any other WEU body with powers to act in armaments matters is not necessarily to bring about joint production but above all to co-ordinate a broad spectrum of efforts in this sense and eventually to give the impetus necessary to raise them to European level.

(e) Disarmament and the control of armaments

41. One of the problems facing Europe is that negotiations on the limitation of armaments are conducted mainly by the United States and the Soviet Union. Their overwhelming strength makes this inevitable, particularly in nuclear matters, but the result is that the uncertainties of their domestic policies play a decisive rôle in the process of the negotiations, while the other members of the two alliances have little say, although they are directly concerned by the arms race. Demonstrations against the deployment of continental-range missiles in Europe following NATO's 1979 twofold decision show that the situation can have very serious consequences for the morale of the European members of the Atlantic Alliance and hence for the cohesion of the alliance.

42. Admittedly the European members of the Atlantic Alliance take part in negotiations on conventional armaments, including the Stockholm conference, but even then they are closely dependent on alliance strategy which is itself determined by how the Americans plan to deploy their nuclear and conventional forces in a global strategy. Only they have the necessary information to guide all these negotiations and the means of supervising the implementation of agreements.

43. It would therefore be desirable for the Western European countries to set up a body to inform those who represent them in negotiations and the idea was put forward, inter alia by Mr. Hernu, the French Minister of Defence, in the Assembly in December 1983, that the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments should be used for this purpose. It must be noted, however, that this proposal does not seem to have been tackled during the first stage of the Council's reflection, which led to the note of 12th June.

44. However, while all the present work of the Agency relates to controls within WEU on the basis of the modified Brussels Treaty, it seems that it will have fewer tasks from now on. Consideration might therefore be given to asking it to carry out a rather different task which would not be defined by the treaty but merely by a joint decision of member governments, i.e. to set up, thanks to the experience

it has acquired in documentary controls, a centre for documentation on armaments throughout the world which would be available to the relevant authorities in member countries.

45. There is in fact every reason to believe that exchanges of military information between members of the Atlantic Alliance are still extremely inadequate and, in particular, the European members receive little information from the United States which alone has the wherewithal to inform them satisfactorily about the situation at world level. Because of past incidents and present uncertainty, it has only limited confidence in NATO and its partners. Of the latter, some seem to have excellent information about regions where they have special interests, but as far as your Rapporteur knows none of them individually can keep up-to-date worldwide information. In the event of crisis, France or the United Kingdom have sometimes had to call on American means of information in order to take action in regions where they could not obtain the necessary information, be it in East Africa or Latin America.

46. Seven-power Europe might form the basis of a body capable of keeping an up-to-date store of information and the Agency for the Control of Armaments might preside over the exchanges and keep the files. The methods it now uses, including the study and analysis of military budgets, might usefully be applied to non-member countries, starting with the Soviet Union, where such serious publications as the *Military Balance*, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, show how little the West knows about its real military expenditure. Naturally, experience acquired in on-the-spot controls could not be used here, but through its information and advice the Agency could prepare joint positions for member countries participating in negotiations or in NATO for countries which are not participating. Thus, the Agency could play a rôle comparable to that of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the United States or SIPRI in Sweden, although it would not have the same status as either of those two bodies.

47. In the explanatory memorandum to its 1985 defence budget, the Netherlands Government even specified that, while it was in favour of cancelling the restrictions in Annex IV to Protocol No. III:

“The government considers a more useful task could be found for the Agency for the Control of Armaments, for instance making a study of how to verify agreements governing weapons systems.”

48. The Agency will of course have to continue its tasks under the modified Brussels

Treaty, particularly those relating to A, B and C weapons, troop levels and conventional armaments listed in Annex IV to Protocol No. III.

49. It is recalled that certain governments have asked for the cancellation of this quite obviously out-of-date list, which, having been drawn up in 1954, could include only armaments which are now obsolescent and not others which have become essential or, a fortiori, those now being developed which will play a major rôle in years to come. That is why other governments have proposed that this list be updated rather than cancelled, or have raised the idea of reducing Annex IV progressively so that the Agency may gradually direct its work in new directions.

50. The modified Brussels Treaty was an innovation in international law since, in an alliance with an almost automatic military assistance clause, it introduced a commitment for the complete “transparency” of levels of forces and armaments among the various allies. This has been and probably still is an essential part of the establishment of mutual confidence from which the whole European edifice has benefited and which might quickly be undermined if the European states again had to resort to espionage to ascertain the means available to their partners. Whereas in all East-West disarmament negotiations the West has rightly stood firm in its insistence on the need to verify the application of any agreement, can it state that the controls effectively applied in Western Europe are now obsolete and difficult to tolerate? The question is in any case worth raising and the governments should not draw negative conclusions without considering it seriously.

51. In an interesting article in the October 1984 issue of the French revue *Défense Nationale*¹, two French generals made a proposal which would be worth considering carefully in the context of the reactivation of the WEU technical bodies, i.e. to set up a European observation satellite agency. The authors wrote:

“Europe’s technological capability gives it an undeniable space vocation. It should take advantage of this, hence the European observation satellite agency. Benefiting from the contributions of member states, this agency should have a system of observation satellites and appropriate means of processing and circulating the data. Europe would thus have an independent observation capability, whose priority task would be every aspect of defence:

1. Pierre Schwed and Henri Bagnouls : *Vers une défense européenne*, *Défense Nationale*, October 1984, pages 43-57.

military, earth resources, agricultural economy, etc.

.....

At European level, this development could follow very closely after the definition of the concept: it should therefore be possible to set up the European observation satellite agency very quickly basing it on an existing concrete programme for instance. Dealing, initially at least, with defence-related activities, there would be nothing to prevent it at the same time providing Europeans with an additional means of contributing to the work of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe which it was decided to convene at the conference on security and co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Madrid, which was closed on 7th September 1983, or to any other similar work."

52. Moreover, some have expressed the view that the Agency's control task inside WEU might in a certain way be extended. Today, the problem is not so much that a European country might be doing too much for its armed forces but that some of them might not be doing enough, and the control of armaments, not solely as a negative guarantee but also as a positive guarantee that everyone is fulfilling his joint defence obligations, might play a rôle at least as great as in the past in maintaining and strengthening Europe's security and the mutual confidence of its members. An obvious question is how far governments are prepared to have their armaments efforts verified and it is to be feared that they will not allow very much.

53. However, this would not be an entirely new practice but an extension of what has been done for the British Army of the Rhine which cannot be reduced without the agreement of the Council. This would seem particularly justified since, following France's refusal to make its nuclear armaments subject to Agency control and apart from the Federal Republic's renunciation of the production of ABC weapons, the United Kingdom would be the only country subject to special – positive – obligations and would thus be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its continental partners, particularly if the list in Annex IV were to be reduced.

54. In any event, if the work of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments is to be extended to matters outside the framework of member countries, as the WEU Council is envisaging, your Rapporteur considers it regrettable for the governments to start with the abolition of controls actually exercised for the last thirty years which have allowed the Agency

to perfect its working methods and train its experts. Effective control of armaments is largely ensured by keeping public information up to date on many subjects, and on-the-spot controls are merely a close complement to documentary controls. What might be abolished could not be easily reintroduced if the need were felt.

55. The fact is that the non-ratification by France of the 1957 convention allowing the Agency free entry to factories, depots and barracks without special authorisation from the governments concerned and its refusal to allow any control over its nuclear forces have, whatever good will the firms concerned may have shown, limited WEU's means of verification and introduced an imbalance contrary to the treaty by maintaining special obligations for the United Kingdom, with the maintenance of the Rhine army, and the Federal Republic, with its renunciation of certain weapons, while France is allowed to evade its own obligations. In these circumstances, it therefore seems curious that France is proposing the maintenance of controls on A, B and C weapons which it evades and the abolition of controls on conventional weapons which it accepts. Your Rapporteur is not suggesting reverting to the full application of the 1954 protocols, which he is the first to admit no longer meet present conditions, but he does not wish the principle of declarations and controls to be abandoned. He therefore suggests that their application be brought up to date, considering inter alia that trying out procedure in a field where it is possible to verify the results obtained on the spot, for instance by the estimates which observers can make of troop levels or armaments involved in manoeuvres, should be of help in working out methods applicable outside the framework of the alliance.

56. Probably in the next few years, if the governments give the Agency tasks outside the area of the Seven, its new range of action will assume increasing importance at the expense of its treaty tasks. But your Rapporteur considers it would be dangerous to reduce the latter prematurely as it gives the Agency valuable competence and experience for new tasks. A programme of progressive conversion by reducing the list of armaments in Annex IV to Protocol No. III might guide such an evolution. Indications which have reached your Rapporteur about the Council's plans lead him to fear that it has not so far been sufficiently aware of the drawbacks of too sudden a change.

57. In any event, any evolution in the Agency's tasks would imply changing its statute and its staff. It was designed as a relatively autonomous body, even with regard to the Council, because of the rigour and independence

necessary for a task exclusively designed to verify the accuracy of declarations by member governments. The more its activities are turned in new directions, the more it will have to become an instrument of the Council and hence of governments. It is formed mainly of officers who have retired from their national armed forces, so as to associate technical ability and independence. Henceforth, it will be far more a matter of recruiting officials capable of following the Council's instructions in areas which will not all be the exclusive responsibility of the military. The Agency may therefore become a body for carrying out the Council's directives, which means placing its activities more directly under the Secretariat-General and making its work more political. With due regard for the order in which present officials leave, its staff will then have to be progressively adapted to these new requirements. This is yet further reason for hoping that measures will not be taken too hastily for changing the direction of the Agency's work.

(f) The WEU Council and defence questions

58. A constant concern of the WEU countries has been to avoid forming a bloc within NATO so as not to bring the Seven into conflict with their European or American allies, which would harm the cohesion of the alliance and jeopardise European unity. This preoccupation is ever present and should be taken into account in any reactivation of the WEU Council. It precludes the creation of military headquarters or permanent commands in the framework of WEU.

59. There are nevertheless several areas in which consultations between the Seven may be useful. There can be no reactivation of WEU affecting only its technical bodies, and if need be the Assembly, and not the Council, which is the real hub of the organisation. Yet it is clear that if WEU has been somewhat lethargic it was due to the Council, i.e. the governments of which it is composed, not the technical bodies or the Assembly. But there would be no point in considering reorganising the Council if a start was not made by trying to define the rôle it might play.

60. First and foremost, the tasks of the Agency and the SAC must be clarified, guidelines drawn up for their work, reports must be received from them and the Assembly must be kept informed. This has been the Council's main task in recent years and the development of the tasks of the SAC and of its international secretariat or the working out of new tasks for the Agency would bring a parallel development in the Council's activities. It may however be wondered whether its present membership, i.e.

the Ministers for Foreign Affairs or their deputies and the ambassadors in London, are the most appropriate authorities in the areas in which these developments may be directed.

61. The note of 12th June refers to these aspects of the Council's rôle, clearly for armaments co-operation, less so for assessing the various aspects of the threat to Europe: military, political and psychological. It seems difficult to consider assessing the threat without also examining how to meet it, and to direct the Agency towards information on world armaments implies that the Council must deal with the possible use of these means, i.e. the alliance's strategy. The need seems even greater for the European members of the alliance to discuss this among themselves since the signs are that current NATO doctrines – the flexible response strategy and forward defence – have lost touch with present circumstances, particularly in view of the superiority which the Soviet Union acquired long ago in conventional armaments and more recently in theatre nuclear weapons. The United States for its part, with the 1979 twofold decision, the Rogers doctrine and then the space defence programme, seems quite prepared to rethink its system of deterrence and defence. But there are signs that its European allies, without making specific proposals, are finding it increasingly difficult to accept initiatives which compulsively come only from Washington, which in a way, stultifies strategic thinking in NATO.

62. It serves no useful purpose to be unco-operative since this would result in the Americans not taking account of the reactions of their allies; rather a European strategic doctrine should be developed, not in opposition to that of the United States but rather to make the specific viewpoints, reactions and interests of the European members of the alliance carry weight in NATO. Here too the WEU Council would have a rôle to play.

63. The possibility of European action in disarmament was mentioned above. To be valid, it must be a prolongation of strategic thinking, just as American and Soviet positions on the subject are based on the two countries' strategic concepts, and this is another area in which the WEU Council might also be the forum for intra-European consultation.

64. The two French generals quoted above made a proposal in the same article which might also be of interest to the Council because it meets some of the concerns voiced by several of its members in recent years. It is based on an experience which seems to have been of benefit to France, by suggesting the creation of a high-level European defence research institute.

Your Rapporteur can do no better than to quote these two authors again¹:

"This body's main purpose would be to make Europeans aware of defence problems; it would be placed under the guidance and control of an institution such as Western European Union (WEU); its courses would be attended by military personnel, civil servants and representatives of all socio-professional activities from all the member states; it should be:

- *a research centre* responsible for examining defence concepts in Europe, working out a general European concept and co-ordinating and providing material support for studies and research likely to contribute to the overall political concept and make it viable; inter alia, this centre would facilitate the harmonisation of member states' attitudes towards the conference on security and co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the conference on disarmament in Europe and any other similar activity;
- *a centre for stimulating opinion* in the European defence area, where a certain picture of Europe would be worked out, i.e. in point of fact its real identity; the institute might be given the task of conveying this picture to public opinion; national meetings on a rotating basis might play a major rôle;
- *a privileged forum for political expression*, where national leaders would express their views and in exchange obtain the reactions of experienced Europeans;
- *a meeting place* widely accessible to Europe and the world, thanks to a policy of exchanges governed by great freedom of expression;
- *a technical council* for the guardian organisation; the institute would of course have to be given the necessary means for this - particularly computers - to allow it to become Europe's true collective memory, a witness to its development and the centre for its openings on the outside world.

Like the *Institut des hautes études de défense nationale* (IHEDN), whose activities have certainly played a part in shaping a common national language and, in point of fact, establishing the consensus

which exists in France, the institute would bring Europeans to form a rational idea of the geopolitical and geostrategic facts of the day by making them more aware of the strength they derive from their exceptional situation in the world and by conducting frank discussions together.

Thus it will be possible to develop effectively the ideas round which the majorities necessary for the advancement of the edifice will be formed."

65. But the most important thing which the Council should do is probably to ensure the effective application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty which, unlike the North Atlantic Treaty, requires member countries to consult each other on all matters threatening international peace, there being no geographical limit to the Council's responsibilities. So far, however, consultations on the international situation have been very limited in WEU and no country has made use of its right to convene the Council in the event of emergency under paragraph 3 of Article VIII, whereas several of them have been involved in armed conflicts outside Europe.

66. It is true that consultations have been held in NATO on events outside the treaty area in cases when the Soviet Union was involved because of the more widespread hostilities to which they might have led and the possible consequences for the deployment of NATO forces, particularly in the case of the United States having to redeploy all or some of its NATO-assigned forces outside the area covered by the Washington Treaty. But NATO makes no provision for consultations on the deployment of these forces or those of other countries which might have to be moved in such cases.

67. The Brussels Treaty requires such consultations and even the agreement of its signatories should the United Kingdom have to move certain forces assigned to the Rhine army. It is difficult to imagine this obligation being extended to other countries at the present juncture, but France's build-up of a rapid deployment force whose troops would be taken from divisions stationed in France and possibly certain equipment from French forces in Germany directly concerns the solidarity of the central front and hence joint security in Europe.

68. Moreover, any military action by a member country anywhere in the world brings into play the security of all members of WEU, even if the Soviet Union is not immediately involved, in view of the imperative nature given to the *casus foederis* in Article V of the treaty. Admittedly, it would paralyse any external action by one of the members to make it subject

1. Op. cit. pages 51-52.

to the agreement of its partners, but actions such as the French intervention in Chad or the British Falklands expedition were clearly not adequately discussed in consultations, which would have avoided some misunderstanding. While useful ten-power consultations are held on political matters, they cannot be extended to anything relating to military interventions and the possible consequences, whereas WEU seems an appropriate forum even if, as the note of 12th June very fairly points out, "the Seven have no special interests to express on all these problems, they at least have specific viewpoints and ideas" about "the effects of the international situation on European security".

69. This note consequently mentions a number of improvements to the Council's working methods, proposing that it meet twice a year at ministerial level instead of once as at present – but four times up to 1969 – in order to "provide the required political impetus and at the same time enhance the work of the Permanent Council". It is questionable whether two ministerial meetings a year would be enough to provide this impetus, particularly in armaments matters. Of course, Ministers for Foreign Affairs who meet very frequently in many different forums cannot be expected to devote more time to WEU, but periodical meetings of Ministers of Defence, with responsibility in several matters which should be covered by the WEU Council, might be one of the conditions for a true reactivation of WEU. Their presence at the ministerial meeting deciding on the first steps to be taken for this reactivation, to be held in Rome on 26th and 27th October 1984, is a novelty and must be followed up, even if meetings of Ministers of Defence are not necessarily linked with those of Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

70. The measures referred to in the note of 12th June with regard to the Permanent Council – more frequent meetings and above all their expansion as appropriate to include senior central government staff – are obviously more substantial than those for ministerial meetings. But here too it should be recalled that the central administrations directly concerned are not just the Ministries for Foreign Affairs but also the Defence Ministries. Only insofar as the national authorities directly responsible for defence take part in the work of WEU will the organisation be able to play its true rôle, that of ensuring the security of Europe in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.

III. *WEU and the European Community*

71. This important subject which the Assembly has often examined in the past is mentioned

only briefly in the note of 12th June. The question is to what extent WEU's activities affect or might in future affect the development of the European Community whose responsibilities some believe should one day include security and defence questions which are not covered by its constituent treaties. It is often feared that, being intergovernmental, WEU might lead to the establishment of another Europe, different to the Community geographically and in its principles, and a rival and dangerous competitor for Community Europe because the governments might use it to undermine supranational power.

72. The Nine's reference at the Paris summit meeting in October 1972 to the establishment of a European union as the ultimate aim of all European organisations did not solve the question insofar as the nature of the union was not specified and the time limits the Nine laid down for setting up the union were passed a long time ago without anything being achieved. In September 1981, the proposed European act launched by Mr. Genscher and Mr. Colombo included joint security among the areas in which Europe would have to assert itself, but without clearly saying how. In his press conference on 12th June 1984, Mr. Cheysson, the French Minister for External Affairs, made no secret of his view that nothing pointed to the geographical and institutional unification of Europe. Everything indicates that other governments share this view.

73. Furthermore, the urgent need to revive European co-operation is illustrated by ten-power Europe's difficulties in areas in which the constituent treaties gave responsibility to the Community bodies, the failure of the Athens and Brussels summit meetings, barely glossed over by the very relative success of the Fontainebleau meeting and the elections to the European Parliament which did not show very much public enthusiasm for the Community cause. With the present economic recession a revival is hardly possible in view of the difficulty governments have in making public opinion accept anything which may appear to be a sacrifice to the European cause. Political co-operation seems to have reached its limits for the immediate future. The defence of Europe is probably the only area in which significant progress can be made. It must in any event be seriously reviewed and the moment now seems ripe.

74. Moreover, the French Government is right to mention the obstacles encountered by the development of ten-power – and probably soon twelve-power – political consultations on security matters to justify its proposal to make better use of the seven-power framework. It is obviously right to give first place to the will to

succeed, even if this means provisionally giving up involving those who do not want a defence Europe: an unduly institutional view must not paralyse European action.

75. If there is to be such a review, it must however be admitted that for a long time to come WEU will remain primarily a body for co-operation between governments anxious to retain their freedom of action in areas which are not at present the responsibility of the European Community. Even from the point of view of those who cannot imagine a European union remaining indefinitely without responsibilities in the important field of Europe's security, the wise course seems to be to advance as far as possible with intergovernmental co-operation among like-minded countries. The reactivation of WEU is now a means of moving forward.

76. Nor must it be forgotten that the European union will never be complete as long as its geographical framework is not fixed and it is not possible to keep Denmark, Greece, Ireland or, above all, Spain and Portugal, which have applied for membership of the Community, out of an essential aspect of the union, at least not permanently.

77. While it is probably true that the revival of WEU can today hardly extend beyond the framework of the Seven, due regard must be paid to the fact that some time or another it is destined to organise the defence of a wider Europe. Hence the consultations to be held in WEU can hardly be defined too positively: they are those which the Ten cannot pursue continuously and effectively, i.e. mainly those which one way or another concern recourse to force inside or outside the continent of Europe and the means of avoiding it or meeting it, which implies security, disarmament or the limitation of armaments, action outside the NATO area and the armaments policies of member countries. These are the areas in which, in the interests of the Atlantic Alliance, a European point of view should be worked out and expressed by the WEU Council.

78. It should also be noted that the French initiative which led to the note of 12th June 1984 came at about the same time as the Franco-German decision to develop bilateral co-operation between the two countries in military matters. Although sound understanding between France and the Federal Republic is indispensable for Europe, too much bilateral activity – in political or military consultations and the co-production of armaments – is always liable to relegate the European partners of the two countries to the rather unenviable position of being unable to accept or refuse decisions already taken and of being pushed to the sidelines of the European forum. They would

then be in the position France rejected in NATO and in the long run this would lead to the paralysis of any truly European organisation in defence matters.

79. This does not mean that the reactivation of WEU is jeopardised before it has started, provided France and Germany do not go too far in their agreement. Franco-German co-operation on the contrary demonstrates a political will which Europe greatly needs. But it also contains a warning for the other members of WEU: if they do not take part in this political will, if they lag behind in the effective reactivation of the organisation, they will have no grounds to complain about the development of Franco-German bilateralism. It is for them to take up the challenge and show that they wish to keep their place in a defence Europe. The fact that Belgium has made proposals to its partners shows that it is prepared to do so. This is certainly also the case for Italy. United Kingdom and Netherlands reservations about the French proposals have made some observers wonder about their intentions. But one must in any event take it as a fact that the note of 12th June defines the points on which the Seven have managed to reach agreement. Likewise it may be assumed that the proposals made by certain governments and not included in the note failed to secure the unanimous agreement of the Seven, which does not necessarily mean that they must be rejected.

80. However, there remain a number of questions where one may wonder to what extent there may be overlapping between the responsibilities of WEU and of the Ten.

81. (a) In external policy consultations on regions outside the NATO area, the frontier between defence-related questions and others is particularly difficult to determine since the ten-power bodies do not in principle hesitate to tackle security questions. In fact, if one follows the principle often advocated by the Council that each matter is preferably dealt with in the widest possible organisation, and if it is considered that all the members of WEU are now members of the European Community, the solution seems obvious. It is to hold consultations in WEU on questions which could not be handled satisfactorily in the ten-power framework. There are very probably quite a lot of them. Furthermore, the Council should abide by the principle, so far accepted, of answering the Assembly's questions provided they have a bearing on matters within the purview of the modified Brussels Treaty, which is hardly restrictive, even if they are effectively dealt with in frameworks other than WEU.

82. (b) Regarding the production, procurement or trade in arms, the European Parliament and the European Commissioner responsible for

industrial questions, Mr. Etienne Davignon, at the symposium organised by our Assembly in Brussels in 1979, claimed their right to take over these problems within their common industrial policy. It is evident that these questions come under industrial policy and defence policy too and it is difficult to see how a clear dividing line can be drawn between them. Uncertainty will probably remain for quite some time and there is little likelihood of the governments now being prepared to limit their options in matters in which they are the exclusive clients of the industrialists and often the major producers too. All recent coproduction agreements have involved authorities which escape, if not always the Community regulations, at least any action by the Commission, and if there is hope for the SAC and its international secretariat to bring some order to joint production or procurement procedures it is because of the freedom of decision that the governments wish to retain. The principle of giving priority to the bodies with the greater number of members, i.e. the Community authorities, might there too be applied without jeopardising the activities of WEU and would leave plenty of room for the rôle of co-ordination which your Rapporteur believes the international secretariat of the SAC should play.

83. (c) While the WEU Council has given up the exercise of some of its responsibilities in favour of other bodies, this is not so for the Assembly which has relinquished none of its prerogatives even if in practice it no longer examines certain questions.

84. The European Parliament for its part has endeavoured to affirm its rôle in discussing questions related to European security and European co-operation in armaments. Its first move in this direction was to adopt the report on the two-way street presented by the German Christian Democrat representative Egon Klepsch in 1978. This step was followed up by the institutional committee and the political committee of that assembly after its election by direct universal suffrage in 1979, but so far the obstacle has been the refusal of the governments, and particularly the French Government, to examine defence questions in a framework defined by the Rome Treaty.

85. In this respect it should first be noted that no one can prevent a parliamentary assembly from examining any question whatsoever. Conversely, if the parliamentary assembly has no legislative or decision-making powers, which is the case of the European Parliament in matters not directly linked with the application of the treaties on which it is based and of the WEU Assembly in all fields, its deliberations can be truly meaningful only if they lead to a

dialogue with the executive. Our Assembly has noted the extent to which the shortcomings of its relations with the Council have until recently limited its audience and the position of the European Parliament seems even worse in security matters, whereas the relative good will shown by the WEU Council in 1984 in holding a dialogue with the Assembly on everything relating to the reactivation of WEU must help to enhance the position of our Assembly whose standing is improving rapidly as testified for instance by the interest taken by the press at the last session.

86. The problem of the WEU Assembly cannot therefore be viewed in isolation. If the reactivation of WEU at intergovernmental level takes effect, it will certainly improve the audience of its Assembly. If, on the contrary, only mediocre results are achieved, a parliamentary assembly opposite an executive in a state of lethargy would have little chance of being heard.

87. Again, if account is taken of the fact that the Commission of the Community cannot at present be the interlocutor of a parliamentary assembly for defence-related questions since these are the exclusive responsibility of governments, the close link between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the member countries remains a means for our Assembly to exercise an influence which the European Parliament has no longer had since its election by direct universal suffrage, most of its members no longer being members of national parliaments.

88. Your Rapporteur therefore believes that the election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, rather than increasing its influence in defence matters, might diminish it and occasional suggestions to modify the status of our Assembly set out in Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty for it to be formed of representatives of the member countries to the European Parliament might result in a further weakening of its authority.

89. This does not mean that Article IX as now drafted and interpreted offers a satisfactory solution. Indeed, the delegations of the parliaments of the member countries of WEU to the Council of Europe which form the WEU Assembly are first and foremost nominated according to the responsibilities of the Council of Europe. They include many parliamentarians more interested in the questions handled in that forum than in defence problems.

90. Our Assembly has tackled the problem thus raised several times without finding a satisfactory solution. A possibility would obviously be to revise Article IX of the treaty so that the delegations would be composed in

the same manner as those of the Council of Europe but not necessarily of the same members. Although generally considered rational, this solution has never been retained because several countries fear that any revision of the treaty might lead to other articles, essential to the security of Europe, being questioned. In no case should it be undertaken without prior agreement of the seven member countries to limit the revision to Article IX of the treaty. Although this solution has never been retained by our Assembly, it is difficult to see why it could not be examined seriously by the Council.

91. A second solution worked out by our Assembly and endorsed several times would be to ask the national delegations to choose as substitutes for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe members who would be more interested in defence questions and would sit rather in the WEU Assembly whereas the titular members would preferably sit in the Council of Europe. An attempt was made to promote this proposal through letters from the President of our Assembly to the presidents of the parliaments of the member countries, but these letters had little effect since it is not the presidents of the parliaments who in fact appoint the delegations and their appointment is governed primarily by internal political considerations.

92. There is an additional means of reducing the distance separating the two parliamentary assemblies, each of which, in accordance with their constituent texts, wish to constitute the parliamentary side of the future European union, and that is through the exchange of observers. The idea was brought up by Mr. von Hassel in 1980 and by Mr. De Poi in 1981 and steps have been taken in this direction although it has not yet been possible to institute a systematic exchange of observers. Perhaps it might be possible to improve this practice. It is clearly in the interests of the European Parliament, allowing it to maintain contact with the European assembly with responsibility in defence questions, and in that of the WEU Assembly, which must not neglect the European dimension of its deliberations. At the present time it seems difficult to envisage a stronger framework for co-operation between two assemblies which are elected in ways which correspond to the realities of Europe in the areas in which each of them has responsibility.

93. Regarding the content the Council wishes to be given to the work of the Assembly, the note of 12th June gives an indication which corresponds to a wish expressed several times by the governments of member countries in recent years: to associate European opinion with the necessary effort the nations must make to

ensure their security. This corresponds obviously to a twofold anxiety stemming on the one hand from the magnitude of the demonstrations against the application of NATO's dual decision taken in 1979 and on the other from the way many European countries are falling behind in bringing their conventional weaponry up to date because of the economic measures they have had to take because of the crisis.

94. To try to redress a weakening in the determination of the European peoples to defend themselves by holding an open and contradictory discussion in parliament is truly the way in which a democratic society must react. Such discussion should include an assessment of the threat and the need for measures to meet it. This your Assembly has done and will continue to do. But in this and other respects it cannot act without adequate response from the executive or without means of information and action which are granted it only too parcimoniously. It is neither desirable nor possible to rely on the Assembly alone to debate the requirements of European security and it is by reactivating the various aspects of the government sector of WEU and by improving the dialogue between the executive and parliamentary sides that the Council can give the Assembly the means of acting in the direction it is proposing. The transmission of the note of 12th June and the contacts between the Council and the Assembly during the elaboration of decisions augur well for the Council's determination in this respect.

IV. The Rome ministerial meeting

95. The ministerial meeting in Rome on 26th and 27th October has been prepared by a Council working group instructed to work out the decisions to be taken by the ministers of the seven governments. The Assembly has been informed of work in progress not through official communications but by several informal contacts between the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the President of the Assembly, accompanied at least once by certain members of the Assembly. The informal nature of the latter meeting meant that it was improvised without allowing sufficient time for fully satisfactory participation by political groups and national delegations. Your Rapporteur can try to assess the state of these negotiations just before the Rome meeting on the basis of oral, fragmentary information.

96. At least the Assembly's views were known thanks to all the recommendations it has adopted on the work and structure of WEU. Your Rapporteur has had a collection of these texts prepared. Among them, Recommendations

406 and 407 play an important part since they were adopted in June 1984 and relate directly to the proposed reactivation of WEU.

97. They provided a basis for a memorandum prepared by Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, expressing his views on the revitalisation of WEU, which was handed to Vice-Chancellor Genscher and then circulated to members of the Assembly. This document allowed the Assembly to play a positive part in the work of the Council and there is no doubt that it helped to guide some of its decisions. Your Rapporteur is pleased to note that, on the whole, this memorandum follows the same lines as his own thinking.

98. Among the Council's statements, a distinction must be drawn between the true guidelines and the first ideas designed to help the working group in the next few months in its reflections on the rôle of WEU's technical bodies.

99. For the *Council at ministerial level*, it is planned to have it meet more often and to associate the Ministers of Defence, who might possibly meet without the Ministers for Foreign Affairs. In this connection, note may be taken of the deliberate adoption of extremely flexible procedure, which has the advantage of making the WEU Council a more manageable instrument, better able to meet requirements as they arise, particularly for the application of Article VIII of the treaty. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that, should the political will which now seems to prevail among governments slacken, these non-binding procedures will effectively be applied, and the results of the Council's work will seem more like declarations of intent than firm decisions.

100. Similarly, measures to strengthen the *Permanent Council* are vague. More frequent use of working groups and examination of matters which truly relate to co-operation in European security are obviously desirable but there is no compulsion. Much will of course depend on the personality of future Secretaries-General and their concept of their duties. The Assembly has often asked that this post be given to a political personality, not because of doubts about the organisation's successive Secretaries-General, who have all fulfilled their duties remarkably conscientiously, but because it believed the revitalisation of WEU, for which it had been asking for many years, required a Secretary-General able to take the political steps necessary for any meaningful action by the Permanent Council under his chairmanship.

101. In his relations with the President of the Assembly in recent months, Vice-Chancellor Genscher has shown that he considered the

chairmanship of the Council to be a political post. This is the real justification for the informal procedure adopted in relations between the Council and the Assembly. Such procedure is obviously impossible for a Secretariat-General run by an official. The Council's choice of informal procedure for some of its meetings and for its contacts with the Assembly involves certain risks. In particular, should certain governments lack the will to work effectively in the framework of WEU the organisation might lapse completely. The only way to take this risk with optimum chances of real success is to give the Chairmanship of the Permanent Council to someone whose past, relationships and ways of thinking and working guarantee that he will take the steps necessary to revitalise WEU.

102. With regard to the *Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee*, a number of factors are not very clear in the terms of reference which the Council intends to give to a working group. It will be recalled that the Assembly's proposals for having these bodies serve the Council by providing it with a direct, continuous flow of information on disarmament and the control of armaments, helping it to define a security and defence policy for Europe in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and promoting European armaments co-operation mean completely reorganising the Agency. Should it be merged with the international secretariat of the SAC to form a single body, closely dependent on the Council, and designed to provide it with the studies and information it needs? Conversely, should the present status of the Agency and of the SAC be maintained, as this makes them better able, with their present structure, to prepare the work of the Council on the first and third of these aims? This will probably be the subject of the forthcoming studies by the working group.

103. Your Rapporteur does not wish, at this juncture, to discuss the purely institutional aspects of the reactivation of WEU, but is anxious to stress that these aspects are important, particularly in cases where there are political reasons for the Council's work being made more difficult. The Council has faced crises during its thirty years' history and has been able to overcome them only because the modified Brussels Treaty made it responsible for organising the control of armaments. The deliberate choice of informal procedure or an end to controls might make the institution wholly dependent on the will of the governments, which might be neither steady nor unanimous. The existence of technical bodies with specific responsibilities, like the appointment of a politician as Secretary-General, are essential conditions if WEU is to be sure of functioning satisfactorily for long enough after

the removal of commitments in respect of the control of armaments.

104. The same is true of *relations between the Council and the Assembly* which the Council intends to improve, but mainly on the basis of informal procedure, as it has done systematically in recent months, thereby only accentuating a trend which began many years ago, moreover. Confirmation of this trend calls for two comments. First, while informal procedure allows an infinitely easier dialogue than with formal procedure which requires the unanimous agreement of the seven governments, it leads the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to speak in his own name, certainly taking account of the views of his partners, but without the Council as a body having to express itself, i.e. without really committing the seven countries in support of his views.

105. The second comment is that a parliamentary assembly, particularly when it represents the parliaments of seven countries and political tendencies which the official groups of the Assembly express only partially, finds it difficult to delegate its powers to a President, a Bureau – even enlarged – or a Presidential Committee for its dialogue with the Council. Your Rapporteur speaks from experience since, having to prepare a report for one of the Assembly's committees, he was not asked to take part in the talks between the President and the Chairman-in-Office of the Council although information was then exchanged which he could have turned to greater advantage had he been able to take part personally. While the Chairman-in-Office of the Council is not the Council, delegations of whatever kind are not the Assembly, and it is most important that the development of informal procedure should not lead to the relinquishment, even partial, of formal procedure, which alone is capable of satisfying the Assembly as a body.

V. *The discussion in the General Affairs Committee*

106. A discussion was held on the working paper submitted by your Rapporteur, which was the first outline of this report, at the meeting of the General Affairs Committee on 9th October. Statements at that meeting led your Rapporteur to stress two points of view which in no way differ from his own but which were expressed forcefully on that occasion.

107. First, Europe's security depends not only on nuclear deterrence and the balance of armed forces in Europe but also on the maintenance or restoration of peace in the rest of the world. Such peace may be lasting only if it is

accompanied by a move towards greater justice in the distribution of wealth to the advantage of the third world. This means that, in the view of certain committee members at least, the Council should pay greater attention to the problems arising for European security outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty and consider not only the military aspects, but also the economic and above all political aspects which are in fact at the centre of any real reactivation of WEU.

108. This remark goes hand in hand with the fact that disarmament must remain an essential aim for Europe and hence for the WEU Council because of the need now being felt in Europe to invest in productive sectors, the growing demands on Europe from the third world countries and the advantages inherent in negotiated, balanced and controlled disarmament. Yet the European countries go their separate ways in these matters. The reactivation of WEU should allow Europe to exist. Your Rapporteur has described above the rôle the Council might play in working out a European disarmament policy and what assistance it should receive from WEU's technical bodies, particularly the Agency, in fulfilling this rôle.

109. Your Rapporteur wholly endorses these two points of view, but wishes to point out that at the present juncture there seems to be a possibility of giving WEU a new, mainly political, activity. There is no point in asking Europe to pursue a given policy in favour of disarmament or the third world, particularly if, as noted by certain committee members, such a policy does not coincide with that of the United States, if Europe fails to afford itself the means of defining a collective policy and taking action. The purpose of the present report being to examine these means, your Rapporteur did not feel he should dwell unduly on the aims pursued. It would serve no purpose to define the aims if the means of taking truly European action did not exist. For that reason your Rapporteur welcomes the initiatives taken by the governments in giving new life to WEU.

VI. *Conclusions*

110. At its June 1984 session our Assembly voted on two reports giving its views on the direction to be given to the reactivation of WEU. The present document, drafted shortly after that session and before new information has reached the Assembly on the work of the Council or of the working group it set up, cannot go much further. Your Rapporteur hopes to add more details in the weeks to come. The main factors may be summed up as follows:

111. (i) It is necessary to review the requirements of European security and this implies revising the activities of WEU and of its organs so as to allow Europe to play a greater rôle in the defence policy of the Atlantic Alliance and in the limitation of armaments. This review should allow the main structure of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance to be built and the defence wing of the future European union to be set up, account being taken of the fact that for quite some time it would probably not be possible for this area to coincide with the European Community in a geographical or institutional respect.

112. (ii) The Council must not only meet more often, it must incorporate representatives of the defence ministries to enable WEU to act in matters which occupy such an important place in its responsibilities. It must also take greater account of NATO meetings and of the questions discussed there in order to obtain a better hearing for Europe's point of view. In addition to the activities of the other organs of WEU, its agenda should regularly include consideration of the possible threats to European security, particularly when they concern matters arising outside the area covered by the Atlantic Alliance.

113. (iii) The armaments controls laid down by the treaty for all the WEU countries on the mainland of Europe must be adapted to present realities, particularly by bringing up to date Annex IV to Protocol No. III. However, the governments of several member countries are thought to prefer a complete cancellation of the list of conventional weapons in this annex. In any event, these controls might usefully be completed by using the method of documentary controls for assessing the level of forces throughout the world with a view to enlightening member governments as to the threats to international peace and helping them to shape their views on disarmament and to guide the production of armaments.

114. (iv) The tasks of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee should be spelt out so as to insure better co-ordination of the joint production and procurement of armaments in Western Europe and Europe's access to the most recent technology in this area. It might also offer better means of communication between the armaments industries and the various bodies responsible for promoting the coproduction of armaments.

115. (v) The dialogue between the Council and the Assembly is important for the work of the Assembly and must be pursued and improved, not only during the period of re-examination of WEU's activities, but also once this re-examination has been completed.

116. (vi) In October 1984 the governments were not in a position to take all the decisions necessary for adapting WEU to the new requirements. This adaptation will have to be progressive and nothing that has been gained must be abandoned without agreement having been reached between the Seven on the various aspects of the new balance of commitments.

117. (vii) The evolution of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty over thirty years raises the question of whether adaptation is possible without revising the treaty. This is a very controversial question, some fearing that a revision might lead to certain obligations which are essential for the security of Europe being questioned. The Council seems to have excluded revising the treaty.

118. (viii) Only if the Seven reach agreement on the other elements of reactivating WEU will it be possible to raise meaningfully the question of the seat of the organisation, i.e. regrouping the Council on the one hand and the other ministerial organs and the Assembly on the other.

119. (ix) Revision of the treaty would allow the question of the composition of parliamentary delegations to be raised. One might usefully re-examine the terms of the statute of the Council of Europe determining the composition of its Parliamentary Assembly to replace Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty which states that the same delegations of the member countries of WEU shall constitute the two assemblies.

120. (x) The decisions communicated by the Council in October 1984 can be a major step towards revitalising WEU, particularly by associating the Ministers of Defence with the activities of the ministerial Council, by making procedure more flexible and by increasing the number of meetings.

121. (xi) Measures to give the Permanent Council effective responsibilities should be specified. They will be fully credible only if the Secretariat-General is placed under a person empowered to take political initiatives.

122. (xii) More informal procedures may improve the work of the Council and its relations with the Assembly provided the governments are truly determined to achieve results. Should this determination waver, the only guarantee of the institution surviving will be the maintenance of formal, compulsory procedures.

123. (xiii) It is essential to adapt the technical bodies to WEU's new requirements, particularly in order to work out a European policy on disarmament and the control of armaments, to promote a European concept of Europe's

security requirements in strategic questions and in its policy outside the North Atlantic Treaty area and to develop rational European co-operation in armaments matters.

124. *(xiv)* All in all, the Council is proposing a complete upheaval of WEU as it was shaped by the 1954 Paris Agreements. Such an upheaval was essential because WEU practice no longer corresponded to the requirements of European security in 1984 and was more a hindrance than a help in working out a

European defence policy. However, the Council is still very vague about the shape it intends to give to the organisation for the coming decades. If it does not soon manage to convert into institutional terms and into effective activities the will it has expressed to inject life into WEU, fully endorsed by the Assembly, it is to be feared that any reforms it advocates will be based on quicksands and that "reactivation" may merely be the shroud for burying WEU.

WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance

AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3¹

tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "European security and" insert "the maintenance of".
2. After paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:
"Convinced of the need to have a single seat for all the WEU organs in the same city in order to facilitate the development of the dialogue between the Council, the Secretariat-General and the Assembly and to ensure that the WEU technical organs are able to carry out their duties of assisting and informing the Council and the Assembly more efficiently,".
3. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:
"Solve the problem of a single seat for all the WEU organs;".

Signed: Cavaliere

1. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment 1 agreed to; amendment 2 negatived; amendment 3 withdrawn).

WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance

AMENDMENT 4¹

tabled by Mr. Pignion and others

4. Leave out paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
“Considering that, whenever useful, the WEU member countries may consult each other on the repercussions for Europe of crisis situations in other regions of the world;”.

Signed: Pignion, Bassinet, Lagorce

1. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment negated).

WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance

AMENDMENT 5¹

tabled by Mr. Vecchietti and others

5. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "East-West relations" and insert "an active policy for improving relations between East and West".

Signed: Vecchietti, Ferrari Aggradi, Fiandrotti, Rubbi

1. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment agreed to).

WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance

AMENDMENT 6¹

tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others

6. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “the action those countries pursued” and insert “to consultations about security challenges”.

Signed: Stoffelen, Gansel, Hughes

1. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment negated).

WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance

AMENDMENT 7¹

tabled by MM. Stoffelen and Gansel

7. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:
“Considering that the reactivation of WEU might jeopardise relations with other NATO member states in Europe.”

Signed: Stoffelen, Gansel

1. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment negatived).

WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance

AMENDMENT 8¹

tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others

8. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph:
“Play an active rôle in disarmament, for example by making an effort – as a first step – in the relevant international organisations to reach limited and controlled disarmament which contributes to the elimination of the perils of war, thus reinforcing the policy of détente;”.

Signed: Stoffelen, Gansel, Hughes

1. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment withdrawn).

WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance

AMENDMENT 9¹

tabled by MM. Stoffelen and Gansel

9. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:
“Properly consult and inform NATO member states, non-member states of WEU, and clearly indicate its intention to take a positive attitude when examining (possible) applications for membership of WEU.”

Signed: Stoffelen, Gansel

1. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment negatived).

WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance

AMENDMENT 10¹

tabled by Mr. Pignion and others

10. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “concerning Europe’s security which occur outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty” and insert “in another area of the world which might have an impact on Europe’s security”.

Signed: Pignion, Bassinet, Lagorce

1. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment negatived).

WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance

AMENDMENT 11¹

tabled by MM. Masciadri and Michel

11. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:
“Develop co-operation between WEU and the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly in the joint production of armaments, bearing in mind that the aim is their accession to WEU as soon as circumstances permit.”

Signed: Masciadri, Michel

1. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment agreed to).

WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance

AMENDMENTS 12 and 13¹

tabled by Mr. Martino and others

12. After paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:
“Welcoming especially the fact that the Rome Declaration introduced the question of disarmament into the Council’s work;”.
13. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:
“Follow closely the expected resumption of international negotiations on disarmament and prepare the necessary measures to allow Europe to play an active part therein;”.

Signed: Martino, Pignion, Fiandrotti, Ferrari Aggradi, Vecchietti

1. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment 12 amended and agreed to; amendment 13 agreed to).

WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance

AMENDMENT 14¹

tabled by Mr. Martino

14. In Amendment 4, leave out “Leave out paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert” and insert “After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation insert”.

Signed: Martino

1. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment fell).

*Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments -
parliamentary action taken on recommendations
adopted by the WEU Assembly
on European co-operation in space technology*

INFORMATION REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Relations with Parliaments
by Mr. Hackel, Rapporteur*

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Information Report

(submitted by Mr. Hackel, Rapporteur)

A. Activities of the committee

1. The first part of this report on the activities of the committee covers the period January to October 1984 and completes the statistics on interventions in parliaments up to 1983.
2. The committee met in Paris on 14th March and 20th June 1984 and in the Netherlands on 16th and 17th May during a visit, when it was addressed by Mr. van Eekelen, a former member of the Assembly, on the rôle of WEU in European security and other topical political questions. His address was followed by a lively discussion.
3. In accordance with Rule 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, the committee selected from among the texts adopted by the Assembly those which it considered should be the subject of debates in parliaments. Among the texts adopted during the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session, the committee selected Recommendation 396 on European security and burden-sharing in the alliance and Recommendation 398 on the rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime. From the texts adopted during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session, it selected Recommendation 406 on thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council and Recommendation 408 on the control of armaments and disarmament.
4. These recommendations were transmitted officially by the President of the Assembly to the Presidents of the parliaments of member countries. On 19th December 1983 and 30th July 1984, the Chairman of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments wrote to all members of the committee sending them draft questions relating to the abovementioned recommendations, together with a draft question on Recommendation 404 on the state of European security.
5. To date, the Office of the Clerk has recorded four questions put in three parliaments on Recommendation 396 and three questions put in three parliaments on Recommendation 398. In the case of Recommendations 404, 406 and 408 adopted at the summer session, Mr. Frasca put a question on each of them in the Italian Senate but has not yet received an answer.
6. The total number of interventions and questions recorded by the Office of the Clerk

was thirty-three for 1983, a sharp drop as compared with the sixty-three interventions and questions recorded in 1982. Your Rapporteur will refer to the problem later in this report.

7. It has been specified several times in earlier reports of the committee that the French, German and Italian Parliaments publish regular summaries of Assembly sessions. Several successive Rapporteurs have asked that the delegations of the other four member countries follow this example. It is therefore a source of satisfaction that two sessions ago the Netherlands Delegation started publishing such summaries and communicating them to the Office of the Clerk. This is a good opportunity for again urging the Belgian, Luxembourg and United Kingdom Delegations to follow suit.

B. Action taken in parliaments on Assembly recommendations on European co-operation in space technology

I. Introduction

8. Two recent events have helped to make the public aware of Europe's importance in space matters. In a speech on 7th February 1984, President Mitterrand proposed the creation of a European space community. On 4th August 1984, Europe's Ariane 3 carrying two satellites to be placed in earth orbit was successfully launched from the French Guiana base.
9. While astronautics is assuming increasing importance, it is natural that the matter should be widely discussed in European and in national parliaments. It would therefore be appropriate to analyse relevant debates on WEU Assembly recommendations in order to assess interest in European space co-operation.
10. To make it easier to follow the discussion, it is worth while first mentioning a few basic aspects of space questions.
11. There are both civil and military aspects to space technology and the distinction between them is not always clear. Various satellite programmes, which have repercussions on the development of telecommunications, maritime communications, radio and television, meteorology and the detection of earth resources, among others, may be exploited for both peaceful and military purposes. The same is

true for the development of orbital systems and space laboratories (e.g. Spacelab).

12. Characteristic of European space co-operation is the fact that work is conducted at different European levels with different national staff. Moreover, there are bilateral agreements between European countries and also between European countries and the United States. This leads inevitably to different national interests and renders homogeneous supranational development more difficult.

II. The main European space co-operation bodies

13. In the peaceful use of space, one of the most important European bodies is the European Space Agency (ESA), which has its seat in Paris. The following eleven European countries are members: *Belgium*, Denmark, *France*, *the Federal Republic of Germany*, Ireland, *Italy*, *the Netherlands*, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and *the United Kingdom*. Countries which are members of WEU are underlined. Apart from Luxembourg, all the WEU member countries are therefore members of ESA.

14. Canada, Norway and Austria take part in certain programmes, Austria is an associate member while Canada and Norway have observer status. ESA was created on 31st May 1975 by merging two organisations, ELDO and ESRO. Its task is to ensure and develop, for peaceful purposes, co-operation between European states in space research and technology for scientific purposes and, in applied technology, to develop operational space systems. Another aim of ESA is to co-ordinate and integrate the various national space programmes. As a major client of the European space industry, one of its tasks is to work out an appropriate industrial policy in order to increase the competitiveness of the European aerospace industry. Furthermore, national space bodies should play a closer part in the implementation of ESA programmes.

15. All member states finance the Agency's general budget and scientific programmes in proportion to their national revenues: these payments are called compulsory contributions. On the other hand, member states may, if interested, take part in optional programmes and fix the amount of their contributions themselves. Examples of these programmes are Spacelab, the Ariane launcher, the ECS and Marecs (maritime) communication satellites and Meteosat and ERS-1 earth observation satellites. Most of these programmes will soon be completed.

16. Arianespace was formed to sell the Ariane programme to industry.

17. Several major European agreements are worth mentioning: (i) In 1973 an agreement was signed on the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF), an interstate organisation grouping seventeen European countries and based in the United Kingdom. Its aim is to make longer-range weather forecasts possible by using mathematical and empirical calculations. (ii) On 14th May 1982, an agreement on the European telecommunications satellite organisation Eutelsat was signed in Paris. This was the outcome of a government conference of twenty-four states, including all the WEU member countries. Eutelsat's main aim is to operate and extend the European communications satellite system (ECS) and, where appropriate, to implement new systems of this type with a view to improving the telephone and television transmission network and to promote the development of a European high-speed data-transmission network. (iii) On 29th April 1980, a major bilateral Franco-German agreement was signed on industrial co-operation on broadcast satellites, which came into force on 1st December 1980.

III. Activities of the WEU Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

18. Since 1965, under the responsibility of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, the WEU Assembly has followed space technology matters in a number of reports and recommendations. In order to be topical, the present report will deal only with recommendations adopted in the last five years. The following list already shows the variety of subjects tackled.

19. On 22nd November 1978, the Assembly adopted Recommendation 326 on *application satellites*, on 23rd November 1978 Recommendation 328 on *weather forecasting*, on 5th June 1980 Recommendation 353 on a *European earth resources detection satellite programme* and Recommendation 354 on the state of European *aerospace activities* – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council, on 17th June 1981 Recommendation 369 on the *future of European space activities* – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council, on 29th November 1983 Recommendation 399 on the assessment of *advanced technology in Japan* and on 20th June 1984 Recommendation 410 on the *military use of space*.

20. In a European framework, the work of the WEU Assembly has been completed inter alia by that of the Assembly of the *Council of Europe*. The principal texts adopted by that assembly in recent years are:

- Order 372 of 2nd October 1978 on remote sensing;
- Recommendation 844 of 2nd October 1978 on the *European Space Agency*;
- Recommendation 845 of 2nd October 1978 on Europe's needs in the field of *remote sensing*;
- Recommendation 896 of 3rd July 1980 on European policy for the design and construction of *direct broadcasting satellites*;
- Recommendation 926 of 7th October 1981 on questions raised by cable television and by direct *satellite* broadcasts;
- Resolution 788 of 24th January 1983 on the future of the *European space programme*;
- Resolution 789 of 24th January 1983 on the second United Nations conference on the *exploration and peaceful uses of outer space*;
- Recommendation 957 of 24th January 1983 on the proposal for an *international satellite monitoring agency*.

21. It is admittedly not always possible to avoid parallelism and overlapping of work by the two assemblies. But the attention of the Presidential Committee might be drawn to the need to find ways of co-ordinating and sharing work; in this task it might start from the principle that the WEU Assembly is primarily concerned with military aspects.

IV. Consideration of WEU Assembly recommendations in national parliaments

Recommendation 326 on application satellites, adopted on 22nd November 1978

22. This recommendation advocated instructing ESA to carry out specific tasks, e.g.:

- to establish a global communications network in which data gathered by satellites could be combined;
- to build a small prototype solar power satellite providing electrical capacity,

and urged member governments:

- to indicate which elements of ESA's draft Spacelab follow-on development programme were to be carried out;
- to define the medium- and long-term goals of ESA and to have a draft long-term budget drawn up.

The Assembly also recommended that in the United Nations member states support steps to oblige states launching satellites to provide information on those which had sources of nuclear energy on board.

23. The reply of the Council, communicated on 25th April 1979, stressed the need for collaboration between ESA and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), considered the proposed prototype solar power satellite premature because of its cost and recalled that the ESA Council would decide whether the draft Spacelab follow-on development programme should be carried out. The Council welcomed efforts undertaken by member states of WEU in the United Nations committee on the peaceful uses of outer space to ensure the security of satellites having sources of nuclear energy on board.

24. Three representatives (Belgian, Italian and British) asked their governments to explain the delay in adopting ESA's budget. The difficulties described in the governments' answers may, it is true, now seem out of date. Similar problems may, however, arise again, particularly as ESA's current programmes are now nearly completed. The Belgian Government's answer in January 1979 to a question put by a representative is therefore perhaps still pertinent:

"Many problems face the European Space Agency stemming mainly on the one hand from the prevailing difficult economic situation which restricts the sums member states can devote to space activities and on the other from the need to take very important decisions concerning new activities: moving on to the operational stage of the communications programme, use of Spacelab, direct television by satellite, European earth resources satellite, subsequent development of the Ariane launcher and Spacelab.

In addition to the difficulties stemming from the economic situation, others result from the varying degrees of interest which member states have in the different programmes."

25. In the Italian Senate, Mr. Treu referred to the recommendation on the construction of a solar power satellite and asked that action be taken on the suggestion that the medium- and long-term goals of ESA be drawn up and that support be given in the United Nations for the necessary security measures for nuclear satellites. The Italian Government has not yet answered this question.

26. In the Bundestag on 24th November 1978, Mr. Scheffler asked the Federal Govern-

ment two questions on communications satellites. The first concerned the progress of research and development in Germany in respect of communications satellites and what success had there been on the international market. The Federal Government's answer on 29th November 1978 gave an overall view of the then situation:

"German research and development have gained an international position where communications satellites are concerned:

- The Franco-German Symphonie communications satellite programme on the experimental transmission of television broadcasts, telephone conversations and data, whose two satellites were launched in 1974 and 1975 and have since played a successful part in worldwide tests, has demonstrated a capability to develop satellites of this type and place them in geostationary orbit.

- The Federal Republic was responsible for the major part of the ESA Telecom programme, both technically and financially. In March 1978, work started on the ECS communications satellite for setting up a European operational satellite system to transmit communications on a large scale and broadcast television programmes. The OTS orbital test satellite was launched successfully in May 1978. A comprehensive test programme is under way.

- The ESA Marots (more recently Marecs) maritime satellite programme is to form part of the planned worldwide Inmarsat system. At the same time, maritime stations and radio distress installations have been developed in Germany.

- Where direct broadcast satellites are concerned, for several years the emphasis has been on modular-type operational models intended for satellite platforms, payloads and receiving installations with the result that German industry is now well placed to develop and produce satellite systems of this type. Thanks to the encouragement of the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology, German industry has recently had considerable success on the international market:

- German industry is developing and producing the attitude control system and solar panels for the seven new-generation Intelsat V satellites constituting the worldwide Intelsat satellite system. It has thus obtained the largest subcontracting contract outside the United States.

- The German electronics industry has provided wave propagation tubes, inter alia for the American SBS (satellite business system), the NASA TDRSS (data-transmission satellite system) and the Canadian Anic-B communications system."

27. Mr. Scheffler's second question asked for an estimate of international demand for communications satellites and Germany's possibilities in that market. The Federal Government answered as follows:

"... recent studies show that in the eighties the world market will amount to DM 17-30,000 million. An estimate made in December 1977 by the Centre for Aeronautical and Space Research and Tests at the request of the Ministry of Research and Technology gave a figure of DM 24,000 million, of which 40% for satellites and ground installations (antennae) and 20% for launchers. Europe's possible share of the world market has been estimated at 30% or DM 7,000 million. Should Germany obtain a share of not less than 25% of the European market, this would represent a figure of about DM 2,000 million for the eighties. Large user receiving stations, needed for direct broadcasting, are not included in these estimates.

When assessing the openings afforded by these market prospects, the strong demand for experimental use of Symphonie and the interest shown in direct broadcast satellites must be considered positive. Conversely, the delay in completing satellite systems, for political and financial reasons, particularly in Brazil, Iran and the Arab states, must not be overlooked.

Where conventional broadcast satellites are concerned, European industry is hardly in a position to compete with American industry which practically dominates that market, even if the adoption of the ECS operational satellite system in Europe consolidates European industry. On the other hand, direct broadcast satellites have a great future. According to estimates by the German Centre for Aeronautical and Space Research and Tests mentioned above, in the eighties broadcast satellites will represent almost as high a proportion of the market as other communications satellites. German industry being well placed at the outset because of the extent of its research, priority will be given to broadcast satellites.

The success of this undertaking will depend on industry making strong efforts to align its prices with those of the Americans and pursue an active sales policy."

Recommendation 328 on weather forecasting, adopted on 23rd November 1978

28. This recommendation stressed the importance of weather forecasting for both civil and military purposes and inter alia recommended that member governments:

- place a system of meteorological satellites in polar orbit;
- promote the foundation of an organisation to start the operational phase of a European meteorological satellite system;
- support the study of the establishment of a meteorological satellite system for defence purposes and test existing military meteorological co-ordination; and
- engage their efforts jointly and fully in fundamental research.

29. On the whole, the Council's reply communicated to the Assembly on 11th June 1979 was positive in regard to these proposals and recalled the work of the WMO. The Council considered that a separate European military contribution to placing military meteorological satellites in orbit might lead to duplication without military satellites being necessarily less vulnerable than civil satellites.

30. There was a response to this recommendation in the parliaments of six member countries. Questions put by representatives may be grouped as follows.

31. Four representatives referred to the proposal to place a meteorological satellite system in orbit for *defence purposes*.

32. On 1st June 1979, Mr. Scheffler asked the Federal Government whether it considered meteorological co-ordination in the alliance satisfactory and what it thought of the need to set up a European meteorological satellite system for defence purposes.

33. The Federal Government answered as follows:

"1. Military meteorological co-ordination is now satisfactory. However, it does not concern only the European partners of the alliance but NATO as a whole.

The highest body for co-ordination and planning, the Military Committee

Meteorological Group (MCMG), supervises co-ordination and working groups at the level of each major command in which countries and NATO commanders are represented.

The interests of the Bundeswehr are represented by officials from the Ministry of Defence and the Bundeswehr geophysical information service.

The broad lines of co-ordination and planning are set out in NATO documents.

2. The military meteorological services of the European members of NATO at present use data and information supplied by American meteorological satellites and the European meteorological satellite Meteosat. In the event of hostilities, it is expected that there would be a severe limitation of the volume of data supplied by these civil meteorological satellites.

Since 1974, NATO has been asking that meteorological data and information supplied by satellite be also, and above all, available in case of war, but has stopped short of calling for the creation of a meteorological satellite system specially designed for defence purposes."

34. On 22nd December 1978, Mr. Delehedde drew the attention of the French Government to Recommendation 328 and asked whether it was prepared to afford its active support to examining the establishment of a European meteorological satellite system for defence purposes, together with a network of mobile ground stations.

35. On 10th February 1979, Mr. François-Poncet, Minister for Foreign Affairs, answered as follows:

"A first meteorological observation satellite, Meteosat, has already been launched by the European Space Agency and others are planned. The French Government is playing an active part in this programme, which is producing satisfactory results. But it is obvious that the activities of the European Space Agency are wholly peaceful and that the satellites it launches cannot be used for other purposes."

36. In the Italian Senate, Mr. Treu drew the attention of his government to several points in Recommendation 328, as follows:

"To ask the Minister of Defence to give his opinion and that of his ministry on Recommendation 328 on weather forecasting.

In this recommendation, the WEU Assembly, considering the need for a

defence meteorological satellite programme in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, recommends that member governments develop research and co-operation in respect of meteorological satellites by affording appropriate financial support and promote the formation of a European meteorological satellite system, Eurometsat, similar to the Eutelsat of the postal authorities. It also recommends increasing the number of observation posts covering the North Atlantic by organising automated meteorological data collection by specially-equipped aircraft and placing a system of meteorological satellites in polar orbit.

To ask the Minister what action, if possible early and effective, he intends to take on this recommendation.”

37. On 8th February 1979, Mr. Ruffini, Minister of Defence, answered as follows:

“The establishment of a meteorological satellite system for defence purposes would obviously allow specific meteorological information to be obtained in wartime; the technical operational characteristics of such a system should be worked out in a study at European level to determine the cost, breakdown of responsibilities and management of the various elements of infrastructure necessary for the orbiting and operational control of the satellites.

Consequently, participation in a programme of such magnitude could be considered only once all the technical and financial aspects are known.

It should be pointed out that at present, in the field of military meteorological satellites, the United States has developed a satellite system which operates in the European area and whose technical characteristics are a military secret; data might be made available to NATO countries through the establishment of appropriate links with receiving stations in Germany.

Automated meteorological data collection in the North Atlantic area by specially-equipped aircraft and meteorological satellites is being studied by the Military Committee.

It should be pointed out in particular that Italy has been assigned no responsibility with regard to meteorological observation and/or reconnaissance flights in the North Atlantic area.”

38. On 15th December 1978, Mr. Kershaw put the following two questions in the House of Commons on Recommendation 328:

“1. To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what steps he has taken to establish a European meteorological satellite system for defence purposes together with a network of mobile ground stations.

2. To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether he will propose the formation of an organisation by the European meteorological services of institutes to start the operational phase of a European meteorological satellite system Eurometsat similar to the Eutelsat of the European postal authorities.”

39. On 15th January 1979, Mr. Wellbeloved, Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force, answered as follows:

“1. None. Existing weather satellites are fully utilised for defence purposes as are more conventional observational systems. These arrangements are kept under continuous review by the NATO Military Committee Meteorological Group, of which the United Kingdom is a member.

2. The European geostationary satellite (Meteosat 1) is at present operated as a research system. Should the system prove to be cost-effective in competition with conventional ground-based systems a continuing operational programme will be contemplated. Meteosat 2 is currently being discussed by the appropriate European institutions and it is possible that it will function as an operational system. The United Kingdom is keeping in close touch with developments.”

40. Two representatives (Mr. Cavaliere, Italy, and Mr. Cornelissen, Netherlands) put questions on the evolution of weather forecasting in general. Since the answers of the governments concerned were connected only indirectly with Recommendation 328 and described above all their respective national positions, there is no need to study them in detail.

41. On 13th December 1978, Mr. Hengel put the following question in the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies:

“Is the government prepared to promote the formation of an organisation by the European meteorological services or institutes to start the operational phase of a European meteorological satellite system, Eurometsat, similar to the Eutelsat of the European postal authorities ?”

42. On 26th January 1979, Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs, answered as follows:

"The aims of the European meteorological satellite programme (Meteosat) are to design, develop, place in orbit, manage and control a preoperational meteorological satellite and to develop and set up the relevant ground stations. The European Space Agency (ESA) is carrying out the programme on behalf of participating member states, i.e. Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

The first meteorological satellite, Meteosat-1, was launched successfully on 23rd November 1977 and at the beginning of December was in geostationary orbit at an altitude of 36,000 km at the intersection of the Greenwich meridian and the Equator. From this position over the Gulf of Guinea it photographs Europe, Africa and South America every half an hour and transmits the raw images to the central ground station, the European Space Operations Centre in Darmstadt (Federal Republic of Germany). Once processed the sectorised images are transmitted by Meteosat-1 from Darmstadt to stations using the data, currently some twenty-five meteorological centres at airports and elsewhere. Processing the images includes extraction of wind vectors and will in future provide other elements, including the surface temperature of the sea, objective analyses of cloud cover and relative humidity in the upper atmosphere, data on radiation and maps showing the height of cloud summits. Meteosat-1 is also used to collect data and anybody wishing to integrate a platform or system must negotiate with the European Space Agency. Images emanating from Meteosat can be seen on German television every evening at about 7 o'clock.

Since the Meteorological and Hydrological Service is aware of no meteorological satellite programme other than the one described, it has been agreed that the development phase of the preoperational meteorological satellite Meteosat should lead to the operational phase of the European meteorological satellite system Eurometsat.

Direct Luxembourg participation in the development of this system appears difficult in view of the high technical level required. Consideration might be given to installing a user station at Luxembourg-Findel airport but this would be very expensive: the station at the Belgian Royal Meteorological Institute cost about 25 million Luxembourg francs."

43. This subject, i.e. the creation of an organisation to start the operational phase of a European meteorological satellite system, Eurometsat, similar to the Eutelsat of the European postal authorities, was also referred to in the second part of Mr. Kershaw's question and partially in Mr. Treu's question. The answers of the Luxembourg and United Kingdom Governments both recognise that ESA, which handled the development phase of the meteorological satellites, would also assume responsibility for the operational phase. The Italian Government did not mention this matter.

Recommendation 353 on a European earth resources detection satellite programme, adopted on 5th June 1980

44. In this text, the Assembly recommends that the Council:

"Urge the member states:

1. To put greater political emphasis on the final definition and initiation of an agreed earth resources satellite programme and on the continuation of the Meteosat meteorological programme;
2. To co-ordinate their efforts in remote sensing by satellite through the European Space Agency, for which they should evolve a European space policy and a more closely involved political direction of the Agency, and invite the Italian Minister in charge of space questions, Chairman-in-Office of the ESA Ministerial Council, to prepare and convene a Council meeting in the near future to establish that European policy since ESA is at a crossroad for its new programmes;
3. To build on existing national programmes such as the French Spot system, either by a renewed effort at their Europeanisation or by integrating such programmes with an approved ESA schedule of compatible earth resources satellite launches;
4. To devote adequate funding for a worthwhile European earth resources satellite programme through the European Space Agency as being the most cost-effective instrument for its development so as to be able to exploit the industrial, technical, environmental and strategic benefits of a substantial and carefully prepared remote-sensing satellite programme;
5. To evolve the most appropriate mechanisms both for the practical application of remote-sensing satellite observations and the commercial exploitation of such satellite systems;

6. To encourage within the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) the concerted study of the military requirements for remote-sensing satellites on a European basis, the definition of any resulting satellite projects and their economic and efficient procurement;

7. To urge *the Councils of the European Communities and the Council of Europe* to co-ordinate the possible application of European earth resources satellite programmes to the benefit of European overseas aid programmes and the economic development of poorer countries of the third world."

45. The reply of the Council, communicated to the Assembly on 21st November 1980, adopted an attitude which was on the whole positive towards these proposals, although stressing that there was no link between ESA (civil) and the IEPG (military).

46. Two questions were put in the Italian Senate on this recommendation. To the question by Mr. Maravalle on paragraphs 1, 2 and 7, Mr. Tesini, Minister without Portfolio responsible for co-ordinating scientific research and technology, answered on 9th March 1982 that:

"Italy is keenly interested in Europe's future remote-sensing activities and, in view of the importance of the recommendation in question, it asked the WEU Permanent Council at its meeting in London on 18th June 1980 to prepare a reply, and this was done.

Following this initiative, as Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, I proposed in ESA that a meeting of member countries' ministers be convened with the specific purpose of defining European space policy. With particular regard to the European satellite programme, our country is following attentively the earth resources remote-sensing satellite programme through my deputy's active participation in the ESA committee which is managing the programme. In this framework, Italy is at present helping to define the second stage of this programme, which includes the research, development and construction of the first European remote-sensing satellite, ERS-1; Italy is now prepared to consider playing a major part in the definition phase of the ERS-1 system, known as phase B. The first part of this programme is the Meteosat programme, including the meteorological satellite successfully developed by ESA thanks, inter alia, to the Italian contribution.

The second flight unit of this satellite (Meteosat 2), which has now been successfully placed in orbit, was carried out by ESA with a significant Italian contribution. Finally, it should be recalled that our country is also taking part in the management and operational phase of Meteosat 2 with a contribution of some Lire 4,000 million."

47. As far as your Rapporteur knows, no answer has been given to a similar question put by Mr. Talamona in the Italian Senate.

48. In the French Senate, Mr. Jeambrun put a question on 11th June 1980, laying particular stress on paragraph 3 of the recommendation (Europeanisation of the French Spot programme).

49. On 10th September 1980, Mr. Giraud, Minister of Industry, answered as follows:

"Recommendation 353, recently adopted by the Assembly of Western European Union, advocates the implementation of a European remote-sensing satellite programme. To this end, it recommends better co-ordination between member governments through the intermediary of the European Space Agency (ESA) and convening a meeting of the ESA Ministerial Council to define a European policy in this field. It suggests defining the European programme either by the integration of national programmes with an approved ESA schedule of compatible earth resources satellite launches or by a renewed effort to Europeanise Spot. The latter proposal hardly seems realistic. It should in fact be recalled that France's offer made in 1977 to carry out the Spot programme in the framework of ESA was rejected by all our partners with the exception of Sweden and Belgium, who became associated through bilateral agreements. Conversely, a European remote-sensing satellite programme is now being considered and has been discussed in ESA since the beginning of this year. The first stage might include a maritime and meteorological monitoring satellite using the Spot platform and new instruments in the field of ultra high frequencies. The detailed definition of the tasks of this satellite and technical studies on the instruments on board are in the process of being carried out. They should lead ESA to submit a proposal to member states at the end of this year. France's position towards this proposal will depend on the scientific, technological and economic value of such a satellite. In any event, it could not agree to take part in a programme which did not use the

technical know-how already acquired from the Spot programme, particularly where the platform is concerned, or whose aims were too close to, and hence in competition with, those of Spot. In this respect, France is in favour of the present trend towards a predominantly scientific and experimental programme designed to verify and measure possibilities of maritime monitoring and detection by satellite."

50. This statement clearly illustrates the problems involved in co-ordinating national and European satellite programmes.

Recommendation 354 on the state of European aerospace activities – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council, adopted on 5th June 1980

51. This recommendation deals inter alia with space matters and recommends that the Council:

"2. Invite the governments of the member states of the European Space Agency to take appropriate steps to ensure a close link between the French and German national programmes for direct broadcasting spacecraft and the ESA L-Sat programme so that European space interests will not be divided on the world scene and in the world market;

3. Invite the governments of the member states of ESA to consider the political importance of space co-operation for Europe and the need to take decisions concerning the future of the Agency at an appropriate political level;"

52. Two questions were put in the Bundestag on these matters.

53. On 22nd July 1980, Mr. Scheffler asked the Federal Government whether it intended to take steps to ensure a close link between the national programme for direct broadcast satellites and the ESA programme, inter alia for financial and commercial reasons concerning the world market.

54. Through Mr. Haunschild, then Secretary of State for Research and Technology, the Federal Government answered as follows:

"The joint development of television broadcasting satellites decided upon in the framework of the international programme with France is limited, in accordance with the provisions of WARC 77, to operations in the two countries. The organisations responsible – Bundespost and Télédiffusion de France – will

carry out the planned launching at the end of 1983 or in May 1984 for operational tests of at least two years' duration.

The joint implementation of this project was started after the signing of the government agreement on 29th April 1980. Various European states have expressed the wish for their industries to take part as subcontractors.

The L-Sat concept, on the other hand, is based on the idea of a universal satellite platform which must prove its worth for a wide range of planned uses. The L-Sat programme makes provision for various radio and television broadcasting tests. It is still in the study stage. Negotiations on the implementation and financing of the project are under way.

France and Germany do not intend to take part in the L-Sat programme, whose technological development and aims are different. The two projects may subsequently compete with each other at the marketing stage. Co-operation in the procurement of components might however be possible."

55. On 23rd July 1980, Mr. Flämig put the following question to the Federal Government:

"Is the Federal Government prepared to take part in a meeting of the ESA Council in 1980 or 1981 to determine political guidelines for the work of that organisation, since the time has come to decide on its future programmes?"

56. Mr. Haunschild answered as follows:

"The ESA Council meets regularly every two or three months at the level of delegates to discuss and take decisions on all essential matters of concern to the organisation. For some time, it has also been examining guidelines for the Agency for the 1980s. Proposals for new scientific programmes and their financial implications for the Agency are now being studied.

As soon as major fundamental political questions so require, the Federal Government will call for a meeting of the ESA Council at ministerial level. However, the new Director-General, who took office on 16th May 1980, must be allowed time to become acquainted with what is being done."

Recommendation 369 on the future of European space activities – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council, adopted on 17th June 1981

57. This recommendation advocated:

- the elaboration of long-term European space planning;
- full utilisation of Spacelab's potential and pursuit of the further development of the Ariane programme;
- agreement on an earth resources satellite programme;
- promotion of European military satellites;
- mobilisation of public opinion for a European space programme.

58. The Council's reply, communicated to the Assembly on 26th November 1981, gave an overall picture of the state of European space programmes at that time, without referring to the need for European *military* communications and observation satellites or answering the invitation to promote the investigation of the military implications of space technology.

59. It was precisely the military aspect that was raised by various representatives.

60. On 7th August 1981, Mr. Dejardin, a Belgian representative, put the following question to his government:

"The development of space technology is unfortunately not limited to the scientific field and to civil applications. The collective delirium into which the immoral arms race is leading us includes military applications in its murderous folly.

What measures have been taken in Belgium to promote investigation of the military implications of space technology? What is the concrete outcome for European industries of the consultations which have been held in this respect between members of the Atlantic Alliance? In view of their present capabilities, will they be called upon in the near future to provide NATO with observation or communications satellites or are they once again relying on American supplies?"

61. On 15th September 1981, Mr. Swaelen, Belgian Minister of Defence, answered as follows:

"Together with its allies in the alliance, the Ministry of Defence takes part in the research, development and implementation of programmes for the military use of communications and navigation satel-

lites but has no national space technology programmes.

Together with other departments, the Ministry of Defence takes part in some or all of the activities of groups such as the NATO Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development, the NATO Defence Research Group and the NATO global positioning Navstar and Telstar programmes.

The question of the participation of Belgian industries in these programmes, to which should be added Ariane, etc., is the responsibility of the Ministry for Economic Affairs."

62. Answering a similar question put by Mr. Jeambrun in the French Senate on 24th July 1981, Mr. Hernu, Minister of Defence, answered as follows on 9th December 1981:

"The military aspect of space technology was taken into account as from 1962. Thus, the Ministry of Defence contributed to the development of the Diamant launcher in the National Centre for Space Studies. Since then, the Ministry of Defence has continuously participated in the financing of various programmes of the National Centre for Space Studies intended for civil purposes. In the United Nations committee on the peaceful uses of outer space, France is trying actively to prevent space becoming a potential battlefield. No offensive military project intended for a hypothetical space war is currently being studied. Conversely, general studies are being conducted on various aspects of space technology which may affect defence. Such technology may concern non-offensive tasks such as communications or earth observation. As France is not a member of the NATO integrated military organisation, it plays no part in activities relating to military communications specific to the fourteen states which belong to that structure. It is therefore present only as an observer at work on communications satellites."

63. Answering a question put by Mrs. Knight on the same subject in the House of Commons on 28th October 1981, Mr. Pattie, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence Procurement, speaking on behalf of the government, said:

"The military implications of space technology are under study in the defence research programme and there is a continuing dialogue between the scientific and military staffs of NATO member countries. The principal applications are

seen to be in the field of communications and navigational satellites, on which there has been a substantial degree of co-operation within NATO."

64. On 29th June 1981, Mr. Atkinson asked the United Kingdom Government about the level of expenditure on space industries in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy. In its answer, the government gave the following figures:

"1980 budget expenditure on ESA and national civil space programmes – that is excluding PTT and military programmes for which only United Kingdom figures are available – was:

	£ million
United Kingdom	61
France	224
West Germany	162
Italy	61

Additional budgeted United Kingdom expenditure on PTT and military programmes for 1980 was £28 million. No information is available on the level of expenditure by the private sector."

Recommendation 399 on the assessment of advanced technology in Japan, adopted on 29th November 1983

65. Inter alia, this recommendation proposed the appointment of a permanent ESA representative in Japan.

66. While the Council refrained from adopting a clear position, various governments expressed opinions in their answers to questions put by representatives. Whereas the French, German and Netherlands Governments all declared in February and April 1984 that such an appointment was not essential for the time being, the Luxembourg Government merely indicated in its answer of 7th March 1984 that it was not a member of ESA and therefore could not intervene.

Recommendation 410 on the military use of space, adopted on 21st June 1984

67. Since this recommendation was adopted only this summer, your Rapporteur has so far been notified of only one question in parliament, put by Mr. Frasca to the Italian Government on 24th July 1984, in which he laid special stress on the fact that member governments were urged to do all in their power to secure negotiations between the superpowers so as to prevent the military use of space and called for

a larger European industrial involvement in alliance satellite programmes.

68. The Italian Government's position is not yet known.

69. Without referring explicitly to Recommendation 410, Mr. Noir, speaking in the National Assembly on 2nd July 1984, took up parts of paragraph 8 when he asked the French Government about plans for European countries to participate in building an American manned space station.

70. On 24th September 1984, the French Government answered as follows:

"The American offer of participation in the manned space station was made to the Europeans, Canadians and Japanese in January 1984 in President Reagan's speech on the state of the union. Since then, the European states have been examining their answer to this proposal in the framework of the European Space Agency. Germany and Italy are the two countries the most interested in the offer, which might succeed the Spacelab programme. Studies, still at a preliminary stage, led to the Columbus programme for an accommodation module, an automatic platform and service modules. These elements would be attached to the American station and in the early stages transported by the shuttle. However, France has ensured that compatibility with future European launching vehicles should be included in the specifications for the project. Discussions between the European partners advanced significantly on 28th June with the Council of the European Space Agency's adoption of a resolution expressing the will of member states in the long term to have an independent manned system and to this end to start the Columbus programme within the Agency. Ways of carrying out this programme and of sharing the financial burden will be worked out shortly. Furthermore, a working group has just been set up to prepare a meeting of the Council of the European Space Agency at ministerial level, which might be held at the end of 1984 or the very beginning of 1985. The main purpose of this exceptional meeting will be to prepare an answer to the American offer within the overall prospects of space developments to be defined by Europe for the next ten years. NASA has also introduced procedure for consultations which should be continued throughout the detailed study stage. France is taking part in these consultations, together with Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada,

Japan and the European Space Agency.”

V. *To sum up*

71. In accordance with Rule 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, a task of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments is to make all necessary arrangements for drawing the attention of parliaments to the work of the Assembly and inviting them to follow up this work. One of the committee's options is to select from among the texts adopted by the Assembly those which in its opinion should be debated in parliaments.

72. In regard to space, the Committee for Relations with Parliaments simply selected Recommendation 328 in November 1978 for it to be debated in parliaments. However, this does not mean no action must be taken on the other recommendations, for the general rule laid down in Rule 40.2 of the Rules of Procedure stipulates that all committees shall examine the action taken on recommendations adopted by the Assembly.

73. The greatest response was to Recommendation 328 since questions were put in six parliaments. Recommendation 326 also achieved a good score, with several questions put in four parliaments. The results obtained by other recommendations were far more meagre:

- 353: three questions in two parliaments;
- 354: two questions in one parliament;
- 369: four questions in three parliaments,
- 399: three questions in three parliaments,
- 410: one question in one parliament.

74. Without claiming to be exhaustive, a total of twenty-eight questions or interventions relating to the seven recommendations examined were therefore recorded which is in point of fact not a very good result. Moreover, in view of the fall in the number of interventions and questions in 1983, the committee should again consider how to intensify and improve co-ordination of activities in parliaments.

75. In this connection, it is worth recalling that in earlier reports (e.g. Mr. Stoffelen's reports in June and November 1982) proposals were made on procedure for selecting recommendations for examination in national parliaments. For instance, it was suggested that closer examination should be given in committee to the choice of recommendations and a joint tactic agreed upon for use in parliaments. While

endorsing these proposals, your Rapporteur wishes to add the following.

76. Although the Assembly adopts its recommendations only at plenary sessions, the Office of the Clerk should be instructed to propose to the committee a choice of texts well before they are adopted so that the committee might discuss them in the course of the session. Draft questions to be put in parliaments might also be prepared for examination at this stage too. In substance, priority should be given to recommendations which are particularly controversial at national level since a contribution might thus be made to accelerating the process of clarification and decision within the different countries.

77. Before tackling the basic conclusions, your Rapporteur wishes to add a summary of other debates on space questions in the various parliaments.

VI. *Other parliamentary debates on space questions*

78. Apart from WEU initiatives, space questions arouse considerable interest in parliaments since, having consulted the data banks in the various national parliaments, your Rapporteur has recorded, without claiming to be exhaustive, more than seventy questions and interventions. In some cases, only the last two years have been taken into account.

1. *Belgium*

(a) *ESA*

79. In annual budget debates in Belgium, space research and technology and, in particular, Belgium's contribution to ESA programmes are discussed in detail each year. For instance, the Secretary of State for Scientific Policy said in the Senate on 18th July 1979:

“The European Space Agency has however reached a new stage in its development. There is a clear trend towards *national initiatives*. Redefinition of ESA's rôle and long-term reflection on this matter have become necessary.”

80. During the debate in the Senate on 10th May 1984, a member asked whether it was possible, and to what extent, to compel private industry to return to the state in one way or another the subsidies it had been granted for participating in European space research. In its statement, the government underlined that public investment was the basic contribution needed to allow industries to reach an adequate threshold of competitiveness at international level. If industry were asked to make a direct reimbursement, the increase in costs would

make it less competitive in other space projects (e.g. the American space shuttle). However, some supervision of investment was always possible.

81. On 22nd May 1984, several senators also raised the question of Belgium's contribution to ESA programmes. The minister concerned (Minister of the Budget, Scientific Policy and Planning) made a detailed statement on this occasion, specifying *inter alia* that after the successes of recent years a turning point had been reached. Programmes for the next ten or fifteen years now had to be defined. The question of the space station raised problems since it was a major programme and other programmes which seemed to follow logically from what ESA had done so far could not be changed.

82. Moreover, the minister specified that a joint European answer would be given to the American offer of participation in the manned station and there would be no bilateral agreements with the United States.

83. This last point meets one of the requests made in Recommendation 410.

84. Questions on ESA were also put by parliamentarians on 23rd July 1980, 13th September 1982 and 26th January 1983.

(b) Use of satellites for military purposes

85. On 30th April 1981, answering a question put by Mr. Radoux in the Senate on possible action to be taken to complete the treaty banning the use of space for military purposes, the Belgian Government said:

"The question put by Mr. Radoux on a possible Belgian initiative to complete the treaty banning the use of satellites for military purposes calls for the following remarks on my part.

First, I wish to specify that the treaty referred to by the honourable member does not strictly speaking ban the use of satellites for military purposes.

Indeed, the treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies of 27th January 1967, which is the fundamental law in this connection, does not ban all military activity in outer space

What is expressly banned is laid down in Article IV of the treaty, which I quote:

'States parties to the treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass

destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all states parties to the treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.'

Thus, several satellites have already been placed in orbit to accomplish certain military objectives which have no hostile purpose. I am thinking here of military communications satellites or control and surveillance satellites.

Use of these satellites in no way contradicts the treaty provisions and is in my opinion perfectly acceptable or even necessary at the present stage of technology.

Certain newspapers have reported on the existence of so-called anti-satellite or destructive satellites. Although this has not been officially proved, it is clear that the use of such a device, carrying destructive weapons or having non-peaceful aims, would be in contradiction with the spirit of the treaty.

I therefore think it inexpedient for Belgium to take the initiative of urging completion of the treaty on the exploration and use of outer space to cover all space vehicles and devices with the aim of banning their use for military purposes.

This might give the impression that we doubt the sincerity of the space states parties to the treaty as regards their loyal application of the relevant provisions of the treaty or that we consider they are not respecting the spirit of the treaty in their space activities.

The Belgian Government will naturally follow attentively, together with its European partners, all future developments in this complex problem of the peaceful use of outer space."

2. Federal Republic of Germany

86. In the Bundestag, debates held in the last few years may be grouped as follows.

(a) General definition of space policy

87. On 30th March 1982, the CDU/CSU parliamentary group tabled a motion for a resolution on space policy which was debated in depth in plenary sitting of the Bundestag on 16th June 1982. This motion urged the then Federal Government to work out a long-term space programme with accent on the contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany to the solution of certain problems which might arise in the future and guaranteeing that the Federal Republic might assume its due responsibilities in the future in consideration of its major scientific and technological potential.

88. The motion referred to the peaceful use of space. During the debate in the Bundestag, everyone conceded that in the Federal Republic the military space sector was not encouraged and that space research was directed exclusively towards peaceful uses.

89. It should be pointed out that in the various speeches on this motion nearly all general and specific problems and nearly all national and European programmes were mentioned, but at no point did speakers make the slightest reference to the relevant activities and recommendations of WEU or the Council of Europe. No account was taken of either of these organisations in the debates.

90. Answering a question put by Mr. Warrikoff on the definition of its space policy, the Federal Government stated on 23rd August 1983:

"The aim of the Federal Government's space policy is: to encourage basic research; to contribute to the development of space technology whose results will allow innovations to be introduced into the economy and administration; to strengthen the competitiveness of the space industry; to encourage international co-operation; to assist third world countries.

The main points of the space programme are: the pursuit of extraterrestrial research, particularly the exploration of our solar system, astronomy and astrophysics, as well as biology and medicine in space; the acquisition of new knowledge through research into observation of the earth, the soil, the atmosphere, oceans and the ice-covered areas of the world. Fields of application include mapping of unexplored areas, prospecting for mineral deposits, keeping a watch on the environment, studying the climate and forecast-

ing earthquakes; passage from the European experimental meteorological satellite programme, Meteosat, to the European operational meteorological satellite system, Eumetsat; the development of television satellites (TV-Sat) and communications satellites until they have a proven application capability. The introduction of commercial systems by users: the European postal authorities' ECS communications satellite system and the proposed national communications satellite for the German postal authorities; the implementation of an exploratory stage during which space will be used as a laboratory for testing materials and techniques used in medicine and biology, with the assistance of the manned space laboratory and recoverable platforms; the study of possible European participation in the construction of a future American space station. European contributions which might be integrated in this orbital system are platforms and space laboratories which Europe is developing also for its own requirements; the improvement of European launcher technology for reliability, performance and cost."

(b) German participation in ESA programmes and the development of European astronautics

91. Answering a question put by Mr. Warrikoff, the Federal Government made the following statement on 23rd August 1983:

"Participation in European Space Agency programmes is included in the German space programme. More than half the sums allocated to space research and technology by the Ministry of Research and Technology are taken up by the contribution to ESA; in addition, scientific experiments are prepared for ESA space missions. The fact that the seat of the European Space Operations Centre (ESOC) is in the Federal Republic of Germany is tangible proof of the importance of our participation in the Agency.

With a budget of more than DM 1,600 million, ESA is the largest European organisation for research and technology. With its successful satellite and launcher programmes and the Spacelab programme, ESA has won itself a leading place after the major space powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

ESA is above all an organisation for research and development.

Its most important programme is the scientific one. However, Germany con-

siders it should be further strengthened in the long term.

An earth observation programme is being implemented. An ocean surface observation satellite is now being studied whose development would be passed to a German firm as prime contractor. It should be followed by other satellites for the observation of non-submerged land masses. Germany hopes to exploit the climatological possibilities thus offered.

ESA also encourages the development of space technology. Unlike the two programmes mentioned above, experimental application programmes can be undertaken in principle only at the request and according to the requirements of future users and once the operational stage has been reached they have to be placed progressively under the responsibility of the latter. Implementation of purely commercial programmes reverts solely to industry.

However, at the request of third parties, ESA may also carry out work for payment, e.g. the acquisition of a new Spacelab by NASA and three improved versions of the Meteosat satellite, including launchings made by Ariane on behalf of the future European meteorological commercial services organisation, Eumetsat. In this context, too, should be included the rôle of ESA in developing the first European operational communications system, ECS, which is managed by the European postal authorities, through their commercial organisation, Eutelsat, and which remains closely linked with the ESA development programme which preceded it.

The experimental satellite L-Sat is in an ambiguous position. While certain member states still consider it solely as a development project, the Federal Republic of Germany and France consider it has already reached a suitable technical level for early consideration to be given to the commercial use of such systems by the authorities concerned.

ESA played a vital rôle in developing Europe's own launching system. In the meantime, the Ariane launcher has passed its qualifying tests and the Arianespace European industrial consortium has been set up to produce and market it. ESA is nevertheless continuing to try to improve Ariane's performance. For what are now current practical and commercial applications, a European launcher above all guarantees Europe's independence, poss-

ibly in competition with the United States.

Finally, ESA, with substantial backing from the Federal Government and under the direction of German industry, has developed the European space laboratory, Spacelab, which is an integral part of the new NASA space transportation system. The first flight is planned for the end of October. Continuing along the course it followed in developing the space shuttle and Spacelab, Germany is particularly interested in the development in Europe of retrievable platforms and the subsequent appropriate development of Spacelab. The pursuit of European co-operation with the United States in basic research and technologically-oriented space activities will in this respect be of primordial importance, mainly with a view to the construction of a manned space station in transatlantic co-operation."

92. On 24th August 1984, a group of SPD members of parliament tabled a motion for a resolution in the Bundestag on the development of European astronautics, expressing the fear that its hitherto solely peaceful applications might become increasingly associated with military research and development. Its authors considered that all European space nations should oppose this trend and in future undertake to carry out research and applications for peaceful purposes only. A request should also be made in NATO for the conclusion of a global, binding international agreement *banning the military use of space*.

93. Inter alia, this motion for a resolution invites the Federal Government to negotiate with the United States Government – in agreement with the principal European space nations – for European participation in a manned space station to be on the sole condition that it be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that this be verifiable.

94. The motion for a resolution deals with a matter which was examined in great detail in our Assembly's Recommendation 410 on the military use of space, but it is highly doubtful that account was taken of the recommendation's proposals when the motion was drafted.

95. A question put by the Die Grünen Group on 10th August 1984 tackles a similar matter and asks the Federal Government:

- what stage has been reached in regard to participation in a European space station further to President Mitterrand's proposal;
- for its opinion on the European space community proposed as a "response to the military realities of tomorrow";

- what is the position with regard to participation in a joint observation satellite system agreed upon at the European summit meeting in Rambouillet and also intended for the French strike force;
- what financial support is granted to the European space institutions, including WEU working groups, and what contacts there are with NASA.

(c) *Bilateral co-operation*

96. The main topics tackled are as follows. Between 1981 and 1984, the Franco-German agreement of 29th April 1980 on industrial co-operation and the launching of the TV-Sat television satellite were the subject of at least eight questions by parliamentarians, including a question by the SPD and FDP parliamentary groups of 7th September 1981. Most recently, on 14th March 1984 the Federal Government announced that the direct television satellite (TV-Sat) was being built in connection with the proposed Franco-German satellite and that it was to be launched by Ariane in the second half of 1985.

97. In this connection it should be noted that Recommendation 354 of the WEU Assembly laid strong emphasis on the need for close co-ordination between the Franco-German project and ESA's L-Sat programme. This matter was mentioned in the Bundestag by only one member of parliament, in July 1980.

98. On President Mitterrand's proposal to build a space station for joint use, the Federal Government said on 12th June 1984, in answer to a question put by Mr. Reents, that the Franco-German dialogue was only just starting and that experts from the two countries were holding preliminary talks on the subject; it was not yet possible to indicate the outcome of these discussions.

99. In April 1982, Mr. Steger put a question in the Bundestag on the state of bilateral co-operation with the United States. On 26th August 1983, the Federal Government answered a question put by Mr. Bugl on the scientific and technical co-operation agreement now in force between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States.

100. On 4th June 1983, the Federal Government answered a question put by the SPD parliamentary group on launcher technology co-operation with Brazil.

(d) *The possibility of radio and television broadcasts by indirect broadcast satellites*

101. On 29th October 1981, answering questions put by four members of parliament, the

Federal Government said it was not aware that other countries were using so-called indirect broadcast satellites for the direct reception of radio programmes by the public. Only the European orbital test satellite (OTS) was being used experimentally for the point-to-point broadcasting of television programmes between France and Tunisia and between the United Kingdom and Malta. In the Netherlands, these programmes were being intercepted and distributed without authorisation. Under international regulations, the OTS could not be used for direct broadcasting.

102. Because of its importance for the European media, this subject might also be studied in a European framework.

(e) *Other questions*

103. In 1981 and 1982, the Federal Government also answered various questions on the construction of a national communications satellite and on the development in Europe of meteorological and remote-sensing satellites.

104. At the beginning of August 1984, the press reported that the Federal Government intended to submit a long-term space programme in the autumn.

3. *France*

105. The following questions seem to have been to the forefront recently.

(a) *France's general space policy*

106. In the National Assembly, Mr. Debré addressed the government several times. Thus, on 2nd December 1983, he invited it to make a statement in the National Assembly. After asking whether the government was determined to maintain and pursue France's space policy, he let it be understood that the present government was not active enough in this area. He then put five questions, i.e.:

- whether the Ariane 5 programme would be pursued, whether there was European co-operation in this matter and what was the planned timetable;
- whether the government was considering an independently-launched manned flight;
- what stage had been reached in the various satellite programmes;
- what progress had been made with the military observation and communication satellite essential for the deterrent force;
- what stage had been reached in research programmes on electronic

material and components for observation satellites.

107. The Secretary of State concerned emphasised in his answer that the broad lines of space policy had been laid down on 15th October 1981:

- consolidation of the French position in the principal fields of application: communications, television and earth observation;
- development of a space industry in order to increase penetration of the international market for launchers, satellites and ground stations;
- strengthening basic technological research;
- participation in the world scientific research effort in sectors likely to lead to new applications;
- firm programmes: implementation of Ariane 4, placing in orbit of the second Spot observation satellite, creation of the Spot-Image commercial firm and participation in the Spacelab programme.

108. This last point caused keen controversy.

109. Finally, on 28th May 1984 Mr. Debré asked the government whether it was prepared to hold a debate on civil and military space policy. The French Government has not yet answered.

110. On 2nd April 1984, the French Government answered a question put by Mr. Debré on 19th December 1983 as follows:

"Space programmes continue to be among the government's main priorities... (The government has proposed to its ESA partners) that in 1984 they start preparatory studies for a high-thrust engine, the HM-60, and a new-generation launcher, Ariane 5. It has also been decided to participate in the European radar observation satellite, ERS-I, which will allow a programme of research on oceanography and the climate to be implemented."

(b) *Co-ordination of national and European programmes in ESA*

111. Several members of parliament have shown their interest in these matters in questions put to their governments in the last two years.

112. On 2nd July 1984, Mr. Noir, after recalling that the ESA programme, launched about ten years ago, was almost completed,

asked for the government's views on ESA's future tasks and what priorities it was considering proposing to its partners.

113. The government has not yet answered.

(c) *Definition of international regulations for satellites in orbit*

114. Among the many questions put in the National Assembly, mention should be made of one by Mr. Miossec on 25th July 1983. He asked what prospects the American space shuttle could offer Ariane. He also asked whether France intended to play an active part in the *definition of international regulations for satellites in orbit*.

115. The government adopted the following position on this latter point:

"In view of the specific nature of satellites, international regulations on their movements such as apply to aircraft are out of the question. However, there is a series of international regulations relating to the status of and activities in space. Most of these regulations are contained in several international conventions worked out in the committee on the peaceful uses of outer space, a subsidiary body of the United Nations General Assembly. These texts govern a system of freedom to explore and use space, subject to the principle of non-appropriation and the possible commitment of the launching state's international responsibility whether it is acting on its own behalf or through the intermediary of other public or private bodies. In addition to these principal legal instruments, there are the provisions worked out by the International Telecommunications Union, which are included in the periodically-revised radiocommunications regulations. Moreover, at present the question of using the orbit of geostationary satellites, as for earth observation, space-mapping or the use of nuclear energy sources, are being discussed in the United Nations space committee. The results of these negotiations, which have been continuing for several years, will apparently not be known for a long time. France is doing its utmost to facilitate an outcome to these very difficult discussions, as it did in the framework of the negotiations on the five conventions."

116. The definition of international space regulations might open new areas of activity for WEU.

(d) *Bilateral co-operation in television satellites*

117. On 30th May 1984, a debate was held in the National Assembly on the Luxembourg

decision to place a television satellite in orbit with American participation and not with its French partners as initially planned.

(e) *Military satellites*

118. On 6th February 1984, in answer to various questions, the French Government said that the programme for 1984-88 provided for the possibility of carrying out studies on an observation satellite for specifically military purposes.

119. On 23rd April 1984, the government gave further details, as follows:

“At a press conference in The Hague, the President of the Republic recently underlined the importance of the conquest of space for France’s security, thus confirming the military value of satellites. Apart from a communications capability with the civil satellite Telecom 1 as from 1984 and the possibility of using the images from a second civil satellite which it is planned to launch in 1985, if France is to remain in space in the long term this will require studies on countermeasures and on the various types of attack to which satellites might be subject. The research provided for in the 1984-88 programme law will thus lead to very complex developments which do not allow a detailed timetable to be drawn up for the time being.”

(f) *President Mitterrand’s proposal for a European space community*

120. On 23rd April 1984, Mr. Cousté put two questions on this subject to the government to which no answer has yet been given.

4. United Kingdom

(a) *ESA*

121. In many cases, it is mainly the financial aspects that have been of concern to those putting questions.

122. Answering a question put by Mr. Atkinson on 29th June 1981, the government said the United Kingdom’s contribution to ESA was 16.7%, France’s 28.8%, the Federal Republic’s 25.9% and Italy’s 11.7%.

123. In 1982, Mr. Wrigglesworth and Lord Ironside also asked about ESA’s budget and the size of the United Kingdom’s contribution.

124. On 14th March 1984, a member of parliament asked how much the government had spent on the British space programme in the last four years and whether the government intended to increase this budget in 1983-84.

125. On 12th July 1982, Mr. Atkinson asked why the ESA Council of Ministers met so infrequently. He also put a question on the success of the American space shuttle programme, underlining the need for co-operation between the members of ESA instead of independent national initiatives.

126. On 16th May 1982, a question was put on the progress of discussions in ESA on the development of earth observation satellites.

(b) *British space industry*

127. Here too financial considerations were of importance, particularly in two questions put by Mr. Atkinson and Mr. Wilkinson on 7th December 1981.

128. An early day motion dated 2nd April 1984, considering the government’s minimal commitment to space technology and the British industry compared with France and Germany, urged the creation of an organisation equivalent to NASA or ESA to ensure that the United Kingdom plays a leading rôle in space projects and to develop this industry for peaceful purposes.

(c) *Military space questions*

129. Answering various questions about a *British military satellite*, the government said on 5th April 1984:

“Strategic and tactical communications will be provided by two Skynet 4 military satellites. These are being procured from the British Aerospace dynamics group in association with its principal subcontractor Marconi Space and Defence Systems Ltd. It is intended they will be launched into geostationary orbit by the United States space transportation system – the shuttle.

All operational major warships are to be fitted with military satellite communication terminals by the end of the decade.”

130. On *Anglo-American co-operation in space defence*, on 10th April 1984 Mr. Atkinson asked in the House of Commons what consultations the government had had with the United States Government on space defence systems. The ensuing debate was as follows:

“Mr. HESELTINE (Secretary of State for Defence). – I enjoy satisfactory and frequent consultations with Mr. Weinberger on all matters of common defence interest, including space.

Mr. ATKINSON. – Given Britain’s knowledge and expertise in satellite technology, is there not here an opportunity for

the closest possible collaboration with the United States on anti-satellite and anti-missile technology from the point of view of space defence systems?

Mr. HESELTINE. — My hon. Friend will appreciate that our speciality is much more in communication satellites than in any other activity. It is important to remember that at this stage the Americans are considering a very long-term research programme. It is, therefore, much too early to anticipate any possible developments that could come at a later stage.

Mr. STRANG. — Do the British Government support President Reagan's decision to develop the capability to fight a nuclear war in space?

Mr. HESELTINE. — The President is considering the possibilities of ensuring that there are no threats to the United States or to its allies from space developments. It is a long-term research project, and it is understandable, given the capability of the Soviet Union, that he should undertake such a research consideration.

Mr. MARSHALL. — Whatever consultations may proceed with the United States, particularly in the context of NASA and perhaps in relation to civil applications spreading to military use, may I ask my right hon. Friend whether he agrees that the European option might also be explored because we may want to consider a situation which is simply not left to the Russians and the Americans?

Mr. HESELTINE. — My hon. Friend is as aware as I am of the history of European collaboration on space projects. I believe that there is an argument for continuing to keep in close touch on these matters through the European Space Agency.

Mr. McNAMARA. — Rather than supporting the United States President's policy of research into space systems, should not Her Majesty's Government be urging the United States to have discussions with the Soviet Union to prevent a further escalation of the arms race in space?

Mr. HESELTINE. — The hon. Gentleman is as aware as I am that the United States is pursuing the opportunities for arms control in a whole range of forums, and we support that. But in this instance, where it is considering a research programme, it has made it clear that at this stage it does not see any means of verification."

131. On 22nd March 1984, the House of Lords held a debate on the compatibility between *American proposals for an anti-ballistic missile defence system in space* and the provisions of the ABM treaty concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972.

132. On *satellite verification* methods, Mr. Thomas put the following question on 20th February 1984:

"Mr. THOMAS asked the Secretary of State for Defence if satellite verification methods adopted in the strategic arms limitation talks treaty can be effectively used to verify the deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. STANLEY. — All forms of shipborne nuclear missiles, whether ballistic or cruise, present distinctive requirements in terms of their verification. The United States Government are ready to look where necessary for means of verification extending beyond the national technical means used to verify SALT agreements."

5. Luxembourg

133. Although Luxembourg is not a member of ESA, a lively debate was held in the Luxembourg Parliament on space questions, as mentioned in Chapter IV. Furthermore, the question of broadcasting radio and television programmes by satellite is arousing intense discussion.

134. In particular, Luxembourg's choice of an American television satellite played a large part in these discussions. On 29th May 1984, Mr. Werner, Prime Minister, made a statement on this matter on behalf of the government followed by a detailed debate.

6. Netherlands

135. Similarly, Netherlands members of parliament put many questions, particularly about television satellites. European space co-operation has been referred to in statements and various memoranda addressed by the government to the Chamber, and in reports of debates.

VII. Conclusions

136. A quantitative analysis of Chapter IV shows that about twenty-five questions or interventions were directly or indirectly related to WEU Assembly recommendations. In addition, with the assistance of the staff of national

parliaments, your Rapporteur obtained a list of more than seventy other questions or interventions dealing with space technology, a selection of which is given in Chapter VI.

137. It emerges from a general comparison of Chapters IV and VI that simultaneous debates were held in several parliaments on more or less identical subjects. The basic discussion, at least in countries with an active space policy, seems to have had no visible connection with relevant action taken by the WEU Assembly and its work was not discussed. This was particularly clear in parliamentary debates in France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, where space problems were considered and dealt with mainly as national policy matters. Only very few of the members of parliament who took part in these debates were members of a European assembly and they do not seem to have been aware of or to have used the many recommendations of the WEU or Council of Europe Assemblies. This is true of most government statements.

138. There are various reasons for this. At the time, the Committee for Relations with Parliaments had chosen only Recommendation 328 on *meteorological satellites* as a matter for debates in national parliaments. This question was therefore followed up on quite a broad front in six parliaments. The action taken on other recommendations at national level depended more or less on the interest and personal initiative of members of parliament.

139. In view of the absence of co-ordination, it is not surprising that only isolated questions were put in a few parliaments. Since their content varied considerably, it is impossible to classify them by subject. This is also due to the fact that recommendations adopted by the Assembly in the last five years have sometimes been on general space questions and sometimes on very specific issues. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments therefore recommends that the Assembly set very clear priorities. It might even draw up a list of priorities. The present report might be helpful in this respect by initiating a discussion on the matter.

140. Apart from requests for a long-term space programme (Recommendations 326, 353 and 369), specific proposals relating to various application satellites were made on the co-ordination of national and European satellite programmes, the development of Spacelab and the Ariane programme and the appointment of an ESA representative in Japan.

141. The general problem of the military use of space was tackled in Recommendation 410, adopted this summer. The matters it dealt with

will remain highly topical for a long time to come.

142. Several times representatives have put questions on ESA medium- and long-term plans and on the adoption of its budget. There were questions on the co-ordination of European and national satellite programmes, European countries' expenditure on the space industry and the problem of security measures for nuclear satellites. Several members of parliament were interested in the proposal to appoint an ESA representative in Japan.

143. Because of the particularly topical nature of the question, it is instructive to study more closely statements made on the military aspects of space technology (e.g. Recommendations 328, 369 and 410).

144. Statements by the Council and governments are far from being as clear and harmonised as they should be.

145. With regard to military meteorological satellites, the Council expressed doubt in its reply to Recommendation 328 about the usefulness of such satellites in addition to civil meteorological satellites.

146. The Federal Government on the contrary believed that in the event of hostilities it was to be expected that data supplied by present civil satellites would be very limited. The French Government emphasised that satellites launched by ESA could be used for peaceful purposes only. The Italian Government was generally speaking in favour of a system of military meteorological satellites, provided the technical and financial aspects were settled first. Conversely, the United Kingdom Government considered that the use of present meteorological satellites for military purposes was adequate.

147. Government answers to the question of promoting European military satellites (Recommendation 369) were just as divided. While the Council did not refer to the matter in its reply, the Belgian Government said that in general it took part in research, development and applications undertaken by the alliance in this field. The United Kingdom Government referred to co-ordination in NATO. The French Government said it did not belong to the NATO military structure and was therefore merely an observer in this framework. Moreover, it recalled the various national programmes, underlining that it endeavoured, in the United Nations committee concerned, to participate in initiatives to prevent the use of space for military purposes. It considered that present research related solely to communications satellites of a non-offensive type.

148. Recommendation 410, adopted this summer, covered all problems relating to the

military use of space, taking up in part earlier requests by the Assembly, e.g. for the construction of a satellite system for (defensive) military purposes.

149. Debates in parliaments on military questions (see Chapter VI) independently of WEU recommendations give further indications of the trend of public opinion in Europe. It therefore seems even clearer that there is as yet no convergence between views and aims, which is moreover not surprising in view of the magnitude of the decisions to be taken.

150. There is unanimity on one point only, i.e. that space must not be used for stationing *offensive* weapons systems. This idea was also expressed in Recommendation 410. However, there is still the question of the military use of space for defensive purposes. Here opinions obviously diverge considerably.

151. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the SPD parliamentary group tabled a motion for a resolution in the Bundestag at the end of August 1984 calling for a worldwide ban on the military use of space (Recommendation 410 was not mentioned in this resolution).

152. With regard to the cancellation of WEU's last restrictions on the Federal Republic of Germany in conventional weapons, members of parliament – particularly Die Grünen – put various questions in the Bundestag on the consequences of military co-operation, and more especially with France. However the SPD motion and the intentions of Die Grünen have not yet been debated in the Bundestag. Consequently it is not yet possible to make a firm statement on the position of the Federal Republic of Germany.

153. In France and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, there have been several requests to build national military observation and data-transmitting satellites. The French Government announced that research would be conducted in this sense, while the United Kingdom Government has already made a firm declaration that two Skynet-type military relay satellites were planned. Bilateral co-operation with the United States on space defence was also prominent in debates in the United Kingdom.

154. The examples we have just quoted show that there is still much to be done to achieve a joint European position in these matters. The debate has only just begun. WEU parliamentarians must now therefore take the opportunity of joining in the national discussion and recalling that the WEU Assembly has already carried out detailed, well-documented preliminary work.

155. President Mitterrand's proposals for the creation of a European space community and those by the United States Government for Europe to participate in a manned space station have been referred to in only a few parliaments (e.g. Belgium, France and Germany) without governments yet adopting a definite position on these matters. This too would be a further opportunity for WEU representatives to take a more active part in debates by quoting Recommendation 410.

156. Even in the case of purely civil aspects of space technology, it can be seen that in many parliaments the work of the European parliamentary assemblies seems to have no influence on debates. Sometimes these debates may bring out ideas which might be studied at European level, for example:

- in Belgium, a question raised was what became of state subsidies to industry for its participation in European space research;
- in Germany, the possibility of radio and television broadcasts by indirect broadcast satellites was mentioned in the Bundestag several times;
- in France, the question of working out international regulations for satellites in orbit was raised;
- in France and Luxembourg, there were discussions in parliament on bilateral co-operation on television satellites, following which Luxembourg opted for an American system.

157. In Chapter III.B your Rapporteur stressed that the Council of Europe also took a regular interest in European space questions. For work to be divided judiciously, it might be useful for WEU to transmit concrete suggestions to the Council of Europe or the European Community.

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158. With regard to the report on the committee's activities (Section A), it is regrettable that the number of interventions by WEU representatives should on the whole have diminished considerably between 1982 and 1983.

159. As for the proposals on improving our work mentioned in Chapter V, your Rapporteur considers that all earlier suggestions in this sense should be taken up again, completed and included in a further committee report. As a definite proposal, your Rapporteur suggests that the recommendations selected by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments in December for transmission to national parliaments should include any texts adopted on space.

APPENDIX I

*Table of action in the parliaments of member countries**(Totals by country for each session)*

Recommendations adopted in	Member countries							Total
	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	
1956	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
1957	4	0	1	0	0	5	2	12
1958	2	0	3	0	0	4	3	12
1959	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
1960	3	12	2	8	0	3	1	29
1961	0	2	0	3	0	6	0	11
1962	2	4	4	6	2	3	10	31
1963	0	0	13	22	1	2	3	41
1964	4	14	9	11	1	5	2	46
1965	0	11	12	24	0	5	28	80
1966	2	12	12	49	1	4	18	98
1967	14	9	22	29	2	6	16	98
1968	6	14	20	22	1	16	47	126
1969	11	15	17	8	0	4	36	91
1970	3	15	15	7	2	3	10	55
1971	0	4	19	9	0	6	10	48
1972	0	6	2	1	0	1	0	10
1973	0	4	2	6	1	0	0	13
1974	0	1	3	13	2	0	0	19
1975	10	28	8	19	3	11	3	82
1976	16	40	13	14	2	3	8	96
1977	4	18	4	15	1	1	14	57
1978	20	26	12	21	4	8	14	105
1979	16	15	16	10	12	1	4	74
1980	0	34	24	15	14	0	10	97
1981	15	42	14	4	16	5	38	134
1982	0	25	11	6	2	6	13	63
1983	9	8	8	3	1	2	2	33
Total	141	159	278	325	68	110	292	1,573

APPENDIX II

Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1980

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session
June 1980	345									-	56
	346									-	
	347					2				2	
	348			7						7	
	349	x		1	2		6	2	2	13	
	350					2				2	
	351			2	2					4	
	352	x		2	4	2				8	
	353			2		2				4	
	354				6					6	
Other action			4			2		2	8		
Dec. 1980	355					2				2	45
	356										
	357										
	358	x		6	4	2	2		2	16	
	359	x			4		2		4	10	
	360										
	361										
	362						2			2	
363						2			2		
Other action				10	2	1			13		
June 1981	364	x	2	2					2	6	79
	365	x	2	4	2				4	12	
	366	x	2	4			2		2	10	
	367	x		2				2		4	
	368	x	2	2					2	6	
	369	x	2	2					10	14	
	370	x		2			2	2		6	
	371	x	2	2			2		4	10	
Other action			7		2	1			11		
Dec. 1981	372	x		4			2		2	8	53
	373	x		4	2				2	8	
	374			2	2		2			6	
	375			2	2					4	
	376										
	377										
Other action			3	3	2	3	3	3	10	27	

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session
June 1982	378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387	x x				2 2				2 2	27
	Other action			7	4	3	1	2	6	23	
Nov. 1982	388 389 390 391 392	x x			4				2	2	36
	Other action			14	2	3	1	4	4	28	
June 1983	393 394 395	x				1				1	22
	Other action		9	4	5	2			1	21	
Nov. 1983	396 397 398 399 400 401 402	x x									11
	Res. 69 Other action			4	3		1	2	1	11	

*United States-European co-operation
in advanced technology*

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions²
by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 11 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. *Lenzer* (Chairman); MM. *Wilkinson*, *Bassinot* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Aarts*, *Adriaensens*, *Böhm*, *Colajanni*, *Fiandrotti*, *Fouéré*, *Garrett*, Sir Paul *Hawkins* (Alternate: *Hill*), MM. *Hengel*, *McGuire*, *Mezzapesa* (Alternate: *Cavaliere*), *Rizzi*, *Schmidt*, *Souvet*, *Spies von Büllenheim* (Alternate: *Kittelmann*), Mrs. *Staels-Dompas*, MM. *Valleix* (Alternate: *Galley*), *Worrell*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
*on United States-European co-operation
 in advanced technology*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering this report to be a follow-up of earlier reports on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology and especially Documents 773 of May 1978 and 889 of October 1981;
- (ii) Considering that the Council, in its reply to the Assembly on 7th April 1982 to Recommendation 376 stated that the WEU member governments were well aware of the need to contain equipment costs and that the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) is the central focus for multinational European equipment co-operation and is actively engaged in identifying opportunities of this type;
- (iii) Aware that, in 1985, the United States will order the development of a new advanced tactical fighter aircraft and that five countries in Europe – plus the Netherlands which has applied to join – are co-operating in a new European fighter aircraft project with an estimated development cost of \$4 billion;
- (iv) Considering American willingness to share its nuclear power plant experience with European countries;
- (v) Considering that the space station was one of the subjects on the agenda of the economic summit conference in London in June 1984 but that no endorsement of European collaboration in the United States space station was given;
- (vi) Considering that an international co-operative space station programme is in the interests of both the United States and Europe and would strengthen Atlantic ties considerably during the research and development phase as well as during the operational activities of the station;
- (vii) Conscious of the need to inject new life into American-European collaboration in many fields of high technology,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

- I. Inform the Assembly of the achievements of the Independent European Programme Group since 1978 in multinational European equipment co-operation, specifying which opportunities for savings in weapon supplies have been identified and which two-way street programmes with the United States have been concluded or might be concluded in the near future;
- II. Invite member governments:
 - 1. To submit a plan to the United States Government for discussion on how to collaborate in new military programmes such as fighter aircraft, helicopters, other weapon system platforms and under water weapon systems about to be developed so as to stop the spiral of ever-increasing costs within military budgets;
 - 2. To promote a common policy on the first space station project, taking into account the need for Europe to receive definite guarantees, such as:
 - (a) information access to the entire space station system;
 - (b) equality between European and American companies exploiting the research and manufacturing facilities on the space station;
 - (c) access of European crews in order to operate the space station and not just to visit it;
 - (d) European industrial and operational responsibility for a primary item of space station hardware;
 - 3. To foster a common European programme for exchanging information with the United States on future nuclear energy plants, drawing on individual up-to-date experience in Europe and the United States;
 - 4. To invite the United States and other governments to reconsider their attitude with regard to the draft convention on the law of the sea.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Your Rapporteur is grateful to the committee for having appointed him again Rapporteur for this report on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology. He believes that a certain continuity in this type of activity is of great importance and could be valuable for the committee as well as the Assembly.

2. He wishes to start his report by expressing his appreciation and that of the committee to the staff of the United States Embassy in Paris, the Departments of Defence, State and Energy and NASA in Washington and to the eminent leaders of the aerospace industries the committee met during its visit from 9th to 22nd July 1984.

3. In preparing for this visit the committee had worked out a number of questions for use as guidelines in its discussions with the official authorities and industrial leaders. For the programme of the visit your Rapporteur refers you to Appendix I; for the list of questions to Appendix II.

II. General policy discussions

Defence Department

4. During briefings at the Pentagon on 10th July 1984, a certain number of policy questions were discussed. Mr. Lindstrom, Deputy Under-Secretary for International Programmes and Technology, drew the attention of the committee to the emerging technologies initiative of the Pentagon. The new technologies are revolutionising the conventional battlefield and offer the alliance a vastly increased performance. NATO has now embarked on this initiative which, if supported politically, will enable it to introduce major conventional force improvements in this decade.

5. All NATO governments agreed in general at the last meeting of the Conference of National Armaments Directors to give priority to a list of conventional armaments systems earmarked for co-operative development and production. Further work is being undertaken by the conference to polish up this list and to start work on the introduction of these select force multiplying systems. Within the alliance, through the conference, the military agency for

standardisation, the NATO commonly funded programmes and the NATO Air Defence Committee, the United States Defence Department will continue its efforts to achieve more alliance standardisation.

6. One of the political questions resulting from the emerging technologies initiative is that of protecting these technologies which we must share from being transferred outside NATO countries. A United States objective is to reach agreement with its allies on which technologies should be especially protected on account of their military criticality and which are shared pursuant to co-operative armaments programmes.

7. Furthermore, the United States has shared with its NATO allies in Europe the recently completed Defence Science Board study of industry-to-industry international armaments co-operation. This study made a number of important recommendations which should be implemented in the years to come. One of the board's key conclusions was that, while the basic structure for co-operation exists and many contacts between industries have been established, unambiguous American executive and congressional supporting policies and objectives are needed.

8. The Independent European Programme Group is studying the Defence Science Board's report at the same time as the United States papers on emerging technologies and plans a collective response from the European armaments directors. The common reply might reduce waste, duplication and inefficiency attendant on the separate efforts of the thirteen European nations. Such rationalisation would permit Europe to invest far more in defence procurement and reverse the downward trend in defence expenditure.

9. New rules on exports of high technology products are to come into force in January 1985. The most important of these products are semi-conductors, computers and advanced machine-tool builders. The new guidelines are received favourably by NATO governments and by the business community. Moreover, governments and companies had warned that they might refuse to acknowledge the extra-territorial authority that was being asserted by the United States. Licence applications will be given out by the United States Department of Commerce but the Department of Defence has the authority to review these applications. While liberalising the regulations, the new proposals

call for additional high technology products to be excluded from multiple licensing procedures. Current electronic eavesdropping equipment, aircraft replacement parts, crime suppression equipment and some nuclear processing equipment are barred from multiple licensing which means that every export order has to be individually approved.

American-European collaboration

10. The Under-Secretary of Defence for Research and Engineering, Dr. Richard D. DeLauer, also pointed to the findings and recommendations submitted by the Defence Science Board Task Force and the need to enhance direct industry-to-industry arms collaboration within the alliance. He said that from the moment he entered government four years ago he was disturbed about the lack of co-ordination among NATO countries in arms production and research and development programmes which had led to a great deal of duplication. This was the more regrettable as alliance research spending exceeded that of the Warsaw Pact. Europe needs to make a greater investment in military technology to achieve a better balance and more effective technological partnership. This does not mean massive financial investment but rather investment of high quality in basic technologies applicable to military systems. Eventually we should be able to think in terms of a two-way street in technology between the United States and its European allies which is based on balanced technological capabilities at an advanced level and which would provide the most powerful form of natural incentive for alliance-wide industry-to-industry co-operative initiatives.

11. We should be aware that we had the same requirements and that these requirements might generate a useful job programme. Here we could learn some lessons from the Soviet Union which had attained a high degree of standardisation and of long-term planning covering every stage of a programme. Moreover, its matériel remained with the forces for a much longer time than in Europe. In NATO we also should think of, for instance, re-engineering existing aircraft instead of building new aircraft. We should think of reinforcing aircraft and missile shelters as this would strongly enhance the effectiveness of the defence effort in these fields.

Technology and security

12. Emerging technologies should now be included in the weapons system which would become operational by the end of the decade and which could much improve the alliance's ability to withstand attack.

13. The Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy, Mr. Perle, spoke about the microelectronics which the Soviet Union was trying to introduce into its forces, acquired through copying them from the European and Japanese as well as American firms. The Department of Defence had established a technology security centre to focus and co-ordinate its export control process. This centre served as the focal point for co-ordination with industry, the armed services and other Department of Defence and governmental agencies involved in case processing.

14. A computerised information system, called the foreign disclosure and technical information system, was a computer network and data base that included United States and Cocom¹ export cases, technological data and other relevant information. The network linked the technology security centre with similar functions in the services and defence agencies. This network would soon be extended to the United States Cocom delegation in Paris and other departments in the Washington area. Cocom, consisting of representatives from Japan and the NATO countries, except Iceland and Spain, had developed an agreed list of restricted items to control the transfer of products and technology to the Warsaw Pact. The United States provided most of the technical support for the Cocom export group. Many areas which were previously uncontrolled were now submitted to the expert group in Paris. Although the Department of Defence was aware of the rapidly increasing worldwide importance of trade in technology, it was also keenly aware of the need to maintain the West's technological lead. By maintaining that lead the West could offset the significantly superior numbers of weapons and troops available to potential adversaries.

15. Industrial espionage was one of the greatest problems of our times and the Soviet Union had a massive organisation of trained professionals who did nothing but sample blueprints of all sorts of new high-technology developments. Should not security checks be made on descriptions in technical magazines? In this field only a multilateral effort could make any impact. For a long time Japan did not wish to collaborate with the United States in this field and it had, for instance, often sold computer material to countries like Hungary or Bulgaria which then, of course, passed it on to the Soviet Union.

16. American subsidiaries in Europe were also under control from the United States

1. Co-ordinating Committee for multilateral export controls.

agencies. The defence programme in export control and technology transfer had enhanced policies and procedures so that export licence applications were now being processed more expeditiously, consistently and systematically.

Research activities

17. Dr. Edith Martin, Deputy Under-Secretary for Research and Advanced Technology, stated that the Defence Department was very much aware of the need to rely on superior technology and applications in order to compete with the growing Soviet competence, research and technology in military matters. The Soviet Union increased its defence capabilities twice as fast as the United States. It had some 300,000 scientists and engineers compared with 60,000 to 80,000 in the United States. The technological leadership could only be kept through commercial and industrial high-technology enterprises. Only through acquisition of western technology could the Soviet Union overcome the lack of advancement in some high-technology products. United States industry's competitive system of free enterprise was necessary to give the United States its edge over the Soviet Union. In order to promote industrial research and development, the Defence Department was spending some \$4.4 billion a year which would be increased to \$6.5 billion for fiscal year 1985. Part of this money was used to revitalise American university research and efforts. In the past year the universities had made more than 2,700 offers to help to develop research and development.

18. Computers have the highest priority. Research and development is being conducted first in very high-speed integrated circuits which provide the capability for massive and fast data processing, second, in stealth aircraft, third in advanced software and fourth in microprocessors.

19. For software technology, \$9 billion is earmarked for development and maintenance. Up until the year 1990, \$13 billion will be spent on several software programmes with the help of a software engineering institute. The software technology for adaptable reliable systems (STARS) programme will improve the United States ability to develop and support software for mission critical systems. This tri-service effort, built up on the Defence Department's ADA computer language programme, will deal with critical problems in the cost transportability, reliability and survivability of computer software in weapons systems.

20. The advanced materials programme continues to make a significant contribution by reducing the weight of weapons systems and improving their performance.

21. Composite materials will be used in all types of systems, such as turbo engines, shipboard antennae, tank track components, long-life submarine batteries, aircraft wings and helicopter transmission cases. They will also be used for large space structures in order to enhance the survivability of spacecraft.

Strategic defence initiative

22. At the Pentagon the committee was briefed finally by Brigadier General Rankine, Assistant for Directed Energy Weapons. He spoke on the policy implications of defence against ballistic missiles. However, your Rapporteur will not go into details of this subject which is to be examined in the second part of the report by Mr. Wilkinson on the military use of space¹. He will discuss the technology for defence against ballistic missiles, the characteristics of such defence, the new technologies involved and the consequences this will have for the anti-ballistic missile treaty and the strategic arms limitation talks agreements.

The State Department

23. At the State Department the committee was briefed by the Director of Policy Planning, Mr. Peter Rodman, who pointed out that the President had restored the American position on the long term. First of all, the United States had neglected its defence and there had been an anti-military mood throughout the country. Now the military balance was more or less restored. Secondly, the President had achieved an economic recovery in a relatively short period which would also have a great impact on the world economy. Thirdly, psychologically America had lost part of its self-confidence and this self-confidence has now been restored. This is not an end in itself but a political problem which will have repercussions on all aspects of United States foreign policy.

24. There are still many contacts with the Soviet Union, such as the installation of hot-line conversations and many other contacts which are not publicised but which may be conducted behind closed doors.

25. The new American self-confidence has also been of advantage for the Atlantic Alliance and allied unity has been greatly enhanced. On the outside there are events in Poland and the contradictions of socialism which have caused great frustration in many states. There is an important consensus on the need for defence spending and a debate has been held on the Central American situation.

¹ Military use of space, part II, Rapporteur Mr. Wilkinson, Document 993.

26. The peace movements in Europe have considerably weakened the global security offered by the Atlantic Alliance and one should be aware of the global implications of any further weakening of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

WEU

27. Greater European coherence and a strengthening of Western European Union, which is not directed against the Atlantic Alliance, has the public support of the United States. It encourages a strengthening of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. A partial American withdrawal from Europe, as proposed by Senator Nunn, is not very likely. Moreover, Senator Nunn's intention was not to weaken but to strengthen NATO by forcing the European countries to live up to their commitments.

Law of the sea

28. Mr. Otho Eskine, Director, Office of Advanced Technology, gave the committee a briefing on the law of the sea issue. The United States has decided to attend the conference no longer nor will it sign the agreement of 9th December 1982. It rejected the convention because of the deep-sea mining issue. The rest of the treaty can be considered on balance acceptable as it has qualified emerging international law. The deep-sea mining arrangement is not acceptable to any potential deep-sea mining country and is regarded as impossible to implement. Nine countries so far have ratified the convention, whereas sixty countries are needed for it to enter into force. The European countries are very concerned about providing the best possible organisational arrangements to improve the sea-bed mining régime. However, the Eastern bloc and the uncommitted countries will not accept important changes in the rules of the deep-sea mining organisation.

29. For freedoms of the high sea, the law of the sea convention is not a necessity. The 200-mile common economic zone has been accepted more or less everywhere.

30. International consortia, in which participate Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States as well as the French consortium, do not think there will be deep-sea mining exploration and exploitation for another ten to twenty years. The United States will have a national law which will ensure environmental protection and allow other countries to play a rôle. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are also planning to introduce national laws and to ensure that licences by

other countries are not being issued for the same plots. Licences will be recognised reciprocally. An intergovernmental agreement would ensure the proper application.

31. The United States will have an oceanography budget of some \$185 million for 1985. From January 1985 onwards the *Glomar Challenger*, a research vessel with fifty-two personnel and some fifty scientists, will start a new drilling and research campaign.

The space station's international aspects

32. The Office of Advanced Technology also handles the manned space station. International participation is, of course, of the greatest importance and early contacts have already been made with Canada, Japan and ESA. The United States hopes that ESA will participate effectively in the early planning. The manned space station will be of importance far into the next century and Mr. Eskine was optimistic that a broad spectrum of countries could and would work together. ESA has already adopted a \$30 million budget to carry out preliminary studies for the next two years. It is considering participating with a more or less autonomous module and therefore leaving open the possibility of an independent European space station in the future.

III. Space developments

33. After a welcome by Mr. John D. Hodge, Director, Space Station Task Force of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Mr. Robert F. Freitag, Deputy Director, Space Station Task Force, briefed the committee on space station developments. He gave a general outline of the policy of the Reagan administration on these developments as follows:

The space station

34. The NASA budget for 1985 is just under \$7.5 billion and the five-year projections laid down in the budget include a real growth in NASA activity of approximately 1% per year over the 1986-89 period. While the overall projected growth is modest, it will allow NASA nevertheless to undertake and accomplish the space station effort. The space station initiative announced by the President in his 1984 state of the union message to Congress reflects America's commitment to research technology and the peaceful development of space. It gives a clear direction to the civil space policy. The most important reason for starting a space station at this time is that the space shuttle is approaching full operational status. To maxim-

ise this transportation system a space station is necessary. The second reason is that the operations which have been conducted with the space shuttle have stimulated great interest in the private sector to look towards investment in future space activities. The construction of a space station is necessary to create the facilities that will encourage such investment and stimulate new technology that will spin off into the United States economy. The space station will therefore provide a threshold for significant commercial exploitation of the space environment. An example of this is the McDonnell Douglas/Johnson and Johnson - pharmaceutical industry - joint venture to monitor an electrophoresis experiment in the gravity-free environment on board the shuttle Discovery which could create a new hormone which could be used for manufacturing superinsulin. Finally, the shuttle has also stimulated wide international interest in the United States space programme.

35. Making the space shuttle fully operational and cost-effective is one of NASA's main priorities. The major achievement of 1983 was the first flight of spacelab which was funded and built by ESA. It demonstrated that people in space could perform very complex experiments and that real time corrections and fixes to experiments could greatly enhance the ability to obtain important scientific results.

36. Eight shuttle flights are scheduled in 1984 and eleven in 1985, including three in which spacelab missions will be completed. The shuttle will also be used regularly by the Department of Defence. It is certain that, whatever future space developments may be, the space station will become an essential part of space capability.

37. The space station will have both a manned element and unmanned elements co-orbiting so that they have access to each other. The manned base would have living quarters as well as working space and the cockpit from which the station is operated. It will be necessary to commute between the manned and the unmanned element and this calls for a sort of mini-transportation system. Later on, a large high-energy upper stage will be necessary to allow man to go from that transportation base to the higher energy orbits such as a synchronous orbit or back to the moon, or Mars or elsewhere.

38. The final configuration of the space station will be worked out in 1985. However, of the greatest importance is a proper combination of manned and unmanned elements allowing the human factor to do what it is best able to do, leaving the unmanned system to be fully robotised. It therefore has to be built as a multi-functioning facility with the ability to do

laboratory-type work for science and applications for technology and for advanced development.

39. The space station should also be a jumping-off point for missions beyond low earth orbit. There are significant economic benefits in having space-based reusable upper stages and using the space station as the base from which to go forward into planetary exploration.

40. For fiscal year 1985 NASA is requesting \$150 million for the space station study programme. These funds are enough to begin an endeavour of this importance and scope and necessary to assure an efficient, well-conceived space station programme.

41. A space station could serve a variety of useful functions and purposes, including:

- (i) a permanent observatory for looking down at the earth and out at the universe;
- (ii) a transportation mode where payloads and vehicles are stationed, processed and propelled to their destinations;
- (iii) a servicing facility where these payloads and vehicles are serviced, maintained or repaired;
- (iv) an assembly facility where, due to ample time and orbit and the presence of appropriate equipment, large structures are put together and checked out;
- (v) a manufacturing facility where human intelligence and the servicing capability of the station combine to enhance commercial opportunities which can be solved only or less expensively in space; and
- (vi) a storage depot where payloads and parts are kept on orbit for subsequent deployment.

There will also be many other uses and benefits as time progresses.

42. The President indicated that the permanently manned space station should be ready within the decade. The international aspects of the space station development are focused mainly on the rôles of potential users of the space station. User requirements have been studied but no formal agreements have been concluded. This is not possible because NASA has not even reached the point of designing the space station. It would not know what kind of commitment it could make with respect to any part of the space station.

43. NASA's traditional partners in space, principally Canada and the European Space

Agency, are now spending a fair amount of their own funds on independent space station mission analysis and planning studies. France, Germany and Italy have also undertaken independent analyses and national studies.

44. Japan is motivated by a number of things. One, of course, might well be that when the space shuttle was conceived and international involvement in the shuttle was ultimately narrowed down to the spacelab with a Canadian manipulating arm, Japan chose not to be involved. Now, in this case they wish to be sure that a Japanese option will be available so that they may take a fully-informed decision.

45. All these studies indicate that the eventual missions will be compatible with the current space station concept. A further dialogue is, of course, necessary.

46. One of the major studies was undertaken by ESA which believes that a human presence, the possibility of a manned space station, offers certain special benefits, especially in material science and life science and technology development. A space station appears to be compatible with spacelab 2 and the Eureka unmanned platform that is currently under development. They might in the long run give Europe an increased operational commercial space potential for the commercial use of space. Whether Europe alone could develop an equivalent space station is an open question. Moreover, a manned space station need not be competitive with unmanned systems available in Europe. Canada already has a formal relationship with the European Space Agency and it may also be interested in a European unmanned space station. At the same time it wishes to participate in the United States manned space station. Canada, of course, is very interested in remote-sensing is extremely important technology for such a large country which is very sparsely populated in a number of areas. They are also interested in robotics and materials processing.

European participation

47. From a European point of view, it has always been considered that to become a viable partner in the space station developments ESA would have to pay at least 10% of the budget. Based on NASA's \$8 billion figure for an eight-year period, this would mean that Europe would have to pay about \$1 billion for the same period. In negotiating a European share in the programme, a number of considerations would have to be taken into account by ESA:

- (i) The European share should provide a stimulus to European technology.

- (ii) European participation should be visible – in other words, Europe should be responsible for one or more key elements of the station over which Europe would exercise full responsibility in the development phase.

- (iii) ESA should also have a clearly defined rôle in the operational phase of the space station and this would include ground operations and flight crew.

- (iv) On the basis of its collaboration in the programme, ESA should have complete information on the research and engineering of the entire space station and not just the element or elements which ESA developed.

48. NASA has therefore proposed the development of a space station complex consisting of a manned station core and unmanned platforms. Automation will be applied to the maximum extent possible but man remains an essential part of the NASA space station concept providing the link between basic research and the development of fully automated space-based production processes. Man and machine are complementary to each other. For the space station, automation of routine tasks and house-keeping functions is necessary to free the crew for useful tasks that cannot be automated. Computers, robots and artificial intelligence will all be used to extend human capabilities in space but they can never be substitutes for man.

49. Space station missions can be divided into three major categories: micro-gravity research, observation missions and space operations.

50. The space station will make more efficient use of the existing shuttle fleet. Instrument testing and experiments now carried out on the shuttle could be carried out on the space station.

Lyndon B. Johnson Space Centre

51. On Monday, 16th July 1984, the committee visited the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Centre in Houston where it was received by Mr. Charles Biggs who briefed the committee on the purpose and responsibilities of this centre.

52. The centre was established in September 1963 in order to allow NASA to take responsibility for the design, development and testing of spacecraft. The centre also houses associated systems for manned flight, selection and training of astronauts, planning and conducting manned missions and extensive participation in vehicle engineering and scientific experiments.

53. The budget of the centre for fiscal year 1984 is \$1.6 billion.
54. The centre is divided into a number of directorates which, however, are frequently realigned to keep pace with the changing directions and dimensions of manned space flight.
55. The facilities include approximately 100 different buildings of sizes and uses ranging from the nine-storey project management building to small traffic control pools at each entrance. Many structures are devoted to office space and others are solely designed to accomplish special tasks.
56. The committee had a specially-arranged guided tour of several buildings. One of the main buildings is the mission control centre where the flight controllers study the data that enable them to make decisions for each manned flight.
57. One special facility at the centre is the space environment simulation laboratory. This contains two vacuum chambers and a complete spacecraft or individual components can be subjected not only to a space-like vacuum but also to temperature extremes which may be encountered in space.
58. The training of astronauts takes place in special buildings where simulators incorporate projections onto screens where the spacecraft windows would be, showing scenes which the crew will see during a real mission. The crews and flight controllers can practise the entire mission many times before the actual flight.
59. One very important function of NASA is the management and assembling of spacecraft. Hundreds of contracting companies are working on a space programme. These companies are located throughout the United States and might employ just a few people or tens of thousands. The task of managing these efforts is very important. The largest contribution the centre makes to this programme management is in the design and construction of manned spacecraft.
60. The centre is responsible, for instance, for the shuttle orbiter which will carry astronauts, scientists and engineers into earth orbit and return them to earth with an aircraft-type landing.
61. The programme management defines and controls the many interfaces between the systems to ensure compatibility of crew, spacecraft and launch vehicle. It also establishes quality control and reliability standards together with the appropriate checkout and test procedures.
62. The centre's prime responsibility is the space shuttle programme. The shuttle flight system consists of the abovementioned reusable orbiter, a large expendable liquid propellant tank and two recoverable and reusable solid propellant rocket boosters.
63. The primary shuttle landing facilities are located at Kennedy Space Centre and Vandenberg Airforce Base. However, several alternative landing sites are available for contingencies.
64. Scientists and engineers from this centre are now studying the feasibility of using space technology for the construction of a space operations centre and of placing a satellite in space that could relay energy from the sun directly to earth and aid in the energy crisis. Such a space operations centre would allow on-orbit assembly, launch, recovery and servicing of manned and unmanned spacecraft.
65. As more and more shuttle flights are being planned, the centre is constantly occupied with managing this programme as well as its responsibilities for the development, production and delivery of the orbiter. The centre has also made a special study of space benefits. According to the Johnson Space Centre, applications of space technology to meet earth-bound needs fall into three main categories: health, earth resources and safety.
66. Health-care, for example, is using much of the technology which was developed for the medical monitoring of astronauts during space flight. Crew equipment, such as space suits and space food, is also being adapted to rehabilitation and nutrition applications.
67. The earth observation programmes of NASA started in the 1960s with the earth resources aircraft programme initiated by the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Centre. Landsat 1 has been in orbit since 1972 and has been transmitting data to produce tens of thousands of photographs which are being used by government agencies, private industry, and university researchers, to use and understand natural resources. Landsat 2, which is now circling the earth, is producing many beneficial results in agriculture, forestry, land use and land mapping, water quality and resources, minerals and land resources, marine resources and the environment. The Landsat 2 system will be combined with meteorological data from the NOAA satellites and from ground stations to relate weather conditions and to make production forecasts.
68. The space shuttle, which is being flown regularly, will provide possibilities for all types of experiments and will provide scientists with the ability to exchange experiences, look at different targets and generally use the shuttle's possibilities to the full. In the end, spaceborne studies of the earth will have worldwide

economic benefits in land use planning, agriculture, forestry, inland water resources, mineral resources, etc.

69. In safety improvement, the Johnson Space Centre engineers have been finding ways of using space-developed materials in making firemen's protective equipment and clothing more efficient and fire-resistant. New breathing systems are being developed.

IV. Energy policy

70. On 11th July 1984 the committee met at the German Embassy and was briefed by Mr. Bryan Hampton, Energy Counsellor of the British Embassy, on the energy policy of the American Government.

General remarks

71. The approach to energy policy is based on a free market philosophy. It involves reducing the rôle of the federal or state government wherever possible and placing increased reliance on the free market system to allocate resources in the energy sector.

72. This was the big change after Mr. Carter's presidency.

73. The main items on the energy agenda have been: (i) to remove price and other controls wherever possible; (ii) to continue support for longer-term, high-risk energy research and development which the private sector cannot be expected to undertake, but to reduce government expenditure in near-term research and development and commercialisation programmes; (iii) to reduce fuel use and other regulations that constrain market forces, and to reduce restraints on oil and gas findings thereby curtailing the power of the environment lobbies; (iv) to avoid government involvement in allocating oil supplies, even in times of emergency.

74. This policy is reinforced – particularly in the desire to reduce research and development expenditure – by the severe budgetary pressures on the administration. But it is also tempered by national security considerations. A major national preoccupation with security of energy, particularly oil supplies, has led, despite the deficit problem, to a continuing rapid build-up of the strategic petroleum reserve.

75. Two points are extremely important: (i) the conservation and energy, including nuclear, research and development programmes; (ii) the significance of energy as a factor in national security planning in the United States.

76. When it took office, the Reagan administration sought to reduce the Federal Govern-

ment's research and development spending across the board, with the exception of the nuclear fission budget. In FY 1982 for example it sought to reduce the research and development budget (leaving aside nuclear fission and magnetic fusion) to \$1.5 billion, about \$2.5 billion lower than the Carter administration levels. The aim was to cut out state and local conservation grant programmes and to make the heaviest cuts of all in the fossil, particularly coal programmes where it was believed that high energy prices coupled with federal tax credits would be sufficient to promote desirable projects.

77. But Congress, and this includes the Republican controlled Senate, remained committed to higher levels of government involvement in the energy industry than the administration would like, and has continued to provide higher levels of energy research and development appropriations than requested. In 1984, bowing to the inevitable, Secretary Hodel presented a budget for FY 1985, which, instead of containing requests substantially lower than the FY 1984 appropriations, is roughly in line with the levels set last year, with energy research and development at around \$3 billion. Nuclear is down compared with the FY 1984 appropriation, largely because the Clinch River breeder programme has been discarded, but programmes concentrating most heavily on long-term basic and applied research, e.g. general science and magnetic fusion, were increased. Apart from the longer-term work, coal has collected by far the lion's share of the increased fossil budget, with major increases for the programmes that the administration can link to its announced doubling of acid rain research money. Thus coal preparation technology has been given a 24% increase for such things as fine grinding technology, organic sulphur removal and chemical cleaning and there has been a 74% increase in the budget for coal combustion systems.

78. But while the direct combustion of coal is getting much attention, the administration has progressively sought to run down the synthetic fuels programme administered by the Synthetic Fuels Corporation. The SFC was originally established in 1980 to create a major synthetic fuel industry in the United States. In the changed energy market conditions of today, the objectives of that programme have by general consent shifted to the establishment of a basic capability in the synfuels area, rather than a large volume industry, with widespread acceptance that the SFC might commit the first slice of \$20 billion in loan guarantees and price supports, but not the full \$80 billion legislated for in 1980. The administration has responded to management problems and the departure of SFC board members to seek a

major reduction in funding consistent with its view that the nation will not need synthetic fuels before the turn of the century, so research should focus on laboratory-scale work.

79. Nuclear energy research and development continues to be a major element of federal policy based on a conviction that it is needed to provide safe and economic alternatives to finite fossil energy resources and requires resources and capabilities normally outside the realm of the private sector. But it goes beyond this to a recognition that, for example, fusion as an energy source, if successful, will result from the work of several generations of scientists and engineers and of a very large financial effort. For this reason, the United States believes that international co-operation is particularly desirable. Following the Versailles summit, meetings have been held among the summit countries and the European Communities to review the possibilities of collaborative or complementary and sequential programmes in the fields of fusion and high energy physics. Even a country as large and wealthy as the United States acknowledges that the investments required in the future have grown so large that it is ridiculous to have actual duplication of facilities and unproductive competition to achieve the same scientific or technical results.

80. The federal programme that bears most directly on energy security is, of course, the strategic petroleum reserve, which now stands at well over 400 million barrels, or three months' United States imports, and the part it would play, both domestically and internationally in responding to any interruption of oil supplies.

81. This has provided the most interesting change of posture in the energy policy in the last three years. Until 1984, the Reagan administration, while agnostic about the possibility of a new supply interruption, has argued that the most effective action, should an interruption occur, would be to avoid government intervention – at the international as well as national level – and permit prices to rise by enough to clear the market at the reduced level of supply. This approach, it was claimed, would minimise efficiency losses and set in motion forces of adjustment that would reverse the price run-up. Not surprisingly this caused considerable credibility problems for the administration in Congress, and criticism increased sharply when it became known last year that the fourth test of the IEA emergency arrangements had produced \$98 per barrel of oil in the United States market. The policy review which the then newly appointed Energy Secretary, Mr. Hodel, immediately set in hand coincided with growing concern about the course of the Iran-Iraq conflict, and led at the turn of the

year to the establishment of two inter-agency committees to examine international energy preparedness and domestic energy security. This review focused on the strategic petroleum reserve as the centrepiece of the administration's oil contingency plans. It concluded that oil should be released from the strategic petroleum reserve early in any crisis in order to forestall panic buying and calm the market, and led to the decision to press other countries to increase their strategic oil reserves and to agree on early mobilisation of stocks in an international supply crisis.

82. It is perhaps surprising that it has taken so long for minds in Washington to change on this issue since the growth of strategic stocks provides an opportunity to create a supply-orientated response to an oil disruption, and to move away from IEA programmes which are directed at controlling demand in a supply crisis. It should have been attractive to the "supply-siders" in the Reagan administration from the outset in 1981. In fact at that time many of the European countries were lobbying for new measures, including stock drawdown, in response to "sub-trigger" disruptions and as a means of preventing small and even medium-sized disruptions in oil supply having large effects on prices. Now, with a major push coming from the Americans the IEA is involved in the creation of a new art-science in the oil policy area which one commentator has described as "drawdown-nomics" – the study of when and how to use emergency petroleum reserves. The objective will be to design a programme that is perceived to be effective and equitable, and it is a process that seems likely to keep the IEA fully occupied for the next decade of its existence.

Nuclear energy policy

83. On 12th July 1984, Mr. Frank Goldner of the Energy Department briefed the committee about nuclear power in the United States.

84. At this very moment eighty-three nuclear plants are in operation and sixty-seven are under construction. The electricity generated by nuclear plants is now 10% and will be some 20% in the more distant future. The first signs of trouble for the United States nuclear industry came in the mid-1970s. Eleven nuclear projects were cancelled in 1975 and another thirty-two from 1976 to 1979. During this period only thirteen nuclear plants were ordered. The early 1980s have again witnessed a massive trimming of nuclear power programmes by most of the country's utilities. Sixteen plants were cancelled in 1980, six were cancelled in 1981 and eighteen in 1982. Only two nuclear plants ordered in the last nine years have not been subsequently

cancelled. The total bill for discontinued plants is some \$10,000 million.

85. Fundamental changes in the economic condition of the United States utility industry has been behind these cancellations. Electricity growth demand has fallen from 7% per year a decade ago to 3% today, greatly reducing the need for additional power plants. Revival of nuclear orders in the United States does not appear imminent. In the last few years the utilities have attempted to adjust their nuclear construction programmes to changing conditions but economics have been so confused that many decision-makers have intervened too late.

86. One of the chief lessons of the nuclear power experience so far is that existing technologies cannot provide sufficient guarantees on safety at a reasonable enough cost. Many of the strongest advocates of nuclear power now argue that engineers and physicists will need to design new plants. Some steps in this direction have been taken in Japan but nuclear power's economic problems will not disappear in the near future. Costs continue to increase in all countries and high interest rates and tied capital markets will be likely to remain, even with a vigorous economic recovery. It will not be long before a definite decision will have to be taken as to whether nuclear power programmes should be considered money-losing enterprises and should not therefore be continued if more promising investment opportunities are available.

87. Nevertheless, while electricity growth has been very slow over the last decade, there is no assurance that this trend will continue. Even quite modest growth would require new plants to come on line in the 1990s. Replacement of aging plants will require new generating capacity. Oil is not a realistic option for new electricity-generating plants because of its already high cost and vulnerability to import disruption. Natural gas may also be too costly or unavailable for generating large quantities of electricity. The use of coal, of course, can and will be expanded considerably. However, the continued combustion of fossil fuels, especially coal, has the potential to release enough carbon dioxide to cause serious climatic changes.

88. The possible alternatives to coal cannot generate enough electricity to replace it. Various forms of solar and geothermal energy may appear promising but uncertainties of economics and applicability of these technologies are too great to demonstrate that they will replace the need for nuclear power over the next several decades. There might therefore be good policy reasons for wanting to see the nuclear option preserved.

89. The United States is striving to become eventually completely self-sufficient in oil and

achieve energy independence. As the United States Congress withdrew government funding for the Clinch River breeder reactor, nothing is planned of a similar nature. However, a research breeder reactor programme is continuing. The United States is working with other countries, including France and Japan, sharing research and the use of components and facilities. The technology base will have to be preserved in order to pick up the breeder technology and use it if it turns out to be an economical choice for the future. The budget for 1983 was \$346.5 million. Research and development on other types of reactor – gas-cooled – converters on fuel cycle processes are still going on. In the meantime, coal is the alternative to nuclear in electric power generation.

Fossil energy

90. Mr. Marvin Singer, on behalf of Mr. Bill Vaughan, Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy, then briefed the committee on United States fossil energy policies and also on the international co-operative research effort in fossil energy.

91. The United States participates in both multilateral efforts, through such organisations as the International Energy Agency, and bilateral projects with individual governments and institutions in other countries.

92. The fossil energy division has three major functions: (i) conducting a research and development programme focused on coal, oil, gas and oil shale; (ii) producing oil from the naval petroleum reserve located in California; and (iii) managing the strategic petroleum reserve located in Southern Louisiana and Texas.

93. Fossil energy's strategic objectives are: (i) to increase the contribution of coal by improvements in environmental, technical, and economic performance of coal-based systems; and (ii) to increase the effective resource base for premium gas and liquid fuels through enhanced resource recovery and processing techniques from coal, shale, tar sands and unconventional oil and gas sources.

94. The United States pursues these objectives through a programme of research in coal, petroleum and gas. The performers of this research include fossil energy laboratories located in Pittsburgh and Morgantown. These laboratories have the responsibility for day-to-day management of the research programme. Other research performers include national laboratories, such as Oak Ridge, Argonne and Sandia National Laboratories, universities and industry and non-profit-making organisations. It spends: on coal \$178 million, or about 65% of

the total fossil energy budget; on petroleum \$37.8 million, or about 14% of the total; and on gas \$8.55 million, or about 3% of the total. About \$57.4 million, or about one-third of the coal research budget, can be considered as acid rain related.

95. The events of the last ten years – when the United States suffered a five-month cut off of Arab oil – have resulted in changes in its energy consumption patterns. As a percentage of its total energy use, from 1973 to 1983, coal has increased from about 17% to 22%, oil has decreased from about 47% to 17% and gas has increased from about 30% to 50%.

96. With regard to petroleum imports, today the United States imports less than 4% of its oil from the Persian Gulf. Mexico is the largest oil supplier, followed by Canada, the United Kingdom and Venezuela, Saudi Arabia is fifth or sixth. There are more than 400 million barrels of oil in the strategic petroleum reserve – enough to tide the United States over for at least three months should all imports be cut off.

97. The United States has diversified its energy supplies. Coal now supplies more than half of the electricity and 90% of the energy used is now supplied by domestic energy resources.

98. George Keyworth, the President's Science Advisor, put it this way:

“Perhaps the most important element of policy that emerged from the reassessment of the responsibilities of government and the private sector was a renewed and considerably strengthened commitment to federal support for basic research. Not only is basic research an essential investment in the nation's long-term welfare, but it is largely a federal responsibility because its benefits are so broadly distributed.

Quite simply, basic research is a vital underpinning for our national wellbeing.”

99. The fossil energy programme underlines wholeheartedly this statement. Basic, as well as applied, research within the fossil energy programme have increased both in priority and funding.

100. Basic research seeks to develop fundamental scientific knowledge, including a fundamental understanding of unconventional energy systems and fuels and of their physical and chemical properties, leading to the definition of new energy research and development concepts. Applied research includes activities to resolve broad engineering and physical science problems

in specific fossil technologies and related areas. However, practical utility may not be proven at this stage. Proof-of-concept is the stage at which enough has been learned to resolve specific problems to determine the technical and environmental feasibility of the integrated process. Data are generated to evaluate critical scale-up parameters, characterise sub-systems, processes, and products, and to permit preliminary economic projections to be made. Process development is directed at increasingly larger-scale engineering design, construction and operation of energy systems with the objective of reducing technical risks and improving the process operability, reliability, economics and environmental impact. Commercialisation consists of a wide variety of efforts to eliminate technical, economic and institutional barriers required for acceptance of a new energy technology into the market place.

101. In 1980, the office of fossil energy funded essentially no basic or fundamental research. Nearly 90% of its budget was focused on proof-of-concept engineering units and large-scale pilot and demonstration efforts. In 1981, basic research accounted for less than one-tenth of 1% of the fossil energy programme's \$1 billion-plus budget.

102. This budget was, in part, a response to international events and was heavily focused on the commercialisation of synthetic fuels processes. Today that has changed.

103. Basic and fundamental research in the proposed FY 1985 fossil energy budget will receive \$33 million if Congress approves the budget request. This would be the fossil energy's advanced coal research programme.

104. The fossil energy division has a vigorous international programme. Its international research projects cover the entire spectrum of fossil-fuel activities – extraction, preparation, processing, conversion and utilisation. Almost half of the active projects are related to coal; the rest are oil-related.

105. Authorisation for individual projects results from bilateral or multilateral agreements. All active multilateral projects are being conducted under the auspices of the International Energy Agency (IEA).

106. There are currently seventeen active bilateral fossil energy projects under way between the United States and six other countries. The other six countries involved are Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands and Venezuela. Two active projects are with the Netherlands and four with Canada. Venezuela is participating with the United States in eight active projects under a single general agreement. The

Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and Mexico are participating with the United States in one project each.

107. Active bilateral projects promote technology development and information exchange. The projects with Canada, Mexico and Venezuela stress oil recovery techniques, while most of the remaining activities seek to develop improved coal utilisation and conversion processes.

V. Activities of aircraft companies visited

Grumman Corporation

Aircraft development

108. On 9th July 1984, the committee visited the Grumman Aerospace Company at Bethpage, New York, where it was received by the President and Chairman of the Board, Mr. George Skurla. He gave a general briefing on Grumman Corporation which produces a great variety of products: military aircraft, trucks for the commercial market place, yachts and boats for leisure activities, solar systems for heat and hot water, computer systems, software and services to commercial customers. It has some 28,000 employees working in more than 110 manufacturing plants and its annual sales exceed \$2 billion. Its business strategy has been to make Grumman the first integrator of airborne electronics systems. Its naval aircraft have been greatly improved through these new systems. To enhance the performance of its aircraft at a minimum cost the emphasis is not on building new aircraft but on new avionics, electronics, etc. to be integrated in existing aircraft.

109. Its speciality is naval aircraft, such as the F-14, the E-2C Hawkeye, the A-6E Intruder, its derivative, the EA-6P Prowler and the new EF-111A, which are the free world's only flying electronic fighter aircraft. They are equipped with extensive electronic countermeasure systems and could jam the most advanced enemy radar.

110. Mr. M. Pelehach, President of Grumman International, pointed out that Grumman and other aircraft factories have now reached a point in aircraft building where one has to decide which way to go in the near future. Should existing aircraft be re-equipped and should their operational flying life be prolonged or should new aircraft be built. The problem is that the governments cannot afford to pay for the planes which the aircraft industry is able to

produce. New electronic equipment will enable existing aircraft to fly well into the 1990s.

111. Grumman knows that Europe is considering building a new fighter aircraft. However, with the technology now available, these aircraft would become extremely expensive. They would consist of new composite materials, have stealth possibilities, should be able to fly sideways, have new weapons systems, new communications and new propulsion systems. However, with all these new features, would it be possible to build aircraft which governments could pay for? For instance, the new B-1, when it comes off the line, will cost some \$250 million. The F-14 cost, some years ago, \$10 million. Now, however, it might come to \$30 million per aircraft. The total cost of the Tornado does not fall far short of this sum. It can be seen that everywhere in the industry technology is not making aircraft any cheaper. The requirements for new aircraft are not written in Washington but in Moscow and high cost weapons and requirements for aircraft might become unsurmountable. Again, in many cases planes are not being built because they are needed but because industries need the work to continue their existence and therefore build new and better aircraft. This will mean that an aircraft which used to be in service for about twenty years might now have a lifetime of nearly forty to fifty years, albeit with new engines, new electronics etc.

112. This new development can also be seen in numbers of aircraft. If the United States air force has 500 B-51s they will now be replaced by a hundred B-1s equipped with cruise missiles. Another result will be less and less aircraft manufacturers.

Space station research

113. Mr. J. Mockovciak, Deputy Director, shuttle applications and space station programmes of Grumman, indicated that in 1985 Grumman would be spending \$150 million on space station research and development. It is building prototypes of work stations which will eventually fit inside the space shuttle cargo bay and enable astronauts to work in space. The space station will operate some 250 miles out in orbit and the command centre and living quarters module will provide room for six to nine people. Grumman is also building a manipulator prototype to serve the satellite after it is retrieved.

114. It is considered that there will be a crew rotation for the space station every three months and the module structure has therefore to be a habitat as well as a command centre. The initial flight-off might be in the early 1990s. Reusable orbital transport vehicles will travel short distances from the space station and then

return to be refuelled and refitted. NASA will indicate firm definitions of the system in 1985.

115. There is no doubt whatsoever that industrial development in space is going to take place. Some forty to fifty large companies have requested NASA to participate in space station operations to carry out research and development. They are mainly concerned with drug companies and material processing. As soon as industry knows definitely that the overall facility will be there and that the shuttle will regularly serve it, industry will certainly seek the opportunity to manufacture products which cannot be produced on earth. At a later period the space station might be used as a stepping-stone to the moon.

116. Grumman is convinced that sooner or later the Soviet Union will also try to build a space shuttle, as this is the only logical development of the space transportation system.

117. Once a permanently manned space station is operational, a permanently manned station on the moon becomes feasible. This might be established in the year 2020.

118. As far as Grumman knows, the Defence Department is not involved in the space station and is not ready to fund it. This will be a completely civil activity.

119. The space station will be of great importance as a repair station for satellites. Their cost might be as much as \$250 million and it would be worth while to repair them from a space station, either by robot or by an astronaut. Another important point will be the refuelling of satellites and lastly the space station will allow large antenna systems to be built to follow and direct satellites.

E-2C Hawkeye

120. After these briefings the committee went to see the production halls of the E-2C Hawkeye. This system has benefited from the development and production of three generations of Grumman airborne early warning systems and it has established itself through years of successful use as an effective command and control system. In 1975 the Government of Israel selected this plane for its early warning and co-ordination system. The aircraft is now in service in Israel and Japan and might be bought by Egypt, Pakistan and Singapore.

121. For Israel the Hawkeyes supplement ground-based air defence radars, providing information on the movement of equipment and troops and helping to tie together the nation's entire defence network. The compact size of the E-2C makes it an ideal system for a small country with long exposed borders.

122. For Japan, the E-2C provides an early warning coverage against low- or high-flying intruders.

123. For Australia, with its huge coastline to defend, the E-2C can be used to control smuggling, protect its offshore resources and fishing rights and co-ordinate far-flung research and rescue operations.

124. The turbo-prop Hawkeye, though smaller, is also considerably less expensive than AWACS and Nimrod; it offers a most advanced early warning system with proven capabilities in maritime surveillance plus the advantage of its passive detection system.

X-29A

125. During the visit of the plant, the committee saw a prototype of the X-29A, a technology demonstrator aircraft meant to prove the value of forward-swept wings for tactical aircraft. Grumman's research budget is some \$70 million for 1984, of which an important part will be used to support the X-29A forward-swept wing programme.

Sperry Corporation

Electronic developments

126. Sperry Corporation is one of the world's largest suppliers of total integrated simulation and training systems for military and commercial applications. It deals with avionic, ship control, weapons control and data-processing technologies. It is a leading supplier of advanced sensor, guidance and control systems.

127. The committee was briefed by Mr. Robert Wendt, President of Electronics Systems, on Sperry as a high technology industry.

128. Sperry Corporation is one of the 100 largest corporations in the United States, with annual revenues of almost \$5,000 million and more than 71,000 employees worldwide. The company is primarily involved in the design, development and production of high technology electronic products and systems for both the commercial sector and the military. It is also a major manufacturer of specialised farm equipment.

129. Sperry has four major business units: the computer systems unit is responsible for the design and manufacture of computers and information-processing systems for both commercial and defence markets. The electronic systems unit, with headquarters in New York, develops and produces defence systems and commercial maritime electronic systems. The flight systems unit designs and produces avionic

systems for commercial and military aviation and space flight operations; while Sperry's New Holland unit is a leading supplier of specialised farm machinery.

130. Technology has been the focus since the company was started by Elmer Sperry in 1910. Its long line of technological innovations include: the first reliable gyrocompass for ship navigation; the first aircraft autopilot; the first aircraft artificial horizon; the first guided missile; the first gyro-stabilised bombsight for aircraft and the first automatic radio-controlled navigation system. The tradition of technological leadership continues today at Sperry, especially in the defence area.

131. Sperry is the twentieth largest defence contractor in the United States. That is no small accomplishment, since it does not make ships, aircraft, tanks or other "vehicles". It is, for the most part, strictly a high-technology electronics firm that has increasingly applied its skills to system design, integration and support.

132. First will be discussed some of Sperry's United States aerospace projects, as well as some of its other areas of expertise.

133. It develops and produces avionic systems through its flight systems operation. It provides a number of electronic systems for aircraft as diverse as the United States air force's new B-1B strategic bomber and the United States army's Apache attack helicopter. It recently delivered the first full colour airborne displays for the air force F-15 and is producing advanced control and display equipment for the Bell Aerospace Improved Scout Helicopter.

134. In addition, its flight systems group is producing advanced digital flight management systems for Airbus A-310, as well as for Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft. It recently formed a new space operations division within flight systems to handle the growing volume of work on the space shuttle and on defence and scientific satellite programmes.

MATE

135. The electronic systems unit, which is the largest part of Sperry's defence operations, is active in many fields. For example, as the second largest manufacturer of simulation systems in the United States, it has designed and produced simulators for the EA-6B, the F-18, the EF-111, the A-6 and the A-4 aircraft, as well as the CH-53 helicopter, among others. Sperry also won a contract to produce the simulators for the new T-45 jet trainer for the United States navy. This programme to train undergraduate pilots to fly advanced jets uses a modified version of the British Aerospace

Hawk aircraft and will require a total of thirty-two simulators.

136. Sperry is working on a major programme for the United States air force called the modular automatic test equipment programme, or MATE. This project has established standards for both hardware and software modules and their interfaces, so that a wide range of digitally programmed test equipment can be readily adapted and deployed to meet the needs of new avionic systems. These new standards have been designed as mandatory for all new test equipment for future United States air force systems and offer great potential as a world standard for aircraft electronics testing.

137. Sperry is also involved in the development and production of low-cost, high-powered electronic jamming pods for aircraft and is a leader in the development of fast-switching frequency synthesisers for both transmitters and receivers.

Radar systems

138. As a leader in the development of air defence radars, Sperry is involved in the design of the United States air force's advanced tactical radar, expected to be deployed in the 1990s as a replacement for current battlefield surveillance radars that are inadequate in most projected military scenarios. Sperry is also competing for the north warning system, a new network of short-range, unattended radars which will be used to upgrade the distant early warning, or DEW, line system stretching across Canada and Alaska.

139. Sperry is a world leader in navigation and guidance equipment and systems for naval applications. At one extreme, it designed, developed and produced the navigation systems for the Polaris, Poseidon and Trident submarines and is currently working on an \$800 million contract for the navigation systems for the Trident II submarines. At the other end of the spectrum, tens of thousands of commercial ships of all sizes depend on Sperry gyrocompasses and a wide range of related navigation and control products for safe passages.

140. Sperry pioneered in developing an integrated approach to combat systems design for the United States navy, with the development of the FFG-7 class guided-missile frigates, using sophisticated computer networks and advanced programming techniques to provide significantly improved reaction times for combat crews.

141. Sperry has also developed and produced some of the most advanced electronic warfare systems for both signal and electronic intelligence ever developed, and recently delivered electronic warfare training systems to NATO for use during fleet exercises.

Computers

142. The third element of Sperry's defence operations, in computer systems, has for the past decade provided the standard computers that are used on board every United States navy ship, and in the navies of several NATO countries. Last year, Sperry received a contract to provide the next generation of standard navy computers.

143. The computer systems unit has also designed and developed the computerised air traffic control systems for many of the United States Federal Aviation Administration's air traffic control centres, including the one in New York.

144. In non-military areas, the electronic systems unit is also now competing for the contract to develop a next generation weather radar system for the United States called NEXRAD, which will improve the detection of severe weather conditions, and which offers great potential for application in Europe and around the world. This new technique will greatly enhance the safety of airline operations.

145. Sperry is a source of high-technology systems in a wide variety of fields. While its product lines are diverse, its underlying strength is its consistently innovative and forward-looking systems approach to solving customers' problems.

European-American collaborative projects

146. Mr. Spencer Ross, Vice-President of marketing for the electronic systems operations of Sperry, spoke on European-American collaborative projects.

147. As opposed to thirty years ago, there are now competent companies throughout Europe capable of producing the latest in high-technology equipment.

148. Co-development and co-production programmes, a clear objective of the United States Department of Defence, nevertheless are becoming more difficult to achieve, in part due to more rigid United States export licensing procedures and in part due to the difficulties of harmonising European and United States practices and legal systems.

149. The traditional means of technology transfer in the past – licensed production – has lost some of its popularity, in part because of the restrictions on re-export which normally accompany such agreements.

150. Yet in a historical sense, the licensing of United States technology has had a decided effect upon the growth of important electronics

and aerospace industries in Europe, dating back to such major aircraft programmes as the F-104, which was a catalyst to the establishment of many aircraft-related capabilities in Europe.

151. One of the unique aspects of high-technology manufacturing industries is that most of them require a worldwide market in order to survive. To establish a specialised manufacturing facility with the concept of serving only a home market is to invite financial failure.

152. Further, if a company's competitors serve larger world market needs, those worldwide companies will develop an economy of scale which will be superior to that of the purely local industry.

153. Another aspect to be considered are the protectionist interests at work on both sides of the Atlantic. Despite the desirability of industry-to-industry co-operation within WEU and between WEU and the United States, the process of reaching agreement on sharing of costs, technology and production is not simple. Additionally, the defence procurement process differs in the United States from that followed in Europe.

154. Meetings such as this can be helpful factors in removing the barriers to industrial co-operation. Sperry supports with enthusiasm the policy of the government which recognises the need for effective co-operation among NATO allies in armaments production. To quote from a recent report of the Defence Science Board of the United States: "... industrial co-operation affords better utilisation of technology and resources, decreases the likelihood of research and development duplication and fosters greater interoperability and standardisation".

Miscellaneous

155. After these introductions, a number of questions were asked and Mr. Ross answered them as follows.

156. Important partners of Sperry in Europe are Selenia, in Italy, and Holland Signal, in the Netherlands. There is also a close collaboration with firms in Sweden, the United Kingdom and Canada. Sperry has some sixty locations in Europe and employs some 250 people there.

157. On the Trident weapons system, Sperry agreed that, because of United States security systems, it was extremely difficult to arrive at a satisfactory two-way street.

158. As a result of its research and development effort, Sperry won a very large commercial computer contract from the United States air

force and one from the Canadian Defence Department for the Canadian frigate programme. It was also awarded contracts totalling \$1.2 billion by the United States navy for shipborne computers and for the Trident II submarine navigation system.

159. Sperry is also in line for the next generation weather radar system which is being developed by the national weather service so that the future quality of weather prediction will be improved, particularly the prediction of life-threatening hurricanes, tornadoes, blizzards and super-storms. The production award for this system is scheduled for 1986. The system will be used for civil as well as for military purposes.

Martin Marietta

The NASA Michoud Assembly Facility

160. On Friday, 13th July 1984, the committee was received at the NASA Michoud Assembly Facility by Dr. Mathias Siebel, Manager, Mr. Kenneth P. Timmons, Vice-President and General Manager, Michoud Division of the Martin Marietta Corporation, and Mr. Charles Richardson, Director, International Marketing, Martin Marietta Corporation.

161. Dr. Siebel pointed out that since 1961 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration had acquired the Michoud Facility from the Department of Defence to manufacture large space launch vehicles requiring water transportation to launch sites. In 1973, Martin Marietta Aerospace was awarded a contract to design, develop and manufacture nine external propellant tanks for the space shuttle system. The external tank is the only component of the space shuttle system that is not recovered for reuse. The space shuttle is further composed of the orbiter and two solid rocket boosters which are both reusable.

162. The Michoud Facility contains one of the largest production buildings in the country, a vertical assembly building for stacking external tank components, pneumostatic and system test buildings, a deep-water port for shipment, manufacturing support buildings and administrative offices.

163. Some 4,600 Martin Marietta employees work at the Michoud Assembly Facility alongside some 400 employees of federal agencies which share the Michoud facilities.

The shuttle's external tank

164. The external tank has two major rôles in the space shuttle programme: first, to contain

and deliver quality propellants, liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen to the engines; second, to serve as the structural backbone of the space shuttle during launch operations. The tank is composed of two tanks, a large hydrogen tank and a smaller oxygen tank joined together by a collar-like intertank to form one large propellant storage container which is 46.89 metres long and 8.4 metres in diameter. The intertank joins the two tanks and provides a protective compartment to house some of the instrumentation components in the space between the two propellant tanks.

165. The external tank is manufactured, assembled and given final acceptance testing at the Michoud Assembly Facility. The tanks themselves are built at Michoud by the Denver Division of Martin Marietta Aerospace.

166. Mr. Timmons, Vice-President and General Manager of the Michoud Division of the Martin Marietta Corporation, stated that the corporation has its headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland. It is involved in designing, producing, integrating and managing systems in aerospace and defence, electronics, communications, information management, energy and materials. The Michoud Division is part of Martin Marietta Aerospace.

167. In 1983, corporation sales reached an all-time high of \$3.9 billion compared with \$3.5 billion the previous year. Aerospace continued to be the major source of sales and operating earnings.

168. In 1983, four space shuttle flights relied on the Martin Marietta-built external fuel tank and seven more of the giant tanks were delivered to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Nine more space shuttle external tanks are scheduled for delivery in 1984. Martin Marietta is ahead of schedule and has already eight external tanks ready. Fifteen are in the process of production or assemblage. Production rates will be increased to twenty-four tanks a year by 1988. The production costs have remained stable for the last ten years.

169. In 1983, two manned manoeuvring units were delivered to NASA and were flown from the space shuttle early in 1984, providing astronauts with the ability to carry out tasks in space with the backpack propulsion device which in effect transforms the astronaut who wields it into a one-man satellite capable of precision tasks which were hitherto unattainable.

McDonnell Douglas Corporation

General remarks

170. On 17th July 1984, the committee was received at the McDonnell Douglas Corporation

in St. Louis by Mr. James S. McDonnell III, Corporate Vice-President, Aerospace Marketing. Mr. McDonnell gave a short review of the origins of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation.

171. A total of about 80,000 people are employed by McDonnell Douglas and sales totalled \$8.11 billion in 1983 – some 10% higher than in 1982. Most of the increase occurred in the combat aircraft line of business, especially in the F/A-18 Hornet programme. The net earnings were some \$270 million and the net worth of the company was \$2 billion.

172. Some 25,000 employees work in the aircraft section and are mainly concerned with fighter aircraft production. The Douglas commercial aircraft company employs some 15,000 people and the astronautics company employs some 6,000 people who are mainly concerned with tactical missiles. In 1984, Hughes Helicopters was purchased from the estate of the late Mr. Edward R. Hughes. This is a new line of business for McDonnell Douglas but the already strong position of Hughes Helicopters will be enhanced by McDonnell Douglas capabilities in cockpit technology, systems integration and other areas. Hughes Helicopters has about 5,800 employees and its major facilities are in Culver City, California, and Mesa, Arizona. It manufactures military and commercial helicopters.

Military aircraft programmes

173. Mr. Marshall and his colleagues briefed the committee on military aircraft programmes. They mentioned the F-15 Eagle fighter aircraft which is one of a series of strike fighters in which McDonnell Douglas has been engaged since 1945. They built the Phantom 1, the Banshee, Demon, Voodoo, the Phantom 2 and are now producing the F-15 Eagle.

F-15 Eagle

174. The Eagle can operate in any environment, day or night, and undertake air-to-air and air-to-ground missions penetrating deep into enemy territory. The dual rôle fighter is required to operate in any environment and to have the high performance and capability necessary to counter improved threat air-to-air and ground-to-air weapons systems and fly long range with a substantial payload to attack a wide variety of potential targets, including mobile armour. It has thirteen armaments stations for air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons and can fire conventional ammunition as well as nuclear warheads. Its development is continuing with the multi-stage improvement programme and will continue in the years to come.

175. The F-15 is in service with the United States tactical air command, United States air force Europe, Pacific air force and with the air forces of Israel, Japan and Saudi Arabia.

F-18 Hornet

176. The Hornet is a multi-rôle, high performance, tactical aircraft which can perform fighter, strike or intercept missions. The twin-engined multi-mission aircraft is capable of operating from both aircraft-carriers and shore bases. The aircraft is in service with the United States navy, United States Marine Corps, the Canadian forces and in several international air forces. It has a very high manoeuvring performance and multi-mission versatility. It was the first tactical aircraft to have a digital fly-by-wire flight control system. Two independent computers control and monitor the four general flight control systems, offering a high degree of flexibility in flight control systems. The Hornet can carry a great variety of weapons systems, such as the Sidewinder missiles, multi-barrel cannons, the advanced medium-range air-to-air missile, AMRAAM, etc. It can also carry conventional or laser-guided bombs, rockets and other weapon systems.

Harrier II

177. The Harrier II is an international V/STOL tactical aircraft involving the United States and British Governments as well as their military forces and industries. It was first ordered by the United States Marine Corps and the Royal Air Force and is designated AV-8B in the United States Marine Corps service and GRMk-5 with the RAF. The weapons system development and production team is headed by McDonnell Douglas Corporation which acts as programme prime contractor for the aircraft delivered to the United States Marine Corps, with British Aerospace as principal sub-contractor. For the RAF's GRMk-5s, the rôles of the two companies are reversed with British Aerospace as prime contractor undertaking final assembly and tests. Internationally the Harrier II will be marketed jointly by the two companies. The Harrier II can land and take off vertically in places with no runways and can hover motionlessly in mid-air, move sideways and back up. The Harrier II is equipped with an integrated computer-controlled navigation attack system. It can carry a wide variety of arms, including conventional general-purpose bombs, cluster munitions, laser-guided weapons, air-to-ground guided missiles, such as the Maverick missile, and self-defence air-to-air missiles, such as the Sidewinder. The Harrier is powered by the

latest version of the Rolls-Royce Pegasus 11 engine.

AV-8B

178. The first production of the AV-8B was delivered to the United States Marine Corps in late 1983. Future improvements to the basic design will be possible as well as the weapons system performance which can also be substantially improved with the addition of an airborne air-to-air, air-to-surface radar.

KC-10

179. Mr. Bollick spoke to the committee about airlifters, tankers and trainers. In developing the DC-10 jetliner, McDonnell Douglas built a modified version called the advanced tanker-cargo aircraft. This was designated by the air force as KC-10. It can do two jobs. It carries 350,000 lbs of fuel and in its wide cabin fuselage it carries a huge amount of cargo. With this double-barrelled capability, it can escort squadrons of combat planes to distant bases, carry the support equipment which the squadrons need and eliminate the need for stops along the way. Using it as a tanker aircraft, it has a boom of 45 ft. The United States air force needs some sixty planes and up until now twenty-three have been delivered.

180. The C-17 is an advanced cargo aircraft. It is expected to be a key element in the future mobility of United States ground forces. It can use small, little-equipped airfields in sustained operations and can provide possible forward area airlift support. Full-scale engineering development of the C-17 will start in 1985 and the first squadron will be in service in the air force in late 1991.

Space systems and missiles

181. Mr. John F. Yardley briefed the committee on space systems and missiles. McDonnell Douglas has been designing and building rockets and missiles since as long ago as world war II. Later they built the Mercury spacecraft, the Gemini spacecraft and the Skylab. They are now deeply involved in the space shuttle programme and in the preparation of the space station programme.

Harpoon

182. For the navy, McDonnell Douglas is building the Harpoon which is used as an anti-ship missile. This missile was operational on 223 ships and submarines and 209 aeroplanes in 1983. Twelve allied nations are also deploying the Harpoon. Of the 3,440 Harpoons which

have been ordered, more than 2,800 have been delivered.

Tomahawk

183. The Tomahawk cruise missile is a weapon capable of following the contours of the earth or sea beneath it on a low fast flight to its target and it is therefore extremely difficult to detect and intercept. One of the strengths of the cruise missile is its extraordinary accuracy. Production of the first complete Tomahawk will be in 1984 and the navy plans to initiate a limited competition for full production contracts in fiscal year 1985. Several versions will be manufactured: (i) anti-ship Tomahawk; (ii) for nuclear land attack; (iii) for conventional land attack; (iv) ground launchers.

The EOS project

184. Mr. Yardley mentioned especially the EOS project, the electrophoresis operations in space project, based on a device that separates biological materials for use as pharmaceuticals. Research and development was carried out during three flight tests on the space shuttle in 1983. In space the device achieved more than four times the purity levels and more than 700 times the quantity possible from similar operations on earth. In addition, the device demonstrated that it can separate live cells. This makes it possible for researchers to obtain purified living cells.

185. A McDonnell Douglas engineer was selected to become the first industry-sponsored astronaut to fly on a shuttle mission. As payload specialist, he operated the device for a hundred hours during a seven-day mission in August 1984.

186. McDonnell Douglas has a contract for refurbishment of the space shuttle's reusable solid rocket booster structures.

187. In 1983, McDonnell Douglas completed a space station mission analysis study for NASA. The study examines possible payloads and uses for a permanent orbiting manned space station. If developed, the station could serve as a base for a variety of scientific and commercial functions including the EOS project. In this field, projects will be submitted also by Grumman, Martin Marietta, Rockwell and Boeing.

Hughes Aircraft Company

General remarks

188. On 19th July 1984, the committee was received by Mr. Malcolm Currie of Hughes

Aircraft in El Segundo, Los Angeles. In El Segundo Hughes is constructing the corporate offices and the electro-optical and data systems group. Surrounding Los Angeles international airport are the development and production facilities for the radar systems group and the space and communications group.

189. Hughes has become one of the world's largest and most diversified developers and producers of advanced electronics, missiles and space systems. Although the name reflects the fact that it once made aircraft, the company now makes a wide range of products, all more or less related to electronics. As of late 1981, it had almost 60,000 employees, 18,000 of whom are on the scientific and engineering technical staff. The company is divided into a number of operating groups.

190. The ground systems group specialises in command and control systems, radars, computers, computer programming, displays, communications, information management systems, electronic warfare systems, sonar systems for both surface ships and submarines, torpedo guidance control, fire control and mine electronics.

191. The missile systems group designs and develops advanced missile systems, such as the Phoenix and the Maverick. The radar systems group specialises in airborne systems and the electro-optical and data systems group produces electro-optical systems. The space and communications group is responsible for all space systems including international and domestic communications satellite systems and satellites for scientific investigation. The industrial electronics group builds advanced components and industrial equipment, including microelectronics, micro-wave tubes, connectors, multiplexing systems, gas lasers, welding and soldering equipment and industrial automation equipment. Advanced research is carried out at the research laboratory.

192. During fiscal year 1983, Hughes Aircraft Corporation sales increased by 13% to \$4 billion; 80% of these sales were to the United States Government. Hughes is the nation's second largest defence contractor and the Department of Defence number one contractor for defence electronics. Capital expenditure during the five-year period from 1978 onwards totalled \$1.1 billion or 7.6% of sales. From 1983 to 1987 more than \$2 billion will be invested in capital improvements. The long-term objectives are to (i) design low-cost production, (ii) apply technology to the process of design and manufacturing, (iii) make total quality a way of life, (iv) encourage people to develop and use their full capabilities and talents, and (v) involve suppliers in reducing the cost of Hughes systems.

193. The mission of the ground systems group is to produce systems for tactical air defence, command and control, communication radar, electronic warfare, sonar, torpedo guidance, mine warfare, data processing and display. The United States air force started operating the Hughes joint surveillance system in 1983. This new system protects the air space of continental United States, Canada, Alaska and Hawaii. It is expected to save the air force more than \$100 million in annual operating and maintenance costs. In Europe the first two sites for a new air defence system of the Federal Republic of Germany began operating as did the first of forty-two sites for AEGIS, the computerised command and control network which Hughes is building for NATO.

194. The joint tactical information distribution system will integrate the radar data system from the AWACS aircraft with the NATO ground-based air defence network.

Missiles

195. The missile systems group has as its mission advanced tactical guided-missile systems, including missile guidance and propulsion systems, missile launch control equipment and ancillary sub-systems and components. In 1983, the main effort was the development of the advanced medium-range air-to-air missile, AMRAAM, and the transition to a high-rate production of four other programmes which are: the improved Phoenix, the imaging infrared Maverick, TOW 2, and the Angle-rate bombing set. For AMRAAM there will be an extensive flight test programme in 1984 and 1985 and fabrication of parts for more than a hundred test missiles has begun. The Phoenix is a naval missile and will be delivered in 1984. It covers a distance of some 160 kilometres and has been 92% successful.

Maverick

196. The Maverick is an air-to-ground missile designed for the United States air force and later on for the United States Marine Corps and navy, which versions are now being developed. It is designed for launching from tactical aircraft against hard point targets, such as field fortifications, bunkers, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, parked aircraft and radar or missile sites. More than 11,000 Mavericks have now been launched at distances ranging from a few thousand feet to many miles and from high altitude down to treetop level.

TOW

197. The TOW is a tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided missile developed for the

United States army. It is a low-cost high-reliability anti-tank missile system now also in use by the United States Marine Corps and by the armies or marine corps of more than thirty other nations. The wire-guided missile is capable of destroying such targets as tanks, armoured personnel carriers, bunkers and small boats. Since its initial development, improvement programmes have led to heavier warheads with greater armour-piercing capacity as well as with an improved engine and guidance system. The modifications will not require any change in launcher or guidance hardware. Hughes has delivered more than 270,000 TOW missiles and over 1,000 airborne TOW systems.

AMRAAM

198. The AMRAAM is the advanced medium-range air-to-air missile under full-scale development by Hughes for the air force and the navy. It is intended to improve significantly the air-to-air combat capability of the United States fighter pilots. The AMRAAM is the leading project initiated by a memorandum of understanding, signed by the defence departments of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, which is intended to avoid duplicated development costs in Atlantic Alliance countries. In carrying out this intention, AMRAAM will be compatible with selected NATO aircraft. Hughes will produce ninety-four test missiles. Test firing will be conducted from the F-14, F-15, F-16 and F-18 at different air force bases.

Radar systems

199. Hughes Aircraft Company is a pioneer in the development of electronic scanning radars. These radars have dramatically improved the surveillance ability of the United States and many NATO and third countries. Hughes is developing radar for self-defence capabilities for the army as well as for the navy, for short-range as well as long-range projectiles. Many radars can be utilised in fixed or mobile configurations and many versions are being sold to NATO and other foreign countries.

200. Hughes's long-term business base is anchored in three major airborne radar programmes: the weapons control system for the navy F-14 Tomcat, the radar systems for the air force F-15 Eagle and the navy and marine F-18 Hornet. These products will be diversified by the production of the advanced synthetic aperture radar system for reconnaissance aircraft, the establishment of electronic countermeasures development programmes and additional orders for the weapon guidance data link.

201. The mission of the Santa Barbara Research Centre is infrared systems, compo-

nents and materials for ground, air and space applications, electro-optical instrumentation for military and space systems. Of the 71,000 personnel working at Hughes Aircraft Corporation, some 20,000 are engaged in research and development and they handle about 2,000 research projects.

Technology transfer

202. Finally, Mr. Malcolm Currie briefed the committee on American policy on technology transfer. He indicated that some 165 agreements have been concluded with many European countries, for instance, five with France, five with the Netherlands and Belgium, sixty-one with Italy, twenty-eight with the United Kingdom and forty-one with Germany. According to the new rules, technology transfer is now being very much controlled by the Defence and State Departments. For the flow of civil products which can be used for military purposes, the Department of Commerce will consult the Department of Defence. Cocom in Paris will be strengthened and there will be a narrow link between the Washington offices and those in Europe. A top priority task is to determine how effective controls can be maintained with increased industry-to-industry contacts. On this question your Rapporteur refers to what has been said earlier in this report.

TRW

General remarks

203. On 20th July 1984, the committee was received by Dr. Gerald Czaika and by Mr. Jan Roos, Vice-President, at TRW Company, 1 Space Park, Redondo Beach, California.

204. Mr. Roos gave a general overview of TRW, its origin and its future. It is a diversified company that provides high technology products, electronics and space systems and serves industrial and energy markets worldwide. They are developing communications satellites to link commercial, scientific and military systems worldwide; microelectronic chips to speed the flow of information, alternative energy resources and electronic systems to improve fuel efficiency in tomorrow's cars, trucks, fire vehicles and construction equipment. It is based on a two-tier system: the growth of hardware and system growth. Since 1953 it has been involved in the development of ballistic missiles. The three most important segments are: electronics and defence, which cover about 50%, industrial and energy 20% and the automotive department 30%. In Europe TRW has some 20,000 personnel in thirty countries and in 1984 it has sales of \$6 billion.

205. The industrial and energy division is concerned with oil and gas drilling equipment, components that keep aircraft flying and bearings, tools and fasteners that help raise productivity levels worldwide. TRW submersible pumps produce oil in the North Sea, Indonesia and the Middle East. The centrifugal pumps have helped set new drilling depth records. TRW operates facilities in thirteen locations worldwide. New sources of energy are also developed. TRW is conducting research in the uranium enrichment and fusion energy, is developing coal combustion and coal gasification systems. It is helping to create a technology to unlock oil-shale, heavy oil and tar sands and natural gas.

206. TRW has been working now for nearly thirty years in electronics and space systems. Large-scale integrated circuits help television broadcasters create special effects. TRW build the S-band space-to-ground communications systems for the space shuttle. The tracking and data relay satellite system (TDRSS) is one of the first in communications satellite technology. It will be used to transmit data between earth orbiting spacecraft, earth-based users and a single highly-automated ground station at White Sands, New Mexico, for which TRW did the engineering.

Chips

207. Of great importance is the computer maintenance programme servicing more than 700,000 units. TRW is making chips used widely by the television industry and producing circuits with 200,000 transistors mounted on a quarter-inch chip. The microelectronic circuitry is only a part of TRW's rôle in the nation's defence.

208. The defence satellite communications system built by TRW is the backbone of the United States military worldwide communications system. TRW has launched five satellites under a fleet satellite communications programme for the air force and the navy and is now working on the next generation of military communications satellites.

Space station

209. Because of its extensive experience of spacecraft, TRW has been chosen for space platform studies and space station architectural studies. The space platform was intended to be a cost-effective long-term host vehicle for scientific and applications payloads. The services it would provide to multiple payloads include electrical power, heat rejection, attitude control and higher-rate data-handling communications through the tracking and data relay satellite system (TDRSS).

210. The platform is intended to become the core of a future space station. It had to be adaptable for manned occupancy without the need for major technological or operational breakthroughs. The platform modules are therefore designed to be highly redundant and fault tolerant. The platform is designed to have an on-orbit life of five years but it has also repair and replacement opportunities provided by shuttle-delivered parts, equipment and personnel.

211. The space station can serve as a staging point for scientific missions, house a permanent laboratory for life sciences and materials research and act as a servicing facility for orbiting space platforms. For satellite communications the space station can be used to assemble and test very large antennas prior to being placed in geosynchronous orbit and can reduce launch costs for comsats. For materials processing in space, the space station can provide a manned research laboratory and at some future time serve as a free-flying automated materials processing factory.

212. A significant market for remote sensing also exists and, as the industry develops, the willingness of the private sector to invest in space resources might increase. For remote sensing from the space station, there are several areas that could benefit, among them ocean wind/wave forecasting, sea ice forecasting, ocean monitoring for fisheries management, crop condition assessment and mineral resource discovery. The space station's use would be mainly to provide maintenance and servicing of a remote-sensing platform.

213. The space station could reduce the cost of flights to geosynchronous orbit as well as permit the servicing and repair of satellites. Repairs could be performed by a reusable orbital transfer vehicle using the space station as a base for operations. These benefits together could amount to some \$10 billion by the year 2000.

214. The space station is extendable and can be maintained in orbit incorporating new technology as it becomes available. A manned space station could also generate many economic benefits. Most significant is its ability to serve as a warehouse for parts, orbital replacement units and fuels thereby increasing the shuttle load factor. The space station will also open the door to zero gravity manufacturing. From now on, space activities should be directed towards revenue-producing benefits as well as technological advances.

215. TRW has had a rewarding twenty-year relationship with European countries. One of the great problems in Europe is that the reservoir of know-how is not big enough,

especially in the large electronics materials field. TRW has a good relationship with Matra in France but their number of engineering staff is relatively small. Matra, for instance, has 1,000 whereas TRW has 10,000 engineers. One of their management problems is therefore that they have to hire out staff from TRW to European firms.

High energy lasers

216. Finally, the committee was briefed on high energy lasers which will become highly effective weapons in the future: lasers as directed-energy weapons, lasers to communicate with submarines travelling at great depths, lasers in cruise missiles with intercontinental range and lasers with autonomous terminal homing guidance systems resistant to enemy countermeasures. They may have the potential for reshaping military strategy. No other weapons system can deliver intense thermal energies at the speed of light to distant targets. Research on laser uses and development started in 1961. In the 1970s, the research and development of high energy lasers took place. TRW combines a range of science and engineering disciplines to develop the high energy lasers. The physics studies include atomic and molecular chemistry, laser kinetics and particle behaviour in accelerators for particle beams or free electron-lasers. In the weapon field, they can be either ship-based or air-based.

VI. Conclusions

217. Ever since the committee was formed in 1965, it has been convinced of the need to assert Europe's rôle in high technology and to establish close links with the United States. It realised that the Atlantic Alliance had to be steadily strengthened and that a large percentage of taxpayers' money could be saved by avoiding the research and development process of items already in production on the other side of the Atlantic. As indicated on 25th September 1984 in the Council's reply to written question 240 put by Mr. Bassinet, this meant the transfer of technology among European countries and between the United States and Europe. Co-operation on technology and components, as affirmed by the Council, would be the only means of achieving increased collaboration on weapons systems in the future.

218. Close political attention has always been paid to the NATO military alliance. Since the 1980s, however, a NATO industrial alliance has grown up within the military alliance and Europe having more or less caught up with the

United States in several high technology fields, it sought to increase its share of the NATO market.

219. Your Rapporteur is convinced that a certain balance is required and that this would be advantageous for both Europe and the United States. In order to achieve this balance, sincere efforts should be made on both sides of the Atlantic to establish what is widely referred to in the industry as a two-way street in arms trade. For the United States, this would involve transferring highly-sophisticated United States technology to the European arms industry to produce new equipment in Europe while buying new European military technology and equipment.

220. The aerospace companies which the committee visited in the United States all declared that they were willing to seek this kind of co-operation. All were also aware that the high cost of new equipment required a broad-based market. However, the administration and Congress keep the civilian and military aircraft market closed to European imports. There are certain exceptions, of course, such as the European Roland missile system which the United States bought to improve its air defences in Central Europe. If the governments wish to change the attitude of the United States Congress and administration, they will have to operate at a political level to achieve an acceptable two-way street.

221. Much is at stake for the major European aerospace companies which have all had to cut back employment levels because of stagnation in orders at home and in such key export markets as Latin America and the Middle East.

222. On the other hand, within Europe, co-operation among European aerospace companies should be intensified and much might depend on collaborative efforts on the tactical combat aircraft. Your Rapporteur is convinced that, if the six countries – the Netherlands wishes to participate with France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom – are not able to agree on the new tactical fighter, it will be a heavy blow to Europe's ability to produce such an aircraft. At the same time, it will jeopardise European-American collaboration as none of the individual countries concerned can be a valid partner for the United States.

223. Ultimately, these collaborative problems can be solved only by the political leaders of the countries concerned. Co-operation cannot be restricted to the new tactical fighter but will be extended also, for instance, to new helicopters, military transport planes and missiles for the 1990s.

224. The Council should inform the Assembly of the results of major multinational weapon

projects in which the WEU countries are currently engaged and draw its conclusions from past experiences. Following-up on this information, the Council should indicate which two-way street programmes with the United States could be concluded and might be concluded in the near future. It should be fully realised that a sound European aerospace industry with some 500,000 employees is not only advantageous to Europe but essential for the well-being of the Atlantic Alliance, including the United States.

225. Less difficult might be future co-operation on the space station. NASA and ESA have a long collaborative experience and, on the European side, there is an international agency which can act for Europe. At the summit conference in London in June 1984, the heads of state and government declared that manned space stations are the kind of programme that provides a stimulus for technological development leading to strengthened economy and improved quality of life. The European countries should consider carefully the United States invitation to participate in the development of such a station.

226. Of course, participation, which would amount to some \$1 billion, cannot be agreed to without certain conditions. Experience with spacelab was not considered wholly satisfactory for Europe; it received inadequate returns on its investment in spacelab.

227. On the other hand, Europe should recognise that, while fund-sharing with the United States would be useful, it is not essential

and NASA could work alone, benefiting in the years to come from its research and the new products produced on the space station. Your Rapporteur has indicated a number of conditions which should be negotiated and which are mentioned in the recommendation. The most difficult problem will certainly be to obtain management concessions necessary for a co-operative space station.

228. With regard to energy problems, the committee has the impression that the nuclear industry in the United States is at a turning point. At the same time, in Europe, apart from France, the nuclear industry is stagnating and new more economic and more secure ways have to be found for building nuclear energy plants with the necessary safeguards for the complete fuel cycle and radioactive waste. Here again, European-American collaboration would be in the interests of both the United States and Europe.

229. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to express his regret that, after so many efforts and such a long period of negotiations between some 150 countries, the conference on the law of the sea has not reached a successful conclusion. Europe is divided and the present United States Government has a fairly negative attitude. Nevertheless, it seems inevitable that one day or another the threads will be taken up again and that a modified convention will emerge. Your Rapporteur hopes the issue will remain a regular subject of consideration and consultation on both sides of the Atlantic.

APPENDIX I

*(a) Programme of the visit to the United States by the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions¹**8th-22nd July 1984**Sunday, 8th July 1984*

1.40 p.m. Arrival at John F. Kennedy Airport, New York.
Hotel: Long Island Marriott
101 James Doolittle Blvd.
Uniondale, New York

Monday, 9th July 1984

9.30 a.m.-12.30 p.m. Grumman Aerospace Company
1111 Stewart Avenue
Bethpage, N.Y. 11714
Introduction:
Mr. George M. Skurla, President and
Chairman of the Board
Aircraft developments:
Mr. M. Pelehach, President, Grumman
International
Grumman space programmes:
Mr. J. Mockovciak, Director, Grumman
Aerospace Corporation

2.30 p.m.-5 p.m. Sperry Corporation Electronic Systems
Great Neck
N.Y. 11020
Electronic developments:
Mr. Robert L. Wendt, President
European-American collaborative projects:
Mr. Spencer Ross, Vice-President Marketing,
Electronic Systems

7.11 p.m. Arrival at Washington National Airport.
Hotel: Key Bridge Marriott
401 Lee Highway

Tuesday, 10th July 1984

9 a.m. Department of Defence
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
Welcome:
Colonel Phil Pryor, Contact
Emerging technologies initiative:
Mr. Lindstrom, Deputy Under-Secretary for
International Programmes and Technology

1. Due to the need for a concise report, your Rapporteur has only been able to mention the most politically relevant briefings. The programme of the visit has been set out accordingly.

American-European collaboration:

Dr. Richard D. DeLauer, Under-Secretary of
Defence for Research and Engineering

Technology and security:

Mr. Perle, Assistant Secretary for
International Security Policy

Research activities:

Dr. Edith Martin, Deputy Under-Secretary
for Research and Advanced Technology

Strategic defence initiative:

Brigadier General Rankine, Assistant for
Directed Energy Weapons

Wednesday, 11th July 1984

10 a.m.

NASA
400 Maryland Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20546

Introduction:

Mr. John D. Hodge, Director, Space Station
Task Force

(i) Space station developments;

(ii) European participation:

Mr. Robert F. Freitag, Deputy Director,
Space Station Task Force

2.30 p.m

Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
4645, Reservoir Road
Washington, D.C. 20007

General introduction:

Mr. D. von Kyaw, Minister Plenipotentiary

Energy policy:

Mr. Bryan Hampton, Energy Counsellor at the
United Kingdom Embassy

European participation in the space station:

Mr. Ian Pryke, Head of the Washington
Office of the European Space Agency

Thursday, 12th July 1984

9.25 a.m.

Department of State
2201 "C" Street
Washington, D.C. 20520

Welcome:

Mr. John Hamilton, Contact

General policy:

Mr. Peter Rodman, Director of Policy
Planning

Law of the sea policy:

Mr. Otho Eskine, Director, Office of
Advanced Technology

2.30 p.m.

Department of Energy
James Forrestal Building
1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20585

Welcome and international co-operative activities:

Mr. John Dugger, Director, Office of International Affairs

Nuclear energy policy:

Mr. Frank Goldner, Assistant Director, Office of nuclear energy

Fossil energy:

Mr. Marvin Singer, Director, Office of Fossil Energy

8.07 p.m.

Arrival in New Orleans

Friday, 13th July 1984

9 a.m.

Martin Marietta Aerospace
Michoud (external tanks)
Denver Aerospace
P.O. Box 29304
New Orleans
Louisiana 70189

General remarks:

Dr. Mathias Siebel, Manager, NASA Michoud Assembly Facility

The shuttle's external tank:

Mr. Kenneth Timmons, Vice-President and General Manager, Martin Marietta, Michoud Division

Weekend free

Sunday, 15th July 1984

6.45 p.m.

Arrival in Houston

Hotel: Houston Marriott Greenspoint
255 North Belt Drive
Houston, TX 77060

Monday, 16th July 1984

9 a.m.

Lyndon B. Johnson Space Centre
Houston, TX 77058

Activities of the Centre:

Mr. Charles Biggs, Public Relations

6.55 p.m.

Arrival in St. Louis

Hotel: St. Louis Marriott

Tuesday, 17th July 1984

8.30 a.m.

McDonnell Douglas Corporation
Box 516
St. Louis MO 63106

General remarks:

Mr. James S. McDonnell, Corporate Vice-President

Military aircraft programmes:

Mr. A. Marshall and collaborators

Space systems and missiles:

Mr. John F. Yardley

Wednesday, 18th July 1984

8.25 p.m.

Arrival in Los Angeles
 Hotel: Marriott Airport Hotel
 5855 West Century Road

Thursday, 19th July 1984

1.55 p.m.

Hughes Aircraft Company
 P.O. Box 902
 El Segundo CA 90245

General remarks:

Mr. Malcolm R. Currie, Executive Vice-
 President

Friday, 20th July 1984

9 a.m.

TRW Systems and Energy
 One Space Park
 Redondo Beach
 California 90278

General remarks:

Mr. Jan Roos, Vice-President

(b) List of participants in the committee's visit to the United States

MM.	AARTS	(Netherlands)
	BASSINET	(France)
Sir	Frederic BENNETT	(United Kingdom)
MM.	BIEFNOT	(Belgium)
	BOEHM	(Fed. Rep. of Germany)
	CAVALIERE	(Italy)
	COLAJANNI	(Italy)
	FOURRE	(France)
	GARRETT	(United Kingdom)
	GIANOTTI	(Italy)
	HILL	(United Kingdom)
	LENZER	(Fed. Rep. of Germany)
	McGUIRE	(United Kingdom)
	MASCIADRI	(Italy)
	MEZZAPESA	(Italy)
	MUELLER	(Fed. Rep. of Germany)
Sir	John OSBORN	(United Kingdom)
MM.	SCHMIDT	(Fed. Rep. of Germany)
	VALLEIX	(France)
	WILKINSON	(United Kingdom)
	WORRELL	(Netherlands)
Mrs.	SAROGNI	(Italian Delegation)
Mr.	HUIGENS	(Counsellor to the Committee)

APPENDIX II

*Questions for discussion during the committee's
visit to the United States
8th to 22nd July 1984*

State Department

General policy

1. What are the general policy guidelines with regard to science and technology in preparation for the 1990s?
2. How can the international political aims of the American scientific and technological programme be defined?
3. What is the government's position on collaboration with Western European countries in the scientific and technological field in the medium term?
4. What is the government's position on collaboration with Japan and other countries of South-East Asia in the scientific and technological field?
5. What is the relationship of the United States with the Latin-American countries and especially Brazil?
6. How will it be ensured that the interchange with the NATO allies covers the full spectrum of western security aspects and can a new consensus on requirements for the alliance be defined?
7. Do we need new consultative mechanisms outside the NATO framework including non-NATO countries such as Japan?
8. Should we aim for a security policy of a global nature?
9. The committee is particularly interested in questions on space and aviation research but also in energy problems, new sources of energy and marine science development. What are the United States policy trends for the 1990s?
10. To which of the above sectors did your government give priority during the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s?
11. What are the budget trends and could global figures be given?

Space activities

12. What should be the rôle of the United Nations in space?
13. Could it play a rôle by using satellites to verify the execution of disarmaments plans?

14. Would it be possible for the United Nations to have its own reconnaissance satellites?

15. Should the United Nations committee on the peaceful uses of outer space discuss this matter and, if so, what action might it be able to take?

16. What rôles should Intelsat and Inmarsat play and what is the American policy towards other international space-oriented organisations? What should be the rôle of private industries?

17. Which countries have agreements with the United States for receiving and processing Landsat data?

18. What is the Department of State's opinion on the results of and follow-up to the 1958 Antarctic Treaty, the 1963 Moscow Test Ban Treaty, the 1966 Outer Space Treaty, the 1968 Non-proliferation Treaty, the Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects of March 1972, the 1975 Convention on the registration of objects launched into outer space and the draft treaty submitted by the United Nations General Assembly on banning the stationing of any weapons in outer space?

19. What are the space implications of the SALT I and SALT II agreements?

20. Is it correct to say that celestial bodies are in part demilitarised but that outer space is not?

21. Do you consider it possible to prevent the military use of space through the deployment of offensive space weapons systems by promoting new international treaties and related verification procedures as well as through the implementation of existing accords to limit the military use of space.

22. Would negotiations also be necessary between the United States and the Soviet Union or between other powers?

Law of the sea

23. On its last visit the committee discussed extensively the consequences of the American position on the law of the sea treaty. What is the present situation and what is American policy with regard to this convention?

24. Will the United States authorise private companies to start mining during the next decade without adhering to the convention?

25. Will the United States initiate international negotiations to establish reciprocal interim arrangements co-ordinating regulation of deep seabed mining operations?

26. With which countries would the United States wish to establish such interim arrangements?

27. Is research and development still continuing and is this being carried out by government agencies such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration?

Defence Department

NATO activities

28. How is the transatlantic two-way street between North America and Europe developing?

29. Which specific programme in the area of co-operation between the United States and the NATO allies can be considered a success?

30. How is the development of family of weapons systems progressing?

31. What has been the result of the initiative taken by Mr. Delauer on the subject of international industry-to-industry armaments co-operation?

32. What have been the main difficulties up until now?

33. Could a view be given on the relative merits of international industry-to-industry co-operation versus government-to-government co-operation on armaments?

34. Have there been concrete results of the October 1982 meeting with the national armaments directors of the European countries in Brussels?

35. What conclusions has the United States Government drawn from this experiment?

36. What is the opinion of the United States administration with regard to the NATO infrastructure programme which started in 1950?

37. What are the benefits for the United States of this programme?

38. What is percentage of the United States budget contribution to NATO is set aside for the infrastructure programme?

39. What is the total United States defence expenditure for all the common funding pro-

grammes – infrastructure, military budget, civil budget and the NATO airborne early warning system?

40. How does the United States view this integrated NATO AWACS system?

41. What is the budget of the Defence Department research and development programme?

42. How much is allotted to industry and to defence establishments?

43. What are the main items for research: very high speed integrated circuits, high energy lasers, a new composite material, chemical agents, etc.?

44. Would it be possible to improve co-ordination of American-European research and development

45. Would it be possible for NATO to promote joint American-European aircraft developments for the year 2000 and beyond with regard to fighter, bombardment and transport aircraft?

46. Could collaborative ventures be set up in the field of air-, land- and sea-based missiles?

Space activities

47. In his report 976, Mr. Wilkinson described long-term United States space strategy and indicated that a low-altitude defence system is being designed to intercept incoming re-entry vehicles. What is the American policy in this field?

48. What would be the consequence of a further-developed ballistic missile defence system and the existing nuclear strategy?

49. How should the recommendations of the High Frontier team be regarded?

50. Is the space segment becoming increasingly important for the deployment of military forces? In which fields is this especially true?

51. What would be the military use if a space station or space platform was assembled in orbit?

52. Would such a platform play only a secondary rôle with regard to science or civil space applications?

NASA

53. What specific guidelines has the government drawn up for long-range space activities?

54. What is the budget trend for space development?

55. What percentage of the space budget is assigned to the space station, the shuttle and the tug?

56. What percentage of the budget is set aside for scientific purposes and what goals have been set for scientific work and research in outer space?

57. How many shuttles will be built over the coming decade and how many flights will take place a year when the system becomes operational?

58. Could the shuttle put modules into orbit for the construction of large platforms in space?

59. What has been industry's reply to the request to promote industrial development in space, new metals, new medicines, etc.?

60. Could an indication be given of the results of the space telescope mission?

61. What are the developments with regard to the transferring of NASA tasks to operational systems of the private sector? Is this taking place in the fields of communications, remote-sensing, meteorological satellites, etc.?

62. Although there is competition between Europe and American industry, for example in satellite communications, there are still many areas where co-operation is essential. Which are considered to be of most importance?

63. Europe has expressed her interest to study President Reagan's offer regarding a space station provided:

- the participation in the United States station is coherent with Europe's own long-term planning, one goal of which is Europe's autonomy;
- the participation is situated in a technologically innovative field;

- the participation takes account of Europe's experience gained over ten years of co-operation for the development of spacelab.

What is NASA's reaction to Europe's objectives as outlined above?

64. Is NASA willing to recognise the very specific relations with Europe stemming from the spacelab co-operation?

65. Is NASA, for example, prepared not to duplicate all phase B activities undertaken by Europe thus recognising the experience existing in Europe?

66. Will it be possible for Europe to contribute a technologically innovative element of the initial core station?

67. Would Europe have a more active rôle in the management during the various phases of the programme than in the case of spacelab where ESA could not but accept the changes decided by NASA (delays and cost overrun)?

68. How does NASA view the potential problem of surplus capacity if NASA, Europe and Japan develop laboratory modules? What solution does NASA envisage?

69. Would Europe have preferential access and use of the entire space station?

70. Although it is understood that exact figures on the operation cost are still unknown, it would be interesting to learn NASA's ideas on what could be the leading principle for the repartition of operation cost amongst the different partners and whether there will be mechanisms for off-setting them by providing hardware/services/access to facilities or data, etc.

APPENDIX III

Status of the Hubble Space Telescope Programme

NASA currently plans to launch the Hubble space telescope in the second half of 1986. The Hubble space telescope consists of three major hardware elements: the optical telescope assembly, the support systems module and five science instruments. The European Space Agency (ESA) is developing one of those instruments, the faint object camera, and the solar arrays.

All of the major structural components of the Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA), including the primary mirror, have been manufactured and are in the process of final assembly and checkout. The OTA is currently planned to be delivered to Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, the prime contractor, in November 1984. This schedule will accommodate the completion of the integration with the science instruments and support systems module in time for a launch in the second half of 1986.

The support systems module (SSM) is the primary structural element that will accommodate the assembly of all systems into the complete spacecraft and will provide the basic spacecraft services including pointing control, electrical power, data management and thermal control. Lockheed began the integration and checkout of the SSM on 1st May 1984, an important step towards an integrated, fully-proven space system.

The five scientific instruments, including the faint object camera, have recently completed a very crucial testing and verification programme that required nearly a year to complete. Now that this testing has been concluded, the instruments have been released back to their

manufacturing groups and ESA to perform the necessary rework, recalibrations and retest prior to their delivery to Lockheed.

The ESA solar array system is nearing completion. Several of the electronic assemblies have been delivered by ESA to Lockheed to support the verification programme, and the solar arrays are expected to be delivered to Lockheed in time to support a launch in the second half of 1986.

Finally, NASA has established a Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI) to manage the space telescope research programme through selection of ST users, conduct science operations of the space telescope observatory and provide staff and facilities to serve the user community. ESA is also providing staff to the STScI.

The STScI has made good progress since its establishment. It is currently developing the capability to operate the science aspects of the Hubble space telescope observatory and its versatile scientific instruments. The mechanism to solicit and evaluate observing proposals from the science community is under development. Furthermore, many of the supporting capabilities and services needed to operate the Hubble space telescope are being developed by the STScI.

As the NASA administrator has stated, the Hubble space telescope is the centrepiece for the NASA space science and applications programme and we expect that it will prove to be the most important scientific instrument ever flown. We are pleased that Europe, through ESA, is co-operating with us on this programme.

APPENDIX IV

*Information given in Aviation Week
on the United States defence budget**1st October 1984*

Congress last week authorised a 6.9% real increase in defence spending in fiscal year 1985 and backed restrictions on MX missile funding and on anti-satellite weapons tests previously agreed to by congressional leaders.

Congress approved a \$297 billion defence authorisation bill for the new fiscal year that began on 1st October. The 6.9% increase after inflation is just over half the 13% increase originally requested by the White House.

The authorisation bill contains, inter alia, these provisions:

- The \$99.5 billion conference compromise contains \$2.5 billion of procurement funding for 21 MX strategic missiles. However, \$1.5 billion of that is frozen.
- \$8.2 billion in procurement and research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) funds for 34 USAF/Rockwell International B-1B bombers.
- \$3.5 billion for 150 USAF/General Dynamics F-16 fighters, the quantity requested by the administration.
- \$2.8 billion for 84 Navy/McDonnell Douglas F/A-18s, the number requested by the administration.
- Approximately \$2.3 billion for 42 USAF/McDonnell Douglas F-15s, six fewer than sought by the administration.
- Nearly \$1.9 billion for eight USAF/Lockheed C-5Bs, 10 of which had been requested by the administration.
- Just under \$1.5 billion for 144 Army/Hughes' Helicopters AH-64 attack helicopters, the quantity sought by the administration.
- Nearly \$1.3 billion for 24 Navy/Grumman F-14s, the number requested by the administration.
- \$984.1 million for 32 Marine/McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harriers, the number requested by the administration.
- \$800.3 million to re-engine 43 USAF/Boeing KC-135s.
- \$580.7 million for 117 Divad division air defense guns.
- \$625 million for 1,571 Texas Instruments HARM air-to-surface missiles.
- No more than two "successful" tests (defined as intercepts) of an anti-satellite missile (Asat) against an object in space may be conducted in fiscal year 1985. No tests whatever may be undertaken until 15 days after the President certifies that four conditions have been met: the tests are consistent with the 1972 United States/Soviet Union anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty; the United States is trying to negotiate the strictest possible limits on Asat, consistent with national security; pending completion of the negotiations, testing Asat against an object in space is necessary to the national security, and such testing will not impair Asat negotiations with the Soviet Union. The conferees approved the full \$143.3 million requested for Asat research and development. Procurement funding was not an issue, but the research and development funds are limited to no more than the two successful tests of the F-15 miniature homing vehicle Asat weapon.
- Approved funding includes \$81.5 million for research and development and \$532.1 million for procurement of 180 General Dynamics Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) in fiscal year 1985.

Other provisions of the bill include:

- A Senate proposal to develop the C-18, a used Boeing 707, for the joint surveillance and target attack radar system (JSTARS). Conferees authorised \$94.9 million for the air force research and development account and \$60 million for the army's. The system is intended to give United States conventional forces the ability to detect enemy units more than 100 km. (62.1 mi.) beyond the forward edge of the battle area.

- Reduced funding for the Hughes advanced medium-range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM) because of congressional concerns about programme cost and schedule growth. The reduced authorisation of 50 missiles at a cost of \$115 million plus \$35 million for advanced procurement will "prohibit the premature production of a large number of missiles", the House Armed Services Committee said. The administration asked for 174 missiles at a cost of \$377.5 million and \$64.9 million for advanced procurement.
- Six Grumman A-6E attack aircraft were authorised for the navy and provided \$15.1 million in advance procurement for continued production in fiscal year 1986. Also approved were Senate recommendations of \$69.6 million for A-6E modernisation and \$278.9 million for improvements to the F-14, including new avionics and engines.
- Authorisation of \$188 million for development of the Marine tilt-rotor JVX aircraft.
- Just over \$1.7 billion was authorised for procurement of a Trident ballistic missile submarine in fiscal year 1985. In addition \$2 billion in research and development and \$133 million for advanced procurement were authorised for the Trident 2 (D-5) missile system. "The conferees also expressed their support for penetration aids research in view of Soviet efforts to expand significantly their anti-ballistic missile capability", a Senate Armed Services Committee statement said.
- The greater operating range of the Trident missile system has imposed a heavier communications load on the navy's Tacamo fleet of 16 Lockheed EC-130Qs, the conferees said, and they authorised \$60 million for research and development of a new or improved aircraft. More than \$99 million was authorised for navy strategic communications.
- Purchase of nine Lockheed P-3 Orion antisubmarine warfare (ASW) patrol aircraft, 24 Sikorsky Lamps Mk. 3 SH-60B ASW helicopters and six Kaman Lamps Mk. 1 SH-2F ASW helicopters.
- Procurement of eight McDonnell Douglas KC-10A tanker aircraft and eight Lockheed C-5B strategic airlift aircraft. For tactical airlift, the conferees authorised 16 Lockheed C-130H aircraft. Eight are to be assigned to the Air Force Reserve, four to the Air National Guard and four to the active force. Also authorised was modification of two General Dynamics C-131 mission support aircraft operated by the Air National Guard.
- \$129.3 million for research and development on C-5A aircraft capabilities.
- A House recommendation of \$150 million for the very high speed integrated circuits (VHSIC) programme "in recognition of the need to improve weapon system reliability and capability". The conferees ordered the Secretary of Defence to develop a plan to ensure that VHSIC technology is shared with weapon system developers as it becomes available.
- \$20.4 million for the space booster programme. The conferees believe, the House Armed Services Committee said, "that although the space shuttle has demonstrated its effectiveness as a space-launch system, the Department of Defence should not rely only on that system for the deployment of crucial military payloads".

United States-European co-operation in advanced technology

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. van der Werff

1. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed: van der Werff

1. See 9th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment negated).

United States-European co-operation in advanced technology

AMENDMENT 2¹

tabled by Mr. Fourré and others

2. After paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph:
“Use more actively the Standing Armaments Committee as a technical body of WEU to harmonise the positions of the seven member states in matters concerning the European armaments industry and to co-ordinate their efforts in order to improve the efficiency of co-operative work in the various multilateral forums;”.

Signed: Fourré, Bassinet, Lagorce

1. See 9th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment agreed to).

Military use of space
Part II

REPORT¹

submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions²
by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur

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DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on the military use of space, Part II

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. United States military involvement in space – a summary
- III. The politics of vulnerability
- IV. High Frontier
- V. The strategic defence initiative
- VI. Implications for arms control of the strategic defence initiative
- VII. The United States space station – a challenge for Europe
- VIII. Conclusions

APPENDICES

- I. Policy implications of defences against ballistic missiles
- II. President Reagan's strategic defence initiative (SDI)

1. Adopted in committee by 9 votes to 1 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. *Lenzer* (Chairman); MM. *Wilkinson*, *Bassinot* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Aarts*, *Adriaensens*, *Böhm*, *Colajanni*, *Fiandrotti*, *Fourré*, *Garrett*, Sir Paul *Hawkins* (Alternate: *Hill*), MM. *Hengel*, *McGuire*, *Mezzapesa* (Alternate: *Cavaliere*), *Rizzi*, *Schmidt*, *Souvet*, *Spies von Büllenheim* (Alternate: *Kittelmann*), Mrs. *Staels-Dompas*, MM. *Valleix* (Alternate: *Galley*), *Worrell*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation**on the military use of space
Part II**

The Assembly,

- (i) Determined to pursue its consistent interests in the strategic implications for Western Europe of present and future applications of space technology;
- (ii) Eager to exploit the specialist expertise of the revitalised organs of WEU, namely the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments, to concert industrial collaboration in the military space field and to evolve a Western European policy on arms control that takes into account current and projected developments in military space technology;
- (iii) Noting the Soviet Union's persistent refusal to engage in a fruitful dialogue with the United States over reductions in offensive ballistic missiles but eagerness to halt American development of defensive space-based systems;
- (iv) Welcoming the steady progress of the European space effort under the aegis of the European Space Agency and in particular the validation of Spacelab and the Ariane launcher and success in the fields of telecommunications and remote sensing;
- (v) Appreciating the French Government's commitment as expressed by President Mitterrand to a full realisation of Europe's strategic potential in space and its publicly stated concern that the consequent deductions for European security policy should be drawn and acted upon;
- (vi) Confident that WEU can offer the best forum for parliamentary debate and analysis about the United States Government's strategic defence initiative and the prospects for an effective space-based defence against ballistic missiles;
- (vii) Supporting efforts through the European Space Agency and through national governments to make a co-ordinated and cost-effective Western European contribution to the NASA space station,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Act as the primary political instrument for intergovernmental concertation of a unified Western European policy towards the military use of space;
2. Commission the restructured and more appropriately staffed Standing Armaments Committee and Agency for the Control of Armaments to provide expert advice on the defence and industrial aspects and implications, for arms control and confidence-building measures between states, of current developments in military space technology;
3. Maintain the closest liaison with the United States Government to prevent divergencies of view between the American and Western European partners of the Atlantic Alliance about the benefits of the strategic defence initiative, and suggest a space planning group be established within NATO to that end;
4. Support for industrial, technological and strategic reasons an expanded European space programme and promote enhanced dialogue on related policies and objectives both with the European Space Agency and national governments;
5. Give impetus to a joint European response to the NASA space station proposals which builds on existing European capabilities, is complementary to the modules, elements and systems of the space station as a whole and enhances Europe's technical capacity for autonomous developments in this field including manned space missions;
6. Provide a clear lead and direction to parliamentary and public opinion in favour of a major European effort to meet the challenge of the space age in the fullest sense through increased scientific space experimentation, commercial applications and security-enhancing space developments;
7. Ensure that the reorganised office of the Council of Ministers of WEU can draw on adequate specialist space expertise to inform its consideration of the increasingly important implications for Western European security policy of developments in space technology.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. This report follows the visit of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to the United States in July 1984¹. During that visit your Rapporteur and members of the committee were briefed and informed by representatives of the United States administration, Departments of State and Defence, NASA and industry. This report will be more descriptive than prescriptive. It will seek to analyse current developments in the military application of space technology in the United States and their potential strategic implications for the Western Alliance as a whole and for Western European strategy in particular. The purpose of this report is to stimulate interest and debate rather than to lay down dogmatically firm proposals.

2. Europe, through a combination of disinterest and lack of collective will has allowed the United States and the Soviet Union to assume a leading and dominating position in the space field. This failure on the part of the European nations represents a denial of Europe's technical potential which is in striking contrast to earlier European achievements in pioneering jet propulsion, supersonic flight, vertical take-off aircraft and nuclear power. Indeed the work of German scientists on the V1 flying bomb (the first operational cruise missile) and on the V2 rocket (the first operational ballistic missile) formed the basis of the subsequent American and Soviet ballistic missile and space programmes. Indeed, without the help of former German scientists, like Dr. Werner von Braun, it is unlikely that the Soviets would have launched Sputnik I by 1957 and that the American Apollo programme would have landed man on the moon by 1969.

3. Until the foundation of the European Space Agency, the European space effort was poorly co-ordinated and its results disappointing. The decision of the British Government not to pursue the development of Blue Streak as a ballistic missile component of the United Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent meant that the United Kingdom would no longer have the capability to put big payloads into space although it continued to produce small sounding rockets. When ELDO also finally cancelled Europa I, Europe was left without a launcher

until the Ariane rocket was built. The maintenance of an independent national nuclear deterrent on the part of France with a sizeable ballistic missile element ensured that launcher technology was retained by Europe.

4. Today, Europe has a useful space programme for a tenth of the annual financial outlay of the United States thanks largely to the co-ordination of the European Space Agency. Ariane has proved itself fully competitive with the shuttle for the insertion of satellites into geostationary orbit. ESA has a full and varied scientific programme and its applications programme is evolving well with the forthcoming launch of the ERS-1 remote sensing satellite system in addition to the already successful Meteosat satellite. In communications satellites Europe can technically match the United States and this is the area in which for sound commercial reasons the United Kingdom has concentrated its expertise. Lastly, the successful flight of Spacelab – primarily a German achievement – on the United States shuttle showed that ESA can be a reliable partner with NASA and the experience gained will be invaluable for later co-operation on a space station.

5. In spite of all these undoubted successes, Europe has failed to respond adequately to the challenge of the space age. There has been a lack of political leadership to match the dimensions of the challenge with the notable exception of France. France's President Mitterrand has called for the establishment of a European space community to build a Europe space station. In his speech at The Hague, President Mitterrand set Europe a clear goal in the space field and he has demonstrated in subsequent speeches that the French Government appreciates the strategic significance of current space developments.

6. The United Kingdom has, of course, deployed Skynet military telecommunications satellites and its own experience during the Falklands war of 1982 demonstrated the key rôle which space-based communications satellites can play in modern military operations. More recently, United States reconnaissance satellites played an important part in the arrest by the British navy of a trawler running guns and explosives to the IRA. Even so, the general Western European reaction to the full exploitation of the potential of modern space technology to enhance our security and defence is cautious and lukewarm. Anxiety about cost is allied to emotive and ill-considered judgments

¹ United States-European co-operation in advanced technology, Rapporteur Mr. Hill, Document 992.

about "star wars". These superficial views owe more to fanciful imagination than they do to serious analytical study of today's space technologies and their likely effect on the global balance of power, deterrence, the prevention of war and the conduct of military operations were deterrence ever to fail.

7. The Assembly of Western European Union and its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in particular has taken a consistent and serious interest in the strategic implications of space technology. Institutionally the Council of Ministers of Western European Union is the body best-fitted to concert a European policy for the utilisation of military space technology since the European Space Agency is statutorily limited to the civil space field. The Standing Armaments Committee could examine possible joint requirements for military space-based systems and how they could be met industrially. The Agency for the Control of Armaments could study the implications of technical developments in the space field and their potential impact upon disarmament and arms control. If appropriately staffed by suitably qualified experts, the Agency could monitor surveillance satellite data on behalf of the member countries and by thus processing and transmitting reconnaissance information from remote sensing satellites build confidence in Western Europe against the risk of surprise attack and unexpected aggression. The Agency for the Control of Armaments of WEU could in this new form provide data from a European regional satellite monitoring system either to international clients or just to WEU member countries.

8. In short, it is time for the member nations of WEU to make a cool and well-informed appraisal of the likely effects for the security of Western Europe of the continued Soviet space challenge and of the United States strategic defence initiative (SDI), whereby the practicability of a space-based defence against ballistic missile attack is being investigated. For a generation, the virtually unstoppable capacity of the ballistic missile to wreak nuclear devastation has represented the principal and most dramatic exploitation of space technology for military purposes. The negligible effectiveness of anti-ballistic missile systems and the strict numerical limitation placed on them under the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty have enabled the destruction of the superpowers' main centres of population in any nuclear exchange to be mutually assured. The greatly improved accuracy of modern ballistic missiles has put a premium on the effectiveness of a first strike against land-based systems and emphasised the necessity of maintaining a triad of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles between land-based, submarine and air-launched sys-

tems. The present technical feasibility of a counter-force strategy has not, however, in any way reassured public opinion. Many people in Western Europe are understandably deeply concerned by the build-up of nuclear stockpiles and what they view as massively assured mutual destruction if deterrence fails whether by malign and fatal design, miscalculation, escalation from conventional conflict or simply by accident.

9. There must be a better way of preserving the peace than the threat of mutual annihilation. Hitherto, the chief contribution of space technology has been to ensure that the balance of terror has been maintained by a proliferation of nuclear ballistic missiles, the provision of satellite communications for nuclear-armed submarines and aircraft and of remote-sensing satellite-derived mapping data for the guidance of nuclear warhead cruise missiles. The offence has almost totally dominated defence. The consequence has been the awesome paradox that the perfection of the space-related offensive technologies of mass nuclear destruction has rendered war incredible as a rational instrument of political and strategic policy between the superpowers. As a consequence, our continent has enjoyed peace for a longer period than any during the last hundred years. However, it has been an uneasy peace and little progress has been made to resolve potential sources of conflict in our continent, such as the artificial division of Germany and the denial of the right of self-determination to the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe.

10. This paper will examine whether current and projected developments in the field of space technology could redress the balance between offence and defence in favour of defence and whether as a result our security could be enhanced and the process of mutual, balanced and verifiable disarmament accelerated. Furthermore, the potential rôle and involvement of Europe in this process will be analysed. Lastly, the WEU nations must decide whether they can afford, on strategic, industrial and commercial grounds, to maintain only a minimal presence in space or whether they will rise to the opportunities and challenge of the last and ultimate frontier whose conquest will, for good or ill, undoubtedly transform man's potentialities and way of life more profoundly than any challenge of modern history.

II. United States military involvement in space — a summary

11. As explained in the introduction, the militarisation of outer space has massively gathered momentum since the first V2 ballistic

missiles fell upon London in late 1944, although to date no weapons of mass destruction have actually been deployed in space. Satellites are used as integral components of earth-based armed forces and weapons which can be aimed at satellites (Asat) weapons have been introduced into the Soviet armed forces and are in an advanced state of development in the United States. From 1958 to 1983, 2,114 military-orientated satellites have been launched which constitutes about three-quarters of all satellites put into orbit. About half of the United States' expenditure on space is funded by the Department of Defence.

12. The position of the American Government with regard to space development has been laid down in several directives. It could be summarised by saying that the United States will conduct those activities in space that it deems necessary to its national security. National security space programmes support such functions as command and control, communications, navigation, environmental monitoring, warning, surveillance and space defence. The following policies will govern the conduct of the national security programme:

- (i) survivability and endurance of space systems;
- (ii) development of an anti-satellite capability with operational deployment as a goal (the primary purposes of a United States Asat capability are to deter threats to space systems of the United States and its allies);
- (iii) development and maintenance of an integrated attack warning, verification and contingency reaction capability which can effectively detect and react to threats to United States space systems. Security, including dissemination of data, is to be conducted under the exclusive control of the government.

13. The United States Defence Department operates a military satellite communications system in support of its worldwide military forces. This is called the Milsatcom. The air force satellite communications system, Afsatcom, is specially designed for the air force nuclear capable forces. The fleet satellite communications system, Fleetsatcom, provides a worldwide communication system for the navy. The navy also has its own navigation system, called Transit, which is specially designed for strategic ballistic missile submarines and many other military and commercial users. The Navstar global positioning programme is a space-based radio-positioning navigation and time dissemination system that will improve weapon delivery, worldwide rapid

deployment and intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities. It will be definitively operational in 1988.

14. The Landsat 4 satellite, launched in July 1982, is used mainly for earth imagery and for mapping, although its applications are primarily civil.

15. The defence meteorological satellite programme provides high resolution visibility and infrared cloud imagery, atmospheric sounders for moisture content and temperature and ionospheric monitoring to support the Department of Defence strategic and tactical weather requirements. A surveillance and warning satellite system provides the national command authorities with early warning data on missiles. The space surveillance research and development programme adopted by the defence advanced research projects agency (DARPA) is of great importance. It includes advanced microwave technology, naval space surveillance systems and also the anti-satellite programme in response to Soviet development of operational Asats.

III. *The politics of vulnerability*

16. When President Reagan was elected to office in 1980, the growth in Soviet military power and the heightened threat posed by Soviet nuclear forces were a theme in his election campaign. Governor Reagan came to the White House committed to redressing the balance of military power in the United States' favour.

17. However, the accuracy and effectiveness of the latest Soviet nuclear ballistic missiles, such as the SS-18, SS-19 and SS-20, were so formidable that it was clear that the United States and its European allies were potentially vulnerable to a Soviet first strike as never before. In Europe some balance was restored through the modernisation of NATO's intermediate-range nuclear forces and the introduction to service of Pershing II ballistic missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles (ICBM). In the United States it had become clear during the Carter years that the deployment of a new strategic ballistic missile was essential. When Mr. Reagan came to office, President Carter's plans to procure MX ballistic missiles to be based in multiple protective shelters were replaced by new proposals which would be supposedly more popular, to base the new MX missiles in closely-spaced and hardened silos, known in Pentagon jargon as "dense pack". Even this basing mode proved unacceptable to Congress.

18. The President, therefore, requested Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft (USAF retired)

to form a commission to study the options for the future modernisation of the United States ICBM forces, consult with Congress and report. The outcome was the recommendation that limited MX deployment in existing Minuteman silos should proceed and that a new small single warhead strategic nuclear missile should be developed. This view prevailed. However, in spite of the success of the Scowcroft commission in removing from the arena of political controversy the question of the basing of the new generation of United States strategic nuclear missiles, Soviet intransigence over arms control and a lobby of increasing influence calling for the United States to use its vast technical resources and economic strength to develop new space-related technologies to reduce American vulnerability to Soviet surprise nuclear attack, led to a novel defence initiative. Instead of building stockpiles of offensive nuclear missiles of increasing deadliness and accuracy, the United States should build space-based defences against ballistic missile attack. This would have the merit of appealing to the ever-growing constituency of nuclear freeze supporters, enhance deterrence and provide an incentive for the Soviets to resume the arms control process, since any attempt on their part to swamp the defences numerically or to outsmart them with new penetration devices would be prohibitively costly.

IV. High Frontier

19. In the words of Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, former Deputy Director of the CIA:

“High Frontier is a privately funded effort conducted under the aegis of the Heritage Foundation. Its purpose is to seek answers in United States technology, especially space technology, to the strategic problems that plague the United States and the free world.

The origins of the effort lie back in the days when I was a military adviser to the then candidate Ronald Reagan. Early in the campaign I was among those insisting that the only viable approach for a new administration to cope with growing military imbalances was to implement a basic change in United States ground strategy and make ‘a technological end run on the Soviets’.

As far as I could determine, all advisers to Mr. Reagan agreed with this conclusion at least in principle at the time The fundamental strategy change required was the replacement of the mutual

assured destruction (MAD) doctrine which had shaped – rather *warped* – our strategic force posture and had ungirded the United States approach to arms control. The MAD doctrine postulates that strategic *defensive* systems are destabilising and provocative, a theory that has led to a free world seriously vulnerable to nuclear attack and blackmail

A search for technology which would provide the basis for an end-run on the Soviets led inexorably to space. The United States advantage in space is demonstrated in its most dramatic form by the space shuttle. More fundamentally, the ability of the United States to miniaturise components gives us great advantages in space where transport costs per pound are critical. Today, a pound of United States space machinery can do much more than a pound of Soviet space machinery.

It also happens that the technologies immediately available for military systems in space – beyond intelligence, communication and navigation aid satellites – are primarily applicable to ballistic missile defence systems. This fact raised a strong expectation that space held the key to a technological end-run which would offset current Soviet strategic nuclear advantages and at the same time provide an escape from the balance of terror doctrine of MAD.”¹

20. In the course of his researches, your Rapporteur was briefed by the two leading exponents of the High Frontier theses: Lt. General Daniel Graham and Brigadier General Robert Richardson. At the conclusion of the study visit, Brigadier Richardson wrote to the clerk of the committee summarising the points previously made and updating them. Brigadier Richardson’s summary is worth quoting in extenso:

“As was pointed out in our presentations, High Frontier, star wars, and the United States strategic defence initiative (SDI), are different names for the same defence plan. All three call for abandoning the current strategic concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD) and developing and deploying active defences against Soviet ballistic missiles. MAD would be replaced by a strategy we call assured survival that would provide for protection,

1. Forward: High Frontier: A New National Strategy, Lt. Gen. D.O. Graham (USA Ret.) – Heritage Foundation 1982.

in the event of a war, and improve the prospects of deterrence.

Assured survival's defence elements will consist of four intercept layers, three of which would be space-based. This makes it a truly "global" ballistic missile defence since the first intercept layer will destroy the Soviet missiles in their boost phase, that is regardless of their destination and before this can even be determined in most cases.

The new strategy does NOT call for substituting defence for offence. It merely seeks to establish an optimum balance between defensive and retaliatory capabilities. The protection it can provide for retaliatory forces should, however, allow for some reduction in these and will definitely reduce the potential for any effective Soviet first strike.

In 1982 High Frontier determined the technological feasibility, military soundness, political acceptability (in the United States), and economic viability of the plan. Based largely on these findings President Reagan announced, on 23rd March 1983, the United States strategic defence initiative (SDI) programme. The task of SDI to date has been to undertake the technological and policy research that obviously must be completed before any decision can be made to proceed with actual development and deployment of the necessary space-based and point defence weapon systems.

Last October (1983) task forces, established within our Defence Department, reported favourably to the President on the technical feasibility and policy issues. Early this year (1984), a special management team headed by Lt. General Abrahamson, then manager of the shuttle vehicle programme in NASA, was established to implement the SDI research programme. In the defence budget submitted to our Congress for 1985 approximately \$2 billion are programmed for SDI related research.

Following the adoption by our government of the High Frontier concept, and the assumption of responsibility for researching the technology and major policy issues by General Abrahamson's SDI office, we reoriented our High Frontier efforts primarily towards obtaining additional United States and allied public understanding and support for the plan. We are also working to bring about an early (1985) decision to move from mere research into actual development and

deployment of promising defence systems, and have assumed a 'watch-dog' rôle in exposing resistance to the President's plan by vested interests that either inherently resist change or seek to protect programmes whose funding may be jeopardised by it.

Status of programme

The SDI programme is at present in what might be called the 'homework' phase. Obviously a decision to change the free world's strategic strategy, and to build defences against Soviet ballistic missiles, will have momentous implications. These must be identified and carefully considered before implementing decisions can be properly made.

To date we have established:

(1) *Technological feasibility.* Effective (95% or better), first generation, space and point defences can be built and deployed using existing technology.

(2) *Political acceptability.* Polls, in the United States, have established that four out of five Americans want their government to defend them against any acts of aggression (not just avenge them as under MAD). There is massive public support for the President's strategic defence initiative (SDI), not only for the protection it would provide but also because it will reduce dependence on nuclear weapons and essentially eliminate the threat of a Soviet 'first strike' and with it the so-called balance of terror.

(3) *Economic viability.* Costs will vary with both the effectiveness goals adopted and the time required to build and deploy the new weapon systems (each year added to research and development adds about 30% to all up systems costs). High Frontier studies showed that 87% effective point and boost phase space-based defences could be deployed within six years for \$15 to \$20 billion, given suitable priorities and special management for the programme. A business as usual acquisition programme of ten to twelve years would run somewhat over \$50 billion. The elimination of ongoing or planned defence procurement made unnecessary by SDI could more than offset either total.

(4) *Military soundness.* The proper rôle of the military of all nations has always been to defend the country from acts of aggression, not merely to be able to avenge these. From a military point of view the optimum defence posture should include the best possible balance between

offensive and defensive capabilities that can be achieved with existing technology. MAD has always been immoral and its indiscriminate, revenge only, characteristics violate the terms of the Geneva Convention on warfare. MAD never provided any ability to protect the free world's people and assets in wartime. If a deterrent-only strategy ever made any sense it was when the West enjoyed decisive strategic nuclear superiority which is no longer the case now that the strategic balance has shifted in favour of the Soviets.

Having established the above facts, we are now seeking the answers to other pertinent questions such as: the impact of SDI on NATO and allied national forces and defences; the impact of SDI on arms control policies and negotiations (which, incidentally look very favourable); the best initial technologies to pursue and their time and cost implications (SDI triggered off many new industry proposals that must now be evaluated); the implications of the new strategy and defences on other force and weapon programmes; etc.

Studies of these and related questions are under way. We would hope to have some answers early in 1985. Until this 'homework' has been completed, however, decisions cannot be logically made with respect to WHAT to develop and WHEN to deploy it.

As I indicated above, our High Frontier would like to see a presidential decision to proceed with the development of a first generation capability early in 1985. This should be accompanied by a target date for initial system deployments (the end of this decade?). This is essential in order to focus the technological effort and minimise its costs. There is also an urgent need to counter the growing Soviet military threat, re-establish the military balance, and preclude or close any 'windows of vulnerability'. The High Frontier/star wars solution is the way we must go about achieving these goals for the only alternatives are:

- (a) to accept increasing military inferiority, or
- (b) to pursue a MAD arms race in existing types of offensive weapons as necessary to maintain military equivalence.

Inferiority, (a) above, is obviously unacceptable. Maintaining military equiva-

lence, (b) above, would require roughly matching whatever nuclear or other build-up in existing offensive forces the Soviets choose to undertake. This would entail political and economic costs that democracies are not prepared to pay.

1984 is an election year in the United States. While the star wars proposal has been made an issue by some Reagan opponents, their opposition has been tempered somewhat by general recognition that, when challenged, they have to choose their national security solution between the above two alternatives. Neither more atomic weapons and more defence spending nor acceptance of United States inferiority are attractive positions to run for office on, especially in light of the public poll results I previously mentioned.

Although some have tried to argue that security through arms control treaties was a fourth option, this would be true only if both sides agreed. Since this is not the case, such agreements would obviously continue to be pursued under any posture selected and the question then is only: Which posture offers the best prospects? Negotiations from: Inferiority?, Equivalence sustained by a massive atomic build-up and ever more spending?, or from the proposed posture of assured survival?

Allied support and activities

Obviously, consultation with United States allies is a prerequisite to any decisions that might be made by President Reagan to proceed with the development and deployment of defensive systems, especially in space. This has been going on at various levels, in and out of government, since the President's speech on 23rd March 1984.

In connection with this, High Frontier has been trying to enlist the support of strategists, defence analysts, and writers in major NATO countries and Japan. We believe that official consultations will be more productive and less likely to generate opposition through lack of understanding of the United States motives, goals and alternatives, if influential experts in each country have debated the plan in their press and professional journals. To this end we plan to keep as many of you as possible informed on this subject. We also consider that we are in a good position to do this since we, in High Frontier, can go into details and suggest goals and considerations, without these

being automatically construed as official United States positions.

Where we need your help

As I pointed out earlier in this letter, our proposed change in strategy and the related building of a layered anti-missile defence system is in the 'homework' or study phase. Neither we in High Frontier nor our colleagues in government claim to have answers to all the consequences and implications of a free world security policy change of this magnitude.

We know that a change along the lines proposed makes technical, military, economic and political sense and that it is feasible. We also know that no one has been able to propose any practical, affordable or militarily effective alternative way of providing for the security of the free world in today's threat environment.

What we do not yet know is how the change will undoubtedly effect many other aspects of western security, or how it should be presented to the Soviets, what the best timing and associated technology approaches should be, what nations might participate, and so forth.

Obviously we, in the United States, are studying these questions. We would more than welcome your help. Many of you are far better qualified to determine the implications of the new strategy on your national forces and security than we are. Most major western nations have technical and engineering capabilities that can complement United States efforts in developing military space systems as well as point defences. All free world countries will, at minimum, derive security benefits from the global ballistic missile defences we plan to build. To some these should also offer technical and economic opportunities.

Our early High Frontier studies showed that we can expect an explosion of space activities in the 21st Century and that the trunk technologies for civil and military space activities are essentially the same. One will benefit from the other. Churchill and de Gaulle foresaw in the 1950s that their nations would not long retain major power status in the atomic age unless they participated actively in atomic technology. The same is true in the case of space activities in the 1980s. Nations that fail to move out briskly to explore and exploit this new, 'High',

Frontier whether, individually or collectively, cannot hope to retain major power status in the years to come.

So, while we welcome criticisms of the United States star wars programme, especially where these help us anticipate pitfalls and problem areas, we would also like to receive constructive inputs from our overseas colleagues. We need your views on how you think that the proposed new strategy will effect your country, your forces, your security, alliance strategy, etc., on the assumption that it will eventually be implemented.

We would also very much welcome your views on your country's possible interest in participating in research, development, production, deployment, financing and future management of such systems. We, in High Frontier, do not believe that we should study these matters unilaterally in the United States and then present you with conclusions to accept or reject. Instead, we would hope to see as many findings as possible the product of collective study efforts and debates supported by a consensus in each country."

V. The strategic defence initiative

21. The writings of the High Frontier team could be easily dismissed as the work of retired military ideologues with too much time on their hands, sponsored by a right wing think tank and encouraged by the military-industrial complex. To do so would be facile and foolish. Their counsels and those of highly placed well-qualified officials expert in space science and military technology clearly influenced the President of the United States for good reason.

22. On 23rd March 1983, President Reagan delivered a televised speech to the nation in which he initiated a potentially radical departure in United States strategic policy. The President suggested that the policy of nuclear deterrence through the threat of strategic nuclear retaliation is inadequate, and called upon the vast American technological community to examine the potential for effective defence against ballistic missiles:

"Would it not be better to save lives than to avenge them? Are we not capable of demonstrating our peaceful intentions by applying all our abilities and our ingenuity to achieving a truly lasting stability? I think we are – indeed we must.

After careful consultation with my advisers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I

believe there is a way ... It is that we embark on a programme to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base ... I know this is a formidable technical task, one that may not be accomplished before the end of the century. Yet, current technology has attained a level of sophistication where it is reasonable for us to begin this effort."

23. Following the President's speech, national security study directive 6-83 mandated an examination of the technology that could eliminate the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles to the security of the United States and its allies. Accordingly, between June and October 1983, two studies assessed the technical and policy issues of a national commitment to ballistic missile defence (BMD).

24. James Fletcher, former administrator of NASA, headed a defensive technologies study team and Fred Hoffman, Director of Pan Heuristics (a policy analysis organisation based in Los Angeles) led an extra-governmental future security strategy study. A senior inter-agency group integrated the two studies and on behalf of the Secretary for Defence recommended a technology development plan to the President. Such is the importance of this document "Defence against ballistic missiles – an assessment of technologies and policy implications – United States Department of Defence, April 1984" that is reproduced verbatim in Appendix I.

25. The interagency group advised that a vigorous research programme be undertaken to make possible an early decision whether to initiate the development, construction and deployment of ballistic missile defences (BMD). On 6th January 1984, President Reagan signed national security decision directive 119 which authorised the SDI research programme to evaluate the technical feasibility of intercepting attacking missiles. Funding for the SDI requires \$2 billion in financial year 1985 and \$26 billion through to financial year 1989. For a technical summary of current developments in ballistic missile defence, see Appendix II.

26. The impetus behind the BMD is undoubtedly in part directly responsive. The Soviet Union is upgrading its own anti-missile defences round Moscow and has built a large phased array radar. Since 1978, the Soviet Union has accepted no arms control measures whatever. The Soviets are certainly engaged in high-energy laser development. Moreover, verification of new technological developments is virtually impossible. When Strategic Air Command's manned bombers provided the western

alliance's strategic nuclear guarantee, the whole of NATO believed it essential and unquestionable that the United States should maintain an effective air defence. Ballistic missile defence would undoubtedly strengthen the cohesion of the alliance today since the less the vulnerability of the United States to Soviet nuclear bombardment the greater the "linkage" or sense of United States commitment to the defence of Europe. BMD would clearly enhance deterrence and thereby diminish the risk of war. The cost could only be calculated when the SDI is concluded at the end of this decade. Against the cost of BMD, however, would have to be set the cost of new offensive nuclear systems which might be foregone particularly if the institution of BMD on the part of the United States made the Soviets realise the futility of the continuing build-up of new weapons of mass destruction – i.e. offensive nuclear systems.

VI. *Implications for arms control of the strategic defence initiative (SDI)*

27. The United States administration believes that the President's strategic defence initiative is consistent with current United States treaty obligations under the ABM, outer space and limited test ban treaties. The initiative contemplates only research on a broad range of defensive technologies. Should a decision be made in the future to deploy an effective advanced defence capability, such defences would complement the United States' goal of significant reductions in offensive nuclear armaments. Advanced defences would reduce the potential of ballistic missiles thus providing an incentive for negotiated reductions of them. The United States commitment to the START and INF negotiations is unchanged.

28. The ABM treaty obligation:

- limits each side to one deployment area with 100 launchers/interceptors. It also limits radars;
- bans deployment of systems that do not consist of radars, launchers and interceptors, but permits development and testing of fixed land-based ones;
- bans development, testing and deployment of mobile systems and components (i.e. space-based, air-based, sea-based and mobile land-based);
- bans rapid reload and multiple warhead components;
- permits research – short of field testing a prototype of a prohibited system or component;
- provides for amendments.

The outer space treaty bans nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in space. The limited test ban treaty bans tests of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices in space, in the atmosphere and under water.

29. The United States administration has stated that the strategic defence initiative's implications for foreign policy are as follows:

- the United States will take no actions which will reduce the security of its allies;
- research into multi-layered defence against theatre and strategic ballistic missiles will continue;
- missile defences have potential for strengthening deterrence, but they will not eliminate nuclear weapons;
- the United States commitment to defence of its allies will not change;
- the United States will consult them fully.

30. The President's Science Adviser, Dr. George Keyworth, in an article in the Air Force Times of 31st October 1983 entitled "Space-based defence possible" observed:

"We can now project the technology - even though it has not been demonstrated yet - to develop a defence system that could drastically reduce the threat of attack by nuclear weapons, not only today but those that could reasonably be expected to be developed to counter such a defence system."

31. That belief was echoed by Dr. Colin Gray in Foreign Affairs of spring 1984:

"All of recorded history has shown swings in the pendulum of technical advantage between offence and defence. For the strategic defence to achieve a very marked superiority over the offence over the next several decades would be an extraordinary trend in the light of the last thirty years, but not of the last hundred or thousand years. History is replete with examples of defensive technology and tactics dominating the offence."

32. Interestingly, the former national security advisers who are perhaps the leading academic experts in the field of international relations, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, have commented separately in favour of space-based defence against ballistic missile attack for the arms control perspective. First, to quote Henry Kissinger, in his article of 24th September 1984 in the Herald Tribune entitled "Limited star

wars - Defence may help deter an attack, encourage arms control":

"Perhaps the most compelling argument is the possible beneficial effect of some missile defence on arms control. Arms control theory is now at a dead end; the stalemate in negotiations reflects an impasse in thought. The reductions proposed by the Reagan administration would add little to stability; the freeze which is its alternative would perpetuate what needs correction.

A breakthrough requires reductions of the numbers of warheads on a scale inconceivable so long as the strategic balance depends entirely on offensive weapons.

Under present conditions, the reductions that can be verified are relatively small. They are either dangerous because they simplify an attacker's calculations or they are irrelevant because they leave large residual numbers of warheads.

If, however, the strategic warheads of both sides were reduced to a few hundred - a number astronomically below any so far envisaged - the side capable of hiding a thousand warheads might be able to disarm its opponent with a surprise attack or blackmail him into submission by revealing the secret weapons. But with a properly designed defence, much larger numbers would be needed for a strategically decisive evasion, and those numbers could be detected.

I consider these arguments compelling with respect to three propositions:

- We should not commit ourselves at this point to the demilitarisation of space.
- We should proceed actively with research and development and forgo moratoriums.
- We should be prepared to negotiate over control of *all* defensive weapons.

Before committing ourselves to actual deployment, an answer to the following questions is needed:

- Is it possible to design a ballistic missile defence that is primarily useful for the defence of the retaliatory forces or against maverick smaller nuclear countries?
- If such a limited defence were to become part of an arms control agreement, how would the limitation be expressed and verified?

- Could we avoid loopholes that would allow further expansion to a full-scale defence?
- Would such a defence be destabilising by tempting a first strike and relying on the defence to absorb the counter-blow? (In theory this should not be, if both sides have relatively limited defences.)
- What, in such a context, would be the appropriate low level of offensive forces to bring about the breakthrough toward real arms control that has eluded us for a decade?
- Would strategic defence at any level destroy all hopes for an equilibrium?

The real debate will be joined after the United States election in November. Theoretically, both superpowers should have an interest to prevent both war by miscalculation and nuclear blackmail by irresponsible smaller powers. Neither side can gain from seeking unilateral advantage.

Thus, a renewal of negotiations will be a test less of ingenuity than of political maturity. There seems to be general concern with the precariousness, both physical and psychological, of a balance based on large unopposed offensive systems.

This article argues that some limited defence, yet to be analysed, coupled with a revolutionary approach to reduction of offensive forces by agreement may advance us toward the elusive goal of stability."

33. Secondly, to quote Zbigniew Brzezinski, in an article in the *Wall Street Journal* of 10th July 1984 entitled "From arms control to controlled security":

"The advent of increasingly numerous and accurate systems is making it possible for planners of a strategic attack to envisage a first strike that leaves the opponent strategically crippled, capable of only a spasmodic, disorganised and strategically aimless response – or none at all. This still does not make a first strike attractive from a moral or even political point of view, given the stakes, but the point is that gradually the military attractiveness of this option is again increasing.

Accordingly, with the stalemate in arms control, the enhanced capacity of strategic offence must be offset – and it is likely to

be offset by greater reliance on the part of both sides on defensive strategic systems. The *Times* of London put it correctly when it stated editorially on 13th June: 'The Soviet Union is now naturally worried about the consequences of a burst in American spending on missile defence. It casts doubt on Soviet plans for offensive systems since the possibility of any missile defence – even an incomplete one – would radically alter the cost calculation of offensive systems. In the long run a defensive programme would enhance arms control by reducing the potential gains from building offensive weapons ... It is ironic and paradoxical that the age of deterrence has so confused the strategic mentality of many commentators that their reaction to a purely defensive system is to suggest that it increases danger.'

The fact is that strategic defence has become feasible not in the sense that it can safeguard society but because it can increasingly complicate the planning and execution of an effective first strike. In other words, strategic defence can somewhat negate the offensive advantages of increasingly sophisticated strike systems, restoring the element of deterrence simply by creating again greater uncertainty as to the consequences of a first strike.

Respective vulnerability

For the United States, it is an especially attractive option for it permits us to exploit the advantages of high technology, an area of United States superiority. This provides us with genuine potential for offsetting the military advantages gained in recent years by the Soviet Union, and would put pressure on the Soviet Union to return to serious arms control negotiations.

But even with such negotiations, the development of some defensive strategic capability will remain desirable. It is often said that an imbalance might arise when one side sees the other side acquiring a relatively invulnerable shield while itself remaining vulnerable. Pre-emption might therefore become tempting. In fact, that is not likely to happen. The acquisition of a defensive strategic capability is not like purchasing an umbrella, which one can unfold against the rain upon leaving the store. It is bound to be a protracted trial-and-error piecemeal process, with both sides experimenting, deploying partially, and adjusting their capabilities, with neither one at any point in the next fifteen to twenty

years feeling it is truly invulnerable to the other side, even though over time the respective vulnerability of each side to a first strike by the other will gradually be declining.

Through such a process, a measure of reciprocal stability will be acquired and security of both sides will gradually be enhanced, though the process will not yield the kind of restraint in defence expenditures that many have associated with the hoped-for arms control. But the time has come to lay to rest the expectation that arms control is the secret key to a more amicable American-Soviet relationship or even to the enhancement of mutual security. The maintenance of such security will remain an ambiguous and protracted process requiring unilateral actions by both sides, and increasingly so in the area of strategic defence."

Arms control and anti-satellite weapons

34. It often seems that the Soviet Union is keen to secure treaty limitation in those areas of capability in which the United States has a technical lead, and is unwilling to do so in those areas where the technical advantage lies with the USSR. So it is in the debate about verification and the possibility of achieving a treaty controlling anti-satellite weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union.

35. Understanding the debate depends, in part, on some knowledge of the progress the United States and the Soviet Union have made in the development of these weapons and their long-range goals.

36. United States officials detected twenty tests of a Soviet ground-launched anti-satellite weapon system between 1968 and 1982. American officials believe that 45% of these tests were successful. However, the more advanced modifications in the system that would make it more difficult to foil with American countermeasures have failed. The Soviet weapon is launched from the ground by a 150 ft. intercontinental ballistic missile and, in its only successful configuration, must make two earth orbits to approach its target, an undesirable system militarily.

37. The United States is now developing a more advanced weapon that permits direct ascent to the target within a matter of minutes. It consists of a small, 18 ft. rocket launched from an F-15 fighter plane. There was a test of the rockets in January, but it will not be tested against a space target until late this year. Both nations' weapons can now reach only low earth

orbit targets, which makes many valuable satellites immune.

38. The warhead of the American weapon is a cylinder only about eleven inches in length. The warhead of the Soviet weapon, discounting the 150 ft. booster rocket, is slightly more than 18 ft. long and weighs about 4,500 lb.

39. The United States reportedly plans to build 112 anti-satellite weapons to be stationed at two F-15 wings near Washington, D.C., and in Washington State. However, a special modification kit would permit any F-15 to be converted to a launcher within six hours and any jet airfield could become a base.

40. Advocates of a treaty counter arguments about verification problems by saying that if the United States weapon is fully developed, Soviet verification of United States treaty compliance would become impossible because of the relatively small size of the rocket and almost minute size of the warhead, as well as its potential deployment on any airfield.

Problems of concealment

41. But such advocates tend to agree that the 4,500 lb Soviet warhead could probably be concealed also. Such figures as Richard L. Garwin and Kurt Gottfried, two physicists who recommend a treaty, say that a treaty that prohibited space testing and ground deployment would work to the United States' advantage. They say that satellites could readily identify the deployment of the 150 ft. Soviet launchers and other sensors could catch any test against a target in space.

42. These and other figures argue that the present Soviet weapon is not really capable and could not be used in a conflict without further testing.

43. Administration officials, on the other hand, have consistently described the Soviet weapon as already "operational".

44. As for motives, they have made clear that they want no treaty that would halt the development of a promising, probably superior, United States weapon. One suggestion is that they might recommend to President Reagan a treaty limiting the altitude of anti-satellite weapons to low orbit targets, but no more.

VII. The United States space station – a challenge for Europe

45. Such is the strategic and commercial significance of the United States space station project that your Rapporteur makes no apology

for giving the full description of it. Space stations, although not primarily of military significance will be the key building blocks for space exploitation, the placing of large payloads in outer earth orbit and the exploration of deep space. Participation in the United States space station is for ESA a natural follow-on to the Spacelab programme¹.

46. During the state of the union address, the President announced that he has directed NASA to take the nation's next bold step in space – to begin the development of a permanently based, manned space station. The President's goal for the space station programme is to have Americans living and working in space, permanently, within a decade.

Programme description

47. The idea of a space station has been under consideration for years. NASA has conducted preliminary planning efforts over the past few years – seeking the best design to satisfy the requirements of commercial and scientific users. Over the next two years, NASA will be conducting an extended definition effort in order to minimise programme risk and to maximise space station capabilities. NASA will involve United States industry in the system design process, develop advanced technologies, and establish test facilities to check space station concepts and technologies. By the end of this two-year period, NASA expects to have a firm and responsive space station design and be in a position to proceed toward hardware development.

48. The space station concept provides for a manned base in a low inclination orbit. NASA is looking towards providing for a crew of six to eight. In addition to living quarters, the manned base will need to provide utilities (electrical power, thermal control, attitude control and data processing), work space, and a docking hub to allow tending by the shuttle. The space shuttle will be used to launch and provide transportation to the station. The shuttle will permit crew rotation and resupply at three to six-month intervals. The work of the space station will be conducted both in attached pressurised operations modules and also on unpressurised free-flying platforms. The operations modules will be able to support scientific research and technology development requiring crew interaction. The unmanned platforms will be able to provide changeable payload accommodations for activities requiring minimum disturbance and protection from contamination from base activities.

1. Report by Mr. Hill, Document 992.

Capabilities

49. The space station will enable extensive commercial use of space by providing capabilities that are not currently available to the private sector. These capabilities are possible because the space station will couple manned presence with unlimited stay-time in orbit and advanced automated systems.

50. The space station will enable the commercial production, in quantity, of critical materials not obtainable on earth, such as extremely pure pharmaceuticals. Frequent crew intervention is required in the development phases for such production processes. The space station also will provide a system allowing changeable payload accommodations for commercial remote sensing instruments.

51. The space station will serve as a permanent base for the efficient tending, servicing and repair of unmanned platforms and satellites, thereby increasing the lifetime of these expensive space assets and offering the flexibility to upgrade space systems as technology advances. This efficiency derives in part from the fact that the servicing equipment is stored on the station and will not have to be brought up on the shuttle for each individual servicing mission. The space station also will enable the on-orbit assembly and check-out of large space structures such as antennas, astronomical telescopes and satellites prior to their deployment.

52. The space station will provide the capability to conduct space-based scientific research in fields such as astrophysics, solar system exploration, earth science and applications, life sciences, materials processing and communications.

53. Space station research focused on extending human stay-time in space will contribute to future manned exploration and exploitation of space. Thus, in the longer term, the space station could provide the necessary first step for major future manned advances in space, such as a permanent lunar base, a manned mission to Mars, a manned survey of the asteroids, a manned scientific and communications facility in geosynchronous orbit, or a complex of advanced scientific and industrial facilities in low earth orbit. Also, the space station could enable the staging of future unmanned missions, such as planetary probes including the possibility of sample returns.

International participation

54. In order to deepen the United States commitment to work with all nations in the peaceful exploration and use of space, the President has invited America's friends and

allies to participate in the United States space station programme. This participation could range from use of the completed facility to co-operation in the development of the space station. Participation by Europe on the NASA station is a prerequisite for Europe's eventually building its own space station.

55. The subject was discussed at the economic summit of western leaders in London on 9th June 1984 and the following communiqué issued:

"We believe that manned space stations are the kind of programme that provides a stimulus for technological development leading to strengthened economies and improved quality of life ... In that context, each of our countries will consider carefully the generous and thoughtful invitation received from the President of the United States to other summit countries to participate in the development of such a station by the United States. We welcome the intention of the United States to report at the next summit on international participation in their programme."

NASA space station programme (SSP)

56. President Reagan announced on 25th January 1984 that he was instructing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to develop a permanent, manned orbiting space station within a decade. He subsequently invited the heads of government of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Canada to participate in the project and NASA officials have subsequently contacted Western European states bilaterally and through the European Space Agency. NASA sees it as the next logical step in the beneficial exploitation of space. They also regard it as a symbol of the linkage between the western democracies and an opportunity to display international co-operation in high technology.

57. The space station will be assembled in orbit from shuttle-launched modules and comprise laboratories (both within and outside a shirtsleeve environment), living quarters, a logistics module (for supplies, particularly propellants) and a resource module (to provide power, thermal, propulsion and communications functions. It will orbit at 28.5 degrees inclination to the equator and have 75 kW power. The basic project also includes at least one co-orbiting platform, a polar orbiting platform serviced from the shuttle, internally and externally attached payloads, arrangements for servicing satellites and orbital manoeuvring

vehicles and arrangements for assembly of payloads and large structures.

58. By the year 2000, NASA envisages a complex costing \$20 billion, but their proposal for the initial programme described above is \$8 billion (1982 prices) not including launch, utilisation or operation costs. The NASA administrator has suggested that a European contribution should amount to 20-25% of NASA's investment, i.e. up to \$2 billion over eight years, while Canada and Japan should each contribute 10%. These contributions would be additional to the American \$8 billion and so enhance the programme beyond what the United States can immediately afford.

59. Initial uses of a manned station fall into four classes:

- (i) those which would exploit the micro-gravity and vacuum environment, for experimental or commercial purposes;
- (ii) those which would utilise the station or a co-orbiting platform as a permanent satellite;
- (iii) those which would use the station to test technologies designed for incorporation in other satellites; and
- (iv) those which would use the station to refurbish and maintain satellites or to undertake check-out and/or final assembly for satellites before they are boosted to their final orbits.

60. The first encompasses space processing and life sciences. It is impossible to recreate on earth for any length of time the low gravity environment achieved in orbit. Space could become an important resource for the ultra-high purification of drugs or production of high value crystals and metal alloys and, whereas the shuttle and Spacelab can sustain these conditions for several days, a station will do so for months or years.

61. As a permanent satellite, the station will not have direct telecommunications applications. For remote sensing, the polar-orbiting platform planned as part of the core manned space station could have a far-reaching impact.

62. After several years of in-house NASA study and some external support contracts, the space station has been formally approved and an amount of \$155 million earmarked from the NASA budget in financial year 1984. A 250-man team, drawn from all NASA establishments, produced on 20th August 1984, a draft request for proposal (RFP) for the space definition and preliminary design. After three weeks for comments both from United States industry and from potential international par-

ticipants, the definitive RFP will have been issued to industry on 14th September 1984.

63. The following description of the space station is based on the draft RFP and presentations made by senior NASA staff on the occasion of the Banks Committee summer study on the scientific uses of the space station, held at Stanford University from 13th to 19th August 1984.

64. For the first time in a NASA programme since Apollo, there will be no industrial prime contractor; this function will be fulfilled by Lyndon B. Johnson Space Centre. The RFP is thus for four separate "work packages", for each of which two contractors will be chosen to work in parallel, each supervised by a NASA centre.

65. Contractors are instructed to develop a configuration which would meet estimated needs around the year 2010, and then scale down to an initial operating configuration (IOC) which could be operational in "the early 1990s" within the approved budget envelope of \$8 billion. In this way NASA hopes to arrive at a configuration capable of considerable expansion without major design changes.

66. As a reference configuration for the manned core, NASA has given a gravity gradient stabilised concept which has come to be known as the "Power Tower".

67. The space station will comprise various space station programme elements (SSPEs) as follows:

(i) Modules

68. Marshall Spaceflight Centre, under Work Package 01, is responsible for the definition of a common module which – so long as this proves practicable – is to be the basis for all modules developed by NASA. In the initial configuration it is proposed to provide:

- a logistics module;
- a living quarters module; and
- two laboratory modules.

(ii) Platforms

69. The original intention was to include possibly only one co-orbiting platform in the initial orbiting configuration. But the need for a polar-orbiting platform is being hotly canvassed by potential users, and NASA has now had the benefit both of internal studies (particularly by Goddard Spaceflight Centre and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory) and the recent meetings with scientific and other users. The RFP therefore contains a great deal of

flexibility and the call is for a single, multi-purpose platform capable of modular growth, and allowing in-orbit interchange of instruments or the processing of module payloads at a standardised interface.

70. If the money stretches to it, NASA would wish to include initially two polar orbiting platforms (where there is more call for accommodating several instruments on the same platform) and a modular family of co-orbiting platforms. Goddard Spaceflight Centre appears to favour six to eight small platforms each supplying 5 kW of power.

(iii) OTV and OMB

71. The orbital transfer vehicle (OHV) does not form part of the space station, only its accommodation and interfacing. The development of the OTV itself is the responsibility of Marshall Spaceflight Centre and parallel study contracts have been awarded to Martin Marietta Aerospace and Boeing Aerospace. The orbital manoeuvring vehicle (OMV) is similarly a separate development, also under the responsibility of Marshall Spaceflight Centre. The status of these vehicles with regard to international co-operation is unclear, but they are not thought to be included in the present invitation.

NASA timetable

72. The key milestones announced by NASA for the SSP are as follows: distribution of RFP to industry: 14th September 1984; receipt of industrial proposals: November 1984; selection of contractors and authority to proceed: 1st April 1985; fixing of final configuration: October/December 1985; evaluation of development proposals: September 1986-March 1987; start phase C/D: April 1987.

Congress approval

73. It is important to note the conditions imposed by Congress when the space station financial year 1984 budget was approved. The commitment of the \$155.5 million was blocked until 1st April 1985, and its release is subject to NASA giving satisfaction on two issues:

(i) NASA is required to study an option under which the space station would initially be man-tended with the permanent manning being phased in at a later date. NASA is under an obligation to spend 10-15% of the definition funds in having this trade-off study made; and

(ii) a space station advanced technology committee is to be established to

identify systems that would advance the technologies of robotics and automation of use, not only in the space station, but also in ground-based industries. A programme equal to 10% of development costs is to be defined.

74. NASA has responded promptly to both these requirements. The SSP Phase B contractors are instructed to undertake a meaningful study of the man-tended option, and in-house work is also planned in this area. To meet the second point, the California Space Institute (CSI) will lead a university/industry team to guide a comparative effort on systems design and systems technology. The Stanford Research Institute (SRI) will perform technology evaluation and forecasting, and some aerospace companies are to examine the design implications of the Stanford analysis. To pull the work together and to assist NASA in formulating an automation/robotics programme, a high-level advisory and overseeing group has been appointed, chaired by Dr. Frosch, the former NASA administrator.

75. NASA is due to present to congress by 15th December 1984 a report on space station "management plans and acquisition strategies".

United States invitation for international participation

76. The invitation was first made in President Reagan's last state of the union message when he invited America's friends and allies to participate and explained that this participation could range from use of the completed facility to co-operation in the development of the space station. In order to underline the political nature of the invitation, Mr. Beggs, administrator of NASA, was sent to Europe in April 1984, as the United States President's personal representative, to encourage European countries to respond positively. The subject figured on the agenda of the June 1984 economic summit meeting and the communiqué provided for a report to the next summit in 1985.

77. The draft RFP to industry also addresses this aspect and speaks of an invitation to international friends to become "builders, users and operators" of the space station, warning United States contractors that work package allocation could very well be altered as a result of international participation.

78. NASA has in fact indicated that a reply in principle is looked for from international participants by the end of 1984, and that they would like all formalities to have been concluded by the end of 1985, i.e. at the time the space station configuration is frozen.

79. Before considering the situation in Europe, a word about reaction in Canada and Japan.

80. The Canadians have indicated to NASA that they are in principle interested in participating in the space station and that they are presently concluding national studies to define the nature and extent of this participation. Canada has also informed the European Space Agency that Canadian co-operation in the programme through the Agency is not excluded. A further development of the remote manipulator system (RMS) developed for use with the shuttle is certain to be one, and perhaps the main, Canadian proposal.

81. The Japanese industry has from the start been enthusiastic about participating in the programme. Four industrial consortia have been formed and internal studies are being carried out, in some cases in association with United States firms. The draft proposals are far-ranging and are estimated to cost around \$1.3 billion. The Japanese governmental position has not yet been announced, but it is known that the Diet will be asked in April 1985 to approve the necessary funding.

82. NASA invited potential international participants to attend a workshop in Washington on 20th-21st September 1984 at which the latest state of the United States programme was described and foreign participants encouraged to discuss the form their contribution might take.

Spacelab follow-on programme

83. Eight ESA member states agreed to participate in an optional programme "Eureca" at a cost of 155.9 MAU. This is a reusable autonomous carrier designed to be launched into space, operated in a free-flying mode for up to six months and retrieved by the space shuttle. The first flight is due for mid-1987. The reference orbit is 270 NMi altitude and an inclination of 28.5 degrees.

European space station programme

84. In January 1983, nine ESA member states agreed to contribute to a 13 million accounting unit "space transportation systems (STS) long-term preparatory programme (LTPP)". The object of the programme was to analyse options open to Europe for STS activities beyond Ariane 4 and Spacelab follow-on development (FOD), and to prepare decisions on a long-term policy and on the start of new programmes by 1985-86 within the following three areas:

– Theme I: Future European launcher;

- Theme 2: European space in-orbit infrastructure (IOI);
- Theme 3: Manned space station and continued co-operation with United States.

85. The United Kingdom contributed to the preparatory plan at the rate of 4%, the average of its share in previous ESA Ariane/Spacelab programmes. However, the response to the RFP on the part of British industry will be vigorous. For example, British Aerospace will be proposing its space platform design.

86. The existence of the plan enabled ESA to reach an agreement with NASA whereby the two agencies keep each other informed on the progress of their studies and permits the participation of United States and European industry in all relevant inter-agency conferences.

87. The ESA Council, meeting in June 1984, agreed on two enabling resolutions approving the execution of two new optional programmes; this means the Agency can examine relevant details and make proposals to the member states who, before work can start, must formally agree the technical details and funding of these programmes. These new programmes are for:

- the development of the large cryogenic engines (HM60); and
- a space station-related programme, Columbus, based on a proposal by the German and Italian Delegations; this programme will be defined with a view to ensure progressively the European autonomy in the field of the manned space station mutually compatible with the future European launching systems.

88. The second resolution also approved "in the process of this preparatory programme the consideration of the invitation received from the President of the United States ...".

89. The space station resolution envisages a funding of 80 MAU (35 MAU for definition contracts and 45 MAU for a supporting technology programme). For the space station Phase B study, ESA hopes to have all the formalities completed in time to allow industry to start work in April 1985 (the same date as for the NASA Phase B start)

90. Meanwhile 1.1 MAU of the long-term preparatory programme will be used to provide two bridging contracts which will be awarded to MBB/ERNO and Aeritalia with instructions to arrange a "reasonable" geographical distribution of the work. The time before 1985 is intended to be spent mainly on refining cost analyses, examining maintenance and operations costs and attempting to define the elements

in NASA's space station programme available for international participation. The first meeting of the potential participants was arranged for 28th September 1984.

Columbus programme

91. The German/Italian proposal referred to in the ESA space station resolution is the so-called Columbus programme.

92. The Columbus programme is funded by the German BMFT (the Ministry of Research and Technology) and the Italian MRST (the Ministry of Scientific and Technological Research) as a "joint effort for the continuation of European space activities based on the exploitation of Spacelab and Eureka technologies and results obtained". The industrial studies were carried out from April 1983 to July 1984 by MBB/ERNO and Aeritalia, supervised by DFVLR (the German federation for aeronautical and space industries) and the Italian CNR (national research agency and location of the Italian National Space Plan). The studies also took account of considerable in-house DFVLR work which had been done under the name of Orbitas.

93. As presented to the ESA Council in June 1984, for "Europeanisation", the Columbus programme consists of:

- (i) pressurised modules (PM), a further development of Spacelab, and intended to be either manned or man-tended;
- (ii) payload carriers (PC), a further development of European hardware, designed to carry experiments, material production facilities, etc.; and
- (iii) resource module (RM) providing power, communications, data management and other housekeeping facilities for the PM and PC.

94. The programme also provides for payloads, ground segment and some demonstration missions in orbit due to commence around 1993, the launching of this initial configuration would depend on the United States shuttle, but Ariane "could be considered as an option for manned launches". The programme is intended to be "compatible" with the NASA space station "as a general policy", and the pressurised module is seen as being initially attached to and serviced by the space station. But a prominent feature of the programme is the possibility of the Columbus elements separating from the United States space station and constituting an independent system serviced by European launches.

VIII. Conclusions

95. The purpose of this report has been to open up the debate about the implications of military space technology for the member countries of WEU and Western Europe as a whole. It is understandable that in individual European countries there should be disinterest verging on apathy about the military developments of the United States and the Soviet Union in the space field. Individually even the largest, most powerful and technically capable Western European countries, like France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, are so totally incapable of matching the military potential of the superpowers in space that minds can be too easily closed and a vital subject ignored.

96. Collectively, however, the WEU member countries have a formidable space potential. Certainly, if their policies are concerted – and the WEU Council is the ideal body to fulfil that process – they could considerably influence the NATO decision-making process. Likewise, it is very necessary for the WEU member countries, which are the European nations probably most threatened by the deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the Soviet Union and of SS-22 and SS-23 missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, to be able to evaluate any possible defence against these threats on the part of the western alliance and to evaluate also the effectiveness of British and French retaliatory nuclear forces against those threats. The possible inclusion of the British and French independent nuclear deterrents and of Soviet intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces in the arms control process is a subject that merits urgent consideration and specialist advice from the Agency for the Control of Armaments of WEU.

97. There has been much loose talk of decoupling from Western Europe resulting from the deployment of space-based defence on the part of the United States. It is strange that the proliferation of offensive nuclear systems on the part of the Soviets is so readily accepted by the Western Europeans, whereas the construction of a space-based defence by the United States that would diminish the vulnerability of Western Europe to all but short-range ballistic missile attack is so often criticised.

98. It does not mean that the United States would be prepared to unleash a pre-emptive nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union

believing that its own heartland was relatively secure and leaving Western Europe open to Soviet nuclear retaliation. First, NATO is a purely defensive alliance and the United States would not attack first. Second, even the most futuristic space-based triple-layered ballistic missile defence system will never be 100% effective. Some ballistic missiles would still get through thus ensuring that mutual deterrence based on the continued capacity of each side to inflict unacceptable damage on the other would continue.

99. What would be diminished is the risk of a Soviet nuclear first strike upon the United States. The Soviet Union has been building up a strategic ballistic missile arsenal of great precision and destructive power. The Soviet drive to strategic (and intermediate-range) nuclear superiority would be nullified. Western Europe would be less subject to Soviet nuclear intimidation and blackmail because a space-based defensive system would be global in operation. Furthermore, our United States allies would regard as more credible the NATO doctrine of graduated flexible nuclear response since escalation to the strategic level to ensure the national survival of the Western European allies could be contemplated without risking the total nuclear devastation of mainland United States. Deterrence would therefore be heightened and the risk of war diminished. Unable to gain an advantage over NATO by the proliferation of offensive nuclear ballistic missiles except at inordinate cost, the Soviet Union would be more likely to negotiate an agreement to reduce such offensive systems.

100. Lastly, there is the reassurance that a global space-based defence would protect the free world from nuclear attack by miscalculation, error, the act of a madman or from a proliferation of ballistic missile systems to nations other than the five present nuclear powers.

101. Mankind has expended almost immeasurable resources in the development, construction and deployment of awesome engines of mass destruction. If only a modest fraction of that expenditure were devoted to research into defensive systems, we could judge whether a ballistic missile defence is feasible at reasonable cost. If man can be landed on the moon and permanent space stations assembled in orbit, the likelihood is that such a defence is practical and not the science fiction that people believe it to be.

APPENDIX I

*Policy implications of defences
against ballistic missiles*

During the 1950s, the United States maintained substantial programmes for defence against possible attack by Soviet bombers. But in the 1960s, in light of the growing threat from Soviet missiles, the United States Government concluded that an effective missile defence would be most difficult to achieve. Moreover, it was thought that deployment would not be desirable because it might provide an incentive for the Soviets to further increase their offensive strategic forces to overwhelm our missile defences, and that they could do so at a cost much lower than our cost for missile defences. And once our increasing vulnerability to Soviet missile attacks was accepted, it did not seem warranted to continue a major effort for defence against Soviet bombers. As a result, we largely disbanded our air defences in the 1960s.

At the same time, a strategic theory gained currency in the United States that held that deterrence of nuclear attack could best be maintained if both the United States and the Soviet Union were vulnerable to attack. This theory found expression in the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty, which was designed to foreclose widespread deployment of ballistic missile defences, and in the anticipation that we could reach agreements first to limit and then to reduce strategic offensive forces.

Unfortunately, neither the United States abandonment of the attempt to defend against nuclear attack in the 1960s nor the ABM treaty and the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT I and II) agreements have led to a levelling off in the growth of offensive systems – much less to reductions. Moreover, unlike the United States, the Soviet Union has continued to maintain and modernise both a large nationwide air defence system and ballistic missile defences around its capital (as permitted by the ABM treaty). In addition, as the President recently reported to the Congress, the Soviet Union has now deployed a large radar in central Siberia that almost certainly constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the ABM treaty since its associated siting, orientation and capability are prohibited by this treaty. The Soviets have also been conducting research in technologies that would be required for more effective missile defences.

The continual growing Soviet offensive threat to the United States and our allies plus the ongoing Soviet research and deployment of defensive systems offers a powerful motive for

reassessing the potential rôle of defensive systems in our security strategy. At the same time, advances in relevant technologies require us to reassess the feasibility of useful defences. The conjunction of these issues prompted the President to call for a new assessment of the possibilities for increasing the rôle of defensive systems in our deterrent posture.

It is to be expected that the technological approaches proposed would vary widely in technical risk and strategic uncertainty. For the first time in history, we have the possibility of developing a multi-tiered system. Such a system could defend against enemy ballistic missiles in all phases of their flight, not only in the terminal phase, where decoys and multiple re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) constitute a large number of objects that the defence must cope with. The current technology addresses only the final re-entry phase. A capability to intercept missiles in the boost and post-boost phases could defend against a missile attack before the deployment of a multiplicity of re-entry vehicles and decoys.

We do not yet have enough information for estimating the entire cost of a full research and development programme for a multi-tiered missile defence. The costs of actual development of various possible systems will, of course, depend on the characteristics of the systems. Clearly, costs of defences and the trade-offs with offensive forces they will permit and require are among the most critical issues. The costs will, however, be spread over many years, and decisions on the desired magnitude of the effort can – and should – be taken at various stages in the programme. At this time one cannot prejudge the extent to which costs of increasingly more effective defence deployments will be warranted by the resultant security benefits and defence savings in other areas.

The rôle of ballistic missile defences must be viewed in the context of the overall military and political requirements of the United States. A decision to pursue ballistic missile defences would have major implications for nuclear strategy, the prevention of nuclear war, deterrence of aggression and arms reduction. It is with this broad context in mind that our policy on missile defences must be shaped. To permit informed decisions we have to conduct research on many aspects of the relevant technology and develop a range of specific choices.

It is likely that components of a multi-layered defence, or less than fully effective

versions of such a defence, could become deployed earlier than a complete system. Such intermediate versions of a ballistic missile defence system, while unable to provide the protection available from a multi-tiered system, may nevertheless offer useful capabilities. The development of options to deploy such intermediate capabilities would be an important hedge against an acceleration in the Soviet strategic build-up. If such intermediate systems were actually deployed, they could play a useful rôle in defeating limited nuclear attacks and in enhancing deterrence against large attacks.

Intermediate defence capabilities would reduce the confidence of Soviet planners in their ability to destroy the high-priority military targets that would probably be the primary objective of a contemplated Soviet attack. The planners' decreased confidence in a successful outcome of their attacks against military targets, war-supporting resources with the United States, or United States and allied forces overseas would strengthen deterrence of Soviet use of nuclear arms.

An effective, fully deployed United States ballistic missile defence could significantly reduce the military utility of Soviet pre-emptive attacks, thereby potentially increasing both deterrence and strategic stability. But such a defence could remain effective only if the Soviet Union could not negate it with countermeasures more cheaply than the United States could maintain the viability of the system or if the two sides agreed to limit offensive missile forces while protecting defensive systems. Effective defences strengthen deterrence by increasing an attacker's uncertainty and undermining his confidence in his ability to achieve a predictable, successful outcome. By constraining or eliminating the effectiveness of both limited and major attack options against key United States military targets and thus leaving only options for attacking urban areas – which would be of highly questionable credibility – defences could significantly reduce the utility of strategic and theatre nuclear forces and raise the threshold of nuclear conflict.

It must be recognised, however, that there are uncertainties that will not be resolved until more is known about the technical characteristics of defensive systems, the future arms policies of the Soviet Union, the prospects for arms reduction agreements, and the Soviet response to United States initiatives. Important questions to be addressed are:

- the absolute and relative effectiveness of future United States and Soviet defensive systems and how this effectiveness is perceived by each side;
- the vulnerabilities of the defensive systems (both real and perceived);

- the size, composition and vulnerability of each side's offensive forces;
- the overall United States-Soviet military balance.

While these uncertainties cannot be fully resolved, we will learn more about them with the passage of time. Our assessment of these issues will affect design and deployment decisions.

These uncertainties notwithstanding, a vigorous research and development programme is essential to assess and provide options for future ballistic missile defences. At a minimum, such a programme is necessary to ensure that the United States will not be faced in the future with a one-sided Soviet deployment of highly effective ballistic missile defences to which the only United States answer would be a further expansion of our offensive forces (penetration aids, more launchers, etc.). Such a situation would be fraught with extremely grave consequences for our security and that of our allies. There is no basis for the assumption that decisions on the deployment of defensive systems rest solely with the United States. On the contrary, Soviet history, doctrine and programmes (including an active programme to modernise the existing Moscow defence – the only operational ballistic missile defence in existence) all indicate that the Soviets are more likely (and better prepared) than we to initiate such a deployment whenever they deem it to their advantage. For the near future, in particular, they are better prepared than we to deploy traditional (conventional) terminal defences. United States work on ballistic missile defence technology in the 1960s and early 1970s appears to have been an important factor in Soviet willingness to agree to the deployment limits imposed by the ABM treaty; similar considerations can be expected to play a rôle in future Soviet decisions on the deployment of ballistic missile defences.

If United States research efforts on defensive technologies prove successful, and are so perceived by the Soviet Union, such technologies could fundamentally alter the nature of the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Advanced ballistic missile defences have the potential for reducing the military value of ballistic missiles and lessening the importance of their rôle in the strategic balance. In reducing the value of these weapons, defensive technologies could substantially increase Soviet incentives to reach agreements reducing nuclear arms. In conjunction with air defence and effective, agreed constraints on all types of offensive nuclear forces, highly effective ballistic missile defences could drastically diminish the threat of massive nuclear destruction.

Nevertheless, the immediate response of the Soviet Union to a United States effort to develop ballistic missile defences is likely to be a continuation of its current political and diplomatic campaign to discredit such defences. At the same time, the Soviet Union will continue its own efforts on air defences and on both existing and advanced ballistic missile defences. The Soviets can also be expected to press ahead with further expansion and modernisation of their offensive systems. The Soviets may change their pattern of behaviour if they become convinced that the American commitment to the deployment of defences is serious, that there are good prospects for eventual success in the development of ballistic missile defences and that such deployments present opportunities for a safer United States-Soviet nuclear relationship.

Since long-term Soviet behaviour cannot reliably be predicted, we must be prepared to respond flexibly. A research and development programme on ballistic missile defence that provides a variety of deployment options will help resolve the many uncertainties we now confront and over time offers the United States flexibility to respond to new opportunities. By contrast, without the research and development programme, we condemn future United States presidents and congresses to remain locked into the present exclusive emphasis on deterrence through offensive systems alone.

If, for example, the Soviets persisted in attempts to expand their massive offensive forces, a flexible research and development programme would force Soviet planners to adopt countermeasures, increasing the costs of their offensive build-up and reducing their flexibility in designing new forces in a manner that they would prefer. Over time, our research and development on ballistic missile defence might induce a shift in Soviet emphasis from ballistic missiles, with the problems they pose for stability, in favour of air-breathing forces with slower flight times. By constraining Soviet efforts to maintain offensive forces and making them more costly, United States options to deploy ballistic missile defences might increase our leverage in inducing the Soviets to agree to mutual reductions in offensive nuclear forces. In turn, such reductions could reinforce the potential of defensive systems to stabilise deterrence. Reductions of the magnitude proposed by the United States in the strategic arms reduction talks (START) would be very effective in this regard.

In its initial stages, a United States ballistic missile defence research and development programme would be consistent with existing United States treaty obligations. Were we to decide on deployment of a widespread

defence of the United States, the ABM treaty would have to be revised. If the results of the research and development programme warranted such a decision in the future, it would be appropriate to address it in the context of a joint consideration of offensive and defensive systems. This was the context contemplated at the outset of the SALT negotiations; but while we reached an agreement limiting defences, our anticipations of associated limitations on offensive forces have not yet been realised.

Both the Soviet national interest and traditional themes in Soviet strategic thought give reason to expect that the Soviets will respond with increased dependence on defensive forces relative to offensive forces. The nature of a co-operative transition to defensive forces would depend on many factors, including the technical aspects of each side's defensive systems, their degree of similarity or dissimilarity, and whether United States and Soviet systems would be ready for deployment in the same period. Because of the uncertainties associated with these factors, no detailed blueprint for arms control in the transition period can be drawn at this time. A list of arms control measures might include agreed schedules for introducing the defensive systems of both sides, and associated schedules for reductions in ballistic missiles and other nuclear forces. Confidence-building measures and controls on devices designed specifically to attack or degrade the other side's defensive systems are other potential arms control provisions.

If both the United States and the Soviet Union deployed defensive systems against a range of nuclear threats, it would not diminish the need to strengthen United States and allied conventional military capabilities. Moreover, to realise the protection offered by a fully effective strategic defence, we would require air defences so that the ballistic missile defence could not be circumvented by increased deployments of bombers and cruise missiles. The integration of defences against air-breathing vehicles with defences against ballistic missiles requires further study.

Defence against ballistic missiles offers new possibilities for enhanced deterrence of deliberate attack, greater safety against accidental use of nuclear weapons or unintended nuclear escalation, and new opportunities and scope for arms control. The extent to which these possibilities can be realised will depend on how our present uncertainties about technical feasibility, costs and Soviet response are resolved. Clearly, the pursuit of defensive systems should not build only on our present policies of maintaining peace; it should also seek to strengthen the effectiveness of our strategic policy in the face of a growing Soviet

threat. The essential objective of the United States strategic defence initiative is to diminish the risk of nuclear destruction – contrasted with continued, sole reliance on the threat of nuclear retaliation – to provide for a safer, less menacing way of preventing nuclear war in the decades to come.

Technologies for defence against ballistic missiles

Six broad areas were addressed by the technologies study team:

- surveillance of Soviet missile forces and acquisition and tracking of missile attacks;
- directed energy weapons for missile defence;
- more-conventional weapons for missile defence;
- control and co-ordination of the battle between the offensive missile forces and our defences, together with its requirements for communications and data processing;
- concepts for an integrated defensive system;
- possible Soviet countermeasures and tactics.

The goal of the study was to provide guidance for research and development programmes, in particular for the development of technologies that could make possible a defence against ballistic missiles. As a first step, the research and development programme should further informed decisions on subsequent engineering programmes seeking to test the technologies.

In addition, the study identified demonstrations of key components of a missile defence that could be conducted by the end of this decade. These demonstrations can provide a basis for choosing specific, partial missile defence systems to be deployed by the early 1990s. Such partial systems could defend perhaps a few critical targets, especially against smaller attacks. In the event of a large missile attack, however, many missiles would reach their targets. Yet even the limited effectiveness of a partial system could make a significant contribution to deterrence by depriving the enemy planner of reliable military results of his attack.

This study dealt only with defences against ballistic missiles; defences against bombers and cruise missiles have been evaluated in other studies.

The principal conclusions of this study were that:

- new technologies for ballistic missile defence hold promise that warrants a major research and development effort to provide specific options for defensive systems;
- through demonstration projects, evidence and measurement of progress on the required technical capabilities can be provided within the next ten years;
- development of all the technologies essential for a comprehensive ballistic missile defence will require effective co-ordination through central management for the research and development efforts;
- the most effective defensive systems have multiple layers, or tiers;
- a combination of technologies and special tactics needs to be developed to protect vulnerable components of the future defence system.

A. The ballistic missile attack

Advances in Soviet and United States technology warrant a re-evaluation of ballistic missile defences. Over the past twenty years, the Soviet threat from ballistic missiles has increased steadily. For purposes of analysis, this study assessed a variety of potential future threats, ranging from an attack with fewer than 100 ballistic missiles and a few hundred warheads to an attack with thousands of missiles launched simultaneously with tens of thousands of warheads. The study focused on the most demanding case – a ballistic missile attack, unconstrained by arms limitations, that would impose the greatest stress on a defensive system.

In seeking to determine the best defence, the study team analysed the characteristics of a ballistic missile throughout all four phases of a typical trajectory. In the boost phase, the first- and second-stage engines of the missile are burning, producing intense infrared radiation that is unique. A post-boost, or bus deployment, phase occurs next, during which multiple warheads and enemy penetration aids are released from a missile. (Penetration aids are objects that accompany a missile attack, designed to saturate defences.) Next, in the mid-course phase, warheads and penetration aids travel on ballistic trajectories above the atmosphere. In the final phase, the warheads and penetration aids re-enter the atmosphere, where they are affected by atmospheric drag.

B. Characteristics of an effective defence against ballistic missiles

1. *Defence in depth.* For many years now, ballistic missile defence studies and experiments have continued to support the conclusion that an efficient defence against large missile attacks would need to be multi-tiered. Some missiles (or other objects that are part of the attack) will be able to penetrate any one defensive tier; those that have not been intercepted at one phase will move on to the next phase. For example, a 10% leakage in each of three tiers would amount to an overall leakage of only 0.1%. A single layer that can achieve 90% effectiveness is many times less costly than a single layer of 99.9% effectiveness. It is thus reasonable to construct a three- or four-layer defence with 99.9% effectiveness at far less cost than that of the equivalent single-layer defence. Finally, a multi-tiered defence complicates an attacker's planning because any single method an attacker used to circumvent the defensive system would not be equally effective for each tier. This compounds the uncertainty of Soviet planners about the effectiveness of a missile attack that they might contemplate.

2. *Defence at each tier.* The effective reach of a terminal-defence interceptor is determined by how fast it can fly and how early it can be launched. Terminal-defence interceptors fly within the atmosphere. The precise timing of their launching is linked to discrimination of their real targets from penetration aids and accompanying debris. Terminal defence must be complemented by area defences that intercept incoming warheads at long ranges. Intercepts outside the atmosphere, designed to eliminate threatening warheads while they are still in the mid-course trajectory, offer such a complement. New technologies make it possible to perform these intercepts with non-nuclear warheads.

Mid-course intercept requires the defence to identify decoys designed precisely to attract interceptors and exhaust the defending force prematurely. Fortunately, in this phase there is more time available than at later stages to engage objects in trajectory. The mid-course defensive system must provide both early filtering, or discrimination, of non-threatening objects and continuing warhead attrition to minimise the demand placed on the terminal system. Placing a layer of defence intercept *before* mid-course is an attractive option. To delay the start of the defensive effort *until* mid-course would accept the risk of a large increase in the number of objects the defence must cope with because multiple independently targeted re-entry decoys would have been deployed.

In the post-boost phase, the defence must cope with an increasing number of objects in

the enemy attack, as decoys and re-entry vehicles are deployed. On the other hand, the post-boost phase offers additional time for interception and an opportunity to discriminate between warheads and deception objects as they are deployed.

Consequently, an ability to defend effectively against large Soviet missile attacks would be strongly dependent on the effectiveness of a boost-phase intercept system. For every booster destroyed, the number of objects to be identified and sorted out by the remaining elements of a layered ballistic missile defence system is reduced sharply. Because each booster is capable of deploying tens of re-entry vehicles and hundreds of decoys, the defence, by destroying the boosters, has to destroy 1% or fewer of the objects it would have to cope with in subsequent phases of the missile trajectory – truly substantial leverage. Yet a boost-phase system is itself constrained by the very short time during which the target can be engaged and the potentially large number of targets. Because of these constraints, and because of the need to obtain the maximum leverage from all tiers of the strategic defensive system, we need an effective system for surveillance and for commanding and allocating the defences against a missile attack (battle management).

Each phase in the layered defensive system presents different technical challenges. But in each phase a defensive system must perform three basic functions: first, surveillance, acquisition and tracking; second, intercept and target destruction; and third, battle management.

C. Key functions of a ballistic missile defence

A ballistic missile defence capable of engaging the missile attack all along its flight path must perform certain functions:

- *Promptly and reliably warn of an attack and initiate the defence.* Global, full-time surveillance of ballistic missile launch areas is required to detect an attack, define its destination and intensity, and provide data to guide boost-phase intercept and post-boost tracking systems.
- *Continuously track all threatening objects from the beginning to the end of their trajectories.* This objective would allow accurate and timely data transfer from tracking systems to intercept systems, permitting the assignment of intercepts to attacking re-entry vehicles.
- *Efficiently intercept and destroy the booster or post-boost vehicle.* The defence must be capable of dealing

with attacks ranging from a few dozen missiles to a massive, simultaneous launch. An early attack on post-boost vehicles will minimise the number of penetration aids deployed.

- *Efficiently discriminate between enemy warheads and decoys through filtering of lightweight penetration aids.* The system must be capable of rapidly and effectively discriminating decoys or penetration aids from re-entry vehicles (warheads). The more effective such discrimination, the greater the cost to the offence in providing the necessary mass and volume for decoys that cannot be filtered out.
- *Low-cost intercept and destruction in mid-course.* Accurate recognition of the enemy warheads (re-entry vehicles) in this phase and a capability to intercept them cheaply will increase the enemy's difficulty and cost in mounting an effective attack. To discourage the Soviet Union from increasing the number of warheads, the cost to the United States defence for interceptors should be less than the cost to the Soviet offence for warheads.
- *Terminal intercept at the outer reaches of the atmosphere and destruction.* The final phase involves the relatively short-range intercept of each re-entering warhead.
- *Battle management, communications, and data processing.* These are the connecting elements that co-ordinate all system components to gain effectiveness and economy of force.

D. *The effect of advances in defence technologies*

Because of recent advances in technology, it is now possible to specify how these key functions of an effective ballistic missile defence could be met. For example, two decades ago no reliable means for boost-phase intercept were known. Now, several approaches are becoming feasible for boost-phase defences, based on directed energy concepts (such as particle beams and lasers) and methods for destroying enemy missiles based on kinetic energy (including non-nuclear rocket-propelled projectiles and hypervelocity guns).

Twenty years ago, mid-course intercept was difficult. No credible concepts for decoy discrimination existed, the intercept cost was high, and the unintended damage caused by nuclear weapons then necessary for the interceptor warheads was unacceptable. Today, multispectral sensing of incoming objects with

laser imaging and millimetre-wave radar, tracking through all phases of the trajectory, and inexpensive direct-impact projectiles give promise of overcoming the difficulties of mid-course intercept.

A few years ago, it was not yet possible to design a method to differentiate between penetration aids and warheads at high altitudes. This shortcoming, combined with limited interceptor performance, meant that an effective defence would have required too many interceptors. Now, technological advances provide new ways to discriminate among multiple incoming objects, as well as to intercept missiles at high altitudes. Coupled with an ability to intercept enemy missiles and warheads in boost phase and mid-course and to disrupt co-ordinated enemy attacks, these improvements would greatly increase the effectiveness of terminal defences.

But it is not sufficient to develop the capability to destroy incoming targets without also developing the capability to manage the allocation of interceptors and their integration with other portions of a multi-tiered defence system. Computer hardware and software and signal processing in the 1960s was incapable of supporting such a multi-tiered defence battle management. Today, technological advances permit the development of effective command, control, and communications facilities.

New technology also offers more effective solutions to the problem of discriminating between a warhead and a decoy or debris. By using both active and passive sensors, a ballistic missile can be observed during its trajectory to determine the presence of a warhead. An active sensor determines the location and motion of the object by measuring radiation that has been directed from the sensor to the object and reflected from the object back to the sensor; a passive sensor relies on radiation emanating from the object. Active techniques, such as creating an observable thermal response by an object to a continuous-wave laser, and passive techniques, such as observing with infrared sensors, are possible ways to improve surveillance, acquisition, and tracking of missiles. Both active and passive surveillance techniques are being developed to image an object in order to determine by its appearance what it is. It is important to understand that any one sensor can be defeated, but it is far more difficult to defeat several operating simultaneously.

E. *The new technologies*

1. *Surveillance, acquisition and tracking.* As each potential re-entry vehicle begins ballistic mid-course flight accompanied by deployment hardware (or "space junk") and possibly by decoys, every object must be evaluated and

accounted for from the beginning to the end of the trajectory, even if the price is many wasted evaluations about what are, in effect, decoys. Defending interceptor vehicles must also be tracked to maintain a complete and accurate status of the engagement.

Mid-course sensors must be able to discriminate between warheads that survive through the post-boost deployment phase and non-threatening objects such as decoys and debris. They must also provide warhead position and trajectory data to permit timely and accurate employment of interceptors and to assess target destruction. The minimum requirements are to track all objects designated as re-entry vehicles and also to track other objects that might be confusing in later tiers.

Space-based, passive infrared sensors could provide the means to meet these tracking requirements. They could permit long-range detection of warheads (or cold objects) against the space background and the elimination of simple, lightweight objects, leading to determination of the full trajectories of threatening objects. Laser trackers could also provide validation to determine if targets had been destroyed, as well as precision tracking of objects as they continue through mid-course. As the objects proceeded along their trajectories, data would be handed off from sensor to sensor and the computerised tracking files progressively improved.

For the final line of the defence, the surveillance and tracking would be based, where possible on the data collected from the mid-course engagement. This task would consist of sorting all objects that have leaded through the early defence layers to identify the remaining enemy re-entry vehicles. Objects to be tracked would include re-entry vehicles shot at but not destroyed, re-entry vehicles hitherto undetected, and decoys and other objects that were neither identified nor destroyed. These possible threatening objects must be assigned to final-phase interceptors.

One innovative concept for that phase involves an airborne optical adjunct – a platform put into position on warning of attack – that would help detect arriving re-entry vehicles using infrared sensors (much as space-based sensors had done in mid-course), tracking those not previously selected. Airborne sensors could also provide data necessary for additional discrimination. They could acquire and track objects as they were about to re-enter the atmosphere and observe interactions of those objects with the atmosphere from the beginning of re-entry. At that point, a laser or radar would precisely measure the position of each object and refine its track before interceptors would be committed.

2. *Intercept and destruction of threatening objects.* A variety of mechanisms, including directed energy, can destroy an object at any point along its trajectory. The study identified several promising possibilities. A laser relying on advanced technology can be designed to produce a single giant pulse that delivers a shock wave to a target. The shock causes structural collapse. A continuous-wave or repetitively pulsed laser delivers radiant thermal energy to the target. Contact is maintained until a hole is burned through the target or the temperature of the entire target is raised to a damaging level. Examples of such lasers are free-electron lasers, chemical lasers (hydrogen fluoride or deuterium fluoride), and repetitively pulsed excimer lasers.

There are other possible means of destroying incoming warheads. A neutral-particle beam could deposit sufficient energy within a missile or warhead to destroy its internal components. In conventional warfare, guns and missiles destroy their targets through kinetic-energy impact supplemented with a chemical explosive in some cases. In defending against ballistic missiles, homing projectiles propelled by chemical rockets or by hypervelocity guns, such as the electromagnetic gun based on the idea of an open solenoid, could destroy warheads in all phases.

3. *Battle management.* The tasks of battle management are to:

- monitor the global situation;
- allocate all available defence weapons (interceptors, etc.);
- determine their best use;
- report results.

A layered battle-management system would correspond to the different layers of the ballistic missile defence system, each layer being semi-autonomous, with its own processing resources, rules of engagement, sensor inputs, and weapons. During an engagement, data would be passed from one phase to the next. The exact system architecture would be highly dependent on the mix of sensors and weapons, and the geographical scope of the defence to be managed would determine the structure of the battle-management system.

As sensors survey the field of battle, raw data are filtered to reduce the volume. Later processes organise these data according to (1) the size of the object, (2) orbital parameters and positions as a function of time, and (3) listings of other data that help identify and assess the threat inherent in the object that is being tracked. In principle, all objects in the field of view of the sensors are candidates for

tracking, and all objects that cannot readily be rejected as non-threatening would appear in the file – the representation of the total battle situation.

Defence system resources include sensors and weapons, the data-processing and communication equipment, and the platforms (or stations) on which these and other components are emplaced. The assignment of these resources – both sensor and weapon – is a dynamic process requiring re-examination throughout an engagement. For example, sensors must be assigned to sectors or to targets of interest at appropriate times to acquire necessary targeting and tracking data. Weapons must then be assigned to targets as determined by rules of engagement. Defensive resources must extrapolate the present situation into the future to determine the most likely development of the attack and to select a course of action that maximises the effectiveness of the defence.

F. Meeting the challenge

The technologies study concentrated on the most difficult aspects of a multi-tiered, four-phase ballistic missile defence system capable of defending against a massive threat – the technologies that pose the greatest challenge. The study team was primarily concerned with technologies whose feasibility would determine whether an effective defence is indeed possible.

1. *Critical technologies.* Several critical technologies will probably require research and development programmes of ten to twenty years to be ready for deployment as part of such a ballistic missile defence:

- *Boost- and post-boost-phase intercept.* As mentioned earlier, the ability to respond effectively to a very large missile attack is strongly dependent on countering it during the boost or post-boost phases.
- *Discrimination.* Dense concentrations of re-entry vehicles, decoys, and debris must be identified and sorted out during the mid-course and high re-entry phase.
- *Survivability.* A combination of tactics and mechanisms to ensure the survival of the system's space-based components must be developed.
- *Interceptors.* By using inexpensive interceptors in the mid-course and early re-entry phase, intercept can be sufficiently economical to permit attacks on objects that may not be warheads.
- *Battle management.* Tools are needed for developing battle-management software.

There is much still to be done. For example, the management of large computer systems will pose important challenges. Developing hardware will not be as difficult as developing appropriate software. Large packages of software (on the order of 10 million lines of code) for reliable, safe, and predictable operation would have to be deployed. Fault-tolerant, high-performance computing would be necessary. Not only must it be maintenance-free for many years, but it must also be radiation-hardened, able to withstand substantial shock, and designed to avoid a sudden failure of the entire computer system. The management of interlocking networks of space-, air- and ground-based resources would require the development of an accurate means of transferring data between computer systems rapidly and accurately, through system-generated protocols. There must also be a means to reconstitute all or part of the system if portions of it are damaged or made inoperable. In addition, specific ballistic missile defence algorithms will have to be developed for target assignment and a simulation environment for evaluating potential system architectures.

The problem of survivability is particularly serious for space-based components. The most likely threats to the components of a defence system are direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons; ground- or air-based lasers; orbital anti-satellites, both conventional and directed energy weapons; space mines; and fragment clouds. On the ground, traditional methods to enhance survivability can be effective, such as hardening, evasion, proliferation, deception, and active defence. But to protect space-based systems, these methods must be employed in combination. Ideally, the defence system should be designed to withstand an attack meant to saturate the system. At the very least, the system's most critical points must be protected.

The history of warfare in general and the interactions of weapons technologies in particular indicate that for many potentially successful defences counters have been developed. It is essential, therefore, to consider possible countermeasures to the development of a ballistic missile defence. But countermeasures are likely to compete with other military programmes for available resources and thus may result in diminished offensive capability. For example, hardening of booster rockets of missiles (to withstand a boost-phase missile defence) results in either a reduced payload or a shorter range of the offensive missiles.

2. *Logistical support.* The study also described research programmes on space logistics that would take five to ten years to complete. In order of priority, the requirements are:

- (1) development of a heavy-lift launch vehicle for space-based platforms of up to 100 metric tons (220,000 pounds one-time payload);
- (2) ability to service the space components;
- (3) ability to make available, or to orbit, sufficient materials for space-component shielding against attack;
- (4) ability to transfer items from one orbit to another;
- (5) multi-megawatt power sources for space applications.

Based on the defensive technologies study, the Department of Defence, along with the Department of Energy, has established a new programme for the President's strategic defence

initiative (SDI). Existing programmes relating to the SDI have been focused in five technology areas, and additional funding will be sought to pursue them aggressively. In recognition of its importance, the strategic defence initiative will be centrally managed and will report directly to the Secretary of Defence.

The strategic defence initiative represents one of the most important technological programmes the nation has ever embarked upon – a great hope for the future – but it does *not* represent a deployment attempt, nor is it a substitute for current strategic and conventional force modernisation or for arms control. Rather, it will create the technological base for sound deployment decisions. SDI will use America's greatest assets, our creativity and our ingenuity, to lessen the awesome threat of nuclear weapons.

APPENDIX II

President Reagan's strategic defence initiative (SDI)

The basic purpose of the SDI research programme is to sponsor the necessary research to be able to ascertain which of the many proposed various hypothetical weapon systems can actually be considered for realisation. Even groups opposed to a ballistic missile defence (BMD) such as the Union of Concerned Scientists have stated that they are not opposed to a research effort. The proposed five-year, \$25 billion programme in no way appropriates funds for the development and stationing of a BMD system in space. Exactly such a research programme, well funded, could provide the basis to decide whether the administration or its critics are correct in their assessment of the viability of any future BMD system. The actual development and stationing of a system proposed as a result of this research programme would still have to be approved and funding authorised by the Congress.

In any case any research programme undertaken must be exhaustive and conclusive in its results to avoid further heated debates between opponents and proponents of a BMD. It is crucial to have a solid basis of scientific facts to address the question of the viability of any BMD system.

The goals of a BMD

The current controversy revolving around a possible BMD system has served to show how nebulous the concept is in the eyes of many people. In the press, Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger has been quoted as calling for a 100% effective system, whereas the President's Science Adviser G. Keyworth has stated that a completely leakproof system is not foreseen. The latter is in agreement with many of the critics who state that a completely leakproof system is impossible.

The seemingly contradictory statements can be reconciled if one examines the basic goals of any proposed BMD. One must ask the question "What do I wish to defend with a BMD?". One must differentiate between three possible missions.

ICBM silo defence

In this case the primary rôle of the BMD is to intercept and destroy as many as possible of the enemy rockets targeted against the United States missile silos. This would be basically a system orientated toward point

defence. The basic aim is to guarantee the survival of as many missiles as possible during an enemy first strike.

C3/OMT

A further possibility is the defence of the command, control and communication (C3) as well as other military targets (OMT). Here the number of targets to be defended is larger, they cover a larger area, and their geographic distribution is broad.

Cities

Here the aim is to defend population centres against an enemy's nuclear attack. Since cities are, relatively, very soft targets, the requirements for a BMD in this case are the most stringent. Any intercept occurring at low altitudes would still pose grave consequences in terms of blast, heat damage and radioactive fallout. The BMD system must, in this case, interdict the RVs much sooner than in the situation of missile silo defence. Here an efficiency of less than 100% could still imply unacceptable levels of destruction.

With these three possible goals in mind, one can see that when Defence Secretary Weinberger discusses BMD he means the goal of eventually finding a system which could successfully defend even cities. Dr. Keyworth addresses the shorter-term goal of significantly reducing the vulnerability of the present United States missile arsenal.

BMD and its technologies

A multi-layered BMD has already been presented in a previous article (MT number 8, August 1983). Even though several proposals have been made for systems of between two and five layers, we still feel that the original four layers proposed in that article is valid. A brief look at the table shows that the proposed SDI budget encompasses three main technological categories. The lion-share of the effort will go toward finding solutions for the problems of tracking and acquisition. Next, the complex of the directed energy weapons (DEW), followed by the family of kinetic energy weapons (KEW).

The problems of the first category are neither simple nor completely solved. Various

programmes anywhere from Talon Gold to the development of very sensitive infrared sensors and laser radars demonstrate the complexity of the areas which require a solution. Besides these hardware systems, there will be various software systems of increasingly critical importance. Since any spaceborne system will be required to be fairly autonomous, a new technology such as artificial intelligence (AI) may play a decisive rôle in an eventual BMD.

Directed energy systems

A careful and detailed analysis of every proposed DEW is outside the scope of this article. Since most of these systems have been discussed in our article in MT8/83, we restrict ourselves to describing the developments of the last two years which are critical to this discussion.

Lasers

Space-based battle stations have come into much criticism, since such stations would of necessity be large and thereby quite vulnerable. Proponents, quite rightly, note that such a station could defend itself; yet can a station defend itself effectively and still simultaneously destroy enemy ICBMs?

When one has a laser, one needs the accompanying optics (i.e. mirrors) to be able to direct and focus the beam on the target. Present plans call for mirrors of several metres in diameter. Yet, if the number of battle stations is to be reduced through increasing the range of each laser – which implies an upgrading of the laser energy – it becomes necessary to have mirrors of several tens of metres in diameter to obtain tolerable beam divergences in the order of microradians.

Free electron lasers (FEL)

This type of laser has come into the discussion as a possible ground-based laser that, with the help of auxiliary mirrors in orbit, could be used to defend against ICBMs. It is hoped that with the use of adaptive optics and other means, the laser light can be beamed into space without dramatic losses of energy as the light traverses through the atmosphere. Since the system is ground based, the difficulties of fuel supplies and laser efficiency play, in this case, only a very minor rôle.

Much more critical in this case (besides whether the adaptive optics scheme works) is how one stations or transports the relay and battle mirrors in space. Furthermore how one goes about constructing mirrors with a diameter

of 10 metres or more and still having a laser beam divergence of perhaps less than a microradian. These parameters are necessary to ensure a long range for the laser beam. The technology required to solve the problems of these dimensional parameters have not yet been fully demonstrated. Again, in an actual crisis situation or under battle conditions, these mirrors themselves would be very easy targets.

X-ray lasers

This laser type is perhaps one of the most controversial weapons discussed in connection with SDI. The principle has been tested in a series of underground tests in Nevada in recent years. The information about the results of these tests is still very sparse and questions of scalability have arisen.

At this point it may be worth noting that, in a presentation at the BMD forum at the Brookings Institute, Dr. G. Keyworth mentioned that there was no important rôle for nuclear weapons in the SDI. From this one could infer that the X-ray laser is not considered one of the main components of a possible BMD. Additionally, in FY 1984 the initial budget was cut from \$22 to \$8 million.

Particle beams

The situation of the PBWs has not changed greatly in the last two years. The ATA (advanced test accelerator) tests continue at Lawrence Livermore National Labs. using a 10 kA beam at 50 MeV. These tests will decide whether a CPBW will be viable. In the case of the NPBWs, the main problems of finding a high density source of negative hydrogen ions and the question of the neutralisation of the beam as it leaves the accelerator are still barriers for the realisation of a NPBW.

Plasmoids

Plasma guns have been able to produce intense puffs of high-speed plasma. By producing very high density rings of plasma, where the magnetic field induced in the plasma ring is strong enough to keep the plasma contained for an appreciable time-span (e.g. several msec.), a weapon application comparable to the NPBW could possibly be achieved. Some plasma guns have succeeded in accelerating such plasmoids up to velocities in excess of many 1000s of km/sec.

The plasma gun is an accelerator which is much simpler to build and operate than that required for an equivalent NPBW, and is probably much more efficient to boot. This type

of space-based system would be much smaller and compacter than a NPBW.

Microwaves

Recently, several different types of extremely powerful microwave sources have been built and tested in various laboratories of the United States and USSR. These might be used to interrupt or jam satellite communications to earth, etc. Exact details are not well known. The possibility would require thorough testing.

Kinetic energy weapons

This group with its non-nuclear kill (NNK) has also been previously discussed. The area has seen quite a bit of progress in the last few years.

Vought-ALMV

This system has had several names, ALMV (air-launched miniature homing vehicle) being the latest. This Asat (anti-satellite) is a two-stage rocket using a SRAM (short-range attack missile) with an Altair-III stage. An F-15 climbs to high altitude and fires the ALMV, thus the plane is in effect the booster stage for this system. The warhead of this system is a small miniature homing vehicle (MHV) with an infrared sensor which tracks the target. With the help of more than fifty small steering rockets, the MHV manoeuvres close to its target. The MHV destroys the target by either impacting directly or scattering a shrapnel cloud, much like flak.

A version of this system was recently tested in the Pacific. With the infrared sensor and vehicle mounted on a Minuteman rocket, this system intercepted a RV using a netlike aluminium structure with iron weights attached. The kill occurred through direct impact with the target. The system could be deployed within the next few years and is thus a candidate for the first system of a multi-tiered BMD to be deployed.

Electromagnetic launchers (EML)

In a recent article (MILTECH June 1984), we attempted to demonstrate the capabilities of the Railgun. Even as this article went into print, great progress in the EML area was being made. EMLs are now seen as a very concrete possibility not only for a ground-based terminal defence, but also as a very good space-based candidate. The EML could be used to propel either a simple metal slug or even an "intelligent" warhead such as an MHV men-

tioned in the ALMV case. Since progress has been made in raising the efficiency of the Railgun, the space platforms for EMLs would be lighter in weight and compacter in size when compared to the rival PBWs.

Alternates

Several further systems using rockets and other gun types to achieve hypervelocities are in the discussion. The High Frontier suggestion of Swarmjet is one in which hypervelocity rockets form a shrapnel curtain which destroys the incoming RVs. A further possibility is the Tround open-chamber gun which fires a burst of small pellets, producing an up to 4,000 ft long cloud containing up to 1,000,000 pellets. Finally, an upgraded version of the Sprint rocket – the Sentry – could be used to propel an MHV into the upper atmosphere.

A multi-layered BMD

The basic system has already been presented, yet we wish to very briefly underline and add some of the critical factors in a multi-layered BMD such as the SDI proposed to investigate.

Tier I: This is the boost phase of the ICBMs, which generally lasts only about 200 to 300 sec. Any defensive system would need to react inside this time frame, making political decisions in this situation also impossible. Some sort of automation of the decision to intercept would be necessary.

Tier II: Here it is planned to use the ground-based FEL as an addition to the space-based DEW platforms. The problem of the space-based mirrors, critical for the mission of the FEL, has already been discussed elsewhere in this article. Additionally, the use of EMLs and the Plasmoid weapon for this tier is possible.

Tier III: Among the weapons available for this tier could be a laser firing from the ground yet the brunt of the assignment will probably fall on a system like the F-15-launched ALMV. A Sentry-type (i.e. fast boost) rocket armed with an MHV could supplement or enhance the effectivity of this tier.

Tier IV: The main reason for dividing up the terminal defence layer involves the so-called "keep out" region. The "keep out" can be defined as that volume of atmosphere immediately above the target inside which a nuclear explosion would cause serious damage even though it does not actually strike the target.

In light of this fact, the fourth tier is meaningless in the case of a city defence. Even

a nuclear burst a few kilometres above a city could still cause heat and blast damage accompanied by some fallout. Especially if the RVs are salvage fused, i.e. they detonate in any case if intercepted, this kind of defence of the last resort would not save the city, only possibly limit the damage.

For the case of point-like hardened targets, such as silos and C-cubed/OMT facilities, a detonation occurring close, but not too close could mean survival of the facilities. Their basic "keep out" region is greatly reduced. For these types of targets a low-altitude defence system is reasonable.

BMD – the technological debate

At this point we wish to separate the objections to a BMD based on scientific, technological arguments from those of a mainly political and strategic nature which are considered in the next section.

The more technological aspects of the BMD debate can be divided into three main categories:

- (1) Effectiveness: can the claims of 99% be trusted or not?
- (2) How much will it cost, or does one need hundreds or tens of space-based satellites?
- (3) The system is much too vulnerable and the countermeasures the enemy can undertake are much cheaper.

We attempt to briefly address each of these points, but only a thorough research programme, such as SDI proposes, can provide a conclusive answer.

Effectiveness

We are not going to quote in this article a set of numbers predicting that a yet-to-be-realised BMD is a nearly leakproof system and allows only one in 10,000 warheads to penetrate it. If one's primary aim is to revalidate the deterrent capacity of his own ICBM fleet, then even a system only 50% effective can be valuable. The effectiveness must be measured against the goal one sets for a BMD. Besides this very basic consideration, which is all too often lost in the public discussion, the additional considerations to be weighted are:

- One must assume that to some degree the enemy will directly attack the BMD, especially the spaceborne components with their high vulnerability. Even if these systems can effectively defend themselves against such attacks,

their ability to fulfil their primary mission will be impaired. Each defensive action requires scarce fuel and, even more scarce, the time available to intercept and destroy ICBMs.

- Not all tiers are necessarily independent of each other, thus the same kind of countermeasure (e.g. decoys) might be effective against more than one tier. This implies that computing the effectiveness of a BMD, using the usual arithmetic, naively assumes the best possible case, which seldom, if ever, occurs. A definite and pragmatic range of efficiency values can only be realistically obtained when the research for SDI has been completed and a concrete system is studied, with weight given to the military-logistical and operational difficulties.

System dimensions

The figure demonstrates how critically the range of a system and the number of platforms required to provide coverage at any given time are coupled. Obviously no one proposed to deploy a fleet of hundreds of very costly and complicated platforms. The solution to the problem is to see whether one could increase the power levels of a laser, the size of its mirrors, and decrease the beam divergence, such that the increase in range permits one to deploy relatively few satellites. Once again, the function of SDI research is to ascertain whether such solutions are viable.

In any case, a well-designed BMD should have a pyramid look to it, in the sense that the number of units deployed should increase for each succeeding tier of the BMD. This ensures a high degree of reliability and effectiveness. The last two tiers should consist of relatively cheap weapons (when compared to the DEW space platforms) that can be deployed in much larger numbers.

The estimates of what the final combined system could cost vary, but price tags of between \$500 billion and \$1 trillion have been mentioned.

Countermeasures

A full catalogue of all the possible countermeasures would be beyond the scope of this article, yet, several selected examples are worth examining in more detail.

One main criticism is that the space-based platforms will be very vulnerable. They will in fact be quite vulnerable. Space mines and even simple debris have in the past, and

will continue to be in the future a constant hazard to such satellites, even in peacetime. Even for systems well equipped with defensive measures, one must consider that a relative proportion of them will be destroyed, reducing the effectiveness of the first two tiers.

Many countermeasures have been proposed, such as having the missiles rotate during flight to avoid having a laser burn through the outer skin. Values for the laser energy density on the target and/or the hardening of the missile in this discussion have reached 10,000 J/sq.cm. The most effective yet simplest countermeasure for the post-boost phase will be that of decoys – in some cases, simply inflated balloons that imitate RVs. In space, sensors will find it difficult to always reliably discern between these decoys and the actual warheads. In the case of balloons, the decoys are lightweight and very compact. A great many of them can be deployed by the enemy without paying too high a payload penalty. Each decoy or similar countermeasure, reduces the number of RVs that can be carried on the missile.

Once the RVs begin to enter the atmosphere, these decoys will be filtered out (they will burn up). Thus the decoy countermeasure will be very effective only against the defensive measures of space-based tiers. Tiers III and IV could be foiled by a different type of measure, that of the introduction of MARV warheads. These manoeuvrable RVs could, up to a point, evade the pure kinetic kill systems. This threat could be met by increasing the number of such systems and using an area defence where one effectively blocks whole access windows to the target.

MARV warheads will be no threat to the Tier II systems. Any system which manoeuvres in space to evade defences requires extra quantities of fuel to do so. This requirement, in turn, decreases either the weight of the warhead or allows the deployment of fewer warheads per missile by constant throw-weight. Thus, even though their velocity will be much less than that of light, EML systems can still be an effective part of Tier II.

The other notable class of countermeasures involves the missile's booster phase and its ballistic trajectories. With "fast" boosters, boosters that burn out before having left the atmosphere, one might foil laser attacks against the rocket motor. This can only be achieved through paying a penalty in throw-weight, i.e. less warheads. A further possibility is using a "depressed trajectory", a very low ballistic trajectory that never really leaves the upper atmosphere and thereby, in part, circumvents the first two tiers of the BMD.

Another factor is that such a BMD might have difficulties defending against alternate

attack systems, i.e. non-ICBMs such as SLBMs, cruise missiles, strategic bombers.

Thus a total defence would involve not just a BMD but also a strong air defence. Many of the terminal Tier IV weapons could also be utilised in defensive systems of this type.

BMD – the strategic policy debate

The debate whether one should build a BMD or not, centres upon the argument whether the BMD is destabilising or not in light of the prevailing principle of MAD (mutually assured destruction). To discuss this type of question one must return to the first part of this article and select a specific goal for the BMD.

If one wishes only to defend his land-based retaliatory forces, and not rely solely on the SLBMs, then a BMD to defend the ICBM fields not only would not be destabilising but would in fact reinforce MAD. It makes the outcome of a first strike doubtful enough that no one would risk it. The counter argument to this goes as follows: a leaky BMD is much more effective against a ragged (perhaps uncoordinated) retaliatory strike than against a massive first strike. This reasoning then sees an advantage in making a pre-emptive first strike and using one's own BMD to ward off the retaliatory strike on the other side.

On the other hand, a BMD that can protect cities, i.e. an effectively leakproof system *that cannot be easily saturated*, would in effect do away with MAD, and in this sense can be thought of as destabilising for MAD. At this point one can ask the question: How meaningful is MAD? This is left for the reader to decide for himself.

The most dangerous time frame is without a doubt that period in which one side unilaterally deploys a BMD. In this case, if the other side is not in the position of being able to field its own BMD – a BMD that is at least as effective – then a very unstable situation would arise. The disadvantaged side might be tempted to unleash a first strike before the other side has completed deployment of its BMD.

Thus, either a bilateral arms agreement banning the deployment of any meaningful BMD system – thus preserving MAD – or a bilateral agreement on the simultaneous deployment of both systems – abolishing the MAD – seem to be the only two reasonable courses for both sides and the preservation of world peace.

The European question

In this section we discuss very briefly three factors important for Europe in the BMD

debate. The first is that the deployment of a United States BMD system could lead to the decoupling of European defence from the United States. Some see this as a threat to NATO. If a BMD will actually lead to this or not depends mainly on the United States and its allies. President Reagan and his advisers have stated publicly more than once that the protective shield of a BMD would be extended to allies in Europe.

Next, though not completely independent of the first, is the initiative taken by President Mitterrand of France, that in any case there should be some sort of European effort in parallel to that undertaken in the United States. The main threat against Europe is not so much ICBMs as that of IRBMs such as the SS-20 and the tactical nuclear warheads of the Warsaw Pact. Thus the development of an ATBMD (anti-tactical ballistic missile defence) system would be an answer to this threat. Those weapons systems and technologies planned or under consideration for the Tiers III and IV of the United States system would lend themselves to being used as an ATBMD in Europe.

Lastly, one must consider a point made in one of the previous sections. A leaky BMD can still be a very effective defence against a ragged or small attack. This implies that if the Warsaw Pact has a BMD system the deterrence value of the British or French arsenal is put in question. A system which could not stand up to a massive American retaliatory strike might be able to deal effectively with a retaliatory strike of one of the European nations, limiting severely their deterrence capacity. In light of this factor, the suggestion of President Mitterrand is quite appropriate.

Conclusion

Too many still unknown or nebulous variables are contained in the debate centring around the BMD. A far-reaching and exhaustive research programme is called for. If nothing else, it can then answer the question of whether any technology is capable of being adequate for use in a BMD, which they are, how such a complete system might look, and finally how effective it might be. In this sense SDI is on the right road.

Military use of space – Part II

AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5¹

tabled by MM. Fourré and Pignion

1. Leave out paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
“Noting the difficulty of resuming negotiations between the two superpowers, due in particular to the link between space problems and the START and INF negotiations, and considering that under the pressure of opinion at home and among its allies the United States must adopt a position towards the Soviet Union in which the reaffirmation of American power is accompanied by a more marked preparedness for dialogue, particularly on space questions;”.
2. After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph:
“Welcoming the announcement made on 22nd November 1984 in a joint communiqué issued by Tass and the United States Department of State of the probable opening of negotiations on all problems relating to nuclear and space weapons;”.
3. In paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “governments” to the end of the paragraph and insert:
“to obtain, in the framework of possible co-operation on the proposed NASA space station, full guarantees regarding the conditions of this co-operation, thus leaving open the possibility of developing an independent European space station,”.
4. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “Alliance” to the end of the paragraph.
5. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:
“Take into account the proposal made by France at the disarmament conference held in Geneva in June 1984 that negotiations be held on the military use of space leading to commitments which are limited with regard to anti-satellite systems, progressive with regard to a test ban and verifiable with regard to improving the existing system for notifying the launching of objects into space.”

Signed: Fourré, Pignion

1. See 8th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment 1 withdrawn; amendment 2 amended and agreed to; amendments 3, 4 and 5 agreed to).

Consequences of the Gulf war

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur*

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APPENDIX

Letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the President of the Security Council – 14th June 1984

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy, van der Werff (Alternate: Blaauw) (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier (Alternate: Baume), Bianco, Bogaerts, Burger, Hill (Alternate: Ward), Koehl, Lagneau (Alternate: Van der Elst), Lagorce, Lord McNair (Alternate: Lord Hughes), MM. Martino, Masciadri, Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf (Alternate: Haase), van der Sanden, Spitella, Vecchiatti, Vogt, de Vries (Alternate: Tummers).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on the consequences of the Gulf war

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the war between Iran and Iraq is a serious threat to peace throughout the Middle East;
- (ii) Considering that a decisive victory by one or other of the belligerents would involve serious dangers for the stability of the area;
- (iii) Noting that no individual power outside the area seems in a position to exert decisive influence in favour of peace;
- (iv) Considering however that the supply of arms to the belligerents by some of these powers is liable to prolong the war;
- (v) Noting that both belligerents have already gravely violated the laws of war several times;
- (vi) Fearing that the war may be accompanied or followed by renewed and aggravated international terrorism;
- (vii) Considering that while Europe's supplies are not yet seriously threatened by the war, an intensification of hostilities might disturb the oil market and hence the security of Western Europe, as would the internationalisation of the conflict,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Afford its full support to any initiative by the United Nations and by Middle Eastern countries to restore peace between Iran and Iraq and instruct its Chairman-in-Office to do all in his power to foster such an initiative;
2. Seek agreement between member countries and all other arms-exporting countries on curtailing arms supplies to the belligerents;
3. Afford its support to all humanitarian organisations concerned with the conditions of prisoners of war, particularly the ICRC;
4. Gather the maximum information on possible violations of the laws of war by the belligerents and object in the strongest terms whenever such violations are proved;
5. Plan the measures to be taken jointly by member countries in the event of an extension of terrorist operations in the Middle East or Western Europe;
6. Have a study made of the lessons which Europe might draw for its own security from the Gulf war;
7. Encourage member countries to keep large stocks of oil and continue the efforts they started in 1973 to diversify their sources of energy.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. It is obviously no easy task to analyse the consequences of an international conflict still being waged and whose outcome is still very largely unpredictable. Which side will win? Will there be a winner or will a compromise be reached? What other powers will become involved in the conflict? How far will it spread? Will the great powers stay on the side-lines much longer? Depending on the answers to such questions in the next few months, the consequences of the present war will be very different and today it would be walking on thin ice to argue one way or the other.

2. Your Rapporteur therefore proposes to start by analysing events so far and the situation as it is today. He will then mention a number of emerging problems, but without trying to forecast a future which is still terribly uncertain. However, examination of the various aspects of the present crisis in the Gulf area makes it necessary to look at the consequences in very many fields including the economy, with particular regard to energy and oil, the pursuit of a long war without the nuclear powers intervening and the balance of a variety of forces at both local and world level.

3. These consequences do not all concern Western European security to the same extent. Naturally, when the war broke out in 1980, it was first the fear of an oil shortage which stirred Europe, still reeling from the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis. This fear was fanned by the blockade of the Kharg terminal, the attack on oil tankers in the Gulf and the appearance of mines in the Red Sea in conditions which have still not been clarified. However, although these fears have not been dispelled, the progression of the war has shown that they had been exaggerated, but there were other reasons why Europe should be concerned with the international and local repercussions of the conflict, insofar as the stability of the Middle East is of increasing concern to Europe's security.

II. The war in September 1984

A. The aim of the war

4. It is clear that the Iraqi Government assumed heavy responsibility by initiating

widespread military operations against Iran on 22nd September 1980. However, the roots of the war which flared up that day go back throughout the ages during which the mountains and rivers separating the two countries have always been a disputed frontier between states with very different ethnic, religious, cultural and political foundations.

5. In the course of its history, Iran has often been the nucleus of vast empires extending far beyond its present frontiers. It is still a composite state in which 75% of the population speak languages derived from Persian and 93% are Shiite Moslems. There is a strong national feeling of long standing. However, this population of 42 million is very unequally distributed round a central region which is almost a desert and national unity is weakened by the existence of many minorities, particularly Turkish-speaking people (22%), Sunni Arabs (2%) in Khuzestan in the south-east of the country, and Kurds (5.5%) in the north-east, all of whom are to be found on both sides of the frontier between Iran and Iraq. The country's northern and eastern frontiers with the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and Pakistan are not ethnic or religious frontiers either, particularly in Azerbaijan (where 0.6% of the population is Armenian) and Baluchistan (where 2.3% of the population is Baluchi).

6. Apparently a certain western tendency to oppose the various linguistic groups, ethnics and religious traditions within Islam has led to the rôle of these diverging elements being exaggerated and to insufficient account being taken of national realities or of the rôle of modern ideologies. This is true of the clash between Shiism and Sunnism which, if not judged correctly, prevents one from seeing certain transdenominational movements throughout the Moslem world. Thus Ayatollah Khomeini's messianism spreads far outside the Shiite world and is felt fairly strongly as far as in the Sunni Maghreb. This explains the fear it inspires among all conservative Arab groups, as the General Affairs Committee saw when it visited Jordan in spring 1984. This fear is obviously even greater in the Arab Gulf countries.

7. Since 1925, the Pahlevi emperors had endeavoured to unite all Iranians round a feeling which was both national and dynastic, which meant the state separating to some extent from Shiite Islam. The festivities at Persepolis to celebrate the 2,500th anniversary of the empire of Cyrus on 13th October 1971, thus sought to promote a concept of the Iranian

nation going much further back than its Islamisation, which occurred in the seventh century A.D.

8. However, once the Pahlevi empire had emerged from the trusteeship of the western powers, it adopted aims which were both territorial and hegemonous: it wished to be seen as the greatest power in the region and to control access to the gulf, which was then still known as the Persian Gulf. Better than any of its neighbours, Iran had managed to take advantage of the wealth drawn from its oil to develop certain parts of a modern, highly industrialised economy. In 1974, it was the world's fourth oil producer, with an annual output of 300 million tons, second only after Saudi Arabia for exports with an oil income of \$22,000 million. Its reserves were estimated at 8,000 million tons which placed it in fourth position in the world. It had large reserves of natural gas, although transport requirements were still restricting the marketing of this commodity.

9. Nationalisation of the oil industry in 1951 allowed the Iranian state to keep a close control on oil production, trade and industry, to expand its domestic refinery capacity and related industries and to take advantage of the crisis which broke out in October 1973 to obtain a significant revaluation of its oil income. There was a very rapid rise in gross national product in the years preceding the fall of the Shah and although very unequally spread among the Iranian people, a middle class did however emerge which might have seemed to guarantee a better economic future and some political stability.

10. Shah Reza Pahlevi had transformed part of this wealth into military power and his army of 400,000 men was equipped with modern weapons procured in the United States and other western countries and in the USSR. He had the most powerful and up-to-date air force in the region and was in a position to impose his will on his neighbours. Thus, on 30th November 1971, at the expense of the Emirates of Sharjah and Ra's al Khaymah, he annexed the three islands of Abu Musa and the Two Tumbs which offered control of the Strait of Hormuz and access to the Gulf. On 13th June 1975, he imposed the Algiers Agreements on Iraq, which gave Iran half the channel and certain islands of the Shatt al'Arab, Iraq's only outlet on the Gulf and towards the high seas. Moreover, the Shah did not hesitate to arm the Iraqi Kurd rebels prior to the conclusion of the 1975 Algiers Agreements and to mass forces along the frontier between the two countries when Iraq threatened Kuwait's sovereignty. He also took advantage of the existence of strong Iranian minorities in many territories of the

Arab peninsula to intervene actively, inter alia by providing the Sultan of Oman with military support against a rebellion, and also by laying claim to Bahrein and Qatar where Iranians form a major part of the population.

11. In face of Iranian power, the Arab countries round the Gulf were disunited and incapable of offering effective resistance. At the time, Saudi Arabia's military strength was insignificant and the emirs often considered Iran as an essential protector when they faced internal rebellions or Iraqi imperialism, which was a particular threat to Kuwait. Only Iraq was seriously able to resist Iran, although its forces were far from equal and it was involved in various domestic and Middle Eastern conflicts which considerably limited its means of action.

12. With 14 million inhabitants, oil output of 150 million tons, reserves estimated at 5,000 million tons and a relatively agitated recent political history, Iraq was not a negligible power but nor was it strong enough to face up to the Shah's Iran. Iraq has been a state only since the fall of the Ottoman empire. It was under British mandate until 1946 and it is still not ethnically, linguistically or religiously united. With 80% of its population Arab, it has constantly wished to belong to the Arab community and tried to be united with Jordan in 1958 and with Syria in 1979, but with no lasting effect. It has taken part in the various wars waged by Arab countries against Israel, although it has no common frontier with the latter. But 20% of its population are Kurds. They are a non-Arab race, spread over the territories of Iran, Iraq and Turkey, countries with which they have periodically fought. Moreover, religious differences are considerable in Iraq since the Sunnis represent only 40% of the population, half of whom are Kurds, 50% are Shiite and 10% Christian. Finally, between the revolution of 14th July 1958 and the coup d'état of 31st July 1968, when President Hassan El Bakr finally came to power, there were ten years of civil war and regular demonstrations of force in Iraq. Since 1968, the Baath Party has been exercising a dictatorship with President Saddam Hussein at its head since 16th July 1979. All opposition has been brutally repressed, including the Kurds between 1973 and 1975, the Shiites in 1980, the communists in 1978 and certain Baathists in 1979.

13. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was to change completely a balance of forces which had until then been very much in Iran's favour. The Iraqi Government had the impression that the time was ripe for it to erase the results of twenty years of Iranian preponderance. Iraq had sound allies in the Arab world where many leaders wished to ward off the Islamic revol-

utionary contagion, in the Soviet Union, allied with Iraq since 1972 by a treaty of friendship and co-operation, and even in the West. Indeed, the United States was on the worst of terms with the government of Imam Khomeini who, after overthrowing the Shah, the United States' traditional ally, took as hostages the staff of the American Embassy in Tehran. Moreover, the United States and its European allies were anxious to protect their Arab allies against revolutionary threats. Finally, since 1976 France had been pursuing a major investment programme in Iraq and was that country's second supplier of arms after the Soviet Union.

14. Well supported from without and absolute master at home, Saddam Hussein's government found itself opposite an Iranian régime which seemed considerably weakened. The collapse of the Shah's régime at the end of 1979 had established an Islamic republic which seemed to be sinking into anarchy. Imam Khomeini's spiritual power openly clashed with the head of state, President Bani Sadr, who soon had to go into exile. The police and army were subjected to cruel repression which left them without leaders and Iran seemed unable to replace the officers who were executed by hundreds if not thousands. Isolated abroad, the Iranian Government spurned with horror both the great American satan and the Soviet Union, responsible for the invasion of Afghanistan, Iran's Moslem neighbour and the only country culturally close to it. The Kurds had been estranged and, reconciled with Iraq, they resumed their rebellion in Iranian Kurdistan. At the beginning of 1980, practically the entire Arab world had noted how Prime Minister Ghotzadeh, President Bani Sadr and Mr. Sadegh Rouhani, said to be Ayatollah Khomeini's spokesman, had resumed Iran's claims to the southern shore of the Gulf, and in particular Bahrein, "Iran's fourteenth department" in addition to the islands it already occupied. It was to be hoped that, in a war against Iran, Iraq would receive support from all the Arab states and also from the Arabs of Iranian Khuzestan on the frontier as well as from the Kurds and ethnic or religious minorities who were being harshly oppressed by the new Iranian authorities under the Shiite clergy.

15. The Iraqi attack on 22nd September 1980 was not a bolt from the blue. Since the beginning of the year, Iranian immigrants in Iraq had been agitating in a revolutionary manner which the Iraqi Government considered dangerous enough for it to expel some 60,000 Iranians in spring 1980. Conversely, it received many Iranian political refugees who probably helped to give it the idea that the new régime was about to collapse and that the Iraqis would be received as liberators by a significant part of the population. On both sides, insulting and

threatening remarks were exchanged with increasing intensity and there were many frontier incidents which sometimes developed into real fighting and as from April the two countries mobilised their forces along their 1,500 km common frontier.

16. Iraq obviously initiated the war, but it cannot be accused of being the sole aggressor. The Iranian revolution was a destabilising factor for the whole region. In foreign policy there was no interruption of the expansionist aims pursued by the Shah which were continued by political and ideological means rather than the military power which Iran had allowed to diminish. It is not surprising that Iraq wished to take full advantage of a situation which it considered favourable and which was not liable to last for long. In any event, study of the origins of the conflict shows that it was not limited to two powers but involved the fate of the whole region with the paradoxical aspect that Iraq, a child of the Baathist revolution, was defending the interests of the most conservative régimes in the Arab world in whose eyes it had been a threat a few years earlier and that Iran henceforth represented a considerable danger of subversion for those it had protected in the days of the Shah.

17. Certain reliable observers even accord decisive importance to the policy pursued by Iran after the 1979 revolution among the reasons for the Iraqi decision. They stress that Iraq at first welcomed the Iranian revolution but changed its attitude following the disturbances and terrorist attacks fomented by Iranians on Iraqi territory or against Iraqi interests abroad. For instance, on 1st April 1980 Tarek Aziz, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, escaped an attack, on 6th April 20,000 Iranians were expelled from Iraq and on 15th April Ayatollah Khomeini declared that Iran would break Iraq and advance as far as Baghdad, while the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs insisted on the termination of Saddam Hussein's régime, linked with Israel, as a condition for settling the conflict between the two countries over the application of the Algiers Agreements and Iran's occupation of the Gulf islands. On 16th April, Ayatollah Bada Sadr, one of the leaders of the Iraqi Shiite clergy, was arrested and was to be assassinated shortly afterwards. On 27th April, the Iranian radio announced the death of Saddam Hussein, while the Iraqi radio broadcast statements by leaders of Iranian opposition movements in exile. Starting in the summer, frontier incidents increased before Iraq denounced the Algiers Agreements on 17th September and Iran called up reservists on 20th September.

18. Relations between the two countries therefore certainly deteriorated very quickly

after the Iranian revolution and because of Iran's subversive action in Iraq. However, this does not entirely demolish the other explanation, i.e. that Iraq wished to take advantage of what it considered to be a favourable situation to settle a dispute which had preceded the 1979 revolution. Would it have done so even if Iran had not increased its provocation? There is no certain answer to this question.

B. *The stages of the war*

19. The war which broke out in September 1980 has so far passed through three distinct stages of varying duration.

20. (a) Between September and December 1980 Iraq conducted an offensive in three sectors: along the Shatt al 'Arab towards Abadan, which was for a time encircled, in northern Khuzistan and in Kurdistan. The land offensive was covered by numerous air raids, mainly aimed at oil and port installations, which induced Iran to retaliate against Iraqi ports and oil industries, thus reducing the oil industry of the two countries to practically nought during the early months of the war.

21. Iraqi offensives had limited results in the field, in spite of fairly heavy losses, and showed that Iran was capable of mustering strong defence. The Khuzistan Arabs proved loyal to the Iranian régime and the Kurd rebellion was less threatening than expected to the bitter disappointment of Iraq. The Iran army and air force showed a greater fighting capability than expected and above all, rather than encouraging the counter-revolutionary forces in Iran, the Iraqi attack apparently made a major contribution to restoring national union round Imam Khomeini's régime, in spite of a rapid deterioration in relations between the civil and religious leaders of the country and the serious crisis between Iran and the United States caused by American diplomats in Tehran being taken hostage.

22. (b) Between January 1981 and spring 1984 the war took a new turn. Operations were increasingly initiated by Iran, which reconquered the territory lost in 1980 and crossed the Iraqi frontier on three fronts. However, these offensives by large numbers of badly trained, poorly-led and under-equipped forces cost many lives and obtained no decisive results. Everything indicates that the Iraqi army, better trained, commanded and armed, particularly in tanks, artillery, missiles and aircraft, was able to resist close to the frontier and suffered far fewer losses. Hence, it became increasingly clear that neither side was in a position to win a decisive victory in the field.

23. The Iraqi Government seems to have realised quite quickly that it could not attain its initial objectives and that to prolong the war might make its internal position most difficult, particularly since although certain Arab countries were supplying it with generous financial assistance, e.g. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, or even limited military assistance, e.g. Jordan, others, such as Libya and above all Syria, were taking the side of Iran. On 10th April 1981, Syria cut the two oil pipelines still transporting Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean, thus halting oil exports, the mainstay of Iraq. It also allowed parties opposed to the Baghdad régime to regroup in Damascus, thus creating a serious threat of subversion, particularly among the Shiite and Kurd elements of the Iraqi population and the Iraqi communists.

24. As soon as it became apparent that Iranian resistance was much stronger than the Iraqi Government had expected, i.e. in November 1980, the latter looked for ways to end the war. While calling for the abrogation of the Algiers Agreements and referring to the dismantling of Iran and application of the rights of the occupying power, on 2nd December, in a message to the European Community, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs denied that his country had expansionist aims and referred to negotiations with Iran on the position of the common frontier. In March 1981, Iraq accepted the principle of an immediate cease-fire proposed by a group of Islamic countries which tried to impose mediation, whereas Iran insisted on the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from its territory, full application of the 1975 Algiers Agreement and an inquiry into Iraqi aggression by an international commission, which Iraq obviously found unacceptable. Finally, on 27th June 1981 the Islamic Conference Organisation drew up six proposals. These were rejected by Iran. Attempts by the United Nations and non-aligned countries were no more successful. In June 1981, Iraq proposed a truce and in October President Saddam Hussein said his country was prepared to end the war without conditions other than the safeguarding of its honour and dignity. It renewed its proposal for a cease-fire on 5th November. Imam Khomeini refused all these proposals, asserting that peace would be possible only if the Iraqi régime were first overthrown, thus excluding any possibility of negotiated peace.

25. In these circumstances, the two sides had no choice but to intensify hostilities and try to extend them in the hope of finding a military solution. Iran's intention was to exploit the areas in which it had superiority to try to win the day through naval operations to blockade the Shatt al 'Arab and through offensives involving large numbers of troops to offset its

growing inferiority in the air and in land weapons since 1982. Thus, in autumn 1983 children of fourteen were used in a series of offensives in the Shatt al 'Arab islands. These offensives had limited results. They met with an ever better defensive system, deployed to a depth of 30 to 50 km resulting in considerable losses for Iran.

26. However, there are signs that limits to all-out war have been set if not through a formal agreement between the belligerents at least by some kind of tacit agreement. For instance, air raids on civil populations, frequent on both sides in the earlier months of the war, seem to have stopped. Iraq does not seem to have taken advantage of its superiority in the air to resume them.

27. One committee member recalled the disturbing rumours circulating in the West about the fate of prisoners of war. Information on this matter is too rare and fragmentary, particularly about the situation in Iran, for a definite opinion to be expressed. However, on 10th October 1984 a delegation from the International Committee of the Red Cross was able to enter an Iranian camp for Iraqi prisoners of war in Gorgan to the north-east of Tehran. This visit was the occasion of demonstrations and a rebellion by the prisoners. The resulting repression caused six dead and thirty-five wounded among the prisoners – a sign that the situation is abnormal. However, an exchange of seriously wounded or disabled prisoners was held at the initiative of Iraq and through the intermediary of Turkey. A hundred prisoners were freed by Iraq and seventy-five by Iran.

28. On the one hand, the decision taken by the Soviet Union in 1982 to grant large-scale assistance to Iraq allowed it to replace its land and air weapons with some very up-to-date surface-to-surface missiles and with surface-to-air missiles and to build up considerable strategic reserves. It supplied Sukhoi fighter aircraft, a large number of tanks and artillery. France too supplied Iraq with armaments including, in 1983, sixty Mirage F-1, five Super-Etendard aircraft equipped with Exocet air-to-sea missiles, and artillery. Conversely, Iran had difficulty in finding suppliers of arms and spare parts in view of its unfriendly relations with the United States and the latter's embargo on deliveries to the belligerents. Iran's suppliers include the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic, Italy, Spain and Israel, which provided surface-to-air missiles and spare parts for American weapons in Iran since the Shah's time. It also has Soviet weapons recovered from the battlefields in 1973 and recycled by Israel. By and large, the balance was in favour of Iraq which henceforth has a clear superiority in land and air armaments and above all has strategic reserves which are lacking in Iran.

29. On the other hand, Iraq extended hostilities to the Gulf. On 18th August 1982, Iraq proclaimed a blockade of the Kharg oil terminal, the principal outlet for Iranian oil, and started bombing it, while the Iraqi air force attacked the oil port at Bushehr and, at sea, any Iranian or foreign ships approaching Kharg. There is little doubt that one of its aims was to make non-belligerent countries bring pressure to bear on Iran to accept peace. Another aim was probably to encourage the Arab countries interested in the restoration of peace in the Gulf to increase their assistance to Iraq and to become more involved in the war.

30. Iran retaliated by attacking ships calling at ports on the southern shore of the Gulf and threatening to block the Strait of Hormuz, thus leading the United States, the United Kingdom and France to bring their ships deployed in the Indian Ocean nearer to the strait. So far, Iran has not carried out its threats.

31. Finally, during the winter 1982-83, Iraq appears to have used chemical weapons against Iranian forces. Victims of burns from a yperite type gas were visited by Red Cross delegations in Iranian hospitals at the beginning of 1983. At the end of October 1984, American sources indicated that Iraq had renewed the stocks of chemical weapons it had in reserve for use if necessary in the event of too threatening an offensive by Iranian forces.

32. Is Iran the only one to have used adolescents in its armed forces, where there is a mixture of professional soldiers suspected of disloyalty to the régime either because they miss the former régime or because they are influenced by communist propaganda, and fanaticised volunteers of all ages unsuitable for modern warfare but undoubtedly loyal? Is Iraq the only one to have used chemical weapons produced who knows where? There is contradictory evidence on these two points.

33. (c) Since spring 1984 large-scale military operations have practically stopped. There is occasional mention of the idea of a major Iranian offensive, but it has not yet occurred and experts seem to consider it very doubtful that it would be successful in view of the defensive system deployed by Iraq. Ships continue to be attacked by both sides in the Gulf, but less frequently. The only new factor has been the appearance of mines in the Red Sea. The most recent indications from Egypt would attribute responsibility for laying them to Libya. After nineteen ships had been damaged, a minesweeping campaign was undertaken by special-purpose ships from several countries, including the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Egypt, but results were very sparse and allowed no direct link to

be established between the mines in the Red Sea and the Gulf war.

34. Iraq is still proposing negotiations on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum* and Iran has still not accepted the principle of negotiations with the government of Mr. Saddam Hussein. Iran's strategy still seems to be based on a large-scale land offensive although it has not yet found the wherewithal to take the initiative, whereas Iraq's strategy seems mainly defensive on land but does not exclude the extension of the war to the Gulf in case of need.

C. The situation in October 1984

35. The military situation at present offers no way out. In 1980 a decisive land victory might have seemed possible for Iraq when Iran's domestic or military collapse was likely. But it is hard to imagine a country of 14 million triumphing over one of more than 40 million unless the latter is torn by internal strife and the war seems to have strengthened Iranian national solidarity thus making such a collapse improbable.

36. An Iranian victory also seems improbable in view of the very great increase in Iraqi armaments procured since 1983, mainly from the Soviet Union and France. Iraq now seems to have a definite quantitative and qualitative superiority in modern weaponry, much of which is being kept in reserve, whereas Iran, after heavy losses during the first years of the war, is having difficulty in replacing the equipment destroyed or lost and seems to have no reserves, even if the size of its population allows it to mobilise far more troops than Iraq.

37. Naturally, the situation would be very different if other powers intervened, particularly the superpowers. However, there is no intimation of this. Of the Arab countries, only Jordan gives Iraq military assistance in the form of a limited number of "volunteers". The Arab countries of the Gulf grant it financial assistance and are hardly inclined to go any further so as not to give Iran a pretext for attacking their territory or closing the Strait of Hormuz. Some of them probably fear an increase in Iraqi power as much as Iranian power. Two Arab countries, Syria and Libya, have clearly opted for Iran, the former because of hostility between Iraqi and Syrian Baathists and the latter perhaps out of sympathy for the Islamic revolution. Both have very close relations with the Soviet Union, which nevertheless does not favour Iran. The only country in the area to give significant assistance to Iran is Israel which, in spite of Imam Khomeini's violent anti-Israeli declarations, purchases much of its oil in Iran and, under a \$5,842,000 contract of

24th July 1981, sells it missiles, artillery and munitions of American origin.

38. The United States for its part was on the worst of terms with Iran at the beginning of the war since it was in 1981 that members of the United States Embassy in Tehran were taken hostage. However, it announced on 30th September 1980 that it would accept neither an escalation of the war nor any infringement of Iran's sovereignty and agreed to American arms being delivered to Iran by third countries. However, since 1983, its relevant policy has become gradually more restrictive and it seems to be bringing pressure to bear on its partners to make them join in the embargo which it has placed on deliveries of arms to all countries at war. Finally, China, Yugoslavia and the two Koreas supply Iran with certain equipment.

39. Whatever their origin, it cannot be said that the armaments received by Iran come from true allies. Only Syria and Libya seem to be aiming at the overthrow of the Iraqi régime. Iran's other arms suppliers are pursuing mainly economic aims or at least wish to maintain relations with Iran in spite of its political régime in order to keep some balance in the area. In the event of a serious crisis, Iran would probably find little support abroad, at any rate as long as it is dominated by Imam Khomeini's régime.

40. Iran therefore has only limited possibilities of procuring the armaments it needs to continue hostilities. Admittedly it still exports oil and has large foreign currency reserves apparently in the region of \$20,000 million, but the drop in oil prices, its diminishing exports, the disorganisation of its economy due to the 1979 revolution and its aftermath, and its low credit-worthiness abroad prevent it from procuring enough armaments to tip the present balance in its favour. It seems to be having difficulty in maintaining its current equipment for lack of spare parts and qualified personnel.

41. Iraq, on the contrary, since 1983 has been receiving large-scale assistance from the Soviet Union which, after some hesitation in the early years of the war during which it sold small quantities of arms to both belligerents, seems to have deliberately opted for the Iraqi side. The Iraqi air force seems to have about the same number of aircraft as at the start of the war, but they are far more recent, and it has large stocks of missiles, including SS-21s, which have not yet been used. There are now as many as 1,500 or 2,000 Soviet military advisers in Iraq. No reason has ever been given for the Soviet Union providing such massive assistance to Iraq, but it is perhaps due to the Iranian régime's persecution of the Tudeh Communist Party and its members as from 1983 and to more general views about balance in the area and the danger militant Islamism might

represent for internal order in the Soviet Union. As for France, to which Iraq is very heavily indebted, for reasons which are inter alia economic and financial, its interest is to assist its debtor in the hope of being paid one day. It also wishes to retain its influence among the Arab countries.

42. Iraq has fairly meagre foreign currency reserves: they are believed to be about \$7,000 million, and when Iran and Syria closed all its oil outlets in 1981 it was in a difficult position and its oil exports fell to a very low level. Only the assistance of the Arab Gulf countries allowed it to pass quickly through this difficult period thanks to the construction of new pipelines. Hence there is every reason to think that as from the end of 1984 Iraq will be in a position to pursue the war without adding unduly to debts which have been exaggerated. In the event of a serious crisis, solidarity between the Arab Gulf countries might also help Iraq to pursue the war, as was the case in 1982-83.

43. The chances of one or other side collapsing therefore seem slight, as does a military victory, and there are serious reasons to fear a prolongation of the war unless something unexpected happens. This might arise from an extension of the war which, in present circumstances could but be to the advantage of Iraq in view of Iran's diplomatic isolation. It might also result from a change at the head of one of the states. There are many signs that Ayatollah Khomeini's uncompromising attitude since 1981 is criticised in the Iranian Government and he might tone it down if for some reason the Iraqi President, the main target of Iranian hostility, were no longer in office or if Khomeini's influence were to wane. However, it should be noted that Iranian circles the most hostile to Khomeini's dictatorship are no less nationalistic than he, far from it, and their possible return to power would not necessarily be accompanied by a more peaceful policy. This view is shared even by observers who see the Iranian revolution as being largely responsible for the outbreak of war.

44. The only rational way out of this war now is through a compromise peace, more or less restoring the *status quo ante bellum*. Since 1980, Iraq has expressed its willingness to accept such a solution and has in fact accepted successive interventions by a United Nations mediator, the Islamic Conference, the movement of non-aligned countries and certain countries such as Sweden, Algeria and Turkey for the conclusion of a compromise peace, but Iran rejected them. It is clear that no country is in a position to impose mediation or arbitration until both belligerents accept the principle. But the trend in the balance of forces engaged

offers hope that Iran too will soon recognise its interest in restoring a peace which does not upset the regional balance.

45. The Western European countries are certainly not particularly well placed to propose their mediation. Their forces in the Gulf area are very weak and their immediate interests do not converge, although they all wish peace to be restored and recognise that this would not be furthered by more definite intervention by one or other of the two great powers. They can do little more than act individually to bring to bear whatever influence they may have on one or other of the belligerents to accept the principle of a compromise.

III. *The economic consequences of the war*

46. If the Gulf war had broken out immediately after the 1973 oil crisis the consequences would certainly have been far worse. However, it came at a time when the world economic recession, together with the economy measures taken by countries and greater use of alternative forms of energy, had considerably reduced oil consumption and when OPEC and even more OAPEC had lost their near monopoly and much of their internal cohesion. Many new countries have become oil exporters without joining these organisations which can therefore now exercise only a limited influence on oil prices, which are kept relatively high thanks to an export quota system. The fall in Iranian and Iraqi exports in 1981 therefore merely helped to avoid a collapse in prices. The war did not therefore run counter to the immediate interests of the other exporting countries but nor did it lead to higher prices. It is the rising dollar, not the Gulf war, that raised oil prices calculated in European currencies. In fact, the price of oil, calculated in dollars, has fallen considerably since 1978.

47. Nothing points to this trend being reversed, even if the war continues. Even though its extension to the whole Gulf and the possible closing of the Strait of Hormuz might disrupt supplies to the industrialised world and particularly to Western Europe, neither one nor the other would probably be enough to cause a very serious oil crisis.

48. During the second quarter of 1984, world production was 33 million barrels per day, 11 million of which came from the Gulf countries, but world production capacity was then 43,700,000 barrels per day. Hence there was a reserve production capacity of 10,700,000 barrels per day, of which 7,600,000 in the Gulf countries and 3,100,000 in the rest of the world. But the capacity of pipelines now in use leading

from these countries to the open sea was 3,050,000 barrels per day, not including 1,200,000 barrels per day for the pipelines leading from Iraq to the Mediterranean via Syria, which are at present closed.

49. The only present outlet for Iraqi oil is the pipeline linking the Kirkuk region to Yumur-talik, near Dortyol in Turkey. Its capacity was raised to 1 million barrels per day in August 1984. A Turko-Iraqi agreement, signed at the same time, provided for this pipeline to be doubled. Another planned pipeline would link the Basra and Rumaila oilfields with Aqaba in Jordan, but its financing still depends on American backing. Finally, an agreement has been concluded between Iraq and Saudi Arabia for building a pipeline with a 1,600,000 barrel per day capacity towards the Red Sea.

50. This means that the possible closing of the Strait of Hormuz, through which 7,800,000 barrels passed per day in the first quarter of 1984 (500,000 towards the United States, 2,000,000 towards Western Europe, 2,600,000 towards Japan and 2,700,000 towards the rest of the world), might be partly offset by making better use of the pipelines, particularly those which cross Saudi Arabia (3,050,000 barrels instead of 1,800,000 i.e. 1,250,000 barrels more) and increasing production in other regions (3,100,000 barrels per day of unused capacity), which would limit to 4,450,000 barrels per day the deficit in oil marketed in the world, i.e. about 14% of present consumption.

51. In view of the fact that Western Europe has reconstituted its stocks, which represented seventy-six days' normal consumption on 1st October 1984, and that production capacity could be increased within a few months in many producing regions outside the Gulf including Syria and Egypt where new deposits have just been discovered, it can no longer be held that either the Arab oil-producing countries or Iran, in spite of the fact that it is theoretically possible for it to close the Strait of Hormuz, has "a knife at the throat" of consumer countries as in 1973.

52. Moreover, it should be recalled that the position of consumer countries should improve still further with the forthcoming building of new pipelines in the East and the fall in world oil consumption (15.5% between 1980 and 1983) and particularly in the OECD countries (20.2%). Agreed, this fall is due to the economic recession as well as to economy measures and the development of the use of natural gas, the resumption wherever possible of coal-mining and the use of new sources of energy, particularly nuclear, the only one whose output is at present sufficiently large. At the end of 1982, there were 298 nuclear power stations in

operation in the world, of which 91 in WEU member countries; 216 were under construction, of which 55 in WEU countries, and 107 were planned, of which 7 in WEU countries. They produced 176,000 MW. Those under construction will produce 205,000 MW and those planned 104,000, of which 47,000, 55,500 and 8,178 respectively for WEU countries. It may therefore be thought that for some ten years the increase in the production of electricity by nuclear means, in the WEU countries at least, will be more rapid than the increase in energy consumption and that oil imports will drop still further.

53. However, it must be noted that there has been some increase in oil imports in the world (0.1%), and above all in the OECD countries (3%) in 1984, and it is expected that this trend will continue in 1985 (2.8% and 1.4% respectively). The main reason is the reconstitution of stocks, which had fallen too low in 1983. It should also be noted that the production of electricity by nuclear means is very unequally spread since France, with 32 power stations in operation, 29 under construction and 1 planned at the end of 1982, has become an electricity exporter, while the other OECD countries have made a far more limited effort to produce energy by nuclear means. Finally, 42 power stations are planned in the Soviet Union compared with 18 in the United States and 7 in the WEU countries, which means that nuclear electricity production will stop rising in these countries after 1990 if new programmes are not adopted soon.

54. Total world oil production seems to have exceeded demand by 500,000 barrels per day in the first three quarters of 1984 with the result that there has been some reduction in official oil prices. Thus, Middle East prices varied from \$31.10 to \$41 per barrel in 1980, but from \$26.40 to \$30.40 in July 1984 and, on 1st September 1984, were \$27 to \$28 on the free market, in spite of repeated air raids on oil tankers in the Gulf in spring 1984. Between 1st February and 10th October 1984, forty-nine tankers were damaged or destroyed in this way.

55. It therefore seems that even if the Gulf war were to spread and be intensified, it would no longer cause a serious oil crisis in the West and the likelihood will diminish the longer it continues.

56. If it is now assumed that peace will soon be restored, it may be thought that the relative discipline shown by OPEC and OAPEC will prevent a collapse in prices. The main problem will be for their member countries to authorise a significant rise in the Iraqi quota, now fixed at 1,200,000 barrels per day because of Iraq's export difficulties. But as soon as its export capability has been restored, Iraq will need to

have its quota increased so as to be able to pay its debts. It is estimated that it would at present have to export 1,600,000 barrels per day to cover its war expenditure. It will have to produce more to catch up its backlog. It may be assumed, however, that the Arab countries which have earmarked part of their oil production for helping Iraq will agree to a reduction in their quotas to allow Iraq's to be increased.

57. Furthermore, the destruction of the Abadan refinery in Iran will certainly limit Iranian exports of refined products for several years, but there is no indication that damage to the Kharg terminal or the oil ports along the Iranian shore of the Gulf will have very long-term consequences.

58. Iran for its part had little difficulty in exporting its oil during the first years of the war. In 1983, its output reached 2,500,000 barrels per day, i.e. slightly more than the quota of 2,400,000 prescribed by OPEC, and this output was more or less sustained during the first half of 1984 (2,280,000 barrels), only to collapse during the summer, with a daily output of 1,100,000 barrels in mid-August. This reduced output was due to a drop in sales to 450,000 barrels per day. Above all, exports to Japan (350,000 barrels per day in 1983) and the Soviet Union (100,000 barrels per day in 1983) fell to practically nothing. Probably the Soviet Union's decision to stop buying Iranian oil is due to its opting for alliance with Iraq. The drop in Japanese imports is probably not due to considerations of this kind but rather to a realistic calculation of the economic interests of Japanese importers.

59. In recent years, Iran has promoted its oil sales and applied tariffs lower than those fixed by OPEC to compensate for the difficulty buyers have in shipping the oil. It gave up this practice in August 1984. Iraqi air force attacks on ships near Kharg caused a slight increase in insurance premiums for ships using the Gulf and Japanese seamen's unions refused to load at Kharg. It is however difficult to ascertain the reasons for this reorganisation of Japanese buying and to draw conclusions for the future, except that the Iranian external trade deficit, which had remained moderate (\$4,000 million in 1983-84), might increase sharply and make the pursuit of the war even more difficult since the credit-worthiness of the Iranian régime seems to be at a low ebb on the international financial market. It is not sure that Iran's investments to convey its oil to terminals outside the Gulf will be enough to remedy this situation. In any event, Iran will probably still need foreign currency for several years after the end of the war and will not willingly bow to OPEC orders but will continue to supply the free

market, which would make any spectacular increase in oil prices difficult.

60. It may therefore be considered that if Europe adheres to the caution it has shown since 1974, neither a return to peace nor the possible pursuit of the war, provided it remains confined to the Gulf area, should have major economic consequences for it. The necessary precautionary measures would obviously be first to maintain or reconstitute stocks covering more than three months' oil consumption for each European country, then to apply an energy-saving policy and develop alternative sources of energy, and finally show great moderation in exporting to the belligerent countries and above all in granting their credits, so that there is no risk of the European countries finding themselves forced, for economic and financial reasons, to take political and military measures which would endanger peace. In this connection, it may be wondered whether France, which is moreover to be congratulated on an audacious policy to promote the production of nuclear energy, where it now occupies second place in the world after the United States and before the Soviet Union and Japan, did not commit an error in allowing Iraq to build up too high a level of debts which thus may restrict France's freedom of action. This does not now seem to be the case for other western countries.

61. Apart from this moderation in exports and in the credit it makes available, Western Europe should also ensure that it reconstitutes its stocks of oil products so as not only to reserve the ninety days' stocks planned in 1974 but to go well beyond this quantity, as certain countries have already done. It must also ensure that, just as the outbreak of war and attacks on tankers in the Gulf were not disastrous for Europe, any return to peace, which may be followed by a sudden collapse in oil prices and a slowing down in orders for equipment, both civil and military, by the oil-producing countries, will not have repercussions which are too serious for its economy. Diversification of outlets and moderate use of credit sales are the conditions.

IV. *The political consequences of the war*

(a) Balances in the Moslem world

62. Since the nineteenth century, Islam has been divided between two views of its future. The first, while considering Islam as a factor of resistance to all foreign domination, aims, once independence has been achieved for the Moslem countries, to make them accede to modern industrial civilisation, with all its economic and

social aspects. This was the case of the Shah's monarchy where the Iranian economy had made very rapid strides in later years. It is also the case of certain states with political régimes adhering in various ways to what is known as Arab socialism e.g. Iraq, Syria and Algeria, or still other states which have more or less liberal aims, e.g. Jordan and Egypt. This implies reading the Koran and the sacred Islamic texts while taking account of modern scientific knowledge, including history, and interpreting them bearing in mind that they were written for a certain society at a certain time and that they consequently express eternal truths only if one manages to determine the idea that inspired them by analysing the then contemporary realities. To use the vocabulary of the Christian churches, this is a liberal or modernistic Islam in which western or communist societies find a partner at both economic and political level and at cultural level.

63. Conversely, there is Islamic fundamentalism which interprets the sacred texts literally as opposed to everything outside Islam. It refuses on principle any compromise with industrial civilisation, whether western or communist, and expresses the people's revolt against an over-rapid transformation of economies and societies, which would upset the context of traditional thinking. For those who subscribe to this way of thinking, the Moslem past is the yardstick and everything modern must be rejected. Whatever the policy of the United States may be, American civilisation makes that country the Great Satan systematically denounced by Khomeini, who is the most outstanding figure of this retrograde philosophy in contemporary Islam.

64. But it should not be forgotten that the Middle East covers only a significant but not preponderant part of the Moslem world which extends to much of Africa and Asia. Indonesia, Pakistan, the Soviet Union and West African countries have large groups of Moslems, but they seem far less inclined towards the more extreme forms.

65. Shiism has certainly been more affected by this theology than Sunnism but, while it is to be found in power in Iran, it is not absent from the leading circles of certain Moslem countries such as Sudan, where Shiism is also prevalent, and Sunni Libya. It is a hotbed of opposition which makes itself felt more or less strongly throughout the Moslem countries thanks to brotherhoods whose names vary, e.g. the Ulemas or, in Egypt, the Moslem Brothers. There is no doubt that the assassination of the Egyptian President Anwar el Sadat on 6th October 1981 was fomented by such secret societies. The governments of most Islamic countries now feel threatened by plots emanat-

ing from these organisations, particularly Saudi Arabia, where the occupation of the Great Mosque at Mecca on 13th December 1979 by a group of some 1,300 fundamentalists was a violent shock to the régime. Similarly, Shiite fundamentalists have rightly or wrongly been held responsible for a number of terrorist operations in Lebanon, including the assassination of President Beshir Gemayel in 1983, the murderous attacks on French and American troops in the international buffer force, also in 1983, and on the United States Embassy in Beirut in October 1984, not to mention many attacks on western diplomatic representations, Christian militia or Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.

66. There is no doubt that this sometimes desperate militancy expresses a radical revolt not only against local leaders considered to have been corrupted by western influence or against the presence of foreign forces, but also against anything which may seem to jeopardise a traditional view of Moslem society. Its success implied reversion to obsolete forms of civilisation which flout all human rights not only in regard to political and religious freedoms, but also in regard to the most elementary aspects of human dignity, be it the mutilation of criminals or the fate of women. Minorities, particularly religious ones, are persecuted or even massacred in countries where Islamic fundamentalism has taken over.

67. The Presidential Committee of the Assembly expressed the wish that the present report refer to the fate Khomeini's Iran reserved for the Bahai religious sect, which was founded in the mid-nineteenth century and advocates a liberal concept of Islam, or even some degree of syncretism: opposition to the death penalty, polygamy, wearing the veil and the influence of the mullahs were the main topics of their preaching, which led to their being persecuted and massacred in tens of thousands in 1979. They are but one example among others of the intolerance of the Shiite fundamentalists.

68. This in no way means that régimes which are less fundamentalist are always open and tolerant, whether they subscribe to Islamic socialism or to the most traditional political forms. All fear the influence of fundamentalists to various degrees and make the concessions they consider necessary for maintaining internal order. Today, no Moslem country seems to be escaping the pressure of a part of society advocating fundamentalism.

69. The war between Iran and Iraq therefore broke out in an extremely divided Moslem world, the former country incarnating Shiite fundamentalism, the latter a more modern view of mankind and society, although its régime was dictatorial and repressed public freedoms.

It is certain that the Iranian régime made use of the weapons provided by the fundamentalist opposition in the Moslem world against both Iraq and the western world. It is naturally very difficult to determine its exact rôle in inspiring and preparing the many terrorist operations which have taken place, particularly in Lebanon, but also in many other Moslem countries and even in Western Europe in recent years. However this may be, an Iranian victory over Iraq, whether on the battlefield or through internal uprisings in Iraq would be a tremendous encouragement for the cause of Islamic fundamentalism and for subversive forces in the Arab countries round the Gulf where there are large minorities, or sometimes a Shiite and Iranian majority, and throughout the Moslem world where factions less marked by fundamentalism are still, in spite of everything, the only possible interlocutors for the western world. Probably no one would stand to gain.

70. On the other hand, a decisive military victory by Iraq would perhaps not be able to keep down for any length of time a Shiite fundamentalism which has merely been consolidated by ordeals in the past. It would certainly not mean that the Moslem world would once and for all opt for a western concept of the economy, society, human rights and public freedoms. It might even provoke wider recourse than before to the most desperate methods of fighting all forms of modernism, i.e. to terrorism of all kinds, both in the Middle East and in the western countries. It would probably also revive fears of Iraqi expansionism once evident among the Gulf countries. Finally, if Khomeini's régime were to collapse, those who took over would perhaps be closer to western ways of thinking but no less alive to Iranian nationalist aspirations and they would certainly be even less prepared for a compromise peace with Iraq since they would need a means of rallying the Iranian nation round them.

71. Some observers do not preclude the fact that certain countries in the area find it useful for the war to be continued since, on the one hand, it allows their oil to be marketed more easily and keeps up prices in periods of over-production and, on the other hand, it weakens the strongest two military powers which are also suspected of having imperialist aims around the Gulf. It is not easy to confirm or invalidate these accusations but if true they would be very short-sighted since all considerations about the internal order of these countries indicate that the pursuit of hostilities or a decisive victory by one side or the other would be an extremely dangerous destabilising factor for all the régimes in the area. It also involves a strong risk of hostilities spreading, as already shown by air or naval raids by both sides against ships of neutral countries in the Gulf. Thus, on 5th

June 1984, Saudi Arabia had to ward off an Iranian air raid against the island of Al Arabiyah, two Phantom aircraft being shot down. Finally, the moderation so far shown by the two great powers might be undermined if the war were to last and involve more definite intervention on their part, as shown by increased Soviet assistance to Iraq since 1983.

72. In fact, the Arab countries round the Gulf seem to have well understood that it is in their interests to keep out of the war. Six of them (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrein, Oman and Kuwait) set up the Gulf Co-operation Council on 26th May 1981 intended admittedly to afford support to Iraq to which it has given \$40,000 million in four years, but also to dissociate their cause from the Iraqi cause, to maintain their neutrality and to oppose any extension of the theatre of operations.

73. For these reasons your Rapporteur believes the only way out of the war which would ensure stability in the area while restoring the peace which everyone needs is through a compromise between the belligerents which would change little in the situation prevailing before the war, in any event territorially. But such a compromise can hardly be imposed from outside, above all by Europe, which does not have the wherewithal. The United States, which has a strong military force in the area, has very wisely refrained from using it and even from bringing pressure to bear too openly on the belligerents, while guaranteeing countries which have remained neutral the military means to defend their territory and remain neutral. It would presumably be to Europe's advantage to follow this cautious attitude.

(b) The world balance

74. So far, the Gulf war has not endangered the balance between the great powers which have both shown great caution, but there are signs that this situation may not last indefinitely if the war continues.

75. The Soviet Union seems to have hesitated for three years. It is engaged in a difficult war in Afghanistan which, since December 1979, has brought it into conflict with a Moslem people with which Khomeini's Iran and most of the Arab countries have shown some degree of solidarity. Iran in particular has taken in about a million Afghan refugees. There are moreover ethnic, linguistic and religious affinities between several factions of the Iranian population and of both the Afghan and Soviet people and the Soviet Union clearly fears the spread of Iranian fundamentalism to Soviet Moslems. Finally,

Khomeini's régime, like the Iraqi Baathists, has persecuted the leaders and members of the communist parties in both countries. It has been reported that there are 60,000 Iranian communist refugees in the Soviet Union, while the Iraqi Communist party, which was banned, has been reformed in Damascus.

76. Apparently it was only in 1983 that the Soviet Union opted for Iraq, i.e. when an early, decisive Iranian victory was in sight. The despatch of large quantities of modern weapons and some thousand military advisers to Iraq made a major contribution to that country's recovery, but obviously involved the Soviet Union deeply on Iraq's side. Its aim was presumably twofold: first, to avoid a victory by the Islamic power the most dangerous for Soviet internal order and, second, to recover its influence in the Arab world which it had lost through the war in Afghanistan. However, the fact that the Soviet Union's main allies in the Arab world are the very two countries which took Iran's side, i.e. Syria and Libya, and that there is no indication of a deterioration in their relations with the Soviet Union seems to show that Soviet commitment to Iraq remains cautious and dependent on circumstances. It continues to supply Iran with arms through its two Arab allies, North Korea and several people's democracies.

77. It may therefore be wondered, and the question has been raised, whether one of its real aims is not to prolong the war, at least until it has settled the Afghan affair.

78. However this may be, it should be recalled that the Shah's downfall was politically favourable to the Soviet Union because it led to the departure of the Americans from a Soviet frontier area where they had had considerable influence until 1979. The clearly anti-western nature of the new régime and its discretion in the Afghan affair largely made up for the persecution of Iranian communists – in point of fact, their trials were hardly less in earlier decades – and the Soviet Union ultimately has just as much interest as the West in a return to peace which does not disturb regional balances. This is moreover an official position that has been asserted.

79. The United States policy is also ambiguous insofar as, in order to preserve the status quo in the Gulf area, declared to be a zone of vital interest for the United States, it maintains a base for its rapid deployment force in Oman and supplies modern weapons to the non-belligerent Arab countries round the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia. At the same time it understands the Israeli fear lest the balance in the Middle East be tipped against it through supplies of ultra-modern weapons to the Arab countries. Every delivery of American arms to

Saudi Arabia is the subject of keen controversy in Congress and among American public opinion. Yet in 1982 an 8,000 strong Jordanian rapid deployment force was trained and equipped by the United States. In January 1984, the Pentagon authorised the sale of two hundred surface-to-air Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia, which had requested two thousand, and surface-to-air Sparrow and air-to-surface Maverick missiles. Finally, the five AWACS aircraft, procured by Saudi Arabia after a difficult debate in Congress for the air control of the Gulf area are being operated by American technicians until Arab aircrews have been trained. These aircraft detected the Iranian attack of 5th June 1984.

80. But a section of Arab public opinion considers the United States to be a very compromising ally for Saudi Arabia, Oman and the Emirates, not only because it supports Israel but probably far more because of what American power symbolises in the eyes of a large section of Arab opinion. Thus, with the exception of Oman, all the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, have refused to allow contingents of the American rapid deployment force to be stationed on their territory and are diversifying their armaments suppliers in Western Europe, or even the Soviet Union in the case of Kuwait which, in August 1984, signed a \$300 million contract with that country so as not to seem too reliant on American supplies. Egypt on the contrary, has adopted a very positive attitude towards the American rapid deployment force since it has allowed it to conduct manoeuvres on its territory, sometimes with the participation of Egyptian forces.

81. Finally, the United States has no interest in Iran becoming too weak because, following the invasion of Afghanistan, it is the last rampart cutting off the Soviet Union's direct access by land to the area of the Gulf. All official American Government statements since the beginning of the war and even at the most serious moments of the crisis provoked in 1981 by members of the United States Embassy in Tehran being taken hostage have concurred in signifying that the United States would not tolerate the establishment of hegemony in the area of the Gulf. The rapid deployment force was formed to give the American Government means of action anywhere in the world if necessary. There has been no need so far. Units of this force are stationed in Panama or belong to the international force in the Sinai, but a large part is near the Gulf. The existence of this force is at least a valuable guarantee of the maintenance of the independence of the countries on the southern shore of the Gulf, whatever the outcome of the war between Iran and Iraq, and an effective deterrent against any Soviet wish to intervene more directly in the area. The

presence of an American fleet in the Indian Ocean also helps. In October 1983, when Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, the United States moved a few warships into the Gulf to back up its statements against any such measure.

82. Western Europe for its part has played only a secondary rôle in these matters. On the one hand it has expressed its concern about the pursuit of the war, particularly in its votes in the United Nations, including the resolution of 31st October 1983 calling for an immediate end to hostilities in the Gulf at a time when Iran seemed to be winning. However, this does not mean that there is a European Middle East policy. Some countries avoid any arms sales in the area while others deliver small quantities to Iran or the Arab countries to the south of the Gulf. The United Kingdom provides officers for the Omani army. In recent years, France has sold far larger quantities of armaments to Saudi Arabia, certain emirates, Jordan and above all Iraq. Should this fairly close co-operation between France and Iraq be taken to indicate a deliberate political choice in favour of one of the belligerents or merely the result of economic exchanges dating back to before the war which, making Iraq heavily indebted to France, led the latter to favour its debtor? It is difficult to say exactly, but it is evident that in France itself some observers consider that an unduly unilateral commitment might jeopardise France's future relations with Iran. Others on the contrary, and not only in France, emphasise the political motives of all the countries interested in stability and peace in the Middle East in doing their utmost to ensure that Khomeini's revolutionary messianism is halted and wish France's European allies to participate in a pro-Iraqi policy. In any event, France's policy is quite different from that of all its European partners which are more concerned to avoid the extension of hostilities in the Gulf and not to break off their relations with Khomeini's Iran, however difficult these may be. However, all ultimately agree on one aim, i.e. to do everything to help restore peace on the basis of a compromise avoiding regional hegemony. This is one of the points on which closer consultations between the Western European countries should have allowed Europeans to avoid adopting such divergent policies and thus carry greater weight in promoting peace.

83. However this may be, their means of action are very limited. No European country has means of intervening or, above all, adequate transport for sending large numbers of troops to the Middle East. United Nations resolutions carry very little weight in matters in which nations are so deeply committed and the religious aspects of the war hardly allow western countries to voice their views. It is always very

dangerous to commit oneself deeply in a war which one cannot master and the only policy on which agreement between Europeans may be possible would be a policy of non-intervention, moderation or abstention from delivering arms to the belligerents, discreet action to foster negotiations between the countries at war and measures to avoid an extension of hostilities.

V. *The military consequences of the war*

84. While there has been no lack of information about the economic and political aspects of the war, the same is not true of its military aspects. In this field as in others, far more is known about Iraq's situation than that of Iran because it is more ready to receive foreign observers, but even here the possibilities of direct reporting are limited and the war communiqués are neither detailed nor reliable enough for it to be possible to draw clear lessons from them. Iran for its part does not allow journalists to approach the front and only in rare cases has it allowed them to enter into direct contact with the combatants. The information it publishes is sparse, fragmentary and couched in such extreme terms as to be difficult to decipher. Your Rapporteur is therefore well aware of the weakness of this chapter which he will endeavour to improve in the second version of his draft report.

(a) *Features of the fighting*

85. A remarkable aspect of the four years of war is that in spite of the use of very modern weaponry, including tanks, missiles and combat aircraft, along a 1,600 km front, and in spite of determined offensives by Iraq in 1980 and by Iran in 1982-83, neither belligerent has been able to achieve a decisive success. The Iraqi advance into Iranian territory in 1980 was no more than some forty kilometres. The large towns attacked were not taken and it took almost three years for the Iranians to recover lost territory and penetrate Iraqi territory to depths of little more than twenty kilometres. The offensives, particularly those of the Iranians, resulted in very heavy casualties. It is difficult to give accurate figures, but estimates given have often quoted Iranian losses of 400,000 and Iraqi losses of 200,000. Yet these offensives achieved only very limited territorial gains and no decisive success. In many respects the military situation recalls that of the western front during the first world war or a front held by some kind of Maginot line.

86. This seems to confirm observations during the 1973 Israeli-Arab war that modern weapons, particularly missiles, make the use of tanks and

armoured vehicles difficult and not very efficient, but enhance field organisation. For instance, when the Iraqi army was building a fortified zone behind the country's frontiers in 1983, it buried a number of tanks and used them with success as means of defence. Iraqi fire power, based on superiority in modern artillery, missiles and aircraft, largely offset the numerical superiority of the Iranian army once Iraq adopted a defensive position, but failed to give it an adequate offensive capability.

87. It may now be wondered whether the same might be true for the defence of Europe, where battlefield conditions, command, staffing and recruitment of troops would be different. Comparison with conditions in 1973 implies that it is mainly the result of technical progress in armaments that would prevail wherever modern defensive armaments are deployed and there is little chance of this situation changing for a long time to come. Such operations would be tolerable in sparsely-populated areas but not on a front in the more densely-populated areas of Europe.

88. Another aspect of this low level of offensive capability is the temptation to resort to means contrary to the rules of war in an effort to win. Iraq's quickly-acquired air superiority induced it to bomb towns and industrial and port installations. Iran retaliated with like methods but with obviously less powerful means. More serious was the use of chemical weapons, certainly by the Iraqi army – as was established by Red Cross observers in 1983 in Iranian hospitals – but perhaps by Iran, too, as well as the use of adolescents in the Iranian army's autumn 1983 offensives, as proved by a visit by foreign observers to the Iraqi front and prisoner of war camps. Some sources also accuse Iraq of having used adolescents. Demonstrations of international disapproval were probably not foreign to such practices being abandoned in 1984, but there is no proof that they might not be resumed.

89. Iraq has also been tempted to try to extend the theatre of operations, to involve other countries in the war and to provoke an international reaction in favour of peace or at least to obtain more foreign assistance by air raids on navigation in the Gulf. Nor has it hesitated to attack merchant shipping from countries not involved in the war, generally near the Kharg terminal which it was blockading, but sometimes much farther off shore. Between January and October 1984, forty-nine merchant ships, usually tankers, were thus the target of air-to-sea missiles. Most were seriously damaged but few were destroyed. The Iranian response was not only to blockade the Shatt al 'Arab delta, already a fact since the beginning of the war, but to attack a few tankers long the Arab

coast of the Gulf, provoking complaints, threats and even an armed reaction from Saudi Arabia.

90. Attempts to extend the war have admittedly not led to other countries becoming involved nor to serious efforts to impose peace. However, to an extent difficult to assess, they have helped to strengthen solidarity between the Arab countries, shown mainly in financial assistance to Iraq, made the United States assert its intention to oppose any blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and produced several international initiatives, admittedly to no effect, for a cease-fire or a compromise peace.

91. Your Rapporteur considers that these attempts to radicalise and extend the conflict are almost inevitable consequences of the strategic confinement of the war to a front close to the frontier, itself due to the kind of modern weapons used. It is to be feared that one of them may succeed in the near future. One risk of flouting the rules of war might be to make that the whole world believe that attempts in this century to limit the human consequences of warfare are obsolescent. Another, the extension of the war to other Arab countries, would make direct intervention by the great powers probable in a war which they have so far managed to keep out of. As long as peace has not been restored, this risk will remain.

92. But considering these events and threats in perspective, the idea that local wars outside areas protected by the nuclear weapons of the two great powers will not affect overall security henceforth seems very fragile. It might even be thought that if Iran and Iraq had had nuclear weapons they would have been unlikely to pursue a bloody and hopeless war for four years without using them, which would have escalated the war to world level. Such considerations can but encourage the Western European countries to strengthen their consultations on the defence and political aspects of matters arising outside the North Atlantic Treaty area and to search for joint codes of conduct in the arms trade and the application of measures under the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

93. Furthermore, they would have every interest in studying together any lessons which Europe can draw for its own security from the military aspects of the Gulf war, the main one perhaps being that modern weapons give the defensive superiority over the offensive, with the implicit reversal of estimates of the possible duration of hostilities. One may also wonder how far such conditions still allow mobile forces to be used, as had been envisaged only a few years ago. There now seem less grounds for the idea that a modern war would be of short duration, at least in the case of a conventional war. It would certainly seem desirable for the deterrent capability of the Atlantic Alliance to

be enhanced by a stronger European conventional defence system, but this would no doubt mean having far larger strategic reserves than has hitherto been the case.

(b) *Armaments*

94. Iraq's superiority appears clearly in land and particularly air armaments. Your Rapporteur has examined the 1984-85 edition of the *Military Balance* published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London which, while expressing firm reservations about most recent knowledge of losses suffered and purchases made by the two belligerents, nevertheless gives figures which are probably the most reliable currently available.

95. According to this publication, the Iraqi air force is believed to have 580 combat aircraft, compared with about 95 in Iran, and 160 combat helicopters, compared with 96. This would explain Iraq's apparent air supremacy which allows it to command the skies in the zone of operations, to bomb towns and economic and military installations over a wide area of Iran and largely make up for its naval inferiority.

96. It is believed that Iraq could arm a total of 642,000 regular soldiers, plus 650,000 men in the people's army, while Iran, with far larger human reserves, could arm only 550,000 men in the regular army, 250,000 Pasdarans and 200,000 to 250,000 men specially recruited for certain war operations. Hence the Iraqi forces appear to have numerical superiority backed by better weapons.

97. According to the same publication, Iraq has 4,500 tanks, compared with 1,050 in Iran, 3,500 other armoured vehicles, compared with 1,342, and 3,500 pieces of ordnance, compared with 1,000. Armaments on order which are listed are far more numerous in the case of Iraq. Similarly, those in service are on the whole far more modern than Iranian armaments, most of which were procured under the Shah's government for an army which virtually no longer exists, by military staff who have in the meantime been completely eliminated. The *Military Balance* reports only very small quantities being delivered to Iran. Conversely, Iraq has very modern armaments and a number of contracts have been concluded with the Soviet Union and France, inter alia for 219 combat aircraft, 39 helicopters, 140 tanks, 180 armoured vehicles and many missiles of all kinds; 4 frigates and 6 corvettes have been ordered from Italy and they are believed to be capable of levelling out the naval forces of the two countries. A major agreement on military supplies was also signed between Iraq and the

Soviet Union in November 1983 for the delivery of new equipment in exchange for sales of Iraqi oil. This includes many surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles which are believed to have been delivered to Iraq already but which it is keeping in reserve and has not yet moved to the battlefield.

98. Furthermore, if account is taken of the large quantities of arms procured in recent months by Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf countries which have so far remained outside the war, but which, it is known, would not tolerate an Iranian victory, it is hard to see how Iran could hope to win a decisive victory.

99. Insofar as these figures can be relied upon, it would therefore seem that the balance of forces has already swung in favour of Iraq although it is not in a position to wage an offensive war against Iran. To strengthen it further by additional deliveries of arms might renew its hopes of success and consequently incite it to abandon the favourable attitude it has had towards a compromise peace since 1981.

100. Nevertheless, the definition, respect and maintenance of an embargo are particularly difficult since the number of countries producing weapons, directly or under licence, is still growing and purely European measures might be ineffective since the belligerents will still be able to procure weapons, even of European design, from third countries or from private firms not over concerned about respecting decisions taken by the governments of countries where they have their head offices.

VI. *Conclusions*

101. (i) In autumn 1984, the war between Iran and Iraq seems to have entered a period of relative calm, but there is every reason to fear that this calm is only provisional and that the day one of the belligerents can rightly or wrongly hope to win a decisive victory it will reignite hostilities.

102. (ii) The interest of peace in the region, of peace in the world and consequently of Europe's security, lies in the re-establishment of peace which is not based on the victory of one of the belligerents. On the contrary, any decisive success by one or other would sow the seeds of other wars in the region.

103. (iii) While it is true that so far the war between Iraq and Iran has led to no major economic or political upheavals and has not seriously endangered Europe's oil supplies, an extension of the war in the Gulf area might have serious consequences for the world econ-

omy, and particularly for oil prices, and might reactivate the economic recession from which Western Europe is now in the process of recovering.

104. (iv) The delicate balance throughout the area of the Gulf, its unstable economy, the political régimes of the Gulf states and the revolutionary force of the so-called fundamentalist Islamic movements make it a high stake in international rivalry and any extension of the present war would probably involve the great powers and thereby threaten peace in the rest of the world.

105. (v) The deployment of very modern weaponry by the belligerents already allows a number of lessons to be learned from the Gulf war which may be extremely useful for Western Europe's defence concept. It would be of the utmost interest for the WEU Council here and now to instruct an appropriate technical body to analyse the development of hostilities in terms of the use of weapons and the conduct of the war.

106. (vi) Following the Gulf war, it is to be feared that there will be an increase in terrorist action in that area and throughout the world, since there is every reason to think that the

prolongation of the war would exasperate politico-religious fanaticism just as much as a compromise peace. Europe collectively should therefore work out measures here and now for countering a new outbreak of terrorism of which the Gulf war might well be the detonator. Events in Lebanon in 1983 and 1984 have obvious links with this war and are a serious warning of the danger.

107. (vii) Western Europe's obvious interest is in an early return to peace which does not disturb the balance of the region. However, its action must be cautious and limited. Its effectiveness will depend on the degree to which it is distinct from but co-ordinated with that of the United States.

108. (viii) Europe will be able to play such a rôle only if it is united in its approach and is truly impartial in its relations with the belligerents.

109. (ix) Warnings by world public opinion about threats of extending the war or violating the rules of war seem to have been heeded by the belligerents more than once and this should encourage Europe to be vigilant and to renew such warnings whenever necessary.

APPENDIX

*Letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations
to the President of the Security Council**14th June 1984*

As the Security Council is aware, in response to my proposal, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Government of the Republic of Iraq have given the Secretary-General undertakings that all deliberate military attacks by any means on purely civilian population centres in either country will cease effective 0001 hours GMT on 12th June 1984. The relevant communications are contained in Security Council documents S/16609, S/16610, S/16611, S/16614 and S/16615.

As I stated in my messages to the two governments, I trust and expect that both sides will scrupulously implement these undertakings. I am gratified that, so far, there has been no incident.

As, however, each of the governments, in its response, has made independent requests for arrangements to verify compliance with the undertakings, consultations were held with the Permanent Representatives of the two governments, with a view to working out the measures that might be essential to verify that the commitments are adhered to.

Understandings have now been reached with the Government of Iran and the Government of Iraq. Accordingly, it would be my intention, as an immediate step, to set up simultaneously, as at 15th June 1984, two teams, each consisting of three officers drawn

from among the military personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) and one senior official of the United Nations Secretariat. Each team would be ready to proceed to the respective country as soon as so requested by its government.

The mandate of the teams would be to verify compliance with the undertakings given by the Governments of Iran and of Iraq to end and in the future refrain from initiating, deliberate military attacks, by any means, on purely civilian population centres. The teams, following each inspection of a specific allegation of any violation, would report to me, and it is my intention to keep the Security Council informed of their findings as required and in a timely manner. I would, of course, request assurances from the two governments that they will provide the necessary conditions of safety for the teams while they are in areas subject to hostilities. The concurrence of the contributing countries concerned will be secured.

These arrangements would be kept under constant review in the light of circumstances and in further consultation with all parties concerned.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the urgent attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Javier PEREZ de CUELLAR

Consequences of the Gulf war

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “by the United Nations and by Middle Eastern countries” and insert “by the United Nations, by Middle Eastern countries or by other countries”.

Signed: Cavaliere

1. See 8th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment agreed to).

Consequences of the Gulf war

AMENDMENT 2¹

tabled by Mr. Hardy

2. Leave out paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed: Hardy

1. See 8th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment negatived).

Consequences of the Gulf war

AMENDMENTS 3 and 4¹

tabled by Mr. Beix and others

3. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph:
“Deploy every effort to support United Nations Resolution 540 of 31st October 1983 on preventing the spread of the war in the Gulf and the bombing of towns, at the same time condemning recourse to particularly reprehensible weapons;”.
4. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph:
“Foster the maintenance of a balance between Iraq and Iran likely to convince the two opponents that they have nothing to gain from continuing hostilities;”.

Signed: Beix, Bassinet, Pignion

1. See 8th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendments negatived).

Armament sector of industry in the member countries

ECONOMIC STUDY

prepared by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee

This study has been circulated separately.

*Replies of the Council to Recommendations 403 to 410***RECOMMENDATION 403¹***on the situation in the Middle East and European security²*

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling its Recommendations 341, 349, 361, 371, 386 and 389;
- (ii) Considering that armed conflicts in the Middle East are a serious threat to Europe's security;
- (iii) Considering in particular that there is a serious risk of the war between Iran and Iraq escalating and further endangering stability in the area and the world economy;
- (iv) Considering that the use of chemical weapons by either of the belligerents seriously undermines respect for international conventions in all international warfare;
- (v) Condemning also the use of children in an army at war, and the ill-treatment of prisoners;
- (vi) Considering that the situation of Lebanon continues to be likely to provoke international crises and that such a risk remains grave whilst part of the country is subject to foreign domination;
- (vii) Considering that the situation in Lebanon should not be seen only nor even primarily in terms of the East-West conflict;
- (viii) Welcoming the formation in Lebanon of a government which reflects the demographic balance and the rights of the different political and other elements in the country;
- (ix) Paying tribute to the peacekeeping task accomplished by units of the multinational buffer force and deploring the heavy losses suffered by two of these units;
- (x) Convinced that all foreign forces other than those of the United Nations should leave Lebanese soil completely;
- (xi) Considering that the vicious circle of terrorism and repression and the installation of settlements are obstacles to the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East, which rather requires:
 - recognition by those who have not yet done so, including most Arab countries and the PLO, of the right of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers;
 - recognition by Israel of the fact that most Palestinian people still consider the PLO under its present leadership as their representative and of their right to their own national homeland;
- (xii) Welcoming the improvement in relations between the PLO and Jordan with a view to solving the Palestinian problem,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Co-ordinate the policies of member countries towards Iran and Iraq with a view to ensuring that no action is taken which might prolong the conflict and to help to restore peace between these two countries;
2. In order to confirm declarations by member countries that they have not supplied the belligerents, directly or indirectly, with chemical weapons, instruct the Agency for the Control of Armaments to verify declarations made by member countries in this connection;
3. Press for the complete withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign forces, except for those of the United Nations, in application of United Nations Resolutions 508 and 509;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1984 during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (2nd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Lord Reay on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 978).

4. Formally reaffirm the joint views of the Western European countries expressed by the Ten in their Venice declaration of June 1980, and in particular:

- (a) recall that stability in the Middle East depends, on the one hand, on the PLO and all nations recognising Israel and its rights and, on the other hand, on Israel recognising the fact that the Palestinian people have the right to their own national homeland and that they are represented by the PLO;
- (b) repeat its condemnation of Israel's continued settlement policy on territories occupied since 1967 and warn that country that there must be no further expulsion of Arab populations from these territories.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 403***

The Council has given careful consideration to the lines of thought and preoccupations contained in Recommendation 403 of the WEU Assembly on the situation in the Middle East and European security.

In particular:

1. The member countries of WEU have made all possible efforts, with the competent international agencies, as well as in bilateral contacts with the parties concerned, in favour of a negotiated solution to the conflict between Iran and Iraq, in order to avoid its spreading. Moreover, they have supported the action of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in this direction which has brought about as a first result the suspension of the bombing of civilian targets.
2. Confirmation of the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf conflict has underlined the urgency of reaching agreement at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament on a total worldwide ban on the manufacture, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. It is only through a comprehensive and effectively verified global ban that these odious weapons can be removed once and for all. Neither strengthening of European controls under the aegis of WEU nor a regional ban in Europe as a first step would be a substitute.
3. The member countries of WEU have always maintained that a peaceful solution to the Lebanese question can only be achieved by safeguarding the unity, independence and national integrity of the country, and they have stressed the importance of the withdrawal of all foreign forces whose presence is not authorised by the Lebanese Government.
4. On several occasions, individually and in the context of the EEC, the member countries of WEU have expressed themselves in favour of the recognition of the right to existence and to security of all the countries in the region, including Israel, and justice for all. This implies the association of the representatives of the Palestinian people and consequently of the Palestine Liberation Organisation with a future peace process. Such a process must be based on the recognition of the right to self-determination of the Palestinians, with everything which this entails. In the same context, the member states of WEU have repeatedly affirmed their belief that Israel's settlement policy on the occupied territories constitutes a negative factor as far as the commencement of the peace process is concerned.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th November 1984.

RECOMMENDATION 404¹
on the state of European security²

The Assembly,

- (i) Reiterating its belief that a European view on defence policy should be formulated collectively in WEU and in close consultation with all other European allies;
- (ii) Paying real tribute to the vital contribution to the defence of Europe which the United States continues to make after forty years, and being convinced that collective defence should continue to be organised in NATO to which WEU is inextricably linked by the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (iii) Recognising however that the European allies today contribute 65 to 75% of the ready forces in Europe and believing that some adaptation of NATO is necessary for it properly to reflect the European view of defence requirements;
- (iv) Stressing the overriding importance of allied solidarity and the need for all countries, with due regard to their resources and geographical position, to accept their full responsibilities in the alliance;
- (v) Welcoming the perceptive study on collective logistical support by General C.J. Dijkstra,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments to recommend in NATO:

1. That the structure of NATO be modified to reflect properly the European view of defence requirements, and to improve efficiency; in particular:
 - (a) that the position of the Military Committee as the highest military authority under the Council and Defence Planning Committee should be clarified;
 - (b) that the International Military Staff be fused with the Defence Planning and Policy Division of the international staff, and that defence and force planning matters be handled by the Defence Planning Committee and Military Committee in joint session;
 - (c) that the prerogatives of the three major commanders be adjusted to place them on a more equal footing and to reflect the primacy of the Military Committee;
 - (d) that a European officer should be appointed as Chief-of-Staff in SHAPE, and a European as Special Assistant to SACEUR for international affairs;
2. That every effort be made to demonstrate the solidarity of the alliance, and to ensure that all members assume corresponding responsibilities;
3. That the NATO authorities take note of and act on the study on collective logistical support, and in particular:
 - (a) reaffirm the logistics authority of SACEUR under paragraph 9 of the North Atlantic Council Resolution of 22nd October 1954;
 - (b) establish a communications zone command in the central region, under the command of Deputy CINCENT;
 - (c) arrange common funding of sustaining stocks and greater use of NAMSA;
 - (d) agree that essential logistics units would be mobilised at the earliest stage of the alert process;
4. That, as a matter of urgency, a common IFF aircraft recognition system be introduced on all NATO aircraft.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1984 during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (5th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 971).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 404***

The Council has noted with interest Assembly Recommendation 404 on the state of European security. Since this Recommendation relates essentially to the structures of the integrated military organisation of NATO, the Council has deemed it advisable to inform the competent authorities of the Atlantic Alliance of the recommendation and of the specific ideas that it contains.

The Council shares the Assembly's belief on the advisability of formulating a European view on defence policy within WEU, in close consultation with all the other allies.

Like the Assembly, the Council is convinced that the security of the WEU member countries continues to be assured by the Atlantic Alliance to which WEU is linked by virtue of the modified Brussels Treaty. Accordingly, every effort must be made to stress the overriding importance of solidarity among allies and of the strengthening of the contribution of WEU member countries to the transatlantic dialogue, as well as the necessity for all the member countries to assume their full responsibilities within the alliance.

The Council will obviously keep these essential principles in mind when meeting at ministerial level in Rome on 26th and 27th October.

It is in the context of the fundamental solidarity of all the members of the alliance that the seven member states of WEU, after their deliberations in Rome, could consider how to initiate a process of reflection that could have a follow-up within the alliance, so that the European view of defence requirements could become more visible.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 18th October 1984.

RECOMMENDATION 405¹
on AWACS and Nimrod aircraft²

The Assembly,

- (i) Following with great interest the build-up of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Mixed Force composed of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force E-3A component at Geilenkirchen in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Nimrod component at Waddington in the United Kingdom;
- (ii) Welcoming the integrated nature of the NATO AWACS force's E-3A component in which airmen of nine continental European forces as well as from the United States and Canada participate and considering it to be an example for future schemes for multilateral units;
- (iii) Aware also that this NATO force is directed politically by the North Atlantic Council as such and militarily by SACEUR and his subordinate commander, the Commander of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Mixed Force;
- (iv) Noting with satisfaction that this important force is being set up speedily in accordance with the plans agreed to at the outset;
- (v) Welcoming the fact that France might also associate its air defence more closely with that of NATO by ordering the same type of AWACS aircraft and thus reinforce the common defence potential;
- (vi) Considering that the British decision on the Nimrod component might benefit the other member countries as well because of its maritime capability, but only provided its eleven aircraft are operational by 1986,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. Promote within NATO

- (a) Organisational structures to ensure that the national American AWACS force, the NATO E-3A component, the Nimrod component and any future French AWACS force will be equipped with the same type of hard- and software and with harmonised procedures so as to derive the maximum effectiveness from allied defence efforts and expenditure;
- (b) The improvement of the NATO E-3A component by providing its aircraft with airborne refuelling capabilities involving financially-acceptable modifications and appropriate training for its crews, taking into account the existence of American and British tanker aircraft;
- (c) Training for the necessary number of air staff officers in order to use the NATO E-3A aircraft as command and control aircraft in emergencies;
- (d) A set of rules which can be applied in the event of more multilateral military units being set up for common defence purposes thus codifying the lessons learned from the formation of the NATO AWACS force E-3A;

II. Remind the French Government of the importance it attaches to an early decision being taken on the procurement of its AWACS force.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1984 during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (5th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see report tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 974).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 405***

The Council welcomes the Assembly's interest in the development of a new airborne early warning force based in Western Europe. Like the Assembly, the Council considers that this will contribute greatly to the enhancement of the air defences of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance. With this goal in mind, the United Kingdom has selected Nimrod; other countries have opted for the E-3A and France, which has decided to procure an equivalent system, is currently evaluating the various possibilities. The Council notes the Assembly's views on the adoption by individual member countries of the alliance of different AEW systems, but considers that all these systems will make a major and valuable contribution to the goal stated by the Assembly.

The Council understands that:

- I. (a) Interoperability between different components of the AEW force has been a priority concern of the various NATO authorities responsible for the co-ordination of operational planning and procurement: the degree of interoperability is intended to be very considerable (including for example software to common NATO standards) although it will not be practicable to introduce literally the same type of hardware and software for a number of tasks.
 - (b) The E-3A component, like the Nimrod, already has an air-to-air refuelling capability, and crews are now being trained in its operation.
 - (c) The question of training staff officers, and the likely benefit accruing therefrom, must be examined in the light of the requirements and preoccupations of the member states.
 - (d) The extension of a mixed force concept to other applications and the development of a set of general rules for such requirements is something which needs to be explored in the light of experience, when the AEW force is fully operational.
- II. The French Government's decision to procure for its forces, under its 1984-88 programme law, an airborne early warning system has not been changed. The study relating to the type of aircraft and equipment has entered its final phase and the choice should soon be made. Interoperability with other alliance forces will make it possible to increase, where necessary, the volume of exchanges of air defence data.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th November 1984.

RECOMMENDATION 406¹*on thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty –
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council²*

The Assembly,

- (i) Believing it to be urgent to reinforce deterrence and safeguard peace, to organise within the Atlantic Alliance a politically credible and militarily effective European pillar;
- (ii) Considering that setting up a European pillar of the alliance should in particular serve the object of strengthening co-operation with our American allies, while giving a more European dimension to the discussion of questions touching the security of our continent;
- (iii) Believing that WEU should be used fully by the member states as a forum for analysis, debate and concerted action on the requirements of European defence, and that the other European allies, and other partners in the Ten should be kept fully informed;
- (iv) Recalling its Recommendation 380 and reiterating its belief that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s, in particular through the abolition of controls on conventional weapons;
- (v) Aware that the controls on atomic and biological weapons provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty have never been applied, but considering that in present circumstances it is no longer appropriate to apply them,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine and redefine the problems of European security and, to this end,
 - (a) meet regularly at a high level;
 - (b) hold at least two ministerial Council meetings a year, in particular to prepare NATO ministerial meetings, with the participation of defence ministers at at least one of these meetings; and
 - (c) keep the Assembly informed of these proceedings;
2. Strengthen the Permanent Council through the attendance as required of the senior officials concerned from the ministries for foreign affairs and defence and of the chiefs of defence staff;
3. Be assisted in its work by the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments, instructing:
 - (a) the Standing Armaments Committee to assist the Council in preparing a European policy in new conventional armaments, with particular regard to problems raised by emerging technologies; and to help the Council lay the foundations of a policy on the defensive use of space technology; and to secure international agreement to ensure that such developments are adequately and effectively controlled;
 - (b) the Agency for the Control of Armaments to undertake, on behalf of the Council or the Assembly, studies and analyses of problems related to disarmament, the limitation of armaments and the problems of verification of disarmament agreements;
4. Pursue the adaptation of WEU to the needs of the 1980s by:
 - (a) abolishing the controls on conventional weapons set out in Annexes III and IV to Protocol No. III;
 - (b) reorganising the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments to enable them to accomplish their new tasks;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1984 during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (5th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 973).

(c) making the necessary arrangements to co-locate the ministerial bodies of WEU in a single place;

5. Establish appropriate procedure for informing European and Atlantic bodies about the conclusions of ministerial meetings.

RECOMMENDATION 407¹

*on the political implications of European security in 1984 –
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council²*

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the difficulties in defence policy, not only in Europe but throughout the western world;
- (ii) Aware also of the fact that in the medium and long term the only way to end the unbridled armaments race and the division of Europe is to find firm answers to the many political, social, economic and strategic questions of our era;
- (iii) Emphasising that in present circumstances a conflict between the two blocs might lead to the near-total destruction of Europe;
- (iv) Aware of the overriding need for:
 - a balanced, general, effective and verified disarmament policy;
 - political control of armaments and more particularly of recourse to nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces;
 - the meaningful pursuit of East-West disarmament negotiations in spite of the difficulties and setbacks in recent months;
 - political, economic and social co-operation between East and West in the spirit of the Helsinki final act;
- (v) Therefore underlining:
 - the growing importance of WEU for the security of Western Europe;
 - the need for the European members of NATO to assume greater weight but also greater defence responsibilities vis-à-vis their North American partners, while maintaining close co-operation with them;
- (vi) Taking note that the Council is examining the structural and operational changes to be made in WEU to allow it better to fulfil the rôle assigned to it under the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (vii) Considering that recent developments in Europe and in transatlantic and international relations make this an appropriate time for such an examination;
- (viii) Considering that the way the Council now operates does not allow it to give continuous political impetus to the organisation;
- (ix) Welcoming the Italian proposal to hold a meeting of ministers of defence of the WEU member countries in Rome in October 1984 and hoping this meeting will lead to decisions likely to promote a European armaments policy;
- (x) Regretting that the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council does not refer to the problems raised by the reorganisation of WEU and that the Assembly is systematically left without knowledge of the Council's activities on this essential matter,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Be guided at all times by the preceding considerations and general principles, particularly in the necessary reactivation of WEU;
2. Examine attentively the conditions in which better use might be made of WEU in the coming decades to achieve in particular:

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1984 during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (5th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Thoss on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 979).

- (i) a permanent representation of member countries on the Council so that it may take more effective action;
- (ii) more frequent meetings, particularly at ministerial level, and the continuation, after the Rome meeting, of regular meetings of ministers of defence in the framework of WEU, *inter alia* so as to give steady encouragement to the European armaments policy;
- (iii) a regrouping of the various WEU organs;
- (iv) an adaptation of the Secretariat-General to the organisation's new requirements;
- (v) an agenda for its meetings allowing consultations on all matters relating to the security of Western Europe and the definition of a collegial European position prior to each meeting of the North Atlantic Council;
- (vi) a possible enlargement of Western European Union;
- (vii) co-operation between the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Independent European Programme Group without jeopardising the other tasks of the SAC, in view of the fact that paragraph 10 of the statute of the SAC specifies that agreements or arrangements concluded in the framework of that body remain open to participation by other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation;
- (viii) an assessment of the consequences for the Agency for the Control of Armaments of cancelling Annex III to Protocol No. III and possible modifications to Annex IV;
- (ix) a definition of Europe's present requirements in the control of armaments and the adaptation of the Agency for the Control of Armaments to a different rôle;
- (x) the possible use of the competence acquired by the Agency for the Control of Armaments for the benefit of representations of member countries at international conferences on disarmament or the limitation of armaments and for more general research on the level of world armaments;
- (xi) the provision of financial means for the Assembly allowing it better to carry out its rôle;

3. Keep the Assembly properly informed about the stage reached in its discussions on all matters relating to the future of WEU and in any event report on them either in its next annual report or in a supplementary report to be submitted to the Assembly on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of WEU.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendations 406 and 407

1. The Council has noted with satisfaction Assembly Recommendations 406 and 407 and believes that they both confirm and support the policy it has adopted.
2. At its extraordinary session in Rome on 26th and 27th October 1984, the Council of Ministers took a number of wide-ranging decisions on WEU and how to make better use of the organisation. It charged the Permanent Council and the Secretariat-General with certain tasks in implementation of these decisions. In terms of basic objectives and on many points of detail, the decisions taken by the Council of Ministers coincide with the Assembly's proposals, as contained in Recommendations 406 and 407.
3. The Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, Foreign Minister Genscher, gave a detailed explanation to the Assembly, at its extraordinary session on 29th October, of the decisions taken by the Council of Ministers on 26th and 27th October. The documents approved at the anniversary meeting of the Ministers on 26th and 27th October (the Rome Declaration and the document on the institutional reform of WEU) have already been communicated to the Assembly.
4. The Assembly will be briefed immediately and comprehensively on all further measures taken in implementation of the Rome decisions.
5. The Council welcomes any comments from the Assembly which would contribute to the effective implementation of the Rome decisions.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd November 1984.

RECOMMENDATION 408¹***on the control of armaments and disarmament²***

The Assembly,

(i) Concerned at the deterioration in the atmosphere of East-West relations, aggravated by the lack of personal contact between the superpowers at a time of change or prospective change in the leadership, and at the suspension of negotiations in three fields of arms control: a comprehensive nuclear test ban, INF, and START;

(ii) Believing that all the more importance now attaches to the three remaining disarmament conferences in Geneva, Stockholm and Vienna, in all of which there is prospect of agreement in due course;

(iii) Calling on member governments to take the initiative in these fields of primary interest to Europe by injecting a sense of urgency into the negotiations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge upon member governments the need:

1. To draft a joint, solemn declaration setting out their aims in the control of armaments and disarmament and to call on the superpowers to resume without delay negotiations which have been interrupted or to stimulate discussion when they take place;

2. To take every initiative in seeking to restore confidence in East-West relations, as a precondition of any arms control agreement, by promoting personal contact at the highest level between member governments and the new Soviet and other eastern bloc leaderships;

3. To study the possibility of concluding interim agreements this year in the conference on disarmament in Europe and mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations based on the common elements in present eastern and western proposals and taking account of the importance of verification measures.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1984 during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. de Vries on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 972).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 408***

1. The Council fully shares the importance the Assembly attaches to maintaining and improving the East-West dialogue in the interest of peace, security and stability in Europe. The WEU member states will continue to pursue their efforts to achieve, within the framework of an extended political dialogue, balanced, equitable and verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and its allies. It is important that this dialogue should include meetings at high political level. In fact, quite frequent talks between members of WEU governments and the leadership of the Soviet Union and the other East European states have already taken place on a bilateral basis and in the margins of multilateral fora such as the United Nations.

2. The Council shares the Assembly's view that arms control is one of the important elements in the relationship between East and West. It recalls that at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 31st May this year, the WEU member countries adopted, together with the other members of the Atlantic Alliance, the Washington statement in which they reaffirmed their offers to improve East-West relations, made most recently in the declaration of Brussels of 9th December 1983. At the same time they restated their aim of achieving security at the lowest possible level of forces through balanced, equitable and verifiable agreements on arms control, disarmament and concrete confidence- and security-building measures.

3. The Council points out that the WEU member states have welcomed, on various occasions, the readiness of the United States to resume bilateral negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and strategic arms reductions (START) with the Soviet Union without preconditions and have called on the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating table. They welcome the announcement that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to hold high-level talks in Geneva on 7th and 8th January 1985.

4. The Council would like to draw attention to the major individual and collective proposals put forward by western countries at the existing arms control and disarmament fora as a further proof of western determination to make every effort required to ensure progress. It is regrettable that no positive Soviet response to these proposals has been forthcoming.

5. The WEU member countries hope that in a first stage of the Stockholm conference agreement can be reached on a set of militarily significant and verifiable confidence- and security-building measures covering the whole of Europe and designed to diminish the risk of military confrontation there. This would pave the way for further stages of the conference where the participating states would continue their efforts for security and disarmament in Europe with a view to concrete and verifiable results.

6. Together with the other western states the WEU members have made every effort to ensure a sustained negotiating pace in Stockholm. At the beginning of the first round of the conference they tabled detailed proposals for a set of concrete confidence- and security-building measures. On a number of important points the proposals tabled by the neutral and non-aligned countries at the end of the first round are in line with the western proposals. The Soviet Union tabled proposals only at the beginning of the second round, which gave comparatively little attention to the kind of concrete measures that are the aim of the conference, in accordance with the mandate defined in Madrid in 1983. Soviet negotiators have so far proven reluctant to engage in a substantive discussion of such measures.

The WEU member countries are determined to seek ways to achieve progress. The Council hopes that intensive efforts to set up a work structure will lead to a result.

7. The WEU member countries concerned recall that the NATO countries participating in the MBFR initially favoured a two-phased approach and proposed, in an effort to speed up agreement, a simplified interim phase I in 1979.

The East, however, insisted on a strong link between the two phases in order to ensure the continuity of the reduction process. To meet this concern and at the same time to do away with complicated discussions on how to link the two phases, western participating countries proposed in

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th November 1984.

1982 to seek a single comprehensive agreement. The East agreed to the concept of a single treaty, but proposed initial United States-Soviet reductions followed by a freeze prior to signature of the actual treaty. These introductory steps would, according to the East, have the character of a political commitment. These proposals for phasing the reductions, however, could not be pursued further with the East because of lack of agreement on the fundamental and interrelated issues of data and verification which remain crucial and cannot be evaded or circumvented.

In April 1984 the western delegations in Vienna, with full participation of the WEU member countries involved, tabled new and open-minded proposals which specifically address these issues and at the same time portray how the "data impasse" could best be overcome. The WEU member countries concerned regret that hitherto eastern reactions to these proposals have not been encouraging.

8. The Council would also underline the importance of the rôle of the United Nations, especially the Assembly's First Committee on Disarmament and Security and the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), as well as the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD), in all of which the WEU member countries play an active rôle. The Council welcomes the efforts made by the Conference on Disarmament to achieve, among others, a complete and worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

RECOMMENDATION 409¹

***on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU
for the financial year 1983²***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Having taken note of the contents;
- (iii) Considering that:
 - (a) the future structure of the ministerial organs of Western European Union depends essentially on the tasks devolving upon them in the framework of political decisions to be taken on this matter by the Council;
 - (b) it would consequently be pointless at the present juncture to express an opinion on the cost-effectiveness of these organs;
 - (c) it would however be possible to make budgetary savings if the restructuration of the ministerial organs included unification of the Paris and London headquarters and the integration of their services;
 - (d) in preparing the budget the criterion of "zero growth" was applied,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine the possibility of uniting the London and Paris headquarters with a view to integrating joint services;
2. Adopt flexible criteria in its staff recruitment policy, in view of new tasks to be accorded to the ministerial organs of Western European Union;
3. Specify that the criterion of "zero growth" applies only to operating expenses and that expenditure and income relating to pensions should therefore be set out in a separate section of the budget;
4. Inform the Assembly of the stage reached in the studies on improving the status of staff announced in the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 340 and the participation of staff associations in the consultation and conciliation structure of the co-ordinated organisations.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1984 during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. de Vries on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 983).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 409***

1 and 2. Discussions on the reactivation of WEU have not yet reached the stage at which the new tasks of the organisation, the Council and its subsidiary bodies can be clearly defined. Conclusions on these matters must first be reached before the future structure, size, location and other administrative requirements can be foreseen. Included in this second stage of the Council's considerations would be recruitment policy.

3. The criterion of "zero growth" is already applied to the budget of the ministerial organs. The present budget format includes a separate statement of pensions' costs. While these have been taken into consideration by governments in determining the total acceptable budget, the Council is aware that with increases foreseeable in pensions' costs over the coming years, the situation will have to be kept under review.

4. The position of the combined staff associations of the co-ordinated organisations has improved considerably over the past few years. The previously ad hoc attendance of staff representation at meetings and discussions in the framework of co-ordination has given way to regular and overall participation by the associations. Negotiations on this matter still continue within the co-ordinated organisations and in the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts, at present concentrating on refining current procedures for consultation and on possible conciliation structures.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th September 1984.

RECOMMENDATION 410¹

on the military use of space²

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the consistent interest shown by Western European Union in the strategic and industrial implications of the space capabilities of the member countries;
- (ii) Appreciating the considerable achievements of Western European countries in the space field both nationally and under the aegis of the European Space Agency, most notably in the Spacelab and Ariane and satellite programmes;
- (iii) Conscious of the need for Europe to initiate new projects in both the space science and applications fields if Europe's successful development of telecommunications and remote-sensing satellite systems, together with launch vehicles and manned work modules, are to be fully exploited;
- (iv) Understanding that the United States spends about ten times as much as Western Europe on space activities and that at least half the United States space programme is directly or indirectly funded by the Department of Defence;
- (v) Aware also that current efforts by the Soviet Union to expand its present space capability should not go unmatched by western countries;
- (vi) Concerned that in addition to the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, other major nations, such as Japan, India, Brazil and the People's Republic of China, are pursuing active space programmes which could jeopardise Europe's current position as the established third force after the United States and the Soviet Union in space activities;
- (vii) Believing that space capability will be a key determinant in future warfare, that in military terms the difference in potential between the space-capable nations and the others will be almost as great as the current difference in power between nuclear and non-nuclear nations and that Europe should not only take note but act upon this fact;
- (viii) Noting President Mitterrand's call in his speech of 7th February 1984 for a "European space community" and his remarks on the potential of a manned European space station as well as current Western European interest in this subject;
- (ix) Supporting initiatives to exploit space technology to bring about confidence-building measures such as the proposed international satellite monitoring agency and determined to use Europe's space capabilities in order to reduce the risk of war by eliminating the advantage of surprise through surveillance satellite systems;
- (x) Confident that WEU can offer a valuable forum for debate about and analysis of the implications for the defence of Western Europe of the latest military space technologies as well as an institutional framework untrammelled by the political inhibitions of the ESA convention for the initiation by the principal space-capable nations of Western Europe of a defensive European military space programme,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge the governments of member countries to do all in their power to secure negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union so as to prevent the military use of space through the deployment of offensive space weapon systems by promoting new international treaties and related verification procedures, as well as through the implementation of existing accords to limit the military uses of space;
2. Demand a larger European industrial involvement both in NATO telecommunications satellites and in NATO military satellite programmes as well as in the associated ground station infrastructure, in addition to supporting successful national military communications satellites like Skynet;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1984 during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 976).

3. Commission a detailed analysis by the Standing Armaments Committee of the implications for European defence of developments in military space technology and in particular of Soviet and United States research and development in this field;
4. Initiate a study by the Agency for the Control of Armaments of the confidence- and security-building measures that could be taken in Europe following the establishment of either an international satellite monitoring agency or of Western European oceanic and terrestrial surveillance satellite systems and in the light of this study examine what tasks might be entrusted to the Agency for the Control of Armaments with a view to participating in verification that these measures are being respected;
5. Establish a dialogue with the European Space Agency whereby the industrial implications of ESA scientific or applications programmes can be discussed in an institutional framework appropriate for the formulation of Western European security policy;
6. Set clear European space policy objectives and priorities in the course of its politico-military consultations in the key strategic fields of launchers, manned modules, space station integration, telecommunications, meteorological and remote-sensing satellites and manned reusable service and space transport vehicles;
7. Propose a European surveillance and reconnaissance satellite programme adapting and refining the sensor technologies in the existing CNES Spot project and the ESA ERS-1 project;
8. Concert a joint response by the member countries to the NASA proposals for European participation in the projected United States space station and evolve a common strategy to utilise the consequent technological expertise should a European space station programme be initiated;
9. Require the construction of a Western European military meteorological satellite programme to follow the successful series of civil Meteosat satellites;
10. Postpone reaching decisions on the results of the analysis by the Standing Armaments Committee, the study by the Agency for the Control of Armaments and on the other abovementioned measures until the Assembly has had an opportunity to gain detailed knowledge about these and related military space problems through a broad-based symposium on the possibilities and desirability of the use of outer space for military purposes.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 410

It was with very great interest that the Council took note of this recommendation, commendable for both its quality and topicality. The problem of the military use of space is a particularly appropriate and topical subject for discussion and analysis.

The member countries of WEU consider it of the utmost importance to prevent a destabilising arms race in outer space.

They therefore encourage bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States, the two main space powers, on verifiable steps to avert this danger, and hope that significant progress can be achieved also through multilateral work at the conference on disarmament.

Also the existence and potential further development of anti-satellite systems pose a problem of immediate concern and developments in the field of anti-ballistic missiles raise new questions about the future relationship between offensive systems and ABM technologies.

In view of the inseparable link between offensive and defensive systems, a resumption of negotiations on the limitations and reductions of offensive nuclear weapons is as important as ever.

WEU member countries have regretted that bilateral talks between the two leading space powers have until now not taken place. They have, however, been encouraged by recent statements by the leaders of those two powers that both sides recognise that a dialogue to deal with these questions is needed. They welcome the announcement that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to hold high-level talks in Geneva on 7th and 8th January 1985.

WEU member countries stress the continuing importance of the 1972 ABM treaty between the United States and the USSR, and the 1967 outer space treaty.

As far as the implications of developments in space for European industry are concerned, the Council would point out that opportunities already exist in this field for European industries. Moreover, two important conclusions may be drawn from the Assembly recommendation in this connection. Firstly, the European space industry is a reality; its achievements are considerable and its potential is far from insignificant. Secondly, it is clear that Europe's international influence, and to some extent its security, will, in the long term, also depend on what position it will occupy in the field of space activities. In this connection the Council underlines the importance for the WEU member states to strengthen and improve their collaboration in the field of space technology. Generally speaking, it should be borne in mind that the principle of co-operation between the United States and Europe raises no difficulties and can be mutually profitable.

The Council has taken note with interest of the Assembly's recommendation and the proposals contained therein. However, it is not in a position, at this stage, to give precise and detailed replies.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th November 1984.

*Written questions 240, 244 and 247 to 251 and replies of the Council
to written questions 240, 244, 247 and 248*

QUESTION 240

*put by Mr. Bassinet
on 13th October 1983*

Since European co-operation in armaments matters is essential, can the Council give the Assembly information about the tripartite discussions between France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom in Paris on 21st September 1983?

Will co-operation in overall research and development be strengthened?

Is standardisation possible for NATO frigates, guided anti-tank weapons, helicopters and above all tactical combat aircraft?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 19th September 1984*

European co-operation on armaments is indeed essential.

1. This was the main subject discussed last year at the tripartite meeting of defence ministers. On that occasion, the ministers made a general survey of the situation and noted with interest the status of armaments co-operation, reaffirming their interest in the following: the European development of an advanced combat aircraft in the mid-nineties; the production in Europe of a multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS); third generation anti-tank missile programmes.

The Ministers also confirmed their strong interest in the development of emerging technologies in Europe as well as closer European industrial links.

2. Within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the European countries agreed to encourage co-operation on technologies and components, this being the only means of achieving increased collaboration on weapons systems in the future. This would involve the transfer of technologies among European countries and between the United States and Europe.

3. With respect to the NATO frigate programme for the nineties, a memorandum of

understanding for starting the feasibility studies has been signed between France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. These studies will enable the satisfactory level of standardisation to be achieved.

As for guided anti-tank weapons, the Defence Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and France have signed a memorandum of understanding relating to the definition phase of the third generation anti-tank weapons systems, including two concepts – one medium-range and the other long-range (with land-transported version and helicopter-launched version). The development phase will begin around the middle of 1985. Wider co-operation is being discussed to include Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece and Spain.

As regards tactical combat aircraft, the Council in their reply to written question 239 informed the Assembly of the procedure which has now been set in motion for intra-European co-operation in this area.

With respect to operational specifications, note should be taken of the particularly important work of the FINABEL group, which will allow work to be done on common bases as regards military requirements.

QUESTION 244

*put by Mr. Wilkinson
on 24th January 1984*

The European market for military flight simulators and training systems for the decade 1984-94 would amount to some \$8 billion – France \$286 million, Germany \$339 million, United Kingdom \$311 million – and further sizeable sums of money for Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands.

Would the Council promote a joint or at least co-ordinated effort by the countries concerned, not so much for existing basic needs but for new aircraft, helicopters and other weapons systems?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 6th July 1984*

1. Independently of the exact size of the European market for military flight simulators and training systems for the decade 1984-94, the Council would like to point out the following:

For many of the collaborative aircraft projects in which WEU member states have been involved, the related flight simulators have been purchased nationally. It is however important to point out that the financial incentives for collaboration on simulators are not so strong as for collaboration on aircraft because of the much less extensive development task, and the smaller quantities involved. Individual members moreover have different approaches to pilot training and this makes agreement on specifications rather difficult.

2. The Council agree that pooling of certain simulation facilities should however be encouraged in the context of future co-operation in the aeronautical field, but consider that the impetus for this will need to come from the European countries involved in particular projects.

QUESTION 247

*put by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
on 20th June 1984*

To ask the Council if, when replying to written questions, they will give the date of both the original question and the answer so that the members of the Assembly may see how long it has taken to reply.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 27th July 1984*

The Council is prepared to follow up this request. It would like to avail itself of this opportunity to point out that its concern to give substantial replies both to written questions from members of the Assembly and to recommendations adopted by the Assembly, as well as the principle of unanimity governing its work, involve extensive consultations that may take time.

At all events, the Council in the context of its current reflections on the reactivating of WEU – one of the main elements of which is the strengthening of the dialogue with the Assembly – is examining, inter alia, how the procedure for preparing its replies to recommendations and written questions might be improved.

QUESTION 248

*put by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
on 20th June 1984*

To ask the Council, based on the assumption that the workload of WEU remains unaltered, how much they estimate it would cost to co-locate all the organs of WEU on a first-year basis as well as for subsequent years.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 13th August 1984*

This matter has not yet been considered in the WEU Council. Conclusions regarding future activities of the organisation, now under review, must first be reached by member governments before any useful study of the administrative implications can be made.

QUESTION 249

*put by Mr. Hill
on 17th October 1984*

Is the Council aware that the Belgian Government is examining a contract for the sale of \$1 billion worth of nuclear equipment to Libya?

Why should Libya, with vast reserves of gas and oil and a small population, need a nuclear power plant?

Will the Council give the Belgian Government assurances that, if it decides not to accept this contract, no other Western European country will accept such a contract from Libya?

*
* *

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

QUESTION 250

*put by Mr. Wilkinson
on 22nd October 1984*

Is the Council aware of the passing of a nuclear attack submarine of the Soviet Union hidden behind a Soviet freighter through the Straits of Gibraltar on 19th September 1984 under water instead of surfacing and showing the flag?

Is such a passage acceptable to the coastal states of Spain and Morocco and according to the 1958 Geneva law of the sea convention?

*
* *

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

QUESTION 251

*put by Mr. Lenzer
on 27th October 1984*

Further to written question 240 of 17th October 1983 and the Council's reply of 19th September 1984, will the Council inform the Assembly on:

- (a) the progress of the proposed European fighter aircraft;
- (b) the bi- and trilateral plans of member governments on joint helicopter projects;
- (c) the development of new military transport aircraft;
- (d) the development of the second generation of European missiles;
- (e) the planning of "emerging technologies" in Europe, as adopted by the Conference of National Armaments Directors.

*
* *

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

Control of armaments and disarmament

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Pignion (Chairman); MM. Blaauw, Kittelmann (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alberini (Alternate: *Milani*), Amadei (Alternate: *Cifarelli*), *van den Bergh*, Bonnel, Bourges, Brown (Alternate: *Dr. Miller*), Cox (Alternate: *Lord Newall*), *Dejardin*, Ertl (Alternate: *Rumpf*), Galley, Gerstl (Alternate: *Klejdzinski*), *Giust*, *Sir Anthony Grant*, MM. Huyghues des Etages, Konen, *de Kwaadsteniet*, Lemmrich, Natiez, *Pecchioli*, Sarti, Scheer, *Sir Dudley Smith*, *Stevelyneck*, *Stokes*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Introductory Note

In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows:

13th August 1984 – Conference on Disarmament, Geneva:

H.E. Mr. Robert van Schaik, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations in Geneva, Head of Delegation; Mr. Jaap Ramaker, Counsellor, and Mr. Robert Jan Akkerman, First Secretary;

H.E. Mr. Rolf Ekeus, Ambassador, Head of Swedish Delegation;

H.E. Mr. Victor Issraelyan, Ambassador, Head of Soviet Delegation;

H.E. Mr. Ian Cromartie, Ambassador, Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation;

H.E. Mr. Qian Jiadong, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of China;

The Hon. Louis Fields Jnr., Ambassador, United States Representative to the Conference, and Mr. Emery, Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency;

H.E. Mr. Milos Vejvoda, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia;

Mr. Teodor Mescanu, Counsellor, Deputy Head of the Romanian Delegation.

The committee as a whole met in the Federal Republic of Germany from 15th-17th October 1984, where it was briefed by:

Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty

Mr. William Mahoney, Office of Public Affairs; Mr. Keith Bush, Director of Research, Radio Liberty; Ms. Elizabeth Teague and Dr. William Murphy, Radio Liberty Research and Analysis Department;

Ministry of Defence, Bonn

Dr. Manfred Wörner, Minister of Defence; Brigadier General Oppermann; Colonel Bromeis; Lt. Colonel Keller; Colonel Kellein;

Fighter-Bomber Wing 33, Büchel Air-Base

Colonel Helmut Borchers, Commander; Lt. Colonel Jürgen Stehli, Deputy Wing Commander; Major Schröder; Major Becker; Lt. Colonel Christoph Keitel, Commander Flight Support Group;

Headquarters Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), Brunssum, Netherlands

General L. Chalupa, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe; Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Beavis, Deputy Commander-in-Chief; Lt. General H. Depoorter, Chief of Staff; Lt. Colonel. L. Denniston, Intelligence Division; Major R. Boryer, Operations Division.

The committee subsequently met at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 8th November 1984 when it discussed the present report, which was adopted at a subsequent meeting on 3rd December 1984.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of parliament, officials, senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or met the committee and replied to questions.

The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation
on the control of armaments and disarmament

The Assembly,

- (i) Endorsing the Council's view expressed in the Rome Declaration that increased co-operation in WEU will also contribute to the maintenance of adequate military strength and political solidarity and, on that basis, to the pursuit of a more stable relationship between the countries of East and West by fostering dialogue and co-operation;
- (ii) Believing that negotiations on arms control and disarmament, such as those conducted in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, are too important for the security of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance to be made dependent entirely on the state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union;
- (iii) Welcoming, therefore, the inclusion of arms control and disarmament among the specific conditions of security in Europe on which the Council of Ministers will hold comprehensive discussions and seek to harmonise their views;
- (iv) Reiterating its view that it is impracticable, and indeed undesirable, to seek to establish a separate East-West balance in different categories of nuclear weapons – strategic, intermediate- or short-range – and that any such nuclear balance can be assessed only globally;
- (v) Believing, however, that actual negotiations on reducing present levels of nuclear weapons may best be pursued by such categories,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Seek agreement on the extent of verification measures necessary to provide adequate assurance of compliance with arms control agreements, in particular a chemical weapons ban, a comprehensive test ban, and MBFR reductions;
2. Agree common instructions to the representatives of those WEU countries participating in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva with a view to securing the early conclusion of agreements on a chemical weapons ban; a ban on space weapons, including anti-satellite systems or new ABM systems; and a comprehensive test ban;
3. Call simultaneously on the United States to ratify the threshold test ban treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty, and with the United Kingdom to resume the tripartite negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty;
4. Examine any constructive proposals from the Soviet Union linked with the early resumption of INF and START negotiations, not excluding a possible mutual temporary freeze on further deployments of INF and short-range nuclear weapons;
5. Instruct the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out specific studies to assist it in the foregoing tasks, and those identified in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. In considering its programme of work for 1984, the committee decided to report twice on the subject of arms control and disarmament, first in the spring on two international arms control conferences – the Conference on Disarmament which held its first session in Stockholm on 17th January 1984, and the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations, which have been continuing in Vienna for the last ten years¹, and secondly to report to the second part of the session on the status of the INF and START negotiations; and negotiations within the general framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, with particular reference to the prohibition of chemical weapons; the suspension of nuclear tests; and a ban on weapons in space.

1.2. The last part of 1984, during which there have been no bilateral arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, is not a propitious time to report on the subject. The presidential election year in the United States and the two changes in rapid succession in the leadership of the Soviet Union have had the combined effect of virtually freezing superpower relations in the area of arms control. It is significant that neither President Reagan nor President Chernenko has ever visited the other's country. Nevertheless, the two countries have, during the year, continued to participate in all multilateral arms control forums – the Conference on Disarmament and the MBFR talks on which the committee has already reported, as well as the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The two superpowers have also continued to meet bilaterally in Geneva in the Standing Consultative Commission, established under SALT I, and have agreed to improve the "hotline".

1.3. It is not possible at the present time, however, to see what changes there may be in the climate of relations between the two superpowers in 1985. Yet, arms control negotiations are too important for the security of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance to be made dependent entirely on the state of relations between the superpowers. Thus, in the opinion of the committee at the present time, the European members of the alliance must bear a far greater share of responsibility for maintain-

ing and developing relations with the Soviet Union and its allies, and if necessary in taking the initiative with specific proposals in certain fields at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva which could open the way to mutually advantageous agreements in the arms control field.

1.4. The report analyses the present status of the particular negotiations listed above and makes specific recommendations for further progress.

II. INF and START

2.1. There have been no bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva in either the INF or the START frameworks during 1984. The first cruise missile to be deployed in Europe arrived at Greenham Common in the United Kingdom on 14th November 1983; the first Pershing II missile arrived at the Ramstein air-base in Germany on 23rd November, for deployment at the Mutlangen base, and the Soviet negotiator left the INF talks in Geneva on the same day – the Soviet Union had consistently maintained that the talks would be suspended if NATO began deployment of the cruise and Pershing II missiles in accordance with the 1979 dual decision. On 27th November 1983 the first cruise missile to be deployed in Italy arrived at the Sigonella air-base in Italy for temporary deployment, pending the completion of the permanent base at Comiso in March 1984.

2.2. The Soviet Union had not previously linked the deployment of INF missiles in NATO countries in Europe with the START talks – successors to the earlier SALT talks – also being conducted in Geneva, and covering strategic missiles and bombers based in the United States and the Soviet Union or in submarines. As late as 2nd December 1983 cautiously optimistic statements were being made by the North Atlantic Council at permanent level following briefings by the United States START negotiator, Mr. Rowny, but at a press conference in Moscow on 5th December 1983 General Ogarkov, then Chief of Defence Staff of the Red Army, warned that the START talks were "heading in the same direction as INF". The Soviet negotiator left the Geneva talks on 8th December, without agreeing a date for their resumption, and a Tass communiqué issued afterwards stated that "the change in the global situation, linked with

¹ Control of armaments and disarmament, Document 972, 15th May 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. de Vries.

the commencement of the deployment of the new American missiles in Europe, obliges the Soviet Union to review all the questions under discussion" in Geneva. Intense Soviet efforts over four years to prevent the deployment of the NATO missiles had failed; after some hesitation the Kremlin leadership had clearly decided to suspend all bilateral arms control negotiations with the United States, at least during the year of the presidential election.

2.3. Overall, the rate of deployment of nuclear weapons by both the United States and the Soviet Union during 1984 has not significantly modified previous levels. Both sides have been progressively replacing older weapons systems with more modern – in the case of the United States, some Titan missiles and older models of the B-52 bomber have been withdrawn, while the fourth Ohio class ballistic missile submarine has entered service, with a further 24 Trident C-4 missiles, each with ten warheads. The Soviet Union has withdrawn the last of its SS-5 missiles and continued to replace SS-11s by SS-19s. A second Typhoon ballistic missile submarine with 20 SSN-20 missiles, each with nine warheads, has entered service. The United States has continued deployment of air-launched cruise missiles on its B-52 bombers and has now introduced on two of its nuclear-propelled attack submarines the first eight out of a planned total of 758 nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. The Soviet Union announced in an official Tass communiqué of 16th October that it had begun to deploy cruise missiles on strategic fighter bombers and submarines. Current data are given at Appendix IV.

2.4. As far as INF forces are concerned, since December 1983, the number of SS-20 missiles actually deployed by the Soviet Union has remained frozen at 378 with 1,134 warheads, reported in the Nuclear Planning Group communiqué of 7th April 1984. Of these, 243 missiles are within range of Europe. Official western sources, however, report that fourteen further SS-20 sites are under construction west of the Urals, and that there are a number of unoccupied sites in eastern Soviet Union. A clear difference of interpretation on this issue between the United States, on the one hand, and its European allies on the other, emerged from the meeting of NATO defence ministers in the Nuclear Planning Group, held at Stresa on 11th and 12th October. For the first time for a number of years, the communiqué did not state the numbers of SS-20 missiles deployed, but pointed out that "new SS-20 bases, east and west of the Ural mountains, are under construction which, when operational, will significantly increase the number of deployed SS-20 launchers". The United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. Weinberger, however, is reported as saying to journalists at the meeting

"... to my knowledge the number has increased ... there are additional SS-20 missiles since the January count that are ready and able to be shot"¹. The issue was further complicated by a statement attributed to a senior (United States) State Department official at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, following the Special Consultative Group meeting on 20th November. He was quoted as saying that numbers of SS-20s were "fluctuating" with new bases being built while some existing bases were converted to other uses, assumed to be for an experimental intercontinental missile, the SS-X-25. The question of numbers of SS-20s actually deployed is particularly significant in view of the Netherlands decision of 1st June referred to below.

2.5. There are of course other examples of attempts to influence public or parliamentary opinion through variations in assessments of the Soviet defence effort. On 14th June 1984 the United States Defence Intelligence Agency, at a background briefing in the Pentagon, issued an estimate claiming that Soviet expenditure on 170 weapons systems had increased by 5% and 10% over 1983 levels. At the same time, the Central Intelligence Agency declined to confirm the figure; the previous year it had revised downwards to 2% its earlier estimate that Soviet defence expenditure had been increasing at between 3% and 4% annually. The unattributable Pentagon briefing took place at a time when the Senate was due to vote on the defence budget, and the New York Times refused to send a reporter to it. As previously pointed out, the Assembly itself was informed by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, on 7th June 1983, that there were 2,100 SS-20 warheads. These were deployed on 351 launchers, with a second missile at each launch site. This contrasts with the official NATO estimate, in a Nuclear Planning Group communiqué of 23rd March 1983, that there were only 1,053 warheads and only 351 SS-20 launchers deployed. The Council, in reply to Written Question 235 on the subject, did not confirm SACEUR's estimate, reiterating that "the number of 351 operational SS-20 missiles was valid on 7th June 1983".

2.6. The Nuclear Planning Group communiqué of 12th October referred to above provided other qualitative information about Soviet nuclear developments: "Ministers expressed their concern that the Soviet nuclear build-up continues unabated at all levels. In the strategic field, the Soviet Union is pressing

1. Atlantic News, 17th October 1984. Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. The SS-22 is reported to have a range of 900 kilometres, and could be well within range of targets in Germany and the Benelux countries.

ahead with the development and testing of a wide range of new systems, including two intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, a new bomber, and a new generation of ground-, air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, which are expected to enter operational service in the near future. The communiqué also pointed out that SS-21 and SS-22 shorter-range nuclear missiles were being deployed in the German

2.7. Since the announcement at the end of 1983 of the deployment of the first 16 Pershing or cruise missiles in each of Germany, Italy and United Kingdom, it has apparently not been

official policy of these governments to announce further deployments under the 1979 decision, as and when they occur. From press reports and evidence given to Congress committees, it is known that deployment of Pershing II missiles continued fairly rapidly in Germany and that further cruise missiles had been deployed in the United Kingdom. On 20th November 1984, however, General Rogers, SACEUR, stated that 93 missiles were deployed, including 32 cruise missiles at Greenham Common and 45 Pershing II missiles. The present deployment status appears to be as follows:

NATO INF deployment schedule

Country	Base	Maximum levels agreed in 1979		Status of deployment November 1984
		Pershing II	Cruise missiles	
Belgium	Florennes	—	48	Preparatory work begun to permit deployment from March 1985, subject to government decision
Germany	Mutlangen	36	—	36 deployed
	Heilbronn	36	—	9 deployed
	Neu Ulm	36	—	Due later in 1984
	Bitburg	—	96	Due in 1986
Italy	Comiso	—	112	16 deployed
Netherlands	Woensdrecht	—	48	Due in 1986 subject to decision on 1st November 1985
United Kingdom	Greenham Common	—	96	32 deployed
	Molesworth	—	64	Due in 1988
Totals		108	464	

2.8. Deployment of cruise missiles in Belgium is not due until 1986, but preparatory work has begun at the Florennes base; the government has stated that it will review the deployment decision on a six-monthly basis in the light of any progress that may be made in arms control negotiations, and that deployment could begin in March 1985 if the government so decided.

2.9. On 1st June 1984 the Netherlands Government took a special decision on INF deployment in the Netherlands under the terms of the 1979 decision¹. The government decided in essence that, in the event of an agreement being reached between the United States and

the Soviet Union on the deployment of a number of INF weapons in Western Europe, the Netherlands would accept its share of such weapons. The dates of deployment of missiles in the Netherlands under the 1979 decision were, however, postponed, but not beyond the final date of deployment in the Netherlands. The cabinet will take a decision on 1st November 1985 on numbers to be deployed in the Netherlands and submit a bill to parliament on 1st January 1986. If no agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on deployment of missiles has been reached by 1st November 1985, and if the Soviet Union then has deployed a greater number of SS-20 missiles than were deployed on 1st June 1984 (i.e. 378), then the Netherlands will agree to

1. Full text at Appendix I.

deploy its full share of 48 cruise missiles. The government decision is understood to imply that if the number of deployed SS-20 missiles is not increased beyond the present 378, then there would be no requirement to deploy any cruise missiles in the Netherlands.

2.10. The Nuclear Planning Group communiqué of 12th October 1984 referred to above reiterates the language of previous communiqués according to which: "Ministers repeated their willingness to reverse, halt or modify the LRINF deployment – including the removal and dismantling of missiles already deployed – upon achievement of a balanced, equitable and verifiable agreement calling for such action". When it withdrew from the INF talks on November 1983, the Soviet Union asserted that they could not be resumed until NATO removed the missiles it had begun to deploy. Because the Soviet leaders had not recently reiterated that condition, there had been speculation that it might be dropped in favour of the Soviet proposal for a quantitative and qualitative freeze on all nuclear weapons at their present levels – a proposal reiterated by President Chernenko in his interview with the Washington Post, published on 17th October, when he said:

"...the Soviet proposal that the nuclear powers freeze quantitatively and qualitatively all nuclear weapons at their disposal also remains valid. Agreement on this matter would mean mutual cessation of the build-up of all components of the existing nuclear arsenals, including delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads. The nuclear arms race would thus be stopped. This would radically facilitate further agreements on reductions in and eventually complete elimination of such weapons. The White House still has before it our official proposal that the Soviet Union and the United States initially agree to freeze their nuclear weapons, thus setting an example for other nuclear powers..."

However, the withdrawal of NATO's INF missiles as a precondition to a resumption of INF talks was reiterated by a Soviet spokesman in October. But on 23rd November a joint statement issued in Moscow and Washington said:

"The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to enter into new negotiations with the objective of reaching mutually-acceptable agreements on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer space arms. In order to reach a common understanding as to the subject and objectives of such negotiations, Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Foreign

Minister Andrei A. Gromyko will meet in Geneva on 7th and 8th January 1985."

Mr. Chernenko's comments on 26th November made during the visit to Moscow by the British Labour Party leader Mr. Kinnock, but released by Tass, said specifically that the Soviet Union wanted to start negotiations on "... reduction of strategic nuclear weapons" but did not mention preconditions.

2.11. It is nearly five years since NATO, on 12th December 1979, announced its dual decision concerning what it was then calling "long-range theatre nuclear forces". The main provisions of the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the special meeting of foreign and defence ministers is worth recalling. The communiqué announced that 572 United States nuclear missiles would be deployed in Europe, and:

"As an integral part of TNF modernisation, 1,000 United States nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible ... The 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level."

The communiqué stressed the importance of arms control and supported the United States decision to negotiate LRTNF limitations with the Soviet Union along the following lines:

A. Any future limitations on United States systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems.

B. Limitation on United States and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach.

C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on United States and Soviet land-based long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable."

The communiqué concluded that:

"A. A modernisation decision, including a commitment to deployments, is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defence needs, to provide a credible

response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF.

B. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet build-up can enhance alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF requirements, and promote stability and détente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defence and détente as enunciated in the Harmel report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations."

The communiqué stressed the importance of arms control and SALT II:

"8. Ministers regard arms control as an integral part of the alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member states and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard they welcomed the contribution which the SALT II treaty makes towards achieving these objectives."

2.12. A fundamental premise of the December 1979 decision was that the SALT II treaty, signed on 18th June 1979 after seven years of negotiations, would very shortly enter into force, leading to the opening of SALT III talks for which it made provision. In practice substantive INF talks between the United States and the Soviet Union began only on 30th November 1981 – nearly two years after the INF decision.

2.13. Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments have endorsed both aspects of the NATO dual decision on a number of occasions. At the same time, the reports have made a number of specific points about the INF situation. First, it is not meaningful to attempt to measure the balance, or lack of balance, of INF systems in Europe in isolation. Any Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons which are within range of the capitals or major industrial areas of the European NATO countries are "strategic", as far as those countries are concerned. Secondly, many of the Soviet SS-11 and SS-19 ICBMs, counted in the strategic weapons category, have been specifically designed and deployed so that they can be fired at targets in Europe as well as in the United States. Thirdly, there is considerable uncertainty as to which classes of aircraft should or should not be included in any theatre balance. Certainly carrier-borne aircraft are so counted by the Soviet Union. Deterrence, in any case, must rely on the existence of the whole range

of nuclear weapons available to the West so as to avoid any suggestion of "decoupling" United States strategic nuclear forces from the defence of Europe; European security would not be enhanced if the Soviet Union were led to believe that at a particular level of conflict NATO retaliation would be limited to the use of nuclear weapons actually based in Europe.

2.14. Where specific negotiations on arms limitations are concerned, however, the committee has supported the view that agreement can be facilitated by attempting to negotiate specific packages limited to more narrowly-defined categories of weapons system. Although the INF and START negotiations cannot be viewed in isolation, for many reasons it makes good sense to attempt to negotiate separately on possible mutual reductions in each category of weapons system.

2.15. As far as the British and French nuclear forces are concerned, the Soviet Union has repeatedly sought to include them in negotiations on INF forces, while the United States, in agreement with its NATO allies, has as consistently refused to take them into consideration. The committee has always endorsed the view that while United States and Soviet nuclear weapons remain at their present very high levels, there can be no question of negotiating reductions in the relatively small levels of nuclear weapons controlled autonomously by two European governments. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the Soviet Union must count the levels of British and French nuclear forces in its own assessment of the threat, and they inevitably form part of the overall assessment of levels of nuclear weapons. With the introduction of multiple independently-targeted warheads on the submarine-launched ballistic missiles of these countries at a later date, their significance in the numbers game will increase. The Trident D-5 missile which is scheduled to be fitted to United Kingdom submarines in the mid-1990s can carry ten MIRVs. Although the United Kingdom has stated that it is not its intention to deploy this number of warheads on its submarines, from an arms control standpoint there will be difficult problems of verification if the Soviet Union is to be given assurances concerning the actual numbers deployed.

III. Space

3.1. While the committee was being briefed in the Pentagon on 23rd March 1983, President Reagan made a televised speech on defence spending and defensive technology about which the committee learned later from the press. The senior officials and officers briefing the commit-

tee, and indeed the ministers attending the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, which happened to be meeting the same day, do not appear to have had any prior knowledge of the speech. Suggesting a research and development programme on defensive systems against ballistic missiles, the President said "I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete".

3.2. Dubbed star wars by the media, these proposals, which had not been studied by the Department of Defence at the time they were made, have since been presented as the strategic defence initiative (SDI) for which \$2 billion is being budgeted in financial year 1985. This programme is running in parallel with a space defence programme to provide an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability, for which \$226 million is being budgeted in financial year 1985. President Reagan's star wars speech was not directed to the space defence programme, but the SDI and ASAT programmes, although presented as distinct, have to be considered together for four reasons:

- (i) they have inevitably been confused in the public mind;
- (ii) both could involve weapons systems based on satellites in outer-space;
- (iii) some of the technology is common to both: in particular, the United States Defence Department is reporting as anti-ballistic missile tests the testing of certain anti-satellite weapons systems, because Congress introduced an amendment in 1983 preventing the administration from attacking any point in space with an ASAT test¹;
- (iv) both the SDI and ASAT research and development programmes have a parallel impact, both on western defence strategy and, most important as far as this report is concerned, on arms control policy and negotiations.

The 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union remains at the present time the only arms control agreement between these two countries concern-

1. See interview with Dr. Richard L. Garwin of the IBN Thomas J. Watson Research Centre in CLSW, 24th June 1984. The United States launched a missile from the Kwajalein missile range on 10th June 1984, which successfully destroyed in flight a ballistic missile warhead fired from Vandenberg air force base. This weapon would not be capable of destroying enemy ballistic missiles under operational conditions, but could be used to destroy satellites because their orbits are predictable.

ing strategic weapons which is actually in force. While research and development is permitted under the terms of the treaty, it would have to be abrogated before ABM weapons were deployed.

3.3. The present SDI programme is a long-term research and development programme:

"...previous programmes emphasised point defence systems that would protect selected military targets by intercepting re-entry vehicles in the terminal phase of their flight. The new strategic defence initiative programme is designed to examine the feasibility of a system that could engage ballistic missiles and warheads along their entire launch to impact trajectories ... Major research efforts will be required in directed energy weapons, conventional weapons, and surveillance and target acquisition systems. An essential element of the programme is the early demonstration of key technologies needed for an effective ballistic missile defence."²

Decisions on the development of actual ballistic missile defences are not planned until the 1990s.

3.4. The ASAT programme is more advanced, at least as far as low-level satellites are concerned.

"The centre-piece of our ASAT programme is the air-launched miniature vehicle, which is designed to be launched from F-15s (aircraft). Successful completion of this programme will give us the means of destroying Soviet satellites orbiting at low altitudes, thereby enhancing deterrence against Soviet use of ASAT weapons. ... For the long run, we are assessing in conjunction with SDI the feasibility of advanced technologies, such as space-based lasers for ASAT missions."³

Technical criticism

3.5. Previous United States administrations had continued basic research into ABM systems, knowing that the Soviet Union did not have an operational capability beyond the one rather

2. United States Secretary of Defence annual report to the Congress, fiscal year 1985, 1st February 1984, pages 192 and 193.

3. *Idem.* smallest of which would have an explosive yield ten times that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. To counter such a system, the Soviet Union, for a fraction of the cost of the ballistic missile defence, could, with existing technology, multiply ten-fold the numbers of warheads and possible decoys in order to swamp any defensive systems.

primitive ABM site permitted under the 1972 ABM treaty. Department of Defence reports had drawn attention to Soviet development of directed energy systems (both of lasers as well as of particle beams), but had concluded that, in the present state of basic research, such devices could not be developed as satisfactory weapons systems, and that the Soviet Union was wasting its money on the development it was then undertaking. Even after President Reagan's March 1983 speech, the President's Commission on Strategic Forces (known as the Scowcroft Commission), reporting in April that year on strategic missile systems in general, concluded that:

"applications of current technology offer no real promise of being able to defend the United States against massive nuclear attack in this century ... no ABM technologies appear to combine practicality, survivability, low cost, and technical effectiveness sufficient to justify proceeding beyond the stage of technology development."

3.6. The United States administration is not now claiming that the SDI could make nuclear weapons obsolete as the President originally said, but suggests that it might be possible to develop a defence which would reduce the weight of a missile attack – however, it remains impossible to guess at the percentage of attacking missiles that might be destroyed. Even if 90% of existing Soviet strategic missile warheads could be destroyed, that would still leave some 770 which would strike targets in the United States, the

Strategic impact

3.7. Critics of the SDI have feared that, apart from its possible effect of stimulating further increases in present offensive strategic forces, it could prove destabilising if it heightened the advantage of surprise attack. Moreover, as there is far less chance of providing ABM defence for Europe because of the very short flight times for Soviet missiles fired against Europe, present fears that the United States might be developing "war fighting" nuclear capability, as opposed to a deterrent capability, would be heightened if the United States were seen to be seeking to acquire for itself immunity to nuclear attack. Soviet fears of a pre-emptive strike on its land-based ICBMs could be heightened because a 90% effective ABM system might seem attractive if Soviet missile forces were first reduced by such an attack.

3.8. The ASAT programme itself could have a destabilising impact on strategic relationships, because military satellites are used essentially for surveillance and communications – both

vital for providing advance information of an adversary's activities and hence stabilising in their effects. The capability to destroy stabilising systems can only in itself be destabilising, increasing the advantages of surprise attack.

Impact on arms control

3.9. As with multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), the problem of verifying the existence of ABM systems or ASAT systems may well be insoluble if such weapons are deployed. Development testing of these systems, however, is readily observable by an adversary through his national technical means – both radar and radio intercept, as well as satellite observation. It should therefore be possible to reach an arms control agreement to ban such weapons systems before development testing has gone too far, but impossible thereafter. The value of the introduction of MIRVs for western security is now in considerable doubt. From the first nuclear stalemate of about 1970 when the United States had some 1,700 single warhead strategic missiles compared with the Soviet Union's 1,500, the deployment of MIRVs by the United States led through a brief four years of overwhelming superiority with 7,300 United States warheads, to renewed stalemate in 1980, by which time the Soviet Union had deployed 6,300 MIRVs. The opportunity to stop MIRVs through arms control had been abandoned in the late 1960s, partly because United States expenditure on the systems had become too large to be stopped. Budget requests for the SDI and ASAT programmes for financial year 1985 already exceed \$2 billion, of which \$53 million is to be spent on actual procurement of ASAT systems. Projects of this magnitude in the United States rapidly become politically unstoppable when production contracts are spread over factories throughout the country, and in themselves generate domestic opposition to possible arms control agreements.

European attitudes

3.10. Mr. Wörner, the German Defence Minister, has perhaps been the most outspoken governmental critic of the SDI. France, in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament described in the following section, has called for negotiations to ban space weapons systems. In an interview with *La Croix* on 11th July, the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Cheysson, said: "We want the prohibition of arms based in space or capable of destroying satellites or missiles in space." The Netherlands representative to the Conference on Disarmament has adopted a very similar position.

Arms control negotiations

3.11. The agenda item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" has been discussed in the

forty-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, but little concrete progress has been made. No agreement has been reached on a mandate for an ad hoc committee to deal with this subject. A joint western proposal limited such a mandate to purely exploratory and verification issues, without powers to negotiate a draft treaty; other countries demanded powers to negotiate the treaty, as for example the existing ad hoc committees on chemical weapons and radiological weapons are doing. It is clear from discussions in Geneva that the restricted western proposals were at United States urging. On 2nd April, President Reagan sent a report to Congress with an accompanying letter saying that the government would proceed with the development of an anti-satellite missile system, and that it was not considered productive to engage in formal international negotiations to ban such weapons until practical solutions had been found to verification and related problems. While the United States was ready to examine these problems in a working group in the Conference on Disarmament, that group should not have authority to negotiate.

3.12. In the Conference on Disarmament on 20th March the Soviet Union tabled a draft treaty on "the prohibition of the use of force in outer space, and from space, against the earth" which would ban the placing of weapons in orbit or on celestial bodies designed to destroy objects on earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space. The treaty would also prohibit any interference with space objects belonging to other states, and would prohibit the testing, production or possession of any anti-satellite systems. It would also prohibit the use of manned spacecraft for any military purpose. The draft treaty makes no reference to anti-satellite ballistic missile systems as such, or to directed energy systems.

3.13. President Chernenko, in his Washington Post interview of 17th October quoted above, said:

"We are ready to proceed with negotiations, with a view to working out and concluding an agreement to prevent the militarisation of outer space, including complete renunciation of anti-satellite systems, with a mutual moratorium – to be established from the date of the beginning of the talks – on testing and deployment of space weapons ..."

3.14. France, in a major statement to the conference on 12th June, called on all countries concerned, but in the first place the United States and the Soviet Union, to engage in multilateral negotiations on the properly verified limitation of new anti-ballistic technologies, which would prohibit both new anti-ballistic missiles systems as well as anti-satellite systems,

directed energy systems and particle-beam systems. France called in particular for:

- (i) the strict limitation of anti-satellite systems, including the prohibition of any that could reach satellites in high orbit;
- (ii) the prohibition, for a renewable period of five years, of the deployment or testing anywhere of directed energy systems capable of destroying ballistic missiles or satellites;
- (iii) the strengthening of the existing system for registering objects in space (established by the convention of 14th June 1975) so as to improve the possibility of verification; and
- (iv) an undertaking by the United States and the Soviet Union to extend to the satellites of third countries the provisions concerning immunity of certain space objects on which they have already agreed bilaterally.

3.15. In his speech to the Conference on Disarmament on 24th July 1984, the Netherlands representative proposed an analysis of existing international law in order to ascertain to what extent it already restricted the military use of outer space. He continued:

"The conference should, on a priority basis, focus attention on the issues raised by the development of anti-satellite weapon systems, in particular on the prohibition of the testing, development and use of specific anti-satellite weapons systems ... An agreement which comprehensively bans all means of anti-satellite warfare appears to be impossible. Residual ASAT capacities of certain space systems are amongst the main obstacles. We have to look for a combination of verifiable and co-operative elements in a future agreement, which would prevent anti-satellite warfare from any longer being an effective military option. In the Netherlands' view negotiated constraints on ASAT would be greatly preferable to a totally unrestrained ASAT competition ... Intensive research efforts are taking place in the field of ballistic missile defence, including space-based systems. The process could, if carried beyond the present stage of feasibility research, have far-reaching implications for arms control and stability. We therefore very much hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will reach agreement to hold further talks on that subject too."

3.16. During his talks in Geneva, your Rapporteur obtained the impression that representatives

of the European NATO countries widely shared the French view and recognised that the proposals went beyond the restricted terms of reference for an ad hoc committee on space that the western countries had proposed.

3.17. President Chernenko, in June this year, called in general terms for the negotiation of a treaty to ban the use of anti-satellite weapons. Then, on 29th June, a Tass statement announced that the Soviet Union had proposed bilateral negotiations with the United States, to begin in Vienna on 18th September, designed to block the development and deployment of all space weapons, including the renunciation of anti-satellite systems. The statement said it would mean banning weapons of any kind, "conventional, nuclear, laser-beam or any other", and proposed a reciprocal moratorium on the testing and deployment of space weapons from the opening of the talks.

3.18. The committee notes that the Soviet Union is reported to have had some anti-satellite capabilities against near-earth orbits since 1971 with interceptors based at two launch pads at Tyuratam¹.

3.19. The United States, in its reply on 1st July, agreed to meet with the Soviet Union for the following purposes:

- "(i) to discuss and define mutually agreeable arrangements under which negotiations on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons can be resumed, and
- (ii) to discuss and seek agreement on feasible negotiating approaches which could lead to verifiable and effective limitations on anti-satellite weapons."

The Soviet Union did not accept the condition of resuming discussion of intermediate-range and strategic nuclear weapons at such talks, and appeared to back away from its initiative amid speculation in the West of lack of clear leadership in Moscow. The joint United States and Soviet statement of 23rd November agreed to a meeting of foreign ministers at Geneva on 7th or 8th January 1985 to discuss the objectives of new talks on nuclear and space weapons (text quoted in paragraph 2.10).

3.20. The committee considers that arms control negotiations on space weapons of all kinds should be pursued actively in the multilateral framework of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and that the WEU Council could

well turn its attention to this issue and urge that agreed common instructions be sent to the representatives of the WEU countries which are members of conference – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

IV. *Comprehensive test ban*

4.1. The first item on the 1984 agenda of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament was "nuclear test ban". As in the case of space weapons, however, and for similar reasons, no agreement has been reached on the mandate of an ad hoc committee on the subject. The United States, with the support so far of the western countries, has proposed a mandate limited to discussing methods of verification, whereas the Soviet Union and its allies and the twenty-one non-aligned countries want a mandate that would permit an ad hoc committee to negotiate the text of a treaty. The United States has stated, however, that its nuclear weapons modernisation programme will continue to require test explosions. The United Kingdom has not made such a statement.

4.2. The partial test ban treaty of 1963 has probably been the single most successful arms control agreement concluded since world war II. It bans all nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space or under water – i.e. in all environments other than under ground. 112 countries are parties to it, including all the nuclear weapon powers except France and China, and these two countries in recent years have complied with it in practice, in that since 1974 and 1980 respectively they have conducted only underground tests.

4.3. Discussion and negotiations on the banning of underground tests have continued sporadically since 1963. On 3rd July 1974, Presidents Nixon and Brezhnev signed a bilateral agreement prohibiting nuclear tests of a yield in excess of 150 kilotons, and providing for verification by national technical means and the exchange of relevant data between the parties. This threshold test ban treaty has not been ratified by the United States, and the present administration has sought to reopen negotiations with the Soviet Union to seek further methods of verification. While both parties have said they are complying with the provisions of the treaty, the United States has claimed that certain Soviet underground nuclear explosions have fallen within a dubious range near the 150-kiloton threshold.

4.4. On 28th May 1976, Presidents Ford and Brezhnev signed a further bilateral treaty banning peaceful nuclear explosions with a

1. According to United States Department of Defence publication, Soviet military power, April 1984, page 34.

yield exceeding 150 kilotons, and providing for verification by national technical means, and the access to sites of explosions in specified cases. Like the threshold treaty, the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty has not been ratified by the United States.

4.5. Since 1976, in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, an ad hoc group of experts has been working on the possibilities of verifying nuclear explosions through an international seismic network, and has agreed that events producing seismic waves of magnitude 4 or more would be detected with high probability of about 90%. A United Kingdom paper suggests seismic signals of magnitude 4.5 would be produced by nuclear explosions as low as 3 kilotons in close contact with hard materials, or of 30 kilotons in soft materials. The paper concludes, however, that if a sufficiently large cavity can be created in a suitable geologic formation, an explosion of up to 300 kilotons could be conducted before a seismic wave of such magnitude was produced. The paper does not state the size of the cavity that would be required to produce this degree of "decoupling", and other international scientific opinion has held that the 150-kiloton threshold of the bilateral treaty referred to above can be readily detected by existing seismic means.

4.6. For three years from 1977 to July 1980, tripartite negotiations were conducted by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States on a comprehensive test ban treaty which, in the words of the agreed tripartite report of 30th July 1980, "made considerable progress in negotiating the treaty". It was agreed that a treaty would ban all nuclear weapon testing and would be accompanied by a protocol laying down conditions under which nuclear explosions would be conducted for peaceful purposes. Verification would include national technical means; an international exchange of seismic data; and the right of the three parties to establish their own seismic stations on the territories of the other two. On-site inspection of dubious events would be permitted with the agreement of the party on whose territory the event had occurred. The tripartite report concluded as follows:

"The three negotiating parties ... believe that their trilateral negotiations offer the best way forward. They are determined ... to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion."

4.7. It is understood that, at the time they were suspended, the tripartite talks had come close to final agreement. The outstanding issues related to the duration of the treaty; the numbers of seismic stations the three parties would be entitled to install on the territory of

the other two; and details of facilities to be accorded to observers conducting on-site inspections. Since the date of the tripartite report these negotiations have not been resumed. The Soviet Union has proposed their resumption on a number of occasions and it is believed that the United Kingdom would have no objection to a resumption if the United States agreed. In his 17th October interview with the Washington Post, President Chernenko said:

"... There is a real opportunity to finalise the agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Should there be no such tests, these weapons will not be improved, which will put the brakes on the nuclear arms race. Here, too, the United States could prove in deeds the sincerity of its declarations in favour of nuclear arms limitations. The United States can also prove it by ratifying the Soviet-American treaties on underground nuclear explosions. These treaties were signed as far back as 1974 and 1976...."

4.8. Under the terms of the non-proliferation treaty a review conference of that treaty is due to be held in 1985; under Article VI the parties to that treaty undertake "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament ...". The committee believes it to be vitally important for the nuclear weapons powers to be able to show evidence of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament when the review conference convenes. The committee calls for the ratification of the bilateral threshold test ban treaty and peaceful nuclear explosions treaty, and for the resumption of the tripartite talks on a comprehensive test ban. That failing, an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament should be enabled to negotiate a draft treaty on a comprehensive test ban – Sweden has already tabled such a draft in 1977 and a revised version on 14th June 1983.

V. Chemical weapons

5.1. Public attention has recently been drawn to the subject of chemical weapons through the use of nerve and mustard gas by Iraq against Iran early in 1984. An international investigating team of four experts from Australia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, appointed by the United Nations Secretary General, reported unanimously on 27th March that both a blister gas – sulphur mustard – and a nerve gas – tabun – had been used in Iran. The team spent six days in Iran, visited the war zone, and examined 47 wounded in hospital, 12 cadavers,

and unexploded bombs and shells on the battlefield. Although the experts' report did not name Iraq as the user of the weapons on the grounds that the experts were not present at the time the weapons were used, Iraq has not denied its use of chemical weapons.

5.2. The unambiguity and unanimity of this authoritative international report contrasts sharply with the confusion which exists over United States allegations during 1982 and 1983 of the use of trichothecene mycotoxins (yellow rain) by Vietnamese and Lao forces in Kampuchea and Laos¹. The report of the United Nations investigating team led by Major General Ismat al-Ezz of Egypt, published on 8th December 1982, was unable to confirm or refute the United States allegations. The team did not secure access to the territory of Kampuchea or Laos, but visited refugee camps along the Thai border with the two countries in the autumn of that year. The international scientific community has been divided or sceptical on the issue. The Australian chemical warfare defence laboratories at Maribyrnong issued a report in August 1983 claiming that yellow rain samples were "the excrement of bees (or other pollen-eating insects)". Trichothecene toxins are the natural products of certain moulds and scientific papers have been found dating from the 1930s reporting the natural occurrence of such toxins in the area, although the United States reports claim that the particular variety of Trichothecene-2 does not naturally occur in the region.

5.3. Trichothecene mycotoxins do not appear among the lists of bacteriological or chemical warfare agents approved for arms control purposes by the Council of WEU, or listed in the United Nations report of 1969: "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use". On military grounds it is not immediately obvious why, as is alleged, the Soviet Union should have supplied such toxins for use as chemical warfare agents, when it is known to have stocks of nerve gas which the military authorities from experiments on proving grounds in the Soviet Union would regard as a more effective chemical agent. During 1984 the United States does not appear to have reiterated its allegations concerning yellow rain.

5.4. There has been less extensive international comment on allegations made prior to 1983 of the use of chemical warfare agents by Soviet forces in Afghanistan. It appears possible that either phosphorous weapons – used in

world war II for generating smoke screens – or incapacitants such as tear gas have been used there, but there have been fewer such reports in the last two years.

5.5. As far as NATO and Warsaw Pact countries are concerned, all are parties to the 1925 Geneva protocol prohibiting gas and bacteriological warfare, but this protocol does not ban the possession or stockpiling of such weapons, and most parties have entered reservations, reserving the right to use them in retaliation against their use by an enemy. It amounts to a "no first use" commitment. The United States acceded to the protocol on these terms in 1975. All these countries are parties also to the 1972 Bacteriological Warfare Convention², which bans both use and possession of such weapons, but makes no provision for verification.

5.6. While international agreements in force do not therefore ban possession of chemical weapons at the present time, it seems clear that among the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries such weapons are stockpiled only by the United States and the Soviet Union. Although France, among the NATO countries, appears to maintain its policy of not making public statements as to whether or not it possesses any stock of chemical weapons, the language of annual reports from the WEU Council, slightly modified in the section concerning chemical weapons since reports of the committee drew attention to possible ambiguity, appear to rule out that possibility. The report for 1983, communicated to the Assembly on 2nd March 1984, states:

"... the Agency for the Control of Armaments asked the member states, in the covering letter to its questionnaire, to declare any chemical weapons that they might hold, whatever their origins. Since all the member states replied in the negative, the Agency carried out no quantitative controls of chemical weapons in 1983."

5.7. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, that country has persistently refused to confirm or deny that it possesses stocks of chemical weapons. There is, however, well documented evidence that it does, including the known transfer of a world war II nerve gas production plant from Germany to the Soviet Union at the end of the war, and other evidence of trials of chemical weapons in certain proving grounds in the Soviet Union. Evidence about the actual size of Soviet chemical weapon stocks, however, is tenuous and, in many cases, suspect. Prior to its 1969 decision to cease production of chemical

1. For a summary of reports on the subject see SIPRI Yearbook 1984, Chapter 9, "Chemical and biological warfare: developments in 1983".

2. France acceded to this convention on 17th September 1984, having reversed its earlier policy of non-accession.

weapons, the United States consistently claimed that the Soviet chemical weapons stockpile was enormous, amounting to one-fifth or one-sixth of the total ammunition stockpile¹. Following its 1969 decision, the United States abandoned such claims and information appears to have been provided to the press to show that they had been exaggerated. The committee's rapporteur, in March 1980, in a briefing in the Pentagon, was informed merely that the Soviet chemical stockpiles were "sufficient for their requirements"².

5.8. In recent years, following the decision of the United States administration to produce binary chemical weapons (not yet finally authorised by Congress), claims have been renewed that there is a large Soviet chemical weapons stockpile, but authoritative quantitative information is lacking. The United States publication *Soviet military power*, in its latest 1984 edition, claims merely that "the amount of agents, weapons and matériel in storage at these military depots for chemical weapons has increased significantly since the late 1960s". The fiscal year 1985 annual report to Congress by the Secretary of Defence, dated 1st February 1984, is similarly imprecise: "The Soviet Union possesses a considerable advantage in chemical warfare capabilities ...". Such quantitative statements concerning the Soviet chemical stockpile as are made from time to time by official spokesmen of NATO governments have ranged from 30,000 (somewhat less than the United States stockpile) tons to 700,000 tons, the most commonly used figure in the last two years being 300,000 tons. No definition has been associated with these figures to show whether they refer to the quantity of chemical agent contained within ammunition, or to the total weight of ammunition containing chemical agents. It is believed that the figure of 300,000 tons has been derived by intelligence sources from arbitrary assumptions as to the proportion of the Soviet ammunition stockpile that is likely to consist of chemical weapons. The figure would relate to the weight of ammunition, not to the weight of contained chemical agent which, in most weapons, will be a fraction of the total weapon weight.

5.9. The committee can only conclude that the existence of a chemical weapon stockpile in the Soviet Union is well established, but that there is no reliable evidence to show whether that stockpile is greater or less than the present United States stockpile. Certainly production of

1. The evidence is reviewed in the committee's report on nuclear, biological and chemical protection, Rapporteur: Mr. Banks, Document 838, 29th April 1980. See explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 2.50 et seq.

2. *Idem.* Paragraph 2.50.

chemical weapons in the Soviet Union appears to have continued after the United States ceased their production in 1969.

United States

5.10. In contrast to the secrecy of the Soviet Union there is official information concerning United States stockpiles of chemical weapons which consist of mustard gas and two nerve gases – GB (sarin) and VX. Nerve gases in particular were in full-scale production up to 1968. As noted above, production of all chemical weapons was stopped in the United States in 1969 when President Nixon announced a new policy renouncing the first use of chemical weapons. Although the United States does not appear to have published details of its stocks by type of agent and location, a good deal of evidence has been given to Congress over the years and the committee has previously published the following academic estimate:

United States stockpile of chemical warfare agents³
(thousands of tons)

	Nerve gas	Mustard gas
Total stockpile	16-18	16-18
In bulk storage	2-5	11-16
Contained in filled munitions	11-16	2-5
Stored in United States	11-16	16-18
Stored in Germany	2-4	Nil

5.11. The munitions filled with this chemical agent are believed to include projectiles for 105 mm, 155 mm and 8 in cannon, rockets, land mines and aircraft spray tanks and bombs.

5.12. It remains United States policy to reserve the right to use chemical weapons in retaliation against such use by an adversary. The latest report to Congress by the Secretary of Defence states: "However, our current aging stocks of chemical weapons, produced in the 1950s and 1960s, no longer constitute an adequate deterrent, primarily due to obsolete means of delivery". The problem appears to be not deterioration of the chemical agents themselves, but the fact that some of the weapons systems

3. Source: Should NATO keep chemical weapons? A framework for considering policy alternatives, J.P. Perry Robinson, Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, August 1977. Figures converted to metric tons.

which would fire the ammunition produced twenty years ago are being withdrawn from service. This may be the case with the 105 mm artillery ammunition. Plant is now being constructed for the production of "binary" nerve gas ammunition, both 155 mm shells for GB agent, and "Bigeye" aircraft bombs to be filled with VX. Considered safer to stockpile, binary ammunition would contain two or more comparatively non-poisonous chemical agents which would mix only as the round was fired so as to produce a toxic agent on arrival at the target. However, Congress has not so far authorised actual production of binary weapons, despite several conflicting votes in both the Senate, the House of Representatives and in House-Senate conference.

NATO policy

5.13. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Bernard Rogers, at a press conference given during manoeuvres in Germany on 21st September, said that United States chemical weapons stocks in America and Europe were approaching obsolescence. He urged the production of modern chemical weapons. In particular, he sought clarification of the political controls to be exercised over the use of such weapons:

"We need to strengthen the political voice, I think. Because if they have assigned me the responsibility to retaliate in kind if chemical weapons have been used against us, I want to be sure that the political authorities play the key rôle in the release of these weapons ..."¹.

At the same time, Mr. Michael Heseltine, British Secretary of State for Defence, said he knew there was a "military preoccupation" with chemical weapons, but said the British Government's first priority was to negotiate a ban and to impress on the Soviet Union the urgency of an agreement: "We do not simply take military judgment into account."²

Negotiations on a chemical weapons ban

5.14. In the late 1970s there were bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the prohibition of chemical weapons on which a joint report was submitted to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in 1980. The talks were subsequently broken off by the United States. Since then, the subject has been discussed in the conference as a whole, and an ad hoc working group has considered

the basic provisions to be included in a treaty. By the end of 1983 some consensus had been reached on fundamental provisions, including the listing of chemicals which should be forbidden and those that should be permitted for industrial purposes; the concept of destruction of existing stocks of weapons; and the recognition of the need for proper verification, including the right of inspection by challenge. The Soviet Union had conceded the right of continual inspection of the process of destruction of stocks. At the beginning of the 1984 session the Conference on Disarmament was expected to make substantial progress on a chemical weapons ban, and converted its ad hoc working group on the subject into an ad hoc committee responsible for drafting an appropriate treaty.

5.15. The problem of verification of chemical weapons is a particularly difficult one because the nerve gases are closely related to the organo-phosphorous compounds used in insecticides, factories for the production of which are distributed widely in many countries.

5.16. On 15th April the United States Vice-President Bush introduced in person in the Conference on Disarmament a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons which included many of the previously agreed concepts in treaty language, including in Article XI the right of ad hoc on-site inspection which would give a challenged party the right to offer an alternative means of resolving a challenge. But the United States draft included in its Article X a new concept of "special on-site inspection" which would give a major party such as the United States or the Soviet Union the right to demand inspection of any location or facility "owned by the government of a party" within twenty-four hours.

5.17. NATO appears to have been informed of the new United States proposal only on 9th April, when consultations were held in Brussels, but no agreement was reached to adopt a common position in Geneva. European NATO countries have welcomed the United States proposals in general terms, but in private have reservations about the new Article X which is described as running counter to the consensus which had been emerging in the Conference on Disarmament prior to the tabling of the United States draft treaty.

5.18. The Soviet Union and its allies, while not refusing to consider further proposals for verification, have objected vehemently to the United States draft, in particular to what they describe as the "intrusive" Article X, the fact that the draft refers only to government-owned installations, whereas many private companies in the United States are engaged in government defence contracts, and to the fact that the United States draft does not specifically ban

1. The Times, 22nd September 1984.

2. Guardian, 22nd September 1984.

binary chemical weapons in its present wording. The Soviet representative has been able to quote the United States Assistant Secretary of Defence, Mr. Richard Perle, in an interview, as claiming that the United States would come up with verification proposals unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

5.19. In the light of available evidence, the committee concludes that, at the present time, existing stocks of United States chemical weapons remain sufficient for deterrent purposes. It believes that every effort should be made to reach agreement on an adequately verifiable ban on such weapons. The problem of verification will inevitably be the most complicated issue, but unnecessarily intrusive provisions will be as unacceptable to western countries with significant chemical industries as they are to the Soviet Union. This appears to be the third disarmament issue on which there is now a marked difference of approach between the United States and its European allies. The committee recommends that this issue be considered by the WEU Council, with a view to agreed common instructions being given to the representatives of WEU countries to the Conference on Disarmament. It draws attention to the resolution of the Liberal International 1984 Congress¹.

VI. Emerging technology

6.1. The committee is to report to the first part of the next session of the Assembly on "emerging technology and military strategy". In addition to the prospects of anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite weapons, that report will consider recent proposals for "deep-strike" battlefield tactics that might use new technology weapons with conventional warheads capable of identifying and destroying point targets tens or hundreds of kilometres behind the battleline. These proposals have been spoken of in conjunction with the United States "air-land battle" concept.

6.2. In this report devoted to disarmament, the committee draws attention to the possible consequences for arms control negotiations of the introduction of new weapons systems, particularly those that may affect existing perceptions of military balance. The committee renews its previous proposals for the production by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments of arms control impact statements on the lines of those which the President of the United States is required to submit to Congress each year, pursuant to Section 35 of the Arms

Control and Disarmament Act. These statements, prepared by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for the last nine years, were intended by Congress to result "in a greater integration of arms control considerations by the Executive Branch in major defence and nuclear programmes".²

VII. Conclusions

7.1. The committee's chief conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation to which the explanatory memorandum relates as follows:

Preamble

Paragraphs (i) to (iii) The introduction mentions the state of East-West relations. The Rome Declaration is circulated separately as Document 989.

Paragraphs (iv) and (v) See explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 2.13 and 2.14.

Operative text

Paragraph 1 Problems of verification measures are mentioned in respect of the various negotiations in paragraphs 3.9; 3.11; 4.5-4.7; 5.11-5.15 of the explanatory memorandum.

Paragraph 2 See explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 5.15; 3.20; 4.8.

Paragraph 3 See Chapter IV of the explanatory memorandum.

Paragraph 4 See Chapter II, especially paragraphs 2.13 et seq. of the explanatory memorandum.

Paragraph 5 Tasks which might profitably be undertaken by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, with a view to providing information both for the Council and the Assembly, are suggested at Appendix IV.

1. Appendix II.

2. Foreword by Senator Charles Percy, Chairman of the Senate Commission on Foreign Relations, to the fiscal year 1985 arms control impact statements, March 1984.

APPENDIX I

*Netherlands Government decision on INF**1st June 1984*

1. The Netherlands Government declares now that if the United States and the Soviet Union reach an agreement on arms control, on the basis of which a number of LRINF weapons systems are retained in Western Europe, the Netherlands will accept and deploy its share of such systems.

2. The dates of deployment in the Netherlands as envisaged in the NATO deployment schedule are being postponed; they will, however, not be postponed beyond the final date of the NATO deployment schedule.

3. (a) To that end the cabinet will take a decision on 1st November 1985 concerning an agreement then to be concluded with the United States on the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands, thus enabling the appropriate bill to be presented to parliament on 1st January 1986.

(b) In preparation for the conclusion of such an agreement, parliament and the allies will be consulted well in advance on the "control aspects" of any cruise missiles so deployed.

(c) The preparatory activities for possible deployment, i.e. physical planning procedures, the arranging for the necessary permits and the drawing up of specifications for tenders, will go ahead.

(d) Tenders will be invited on 1st November 1985 in order to allow for contracts to be awarded early in 1986.

4. (a) If an arms control agreement as referred to under 1 above is reached prior to 1st November 1985, an agreement will be concluded with the United States concerning deployment of the number of cruise missiles which the Netherlands will reasonably have to accept as its share.

(b) If no such arms control agreement has been reached by 1st November 1985 and the Soviet Union has as of the date of this decision (i.e. 1st June 1984) increased its number of deployed SS-20s or has not reduced it to the level of 1st June 1984, the agreement to be concluded with the United States will relate to the deployment of 48 cruise missiles.

5. The decision to deploy cruise missiles thus having been taken, contracts will be

awarded and construction operations will begin immediately after parliament has approved the agreement, in order that the time schedule referred to at 2 can be met.

6. In the context of the above, the cabinet has decided to continue to perform the present nuclear tasks up to 1st January 1986, when they will be reviewed anew.

Exposition

re 1. This conditional withdrawal of the reservation should be viewed in conjunction with point 2. While deciding on a limited postponement for the purposes of arms control, the Netherlands also accepts a commitment. The Netherlands stance is described by many both inside and outside the alliance as "have them elsewhere in Europe, but not in the Netherlands". It is very important that this erroneous impression be completely dispelled. Point 1 also makes this clear.

re 2. The NATO deployment schedule for 464 cruise missiles (the remaining 108 weapons are Pershing IIs) envisages deployment between December 1983 and December 1988. According to the schedule, the Netherlands is to deploy 16 weapons at the end of 1986, and 32 in the first half of 1987. The planning of the infrastructure for the deployment of the weapons is based on this schedule. The following points should be noted in this connection:

- the Netherlands stated in 1979 that it would not decide until later whether it would actually deploy the 48 cruise missiles allotted as its share;
- the Netherlands recognised the NATO double-track decision as a fact and has supported the negotiations conducted on this basis;
- the Netherlands has to date taken all the practical preparatory steps to make deployment possible in accordance with the NATO deployment schedule.

One of the most important reasons for the Netherlands not taking a decision on construction operations and deployment until now, but keeping that option open, has from

the outset been the idea of exerting optimum influence on the negotiating process.

The Netherlands desire for and views on arms control have always played an important rôle in that respect. This gives rise to the question whether – as there are no perspectives for a breakthrough in the negotiations right now – substance can be given in a responsible way to the Netherlands policy of restraint and the desire for a result by way of negotiations, by allowing for more time.

The deployment schedule of the alliance as mentioned above indicates that this is possible; however, it can only be done in a responsible way if the adjustment of the timing would not push a possible deployment in the Netherlands beyond the final date of the deployment schedule of the alliance as a whole (December 1988).

The margin between the timing of deployments as presently envisaged for the Netherlands and the final date of the NATO deployment schedule amounts to approximately one and a half years. Such an adjustment of the timing is defensible inasmuch as it expresses the specific position which the Netherlands has assumed concerning the NATO double-track decision from the outset.

Such an adjustment of the timing expresses the Netherlands desire to create as much room as possible for the negotiations. At the same time, however, the decision-making at the present point in time must indicate clearly that this postponement is not tantamount to cancellation but takes place with a view to arms control only.

re 3. The time schedule specified here for the various activities involved ensures that construction and deployment can be carried out

promptly and effectively, should this prove to be necessary. The time available will also need to be used to clarify the procedure to be followed in the event of the release of cruise missiles deployed in the Netherlands to be specified in the agreement with the United States.

re 4. If the Soviet Union were now to cease deploying additional SS-20s and the NATO double-track decision of 1979 on deployment of 572 LRINF weapon systems in Western Europe were to be fully implemented, the resulting ratio would be approximately two Soviet weapons to one weapon in Western Europe. It is feared that this ratio will further deteriorate. In order to bring about a reversal of this trend on the part of the Soviet Union, the cabinet now wishes to give a clear signal – to draw a line – by making the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands dependent on the actual willingness of the Soviet Union to exercise restraint now. It should and must then be possible to arrive by means of negotiations at the more balanced situation which is needed between East and West. The Netherlands will thus continue to support the basic principles of the alliance in those negotiations. Following upon the reversal referred to above, a further arms reduction will of course be necessary.

As is also apparent from points 1 and 2 and the exposition thereof, the Netherlands continues to attach great importance to an arms control agreement on intermediate-range weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union. If, however, the Soviet Union continues its build-up and no such agreement is reached, the deployment of cruise missiles also in the Netherlands will in the end become inevitable. This combination of restraint (points 1 and 2) and commitment (point 4) preserves the credibility of the Netherlands efforts to promote arms control.

APPENDIX II

*Resolution on chemical and biological weapons adopted by the
Liberal International Congress, Tel Aviv, 1984*

1. *Peace and disarmament*

2. *Chemical and biological weapons* – Proposed by LI Resolutions Drafting Committee on the basis of a suggestion by the Dutch Group

This Congress

1. Recalls Resolution I, peace and disarmament, adopted at the 1983 Congress in Stockholm, more in particular paragraph 11 of that resolution on the subject of chemical and biological weapons;

2. Sharply condemns the contemporary use of chemical weapons in various conflicts throughout the world and especially in the ongoing wars between Iraq and Iran, as confirmed by the UN investigation, and in Afghanistan;

3. Calls on all member parties of the LI to advocate that governments should:

- press at the Geneva negotiations for a comprehensive treaty on the development, production, storage and use of chemical weapons, including adequate verification of such a treaty aiming at a complete abolition of chemical weapons as well as their production facilities;
- in the meantime adhere to the 1925 protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons;
- strive to strengthen the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention by means of adequate provisions on verification and procedure, now absent from this treaty;

4. Opposes any production or deployment of those weapons in their territories.

APPENDIX III

***Specific tasks suggested for the Agency for the Control of Armaments
(with some comparison with the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency)***

Europe should have its own source of comparative factual information on defence capabilities of various countries and arms control issues. At present, the United States is the principle source of much public information.

A. Studies

1. Study extent of verification measures necessary to provide adequate assurance of compliance with arms control agreements, in particular a chemical weapons ban, a comprehensive test ban, and MBF reductions.
2. *Arms control impact statements.* The United States ACDA reports annually to Congress on the possible effect on disarmament negotiations of the introduction of any new weapon system being considered in the United States. A similar assessment should be available to European governments and parliaments.
3. *World military expenditure and arms transfers.* United States ACDA publishes this statistical data each year. It covers all countries of the world, as well as regions and major alliances (NATO and Warsaw Pact). There should be an independent European source, not open to accusations of political manipulation.
4. In the above context, there should be an

independent European assessment of the level of the Soviet defence effort, based both on rouble costs and dollar (or other convertible currency) costs.

5. *Threat assessment.* On the basis of statistical data and value judgements concerning intentions, the Agency could assist in preparing a European threat assessment. It could contribute also to the NATO publication NATO and the Warsaw Pact – Force comparisons, two editions of which have not been published by NATO – they are far more objective than the popularised United States publication, Soviet Military Power.

B. Operational activities

6. The Agency could conduct *field exercises* by sending observers to allied manoeuvres to investigate the extent of facilities which observers would require in the context of any MBFR agreements if they were to be able reliably to detect the size and extent of movements of troops and military equipment.
7. The Agency could also train and co-ordinate the *activities of observers* sent by European allied countries to observe Warsaw Pact exercises under the terms of the Helsinki agreements.

APPENDIX IV

*Levels of nuclear weapons – mid-1984**A. Total warheads all systems*

Numbers of nuclear warhead mid-1984 (Figures rounded to nearest hundred)		
	United States	Soviet Union
ICBM	2,100	5,300
SLBM	5,400	2,400
Strategic bomber	2,500	300
Total strategic ¹	10,000	8,300
All other ²	19,000	9,100
Grand total ³	29,000	17,400

Sources : 1. As in following table.

2. Deduced by difference.

3. World Military and Social Expenditures 1983, Arms Control Association *et.al.* Washington.

*B. Levels of United States and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons
(covered by SALT)**(i) United States strategic systems (covered by SALT)*

Type	Maximum-range (km)	Number	Number of independent warheads each	Assumed total number of warheads
ICBMs				
Titan II	15,000	37	1	37
Minuteman II	11,300	450	1	450
Minuteman III	13,000	{ 250 (160 kt) 300 (335 kt– Mk 12A)	3	1,650 ¹
Sub-total		1,037		2,137
SLBMs				
Poseidon C-3	4,600	304	10-14	3,040
Trident C-4	7,400	288	8-14	2,320
Sub-total		592		5,360
BM total		1,629		7,500
Aircraft B-52 G B-52 H	16,000	151 90	12 ALCM + 8 8	2,500
TOTAL		1,870		10,000

1. On the assumption that the maximum number of warheads are fitted.

(ii) Soviet strategic systems (covered by SALT)

Type	Maximum-range (km)	Number	Number of independent warheads each	Assumed total number of warheads
ICBMs				
SS-11	10,500	520	1 or 3	520
SS-13	10,000	60	1	60
SS-17	10,000	150	1 or 4	600 ¹
SS-18	9-10,500	308	1 or 8 or 10	2,465 ¹
SS-19	11,000	360	6 or 1	1,745
Sub-total		1,460		5,390
SLBMs				
SSN-5	1,120	45	1	45
SSN-6	2,400-3,000	368	1 or 2	384
SSN-8	8,000	292	1	292
SSN-17	5,000	12	1	12
SSN-18	8,000	224	3-7	1,514
SSN-20 ²	8,300	40	9	360
Sub-total		980		2,610
BM total		2,380		8,000
Aircraft	Combat radius (km)			
Bear Tu-95	5-6,000	100	2-4	210
Bison Mya-4	4-6,000	43	4	90
Sub-total		143		300
TOTAL		2,520		8,000

1. On the assumption that the maximum number of warheads are fitted.

2. Entry into service expected before end 1983.

Note : Forces loadings for aircraft deduced from total warheads (rounded to nearest hundred).

Source :

- IISS, Military Balance 1983-84.
- United States Department of Defence Annual Reports fiscal years 1982 to 1985
- Soviet military power, United States Department of Defence, March 1983.
- Whence the threat to peace, Soviet Ministry of Defence, January 1982.

C. Historical levels of SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 missiles

Year	Total of SS-4 and SS-5	SS-20	Total missiles	Total warheads ¹	Total yield MT ²	Total equivalent megatons ³	Total warheads in range of Europe ⁴	Notes
1962	200	—	200	200	200	200	200	Period of SS-4 and SS-5 build-up
1963-1971	700	—	700	700	700	700	525	
1972-1976	600	—	600	600	600	600	450	
1977	600	(20)	620	660	609	617	440	Start of SS-20 deployment
1978	590	100	690	890	635	675	642	
1979	590	120	710	950	644	692	682	
1980	440	160	600	920	512	576	650	
1981	380	230	610	1,070	483	575	745	
1982 ⁵	230	324	554	1,200	376	504	820	
1983 ⁵	239	351	590	1,300	397	536	970	
1984 ⁵	224 ⁶	378	602	1,358	394	544	900	

Source: Successive editions of ISS Military Balance.

1. Assuming 3 warheads on all SS-20 missiles, but ignoring any reloads.
2. Assuming 1 MT on SS-4, SS-5 warheads; 0.15 MT on SS-20 warheads.
3. Total of $Y \frac{2}{3}$ where Y is yield of each warhead in MT.
4. Assuming $\frac{3}{4}$ SS-4, 5 and $\frac{2}{3}$ SS-20 in range of Europe.
5. Figures from NATO NPG communiqués up to 7th April 1984.
6. SS-4 only; SS-5 phased out.

Control of armaments and disarmament

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Haase and others

1. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“Welcome the resumption in the near future of negotiations on disarmament between the United States and the Soviet Union and at the same time call for intensive consultations between the United States and the European allies during those negotiations;”.

Signed: Haase, Gansel, Klejdzinski

1. See 9th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment withdrawn).

Control of armaments and disarmament

AMENDMENT 2¹

tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “not excluding” to the end of the paragraph.

Signed: Cavaliere

1. See 9th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment negated).

Control of armaments and disarmament

AMENDMENTS 3, 4, 5 and 6¹

tabled by Mr. Pignion

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Agree common instructions to" and insert "Promote exchanges of views between".
4. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "and a comprehensive test ban".
5. At the end of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "and with the United Kingdom to resume the tripartite negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty".
6. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "not excluding" to the end of the paragraph and insert "avoiding any measure liable to confirm present imbalances;".

Signed: Pignion

1. See 9th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendments negatived).

Control of armaments and disarmament

AMENDMENT 7¹

tabled by Mr. Haase

7. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph:
- “Remind the Warsaw Pact states that WEU during the thirty years of its existence has never prepared or taken any aggressive and hostile measures against the Warsaw Pact but on the contrary has paved the way for the policy of détente and aims at peaceful interaction and reduction of tension among the European peoples; and call upon the states of the Warsaw Pact to take into account this position of WEU, which is also in conformity with the position of the United States and Canada as well as of the NATO member states, when taking a decision on the confirmation of their treaty beyond June 1985 and to draw consequences from this position for the continuation or shaping of the Warsaw Pact.”

Signed: Haase

1. See 9th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment agreed to).

Control of armaments and disarmament

AMENDMENT 8¹

tabled by Mr. Pignion

8. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “early” and insert “quick”.

Signed: Pignion

1. See 9th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment agreed to).

Control of armaments and disarmament

AMENDMENT 9¹

tabled by MM. Haase and Gansel

9. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add the following:
“and further aim its efforts to achieve intensive consultations between the United States and the European allies during new United States-Soviet negotiations”.

Signed: Haase, Gansel

1. See 9th sitting, 4th December 1984 (amendment agreed to).

*WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance*OPINION¹

*on the draft recommendation
in the report of the General Affairs Committee
(Document 990)
submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur*

The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments,

Agreeing with the broad lines of the abovementioned recommendation but considering that certain improvements might be made to it,

PROPOSES the following amendments to the Assembly:

Amendment 1

Make the present paragraph (v) of the preamble paragraph (iii) and add a new paragraph (iv) as follows:

“(iv) Welcoming therefore the decision of the Ministers to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in particular on the six points listed in paragraph 8 of the Rome Declaration;”.

Consequently renumber (v) and (vi) the present paragraphs (iii) and (iv) and renumber (vii) to (xi).

Amendment 2

At the end of paragraph (vii) of the preamble (now paragraph (viii)) insert: “and the decision to delete as from 1st January 1986 conventional weapons from the list in Annex IV to this protocol”.

Amendment 3

In the second line of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “obtain” and insert “afford both the Council and the Assembly” and at the end of the line leave out “it” and insert “them”.

1. Adopted in committee by 12 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Pignion (Chairman); MM. *Blaauw*, Kittelmann (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alberini (Alternate: *Milani*), Amadei (Alternate: *Cifarelli*), *van den Bergh*, Bonnel, Bourges, Brown (Alternate: Dr. *Miller*), Cox (Alternate: *Lord Newall*), Dejardin, Ertl (Alternate: *Rumpf*), Galley, Gerstl (Alternate: *Klejdzinski*), *Giust*, *Sir Anthony Grant*, MM. Huyghues des Etages, Konen, *de Kwaadsteniet*, Lemmrich, Natiez, *Pecchioli*, Sarti, Scheer, *Sir Dudley Smith*, MM. Steverlyncx, *Stokes*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur)

1. The Presidential Committee referred the subject on which the General Affairs Committee is reporting to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments for an opinion.
2. The committee has studied the draft recommendation contained in the report of the General Affairs Committee. The first paragraph of the preamble recalls the Recommendations 406 and 407 adopted by the Assembly in June 1984, the first of which was adopted on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments "Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council". The present draft recommendation from the General Affairs Committee follows in general the Assembly's earlier recommendations, and takes account of the Rome Declaration adopted by the Council on 27th October 1984.
3. The Committee has no hesitation in supporting the main lines of the present draft recommendation, but proposes to the Assembly three amendments which, it feels, would improve the present draft.

Amendment 1

The committee proposes that paragraph (v) of the preamble become (iii), and that a new paragraph (iv) be added. The text of this proposed new paragraph (iv) is largely a quotation from the very important paragraph 8 of the Rome Declaration, which reads as follows:

"The Ministers therefore decided to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in particular:

- defence questions;
- arms control and disarmament;
- the effects of developments in East-West relations on the security of Europe;
- Europe's contribution to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance, bearing in mind the importance of transatlantic relations;
- the development of European co-operation in the field of armaments, in respect of which WEU can provide a political impetus.

They may also consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world."

The committee feels that this is the most important feature of the Rome Declaration – the decision of a number of European countries to harmonise their views "on the specific conditions of security in Europe" and to enumerate the topics they will consider. It seems logical to the committee that the Assembly should welcome this important decision first, and that the present paragraph (iii) of the preamble, which welcomes the Council's desire to give new life to WEU, should then follow as a corollary of the first decision.

Amendment 2

In Recommendation 406 adopted on 20th June this year, the Assembly recommended that the Council pursue the adaptation of WEU to the needs of the 1980s, inter alia by "abolishing the controls on conventional weapons set out in Annexes III and IV to Protocol No. III".

The present paragraph (vii) of the preamble welcomes the decision taken by the Council in the week following the adoption of Recommendation 406 to delete the remaining items on the list of conventional weapons which Germany had agreed not to produce on its territory (Annex III to Protocol No. III), but does not refer to the equally important decision announced by the Council in the document concerning the institutional reform of WEU annexed to the Rome Declaration, according to which:

"... the Ministers decided, in accordance with Article V of Protocol No. III, ... to abolish gradually the remaining quantitative controls on conventional weapons. The Ministers agreed that these controls should be substantially reduced by 1st January 1985 and entirely lifted by 1st January 1986. The commitments and controls concerning ABC weapons would be maintained at the existing level and in accordance with the procedures agreed at the present time."

The Council's decision is entirely in accordance with Recommendation 406 already adopted by the Assembly, and the committee feels that it should be welcomed in the same way as the lifting of restrictions on the production of conventional weapons in Germany.

Amendment 3

In Recommendation 406 mentioned above the Assembly also recommended that the Council should instruct the Agency for the Control of Armaments to undertake "on behalf of the Council or the Assembly, studies and analyses of problems related to disarmament, the limitations of armaments and the problems of verification of disarmament agreements". The Assembly has made similar recommendations in the past. A very welcome feature of the decisions taken by the Council in Rome is the full acceptance of the Assembly's recommendation in this connection, as set forth in the document on institutional reforms of WEU mentioned above:

"3(b) The Ministers have instructed the Permanent Council to define ... the precise modalities of an overall reorganisation affecting both the ACA, the international secretariat of the SAC, and the SAC,

which could be structured in such a way as to fulfil a threefold task:

- to study questions relating to arms control and disarmament while carrying out the remaining control functions;
- undertake the function of studying security and defence problems ...;
- ...

(c) As regards the first two functions indicated above the intention would be to have available a common basis of analysis which could form a useful point of reference for the work of both the Council and the Assembly and also for informing public opinion."

Amendment 3 is therefore proposed in order to place on record in the draft recommendation the fact that the future work of the Agency for the Control of Armaments can be for the benefit of the Assembly, as well as for the Council.

Warsaw Pact and disarmament

MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION¹

*tabled by Mr. Haase and others
with a request for urgent procedure*

The Assembly recalls that on 5th June 1955 the alliance provided for in the Warsaw Treaty entered into force. In the preamble, WEU is cited as one reason for the threat facing the Warsaw Pact countries.

Pursuant to this treaty, the alliance of the Warsaw Pact expires on 3rd June 1985. The Assembly of WEU therefore wishes to make the following statement:

Since it was founded over thirty years ago, WEU has never prepared or taken any aggressive and hostile measures against the Warsaw Pact states.

On the contrary, WEU has, through its member states, paved the way for the policy of détente and endeavoured actively to promote it. In particular, its member states have played a crucial rôle in the conclusion of the final act of the CSCE.

Today, too, the Assembly declares that its express aim is to help ensure that the peaceful interaction of peoples, especially in its European sphere of responsibility, and the reduction of tension, is actively promoted. The Assembly therefore calls upon the states of the Warsaw Pact to take into account this position of WEU, which is also in conformity with the position of the United States and Canada as well as of the NATO member states, when taking a decision on the continuation of their treaty beyond June 1985 and to draw consequences from this position for the continuation or shaping of the Warsaw Pact.

Signed: Haase, Gansel, Ahrens, Hardy, Millan, Stoffelen, Beix, de Vries, Masciadri, Schulte, Klejdzinski, Adriaensens K.

1. See 7th sitting, 3rd December 1984 (urgent procedure not agreed to).

**DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1985¹**

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 11 votes to 0 with 1 abstention and approved by the Presidential Committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Beix, Haase (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, Biefnot, Bohl, Enders, Ferrari Aggradi, Foschi, Freeson, Jeambrun, Linster (Alternate: Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges), Morris, Oehler, Pollidoro, Rauti (Alternate: Mitterdorfer), Schmitz, Stokes, van Tets, de Vries.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Summary of estimates of expenditure and receipts
for the financial year 1985*

Details	Expenditure	Receipts
PART I Operating budget		
<i>Section A :</i> Expenditure		
<i>Head I :</i> Permanent staff	8,725,000	
<i>Head II :</i> Temporary staff	2,588,800	
<i>Head III :</i> Expenditure on premises and equipment	1,292,000	
<i>Head IV :</i> General administrative costs	2,161,300	
<i>Head V :</i> Other expenditure	1,270,700	
<i>Section B :</i> Receipts		458,000
	16,037,800	458,000
NET TOTAL		15,579,800
	16,037,800	16,037,800
PART II Pensions budget		
<i>Section A :</i> Expenditure		
<i>Head I :</i> Pensions, allowances and social charges	683,500	
<i>Section B :</i> Receipts		383,000
	683,500	383,000
NET TOTAL		300,500
	683,500	683,500
NET TOTAL BUDGET		15,880,300

Analysis of budget estimates
PART I : OPERATING BUDGET

Section A - Expenditure

Head I - Permanent staff

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1985	Sums authorised for 1984	Expected expenditure in 1984
Sub-Head 1 - Basic salaries	6,330,000	6,054,000	6,010,000
Sub-Head 2 - Allowances :			
2.1. Expatriation allowance	555,000		
2.2. Household allowance	253,000		
2.3. Allowance for children and other dependent persons	200,000		
2.4. Rent allowance	25,000		
2.5. Education allowance	90,000		
2.6. Allowance for language courses	2,000		
2.7. Overtime	50,000		
2.8. Home leave	<u>20,000</u>	1,195,000	1,150,000
Sub-Head 3 - Social charges :			
3.1. Social security	845,000		
3.2. Supplementary insurance	227,000		
3.3. Provident fund	<u>120,000</u>	1,192,000	945,500
Sub-Head 4 - Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials			
4.1. Travelling expenses of can- didates for vacant posts	pro mem.		
4.2. Travelling expenses on arri- val and departure of per- manent officials and their families	pro mem.		
4.3. Removal expenses	pro mem.		
4.4. Installation allowance	<u>pro mem.</u>	-	65,000
Sub-Head 5 - Medical examination	8,000	7,000	7,000
TOTAL OF HEAD I	8,725,000	8,205,200	8,385,000

Explanations

Sub-Heads 1 and 2

Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to permanent staff in accordance with Chapter III of the staff rules of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of scales in force on 1st January 1984¹, adjusted in accordance with the following expected increase :

2.5% as from 1st July 1984 (total F 200,000);
4.5% for 1985 (total F 366,000).

A list of staff of the Office of the Clerk, showing their grades and duties, is given at Appendix I.

Sub-Head 3

Estimated expenditure for "Social charges" is based on commitments stemming from :

- application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1)² ;
- application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2)³ ;
- application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the Provident Fund, amounting to 14% of basic salary, for staff not affiliated to the pension scheme (Sub-Head 3.3).

Sub-Head 4

As it is not planned to recruit any new staff, this sub-head is included pro mem.

Sub-Head 5

The sum requested is to cover the cost of the medical check-up which all members of the staff must undergo under Article 9 of the staff rules. Medical check-ups for WEU staff in Paris are carried out at the OECD medical centre.

1. These scales are worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts and approved by the WEU Council and the Councils of other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA). In accordance with the committee's 159th report, salaries are adjusted with effect from 1st July of each year. Furthermore, should the cost of living between 1st July and 31st December rise by more than 3%, a corresponding percentage adjustment is made. (This threshold, initially 2%, was raised to 3% in the 191st report).

2. Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from the French general scheme, with the exception of family allowances and old-age pensions.

3. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or permanent disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum to the beneficiaries he has nominated.

Head II - Temporary staff

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1985	Sums authorised for 1984	Expected expenditure in 1984
Sub-Head 6 - Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly :			
6.1. Sittings service 960,000			
6.2. Interpretation service 329,000			
6.3. Translation service 700,000			
6.4. Other services 50,000			
	2,039,000	1,726,000	1,670,000
Sub-Head 7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	400,000	337,000	300,000
Sub-Head 8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	60,000	75,000	65,000
Sub-Head 9 - Social charges			
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters 4,000			
9.2. Provident fund for interpreters 83,000			
9.3. Insurance for interpreters 2,800			
	89,800	62,000	68,000
TOTAL OF HEAD II	2,588,800	2,200,000	2,103,000

Explanations

Sub-Head 6

Estimates under this sub-head relate to :

(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the reimbursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation and translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at Appendix II. These salaries are calculated in accordance with scales in force on 1st January 1984 in the co-ordinated organisations (on the basis of salaries paid to permanent staff of comparable grades), adjusted in the same way as for permanent staff, i.e. :

2.5% increase as from 1st July 1984 (total : F 41,000);
4.5% increase for 1985 (total : F 75,000).

The salaries of interpreters also include an increase of 6% as from 1st July 1984, in application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the International Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI) ;

(b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post office technician, typewriter mechanic, roneo staff, etc.).

Sub-Head 7

This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at meetings of parliamentarians between sessions (salaries and where appropriate per diem allowances, travelling time and travelling expenses).

Estimates are based on a total of 150 working days (of which 105 in Paris and 45 elsewhere). Salaries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (cf. Sub-Head 6). Their salary adjustments may be estimated as follows :

1st July-31st December 1984 : 2.5% (i.e. F 8,500) ;
for 1985 : 4.5% (i.e. F 16,000).

Sub-Head 8

Estimates under this sub-head relate to the salaries of additional staff of all grades which the Office of the Clerk may have to recruit in 1985. They include an overall sum for salaries, possible travelling expenses and insurance.

Sub-Head 9

Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges :

Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters

Staff recruited for the Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company against the risks of death, accident or sickness, 60% of the premium being paid by the Office of the Clerk and 40% by staff.

Provident fund for interpreters

In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACI, WEU has to pay into the conference interpreters' provident fund or, where appropriate, another provident fund, a contribution of 14%, which is added to a contribution of 7% by interpreters.

Insurance for interpreters

A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Stewart Wrightson in London, covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or permanent disability preventing them from working. Two-thirds of premiums are paid by the Office of the Clerk and one-third by the interpreters.

Head III - Expenditure on premises and equipment

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1985	Sums authorised for 1984	Expected expenditure in 1984
Sub-Head 10 - Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	430,000	407,000	407,000
Sub-Head 11 - Hire of committee rooms	15,000	15,000	—
Sub-Head 12 - Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	315,000	358,000	290,000
Sub-Head 13 - Various services for the organisation of sessions	27,000	33,000	25,000
Sub-Head 14 - Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	15,000	15,000	15,000
Sub-Head 15 - Purchase or repair of office furniture	65,000	10,000	10,000
Sub-Head 16 - Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	150,000	73,000	105,000
Sub-Head 17 - Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	275,000	84,000	148,000
TOTAL OF HEAD III.	1,292,000	995,000	1,000,000

Explanations

Sub-Head 10

Sums requested under this sub-head cover the Assembly's share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises. The international secretariat of the SAC is responsible for co-ordinating and managing the programme for such expenditure to which the Assembly contributes 30%, the ACA 45% and the SAC 25%.

These estimates conform to the opinion expressed by the WEU Budget Committee during its discussion of the budgets of the ministerial organs. They include the fixed annual sum of F 30,000 which the Assembly has to pay until 1987 as its share of the cost of replacing the telephone switchboard.

Sub-Head 11

It now seems probable that it will not be necessary to hire a committee room in 1984. However, the same estimate of F 15,000 is included in the 1985 budget for this purpose.

Sub-Head 12

As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment, telephone booths, screens, etc., in the premises of the Economic and Social Council during Assembly sessions. The sum is lower than that requested in 1984, mainly because, in spite of widespread price increases, the supplier of simultaneous interpretation equipment has agreed to reduce the amount charged in view of his operating results in 1983.

Sub-Head 13

Expenditure under this sub-head relates to contracts for the provision of various services during Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises loaned by the Economic and Social Council, etc.). A strict economy drive should allow actual expenditure in 1984 to be lower than the sum allocated. Estimated expenditure for 1985 is therefore also lower.

Sub-Head 14

The same sum is requested for 1985 as for 1984 to allow minor repairs to be carried out to the premises of the Office of the Clerk.

Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17

Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the three-year modernisation and maintenance programme for equipment given at Appendix III to this budget. Criteria governing the preparation of this programme are shown in the explanatory memorandum.

Head IV - General administrative costs

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1985	Sums authorised for 1984	Expected expenditure in 1984
Sub-Head 18 - Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	480,000	447,000	447,000
Sub-Head 19 - Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	238,000	238,000	238,000
Sub-Head 20 - Printing and publication of documents	1,338,000	1,333,000	1,250,000
Sub-Head 21 - Purchase of documents	44,800	40,000	40,000
Sub-Head 22 - Official cars	60,000	40,500	50,000
Sub-Head 23 - Bank charges	500	500	500
TOTAL OF HEAD IV	2,161,300	2,099,000	2,025,500

Explanations

Sub-Head 18

The increase of F 33,000 as compared with 1984 is calculated on the basis of an average inflation of 7.5%, this being the minimum foreseeable.

Sub-Head 19

A strict economy drive and use of the new offset machine, which can be used for minor printing work which hitherto had to be done outside, allow savings to be made and the estimate for 1985 is therefore the same as for 1984, in spite of a considerable increase in prices in this sector (12%).

Sub-Head 20

The hire of word-processing equipment in 1984 has resulted in considerable time-saving in the printing of documents and savings in printing costs, which should cover the hire of this equipment. In 1984, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration therefore authorised a transfer between the two sub-heads concerned. Estimates for 1985 take account of the new situation. They are calculated on the basis of an increase of 12% (a weighted percentage, the increase in the cost of paper pulp having been more than 25% in one year) over 1984, less the cost of hiring data-processing equipment (c.f. the three-year modernisation programme at Appendix III), which represents an increase in the estimates under Sub-Head 17.

Sub-Head 21

The increase of 12% corresponds to the increase in the INSEE index for books and newspapers for the most recent twelve-month period known at the time this budget was drawn up and to changes in exchange rates for publications purchased outside France.

Sub-Head 22

Compared with 1984, estimates under this sub-head are higher than the foreseeable rate of inflation due to the fact that the President of the Assembly, elected at the June 1984 session, is constantly at the seat of the Assembly. It will therefore be necessary to hire a chauffeur-driven car more often.

Sub-Head 23

The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged.

Head V - Other expenditure

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1985	Sums authorised for 1984	Expected expenditure in 1984
Sub-Head 24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	139,000	125,000	125,000
Sub-Head 25 - Expenses for representation	160,000	150,000	150,000
Sub-Head 26 - Committee study missions	3,300	3,000	3,000
Sub-Head 27 - Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	321,900	290,000	230,000
Sub-Head 28 - Expenses of experts and the auditor	75,500	68,000	56,700
Sub-Head 29 - Expenditure on information	275,000	253,000	253,000
Sub-Head 30 - Expenses for political groups	273,000	253,000	253,000
Sub-Head 31 - Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3,000	3,000	3,000
Sub-Head 32 - Non-recoverable taxes	20,000	12,000	30,000
TOTAL OF HEAD V	1,270,000	1,157,000	1,103,700

Explanations

Sub-Head 24

The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly is borne by governments, as are those of members of the Bureau and Presidential Committee.

The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for the President of the Assembly on official visits and of rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairmen insofar as these visits are connected with the preparation of a report or the running of the Assembly. Journeys by committee chairmen and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee.

The percentage increase is the same as for expenses of members of the Office of the Clerk travelling on official business, i.e. 11% (c.f. Sub-Head 27).

Sub-Head 25

The increase of 6.5% compared with the sum authorised for 1984 corresponds to the increase in the INSEE index for the cost of meals in restaurants in the Paris region for the most recent twelve-month period, which is included in the national consumer price index of the host country.

Sub-Head 26

For committee study missions, the increase is the same as for other official journeys, i.e. 11%.

Sub-Head 27

The increase in per diem allowances approved by the Council with effect from 1st January 1984 (202nd report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts) and the increase in the cost of air travel amount on average to 11%. Estimates for the travelling allowances of members of the Office of the Clerk for 1985 are therefore made on the basis of sums granted in 1984 plus 11%.

Sub-Head 28

The increase is the same as for travelling expenses, i.e. 11%.

Sub-Head 29

The increase of 8.75% over sums granted in 1984 is an average between the 6.5% increase in the cost of representation and the 11% increase in travelling expenses.

Sub-Head 30

The increase in the estimate for this sub-head takes account of the expected rise in the cost of living (8%).

Sub-Head 31

There is no change in the estimate for this sub-head as compared with 1984.

Sub-Head 32

The increase of F 8,000 as compared with 1984 is calculated on the basis of experience.

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET

Section B - Receipts

	Estimate for 1985	Budget for 1984	Expected receipts in 1984
Sale of publications	50,000	25,000	25,000
Bank interest	250,000	100,000	200,000
Social security reimbursements	8,000	15,000	15,000
Levy on basic salaries of Grade A officials	150,000	90,000	90,000
TOTAL RECEIPTS	458,000	230,000	330,000

Explanations

Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are calculated on the basis of experience.

The amount of the levy on basic salaries of Grade A officials has been calculated at the rate of 3% of such salaries for the first half of 1985 and 4.5% for the second half.

PART II : PENSIONS BUDGET

*Section A - Expenditure**Head I - Pensions, allowances and social charges*

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1985	Sums authorised for 1984	Expected expenditure in 1984
Sub-Head 1 - Pensions and leaving allowances			
1.1. Retirement pensions	402,000		
1.2. Invalidity pensions	181,000		
1.3. Survivors' pensions	43,500		
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' pensions	—		
1.5. Leaving allowances	—		
	626,500	613,000	662,000
Sub-Head 2 - Family allowances			
2.1. Household allowances	18,000		
2.2. Children's and dependants' allowances	22,000		
2.3. Education allowances	5,000		
	45,000	55,000	42,000
Sub-Head 3 - Supplementary insurance	12,000	9,000	12,000
TOTAL OF HEAD I	683,500	677,000	716,000

Explanations

Sub-Heads 1 and 2

In 1985, the Assembly will be paying four pensions, as follows :

- two old-age pensions ;
- one invalidity pension ;
- one survivor's pension.

Entitlement to an orphan's pension paid in 1984 has now come to an end.

Estimates for expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the current provisions of the pension scheme rules.

Sub-Head 3

Pensioners are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19 *bis* of the collective convention in force. Estimates for expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid by the Assembly.

PART II : PENSIONS BUDGET*Section B : Receipts*

	Estimate for 1985	Budget for 1984	Expected receipts in 1984
Contributions by permanent officials	383,000	341,000	341,000
	383,000	341,000	341,000

Explanations

Estimated receipts have been calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid by permanent staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (7% of basic salary).

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. Foreword

1. The draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 could not fail to take into account the fact that the governments are determined to inject new life into WEU since the Assembly itself has regularly expressed its wish for the structure and functions of WEU to be adapted to Europe's new security requirements.
2. Furthermore, in both the Council and the Assembly great importance is attached to developing the dialogue between the governmental body and the parliamentary body of an institution one of the fundamental merits of which is to allow qualified representatives of European public opinion to take part in a continuing process of reflection on Europe's defence.
3. In 1984 it seemed possible to keep a negative growth rate in the Assembly's budget. This decision inevitably had repercussions on the work of the Assembly and its propagation and there can be no question of continuing along this course in 1985.
4. In spite of the financial difficulties now facing all member countries, the will to give new life to WEU must be demonstrated in an improvement in the means of work at the Assembly's disposal. But the very short time available before having to submit the budget to the Assembly for approval prevented the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration from assessing this improvement accurately, in terms of both staff and equipment. The budget before you therefore shows only the most immediate requirements. The committee reserves the right to complete its study of the Assembly's essential requirements in the next few months and possibly to submit a supplementary budget at the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session.

2. New structure of the budget

5. The draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 is submitted to you in a new form, which was approved by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration at its meeting on 26th April 1984.
6. In accordance with Recommendation 409, adopted unanimously by the Assembly during the first part of its thirtieth ordinary session, operating expenses and receipts are set out separately from expenditure and income relating to pensions. The 1985 budget therefore has two parts: Part I: Operating budget, and Part II: Pensions budget.
7. In accordance with the criteria in Article 2 of the financial regulations of the Assembly, estimates are divided into heads (homogeneous categories of expenditure) and sub-heads, forming the basic elements of the budget. In order to identify expenditure more accurately, certain sub-heads are further sub-divided.
8. Appendix V is a table showing the correspondence between the 1985 and 1984 budgets.

3. Operating budget

3.1. General

9. The operating budget now before you differs from the 1984 budget as follows:

	1985	1984	Difference	Rate of growth
Total expenditure	16,037,800	14,656,200	1,381,600	9.42%
Net total	15,579,800	14,426,200	1,153,600	7.99%

This increase is higher than the zero growth rate estimated by the London Budget Committee at 4.5% for 1985 but it should be underlined that sums granted to the Assembly in 1984 for operating expenditure represented a rate of growth of only 3.98% compared with the previous financial year, to meet an inflation rate of about 7.5%. It would be justified to deduct this difference from the growth rate of the 1985 budget since it had negative repercussions on the management of the 1984 budget.

3.2. Expenditure

10. Technical criteria governing the preparation of the budget having been set out in the explanations given in the analysis of estimates for each head, this explanatory memorandum will describe the guidelines and options, which inter alia justify the substantial differences compared with the previous budget.

Head I

11. Estimates under this head include no change in the staff of the Office of the Clerk. As specified earlier, the structure of the Office of the Clerk will be studied very attentively in order to determine requirements in relation to the tasks it has to fulfil.

12. Estimates under Head I represent an overall increase of 6.33% as compared with the sums granted in 1984.

Head II

13. Estimates under this head are affected by the sharp rise in salaries payable to certain categories of temporary staff recruited for Assembly sessions. The difference between scales in force on 1st July 1983 and 1st July 1984 is about 40% for verbatim reporters and summary reporters and 20% for other sittings staff. It is well known that such staff are increasingly difficult to recruit, but their presence is essential when holding plenary sessions of the WEU Assembly (as is also the case for the Council of Europe).

14. The same applies to interpreters recruited for sessions and other meetings of parliamentarians. As specified in the explanations to Head II, the agreement signed on 13th July 1984 between the co-ordinated organisations and the International Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI) introduced an additional amount of 6% in addition to their salaries, which is indexed in the same conditions as the latter, i.e. on the salary of a Grade L4, step 8, official.

15. In view of these exceptional circumstances, the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly has adopted certain measures likely to limit the budgetary repercussions of these increases. On the one hand, an attempt is being made to recruit as many staff as possible in Paris itself in order to avoid additional expenditure such as transport, allowances for travelling time and daily allowances, and on the other hand it is trying to keep the length of contracts as short as possible.

16. Furthermore, account has been taken of the fact that the Assembly's programme of work for 1985 will mean an increase in the number of meetings of the Presidential Committee, Bureau and various other committees, thus justifying the increase in sums requested under Sub-Head 7.

17. Finally, it seems appropriate to mention the special problem raised by the recruitment of verbatim reporters, which is becoming more difficult at each session because members of this profession are becoming rare. This matter will be studied in depth by the relevant Assembly bodies with a view to adopting an alternative solution, efficient and less expensive, possibly after amending the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. If the results of this study are conclusive, they will be taken into account in administering the 1985 budget and in the preparation of the 1986 budget.

18. Overall, estimates under Head II represent an increase of 17.67% as compared with sums authorised for 1984.

Head III

19. Explanations given for Sub-Heads 10 to 14 of this head justify the sums requested which are on the whole lower than total sums authorised for the same purposes in the 1984 budget.

20. Conversely, there is a substantial increase in estimates under Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17 which is moreover largely justified by a three-year programme for the modernisation and maintenance of equipment, prepared for the purpose and given at Appendix III.

21. This programme provides for the gradual replacement of certain office furniture which is so worn as to be unusable (Sub-Head 15), and the essential replacement of a second offset machine, the first having been replaced in 1984 (Sub-Head 16). But the key to this modernisation programme is the purchase of a personal computer for the administration service of the Office of the Clerk and the hire of five word-processors.

22. For word-processors, a contract for their hire has been signed with Olivetti and will come into force in January 1985, once the equipment ordered has been delivered. In the meantime, the Office of the Clerk has carried out tests with five machines, made available free of charge by the same firm. Nearly all the documents for the first part of the thirtieth session of the Assembly were prepared by new methods and the test has therefore been conclusive. In 1984, the cost of hiring them will be offset by savings in printing costs thanks to the direct transmission of texts to the printer. After examining this question, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration authorised the transfer of the necessary sums from Sub-Head 8 to Sub-Head 7 of the 1984 budget. The same offset criteria have been adopted for the 1985 budget, so that the cost of hiring word-processors has been offset by an equivalent reduction in sums requested for printing and publishing.

23. The usefulness of such a three-year programme seems clear. It will be kept regularly up to date and appended to budgets for future financial years.

24. Overall, estimates under Head III represent an increase of 29.84% as compared with sums authorised for 1984, including the hire of word-processing equipment, the cost of which is offset by savings under Head IV.

Head IV

25. Criteria of strict economy have been used for estimating sums needed for 1985, as shown in the explanations. In view of the reduction in printing costs which will offset the cost of hiring word-processing equipment, referred to under Head III, the rate of increase in this head as compared with the 1984 budget is 2.96%.

Head V

26. All estimates under this head have been made on the basis of the rates of inflation applicable to each category of expenditure. The overall increase in this head as compared with 1984 is 9.82%.

3.3. Receipts

27. Apart from receipts from the levy on the basic salaries of Grade A officials, which are an accurate assessment, receipts have been estimated on the basis of past experience.

4. Pensions budget

28. Estimated expenditure on pensions in 1985, taking into account the same changes in scales as for permanent staff, is lower than actual expenditure foreseen up to the end of 1984 because an orphan's pension will be terminated on conclusion of the entitlement of the beneficiary.

29. The situation will be different in 1986 because of the foreseeable retirement of two Grade A officials who will reach the age limit of 65 during that year.

30. Appendix IV to this budget shows the foreseeable trend of expenditure on pensions for the next five years, based on the age of staff. It is interesting to note that if the organisation's contribution (14%) – not included in the budget – is added to the staff contribution (7%), the cost of pensions is almost entirely covered by these contributions until 1987. As from 1988, expenditure will largely exceed receipts, but by referring logically to the savings made in earlier years it can be considered that the administration of pensions will be positive for several years to come.

31. Receipts in this budget come from the serving staff's contributions to the pension scheme, calculated at the rate of 7% of basic salaries.

APPENDIX I

Table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly

Grade	Duties	1985 budget	1984 budget	+ or -
H.C.	Clerk	1	1	-
A6	Senior counsellor	1	1	-
A5	Counsellors	4	4	-
A4	First secretaries	2	2	-
A3	Secretary	1	1	-
A2	Translators/Documentalist	3	3	-
B6	Chief accountant	1	1	-
B4	Personal assistants	4	4	-
B3	Bilingual shorthand-typists	6	6	-
B3	Switchboard operator	1	1	-
C6	Head of reproduction department	1	1	-
C4	Assistants in reproduction department	2	2	-
		27	27	-

APPENDIX II
Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions
 1. *Sittings service*

Duties	Number	No. of days*	Daily remuneration F	Total F	Total F
Counsellors to the President of the Assembly. .	1 a	16	1,084	17,344	36,856
	1 b	18	1,084	19,512	
Heads of sections	1 a	10	816	8,160	43,872
	1 b	12	992	11,904	
	1 a	10	992	9,920	
	1 b	14	992	13,888	
Sergeant-at-arms	1 b	12	875	10,500	10,500
Parliamentary secretaries	3 a	10	699	20,970	41,970
	2 b	12	875	21,000	
Précis writers	3 a	10	699	20,970	52,470
	3 b	12	875	31,500	
Verbatim reporters	7 a	10	875	61,250	197,750
	13 b	12	875	136,500	
Assistants	10 a	10	307	30,700	249,094
	1 a	18	307	5,526	
	1 a	22	307	6,754	
	1 a	10	353	3,530	
	1 b	16	483	7,728	
	2 b	14	483	13,524	
	28 b	12	483	162,288	
	3 b	12	529	19,044	
Head ushers	1 a	10	288	2,880	6,336
	1 a	12	288	3,456	
Ushers	8 a	10	261	20,880	53,766
	1 a	12	261	3,132	
	1 a	14	261	3,654	
	1 a	12	288	3,456	
	1 a	24	288	6,912	
	3 b	12	437	15,732	
Offset-assemblers	10 a	10	261	26,100	26,100
	112				718,714
					Adjustment as from 1st July 1984 (2.5%)
					17,968
					736,682
					Adjustment for 1985 (4.5%)
					33,150
					769,832
					Travelling expenses
					190,000
					959,832
					Rounded up to
					960,000

* In accordance with scales in force on 1st January 1984.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

2. Interpretation service

Duties	Number	No. of days	F	F
Interpreters	6a	10	120,360	
	6b	14	173,920	294,280
Adjustment as from 1st July 1984 (2.5%)				7,000
				301,280
Adjustment for 1985 (4.5%)				12,000
				313,280
Travelling expenses				15,000
				328,280
Rounded up to				329,000

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

N.B. On 1st January 1984, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 2,005.38. In addition, interpreters recruited outside Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (half a day each way), a daily allowance (per diem) corresponding to that of a Grade L4 permanent official, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses.

3. Translation service

Duties	Number	Daily remuneration F	Estimate ¹ F
Revisers	3a	801	232,410
	4b	1,336	
Translators	3a	640	224,700
	5b	1,114	
Assistants	6a	307	171,994
	2a	353	
	3b	483	
	2b	529	
			629,104
Adjustment as from 1st July 1984 (2.5%)			15,727
			644,831
Adjustment for 1985 (4.5%)			29,018
			673,849
Travelling expenses			26,000
			699,849
Rounded up to			700,000

1 Based on 30 days for revisers and translators and a varying number of days for assistants.

a Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

APPENDIX III

*Three-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Office of the Clerk**(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices)*

Ref. No.	Equipment	Explanations	Budgets		
			1985	1986	1987
	A. Reproduction equipment				
1	1 RX 1045 photocopier	This new model replaced the RX 5400 in April 1984. It has a better performance than the old model and costs less to hire. The sum thus saved has been used to finance a contract for servicing the Office of the Clerk's second photocopier. The contract for the hire of the RX 1045 provides for a fixed charge of F 1,712 per month and an indexed maintenance charge of F 1,837 per month.	42,600	42,600	42,600
2	1 RX 3107 photocopier	When a leasing contract came to an end in April 1984, this machine became the property of the Office of the Clerk. The maintenance contract was negotiated at the same time as the hire of the RX 1045 (F 1,533 per quarter).	6,132	6,132	6,132
3	2 Gestetner offset 209 machines with 1 applicator	These 2 machines were purchased in 1978. They are in poor condition due to age and intensive use. It is planned to replace them, since they are essential for the Assembly's work, in accordance with the following programme : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - in 1984 - replacement of 1 of the (2nd half) : 2 machines by the Gestetner 311, which has a better performance ; - maintenance of this machine on the basis of an annual contract ; - in 1985 : - replacement of the second machine by another Gestetner 311 ; - maintenance of this machine on the basis of an annual contract. 	6,000	6,000	6,000
			105,000		
			6,000	6,000	6,000
4	1 Gestetner PM/9 electrostatic stereotyper	It will be possible to use this stereotyper, purchased in 1980, until 1986 at latest by extending the current maintenance contract.	1,053		

Ref. No.	Equipment	Explanations	Budgets		
			1985	1986	1987
		In 1986 it will be replaced by a more recent model, more suitable for use with the Gestetner 311 offset machine. A new maintenance contract will have to be signed for this stereotyper.		69,000	
5	1 Gestetner 100 binding machine	Purchased in 1979, this machine is still in good condition and it will be possible to use it for another five years, until the current maintenance contract expires.	976	3,700 976	3,700 976
6	1 Logabas-Ordina 7630 assembling machine with stapling machine	Purchased in 1977, these machines are serviced when required. Since the cost of a maintenance contract is exorbitant, the expediency of continuing this form of maintenance is being examined. The estimate is based on experience.	3,000	3,000	3,000
7	1 AM International addressograph	This machine is on hire for a five-year period which began on 1st July 1981. Maintenance is included in the cost of hire. The expediency of renewing the contract when it expires on 30th June 1986 is being examined.	18,000	18,000	18,000
8	1 Fortematic 655 paper-cutting machine	Purchased in 1976, this machine is serviced when required. A single annual service is enough to keep it in good working order.	600	600	600
9	1 Orpo-Planax binding machine	Purchased in 1964			
		These machines are in good working order and no maintenance contract seems necessary.			
10	1 Orpo-Thermomatic binding machine	Purchased in 1974			
	<i>B. Typewriters and calculators</i>				
	<i>(a) Office of the Clerk</i>				
11	8 Olivetti ET 121 electronic typewriters	Purchased between 1981 and 1983, these typewriters are in perfect condition.			
12	1 Olivetti ET 221 electronic typewriter	Purchased in 1983, this typewriter is in perfect condition.			
13	4 Olympia SGE 51 electric typewriters (2 with English keyboards and 2 with French keyboards)	This is an old model which is no longer on the market and is therefore difficult to repair. The typewriters will remain in service as long as their condition allows.			

Ref. No.	Equipment	Explanations	Budgets		
			1985	1986	1987
14	2 IBM electric typewriters (1 with an English keyboard and 1 with a French keyboard)	Purchased in 1968 and 1975, these typewriters will remain in service as long as their condition allows.			
15	3 Olivetti calculating machines <i>(b) For use during sessions</i>	Purchased between 1968 and 1979, these machines are in good working order.			
16	4 Olympia SGE 51 electric typewriters (1 with an English keyboard and 3 with French keyboards)	These typewriters are the same model as those under 13 above. They will be assigned to national delegations as long as their condition allows.			
17	4 IBM electric typewriters (2 with English keyboards and 2 with French keyboards)	These typewriters are the same model as those under 14 above. They will be assigned to national delegations and political groups as long as their condition allows.			
18	3 Olivetti Editor 4 electric typewriters (with Italian keyboards)	Purchased secondhand in 1980, these typewriters are assigned to the Italian Delegation and the Italian summary reporters. They will remain in service as long as their condition allows.			
19	21 Olympia mechanical typewriters (19 with English keyboards and 2 with French keyboards)	Purchased between 1966 and 1979, these typewriters are used only occasionally because they are old models and staff are no longer used to working on such machines. It is planned to keep the best of them in reserve in case of electricity cuts and to scrap the others.			
20	Electric typewriters	To meet requirements during Assembly sessions, it is becoming necessary to hire a number of electric machines in addition to those already available. Taking account of the need to replace mechanical machines still in use, the following hire programme is envisaged for each session :			
		1985 1986 1987			
		English keyboards 12 16 16	9,600	10,800	10,800
		French keyboards 15 15 15	12,750	12,750	12,750

Ref. No.	Equipment	Explanations	Budgets		
			1985	1986	1987
21	(c) <i>Maintenance and repairs</i>	All typewriters and calculators are serviced twice a year, before each session, by a mechanic recruited for this purpose. However, a lump sum should be earmarked for possible repairs at other times.	6,000	6,000	6,000
	<i>C. Miscellaneous equipment</i>				
22	2 UHER 5000 dictaphones	Purchased in 1971 and 1980, these dictaphones are in good condition. It is not planned to replace them in the period 1985-87.			
23	11 Grundig Stenorette dictaphones	Purchased between 1963 and 1983, these dictaphones are in good condition. It is not planned to replace them in the period 1985-87.			
24	1 Grandjean stenotyping machine	Purchased in 1974, this machine is in good working order. It is planned to keep it in use for the next five years.			
25		Overall estimate for possible repairs to equipment in this category.	4,000	4,000	4,000
	<i>D. Word-processors and computers</i>				
26	5 Olivetti ETS 2010 word-processors with 4 printers	After a trial period with 3 machines provided by Olivetti free of charge, it is now intended to increase the number to 5. They have been hired on a five-year quarterly leasing basis.	125,000	125,000	125,000
		The machines are maintained by Olivetti on the basis of an ad hoc contract.	30,000	30,000	30,000
27	1 personal computer with "wages" and "book-keeping" software	This will be purchased in 1985 in order to modernise the administration service. It will be maintained by the supplier on the basis of an annual contract.	45,000		
			3,000	3,000	3,000
	<i>E. Office furniture</i>				
28	Offices 107, 113 and 118	Purchase of 5 "computer" desks for committee assistants using word-processing machines.	35,000		

Ref. No.	Equipment	Explanations	Budgets		
			1985	1986	1987
29	Offices 104 and 105	Replacement of furniture	20,000		
30	Office 103	Replacement of furniture		12,000	
31	Office 108	Replacement of furniture			18,000
32	Swivel armchairs and easy chairs	Reupholstery of 14 armchairs	5,000	8,000	
33	Metal cupboards	Repair of 10 cupboards	5,000	5,000	

Breakdown by budget classification

Budget classification		Ref. No. in programme	Budgets		
Head	Sub-head		1985	1986	1987
III	15. Purchase or repair of office furniture	28	35,000		
		29	20,000		
		30		12,000	
		31			18,000
		32	5,000	8,000	
		33	5,000	5,000	
				65,000	25,000
III	16. Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	3	105,000		
		4		69,000	
		27	45,000		
			150,000	69,000	
III	17. Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	1	42,600	42,600	42,600
		2	6,132	6,132	6,132
		3	12,000	12,000	12,000
		4	1,053	3,700	3,700
		5	976	976	976
		6	3,000	3,000	3,000
		7	18,000	18,000	18,000
		8	600	600	600
		20	22,350	23,550	23,550
		21	6,000	6,000	6,000
		25	4,000	4,000	4,000
		26	155,000	155,000	155,000
		27	3,000	3,000	3,000
				274,711	278,558

APPENDIX IV

Foreseeable trend of pensions in the period 1985-89

(calculated in accordance with 1985 scales)

Grade	Basic salary	No. of monthly contributions taken into account	% of salary	Pensions				
				1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
A6	Pensions already being paid			297,000	297,000	297,000	297,000	297,000
A3				212,000	212,000	212,000	212,000	212,000
B4				130,000	130,000	130,000	130,000	130,000
C1				44,500	44,500	44,500	44,500	44,500
A6				417,575.35	306	61	280,000	280,000
A4	338,472.90	333	65.5	222,000	222,000	222,000	222,000	222,000
A5	403,729.06	325	64.16				259,000	259,000
A5	403,729.06	402	70				283,000	283,000
Employees' contributions				683,500	1,185,500	1,185,500	1,727,500	1,727,500
		7% =	383,000					
Theoretical WEU contribution				1,149,000	1,149,000	1,149,000	1,149,000	1,149,000
		14% =	766,000					
Difference				- 465,500	- 36,500	- 36,500	+ 578,500	+ 578,500

APPENDIX V

*Table showing the correspondence between heads
and sub-heads in the 1984 and 1985 budgets*

<i>1985 Budget</i>	<i>1984 Budget</i>
PART I	
<i>Section A</i>	
<i>Head I</i>	<i>Head I</i>
Sub-Head 1	Sub-Head 1
Sub-Head 2	
2.1.	Sub- Head 2 (A) (c)
2.2.	2 (A) (a)
2.3.	2 (A) (b)
2.4.	2 (A) (d)
2.5.	2 (A) (g)
2.6.	2 (A) (h)
2.7.	2 (A) (e)
2.8.	2 (C) (e)
Sub-Head 3	
3.1.	Sub-Head 2 (B) (a)
3.2.	2 (B) (b)
3.3.	2 (B) (c)
Sub-Head 4	
4.1.	Sub-Head 2 (C) (a)
4.2.	2 (C) (b)
4.3.	2 (C) (c)
4.4.	2 (C) (d)
Sub-Head 5	Sub-Head 2 (C) (f)
<i>Head II</i>	<i>Head II</i>
Sub-Head 6	
6.1.	Sub-Head 3.1
6.2.	3.2 (A) (a)
6.3.	3.2 (B)
6.4.	3.5

Sub-Head 7	Sub-Head 3.2 (A) (b)
Sub-Head 8	Sub-Head 1 (b)
Sub-Head 9	
9.1.	Sub-Head 3.3
9.2. }	3.2 (A) (a) &
9.3. }	3.2 (A) (b)
<i>Head III</i>	<i>Head III</i>
Sub-Head 10	Sub-Head 4.1 & 4.2
Sub-Head 11	Sub-Head 4.1
Sub-Head 12	Sub-Head 3.4 & 3.5
Sub-Head 13	Sub-Head 3.4 & 3.5
Sub-Head 14	Sub-Head 4.1
Sub-Head 15	Sub-Head 4.1
Sub-Head 16	Sub-Head 5
Sub-Head 17	Sub-Head 3.5, 4.1 & 7
<i>Head IV</i>	<i>Head IV</i>
Sub-Head 18	Sub-Head 6
Sub-Head 19	Sub-Head 7
Sub-Head 20	Sub-Head 8
Sub-Head 21	Sub-Head 9
Sub-Head 22	Sub-Head 10
Sub-Head 23	Sub-Head 11
Sub-Head 24	Sub-Head 12
Sub-Head 25	Sub-Head 13
Sub-Head 26	Sub-Head 14
Sub-Head 27	Sub-Head 15
Sub-Head 28	Sub-Head 16

Sub-Head 29	Sub-Head 17
Sub-Head 30	Sub-Head 18
Sub-Head 31	Sub-Head 19
Sub-Head 32	Sub-Head 20
<i>Section B - Receipts</i>	<i>Receipts (A)</i>
	Sub-Head (A) (a)
	Sub-Head (A) (b)
	Sub-Head (A) (c)
	Sub-Head (C)
 PART II	
<i>Section A</i>	<i>Head VI</i>
Sub-Head 1	Sub-Head 21 (A)
1.1.	21 (A) (a)
1.2.	21 (A) (b)
1.3.	21 (A) (c)
1.4.	21 (A) (d)
1.5.	21 (C)
Sub-Head 2	Sub-Head 21 (B)
2.1.	21 (B) (a)
2.2.	21 (B) (b)
2.3.	21 (B) (c)
Sub-Head 3	Sub-Head 21 (D)
<i>Section B - Receipts</i>	<i>Receipts (B)</i>
	Sub-Head (B) (a)

***Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of
the Assembly for the financial year 1985***

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Sir Paul Hawkins

1. In Part I, Section A, Head I of the budget estimates for 1985, increase the total provision by 348,000 francs to provide for the head of the private office for the President.

Signed: Hawkins

1. See 12th sitting, 6th December 1984 (amendment agreed to).

Relations between the Assembly and the Council

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Lord Reay, Rapporteur*

Draft Order

on relations between the Assembly and the Council

The Assembly,

Expressing its satisfaction with the intentions proclaimed in the Rome Declaration,

REQUESTS THE PRESIDENT

To take the appropriate steps, in agreement with the Council, to arrange for the Assembly's participation in the discussions and decisions called for by the attribution of a new and more important rôle to Western European Union;

INSTRUCTS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

To establish permanent liaison arrangements with the Council or its presidency and to see that the Assembly is enabled to bring to a successful conclusion its mission in working out a new and more important rôle for WEU.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy, van der Werff (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens (Alternate: Haase), Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier, Bianco, Bogaerts, Burger, Hill, Koehl (Alternate: Dreyfus-Schmidt), Lagneau (Alternate: Pécriaux), Lagorce, Martino, Masciadri, Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spitella, Vecchietti, Vogt, de Vries, (vacant seat) (Alternate: Millan).*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Lord Reay, Rapporteur)

1. On 27th October 1984, the Presidential Committee of the Assembly met in Rome to prepare the extraordinary session held on 29th October. To this end, it adopted a draft order for debate at that session. However, in view of the way the session proceeded and the time filled – very advantageously for the Assembly – with ministerial addresses and the ensuring questions and answers, the plenary Assembly was not able to hold a proper debate on this draft order. On the proposal of the President of the Assembly, the Presidential Committee therefore agreed to refer the text back to the General Affairs Committee so that it might report on it at the second part of the ordinary session. This is normal procedure since, while the Presidential Committee had to take urgent action, it is for the committees to prepare the work of the Assembly in plenary sitting.

2. The purpose of the order was to allow the Assembly to respond to the wish expressed by the Council, and in particular by its Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Genscher, that continuing consultations be held between the presidency of the Council and the Assembly on matters arising from the governments' decision to give WEU a new and more important rôle. In practice, in agreement with the Presidential Committee, the President of the Assembly had taken the necessary steps to ensure that such consultations could start, and certain members of the Assembly took part in meetings with the Chairman-in-Office of the Council prior to and following the ministerial meeting in Rome on 26th and 27th October.

3. However, such meetings raise a problem, the seriousness of which must not be underestimated. On the one hand, the Rome Declaration seems to make a distinction between the "presidency" of the Council and the Council itself without being very explicit about what it means by this distinction. On the other hand, the frequency, relative brevity and informal nature of these meetings and the need to hold a dialogue make it necessary to reserve them for a small number of parliamentarians. The nature of a parliamentary assembly which cannot delegate its attributions makes it particularly difficult to set up an appropriate body for such a dialogue since it is essential that all national delegations be represented and all political groups, too. The solution adopted by the Presidential Committee was to make the Bureau of the Assembly responsible for this task. The Bureau is composed of the President and Vice-Presidents and a member of each delegation is therefore represented. Since certain

political groups are not represented on the Bureau, it was agreed to add the chairmen of the two political groups not otherwise represented.

4. This method had the advantage of forming a group of nine persons, i.e. of reasonable size, meeting the twofold requirement mentioned above. However, there are disadvantages:

- (i) there is no system of weighting to compensate for differences in the size of delegations and political groups;
- (ii) there is no provision for alternates, since members of the Bureau as such have none, yet the frequency of meetings with the Council makes it difficult for many of them to attend regularly;
- (iii) it does not correspond to the status of the Bureau, which is not a political body;
- (iv) it is not an official organ of the Assembly, which may create delicate situations, particularly when justifying expenditure involved in meetings.

5. Your Rapporteur sees no wholly satisfactory solution to these problems but considers that the advantages of the method chosen outweigh the disadvantages, since it allows a true dialogue between the Council and the Assembly such as WEU has never known in the past. But he considers the situation can be improved by taking the following measures:

(a) A special body might be set up responsible for contacts with the Council and recruited in the same way as the enlarged Bureau but, if it is formed by a decision of the Assembly, it would become official. It might be called the Group for Liaison with the Council. This is the purpose of the present draft order.

(b) Delegations and political groups specially represented in the present enlarged Bureau might be asked to appoint alternates to stand in when the titular members are unable to attend certain meetings, and in those cases only. The procedure for replacing Vice-Presidents of the Assembly when acting as members of the liaison group might help to introduce the desired political weighting without jeopardising the principle on which the Assembly's participation in the dialogue with the governments is at present based.

6. However, it should be ensured that the creation of this liaison group does not interfere with the work of the Assembly and its committees. Relations between the Council and the Assembly include official written and oral procedure in the form of recommendations and replies, written questions and answers, the participation of ministers in sessions and joint meetings between committees and the Council. For many years, the latter have been held in an informal manner with the result that official procedure for joint meetings has been left in abeyance. Admittedly, informal procedure has the advantage of allowing a freer, easier dialogue, but also the serious disadvantage of not obliging the Council to reach effective agreement on the answers it gives the Assembly and leaving some doubt about the nature of the commitments involved in the answers given by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to questions put by members of parliament. The new procedure is certainly not likely to throw full light on this matter.

7. Moreover, by adopting recommendations, the Assembly is generally able to give its views only after some time has elapsed. But the informal dialogue between a liaison group and the Ministers, designed to avoid this delay, will probably tempt the group to anticipate the Assembly's subsequent deliberations.

8. For these reasons your Rapporteur considers that the draft order prepared by the Presidential Committee may lead to a worthwhile debate, allowing the opinions of members of the Assembly to be obtained, as well as a decision which should make relations between the two WEU bodies more official and durable.

*
* *

9. Moreover, your Rapporteur wishes to mention some of the problems which the Rome Declaration raises for the WEU Assembly, not with a view to taking immediate decisions but to guide the thinking of the Council and Assembly in the coming years.

10. (a) Although the Council has never been very specific about this point, it does not at the present juncture seem to consider a revision of the treaty necessary. But for a long time the Assembly has been concerned that the generally-accepted interpretation of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty was to make national delegations to the WEU Assembly identical with those to the Assembly of the Council of Europe. As a result, members of these two assemblies are overburdened with work and some members of parliament whose

tastes and responsibilities make them experts on defence questions are not members of the WEU Assembly because they are passed over in favour of persons more interested in matters handled by the Council of Europe.

11. Any revision of the treaty would naturally have to include a revision of Article IX. But if the Council does not intend to revise the treaty your Rapporteur considers the authorities concerned in member countries might appoint delegations in which titular members in the Council of Europe are substitutes in the WEU Assembly and vice versa without this infringing the obligations set out in Article IX.

12. (b) In the Rome Declaration, the Ministers "stress the value, in their eyes, of developing a dialogue between the Assembly and other parliaments or parliamentary institutions". The Assembly has always been aware of the usefulness of this. Its composition certainly means that its relations with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe raise no real problem.

13. The same is not true for the European Parliament. That assembly has been invited several times to be represented officially by observers at our sessions. It has never done so – although one or other political group of the European Parliament has sometimes sent a delegation – and it has never invited WEU observers to take part officially in its sessions. This is not surprising in view of the obligations all parliamentary assemblies have to fulfil, as your Rapporteur noted in connection with relations between the Assembly and the Council. In any event, it seems difficult for the WEU Assembly to take any further steps as long as the European Parliament has not given its own views on a possible dialogue with the WEU Assembly.

14. The same does not apply to the North Atlantic Assembly which has no official status but whose interests cover the same areas as those for which our Assembly is responsible. Exchanges of information, links between secretariats, reciprocal invitations and the fact that some members of parliament belong to both assemblies established connection with it a long time ago. But can one nevertheless speak of a dialogue? This would probably be saying too much, in the absence of an adequate effort on either side to ensure that due account is really being taken, in reports for instance, of information exchanged by the two assemblies. Only the secretariats would be able to ensure that information circulates better and provides material for a true dialogue which might for instance be achieved by the rapporteurs concerned taking part in the debates on each other's reports on the same subjects. Naturally, the main interest of relations with the North

Atlantic Assembly is to allow exchanges of views with North American members of parliament, and this can be done only if careful attention is paid to the dates of that Assembly's sessions, it being easier for committees to establish such relations than the WEU Assembly meeting in plenary session.

15. Observers from the parliaments of member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, not members of WEU, have frequently been invited, often with success, when our Assembly was dealing with matters of particular interest to one or other of these countries. The interest shown by some of them in the reactivation of WEU should make this practice more systematic and general, as was the case at the extraordinary session in Rome.

16. However this may be, the presence of too many members of parliament from outside the Assembly, who must obviously have the right to speak, might weaken the debates, and the WEU Assembly must not become a forum with vaguely-defined activities but remain what it is: an assembly composed of delegations from the parliaments of member countries for exercising parliamentary supervision of the WEU Council.

17. (c) The Assembly can but welcome the intentions expressed by the Ministers in the second part of the Rome Declaration on the institutional reform of WEU. However, it should be noted that the development of contacts between the Council and the Assembly, like the dialogue with other parliaments, will have budgetary repercussions which the Council cannot overlook. The Assembly must also recall that more informal contacts must not be to the detriment of official procedure which alone compels the Council to act as a body which has to find terms on which it is unanimous.

18. The proposal to hold "a colloquium involving the presidency of the Council and the committees of the Assembly" might be an interesting step provided the views of the governments and of the Assembly are made clear. What would be the aim of such a colloquium? Would it be open to the public? Would the presidency be acting on behalf of

the Council or on its own behalf? Would the whole Council take part? Would the agenda be proposed by the presidency or by the Assembly committees? The liaison group should seek details from the Ministers on these points and endeavour to obtain the widest possible scope for initiatives by the organs of the Assembly.

19. The participation of representatives of the presidency – or other governments – at committee meetings has often been called for by the Assembly which can but be gratified if Ministers accede to these requests, which should raise no problems for the Assembly since the committees have to take the initiative for such participation.

20. The WEU technical institutions already contribute to the Assembly's work in two ways: (a) joint meetings between the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee on the work of the SAC; (b) the request conveyed by the Council to the international secretariat of the SAC that it prepare studies at the request of the Assembly.

21. Both procedures might be developed without jeopardising the governmental nature of the WEU technical organs, i.e. their dependence on the Council alone. Should it be otherwise, there would be a serious risk of governments refusing to provide the technical organs with the information they need and more interference between the executive authority and the parliamentary authority would make the work of these technical organs difficult. Conversely, it might be possible for the Council to transmit the Assembly's requests to the technical agencies more quickly thus allowing the Assembly to receive their studies earlier.

22. Your Rapporteur considers these are the main positions which members of the group for liaison between the Council and the Assembly should uphold in relations between the Assembly and the Council. The draft order emanating from the Presidential Committee calls for such a group to be set up officially to allow a fruitful dialogue to be pursued with the Ministers.

Relations between the Assembly and the Council

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Vecchietti and others

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft order, add "including Europe's rôle for the strengthening of peace".

Signed: Vecchietti, Fiandrotti, Amadei, Rubbi, Milani

1. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (amendment negatived).

Political union of Europe

MOTION FOR AN ORDER¹

tabled by Mr. Tummers and others

The Assembly,

Noting that, in June 1964, Mr. von Merkatz, as Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee during the tenth session of Western European Union, prepared a brief on the political union of Europe containing a chronology (1946-63), documentation (seventeen historical documents) and comparative statistics concerning the EEC, EFTA and certain other countries;

Noting that, in May 1974, Mr. Leynen, as Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee during the twentieth session of Western European Union, prepared a brief on the political union of Europe containing a continuation of the document presented by Mr. von Merkatz, ending with a communiqué issued after the nine-power conference in Copenhagen on 15th December 1973,

I. URGES THE GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

To elaborate a third brief in this series of historical surveys;

II. ASKS THE PRESIDENCY OF THE ASSEMBLY OF WEU

(a) To consider publishing these three surveys in one combined volume;

(b) Pursuant to the Assembly's aims to make information on WEU more easily accessible to the general public, to consider publishing a special edition.

Signed: Tummers, Vecchiotti, van der Werff, Fourné, Stoffelen, Gansel, van den Bergh, Wilkinson, Aarts, Worrell, Valleix, Reddemann, Spies von Bülllesheim, Hughes, Blaauw

1. See 11th sitting, 5th December 1984 (order referred to the Presidential Committee).

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