

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTIETH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1984

II

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTIETH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1984

II

Minutes
Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

The proceedings of the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU
comprise two volumes:

Volume I : Assembly documents.

Volume II: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general
index.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
List of representatives and substitutes	8
Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings:	
First sitting	12
Second sitting	18
Text adopted	21
Third sitting	22
Fourth sitting	25
Fifth sitting	28
Texts adopted	32
Sixth sitting	37
Texts adopted	41
Official report of debates:	
First sitting	46
Second sitting	62
Third sitting	84
Fourth sitting	130
Fifth sitting	158
Sixth sitting	205
Index	235

LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
BOGAERTS August	Socialist
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
MICHEL Joseph	PSC
NOERENS René	PVV
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP

Substitutes

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	Socialist
BONNEL Raoul	PVV
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
LAGNEAU André	PRL
PECRIAUX Nestor	Socialist
STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP
VAN DER ELST Frans	Volkunie

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BEIX Roland	Socialist
BERRIER Noël	Socialist
BOURGES Yvon	RPR
CARO Jean-Marie President of the Assembly	UDF-CDS
FOURRE Jean-Pierre	Socialist
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
LAGORGE Pierre	Socialist
MAYOUD Alain	UDF
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.
SENES Gilbert	Socialist
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	Communist
WILQUIN Claude	Socialist
WIRTH Frédéric	UCDP

Substitutes

MM. BARTHE Jean-Jacques	Communist
BOHL André	UCDP
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DELEHEDDE André	Socialist
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
DREYFUS-SCHMIDT Michel	Socialist

MM. GALLEY Robert	RPR
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUYGHUES des ETAGES Jacques	Socialist
KOEHL Emile	UDF
MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist
MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left
NATIEZ Jean	Socialist
OEHLER Jean-André	Socialist
PROUVOST Pierre	UDF
ROSSINOT André	RPR
SOUVET Louis	Socialist
VERDON Marc	

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
BOEHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
GERSTL Friedrich	SPD
HAASE Horst	SPD
HARTMANN Klaus	CDU/CSU
HORNHUES Karl-Heinz	CDU/CSU
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
MUELLER Günther	CDU/CSU
NEUMANN Volker	SPD
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
RUMPF Wolfgang	FDP
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
SCHWARZ Heinz	CDU/CSU
SPIES von BUELLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU
VOGT Roland	Die Grünen

Substitutes

MM. BUECHNER Peter	SPD
ERTL Josef	FDP
GANSEL Norbert	SPD
GLOS Michael	CDU/CSU
HACKEL Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
HAUFF Volker	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
JAEGER Claus	CDU/CSU
Mrs. KELLY Petra	Die Grünen
MM. KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
SCHAUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
SCHMITZ Hans Peter	CDU/CSU
STAVENHAGEN Lutz	CDU/CSU
WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM.	AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
	ANTONI Varese	Communist
	BIANCO Gerardo	Chr. Dem.
	CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
	CIFARELLI Michele	Republican
	FERRARI AGGRADI Mario	Chr. Dem.
	FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
	FRASCA Salvatore	Socialist
	GIANOTTI Lorenzo	Communist
	GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
	MEZZAPEZA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
	MILANI Eliseo	PDUP
	PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
	RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
	RUBBI Antonio	Communist
	SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
	VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist
	ZAMBERLETTI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.

Substitutes

MM.	ACCILI Achille	Chr. Dem.
	ALBERINI Guido	Socialist
	BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
	COLAJANNI Napoleone	Communist
	FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs.	FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM.	GORLA Massimo	Prol. Dem.
	LAPENTA Nicola	Chr. Dem.
	MARCHIO Michele	MSI-DN
	MARTINO Guido	Republican
	MASCIADRI Cornelio	Socialist
	MITTERDORFER Karl	SVP
	PALUMBO Vincenzo	Liberal
	POLLIDORO Carlo	Communist
	RIZZI Enrico	PSDI
	RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
	SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
	TEODORI Massimo	Radical

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM.	BERCHEM Albert	Dem.
	MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
	THOSS Maurice	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM.	GLESENER Jean-Pierre	Soc. Chr.
	HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
	PRUSSEN Robert	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM.	AARTS Harry	CDA
	van den BERGH Harry	Labour
	BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
	de KWAADSTENIET, Willem	CDA
	STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
Mrs.	van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA
Mr.	van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal

Substitutes

Mr.	EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
Mrs.	den OUDEN-DEKKERS Greetje	Liberal
MM.	van der SANDEN Piet	CDA
	van TETS Govert	Liberal
	TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
	de VRIES Klaas	Labour
	WORRELL Joop	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Sir	Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr.	Thomas COX	Labour
Sir	Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
Sir	Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Mr.	Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir	Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr.	James HILL	Conservative
Lord	HUGHES	Labour
Mr.	Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Mrs.	Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr.	Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr.	Maurice MILLER	Labour
Sir	John OSBORN	Conservative
Sir	John PAGE	Conservative
Lord	REAY	Conservative
Mr.	Stephen ROSS	Liberal
Sir	Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr.	John WILKINSON	Conservative

Substitutes

MM.	David ATKINSON	Conservative
	Robert BROWN	Labour
	Donald COLEMAN	Labour
	John CORRIE	Conservative
	Robert EDWARDS	Labour
	Reginald FREESON	Labour
	Edward GARRETT	Labour
	Ralph HOWELL	Conservative
Earl of	KINNOULL	Conservative
Lord	McNAIR	Liberal
MM.	Bruce MILLAN	Labour
	Michael MORRIS	Conservative
	Christopher MURPHY	Conservative
Lord	NEWALL	Conservative
MM.	John STOKES	Conservative
	Stanley THORNE	Labour
	John WARD	Conservative
	Alec WOODALL	Labour

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 18th June 1984

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the thirtieth ordinary session of the Assembly.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (Doc. 968).
7. Nomination of members to committees.
8. Situation in the Middle East and European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 978*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Edwards, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2, 5 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the thirtieth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Address by the Provisional President

The Provisional President addressed the Assembly.

4. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 1 had been ratified by that Assembly with the exception of Mr. De Decker, Representative for Belgium, and Mr. Bonnel, substitute member for Belgium.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure and subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of the above.

5. Election of the President of the Assembly

Mr. Bassinet moved the suspension of the sitting under Rule 32 (1) (b) of the Rules of Procedure.

Speakers: Mr. Bassinet and Mrs. Knight.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the motion to suspend the sitting.

The motion was rejected.

Two candidates had been nominated, namely: Mr. Blaauw and Mr. Caro.

In accordance with Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded, by roll-call, to a secret ballot.

Speakers (points of order): MM. Hardy, Schwarz, Reddemann, Hardy.

The sitting was suspended at 3.50 p.m. and resumed at 4.20 p.m.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Worrell.

The Provisional President announced the result of the vote:

Votes cast	75
Blank or spoiled papers	3
Effective votes cast	72
Absolute majority	45
Mr. Blaauw	32
Mr. Caro	40

The necessary majority not being obtained, the Assembly proceeded to a second ballot.

Speaker (point of order): Mrs. Knight.

The sitting was suspended at 4.45 p.m. and resumed at 5.10 p.m.

The Provisional President announced the result of the vote:

Votes cast	76
Blank or spoiled papers	3
Effective votes cast	73
Absolute majority	45
Mr. Blaauw	28
Mr. Caro	45

The Provisional President declared Mr. Caro elected President.

On the invitation of the Provisional President, Mr. Caro took the Chair.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

Speaker: Mr. Bianco.

7. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

Two candidates were proposed for two posts of Vice-President, namely: Mr. Berchem and Mr. Reddeman.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

Mr. Berchem and Mr. Reddemann were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

8. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session

(Doc. 968)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session.

Speakers: MM. Freeson and Hardy.

The Assembly adopted the draft order of business for the first part of the session.

9. Nomination of members to committees

In accordance with Rules 39 (6) and 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the membership of the six committees as follows:

1. COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS (27 seats)

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Bonnel Dejardin Stevelyck	MM. De Decker Van der Elst Noerens
<i>France:</i>	MM. Bourges Galley Huyghues des Etages Natiez Pignion	MM. Matraja Caro Baumel Wirth Verdon
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Ertl Gerstl Kittelmann Lemmrich Scheer	MM. Rumpf Klejdzinski Lenzer Glos Gansel
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Alberini Amadei Giust Pecchioli Sarti	MM. Milani Cifarelli Palumbo Antoni Rauti

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Prussen	Mr. Glesener
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. van den Bergh Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet	MM. de Vries van Tets Aarts
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Brown Cox Sir Anthony Grant Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Stokes	Dr. Miller MM. Edwards Ross Lord Newall Mr. Wilkinson

2. GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (27 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Bogaerts Lagneau Michel	MM. Van der Elst Péciaux De Bondt
<i>France:</i>	MM. Berrier Caro Lagorce Prouvost Ruet	MM. Baumel Dreyfus-Schmidt Mayoud Grussenmeyer Wilquin
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Ahrens Müller Reddemann Rumpf Vogt	MM. Haase Kittelmann Böhm Ertl Mrs. Kelly
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Bianco Martino Masciadri Spitella Vecchiatti	MM. Accili Teodori Frasca Amadei Rubbi
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Thoss	Mr. Berchem
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. van der Sanden de Vries van der Werff	Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra MM. Tummers Blaauw
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Hardy Hill Lord McNair Lord Reay	Mrs. Knight Lord Hughes MM. Ward Millan Atkinson

3. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	Mr. Adriaensens Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Biefnot De Bondt
<i>France:</i>	MM. Bassinet Fourré Souvet Valleix	MM. Lagorce Croze Barthe Galley

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Böhm Lenzer Schmidt Spies von Büllenheim	MM. Müller Schwarz Klejdzinski Stavenhagen
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Colajanni Fiandrotti Mezzapesa Rizzi	MM. Gianotti Masciadri Cavaliere Sarti
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Prussen	Mr. Thoss
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Aarts Worrell	Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers Mr. Tummers
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Mr. Garrett Sir Paul Hawkins MM. McGuire Wilkinson	MM. Thorne Hill Sir John Osborn Sir Frederic Bennett

4. COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Adriaensens Biefnot	MM. Steverlynck Bogaerts
<i>France:</i>	MM. Beix Bohl Jeambrun Oehler	MM. Dhaille Rossinot Delehedde Ruet
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Enders Haase Hartmann Schmitz	MM. Büchner Ahrens Lemmrich Hornhues
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Ferrari Aggradi Foschi Pollidoro Rauti	MM. Accili Giust Alberini Mitterdorfer
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Hengel	Mr. Margue
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. van Tets de Vries	Mr. van den Bergh Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Freeson Morris Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Stokes	Mr. Woodall Lord McNair Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Sir Paul Hawkins

5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Michel Péciaux	MM. Lagneau De Decker
<i>France:</i>	MM. Delehedde Koehl Vial-Massat Wilquin	MM. Sénès Beix Bohl Prouvost

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Antretter Schulte Spies von Büllenheim Unland	MM. Büchner Schmidt Jäger Wulff
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Antoni Gorla Lapenta Marchio	MM. Fiandrotti Zamberletti Bonalumi Palumbo
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Glesener	Mr. Margue
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Eysink van der Werff	MM. van der Sanden Stoffelen
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Coleman Corrie Edwards Murphy	MM. Jessel Cox Woodall Earl of Kinnoull

6. COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS (14 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Bonnel Noerens	Mr. Dejardin Mrs. Staels-Dompas
<i>France:</i>	MM. Mercier Sénès	MM. Verdon Jung
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Enders Hackel	MM. Antretter Glos
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Cavaliere Frasca	Mr. Giust Mrs. Francese
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	MM. Berchem Glesener	MM. Prussen Thoss
<i>Netherlands:</i>	Mr. Stoffelen Mrs. van der Werf- Terpstra	Mr. Eysink Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers
<i>United Kingdom :</i>	Dr. Miller Sir John Page	Mr. Coleman Mrs. Knight

Speakers: The President and Sir Frederic Bennett (point of order).

10. *Situation in the Middle East and European security*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 978 and amendments)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Lord Reay, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Michel (*Chairman of the Committee*), Cifarelli, Stokes, Gianotti, Müller, Dreyfus-Schmidt and Reddemann.

The debate was adjourned.

11. *Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting*

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 19th June, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.35 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

<p>Belgium</p> <p>MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts De Decker Dejardin Michel Noerens Mrs. Staels-Dompas</p>	<p>MM. Kittelmann Müller Neumann Reddemann Rumpf Schulte Schwarz Spies von Büllenheim Unland</p>	<p>Netherlands</p> <p>MM. Aarts <i>Tummers</i> (van den Bergh) Blaauw <i>Worrell</i> (de Kwaadsteniet) Stoffelen Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra Mrs. <i>den Ouden-Dekkers</i> (van der Werff)</p>
<p>France</p> <p>MM. Bassinet <i>Dreyfus-Schmidt</i> (Berrier) <i>Souvet</i> (Bourges) Caro Fourré Jeambrun Jung Lagorce Pignion <i>Matraja</i> (Sénès)</p>	<p>Italy</p> <p>MM. <i>Martino</i> (Amadei) <i>Colajanni</i> (Antoni) Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi <i>Masciadri</i> (Fiandrotti) Frasca Gianotti Giust Mezzapesa Milani Rauti <i>Mitterdorfer</i> (Rubbi) Sarti <i>Rodotà</i> (Vecchietti) <i>Bonalumi</i> (Zamberletti)</p>	<p>United Kingdom</p> <p>Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Cox <i>Stokes</i> (Sir Geoffrey Finsberg) <i>Ward</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins MM. Hill <i>Freeson</i> (Lord Hughes) Earl of <i>Kinnoull</i> (Jessel) Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Garrett</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller MM. <i>Morris</i> (Sir John Osborn) <i>Murphy</i> (Sir John Page) Lord Reay Lord <i>McNair</i> (Ross) Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson</p>
<p>Federal Republic of Germany</p> <p>MM. Ahrens Antretter <i>Lenzer</i> (Böhm) Enders <i>Scheer</i> (Haase) <i>Lemmrich</i> (Hartmann) <i>Jäger</i> (Hornhues)</p>	<p>Luxembourg</p> <p>MM. <i>Prussen</i> (Berchem) Margue</p>	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<p>France</p> <p>MM. Baumel Beix Mayoud Ruet Valleix Vial-Massat</p>	<p>MM. Wilquin Wirth</p>	<p>Italy</p> <p>Mr. Pecchioli</p>
	<p>Federal Republic of Germany</p> <p>MM. Gerstl Vogt</p>	<p>Luxembourg</p> <p>Mr. Thoss</p>

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 19th June 1984

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Situation in the Middle East and European security (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 978 and amendments*).
2. Deterrence and the will of the people (*Présentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and*
3. State of European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 971*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

Three candidates were proposed for three posts of Vice-President, namely: Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Blaauw and Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Blaauw and Mr. Ferrari Aggradi were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

4. Situation in the Middle East and European security

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 978 and amendments)

The debate was resumed.

Speaker: Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Garrett, Freeson, Cavaliere and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The debate was closed.

Lord Reay, Rapporteur, and Mr. Michel, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

1. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (ix) and insert:

“Paying tribute to the peacekeeping task accomplished by units of the multinational buffer force and deploring the heavy losses suffered by two of these units;”.

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere, Vogt and Lord Reay.

The amendment was agreed to.

Speaker: Mr. Jung.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

2. In the first sub-paragraph of paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “and the PLO”.

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere, Milani, Rauti (point of order) and Lord Reay.

The amendment was negatived.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Cifarelli.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

3. Leave out the second sub-paragraph of paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“- recognition by Israel of the right of the Palestinian people to their own national homeland;”.

Speakers: Sir Frederic Bennett and Lord Reay.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere.

4. Leave out sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“(a) recall that peace on the territory of former Palestine depends, on the one hand, on all Arab countries recognising Israel and its rights and, on the other hand, on Israel recognising the fact that the Palestinian people have the right to their own national homeland;”.

Speakers: MM. Bianco and Michel.

The amendment was negatived.

Speakers (points of order): Dr. Miller, Mr. Hardy, Dr. Miller and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Jung:

6. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph 4 (b).

Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: Mr. Jung, Sir Frederic Bennett and Lord Reay.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt:

5. In sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out:

“and warn that country that there must be no further expulsion of Arab populations from these territories.”

Speakers: Mr. Jung, Sir Frederic Bennett and Lord Reay.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 403)¹.

Speakers (explanation of vote): Dr. Miller, MM. Cifarelli, Vogt, Fresson, Bianco, Cavaliere and Martino.

5. Deterrence and the will of the people

(Presentation of the debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 970 and amendments)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Michel (*Chairman of the Committee*) and Mrs. Knight.

Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Gianotti, Murphy and Müller.

The debate was adjourned.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.

1. See page 21.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Kittelmann Müller Reddemann Rumpf Schulte Schwarz Spies von Büllesheim Vogt	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts De Decker <i>Pécriaux</i> (Dejardin) Michel Noerens Mrs. Staels-Dompas		MM. Aarts <i>Worrell</i> (de Kwaadsteniet) Stoffelen <i>Tummers</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra)
France	Italy	
MM. Bassinet Berrier <i>Souvet</i> (Bourges) Fourré Jung Lagorce Pignion Sénès <i>Prouvost</i> (Wilquin) <i>Dreyfus-Schmidt</i> (Wirth)	MM. <i>Martino</i> (Amadei) Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi <i>Masciadri</i> (Fiandrotti) Frasca Gianotti Giust Mezzapesa Milani <i>Pollidoro</i> (Pecchioli) Rauti <i>Mitterdorfer</i> (Sarti) <i>Rodotà</i> (Vecchietti) <i>Bonalumi</i> (Zamberletti)	United Kingdom
Federal Republic of Germany		Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Cox Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Sir Anthony Grant MM. Hardy <i>Howell</i> (Sir Paul Hawkins) Hill <i>Freeson</i> (Lord Hughes) <i>Ward</i> (Jessel) Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Garrett</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Sir John Page) Lord Reay Lord <i>McNair</i> (Ross) Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
MM. Ahrens Antretter Enders Gerstl <i>Scheer</i> (Haase) <i>Lemmrich</i> (Hartmann) <i>Hackel</i> (Hornhues)	Luxembourg	
	MM. <i>Prussen</i> (Berchem) Margue	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg
MM. Baumel Beix Jeambrun Mayoud Ruet Valleix Vial-Massat	MM. Böhm Neumann Unland	Mr. Thoss
		Netherlands
		MM. van den Bergh Blaauw van der Werff
	Italy	
	MM. Antoni Rubbi	United Kingdom
		Sir John Osborn

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 403

on the situation in the Middle East and European security

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling its Recommendations 341, 349, 361, 371, 386 and 389;
- (ii) Considering that armed conflicts in the Middle East are a serious threat to Europe's security;
- (iii) Considering in particular that there is a serious risk of the war between Iran and Iraq escalating and further endangering stability in the area and the world economy;
- (iv) Considering that the use of chemical weapons by either of the belligerents seriously undermines respect for international conventions in all international warfare;
- (v) Condemning also the use of children in an army at war, and the ill-treatment of prisoners;
- (vi) Considering that the situation of Lebanon continues to be likely to provoke international crises and that such a risk remains grave whilst part of the country is subject to foreign domination;
- (vii) Considering that the situation in Lebanon should not be seen only nor even primarily in terms of the East-West conflict;
- (viii) Welcoming the formation in Lebanon of a government which reflects the demographic balance and the rights of the different political and other elements in the country;
- (ix) Paying tribute to the peacekeeping task accomplished by units of the multinational buffer force and deploring the heavy losses suffered by two of these units;
- (x) Convinced that all foreign forces other than those of the United Nations should leave Lebanese soil completely;
- (xi) Considering that the vicious circle of terrorism and repression and the installation of settlements are obstacles to the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East, which rather requires:
 - recognition by those who have not yet done so, including most Arab countries and the PLO, of the right of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers;
 - recognition by Israel of the fact that most Palestinian people still consider the PLO under its present leadership as their representative and of their right to their own national homeland;
- (xii) Welcoming the improvement in relations between the PLO and Jordan with a view to solving the Palestinian problem,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Co-ordinate the policies of member countries towards Iran and Iraq with a view to ensuring that no action is taken which might prolong the conflict and to help to restore peace between these two countries;
2. In order to confirm declarations by member countries that they have not supplied the belligerents, directly or indirectly, with chemical weapons, instruct the Agency for the Control of Armaments to verify declarations made by member countries in this connection;
3. Press for the complete withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign forces, except for those of the United Nations, in application of United Nations Resolutions 508 and 509;
4. Formally reaffirm the joint views of the Western European countries expressed by the Ten in their Venice declaration of June 1980, and in particular:
 - (a) recall that stability in the Middle East depends, on the one hand, on the PLO and all nations recognising Israel and its rights and, on the other hand, on Israel recognising the fact that the Palestinian people have the right to their own national homeland and that they are represented by the PLO;
 - (b) repeat its condemnation of Israel's continued settlement policy on territories occupied since 1967 and warn that country that there must be no further expulsion of Arab populations from these territories.

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 19th June 1984

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by the President of the Assembly.
2. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
3. Deterrence and the will of the people (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 970 and amendments*).
4. State of European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 971*).
5. Control of armaments and disarmament (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 972*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

4. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom

Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Baroness Young replied to questions put by MM. Wilkinson, Pignion, Vogt, Blaauw, Dr. Miller, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Cavaliere and Morris.

5. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

One candidate was proposed for the vacant post of Vice-President, namely: Mr. De Decker.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-President by acclamation.

Mr. De Decker was elected Vice-President by acclamation.

The President informed the Assembly that, according to age, the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents was as follows: Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berchem, Reddemann, Blaauw and De Decker.

6. Deterrence and the will of the people

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc 970 and amendments)

The debate was resumed.

Speaker: Mr. Vogt.

Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere, Tummers, Spies von Büllesheim, Mezzapesa and Dr. Miller.

Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Milani, Freeson, Rodotà, Scheer, Reddemann, Dejardin, Pignion and Martino.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur, and Mr. Michel, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Freeson and others:

1. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out:

“and that nuclear weapons are an essential part of that deterrence”.

Speakers: MM. Freeson, Cavaliere and Lagorce.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. Michel, Chairman of the Committee, proposed the reference back to the committee.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Freeson.

Mr. Michel, Chairman of the Committee, proposed that the amendments be referred back to the committee.

Speakers (points of order): Mr. Hardy, Dr. Miller, MM. Milani, Reddemann, Rodotà, Cifarelli, Vogt, Dejardin, the President, MM. Cox, Reddemann, Cox, Ferrari Aggradi, the President, MM. Freeson, van den Bergh, Dr. Miller, MM. Pignion, Michel (*Chairman of the Committee*) and the President.

The sitting was suspended at 7.35 p.m. and resumed at 8.05 p.m.

The President reminded the Assembly of the terms of Rule 29, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Rules of Procedure.

Speakers: Mr. Michel (*Chairman of the Committee*); (points of order): MM. Bianco, Milani, Rauti, the President, Mr. Spies von

Büllesheim, the President; (explanation of vote): Mr. Hardy; the President, Mr. Michel (*Chairman of the Committee*); (points of order): MM. Vogt, Blaauw, van den Bergh and Freeson.

The President proposed that the debate be continued after a suspension of one hour.

The proposal was agreed to.

The sitting was suspended at 8.50 p.m. and resumed at 9.55 p.m.

Speakers (point of order): Mr. Bianco and the President.

Sir Frederic Bennett proposed the reference back of the report to the committee in accordance with Rule 32 (1) (d) of the Rules of Procedure.

Speakers: Mr. Blaauw (point of order), Mr. Hardy, the President; (points of order): MM. Bianco, Cox, the President, Mr. Beix, the President, Dr. Miller, the President, Mr. Müller; Mr. Michel (*Chairman of the Committee*).

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the reference back to the committee.

The motion for reference back was agreed to and the report was referred back to the General Affairs Committee.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Hardy.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 20th June, at 9.30 a.m.

Speakers (points of order): Mr. Cox, the President, Mr. Vogt, the President, Mr. Freeson, the President, Mr. Bianco and the President.

The sitting was closed at 10.35 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium

Mr. Adriaensens
Mrs. *Staels-Dompas*
(Bogaerts)
MM. *Bonnel* (De Decker)
Dejardin
Michel
Noerens
De Bondt (Mrs. Staels-
Dompas)

France

MM. Bassinet
Baumel
Beix
Berrier
Lagorce
Pignion
Prouvost (Wilquin)
Wirth

Federal Republic of Germany

MM. Antretter
Lenzer (Böhm)
Enders
Gerstl
Scheer (Haase)
Hackel (Kittelmann)
Müller
Reddemann

MM. Rumpf
Schwarz
Spies von Büllesheim
Unland
Vogt

Italy

MM. *Martino* (Amadei)
Amadei (Antoni)
Bianco
Cavaliere
Cifarelli
Ferrari Aggradi
Masciadri (Fiandrotti)
Frasca
Gianotti
Giust
Mezzapesa
Milani
Pollidoro (Pecchioli)
Rauti
Palumbo (Rubbi)
Mitterdorfer (Sarti)
Rodotà (Vecchietti)
Bonalumi (Zamberletti)

Luxembourg

MM. *Prussen* (Berchem)
Glesener (Margue)
Margue (Thoss)

Netherlands

MM. Aarts
van den Bergh
Blaauw
Worrell (de
Kwaadsteniet)
Stoffelen
Tummers (Mrs. van der
Werf-Terpstra)

United Kingdom

Sir Frederic Bennett
Mr. Cox
Sir Anthony Grant
MM. Hardy
Hill
Freeson (Lord Hughes)
Ward (Jessel)
Mrs. Knight
Mr. *Millan* (McGuire)
Dr. Miller
MM. *Morris* (Sir John
Osborn)
Murphy (Sir John Page)
Corrie (Lord Reay)
Sir Dudley Smith
Mr. Wilkinson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France

MM. Bourges
Fourré
Jeambrun
Jung
Mayoud
Ruet
Sénès
Valleix
Vial-Massat

Federal Republic of Germany

MM. Ahrens
Hartmann
Hornhues
Neumann
Schulte

Netherlands

Mr. van der Werff

United Kingdom

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
Sir Paul Hawkins
Mr. Ross

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 20th June 1984

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. State of European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 971).
2. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions* Docs. 973 and amendments, 979 and 975).
3. Twenty-ninth annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*, Doc. 969).
4. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council (*Joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and votes on the draft recommendations*, Docs. 973 and amendments, 979 and 975).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. State of European security

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 971)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Sir Dudley Smith, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Pignion (Chairman of the Committee) and Mr. Vogt.

Sir Frederic Bennett, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Aarts, Cavaliere and van den Bergh.

Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Hill.

The debate was adjourned.

4. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council

Political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council

Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 973 and amendments, 979 and amendments and 975)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur.

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Thoss, Rapporteur.

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Rapporteur.

**5. *Twenty-ninth annual report
of the Council***

*(Presentation by Mr. Genscher,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic
of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 969)*

The report of the Council to the Assembly was presented by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. Genscher replied to questions put by MM. Pignion, Bianco, Dejardin, Baumel, van

den Bergh, Blaauw, Ferrari Aggradi, Vogt, Giannotti, Milani, De Decker and Lord Reay.

**6. *Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting***

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Schulte Schwarz Spies von Büllesheim Unland Vogt	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts De Decker Dejardin Michel Mrs. Staels-Dompas	Italy	MM. Aarts van den Bergh Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen <i>Eysink</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) <i>Worrell</i> (van der Werff)
France	MM. Amadei <i>Colajanni</i> (Antoni) Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi <i>Masciadri</i> (Fiandrotti) Gianotti Giust Mezzapesa Milani <i>Pollidoro</i> (Pecchioli) Rauti <i>Palumbo</i> (Rubbi) <i>Mitterdorfer</i> (Sarti) <i>Rodotà</i> (Vecchiotti) <i>Bonalumi</i> (Zamberletti)	United Kingdom
MM. Baumel <i>Huyghues des Etages</i> (Berrier) Fourré Jeambrun Lagorce Pignion	Luxembourg	Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Cox Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Sir Anthony Grant MM. Hardy Hill Lord Hughes MM. Jessel <i>Corrie</i> (Mrs. Knight) <i>Brown</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Sir John Page) Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Berchem Margue Thoss	
MM. Ahrens <i>Lenzer</i> (Böhm) Enders Gerstl <i>Gansel</i> (Haase) <i>Jäger</i> (Hornhues) <i>Hackel</i> (Kittelmann) Müller Neumann Reddemann Rumpf		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Ruet Sénès Valleix Vial-Massat Wilquin Wirth	Italy
Mr. Noerens		Mr. Frasca
France	Federal Republic of Germany	United Kingdom
MM. Bassinet Beix Bourges Jung Mayoud	MM. Antretter Hartmann	Sir Paul Hawkins Sir John Osborn Mr. Ross

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 20th June 1984

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. State of European security (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 971*).
2. Address by Mr. van Houwelingen, Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands.
3. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council (*Joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 973 and amendments, 979 and amendments and 975*).
4. AWACS and Nimrod aircraft (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 974*).
5. Control of armaments and disarmament (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 972*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. State of European security

(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 971)

The debate was resumed.

Speaker: Sir Anthony Grant.

The debate was closed.

Sir Dudley Smith, Rapporteur, and Mr. Pignion, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

Speakers: The President, Mr. Vogt (explanation of vote), Sir Anthony Grant (point of order) and the President.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 404)¹.

4. Address by Mr. van Houwelingen, Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands

Mr. van Houwelingen, Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. van Houwelingen replied to questions put by Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Wilkinson, Pignion, Gansel, Vogt, Cavaliere, van den Bergh, Blaauw and Scheer.

5. Change in the orders of the day

Speakers (points of order): MM. de Vries, Dejardin, the President, MM. Blaauw, van den Bergh and the President.

The President proposed that the Assembly proceed immediately to examine the report by

1. See page 32.

the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on AWACS and Nimrod aircraft, Document 974.

The proposal was agreed to.

6. AWACS and Nimrod aircraft

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 974)

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Rapporteur.

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Vogt; (point of order): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Vogt.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Wilkinson, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 405)¹.

7. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council

Political implications of European security in 1984 - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council

Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council

(Joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 973 and amendments, 979 and amendments, and 975)

The joint debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Blaauw, van den Bergh, Dr. Miller, MM. Cavaliere and Wilkinson.

Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Steverlynck, Dejardin, Prussen, Baumel, Gianotti, Mezzapesa, Bianco and Gansel.

1. See page 33.

The joint debate was closed.

Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and Mr. Thoss, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, replied to the speakers.

Mr. Blaauw, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Mr. Hardy, Vice-Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, and Mr. Pignion, Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly took note of the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, Document 975.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation on thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, Document 973 and amendments.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Pignion:

3. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "the partnership" and insert "co-operation".

Speakers: MM. Pignion, De Decker and Vogt (point of order).

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

1. At the end of sub-paragraph 3 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, add:

"and to secure international agreement to ensure that such developments are adequately and effectively controlled".

Speakers: MM. Hardy and De Decker; (points of order): Dr. Miller, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Pignion, De Decker and Wilkinson.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Dejardin and others:

2. Leave out sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"assessing the consequences for the Agency for the Control of Armaments of the possible abolition of Annex III to Protocol No. III and any changes which might be made to Annex IV;".

Speakers: MM. Dejardin, Bianco (point of order), Wilkinson, De Decker and Dejardin.

The amendment was negatived.

Speakers (points of order): Lord Hughes and Mr. Vogt.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 406)¹.

Speakers (explanation of vote): MM. Pignion, Vogt and Bianco.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation on the political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, Document 979 and amendments.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Gianotti:

2. In the second sub-paragraph of paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out:

“ and more particularly of recourse to nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces ”.

Speakers: MM. Pollidoro and Thoss.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

1. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “ Welcoming the fact ” and insert “ Taking note ”.

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere and Thoss.

The amendment was agreed to.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Thoss.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 407)¹.

Speakers (explanation of vote): MM. Pollidoro and Vogt.

8. Change in the membership of a committee

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following change in the membership of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments proposed by the United Kingdom Delegation: Mrs. Knight as a titular member in place of Sir John Page; Sir John Page as an alternate member in place of Mrs. Knight.

9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 21st June, at 9.30 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 8.50 p.m.

1. See page 34.

1. See page 35.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Spies von Büllenheim Unland Vogt	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts De Decker Dejardin <i>Stevelynck</i> (Michel) Mrs. Staels-Dompas	Italy	MM. Aarts van den Bergh Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen <i>Tummers</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) <i>Worrell</i> (van der Werff)
France	MM. Amadei Bianco Cavaliere <i>Martino</i> (Cifarelli) Ferrari Aggradi <i>Masciadri</i> (Fiandrotti) Frasca Gianotti Mezzapesa Milani <i>Pollidoro</i> (Pecchioli) Rauti <i>Palumbo</i> (Rubbi) <i>Mitterdorfer</i> (Sarti)	United Kingdom
MM. Baumel Pignion		Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. <i>Millan</i> (Cox) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Sir Anthony Grant Mr. Hardy Lord <i>Newall</i> (Sir Paul Hawkins) Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Earl of <i>Kinnoull</i> (Mr. Jessel) Mr. <i>Woodall</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller Sir John Page Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens Antretter <i>Lenzer</i> (Böhm) Enders Gerstl <i>Gansel</i> (Haase) <i>Lemmrich</i> (Hartmann) <i>Hackel</i> (Kittelmann) Reddemann <i>Scheer</i> (Schulte) Schwarz	MM. Berchem Margue Thoss	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Mayoud Ruet Sénès Valleix Vial-Massat Wilquin Wirth	Italy
Mr. Noerens		MM. Antoni Giust Vecchietti Zamberletti
France	Federal Republic of Germany	United Kingdom
MM. Bassinet Beix Berrier Bourges Fourré Jeambrun Jung Lagorce	MM. Hornhues Müller Neumann Rumpf	Mrs. Knight Sir John Osborn Lord Reay Mr. Ross

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 404***on the state of European security***

The Assembly,

- (i) Reiterating its belief that a European view on defence policy should be formulated collectively in WEU and in close consultation with all other European allies ;
- (ii) Paying real tribute to the vital contribution to the defence of Europe which the United States continues to make after forty years, and being convinced that collective defence should continue to be organised in NATO to which WEU is inextricably linked by the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty ;
- (iii) Recognising however that the European allies today contribute 65 to 75% of the ready forces in Europe and believing that some adaptation of NATO is necessary for it properly to reflect the European view of defence requirements ;
- (iv) Stressing the overriding importance of allied solidarity and the need for all countries, with due regard to their resources and geographical position, to accept their full responsibilities in the alliance ;
- (v) Welcoming the perceptive study on collective logistical support by General C. J. Dijkstra,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments to recommend in NATO:

1. That the structure of NATO be modified to reflect properly the European view of defence requirements, and to improve efficiency ; in particular:
 - (a) that the position of the Military Committee as the highest military authority under the Council and Defence Planning Committee should be clarified ;
 - (b) that the International Military Staff be fused with the Defence Planning and Policy Division of the international staff, and that defence and force planning matters be handled by the Defence Planning Committee and Military Committee in joint session;
 - (c) that the prerogatives of the three major commanders be adjusted to place them on a more equal footing and to reflect the primacy of the Military Committee;
 - (d) that a European officer should be appointed as Chief-of-Staff in SHAPE, and a European as Special Assistant to SACEUR for international affairs;
2. That every effort be made to demonstrate the solidarity of the alliance, and to ensure that all members assume corresponding responsibilities;
3. That the NATO authorities take note of and act on the study on collective logistical support, and in particular:
 - (a) reaffirm the logistics authority of SACEUR under paragraph 9 of the North Atlantic Council Resolution of 22nd October 1954;
 - (b) establish a communications zone command in the central region, under the command of Deputy CINCENT;
 - (c) arrange common funding of sustaining stocks and greater use of NAMSA;
 - (d) agree that essential logistics units would be mobilised at the earliest stage of the alert process;
4. That, as a matter of urgency, a common IFF aircraft recognition system be introduced on all NATO aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION 405
on AWACS and Nimrod aircraft

The Assembly,

- (i) Following with great interest the build-up of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Mixed Force composed of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force E-3A component at Geilenkirchen in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Nimrod component at Waddington in the United Kingdom;
- (ii) Welcoming the integrated nature of the NATO AWACS force's E-3A component in which airmen of nine continental European forces as well as from the United States and Canada participate and considering it to be an example for future schemes for multilateral units;
- (iii) Aware also that this NATO force is directed politically by the North Atlantic Council as such and militarily by SACEUR and his subordinate commander, the Commander of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Mixed Force;
- (iv) Noting with satisfaction that this important force is being set up speedily in accordance with the plans agreed to at the outset;
- (v) Welcoming the fact that France might also associate its air defence more closely with that of NATO by ordering the same type of AWACS aircraft and thus reinforce the common defence potential;
- (vi) Considering that the British decision on the Nimrod component might benefit the other member countries as well because of its maritime capability, but only provided its eleven aircraft are operational by 1986,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. Promote within NATO

- (a) Organisational structures to ensure that the national American AWACS force, the NATO E-3A component, the Nimrod component and any future French AWACS force will be equipped with the same type of hard- and software and with harmonised procedures so as to derive the maximum effectiveness from allied defence efforts and expenditure;
- (b) The improvement of the NATO E-3A component by providing its aircraft with airborne refuelling capabilities involving financially-acceptable modifications and appropriate training for its crews, taking into account the existence of American and British tanker aircraft;
- (c) Training for the necessary number of air staff officers in order to use the NATO E-3A aircraft as command and control aircraft in emergencies;
- (d) A set of rules which can be applied in the event of more multilateral military units being set up for common defence purposes thus codifying the lessons learned from the formation of the NATO AWACS force E-3A;

II. Remind the French Government of the importance it attaches to an early decision being taken on the procurement of its AWACS force.

RECOMMENDATION 406***on thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Believing it to be urgent to reinforce deterrence and safeguard peace, to organise within the Atlantic Alliance a politically credible and militarily effective European pillar;
- (ii) Considering that setting up a European pillar of the alliance should in particular serve the object of strengthening co-operation with our American allies, while giving a more European dimension to the discussion of questions touching the security of our continent;
- (iii) Believing that WEU should be used fully by the member states as a forum for analysis, debate and concerted action on the requirements of European defence, and that the other European allies, and other partners in the Ten should be kept fully informed;
- (iv) Recalling its Recommendation 380 and reiterating its belief that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s, in particular through the abolition of controls on conventional weapons;
- (v) Aware that the controls on atomic and biological weapons provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty have never been applied, but considering that in present circumstances it is no longer appropriate to apply them,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine and redefine the problems of European security and, to this end,
 - (a) meet regularly at a high level;
 - (b) hold at least two ministerial Council meetings a year, in particular to prepare NATO ministerial meetings, with the participation of defence ministers at at least one of these meetings; and
 - (c) keep the Assembly informed of these proceedings;
2. Strengthen the Permanent Council through the attendance as required of the senior officials concerned from the ministries for foreign affairs and defence and of the chiefs of defence staff;
3. Be assisted in its work by the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments, instructing:
 - (a) the Standing Armaments Committee to assist the Council in preparing a European policy in new conventional armaments, with particular regard to problems raised by emerging technologies; and to help the Council lay the foundations of a policy on the defensive use of space technology; and to secure international agreement to ensure that such developments are adequately and effectively controlled;
 - (b) the Agency for the Control of Armaments to undertake, on behalf of the Council or the Assembly, studies and analyses of problems related to disarmament, the limitation of armaments and the problems of verification of disarmament agreements;
4. Pursue the adaptation of WEU to the needs of the 1980s by:
 - (a) abolishing the controls on conventional weapons set out in Annexes III and IV to Protocol No. III;
 - (b) reorganising the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments to enable them to accomplish their new tasks;
 - (c) making the necessary arrangements to co-locate the ministerial bodies of WEU in a single place;
5. Establish appropriate procedure for informing European and Atlantic bodies about the conclusions of ministerial meetings.

RECOMMENDATION 407***on the political implications of European security in 1984 -
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the difficulties in defence policy, not only in Europe but throughout the western world;
- (ii) Aware also of the fact that in the medium and long term the only way to end the unbridled armaments race and the division of Europe is to find firm answers to the many political, social, economic and strategic questions of our era;
- (iii) Emphasising that in present circumstances a conflict between the two blocs might lead to the near-total destruction of Europe;
- (iv) Aware of the overriding need for:
 - a balanced, general, effective and verified disarmament policy;
 - political control of armaments and more particularly of recourse to nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces;
 - the meaningful pursuit of East-West disarmament negotiations in spite of the difficulties and setbacks in recent months;
 - political, economic and social co-operation between East and West in the spirit of the Helsinki final act;
- (v) Therefore underlining:
 - the growing importance of WEU for the security of Western Europe;
 - the need for the European members of NATO to assume greater weight but also greater defence responsibilities vis-à-vis their North American partners, while maintaining close co-operation with them;
- (vi) Taking note that the Council is examining the structural and operational changes to be made in WEU to allow it better to fulfil the rôle assigned to it under the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (vii) Considering that recent developments in Europe and in transatlantic and international relations make this an appropriate time for such an examination;
- (viii) Considering that the way the Council now operates does not allow it to give continuous political impetus to the organisation;
- (ix) Welcoming the Italian proposal to hold a meeting of ministers of defence of the WEU member countries in Rome in October 1984 and hoping this meeting will lead to decisions likely to promote a European armaments policy;
- (x) Regretting that the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council does not refer to the problems raised by the reorganisation of WEU and that the Assembly is systematically left without knowledge of the Council's activities on this essential matter,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Be guided at all times by the preceding considerations and general principles, particularly in the necessary reactivation of WEU;
2. Examine attentively the conditions in which better use might be made of WEU in the coming decades to achieve in particular:
 - (i) a permanent representation of member countries on the Council so that it may take more effective action;

- (ii) more frequent meetings, particularly at ministerial level and the continuation, after the Rome meeting, of regular meetings of ministers of defence in the framework of WEU, *inter alia* so as to give steady encouragement to the European armaments policy;
 - (iii) a regrouping of the various WEU organs;
 - (iv) an adaptation of the Secretariat-General to the organisation's new requirements;
 - (v) an agenda for its meetings allowing consultations on all matters relating to the security of Western Europe and the definition of a collegial European position prior to each meeting of the North Atlantic Council;
 - (vi) a possible enlargement of Western European Union;
 - (vii) co-operation between the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Independent European Programme Group without jeopardising the other tasks of the SAC, in view of the fact that paragraph 10 of the statute of the SAC specifies that agreements or arrangements concluded in the framework of that body remain open to participation by other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation;
 - (viii) an assessment of the consequences for the Agency for the Control of Armaments of cancelling Annex III to Protocol No. III and possible modifications to Annex IV;
 - (ix) a definition of Europe's present requirements in the control of armaments and the adaptation of the Agency for the Control of Armaments to a different rôle;
 - (x) the possible use of the competence acquired by the Agency for the Control of Armaments for the benefit of representations of member countries at international conferences on disarmament or the limitation of armaments and for more general research on the level of world armaments;
 - (xi) the provision of financial means for the Assembly allowing it better to carry out its rôle;
3. Keep the Assembly properly informed about the stage reached in its discussions on all matters relating to the future of WEU and in any event report on them either in its next annual report or in a supplementary report to be submitted to the Assembly on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of WEU.

SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 21st June 1984

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Control of armaments and disarmament (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 972*).
2. Military use of space (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 976 and amendments*).
3. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1983 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 983*).
4. Action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on the standardisation and production of armaments (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 977*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Control of armaments and disarmament

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 972)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. de Vries, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Pollidoro.

Mr. Blaauw, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Vogt and Hardy.

The debate was closed.

Mr. de Vries, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 408) ¹.

4. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1983

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 983)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. de Vries, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Pollidoro, Vogt, Woodall and Sir John Page.

The debate was closed.

Mr. de Vries, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 409) ².

Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

1. See page 41.

2. See page 42.

5. *Military use of space*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 976 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Hill, Vogt, Tummers, Fourré, Thorne, Brown and Scheer.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur, and Mr. Bassinet, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by MM. Thorne and Edwards:

1. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraphs 2 to 9.

Speakers: MM. Thorne and Wilkinson.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mr. Fourré:

7. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“Demand a larger European industrial involvement in telecommunications satellites and in military satellite programmes pursued at international level as well as in the associated ground station infrastructure, in addition to supporting existing national military communications satellites like Skynet and SAMRO;”.

Speakers: MM. Fourré and Wilkinson.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Fourré:

5. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, after “Soviet” add “and United States”.

Speakers: MM. Fourré and Wilkinson.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Fourré:

6. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

“and in the light of this study examine what tasks might be entrusted to the Agency for the

Control of Armaments with a view to participating in verification that these measures are being respected”.

Speakers: MM. Fourré and Wilkinson.

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out:

“appropriate for the formulation of Western European security policy”.

Speakers: MM. Brown and Wilkinson.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

3. In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “to utilise” and insert “for the civil and peaceful utilisation of”.

Speakers: MM. Brown, Wilkinson and Bianco (point of order).

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by MM. Tummers and Garrett:

4. In the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph 10 as follows:

“10. Postpone reaching decisions on the results of the analysis by the Standing Armaments Committee, the study by the Agency for the Control of Armaments and on the other abovementioned measures until the Assembly has had an opportunity to gain detailed knowledge about these and related military space problems through a broad-based symposium on the possibilities and desirability of the use of outer space for military purposes.”.

Speakers: MM. Tummers and Wilkinson.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 410)¹.

Speakers (explanation of vote): MM. Vogt and Martino.

¹. See page 43.

6. Military use of space

(Motion for an order, Doc. 984)

In accordance with Rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure, a motion for an order was tabled by Mr. Tummers.

The motion for an order was referred to the Presidential Committee.

7. Action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on the standardisation and production of armaments

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 977)

The report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Antretter, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Brown, Rauti and Sir John Page.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Antretter, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly took note of the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

8. Adjournment of the session

The President addressed the Assembly.

Speaker: Mr. Margue.

The President adjourned the thirtieth ordinary session of the Assembly.

The sitting was closed at 1.10 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Reddemann Schulte Schwarz Vogt	Netherlands
MM. Bogaerts De Decker Dejardin Mrs. Staels-Dompas		MM. <i>Tummers (Aarts)</i> <i>de Vries (van den Bergh)</i> Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen
	Italy	United Kingdom
France	MM. Amadei Bianco Ferrari Aggradi <i>Masciadri (Frasca)</i> <i>Martino (Giust)</i> Mezzapesa Milani <i>Pollidoro (Pecchioli)</i> Rauti <i>Palumbo (Rubbi)</i> <i>Mitterdorfer (Sarti)</i>	Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. <i>Thorne (Cox)</i> Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Sir Anthony Grant MM. Hardy <i>Murphy (Sir Paul Hawkins)</i> Hill <i>Millan (Lord Hughes)</i> Jessel <i>Stokes (Mrs Knight)</i> <i>Woodall (McGuire)</i> <i>Brown (Miller)</i> Sir John Page Lord <i>Newall (Sir Dudley Smith)</i> Mr. Wilkinson
MM. Bassinet Baumel Fourré Lagorce Pignion <i>Natiez (Sénès)</i>		
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens Antretter <i>Scheer (Enders)</i> <i>Schmidt (Gerstl)</i> <i>Gansel (Haase)</i> Kittelmann <i>Büchner (Neumann)</i>	MM. Berchem Margue <i>Prussen (Thoss)</i>	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Wilquin Wirth	MM. Cifarelli Fiandrotti Gianotti Vecchiatti Zamberletti
MM. Adriaensens Michel Noerens	Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands
France	MM. Böhm Hartmann Hornhues Müller Rumpf Spies von Büllesheim Unland	Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra Mr. van der Werff
MM. Beix Berrier Bourges Jeambrun Jung Mayoud Ruet Valleix Vial-Massat	Italy	United Kingdom
	MM. Antoni Cavaliere	Sir John Osborn Lord Reay Mr. Ross

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 408***on the control of armaments and disarmament***

The Assembly,

- (i) Concerned at the deterioration in the atmosphere of East-West relations, aggravated by the lack of personal contact between the superpowers at a time of change or prospective change in the leadership, and at the suspension of negotiations in three fields of arms control: a comprehensive nuclear test ban, INF, and START;
- (ii) Believing that all the more importance now attaches to the three remaining disarmament conferences in Geneva, Stockholm and Vienna, in all of which there is prospect of agreement in due course;
- (iii) Calling on member governments to take the initiative in these fields of primary interest to Europe by injecting a sense of urgency into the negotiations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge upon member governments the need:

1. To draft a joint, solemn declaration setting out their aims in the control of armaments and disarmament and to call on the superpowers to resume without delay negotiations which have been interrupted or to stimulate discussion when they take place;
2. To take every initiative in seeking to restore confidence in East-West relations, as a precondition of any arms control agreement, by promoting personal contact at the highest level between member governments and the new Soviet and other eastern bloc leaderships;
3. To study the possibility of concluding interim agreements this year in the conference on disarmament in Europe and mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations based on the common elements in present eastern and western proposals and taking account of the importance of verification measures.

RECOMMENDATION 409***on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1983***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Having taken note of the contents;
- (iii) Considering that:
 - (a) the future structure of the ministerial organs of Western European Union depends essentially on the tasks devolving upon them in the framework of political decisions to be taken on this matter by the Council;
 - (b) it would consequently be pointless at the present juncture to express an opinion on the cost-effectiveness of these organs;
 - (c) it would however be possible to make budgetary savings if the restructuration of the ministerial organs included unification of the Paris and London headquarters and the integration of their services;
 - (d) in preparing the budget the criterion of "zero growth" was applied,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine the possibility of uniting the London and Paris headquarters with a view to integrating joint services;
2. Adopt flexible criteria in its staff recruitment policy, in view of new tasks to be accorded to the ministerial organs of Western European Union;
3. Specify that the criterion of "zero growth" applies only to operating expenses and that expenditure and income relating to pensions should therefore be set out in a separate section of the budget;
4. Inform the Assembly of the stage reached in the studies on improving the status of staff announced in the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 340 and the participation of staff associations in the consultation and conciliation structure of the co-ordinated organisations.

RECOMMENDATION 410***on the military use of space***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the consistent interest shown by Western European Union in the strategic and industrial implications of the space capabilities of the member countries;
- (ii) Appreciating the considerable achievements of Western European countries in the space field both nationally and under the aegis of the European Space Agency, most notably in the Spacelab and Ariane and satellite programmes;
- (iii) Conscious of the need for Europe to initiate new projects in both the space science and applications fields if Europe's successful development of telecommunications and remote-sensing satellite systems, together with launch vehicles and manned work modules, are to be fully exploited;
- (iv) Understanding that the United States spends about ten times as much as Western Europe on space activities and that at least half the United States space programme is directly or indirectly funded by the Department of Defence;
- (v) Aware also that current efforts by the Soviet Union to expand its present space capability should not go unmatched by western countries;
- (vi) Concerned that in addition to the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, other major nations, such as Japan, India, Brazil and the People's Republic of China, are pursuing active space programmes which could jeopardise Europe's current position as the established third force after the United States and the Soviet Union in space activities;
- (vii) Believing that space capability will be a key determinant in future warfare, that in military terms the difference in potential between the space-capable nations and the others will be almost as great as the current difference in power between nuclear and non-nuclear nations and that Europe should not only take note but act upon this fact;
- (viii) Noting President Mitterrand's call in his speech of 7th February 1984 for a "European space community" and his remarks on the potential of a manned European space station as well as current Western European interest in this subject;
- (ix) Supporting initiatives to exploit space technology to bring about confidence-building measures such as the proposed international satellite monitoring agency and determined to use Europe's space capabilities in order to reduce the risk of war by eliminating the advantage of surprise through surveillance satellite systems;
- (x) Confident that WEU can offer a valuable forum for debate about and analysis of the implications for the defence of Western Europe of the latest military space technologies as well as an institutional framework untrammelled by the political inhibitions of the ESA convention for the initiation by the principal space-capable nations of Western Europe of a defensive European military space programme,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge the governments of member countries to do all in their power to secure negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union so as to prevent the military use of space through the deployment of offensive space weapon systems by promoting new international treaties and related verification procedures, as well as through the implementation of existing accords to limit the military uses of space;
2. Demand a larger European industrial involvement both in NATO telecommunications satellites and in NATO military satellite programmes as well as in the associated ground station infrastructure, in addition to supporting successful national military communications satellites like Skynet;
3. Commission a detailed analysis by the Standing Armaments Committee of the implications for European defence of developments in military space technology and in particular of Soviet and United States research and development in this field;

4. Initiate a study by the Agency for the Control of Armaments of the confidence- and security-building measures that could be taken in Europe following the establishment of either an international satellite monitoring agency or of Western European oceanic and terrestrial surveillance satellite systems and in the light of this study examine what tasks might be entrusted to the Agency for the Control of Armaments with a view to participating in verification that these measures are being respected;
5. Establish a dialogue with the European Space Agency whereby the industrial implications of ESA scientific or applications programmes can be discussed in an institutional framework appropriate for the formulation of Western European security policy;
6. Set clear European space policy objectives and priorities in the course of its politico-military consultations in the key strategic fields of launchers, manned modules, space station integration, tele-communications, meteorological and remote-sensing satellites and manned reusable service and space transport vehicles;
7. Propose a European surveillance and reconnaissance satellite programme adapting and refining the sensor technologies in the existing CNES Spot project and the ESA ERS-1 project;
8. Concert a joint response by the member countries to the NASA proposals for European participation in the projected United States space station and evolve a common strategy to utilise the consequent technological expertise should a European space station programme be initiated;
9. Require the construction of a Western European military meteorological satellite programme to follow the successful series of civil Meteosat satellites;
10. Postpone reaching decisions on the results of the analysis by the Standing Armaments Committee, the study by the Agency for the Control of Armaments and on the other abovementioned measures until the Assembly has had an opportunity to gain detailed knowledge about these and related military space problems through a broad-based symposium on the possibilities and desirability of the use of outer space for military purposes.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 18th June 1984

SUMMARY

1. Opening of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Address by the Provisional President.
4. Examination of credentials.
5. Election of the President of the Assembly.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Bassinet, Mrs. Knight; (points of order): Mr. Hardy, Mr. Schwarz, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Worrell, Mrs. Knight.
6. Address by the President of the Assembly.
Speaker: Mr. Bianco.
7. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
8. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session (Doc. 968).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Freeson, Mr. Hardy.
9. Nomination of members to committees.
Speakers: The President, Sir Frederic Bennett (point of order).
10. Situation in the Middle East and European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 978 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Lord Reay (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Michel (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Cifarelli, Mr. Stokes, Mr. Gianotti, Mr. Muller, Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt, Mr. Reddemann.
11. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Edwards, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2, 5 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the thirtieth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Address by the Provisional President

The PRESIDENT. – According to the agenda, the President has the right, as the oldest member, to make a speech. I intend to claim that privilege, but not to speak for too long. Many years ago, the seven nations involved in WEU

came together and signed an agreement. Those seven nations had fought one another across the frontiers of Europe and millions of Europeans had died in that war. The fact that that agreement was signed by those seven nations now makes conflict between them a thing of the past. The politicians achieved what the military men had failed to achieve over a thousand years, and that was to unite an important section of Europe.

We are left today with the results of the elections to a European Parliament. As a committed, unrepentant European I have always thought that for ten nations to elect a parliamentary assembly would be a political miracle. Who would have thought thirty years ago that the peoples of Europe would be walking to the polls to elect their own parliament? That has been achieved, and I believe that it is a political miracle. That is the case no matter what your views and cynical observations about that parliament. It has always been my view that the commissioners, who are accused of being a group of bureaucrats, are the very heart of our Europe. They handle the day-to-day problems, for the Council of Ministers meets rarely. Among the problems that they handle are our trade agreements with fifty-two third world countries under the Lomé Convention. That is a marvellous achievement.

1. See page 17.

The President (continued)

There is no reason why we should despair about our Europe. If seven nations can come together to make war impossible, so can ten nations. That is important.

If I may be a little controversial in these, my short remarks, may I say that it has always been my view that our Europe should be a bridge between the superpowers, putting peace on the agenda and keeping it there permanently. I hope that that function will never be forgotten.

4. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the examination of credentials.

The list of representatives and substitutes attending the thirtieth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union has been published in Notice No. 1.

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, all these credentials were ratified by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and are attested by a statement of ratification which has been addressed to the President, with the exception of Mr. De Decker, representative, and Mr. Bonnel, substitute, who have been nominated since the conclusion of the meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

It is now for the Assembly to ratify those credentials not already ratified, under Rule 6(2). The nominations are in proper form. No objection has been raised.

If the Assembly is unanimous, we may proceed to ratification without prior referral to a credentials committee.

Is there any opposition?...

The credentials of Mr. De Decker and Mr. Bonnel are ratified by the Assembly, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

May I take this opportunity, as the oldest member, of welcoming new colleagues and looking forward to their contributions to our work.

5. Election of the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the election of the President of the Assembly.

Under Rules 7(2), 10(2) and 10(10), only a representative, who may not be a member of his national government, may stand as a can-

didate for the office of President, and his candidature must be sponsored by three or more representatives in writing.

I call Mr. Bassinet.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, on behalf of a number of my colleagues, I request a half-hour suspension of the sitting in accordance with Rule 11 of the Rules of Procedure.

The PRESIDENT. – I understand that some members of the Assembly wish to move the suspension of the sitting.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – Further to that point of order, Mr. President. Surely the members present should be told why the member who has asked for the adjournment puts forward that proposal.

The PRESIDENT. – The matter can be debated. There can be one speech for and one against the proposition.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in a democratic assembly the right to request a suspension of the sitting cannot be questioned.

Furthermore, in view of the orders of the day for this afternoon, I should like the political group of which I am a member to meet.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – It is well known that we have had the entire morning to speak in our political groups. Certain difficulties may have cropped up, but Mr. Bassinet has not given us any information to suggest that there is a good reason for suspending the sitting. We have a very short time for many important reports and debates. If we have suspensions for no real reason, our work cannot continue. I ask members to vote against suspending the sitting.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The motion is rejected.

I have received two nominations, properly made in the form prescribed by the rules, for President of the Assembly. They are, in alphabetical order: Mr. Blaauw and Mr. Caro. Voting will take place by secret ballot.

The procedure for election is prescribed by Rule 10 as follows:

“Two tellers chosen by lot shall count the votes cast... If after two ballots no candidate has obtained the votes of a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of representatives to the

The President (continued)

Assembly [that is, forty-five or more] the candidate who on the third ballot receives the greatest number of votes shall be declared elected. In the event of a tie, the candidate senior in age shall be declared elected."

All representatives or substitutes who have signed the register of attendance under Rule 24 have received an envelope and voting papers bearing the names of the duly nominated candidates.

I will now draw by lot the names of the two tellers who will be responsible for counting the votes.

Mr. Jung and Mr. Jeambrun have been drawn.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. A few moments ago, you said that this was a secret ballot. I have to cast serious doubts on whether it is secret.

When a voter is given two pieces of paper, with a different name on each, it is easy to tell how he voted. I do not mind making public the fact that I voted for Mr. Blaauw.

The PRESIDENT. – Order. You are out of order.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – There are two points of order. This is the second. If a person puts into an envelope a piece of paper on which is written the name of the candidate that he supports, he leaves behind the piece of paper on which the other candidate's name is written. That is hardly a secret ballot.

The PRESIDENT. – That may be a valid point to refer to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges at a later stage. The practice has obtained here for many years and has never previously been questioned. However, you are within your rights to question it.

I call Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. SCHWARZ (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I support the comments on the form of this election. I do not think this is the right way to do it. We are told that this has been the practice for the last thirty years, but that does not make it right. The administration should have produced a ballot paper with both names on it. We could then have voted for one or other candidate on the same ballot paper. I too doubt the genuine secrecy of this ballot. I say this as a precaution, although I too know which way I shall vote.

The PRESIDENT. – Until a few minutes ago, we had only one nomination for the presidency.

Just before I opened the session we received another. Therefore, it was impossible for the secretariat to produce a single voting slip. That explains the situation. The practice has obtained for many years.

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I do not want to argue with you, but I would have thought that, since we had to have a second ballot paper anyway, it would have been possible for both names to appear on it. I do not want to start a row about it, but simply to propose that there should be a second ballot box into which we can put the second ballot paper, the one showing the name of the candidate we are not voting for. This would restore the secrecy of the vote.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Further to that point of order, Mr. President. I entirely accept your explanation. In view of the short time available, it would have been impossible for the secretariat to do what we were originally suggesting. We should, however, have closed nominations at, say, 12 noon today to give a reasonable time for sensible ballot forms to be issued a couple of hours later.

The PRESIDENT. – That is a matter of changing the rules. You have the opportunity to do that at any time except while the vote is being taken. The matter of changing the rules goes to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, which then reports. The procedure that is being carried out has operated with success for many years. We cannot change it at a moment's notice.

I am sorry if I have not heard the points of order correctly. I may have the wrong tune.

Each representative or substitute to sign the register will be called in alphabetical order.

The voting is open.

(*A vote by roll-call was then taken*)

Does anyone else wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The tellers will now take their place and the votes will be counted behind the rostrum.

The sitting is suspended for twenty minutes.

(*The sitting was suspended at 3.50 p.m. and resumed at 4.20 p.m.*)

The sitting is resumed.

Mr. WORRELL (*Netherlands*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Are the results of the first vote available?

The PRESIDENT. – I am delighted to announce the result of the first ballot:

Votes cast	75
Blank or spoiled papers	3
Effective votes cast	72
Absolute majority	45
Mr. Blaauw	32
Mr. Caro	40

The majority required for the election is a number equal to half the number of representatives in the Assembly – that is, 45. A second ballot is now necessary. The candidates must secure 45 votes to be elected President.

I remind members that they may have an extra ballot paper in their pocket. Please do not use that ballot paper, but use the ballot paper that is now to be issued. Two ballot papers will be declared void if members use both ballot papers.

We shall now proceed to the second ballot. We shall start with the same member as before. Members will be called in alphabetical order when they have all received ballot papers.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – As it seems we may have further roll-call votes, I wonder whether in future when ballot papers are being passed out we might utilise the services of more than two helpers so that the ballot papers can be got to representatives more quickly.

The PRESIDENT. – You have made a fair and valid point of which I am sure the secretariat will have taken note.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does anyone else wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

I suspend the sitting for twenty minutes.

(The sitting was suspended at 4.45 p.m. and resumed at 5.10 p.m.)

The sitting is resumed.

The result of the vote for the election of the President is as follows:

Votes cast	76
Blank or spoiled papers	3
Effective votes cast	73
Absolute majority	45
Mr. Blaauw	28
Mr. Caro	45

Mr. Caro having obtained the necessary majority, I declare him President of the Assembly of Western European Union. *(Applause)*

(Mr. Caro then took the Chair)

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, I am deeply moved, as you can imagine.

I must begin by thanking our friend Mr. Edwards for presiding over this sitting in his usual friendly, good-natured way and for welcoming me to this chair.

The election that has just taken place reminds me of our friend Mr. De Poi, who, for reasons of which we are all aware, has been prevented from continuing to use his talent and youth in the cause of Western European Union. This is regrettable, but I hope I shall be able to continue the work he was doing here.

I should also like to assure my friend Mr. Blaauw that I competed with him in a spirit of complete fairness. I hope that the way in which we work together will enable us all, and particularly Mr. Blaauw, who has done so much for our Assembly, to give of our best.

To the representatives of our governments I should like to say that I shall always be available and I hope to join with them in the fullest possible dialogue so that, with the help of the Assembly's secretariat, we can tackle this very important period for WEU.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you most sincerely for the confidence you have placed in me, and as President I shall, of course, try to be fair to everyone. I shall not forget what I owe you, and I hope that I can help you to achieve the various goals you have set yourselves, because it is in the thrust and parry of our proceedings that we shall find the new ideas we need. I shall not make a speech now since my nomination this morning came as something of a surprise and I have not therefore prepared myself for this occasion. With the Assembly's permission, I shall make a brief and as considered a political speech as possible at the beginning of tomorrow afternoon's sitting.

Once again I thank you most sincerely. As a European, I appreciate this further opportunity to demonstrate my devotion to the cause of Europe, which I hope to serve well.

I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to congratulate you on your election. I am sure that, with your long experience, you are well equipped to work for the fullest possible reactivation of WEU.

I should like to say briefly, in my capacity as head of the Italian Delegation – which at the last Assembly produced a President, in the person of Mr. De Poi, to whom I wish to pay a warm tribute – that, while welcoming your election, we

Mr. Bianco (continued)

feel bound to express our great regret that the Assembly has decided not to respect certain rules which seem to govern relationships between the various groups and delegations. I am referring to the maintenance, as we have done in other assemblies, of the candidature of a person of the same party and nationality. Having made this point, we offer you our compliments and our best wishes for a successful term as President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Bianco, I take this opportunity to thank you and the other members of the Italian Delegation.

It is no secret that one of the political groups of our Assembly had talks this morning. But I must again pay tribute publicly to the wholly correct attitude you and all your Italian colleagues have taken towards me.

7. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the election of Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 7(2) of the Rules of Procedure lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

In addition, Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure states that no representative may stand as a candidate for the office of Vice-President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives and representatives who are members of governments may not be members of the Bureau.

Two nominations have been submitted in the prescribed form.

The candidates are, in alphabetical order, Mr. Berchem and Mr. Reddemann.

The other vacancies will be filled later.

If there are no objections, I propose that the Vice-Presidents be elected by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare Mr. Berchem and Mr. Reddemann elected as Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, and congratulate them.

8. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session

(Doc. 968)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the thirtieth

ordinary session of the Assembly, Document 968.

Is there any opposition to that draft order of business?...

I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). – I do not want to question the order of business at this stage but I want to register my irritation that most of the reports to be before us during this session were not received, certainly not by a number of representatives, including myself, before our arrival in Paris last night and this morning. I stress that it is not good enough for us to have an order of business that includes a considerable number of major issues requiring serious and deep consideration and yet not have the opportunity to study the relevant reports well before we arrive in Paris. Even those that I received in London I did not receive more than a week ago, if then, and I have not had the opportunity of reading them carefully and consulting my colleagues. Certainly, not until I arrived this morning in this Assembly did I have the opportunity of reading several major reports that we are supposed to be debating and considering.

It makes a farce of our proceedings – and I choose my words carefully and deliberately – if members of parliamentary delegations are unable to study major reports of serious significance until we actually arrive in the session, quite apart from the fact that, as I believe, the agenda is overloaded with those reports.

I want to record my anxiety – and I believe that I speak for a number of other representatives at WEU – that in future we should receive reports well before we come to attend the session, so that we may study them properly, confer with colleagues and come to our conclusions about them before we come to Paris.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I want to make it clear that Mr. Freeson was entirely right when he said that he spoke for others. There are not only labour members but many other representatives in the Assembly who, like Mr. Freeson, will recognise that many of the contents of the reports before us this week deal with matters of enormous importance. There should have been time for us to carry out consultations as well as to read the documents carefully ourselves. We have not had the opportunity to do so.

I suggest, Mr. President, that you consult the Bureau to see whether we can devise some arrangement to ensure that important reports are with us early enough for us to read them. I suggest that the Bureau considers some kind of arrange-

Mr. Hardy (continued)

ment whereby reports will be with representatives in normal circumstances for at least two weeks before the Assembly requires representatives to consider them and to make decisions on them.

Secondly, there may be emergencies when that kind of arrangement cannot apply but by and large matters before this Assembly should have been with representatives long enough to allow mature judgment and adequate consideration and preparation. My colleague's comment is of major importance. I trust that proper attention will be given to it.

The PRESIDENT. (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

I have noted Mr. Freeson's and Mr. Hardy's comments.

As they have suggested, the Bureau would be well advised to consider this worrying problem. However, it has become normal practice for members to follow more closely in the first instance the reports they have considered in the committees to which they belong. I do not think therefore that the comments that have been made concern the members of the Assembly who study the reports of their own committees and can therefore be assumed to be familiar with them. On arriving here, we naturally study other documents drawn up by other committees, but time is short.

I take note of these comments. We shall do our best, with your help.

Subject to these comments and my reply, are there any other remarks on the draft order of business?

The draft order of business is adopted.

9. Nomination of members to committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the nomination of members to committees.

The candidates for the Assembly's five permanent committees and the Committee for Relations with Parliaments have been published in an Annex to Notice No. 1, which has been distributed.

I also ask the Assembly to note that the German Delegation has nominated Mr. Klejdzinski as alternate member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in place of Mr. Hauff and Mr. Klejdzinski as alternate member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in place of Mr. Haase.

In accordance with Rule 39(6) and Rule 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, these nominations are submitted to the Assembly.

Are there any objections to these nominations?...

These nominations are agreed to..

As President, I now have to propose something which is not as a rule much to the liking of the members of the Assembly.

As we have a particularly heavy agenda for this part of the session, I am obliged to propose to you, in accordance with Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, that the time allowed to speakers, with the exception of committee chairmen and rapporteurs, should be limited to five minutes, as is the normal practice.

This time-limit will, of course, make things very difficult for representatives. Thus, if you agree, we could make this a permanent rule, with due regard for the number of items on the agenda, but leave it to the President to decide what speaking time should be allowed according to the number of members who have put their names down to speak on a particular item of the agenda.

I would also be extremely grateful if both the national delegations and the political groups could arrange for as few of their members as possible to speak in debates so that each may have as much speaking time as possible. This is the practice in all other assemblies, and it is one that we should also adopt.

Provided that the Assembly allows the President this latitude, are there any objections on principle to speaking time being limited to five minutes?

The time-limit is agreed to.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I congratulate you and am the first to do so, but I add to those congratulations a word of worry about tonight's business, because I have some sympathy with my colleagues, Mr. Hardy and Mr. Freeson.

Probably the most important topic before us today is the subject of the whole Middle East, including the Gulf, where the situation is dangerous. While I completely concur with having a time-limit for speeches, I feel that it would be a good idea if you could give us some guidance – and I asked your predecessor in the chair this question also – about what is proposed. This is not the kind of subject that ought to be dealt with by representatives of this Assembly by 7 o'clock. I do not mind staying up if there are other arrangements, but could you, Mr. Presi-

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

dent, give us some indication of what you have in mind, because I do not think that that is the best way to treat this subject?

I am sure that the world press is delighted that you are the President, but the press is also interested in policy. Therefore, if you could give us some guidance on how far you will allow this debate to go it would be more dignified. We are clearly behind time. Perhaps you can say whether we might begin earlier tomorrow. We should not allow this debate to drag on without you, as President, giving us some idea of what you have in mind.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Sir Frederic. We can reconcile your point of view, which I share, with the exigencies of our timetable.

We shall have to suspend the sitting at about 6.30 p.m. because of commitments elsewhere, but we could begin the debate now and take the Rapporteur, the Chairman of the committee and a few speakers. But we shall resume the debate tomorrow morning.

I am told that thirteen members are down to speak, which is not an unusual number. Let us therefore wait and see at the end of the sitting whether tomorrow morning's sitting has to begin earlier than planned.

10. Situation in the Middle East and European security

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 978 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We now come to the next order of the day which is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the situation in the Middle East and European security and the vote on the draft recommendation, Document 978 and amendments.

I call Lord Reay, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – As the first member of the Assembly and the first rapporteur to take this rostrum today I should like to add my congratulations to those that have already been offered to you, Mr. President, on your election today as President of this Assembly. Western European Union is poised on the brink of a future that throbs with promise – appropriately, in the first instance, due to the initiative taken by your country. I hope that you will successfully preside over an Assembly that sees that promise become something meaningful and important for Europe's collective security.

The last occasion when this Assembly adopted a recommendation and a report about the Middle East was December 1982 when I had the honour to be the Rapporteur on the subject of South-West Asia, a slightly wider remit than that of the report that is before you this afternoon. Members will recollect that then a report and recommendation on the same subject were due to be taken on the final day of our session last December.

However, so delayed had business become that, with the prospect of debating such an important and, in part, controversial subject, and of taking decisions on several amendments in a dwindling Assembly, it was proposed by the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee and seconded by me as Rapporteur that the matter be referred back to the General Affairs Committee. The Assembly agreed.

Since then the committee has visited Jordan. At the request of several members of the committee, I visited Syria. A new report was prepared, a new recommendation was adopted by 19 votes to 0 with 1 abstention, and the result is what you have before you today.

The report tries to deal with three subjects: the conflict between Iraq and Iran, the situation in Lebanon and the problem of Palestine.

On the first subject, oil stocks now seem to most people to be sufficient to outlast any stoppage in Gulf supplies that might be caused by a crisis in that area. Nevertheless, it would be highly dangerous for us to become complacent. In the not-too-distant past it has often seemed as though we were only a short step from a crisis that could threaten the stability of many, if not all, western economies. We could still reach that point.

The recommendation makes only two modest requests, through the Council, of WEU member states. These are that they should leave no doubt in anyone's mind that they have not supplied and do not supply chemical weapons to the belligerents, and that no action is taken by them that is likely to prolong the conflict or prevent peace.

On the first point, I believe that the ten EEC countries have recently agreed to introduce controls on the export of a certain number of civilian end-use chemicals that could be diverted to the manufacture of chemical weapons. The second point raises the question of whether we intend that no member country should supply arms to either side. By itself our request does not imply that. The supply of arms may as well serve to end as to prolong a conflict. I believe that even if it were desirable, it is unrealistic to suppose that there will be an agreed policy on arms supplies by WEU member countries. I think that it will remain a bilateral matter.

Lord Reay (continued)

At present, as far as I know, there is one major WEU state arms supplier to Iraq and none to Iran. Iraq's principal or other principal arms supplier is the Soviet Union, which has evidently decided to come down firmly on the side that is fighting Islamic fundamentalism. Considering not only the possible disaffection of the Soviet Union's enormous Moslem minority but Iran's own frontier with Afghanistan and the moral support that Iran has been giving to the Afghan rebels, who have been causing so much trouble to the Soviet occupying forces, that outcome is perhaps not surprising.

At the same time it appears that the Soviet Union has been able to restrict arms deliveries to Iran from third countries such as Korea. The United States has also acted to curtail arms supplies to Iran. China, likewise, apparently has desisted. However, Israel is still reported as being active in this quarter. If it is correct to see a swing in the balance of power in Iraq's favour as a result of the rearmament that has taken place – a development that has become apparent only since this report was written – we can hardly expect a swift end to the war.

It is unlikely that Iran will seek an overall truce in its continuing state of revolutionary fervour. We should be wise to wait before making a judgment on whether Iran's placatory and co-operative moves of the last ten days – its acceptance of an agreement to refrain from hostilities against Iraq's civilian population, its request for United Nations observers, its offer of a truce in the disputed waters of the Gulf, and even a postponement of the long-awaited planned offensive against Iraq – reflect a first, sober recognition by Iran that it stands to lose rather than gain if it escalates the war, or whether they reflect internal dissension or have a tactical or other motivation.

I must turn to Lebanon. Here I think that we should welcome the formation of a government who have the support of the principal Moslem and Christian elements in the country, excluding, as we have seen, the Maronite and Phalange militias – for whom peaceful government is no doubt something to which they will require longer to adapt.

What Lebanon needs, however, if it is to enjoy long-term stability is the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces. There is no justification for the continued Israeli occupation. Syria, at least, has played a constructive part in the reconciliation of parties in Lebanon. No doubt in due course a Lebanese Government will desire and require a Syrian withdrawal just as today they request an end to the Israeli occupation. We should support all Lebanese attempts to recover its own national territory.

Incidentally, it should be noted that in calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces, except for those of the United Nations as we did in the recommendation, we go further than Security Council Resolutions 508 and 509, which dealt only with Israeli withdrawal.

The position in Lebanon may, therefore, on the face of it, look more promising than six months ago. However, let us not forget that the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon leaves the Israelis only some twenty-five miles from Damascus; that since the Israelis last knocked out Syrian batteries in the Bekaa valley the Soviet Union has rearmed Syria, no doubt to a higher level of efficiency, as substantial numbers of Russian personnel have remained in an operating capacity, and that the tension between Syria and Israel is something that can ebb and flow from day to day. Lebanon can, therefore, still be a flashpoint for a more general conflagration.

Lastly, I deal with the Palestinian problem. The recommendation calls upon the Council to reaffirm the Venice declaration adopted by the nine EEC countries in 1980 which recognised Israel's right to existence and security on the one hand and the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination on the other. As the declaration stated: the Palestinian problem is not one simply of refugees. On that occasion, the Nine further asserted their deep conviction that the Israeli settlements constituted a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East and noted that "these settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law". In this recommendation we have added a sentence warning against any further expulsion of Arab populations from these territories, because, as we discovered on our visit to Amman in March, this is a serious anxiety at present for Jordan. I do not believe that we are in a position to dismiss such fears as groundless.

As far as I know, no EEC member state wishes to depart from or abrogate the Venice declaration. The United Kingdom Government certainly do not. The question then arises: should Europe now take some further initiative? Some say that this is a propitious moment, since the United States is immobilised in any constructive development of its Middle Eastern policy by the presidential election, and that therefore there is a vacuum to be filled. Others say, on the contrary, that that is a reason for not taking any initiative as all European initiatives are, basically, appeals for United States action. In any case, the coming Israeli election and the split in the PLO contribute additional uncertainty and confusion and thereby provide further reason for Europe not to stick its neck out any further.

Lord Reay (continued)

Governments will have to decide this matter in the light of events as they unfold. What I should like to do is bring to the attention of members of the Assembly two strong impressions which our committee received on its visit to Jordan. First, Jordan ardently desires peace. That desire is evidently shared by the moderate PLO leadership of Arafat, with whom Jordan has been conducting a dialogue with a view to reaching an agreed negotiating position on the West Bank. It is not shared by the radical Syrian-backed wing of the PLO, which loses no opportunity to attack Arafat, even for presuming to hold a dialogue with Jordan, and whose position threatens that dialogue. That raises troubling questions about Syria's long-term intentions in that area.

The second impression was Jordan's sense of isolation and vulnerability – no encouragement from the United States, refused weapons by the United States, antagonism from Israel and Syria, vulnerable to any further rise in the tide of Arab fundamentalism, being, as it is, a secular, open and prosperous society and one which, even while we were there, was increasing the rôle of democratic representation in its political institutions. Moreover, Jordan felt particularly vulnerable at present, fearing that Israel might take advantage of an American election year to expel Arabs on a massive scale from the West Bank over the Jordan river.

For both those reasons, I think that we in Europe, who have such interest in peace in the Middle East, should surely show our moral support for these moderate forces. Wherever the moderate forces are repulsed or rejected, the extremists gain. For that reason, I think that we should maintain in the text references to the PLO as representatives of the Palestinian people, for if we were to leave out a reference to the PLO in this context, as Mr. Cavaliere proposes in certain amendments, it will be taken as meaning that we refuse to accept the PLO as possible interlocutors. In other words, that would be taken as a rebuff by the moderates, who alone are willing to negotiate.

The Palestinian problem lies at the heart of the problem of peace in the Middle East. I do not believe that it will go away merely if it is ignored. The Palestinian exodus has resulted in large Palestinian populations in countries throughout the Middle East. Many of those people are in influential positions. They will, I presume, continue to preserve their identity and to fight for a homeland of their own. Let us hope fervently that that goal can be pursued by peaceful means and not through further wars, because one day one such war could engulf us all.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank the Rapporteur and pay tribute to the work he has done. Having been a member of the General Affairs Committee, I know how much care he has taken over this report and particularly in drafting his conclusions, because we must not forget what happened during the last session. In view of the importance of the subject, I am sure the Assembly is very grateful to him for the document he has just presented.

The debate is open.

Does the Chairman of the committee wish to speak at this stage of the debate?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Yes, Mr. President, but I shall be brief.

As Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, I should like to congratulate the member of this committee who has just been elected President of the Assembly. Knowing your love of work and your knowledge of all things European, I have no doubt, Mr. President, that you will always be more than willing to use them to Europe's benefit.

I should also like to congratulate the Rapporteur, who has just explained the substance of his report, a clear and courageous document, which he has moreover had to draft twice. I am pleased because it was I who, at the last session, asked for this subject to be held over, but we were coming close to the end of the session and there was a degree of "vacillation" in the air.

Since then, as members of the General Affairs Committee, we have had the opportunity of seeing the situation for ourselves, making contact with people in Jordan, a country that is both moderate and strategic, and learning things we did not know before.

The people we talked to were competent and moderate in their attitudes. The Crown Prince was kind enough to set aside a whole day for the General Affairs Committee and, seemingly without preparation, to answer the questions we put to him. We learnt so much during these talks, and we shall try to give the Assembly the benefit of our newly acquired knowledge.

The Middle East question is extremely complex, and a visit to the area was undeniably necessary to enable us to get to know the land and the people. The territorial and human problems which this area of the world faces are immense and never-ending.

Our talks ended with the Jordanians virtually begging us "to do something".

The Rapporteur has just explained the views of those who believe Europe should take the initiative and the position of those who urge caution. The speeches we shall be hearing will enlighten us further and enable us to decide in

Mr. Michel (continued)

the final debate whether or not an initiative should be taken at what is an extremely difficult time, with the build-up to the presidential election, in the United States. This great country is holding itself back somewhat precisely because it must wait and see what November brings.

The conclusion drawn by the Rapporteur, which I approve, is that, whatever happens, Europe must do something and that we shall not help these countries to find the solution they are seeking simply by standing back and watching the situation in the Middle East. By at least saying something and taking action we shall help them to find peace, a peace which, of course, concerns them but also and above all concerns Europe.

I shall say no more for the moment, Mr. President, but I should like to speak again when I have heard the speakers in this debate, whose speaking time is very limited.

I hope this debate will be fruitful, enable us to add to our knowledge of the problem and to take decisions that will further the cause of peace in Europe and peace in the Middle East, which is what we all want.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Michel.

I call Mr. Cifarelli to speak in the general debate.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as I intend to observe the five-minute limit on speaking time, I shall have to speak in telegram style.

Referring to the very substantial conclusions to be found in this report, which has been so lucidly presented by Lord Reay, I must say that I personally share the view that the conflict in the Middle East and especially the conflict in Lebanon are not just East-West conflicts. Other factors, other complications must be borne in mind, or a sound basis for effective action will not be found.

In answer to the question put by the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, I would say that Europe must do something and must do it now.

Of course, it can wait until November, until the President of the United States has been elected, but no longer, and it must act in the firm conviction that the position it adopts does not consist solely of words and, above all, is not influenced by conventional lies. An example of a conventional lie is the claim that Syria is playing a moderating rôle in Lebanon, gathering the various factions together to form a government, whereas the Lebanese Parliament has

taken its decisions to the sound of gunfire, and it will be a long time before the Lebanese problem is solved. We all know that Syria has a real and unshakable determination to annex Lebanon.

This has its roots in history, which we do not have time to consider now. Those who, like myself, have been to the Middle East, to Lebanon and Syria, doubtless realise that this conviction underlay a wide range of activities on the part of both bankers and businessmen and those who constructed the infrastructure and even more so those who provided all the resources and urged on the armed factions that are fighting each other in Lebanon, with the eventual aim of bringing the country under Syria's control.

We must therefore consider the situation as it is, opt for constructive moderation, and above all rid ourselves of conventional lies.

Let me give you another example of a conventional lie, one that has now become habitual, namely that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people. We all agree, I assume, that the Palestinians are not refugees. For thirty years they have been exploited by the major powers, by the medium-sized powers, with fanaticism and political strategem, but they are a people looking for the home to which they are entitled. But there is no reason why they should not have different representatives. I am not denying that the PLO has occasionally been successful in the struggle that has been going on for decades and in the action it has taken, but it is not true to say that all Palestinians have been concerned. We must remember what has happened and everything that the powers around the PLO have done. Above all, the question to be asked is what reasonably valid claim the PLO has to be regarded as democratic by the outside world and in particular by Europe. It is an important organisation and one which must be taken into account – obviously since it is there – but no one can argue that it is the only representative organisation because that means succumbing to the lies and manipulations of the factions, in short, anything that is opposed to peace.

We must also recognise the importance of Israel, especially from the West's point of view, since it is a democratic, modern and organised country. But we must also state loud and clear that a foolish policy has been pursued since the Camp David agreement was reached, that this policy has violated the agreement and has resulted not in the progressive recognition of the autonomy of the Palestinian people and therefore of an organisation which might succeed in creating a Palestinian homeland, about which we were talking just now, but in Israeli settlement in the territories that have been occupied since the six-day war.

Mr. Cifarelli (continued)

I say this because in and outside Europe we must rid ourselves of certain deep-rooted ideas. This foolishness affected Italy and other countries in times past, when certain areas in and around Europe were spoken of as belonging to the Persian empire, the Roman empire and so on. Galilee and Samaria, of course, belonged to Israel at the time of Moses and Joshua, but have become areas over which Israel cannot have sovereignty. That must be remembered and emphasised. But if we leave aside the words and lies that I have called conventional, those who live in these areas, those who, as Mr. Michel has said, know the land and the people, appreciate that it is extremely difficult to reconcile the need for peace and defence with the need for recognised and fully developed autonomy for the Palestinians. Many attempts to this end have failed, and Jordan, this moderate country, has on several occasions had to abandon activities when the risk became too great.

In my opinion, we must look forward hopefully not only to the efforts which the new presidency in the United States may take to achieve peace from November onwards but above all to the outcome of the elections to be held in democratic Israel. I hope with all my heart that the results of these elections will serve the cause of moderation and peace. If we Europeans can encourage the proponents of democratic moderation with our style, our ideals and the practical action we take and not be seen, in Israel and elsewhere, as countries lacking in impartiality and objectivity and end up as the tools of others, we shall have done our duty.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Cifarelli, for being so brief, and I hope the other speakers will follow your example.

I call Mr. Stokes.

Mr. STOKES (*United Kingdom*). – I hope that you, Mr. President, and this Assembly will give indulgence to me when I make my maiden speech today.

I served for many years with the French forces, and I am delighted to see you, Mr. Caro, in the chair and to work with you and your French colleagues. I am pleased to take part in this debate on the Middle East as I spent three years in the Levant during the war and recently again visited Damascus and Syria.

We in Europe have a great part to play in influencing affairs in the Middle East, especially because France and the United Kingdom have had many years' experience in that part of the world and still enjoy considerable influence there.

Regrettably, for the sake of the whole of the western alliance, our American allies, for various

reasons, have had to withdraw completely and there is no possibility of their having any influence there again, at least not until after the American election.

I regret to say that I disagree with some of the remarks of Mr. Cifarelli about Lebanon and Syria – countries that I know well. I am convinced, after recent lengthy and intimate discussions with the Syrian Foreign Minister, that Syria has no permanent territorial ambitions in that region. The Syrians are obviously backing the new Lebanese Government and I hope that as soon as the fighting entirely dies down in Beirut they will be able to see themselves withdrawing from the north and the Bekaa valley. I must confess that I do not understand why the Israeli forces are remaining in the south of Lebanon, because we know that that is not popular either with the Israeli army or with the rest of the population of Israel. It is a running sore. They are doing nothing but making enemies there. They are making no friends. They are doing no good for their own country and it would be a very wise and statesmanlike act if they were to withdraw. If they did so, I am certain that the Syrian troops would follow suit.

In the few minutes available to me I should like to comment on the general conflict between the Arabs and Israel. This conflict is immensely sad. I was in the Levant and Palestine just before the hurried British withdrawal and I believe that those of us who sympathised deeply with the Jews – as I did and I do – were distressed to find how unfortunately aggressive many of their governments have been in Israel since the foundation of that country. Now we have Egypt, which has settled a pact with Israel. We have Jordan, which is extremely moderate. We have countries like Saudi Arabia and those in the Gulf which certainly do not want a prolongation of the Arab-Israeli war. I believe that in Syria there is a desperate desire for a settlement in Lebanon and I hope that the most statesmanlike councils will prevail in Israel at a time when the Arabs are showing signs of moderation.

We know that the Arabs have great difficulty in agreeing among themselves and that is something that the European powers can and should help. I regard the continuing Israeli occupation of settlements on the West Bank as the most dangerous development. It is setting a kind of land mine that one day may blow up and cause a conflagration in the whole of that part of the world. I repeat, there is much good will towards them in that part of the world, both in Israel, where we have many contacts, and in the Arab world, where we and certainly France have been since the middle of the last century. They look to us to be unbiased and fair and to bring peace to that beautiful part of the world.

Mr. Stokes (continued)

It is very moving for someone like myself who served with all those people to be here in Europe, and in Paris today, talking about peace and the means of finding peace. We are fortunate, a week or so after the D-Day anniversary, to have here the German Delegation who contribute much to European security. I am so glad to hear from our discussions with the ministers a few days ago that there is a much better and more purposeful future for WEU. I hope that this debate on the Middle East, which I am glad is to continue tomorrow, will set the standard to show that we are interested not only in the parochial troubles of Europe but the wider troubles of peace throughout the world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gianotti.

Mr. GIANOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I too wish to congratulate you on your election. I am impressed by the draft recommendation and the report submitted to us. The situation in the Middle East is more than ever a cause of concern. I agree with the view, expressed several times in the report, that outside intervention cannot resolve the infinitely confused situation in Lebanon. We think, for example, that the buffer force played a positive rôle until some of its elements became involved in the conflict. We think that all foreign troops must be withdrawn from Lebanese territory. In our opinion, what Europe has to provide is not force but an intelligent policy, at a stage in history when thousand-year old movements are taking on new strengths, sometimes with violence, in the third world and, in particular, the Arab world.

I should next like to stress very forcibly the call for compliance with Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council, which is repeated several times in the report. The view held in some Israeli quarters is that national security can only be guaranteed by force. This view led to the Lebanese adventure which went as far as the occupation of part of Beirut; the result was exactly the opposite of what had been intended; the result was not greater security but greater uncertainty and greater danger, and more questions about the future of the area: we believe that the future of Israel should be fully guaranteed by its neighbours, but we also believe that the way to achieve this is not by the dispersal of the Palestinians or by weakening of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation headed by Arafat. On the contrary, we believe that recognition of Arafat's PLO, with the granting of legal status and encouragement of the negotiations started between the PLO and the King of Jordan may offer hopeful prospects for the future, as the report affirms. We therefore think it most

important that the European governments should recognise the PLO and accept its representatives.

As regards the war between Iran and Iraq, we believe it to be in the interests of all to put out the fire which could spread far beyond the boundaries of the two countries, as we have already seen in recent months.

We believe it to be in the interests of all that the armed conflict between the forces which look to the two great powers should not be repeated and extended in the Persian Gulf and the surrounding countries; instead, we believe that efforts should be directed to achieving a minimum of agreement in the area in order to lower tension between the two great powers in that region. We believe this to be in Europe's interest as the report we are discussing maintains.

Reference must also be made to Afghanistan as part of the same area: this conflict can only be resolved by the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. We believe that the WEU countries and the countries of Europe in general should take a major initiative because of the esteem in which Europe is held in those countries, as previous speakers have said: an initiative directed to encouraging efforts towards agreements which will damp down the conflict. We also believe, and here we support the recommendation in the report, that in order to prevent the use of chemical weapons there must be control of trade in all types of armaments and such control must naturally be balanced. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, speaking for the first time since the vote, I too should like to congratulate you on your election as President of this Assembly.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall begin with a few words on the present conflict in the Middle East in and around Israel. I very much regret certain recent events in Israel, which will worsen rather than improve the situation. The terrorism that is emerging in Israel is a blot on that country's untarnished escutcheon. I want to make this clear, because it has aggravated rather than eased the situation in the Middle East. I must emphasise, however, that I am not drawing some kind of parallel with the PLO, or with the terrorism which the PLO has practised and still practises, because there is one important difference: the PLO is not simply a body acting on behalf of the Palestinians but has also allowed itself to be used in the past as an extended arm of world revolution, if I may put it that way.

We know, for example, that terrorists who have operated and caused considerable damage

Mr. Müller (continued)

in the member countries of WEU, like the Red Army Faction in the Federal Republic of Germany, were trained in PLO camps. We also know that the PLO has involved itself in other areas of the world where there is unrest or civil war, not only by supplying arms but by actually training "revolutionaries". It is very surprising to hear that an organisation that rightly laments the suffering of the Palestinian refugees – and after my recent visit to Jordan with the committee I can confirm that they are suffering – is able to provide millions of dollars in donations or loans for insurgent movements like those in Central America. I believe this combination of factors shows that the situation in the Middle East cannot be considered solely in local terms but is also, of course, a demonstration of the conflicts arising in global politics.

Secondly, I should like to say something about the war between Iran and Iraq. It should be remembered in this context that Reza Shah and his father before him also pursued an imperialist policy towards Iraq. He appropriated the islands in Shatt al'Arab and other territories, wrongly, according to the Iraqis. Iran was acting from a position of strength, and as so often happens when power changes hands in a revolution, in a country like this, there is no consequent change of policy. It was the same in Russia, where the imperialist aspects of Tsarist policy were maintained by the communists under Lenin. The same is true of Khomeiny's policy towards Iraq and Iran's other neighbours, even if other motives, sometimes even religious ones, are adduced.

It is in any event a fact that the explosive situation that has existed between Iran and Iraq for so long – for thirty years, one might say – has resulted in a military conflict not only causing suffering to those directly involved but bringing the risk of conflagration to a much wider area. Let me mention in passing that this area has always been part of the Soviet Union's sphere of interest and was explicitly designated as such in the famous secret agreement concluded by Hitler and Stalin in August 1938.

We must make every possible effort not to exacerbate this conflict any further. It is deplorable that weapons are being supplied to both countries involved, from all over the world, by Israel just as much as Chile and member countries of WEU, and quite obviously, pouring oil on the flames produces a different effect from putting sand or water on. In a conflict, arms supplies are not sand or water, but oil.

It is also deplorable that there have not only been serious violations of The Hague Land Warfare Convention but that children are being sent to the front, whipped up into a frenzy of fanati-

cism and completely unaware of what the war is about. I deplore the fact that many organisations, though quite ready to criticise violations of human rights they come across anywhere in the world, have been on the whole surprisingly silent about the conflict in this area. I would have expected such organisations to be more outspoken than they have been in the past few months.

I will conclude by saying that the member countries of WEU must do all they can to prevent the conflict from spreading in this area, and to slake rather than stoke the fire, because if this conflict spreads, everyone will suffer, both the peoples directly affected and those who might be affected in the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt.

Mr. DREYFUS-SCHMIDT (*France*) (Translation). – I shall begin by asking a question: is it part of WEU's rôle to discuss the situation in the Middle East?

We could, of course, discuss anything, the security of Europe and Nicaragua, the Falklands or Afghanistan. Why has WEU been so determined to discuss this problem all these years? In 1978 we had Sir Frederic Bennett's report. In 1979 and 1982 we had earlier reports from Lord Reay. Now it is 1984, and why stop now?

I am not alone in believing the Israeli Government is wrong not to recognise that, if it wants peace, it must negotiate with its adversary. I am not alone in believing that the Israeli Government is wrong to hang on to the occupied territories and was wrong to invade Lebanon. All the same, we must not fail to see the wood for the trees. This unfortunate country must not become everyone's scapegoat.

It should not be forgotten that this has all come about because many Palestinians and Arab countries refuse to accept what is not only a de facto situation but has also been a de jure situation since the United Nations recognised the existence of the state of Israel in 1947.

Leaving aside the 1978 and 1982 reports, the text we now have before us is better than that presented to us in December 1983, which was far less balanced. For example, one paragraph referred to the application of Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council, which calls for the withdrawal of Israel from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights and the recognition of Israel's right to exist within secure and internationally recognised frontiers and of the right of the Palestinian people to independence and sovereignty.

This paragraph was fairly balanced, but there were three others. The second stated that the

Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt (continued)

PLO is the only organisation that represents the Palestinians, while the third stressed the need for Israel to apply the provisions of the Geneva Convention relating to the treatment of civilians in occupied areas and those concerning prisoners of war, the implication being that Israel was not doing so. The fourth deplored the Israeli Government's illegal settlement policy, which seemed to be clearly aimed at annexing the territories occupied in 1967 and probably at expelling the Palestinians.

In committee we worked hard and tabled numerous amendments aimed at striking a balance, and we had the satisfaction of seeing this draft recommendation adopted by thirteen votes to two with three abstentions.

At that time the final recommendation adopted read: "Repeat its condemnation of Israel's continued settlement policy on territories occupied since 1967 and condemn also the Syrian Government's policy of destabilisation in Lebanon."

And then, it was suddenly proposed that we should go to Jordan, which we did. But we said: "Why only Jordan? If we want to form an opinion on this question, let us go to Syria, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Let us listen to what they all have to say." And the answer we were given was: "No, Jordan is an extremely good observation post."

We saw Jordan, but Jordan is all we saw.

And the committee met again, but the text submitted to it was not the one the previous committee had adopted but a new text that had been proposed by the Rapporteur. Some of those who had taken part in the initial discussions were unable to attend the following meeting. These were the circumstances in which we saw a new text emerge, one that takes up an idea that is clearly very dear to the Rapporteur's heart since he repeats it four times in his written report, the idea that the Palestinians have been expelled from the territory transferred to Israel in 1949. This is a widely held view, it is a thesis but, like any thesis, it has an anti-thesis. And because we want to be impartial judges, we cannot adopt one thesis rather than another. The other idea that is dear to the Rapporteur's heart is that "Jordan... has good reason to fear further expulsions of Arab populations by Israel". Further on, in paragraph 63, he refers to the threat to "expulse the Arab section of the population which remained in that area". In paragraph 64 the Rapporteur writes that "the very nature of the state of Israel precludes acceptance of... cohabitation between a native Moslem and Arab population and an immigrant Jewish population". I would point out to him that the majority of the Israeli citi-

zens now living in the territory of the state of Israel, which was created and is recognised by the United Nations, are not immigrants but were born in Israel.

Let me quote another passage: "At the same time it adds further credibility to Jordanian fears that Israel may seek an early opportunity to provoke a mass exodus of West Bank Palestinians into Jordan."

Refer, if you will, to this fear the Jordanians have, but not, as you have done, at the end of the recommendation you are proposing, which at one time was very balanced thanks to our amendments. The preamble to the draft recommendation read, for example: "Considering that the vicious circle of terrorism and repression" on the one hand "and the installation of settlements" on the other "are obstacles to the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East, which rather requires recognition of the right of Israel to exist and recognition by Israel of the right of the Palestinians".

That was perfectly balanced. But the Rapporteur has now added to the end of the enacting terms: "Recommends that the Council... repeat its condemnation of Israel's continued settlement policy on territories occupied since 1967...". I am sorry, Lord Reay, but the text again lacks balance since you no longer make any reference at all to the PLO's terrorist activities or its refusal - you said the opposite just now - even to recognise Israel's existence.

And when you add: "and warn that country that there must be no further expulsion of Arab populations from these territories", you cease to be a rapporteur, since a rapporteur must be not only impartial but also absolutely objective. Tell me when Arab populations have been expelled from the territories occupied since 1967, because your reference to further expulsions implies that Arabs have been expelled in the past.

I have consulted the history books, I have consulted the press, I have consulted all kinds of sources. No one has ever heard of Arab populations being expelled from the territories occupied since 1967. Although it has been claimed that the Arabs were thrown out of what is today the state of Israel in 1947 and others claim that, on the contrary, it was the Arab countries that called on the populations to flee by promising them that they would be back ten days later, no one has ever claimed that Arab populations have been expelled from the territories occupied since 1967.

Nor should you say that there is a threat of expulsion. You can say that the Jordanians fear this will happen - as you have done four times in your report - but WEU should not endorse such fears when there is nothing to substantiate them.

Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt (continued)

I must stress this point, Lord Reay. While we can discuss the Middle East problem in the Council of Europe and especially the United Nations, and although we should not be discussing it in WEU to the extent that we are now doing, but are doing so because you claim that Europe must bring pressure to bear on both sides by showing everyone its sincerity and offering its good offices, which is true of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, but not of WEU, we must remain objective by recognising everyone's efforts and condemning everyone's excesses.

You have failed to do this, particularly in the last sentence. That is why we have tabled an amendment seeking the deletion of the last few words you have added to the first text, which was in fact adopted by the General Affairs Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt. I feel it would be a good thing for you to speak again when we come to discuss the articles and the amendments.

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may I first repeat from this seat the congratulations I have already offered you on your election.

The draft recommendation contained in the report now before us is far more balanced than the first draft that was submitted. To that extent I welcome this draft recommendation. Above all, I endorse the extremely clear appeal to the governments of the member states to refrain from supplying chemical weapons to this troubled area and so help to defuse the conflict between Iraq and Iran.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I must nevertheless admit that I am not completely satisfied with the text before us. I see it contains the familiar call for recognition of the PLO. I must ask the Rapporteur, for whom, as everyone knows, I have the greatest respect: what is the PLO today? Who in fact represents the PLO? Into how many parts has the PLO long since disintegrated? When will they start shooting at each other, and whose weapons will they be using? How can the PLO still claim to represent the Palestinian people generally? I am afraid that a statement in these terms amounts to little more than idle words.

I have another question: what are the rights of the Palestinian people? I have asked this question often enough – and not only in this Assembly – but I have always received different interpretations. There has never been anything specific, nothing of which I could say: that will

be useful to the Palestinian people. I am always opposed to the inclusion in recommendations of statements whose intentions are not really clear to anyone and which are unfortunately likely to satisfy only one or other of the sides engaged in military or quasi-military conflict.

I must also admit – and this is another criticism – that I do not quite understand why we should welcome the formation of the present Lebanese Government, when everyone knows that, while its members are sitting round one table, their militias are shooting at each other. They fire rockets at each other's houses and slaughter each other with other weapons whenever they meet. In these circumstances, I cannot simply say that I welcome the formation of this government. That would presuppose acceptance of the way in which it, or rather its militias, operate.

I feel I must state this criticism clearly, because I should like to raise another point in conclusion. From what we have heard here today, it might be thought that the only real reason why the situation in Lebanon is so difficult is that the Israeli troops invaded the country two years ago. Ladies and Gentlemen, anyone who knows Lebanon – and I believe there are plenty of members here who know it very well – surely realises that, basically, the Israelis were intervening in a war that had been smouldering for a long time. I do not want to discuss here whether they were right or wrong to do so, but at all events they appeared as belligerents in Lebanon only in the sixth year of this violent conflict. I therefore appeal to everyone here to stop regarding this one state as the villain in the Middle East. What we must appreciate is that for over a century Lebanon has undergone a process which cannot be appraised simply by reference to the standards of recent years.

Mr. President, I am sure you will realise that I cannot vote for the recommendation unless a number of amendments are made to overcome my objections. Otherwise I shall be forced at least to abstain. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, I think we can congratulate ourselves on the quality of the debate that has just begun, and I thank all the speakers.

The debate is adjourned until the next sitting.

11. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 19th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

The President (continued)

1. Situation in the Middle East and European security (Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 978 and amendments).
2. Deterrence and the will of the people (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 970 and amendments).
3. State of European security (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and

vote on the draft recommendation, Document 971).

It will be recalled that I intimated earlier that the usual speech of the President of the Assembly would be deferred until tomorrow afternoon's sitting.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.35 p.m.)

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 19th June 1984

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
4. Situation in the Middle East and European security (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 978 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Garrett, Mr. Freeson, Mr. Cavaliere, Sir Frederic Bennett, Lord Reay (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Michel (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Vogt, Lord Reay, Mr. Jung, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Milani, Mr. Rauti (point of order), Lord Reay, Mr. Cifarelli (point of order), Sir Frederic Bennett, Lord Reay, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Michel; (points of order): Dr. Miller, Mr. Hardy, Dr. Miller, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg; Mr. Jung, Sir Frederic Bennett, Lord Reay, Mr. Jung, Sir Frederic Bennett, Lord Reay; (explanation of vote): Dr. Miller, Mr. Cifarelli, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Freeson, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Martino.
5. Deterrence and the will of the people (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 970 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Lagorce (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Michel (*Chairmann of the Committee*), Mrs. Knight, Mr. Gianotti, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Müller.
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the election of three Vice-Presidents.

I have received in due form the nominations of Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Blaauw and Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that it elect the candidates by acclamation.

Are there any objections?...

I proclaim Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Blaauw and Mr. Ferrari Aggradi elected Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. I congratulate both them and those elected yesterday. I hope that we shall be able to work together within the Bureau in the best possible way for the good of our Assembly.

I would remind you that a vacancy still exists for one Vice-President. The election will take place later.

4. Situation in the Middle East and European security

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 978 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the situation in the Middle East and European security and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 978 and amendments.

1. See page 20.

The President (continued)

I would remind you that speaking time has been limited to five minutes per speaker. However, having regard to the self-restraint shown by speakers yesterday, I have no doubt that we shall adhere to the timetable, and I am therefore prepared to exercise my discretion as President and allow speakers a little more time if absolutely necessary.

The next speaker in the debate is Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is just as difficult for me to comment on this report in a few minutes as it was for the members who were trying yesterday to sum up their views on a massive problem in a few words.

I congratulate the Rapporteur on the attempt he has made – through European eyes, of course – to consider a problem and its solution in terms of Europe's interests and our security above all else. Many passages in the report are full of optimism – justifiably – and reveal a degree of wishful thinking. I endorse many of the critical questions that were raised yesterday, but I do feel that, regardless of the ultimate wording of the recommendation, if the report leads us – concerned as we are with these issues in WEU – to make our national parliaments aware that more is at stake than eliminating terrorism, torture and murder in some countries or unjustified expansionism in others, we shall have accomplished a great deal.

It is a report that tries to do justice to our interests. It is questionable whether it also does justice to the interests of the peoples inhabiting the Arab region. Take Lebanon, for instance. We join with others, of course, in regretting the failure of the United States intervention, which many of us wanted. We cannot fail to see that the vacuum the United States left behind has been filled principally by Syria, which has skilfully exploited a situation of uncertainty, particularly in Lebanon. But we must at least realise that the government now formed in Lebanon consists of yesterday's men, men who have been engaged in bloody strife with each other for decades, pursuing family feuds with one another and among themselves, and who are now making the umpteenth attempt to get together, without having any real basis for doing so.

On the other hand, the younger generation is forming an increasingly powerful opposition in Lebanon. The leader of the Christian militia, Adi Frem, is just one example. This is one reason why the shooting continues and the people are incited to brutality while the government wrangles over its inaugural address.

I would therefore venture to say that what is being described as agreement in Lebanon at the moment will not last long. It cannot last long, because the Syrians have very much more say in the solution of the problems than is frequently admitted in the outside world. I regret this because I believe the United States underestimation of the extent of Syrian influence in this region was obvious. Its mistake was as great as Israel's in believing it could solve problems regardless of Syria. But this still does not justify the rather one-sided description of the Israeli position that appears here.

It is important for us to realise that Israel is probably the only democratic country in this region with a social order and values that come close to our own. Although we do not make a point of mentioning it, torture, terrorism and murder are still common in some other countries. In these circumstances, it is extremely hard to advise the Israelis from the safety of our stronghold, as it were, that they should solve their problems in the confidence that the Arabs are seeking a peaceful arrangement with them. Someone living in Israel will take a different view from someone giving advice here in Paris.

It is all this that makes the report so problematic. And all this goes to show that Lord Reay has made a commendable attempt to strike a balance among the various groups. We can only accept our responsibility and keep on trying to make the best of things. Those of us who have seen how Jordan is suffering because the areas occupied by Israel represent most of the country's vital strength will have every sympathy with the demand that the Israelis should leave. After visiting Jordan I went on to Beirut and Syria. I have every sympathy with the Christians in Lebanon who very much want the Israelis to stay in the south of the country because they fear for their future. Others say they should leave this area. Yet others say that the Syrians have a very strong influence and have in fact occupied the country.

Who is right? Who can say he is giving the right advice, taking the European viewpoint? What we Europeans must do – and this is surely the purpose of this report – is to compensate for the disappointment over American involvement by showing that we are willing to talk to all the parties concerned. If it contributes to this, the report will have served its purpose. Thank you.

(*Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Garrett.

Mr. GARRETT (*United Kingdom*). – I welcome the recommendations in the report, but I should like to have seen more emphasis on the Iran-Iraq war, because there is no doubt that that

Mr. Garrett (continued)

could do immense harm to Western European commercial and business interests and it will be an additional threat to the security of Western Europe.

The Rapporteur made a passing reference to the fundamental religious differences in that cockpit of religious activity, but the West tends to underestimate the immense religious fervour in the area. Members of the Assembly will know that Europe has suffered from religious wars. The two major wars of this century were exceptional in not being religious wars. In Lebanon, and certainly in Iran and Iraq, fundamental religious issues must be set alongside the conquest of territory and business and commercial assets. It is interesting to reflect that some of the problems arise from the suppression of minorities. I am sure that members of the Assembly know that the Bahai religion suffers great persecution and people are denied the right to practise their fundamental religious beliefs.

I have always followed events in the Middle East, because my generation had contemporaries who soldiered in that part of the world and saw, as I have seen, the horrors perpetrated by the Israelis – more than by the Arabs – against British servicemen who were trying to do a job given to them by a League of Nations mandate after the 1914-18 war. I should like to see a much more positive response by the Israelis to the fact that the PLO must be given a national homeland. Fortunately, some enlightened and influential Jewish opinion in Western Europe can influence the Israeli Government to consider a more positive approach. If that fundamental problem can be resolved, much of the tension in the Middle East will be eliminated.

I wish that the report had mentioned events in Libya and other countries on the North African coastline. You may rule me out of order, Mr. President, for going beyond the terms of the report, but I must stress that basic instability exists in Libya, which is ruled by a madman – I use that word deliberately. Events there can have repercussions on other areas of the Middle East and members of the Assembly should always study events in that unhappy country. We should also use our influence – political influence if possible, but also economic influence and, if necessary, perhaps at some time even military influence – to force on Colonel Kadhafi acceptance of the fact that people are entitled to a free mode of living. That applies as much to the citizens of Libya as to the people of any other country.

The report has been exceptionally well prepared and documented. I hope that the report of our debate will be read by representatives of

other countries with embassies in Paris and that those in the countries covered by the report will realise that we are interested and that we look for a positive response. Given encouragement, we shall help those countries to make a positive response to their problems.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). – Unlike my colleague, Ted Garrett, I do not have a high opinion of the report. I believe that at the least it is a trite and facile report and, at most, it could prove to be damaging if any real attention is given to it by the parties concerned with these issues in the Middle East. The report is largely a mixture of bias and ignorance. If we cannot do better than this, it would be better for us not to get involved.

It is not a constructive report, because it will not contribute to a better understanding of what is going on in the Middle East and it will not contribute much to the efforts at conciliation being made by the parties concerned. Whatever the merits of some of the recommendations – and there are some serious questions raised by some of them – the report is riddled with partial statements and much bias reflected in interviews and discussions with one or two of the parties to the dispute. There is also an absence of information of much relevance to the points made in the report.

Time forbids my going through the report to pick out all the queries that I should like to pursue. I stress that I am concerned with the quality of the report, because if WEU reports are read by the people we wish to take serious note of what we say, they should be of better quality. I start with paragraph 2. May we be informed which “other countries”, apart from Jordan and Syria, were visited? With whom were discussions held?

Paragraph 8 states as a matter of fact, which may or may not be true, that Iran is securing the replacement of arms from Israel. One sees such reports, but what substance is there for that statement, particularly when paragraph 12 refers to the attitude of the régime of Imam Khomeiny to Israel? It is a little odd to see a reference to arms supplies between the two countries. If such statements are to be made, let us have a bit more information.

Paragraph 16 states, as if it were a matter of fact to be accepted by us all, that “it is now clear that support for Iraq has become essential to the stability of the region and to the restoration of peace”. I take no sides with Iran in this dispute, but I must say also that I take no side with Iraq either, and I do not believe that WEU should accept such statements. Do we really believe that support for Iraq – that is a one-sided

Mr. Freeson (continued)

position – is “essential” for the stability of the region? That nonsense can be noted the moment one examines the words, whatever one’s views about the war between those two countries.

Paragraph 31 deals with the situation in Lebanon and states: “No doubt Israel will try and disturb any positive developments to the north of it.”

I make it clear that I have no brief to support what the Israeli Government have done in Lebanon. In Britain I condemned – my colleagues will know this – the invasion of Lebanon. I spoke directly to the Israelis including members of the government régime about their actions. I condemned those actions harshly, and I still do. Making such statements as though they were a matter of fact, however, does not add to the quality of the report.

I could continue with many other statements of alleged historic fact which are, to say the least, questionable and which certainly should not be accepted as though they were automatically factual. The report refers to expulsions. Paragraph 62 states, as though this were the only reason for the lack of peace, “Israel’s illegal occupation of the West Bank since 1967 has prevented the restoration of any such peace”. One may have a statement of fact that concerns part of the events – it is a part that I condemn – but it is nonsense to simplify the situation in such terms.

Has no one recalled what happened in Khar-toum after the six-day war? Has no one recalled the points that were negotiated on the other side and the attempts that have been made since? Some reference at least should be made to the facts of history. We should not just single out such statements, leaving them unqualified and therefore introducing some areas of bias.

I refer to talks about expulsions of the population. Merely that certain statements were made by Prince Hassan on a visit to Jordan is no reason why they should be put into the report one, two, three or four times as though they were accepted unquestioningly by members of the WEU delegation who went to the region. Those are the views of Prince Hassan, who has a particular point to put across to the West.

We are not lackeys of our foreign affairs departments. We are parliamentarians, and we should use our minds and exercise our judgments, not simply accept directions and briefings of government departments, whichever they are.

I could continue with more examples of similar statements but I shall now leave my consideration of the report. If the WEU Assembly wishes to exercise a genuine influence on the parties to the disputes in the Middle East, it should, first, talk to as many of those parties as possible and, secondly, exercise a more impartial approach. Frankly, I do not believe that this report will influence anyone in the Middle East. If we cannot exercise ourselves with a view to encouraging and helping conciliation and peace, we should put up and shut up and stop meddling in affairs on which we can have no constructive influence. If we can do better than that, let us pursue our aims. Frankly, the report does not help, and I wish that it had not been put before the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation).– I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt doubts whether our Assembly should discuss questions such as that now before us and events in the Near and Middle East. I think he is wrong, because everything that happens in that part of the world directly affects European security, because Europe looks out on to the Mediterranean, because of certain supplies which are essential for Europe and because the wars in progress there are a serious threat to world peace and therefore to our countries’ security.

Furthermore, it must be remembered that some members of the Atlantic Alliance – the United States, France and the United Kingdom – are more directly involved through the presence of forces which may be influential from the standpoint of the alliance, of security and of the duties which the Atlantic Alliance performs for European security.

We are therefore closely interested.

Having said this, I have to observe that for a long time and in certain respects Israel is still considered by many members to be responsible for the destabilisation of these areas – and moreover as solely responsible. Events, on the other hand, show the contrary to be true because the war between Iraq and Iran, the presence of Libya and the behaviour of Syria are destabilising elements which have nothing to do with Israel’s presence and behaviour. It is said that Europe could, especially this year, rightly take effective action to help the whole of this area to establish the conditions for peaceful collaboration between Israel and the Arab countries.

This is particularly so because the countries of Western Europe, our Assembly and the European Economic Community enjoy great prestige with these countries and their peoples. However, so that Europe can play an influential rôle, I believe that the real facts must be borne in

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

mind. The first obvious fact is that reference to Israel's behaviour in 1967 and subsequent years is unacceptable. First and foremost, we must start from the fact that Israel did not want war, was not the first to declare war, was not and is not recognised by any Arab country except Egypt and has had to defend itself against aggression. All subsequent events therefore stem from that aggression, which gave Israel the right to defend itself.

Failure to recognise this is to take the wrong direction and account must be taken of the destabilising effect of the action taken by Libya and of the rôle played by Syria, which is not, I think, as our Rapporteur would have us believe. It seems to me that, linked as it is with the Soviet Union, Syria has a precise objective which is certainly not the unity and independence of Lebanon as a free and sovereign nation.

If no account is taken of this fact, I do not think that Europe can take any effective action. So, Ladies and Gentlemen, if all this is true, if we are today faced with a Palestinian liberation movement broken up into many factions it is wrong to go on saying that the PLO is the only organisation which represents the Palestinians; and this is why I have submitted a number of amendments to which I will speak at the appropriate time to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that, if we insist on regarding Israel as always and in every way responsible, if we refuse to accept the PLO for what it really is, namely a terrorist organisation until now at least – and the PLO is now broken up into so many factions – we shall never establish the basis for serious negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries.

These are the points I wanted to put to the Assembly and I think that they are not without purpose because the main requirement for playing any part is realisation of the facts; and in my opinion the facts are not in many respects those presented in the report which nevertheless has many praiseworthy features.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Yesterday I was unable for various reasons to hear all the speeches but one or two comments about the Assembly's right, indeed, its obligation and duty, to present reports on the Middle East were misplaced. My friend, Mr. Cavaliere, referred to that. Anything that has an impact, wherever it is, on the security of Europe is of interest to this Assembly and to the Council of Ministers and has always been so regarded. Before starting to speak I confirmed that, without complaints from anyone, we have issued reports about the situation in the Middle East,

with a variety of rapporteurs of different countries and parties, reports that have been referred to the Council of Ministers for eleven years. The first such report on the troubles in the Middle East was written and presented eleven years ago and there have been constant attempts since the problem has remained unresolved to contribute to a greater understanding of the need to end the threat to our security, all other considerations apart.

If one needs to add anything more it is only that the Council of Ministers themselves have repeatedly answered written questions, regarded as being fully in order, about the Middle East, as they have about the security of Europe. That has been done without interruption over many years. The other day some of us listened to the French Minister at a joint meeting of the Council of Ministers and members of parliament and I believe that what he said was tragically true, that is, that whatever we do or say there is very unlikely to be any definitive settlement in Lebanon and that no progress could be achieved in the freeing of the occupied territories and providing a homeland for dispossessed people in present conditions, namely, until at least the American and the next Israeli elections have taken place and until we know what the future of Syria is to be, with trends and tendencies that many of us view with apprehension.

My fear is that, while we wait, a bad situation, unfortunately, continues to solidify. In other words, the Balkanisation of the Near East and Middle East continues and it becomes harder and harder to get the single sovereign state of Lebanon together again and so it becomes harder and harder to get any acceptance of the idea that the colonising of the West Bank by Israeli settlements should be halted so that at least serious talks could go on about the future of that unhappy part of the world and its unhappy inhabitants.

So it could be asked: why, then, should we accept that very little progress will be made and can be made for the reasons stated? Why should we in Europe bother to say anything at all? In a sentence I would say that when I have been in the Middle East, and I have been in most of those countries, I have sensed a feeling of growing despair and frustration, and the more people become frustrated, the more likely it is that in the end that frustration will turn to renewed violence and yet more violence. That was the point made to us by His Royal Highness the Crown Prince – that the position of the moderate governments in the Middle East is being steadily eroded. We have heard references today to Libya and Syria and there is no doubt that as long as the Lebanon problem remains unresolved and as long as the repression of the Palestine people remains unresolved, we are not helping the moderate governments but

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

making it more likely that some of them will fall into extremist hands, which can hardly be the wish of anyone here. Nevertheless, that is what is happening while we are standing here today.

We all know that we would never be surprised to learn that another extremist government had taken over somewhere in that area. Therefore, it was made perfectly clear to us that even an indication that they were not forgotten in these problems would help. Over and over again all sections of the population were saying: "At least let Europe say that we are not forgotten and are determined, however long it takes, to reach a solution. That would be to give us some hope." That would help moderate governments in the area to exercise influence in the cause of peace, but only if they were given at least a chance of thinking that there was some light at the end of the tunnel. Otherwise, one of these days or months we shall see another moderate government fall. Renewed difficulty will develop and it will become even more difficult to negotiate a settlement.

The other day I asked my own government whether they still regarded the Venice declaration as being in force. I am glad to say that I received an unqualified "Yes" and that that is still the bedrock of the European attitude toward these problems. That should be said and said widely today. If just for that reason, the issue of this report demonstrates our interest in the Middle East and the awful tragedy to which I have not referred – the continuing and developing conflict between Iraq and Iran. If we in Europe do not express our anxiety but simply say that nothing can be done because we are not sufficiently strong and influential, even greater tragedies will be ahead.

For that very reason above all others, and without referring to the report, which is excellent, I cannot understand why Mr. Freeson should have spoken as he did. He seems to be the only one who has spoken of the report in that way. He must regard many people as idiotic for the committee vote was sixteen to nil in favour of what has been referred to so critically by Mr. Freeson. From all my years at the Assembly I can say that if one can get a vote of sixteen to nil in a committee in favour of a report one has not done badly.

I therefore congratulate the Rapporteur and look forward to unanimous acceptance of his report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – I am grateful for the friendly remarks yesterday by Mr. Stokes and by Mr. Garrett this morning.

I am grateful, too, for what Mr. Cifarelli said. He made a very pertinent comment when he said that it was wrong for Middle East countries to think in terms of reconstituting their ancient empires. If every country that had had an empire in the Middle East attempted to reconstitute it, it is plain that none of them could be satisfied. One has only to think of the empires that existed in the past, not only the Israeli but the Syrian, the Turkish, the Iranian and so forth to realise what a dangerous path one is treading in introducing such thinking.

I am also grateful to Mr. Gianotti for his view that the PLO should be recognised, that we should not reject it and seek to eliminate references to it in the report. However, there were critical speeches. Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt complained about our having a report on the matter at all. Sir Frederic Bennett has dealt with that. We in Europe are very much affected by what can and does happen in the Middle East. It is not so long ago that three member states had military forces of their own in Lebanon. There were complaints then, or shortly afterwards, of lack of co-ordination of those forces. It is possible that there might be co-ordinated action by certain WEU member state governments, given various hypothetical circumstances, in the Gulf area. It is at least open to question whether it might fall within the area of interest of WEU, which might provide a framework within which such co-operation might, in such circumstances, take place.

It is, therefore, in no way the case that the Middle East has no bearing on Western European security. Although we should not have a report on this matter at each session and each time we meet, the precedent has been established over a long period, and I see no reason yet for our taking it off our agenda as a matter of principle.

Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt complained about a lack of balance in the resolution, although he acknowledged that this resolution was more balanced than that that came before the Assembly in December but was not voted upon. He agreed that paragraph 4 (a) was balanced – that is the sub-paragraph that recalls that:

"stability ... depends, on the one hand, on the PLO and all nations recognising Israel and its rights and, on the other hand, on Israel recognising the fact that the Palestinian people have the right to their own national homeland".

He expressed the view, however, that sub-paragraph (b) was unbalanced, on the ground, I presume, that it criticises Israel but says nothing correspondingly to criticise anything done by the Arabs. I do not believe that balance requires one to say something critical of the Arabs just

Lord Reay (continued)

because one has criticised Israel. That is not a principle that one can accept.

We have to repeat our condemnation of the settlement policy for the West Bank. It is widely agreed and accepted by the WEU member states that that policy constitutes a serious obstacle to peace. It is an internationally illegal policy. It is the most dangerous policy that could continue to be pursued at present. We have always condemned it in the past and we cannot now, for the first time, omit any reference to it. I understand that a sixth amendment has been tabled this morning which seeks to take out that sub-paragraph, and I would have to urge the Assembly not to accept such a proposal.

Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt suggested that there should be some reference to terrorism. How far back does he want to go? Does one refer to the boasts of certain men when they become ministers about what they did in the days of their youth? If so, I am not sure that the balance would be redressed in the direction that Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt requires.

There is no doubt that expulsion from the West Bank is a genuine and serious fear of the Jordanians. Expulsions have occurred in the past. That is well documented. They have not occurred on any mass scale in the recent past, although that is not to say that that might not happen in the future.

That is all I have to say since my remaining remarks will be confined to the amendments when they are moved.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Michel, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, those of you who have raised the question of WEU's competence to deal with the matter in hand have received a highly satisfactory answer from several representatives: the Middle East issue clearly falls within WEU's terms of reference insofar as our own security is involved.

One important comment: WEU must approach the Middle East issue in total honesty and without any hypocrisy. We must tackle it with the will to advance the solutions we are proposing and not pretend to tackle it while having no intention of pursuing it in depth.

From several parts of the House we have heard calls for prudence, particularly where the report refers to personal initiatives, and Sir Frederic Bennett has, in a most timely fashion, asked us to avoid entrenching mistaken attitudes

on the Middle East but to move on instead to practical measures designed to promote a peaceful solution. I support his point.

Several speakers have stressed the need for us to approach such a delicate issue objectively. Lord Reay's report is in fact a model of objectivity and was moreover adopted in committee with genuine unanimity.

Had we also been able to speak to the Israelis, we would obviously have listened to their arguments with equal prudence and objectivity. A problem like this must be approached very realistically. Nor should we think that our actions will have immediate and miraculous effects on so complicated and difficult a situation.

One member said that "our work was relatively useless" since in Lebanon, at the very moment when a government had been brought together, those who supported its various members were fighting in the streets. That is as may be, but we should be pleased that people are talking to each other, in spite of the fighting and dissent. Such is the wish expressed in our report: that the various parties in the Middle East should talk to each other and advance towards peace together with us and in accordance with our ideas, modest as they may be.

That was the wish of the committee, whose work has been characterised by a striking unanimity admirably summarised in the report by Lord Reay, whom I would like to thank again for all his work.

I therefore call on the Assembly to follow the example of the General Affairs Committee and adopt this report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, before proceeding to vote on the draft recommendation we have to deal with six amendments. We shall take them in the order in which they apply to the text of the draft recommendation: Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4, tabled by Mr. Cavaliere; Amendment 6, tabled by Mr. Jung; Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt.

I would point out that if Amendment 6 were adopted, Amendment 5 would fall.

Amendment 1 reads as follows:

1. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (ix) and insert:

"Paying tribute to the peacekeeping task accomplished by units of the multinational buffer force and deploring the heavy losses suffered by two of these units;"

I call Mr. Cavaliere to move the amendment.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, I do not think that Amendment 1 calls for any explanation: it refers to paragraph (ix) of the preamble which rightly deplores the heavy losses suffered by some units, and specifically the United States and French units. In my view it should be recognised first and foremost that the intervention by the units of the multinational buffer force was expedient and praiseworthy, and that it did a great deal for some sectors of the population; and I think therefore that this Assembly should pay tribute to the mission in addition to deploring the losses suffered by some units.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I feel that by retaining Lord Reay's version we shall be adopting a wisely circumscribed formulation. I could agree to Lord Reay's version, because I am always prepared to lament the victims of military activities. But from where I stand I cannot agree to the emphatic and detailed approval of what is called here a peacekeeping task. I could, as I have already said, agree to the very wisely circumscribed wording proposed by Lord Reay. But I cannot approve what I am inclined to call this very explicit celebration of such military interventions.

I therefore ask you to reject this amendment so that this passage can be adopted by a large majority, as it was in committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – I believe that only one person from either side is entitled to speak to the amendment. I should be willing to accept Mr. Cavaliere's amendment. I know that it is a matter about which his country feels strongly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). – I wish to present an explanation of vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Jung has the floor.

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). – I would like to thank all those who voted in favour of Mr. Cavaliere's amendment and to protest against the fact that certain members refuse to pay tribute to those who have given their lives for peace.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – This is not an explanation of vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Amendment 2, tabled by Mr. Cavaliere, reads as follows:

2. In the first sub-paragraph of paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "and the PLO".

I call Mr. Cavaliere to move the amendment.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, if you agree, I will speak to Amendments 2, 3 and 4, which in my view cover the same point. As I said earlier, I firmly believe that we must not lose sight of the facts if our action and European collaboration are to be effective: and that is why I do not wish the PLO to be mentioned in the draft recommendation, without this meaning failure to recognise the existence of that movement.

What is the reason for my proposal? First of all, I think it would be a serious mistake to recognise that a single party or organisation represents an entire country. This is opening the way to dictatorship, because where a country is not represented by more than one party there is no democracy and never will be. I should like to recall what has happened and is still happening in Namibia where the United Nations have recognised one party only when in fact there are several. Nor can I forget the destabilising action pursued until now by the PLO throughout the western world, with a continuous series of terrorist acts which have nothing to do with the proper ways of winning recognition for the rights of individuals or of the people. There is a third set of reasons: we are fully aware of the attitude of the PLO towards Israel and the consequent attitude of Israel towards the PLO. To say that Israel should contact the PLO with a view to starting a genuine dialogue aimed at resolving the problems of the area or recognition of a Palestinian state is saying something that has no real meaning because that would never happen.

Again, with which PLO should negotiations take place? Which is the PLO that we recognise as sole representative of the Palestinian people? We have seen that the PLO is broken up into factions, and that the last time Arafat was obliged to leave Lebanon because another faction which claimed to be the legitimate representative of Palestinian interests forced him out. Taking into account all these points which seem to me to be apposite, I think that to speak of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people does not help towards solving the problem and hence towards the creation of a Palestinian state.

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

These are my reasons for tabling these amendments which are sure to be rejected but nevertheless have some significance and indicate a certain line.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, I would remind you that we are taking the amendments separately and are at present discussing Amendment 2.

Does anyone wish to speak against this amendment?...

The Rules of Procedure allow me to call one speaker only. Mr. Milani was the first to ask to speak. I beg the indulgence of others who have asked to speak, but I must proceed in this way.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish to oppose Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Cavaliere. So far as I understand the position of Italy's political forces, this amendment is in substance personal to Mr. Cavaliere himself. I would observe that a few days ago the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who incidentally belongs to the same party as Mr. Cavaliere, received Mr. Arafat. But this recognition was to be taken for granted since the representative of the PLO was received by the Interparliamentary Union in the Italian Parliament last year in recognition of the rôle of that organisation which has a purely political rôle and seeks, as it always has, to represent the Palestinian people.

Mr. Cavaliere has made two contradictory statements: first, that recognition of the PLO by the Assembly means supporting a single party; second, that we shall be recognising an organisation without knowing what it is because it is at present divided and represented by a variety of forces. As all of us know, the PLO represents various tendencies among the Palestinian people; we are therefore in favour of retaining the Rapporteur's text because such reference and recognition means working for peace and above all for recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Rauti, why do you want the floor, as there can be only one opposition speaker?

Mr. RAUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, you said that there could be only one speaker in favour and one against; but Mr. Cavaliere has spoken to several amendments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – I shall follow Mr. Cavaliere's example and speak once on all three amendments, which seek to remove references to the PLO.

Mr. Cavaliere talked about the reality of the divisions within the PLO, but there is another reality, which is that the PLO is the only body that can claim to represent the Palestinian people. Of course we should not seek to impose a body on the Palestinians and decide that it is their representative, that we shall talk to that body alone, that it will remain the representative of the Palestinians for all time and that we shall never treat any other body as the representative of the Palestinian people. It must be up to the Palestinians to choose their own representatives; that is what self-determination means.

However, at present the PLO is the only body representing the Palestinian people with which anyone could negotiate. If we remove the references to the PLO we shall be saying, in effect, that we do not wish to negotiate with the PLO or with the Palestinians. That would be a rebuff for the moderates and would encourage the extremists, from whom we have suffered so much terrorism. It is because I want to encourage the moderate element, which is willing to negotiate, that I believe that we should retain the references to the PLO.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)
Amendment 2 is negatived.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish to present an explanation of vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Cifarelli, it is not customary to present explanations of votes on amendments.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I asked to be allowed to explain my vote because one of my colleagues had already been allowed to do so. However, out of respect for the Rules of Procedure, I shall not press my request.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Cifarelli, you will be able to speak after the vote on the report. We must abide by the current practices of this Assembly, which are designed to ensure a fair distribution of speaking time.

Amendment 3, tabled by Mr. Cavaliere, reads as follows:

3. Leave out the second sub-paragraph of paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“– recognition by Israel of the right of the Palestinian people to their own national homeland;”.

This amendment has already been moved by the author.

The President (continued)

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – There is an extraordinarily good reason why we should not accept the amendment. That reason was well set out by Lord Reay and was reflected in the last vote.

Although the amendments differ slightly, they all advert to the same theme – that we should take a step backwards and not talk to the PLO. If there is a so-called lack of democracy, it is only because the Arabs on the West Bank are not allowed to press their point in a normal legitimate fashion. When a mayor misbehaves himself, he is immediately expelled from his post arbitrarily. As we know, there is no democracy on the West Bank in choice of representatives.

This amendment and the next should be rejected. Lord Reay has made the point that we are starting to reach the stage where moderates, not just European governments, are in touch with the PLO. I point out that Egypt, which is doing its best to preserve peace – it started the peace programme with Israel – has welcomed Mr. Arafat as leader of the PLO and has accepted the PLO as a legitimate body. The same applies to the Jordanians, who are now engaged in these conversations. Moderates are talking to the PLO. To break off these talks – with the result that a far more extreme body would claim to represent the PLO – would be not only a step backwards but an action for which history would never forgive us. That is what would happen if we handed the future of that part of the world to people who were much more extreme than the PLO on the basis that the PLO does not represent every single Arab there.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – For the reasons that I gave in speaking to the first amendment, I shall oppose this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 3 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

Amendment 4, tabled by Mr. Cavaliere, reads as follows:

4. Leave out sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“(a) recall that peace on the territory of former Palestine depends, on the one

hand, on all Arab countries recognising Israel and its rights and, on the other hand, on Israel recognising the fact that the Palestinian people have the right to their own national homeland;”.

The amendment has already been moved by the author.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think that a full explanation has been given of our reasons for not accepting this amendment which is logically linked with the others. The attitudes of the western governments to the problem of the PLO were restated jointly in the solemn declarations of the various ministers for foreign affairs at Venice. Unquestionably therefore some organisation must speak for recognition of a homeland for the Palestinians.

Furthermore, the organisation concerned has been steadily moderating its position and has taken up a new political stance; it had also had to mediate between the other views held by the Palestinian leaders. That is why I think that the solution proposed in Lord Reay's report should be approved and therefore that the original text should be maintained. It is consistent with the positions of the various governments which, I repeat, were reiterated at the meeting of foreign ministers held in Venice.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Rules of Procedure provide that representatives or substitutes may present explanations of votes at the end of the debate.

I call the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – The Rapporteur has already taken a position on Mr. Cavaliere's amendments on behalf of the committee, but I would like to draw Mr. Cavaliere's attention to a legal point: the various texts which he is seeking to amend impose obligations on the PLO, not rights.

There is a legal distinction here which makes it impossible to accept these amendments. I would ask Mr. Cavaliere to consider this point, which seems to me essential.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 4 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 4 is negatived.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. You ruled that an

Dr. Miller (continued)

explanation of the vote would be given at the end of the debate. Do you mean at the end of the series of amendments or at the end of the whole debate? There is a difference.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, Rule 26, paragraph 2, states that “when examination of and voting on a text as a whole have been concluded and the results announced, representatives or substitutes may present explanations of votes.”

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – That is still not clear. About which text are we talking – the text of the amendments or the text of the report?

The PRESIDENT. – Explanations of votes follow the vote on the whole report.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – With respect, Mr. President, it cannot possibly be at the end of the whole debate on the report, because the explanation of the vote could be entirely different in respect of amendments and the report. If I may advise, it would seem that we should be taking explanations of the vote at the end of the series of amendments.

The PRESIDENT. – Explanations of votes should be given once the recommendation of the Rapporteur has been adopted.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, surely that cannot be right because, as I have indicated before, the explanation of vote might be entirely different. I would want to explain my vote in relation to the amendments that we have just heard. I would give a different explanation if I were going to vote against the report as a whole.

The PRESIDENT. – Perhaps you are right in general, but in presiding I have the duty to do what is always done, and I am informed that what I have told you is correct.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Further to the point of order, Mr. President. It would have been inappropriate for Mr. Jung’s explanation of his vote a few minutes ago to have been deferred for another half or three-quarters of an hour. It would have caused confusion in the Assembly as we would have had a number of decisions since then. I have now been attending these gatherings for quite a long time and I can recall that in the past we have been allowed to speak briefly to explain our vote after an amendment. That ought not to be too frequent – I accept that – and many of us would be hesitant about hearing many explanations of votes. It would be entirely appropriate for that practice to continue whether or not the rules allow it.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – Further to that point of order, Mr. President. The English translation of the rule says that explanation of the vote can be made after the text is given, not after the report as a whole has been debated. I submit that, according to the English version, an amendment on its own is a text on which an explanation of vote may be given.

The PRESIDENT. – It seems to me, as I am presiding for the first time, that I have a duty to follow what has always been done without changing the working methods. I will inform the President of the Assembly about this procedure, and that will be duly decided, but at the moment I ask you not to seek to change the method already adopted.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I am not changing it. It is you who are changing it, or somebody else on the platform is doing so. If the rule says that one can have an explanation of vote after a text, all I am doing is abiding by the rule. It may be that in other debates it is easy to do it in the way you are suggesting, but it seems to me that in a debate of this kind it is necessary to take every amendment or group of amendments in order as they arise.

The PRESIDENT. – It is not my personal view. It is the position of the secretariat and for that reason I beg you to allow us at this moment to refrain from changing the tradition. You will have the possibility of explaining and clarifying your opinion freely.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – May I appeal to my colleagues to support the ruling that you, Mr. President, have given, because the duty of any democrat in an Assembly is to accept the ruling of the chairman. What my colleague, Dr. Miller, has exposed is a clear anomaly and I hope that we can accept your undertaking to refer this matter to the President of the Assembly, because clearly this unclear rule ought not to be permitted to remain after it has been exposed, as it has been today. But we should today accept your ruling, Mr. President, asking the appropriate authorities to look at the clear anomaly that has been exposed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Amendment 6, tabled by Mr. Jung, reads as follows:

6. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph 4 (b).

I call Mr. Jung to move the amendment.

(*Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair*)

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have tabled this amendment because I do not think the draft recommendation is balanced.

Mr. Jung (continued)

The Chairman of the committee spoke a little while ago of objectivity and realism. He will forgive me if I am unfortunately unable to share his opinion.

We have been discussing the Middle East situation for almost twelve years now. Without wishing to be critical, I would point out that it is easier to busy ourselves with problems in distant regions than with others concerning Poland, Czechoslovakia or East Germany.

I, like others, think that this report was necessary, because the war between Iran and Iraq is without doubt the most serious problem of the end of this century. The religious fanaticism we are witnessing, with all its excesses, is behind this war and will, I fear, have harmful effects on all our peoples.

What I cannot understand is why our Rapporteur always focuses on Israel's mistakes. At no time is there any indication that this country has, in the cause of peace, given up the territories conquered from Egypt. Nor is it mentioned that Israel is the only country to have partially withdrawn from Lebanon. At no time is there any analysis of Syria's position. I would have liked somewhere to see condemnation of Syria, which is still occupying Lebanon. But there is nothing there.

Israel withdrew from Beirut, as did France, after many sacrifices, and I am moved at the thought of its dead. Unfortunately, Beirut is still not at peace.

Well, Ladies and Gentlemen, in the interests of peace, let us not carry on condemning a people and a country trying by every means to find solutions! I am not the victim of an *idée fixe*, but this report, which condemns one country only, needs to be balanced.

One day certain people in this Assembly will probably regret the policy pursued for ten years now as the result of a failure to recognise that it is perhaps Israel, the great friend of Europe, that is defending the interests of our peoples.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – The sub-paragraph introduces no reference to Beirut and Lebanon, but simply repeats its condemnation of Israel's continuing settlement policy in territories occupied since 1967. That is not a new, anti-Israeli sentiment being expressed by WEU or anyone else. It is a quotation of the United Nations Security Council resolution which was carried with even American support.

The present settlement policies have been condemned in the United Nations, in the Security Council and even the Americans, who normally staunchly support Israel in the Security Council, have condemned them and continue to do so. To suggest that we are not being objective when we are only repeating a condemnation that has been voiced repeatedly in the highest international forums would be to neglect all our international obligations. All our countries have voted in that way. This is nothing new but is simply reinforcement of the decisions taken at highest international level by our individual governments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – I do not understand Mr. Jung's remarks. In paragraph 3 we request the withdrawal of all forces from Lebanon. That plainly includes the Syrian forces. That goes further than Resolutions 508 and 509 of the Security Council. They called only for Israeli withdrawal. The Israelis may have withdrawn from Beirut, but they have not withdrawn from south Lebanon, although by their presence there they are doing neither themselves nor anyone else any good, as was pointed out yesterday by Mr. Stokes.

I agree with Sir Frederic Bennett that we should oppose this amendment. As he said, if we were to adopt it, we would suddenly appear to be condoning the Israeli settlement policy, which has been condemned as illegal by the United Nations and which all European countries have accepted as being illegal and politically unhelpful and which we have always condemned and which we have always regarded as being one of the central obstacles to peace in the Middle East.

That must be so because, by itself, the policy is a sort of creeping, de facto incorporation of the West Bank into the state of Israel, and if that policy persisted indefinitely it would end all hope of a Palestinian homeland. For those reasons, we must reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 6 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 6 is negatived.

Amendment 5, tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt, reads as follows:

5. In sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out:

“and warn that country that there must be no further expulsion of Arab populations from these territories.”

I call Mr. Jung to move the amendment.

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, I do not wish to be obstinate after the vote that has just taken place. Nor do I think that anybody was in doubt as to the reason why I tabled my amendment. Parallel to the condemnation contained in paragraph 4, I would have wished to see the text balanced by condemnation of other countries responsible. The same reasons lie behind Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt's Amendment 5, which is a fall-back position in relation to Amendment 6.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I can be brief, because in effect this amendment is trying to achieve to a lesser degree what was being sought by the last amendment.

The basic fault lies in the fact that the major problem in that part of the world is the growing unhappiness and economic and social restrictions from which the inhabitants are suffering. There are many ways to carry out expulsion. Some have been forcible. Some have been economic. If one ensures that 60% or 70% of the productive land of a territory is held by a tiny minority of the inhabitants and that it is economically impossible for others to live there, that constitutes another form of expulsion.

There is then the harassment of which all parties know – the Israelis know that it has been happening – around these settlements. With every Palestinian who is compelled by economic, social or other factors, as well as by force, to leave his country, the problem grows. For us here today not to condemn action that is making the problem more intractable would be wholly illogical and would be against the last vote that we held a few moments ago.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – For the reasons that I gave in my winding-up speech, and for the reasons that Sir Frederic Bennett has given, I oppose the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 5 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is negatived.

We shall now vote on the whole of the draft recommendation contained in Document 978, as amended.

Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure as amended on 29th November 1982, a vote by roll-call is mandatory if requested by at least five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber.

Does anyone wish to vote by roll-call ?

The vote will therefore be taken by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted*¹.

Dr. Miller has the floor for an explanation of vote.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I voted in favour of the first group of amendments tabled by Mr. Cavaliere because I object, and shall continue to object, to the term "PLO" in general. In English, PLO means the Palestine Liberation Organisation. If that does not imply the elimination of the state of Israel, I do not know what it does. I am not against the establishment of further national Arab homelands in the area. I am against, and shall continue to oppose, the use of the term "PLO" until the Arabs change the nomenclature that they use and drop their continual demands for the absolute elimination of the state of Israel. That is the reason for my vote in that instance.

My reason for voting in favour of Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt's amendment is that, contrary to the belief of Sir Frederic Bennett, there have not been expulsions. He can go on in an airy-fairy way about economic trends and problems, but we all have them. He would not accept that his government are deliberately expelling people from parts of Great Britain where there is unemployment. In fact, recently in the House of Commons, his Minister said that if people could not work somewhere, they should "get on their bikes". It ill behoves Sir Frederic Bennett to talk about economic difficulties in other parts of the world. If there have been no expulsions, there can be no reference to "further expulsions". That is why I vote in favour of that amendment.

As my colleague, Mr. Freeson, said in an excellent speech, the report is full of bias: it is not representative of what our general populations feel; it goes entirely on one side instead of looking more widely, as we do in other instances. The state of Israel has good points. I concede that it has many bad points, but so have all our countries. Instead of nurturing the good things that Israel is doing and saying to the Arabs: "If you were to come to terms directly with Israel, it would benefit you and the whole of the Middle East", the report, as usual, is a continual onslaught, and it is WEU once again attacking the state of Israel.

I have made it clear, as has Reg Freeson, that I do not agree with many aspects of Israel's economic and political life. Nevertheless, I

¹. See page 21.

Dr. Miller (continued)

concede that it is doing things in the Middle East that are of enormous benefit to the area and would be of enormous benefit to the Arabs if they were only given the lead by the West that it should give. Instead of nurturing ideas about the elimination of the state of Israel, we should be saying to the Arabs: "You must come to terms with the state of Israel" – that need not necessarily be on Israeli terms, because it must be made to make concessions – "on mutually acceptable terms. It would benefit you all."

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, I would ask you to make an effort. We shall be discussing later the procedural issues that have been raised. The speaking time for the debate was fixed at five minutes, but I would like it to be less than that for explanations of votes, notwithstanding the Rules of Procedure.

I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, might I remind you that yesterday you pointed out that I had not used up all my speaking time...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That was indeed the case, Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – It is a pity I cannot use the speaking time I saved.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You may use your accumulated capital!

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I abstained for three basic reasons. The first was that I do not agree – and I had hoped that an amendment would intervene – with congratulating the Syrians on having set up a government at gun-point. It is a step towards a Syrian takeover of Lebanon, that is to say, a Lebanon within Greater Syria.

I said yesterday – and I repeat – that we cannot serve the cause of peace – an aim on which we all agree – if we fail to tell the truth. In politics, lying is a crime. Worse, a mistake.

The second reason why I abstained was that I cannot accept the statement that the PLO – however important – is the sole representative of the Palestinian people. It has no democratic justification, and its charter is a charter for the destruction of Israel. It is an organisation which can serve the cause of struggle, but not the cause of peace. I did not join with Mr. Cavaliere in voting for deletion of the reference to the PLO, but I proposed a different wording – we are specialists of the nuance, and the Chairman of the committee is a past master when it comes to making fine distinctions – to the effect that the PLO is an important, perhaps even a

valuable, organisation, but not the only one. To call it the only organisation is to say no to Israel, not only to the Israel of Mr. Begin or Mr. Shamir, for whom I have no sympathy, but no to all the parties and political organisations in Israel, even those which I hope will win the election in July and form the new government of Israel.

The third reason for my abstention was my opposition to paragraph (b) of the draft recommendation which speaks of expulsions. This is an accusation of intent, and accusations of intent do not serve the cause of peace. A statement such as might come from enemies, those pursuing their own interests or having their own suspicions or fears, ought not to be made by representatives of free, democratic states whose actions and sacrifices are solely directed towards the maintenance of peace.

I would have liked the Assembly to adopt Mr. Cavaliere's amendment recognising the effort made by the Italians, who contributed with prudence and loyalty to the defence of peace and the establishment of an acceptable order in Lebanon and in Beirut in particular.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Vogt has the floor for an explanation of vote.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I should like to explain why I have voted against the whole of this draft recommendation. I might have abstained if we had kept to Lord Reay's original version. The original version undoubtedly had certain drawbacks. In particular, on a number of counts it was too demonstrably Eurocentric. To indicate merely that these conflicts are a threat to European security and the stability of the world economy, viewing everything from the European angle, is regrettable, especially when one passage refers to the heavy losses suffered by the multinational buffer force, without saying a word about the daily losses suffered by the civilian population. That is what I must regretfully describe as Eurocentric.

On the other hand, I must admit that in many respects Lord Reay opted for a wisely circumscribed approach, which might well have led to full agreement. For example, I consider paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation to be very original and forward-looking. Lord Reay says in this paragraph that the Agency for the Control of Armaments should consider chemical weapons and establish which WEU member countries may have supplied such weapons to this area. I think this is a very appropriate suggestion.

However, it is regrettable that the use of chemical weapons, a despicable act which begs description, should be mentioned only in these tactful terms.

Mr. Vogt (continued)

But what prompted me to reject the whole of the draft recommendation was Mr. Cavaliere's Amendment 1, since it unfortunately destroyed what was positive in the original, making a less than satisfactory text even worse by helping to ensure that intervention by military means is once again explicitly commended. I do not think it is good for the further development of the countries of the European Community and Western European Union to become too accustomed to "peace missions" involving the use of weapons. As a civilian, someone who does not have a military mind, I therefore felt it necessary to reject the whole text. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). - During my earlier critical remarks - I did not mince my words - I put a number of specific questions and not one was touched on by the Rapporteur or the Chairman of the committee in answering the debate.

For example, I asked which countries apart from Jordan had been visited in the preparation of the report, what evidence there was to support the statement that arms were being supplied to Iran via Israel and what justification there was for recommending us to support one side in the Iran-Iraq war. I asked a number of specific questions and not one was even touched on in the reply to the debate. I could have asked many more questions.

The report is facile at best and damaging and mischievous at worst. If people in the Middle East are to pay attention to what WEU says about matters of great sensitivity and controversy, we should couch our views more carefully and impartially, analyse the situation much more objectively and make our references to the histories of the problems in that area much more accurate.

The report is not a good one. It is damaging to WEU and to European interests in these matters. At best, it will be regarded as irrelevant and will be ignored by the people in the Middle East, with the possible exception of the Jordanian Government, and there is a special reason for that. Large sections of the report are virtually quotations from Prince Hassan - unquestioned, unchallenged, uncriticised and with no examination of the matters to which the Prince refers.

Let me explain some of the reasons why I voted for the amendments. Recommendation 4(a) says that the Palestinian people have "the right to their own national homeland".

The Palestinians certainly have a right to that, but it is damaging for WEU to single out one

solution as if it is the only solution. That is political nonsense. There are other options from the points of view both of the Jordanian Government and of the people living in the West Bank and Gaza area. I am interested in the Middle East and I attempt to talk to people there - Palestinians as well as Israelis and Jordanians. I should like to talk to many more if we had access to them.

It is wrong to say that there is only one way of dealing with self-determination. If we had used the term "self-determination", I would have supported it, because I am a great supporter of that. However, there are alternative political solutions to self-determination.

References to the PLO are too specific, too narrow and too singular. There are other ways of getting parliamentary or democratic representatives involved in negotiations - I have met some of the people involved - and the report should not have ignored that possibility.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. Freeson you have gone well over your speaking time. I would be obliged if you would conclude.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). - Whatever Sir Frederic Bennett says about expulsions, the statement in recommendation 4(b) is inaccurate, deliberately biased and based on statements made by Prince Hassan. As a representative of the Jordanian Government, the Prince is entitled to make such statements in seeking to put that government's position to the parliamentarians and governments of Europe. However, it is wrong to include such statements in the report. It is not true that there have been major expulsions from the West Bank territories since the 1967 war. On the contrary, there has been major economic development there - the "free bridges" policy between Israel and Jordan and a variety of other actions that make it wrong to include such a statement in a WEU report.

Whatever I say in criticism of the report is said because I wish to see WEU and other parliamentary bodies in Europe play a constructive rôle in conciliation and reconciliation among the disputant parties in the Middle East. The report does not do that. Therefore, it is damaging at worst and irrelevant at best.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. Bianco has the floor for an explanation of vote.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, I will try to save on the minutes taken up by the previous speaker. I think that Lord Reay's report is balanced and that is one of my reasons for voting in favour. I do not regard the interpretations of members who voted against as serving any useful purpose because they misrepresented the tone and judgments of the written report. I voted in favour because I

Mr. Bianco (continued)

thought that the document might point the way for reopening the dialogue and for establishing healthy relations between the Arab countries and the state of Israel.

The interpretation given, for example, by Dr. Miller who sought to describe the report as anti-Israeli is completely unacceptable. I firmly believe that Israel's security must be safeguarded. This has always been the basis of Italian policy and I do not accept as a valid objection the fact that the PLO is still using initials which recall times when this organisation had a bad image. It is of note that in a recent statement Arafat expressed the hope that relations between the state of Israel and the Palestinian organisation could be regularised in the near future.

This is one of my reasons for supporting Lord Reay's report which is a move in the right direction. I think therefore that the whole balance should be restored and that this report is a good contribution to the opening of a fresh dialogue in this sensitive area.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, the intention of my amendments, of which one has been accepted, was not to exploit certain ideas and situations. In my view, a very objective approach is needed in order to help in solving this problem. When it is stated that Syria has played and is playing a positive rôle and when the position of the PLO is disregarded, this does not seem to me to be an objective approach and therefore a contribution to solving the problem of the Middle East and in particular the problem of the Palestinian people. That is why I voted against.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, organisations which WEU can recognise as being representative must be elected democratically. I have no knowledge of such a procedure setting up the PLO. I can only agree if it is clearly stated that the reference to the PLO in Lord Reay's text does not in any way give it legitimate status. That is why I abstained.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We have concluded this order of the day. May I thank the General Affairs Committee, particularly the Chairman and Rapporteur, for their work.

A brief comment on the procedure followed.

I have taken note of all the points raised in regard to explanations of votes. This is a

matter which needs very careful scrutiny, both as regards the point in the debate to which such explanations of vote relate - that is to say, to the vote on amendments or on a whole text - and as regards their timing within the debate - and perhaps also as regards their duration. In view of our strict rule governing speaking time in general debates, it would adversely affect the work of the Assembly if explanations of votes were to become occasions for reopening debates that had been theoretically closed. An explanation of vote is an item of fundamental importance when a vote is taken. The Bureau and the appropriate committee will therefore no doubt be called upon to consider the points raised on this subject.

5. *Deterrence and the will of the people*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 970 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on deterrence and the will of the people, Document 970 and amendments.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this report follows on from the debates on pacifism and neutralism which I had the honour of introducing in this Assembly two years ago. It extends, so to speak, the reflection which we then began on the means of safeguarding peace.

The whole world wants peace. There is, however, no longer such unanimity when it comes to the conditions for maintaining peace or the possible consequences of its precarious nature. The attraction and danger of contemporary pacifism and neutralism derive from the ambiguities and shortcomings of that unanimity. Hence, they both support and oppose deterrence and the popular will which concern us here today.

While my previous comment still stands, it must be admitted that the impact of pacifism and neutralism has changed. Although they remain widespread and worrying, nowhere in the world do they constitute by themselves a majority electoral factor, a social determinant or a dominant ideology. Whether this is a case of remission or recession I cannot say. We have neither moved beyond nor mastered the unease which they bring with them, but it is, on the whole, more spectacular than deep-seated.

If we are to achieve our overriding objective of peace, the means employed must incorporate the healthy aspects of pacifism and neutralism,

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

along with other factors that are more general and more effective – by which I mean détente, disarmament and dialogue, backed up by deterrence and the will of the people, and based in depth on the twin axes of East-West and North-South relations.

Today deterrence is the cornerstone. What does it matter that, warlike in essence, it is by nature terrifying? The world lives directly or indirectly under its potentially destructive “umbrella”. In misery and at enormous cost, panic-stricken mankind submits to its awful and indispensable protection, rushing ahead in collective pursuit of a perpetually unstable balance of indefinite overarmament.

A necessary evil, deterrence can be neither abolished nor sufficient.

Nevertheless, nations cannot forever depend for their strength on military force alone. Whether or not backed up by conventional weapons, corresponding troop levels and chemical and bacteriological weapons that are banned but nevertheless manufactured, the nuclear shield and strike force continue to deter. But unless we take heed early enough, the fatal moment could soon be upon us, either without fighting, by diktat of the more highly overarmed, or through the almost accidental unleashing of a terribly destructive military conflict.

We must therefore make use of the deterrence imposed on us during the present period of non-war. As always, any clear-sighted will for realistic pacifism requires a degree of military preparation. But we have reached the limit of what Raymond Aron defined as the time when both “peace is impossible and war unlikely”.

Accepting this, we must move as quickly as possible beyond the period of crazy overarmament, justified terrors, endless confrontation, and perpetual secondary wars. To do so we must add to deterrence through armaments, and the great fear which they at present induce, the peaceful deterrence of economic dynamism, social justice and co-operation between nations.

This broadening of deterrence will operate, as we have said, in known directions and with known means: the North-South and East-West axes, détente, disarmament and dialogue. Already used with relative success, they nevertheless constitute, alongside deterrence and the will of the people, the only effective means at our disposal.

In this context, the privileged instrument can be none other than Western Europe. The geography, history, influence, and strength of Europe and, even more, its interests and example qualify it for this vital rôle.

Europe must remain the natural link between the protagonists of East and West, if it is not to become their battlefield. Despite their ups and downs and difficulties, the EEC, the Council of Europe, the OECD, the European Parliament and our own WEU bear witness, among a thousand other causes, to Europe’s will for dialogue, to the reality of détente in relations between its states, to its action in favour of disarmament, and to its effective, efficient and constant concern for international co-operation.

Europe must therefore try and succeed in East-West détente. But it must also pursue construction of the North-South axis. Patiently, effectively, without weakness or excessive haste, it must, in this area also, lastingly win over minds and peacefully overcome resistance. In this promising area Europe must overcome the obstacles and, by way of more Lomé agreements, which are modest but realistic and mutually beneficial to the parties, must create real partners rather than “assisted” countries.

Here too we are talking about a course of action that is obligatory in itself and in the interests of Europe and the whole world, but one which present circumstances make difficult. We are at one of those crucial moments when the difficulty of the task only adds to the need to undertake it – and to undertake something even more important: disarmament.

All of us here know the urgency and difficulties of disarmament. Here, as in peace issues, we are always faced simultaneously with unanimous agreement on the principles and the impossibility of implementing decisions.

We must strive, tirelessly and without illusions, to increase real concerted action, reduce natural hypocrisy and establish mutual trust. But, even under these conditions, general, simultaneous, balanced and controlled disarmament, however vital if catastrophe is to be avoided, will never come about spontaneously or independently. It will derive from a combination of external facts and consequences by which it will be stimulated but which it will not itself instigate.

Such are the plausible effects and counter-effects of the course of action called for by peaceful deterrence – deterrence originally buttressed by military deterrence that is obligatory at the present time but which has to be progressively reduced as soon as possible. Europe, followed by the world – or at least that part of it with respect for human rights – will then be capable of accepting an active popular will in its midst.

The will of the people is an indispensable condition for the existence of effective peaceful deterrence. A desirable and effective popular will – a reasoned and reasonably informed

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

public opinion – cannot be expressed through the anarchy of brutally passionate outbursts, of crowds stirred up by rabble-rousing, hatred or disorder.

The will of the people which is wanted and needed requires reflection and information, determination and competence, action and results. This conscious will of the people must today support the defence of freedom, up to and including the possession of the balanced military means of deterrence which are its essential expression.

It must regret but accept the application of NATO's twofold decision of 1979, now rendered inevitable, which it is still desirable to rescind at the earliest opportunity in response to a positive act by the Soviet Union making it possible to do so.

The will of the people must approve the search for a positive, trusting and continuing dialogue between East and West as a means of détente and the condition for balanced, verifiable disarmament, in particular as regards Euromissiles.

The will of the people will then insist on speeding up the harmonious development of a wide range of economic relations between Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union, and also on the development of a worldwide dialogue and the realistic and progressive development of equal North-South relations, which is the logical and indispensable basis of the new international order heartily desired by all men of good will.

In this perspective, which I do not believe Utopian, I would ask you, on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, to adopt this report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Michel, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I congratulate the Rapporteur on the good will and sensitivity which he has shown in drawing together the work of our committee. Mr. Lagorce is a highly-experienced rapporteur who knows his job and has produced an admirable report.

In this area we are locked into an implacable logic. While aiming for peace, wanting disarmament and honestly pursuing it, we are forced to note that our hopes do not become facts as quickly as we would like. Logically, we have to face up to the situation and practise deterrence, our principal defensive weapon.

The Rapporteur said that nuclear weapons are the main instrument of deterrence. We must therefore logically have this nuclear weaponry available if we want to bring our weight to bear on the disarmament process. But the Rapporteur quite rightly stresses that it is not the only means available and that there is another important means, of a moral nature, namely our will, that is to say the consciousness and pursuit of freedom. It is around the communication of information to the public, in order to maintain the will for freedom and belief in the efficiency of our means, that the report will turn. We shall continue to pursue the policy on which we have embarked because it is the right one, but we shall try to explain it to public opinion. That is the essence of the report which Mr. Lagorce has summarised. I ask the Assembly to follow him and draw the appropriate conclusions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – May I take this opportunity of thanking the committee and the Rapporteur for their work, which I hope will give us the opportunity for a second interesting debate.

I call Mrs. Knight.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – I begin by offering my warm congratulations to our good colleague, Mr. Lagorce, on what I consider to be a most balanced and realistic report. This chamber has come to expect from Mr. Lagorce reports of excellence, and this is the second time that we have his report before us, a report that warns of the danger to peace of the so-called peace movement. There are several paragraphs that bring that home, none more pointedly than paragraphs 37 and 38 where Soviet connection with pacifist movements is noted. Recommendation 1 suggests that we should: "Continue to keep European public opinion informed of the threats" which face us. I am not too sure that we do a good enough job now to justify the word "continue". Yet the lessons the pacifist lobby should learn are so simple. First, we all hate war. Militant pacifists do not have a monopoly of the love of peace. We all want to avoid war and to have peace. Secondly, no government of the western world wants to pile up weapons unnecessarily. All governments have other things on which they would far rather spend than armaments. Thirdly, we must maintain sufficient military strength to deter aggression. A government's first duty is to keep its people safe from attack. Fourthly and finally, we in the West are always ready to lower our defence capability, provided – and it must depend on this – that potential enemies lower theirs comparably, provided that a balance is kept. Then, certainly, we will lower our defence capability, for it is that balance that has given us peace for nearly forty years.

Mrs. Knight (continued)

When we try to improve the understanding and acceptance of all our peoples of the policy of deterrence we could do worse, perhaps, than reflect on the importance of reminders. We should remind militant pacifists that little Afghanistan would be free today if it had only been able to defend itself. We should remind them what life is like under communism in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. We should remind them of the obscenity of the Berlin wall, and the same kind of wall – or scar I would call it – that runs 800 miles from top to bottom of West Germany.

Familiarity with a situation not only blunts its horror but leads to acceptance and forgetfulness. We should not forget that thousands of simple, harmless Afghans have been turned off their farms and have been forced by the Soviets to flee with their children, their elderly and with whatever of their possessions they can carry, only to be bombed in their flight. That is happening all the time, even as we sit here. We have become forgetful and have reached the point of accepting that that is part of life. Try telling the Afghans that it is safe to stand undefended against the Soviets. Try telling the Poles or the Czechs.

(Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

A few of us recently visited Berlin. A wonderful kindness was extended to us, for which I thank you personally, Mr. President. The visit was moving and it shocked me deeply, even though I knew of the extent of the wall. To look over that wall into no-man's land, where mines are planted, where killer dogs roam on ring leads, where multi-directional guns are triggered by tripwires and on which guns in the hands of guards are constantly trained, was a chilling experience. It is all designed to deny freedom to those who seek it.

As I looked at the grim, grey land beyond those two walls with the no-man's land between, where not one soul is free as we are free, I felt in my heart that deterrence must be a policy that we must guard with our lives, because it means our very lives and our future. If we can do nothing to help these people – and if we cannot, it is an indictment of the United Nations and other international bodies – who are not criminals but who seek only peace and who will be killed if they seek it too energetically, we must at least remember and think about their plight.

We must impress upon the doubters as well as upon the genuine and well-meaning among the pacifist groups that, unless we keep our deterrence, while maintaining with all our might our efforts at multilateral disarmament, the horrors

of Afghanistan, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, the horrors of the gulags and the oppression in the Soviet Union of innocent people because of their religion will spread to Paris, Amsterdam and London, and all over the free world. Freedom will die. Those are the facts that we should try to keep in front of those who say that we should abandon our policy of deterrence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gianotti.

Mr. GIANOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I disagree with both the draft recommendation and the report submitted by Mr. Lagorce. The report seems to me to lay stress on a number of points. The first is that the deployment of the Euromissiles cruise and Pershing II in Europe should continue because the USSR is continuing to deploy its missiles and because the East has never made any disarmament proposals; the second is that differences between Europeans and Americans – publicly-aired differences of opinion and differing proposals – are a mistake to be avoided; the third relates to the fact that deterrence is said to be the only way to defend peace and with it freedom in Western Europe.

Another argument in the report is that the pacifist movements in Western Europe and the United States – the report speaks of pacifist and neutralist movements as if they are one and the same thing – are, in good or bad faith, a point of weakness for the West but in any case must – the Rapporteur is kind enough to say – be listened to. Indeed, the tone adopted towards the pacifist movements is very arrogant and I have reason to believe that it is different from the tone which prevailed at the meeting held a few weeks ago at Mannheim between representatives of the French Socialist Party and the German Social Democrats, together with representatives of the German Greens.

To maintain his arguments, which I hope I have summarised correctly, the Rapporteur has however had to conceal or distort a number of facts. May I quote one or two.

He is forced to say that the Soviet Union has not proposed any reduction of its own missiles. On the contrary, I would remind the Assembly that in October of last year, when Andropov was still alive, the Soviet Union proposed that the number of its SS-20 warheads already deployed on European territory should be reduced to match the number of French and British warheads; the idea could be questioned but this was surely a proposal. The Rapporteur is also obliged to quote the SS-21 and SS-22 now being deployed in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic as one of the reasons for the deployment of the Pershing II and cruise; this time sequence is impossible.

Mr. Gianotti (continued)

The Rapporteur also finds it necessary to equate pacifists and neutralists and to allege that the pacifist movements are in favour of unilateral disarmament. This is not so; some elements of the pacifist movements are in favour of unilateral disarmament while others are opposed.

These are some of my reasons for disagreeing with the draft recommendation and the report.

I should now like to make a number of other points. I think we must ask ourselves what is to be done to restart the process of détente which, in addition to economic and trade relations, should also be concerned with the question of armaments; and we should also be asking ourselves whether concern over such matters can be described as a sign of weakness only or whether – and this is my question – it should not rather be regarded as farsightedness.

To summarise, we support the idea of equilibrium, which does not mean parity. The critical issue is: can the West stop adding to its arms only when the deployment now in progress has been completed or should not thought be given to the possibility of a moratorium, which has in fact been proposed by representatives of the member governments of WEU as a condition for the resumption of negotiations? And again, could not consideration be given to the proposals made by the heads of the Greek and Swedish Governments for the creation of denuclearised zones?

I reserve the right to submit in writing the part of my speech I have not been able to deliver.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Gianotti you have exceeded your five-minute limit.

Mr. GIANOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I thought that I had ten minutes for my speech. I advocate a moratorium as a precondition for the restarting of negotiations between East and West.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY (*United Kingdom*). – The report before us rightly draws attention to the seriousness of the international situation and correctly asserts in the draft recommendation that “the security of Western Europe will be ensured only by deterrence”.

Leadership is essential. There can be no doubt that the United Kingdom Prime Minister is providing it, as her Soviet accolade, the “iron maiden”, has clearly illustrated. She has received the support of fellow western nations in her stance.

Sound defence is essential. There can be no doubt that the emphasis laid on this by western governments shows that there should be an iron fist rather than the limp wrist, as we have seen before. Determination is essential. There can be no doubt that many western countries want to see an iron resolve in their international dealings.

WEU stands for the interests of the West. If we truly believe in a way of life based upon freedom, in other words, democracy, determination is called for to ensure that the case for its existence and development is made throughout the world. If we regard the type of society for which this organisation stands as worthy for ourselves and our fellow man, sound defence is crucial to ensure its continued survival. If we accept that ideology based upon repression, dictatorship and force of arms must be resisted, leadership is vital to ensure that such resistance is firm and constant.

It is perhaps significant that the word “relations” is always used in the context of East and West. We in the West seek good relations on terms that recognise the rights of individuals and nations to self-determination. Our opponents seem to prefer the rôle of bad relations – for ever undermining those rights but overlaying all with a veneer of hurt pride when the mask of sweet moderation slips, and they falsely wear that mask of sweet moderation in the invasion of Afghanistan.

Reality must be the key factor in the approach adopted by the West when dealing with the eastern bloc. We must not be left with our guard down. We must be prepared to stand up for what we believe. We should rally the countries of the free West to ensure the survival of democracy and to bring about its extension.

The actions of WEU must be seen to reverse the trends of many years. The Soviet Union, rather than the western democracies, has enjoyed the spirit of resolve and a sense of mission. That is why the maintenance of military strength, the working for steady progress towards greater democracy and the urging of closer co-operation among western nations in developing a common policy are essential. Only in those ways can the West successfully begin to counter the growth of Soviet power and influence.

The draft recommendation states:

“deterrence is ensured not by the accumulation of armaments alone but also by governments and nations showing their determination to defend their freedom”.

With regard to the former – and I speak as one who is proud to have part of British Aerospace, both dynamics and aircraft divisions, in his

Mr. Murphy (continued)

constituency – it is essential to ensure that such accumulation of armaments and carriers embraces the adoption of the highest standards of technical expertise, such as that in Hertfordshire. With respect to the latter, East-West relations will continue to be of fundamental importance in foreign policy.

The West has shown undoubted weakness in the past – a situation which the present British Government, again with the support of fellow western nations, have been clearly determined to rectify by an activist approach to foreign affairs.

In terms of national freedom and human rights, the scales of justice rest on the balance of power – a balance between East and West. We have a duty to ensure that those scales come down firmly in favour of democracy and of the individual.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Murphy.

I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we surely realise that the deterrence and balance of forces to which Mr. Lagorce refers in his report have kept the peace in Europe for the past four decades.

Since the second world war ended in 1945, some twenty million people have died in wars, not in Europe, but in Asia, Africa and other continents. We owe the fact that no one has died in a war in Europe, that we have enjoyed peace, not to a peace movement but entirely to the system of pacts, the balance of power and the deterrence that has operated in Europe.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the definitions and interpretations of the term “peace movement” vary considerably throughout the world. I had the pleasure of reading an essay on the peace movement in the Soviet Union in *Rote Blätter*, the magazine published by *Spartakus*, the student organisation of the Communist Party in the Federal Republic. I want to share with you the best sentence in this essay, which claimed that the effectiveness of the peace movement in the Soviet Union was evident from the special shifts worked in the armaments industry at week-ends. This shows how differently the concept of “peace movement” is interpreted in East and West: in one case, the peace movement is trying to reduce armaments, in the other, it is doing the opposite, encouraging an excessive build-up of armaments. In the latter case they stand a good chance of gaining the upper hand.

I must also correct something Mr. Gianotti said just now. He said there had been a proposal from the Soviet Union for unilateral

disarmament, so to speak, and the restoration of balance through a reduction in the number of SS-20 missiles deployed. All the Soviet Union in fact said was that it would like to reduce its launchers and warheads in Europe to a given level at a given time. But the missiles were to be moved to other parts of the Soviet Union, not scrapped.

We must be very careful about the Soviet Union's statements on disarmament. It has referred to the balance that existed in Brezhnev's day. But thanks to the excessive unilateral arms build-up by the Soviet Union this balance no longer exists.

I should like to emphasise once again that in NATO we have taken a dual-track decision, whereby we have said that we want to negotiate but that, if these negotiations are unsuccessful, the balance must be restored. Furthermore, this approach still has the approval of the vast majority of the general public. Last Sunday in Munich, and throughout the Federal Republic, the peace movement took a vote to see whether the public were for or against the NATO dual-track decision. Of the 800,000 people entitled to vote in Munich, a mere 35,000 took part in the ballot. Some even complained to the police that they had been forced to vote by members of the peace movement.

I should also like to take up what Mrs. Knight said about Afghanistan and again quote from a communist newspaper. Norman Paech, chairman of the Democratic Lawyers in the Federal Republic, wrote in a communist magazine in the Federal Republic that the Soviet troops had had to be sent into Afghanistan to restore human rights, which had not previously been honoured there. Ladies and Gentlemen, I feel this example alone shows that freedom cannot be maintained without a balance of forces. I should not like to have my human rights in the Federal Republic safeguarded by Soviet troops.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Müller.

The debate is adjourned.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by the President of the Assembly.
2. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

The President (continued)

3. Deterrence and the will of the people (Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 970 and amendments).
4. State of European security (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 971).
5. Control of armaments and disarmament (Presentation of and debate on the report of

the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 972).

Are there any objections ?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone else wish to speak ?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.)

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 19th June 1984

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
Replies by Baroness Young to questions put by: Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Blaauw, Dr. Miller, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Morris.
5. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
6. Deterrence and the will of the people (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 970 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Spies von Bülesheim, Mr. Mezzapesa, Dr. Miller, Mr. Milani, Mr. Freeson, Mr. Rodotà, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Martino, Mr. Lagorce (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Michel

(*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Freeson, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Michel, Mr. Freeson (point of order), Mr. Michel; (points of order): Mr. Hardy, Dr. Miller, Mr. Milani, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Rodotà, Mr. Cifarelli, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Dejardin, the President, Mr. Cox, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Cox, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, the President, Mr. Freeson, Mr. van den Bergh, Dr. Miller, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Michel, the President, Mr. Michel; (points of order): Mr. Bianco, Mr. Milani, Mr. Rauti, the President, Mr. Spies von Bülesheim, the President; Mr. Hardy (explanation of vote), the President, Mr. Michel; (points of order): Mr. Vogt, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Freeson, Mr. Bianco, the President; Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Blaauw (point of order), Mr. Hardy, the President; (points of order): Mr. Bianco, Mr. Cox, the President, Mr. Beix, the President, Dr. Miller, the President, Mr. Müller; Mr. Michel, Mr. Hardy (explanation of vote).

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

Speakers (points of order): Mr. Cox, the President, Mr. Vogt, the President, Mr. Freeson, the President, Mr. Bianco, the President.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

1. See page 24.

3. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish first of all to welcome Baroness Young who has just joined us and to whom I extend my thanks for her courtesy.

Ladies and Gentlemen, you have expressed your confidence in me and I am most appreciative. I shall endeavour to see that it is not misplaced.

As a fighter for Europe I am deeply conscious of the honour which you do me. It is an honour which carries with it heavy responsibilities, but responsibilities which offer a thrilling challenge against the background of the objectives which WEU is called upon to achieve by mastering the historical context within which it has to operate. The impetus we must impart to our actions rests on a basis of solid realities.

Let us pause for a moment to take stock of those realities. Let us recognise the constant demand for security, which over the last thirty years of our nations' history has become ever more pressing and closely linked to the protec-

The President (continued)

tion of those liberties which were regained at such high cost after the second world war.

Let us recognise the great effort which has been devoted to achieving an ever closer union between the peoples of Europe and the outstanding part played in this by statesmen, parliamentarians, diplomats and public servants who, by their splendid example, the exercise of their high office or the unassuming devotion with which they have performed their duties have all made an incalculable contribution to the cause of European unification.

Let us also acknowledge the very long way we still have to go to reach the point where the people of our countries – that public which we represent – are motivated and activated. The recent European parliamentary elections have taught us a hard, a very hard lesson. We now have to revise our ideas, reassess our policies and look again at our total commitment to the public response. Information and participation must be our guiding principles. The cause of European democracy demands nothing less.

The great visionaries and men of action who built modern Europe and whose names are indelibly inscribed in the fabric of the structure – Winston Churchill, Aneurin Bevan, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, de Gasperi, Paul van Zeeland, Joseph Bech, Joseph Luns, Paul-Henri Spaak and General de Gaulle have handed down to us a remarkable heritage, and our ambition is to emulate their example.

This pause for recollection and gratitude with which I have chosen to preface our renewed surge forward also gives me an opportunity to pay tribute to my predecessors in this office. I will do my best to be a worthy successor. My very special thanks go to Alfredo De Poi, of whom we had such high expectations and who combined all the qualities needed for their realisation.

My thanks also go to Bob Edwards, our much respected doyen, who unstintingly gives us the benefit of his youthful approach and is ever faithful to his commitments as a fighter for democracy.

I thank also my compatriot, Lucien Pignion, the Chairman of the French Delegation, who, to the great satisfaction of the Assembly, has acted as President during the interim period with unbounded devotion and universally acknowledged ability, to which I pay tribute.

Minister, fellow members, Ladies and Gentlemen, here as the representatives of our governments and of the institutions, organs and services of WEU, it is fitting today that I should express my pleasure in working with you and my

determination that Western European Union shall flourish. Have no doubt, you can count on me. But let me add that I shall only be able to work with you as one of a team, and that I shall need your help and valuable expertise. I therefore ask you here and now to excuse the demands which I shall make on you in the interests of this Assembly, which I undertake to serve to the best of my ability.

European defence, that is our responsibility and our aim, and our duty is to identify our goals and organise means of achieving them by a constant process of adaptation to current realities. Our doctrine encompasses respect for the values of western civilisation and the rights of man, active and unequivocal solidarity with our American partners in the Atlantic Alliance, and the dogged safeguarding of peace by a co-ordinated defence effort, by resistance to the arms race and by our absolute determination that the voice of Europe shall be heard in the mighty and dramatic dialogue between the continents.

The achievement of all the conditions necessary for us to become the European pillar of the Atlantic partnership, as John Kennedy urged upon us many years ago, is crucial to the balanced solidarity of the free world. It is also vital to our ability to resist the expansionist totalitarianism of the Soviets.

As an Alsatian, I know full well that the tanks of the Warsaw Pact are less than 250 kilometres from Strasbourg, and as democrats we are very conscious that our European brothers in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania, Romania and Bulgaria are still imprisoned in a brutal and inhuman system.

To release from bondage the forces of freedom, irrespective of time and place, is the prestigious aim of our civilisation, and to this aim Europe is contributing, and must increasingly contribute, by example and effective action. In this stirring venture WEU has a leading rôle to play.

The forthcoming period will, indeed, be crucial to the importance of WEU's rôle. The Council has undertaken a review of the various activities of our organisation to ensure that it still fulfils a real and practical purpose after thirty years in which some areas of activity have lost much of the importance attributed to them by the signatories to the Paris Agreements modifying the Brussels Treaty. Our Assembly's wish that the review should be successful is demonstrated in two of the reports which we shall be considering during the present session. Both show that the Assembly is fully aware of the issues involved and considers that any revitalisation of WEU requires the abolition of those features of the 1954 agreements which discriminate against one of the member countries.

The President (continued)

Once this step has been taken, there are many areas where governments can quickly address themselves to practical matters, while ensuring at the same time that the actions of WEU are smoothly co-ordinated with those of the Atlantic Alliance. We must welcome the fact that our American allies have acknowledged that a strengthening of the European element within the Atlantic Alliance could improve rather than impair the credibility of NATO. It is now up to WEU to demonstrate that this is indeed the aim underlying its reorganisation. Equally, we should not forget that it is the effort made by our countries to develop their conventional arsenals which will provide the criterion by which American opinion will judge the soundness of any decision to reactivate WEU.

I would now like to make a number of comments suggested by the agenda for this session.

My first comment relates to WEU and its thirty-year history. It is sometimes fashionable to stress that some observers consider that there has been too little activity at ministerial level. This reaction is perhaps justified by the silence maintained by the ministerial bodies of the organisation, and this applies equally to the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee. But this silence has not been a cloak for inactivity. Nor can a charge of inaction be levelled against our Assembly, which, over these thirty years, has constantly discharged the full rôle assigned to it by the modified Brussels Treaty and has drawn the attention of the Council and its subsidiary organs to anything which could be interpreted as failure to carry out their duties.

We are always mindful that the 1954 agreements modifying the Brussels Treaty represented at the time a profoundly innovative, not to say revolutionary, measure. In the first place they brought together, for the first time in history, all our countries, which had until then been divided by more than a century of quarrels, and welded them into a single committed alliance. While, today, that alliance appears to be so much a part of the real world in which we live that it seems to have acquired the status of a natural phenomenon, this was much less the case just nine years after the end of the war. Nonetheless, all our countries were willing at that time to put their signature to a treaty which committed them to virtually automatic mutual support in the event of an attack on one of their number. History has very few examples to show of such comprehensive commitments entered into by so many countries, and could probably produce no parallel of an alliance which, over thirty years, has never been queried.

But the novelty of the treaty signed in 1954 does not end there. It extends to the simultaneous existence of a permanent council responsible for the implementation of the treaty and a parliamentary assembly exercising, on behalf of the general public, a watching brief over the Council's activity.

At the very time of our meeting here, the President of France is flying to Moscow. Nobody can be in any doubt about the firm line he will take in discussing with the Soviet leaders the whole range of questions raised by Soviet imperialism, the failure to honour the Helsinki agreements, especially as regards human rights, and the vast deployment of missiles targeted on Western Europe. It is equally sure that he will explore together with his Soviet counterparts what possibilities still remain, in spite of everything, for achieving progress towards détente and disarmament.

In other times such a visit, undertaken at a moment of specially acute tension, would have provoked distrust or even hostility from France's European partners. That does not appear to have happened on this occasion, because of the measure of accord which, year by year, has been growing between the countries of Western Europe. While it is no doubt true that WEU has performed only a very minor rôle in this process, it has nevertheless played a very discreet part which must not be underestimated.

The continuous exercise, over thirty years, of complete openness as regards the level of forces and armaments of the member countries under the watchful eye of the Agency for the Control of Armaments has made a major contribution to making member countries totally confident of each other's intentions. This is a point which our Council should not overlook when it comes to consider changing the Agency's tasks.

But this openness, which is one of the main contributions of the modified Brussels Treaty, to the conduct of international relations has also provided a basis for détente. This is illustrated by the protests which the Soviet Union never fails to utter as soon as changes are made to the application of controls which, after all, are none of its business. The openness with which our efforts in the armaments field are conducted guarantees, in Soviet eyes also, that these activities are motivated exclusively by our concern for security. It also demonstrates that our countries are determined to do whatever is necessary to achieve this security. True détente will never be attained until each party is convinced that the other is not harbouring any aggressive intentions but is determined only to ensure its own security. WEU demonstrates to the world that this is, indeed, Western Europe's position, and it entitles Europe to demand that the Soviet Union should also provide proof of its peaceful intentions.

The President (continued)

Even though there may be cause to regret that joint armaments production by the Seven has remained unduly limited, though some aspects of field controls have not always proved satisfactory, and though the Council has often had recourse to other institutions for implementation of the military and political sections of the treaty, it cannot be denied that WEU has done a great deal in bringing the countries of Western Europe together and in rekindling and maintaining a mutual trust which has enabled the alliance to survive and finally overcome many crises, some of which have been very serious. Europe would never have become what it is today if the modified Brussels Treaty had not formed an integral part of its foundations. While it may not be entirely satisfactory to everybody, it cannot be claimed that the treaty has failed or even that it has merely played a secondary rôle in the building of Europe.

It seems clear that, if WEU is to be revitalised, it will be necessary to rethink the whole range of its activities and to undertake a critical self-appraisal. As a result, it will have to abandon some obsolete parts of its work and develop others in new areas. I believe there is now a general wish to rescind some provisions of the treaty, which, while justified in 1954, could now after thirty years appear discriminatory against one of the signatories. These provisions must be rescinded so that member countries are afforded equal treatment, without which the mutual confidence these discriminatory provisions were intended to create could not be maintained in the future. Everybody seems to agree that joint arms production should be developed, although how this should be achieved is not yet clear.

The definition of the rôle which the Council should assume, and the changes necessary to enable it to perform these duties, are questions which really do seem beset by greater difficulties. This is due not only to the growth over the last thirty years of NATO's activities in the strictly military sphere and in developing a defence strategy and policy common to the European and American members of the Atlantic Alliance but also to the scale which political consultations between the Ten have now assumed. Our governments have acted wisely in declining to undertake, within the more restricted forum of WEU, activities which they could conduct to better effect within a broader framework. It is, however, becoming increasingly clear that there is still room for consultations between European allies on many issues affecting joint security and disarmament which cannot at present take place among the Ten, some of whose members are not willing to participate in European co-operation in the field of

defence. The Americans are now suggesting in the clearest way possible that their European partners should, finally, establish that second pillar of the Atlantic Alliance first envisaged by President Kennedy. WEU remains the only framework currently available for that purpose.

What we have been able to learn about the ministerial meeting of 12th June suggests that our governments are still a long way from having made their intentions clear, although all of them, albeit to differing degrees, are resolved to review the activities of WEU in a way which does not amount simply to abolishing some of them but is compatible with an overall view of the new needs imposed by European security. I welcome their willingness to involve their defence ministers and the Assembly in this review. There is no doubt that this is an essential preliminary to any serious examination of joint requirements and the constraints which apply to us all.

The rôle of WEU is not restricted by directing its work first of all towards areas where co-operation between the European members of the Atlantic Alliance can be further developed without giving rise to misunderstandings between the European and American partners, and that includes especially all matters relating to joint armaments production.

Let there be no mistake, this co-operation implies the maintenance and strengthening of the bonds which unite the western world. The United States was actually the first to perceive the need for a two-way trade in armaments, and it is the fragmentation of European tenders, which remain largely national in character, which is to blame for the slow growth of the east to west flow, while the flow in the opposite direction has continued to be heavy. The idea has been mooted that the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU should be instructed to study the problem posed by this imbalance in order to stimulate two-way trade. In the final analysis, it is not very important to us which European joint body is made responsible. But it is vital that the necessary impetus be given without delay, because, for everyone to be able to make the required effort in the field of conventional armaments, that effort must help to overcome the economic and social problems today affecting all our countries.

The application of this principle, founded on common sense, is in my opinion an essential element not only in the much discussed reactivation of WEU but also in maintaining the cohesion of the western alliance as a whole.

We should bear in mind that Article IX of the treaty creating our Assembly lays down that its first duty shall be to examine an annual report by the Council "on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments". This

The President (continued)

implies, I believe, that the Council should report in a manner quite different from its practice hitherto on its intentions regarding the whole question of the maintenance or abolition of the present activities of the Agency and any change in its duties.

It is our wish that the organisation which unites us should remain at the centre of European joint defence activity. It is our wish that the Assembly should take part in defining WEU's new activities and that it should not in any case be faced by decisions already taken at government level. The Council should at an early date define the objectives which our governments agree should be assigned to WEU as well as the resources which it is prepared to make available so that, armed with this information, we can, as representatives of national parliaments, in turn express our views to useful effect. It is my intention during the period now starting to make every effort to bring about this dialogue between governments and the parliamentary assembly.

In the absence of such a dialogue, WEU would lose all significance, and the reforms now envisaged would merely have the effect of masking temporarily Europe's abandonment of the essential element in the joint security of the member countries, i.e. an alliance which commits its signatories to the giant undertaking of safeguarding their common security within the broader framework of the Atlantic Alliance and of enabling representatives of European opinion to participate in the work of creating that joint security.

John Kennedy, in a moment of brilliant insight which has become justly celebrated, said: "Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country."

Following his lead, we can also join in saying: "Ask not what Europe can do for us, but let us ask ourselves rather whether we have done what we should for Europe and our children."

Thank you. (*Applause*)

**4. Address by Baroness Young,
Minister of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs
of the United Kingdom**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is an address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, whom I thank in advance for answering the questions that will be put to her.

Lady Young, I have already had the pleasure of bidding you welcome and I now ask you to come to the rostrum.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – It is with great pleasure that I am making my first visit to your Assembly. I count it an honour to be addressing you today. The Assembly is the only parliamentary body empowered by treaty to debate questions affecting European defence and security. And this remains the single most significant feature of all the institutions that make up Western European Union. Your Assembly helps to encourage true and free exchange of ideas, one of the crucial differences between the western alliance and the Warsaw Pact. It would therefore give me great pleasure to see its proceedings attract more public interest than in the past. My government wishes to encourage an informed debate on our common security, and your Assembly has a vital part to play in this.

When my predecessor, Lord Belstead, spoke here to your twenty-eighth session in November 1982, he referred to the United States proposal in the INF talks for a zero option, and he welcomed United States proposals in the START talks for reductions in levels of strategic weapons. Since that time, our hopes have been dealt a blow by the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from those negotiating tables in Geneva. But we did not and do not lose hope entirely. We shall continue to urge the Soviet Union to return to those negotiations without preconditions and to seek other ways of engaging them in dialogue.

Over the years we have achieved agreement to ban certain weapons and means of warfare; to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and control the size of nuclear arsenals; to exclude Antarctica from military competition, and to ban some military activities in outer space. There is an urgent need to extend these achievements further.

There are a number of multilateral forums in which talks with the East continue. We talk in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva about the ever more pressing need to eliminate chemical weapons; we talk in Stockholm about measures to build confidence and security in Europe; we talk in Vienna about reducing conventional forces in Central Europe. The East-West climate is harsh, and results are inevitably slow in coming. But our will is undiminished to reduce the threat of conflict and to work for a balance of forces at the lowest possible level; to work for concrete, balanced and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament.

We have given much thought in recent months, with our allies and partners, to the

Baroness Young (continued)

handling of relations with the Soviet Union. The recent meeting of NATO foreign ministers at Washington and the London economic summit brought out the very wide measure of agreement which exists in the West. We are united in our readiness for dialogue. As Margaret Thatcher made clear during her visit to Moscow for Mr. Andropov's funeral, we believe that it is important to increase the range and frequency of contacts with the Soviet leadership. My colleague, Geoffrey Howe, will be doing so when he visits Moscow early in July.

We need such contacts in order to get across our own concerns, to convince the Soviet leadership of our good intentions, to find areas where there may be scope in the longer term for agreement and co-operation. We hope that the Soviet Union will react constructively to these new openings, since reduction of tension must be in the common interest of both East and West. But dialogue is not an end in itself. We have learned that we can negotiate with the Soviet Union only on the basis of firm defence and western solidarity. The Soviet Union allocates some 14% to 16% of its GNP to defence. Its military establishment far exceeds any legitimate defence requirements. Its words about declarations of non-use of force must be seen against the facts of proven willingness to use force in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan; numerical superiority over NATO in conventional forces and weaponry; rapidly growing naval forces; and ever-widening deployment of an array of nuclear weapons. Faced with this threat, the alliance must ensure that it maintains adequate forces, both conventional and nuclear, to deter aggression and, should deterrence fail, to provide effective defence.

In the framework of European and Atlantic organisations which assure our prosperity and security, and of which WEU is a part, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation will continue to be the cornerstone of our security. The history of the North Atlantic Alliance is a history of success. There are inevitably differences of perspective in an alliance of sixteen independent and democratic states. But diversity is a source of strength for the alliance and does not affect the underlying unity on our basic objectives.

The world has changed significantly since the alliance was founded. NATO has had to adapt to a changing political, military and technological environment, and has done so successfully. As we look back over the thirty-five years of the alliance's existence we can take pride in its record of maintaining peace and freedom – the ultimate measure of its success – and can face the future with confidence.

The fundamental cohesion and unity of purpose of the alliance has been demonstrated in recent months: the first INF deployments have been carried through, breaking the threat of a Soviet monopoly in this class of weapons, and there is active planning for new conventional force improvements. The North Atlantic Council had a most successful meeting in Washington at the end of May. The Washington statement repeated the essential point that the purpose of the alliance is exclusively defensive; none of its weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. We do not seek military superiority over the East. We know that we have superiority where it counts – in our way of life and our democratic values.

But within the alliance, the members of WEU have an essential rôle to play. It is a rôle that has attracted much interest in recent months as the WEU Council has focused on the question of reactivation of WEU, or, as I should prefer to call it, on making the best possible use of the potentialities of the organisation. This debate is just one aspect of a broader debate on European co-operation, on the need for greater unity, for Europe to find a more coherent voice in world affairs. Whatever the media may sometimes say, we in Britain are intensely involved in that debate, which is really about no less than how to build a Europe fit for our children and grandchildren.

The European Council will meet at Fontainebleau later this month. For the third Council in a row, heads of government will be looking for ways of completing the negotiations launched at the Stuttgart Council a year ago. Under the stimulus of the French presidency, a great deal has been achieved. At the last European Council in Brussels, heads of government came very close to complete success. They reached agreement on a range of issues – trade policy, the regional funds, fishing quotas, budgetary discipline and the need for a lasting system to correct the budgetary imbalances which have bedevilled the life of the Community over the past five years. All that is now needed is to agree on the figure on which that system will be based.

We are all now looking forward to the new areas in which the Community can and must develop in the coming years. President Mitterrand outlined his thoughts before the European Parliament on 24th May. Sir Geoffrey Howe made a further contribution in his speech to the Franco-British Chamber of Commerce here the next day. In the last few days, the British Government has circulated a paper to its partners setting out its ideas on the manner in which the Community should develop. It is our fervent hope that at Fontainebleau the remaining differences will be resolved and the Community's collective energies will be released to face up to the daunting tasks of the future.

Baroness Young (continued)

We shall be negotiating for success. We trust our partners will, too.

Equally, we are fully involved in the discussion of the future of WEU in this thirtieth anniversary year of the modified Brussels Treaty. We have approached the ideas that are now under consideration for making greater use of the organisation constructively, fully accepting the logic of developing the potentialities of WEU as far as we can, without, of course, encroaching on NATO. In this spirit, it was the United Kingdom which proposed that a working group should be set up to prepare a report for ministers to discuss on 12th June; and it is that report which was transmitted to your Assembly after last week's meeting and published.

The British attitude can be summed up in four propositions. First, our aim should be to strengthen the alliance and the European contribution to it. We must, therefore, avoid anything that would weaken transatlantic ties. Secondly, we should focus attention on the key bodies – the Council and the Assembly – which are at the heart of WEU. Thus, we can see merit in deeper consultation on defence and security issues in the Council, and we recognise the important rôle the Assembly can play in arousing public support for our defence policies. Thirdly, we should keep alive the possibility of discussions on security questions among the ten members of the European Community in European political co-operation. Fourthly, we should meet the concerns of our allies who are not members of WEU to be kept informed.

Europe can do more for western security at both the consultative and practical levels. At the practical level of armaments co-operation, we attach priority to the rôle of the Eurogroup and IEPG. WEU can help its members to speak with a more cohesive voice. The organisation can help to inform the people of Europe and our allies outside Europe about what Europe is doing and why. We sometimes hear complaints from across the Atlantic about burden-sharing. We cannot ignore those calls. Of course, we must ensure that we make our proper contribution, but we need to keep a sense of perspective. The facts are that in 1969 the European share of NATO expenditure was 23%; in 1979 it was nearly 42%. The Europeans provide a large proportion of the alliance's ready forces in Europe – 90% of ground forces, 80% of combat aircraft and tanks and 70% of fighting ships. Those facts are not sufficiently known.

Our governments agreed on 12th June that we should look closely, before the meeting to be held in Rome in October, at how we in WEU organise ourselves. I have already referred to the importance we attach to the proceedings of

this Assembly. We should like its voice to be heard loudly and clearly by our peoples. We should like your dialogue with the Council to be closer and more productive. Some difficulties in these areas are inevitable as the Council has to take its decisions by consensus, but even within that constraint there may be room for improvement, and that is one area that the Council will examine.

Another area that has aroused comment is co-operation in armaments procurement. We are, of course, dedicated to a more productive co-operation among European countries in arms procurement and standardisation. We welcome the stimulus that your debates, and discussions in the Council of Ministers, could have in getting across the political need for greater efforts to collaborate.

The initiatives taken by Michael Heseltine during his chairmanship of the Eurogroup to foster equipment collaboration testify to our seriousness. We are involved in numerous collaborative projects: for instance, we are co-operating with the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy on the Tornado aircraft and on a new self-propelled gun, and with France and the Federal Republic of Germany on a new generation of anti-tank guided weapons, a project on which negotiations are in hand also to include several more European nations. We believe that the Independent European Programme Group, to which all WEU members belong, is, under Dutch leadership, playing an increasingly effective and important rôle as the main operational forum for handling such co-operation.

Some aspects of the modified Brussels Treaty – geological strata, as Sir Geoffrey Howe has called them – are clearly out of date. Your Assembly has expressed views on this on a number of occasions. We are actively working on it in the Council. Progress may be slow, because the implications of changes have to be carefully considered, but I am convinced that we must now move to rid ourselves of anachronisms in the protocols to the treaty on which our organisation is based.

For the United Kingdom the modified Brussels Treaty remains important. It is important not only because it is the legal basis for Western European Union but because it contains a far-reaching commitment to mutual defence amongst our members. Moreover, the treaty provides the legal basis for the stationing of some substantial numbers of British ground and air forces on the mainland of Europe. They make an essential and effective contribution to the forward defence of the alliance in Germany, and to the security and cohesion of Western Europe.

But more than that, the presence of those troops symbolises the historic choices Britain

Baroness Young (continued)

has made and the principles on which our security policy is based. Europe in turn needs the closest possible defence links with North America. That alliance will work only if the countries of Europe work efficiently, responsibly and coherently within it. We in Britain are ready to play our part in this in the framework of Western European Union, just as we do in other forums. I have every confidence that, through our common efforts, we shall achieve our common goals: a strong and united West, ready for dialogue with the East, contributing to peace and security with freedom. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Lady Young, on behalf of the Assembly I thank you for your address and for the hopes at which you have hinted, particularly as regards the close co-operation between the Council and the Assembly.

As agreed, I shall now call representatives who wish to ask a question.

I must point out to the Assembly that the time the Minister can give us is limited, and I therefore ask you to be as brief as possible.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate you, Mr. President, on being elected to office. It is a pleasure to have our Minister, Lady Young, with us today. It was a pleasure to hear what she said. She said that she regarded the Assembly of WEU as the most important organ in our institution. Obviously, we all greatly appreciate such obedience to the parliamentary dimension of WEU. I suggest that the Council of Ministers is in fact the critical institution. For years, we in the Assembly have urged the fullest possible ministerial participation in the Council, because, without leadership at the highest political level, we shall never make this organisation as effective as its task deserves it to be.

The United Kingdom played an important rôle in the signature of the Treaty of Dunkirk, the original Brussels Treaty and in the Council of Europe through Sir Winston Churchill. I ask the United Kingdom in this revivification of Western European Union to be bold in making the best of this institution and making it work, because our American friends are seeking a relationship of increasing parity with their European allies.

They ask that we in Europe get our security act together since they have global preoccupations, preoccupations in their own hemisphere, in Central America, the Gulf and elsewhere, which means that increasingly we in Europe must concert our own defence more effectively;

and, far from derogating from the cohesion and strength of NATO, the revivification of the core, the heart of European defence through WEU would please our American friends.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I believe, Lady Young, that you are prepared to reply to each question individually...

I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I am happy to respond to Mr. Wilkinson. As I said, Britain has made a contribution to the strengthening of WEU. We set up a working group of officials to draw up a paper and, as representatives will know, that paper was circulated last week setting out some ideas on how WEU might be strengthened. We believe that that provides some ideas that might well be considered at the meeting of foreign ministers in Rome in October.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Minister, I should like to know how the United Kingdom Government reacts to the demand made by the Soviet negotiators in Geneva that British and French nuclear weapons be included in the count of western missiles targeted on the USSR.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Thank you for that question. The British Government have made quite clear on a number of occasions that the British and French nuclear deterrent is only a small portion of the total nuclear deterrent in Europe, and they do not believe that they should be included in the INF negotiations which, of course, we hope will be resumed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the British Government frequently makes general comments about disarmament. My specific question is whether, apart from the general comments which we have heard again from Lady Young, her government has any new ideas at all about how to achieve disarmament or bring about progress in this area.

My second question is: how does her government stand with regard to the wish of the German Government to see the arms restrictions imposed on the Federal Republic by the Paris Treaty of 1954 lifted? What would then become of the Agency for the Control of

Mr. Vogt (continued)

Armaments in Paris in her government's view? Is it conceivable that her government would support the development of the Agency into an agency for European disarmament? That would be a more practical contribution to disarmament than general statements.

One final question: if the arms restrictions on the Federal Republic are lifted, what might then be, in the view of her government, the extent of European co-operation on armaments policy? Would such co-operation for example include nuclear weapons in some form or other?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the Minister.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). - Thank you for that question. I take the last part first. You asked whether the United Kingdom was in favour of the abolition of restrictions on armaments which are part of the 1954 modified Brussels Treaty. I confirm what I said in my speech - that the British Government would welcome the abolition of those restrictions. You asked a second question about the future of the Agency. It is a matter that we are studying and of course it will follow from it.

On the more general question of the British attitude to disarmament, I confirm that the British Government are completely committed to the dual-track policy and are therefore completely committed to disarmament, which we should like to see. In Europe we have always said that it must be balanced and verifiable, but of course we have supported the United States zero option, or the modification of that at some level which could be, again, balanced and verifiable above that level if it is not possible to achieve the zero option.

We very much hope as a government that the Soviet Union will return to the negotiating table both in the INF and the START talks. On a specific point on disarmament, we are also interested in a ban on chemical weapons and we have ourselves made suggestions in that respect quite recently.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. Vogt wishes to ask a supplementary question.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - I asked Lady Young a specific question about future armaments co-operation. I asked how far this would extend and whether nuclear weapons would be included in some form or other, having regard to the Federal Republic of Germany. This question has not been answered.

I would also like to remind Lady Young that I inquired about new disarmament concepts. She replied by referring to the NATO armament policy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). - I must apologise if I did not answer all the parts of your question. I understand that there is a further question that you put originally. This is, I understand, one of the issues that is being studied.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). - I should like to put the following question to Lady Young about WEU. In the working paper distributed last Tuesday, 12th June, one of the sentences is on the procedure for answering the Assembly's recommendations. On the agenda for tomorrow there are three reports about the future of WEU and recommendations, which I am sure will be adopted by this Assembly, which go quite far. So I should like to question whether we should not work more on how the Council implements the recommendations of this Assembly, because we are proposing things, we are the representatives of parliaments of member countries and until now too often many recommendations which have been adopted by large majorities in this Assembly have not been implemented.

In particular I bring strongly to your attention these three recommendations and ask you to implement them and to reactivate a lot of the work of WEU, and not only of the Assembly.

We should like to work more efficiently, not only to save money, but to do more with the money that our countries allocate to WEU. Would it not be better to co-locate the organs of WEU? It is something of an anachronism that the Council has its seat in London and that the Assembly and the Agency for Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee are here in Paris. A lot of money is spent on travel. I would prefer to have as permanent representatives to WEU the nations' ambassadors in the co-located city where all the organs of WEU are to be found so that they would not have to travel to this Assembly for the sessions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the Minister.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). - I thank Mr. Blaauw for his question. We touched upon it in our conversations at lunchtime.

Baroness Young (continued)

There have been times when the Assembly's decisions have been slow to be implemented. This is one of the matters that the Council will be studying, and perhaps the Assembly itself will suggest how the difficulty might be overcome. One possibility, I understand, would be for the Council to accelerate its procedures for dealing with questions and submissions to it. That is just the kind of subject that I tried to emphasise in my speech.

One area where WEU could go forward would be in explaining its policies much more to the people in each of the European countries that are members of WEU.

The second point was about co-location, which we discussed. It might be better to determine what WEU will do politically before we look specifically at co-location, although I know that that is of interest to members of WEU.

Certainly we in Britain welcome the presence of the WEU Council in London, but we do not think that at present the initial cost of co-location, which would be considerable – and there is no certainty that there would be great savings from co-location – has been gone into sufficiently for us to be certain that we want co-location at present.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I welcome Lady Young's affirmation of the adherence to WEU and to the development of the organisation into what not only the British Government but the other countries of Europe would like to see.

On the earlier question about disarmament, will she ensure that her government pursue every avenue towards disarmament and are not deterred or put off by what appear to be rebuffs along the way? It has been affirmed on a number of occasions that WEU and the members of the western alliance are intent on seeking peace by all means, short, of course, of appeasement, but we are a long way from that.

My second question concerns non-nuclear defence and the agreement made some time ago with our American allies, with whom I have a great deal in common, but who, nevertheless, require to be held somewhat in check. I refer to their non-adherence to the two-way street agreement. Will Lady Young do what she can in her office to ensure that British firms – and this goes for European firms, too – push as hard as they can to obtain for themselves a share of the non-nuclear aspect of defence work to which they are entitled?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Dr. Miller asks a general question about disarmament, and I can confirm what I said before – that the British Government are completely committed to disarmament. We hope very much that the talks on INF and START could resume once the Russians come back to the negotiating table. We have made proposals at the CDE conference in Stockholm, and we have supported other proposals there, and in the mutual and balanced force reduction talks. We are taking part in that forum. Like, I am sure, all countries in WEU, we should like to see progress on disarmament.

On the second question, the forum for looking at collaboration among countries on the manufacture of defence equipment is the IEPG. That is one respect in which the Council is looking for improvement.

In preparation for coming to WEU today, I was given a piece of paper with a gratifyingly long list of examples of collaboration among different countries of WEU on various items of defence equipment. I am sure that that is something that we all welcome.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I should say first, without fear of contradiction from any members of the British Delegation, and as its leader, that we are absolutely delighted that a senior Foreign Office minister has come to see us. We hope that that sets a useful precedent. We are particularly gratified, if I may say so without indulging in flattery, that Baroness Young is one of those comparatively rare people who manage to combine wisdom with charm, and that is something to which the Assembly is always responsive.

I listened to her speech attentively and I do not think that the phrase "the European pillar" specifically appeared.

I happen to think that when we talk about the future of WEU there is a concept of a European pillar, and any structure can be damaged when one of the pillars is removed. I try to look at the revival of WEU as the European revival pillar of Atlantic defence. I hope that she will agree with me on that. I should also like to be reassured because suggestions have been made by some elements of the press and the media, with not always the best motives, that what has been proposed is a purely French initiative that does not have the support of the British and that will offend the Americans. I do not believe that any of those suggestions are correct. I should

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

be grateful if Lady Young would publicly confirm the impression that I have formed of the present position.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I should like to thank Sir Frederic Bennett for his kind remarks about me. I hope that I can confirm what he said. In the first instance, it is true that the transatlantic link, to which I believe everyone here attaches great importance – we certainly do – can only benefit from the strengthening of European co-operation. It is important that the two should grow together and that we should make it clear when the opportunity presents itself how much Europe contributes to the NATO Alliance.

I hope that in my speech and when answering questions I have said enough to show that we are seriously considering the French proposals for the strengthening of WEU. When he spoke and subsequently answered questions a week ago, Sir Geoffrey Howe made our position clear. As I said, we agree that a group of officials should work together on a paper setting out some constructive thoughts on this matter which can be considered by the Council of Ministers when it meets in October. I have every reason to believe that the Americans welcome the strengthening of European co-operation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – One of the reasons for the plan to reactivate WEU is the need to strengthen the European pillar of defence. In this context, is it either advantageous or useful to lay special stress on the proposal for a preferential Paris-Bonn axis or any other similar axis, or might this not give rise to suspicion or confusion?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Mr. Cavaliere talked about a Paris-Bonn axis. I hope that everything I have said today and that has been said by the British Government will assure him and our European friends that Great Britain is part of Europe, is playing its full rôle in WEU and is a full supporter of the European Community. I think that I have said enough this afternoon – I do not want to repeat myself – to make it plain that we have contributed constructively to the proposals about WEU, have played our part in and see the importance of strengthening European co-operation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – With your permission, Lady Young, Mr. Cavaliere would like to put a supplementary question to you.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – This is not a supplementary question; unfortunately I have not had a reply to my original question. We agree that Great Britain is in favour of the European pillar of defence and of the reactivation of WEU. But, in view of the emphasis on a preferential Paris-Bonn axis, that is a Franco-German axis, what I asked was whether this was useful or rather a source of suspicion and confusion. The question is different, therefore.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I am not sure that it is for me to speak for the Paris-Bonn axis, but I should have thought, as a general rule, that any strengthening of relations between two countries in Europe would strengthen them and Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). – May I ask my friend two questions. First, she mentioned four objectives in the paper that was circulated. Can she tell members of the Assembly whether those four objectives find broad favour or whether she expects any difficulty? Secondly, will Her Majesty's Government reconsider their initial response to proposals made by Mr. Blaauw and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs that all WEU activities be concentrated in Paris? It seems to me that this is a case where the British should be a little less parochial. In many ways, Paris is a much more convenient and certainly far more logical centre for WEU activities.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – The answer to the first question about the four propositions that I made in my speech – they are propositions that we support as a government – is that I hope that they will commend themselves to the Assembly.

On the second point, I have already answered the question about co-location. It is important to know the political objectives before we determine whether to co-locate.

We have talked a great deal at home, and I have no doubt that other WEU countries do, about the need for careful public expenditure. One needs to consider all these matters carefully because, although there may, at least in

Baroness Young (continued)

theory, be arguments for economies, one must show that there will be economies. There will, however, undoubtedly be costs in a removal.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Lady Young, on behalf of my colleagues, I wish to express the thanks of the Assembly. You have devoted some of your very valuable time to the dialogue we are anxious to maintain with the Council. I am grateful for your kindness and for the care with which you have replied to the questions put by delegates.

I would like to stress the importance to us of your presence in this chamber and express my thanks, through you, to Her Majesty's Government. Now that you have had a chance to gauge the feelings of the Assembly, we look to you to help us in furthering our work with the Council. Thank you again for your courtesy. *(Applause)*

5. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the election of a Vice-President. I recall that we elected the other Vice-Presidents during the previous sittings.

Mr. De Decker has been duly nominated.

If the Assembly is unanimous, I suggest that the election be by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

Mr. De Decker is therefore elected Vice-President.

I congratulate him on his election.

I remind the Assembly that under Rule 10 (7) of our Rules of Procedure the order of precedence of Vice-Presidents, being determined by age, is as follows: Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Berchem, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Blaauw and Mr. De Decker.

6. Deterrence and the will of the people

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 970 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, the next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report on deterrence and the will of the people and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 970 and amendments.

In the resumed debate I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I address myself directly to the Rapporteur, Mr. Lagorce, to whom I would like to say that I always find it particularly painful when he talks about the danger of pacifism or neutralism as if there were no more fundamental dangers or as if the cause of the existence of a considerable degree of pacifism in Europe, were not precisely the fact that people are extremely worried about the nature of the weapons and the danger they represent. In other words I, as a member of the peace movement, consider it an impertinence, in drawing up such a report, to be constantly referring to the alleged danger of pacifism.

Mr. Lagorce goes on to talk about deterrence, which, he says, must be the basis of European defence and indeed of defence in the alliance as a whole. Do you not realise, Mr. Lagorce, that one of the reasons why the pacifism which you so deplore has grown so strong is precisely because people in Europe and elsewhere no longer believe the claim that deterrence provides security? Are you unaware that it was certain governments – above all the government of the United States – that, by their words and actions, cast doubt on the continued existence of deterrence and, by introducing new weapons systems and prophesying completely new developments, destroyed the very foundations of the deterrence theory, to wit the credible threat of constant second-strike capability? This situation has come about because systems were introduced which can destroy the enemy not only on but literally in the ground and can therefore destroy the very systems on which second-strike capability is based. I do not want to go into the military technicalities and details, I would simply point out that what we see here is a weapons breakthrough comparable to the replacement of medieval weapons by firearms. The armour of second-strike capability has been pierced, as it were, so that the balance has lost its deterrence and the deterrence its balance. That has been the starting point for the present serious increase in public unease.

It therefore seems to me naïve to keep insisting on the idea of a return to balanced deterrence, like a medieval knight calling for a return to proper tournament rules and complaining about the highly unfair introduction of firearms.

It is also noteworthy that you expressly welcome and take a positive view of the very weapons that have tended to disrupt the arms balance, namely Pershing II and cruise. It is true that you have spoken of disarmament and refer to it in your report and the draft recommendation. You say that the accumulation of armaments must be prevented. But you do so in the same old language that no one in Europe or anywhere else can any longer trust.

Mr. Vogt (continued)

You indirectly bring in the notion of disarmament through rearmament by referring to the NATO policy of compensatory armament. You go on to introduce a monstrous combination of words deeply offensive to an opponent of armament and a member of the peace movement – the monstrous phrase peaceful deterrence. If you really want to follow peaceful, non-military paths, then please leave the concept of deterrence out of it. Try to see for once whether *la persuasion* might not be *plus convaincante que la dissuasion* – that is to say, persuasion might not achieve more than deterrence – and whether it might not be better to strive towards the concept of “making friends” rather than the concept of deterrence. I do not have enough time to develop this in detail.

However, as you keep on talking about deterrence, I would ask you and the whole Assembly to give some real thought to new political concepts which might open the door to disarmament. The old concepts, constantly churned out in this Assembly, of simultaneous, equal and balanced disarmament will not provide the opening. They have never worked, just as two stiffly polite Germans will never manage to walk through a door at the same time. I suggest you choose the concept developed by the peace movement, namely a policy of calculated advance concessions.

Mr. President, I am about to conclude. I would like to refute all those who constantly suspect and accuse – as does the report, and Mr. Müller too – the peace movement of being directed by Moscow. I think one should consider whether the Dutch example of seeking to gain at least a two-year moratorium should not be seen as a policy of calculated advance concessions, and whether one ought not similarly to demand that the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia also postpone their so-called counter-measures for two years. Thank you.

(Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we all want peace and I am sure that we all agree on this; but differences arise over the specific problems of peace and the precise way it should be maintained. One possible way might be total, controlled disarmament but it is pointless to deceive ourselves in that respect.

In this context, I should like to stress that the Soviet Union only proposed to reduce the number of strategic weapons – I am talking of

the past – because the United States had vast superiority in that area. However, when the Soviet Union achieved parity of strategic weapons it used every pretext to avoid any meetings to discuss disarmament or arms reductions. This applies both to conventional forces and weapons and to nuclear weapons.

If all this is true, Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe – as Mr. Lagorce argues most forcefully in his report – that the only way of guaranteeing peace is by deterrence which means the creation of conditions in which the potential adversaries are both deterred from using arms and, in particular, nuclear weapons.

Everyone knows that the Warsaw Pact has a vast superiority of armaments and it is therefore obvious that the balance must be restored as soon as possible in order in particular to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. If war broke out between East and West, if the Soviet Union invaded the West with conventional weapons, the West would have to use nuclear weapons to avoid being defeated. Clearly, therefore, it is absolutely essential to restore a measure of equilibrium in conventional armaments. It is nevertheless also necessary to restore the balance of nuclear and tactical weapons, because the Soviet Union must know that Europe is equipped with such weapons, so that any hope that the United States would stay out of a conflict is meaningless. Such absolute parity of weapons is essential therefore.

The Soviet Union has destroyed the balance and has used every excuse to prevent disarmament talks from achieving any substantial results. When the Soviet Union walked out of the Geneva talks because the deployment of NATO missiles had started, the excuse was transparent. This deployment was announced by the West at the end of 1979, when the balance had already turned in favour of the Soviet Union, which continued to install SS-20 missiles throughout the succeeding years. What is more, when the disarmament talks started, the USSR did not suspend the deployment of its own missiles but in fact targeted a further ninety SS-20s on the West.

At this point, the United States could have refused the talks or broken them off; it did not do so however because, encouraged by the Europeans, it is seeking to restore the balance. In conclusion, I hope that the pacifist movements do not prevail because peace must be ensured by governments by what they consider to be the most appropriate policies and means.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tummars.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, deterrence and the will of the people is not a title we often come across on

Mr. Tummers (continued)

documents appearing in this Assembly. I will begin by pointing out that paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation refers to deterrence and says that nuclear weapons are an essential part of that deterrence. An amendment has been tabled seeking the deletion of the latter phrase, not because nuclear weapons do not have a deterrent effect – it is only too true that they do – but because they are referred to as an essential part of deterrence. The production, holding in readiness and stockpiling of these weapons is slowly becoming a part of the threat into which the strategy of deterrence is escalating – a threat which exceeds any conceivable conflict situation.

This is, of course, the concern of the peoples of Europe, as paragraph (iii) says, but with the word “however” in paragraph (iv) the Rapporteur turns his back on the millions of people, the “will of the people”, who have expressed their concern in colossal demonstrations in recent years, and turns to the governments, who have taken no account at all of this protest in their peace and security strategy. The Rapporteur says that it is up to the governments – regardless of the demonstrations – to weigh up the will of the people, and if necessary, to defend it with military deterrence. If this is not a contradiction in terms, it is at least an attempt at some kind of manipulation.

These demonstrations by no means involve only various categories of pacifists and neutralists. And what if they did? It has gradually become the custom in these debates to refer to pacifists as if they were unpractical, agreeable people – rather unworldly, but certainly nice. No, it is the others, the ones who understand the need for armament so well, who are the real upholders of peace and security. A kind of distinction is made between the “nice guys” and the “tough guys”, with the latter trying to say that they are really the nicest after all.

I cannot find any real regard for the will of the people in Mr. Lagorce’s report.

The Geneva talks have failed, but the intentions of the NATO twofold decision have also failed. It is therefore wrong to say in paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation that negotiations with the USSR must be sought against the background of the NATO twofold decision. Paragraph 4 rightly says that the negotiations with the USSR must be resumed. But that cannot be done on the very same basis as the one on which the Geneva talks broke down. Can we not be any more imaginative about peace than paragraph (vii) of the preamble indicates? All it says is “Hoping that constructive proposals will soon be made” etc. etc.

We certainly must have constructive proposals for the limitation of the nuclear weapons of all kinds that are a threat to mankind. We must not accept the proposal made in Mr. Cavaliere’s Amendment 6, that the words “of all kinds” should be deleted. That would simply reopen the door to the nuclear armoury.

Paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation says that we must continue to keep European public opinion informed. I should like to know how the public is being informed about this kind of thing at the moment. How can we continue with a method of informing the public about which we know nothing? What, for example, does this institution, WEU, do to inform the public about the spirit of the treaties which gave birth to this union? Is the European public familiar with the principles underlying the two Brussels Treaties? If WEU is to be revived, which can only be achieved by a change in the relative position of dominance in the North Atlantic Treaty, one of its first tasks must be to inform the European public about peace and security as they are seen in the original treaties on which this union is based. These treaties in no way imply the concept of the arms race, which is certainly the case with the North Atlantic Treaty.

Part III follows up the title, which I described at the beginning of my statement as unusual. I feel that this section fails to take a broad view of what the protests in the streets, the movement against these threats hanging over us, mean in a wider cultural and historical context. I would have expected more of a man of inspiration like Mr. Lagorce than the narrow account he gives, related only to the present time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I first of all congratulate Mr. Lagorce most warmly on his report. I also think it was a good thing that a French colleague undertook this report, because we all know that the public debate about the defence concept of compensatory armament has been much more subdued in France than in the Federal Republic of Germany. We know that in Germany this debate was in the forefront of the electoral campaign a year ago and was repeated at the time of the confirmation of the NATO twofold decision.

The report clearly shows that the so-called peace movements have two completely different sources, one of which reflects a genuine concern and unease over the constant growth in armaments, while the second source is the support for these movements from those who are objectively exploiting them, namely the Soviet Union. Mr. Vogt dealt with this from his own point of

Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (continued)

view, calling it an unjustified accusation. I can only repeat here what has often been said in the German Bundestag. Nobody is accusing the greens, the peace movement – neither all their members nor you personally – of being directed by the Russians. There are enough citizens active in the peace movement who are completely innocent of that. But it is an objective fact – and it really should be stated here, as it is stated in the Federal Government's report on the defence of the constitution, which is totally objective – that money from the Soviet Union has been flowing into this movement and continues to do so. From the standpoint of the Soviet Union, why not? If these movements objectively serve the interests of the Soviet Union, by pursuing a political line which makes light of the danger from the East – if that is objectively the case – one cannot blame the Soviet Union for actually supporting them. This goes on irrespective of whether such aid is agreeable to individuals in the movement or not. In the background one must always bear in mind that this aid is being provided.

Since I have not much time I will confine myself to one further remark, on the relationship with the United States. Mr. Lagorce pointed out that the peace movement often claims that in the moment of truth the Americans will leave us in the lurch and that the United States has changed its strategy. Let none of us forget – as we in the Federal Republic of Germany know full well – that hundreds of thousands of United States citizens – soldiers and their families – are stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. As long as these troops remain in Germany and in Europe in general, the larger the units, the less will be the danger of the United States leaving Europe in the lurch in the event of an attack.

My second comment is this. At the end of your report you state that WEU should constitute one pillar – the European pillar – of NATO. I believe we all share this view, but we also believe, I think – and this needs to be pointed out again and again – that the European pillar of NATO can be a good one, a support for NATO, only so long as its development – and this applies also to the reactivation of WEU – takes place in full agreement with the United States. A reactivation of Western European Union should never – and, I believe, never will – take place against the United States, for, instead of promoting our security, that would place us in greater jeopardy. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Mezzapesa.

Mr. MEZZAPESA (*Italy*) (Translation). – I wish first to pay tribute to our Rapporteur,

Mr. Lagorce, for having presented the problem under discussion with a wealth of arguments and references, which are exactly summarised point by point in the draft recommendation.

In accepting this draft, I should like to refer to a number of passages in the report which refer to opinion polls on the subject conducted by specialist agencies, which clearly reveal that the people of Europe are deeply interested in armaments, missiles and peace. I should like to mention in particular the views expressed by church circles and communities – Catholic, Protestant and other which by their nature and vocation are intimately concerned with the peace message. And I would observe that in my country – and not there alone I think – these circles and communities have recently done much to focus public attention and interest on the European Community ideal, with special emphasis on peace.

The Rapporteur correctly says that while the churches are unanimous in defending the view that peace is an untold blessing they quite legitimately differ in their assessment when they consider the real historical positions of their own countries. This is inevitable. It is not easy to strike a balance between pacifism as an absolute value and the actual historical way of achieving such a balance and bringing it about because – and this I think must be understood above all – anyone who arms with the intention of imposing hegemony through superiority of armaments is certainly a warmonger; but this may also apply to anyone – even acting in good faith – who does nothing to dissuade other ill-intentioned people from engaging in an arms race.

Mr. Lagorce is therefore right when he says that a world order based on the balance of terror is unacceptable. But he goes on to say, better that than no order at all, which might give someone the idea that he can impose his order or his peace, which is the same thing. I am not one of those who on this subject hark back to the Latin saying *Si vis pacem para bellum*; to this crude realism, I prefer the more Christian attitude of "If you want peace, prepare for peace" because this means and stresses that to prepare for peace means working hard for general disarmament and to restore confidence in efforts which are now being made in that direction, starting at the Stockholm conference last January; because peace is certainly not prepared by favouring, through pacifism whether passive or head-in-the-clouds, the rearming of others even if those others at the same time promote pacifist activities, but only outside their own countries. What I and others who think like myself cannot accept is an attitude of resignation and defeatism like the attitude of some pacifist movements which shouted and perhaps still sometimes shout "Better red than dead". It

Mr. Mezzapesa (continued)

would be the same thing if they said "Better yellow or white than dead" because we are convinced that it is possible to be alive and free, even red if you like, but alive and free; and this is what has to be worked for by this organisation and all organisations which are looking for European unity. And I am sure that little by little their efforts will win the solid backing of all the peoples of Europe and the world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). - I agree with much more of the report than I disagree with, but there are some aspects of the preamble and, therefore, the actual recommendation that do not accord with the general tenor of the report. For example, the report seems in some aspects to lead one along the line that at least queries the nuclear as against the anti-nuclear position. I think that Mr. Lagorce has a genuine dilemma about whether we should be involved in nuclear armaments. The report commits us to the nuclear line. There are amendments to it, one of which deals with this very subject of whether nuclear weapons are an essential part of deterrence.

I shall describe how I see the current atmosphere. I grew up in the 1930s in a world where there was a big debate about whether we should rearm. Some members here may remember when the consensus was among those who were pushing a peace line that it was better not to rearm than to rearm. We were proved wrong, but history sometimes provides only a lesson for us and we must learn it. I do not accept that because we did not rearm in those days we should adopt the same position now, or that because we were wrong then we should now adopt the opposite position.

I am not a pacifist, and, knowing what I know now, if I had been of an age in the 1930s I would not have gone along with the pacifist line. I would have said, "Yes, we must protect ourselves", and I say that now. However, whether we protect ourselves in a way in which it seems we are leading the world into what could be catastrophe, a holocaust, is something that gives us food for thought.

To pay him due respect in this matter, that is what the Rapporteur has done. There is an extremely fine balance in whether we should tread the nuclear line. I believe that we should not, and I speak more as a medical man now than as a politician. If we make a mistake, having trodden the nuclear line, we shall be in trouble - in dire straits. We should be recasting our views on this. I peddle the line all the time that we should be taking no lesser risks for peace than we are prepared to take for war.

I am not happy about the general atmosphere that has developed in the western world during the past twenty years. It seems to have been inculcated into the minds of our populations that the Soviet Union is waiting to attack us if we let down our guard. I do not agree with that. I do not believe that the Soviet Union is doing that. We are doing less than justice to the benefits that western civilisation can give to the world if we remain so afraid of the ideas of the Soviet Union. I do not deny that the Soviet Union is trying to spread its ideas all over the world. If we believe that our political views offer less advantages to humanity, we are not doing justice to our strong position.

A few nights ago I read an interesting article written by an American about twenty years ago. He was an amazing man. He asked why, if we were so afraid of the Russians in the developing world and in all the primitive countries that have such a long way to go, no one wants to emulate the Russians, why everyone wants to become an American and to share the benefits of the affluent society which America appears to be able to deliver. He learns from that the lesson that we should not be afraid to meet the challenge of communism, or what the Russians call communism. We should meet the challenge and not go along the way that could lead us to disaster.

I feel that we are losing our grip. The minds of our people have been inculcated with the idea, by all forms of propaganda, information and written information, that there is a need to defend ourselves by whatever means, including nuclear, that we have at our disposal. I do not agree with that. I believe that we should be prepared to defend ourselves, but if we have to resort to what is called the nuclear deterrent, we are treading an extremely dangerous path, because it is not a deterrent. It has never been proved to be a deterrent and by the time we can prove or disprove it, it will be too late. The draft recommendation states:

"(vii) Hoping that constructive proposals will soon be made to allow negotiations to be opened on the limitation of nuclear weapons of all kinds;"

In my opinion that is far too weak. We should not "hope" that constructive proposals will be made; we must insist that constructive proposals to limit nuclear weapons be initiated as soon as possible. The report pays more than lip service to the rise of pacifism. Mr. Lagorce clearly shows that we must take the pacifist movement seriously throughout the world. In paragraph 79 Mr. Lagorce considers that "many of the pacifists' arguments warrant detailed study". I think that he is quite right about that.

I do not believe that the will of the people of the West to protect what we believe is our demo-

Dr. Miller (continued)

cracy is in any way diminished. I do not believe that it is necessary to descend to what I consider to be an abasement and debasement of what we stand for by propaganda which inculcates into people's minds the idea that if we do not shout out that we will defend ourselves by all possible means, the time will come when we shall not be prepared to defend ourselves at all. I do not agree with that. I do not believe that our will and determination to defend ourselves will be reinforced by propaganda.

In conformity with what I feel about a number of reports on defence that we produce, I think that we should try to get away from the atmosphere of considering that the ogre, the *éminence grise*, the bogey man – the Soviet Union – is waiting for us in the wings if we let down our guard. We should be treading the path of peaceful coexistence, not just with the Soviet Union but with other countries with whom we might have ideological conflicts now and in the future.

(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, we must find a solution to ensure the proper conduct of our work.

By inclination, I would like to allow speakers the longest time possible, and I am opposed to any undue limitation incompatible with the consideration due to a member of this Assembly. At the same time, we must all make an effort while we see whether we are able to complete our business in the time available.

Subject to the possibility of some later relaxation, I would therefore ask you to be as brief as possible.

I call Mr. Milani.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Lagorce's report calls on us to think about the relationship between defence policies and the will of the people, and more specifically between the concepts of "dissuasion" and "deterrence" and the principles of popular sovereignty, democracy and consensus.

I fully share the concern expressed in the report concerning recent developments in the doctrine for the use of United States forces; it is clear that while the doctrine of air-land battle 2000 has not been adopted by NATO as such or by the general staffs of the allied forces, it is gaining ground as a working hypothesis by the whole Atlantic Alliance and by the armed forces of the member countries. I am greatly concerned at this fact for four main reasons.

First, because such a doctrine of use comes dangerously close to the logic of first-strike

defence that is of aggression justified by the pretended need to forestall an enemy attack.

Secondly, the false idea of raising the nuclear threshold by concentrating on more modern and more sophisticated weapons may give fresh currency to the idea that a war can be fought and won in Europe; briefly the material risk that the deterrent stance will be abandoned and a move made towards the idea of a possible war.

A third reason for concern stems from the conviction that it is wholly illusory and false to think that the spectre of a nuclear war can be banished in this way and that the dependence of our defence doctrine on mass destruction weapons can be reduced: the air-land battle thesis does not in fact exclude the use of nuclear and chemical weapons and in any case encourages a nuclear riposte.

My last reason for thinking that the imposition of the air-land battle doctrine on the Atlantic Alliance should be opposed in all ways derives precisely from the principle of the people's will referred to by Mr. Lagorce.

I therefore share the concerns expressed in the report but I believe that more thought is required, starting with the views expressed by the Rapporteur concerning the pacifist movements which have grown up in Europe in recent years and which in my opinion are not really an expression of lack of interest in security or of lowered awareness of the democratic values to be defended at all costs. A defence doctrine based on the American nuclear deterrent, thus leaving the supreme decisions for the future of the peoples of Europe to distant, foreign authorities cannot fail to lessen the will to defend ourselves. In short, when people realise that their own sovereignty is irrevocably destroyed by strategies and weapons systems which deny them their right of self-determination, it is easy to understand that they are highly impatient of any call saying that they must participate in the military commitments of the Atlantic Alliance or must even accept new economic and social sacrifices so that defence expenditure can be increased still further.

In my opinion the Rapporteur's line of reasoning should therefore be completely reversed. While it is an incontrovertible fact that deterrent capacity is based first and foremost on the determination of the peoples of Europe to prevent any wrongful outside interference in their political, economic and social life, the strategic doctrines hitherto tried must be completely overhauled and the actual idea of defence must be revolutionised. The first steps must have the dual purpose of reducing Europe's military and strategic dependence on the United States and of setting aside every doctrine which tends to deny popular sovereignty and the rules of democracy. If the unwillingness of Europe's

Mr. Milani (continued)

peoples to be conquered is to be rediscovered it is not enough to restore European defence to a central position; that defence must also be more structured, organised and directed by the democratic institutions of the individual countries and of the European Community. In short, the people must be made aware of their own central responsibility and this can only be achieved by abandoning strategic models based on self-destruction, on a possible war or in any case on the expropriation of sovereignty either by a superpower, by European supergeneral staffs or even national general staffs not subject to control. This might lead on to proper consideration of models for European defence of arms policy, of relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance and other European communities and of institutions better suited to an effective European system of defence.

I give warning here and now that I shall vote against the draft recommendation which contains a number of vague general platitudes and does not grasp the new realities, including the negative element in the results of the elections for the European Parliament.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). - Mr. Lagorce has produced a report of a high standard and it is a mine of useful information and intellectual content. However, while I recognise the difficulty of drafting conclusions and recommendations on the basis of such a detailed report, I must say that some of that drafting is below the standard of the rest of the report.

I do not think that we need bother ourselves too much with the rôle of WEU in persuading public opinion on these matters. I read the passages about public opinion with much satisfaction. It does not worry me in the least that a variety of opinions, interests, misgivings and anxieties are expressed in a variety of ways.

However, bombast and collective smears in earlier speeches against the so-called pacifist movements that are alleged to be instruments of Soviet imperialist policy do not do justice to the quality of the report. I was a founder member of the CND in my country and I have never considered myself to be an instrument of Soviet policy. Nor do I consider myself to be an instrument of the policy of any government with which I disagree, and that applies to British Governments, whether conservative or labour - I have served in a labour government.

I shall concentrate on the so-called nuclear deterrence and to help me discipline myself I can do no better than refer to one of the most recent letters that I wrote to the appropriate

minister in the United Kingdom as part of an exchange of letters that has been going on for some time and that will continue.

The purported strategy of NATO is one of deterrence. We shall come back to this matter on at least one of the amendments. That strategy has supposedly been continuous since the formation of NATO. It is commonly understood to mean that a potential aggressor will be deterred by the fear that an enemy can inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor if he does attack, that it is that which prevents attack. In terms of nuclear warfare, it is the strategy of mutually assured destruction.

That cannot be a deterrent against all aggressive acts or wars initiated by nuclear powers or others. Millions of people have suffered wounding or death during the past forty years in a series of wars around the world, many of which have had superpower involvement on both sides. It is estimated that ten million people have been killed in wars since 1945. So nuclear weapons are seen - presumably by ourselves, Russia and China - as deterrents against the use of nuclear weapons by the "other side". They are not a deterrent against aggression, because if they were, we should not have had the wars that have involved superpowers over the past forty years.

My fear is that the purported strategy is not in fact the strategy of NATO and it is not the strategy of WEU. It ceased to be clearly so from the introduction of so-called tactical nuclear weapons, each warhead of which has the destructive power experienced in Hiroshima and Nagasaki forty years ago. The technological advances in weapons and their control systems make pre-emptive first strikes much more likely. We have an overkill capacity that is out of proportion to the need to deter the other side's use of nuclear weapons, let alone the need to deter aggressive acts that lead to war - nuclear or so-called conventional.

The West at present possesses technical superiority - for example, the increasing accuracy and, therefore, the counter-potential of the new generation of United States weapons, such as MX, Trident, Pershing II and cruise missiles. The USSR is certain to respond - we may be sure of that - by building similar systems, and in that way the dangers of nuclear war breaking out during future international crises will grow substantially during the next ten years. That is not ten years away, but is ten years starting from now.

Instability can only increase on both sides as both sides use growing nuclear and conventional military power to increase the capacity to break each other's spheres of power and even socio-economic systems and become more frightened

Mr. Freeson (continued)

that, if their side does not strike first, the other side might.

We – not just the Russians – are heavily engaged in this dangerous new strategic nuclear arms race. We must participate in putting a stop to this spiralling arms race if we are serious about wanting disarmament and wanting to turn resources towards resolving the obscene situation which, reinforced by the massive waste of the arms race, creates fertile ground for the causes for breakdown, adventurism and war in which both sides in this conflict have been and still are involved.

Let us here and elsewhere cease to talk as though only one side were the main cause of conflict and instability. We are all involved, and we must take the initiative as well as call upon the Soviet Union to do so. One place in which that type of initiative could be taken is WEU – if it does not, it does not justify its continued existence in the next decades.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rodotà.

Mr. RODOTÀ (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we are debating a report on deterrence and the will of the people. It contains a great deal on the traditional doctrine of deterrence but pays very little attention to the many expressions of the will of the people, which are in reality the principal new feature of recent years. These expressions and phenomena are meticulously listed in Mr. Lagorce's report but are in each and every case underrated because, if I may express myself in a very few words, the view adopted is that these movements are unrepresentative, have no clear content and have no clear objectives, while expressions of the people's will are considered to be clear and pellucid when they accept the old logic of deterrence and the arms race.

I do not think anyone could recognise himself in this new caricature of the pacifist movement. We have heard it repeated here – fortunately by a few speakers only – that the pacifist movements are sponsored by the Soviet Union; we have heard the old phrase "Better red than dead". But this is a very long way from the new reality within which the will of the people is finding expression. There is a dynamism in all that is happening, which is not grasped. The pacifist movements have provided more information on the real arms problems and on questions relating to peace, war and the attendant risks than have any of the post-war governments up till now. There are more proposals on the table now than before the new pacifism entered the field. There is no passivity; on the contrary passive acceptance and resignation are found among those who

continue to repeat the old formula of raising the level of armaments, a form of logic which has not taken us anywhere or rather has led us to the threshold of risk, which is now causing concern to very many people and has been the subject of very significant comments in this Assembly.

I would like to make another point. We are much concerned over Soviet totalitarianism; it is quite right for us to be so but these new pacifist movements offer the only real challenge made to this totalitarian world in recent years. Mr. Lagorce's report refers to the brutal repression of pacifist movements in Eastern Europe but says that this healthy contagion is spreading. Let us beware of underrating the worth of pacifism because in so doing we risk depriving it of the legitimacy it can be accorded as a challenge by freedom to that other world.

It would be as if we were casting doubt on the value of the free press in our world, while quite rightly stressing that there is no free press in the other part of the world. Let us be careful not to abuse certain rhetorical arguments. If there were time, moreover, I would call attention to the need for a closer analysis of a number of references to the way in which the will of the people is expressed. The churches' recent documents are much fuller and explicit, as are the Pope's most recent declarations. I am well aware that opinion polls are not comparable; but they are not confined to Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany; in Italy reputable public opinion research institutes have produced scientifically reliable results, even starting from different premises and have almost always found a clear majority against, for example, the deployment of the latest generation of nuclear missiles in Europe.

This was a point which called for a very full discussion of the kind we are holding today before taking an extremely important vote tomorrow. I do not wish to anticipate interpretations which would surely be hasty, but a number of cases – the Netherlands result and the Italian result – are significant. Today, many people are surprised by the strange anomaly of a Communist Party receiving popular support in Italy but falling back sharply everywhere else. The explanation should be looked for in its independent attitude; the PCI has, for example, declared itself categorically and repeatedly against the SS-20 and was the first party in Italy to speak out against the fresh deployment of Soviet missiles. Then there is the result for the Federal Republic of Germany where the press tells us that half the German electorate took part in the unofficial referendum – the pacifists put 18,000 boxes outside polling stations.

I say this because I think that the report completely fails to grasp these facts and rather reflects a logic which is even more that of the

Mr. Rodotà (continued)

general staffs than that of a political assembly. This new fact, this dynamic force, this need to make political proposals not simply giving democratic expression to what really exists, rather serves politically as a means of escaping from a situation into which military logic has thrust us and from which military logic offers us no way out.

This is the problem we are facing. I agree with much of what the previous speaker has just said and I think, for example, that although I am opposed to the document before us, I shall vote for the amendment signed by him and other members, suggesting that no reference be made to nuclear weapons which, I must say quite frankly, would be a gift to Soviet propaganda which could interpret this kind of text as a sign of the West's aggressive intentions. Again, how are conclusions of this kind to be reconciled with the conclusions of the report we shall shortly be discussing which declares that an atmosphere of confidence must be restored between the two blocs?

Mr. President, I think you were quite right when you said that account must be taken of the people's wishes. This is the direction in which we must advance, taking risks for peace which are not really risks but in fact the only way of avoiding the bigger risks to which the sole logic of deterrence has so far exposed us.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I speak as a German social democrat who is also an officer on the reserve in his own country and has had a whole series of sharp disagreements with sections of the peace movement. All of this entitles me to say that the report before us deals with a fantasy world, rather than the world of real events. I assume Mr. Lagorce is talking about affairs in the Federal Republic of Germany, but I cannot tell exactly which country he is referring to. He cannot really be talking about the Federal Republic of Germany if one looks at the actual events. Nor do I know what peace movement he is talking about, for the peace movement that I have encountered is very different from what is presented here.

What is said in the report applies to a few extremist groups, but the reader gets the impression that the activities of such groups are identical with what is happening in our country or in others in which nuclear weapons are due to be deployed. Aunt Sally has been set up. For all these reasons I do not consider this to be a good report. It is the reverse of excellent. Putting it

bluntly - and I hope Mr. Lagorce will forgive me - the contents are, in part, a disaster.

Let me substantiate this statement. The real question is that of the actual significance of the anti-nuclear weapons protest movement, and not primarily the fact that people no longer accept the concept of balanced deterrence. It is not a question of advance concessions or naïveté vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The central issue is that of nuclear weapons, their relative value, the danger to or self-endangerment of countries in which such weapons are deployed. Let us not now retreat behind developments and debates that have been self-evident for decades.

Not everyone who expresses opposition to nuclear weapons is a pacifist. Are the hundred or more countries which signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and renounced possession of nuclear weapons therefore pacifists? Those countries know why they renounced nuclear weapons. They knew it then and they know it now. They are extremely concerned about the danger of an increase in the number of states with nuclear weapons, because those of the nuclear powers that have signed the treaty have not fulfilled their commitment to nuclear disarmament, under Article VI.

I also think it is quite wrong to speak of the movements in the Eastern European countries as essentially also constituting a pacifist threat. One almost has the impression that the report speaks of movements against nuclear weapons in exactly the same terms as the eastern bloc rulers use with respect to anti-nuclear protest groups in their own countries. To put all these movements on the same footing, as the report does, completely misses the point.

The issue of the NATO twofold decision has been reduced to the military aspect of that decision, that is the deployment of Eurostrategic nuclear missiles in densely populated countries of Western Europe - as if this were the only way to achieve a balance in negotiations or to reach equilibrium. All of us, as experts in the field, know that it is undoubtedly not the only way and it was the very fact that this way was selected that unleashed the protest. It was in this respect a protest against the NATO twofold decision in the form adopted.

Let me ask Mr. Lagorce at this point which is actually more serious: the withdrawal of a NATO member country from the NATO integrated military command, as in the case of France, or a protest against a NATO decision? Nobody has yet gone as far as France did. Nevertheless, we did not presume to declare that France's motives were pacifist, neutralist or dangerous in some way. In this context, what is now happening in other Western European countries where nuclear weapons are deployed is a problem of much less import than the French

Mr. Scheer (continued)

decision of the sixties. There is therefore all the more reason for a differentiated approach.

We all know that strategic nuclear weapons involve an element of self-endangerment. Nuclear weapons are always prime targets for any adversary. In a country like the Federal Republic of Germany such self-endangerment is a particular object of protest. After all, at the present time the Federal Republic of Germany contains, in a confined space, the largest concentration of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. In Utah and Nevada, two American states with a combined area three times that of the Federal Republic of Germany but a population of only three million, nobody called the local protest against the deployment of MX missiles an expression of pacifism or neutralism. Nobody claims that the installation of the new French nuclear weapons on submarines is an expression of pacifism or neutralism. It is rather an expression of French concern that deployment of nuclear weapons on the mainland would pose too great a danger to the French people. The British nuclear weapons are installed on submarines. Two-thirds of the American nuclear capacity is installed on submarines to minimise self-endangerment. This question of where and in what form strategic priorities should be set played a very large part in the whole debate.

When medium-range missiles were due to be deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany at the end of the fifties, Adenauer once said that the Federal Republic was too small for such weapons. Precisely this viewpoint, put forward by a statesman totally above suspicion in the matter, has characterised the greater part of the extraparliamentary movement against nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic – particularly in a situation, Mr. Lagorce, in which the objections to the new American air-land battle doctrine which you mention – I refer to paragraph 8 in your report – naturally also played a key rôle, because we assumed that the political and military assumptions of the NATO twofold decision had changed owing to unilateral American conceptual changes in the army regulations.

All of this reflects the actual situation in our country. Opinion polls in the Federal Republic have shown around 70% of the public to be against nuclear weapons over which we ourselves have no control, but around 80% in favour of NATO. This shows that we ought not to be talking here about an anti-NATO potential. Rather, we should draw the right conclusions from the concern expressed by large sections of the population over a further concentration of nuclear weapons. We should be glad that we have a democratic population that gives expression to its will.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in the first German Republic there was an excellent journalist by the name of Leopold Schwarzschild who published in Berlin a journal called *Das Tagebuch*. In 1933 Leopold Schwarzschild was forced to emigrate and started here in Paris a second journal called *Das neue Tagebuch*. In it he not only revealed, shortly after Hitler came to power, the methods and means by which Hitler intended to finance the second world war, but also paid a great deal of attention to the contemporary peace movement.

He carefully analysed which groups in the democratic countries were pressing for a halt to rearmament and noted their arguments. One of his analytical articles, written with cruel lucidity, was to the effect that very many people who as democrats were against Hitler – very many democrats who had no intention of backing national socialism in any form – were, through their policies and their equivalent of the peace movement, nevertheless furthering national socialism and unconsciously working towards another world war.

This should be borne in mind when we consider the present-day peace movement. I too am convinced that the great majority of members of the so-called peace movement have nothing to do with totalitarianism in the Soviet Union or the Soviet bloc. I can say this simply on the basis of the numerous discussions we have had with members of the peace movement. But I also believe that this is not the real issue at all. The real question is: what comes out of this peace movement, what may its results be – even if one enters the peace debate pure in heart? I am afraid that what Leopold Schwarzschild wrote about the peace movement of the thirties, before the second world war, could apply similarly to the new peace movement, if one were to follow his line of argument.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it has already been stated several times here this evening that the peace movement has nothing at all to do with communism. I am sure – as I have just said – that the majority are not working for communism. But I would ask all those who feel themselves to be members of a peace movement to be a little more critical of their own movement. While it is undeniable that the communist groups are not large in numbers, their high degree of organisation and the financial resources they can bring into the peace movement give them a very much greater influence than one might expect.

I would ask them, therefore, not to act as if there were a clear, as it were, chemical separation between themselves and those who are

Mr. Reddemann (continued)

not at all interested in peace as such but would welcome a Soviet peace in Europe. Mr. Scheer has just said that very many people who belong to the peace movement are not pacifists. I believe this applies in fact to the German social democrats who, after their exclusion from government, also radically altered their political attitude towards the peace movement and suddenly, after having been in favour of the NATO twofold decision, after recognising their then Federal Chancellor as the father of the NATO twofold decision, came out against it with all their force. I am convinced that our colleagues from the Social Democratic Party are no pacifists. I am also convinced that they will change their tune once again if, in ten years or so, they are returned to government.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am not at all bothered by the peace movement as such. What we see in it are rigorous ethical demands and religious convictions, alongside fashionable decadence. I believe this is a movement that goes very much further than the issue of peace. We would perhaps need to talk about the overall situation of our democracies in order to reach a proper assessment of the peace movement.

My concern is not with the peace movement as such. I am concerned that the Soviet Union might draw the wrong conclusion from the existence and extent of such a peace movement – to wit, the conclusion that it now has no need to disarm, because the peace movement will carry on beating the drum in Western Europe and the United States until the West disarms unilaterally. I would then fear that the Soviet Union, through pressure on Western Europe, and later perhaps even on the United States, rather than through military conflict, could achieve exactly what it is after. Let me therefore repeat that I am not bothered by the militant advocacy of peace within the peace movement. I am more worried about the possible consequences.

That is why, Ladies and Gentlemen, I cannot share the harsh judgment of my social democrat colleague Mr. Scheer on the report by his socialist colleague Mr. Lagorce and announce my intention of voting in favour of the report and the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I greatly regret the parallel with the pre-war situation drawn by the previous speaker.

As far as I know, it was not the pacifists who were responsible for Hitler. Perhaps we should lay the blame on those who failed to react to the

reoccupation of the Rhineland or to German rearmament because it meant profits for international capitalism, or on those who failed to take action at the time of the Spanish civil war and allowed hundreds of thousands to perish, or perhaps the responsibility lies with those who claimed that: "Hitler, after all, is a civilised man".

It is not upon those among whom I count myself and who protested against the policy of the arms merchants that the blame should be laid for what happened, but rather upon those who financed and supported the Nazi movement in Germany. That is a fact worth remembering.

At the time, moreover, those same people uttered no protest about the existence of Dachau and Buchenwald, where the German democrats were incarcerated. When it is said that decadence is in fashion, I would question whether there is such a thing as fashion in this context. At all events, decadence is not always to be found where it is most expected...

If there is one thing I must acknowledge about the report of my fellow socialist, Mr. Lagorce, it is the unchanging character of his convictions. I find in the report the same ideas that were contained in his previous report on the security problems posed by pacifism.

I had hoped that the debate stimulated by this report, and by that subsequently prepared by myself on the influence of pacifist movements in national parliaments, would shed some light on the issue and lead to the abandonment of pre-conceived notions and simplistic attitudes of the kind very properly alluded to by Mr. Scheer.

I also believe, however, that this debate should be placed in today's context. No doubt this document was compiled some weeks ago, and in the meantime events have speeded up, and part of the report has, to use a military term, become obsolete. It does not in any case appear to accord with the attitude displayed last week by the Council of WEU – an attitude already hinted at by earlier declarations by governments belonging to WEU, including that of France.

Today's debate takes place between the Council meeting of 12th June and the next meeting on the reactivation of WEU, which is to be held in Rome in October. I do not claim to have found nothing in the report about deterrence and the will of the people, but I do say that I have not found a great deal about the reactivation of WEU. In particular, I did not find the expected reference to acceptance by public opinion of the concept of European defence, or indeed to something else we should not forget, namely the move initiated by the European Parliament, and renewed last Sunday with the adoption of its draft treaty for a European union, which would

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

confer on the European Parliament the responsibilities proper to this Assembly. We must not fail to react to these developments.

And what of the political setting for this debate? It has been referred to by the Rapporteur and is, in fact, characterised by a widening gap between the United States of America and Europe on defence matters.

It was not the pacifists who invented the doctrine of the air-land battle, and if in some quarters it is postulated that NATO has been the guarantor of peace in Europe for thirty-five years, I take the view that this is no more than a hypothesis and that NATO, as conceived thirty-five years ago, has had its day.

While I am willing to talk of establishing a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, I cannot approve the idea of a European pillar of NATO. WEU and Western Europe cannot be an appendage of any other organisation or superpower. This is the moment for European integration. Whether we like it or not, the future is European in both the defence and the economic spheres, and nationalist policies in these areas are outmoded.

As far as expenditure is concerned, would not an integrated European defence policy cost much less in these straitened times than a build-up of separate national forces whose chief aim is to flatter national pride, sometimes to the detriment of the welfare and social progress of the people?

What I regret is the general tone of the report. It strikes me – no doubt I shall be told wrongly – as a rehearsal of the arguments in favour of the French nuclear capability and therefore of the concept of nuclear deterrence – an attitude I can understand. I must point out to my friend, Mr. Lagorce, that I was very surprised by the reference to General Copel, whose views seem to me to differ widely from the international socialist position. But it is true that this report accords well with the general tenor of the Assembly's other reports, which unfortunately, all too often smack of the cold war. I have now been a member of the Assembly for seven years, and I am beginning to get used to this basic anti-communism, to these invocations and this conjuring up of the Soviet ogre, which seems to satisfy the subconscious of some, but which prevents us from looking reality in the face and working out the solutions required for European security. And, of course, there is a general feeling of hostility towards populist movements opposed to nuclear weapons.

I point out to the Rapporteur that, while he can no doubt write that no opinion polls show a majority against deployment, I challenge him to

produce an opinion poll showing any kind of majority in favour of deployment. Of course, the French Government can call for deployment elsewhere, as they will not themselves be hosts to these American weapons! The French would never accept the deployment on their territory of American weapons outside their control. I consider it reprehensible that my French comrades should constantly ask us Belgian, Dutch and German socialists to accept weapons which they would not have on their own territory.

A weakness of this report, when it addresses itself to the problems of pacifism, is that it develops arguments about the consequences of pacifism without looking into its causes.

I do not agree with the report about the reason for the diminished cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. It is not pacifist agitation which is responsible, but the constant policy of the United States towards Europe, particularly in the monetary and economic spheres. If, as I pointed out in Washington two years ago, the United States wish to close their markets to European steel, they must not be surprised if Europe looks for outlets other than America.

What worries me in this report, and I hope my concern is misplaced, is the feeling it gives that the populace is ignorant and should accept the arguments of those in the know. This is an undemocratic view in these times of participation, and I call on the Rapporteur to justify his remarks about the failure of the campaign of support for deployment. The decisions taken by various countries to defer deployment strike me as rather eloquent in this connection.

Like Mr. Scheer, I also wish to refer to the problem of Europe becoming saturated with weapons.

How are you going to give two rifles to every soldier? The view is no doubt somewhat simplistic, but the level of arms deployment in Europe is such that we must ask how many times over we need to be able to destroy the other side before we think we are able to defend ourselves.

I join others in asking that citizens should play their part in defence, and in doing so I echo words uttered by Jaurès a very long time ago.

How can people be convinced that a greater defence effort is needed when our governments are imposing social sacrifices on all the workers of Europe? We shall never make people understand that they have to accept this expenditure while we inflict intolerable damage on their living standards.

People may well feel concerned, and Europeans following the Washington declarations are aware that Europe has now become designated

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

as a battlefield in the global strategy of a super-power.

I consider that the destiny of Europeans should be in the hands of the Europeans themselves and that they should assume responsibility for their own defence, though within the framework of an integrated European defence policy and not as an appendage to the global strategy of the United States.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I must admit that at the moment it is difficult to know how to approach this debate.

I shall, however, act as I intended and will try once again, in spite of what Claude Dejardin has just been saying, to explain why deterrence is credible and why we would be wrong not to attempt to find a basis for agreement leading to a common approach to the problems of European security and later of disarmament. Let anybody who does not want peace and disarmament rise to his feet so that he may be executed upon the spot.

We all want peace and disarmament, but not at any price. That is why, seeing that the report of our friend and colleague, Mr. Lagorce, refers to the French position, I thought I might once more revert to this subject and declare my view that we should try to put our faith in deterrence. We must accept that every time we are divided on a subject like this, every time we accuse a member country of WEU of selfish motives, this distrust and suspicion injures the united front which the Europe of the Seven ought to present to the world together with the fundamental message that everything leading to disarmament carries a blessing and everything conducive to peace is not only desirable but also fervently desired by us, the politicians, and by all those we represent.

A short time ago I asked the United Kingdom Minister of State about the reaction of her government to the call by the Soviet negotiators in Geneva that British and French nuclear weapons should be included when counting the western missiles, the question being to establish who has more, who has less and who is the strongest.

I do not know, Mr. Dejardin, whether NATO really has maintained peace over thirty-five years. I only know that I have stopped believing that no one knocks down an elderly person or someone with his hands in his pockets. Real life daily provides us with evidence about the present state of moral degradation, in which even the helpless and weak are attacked. This

is one of the reasons why, convinced pacifist that I am and desirous of disarmament and peace, I nevertheless believe in the potency of deterrence.

I repeat, our differences in this field should be played down and in saying this I am thinking of the doubts expressed by certain governments and political parties. In this area, all the steps taken following the debates on disarmament problems, that is the inclusion of nuclear weapons, and all our differences including the recent resolution by the Netherlands Parliament concerning the inclusion of French and British nuclear weapons in the reckoning at Geneva constitutes not a demonstration of the strength of WEU but rather proves the weakness of our seven countries in the difficult rôle we have to play between the two superpowers.

I wish to point out just what these deterrent forces amount to. When the Soviets call for these weapons to be taken into account for a reduction in the number of missiles and SS-20s targeted on Europe the consequent reduction of 98 warheads would leave about 9,000 warheads capable of reaching European territory. It is not therefore possible to compare the arsenal of the USSR and that of Britain and France together. We have to compare like with like. The cause of peace is not served by the view that these missiles should be included in the weapons count at Geneva.

As far as the much criticised policy of the French Government is concerned - and such criticism is nothing new and has just been vehemently reiterated by Mr. Dejardin - it is our policy to retain a measure of responsibility for controlling the use of the nuclear deterrent. I hope that this will not be interpreted as the expression of a desire for autonomy or jurisdiction of a national or ultranational character. Until such time as a dialogue is conducted in greater depth, France's refusal to accept the tutelage of one or other of the superpowers must be accepted. To accept the inclusion of its missiles would place France under such tutelage. I am one of those who still believe that, in building the European pillar, the inclusion of the French nuclear capability, which we consider to be a deterrent, may in future be a factor in promoting peace. In fact, bearing in mind the uncertainty attaching to its use, this force which complements the enormous capabilities of the Atlantic Alliance and the United States might well become a significant element in this pillar and necessary to the future defence of Europe along the lines which we have envisaged and which the Council tried to define at its recent meeting on 12th June.

It is no part of our intention that these deterrent weapons should constitute a threat. Our intention is merely to make optimum use of

Mr. Pignion (continued)

these resources for defence and for the maintenance of peace. This, I am sure, is the heartfelt desire of all of us and of ordinary people. However costly these resources there can never be enough in the cause of preserving peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martino, the last speaker on the list.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would not have spoken to explain my vote for Mr. Lagorce's report if other members had not presumed to limit democracy to one only of the many thousands of forms in which it finds expression in our countries.

It is certainly an expression of democracy, particularly as there is no such expression in Eastern Europe, which fires the so-called pacifists of the streets – this is not my definition – but our peoples do not need to go out on to the streets to shout out what they want and thus bring about a non-majority decision by governments. We are deeply committed to democracy and in our view the will of the people in a democracy is expressed not only by shouting in public places, not only in the homilies of the church, not only in statistical findings – often used to prophesy – but first and foremost in constructive action calmly thought out, and therefore not guided by emotion, resulting in a responsible choice in the secrecy of the polling booth. I remind myself, before I remind other members, that if we had not believed in our democracy of the free and secret vote which has decided our history over the past 40 years through difficult political decisions taken by our citizens, we should certainly not be free today to disagree or agree with Mr. Lagorce's report, which I accept, convinced that I am acting with the full understanding of a free citizen of a Europe which is still free.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank all the speakers and you, Mr. Martino, for your conciseness.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, while I am glad that the report has given rise to such a debate which clearly proves the importance which we attach to the issue of peace, I am rather disappointed, not to say unhappy, about the many criticisms – often unjustified – which it has attracted.

I would like to have had the time to sum up the notes which I have taken, and I hope you will excuse me if I confine myself simply to replying to each of the speakers from what I have noted of their remarks.

Mrs. Knight, the first speaker, pointed out that the desire for peace was not the monopoly of pacifists or those who claim to be pacifists, and I thank her for this comment. I agree with her. She also rightly pointed out that Afghanistan would now be free if it had been able to defend itself.

With Mr. Gianotti I do not wish to engage in a dialogue in which neither listens to the other. I would not convince him nor he me. He is convinced that the purpose of Soviet troops in entering Afghanistan was to restore human rights, while I am convinced of the opposite. What basis is there there for discussion? It is impossible. I cannot however let him say that I am twisting the facts, as that is not so.

It was not the Americans after all who were the first to deploy missiles. I do not wish to defend them as I am not unquestioning in my support of the Americans as Mr. Gianotti is in his support of the Soviet Union. When the question of deploying the Pershing missiles arose and NATO took its dual-track decision, the Soviet missiles were already in place and that is something that the pacifists refuse to accept. They behave as though this truth simply did not exist, as though quite simply one day the Americans had decided to deploy Pershing missiles in Europe. The fact remains that we must not forget that they were deployed as a counter to missiles already installed opposite.

I repeat, in this dialogue neither party will listen to the other and each one remains convinced he is right.

All I will say is that I had the unfortunate privilege of witnessing the Munich agreements. I was a pacifist at the time in those pre-war years. Indeed, I was even a violent pacifist. I witnessed the Munich agreements and I shared in the relief which they brought to western nations, France and Britain included. Unfortunately I had to bear the scars for a number of years afterwards. Now I am somewhat immunised and I can understand very well that nations wish to take precautions to ensure that the same thing does not happen to them.

Mr. Murphy reproaches me for not having stressed the action which should be taken by WEU. However, I believe that I actually did so; this is one of the points in the recommendation. I also believe that within WEU, in co-ordination and consultation with the other countries, we should be able to call on the Soviet Union to negotiate. I am in favour of negotiation and WEU seems to me to be just the right body to make such a call.

Mr. Müller rightly said – to quote only that part of his statement – that the famous dual-track decision taken by NATO was based on the will to negotiate. It is very clear that the second

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

part of the NATO decision was to become operative only if the first part was unsuccessful. The dual-track decision was therefore founded on the idea of negotiation and this was a point which I also made in my report.

Mr. Vogt addressed his remarks directly at me. Let me tell him that I am not a sabrerattler; far from it. I have suffered too much from war not to be an advocate of peace. I said as much this morning when presenting my report and I repeat the sentence which encapsulates the rest: the entire world wants peace but this unanimity ceases as soon as the conditions necessary for the maintenance of peace and the consequences of its precarious nature are involved. This sentence sums up the whole content of the report and everything which the speakers have had to say on the subject.

Mr. Vogt believes that all men are men of good will and that there are also nations of good will.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – This is unbelievable! You have understood nothing!

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – I have understood to the limits of my mental capacity. I must apologise if I can do no more!

Of course it would be very nice if all men were men of good will with every desirable quality and a halo round their heads. You could then disarm unilaterally. Why does the Soviet Union not disarm? I promise you, Mr. Vogt, that as soon as the Soviet Union starts unilateral disarmament I will immediately become a member of all the pacifist movements imaginable.

I thank Mr. Cavaliere for his appreciation of my report. He spoke of the need to restore a balance and he also pointed out that it was the Soviet Union which upset the balance. It was the Soviet Union, I repeat, not the Americans who started. That is an established fact which, once again, is not apparent to those behind all the pacifist movements.

On this subject I would like to point out to the speaker who claimed that I did not differentiate between neutralism and pacifism that in my previous report two years ago I devoted a whole section several pages long to making a distinction between neutralism and pacifism, and I am not going to start again now. I ask him to refer to my earlier report.

To Mr. Tummers I say that I am sorry if I have disappointed him, but I do not see things in black and white terms. I do not say the good is all on one side and the bad on the other. I accept that there is good and bad on both sides.

I also thank Mr. Spies von Büllesheim who basically anticipated me in replying to the arguments of Mr. Gianotti, Mr. Vogt and Mr. Tummers.

Mr. Mezzapesa referred to what I had to say in my report about the doctrines of various churches and said that he was not an advocate of the philosophy of surrender. Nowhere in the report, to the best of my knowledge, do I say that I advocate such a philosophy.

To Dr. Miller I say that, while I support nuclear deterrence, I do not believe that is the only possible option. While it is true that, for me, it is the only option at present there may be another one tomorrow. What is more, when I presented my report this morning I thought I drew attention to other possibilities.

Dr. Miller also said that third world countries are modelling their development on America. I would reply that many countries, both French- and English-speaking, are not modelling themselves on the United States, and the same is true of other countries like Tanzania, Guinea, Angola and Mozambique. The two faces presented by the western countries are therefore also apparent in the countries of the third world.

Be that as it may, I thank him for drawing attention to my point that the arguments advanced by pacifists warranted close scrutiny and study. I repeated this morning what I said in my earlier 1982 report to the effect that I by no means reject out of hand the arguments put forward by pacifists and neutralists, and I have a high regard for the leaders of these movements. Their arguments should not be dismissed not only for that reason but also because they have the support of a large part of the population, even though, in my country, the movements are not so large as in other countries.

Replying to Mr. Milani the danger lies not in a policy of preventive defence but in the risk of a pre-emptive attack. What we are discussing is preventive defence, not pre-emptive attack. Many speakers developed similar arguments.

As I said just now, I agree with Mr. Freeson that WEU should take the initiative regarding negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Rodotà found that the objectives stated in the report were confused and unclear. I did however set them out in my own language, French, which is said to possess the virtue of clarity. No doubt the fault is with me rather than with the language which I used.

I repeat once again that I do not underrate pacifism, but there is a question which I would like to put to those who have, with some skill, defended the pacifist and neutralist movements: how many war veterans from any European country are members of such movements? I

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

would like to know whether these pacifist movements include people who have themselves experienced war. I should like to meet and have a discussion with them.

Mr. Scheer, perhaps on behalf of international socialism, did of course shoot me down in flames. He developed a thesis entirely opposed to that set out in my report, and, of course, I cannot reply to him. It is simply a question of yes or no. To him the answer is no, to me, yes. I do not think I can at this point enter into a discussion with him, as this would mean going over the report again point by point. I did not think that the SPD professed a military doctrine so contrary to that of the French socialists. I knew that there were differences, but I was not aware that their positions were diametrically opposed.

With his usual generosity, Mr. Dejardin had to stand up for the pacifist movements, and it is his conviction that they are necessary to safeguard peace. He was unable to locate a reference to the rôle of WEU, but my report does in fact include several pages on that subject. Actually, paragraph 2 of the recommendation is concerned with the rôle that WEU could play in this context.

As for General Copel and his doctrine, the events to which he has referred are fairly recent. Perhaps others have occurred since my report was written. I believe, however, that General Copel's approach set out in his book *Vaincre la guerre* (the defeat of war) is something quite new.

I agree with Mr. Pignion when he deplores the accusation levelled against one member country of WEU. I take the view that the object to be pursued is accord within WEU. We should discuss together to arrive at a consensus, but the best way of doing this is not, in my opinion, to launch a brutal attack, even if justified, on the policy of a country belonging to WEU.

I conclude by expressing my regret that it was I who presented this report. It is not fitting that the task should have fallen to me, and I would have preferred it to be entrusted to a member of the younger generation. I represent a generation which was sacrificed. I was involved, it is all over, and I have lost seven years of my life. I repeat that I would have preferred that somebody young – Mr. Scheer for example – should present this report, and I would then have had the pleasure of discussing it with him and placing before him certain arguments which, to my regret, I have learned by experience.

I now submit myself to the wisdom of the Assembly. We shall consider the amendments and see what happens. Whatever the result, I

have done my best as a man of good will and one who is committed to peace and desires it passionately.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Lagorce, you have performed your task with your customary conscientiousness, and I am pleased to place on record my acknowledgement of the fact.

I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – It was not my intention to speak, my wish being merely to refer to my introductory remarks in the general debate. However, I would not wish Mr. Lagorce's speech to end on a note of disappointment or sadness.

I therefore wish to stress that our experienced and honest Rapporteur has skilfully summarised the work of the committee with all the necessary shades of meaning and has done so in a most meticulous manner.

Mr. Lagorce's purpose was not to state a case. What he had to say reflected perfectly the work of the committee and he devoted himself wholly to his task. Consequently he should not feel in any way put out even if a subject as difficult as that under discussion can create the impression that he is defending an honest and objective case before an assembly of pacifists incapable of understanding him completely, which he finds it difficult to address with composure in order to win acceptance for his view.

The report explains to public opinion the reasons for our course of action, but this is not always an easy task, especially when some people – though believe me, Mr. Lagorce, they are few in number – do not wish to understand.

On careful re-examination of the preamble to the draft recommendation, every member of this Assembly will see that many of the objections which have been raised are not justified. I wish to stress this point.

If we do not vote today, Ladies and Gentlemen, we shall be able to sleep on it and I would then ask you to read the preamble carefully. You will then find that your fears are unfounded.

It is fortunate that we are able to discuss such important, fundamental questions in a democratic assembly like this where everybody can state his opinion, for or against, with the same freedom. The right to express our views here is a privilege we all enjoy, whichever side we are on.

But I ask you, please, to examine this issue and this draft exclusively in relation to defence and from the standpoint of WEU! We must not link our attitudes to changing national circumstances! If we allow ourselves to be

Mr. Michel (continued)

influenced by the situations in our countries, especially in the wake of elections which may have left a particular mark or impression on us, we shall never be able to conduct any discussion.

Our discussions must be calm and unfettered by any of our national commitments. They should be limited to considering the defence issue from the standpoint of WEU. It will then be possible to achieve clarity and recognise the historical truths so well described by our Rapporteur, and we shall also be able to say whether or not we are in agreement with the treaties which have been signed. This is another point which needs to be stressed very forcibly. It would be too easy, in fact, to proclaim in this place one's agreement, one's perfect agreement, with NATO while at the same time uttering statements which are totally contrary to the treaties under which we are committed.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I ask you again, let us reread Mr. Lagorce's report in the knowledge that it is the report of a straightforward, right-thinking and courageous Rapporteur. I am convinced that you will then accept the committee's view and will vote in favour of the preamble and operative text submitted to you this evening. This is my deeply-held conviction, and I thank you in anticipation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Michel. I would also like on this occasion to repeat my thanks to the committee of which you are Chairman for the report which has been presented.

We shall now move on to consider the text, still with the intention of voting this evening, failing which tomorrow's orders of the day are likely to be seriously upset.

Before a vote is taken on the draft recommendation there are six amendments to be considered.

We shall take these amendments in the order in which they refer to the text of the draft recommendation: Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Freeson, Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Stoffelen, Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Stoffelen, Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Antretter, Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Lagorce, Amendment 7 tabled by Mr. Gianotti and Amendment 6 tabled by Mr. Cavaliere.

Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Freeson and others reads as follows:

1. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out:

“and that nuclear weapons are an essential part of that deterrence”.

I call Mr. Freeson to speak in support of his amendment.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). – I move the amendment. I shall speak briefly in its support. I wish this part of paragraph (ii) to be deleted, although not necessarily to pursue the general arguments and discussion, and to try to get one side in the argument accepted along the lines we have been debating so far in the report. To state that this is a matter of fact is open to question, and we should not be prepared to let it pass in the text as though, automatically, it were the truth.

There are those of us who, whatever the history of either side in this long conflict and arms race, would say that nuclear weapons, far from being essential to defensive security, are a *reductio ad absurdum* of defensive or any other type of war. We would argue that “the nuclear arms race has no military purpose”. That is quite apart from other considerations about which on another occasion I should be prepared to argue at length. “Wars cannot be fought with nuclear weapons. Their existence only adds to our perils because of the illusions they have generated.”

I fully endorse these words. They are the words of the late Lord Mountbatten, who was neither a neutralist nor a pacifist. During the second world war he was a gallant leading serving soldier for Britain and the allies. Not very long ago, he was tragically assassinated by terrorists.

I quote the words of another famous person – a former American Ambassador to Moscow, George Kennan, who said:

“To my mind, the nuclear bomb is the most useless weapon ever invented. It can be employed to no rational purpose. It is not even an effective defence against itself.”

The former Secretary of State for Defence, Robert McNamara, said:

“Nuclear weapons serve no military purpose whatsoever.”

A man whom I would not normally quote, Enoch Powell, said:

“It cannot make sense to acquire or maintain a weapon which in no circumstances it would be advantageous to use.”

People of the most diverse and divergent views on pacifism, neutralism, international politics, policy and defence, including many in WEU, must unite in a common endeavour to save Europe and the rest of the world from the perils engendered by our nuclear illusions about nuclear deterrence. In the view of many of us – a growing number of us – nuclear weapons are not a defence. That is neither a pacifist nor a

Mr. Freeson (continued)

neutralist view. We can argue it on defence grounds. Their use would be the ultimate failure. That has major implications. The first is that the abandonment of these devices, of which George Kennan said "I doubt whether they are weapons at all", together with the illusions that they have generated, can in no way weaken our defences. On the contrary, an effective defence policy and capability require us to discard the mythology of the so-called nuclear deterrent and so-called nuclear defence. In purely pragmatic terms, just a small part of the £20,000 million we are spending on Trident and Tornado in the United Kingdom could buy a lot of very effective defence weaponry.

With our nuclear stockpile many times greater than that needed to cause a climactic catastrophe that could even extinguish the human race, there is nothing more urgent than to start the process of nuclear disarmament now. Europe as a whole is the obvious theatre for such an initiative for life and such an initiative for effective defence policies of which it cannot be argued that the so-called nuclear deterrent is an essential part.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I could also agree with some of what the previous speaker said and I could even agree that nuclear weapons are not defensive weapons, but none of this can obscure the facts for me. The fact is that even though we want nuclear disarmament and even though NATO has proposed the zero option, nuclear armaments are being constantly added to by the West's potential enemy. Let us not forget that during the Geneva talks the Soviet Union went on deploying its missiles against the West.

Failure to recognise that nuclear weapons are an effective deterrent and therefore not a weapon of defence but a deterrent weapon means blinking the facts or looking like men of bad faith and I do not think that any of us is a man of bad faith. I say this in all sincerity. To go down that road would mean disregarding everything WEU has done since it was formed. Deletion of the words: "and that nuclear weapons are an essential part of that deterrence" would therefore nullify everything the West has done to achieve a level of deterrence and therefore of protection for peace. That is why I am voting against this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – A short time ago Mr. Freeson welcomed some points in the explanatory memorandum to my report. He also said that, generally speaking, the recommendation was below standard.

In reply I would say that, unlike the explanatory memorandum, this recommendation was the subject of a very long debate in committee, and many changes were made to the original draft. Perhaps Mr. Freeson would have preferred the original draft as I submitted it to the committee?

We arrived at a consensus which, like all consensuses, naturally satisfied everybody without exactly satisfying anybody – just like a piece of legislation in fact. That is generally true of draft recommendations.

Turning to the amendment itself, I cannot accept it as it wholly destroys the meaning, the essence and even the spirit of the report. The report seeks to prove that the security of Europe is founded mainly on the nuclear deterrent. If that point is discarded, what is left? What deterrent? Deterrence by conventional weapons? Deterrence by promises and words? I think not, and I repeat, I cannot accept this amendment.

I could perhaps move a step towards Mr. Freeson by saying that nuclear weapons constitute an essential deterrent "in the present state of the world". This was not suggested in committee, but can be considered now, since deterrence will not exist in perpetuity. The text does not say this in so many words, but it is implied. Be that as it may, I ask the Assembly to reject Mr. Freeson's amendment; otherwise nothing will be left of the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

I call the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I request the reference back to committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That request is in order and the report will therefore be withdrawn from the orders of the day and referred back to the committee.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the circumstances which have now arisen should bring to a conclusion the business for this afternoon. Unfortunately, we cannot continue our work as Sir Dudley Smith, the Rapporteur for the next draft, has been told by me that he could not speak

The President (continued)

before tomorrow morning. That is a pity, but that was the decision we reached with his agreement.

That being the case, before closing the sitting I call Mr. Freeson on a point of order.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*).— I should like to ask you to give us an explanation, Mr. President. Those of us who are new to the Assembly wish to know whether it is the case that, when a democratic vote is taken on an amendment to a recommendation, which is unsatisfactory in the eyes of the people who put it before the Assembly, without a vote, the report in question is automatically referred back to the committee at the request of the chairman of that committee. What sort of farce is that?

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— Mr. Freeson, I believe that the truth lies midway between your position and mine. I have to take note of the decision of the committee Chairman. It is, however, quite correct that it would have been better if this request had been made before the discussion of the draft recommendation. We were talking about the preamble and not about the enacting terms of the recommendation, and that was why I decided as I did. I do not know if I was quite right in my decision, but, however that may be, that is the explanation for it.

Your point is entirely valid, but I can do nothing. The Chairman of the General Affairs Committee is the sole judge of whether or not he should provide an explanation for his request. The Assembly can in any case give a ruling on the request, and I am prepared to proceed to a vote of the Assembly on the issue.

I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*).— Further to that point of order, Mr. President. Will you tell me the rule under which that procedure has been allowed? Is there a rule that says that when the chairman asks for the report to be taken back to the committee, it automatically goes back to the committee without any further discussion? Is it a ruling?

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— Mr. Freeson, I can answer your question subject to confirmation.

The Rules of Procedure contain no specific item dealing with this question. In these circumstances, as the rules cannot be cited and as you can contest my decision— on the grounds to which you have referred— I can ask the Assembly to pronounce on the request from the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee in order to establish, since the voting has begun, whether the Assembly agrees that the report should be referred back to the committee. I cannot find

any other answer in the rules, as my interpretation has been contested. I shall have to ask the Assembly itself to decide.

I call the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation).— Mr. President we cannot vote hastily on the interpretation of the Rules of Procedure. Surely, if there is doubt on the subject the question should be referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges for decision.

This is, moreover, not the first time that a committee chairman has asked for a report to be referred back. I draw your attention to the fact that Rule 29 (8) states that reference back to committee may always be requested and shall be obligatory if requested by the Chairman or Rapporteur of the committee.

We cannot vote on this point, and if you, Mr. President, were to order a vote on this issue, I should leave the chamber and would take no part in the voting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— Mr. Michel, there must be some confusion here. I understood just now that you were asking not for the amendment but for the report to be referred back to the committee. I should be grateful if you would confirm that your request is for reference back of the amendment.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation).— Mr. President, it is quite clear that I was asking that all the amendments should be referred back. When one amendment is such as to emasculate a report, i.e. renders it ineffective and practically pointless, it is obviously necessary to ask that all the amendments be referred back to committee. It is not possible to refer back a single amendment. The amendments will all have to be re-examined by the committee. That is obvious.

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*).— On a point of order, Mr. President. I understand that when a committee brings a report to the Assembly it becomes the property of the Assembly and if the committee wishes to take the report back, it must have the consent of the Assembly. Therefore, the matter must be put to a vote to decide whether the committee can have the report back or whether we insist on keeping it for further consideration.

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*).— On a point of order, Mr. President. Surely the committee cannot take back only the amendment. The amendments are not the property of the

Dr. Miller (continued)

committee; they are the property of the Assembly. Therefore, if the Chairman wishes to remit anything back to the committee, he must remit the whole report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Milani.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I agree with the committee Chairman that this amendment radically alters the sense of the whole report. But the fact is that the Assembly has approved the amendment. That being so, the Rapporteur or the Chairman of the committee can withdraw the report but must consider it to be rejected, if the President's interpretation is correct. The recommendation cannot be redrafted in committee after such a significant amendment has been introduced. This means therefore that the report no longer exists and that the subject must be discussed afresh; but the Assembly cannot avoid a precise judgment which upsets the text.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone else wish to speak?...

I do not want to be suspected of cutting short this debate on procedure.

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The sitting should be concluded as there is no longer the necessary quorum. The Bureau of the Assembly should meet before the next sitting and present proposals to resolve the situation. The custom is that a chairman can withdraw a report, particularly when an amendment is adopted only because of a chance majority.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rodotà.

Mr. RODOTÀ (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to raise two questions. The first relates to the Rules of Procedure quoted by the Chairman of the committee. This rule can be invoked before the first vote on an amendment. The amendment now no longer exists because it has been incorporated in the text. Before a vote is taken on the amendment the chairman of the committee is entitled to ask for time for the committee to consider it but this request can no longer be made on the basis of the rule in question.

After our vote, there is no longer an amendment but a modified text.

On the second point, my view is that if we agree to a procedure which blocks discussion of the draft recommendation in the Assembly – and the report cannot be returned to the agenda during this session – we must take the

view that the committee no longer considers that the report can be submitted to the Assembly. It will then be omitted or referred back to the committee according to which decision the latter takes.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – These are points of order and I cannot refuse to give the floor. As long as there are delegates wishing to speak I shall allow them to do so.

We shall then consider this question in the most objective manner possible, since, apart from the political aspect, it involves a procedural issue and the possible creation of a precedent.

I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – According to the tradition of European assemblies, when the spirit of a report has been changed by a vote, the chairman of the committee who is responsible for its decisions and for the consensus arrived at and therefore for the report presented, may ask that the report be referred back to committee.

The reference back of a report to committee is obligatory if it is requested by the chairman of the committee and we have never voted on that point. The decision, which is the responsibility of the committee chairman, naturally affects the discussion in committee. However, the report will remain on the orders of the day for this session as it can be discussed immediately in committee.

I therefore support Mr. Michel's request which is in line with tradition.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Clearly, Mr. President, any further decision of yours in the present situation will be wrong, simply because, immediately after you presented your ruling as inevitable, many colleagues left the chamber. This gave rise to the impression which Mr. Reddemann has referred to.

Mr. Reddemann, this has been one of the sittings most competent to take decisions and one of the best-informed debates since I have been a member of this assembly. If the debate has not been to your liking, touching, as it did, on the most sacred principles of your concept of deterrence – namely nuclear deterrence – and if you are now attempting to upset the whole agenda by some kind of ideological nuclear fusion, that is your affair and a matter to be judged against the criterion of whether or not democracy prevails in this chamber. I can only say, as I pointed out at the beginning: once the President, by error or for whatever reason, had

Mr. Vogt (continued)

made the ruling in question and many colleagues had left the chamber, the ensuing situation could no longer be regarded as in accordance with the Rules of Procedure. The only thing to be done is to close the sitting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this whole debate on procedure, whatever the decision reached, will not alter the political fact that the Assembly has legitimately adopted an amendment which, in essence, dismisses the report. It is this point which is important to us as politicians, whatever some may think.

As far as procedure is concerned, since you wish to talk about that, I find it curious that reference should be made to other European assemblies which are no concern of mine. I am a delegate to WEU, nowhere else, and have been for seven years. And now newcomers to the Assembly are telling us how we should work! Let them prove themselves before judging the work of others.

But, Mr. President, it is in the nature of things that as soon as a report is printed and published it belongs to the public domain and is no longer the property of the committee but of the Assembly.

What is more, voting has started. Therefore, in spite of my esteem and friendship for Mr. Michel, I cannot understand how a committee chairman can take it upon himself to decide to change the orders of the day of the Assembly. That is simply unthinkable.

Mr. Michel has also referred to a Rule of Procedure concerning amendments. Like earlier speakers, I would remind him that as soon as a vote has been taken on an amendment it becomes a text adopted by the Assembly.

Mr. Reddemann asks that the sitting should be suspended and the debate deferred until tomorrow. Mr. Reddemann, we know that you are a wily bird but I want to avoid falling into a trap. When you chair a committee of the Assembly, are you prepared to interrupt the voting because the majority of those present is not as you would wish? In a democracy is it permissible to interrupt a series of votes and defer them to the next day because the majority in the chamber is not to the chairman's liking? That would be a dangerous precedent.

You have been hoist with your own petard, Mr. Reddemann. Five years ago you were one of those who wanted the quorum to be based on signatures in the attendance register and not on numbers actually present during the sitting. It

was pointed out at the time that you had left your flank exposed inasmuch as many representatives would sign the attendance register and would then disappear into town. Now you have been trapped in your own argument! Let us have fair play as though in a game of football, and accept that you have been out-manoeuvred!

Mr. President, I will end by referring to Mr. Milani's point which I mentioned originally.

The fact is that the Assembly has rejected the report by a majority. When people talk to me about taking advantage I reply in the terms which I used in the Belgian Parliament when I had been blocking a bill for two years: let those who are in favour of nuclear weapons at least make the effort to turn up and support their rapporteur and their colleagues. If they stay away, so much the worse for them.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – This problem of procedure concerns us all. From the number of hands that are raised I see that many members wish to speak. I would like to put a number of facts to you so that we may examine if it is not possible to find an acceptable solution.

The situation is that voting had begun.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). – It had taken place.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – A vote had been taken and the request by the Chairman of the committee referred to paragraph 8 of Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure under which a committee chairman may request that amendments be referred back. Before the vote he is entitled as of right to have them referred back.

This was really why I thought that, considering the lateness of the hour, it was possibly preferable to defer this matter until tomorrow or to decide to examine it later in the session.

I have acted in accordance with my responsibilities and I am prepared to state my reasons on condition that you do not interrupt me.

The basic problem remains. This is an important political issue in the sense that the report of the General Affairs Committee has been placed before the Assembly, a vote has been taken on it and it cannot be withdrawn from the Assembly voting procedure except as presented in its present form.

There is a compromise solution. According to the Rules of Procedure which I have just been reading again, our sitting should end at 6.30 p.m. I cannot therefore even suggest that the sitting should be suspended, as we should then be unable to resume our work. The only possibility which remains to me is to close the sitting, and this is something I am always entitled to do as President.

The President (continued)

The question I would like to put to the Assembly – and I am willing to remain with you as long as is necessary for discussion – is as follows: in view of the lateness of the hour – I had hoped to reach the vote by 7 p.m. or 7.15 p.m. at the latest – do you not think that it would perhaps be more sensible to close the sitting and to ask the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee to submit, when the sitting opens tomorrow morning, a definite proposal regarding the action his committee intends to take as a result of the present debate? We shall then be able to continue the debate according to whether or not we agree with the Chairman of the committee. We can only hope that the evening will bring a little wisdom to our thoughts. However, Ladies and Gentlemen, if you prefer, we can continue our discussion.

As far as I am concerned the matter remains on the orders of the day. I have not deleted it in response to Mr. Michel's request as the matter does not concern a deletion from the orders of the day but a reference back to committee of the amendments.

The debate should therefore continue, perhaps not tomorrow morning but at another time during the session.

I call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – I have to say, with respect, Mr. President, that you have just been appointed President of the Assembly. You are not new to politics. The status and respect that you will enjoy as President of the Assembly will be determined by your decisions on such matters. Many of my colleagues would suggest – to use an English phrase – that you are trying to pull a fast one on the Assembly this evening.

I do not want to go into great detail, but you are confusing us when you talk about a vote. A clear decision had been taken on my friend's amendment. Mr. Freeson's amendment was adopted. Had it been lost, we should not have had the Chairman's attempt to withdraw the report.

The Chairman of the General Affairs Committee is not a new politician. He knows the rules here. When a decision is taken against him, he must not try to short-circuit further discussions on the report. The time factor to which you, Mr. President, referred is meaningless. There is a quorum here.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – There is not a quorum.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – It is for the President to decide whether there is a quorum. It is not, with respect, for a member to decide.

I suggest that there is a quorum, Mr. President. The Clerk is sitting next to you. If there were no quorum, he would have advised adjourning the sitting long ago. Let us not get sidetracked by those issues.

I am genuinely trying to be helpful. It is up to you, Mr. President, to let the Assembly take the decision this evening. There is no reason to postpone it for whatever reasons you may give. The time and quorum factors do not come into it. There are sufficient members here to express a view. My friend, Mr. Freeson, has shown clearly how he feels. It is up to you, Mr. President, to give a fair, straightforward and unbiased lead.

I am sure that this applies in your parliament as it does in the British Parliament: we regard the Speaker – and that is how we regard you – as a person who takes no sides. You are supposed to be completely independent. With respect, I ask you to show that independence this evening.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I am doing my best, Mr. Cox.

I call Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

Mr. FERRARI AGGRADI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I feel that we are losing some of the calm and gravity which we should maintain on all occasions. We are indeed in danger of sliding into unpleasantness. You were elected yesterday, Mr. President, and have done everything possible to find a solution. I am disturbed by a number of outbursts which reveal the state of mind of some people determined to advance particular ideas. When the President proposes that discussion be resumed tomorrow morning and asks the Chairman of the committee to put a proposal to the Assembly which is free to take any decision it likes, I think that his proposal should be accepted. It is a straightforward proposal for a compromise solution. Let us remember that the President could take an independent decision because where no rule applies he has power to decide on the Assembly's business.

I should like to make another point. Seeing that some members intend to reopen the debate, I would remind the Assembly that we were invited to a reception at 7 o'clock this evening. Many members, who are accompanied by their wives, have already gone to the reception so that we voted without a quorum.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, kindly let the speaker finish. The fact that this is an awkward matter is no reason to turn the Assembly into a saloon bar. Please continue, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

Mr. FERRARI AGGRADI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I am well aware that I cannot raise a question of substance but I would ask you out of

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi (continued)

respect for our President, to take into account the fact that we voted without the required quorum because of the absence of many members who have gone to the reception. I am not discussing the merits of the problem, but this is a matter of fact to which we shall have to return.

The President also said a short time ago that the Chairman of the committee had requested that this proposal be referred to the committee and expressed the fear that this might constitute a precedent. In my opinion the best solution here would be for the committee to consider this proposal and to report back tomorrow morning to the Assembly which would take a final decision. This is my view and I think we should proceed in that way out of respect for you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall also try to intervene at each point. You have had your say but the chair, too, should be able to suggest a solution so as to avoid too many interventions in this procedural debate.

I wish my intentions to be quite clear and to reassure Mr. Cox that the chair will play precisely the rôle appropriate to it.

Firstly, the chair considers that the Assembly had completed the general debate and begun to vote on the draft recommendation. Secondly, it considers not only that voting had started but that a vote had actually been taken and recorded and that this constitutes an irrevocable fact, whatever the result of the vote. Thirdly, the Chairman of the committee has explained to us that, in his view, the adoption of Amendment 1 has considerably altered the purport of his draft recommendation. He made the statement which you all heard. It was an objective statement, and the committee Chairman then made a suggestion concerning procedure which, in my opinion, and I hope he will excuse my saying so, was perhaps not the most appropriate as it is not provided for in the Rules of Procedure.

I am convinced, Ladies and Gentlemen, that you would have been quite willing at that point for the committee Chairman to request that the sitting be suspended to allow the General Affairs Committee to meet immediately to consider the newly created political situation. Such a suspension of the sitting, even while voting was in progress, might possibly have been accepted by the Assembly, and I use the word “possibly” and “by the Assembly” advisedly.

We now have an objective explanation of the situation but the way in which it should be resolved is not clear as a situation of this kind has never arisen before and we are in the position of having to take a completely unprecedented decision. Bearing in mind what has

transpired and the statements made by each of you, I wonder whether we could not consider the following alternatives.

On the one hand the voting could continue although we are under no obligation to complete the voting process now, and I repeat “We are under no obligation”.

On the other hand if I close the sitting and voting is not completed this evening it will automatically begin again as soon as the sitting opens tomorrow morning.

Let us be quite clear. The two options are that we continue until the voting on the whole of the draft recommendation has been completed, say by 8 p.m. or 9 p.m., or I close the sitting. I am entitled to do this but I will exercise this right only with your agreement. If voting is interrupted, it will begin again automatically at the beginning of tomorrow morning’s sitting. Those are the two possibilities.

I therefore put the following question to you: do you not think that it would be wiser, bearing in mind the explanation which I have endeavoured to give of this complex situation, for the Assembly to decide here and now by a vote whether or not it wishes to go beyond the normal timetable in order to conclude the debate in progress? That is all.

I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. We have now been going over this ground for at least half an hour. Clearly, when the procedure to refer the matter to the committee was queried, a ruling should have been given immediately, or within a few moments, to the effect that a mistake had been made and that, under the Rules of Procedure, there could not be reference back at that point of the proceedings.

If that ruling had been given approximately half an hour ago, we should have continued – having already taken one vote – with the other amendments on the order paper and it is probable that by now we should have completed or nearly completed our business.

I put it to you, Mr. President, that there is no need for you to debate the matter with us. There is a rule that we proceed with the vote. You have told us that you have the discretion as President to seek the adjournment of the Assembly when you think it right to do so. I am not challenging that decision. It may be the case that you can do that in the middle of the voting procedure, although it would be unusual for such an adjournment to be moved at that time – but that is a matter for you to judge by the rules.

With respect, it is not for you to put that matter to the rest of the Assembly to vote

Mr. Freeson (continued)

upon. Mr. President, you make a ruling. Do we, under the rules, adjourn at your discretion or do we continue? The issue of whether a chairman reports back tomorrow morning on an assessment or proposal is beyond the procedures of the Assembly.

We have voted on a matter. I maintain that, despite what has been said by the Chairman and one or two others, the amendment for which we have voted is not a wrecking amendment. If it had been a wrecking amendment, you, Mr. President, or the Table could have ruled it so, and it would not have been on the order paper.

It was not a wrecking amendment and anyone reading the text as it is now amended would accept that, while there is certainly a change there, that does not wreck the report, as has been said by the Chairman of the committee and certain other members. We should get it perfectly clear. The report is still before us. It is the property of the Assembly. No motion to refer it to the committee was put to the Assembly before we started the debate and voting procedure. All these matters, therefore, should be put aside as being out of order and we should proceed with the vote or – and it is within your discretion so to do – adjourn until tomorrow morning. It is for you to decide.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*). – I do not want to complicate the position but I understand that we have already put forward debates on two reports for this afternoon. If, as I understand, we are to resume tomorrow morning before the German Foreign Secretary addresses the Assembly, we shall not finish that report either. I would ask you to think about that, Mr. President. If the vote is postponed, the result may be that we are in worse trouble tomorrow than we are in today.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – It is quite possible that we shall be making a farce of this Assembly. There is no reason why we should not adjourn, but if we adjourn it means that the report is dead and it must start again *de novo*. It must be taken back to the committee and then be brought before us once more. If we adjourn, Mr. President, surely that is what you will do. You cannot adjourn and then bring it to the floor again tomorrow. You can only suspend or adjourn the sitting and accept that the amendment has been made and that the Chairman of the committee has withdrawn the full report. If he has withdrawn the full report, he cannot withdraw it until tomorrow. He can

withdraw it until some other time when there is a slot in our timetable into which it can again be fitted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am sorry but as Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments I support what Mr. van den Bergh has just said.

The fact is that I gave an undertaking to Sir Dudley Smith, who has had to leave for England, that the report on the state of European security which he is to present would be considered at the beginning of tomorrow morning's sitting.

We arranged for him to be here at 10 a.m., so I hope that tomorrow morning we shall be able to address ourselves to the problems of defence and armaments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the committee Chairman, Mr. Michel.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, a few moments ago you gave us your opinion on this question. I do not share your view, but I am willing to help you pursue the course you have outlined if it enables us to resolve the deadlock.

It is the job of a committee chairman to safeguard the text of his committee's reports to the Assembly. This is very clear and it was for that purpose that I intervened a short time ago.

When an amendment drastically alters a text and changes its original meaning it is the duty of the committee chairman to ask that it be referred back so that the committee may, where appropriate, revise its views and possibly adopt the amendment and return the text with the comment that a mistake was made at first reading and that the committee wishes to reconsider the text, as partly amended by the Assembly. I hold this to be the proper rôle of a committee chairman.

Mr. President, Rule 41 of the Rules of Procedure gives you the right to convene a committee either during or between sessions. I wonder whether you may not have to convene the General Affairs Committee tomorrow at 8.30 a.m. or 9 a.m. so that it can resolve this difficulty and then at the start of the sitting, say at 10 a.m., present to the Assembly a text which might well be the same as that just adopted. Why not? I do not wish to anticipate the committee's decision, I am merely putting forward a suggestion which might lead to a solution. That would be in line with normal Assembly procedure.

I can see, Mr. President, that the convening of a meeting puts you in a difficult situation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Michel, Ladies and Gentlemen, the point has now been reached where I must assume my presidential responsibilities. I would now ask you to remain silent for a while to avoid any repetition of what has just been going on. Having heard the views expressed on one side and the other it is now up to me to take a decision and to ask you to do so as well. I greatly regret that I find myself with a problem the solution of which is not helped by Mr. Michel's explanatory comments.

Voting had already begun and one vote on an amendment had already been taken. Voting was therefore actually in progress. All the Rules of Procedure which can be quoted concerning reference back to committee, the reconvening of the committee and so on apply only to cases where the report may still be under discussion but certainly not when voting has started. This is the problem now facing me and, as it is my duty to uphold the Rules of Procedure, I must insist on the absolute right of the Assembly to continue with a vote which has been started without any challenge concerning a quorum. That is my position. The Assembly will therefore continue to debate this draft, to vote on the other amendments and will take a final decision on the text as a whole.

That is the way in which I interpret the Rules of Procedure and I trust I have understood the points made by a large number of speakers.

We now come to the political problem and here, Ladies and Gentlemen, I must ask for your understanding.

In the first place, I am at the start of my term of office and I do not wish either to complicate the work of the Assembly or to create a precedent which would ruin all our efforts at co-operation. At the same time we are colleagues and have been working together for years. We know each other well. You now have before you a committee Chairman and his Rapporteur who quite suddenly have come up against a worrying political problem. I am well aware that you consider that to be irrelevant and that the voting should continue notwithstanding. But there has been a development: the committee Chairman has asked for our help in trying to resolve this political difficulty. We are therefore discussing not a procedural issue – nobody, I believe, could argue with my interpretation of the rules – but a political problem which has arisen.

As I have already said, we could have suspended the sitting but to have deferred the vote until first thing tomorrow morning would have entailed many disadvantages, the most important of which from my point of view is that the day already has a very difficult and heavy

programme. In these circumstances I ask that everybody should display good will and determination to forge ahead.

I shall now suspend the sitting for a quarter of an hour. I ask the General Affairs Committee to meet during this time and to present their views when the sitting is resumed. I give you my assurance that at the end of this quarter of an hour we shall proceed to vote on paragraph (iii) of the draft recommendation.

I ask you to make this gesture of good will towards our colleagues in the General Affairs Committee. The Rules of Procedure remain intact.

The sitting is suspended.

(The sitting was suspended at 7.35 p.m. and resumed at 8.05 p.m.)

The sitting is resumed.

I ask the members of the Assembly to accept my apologies for having extended the suspension to await the return of the committee to their seats.

Before calling the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee I draw your attention to the specific items in the Rules of Procedure which can guide us in reaching a solution.

I refer you to Rule 29 (8) and (9) of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly which read as follows:

“ 8. The reference back of an amendment to committee may always be requested and shall be obligatory if requested by the chairman or rapporteur of the committee.

9. The reference back of an amendment to committee shall not necessarily interrupt the debate. The Assembly may fix a time-limit within which the committee shall report its conclusions on the amendments which have been referred to it.”

On advice, I shall restrict myself to reading out these two paragraphs of Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure. If you will consider the matter with due objectivity but at the same time make some allowance for the way in which the problem has arisen, we shall be able, once more, to summarise the situation fairly clearly.

An amendment was agreed to and must remain so. Subsequently, the committee Chairman asked for reference back of one or more of the other amendments. He was entitled to do this under paragraph 8 which I have just read to you. If he requests it, the amendment or amendments on which no vote has been taken are automatically referred back to committee. That does not necessarily mean that the debate is interrupted. The debate continues unless in

The President (continued)

accordance with the second sentence of paragraph 9 the Assembly decides – and it is the Assembly not the President which takes the decision – to fix a time-limit within which the committee shall report its conclusions on the amendments which have been referred to it.

How does the situation now appear? If the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee – to whom I apologise, but I want the Assembly to have the same explanation as I was given during the break – asks for reference back of one or more of the amendments which have not been agreed to, they are referred back. Thereafter I shall have to ask the Assembly, in accordance with paragraph 9, whether it is prepared to agree to a time-limit to enable the committee to report its conclusions on the amendments which have been referred to it. If the Assembly agrees to do so there is no problem. If it is not prepared to do so we shall continue to discuss the text of the draft recommendation as modified by the first amendment, but without the other amendments, and I shall then be obliged to put to the vote the text lacking the amendments tabled by several members.

This situation is not only liable to become rather complicated from the procedural point of view but also has a bearing on the right of every member to table an amendment and have it put to the vote. I personally consider that action along these lines would be rather unwise, but it is for the Assembly to decide.

I am further informed that precedents do exist. In Western European Union, whenever a committee chairman has invoked paragraph 8 of Rule 29 to secure reference back of an amendment the Assembly has granted the committee additional time to enable it to present its conclusions at a later sitting on the amendments referred to it.

These precedents are a matter of practice and not covered by the written rules.

I will conclude by pointing out that, depending on the question put to it by the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, the Assembly is well aware of the consequences which will flow from its decision.

Ladies and Gentlemen, in view of the importance of the issue and, I am sure you will agree, of the difficult position I find myself in, and further of my wish not to begin my presidency with a procedural decision which would not be wholly objective, may I, before calling the committee Chairman, simply ask you whether you consider that the explanations I have given you are sufficient to enable us to proceed and listen to what the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee has to say. If anyone would

like any further explanation please put up your hand.

I see no raised hands. Thank you.

I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to express my appreciation of the efforts which you are making to resolve a problem which is perhaps much deeper and more difficult than it seems. It cannot be said that you are having an easy time on the first day of your presidency. Never mind – it is the fate of presidents of assemblies to try to solve difficult problems. There aren't any easy problems or at least they are usually not discussed.

The General Affairs Committee did meet but there was unfortunately no quorum and was therefore unable to reach a decision on a compromise proposal which might have allowed a solution to be reached this evening. I refer in particular to a suggestion made by Mr. Lagorce, the Rapporteur, and to the intermediate proposal from another member of the Assembly. I have no advice to offer since we were unable to vote.

Unofficially, however, the committee did ask Peter Hardy, one of the signatories to the amendment, to give an explanation of vote on this amendment. I do not know if it will be approved by the other signatories to the amendment. That is another question. But the fact remains that his statement may enable our Assembly to continue its work bearing in mind the forthcoming explanation and the possibility of a vote later.

Following this unofficial discussion which does not commit any member of the committee you might now, Mr. President, call one of the signatories to the amendment. Some committee members stated formally that they would not be committed by a statement or expression of opinion. As there was no quorum no committee member is bound by the proceedings.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Michel. I shall take your advice, but would first ask you whether this is the only statement by the committee Chairman on the resumption of the sitting. I ask in view of the rights confined specifically to the committee Chairman and the Rapporteur.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – You want rather more information than you are asking from the committee Chairman...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You know very well what I am trying to establish. I want to know whether or not the debate is to continue following your statement.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Following Mr. Hardy's statement, it would be normal for the debate to start...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That is what I wanted to know.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – ...and the members of the Assembly will then say whether they feel themselves able to continue the debate or not. I have no right to say any more because, I must stress, there was no valid discussion in committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I rule that there is a request for an explanation of vote on the amendment adopted. We are now at the stage of voting on paragraph (ii) of the draft recommendation. Does anyone wish to give an explanation of vote on the amendment which has been adopted?

I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish to point out that our debates are governed by the Rules of Procedure. Rule 23 stipulates that unless the Assembly decides otherwise, sittings shall be opened and closed at specified times; no such decision has been taken. I think that the President should open and close sittings at the times specified in Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, that is 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. and 3 p.m. to 6.30 p.m. This sitting should already be closed. No decision has been taken to the contrary. A decision can only be taken by a vote of the Assembly; otherwise, the President, as in all parliaments, should close the sitting, as the Rules of Procedure lay down very precise times.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I understand your point very well, Mr. Bianco.

I thought that the Assembly was prepared to continue working after 6.30 p.m. when I informed delegates a short time ago of my wish – which was shared by them – to finish, at least, consideration of the draft recommendation on Mr. Lagorce's report, since, if I am not mistaken, we thought it would then be possible to begin consideration of Sir Dudley Smith's report. I regret that Rule 23 cannot be invoked in the present instance.

I call Mr. Milani on a point of order.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – This morning the Assembly was informed that speeches explaining votes are made after the actual texts have been adopted. I find therefore that there has been a breach of the rules as compared with what we were told this morning. Mr. President, I appreciate the political importance of the leader of the Labour Group and I also appreciate the political importance of the attention attached by the Chairman of the Gene-

ral Affairs Committee to the statement made by the proposer of the amendment. I consider, however, that this statement cannot change the situation which has been created. There has been a vote, there has been an amendment and it is therefore not possible to alter the political sense of the amendment so approved by making further amendments. The only solution I can see is that the Chairman of the committee and the Rapporteur should ask the Assembly to consider both the report and the document at the next session. The President should if necessary take an independent decision to that effect.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We are getting there!

I call Mr. Rauti.

Mr. RAUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in my view the point raised by Mr. Bianco cannot be ignored. This Assembly works to a strict timetable fixed in advance. All members are usually present – in many cases they are here for the first time – and they plan their engagements on the basis of that timetable. If you do not suspend the session at the prescribed time, we shall find ourselves in the paradoxical situation that a minority of the Assembly – which now becomes the majority because everyone has relied on the timetable laid down in the rules – can continue the work of the Assembly indefinitely and can approve anything it likes. I wish to refer specifically to the rules and to your precise responsibilities under those rules.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before we hear Mr. Hardy, I now call Mr. Spies von Büllenheim on a point of order.

First of all, however, I wish to reply to the points which have been raised.

I understood that the Assembly had agreed to continue working after 6.30 p.m. I take responsibility for interpreting the will of the Assembly in this way and declare that issue closed.

Turning now to whether or not it is possible to have an explanation of vote after the vote on an amendment when the Rules of Procedure provide for such an explanation after the vote on the draft recommendation, you are right, Mr. Milani, and I formally acknowledge your interpretation of the rules. You are well aware I am looking for a way out of this difficulty. If you wish to adhere strictly to the letter of the Rules of Procedure we shall be here till midnight! But I am at your service. I am endeavouring to find a solution and I appeal for good will provided always that we do not contravene the Rules of Procedure. Please show a little understanding for the efforts which several of us are making!

If your request is for an explanation of vote, Mr. Hardy, then, in view of the objection just

The President (continued)

made, I shall ask whether the Assembly accepts, as it has sole authority to decide.

I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we all know that written rules of procedure cannot cover every contingency. Rather, the correct procedure is enshrined in parliamentary practice. One such practice is that a motion for closure of a debate can be put only by someone who has not yet spoken in that debate. I have not yet spoken in the procedural debate that has now been going on for two hours. May I therefore do so now.

I would like to point out that, at the request of the chairman – whether rightly or wrongly is not important; I think it was wrong, but anyone can make a mistake – you had in practice already concluded this item of business, because you had already said, as we have just been reminded, that we in fact ought to go on to Sir Dudley Smith's report, but you had already told him that he would not be required until tomorrow. This shows that you had actually already closed the debate on this item.

You then announced that you would be prepared – rightly, as I see it – to allow a debate on procedure. This procedural debate has now been going on for two hours. I would refer to Rule 23, which speaks of morning and afternoon sittings. After all, there are lists on which we register for sittings. Now we find ourselves in what is in fact a night sitting – a possibility which no one could have considered. May I point out that after you mentioned Sir Dudley Smith's report many members left the chamber thinking that no further business would be taken today.

This being so, and given the situation in which we now find ourselves, where we can study the Rules of Procedure as long as we like and find nothing to help us, I move that the President – and his decision would be valid – exercise the right given to him alone by Rule 11, which stipulates that “the duties of the President shall be: to open, suspend and close sittings” and close the sitting for this evening. To continue the sitting would be wrong and unfair to those who left the chamber when he concluded the item of business. That is the first point.

The second point is that to continue the sitting would also be unfair to all our other colleagues, who could not have anticipated a night sitting on this important question. I therefore beg to put the motion – directed personally to the President – that he exercise his right under Rule 11. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, I shall of course accept my responsibilities.

Mr. Hardy wanted to speak but I have twice had to deny him the floor because points of order were raised which must take precedence. I will therefore call Mr. Hardy, and will then inform you of my decision, as we must finish with this issue one way or another.

The fact remains – as you have had the kindness to point out – that my first reaction in relation to the Rules of Procedure was to allow the committee to report on the amendment. My second proposal was to adjourn the sitting until tomorrow morning, but this I was unable to do because many points of order were raised and I allowed everybody to express themselves freely. I then suspended the sitting, as I am also entitled to do, so that the committee could present a solution.

Another speaker now wishes to be heard. Under the Rules of Procedure he will be able to do so after the explanation of vote by Mr. Hardy, whom I now call.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). – I can be very brief. I was brief in my comments in the committee and I hope that those comments were helpful to the committee. I hope that they will be helpful now.

My basic proposition was that in the furore it may have been that the Chairman and Rapporteur of the committee were a little hasty in that they may have misunderstood the nature and effect of the amendment. I read out the paragraph, as amended, which was:

“Recalling that, as long as more progress has not been made in disarmament, the security of Western Europe will be ensured only by deterrence;”.

When my colleague, Reg Freeson, moved the amendment and when we drafted it we clearly left in the word “deterrence”. We merely removed the reference in the rest of that paragraph to the “essential part” of nuclear weapons. We did that because paragraph (ii) as it stood contradicted paragraph (vii). It is an essential part of the committee's attitude and, I hope, of every sane politician in Western Europe, be he left, right or centre, that we are calling or hoping for a reduction in nuclear weaponry.

If we leave in the word “essential”, we are making it impossible for any intelligent statesman in Western Europe to seek to reduce nuclear weaponry. It would be foolish of the Assembly to take that line.

The amended paragraph in the report maintains the word “deterrence”. I suggested in

Mr. Hardy (continued)

committee that, in the heat of the moment and the excitement, people may have thought that the word "deterrence" was being taken out. I can assure the Assembly, as an explanation of my vote, that the word "deterrence" remains. My colleague, Reg Freeson, said that we ought not to include nuclear weapons as an essential part when we seek to talk about their removal by negotiation.

I am not suggesting that the negotiations would be easy, or that we would take an unrealistic view, but I am suggesting that we have overlooked that the word "deterrence" is there. As it is, and as a decision has been taken, we should proceed with the rest of the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, the time has now arrived to organise our work systematically.

The request which initiated this debate has not been renewed. Mr. Michel informed me that one of the members of the committee wished to make a statement. I asked if other proposals had been presented. I shall go by what the committee Chairman has said and shall state plainly and quite factually that the request for reference back of amendments to committee has not been repeated. I summarise the statement by the committee Chairman which only he and the Rapporteur are entitled to make.

We have also heard Mr. Hardy. We shall not call that an explanation of vote but we shall say that he wished to express a point of view in this very wide-ranging debate and that he chose to state his position on the interpretation of the amendment which has been adopted.

I therefore consider that the voting on the draft recommendation should go ahead and that there are no grounds whatsoever for interrupting it.

The problem is to know when we are going to complete our business. I ask you simply if you accept my view that it would, for many reasons, be extremely complicated to have this issue added to the orders of the day for tomorrow morning's sitting before Sir Dudley Smith's report. If there are no objections, I believe therefore that it is absolutely vital – and I am very sorry to say this – to continue our present sitting until this draft recommendation is adopted. Of course, if any request is made for suspension of the sitting, I shall ask the Assembly if it is prepared to adjourn for an hour.

But if we wish to maintain respect for the Assembly and to acknowledge that we have displayed a great deal of mutual tolerance, I think that we should not upset the timetable for the next few days but must finish our debate today.

Ladies and Gentlemen, do you agree that we should continue our sitting without interrupting our work?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I ask for the floor.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, after a meeting of the committee from which some members were absent, as I have already mentioned, a number of committee members argued the need for a compromise solution. Mr. Hardy has made a gesture which seems to me to constitute such a solution. But to continue the present sitting and put the later clauses to the vote would be to strain the good will of the delegates who are trying to resolve the difficulty.

I therefore ask that the sitting be suspended and I suggest that we conclude our examination of the draft tomorrow morning before the normal time, say at 9.30 a.m., to allow the day's business to proceed normally. If the efforts at compromise in order to find a solution in fact fail to produce one, I could of course revert to procedural points concerning the later amendments, but that is something I do not wish to do. It would be a good idea to sleep on it so that tomorrow we could all meet and suggest some other final solutions. That is the purpose of the efforts to find a compromise.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, take pity on us all, including the staff who need a little rest.

I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, before the situation occasioned by your comment arose, it would have seemed to me correct, in substance, for us to continue in the normal way. However, thinking of our other colleagues who – as Mr. Spies von Büllesheim rightly pointed out – then left the chamber believing that the sitting had ended, there can be no alternative but to conclude that the sitting proper actually ended at that time. No other procedure is possible. That was in fact what I said two hours ago, although I do not wish to sound self-righteous: any decision taken from that point on could only be wrong, because the Assembly was in fact no longer sitting. I would therefore ask you to proceed in accordance with Mr. Spies von Büllesheim's motion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – You, Mr. President, have to guard the agenda for every day of the session. If we have a spillover from today,

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

we shall have problems tomorrow and the day after. We already have problems today. We have debated procedural matters for two hours because it is not clear how rules should be implemented. I am sorry about that, but I should like to finish the debate today.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Certainly, Ladies and Gentlemen, business ought to have been finished long ago, but when a member asks to speak it is my duty to let him do so.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – It is you who take the decisions!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Indeed, but I cannot refuse the floor to those who wish to speak.

I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). – Before the suspension, Mr. President, you gave us a ruling on how you would conduct the business. Most of what has transpired since five minutes to eight has been unnecessary. You could have ruled – not had a debate with us or put questions to us. You could have ruled and we could have proceeded.

Having wasted three-quarters of an hour since we came back and three-quarters of an hour before the suspension on matters that you could have resolved, let us, for heaven's sake, get on and finish the business.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, I must now call a halt to the points of order. I take responsibility for doing so whether you approve of my action or not. Having shown good will in giving the floor to everybody wishing to speak every time a solution appeared possible I consider that we have now reached a wholly unreal situation as every speaker is tending to say that we have been wasting time whereas in reality we have only been respecting the democratic rights of each and every one of us – rights which I also respect and will safeguard. It is you, Ladies and Gentlemen, who initiated this debate with each developing his own argument following the decision by the committee. The chair simply let you have your say.

Whatever the views of one side or the other – and I am giving my opinion whether you take heed of it or not – a decision that we should start tomorrow morning's sitting at 10 o'clock with the report of the General Affairs Committee would simply paralyse our work for the day. I therefore see no alternative but to have an evening sitting.

On the other hand it is entirely possible, and humanly desirable, to suspend the sitting for an

hour, as we do in our national assemblies even when a bill is under discussion. The vote is then taken when the sitting is resumed.

I ask the Assembly to decide by sitting and standing whether or not this debate should be continued.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

I take note that the Assembly is in favour of suspending the sitting.

Anybody who wishes to do so can check the results of the vote with the Clerk of the Assembly.

Ladies and Gentlemen, let us meet again at 9.45 p.m. to allow you to take a little rest. I hope you enjoy your meals.

The sitting is suspended.

(The sitting was suspended at 8.50 p.m. and was resumed at 9.55 p.m.)

The sitting is resumed.

I call Mr. Bianco on a point of order.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the first requirement, in my view, is to define the precise nature of this sitting. I greatly appreciate your open-handed treatment of members and that is why I am speaking now.

My question is whether this sitting should not be regarded as a new, evening sitting. At the end of the debate you said that the sitting was suspended; we are in fact holding a fresh sitting as Rule 23 of our Rules of Procedure is quite clear. In any case, your interpretation must be "interpreted" as opening a fresh sitting. I maintain, therefore, that there must be a quorum as this is a new sitting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Bianco, allow me to point out that I asked the Assembly a short time ago whether we should continue the debate in uninterrupted sitting or whether the sitting should be suspended. This is recorded in the minutes and I accordingly suspended the sitting.

We shall now resume our work, and the quorum which was valid prior to the suspension continues to be so following it. This is the Assembly's decision on my personal proposal. I suggested another solution some time previously but this was not taken up.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – At the beginning of your undoubtedly successful career in the presidential chair, Mr. President, it is unfortunate that this situation should have arisen tonight and when I rise, as I do, on a point of order it is formally with no considera-

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

tion whatsoever of any political persuasion. I simply do not think that this day has done anything to dignify the proceedings of this Assembly on an important issue, and it is in that spirit, and that spirit alone, that I rise to put a point of order.

I wish to refer to Rule 32 on procedural motions, which has not yet been invoked in this Assembly today and which reads as follows – and I am limiting myself to the precise words:

“A representative or substitute shall have a prior right to speak if he asks leave... to move reference back to committee.”

Down the page it states:

“The above matters shall take precedence over the main question, the debate on which shall be suspended while they are being considered.”

I understand from continuing to read Rule 32 that in a debate on what I have suggested, which I hope will not be necessary, only certain persons shall be heard. The first is the proposer – myself – who on this occasion does not intend to address the Assembly because I have no political consideration to put forward. This is not the way for the Assembly to gain repute for itself. There shall also be one speaker against the motion, and the rapporteur or chairman of any committee concerned, which I presume in this case means the Chairman or Rapporteur sitting on the commission bench. I plead, with no political considerations in mind, that members accept that this is simply not the way to conduct these proceedings.

I move the motion under Rule 32, and I rely on that rule. I am at the moment in no way identified with attitudes to the report or to an amendment one way or the other. If necessary, my colleagues and I are prepared to talk practically indefinitely on any amendment that is raised. I do not want to do that, because I do not think that it helps WEU.

I therefore ask for the collaboration of all my friends from all delegations and political parties in accepting what many of you have had to accept in the past. I have been the rapporteur of a report that has been referred back. It is painful, but it is certainly better than the present situation.

I now rely on Rule 32 and ask you, Mr. President, to take it into account and ask for an opponent speaker, if there is one, and for the Rapporteur or Chairman to speak. I ask, Mr. President, for you to rule that what I have suggested should be voted on in the Assembly and settled one way or another.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I rise not to speak against the Rule 32 procedure, but about the threat by Sir Frederic Bennett of a filibuster. He said that he and his colleagues were willing to talk at great length on any amendment. I do not agree with that. It is below-the-belt fighting in a parliamentary assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy to speak against the request for reference back.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I rise to respond to Sir Frederic's proposition and to speak against his motion. I sympathise with his proposal. Some of us have been here since 6 o'clock this evening listening to one point of order after another. The whole business could have been dealt with in the way that I suggested when I responded at the request of Mr. Michel. When we suspended the sitting and went into committee I pointed out the simple solution and the simple source of the difficulty into which we have plunged ourselves.

You ruled, Mr. President, after long consideration and a great deal of explanation from the chair, that we should complete our consideration of this report this evening. That need not take very long. There is much less between the various members of the Assembly than all the proliferation of points of order might seem to have indicated.

We have to uphold you in your office, Mr. President. I explained once, during a moment of exasperation earlier, that I was not in favour of all this interminable bureaucracy. I have never heard of Rule 32. I have not gone into the rules. We have heard an awful lot about rules tonight. We have had them explained to us in detail. We heard about Rule 29 (8), Rule 29 (9), and we now have Rule 32. We could have completed discussion of this report at 6.30 at the latest if only the Assembly had conducted itself sensibly and if we had not had this proliferation of absurdity. I hope that we shall support you, Mr. President – I am sorry if members feel that I am being aggressive, which I am. I have been in this Assembly for interminable hours. It is no good for people who have not been here to get impatient. If anyone is to be impatient, it is those of us who have sat here for this interminable and outrageous period.

I support you, Mr. President, in insisting that this Assembly finish its business tonight. We can do it in next to no time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, Rule 32 invoked by Sir Frederic Bennett stipulates that such a request shall take precedence, with one speaker for and one

The President (continued)

speaker against the motion. Sir Frederic has spoken for reference back. Mr. Hardy has spoken against. In conformity with Rule 32 which gives priority to such a motion, I shall now put to the Assembly Sir Frederic Bennett's motion for reference back.

Rule 32 states that points of order also have priority. Allow me to add a note of humour to this involved debate: I am a christian democrat and therefore know how to be charitable. Do not make me regret the fact so much that I end up taking dictatorial actions which I never thought I would have to take on the very first day of my presidency. I say this in a humorous vein which I ask you to accept.

The second point I want to make seems to me to be fundamental.

We have the right to debate as long as we like because we are a democratic assembly, but I will not allow the debate to be side-tracked, and on this occasion I shall oppose it categorically. We are currently considering a procedural motion. If somebody wishes to speak it should only be on procedure and its validity. If other issues are raised I shall be obliged to require the speaker to yield the floor.

I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to ask Sir Frederic Bennett to explain clearly whether his proposal is for reference back to the committee or for resumption of the debate at this session. I think it most important that this point be clarified. We are in favour of deferring the debate on this subject to the next session.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I shall tell you again: you are the President of this Assembly. You have before you under Rule 32 a proposition moved by Sir Frederic Bennett. It is time that we decided whether we are to vote on it. As a member of the Assembly, I move formally that the vote be taken.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Order please.

All I ask is that the validity of the Rules of Procedure should not be challenged. Sir Frederic Bennett has invoked Rule 32, which I applied by calling one speaker for and one speaker against. Paragraph 4 of Rule 32 reads as follows:

“In addition, a representative or substitute shall have a prior right to speak if he asks leave to raise a point of order. A point of

order must be confined to raising questions of procedure for a ruling from the chair.”

As far as the reactivation of WEU is concerned I think we have made a good beginning because we are keeping ourselves awake at this late hour learning by heart the Rules of Procedure of our Assembly and thinking especially about the changes we might wish to make to them in future.

Under Rule 32 (4), it is for me, not Sir Frederic Bennett, to answer you. I must simply tell you that this request for reference back under paragraph 2 is tantamount to a previous question calling for the immediate suspension of the sitting or adjournment of the debate.

I shall reply first of all to Mr. Cox.

I am endeavouring, Mr. Cox, to act responsibly as President of the Assembly. It is quite possible that my replies are not pleasing to everyone but I am not here to be agreeable. I am trying to do my duty and you will be able to pass judgment on me later.

I must tell you quite simply that Rule 32, which can be invoked by any member of this Assembly, takes precedence and calls for an immediate vote of the Assembly. If I were to take up your suggestion I should contravene our rules.

I call Mr. Beix on a point of order.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, on a subject as controversial and highly important as the ideas of WEU member states about defence it would be fitting for us to hear what the Chairman and Rapporteur of the committee have to say following Sir Frederic Bennett's motion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I must stress, Mr. Beix, that points of order raised in accordance with Rule 32 (4) take priority. This is why I called Mr. Bianco, Mr. Cox and yourself. However, the same Rule 32, which provides for one speaker in favour and one speaker against, also lays down that the rapporteur or chairman of the committee should give his opinion. I could only call the chairman or the rapporteur after calling representatives who wish to raise a point of order.

I call Dr. Miller on a point of order.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. May I make a helpful suggestion? You have been kind enough to extend to members the right to intervene on points of order. May I suggest that it is up to you to decide what is a point of order and what is not. You should exert your authority as President by saying clearly to a member, almost the moment that he opens his mouth: “That is not a point of order. Sit down.”

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— I entirely share your concern, but for me points of order have always been sacrosanct.

Mr. Müller raised his hand at the same time as you and I cannot refuse to give him the floor. But, as I did a short time ago before the sitting was suspended, I take it upon myself to state that after he has spoken I shall call the Chairman or the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee and shall accept no further points of order.

I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, may I ask you, in full agreement with Dr. Miller — we are almost namesakes, after all — please to give the floor to the Chairman and Rapporteur, and let us then vote without further debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I shall be very brief. A motion for reference back to the committee has been made under a fundamental rule. You must therefore put it to the vote.

In view of the present mood of the Assembly it seems to me that it would be proper to refer the text back to committee to find a formulation acceptable to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Michel.

All those who asked to speak under Rule 32 have now spoken.

I now ask the Assembly to vote on the motion for reference back to committee.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The motion for reference back is agreed to.

The report is therefore referred back to committee.

I will immediately notify the Bureau and, if necessary, the Presidential Committee in order to decide when this report shall be resubmitted to the Assembly.

I call Mr. Hardy for an explanation of vote.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. Explanation of vote — it is all very well, but the majority, having secured that decision, have put in no time this evening while some of us have been here for hours and hours listening to points of order. The Conservative Group returned from their enjoyable evening in time to abuse democracy.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 20th June, at 9.30 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. State of European security (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 971).
2. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty — reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 — reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council (Presentation of the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Documents 973 and amendments, 979 and 975).
3. Twenty-ninth annual report of the Council (Presentation by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Document 969).
4. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty — reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 — reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council (Joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and votes on the draft recommendations, Documents 973 and amendments, 979 and 975).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

I call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). — I understand the problems that you, Mr. President, have had to face and I apologise if I have made things awkward for you.

I hope that we have learnt from what has happened tonight and I suggest that you and the Clerk of the Assembly should, as a matter of urgency, arrange a meeting of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to thrash out as soon as possible ways of overcoming what has

Mr. Cox (continued)

been an absolute farce in the past four hours. If necessary, we shall have to draw up new rules.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I am very conscious, Mr. Cox, of the force of what you say after the difficulties we have just had. I entirely share your view but I must tell you – and I think it accords with the concern which you have been expressing over these many hours – that before referring the matter to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges I will inform you of my intentions and ideas on this subject.

I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, at the risk of appearing somewhat obstinate, I must point out that we have not in fact had a sitting this evening. You interrupted or terminated the sitting at some point in the course of the evening, as Mr. Spies von Büllenheim pointed out. The official report will show that the sitting has long been concluded. Consequently, all further proceedings are legally irrelevant and did not take place. This means, inter alia, that you did not refer the report back to the committee. What you did here was in the nature of a theatrical performance or dress rehearsal, but it was not real. From the legal point of view, I maintain, none of this actually took place.

I would nevertheless ask you – if you see matters differently – briefly to explain so that it can be recorded in the minutes, what this reference back actually means in your view. It would interest me to know, for example, whether you consider Amendment 1 irrevocably adopted or whether you think the committee is entitled to overturn everything once again.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Like every self-respecting parliamentarian, Mr. Vogt, you are obstinate. However, that should not worry you as far as I am concerned. I have also endeavoured to be obstinate in my way throughout the evening and I hope that everything will be clear in the end, whatever our opinions.

As far as the question of validity is concerned I would point out that the sitting was simply resumed, as I explained just now, because I asked the Assembly to vote on whether the sitting should be suspended or the voting continued.

In any case you are aware of my views which I expressed a short time ago. The sitting was suspended and we are now continuing this afternoon's sitting.

A number of speakers have raised points of order, quoting the rule which provides that sittings end at 6.30 p.m. I have told each

speaker that I cannot accept this point because at the beginning of the afternoon sitting I drew attention to the fact that we would continue until the adoption of the draft and that I hoped we might even be able to begin to debate Sir Dudley Smith's report. I was actually able to talk to Sir Dudley here during the sitting before he was obliged to leave us.

It follows that the rule providing that sittings end at 6.30 p.m. cannot be invoked.

The decision was taken openly and I have no doubts as to its validity.

Turning now to the consequences of the adoption of Sir Frederic Bennett's motion for reference back to the committee, we have now heard one speaker against, three points of order and the explanations of the committee Chairman and I must tell you that I cannot at present find anything in this rule – I may be mistaken, but you will forgive me if I do not yet know the Rules of Procedure by heart – to show when and how the report should be referred back to the committee. I will make this my business, but I must confirm again, Mr. Vogt, both to you and to the Assembly, that paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation submitted to us has been amended by the successful Amendment 1 and in this form constitutes an integral part of the draft recommendation.

Those are the replies I wished to give you and I hope they may finally clear up any possibility of misunderstanding.

I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). – I am sorry to have to speak again. Like you, Mr. President, I should prefer not to be here at this time of night.

However, I understand that the report which has been referred to the committee has already been amended by the Assembly. There can be no going back on that decision by the Assembly. I hope that you will confirm my understanding.

I am a new member of the Assembly and I am attending a session for the first time. I feel that I must record my deep anxiety about what I can describe only as a combination of political manipulation and incompetence by the secretariat in advising you on matters about which you require to be advised.

I make it perfectly clear that I am appalled by the standard of administration in the Assembly. None of this was necessary. It would have been perfectly possible at 6.30 p.m. or 6.40 p.m. to rule, according to all the articles that have been quoted since, had you, Mr. President, been properly advised by the secretariat, that our proceedings could continue, subject to the power

Mr. Freeson (continued)

resting with the Assembly that has since been applied.

We have gone on from 6.30 p.m. to about 10.30 p.m. because of a failure by the administration, ending in a complete farce of a major report. The Assembly and its administration should be thoroughly ashamed of themselves. One point is perfectly clear: a vote was taken, and it stands on record. All the incompetence and political manipulation that may have occurred do not alter that decision.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Some of the points which you have raised have been gone into by previous speakers, including Mr. Cox, and to these I have already replied. I see no need to return to them.

As to the report, I have given the Assembly my undertaking to see that it is resubmitted as soon as possible and I said that I would use the instruments available to me including in particular the Bureau.

Mr. Freeson, I acknowledge your determination in defending your position and your toughness in debate. Allow me to say, however, that I have been profoundly shocked by what you said about the administration and our officials. You are well aware as a member of parliament that the President assumes full responsibility. If you have any complaints to make, kindly make them to me. It is I who bear the responsibility.

Bearing in mind the difficulties inherent in this debate I wish to express to our officials my

personal appreciation of their willing support and of their efforts to assist a completely new President who has been confronted with a heavy task.

I regret that you spoke as you did, but, knowing you, I am sure that you will be very willing to join with me on this point. Please show some consideration for the officials who have worked unremittingly throughout this strenuous debate on procedure.

I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have asked for the floor to say that I fully endorse your reply. I also think that the member's comments are unfair and that this Assembly should express support for the administration and the secretariat. Our officials are counsellors who give us their best advice. The political interpretation is a matter for the President. But over and above the impassioned debate, I must also give you credit, Mr. President, for having tried to resolve the questions, for having tried to find the best solutions and for having allowed the Assembly maximum freedom of discussion and therefore the fullest opportunity for a democratic debate.

The officials cannot reply and I think this attack to be unfair. I wish our officials to know that they have my full support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone else wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(*The sitting was closed at 10.35 p.m.*)

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 20th June 1984

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. State of European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 971*).
Speakers: The President, Sir Dudley Smith (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pignion (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Vogt, Mr. Aarts, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Hill (point of order).
4. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 973 and amendments, 979 and amendments and 975*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. De Decker (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Thoss (*Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Spies von Bullesheim (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*).
5. Twenty-ninth annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 969*).
Replies by Mr. Genscher to questions put by: Mr. Pignion, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Baumel, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Gianotti, Mr. Milani, Mr. De Decker, Lord Reay.
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

¹. See page 27.

3. State of European security

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 971)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the state of European security, Document 971.

I call Sir Dudley Smith, Rapporteur.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – The state of European security is nothing if not a topical subject and the committee's report has aroused a good deal of interest in the member countries of NATO and WEU.

That topicality has been underlined by the fact that much interest has been shown by the news media in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. When one considers that every day seems to bring some new announcement about NATO and Western European Union, one realises how interesting and important the subject is.

At the weekend the headlines of a leading British Sunday newspaper suggested that

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

110,000 United States troops might be pulled out of Europe during the next few years. A week ago in this city the foreign ministers of the seven WEU countries were talking – I believe helpfully – about the future of WEU and how the WEU concept could be reinvigorated. At the beginning of this month, the Netherlands Government announced their new decision on INF deployment which, in effect, amounts to a freeze.

There is now more speculation about NATO's future than there has been for many years. Decisions now emerging and crystallising as a result of the discussions are crucial to the world's safety. I hope that the document that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is putting before the Assembly is helpful and relevant and makes a significant contribution to these debates.

The report is a sober, but not unoptimistic, analysis of the current scene and takes due note of the efforts being made by the United States and European countries in defence of freedom – something that is all too often underrated and forgotten by the public whom we as parliamentarians in our various countries seek to represent. Our theme and conclusion is that collective defence should continue to be organised by NATO, to which WEU is inextricably linked, but that some adaptations are of course needed.

When she addressed the Assembly yesterday, Lady Young, who is a Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in my country, said that we should avoid anything that might weaken the alliance – and, I am sure, so say all of us. I strongly believe that the alliance must be constantly strengthened. I suggest that the proposals that we are putting before the Assembly would make NATO stronger at the same time as making it more flexible. The report and individuals in member countries recognise that further Europeanisation of WEU and of NATO is necessary. The report gives credence to the idea that there should be more European recognition in NATO's activities.

The report gives a fairly wide and careful explanation of how NATO has grown up and where it stands today, and I do not believe that too many documents are available as sources of that type of information. It is not always clearly understood exactly where NATO stands. As we point out in the report, many people are left with the impression that, for example, France is no longer connected with NATO. That is not true. As we point out in paragraph 1.3, France is very much involved, as I am sure many of our French colleagues who are here today and who may contribute to the debate will make clear.

I reiterate not so much for our members as for people outside the fact that the key North Atlantic Treaty phrase, which we outline in paragraph 2.1, still holds good. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states:

“the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all...”.

That is the key to the defence of a free society.

The committee went on to explain that not just that point must be considered. Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that preparations for collective defence should be made beforehand, and that is what NATO is all about and what we are trying to improve.

The emphasis in this document and all the way through the development of NATO has been on defence, not on aggression. This report constantly refers to defence and I hope that this document – as, I believe, almost always happens with such documents – will be read and noted in Moscow. I hope that it will be read and noted also by those who would broadly call themselves “the peace people” who are alleging that the free countries of the NATO area are those which are so often putting themselves in the position where they might be an aggressor or make the first strike. Nothing could be further from the truth. NATO is a defensive organisation, and everything that is done to improve it is made from a defensive posture. The posture is realistic and the smaller countries play a significant part.

One of the features that should help this analysis is the fact that many smaller countries on the periphery are playing a key rôle in ensuring that NATO functions sensibly and that a twenty-four-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week watch is maintained. I am glad that there is better news about those countries whose membership has been a little in doubt, especially Spain.

Mr. Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain, has confirmed that a referendum will be held in due course on Spanish membership of NATO, but the issue is expected to be discussed at the Spanish Socialist Party congress in December. Despite trade union opposition to membership, the Spanish Government appears increasingly ready to support membership, and I am sure that many of us will be pleased about that, because in the report we go into the whole subject of Spain's membership and Spain's activities, which came about as a result of the committee's visit to Spain.

NATO is a complex and sometimes puzzling organisation to the layman because of the ramifications of its various committees, its set-up and its various officers, but none the less it is a logi-

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

cal framework. Our proposals on the structure changes could greatly assist to make the organisation more flexible and more relevant while at the same time enhancing its prestige and its ability to respond to any possible challenge.

The position of the Military Committee, the highest purely military authority in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, must be clarified. There is an ambiguity in some of its relationships. There should be a proper balance of responsibility and that, too, should be underlined. There is a strong case for appointing a European chief-of-staff. The three major NATO commanders should be placed on a more equal footing under the Military Committee.

All these changes are probably logical, as can be seen by anyone who wishes to study the present situation and our proposals, which are an effort to increase the standing of the alliance and are in no way to be seen as any kind of anti-Americanism. They are merely to make the whole structure more relevant for all sides in the western free countries. We deal in some detail with logistics and I hope that representatives will at least have a chance to go through the report commissioned by the Defence Committee from General Dijkstra, a man of considerable experience. General Dijkstra's report is a damning indictment of the state of standardisation and harmonisation which somehow has not moved much in the past twenty-five years. In view of the potential threat and the area from which it comes, where there is almost complete standardisation and harmonisation, such as can be achieved in totalitarian countries far more effectively than in free countries, one appreciates the importance of improving standardisation and harmonisation, the lack of which would certainly handicap NATO countries in any conflict.

Our logistics situation is our Achilles heel in the free western world, and our proposals should be referred to NATO immediately for implementation. When I met the press on this report I was asked: "Why do you say that SACEUR should be the authority to do something about this?" That is the operating point, but at the end of the day it is the member governments in the decisions of their cabinets, their prime ministers and their parliamentary assemblies who will have to say that more money will be needed and that much of it should be spent trying to achieve greater harmonisation.

We make a number of other proposals which I hope will commend themselves to the Assembly and which I hope will be read, marked and learned by the NATO authorities. In getting the facts together and presenting the report we have had considerable help from people whom

we approached in various countries. They were kind and helpful and gave us some most useful information, which we have been able to incorporate in the report. Personally, I pay tribute also to one of our leading officials of this Assembly, Mr. Stuart Whyte, for his enormous help in the preparation of the report. There are few people in Europe who have a better understanding and knowledge of NATO than does Mr. Whyte.

In our individual contexts, we can all testify to what has happened in Europe in the course of the last half century, and we can perceive for ourselves exactly what the situation is and where we might be going. I was thinking about this last night. I remember that my late father exaggerated his age so as to be able to fight in the first world war, that bloody conflagration which at the end of the day gave little merit to any of the countries involved. During the second world war I was just too young to be conscripted to fight in that war but those who were around at that time, even if we did not fight, remember it vividly. As we all know, only recently there have been anniversary celebrations.

Over the past forty years since then Europe has been a far safer, better place than ever before. There are now an understanding and a belief that what has happened in the past could never happen again. But I firmly believe that peace, in a different context from fifty years ago, has been maintained and stabilised by the possession of the nuclear bomb, and, secondly and joining with that, by the collective steadfastness of the NATO organisation, which has been responsible for peace and for maintaining peace. That steadfastness must be sustained. Unless we show the political will as parliamentarians, unless our governments are prepared to make the necessary contributions, which are inevitably necessary but which may not be all that electorally popular, the status of the North Atlantic Alliance will inevitably be undermined. We shall neglect that at our peril.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I would like to congratulate Sir Dudley on the quality of his report, which members will no doubt react to with great interest.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Pignion, Chairman of the committee.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). - Mr. President, I will simply make a statement of principle, since we are running a little behind schedule.

Sir Dudley Smith expressed himself most cogently and advanced solid arguments. The quality of his verbal presentation matched that

Mr. Pignion (continued)

of this written report. I do not wish to draw things out. All the essential points have been covered by the Rapporteur, and we had long discussions in committee. I do not think members need any further information. As Chairman of the committee, I am ready to answer questions, but I see no point in adding to the Rapporteur's excellent work.

May I nevertheless add my compliments to those you have addressed to Sir Dudley Smith.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Pignion. As President, I greatly appreciate the example which the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has given the Assembly in the interests of making our proceedings as concise and expeditious as possible.

I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I assume that the sitting yesterday evening left members so exhausted that they are unable to take the opportunity of speaking now. The question that was raised yesterday evening in a very dramatic sitting could be raised again today. I mean the question of the quorum. I assume that, when this question arose yesterday, we were, so to speak, more quorate than we are now. I would ask the President to consider this and to find out whether we are here in sufficient numbers to continue.

When I look at this report on the state of European security what I miss above all else is an analysis of the threat in the sense of an enquiry into the possible reasons for a Soviet attack. There are certainly constant references to the Soviet Union's weapons and its increased arms build-up, but the report does not contain a down-to-earth analysis as to why Western Europe should go on adding to its arsenal, why Western Europe should make further efforts in the arms field within the framework of Western European Union and why, with regard to integration in NATO, we should continue down the same road as before.

I feel it is time we asked what interest the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact could possibly have in attacking NATO's European territory. Perhaps we shall have an opportunity in this debate of hearing some of the reasons. I can think of two reasons for believing in a potential Soviet attack. Firstly, there is the age-old idea, which dates back to the time of the cold war and even of the Russian revolution, that the Soviet Union is determined to subject the whole world to its will or to make it communist, if not by persuasion, then by force of arms. I do not think that even in the Kremlin anyone still

believes the system they represent is so attractive – as a number of speakers said yesterday – that other countries could possibly be impressed by it in any way. I cannot imagine the Soviet Union running the risk of taking over other countries by military means only to face the kind of difficulties they are already experiencing in Central Europe, in Poland, Czechoslovakia and so on.

The second possible reason for a Soviet attack, it is often claimed in the Federal Republic of Germany, is the interest the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact has in getting its hands on the West's technological achievements. I do not believe the Soviet Union sees this as a motive either. But as suppositions often have the same effect as genuine facts, I should like to discuss this point briefly. Let us assume that this interest actually exists, and let me ask you what you think the wisest course of action would be if an unauthorised person attacked your car, as it were, by trying to steal it. The car in this metaphor stands for the West's technological achievements. I think you would try to defend your car. You do this anyway, just by locking the doors. The insurance companies say this does not adequately protect your car against theft, so you have to lock the steering wheel as well. Nor is this, as you know, sufficient protection against theft. There is said to be a clever way of protecting your car against theft, that is, against unauthorised use.

(*Sir Frederic Bennett, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

Mr. President, I must say all this talking around the chair is extremely irritating for the speaker. Perhaps the member who has just taken the chair can put a stop to it. All this toing and froing is extremely annoying. But I see that the member now in the chair is not listening either. Precisely, there is absolutely no communication at the moment. I shall not go on until I have the feeling that communication has been restored and that it also includes the President.

I have tried to make it clear that this study lacks any realistic analysis of the grounds for a threat from the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact. I will sum up what I have said so far. I began by briefly discussing the familiar ideological argument that the Soviet Union wants to turn us all into communists. The second argument I mentioned was that the Soviet Union might want to take over our technological potential. In connection with this second argument I asked how the intelligent average citizen would protect his own technological potential, his car, for example. I concluded that the usual methods of locking the doors and the steering wheel were not enough. A more intelligent method would be to fix the engine or electrical

Mr. Vogt (continued)

system so that a thief would find it extremely difficult to use a car that had been left by its owner. This would be an intelligent way to protect the car against unauthorised persons.

There is, of course, another way. The car could be linked to a device so that, as soon as some unauthorised person touched the car, it would explode. You have to take risks if you want to protect your potential – so your potential is sacrificed. The would-be thief is blown up too – the wicked must be punished. The immediate vicinity and bystanders will also sustain injuries – an additional risk, imposed on the environment.

This example is generally taken as a joke, a completely unrealistic idea. But when I look at our defence system, I tend to think of the second type of driver, the one who thinks he is protecting his car by linking it to a device, rather than the first type, who uses an intelligent method of protecting his car against abuse. The point is this: if Western Europeans want to defend themselves...

The PRESIDENT. – I am sorry, Mr. Vogt, but I am under very firm instructions to apply to everybody, irrespective of party or nationality, the five-minutes rule. I took the chair late and I therefore have allowed you to go on beyond that, but I must ask you to draw your remarks to a close. I shall adopt precisely the same attitude to anyone else.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, yesterday I kept scrupulously to the five minutes and then found afterwards that other members were taking all kinds of liberties, which I really applaud. The President himself pointed out yesterday that it was a parliamentarian's privilege to say what he really had to say.

I do not want to overrun my time. All I want to say – and perhaps we shall have another opportunity to discuss this in greater depth – is that there are forms of defence that are not necessarily military, known in English as "civilian defence" and in German as "social defence". I feel that this too should at some time be discussed in Western European Union.

But I should like very briefly to turn to another point, raised by the speaker. He said...

The PRESIDENT. – I am sorry, but I must ask for the support of the Assembly. I have been asked, because we are running behind time, to enforce the five-minutes rule. When a British member or anyone else gets up I shall apply the same rule. You have spoken for seven minutes, Mr. Vogt. I am not interested in your point of view or that of anyone else

when I am in this chair, because I am completely neutral. I must ask you to observe the same rules as will be applied to everyone else while I am in the chair. I ask for the support of the Assembly to that effect. I now ask you to draw your remarks to a close.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I do not understand what the President is proposing.

The PRESIDENT. – I now propose to call the next speaker.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, all I can say is that some people in this Assembly are more equal than others.

The PRESIDENT. – If I may say so, Mr. Vogt, you have been more equal than others. I now propose to call the next speaker.

I call Mr. Aarts.

Mr. AARTS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the report on European security is an important and comprehensive document that gives an excellent picture of the present state of affairs and main problems in regard to European security. I would like to congratulate the Rapporteur on his work and compliment him on the report.

What I want to talk about is the position of the Netherlands in the alliance, particularly as regards the whole INF problem. In paragraph 4.9 of the report it says that the Netherlands Parliament is "due to vote on the situation" as regards preparations for deployment. The decision has meanwhile been taken, as the Rapporteur said. What is the scope and significance of the Netherlands Government's decision? To what extent is the Netherlands continuing to meet its past commitments? After this decision, is the Netherlands still a faithful and trustworthy ally? Is the Netherlands moving towards neutralism, as some members have been suggesting in the last few days?

These are all important questions. I cannot go into them all, but I would like to say something briefly about the general position. In 1979, when the NATO twofold decision was taken, the Netherlands expressed a reservation about the siting of cruise missiles on Netherlands territory. While accepting the NATO decision, it stated that it was not in a position to take a decision on deployment in the Netherlands. The decision would be taken at a later stage.

I would like to stress this point once again. The Netherlands did not, in 1979, commit itself to deployment, but only to deciding on that issue at a later stage. As Sir Dudley has already informed you, the Netherlands Government's

Mr. Aarts (continued)

decision was taken on 1st June and ratified by the Netherlands Parliament on Wednesday of last week. This is not a "no" decision against deployment. On the contrary, the Netherlands has withdrawn its reservation and declared its readiness to accept the missiles on its territory. Deployment will take place if an arms control agreement is concluded. In that event, the Netherlands will undertake its fair share. Deployment will also take place if, by 1st November 1985, the Soviet Union has installed new SS-20s, in comparison with the situation pertaining on 1st June last.

The Netherlands Government and Parliament realise that, in that event, a temporary imbalance will have been accepted, to wit a ratio of one to two, i.e. roughly one cruise missile per two SS-20 nuclear warheads. I stress the word "temporary", because after this freeze the levels would have to be reduced through negotiations, if possible to zero.

I realise that this decision is not the simple "yes" that many people, including many of yourselves, would have wished. But it is also definitively not a "no". It is on the one hand an expression of solidarity with and commitment to the alliance and, on the other, a gesture in the direction of arms control and arms reduction.

In the course of the parliamentary debate the Netherlands Prime Minister explained that, in taking this decision, the cabinet had made the greatest possible effort, while remaining faithful to the alliance and to NATO, to try and bring about a halt to the disastrous arms race.

Mr. President, there is no disputing the fact that, despite all the good intentions and all the efforts, the nuclear arms spiral has continued steadily upwards in recent years. This upward spiral must be stopped and then reversed. The Netherlands decision is intended to contribute to that process, but the Netherlands Government and the majority of the Netherlands Parliament also want to make it clear to the Soviet Union at the same time that any further deployment of SS-20 systems is unacceptable. We have to call a halt to this situation. Hence the Dutch stipulation that it will deploy forty-eight missiles if there is no arms control agreement, or if the number of SS-20s is increased - by 1st November.

The present period is so important because, according to the NATO schedule, the whole deployment programme is to be completed by 1988. In the interim period this decision may have had its effect.

There are many people in the Netherlands, inside and outside parliament, who would have

preferred the decision to be a clear and simple "no" and to see the Netherlands, if necessary by leaving NATO, striking a blow against the arms race. There were demonstrations and protests to that effect. The Netherlands Government and the majority in parliament firmly chose another path. Despite the fact that in 1979 the Netherlands had not committed itself to deployment, the government has now decided that deployment will go ahead, in the event of an agreement, or if there is further deployment of SS-20s by the Soviet Union. We in the Netherlands are conscious of the great importance of the alliance and its indispensability both for the protection of democratic values in Europe and for disarmament. In disarmament, too, the alliance has an important rôle to play.

Mr. President, I see from your demeanour that I have little time left, though I am surprised that a few minutes were not available for such an important matter.

Let me conclude my argument. Whatever differences of opinion regarding the Netherlands decision may exist within the alliance, and whatever doubts there may be about the viability of the course of action decided upon, there can be no possible difference of opinion about the intention and aims behind the decision itself. I stress that they are not neutralist, but directed towards the long-term security of Europe in the framework of NATO, an alliance which takes the foremost place in the defence policy of the Netherlands Government and forms the cornerstone of Dutch security.

The PRESIDENT. - I am sorry but the Assembly accepted a five-minute rule, as I pointed out to the previous speaker. I am bound by the President's decision, with the consent of the Assembly, that speeches should finish after five minutes. You, Mr. Aarts, like the previous speaker, have gone over that time. I ask you to make what you were going to say public in some other way. Everyone, including myself, thinks that his speech is more important than anyone else's. I must ask you to draw your remarks to a conclusion, or I shall have no alternative but to call the next speaker.

Mr. AARTS (*Netherlands*). - I want to finish my speech by saying that paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation is very good. I will quote...

The PRESIDENT. - No. I now call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the number of events occurring outside the NATO area but with a direct bearing on European security is steadily increasing. As a result some member states of the alliance are having to intervene in the areas concerned so as to

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

safeguard their own security and that of all the other allies. Europe should therefore improve its organisation and efficiency in order to make a bigger contribution to the defence and security of its frontiers. All the current initiatives to reinforce the European pillar of western defence and to revitalise WEU should be supported and encouraged.

This objective of increasing the European contribution within the Atlantic Alliance should not be taken to imply disagreement with or distrust of the United States of the kind which is unfortunately encountered from time to time, and I therefore particularly welcome the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation. As proposed in the recommendation, all the necessary means must be created to implement and act upon the suggestions made by General Dijkstra in his logistical study. Attention also needs to be given – and this seems to me to be a point which has been somewhat neglected in the report – to the situation on NATO's southern flank. While the centre was once the main source of concern, it is now the southern flank which is causing us doubts.

While we are aware of the size of the Soviet fleet – and Soviet nuclear submarines in particular – in the Mediterranean, and while we realise the risks arising from Libya's policy and from Malta's ambiguous attitude, which can only be harmful to our interests, we also know full well that in both Spain and Greece there is a great deal of reserve concerning the Atlantic Alliance. I therefore regard it as a matter of prime importance that at least the current differences between Greece and Turkey should be resolved. We must also hope that Spain will become a fully committed member of NATO, and here I would like to refer briefly to the position adopted by France. It would be very reassuring for all concerned if France were to reconsider its 1966 decision and once more become part of the military structure of the Atlantic Alliance.

May I conclude, Mr. President, by expressing my appreciation of Sir Dudley Smith's brilliant report and make an earnest appeal that Europe should play the rôle expected of it by its non-European allies, who represent a vital element in our security. I trust that this Assembly will be so revitalised as to enable it to play to the full the rôle which we shall be discussing in greater depth on another occasion.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Cavaliere, for staying precisely within the limit fixed by the Assembly.

I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, in which we discussed Sir Dudley Smith's report at length, I supported the recommendation. I have therefore little to add, because its recommendations seem to me correct.

My subject is the situation of European security, and it is my view that the situation ought to give us cause for concern, for a number of reasons. Not that the legions of the Warsaw Pact can be expected to march into the NATO countries any day now. That is not the situation. What I mean is that there is cause for concern about general East-West political relations at the present time, and I shall concentrate on that.

Looking at the situation in Europe, one sees that East-West political relations – where in my view the European countries have an exceptionally important, if not decisive rôle to play – are currently dominated by the superpowers. One of the important, if not most important, recommendations that Western European Union or the democratic European countries in general could make is that, for many reasons, an improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States is urgently required. I consider it of paramount importance for an organisation like ours – and for our national governments and parliaments – to ensure that the situation of near cold war, or at any event of unusually cool relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, improves in a number of areas in the coming years, at least partly thanks to the efforts of our countries.

Why? The present situation of ideological and political confrontation and a cooling climate of economic co-operation, cannot be allowed to exist indefinitely. A failure to progress in the political and related areas of East-West relations may lead to a hardening of military relations. In any event, it also means that there will be less chance, in the years to come, of achieving arms control and checking the arms race. I am firmly convinced that it is a primary task of our countries to intervene in relations between the superpowers.

One or two final comments, because I see that our time is very limited. We must endeavour to ensure that results are reached quickly in Stockholm – modest though they may be – in regard to arms control and the improvement of East-West relations. I believe that it is of the first importance to the European countries that the negotiations on medium-range nuclear missiles in Geneva are quickly resumed and that, shortly after the elections in the United States, or sooner if possible – although that is

Mr. van den Bergh (continued)

rather unlikely – results are achieved with regard to strategic weapons.

Mr. President, I do not say we should be pessimistic about European security. We are not in a situation of serious alarm, in which we are facing new conflicts. The situation is worrying only because if we European countries allow East-West relations in the political field, in regard to arms reductions, and in the field of economic co-operation, to remain as bad as they now are, the situation may deteriorate in the future. I therefore believe the European countries have a major task to perform.

(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, may I remind you that yesterday we decided to change items at 10.30 a.m. That time has now arrived. Persons whose turn to speak in the debate on Sir Dudley Smith's report has not yet been reached will have the floor this afternoon. I beg their indulgence.

We now move, therefore, to the next item.

I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. My point of order has nothing to do with your ruling on speakers. The press has called this a moribund Assembly. We are not being reactivated. Members standing just outside the chamber doing important parliamentary work, lobbying or organising the day, have no means of ascertaining whether they are about to be called, the subject of the debate, for how long the debate will continue, or the President's decision about speaking times. Members have no identification with the Assembly and have far less than they do in Strasbourg. I believe that you, Mr. President, should look into this matter in the Bureau as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Hill. Like you, I realised this morning, at the beginning of the sitting, that there was a problem.

Five minutes after opening the sitting I gave instructions for all national delegations to be informed immediately of the names of their members who would be called upon to speak in the debate. This communication was made at about 9.40 a.m. Perhaps certain messages did not get through, but I shall try to make the procedure for calling speakers as efficient as possible, as far as it is within the power of the chair to do so.

The debate on this item will be resumed at the next sitting.

4. *Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council*

Political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council

Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 973 and amendments, 979 and amendments and 975)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, and reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, Documents 973 and amendments, 979 and amendments and 975.

I remind you that the three replies to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council will be the subject of a joint debate.

We shall first hear the Rapporteurs.

I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Council Representatives, Ladies and Gentlemen, it gave me great pleasure when the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments instructed me to draw up a report, on the occasion of WEU's thirtieth anniversary, on the past achievements and future of our organisation, because, ever since my days as a student of international law, I have been convinced of the fundamental importance of the existence of Western European Union.

It was perhaps in memory of that time that, in drawing up the report, I was concerned that it should be addressed not only to the members of this Assembly but also to the general public, to the universities, and to the ministries and chancelleries of countries which are not members of our union but which would, on the occasion of its thirtieth anniversary, like to find out more about it.

It was particularly interesting for me to draw up this report at a time when, following consideration of the delicate issue of the deployment of the alliance's strategic Euromissiles in response to the deployment of the Soviet SS-20s, the defence of Europe had once again become of crucial concern not only to the general public

Mr. De Decker (continued)

but also to the governments of our member states.

There is no denying the fact that the Euromissile issue has provoked a new awareness, or that the Soviet Union's attempt to achieve regional supremacy in Europe has helped to bring this about.

During the period when this report was being drawn up, a new interest in Western European Union emerged in various member states. First of all, the French Government issued a memorandum expressing France's wish to see WEU revitalised. A few months later the Belgian Minister for External Relations sent his colleagues a memorandum supporting Mr. Cheysson's initiative, which developed and clarified certain aspects of the issue.

In the course of my visits to the foreign ministers of the various member states, I noted the change that had taken place, between February and May of this year, in the attitudes of several of our governments and the emergence of a collective will to see WEU once again play a fundamental rôle in European defence and the political integration of our countries.

It was as if our governments, in response to the difficulties facing the European Communities and more conscious than ever of the threats to the security of our states, had once again come to see Western European Union as the instrument that would enable us to improve the security of our continent while maintaining perfect co-ordination with the Atlantic Alliance, which is the key to the security of our part of the world, and also advancing the political integration of Europe.

Western European Union is celebrating this year the thirtieth anniversary of its existence in its present form.

It was in 1954, after the failure of the European Defence Community, that the London conference looked for means of involving the Federal Republic of Germany in the joint defence of Europe and decided to invite Germany and Italy to accede to the Brussels Treaty, which provided for mutual and collective defence and was signed in 1948 in reaction to the Soviet threat manifested in the Prague coup.

The modified Brussels Treaty, which set up WEU, has helped considerably in keeping our part of the world at peace since 1945. It was that treaty which put an end to European wars and turned the enemies of yesterday into the allies of today. It is the same treaty which stipulates, in its Article V, that "If any of the high contracting parties should be the object of

an armed attack in Europe, the other high contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power."

This Article V imposes a greater commitment than does Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and has therefore been something which any potential enemy of Europe has had to reckon with for thirty years and must still reckon with today.

Apart from this vital step forward, WEU served basically to overcome the failure of the EDC and to involve Germany in the defence of our continent, while at the same time preventing it - to this day - from manufacturing certain armaments. It also served to provide a forum in which the British, who had not yet joined the European Economic Community, could meet with the six Common Market countries.

Nor should we forget that WEU was at the origin of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Following the signing of the treaty in 1948, the Brussels Treaty Organisation, as WEU was then called, established a defence organisation of its own, the Western Union Defence Organisation, WUDO, in order to pursue a policy of mutual assistance.

For this purpose the Council set up, in April 1948, a Western Union Defence Committee consisting of the defence ministers of the governments concerned. It was under the auspices of this committee that a permanent organisation was set up in September 1948 to work out the joint defence policy which was to be applied by the general staff of each country.

Shortly afterwards, in October 1948, a Committee of Finance Ministers was formed to consider the financial and economic aspects of problems arising from the organisation of joint defence.

During the first year of its existence the five-power defence organisation studied a plan for their common defence, including an integrated air defence plan. It made suggestions for the production of arms and equipment which involved large-scale application of the principle of mutual aid. It established, in fact, the nucleus of a joint command organisation, agreed upon measures for training and organised a number of combined exercises. In a document dated 10th July 1956 the WEU Council of Ministers was moreover to recognise that the spade-work done by the five powers had made it possible not only to shape the character of the organisation set up by the North Atlantic Treaty but also to create the atmosphere which had made conclusion of the treaty possible.

Mr. De Decker (continued)

What the Western Union Defence Organisation had in fact created was the nucleus of the integrated military structure of the future NATO, with a military committee consisting of representatives of chiefs of defence staff of member countries, with Field-Marshal Montgomery as permanent chairman, designated senior commander in the event of war, with a headquarters at Fontainebleau and a jointly financed military infrastructure programme.

On 20th December 1950, the Brussels Treaty Organisation decided to transfer its powers in defence matters to NATO, which had been established on 4th April 1949, while specifying that this in no way affected the mutual commitments entered into by the powers that had signed the Brussels Treaty and reserving the right of the defence ministers and chiefs-of-staff of the member countries of Western Union to "meet as they please to consider matters of mutual concern".

Since that time the Atlantic Alliance has – as we know – successfully guaranteed our security. Since the iron curtain is only a few hundred kilometres from the Atlantic Ocean, Europe does not have the geographical depth required for it to ensure its own security. Our American allies, who twice came to fight at our sides, liberated us from fascism and maintain on our continent an army of more than 300,000 men, and guarantee rapid reinforcement in the event of conflict, are and remain indispensable for our security. They are even more indispensable when it comes to nuclear deterrence, because only the United States has a second-strike capability sufficiently credible in the face of the impressive Soviet panoply of nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, world history teaches us that whenever one people has relied on another for its defence, it has ended up by disappearing. It is therefore necessary for Europe to shake off its torpor and assume responsibility for the essential part of its own security.

A community of more than 270 million people and the foremost commercial power in the world, Europe, whose gross domestic product is higher than that of the United States, is also – and Europeans should remember this – the place where democracy was born and still survives. Europe is therefore a treasure in its own right – a treasure which we must have the will to protect and defend.

In order to recover its dignity and ensure its permanent security, it is therefore essential that Europe should constitute a more effective and more credible European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance. This idea is indisputably gaining ground and thereby providing the

opportunity for Western European Union to play a vital rôle in the defence policy of our continent. There are various reasons for this new interest.

The first is the overarmament of the USSR, which took advantage of the period of détente to achieve both regional superiority in Europe, and strategic parity with the United States. Today the advantage lies with the USSR, both at a conventional level and in terms of tactical and Eurostrategic nuclear weapons. The continuous deployment of its SS-20 missiles is the expression of its determination to achieve political and military control of our continent. In the face of this new situation for our continent, it is vital that our states react firmly and swiftly. The whole history of Soviet Russia shows its great caution, but also its determination to take advantage of every weakness of those it considers its adversaries. Let us remember the years 1935 to 1940, the spirit of Munich, the "broken rifles" demonstrations, the cowardly relief of the democracies when they believed they had saved peace by making concession after concession to the totalitarian régimes. The lesson of the thirties ought to make the democracies realise that weakness and concessions do not remove the danger but, on the contrary, bring it on.

A further reason for the new interest in the European security debate is certainly to be found in the difficulties which Europeans often have in understanding United States policy. It is becoming increasingly clear on this side of the Atlantic that the interests of Europeans and Americans are no longer always identical. The monetary policy pursued by the American Government, as indeed its economic and agricultural policy, show the extent to which the United States and the EEC have become trading competitors.

Moreover, Europeans have difficulty in understanding the great-power imperatives of the United States. They also feel a certain unease at the United States refusal to pursue a two-way street policy in the armaments field, at a time when their whole economy is turning more towards the Pacific world. Furthermore, certain American circles do not always seem fully to understand that their security frontier lies along the Elbe and the Weser.

The difficulties of European political integration within the powers of the institutions established by the Treaty of Rome, together with the failure of the Athens and Brussels summits, also give rise to a general feeling that the cause of European political co-operation would be advanced by turning again to the question of European defence, a question which in any case needs a thorough reappraisal.

Is it not reasonable to suppose that European political integration would have gone much

Mr. De Decker (continued)

further by now if the European Defence Community proposed by René Plevin had not fallen through?

Apart from this, the rising cost of armaments and the level of technology required for their design mean that, in future, only an economic and technological entity of European dimensions will be able to continue designing and manufacturing the means required to ensure Europe's security and defence. In isolation, even the largest European countries are not up to the task. Failing European co-operation in the armaments field, the day will come when only the United States will be able to produce the defence systems of the free world. When that happens, we shall have joined the ranks of the underdeveloped countries even in regard to civilian industry.

Recent Soviet superiority in theatre nuclear weapons, together with conventional superiority and strategic parity with the United States, means, finally, that we have to re-examine the credibility of the alliance's current strategy of graduated response. Only a concerted European approach could lead to the adaptation of strategic precepts to the real security needs of our continent. Certain aspects of this strategy still seem to be considered taboo in Europe. If we want to avoid ill-considered risks, the time has come to broach these subjects directly and give them our joint attention.

In another area – and Mr. Wilkinson will be talking about this – there is an urgent need to study the consequences for Europe of the development, both by the USSR and by the United States, of space-based anti-ballistic defence systems. As President Mitterrand has said, Europe will probably have to set up a new European community – the European space community – in order to organise the defence of our continent in space.

For all these reasons, Europe no longer has any choice. Either it rethinks and reorganises its defence, or it runs the risk of disappearing as an entity independent of the great powers. Europeans have major responsibilities throughout the world however. For very many third world countries Europe, cured of its old colonial complexes, represents the only hope for development in a climate of mutual respect, justice and democracy.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in adopting my report the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments put forward a number of specific proposals for the reactivation of WEU.

The fact is that the international situation demands a greater assertion of the European

presence within the Atlantic Alliance, an alliance to which the WEU member states remain irrevocably committed. WEU, consisting as it does of countries belonging to both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community, is an ideal forum in which to take a close and careful look at European security needs. As Pierre Mauroy has stressed, WEU has the advantage of a complete institutional structure – Council, Assembly and technical agencies – that makes it possible to involve elected representatives, i.e. members of national parliaments, and, through them, the general public in consideration of and decisions relating to every aspect of European security.

The psychological difficulties encountered among the general public in our countries during the debate on the Euromissiles issue cruelly demonstrated the crucial need for a real channel of communication between our peoples and our governments. The necessary institution of course already exists: it is our own Assembly, whose work has not so far aroused the public interest it deserves. Revitalisation of WEU must therefore necessarily proceed via a strengthening of the rôle of the Assembly and, above all, an extension of the dialogue between the Assembly and the Council of Ministers. The quality of that dialogue, however, will also depend on the quality of the members of parliament sitting in our Assembly. That is why the committee considered it necessary to draw the attention of member states' parliaments to the importance of appointing members particularly well-acquainted with defence and security problems to sit in this chamber.

Since, however, revitalisation of WEU, just like the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance, depends essentially on the political will expressed by the governments of the member states in the Council, the future of this twofold project will essentially be determined by the work of the ministers meeting in the Council. Your committee therefore considers it vital that the Council should in future meet at least twice a year at ministerial level. We welcome the fact that almost all the foreign ministers attended the Council meeting held in Paris on 12th June last under the chairmanship of Mr. Cheysson. Their presence showed their interest in our institution and, above all, the wish to see it play a more important rôle in the future.

We also welcome the fact that the foreign and defence ministers of our countries will be meeting in Rome at the end of October on the occasion of the commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the modification of the treaty.

In my report I have also recommended that when the Council meets at permanent representative level, the senior foreign ministry officials, and perhaps also representatives of the defence

Mr. De Decker (continued)

ministries and chiefs-of-staff, should be involved in the work of the ambassadors. Their presence would improve the concrete and practical character of the ambassadors' work, which is intended to enable the ministers better to co-ordinate their joint positions on the various matters before them. The explanatory memorandum to my report gives some examples of subjects that might be looked at by the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council.

Our organisation, however, also includes two technical agencies. Greater use should be made of the Standing Armaments Committee – as our committee previously recommended – for studying the capacity of the European armaments industry. Moreover, the Standing Armaments Committee should play a more active rôle in regard to co-operation. Its task could consist in preparing and implementing the political decisions taken by the Seven in the field of armaments. Its rôle could be vital, since maintenance of Europe's technological level necessarily involves better co-ordination of its armaments programmes. Your committee also thought that the SAC could be responsible for co-ordinating the positions of the Seven within the Independent European Programme Group, IEPG, and that the head of the SAC's international secretariat could accordingly attend IEPG meetings.

As regards the treaty provisions on arms control, your committee of course reiterates its previous proposals. The last restrictions on the manufacture of conventional weapons in Germany should be lifted by deleting the last items on the list in Annex III to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, and the quantitative restrictions imposed on the conventional weapons of all member countries on the mainland of Europe should be removed by the Council by modifying the list in Annex IV to the said protocol so as to delete everything except the first paragraph, which refers to atomic, biological and chemical weapons. Your committee is aware of the fact that the controls on atomic and biological weapons laid down in the modified Brussels Treaty have never been applied, but considers that they are no longer appropriate in the present circumstances.

The Agency for the Control of Armaments itself has so far been entrusted with what I would call negative controls, that is, controls which express some distrust of certain member states. No longer needing to concern itself with application of these controls, the Agency could in future put its experience to good use in the discussion and study of major disarmament and arms restriction issues, as well as the problems of verification involved in disarmament agreements. Of course, this change in the tasks of

the Agency for the Control of Armaments would have to be made gradually, as and when it was relieved of its present functions.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, our union is the only European institution at present entitled to deal with defence matters. It brings together countries which, over and above the economic solidarity of the Common Market, have asserted their common determination to defend freedom, democracy and peace in this part of the world. The dangers are real since the totalitarian system that prevails from the China Sea to within a few hundred kilometres of where we are sitting compensates for the poverty of its ideology by military force.

Europe has the know-how, resources and structures required to organise deterrence and safeguard peace. Thanks to the modified Brussels Treaty, it also has a structure that affirms both European and Atlantic solidarity.

Within a framework of mutual assistance, it is easier to defend those who show a will to defend themselves. That is why strengthening the European pillar of the alliance cannot have an "uncoupling" effect but is bound, on the contrary, to make the alliance work more effectively by establishing a better balance between North America and the heart of Western Europe. Over and beyond its material riches, it is essential, indeed vital, that Europe today demonstrate its moral strength. After thirty years of slumber, our union now looks – to repeat an expression employed by Mr. Cheysson on 12th June last – like an "organisation which Europe needs".

WEU's potential can meet the hopes of our youth and of all those who wish for a Europe with the will to assert its democratic personality. The world – and above all the third world – needs such a Europe.

May I express the hope that you will feel able to vote for the draft recommendation before you, which your committee adopted unanimously. If a large majority of you adopt this text, we will be able to say, on the morrow of a rather sad European election, that the members of the WEU Assembly have collectively expressed the wish to see Europe advance in the vital area of the maintenance of peace and the safeguarding of freedom.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentleman, your applause testifies to the Assembly's appreciation of the work of the Rapporteur, Mr. De Decker. I too would like to thank him and to take this opportunity to congratulate him on his election as Vice-President, alongside the other Vice-Presidents already elected.

The President (continued)

The Bureau is now complete, and I would like to express my satisfaction at the election of all the Vice-Presidents.

Before moving on to the next item, I would simply point out that people have put their names down to speak on each of the reports. It was decided that a joint debate would take place, but, on checking the lists, we have found that some members have put their names down twice. I would think we can draw up a single list of speakers, and I will try to be as liberal as possible in regard to speaking time. This procedure will make our work easier. However, if any member objects, I would be obliged if he could let me know at the beginning of the general debate by raising a point of order, in the absence of which I shall deem my proposal to have been accepted by the Assembly.

The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the General Affairs Committee on the political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, Document 979 and amendments.

I call Mr. Thoss, Rapporteur.

Mr. THOSS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as we are already running a little behind schedule I shall try to be as brief as possible.

Let me begin with some general remarks. The original intention was for the present report to be taken during the December 1983 part-session. The Presidential Committee, however, thought it ought to be put on the agenda of this week's part-session because it fitted in better with the other two reports tabled to celebrate in some measure the thirtieth anniversary of WEU.

I would like to thank those who helped me plan and draft this report: our Chairman, Mr. Michel, and the other members of our committee; a number of people I had the opportunity of meeting in London a few months ago, in particular the Secretary-General of our organisation; the diplomatic staff whom I met unofficially; and, finally, Mr. Burgelin and all the legal staff of our Assembly who made a considerable contribution to the drafting of this report.

What are the main features of the report before you? There are six. One: it seemed indispensable to take stock of the situation after thirty years' existence of WEU. Two: it was important to analyse the present situation, that is to say, the dangers facing the West, and Europe in particular, including their extent, nature and future; and it was appropriate at the same time to weigh up the uncertainties facing

the West, so as to provide a snapshot, as it were, of the present situation of WEU. Three: the opportunity had to be used to analyse the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, which – it must be said – is rather lightweight, as usual. Four: I have tried to project a view of the future, that is, of the year 2004 – in other words to ask the basic question of whether we want to go on with WEU or not. The time has come to choose. Five: I have tried to produce a synthesis of the four preceding analyses. Six: I have endeavoured to put before you a more substantial draft recommendation than usual, in order to celebrate WEU's thirtieth anniversary in worthy fashion.

This involved a number of problems. First, a choice had to be made between two possible attitudes. Should one seek confrontation? In the past, reports have unfortunately often been adopted by a very small majority, which is no way to celebrate an anniversary. It seemed to me more useful and sensible to seek a solution embodying the greatest number of points of agreement.

This then was the spirit behind the general approach, which I shall now summarise. The general approach is one of enlightened realism. It must be borne in mind that WEU is primarily an organisation for the defence of the West, not for disarmament. But while this obvious truth remains, we nevertheless have to continue stressing the importance of maintaining peace and the need to pursue disarmament negotiations. Ample mention of this need will therefore be found in both the text and the preamble of the draft recommendation.

Then it was necessary to reaffirm the essential point, namely, the permanent importance of WEU for Europe. I believe that the present time is particularly fortunate and favourable in this respect. For some months now we have been witnessing the emergence of an attitude favourable to WEU. It has shown itself in recent statements by many ministers, in a large number of articles in the specialist press and in statements by parliamentarians and politicians.

It was further my concern to conduct as broad but precise as possible an examination of the new factors relevant to the development of WEU. What are they?

First of all the enlargement of WEU. This point is topical enough to deserve mention. For the time being there is nothing specific to go on, but only a number of declarations, particularly within the Council of Europe, including the statement by the Spanish Prime Minister. I will not go into details, but the enlargement of WEU is now definitely a new element in the situation.

A second issue which is just as recent and important is that of the possible consequences of

Mr. Thoss (continued)

the weakening of the traditional notion of nuclear deterrence for the development of WEU, that is to say, the degree of security which WEU – and beyond it NATO – provides for the peoples of Europe. This has diminished of late – perhaps not considerably, but appreciably nevertheless.

A third phenomenon, also recent and difficult to argue with, is the emergence of new attitudes among the European public relating, among other things, to the peace movements, social problems, the unemployment affecting young people and other sections of the population, the budget cuts that have become more and more necessary in our various countries. While on the subject, I would remind you that the famous increase of 4% in military expenditure has not been achieved by any member country.

In addition to all this, there is the confusion that has arisen between two very different ideas: the idea of détente and the idea of disarmament. These two ideas, which are in no way identical, are often confused by both the general public and the press.

The fourth new factor is the possibility of competition, in the defence field, between WEU and the European Community. As we all know, the European Community has so far had no mandate to deal with defence matters, but nobody can yet be sure of the attitude of the newly elected parliament. If it insists on obtaining certain rights, it will be bound to get them in the end. This new development needs to be watched closely.

A further important point among these new factors is the increase in areas of instability outside Europe, and the potential consequences for European defence of these new areas in Latin America and the Middle East. The danger of internationalisation of these essentially local conflicts cannot be dismissed out of hand.

Another development, also relatively recent, may present some danger for WEU's cohesion. I refer to the fact that many countries still seem to prefer bilateral contacts with the United States to contacts between WEU and the United States.

Finally, the report refers to the main features of the Brussels Treaty, which I shall briefly summarise. One: the commitment to mutual assistance in the event of attack, a basic provision which has not yet been challenged in any way. Two: the indirect involvement of the whole of the British armed forces, including their nuclear forces, in European defence, by virtue of the British presence on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. Three – and this is something which must be stressed and

retained at all costs: control of the armed forces and armaments of the allied countries. I shall say something in a moment about the issue which opposes my own report to that of Mr. De Decker and which the Assembly will have to settle today. I of course accept that the existing control system has gaps, but it remains necessary because it retains the very important elements of security and trust. No one denies, however, that it needs to be updated. Four: the major rôle of the Agency for the Control of Armaments with regard to A, B and C weapons. Here too, intra-European trust would not only increase WEU's cohesion but would also facilitate East-West détente.

To sum up: of the main features of the treaty which I have referred to and illustrated in the report, the existence of different obligations, often unbalanced, from one country to another seems to me today less justified than in 1954 – and I think unanimity on this point will not be difficult to achieve. Let me recall the main inequalities: restrictions on the manufacture of conventional weapons in the Federal Republic of Germany; the British commitments on the mainland of Europe; the fact that France alone is subject to control of its atomic weapons, since the United Kingdom is not.

As for the recommendation itself, we can almost agree with all the points made by Mr. De Decker. I shall not duplicate what he has said, but simply run briefly through the main requirements for the future.

First of all, the General Affairs Committee, whose Rapporteur I have the honour to be, considers that all differences in the treatment of the parties to the treaty can no longer be justified and should be removed. There have already been many consultations between the governments of the seven member countries on this issue, particularly as regards the British commitment to station troops in Europe and the control of the French nuclear arsenal.

Then there is the question of scrapping paragraphs IV and VI of Annex III to Protocol No. III, in other words the discriminatory clauses concerning the conventional armaments of the Federal Republic of Germany. On this point it should be stressed that there is happily almost total agreement.

On the other hand, there is not, at least for the time being, general agreement as regards the list in Annex IV to Protocol No. III, in other words, control of conventional armaments on the mainland of Europe. Here views differ. Should the list be brought up to date and modernised? Or should it be purely and simply abolished or deleted?

Our committee, unanimously with three absences, considered that it was preferable to

Mr. Thoss (continued)

bring the list up to date rather than scrap it completely. Indeed, your committee and Rapporteur considered that the controls in question were a vital element of trust between the different European countries. Furthermore, it would be much more difficult to negotiate on disarmament or the control of armaments between East and West – control being after all an essential element in disarmament – if these possibilities of control on the territory of Europe had already been removed. This issue will have to be decided today and is the subject of an amendment tabled by Mr. Dejardin. My personal opinion, which is also – and above all – that of the committee, is that the list should be updated.

It is also necessary to reform the work of the Standing Armaments Committee, which is at present unsatisfactory for the following reasons. First, the reservations entertained, for reasons that have nothing to do with joint production of armaments, about the whole work of WEU; second, the emergence and development of parallel bodies within NATO and the Euro-group; third, the interest shown by the European Community in the armaments industry; fourth, what still amounts to the repugnance felt by most of the governments for any real co-operation on armaments co-operation which I nevertheless consider important.

Finally the rôle of the Council must be changed particularly as regards the help needed to assist the Assembly in carrying out its tasks and consolidating the links between all our countries.

These are the points I wanted to make. As regards the remaining issues, no difficulty has arisen as between our recommendation and Mr. De Decker's excellent report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – May I congratulate you, Mr. Thoss, on the report you have submitted to us.

The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, Document 975.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BULLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions has considered the twenty-ninth annual report with particular reference to four questions, these being, firstly, the importance of an intra-European gas supply system,

secondly, the law of the sea convention, thirdly, collaboration among the European military and civil aircraft industries and fourthly, the plan to commission a study on the armaments industry in Japan – a plan which attracted the critical appraisal of the committee.

Ladies and Gentlemen, as it is getting rather late, I will not be saying anything more about these various points, but would refer you to Document 975, the report of the committee, so that the proceedings of our Assembly may continue in the proper manner. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Since yesterday we have been participating in a historic debate which is pointing the way forward to the reactivation of WEU, and I would say Mr. Spies von Büllesheim deserves a gold medal for the brevity of his presentation – which, however, in no way detracts from the contents of his report.

As agreed, the joint debate on the three reports just presented will take place after the presentation of the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

5. Twenty-ninth annual report of the Council

(Presentation by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 969)

The PRESIDENT(Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, of the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, Document 969.

May I welcome you, Minister, on behalf of the Assembly and thank you for giving us your time. May I also say how much I appreciated the message you were good enough to send me.

You are certainly fully aware of the interest which your visit has aroused in our Assembly and the importance we attach to it, not only because you are Chairman-in-Office of the Council, but also because of your ceaseless efforts in favour of the general reactivation of work towards European unity, particularly in the political domain.

All of us remember the proposals, memorandums and other interventions which make you without doubt one of the most distinguished protagonists of the construction of Europe.

Yesterday we had the honour of hearing Lady Young, who, on behalf of Her Majesty's

The President (continued)

Government, provided some valuable insights into an issue to which the Assembly attaches great importance: the improvement, in theory and in practice, of relations between the Council and the Assembly. The debate which will follow your address will perhaps allow us to develop this point.

I therefore have great pleasure in inviting you to the rostrum.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you for your kind words of welcome. I deem it a special honour to address the Assembly of Western European Union today. I am pleased that in this way I can express my esteem and respect for this parliamentary body of WEU.

Before turning to the actual subjects of my address, I should like to congratulate you cordially on your election, Mr. President. I am convinced that you will perform the even more important task which we all hope WEU will have with prudence, expertise and personal commitment.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I speak to you today in a dual function: firstly, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and then in my capacity as Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany. As Chairman of the Council of Ministers I have the honourable task of presenting the twenty-ninth annual report, which has to be submitted to the Assembly every year under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. The report covers the period from 1st January to 31st December 1983 – my remarks will therefore concentrate on this period; in addition, I shall report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers held on 12th June 1984.

In accordance with the structure of the annual report, I shall speak on relations between the Council and the Assembly, then on the activities of the Council, and finally – an indispensable subject – on budgetary matters.

The WEU Assembly is the only parliamentary body at the European level which is expressly authorised under an international treaty to deal with security matters. This underscores its particular significance and the importance of its function. Security issues are of vital interest to the peoples of Europe. This is where one of the central tasks of this parliamentary body lies: it is a forum where the democratically elected representatives of European countries can discuss European security policy and thus inform the public in our countries, enabling it to participate in the discussion.

The Council welcomes the expertise and determination with which the Assembly has devoted itself to this task. This year's agenda underscores this anew and illustrates the Assembly's endeavour to cover the entire breadth of its functions. In particular, the Council pays tribute to the fact that the Assembly is again dealing in detail with numerous aspects of European security.

For the Assembly to discharge its responsibility, a dialogue with the Council is necessary. The Council attaches great importance to this and devotes a considerable part of its activities to the dialogue. In future we shall seek ways and means of making it even closer and more direct. Suggestions from you will be most welcome. Let me single out the following topics:

In 1983, the dialogue was conducted on questions connected with the implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty. The questions included ones which the governments of WEU member states deal with in other political forums, especially in European political co-operation and in the Atlantic Alliance.

In addition to its annual report, the Council has submitted substantive replies to the recommendations and written questions presented to it by the Assembly.

In response to specific requests, the Council authorised the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee to provide technical assistance to the Committee for Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in the preparation of a report. The Council is willing to examine similar requests by other committees of the Assembly.

After the Council meetings in Brussels on 17th May 1983 and here in Paris on 12th June 1984, informal meetings took place between the Council and the Presidential Committee, the Committee for Defence Questions and Armaments, and the General Affairs Committee. The meeting of 12th June 1984 led to a thorough discussion between the Council and representatives of the committees. As Chairman of the Council, the Minister for External Relations, Mr. Cheysson, informed the deputies on the results of the meeting and presented on behalf of the Council a working paper on the reactivation of WEU, which is in your possession. I shall come back later on to the results of this important meeting, which provided fresh impetus for the future activities of WEU.

In 1983, several ministers took the opportunity to address this Assembly. The Council welcomes such participation, especially by foreign and defence ministers.

Mr. Genscher (continued)

In its annual report, the Council stresses once more the importance which the seven member states attach to WEU as the only European organisation which is authorised under the treaty to deal with defence matters. The Council reaffirms the determination of the member states to fulfil all their obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty. This applies particularly to the obligation of collective self-defence, as enshrined in Article V of the treaty.

In the context of its political consultations, the Council held meetings in Brussels on 17th May 1983 and in Paris on 12th June 1984. At the Brussels meeting, East-West relations were discussed particularly from the point of view of European security. In addition, other aspects of the international situation were deliberated, including in particular the situation in the Mediterranean. The Council meeting here in Paris on 12th June 1984 was attended by the foreign ministers of almost all member countries for the first time in years. An important item on their agenda was the discussion of ways and means of making greater use of WEU. The numerous recommendations and initiatives of the Assembly were taken into account. I should like to sum up the main results of this Council meeting as follows:

The ministers agreed to make greater use of WEU in future as a consultative and co-ordinating forum for their close co-operation in security matters. The Council of Ministers instructed the Permanent Council to prepare, on the basis of the working paper in your possession, concrete proposals on further aspects of WEU reactivation in time for the meeting in Rome in October. It is intended to adopt a political declaration in Rome.

Let me return to the period covered by the report. In military matters the Council, assisted by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, ensured that the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty were observed with regard to the level of forces and armaments in the member states. The Assembly was informed that the Council had continued to examine the various aspects of a reduction of the list of types of armaments in Annex IV to Protocol No. III. Furthermore, the Council has started to investigate how the Agency for the Control of Armaments can, through a comprehensive renewal of its functions, take up activities in new fields. The Council will inform the Assembly of the results of this study once it has been completed.

Pursuant to a decision taken by the Council of Ministers in Brussels on 17th May 1983, the Standing Armaments Committee revised the confidential version of the first part of its econo-

mic study on the armaments industries of member states. A version of this up-dated study for publication will be forwarded to the Assembly. The international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee has completed its preliminary work on another study, dealing with Japan's entry into the armaments market.

A number of proposals concerning the future activities of the Standing Armaments Committee are currently being discussed by the Council. The Council is intent on avoiding any overlapping with the activities of other organisations in the arms sphere.

In its Recommendations 380 and 397 this Assembly advocated that the organisation of WEU be brought into line with the requirements of the 1980s, and in this connection you advocated cancellation of the final existing production bans and quotas for conventional weapons. I am able to inform you that the Council of Permanent Representatives will shortly deal with these matters.

Let me now turn to the final part of the annual report. As in preceding years, the financial situation of member states obliged the Council to pursue a careful budgetary policy in 1983. The Council will none the less seek to ensure that the organs of WEU can continue to work vigorously towards attaining the goals of the treaty. It is therefore resolved to make sure that the organs receive the resources they need for the efficient performance of their functions and for any necessary changes in their activities. It goes without saying that, in view of the strained budgetary situation, we shall have to continue to economise.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in my capacity as Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany I should like to present to you some considerations which, in my government's opinion, favour a greater use of WEU. The substance of what I have to say is, I know, supported by the other WEU governments.

It is worthwhile starting with the historical facts which Mr. De Decker presented in such a clear and well-organised fashion in his report on the thirtieth anniversary of the modified Brussels Treaty. The London conference and the accession of Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to the modified Brussels Treaty date back thirty years. Only a few people still remember that these political decisions paved the way to eliminating certain consequences of world war two: they permitted the statute of occupation to be terminated, the Bonn Convention to be concluded, and the Federal Republic of Germany to acquire its sovereignty and join the Atlantic Alliance. This marked the beginning of the Federal Republic of Germany's return to and integration into the democratic

Mr. Genscher (continued)

western family of nations. Since then we have together travelled a long and successful path, and I feel that none of us has any reason to regret the decisions taken then. In this lengthy period, WEU has fulfilled important tasks in connection with the objectives defined in the treaty. Today it is essential to make use of WEU in a manner appropriate to present requirements.

Why do we need Western European Union?

The Council working paper provided the following answer: because WEU is the only European organisation authorised under a treaty to deal with defence and security matters. That lends legitimacy to our objective, namely to make use of the great potential of the modified Brussels Treaty, which has not been fully exploited.

In past years there has been no shortage of efforts to provide European economic and political co-operation with a third dimension, a joint security policy. In the solemn declaration on European union of 19th June 1983, the heads of state or government of the ten member states of the European Community stated that "the political and economic aspects of security" could be dealt with within the scope of European political co-operation. Defence policy issues are still excluded in this context. However, Europe must begin to speak with one voice on these questions too, so that it can become a strong and confident partner in the alliance. Europe and America are the two pillars of the Atlantic bridge; they complement and need each other. It is therefore crucial that both pillars should be strong and reliable.

On both sides of the Atlantic complaints have frequently been made about an imbalance within the alliance. A picture has been drawn of a Europe living cheaply under the American umbrella. On this point let me repeat what I said at the Ministerial Council on 12th June: it is not that the United States is too strong within the alliance, but that the Europeans are too weak.

The European pillar of NATO must be reinforced. Specifically, that means pooling European security efforts. If we succeed in that we shall gain more weight in the North Atlantic Alliance and enjoy greater recognition outside the alliance. I have good reason to emphasise the alliance aspect; those who see in the reactivation of WEU the establishment of a counter-position to NATO, or who view it as a way of separating Europe from America, are deluding themselves. The opposite is the case - reactivation of WEU serves to strengthen the alliance. Our goal, the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance, will determine the future

work of WEU. In short: WEU should become the forum for European co-ordination on all matters for which a common European position in the alliance is desirable. That is an ambitious objective.

The paper submitted to you by the working group of the Permanent Council highlighted four subjects with which joint work could be launched, subjects which cover important areas. They can help to "examine and redefine the problems of European security", as a draft recommendation of this Assembly puts it.

Let us take a look at these subjects: analysing the threat to Europe, or, in other words, analysing the military, political and psychological aspects of the imbalance of power in Europe as a basis for outlining Europe's security interests; as to the effects of international developments on the security of Europe, we shall have to pay particular attention to the causes of crises and conflicts in the third world. We should assert more firmly the idea that genuine non-alignment is essential to international stability, that East-West antagonism must not be carried over into the third world. Similarly, we must be aware that economic and social instability are of particular importance and that measures to help overcome such instability in the third world are a constituent part of security policy for us in Europe, too.

In this context the question often arises as to whether WEU's involvement with these questions could be a way of circumventing the geographical limitation of NATO. I wish to make quite clear that this is not intended. The Federal Government will not tamper with the established principles of the alliance; intensification of the transatlantic dialogue in all its aspects is an important contribution to strengthening the alliance itself. It strengthens political co-operation and thus the cohesion of the alliance; your Assembly has again and again made suggestions on how co-operation in the field of armaments can be co-ordinated.

Such co-operation is an important concern of all European states. WEU and its bodies can provide a framework for efforts aimed at co-ordinating existing European resources for the conventional component of defence and using them more efficiently. Such action could take account of the need for a more effective Euro-American two-way street in arms co-operation and technology transfer. However, WEU and NATO must also complement each other in this area; the work of the existing institutions of the European NATO allies must not be impeded.

Increased use of WEU will certainly make greater demands on its organisation than hitherto. For that reason, on 12th June 1984 the Council

Mr. Genscher (continued)

of Ministers charged the Permanent Council to submit specific proposals in time for the anniversary meeting in Rome in October 1984 for decision by the ministers.

I cannot anticipate the decisions of the Permanent Council and therefore do not wish at this point to go into details of any possible organisational reform. I should like to restrict my remarks to one point, namely the reform of the Agency for the Control of Armaments. The Assembly has always carried out the duties laid down in the treaty and – together with the Council – has supervised observance of the armaments control provisions of the treaty. You therefore have a particular interest in this institution, and you have underlined this interest with a series of recommendations. The integrated defence structure of NATO and the close bilateral and multilateral links between the allies afford an open insight into the military capabilities and intentions of all members. Europe should build on openness and transparency, which we have realised to an extent probably unique in the world. In multilateral negotiations we are seeking verifiable arms control measures which transcend the block system. In almost thirty years of activity the Agency for the Control of Armaments has gained a high degree of experience and knowledge, which must not be wasted. One of the important functions fulfilled by the Council – not least as a result of your recommendation – is an examination of the way and the framework in which the potential of the Agency for the Control of Armaments can be exploited in future.

When we speak of Europe, we must not forget that Europe is more than the Seven, more than the European Community and the Council of Europe. Warsaw, Prague and Budapest are as European as Paris, London or Rome. In the interests of peace and stability in our continent and in the world, we must not relax our efforts to seek dialogue and co-operation with the states of the Warsaw Pact. The Assembly has expressed itself along these lines in several reports.

The Washington declaration of 31st May 1984 by the alliance unreservedly supports dialogue and co-operation as a constructive means of shaping relations with the East. In particular, it endorsed and elucidated the dual aspect of the long-term alliance strategy laid down in the Harmel report: what is necessary for defence will be done without seeking superiority or confrontation but in the expectation that the Soviet Union will respect our legitimate security interests just as we respect theirs; further to the Brussels appeal of December 1983, the West confirms its offer of co-operation at all levels

and in all spheres without preconditions or limitations. It is of particular importance that the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union should be restarted. In his recent Dublin speech, President Reagan again called upon the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating tables. The United States is prepared to listen to and negotiate on every new specific proposal made by the Soviet side.

We must utilise the opportunities offered by the Stockholm conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe. There we are seeking a network of specific measures which complement each other. We are also prepared to talk with the Soviet Union in Stockholm about reaffirming the pledge to refrain from the use or threat of force. However, the discussion on refraining from force must not be a substitute for the agreement on specific measures required by the Madrid mandate.

All these efforts must remain geared to the major goal of creating a peaceful order in Europe, in which states with different political and historical systems can live in peaceful competition. This order must be based on confidence, on co-operation and on respect for mutual interests.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, co-operation between the member states of WEU serves to strengthen Europe and the alliance. Co-operation in this union is thus a contribution to stability and peace in the world. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, on behalf of the Assembly, for your address, which we have listened to most attentively.

This is clearly a very important period for our organisation. You have been concerned, in speaking to us today, to accord it the importance it deserves. You have given us a number of indications, but the most important thing, if I may say so, is the political will which your speech reflects and which is so necessary for attainment of our objective.

Some members have questions to put to you. I would be grateful if you agree to answer them, taking perhaps one question at a time.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – That naturally depends on the content of the questions, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – This new meeting with the Minister gives me great pleasure and shows that the contact established

Mr. Pignion (continued)

on 12th June has not been lost. Since he has made several references to the need for East-West dialogue, and since it so happens that the President of the French Republic is in Moscow today, can the Minister say, without being indiscreet, what is the present state of political and economic relations with the Warsaw Pact countries, having regard to the fact that even if Europe were one day to speak with a single voice, the nature of the bilateral relations into which each of our states will have entered with the eastern bloc countries will certainly not fail to have a predominant influence on East-West contacts?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Our relations with the Warsaw Pact countries do not, understandably, need to fear the glare of public debate. I therefore take the opportunity presented by the honourable member's question to refer to these relations. It must be realised that German-Soviet relations are naturally a vital area of East-West relations. German-Soviet relations are based on the Moscow Treaty, which we regard as a long-term concept for co-operation with the Soviet Union and which we have supplemented by a long-term German-Soviet economic agreement. The development of these bilateral relations has been and continues to be satisfactory, as my latest visit to Moscow has also shown. We have also made progress in our efforts to conclude further agreements, on science and technology, for example, in which there are now prospects of a satisfactory solution being found to the problem of including research capacities and establishments in West Berlin.

Economic relations are also developing satisfactorily. The same can be said of the political dialogue between the disarmament negotiators and the heads of planning staffs of the two sides. We expect the Secretary-General of the Soviet Communist Party to accept the Federal Chancellor's invitation in the not too distant future.

The relationship between my country and the German Democratic Republic is, of course, of crucial importance to East-West relations. You will all recall that there have been times in the development of Europe when the relationship between my country and the German Democratic Republic placed a strain on East-West relations. We can say today that our relationship with the German Democratic Republic is one of the positive aspects of European and East-West policy. In other words, the relationship

between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic has a positive effect on East-West relations, and vice versa. I believe this is a gratifying situation, the significance of which extends well beyond the relationship between the two German states – much as we are interested in using these relations to improve the opportunities for meetings between people in Germany. We expect Secretary-General Honecker to visit the Federal Republic of Germany later this year.

I should also like to say to the honourable member at this point that, despite all the differences in the assessment of the causes of tension between East and West, despite all the differences in the political and social organisations of the two German states, their joint responsibility for peace and security in Europe is becoming increasingly apparent. This communion of responsibility, which stems from a common history and also, of course, from common nationhood, is a major contribution to European security, which is being made by Germans in both parts of our country.

Equally, relations with the other Warsaw Pact countries are developing in an extremely promising way. The Federal Chancellor will be visiting Hungary this week. In September the Chairman of the Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Bulgaria, Mr. Zhivkov, will be coming to Bonn. In other words, bilateral relations are developing positively.

We believe that the bilateral relations enjoyed by our country and the other countries of Western European Union naturally also make an important contribution to the stabilisation of East-West relations. We therefore welcome President Mitterrand's present visit to the Soviet Union. But we must realise – and I should like to repeat this, following my address – that the dialogue between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries and the dialogue between the other Western European countries and the Warsaw Pact countries are no substitute for the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both are needed if we want to make progress in East-West relations and to achieve a stable relationship between East and West.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, we know and appreciate your European spirit. You are the author of the Genscher-Colombo declaration, and you have here once more vigorously underlined the fact that you are a committed European. I should nonetheless like to put two related questions to you. Some weeks ago a meeting took place between the

Mr. Bianco (continued)

heads of the German and French Governments, that is between President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl. The final act of this meeting appeared to imply a kind of Paris-Bonn axis resting on a bilateral relationship. I would like some clarification on this point, as I consider it essential that all the member countries of WEU should be collectively involved.

My second question, which is suggested by the answer you gave Mr. Pignion, is whether these bilateral relations taking shape within the German orbit are, or are not, giving rise to neutralist tendencies in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I should first point out that we in Germany still use the word “axis” in the context of vehicles, but no longer in the context of foreign relations.

Leaving that aside, I believe all Europeans should realise that the Franco-German relationship is crucial to the process of European unification. In fact, the process of European unification would not have been possible without Franco-German reconciliation.

Since 1982, irrespective of the government in power in my country, work has gone ahead on the development of an aspect of the Franco-German Treaty which had previously existed only on paper, without ever really coming to life. I refer to the co-operation between our two countries in security matters. I regard the regular meetings between the foreign and defence ministers of the two countries as an essential element in the strengthening of this Franco-German co-operation.

This co-operation can and must, of course, also provide new momentum for the process of European unification. Our efforts to provide such momentum are obviously not inspired by the idea that it can come only from co-operation with France; everyone who wants to contribute is invited to join in, as your question also indicates. After all, the attempt to make progress in relation to the union of Western Europe by proposing a European act, later known as the solemn declaration, was undertaken with my Italian friend, the then Foreign Minister Colombo. In other words, we will co-operate wherever we can and no one in Europe should see a problem for himself in our belief that Franco-German co-operation is particularly significant.

I should now like to turn to your second question, because I believe you have broached a

central aspect of post-war German policy which is important not only for this Western European union, not only for the European Community and the western alliance, but also for the development of Europe generally.

My country is the only one of the larger nations of Europe – with the possible exception of our neighbour Poland – to lie in the heart of Europe, in the middle of our continent. All the other major nations are more or less on the periphery: our British friends on their islands, the Spaniards on a peninsula in the south, the Italians likewise, the French with extensive Atlantic and Mediterranean coastlines, separated by high mountains from Spain as well as from Switzerland and Italy, the Russian people in the broad expanses of their country. We Germans live in the heart of Europe: the current of every historical movement in Europe has involved my country and my people. In our history we have often been in conflict with our neighbours to the west, south and east.

But now, since the second world war, we have had a situation in which the Germans, forced to live in two states as a consequence of that war, have linked their destiny to the destiny of Europe. We see German policy today as a policy of peace in Europe. When we signed the treaty in Moscow, we incorporated in it a letter which states that the aim of our policy is to work towards a situation of peace in Europe in which we can exercise our right to self-determination. This means that we are making our national destiny inseparable from that of Europe. Put it this way, if you like; the Germans have Europeanised their future. This is the opposite of a neutralist policy. It is the opposite of an attempt to solve our national, German problem by going it alone, which would again bring us into conflict with our neighbours to the west and east and again put us at the mercy of the differences between East and West, as a mere object of policies pursued by others. Only by identifying with Europe will we have a chance in the future. So I reiterate: there is a “Europeanisation of our German future”. German policy equates with European peace policy – that is our basic political philosophy.

Every step we take to bring Germans in East and West closer together also brings Europeans in East and West closer together. Every step your government and other Western European governments take to improve East-West relations, every attempt – like that now being made by Mr. Mitterrand in Moscow – to build bridges between East and West, is also a plank in the German bridge and improves our situation as well.

So you must realise that we Germans believe our efforts to improve our relations with the German Democratic Republic not only help to

Mr. Genscher (continued)

make life easier for our compatriots but also contribute to peace and stability in Europe.

I therefore believe that by trying to improve relations with the German Democratic Republic, we are performing both a German and a European task, which are identical in every respect. So efforts on behalf of the relationship between the two German states really are part of a European peace policy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – The Council, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and a majority of the Assembly consider that the so-called “discriminatory” clauses applying to a member state, contained in Annexes III and IV to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, should be rescinded. However, manufacture of the armaments in question is, in our countries, most frequently the province of the profit-hungry industrial sector.

What steps are being considered with a view to avoiding a resurgence of trade and traffic in armaments, particularly with the third world? Putting it briefly, does removal of these restrictions not entail the risk of sparking off an arms race subject to no political control, by turning the Federal Republic of Germany into an arms manufacturer and exporter?

Does either the Council or the German Government plan to make a proposal on the matter?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I do not think that discrimination is good for anyone, either for those who are discriminated against or for those who do the discriminating. This is true of any area and any subject. The abolition of these restrictions is therefore really more than merely axiomatic. It is essential to our co-operation. Being allowed to do something is quite different from actually doing it, as we have clearly stated, but whether we do it or not, we certainly do want to be allowed to do it. The policy of the Federal Republic of Germany towards the export of arms will be quite unaffected. It would be a very great relief to us if all our partners would adopt our cautious policy on arms exports. We invite them to make our standards their own – we have no false ambitions in this respect. I think that is really the answer to your question. We certainly believe that the last thing that is needed in the third

world is a further build-up of arms: what it needs is genuine aid. As I have already said, overcoming economic and social problems in third world countries will also contribute to stability in these countries.

I will go even further: even from the strategic angle, genuinely non-aligned, genuinely independent third world countries which are developing well socially also contribute to our own, European security. I am always trying to explain that hegemony is most likely to arise in the third world where unsolved social and economic problems force the poor and desperate into unwise actions and decisions. Wherever sound social and economic development can be initiated, people will enjoy political stability and above all the will to assert and extend their independence. If we intend to abide by the principle that the East-West conflict should not be transferred to the third world, then we must refrain from dividing it into eastern and western areas of interest and recognise that genuine non-alignment, genuine independence mean stability for the world and hence security for us in Europe. That also answers your question about an expansion of our policy on arms exports.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – On 7th February last, in a public speech at The Hague, the President of the French Republic, looking beyond the nuclear question, proposed the creation of a manned European space station. I have been struck by the polite – not to say prudent – silence which our partners have maintained on this official French proposal.

Could the Minister tell the Assembly whether this proposal has been discussed by the relevant WEU bodies? Have consultations taken place within the member states? Is there a likelihood of consultations and studies on this project?

In the absence of such a project, which is obviously a very long-term proposition, is it possible to conceive of the design, construction and launch of a European observation satellite by members of WEU?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – That is, of course conceivable. I feel this proposal should be considered very carefully. If we are serious about Europe's independence within the alliance, we must not fall behind technologically. Europe must not become the technological licensee of other countries, whether it be Japan or, as in this case, the United States. In the context of this proposal we should not therefore

Mr. Genscher (continued)

underestimate the technological prospects, which go much further than the purely military aspect of facilities for observation. But a self-confident Europe will naturally want to have its own facilities for finding out what is going on in the world. As far as I know, this question has not been discussed within Western European Union. There have been many discussions at bilateral level, and they will continue.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). - Mr. President, I am extremely pleased with what Mr. Genscher said about the future of our organisation. I would like to ask him about two major problems.

There is clearly an important connection between what happens in the European Community in the political, economic and industrial fields and what might develop within the framework of Western European Union in the years to come. Does the Minister think any kind of opposition or competition could arise between the activities of the European Community and those of Western European Union?

The Minister rightly said that the development of European union serves to strengthen the NATO alliance. I would point out that a number of countries which are members of NATO are not members of Western European Union. In my view this is a major problem. Can the Minister say how it is possible to prevent countries like Norway, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey playing a rôle in the context of Western European Union such that the activities of Western European Union, instead of leading to a strengthening of the NATO alliance, lead to additional tensions and conflicts among European member states that are at the moment not members of Western European Union?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). - When I was preparing the European act with my Italian counterpart Mr. Colombo, we felt that security policy in a very broad sense should form part of the common policy of the countries of the European Community, because we believe that what is needed at the moment is a definition and concentration of European security interests. We also wanted to accommodate those who on the one hand point the finger at the Americans, saying that they are not prepared to acknowledge our interests, while on the other hand obstructing any definition of European security interests

in the Community. Unfortunately we were unable to obtain approval for an extension of the European Community's activities to include this area. The excuse was that the Irish were to blame because they are not members of NATO. When it was first suggested that this dimension should be added to co-operation in Europe, it was not the Irish who complained the most, but countries which belong to the European Community and NATO, with Denmark and Greece in the van. There is no point in concealing that fact here.

But can we take that as a reason for saying that, because two countries are unwilling, we should not seek a way of defining European security interests? That is what Western European Union is intended for, according to its treaty. Let us use it, let us get on with this task.

I would not turn away anyone who intends to abide by everything in the treaty and who co-operates with us. Anyone who wants that is welcome. But those who choose not to join us must not complain about our activities. So although I am quite sure that the reactivation of our work will cause doubts in certain minds, that should not prevent us from carrying on. I repeat: those who are willing to co-operate actively are very welcome, but they must be genuinely willing to co-operate and not use here the veto they used in the European Community. To my mind, what our Norwegian friends are saying is not the same as what others are saying: our Norwegian friends are definitely not intent on obstructing our co-operation. I am therefore in favour of continuing resolutely down the path of reactivating Western European Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). - Mr. President, the Minister has already partially answered my question. How seriously does the Council of Ministers take the consultative Assembly now in session? We always hear fine words. One of the reasons for reactivating WEU is that it is the only assembly entitled to discuss defence questions. But how does the Council of Ministers receive our recommendations? The document before us says that matters should in future be dealt with more rapidly. The document, however, emanates from the Council of Ministers. We are not discussing the matter jointly.

Nor is it simply a question of answers to our recommendations. In my view we are a consultative assembly, which means that our recommendations may meet with positive or negative reactions. We must then have an opportunity for joint discussion.

Before the Minister's address we heard the Rapporteurs, Mr. De Decker and Mr. Thoss.

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

The recommendations and reports refer to far-reaching matters. To what extent can the procedure be extended, under the Minister's direction, in such a way that we really can take part in joint discussions and achieve something really worthwhile?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – In my report, and specifically in the part in which I spoke only for the Federal Government, I invited the Assembly to put forward proposals for the improvement of relations and the intensification of the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, so that we may make progress in this respect too, at the anniversary celebrations in Rome. I am absolutely determined on this, and I will add straight away that I know that things have been far from satisfactory in this respect in the past.

If you ask me for the Council's views, I can only tell you that it is difficult to say what seven people think, but my impressions of our meeting here in Paris have been encouraging. I therefore hope that with your advice and proposals we shall be able to take a step forward in Rome.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

Mr. FERRARI AGGRADI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, I would like to ask you two questions, one general, the other specific. The first concerns the Rome meeting. This was suggested by the Italian Foreign Minister, and we have great hopes of it. The question now is whether the meeting is to be a kind of anniversary celebration or the occasion of renewed strength and progress? You have said that organisational reforms will be tabled, but should we believe that the movement will be forward or in another direction? I ask only that you give us some idea of the pattern of events you anticipate. I recall that De Gasperi, in supporting the European Defence Community, laid special emphasis on the political issues involved and on the prospects for political integration. I should be grateful if you would enlighten us on this point.

The second question concerns the present multiplicity of negotiating tables. Would some unification and integration be possible so as to have just one negotiating table in the interests of clarity and efficiency?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – It would be a complete waste of our travelling expenses if we went to Rome simply to celebrate thirty years of WEU, pleasant though it always is to visit Rome. Of course, we want to look ahead. This should be very much a policy meeting, in the directions I have indicated: reactivation of WEU, improvement of co-operation between its organs, and extension of its political significance to include both the definition and the concentration of European strengths and interests. So to your question as to whether progress should be made, I can return an unequivocal yes. To your question as to whether progress is being made, I must make a qualified reply: I will do all I can, but six others are needed to ensure progress. Nevertheless, I am optimistic.

As for your question about negotiating tables, the fact is that in Vienna we are negotiating on troop reductions in Central Europe. There is some connection between these negotiations and the Stockholm conference, in that the goal for the first phase is agreement on confidence-building measures, which could also have some bearing on the negotiations on verification in Vienna. As you know, that is only the first phase. In the second phase of the conference, issues relating to conventional armaments and the balance of conventional weapons are also to be discussed. The principal difference between the negotiations in Vienna and Stockholm is that the Vienna negotiations are confined to Central Europe, while the advantage of the Stockholm conference is that, for the first time, it will cover security policy throughout Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

That is more than we were able to achieve in the Helsinki final act, where it was only possible at the very last minute to include a narrow strip of Soviet territory and so make it clear that even the Soviet superpower must be subject to the confidence-building measures. The principle was thus more important than the geographical scope. At the time some people thought that it was unnecessary – that it was wrong – while others thought that 250 kilometres was not enough. This was too ambitious at that time, but the trend had been set, as the Stockholm conference is now confirming.

The negotiations in the Disarmament Committee in Geneva primarily concern a ban on chemical weapons, which we consider particularly important. The prospects of the negotiations producing results would be reduced rather than increased if all these subjects were combined, because it would do away with the compulsion to discuss concrete problems in concrete terms. It would be easy to evade the issue. I therefore believe the present structure of the negotiations is right.

Mr. Genscher (continued)

Whether there will be one or two sets of negotiations on nuclear weapons in the future is another matter. There are sound arguments for common negotiations on strategic weapons and intermediate-range weapons, but there are also sound arguments for separate negotiations. I should not like to be dogmatic about this, because the important thing for us is that negotiations take place. If a man can only be happy with two negotiating tables, we should let him have two negotiating tables. If someone else wants just one, I would not squabble over principles. But combining all these negotiations would mean generalising them to such an extent that we might as well abandon all hope of achieving practical results. You will recall that I said in my address that we are naturally prepared to discuss non-aggression if only we can define it in more concrete terms. There are plenty of non-aggression pacts already: all the bilateral agreements concluded between the Federal Republic of Germany and eastern bloc countries contain them. But the Helsinki final act and the Charter of the United Nations refer to non-aggression, too.

The question to be answered, therefore, is why a new form of non-aggression is being sought. The only possible answer is that it must be stated categorically that force must be renounced, not only in Europe but throughout the world, that the renunciation of the use and threat of force must apply not only between but also within alliances. Perhaps the last of the aspects I have mentioned is one of the reasons why the smaller Warsaw Pact countries understandably set such store by declarations of non-aggression. So we should talk frankly about this.

But in the midst of this discussion and these negotiations on a concrete definition of non-aggression we must not forget what the Madrid mandate said: effective confidence-building measures are to be agreed upon, which must also help to give effect to the duty to refrain from the use of force. So those who really want disarmament of arms controls must not run the risk of lumping everything together and producing only vague generalities instead of definite results at the end of the day.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. Genscher, I should first like to put a question that follows on from Mr. Dejardin's. I should like to hear from you how far your government thinks co-operation on armaments should go, and particularly whether reports that the Federal Republic of Germany is interested in co-operating with France with

regard to missiles are to be believed. If this is so, I have a supplementary question, which also follows on from Mr. Dejardin's question: would not such co-operation lead to a further dynamic armaments policy, with additional pressure to export to the third world countries, especially when you think of such areas of tension as Iran and Iraq and of the publicity certain missiles received in connection with the Falklands war? That is my question about the possibility of a new dynamic armaments policy and the precautions against it.

My second question is this: do you think that what you said about the third world - that the last thing the third world needs is more weapons - should be applied equally, if not with even greater urgency, to Europe, since the last thing we need is further weapons? Would it not be appropriate to offer as an alternative to this idea of a dynamic attitude to armament, which is what I am afraid of, a dynamic attitude to disarmament, for example, as an institutional precaution, if not a guarantee of this dynamic attitude to disarmament, to turn the present Agency for the Control of Armaments into a really autonomous arms control and disarmament authority?

Thirdly, do you not think it right, following up your basically very reasonable suggestion about strengthening the idea of non-alignment, that this idea should also be applied to Europe and put to good use here? In the same context, I should like to ask you why the Federal Republic of Germany has joined with other countries of Western European Union and NATO to form a bloc at the Stockholm conference by throwing down on the table a NATO proposal which was bound to elicit a *nyet* from the other side. Would it not have been better to keep an open mind and sound out the thirty-five countries to see what they all think?

My final question is this: you have referred to the special nature and advantages of Article V, with its automatic mechanism for affording assistance. I can understand your liking for this article if I consider it solely from the angle of deterrence. But as you know, the forces of the peace movement in particular have become accustomed to adding the other idea, the idea of refraining from deterrence.

Do you not also think, Mr. Genscher, that in the nuclear age an automatic mechanism for affording assistance could very easily - and with fatal consequences in the nuclear age - cause us to slide automatically into a war, as happened on the eve of the first world war, and that what you regard as the advantage of Article V of the WEU treaty would turn out not to be an advantage at all?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – One of the advantages of the western alliance is that it considers security matters not only from the military but also from the political angle, because we know that, as the Harmel report says, military efforts alone are unlikely to guarantee security and freedom. Political efforts are needed to remove the causes of conflicts, to prevent new conflicts from arising and to keep crises under political control. These principles are enshrined in the alliance's security strategy, of which disarmament and arms control are also integral parts. It is against this background, of course, that the future rôle of the Agency for the Control of Armaments must be considered.

I now come to your reference to a dynamic attitude to disarmament, which we have sought in various areas and within certain limits. I regarded the western alliance's moratorium on intermediate-range weapons from 1979 to 1984, while the Soviet Union continued to deploy SS-20s, as an attempt at a dynamic attitude to disarmament, although the eastern bloc responded with the reverse. The West's inferiority in conventional weapons is also a contribution of this kind, but always within definite limits. There have been instances when disarmament went so far that it invited aggression. Afghanistan is an example of this.

I also believe – to refer to your comments on the requirement to afford assistance – that the Afghan people could still be living in peace, and not under foreign occupation, if there had been countries bound by treaty to assist them. I therefore ask you to realise that in the heavily armed environment in which we live there is unfortunately – I stress, unfortunately – no alternative to the course we have adopted, of seeking a balance at the lowest possible level. Efforts on our part without regard for our own security interests would lead to different developments from those you are hoping for. That has absolutely nothing to do with the strategy of deterrence. It would be true even if there were strategies other than the strategy of deterrence. Your reference in a different context to the period before the first world war shows how true this is.

With regard to your question about co-operation with France, I can say that it will most certainly not lead to a dynamic attitude to armament. There has been co-operation with France in the past, even in the area of conventional ballistic missiles. This in itself – and we cannot at present predict if any such step will

take place – would not signify a sudden change in the nature of our co-operation with France.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before calling Mr. Gianotti I would point out, Ladies and Gentlemen, that there are four speakers left on my list, including Mr. Gianotti himself. Having regard to the time and the ordeal to which the Minister has agreed to submit himself here today, I consider, with your agreement, that the list is closed.

I call Mr. Gianotti.

Mr. GIANOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – The Minister has pointed to the absence of a forum for missile negotiations, and it is reasonable to suppose that this situation may unfortunately persist for some time. Recently there has been talk of a possible moratorium on missile deployment as a condition for the resumption of East-West negotiations on the subject, and I refer here to Euromissiles in particular. You referred, Minister, to President Reagan's speech in Ireland and I recall one made by the Italian Prime Minister in Lisbon some time ago. Do you consider this to be a possible option, and could the governments of WEU countries take some initiative in this direction?

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Do you mean Mr. Craxi's initiative, or which initiative do you mean?

Mr. GIANOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I refer to the proposal made in the speech by Mr. Craxi at the conference marking the end of his visit to Portugal.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – No, I share the view which the Italian Government expressed later.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Milani.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, I should like to return to the question put to you by Mr. Bianco. I of course agree with you that we should not talk about "axes". We already had one of those in the past, and it proved beneficial to neither of us. I do, however, call to mind an interview given a month and a half ago by ex-Chancellor Schmidt to the leading Italian newspaper *La Repubblica*, in which he expressed the opinion that any reference to Europe had to take in Rome, Paris, London, Berlin and Leningrad – but by-pass Moscow. Faced with the current difficulties besetting the building of Europe he considered that the aim

Mr. Milani (continued)

should be to establish a strong zone of the kind implied by the meeting between Germany and France. The question now is whether, given all the difficulties within the Community, this meeting heralds joint ventures in the fields of industry and scientific and technological research, or is it intended, as you said initially, merely to give impetus to the European idea to get it moving forward again. I would also specially like to hear your opinion as to whether one effect of this strong zone could be to contain the sources of conflict which are now emerging, particularly with regard to the economic competition between Europe and the United States of America.

As we are also called upon to discuss defence matters, there is a second question I would like to ask: do you consider that it would be possible to change by force the European borders established at Yalta without provoking a generalised nuclear conflict?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). - The only answer any responsible human being can give to this question is that force must be renounced. As regards the prospects for greater Europe, you will have heard me say in my address that Europe consists of more than the countries of Western European Union, the European Community and the Council of Europe. We should never forget that, despite the variety of political and social systems, Europe has its own identity, which will become more and more pronounced. That is quite unmistakable. Moreover, it is an historical process.

Europe has more than a common history; it has a common culture, it acknowledges a joint responsibility, transcending bloc boundaries, for the future of our continent. To strengthen joint responsibility for Europe in East and West, more can be done than just engaging in dialogue. It is only when countries co-operate that joint interests emerge. The importance of the chapter headed "Co-operation" in the Helsinki final act, which is an excellent document on the development and confirmation of the European identity, is often underestimated. But co-operation forges links, creates and defines common interests, and is also a protection against risks, which would, after all, equally threaten the advantages derived from co-operation. Franco-German co-operation - I repeat - is a crucial part of European policy. There are major technological projects in which

by no means all the countries of Europe are involved, such as the Airbus programme which has reinstated Europe as an international factor in aircraft construction, with all the problems, burdens and expense it entails. Not all Europeans are involved in the Airbus programme, yet it means technology for Europe, so it may be that co-operation between two countries - France and Germany in this case - will lead to technological progress in other areas. This would be a threat to European unification only if these two countries refused to allow others to co-operate. But they will not do so.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). - What I too have to say concerns the contents of the Minister's speech here today.

I believe this speech, following the Council of Ministers of 12th June last and preceding the Council of European Ministers next October, shows that the reactivation of WEU is already under way. That can only be welcomed.

The Minister said that WEU and NATO can and must be complementary. That is an absolutely essential point, but the Minister knows that our relations with the United States in matters of defence policy are sometimes delicate, that there are various sensitive areas, and that sometimes, in regard to burden-sharing, different interpretations emerge on either side of the Atlantic. He also knows that the two-way street policy has not always had the hoped-for results. This unease is, moreover, clearly expressed in the amendment which Senator Nunn intends to table to the United States defence budget with a view to repatriating 100,000 American troops stationed in Europe.

My question is as follows. What, in the Minister's opinion, is the American Government's view of the constitution of a European pillar within the alliance by the revitalisation of WEU, given that the wish for the constitution of a European pillar was expressed by President Kennedy some years ago?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). - There were times right at the beginning when certain less than far-sighted people in the United States felt that the process of European unification would cause problems for transatlantic co-operation. That idea was dropped many, many years ago. Today the United States appreciates the benefits to be gained from strengthening the

Mr. Genscher (continued)

European pillar of the alliance, which is only logical. There is no arguing against an increase in our co-operation on these grounds.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – Plainly, the standardisation of arms production and procurement is a subject on which it is highly desirable to make progress and on which progress, on the face of it, produces great benefit both in terms of the saving of budgetary expenditure and greater military efficiency. Does the Minister see standardisation of arms procurement and production as one of the chief, if not the chief, new function for a reactivated WEU? If so, does he consider that there could be conflict between the use of WEU for that purpose and the continued use of bodies that have a wider membership, such as the Independent European Programme Group? Does he consider that such conflict is inevitable, or is it avoidable?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in Office of the Council*) (Translation). – We must avoid conflict. As I said in my address, we do not wish to encroach upon or interfere with existing institutions. This does not alter the fact that we should seize the opportunities offered by WEU, and I would ask you not to misunderstand me. There would be little point in talking about the reactivation of WEU if we thought standardisation was the main issue. We are thinking in political terms and looking further ahead. That may also be an aspect to consider.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Once again, Minister, I speak on behalf of us all in expressing our profound gratitude. You have spent more than an hour and a half with us discussing a matter which will be followed up, as you have indicated, on other occasions. Our warmest thanks once again.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. State of European security (Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 971).
2. Address by Mr. van Houwelingen, Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands.
3. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council (Joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and votes on the draft recommendations, Documents 973 and amendments, 979 and amendments and 975).
4. AWACS and Nimrod aircraft (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 974).
5. Control of armaments and disarmament (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 972).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.)

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 20th June 1984

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. State of European security (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 971*).
Speakers: The President, Sir Anthony Grant, Sir Dudley Smith (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pignion (*Chairman of the Committee*), the President, Mr. Vogt (explanation of vote), Sir Anthony Grant (point of order), the President.
4. Address by Mr. van Houwelingen, Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands.
Replies by Mr. van Houwelingen to questions put by: Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Gansel, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Scheer.
5. Change in the orders of the day.
Speakers: Mr. de Vries, Mr. Dejardin, the President, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. van den Bergh, the President.
6. AWACS and Nimrod aircraft (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 974*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Spies von Bullesheim (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Vogt; (point of order): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Vogt; Mr. Wilkinson (*Vice-Chairman of the Committee*).
7. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council (*Joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 973 and amendments, 979 and amendments and 975*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. van den Bergh, Dr. Miller, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Steverlynck, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Prussen, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Gianotti, Mr. Mezzapesa, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Gansel, Mr. De Decker (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Thoss (*Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Hardy (*Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. De Decker, Mr. Vogt (point of order), Mr. Hardy, Mr. De Decker; (points of order): Dr. Miller, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Pignion, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Wilkinson; Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Bianco (point of order), Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Dejardin; (points of order): Lord Hughes, Mr. Vogt; (explanation of vote): Mr. Pignion, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Bianco; Mr. Pollidoro, Mr. Thoss, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Thoss (point of order); (explanation of vote): Mr. Pollidoro, Mr. Vogt.
8. Change in the membership of a committee.
9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m., with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the last sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be

published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. State of European security

(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 971)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The first order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the state of European security and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 971.

In view of the orders of the day for tomorrow's sitting, of the fact that the Presidential Committee has to meet and of members'

1. See page 31.

The President (continued)

commitments, we must complete consideration of the scheduled business today; the rule which provides for the closure of sittings at half past six will therefore not be applied.

Are there any objections?...

It is so decided.

I call Sir Anthony Grant.

Sir Anthony GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, this is a first-class report, as one would expect from a senior colleague and former minister in the British Ministry of Defence, such as my friend and colleague, Sir Dudley Smith.

In the short time that I believe you want speeches to take I shall confine myself to three matters. First, I am glad that the report refers in some detail to Spain. I record my view that Spain should be integrated fully into NATO, and the sooner the better. Spain is a vital member of a democratic Europe. It is wholly involved with NATO principles of defence and as such should be a full member with the same rights and responsibilities as Portugal and other nations.

Secondly, I wholly support the idea of WEU playing an increasingly important rôle in the defence of the West while not, of course, undermining NATO which has ensured that my children have been spared the sufferings of my generation and of my father's generation. Europe will have to bear a greater responsibility if the United States is to reduce its conventional commitment, as is threatened. The enormous difficulties of making multinational forces effective in a free society call for constant scrutiny and adaptation, as the report points out. It is so much easier for a dictatorship, such as the Soviet bloc, to be cohesive in these matters.

Thirdly, I am worried by the increase in anti-Americanism in recent years. Europe is sometimes too smug and too self-righteous. The solidarity of the alliance is essential to the peace and security of the free world and the security of the whole world, which depends on the balance being maintained.

It is a feature of the freedom and democracy in which we believe that we are at liberty, openly and honestly, to criticise each other. However, the pendulum has swung too far and must be brought back, for otherwise the alliance will be undermined and the work of our enemies done for them. A million United States graves in Europe are testimony to the contribution and sacrifice that that nation made in the defence of freedom in Europe. You will recall, Mr. President, that subsequently President Kennedy used the immortal words *Ich bin ein Berliner*, which demonstrated the United States commitment.

I commend particularly recommendation 2 to the Assembly. We need to lay greater emphasis on what unites us in NATO; we need to lay greater emphasis on and give greater recognition to the burden borne for so many years by the United States, and greater consideration of what contribution Europe can make to its own defence.

The late President Kennedy said in his inaugural speech many years ago: "Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country." I believe that we should adapt that and say: "Think not what the alliance can do for me; think rather what I can do for the alliance." I support the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Two other members, Mr. Hill and Sir Frederic Bennett, were down to speak but are not present.

I therefore call the Rapporteur.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – We have had an interesting debate – interrupted because of the exigencies of the programme – and I am grateful to all the speakers for their various observations. Everybody except Mr. Vogt was in favour of the report, but Mr. Vogt's speech was unashamedly political. I hope that he is right in saying that the Soviets have no aggressive intentions and that the Kremlin is thinking only of peace. The Soviets certainly respect strength and, while we remain strong and vigilant, I shall remain hopeful that we shall never again experience another war of the kind to which Sir Anthony Grant and I referred.

Mr. Aarts said that my speech and the report called Dutch reliability into question. I believe that we shall have an opportunity later to question the Dutch Minister of State on these issues, but I do not regard the recent move by the Netherlands on nuclear deployment as helpful. It is not in tune with what NATO should be trying to achieve. However, I am grateful to Mr. Aarts for his general support for the report and I know from my contacts with many people in the Netherlands that they subscribe strongly to the idea of collective security via NATO.

My old friend, Mr. Cavaliere, made a characteristic speech and, as always, hit the nail on the head. I am glad that he recognised the vital contribution in these matters of the United States. That cannot be undervalued or underestimated and, as Sir Anthony Grant said, we must always nurture the strength of Europe's association with the United States.

Mr. Cavaliere was right to say the southern flank of NATO caused anxiety. I hope that one of our committees will look at the southern Mediterranean area and the difficulties on the southern flank of NATO. Mr. Cavaliere said that

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

Europe should "commit itself to the hilt", and I should have been happy to use that phrase myself.

I agree wholeheartedly with Mr. van den Bergh that our responsibility is to improve relationships. We must improve relationships within NATO and encourage a better relationship with the Soviets and particularly between the United States and Russia. However, just as it takes two to tango, it takes two to reach an agreement, an accommodation, or an understanding.

There seems to be a lot of chilly ill will in the air. I hope that that will change. There may be political reasons for it at the moment, because of the approaching presidential election in the United States, but I am certain that we cannot relax our efforts to get more harmony among nations in the interests of the whole world.

I agreed with Sir Anthony Grant when he said that there needed to be constant scrutiny and adaptation, because otherwise organisations tended to wither or become stale. It is easy for the Soviet bloc to present a united front on everything. As democracies, we have the luxury of independent ideas and sometimes we push them too hard, to the embarrassment of our friends and allies. The solidarity of the alliance is essential and Sir Anthony was right to draw attention to the growing feeling of anti-Americanism in Europe. There is no cause for that, and anti-Americanism is a deadly flower to be blossoming in Europe.

For several generations – I mentioned the first and second world wars – America has bailed Europe out of its troubles and generously followed up its efforts with Marshall aid to put Europe back on its feet. We owe a lot to America and we should always recognise that, because the United States is one of the bulwarks of peace in the world.

I am certain that the report has done some good and I hope that the NATO authorities and member governments will take note of it. Of course, we cannot expect them to implement everything – though it would be nice if they did – but we hope that they will give our proposals serious consideration. They are in tune with several other reports that are giving the new thrust that we see from WEU and are in harmony with the idea put forward by our foreign ministers that WEU should be reinvigorated and take on a new rôle.

Let us hope that that is the beginning of something big and worth while. Already this week, we have had your election, Mr. President, and a number of interesting reports submitted to the Assembly. We have also had

considerable good will from our Foreign Ministers. I am grateful to the Assembly for the reception that it has given to the report. I hope that it will be passed and will not be put into a pigeon hole. I hope that in future we shall be able to say that many of the recommendations have been implemented.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Once again, Sir Dudley, my thanks for having been so brief and, in particular, for the valuable report you have presented.

I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has already given its view. Sir Dudley Smith's report is excellent and, as such, was approved by the committee.

In the absence of Sir Dudley, it fell to me to present the report in committee, I therefore accept partial responsibility for it, but I should like to pay tribute to the end product as being a work of reference.

Ladies and Gentlemen, this document with its appendices and charts should be kept because it is essential for a proper understanding of all the work we do.

Mr. President, the Assembly will certainly adopt this excellent report. Once again, I thank Sir Dudley Smith.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before the vote is taken on the draft recommendation, I have a request to allow an explanation of vote.

I hereby inform the Assembly that – subject to our later work on the Rules of Procedure – I take responsibility for allowing explanations of vote before the actual vote is taken.

I call Mr. Vogt for an explanation of vote.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, it will come as no surprise that we cannot support this draft. However, I should like to draw attention to a misunderstanding in connection with this explanation of vote. Sir Dudley Smith stated this morning – and I quote – that the peace people would maintain that NATO, or the European partners of NATO, wished to deliver a first strike. I should simply like to state that that is not the point. It is not being imputed that such a first strike is actually desired. What is claimed is that the structure of the weaponry deployed will railroad us increasingly into a strategy with an in-built first-strike capability. I think this is an important misunderstanding which should be cleared up in further discussions in this Assembly.

Our overall position is that we are voting against this draft in the conviction that the

Mr. Vogt (continued)

European community and the Europeans within WEU have reserves of power other than those provided by military might and force. I think we shall have occasion to return to this point.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Anthony Grant on a point of order.

Sir Anthony GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Will you explain to us how an explanation of the vote can be given before the vote has taken place? Members were restricted to speaking for five minutes, and Mr. Vogt spoke for seven and a half minutes – about two minutes more than anyone else. He has now spoken for another two minutes. That is not entirely fair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Sir Anthony, I repeat what I said a moment ago; namely that, subject to the work of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, particularly on a proposal which I shall make personally after consulting the Bureau, I have taken it upon myself to decide that explanations of vote may be given before the vote is taken. This is on my own responsibility. In my view, an explanation of vote can affect the vote itself. It seems to me more reasonable that it should precede rather than follow the vote.

You will be the judges of the correctness of my decision but it stands for the moment and I hope that you will accept it.

I am prepared to consider any requests to give an explanation of vote. I had received one from Mr. Vogt and, even though he had already spoken in the debate, he still had the right to explain his vote. Members making a similar request will be granted the same right.

That is my reply, Sir Anthony, and I hope you will accept it.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

In that case the vote will now be taken on the draft recommendation in Document 971.

Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure lays down that the Assembly shall vote by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes call for a roll-call vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

4. Address by Mr. van Houwelingen, Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We are now to be addressed by Mr. van Houwelingen,

Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands.

Mr. van Houwelingen, we have already had the privilege of meeting you before the sitting. I speak for the whole of the Assembly in saying how greatly we appreciate your presence here. We hope that your participation in the debate will advance the dialogue between the Assembly and the Council.

We were addressed this morning by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany and yesterday by the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom. You are the first representative of a defence ministry to speak at this session.

Members will shortly be asking questions which you have already undertaken to answer. I wish to stress the great importance which the Assembly attaches to the dialogue between elected representatives and members of governments responsible for defence questions, because this is the true province of Western European Union.

With my renewed thanks, I call Mr. van Houwelingen, Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands.

Mr. van HOUWELINGEN (*Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is with great pleasure that I have accepted your invitation to make some comments in this important forum on the need for co-operation on matters of defence.

Western Europe must become a stronger and more assertive pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, and this requires closer Western European co-ordination and co-operation on security and defence issues. While they often differ on so much else, most Europeans agree on this. Why is that? There are, in my opinion, four major reasons for this, in itself remarkable, consensus.

The first is that only a more integrated Western Europe can guarantee that America's commitment to the security and independence of Western Europe remains a fact in the future. If Western Europe does not assume a level of responsibility for its own security which is more commensurate than at present with its current level of economic development and political sophistication, then, I fear, the alliance will be weakened by growing misunderstanding and increased internal tensions.

Secondly, various events in recent years have highlighted important differences of opinion between the United States and Western Europe over the best policy to adopt towards the Soviet Union, and towards developments in the third world. This fact is forcing the governments of

1. See page 32.

Mr. van Houwelingen (continued)

Western Europe to define more clearly and more actively their own distinctively European policies.

Thirdly, more Western European co-operation on security and defence issues is necessary in order to give Western Europe more say on key issues of NATO strategy. This strategy, Mr. President, is of vital importance to Europeans. It would only be logical, then, for Europeans to address themselves within the context provided by NATO to the best ways of tackling these largely Eurocentric problems associated with current strategy.

The fourth and last reason is that Western Europe is in urgent need of a less fragmented arms industry and less nationalistic procurement policies, and must develop into an equal partner vis-à-vis the United States defence industry. Moreover, the sharply rising cost of the new weapons systems is forcing Western European countries to work together. I shall be talking about these problems in more detail in a moment.

Although there is virtually a general consensus on the desirability, indeed the necessity for greater co-operation on matters of Western European security, there is much that remains uncertain and vague. The debate on the best ways of safeguarding Western Europe's security is in its greatest state of ferment since the discussion on the European Defence Community of the early 1950s, yet it is still far from clear how much common ground really exists between the Western European countries.

In this context I welcome the French initiative to revive Western European Union. As I have said, we need closer co-operation on Western European security and defence issues. WEU is one of the bodies in which we can discuss the key issues of European security and defence and explore what must and can be done. After all, it is based on a treaty explicitly concerned with security and defence. Besides, as laid down in the Brussels Treaty the mutual commitment of WEU members to a common defence is stronger than that laid down in the North Atlantic Treaty. Moreover, WEU has institutions which are already in existence and do not need to be created, such as the Council of Ministers and, of course, this Assembly. It goes without saying, Mr. President, that discussions within WEU may not interfere with participation in other bodies like NATO. As far as the Independent European Programme Group, the IEPG, is concerned, I see no problems in this respect. After all, all the countries of Western Europe, including France, regard the IEPG as the appropriate forum for co-ordinating defence equipment programmes in Western Europe.

The IEPG is – as you know – the organisation of all Western European countries, including France, which was created in 1976 to promote Western European co-operation in defence equipment production. The reasons for such co-operation are still the same as they were in 1976, when the IEPG was founded, with the one difference that co-operation is even more necessary now than it was then. We need greater co-ordination among Western European countries over equipment than ever before, for three reasons:

First, the cost of producing new weaponry is becoming exorbitant. Consequently most countries are increasingly unable to procure new weapons systems such as aircraft, ships and tanks. Rising production costs can be countered only by far-reaching co-operation in the areas of research, development, production and defence procurement.

Second, in Western Europe, too many small firms are producing the same weaponry on too small a scale. If we do not do anything about this dispersion of effort, in the long run Western Europe will be reduced to nothing more than a sub-contractor for the large American armaments industry. The latter benefits after all from a unified internal market, which results in larger production runs and lower prices per product unit.

Third, from a military standpoint, co-operation leads to greater standardisation and interoperability and thus to greater military effectiveness, lower costs and simpler logistics. NATO has constantly pleaded for more standardisation, but unfortunately without much result so far. There are many telling examples of this lack of standardisation. I will mention only two: at present anti-tank weaponry is in the process of being developed by no less than eleven different firms in seven different countries; ground-to-air missiles are in the process of being developed by no less than eighteen different firms in seven different countries. The number of examples could easily be multiplied.

It should be evident, Mr. President, that we cannot go on in this way. We must put an end to this situation. Costs – seen from an economic, military or political point of view – have simply become too high.

I would like to say just one thing, Mr. President, about the reasons for the deficiencies in Western European co-ordination over equipment programmes. Until now, most countries have given priority to protecting their own defence industries, and not only for reasons of prestige or considerations of strategy: economics are of course also involved. For obvious reasons, governments – and, I must add, parliaments – are committed to maintaining and improving employment and technology in their

Mr. van Houwelingen (continued)

own countries. A no less important reason is to be found in the operational and technical requirements for defence matériel which often vary widely from country to country. As long as the military in each Western European country can set their own – and therefore divergent – procurement requirements, co-operation will scarcely get off the ground. Matériel requirements have to be attuned to each other on an international level. If they are not, we can certainly forget any co-ordination of arms programmes.

It is the IEPG's task, Mr. President, to try to break through the all too nationalistic defence policies of various countries in Western Europe. Until recently results have been meagre. In the past year, however, and particularly in the last few months, the prospects for real co-operation in arms programmes have markedly improved. The political will to start working together and the political support for such efforts have been growing rapidly in Western Europe. There is an increasing realisation that short-term sacrifices must be made in order to profit from the long-term advantages of genuine co-operation. This is a fact of great importance. Because, since the founding of the IEPG it has been clear that without that political will, and without that political support, every attempt to work together is doomed in advance.

To optimise this favourable political climate, at the beginning of this year in my capacity as Chairman of the IEPG for 1984 and 1985 I invited my fellow Ministers of State for Defence to a special meeting, which was held in The Hague in the beginning of April. On the basis of a discussion paper drawn up by myself, we were not only able to make a thorough analysis of the status of co-ordination of Western European equipment programmes, but we were able to pass a resolution on the future work of the IEPG.

This resolution contained several important items. In particular, we spoke out strongly for the active harmonisation of national operational requirements and for greater co-ordination of research and development in Western Europe. The resolution also stressed the importance of more balanced two-way traffic in defence equipment between Western Europe and the United States. I will return to each of these points in a moment.

During the meeting of the Western European Ministers of Defence last month in Brussels, the British Defence Secretary, Mr. Michael Heseltine, gave a further political boost to the work of the IEPG. Building on the resolution passed in The Hague, he presented a list of ten quite specific possible areas where Western Europeans

should be working more closely together, and asked other countries for additional suggestions, all in the interests of actively co-ordinating national operational requirements and operational timetables within a short space of time. The crucial decision was that Defence Ministers of the IEPG countries should discuss this topic before the end of the year.

Boosted by the special meetings of Ministers of State in The Hague and Mr. Heseltine's initiative, the work of the IEPG has gained momentum. Optimising the much-improved political climate, it is now essential that we take definite steps towards the greater co-ordination of European defence equipment programmes. What steps are these? I believe that in the immediate future – by which I mean the next two years – we must apply ourselves to solving two crucial problems which I touched on before: active harmonisation of the national operational and technical requirements for weapons systems and mutual adjustment of national procurement timetables; co-ordination of research and development within Western European defence industries, and stimulation of joint projects.

Results in these two areas will furnish a clear indication as to whether the IEPG is to fail or succeed. I am aware that it will be far from easy to solve these two basic problems. Harmonising national operational requirements, for example, means asking a lot of the countries working together in the IEPG. We must prevent national requirements from piling up, one on top of the other, making the end product more expensive. Not only must countries mutually accommodate their requirements for all sorts of equipment, but concessions must also be made on procurement timetables, involving slowing down in some cases and speeding up in others, if real co-operation is to be achieved. In both instances this means that existing plans must be adapted, which is time-consuming and complicated, and often involves financial consequences as well. At the moment we are working very hard within the IEPG to harmonise operational requirements and timetables. I am completely confident that we shall see results from this work within the year.

At least as important – and equally difficult – is the task of co-ordinating research and development. The necessity for such co-ordination will be clear to you. The costs of research and development, partly as a result of applying recent developments in microelectronics, are high and still climbing. By working together we can cut costs by putting an end to the many overlapping and consequently wasteful programmes. Moreover, international co-operation is best begun in the initial phase: research. If we fail to work together in the initial, research phase, then working together in the arms production phase will become all the

Mr. van Houwelingen (continued)

more difficult and often less attractive into the bargain.

Co-ordination of research and development cannot succeed without the co-operation of the various defence industries, hence it is invaluable that the special meeting of the IEPG countries' Ministers of State in The Hague resolved to recognise the EDIG, the European Defence Industrial Group, as the appropriate body to advise the IEPG in all matters pertaining to the defence industry. Every proposal for joint arms production must be discussed in as early a phase as possible with the industries involved. The advantage of this is, among other things, that defence planners will now be able to gain a much earlier and better overview than before of the possibilities for international arms production.

In addition to harmonising operational requirements and timetables, great efforts are being made to co-ordinate research and development. The first proposals in this area can already be expected this year. What we should be aiming for is a kind of Esprit plan for the Western European defence industry. Just as the purpose of the Esprit plan was to enable the European Community to bridge the gap between Western Europe and the United States and Japan in the field of microelectronics, the IEPG could mount a similar plan to allow Western Europe to catch up in the area of research and development of defence equipment by combining and stimulating national efforts. It is naturally no accident that I think of the Esprit plan in connection with the co-ordination of research and development in Western Europe. After all, it is the first successful example of Western European co-operation in a field which is crucial to the future of our technology and industry; it concerns microelectronics – the basis for all kinds of new technical developments in the fields of weaponry – and it proceeds from the assumption that there will be intensive co-operation between the industries involved.

Harmonisation of operational requirements and timetables and co-ordination of research and development present problems which are insurmountable without the constant attention, leadership, supervision and dedication of the politicians responsible. There are few areas to which the primacy of politics is more applicable than to the co-ordination of European equipment programmes. Only those with political responsibility can change national defence plans. If they fail to do so – which has happened all too often in the past – the whole process of international co-operation is inevitably bogged down in bureaucratic procedures, which in practice turn out to be more of an impediment than an impetus. Political will and true dedication are needed to break through

traditional patterns of thinking and to challenge vested interests.

When I speak of the politicians responsible I think in the first place of ministers of defence and secretaries of state for defence – but not exclusively. The members of national parliaments in the member countries of the IEPG also bear great responsibility and can exert their influence for good as well as ill. For ill, if, as has happened all too often in the past, they use their influence to support, not to say actively further, a protectionist policy in the area of defence equipment programmes. For good, if they would set aside short-term interests and considerations and be alive to the great advantages that the international co-ordination of equipment programmes will yield in the long run, for their own countries and for Europe.

If governments and parliaments fulfil their political responsibility, mistakes which have been made in the past, and now threaten to be repeated, can be avoided. One past mistake has been our inability here in Europe to decide on the joint development of a tank for the 1990s. Efforts still have to be made to arrive at a more concerted project. And now we are in danger of missing the boat as regards the development of new helicopters. Why should it not be possible to get a truly European helicopter programme off the ground? France and the Federal Republic of Germany have decided to develop and produce a new helicopter together. Italy and Great Britain are active in this area as well. It would surely be a good thing to expand the existing bilateral co-operation agreements. My country, the Netherlands, would be happy to work on this project. Everyone must be prepared to bear a proportional amount of the expense and to adapt their own plans. To give another example: co-operation in the area of communications systems is really essential. Because, Mr. President, it is of course nonsensical that through lack of co-operation we should have to procure expensive equipment in order to link up the communications systems already in use in Western Europe. Practically every country has its own mobile tactical communications system, technologically and operationally quite distinct from the others. Moreover, linking such systems with NATO communications systems is very difficult. In short: there are very many problems which make greater co-operation imperative.

It is the duty of all politicians responsible for equipment policy to see to it that such expensive mistakes are avoided in the future. Considering recent developments in the IEPG, cautious optimism in this regard is justified. This autumn, for the first time in the history of the IEPG, there will be a meeting of the Defence Ministers themselves. This is a new political event, which indicates that we are beginning to

Mr. van Houwelingen (continued)

emerge from the stage of mere declarations of intent, and are on the eve of true international co-operation.

I would like to make one last point, Mr. President, on the co-ordination of European and American equipment programmes. For all kinds of reasons that I do not propose to examine here, this idea has scarcely taken off. The two-way street in the transatlantic armaments trade, to which the American Government pledged itself several years ago, is still scarcely functioning. It is much more a matter of "one-way traffic", from the United States to Europe. The United States sells us six to seven times as many weapons as it buys from Europe. This will have to change: a more balanced two-way traffic is necessary. This, incidentally, is not only in Europe's interest but in America's as well. Politically, it will become more and more difficult to accept the continued lack of substantial American arms purchases in Europe, and this could harm the alliance in the long run. From a military point of view, the co-ordination of European and American equipment programmes will lead to greater standardisation and interoperability and therefore to a stronger conventional defence capability. From an economic point of view, if a more balanced two-way traffic is not forthcoming, the European members of the alliance will be forced towards a "European preference" - purchasing more and more weapons in Europe, even if these are sometimes more expensive and of slightly lower quality. Financially speaking, the United States and Western Europe can only profit from increased co-operation, especially in the area of research and development.

To a certain extent, incidentally, we have only ourselves to blame for the present unsatisfactory situation with regard to the co-ordination of European and American equipment programmes. It is high time that we Europeans put our own house in order. The lack of co-operation among Western European countries certainly does not assist the co-ordination of equipment programmes with the United States.

But all this does not alter the fact that in certain areas Western Europe produces defence equipment which is qualitatively at least as good as, and sometimes better than, comparable American products. Yet thanks to the well-nigh autarkic policies pursued there, we are scarcely able to sell any equipment to the United States. Fortunately, in the United States too, there seems to be a growing realisation that co-operation with Europe is a necessity. A good start might be European-American co-operation in the field of the emerging technologies. Such technologies, often based on microelectronics, will probably turn out to be terribly expen-

sive. This is one more reason for seeking co-operation in this particular area with the Americans, but it must be based on a genuine sharing of technological know-how between Europe and the United States.

Mr. President, if we Europeans want to be listened to more, both within and outside the alliance, if we wish to manage our specifically European interests better, then we must be prepared to bear more responsibility. We shall have to be prepared to do more, and above all we shall have to be prepared to do more together.

European co-operation in defence equipment programmes is of vital importance to the future of Europe. It will lead to a stronger conventional defence capability, will heighten the credibility of the NATO strategy of flexible response and contribute to a more effective use of monies earmarked for defence. Moreover, it could show that Europe is capable of meeting the enormous technological and economic challenges of the near future. Much, then, is at stake.

The most important question is whether the current political will to work together in Europe can be converted into concrete agreements. I am far more optimistic about this now than I was six months ago. There are clear indications that the members of the IEPG are much more willing to join forces now than in the past.

Obviously, the achievement of co-ordinated European defence equipment programmes will be a slow and difficult process. I am well aware of that. But we must clear away the many obstacles to co-operation. There is no other way. The result will be a stronger and safer Europe, and in this your support, as members of parliament, is indispensable.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, Mr. van Houwelingen.

As your address is so important, I am sure you will be prepared to answer the supplementary questions you will be asked, beginning with Sir Dudley Smith, whom I call.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). - May I, no doubt like many other members, preface my question by thanking the Minister for his detailed and interesting account? I hope that he will not take it amiss if I take the opportunity to ask him a question about his own country, because it is one that considerably exercises WEU. Is the Minister prepared to comment on the decision that the Netherlands Government have recently announced on the deployment of INF missiles? As I understand it - I am sure that he will correct me if I am wrong - they will delay doing that until 1988. I believe that it is right to say that the Netherlands Government

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

have not just said that they will review the decision in the light of what the Soviets do, but that, in addition, they have consulted the Soviets and asked them what their plans are on this subject.

I do not say this in any spirit of animosity, but does not the Minister think that, at best, that is naive and, at worst, positively harmful? If there is to be some kind of collective deal, should it not be reached on a general NATO basis rather than by an individual country? Is it not harmful because it will probably jump the gun – so to speak – and not achieve the kind of response from the Soviets that might well be forthcoming in due course if the ground is prepared properly and the attention of the Soviets is drawn to full-scale proposals from all the NATO countries?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van HOUWELINGEN (*Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, of course I shall be glad to say something about the decision which the Netherlands Government took some weeks ago and which has been approved by the Netherlands Parliament.

I would describe the decision as a clear synthesis of the desire of the Netherlands Government and the Dutch people for a cautious approach to nuclear weapons systems and the fulfilment of our joint responsibility for security in Europe. The Netherlands Government was very well aware that the importance of arms control can be strengthened if the alliance adopts a common position. The Netherlands Government certainly did not intend its contacts with the Soviet Union to be seen as the activity of one, individual country.

It has rightly been said that the eighteen-month deferment signals renewed efforts to intensify the talks between the NATO countries, the United States and the Soviet Union. It has to be pointed out that the further deployment of SS-20 missiles must be stopped. That is certainly a subject for renewed negotiations. The Netherlands Government wanted to make a – small – contribution to this effort. It wanted to hazard an attempt to get the disarmament talks going again.

The Netherlands Government had no desire to shirk its responsibility. It has a responsibility for the defence of Europe, even in the nuclear field.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I also thank the Minister for his enlightened speech

and particularly for his reference to the Independent European Programme Group. However, despite its rediscovery in official quarters, the IEPG is not new. The group had existed for five or six years and the trouble is that insufficient use has been made of it. Perhaps it is heartening that there is a greater determination in official quarters to use the group, but is it not a fact that the IEPG, which is the Eurogroup plus France – in the armaments sense – is merely the European manifestation of the Conference of National Armaments Directors?

Is not the potential advantage – I hope that it will be decided by October – of the Standing Armaments Committee the fact that it could at least have some sort of rapport with the Assembly of WEU and thereby with parliamentarians? IEPG has been an ad hoc grouping of officials from national defence ministries and there has been no dialogue between the group and members of parliament, even on a European basis, let alone on a national basis.

Would the Minister like the group to become formally associated with the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU so that when our organisation is fully revived, as we hope that it will be before October, there will be a formal procedure for members of the Assembly to be kept informed of the progress towards the harmonisation of operational requirements and time scales for re-equipment of armaments?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van HOUWELINGEN (*Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I fully appreciate the desire for a dialogue between governments and parliamentarians on matters to which I have referred, such as the harmonisation of procurement and defence plans. No alternative to WEU exists. Valuable though this Assembly is – and I would certainly not like to leave that in any doubt in this chamber – genuine European co-operation in this area must be far more broadly based than is possible in WEU. The advantage of the IEPG is that it includes all the European countries. I would not agree that it consists of a number of officials who discuss various technical matters among themselves. In recent years we have tried to make the IEPG into a political forum. If this attempt does not succeed, there will be no real co-operation with regard to defence equipment. Politicians must bring this about, or each country will consider only its own defence industry and its own employment situation.

Mr. President, I am nevertheless convinced that the politicians will understand this. I hope that the dialogue between governments and parliamentarians will reveal that European co-operation will bring us many advantages in the long term. To put it in stronger terms, the

Mr. van Houwelingen (continued)

absence of co-operation will have an adverse effect on the alliance. As our security is at stake, we must do all we can to prevent this.

I cannot at the moment give a definite answer to the question as to whether the IEPG can be associated with the work of WEU. At present there are no structures for this. I am prepared to discuss this question in the IEPG.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – My first question supplements the one asked by Mr. Wilkinson. We have so far heard a great deal about the IEPG and its rôle and work, but it recalls the opera, *l'Arlésienne* – we hear a lot about it but we never see it. Would it be possible for the IEPG to report to the Assembly? Is there any reason why not? We should then have documents providing us with information on its work and we should see how we could back up its efforts in that field.

I apologise but my second question is more direct and personal. In one of my speeches yesterday I observed that anything which might divide our countries lowered the credibility of WEU. In this connection, the Netherlands has supported the Soviet demand and has suggested that the British and French potentials should be taken into account.

Can you explain the reasons for your government's attitude, which it is, of course, quite entitled to take?

There is of course no question of trying to lay down the law for the Netherlands – we have enough to do at home – but I should be glad of some clarification, for which I thank you in advance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van HOUWELINGEN (*Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it is true that a great deal is said about the IEPG's activities. What Mr. Pignion undoubtedly meant was that he sees so little of them. At least you are now looking at the Chairman of the IEPG. But it is the results that matter and I appreciate that parliamentarians want to be able to discuss them.

Your own government could make the information available to your parliament. That is, of course, for your government to decide. I do at all events report to the Netherlands Parliament. I do not see why there should be any problem in making the IEPG reports that have been discussed available to this Assembly. At the moment I do not think it would be possible to create a permanent structure. This will have to be discussed in more detail first.

Mr. President, Mr. Pignion will not expect me, a Minister of State for Defence, to adopt a position on the inclusion of French and British nuclear weapons that differs from that hitherto adopted by the Netherlands Government.

I will briefly explain the Netherlands Government's position. The desire of the Netherlands Government and the Dutch people to see a genuine reduction in nuclear weapons through arms control agreements is a major driving force in the quest for ways and means of encouraging such consultations. Comments on the inclusion of French and British nuclear weapons also belong in this context. The Netherlands Government has, moreover, never been categorical on this subject, which cannot in any case be completely ignored. I agree, of course, that it is for the British and French Governments themselves to decide whether they should fall in with these suggestions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, I believe that we shall be able to impress our peoples with the need for closer co-operation in the armaments field only if we do the same in the interests of closer collaboration on arms control. A policy based on the Harmel report – and this continues to provide a basis for NATO – can succeed only on condition that, wherever necessary, we not only arm in common but also seek détente in common. On no account should we only arm together while seeking détente individually.

I should like to associate my question with those put by my colleagues. I believe that the way in which the Netherlands Government has respected the majority opinion of the Dutch people may well prove to be an historic decision, provided that it meets with the right Soviet reaction. The decision would even now have had greater political significance had it been shared by other European partners in Europe and WEU. My first question is therefore: to what extent were you able to get your decision agreed by your European partners?

My second question is this: the Netherlands decision on cruise is related only to the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles. It would have been in the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany as well as of other countries in which weapons are deployed if certain expectations had also been expressed regarding short-range missiles which are being deployed in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic and which are regarded by the Soviets as a countermeasure and by ourselves as a further contribution to the arms race. I look forward to your reply.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van HOUWELINGEN (*Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). – I hope you will have perceived from my contribution to this debate that my plea for closer European co-operation in the area of defence equipment is necessary if Europe's position in NATO is to be improved. This co-operation must naturally include the political as well as the economic and technical areas. I agree that the quest for a consensus on proposals for the European sector of NATO should form part of a policy of this kind. I agree that constant efforts must be made to establish a common policy on the production and procurement of weapons systems. Joint consultations and co-operation are similarly needed if there is to be détente. This must always be backed by an active policy. That is certainly what the Netherlands Government wants.

I will make two further comments on the Netherlands decision. I emphatically deny that the government was looking to the will of the Dutch people, in opinion polls and so on. They certainly did not form the basis of the Netherlands decision. Every government must, of course, respect the opinion of the majority in parliament. The question for the Netherlands Government was how the Netherlands could make a fresh contribution to negotiations on arms reduction. That was the most important factor. In tune with Dutch society – but also on the basis of the Netherlands Government's own views – this cautious approach was given substance through the decision to defer deployment for a while. I would emphasise that the Netherlands Government did not isolate itself. It showed that it was prepared to accept its responsibility after the consultations had taken place. Although there is a difference in timing, the Netherlands Government has made extensive efforts to use the time available, in consultation with other allies, of course, to find ways of reducing armaments.

It has been asked why the Netherlands decision concerns only the SS-20 missiles. The debate in the Netherlands was conducted on the subject of these nuclear weapons systems. If maximum political pressure was to be exerted – on the Soviet Union and elsewhere – the decision had to be clear, unequivocal and specific. That is why these systems were chosen.

The Netherlands Government – through its Foreign and Defence Ministers – was constantly in touch with all the other allies. It cannot be said that the Netherlands Government has not tried to explain its views ever since 1979.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Before these comments of yours I had meant to congratulate you, Minister, on representing a country with a government which takes heed of a wish close to the hearts of its people. However, what you have just said goes halfway to denying that this was a crucial consideration.

I should like to take up a point just raised by Mr. Gansel and ask you how your government intends to use the period between now and two years hence. Let me provide a pointer. In certain tense situations which are generally considered to be dangerous – and as an example I would quote the recent relations between Egypt and Israel in the Middle East – responsible politicians have done all they could to contribute to détente. In the case in point efforts were made to solve the problems by means of shuttle diplomacy – possibly regarded as novel at the time – involving incessant toing and froing between the decision-making centres.

I wish to ask you what the Netherlands Government intends to do to achieve progress in discussions between East and West on arms control and disarmament, now that it finds itself in a very special situation? Do you intend to conduct some kind of shuttle diplomacy? Do you intend to make a positive point of your decision at the Stockholm conference and to insist that the two-year postponement is in itself a confidence-building measure? Do you intend to establish active contact with a government like that of Romania, which, on the other side, may be regarded as occupying an independent position similar to that of your country on our side? Why did you not give a direct answer to Mr. Gansel's question, enquiring why you are not relating your action in deferring deployment for two years to the so-called counter-measures? Why do you not approach the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia and tell them that they too – for two years, if you like – should not allow their territory to be used for what are termed counter-measures, i.e. the deployment of SS-22 and SS-23 missiles? Please let us have direct answers to direct questions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van HOUWELINGEN (*Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, if I understood the question correctly, it should really be addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Initiatives will, of course, be undertaken in many areas to achieve the objective, which is to use the time gained for joint efforts within NATO to find ways of preventing a further increase in the number of nuclear missiles. This message to the Soviet Union must be constantly voiced by the allies.

Mr. van Houwelingen (continued)

I cannot, of course, say anything about the initiatives that will actually be undertaken. That is something Mr. Vogt will have to ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands about.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). - Referring to the question put by Sir Dudley Smith, I recall that in 1979 your country supported the dual-track decision to install intermediate-range missiles in a number of European countries while trying to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the reduction of missiles.

This decision stemmed from recognition of the fact that the balance in intermediate-range missiles had been upset in favour of the Soviet Union by the deployment of SS-20s. Do you consider that the 1979 decision was right?

Furthermore, from 1979 to the start of the Vienna talks on nuclear arms reduction, the Soviets continued to deploy SS-20 missiles and, indeed, went on to deploy ninety more in the period from the beginning of the Vienna negotiations until their breakdown. Do you believe that subsequent events lend further justification to the 1979 decision and, if so, do you not consider the recent decision of the Netherlands Government to be contradictory?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the Minister.

Mr. van HOUWELINGEN (*Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). - Mr. President, I do not think there is anything to be gained from a political judgment with hindsight on the wisdom of the decision taken in 1979. In that year the Netherlands Government stressed its reservations about the deployment of these missiles on Dutch territory. This has constantly been explained in NATO, in the hope that in 1984 it might be put on record that there were prospects of a reduction in the numbers of nuclear missiles and intermediate-range weapons.

What are the facts now? There is an increase rather than a reduction. The Netherlands Government's attitude is that hope should not be abandoned and that we should not sit idly by. It will keep on trying to get talks on arms control under way. It considers that to maintain the course that has been followed in recent years is unacceptable and irresponsible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). - Mr. President, although I am a member

of the Netherlands Parliament, I shall resist the temptation to discuss typically Netherlands issues with Mr. van Houwelingen. But I must compliment him on the enthusiasm with which he has defended many things in his political past.

I have two questions to ask him. The first carries on from what Mr. Wilkinson said. The Minister said he was pleased with developments in WEU and that it would probably want to develop a kind of European defence concept. He reacted very cautiously when asked if the IEPG should have an expressly political relationship with WEU's parliamentary Assembly. When ideas for a European defence concept are put forward in WEU, a dialogue between governments and parliaments and WEU on political and military aspects is almost inevitable. The policy on defence equipment is an offshoot of a political policy, of politico-military concepts, which we discuss here. Can the Minister give us an assurance - despite all the formal drawbacks involved - that he will propose in the IEPG that it should establish relations with the Assembly of WEU and the Standing Armaments Committee? The Minister will know that the IEPG does not have a permanent staff and has lacked continuity in the past. If the IEPG is to be successful, it must have a staff to guarantee continuity in the longer term.

The Minister referred to emerging technologies. Where defence is concerned, this will probably be the subject in the next ten years, and the military and political implications will be enormous. Where - in the IEPG and elsewhere - will it be possible to discuss the political and military concepts underlying the introduction of emerging technologies? I am afraid that the United States will apply a different concept - one that is not in Europe's best interests. That is why a parliamentary dialogue with WEU must be sought.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the Minister.

Mr. van HOUWELINGEN (*Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). - Mr. van den Bergh is well aware that one cannot defend a government decision convincingly unless one genuinely believes that it is the only possible decision commensurate with Netherlands history, and one which attempts to bring about a reduction in armaments. I would not want to shirk this responsibility.

I cannot give a definite answer to Mr. van den Bergh's question about the structure of the IEPG and the relationship between the IEPG and WEU. The problem is that various countries that are not members of WEU will raise quite a number of questions. The only assurance I can

Mr. van Houwelingen (continued)

give him is that this subject will be discussed in the IEPG. For the moment I cannot give any other assurances.

As regards the emerging technologies, I agree with Mr. van den Bergh that it is important for there to be agreement between America and Europe on the underlying concept. Why do we want certain new weapons systems? How do they fit in with our thinking on security matters? It is extremely important that all the European countries, all the members of the IEPG, agreed at their meeting in The Hague that the very first step must be to arrive at a joint concept in consultation with the Americans. That is what we are now working on. This political debate must also be extended to include the parliaments. I expect this will be the case in all the countries involved, and it is also a possibility in this Assembly. I will see if the IEPG cannot make some contribution to the debate here. I will not, however, make any suggestions about an official structure.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I agree with Mr. van den Bergh that we must not have national debates here. But I cannot help feeling that the fog has thickened after the various statements by the Netherlands Minister. I should like to disperse the fog a little. I will begin with Mr. Cavaliere's comments: the Netherlands Government's decision contradicts the reservations expressed in 1979. It is in fact a twofold decision, a decision to deploy in two cases: if the Soviet Union continues to deploy SS-20 missiles and if an armaments agreement is reached between East and West. In the latter case the Netherlands will take its share of the total number of cruise missiles to be deployed in Western Europe. There are two sides to the twofold decision: on the one hand, negotiations and seeing whether a contribution can be made to arms control and, on the other, falling into line with NATO no later than 1988.

Mr. President, I had to get that off my chest. Otherwise there would have been some confusion over a decision by the Netherlands Government that has been approved by parliament.

My question concerns the emerging technologies. The Minister said that the operational requirements are being considered in the IEPG. But we know that new concepts are being discussed in NATO and at national level: air-land battle 2000, army-21 and Germany's own approach. These discussions are still in progress. How is it possible for agreements on equipment to be reached at this stage? Would

it not be far better for these issues to be settled in WEU? This is a better place for working out a military strategy for Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van HOUWELINGEN (*Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I cannot agree with what Mr. Blaauw has said about the Netherlands' position on intermediate-range weapons. I do not wish to repeat myself. The decision is a synthesis of the will to accept responsibility and the need for caution, the aim being the control and limitation of armaments. That is the essence of the Netherlands' position.

As regards the emerging technologies, no one can point to a given moment when something of this kind begins; it is an on-going process, even if a start has already been made.

I agree with Mr. Blaauw that the influence of the defence industry is a driving force, even when it comes to deciding which systems the various countries will buy. It is therefore high time that a structure is worked out in relation to the systems to be selected in Europe, and the IEPG is considering this. The subject will be discussed when the defence ministers of all the European countries meet in the autumn. The concepts that are now being prepared will be ready by then.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). -- I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I have three questions to put to you, Minister. The first relates yet again to Mr. Gansel's question. I should like to say in advance that I do not expect Netherlands' foreign policy to take initiatives which are beyond the capabilities of other, rather larger, countries which may carry rather more weight in NATO. One must take a relative view. The question is whether it would not be wiser to co-ordinate initiatives of the kind just taken by the Netherlands Parliament and Government with other initiatives, in spite of a lack of clarity on some points – I note Mr. Blaauw's remarks. The point is that over the last three years it has been a positive drawback that separate proposals about placing negotiations on a realistic footing and avoiding the premature deployment of missiles have been put forward, to name only a few examples, by the SPD, by Craxi, by the Netherlands Government and others. I therefore think that the question of co-ordination, which was behind Mr. Gansel's question, is highly important and I would like to hear whether your government sees any opportunities for action, or what future initiatives it intends to take in the interests of co-ordination.

Mr. Scheer (continued)

My second question is rather shorter. To what extent was your decision influenced by the argument that the military, and indeed some of the political, considerations underlying the 1979 NATO decision were no longer valid in 1983 and are not valid in 1984? The factors relating to the eastern side, the deployment of SS-20s, still hold, but on the western side we were much influenced, for example, by the fact that the introduction of the air-land battle concept as set out, say, in Field Manual 100/5, automatically conferred on the deployment of medium-range weapons systems a military character quite different from that of the political deterrent previously envisaged. What weight was given to arguments of this kind?

My third question is rather more general. I have been surprised, even in the context of internal political discussion in the Federal Republic of Germany, that those people who express concern at deployment do not lay greater stress than hitherto, whether in the Netherlands or elsewhere, on the possibility of modifying the military element of NATO's dual-track decision by mounting these medium-range missiles on submarines. From the point of view of the military balance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union the effect would be the same. But the environmental problem associated with the deployment of missiles in the midst of our countries would be different. In a word, nations would be exposing themselves to less danger. I am surprised, therefore, that these ideas are not more widely discussed, and I should be interested to hear your government's answer as to why such discussion does not take place in your country.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van HOUWELINGEN (*Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it is the Netherlands Government's firm intention that a common position should be adopted. The Netherlands believes, in general, that negotiations with the Soviet Union must be based on a common position. The importance and value of the alliance mean that conclusions must also be drawn at national level. The national governments must come forward with ideas so that a common policy can be established. This means, of course, that the member countries should not be passive. It forces the governments to formulate their own ideas and put them into effect within the alliance. This is also true of the Netherlands position, even though there are differences in timing compared with the positions adopted by the other European countries, by which I mean Britain, Germany and Italy.

Even if the Soviet Union decides not to increase the number of SS-20 missiles, we must seek a balance within the alliance. The Netherlands will not adopt a separate and distinct position on this.

I agree – at least if that is what is meant – that the debate on intermediate-range weapons has been too isolated from the general context of the nuclear weapons issue. There has been a lack of co-operation in this respect within the framework of the overall security policy. It is important for the future debate to be conducted against the background of our overall defence concept, including conventional defence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. van Houwelingen, for your detailed replies to questioners.

I have been impressed by your willingness to co-operate. You will not, therefore, have been surprised by the barrage of questions. They were to be expected because this is the only assembly competent in defence matters; WEU was in fact set up for that purpose. At this time, we are vitally concerned with problems of defence, strategy and armaments, including the closest possible co-ordination between member states.

My warmest thanks to you for all the information you have given us and my wishes for every success in your duties.

5. Change in the orders of the day

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Will you give your ruling on how we should deal with the remaining orders of the day?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Yes, I will do that immediately. There is a small problem concerning the report on the AWACS and Nimrod aircraft, which Mr. Spies von Büllesheim is due to present during this sitting. Our colleague has to leave at 6 o'clock at the latest and his report cannot be called until after the general debate on the three reports presented this morning. As his report is relatively short and no one is down to speak on it, I suggest that we might help Mr. Spies von Büllesheim by agreeing to change our orders of the day, so that he can be called at once. We can then decide whether we can vote on the draft recommendation, which should not take long.

In reply to Mr. de Vries, the position is that the debate on Sir Dudley Smith's report on European security has been completed. After hearing Mr. van Houwelingen's address and his answers to questions, we have to consider the three reports listed for joint debate and the reports on the AWACS aircraft and the control

The President (continued)

of armaments and disarmament. As I said at the start of the sitting, we must complete this business today. The Assembly has moreover agreed to continue the debates until all business is concluded.

I call Mr. Dejardin on a point of order.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, longer-serving members of the Assembly will know the importance which I attach to it and its work.

I have listened to your proposal and I acknowledge the efforts you have made in the course of this session which is very rushed but nevertheless extremely important. It seems to me that a majority of members are not showing much interest in the work. I know that the problem of a quorum will arise because less than forty-six members have signed the register of attendance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That is correct.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I know that the problem of a quorum is normally raised when a vote is taken by roll-call. At WEU, however, we have accepted that the number of members present can be checked by reference to a list kept in the entrance hall, which is open for inspection by anyone, including members of the press.

I am quite happy for Mr. Spies von Bullesheim's report to be taken before the others, but if there is no quorum we shall not be able to adopt it and that will not speed up our work very much and might even delay it further.

For the sake of the Assembly and its credibility I shall therefore ask that the quorum be verified.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Dejardin, your comment is not only admissible but also in strict accord with the rules governing our debates; I fully acknowledge this.

I shall myself ask from time to time for the quorum to be checked because we must remind members that it is their duty to attend.

As you yourself said, if verification of the quorum is requested before a vote is taken on any draft recommendation, the vote cannot be taken if the President rules that there is no quorum.

I fully share your concern for better attendances but absences are not due entirely to the commitments of members who for various reasons of their own, which it is not for us to question, are not always present; another factor

is the organisation of our work and our timetable.

I feel responsible in this matter and will do all in my power to improve the situation.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Absences are also due to the hot weather, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I fully agree, Mr. Dejardin.

I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – We also have to discuss the report by Mr. de Vries on the budget. Will problems be caused if that is not taken today?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. de Vries's report has been included in the orders of the day for tomorrow. We could postpone it until tomorrow therefore, if that is the Assembly's wish and our colleague could consider himself free for today as regards his report at least. On the other hand, if we have time and the Assembly, and more particularly, Mr. de Vries agree, I am willing to go on as far as possible with our work. In the meanwhile, I hope that there will not be too many points of order.

I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should just like to respond to your last comment. If you are going to improve the way in which we deal with the agenda in future, I would urge you to arrange matters so that the rapporteurs, who submit excellent reports, stop the present practice of spending twenty to thirty minutes and sometimes even longer presenting their reports. This is not meant as a criticism of anyone, and I have every respect for the reports. But I feel that, the way things are at present, too much time is wasted, to the detriment of the debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – If I have understood you correctly, I agree.

In my opinion, there is already provision for presentation of three of the reports, Mr. Spies von Bullesheim having of course spoken for less than twenty minutes this morning; however, it is the Rapporteur's responsibility to know how long he will need to present his report.

Having said this, is the Assembly prepared to accept the change I have proposed to the orders of the day and to start working immediately on Mr. Spies von Bullesheim's report on AWACS and Nimrod aircraft?...

The change in the orders of the day is therefore agreed to.

6. AWACS and Nimrod aircraft

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 974)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on AWACS and Nimrod aircraft and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 974.

I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Rapporteur.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall again do my utmost to keep within the twenty minutes allowed for speakers, although I am unlikely to keep as well within the limit as this morning. I intend to be brief, Mr. President, but I hope you will allow me a few sentences unconnected with my report.

The manifestation within national governments of the will to revitalise WEU is increasingly evident. Mr. Genscher's report of the ministerial meeting of 12th June is further evidence of this trend. The Federal Minister expressly stated that the ministers had agreed to instruct the Permanent Council to work out concrete proposals in time for the October meeting in Rome on the basis of the working document which you have before you on further questions relating to the reactivation of Western European Union. It is intended that Rome should be the occasion for a political declaration of principle.

I should like to say a word on this subject, Mr. President and fellow delegates, because I consider that the reactivation of WEU, in the positive stage which the issue has now reached, no longer belongs exclusively to the realm of officialdom and national governments but also presents a challenge to parliamentarians. Mr. President, I believe that this Assembly and all of us for whom collaboration in security policy is a particularly burning issue should concern ourselves within our national governments with the contents of this report of the Permanent Council. Mr. President, I would ask you and all my fellow delegates to do this at the beginning of September. Many a good European political idea has become bogged down in the complex machinery of ministries and officialdom, but I believe that at this stage we can do something about it. It is because I believe such action to be necessary that I have taken the liberty of referring briefly to the point, although it is beyond the scope of my report.

Turning now to the subject of my report, the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions has completed the report

on AWACS and Nimrod aircraft which you have before you. What is AWACS? AWACS is an airborne radar station which, fitted with a rotating dome and flying at an altitude of 10,000 metres, is able at this height to perform all the tasks beyond the capacity of ground stations because of the curvature of the earth. AWACS aircraft, or airborne radar stations, are able to pick up low-flying aircraft. Flying along the frontiers, AWACS aircraft are able to pry at least two hundred kilometres and beyond – just how far is a secret – into enemy or other territory without violating the other country's airspace. AWACS aircraft can survey and monitor the vast expanse of the oceans, because they combine the properties of long-range vision and high speed. That is why AWACS aircraft have become so important – so important, indeed, that the Soviet Union has also undertaken extensive development in this field – a point which is all too often overlooked. The airborne Soviet Mainstay stations – to use the NATO terminology – are also obviously highly developed. To some extent Australia, Japan and Israel also have airborne radar stations, but the most highly developed system is that of the United States, which was developed in 1968 after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. This triggered the recognition that early warning is essential, and it was acknowledged that the radar system had to be improved, which meant that it had to fly.

The development project was ready in 1972 and the first AWACS aircraft flew in 1975. The United States now have more than thirty-four AWACS aircraft which have acquired great importance through their operations in other areas of tension, including Lebanon, Egypt and Sudan, where they have been used to monitor the airspace and to oversee and obtain early information about military operations on the ground.

NATO concerned itself seriously with the system for the first time in 1976, and in 1978 twelve states, later joined by Belgium, making the number up to thirteen, decided to make progress on the AWACS project. By agreement between the defence ministers, the United Kingdom later dissociated itself from the AWACS project as such. While it is true that the United Kingdom is going its own way with the Nimrod concept, these aircraft will work very closely together with the AWACS system. They are fully compatible and will be operated in close conjunction with the AWACS system, but they also have very special capabilities appropriate to NATO's essential functions in the European area, because they are particularly well adapted to monitoring the seas, for which the United Kingdom is also a suitable base.

The AWACS project, which will eventually provide us with eighteen AWACS machines, will cost about DM 2,000 million. The main base

Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (continued)

will be at Aachen in the Federal Republic of Germany, close to the German, Dutch and Belgian frontiers, and we shall have outlying stations in Greece, Italy, Turkey and Norway. Without going into further technical details, it should be mentioned that the AWACS project has made it necessary to modify the thirty-four large ground stations in the NATO area. These ground stations are needed to receive and supplement the data gathered by the AWACS machines.

Our NATO AWACS machines, which have a major observation and early warning function to fulfil, are basically the same aircraft as those possessed by the United States, but they are modified to some extent in that they have no guidance and control functions according to the present concept. They cannot be refuelled in flight, and part of the recommendation placed before you by the committee is to investigate whether it would not be possible to align the equipment of the machines even more closely with that of the American aircraft by making them capable of airborne refuelling.

Apart from the technology involved, the significance of the AWACS aircraft lies in the fact that it is the first real NATO unit in which members of the armed forces of thirteen nations work in direct collaboration. The aircrew of an AWACS machine consists of three pilots and a navigator and the operating crew comprises thirteen members, making a grand total of seventeen.

We have already trained and formed thirty such crews, and it very often happens that the seventeen individuals concerned represent nine different countries. I think it is worth mentioning this exemplary and unprecedented achievement. We should be grateful that it has proved possible for members of nine countries to work together in a crew of seventeen in a very confined space and in the performance of such a strictly defined function.

Of the eighteen aircraft planned, NATO now has eleven in operation. When the eighteenth aircraft becomes operational by the end of 1985, the AWACS unit will be at full strength.

I would now like to turn briefly to the Nimrods. I think I have already mentioned that the United Kingdom has undertaken to put eleven Nimrod aircraft into the air for this specific duty alone, which constitutes a very considerable burden for the United Kingdom. So far only two of these eleven aircraft are operational.

I should mention that France also intends to have its own national surveillance unit with an airborne radar system. At the moment,

although no exact details are known, there is a likelihood that for reasons of joint defence and of the acceleration and cost-effectiveness of the programme, France is at least considering procuring AWACS machines from the United States, though with electronics which, as in the other AWACS machines, will largely be procured in Europe and in France itself.

Ladies and Gentlemen, when I was preparing this report many of my colleagues asked why I did not expand on this or that question. I had to tell them that this report had to be written in that borderline area which separates information which has been published or is suitable for publication from that which cannot be made public for security reasons. Anything missing from this report should therefore not be attributed to any lack of conscientiousness on the part of the Rapporteur and secretary, whom I should like to thank for his kind collaboration, but should be put down to the situation I have just described. We discussed this in committee and we take the view that in a few years' time the committee should prepare a supplementary report on the airborne early warning system, when the Nimrod project has also advanced further.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me conclude by pointing out that the NATO AWACS project is purely defensive. These aircraft are unarmed and perform no function other than that of observing events over a wide area on land and sea and in the air. By giving us an intensive surveillance capability the system provides our countries with increased security and therefore, in my opinion, forms part of a confidence-building measure necessary to our ability to maintain peace in Europe. Thank you.

(Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank the Rapporteur and congratulate him on his excellent report.

The debate is open and I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to refer to Mr. De Decker's remarks today and to the draft recommendation. It is noticeable that there is a desire for a new European dimension in the area of security policy but that, in spite of ample opportunity for discussion, the same zeal is not displayed in the search for a new European dimension or rather a new European dynamism directed towards disarmament.

I should like to mention a few examples of what the Europeanisation of disarmament could achieve. At the Stockholm conference, in which thirty-five nations are participating, the

Mr. Vogt (continued)

Europeanisation of disarmament could have meant that the Europeans, in collaboration, could have tried to find new approaches to the problem. In contrast to the procedure adopted by the NATO countries, who more or less slammed down a complex package of proposals on the table, they could first have listened to any independent proposals which might have been forthcoming from our Romanian or Hungarian colleagues or, for all I know, from the delegates from the German Democratic Republic. After an initial stage, say after 16th March, all these suggestions could then have been assessed in the various capitals. Once that had been done, it might have been possible to formulate joint approaches. Instead of that, we have adhered to the stale old pattern of bloc-orientated politics, which paralyses everything. There can be no progress round negotiating tables where the parties are committed in advance. The problem already arose in Geneva where the United States, as a maritime power, said to the Soviet Union, a land-based power: let's talk about everything except ship-borne weapons systems, missiles and aircraft. Given this initial negotiating position it is impossible to achieve results, as even the starting-point cannot be taken seriously.

We are now witnessing the same thing in Stockholm. Under the influence of NATO co-operation and the pretext of creating confidence-building measures, it was decided beforehand that discussion should be limited to conventional weapons. It was simply claimed that the Madrid mandate permitted no initiatives in the nuclear field, despite the fact that it is precisely this area which is causing people the greatest concern.

A common European initiative would therefore have meant that consideration could first have been given to the suggestions made by the various European countries, such as the Palme corridor or the Craxi proposal. The Europeans could then have co-ordinated their ideas independently, without having to act from the outset under the tutelage of the United States, resulting in a package of proposals which immediately, and with a kind of fateful inevitability, provoke a *nyet* from the Soviet Union.

To quote a good example, I draw your attention to Romania's behaviour, and I would like to refer also to a matter which we have already discussed in the disarmament sub-committee of the German Bundestag, namely that the representative of the German Democratic Republic – I say this not because I have any particular liking for the German Democratic Republic, which has forbidden me to enter its territory – evidently approaches his task in a more creative spirit and in an endeavour to gain more room for

manoeuvre than is displayed, for example, by the representatives of West German foreign policy.

I now turn again to the objectives of the peace movement. The peace movement has not put every effort into the campaign on the streets and in every stratum of society just in order to comfort and assist those who are calling for a new military build-up in the European Community and the countries of WEU. The peace movement has, on the contrary, fought to reduce the high level of armaments. You do not merely misunderstand, you abuse the peace movement, Mr. De Decker, if you believe that we have prepared the ground so that others can sow their militaristic seed. That is not the aim of the peace movement's activities.

We reject any new military build-up by the European Community, just as we also reject the kind of armaments agency which was called for by the European Parliament as early as September 1979. What we want is a disarmament agency. We have several times indicated that the present Agency for the Control of Armaments – on a new and extended basis, to be sure – could in future assume such a rôle. It would then also be necessary to create a disarmament committee in the European Parliament. We want the European Community and Western European Union to be attractive, not deterrent bodies. We want a Community which looks to its own resources – arising from a civilian, not a military background.

We must point out that the military build-up is a virtually inevitable consequence of the production pattern and lifestyle of Europeans, who are very inclined to squander other people's raw materials. The right response would be to move towards self-discipline and self-sufficiency, and to produce energy, for instance, from our own resources by the application of new technology in coal-fired power stations and the fluidised bed process. It would then be unnecessary to depend on oil from other countries, i.e. on foreign raw materials. We should also avoid a situation in which governments, which are after all not made up of born rogues, can claim that they have received an unspoken mandate from the people to secure foreign raw materials, if necessary by military force. We want the people concerned, the public at large, to recognise that responsibility is borne not only by governments but also by themselves. Equally, we want the captains of industry to recognise that it is not only in the hands of governments but also up to them to opt for alternative policies. We call these the alternative options, offered by "soft" rather than "hard" technology. In other words we believe that it is through the organisation of the economy and of consumer policy that we can steer either in the direction of a peaceful community, or towards a

Mr. Vogt (continued)

community intent on hard technology and deterrence.

The European Community was originally imbued with a desire for peace. After the second world war, during which the resistance organisations had already been working in that direction, the exhausted peoples of Western Europe were determined that there should be no more military build-ups and that armaments should not take priority. For the European peoples priority was accorded to preventing the traditional enemies, France and the Federal Republic, from taking up arms against each other again. The brilliance of the Schuman plan lay in basing this strategy on the raw materials industry – in other words, on coal and steel. Over the years and decades, however, it has become clear that this approach, considered in isolation, is now antiquated. The Europeans are obviously engaged in constructing a new empire, no longer on Bismarck's "blood and iron" formula, but on the entirely new empire-building formula of "plutonium and cancer". This is of course intended merely as an aphorism. The position is that the Europeans are trying to create a peaceful internal structure, while at the same time erecting a warlike and menacing outward-facing structure. It is our belief that this policy should be nipped in the bud.

I ask all the rapporteurs and speakers in this chamber to take due note that the people are fully articulate – for example they made their views known in the European elections, which were a breakthrough for those seeking alternative policies. The fact that the party to which the Federal German Foreign Minister who addressed us this morning belongs, and which conducted a vigorous European election campaign favouring the hard line, a European military community, a European armaments agency, and supporting Article 68 of the draft treaty for a European union, calling upon the European union to concern itself with military matters, received only 4.8% of the Federal German vote, as against the 8.2% and seven seats won by the Green Party, which demands that Western Europe should adopt the policy of a civil power, all this I say constitutes an expression of will which should not be ignored by Western European Union.

Once more, in straightforward terms: we wish you in this forum to be more aware of the civil resources of the European peoples and societies. We wish to suggest that you should lay greater emphasis on disarmament and that in the forum provided by Western European Union more should be done to stimulate initiatives aimed at disarmament. We do not want mere lip service paid to these principles; we want action taken at institutional level.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Does some special rule apply to Mr. Vogt? I thought that we were operating under a five-minute rule to limit speeches. This morning he spoke for seven and a half minutes and this afternoon for eight. That is an abuse of the procedures of this democratic body, and I ask that you as the current occupant of the chair draw the matter to the attention of the President of the Assembly so that members may be reminded that when they take more than five minutes it is a gross abuse of the privilege that they enjoy by being here.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I think I can agree with my fellow delegates. I believe in the principle that the time allowed for speaking should be fairly allocated. However, in view of the scrupulous attention paid this morning to my seven and a half minutes – caused partly by the fact that I had to break off temporarily because of the disturbance round the President – I would have welcomed it had he exhibited the same scruples with regard to the nine minutes each taken by the subsequent speakers and to the fact that Sir Frederic, who was concerned to introduce this particularly strict five-minute rule, did not interrupt these speakers until they had spoken for nine minutes, and then discussed with them how much more time they required.

I take the view that we should not adopt a petty attitude to each other. Furthermore, three reports are being taken together today and, as we are very interested in these questions, I have put myself down to speak on all three reports, which would have given me fifteen minutes, but, as you rightly observed, I limited myself to seven minutes. I believe this reply should be acceptable to you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I take responsibility for speakers having overrun the allotted time.

From now on, I shall try to keep to the Rules of Procedure but it seems to me that what is most important is that we should show some tolerance.

The debate is closed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to speak?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – As senior Vice-Chairman of the committee I am replying on behalf of Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, who has had to return to Germany. I have listened throughout to the debate. I say on behalf of the committee that the report had its

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

full backing. We have noted the remarks that have been made, notably by Mr. Vogt. I am sure that Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, who has done the most excellent and detailed work in a sensitive area of great importance to European security, would wish us all to vote for his report, and I, as senior Vice-Chairman, recommend that we give it our full backing.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly will now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 974.

Under the terms of Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Do five or more representatives request a vote by roll-call?...

As this is not the case, the vote will be taken by sitting and standing.

I now put the draft recommendation to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

7. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council

Political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council

Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council

(Joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 973 and amendments, 979 and amendments and 975)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council and votes on the draft recommen-

dations, Documents 973 and amendments, 979 and amendments and 975.

In the joint debate, I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we can take it that these are good reports. I myself had the satisfaction of being involved in both Mr. De Decker's and Mr. Thoss's reports. Both emphasise fairly strongly what should be happening in relation to WEU. As a result, the discussions we had with Mr. Genscher and Mr. van Houwelingen were enlightening and extremely interesting. Naturally, some matters were also discussed which did not have any bearing on these reports.

It is often said that reactivation of WEU and of Western European defence would be to NATO's disadvantage and this would be true of both WEU and EPC. I dispute that. It is clear that in the United States and Europe there is considerable interest in Europe's accomplishing more for European defence. I was myself involved in the drafting of a report published by the Netherlands European movement, in which we specifically considered European security. One of the things that emerged from that was that Europe should take action to improve or strengthen the western alliance. But it is impossible for Europe to "go it alone", for the simple reason that it will never have enough money. The cost of a completely European defence would be astronomical. Both Europeans and Americans believe that the defence of Europe must be strengthened and Europe's contribution to the security of the West increased, which would in no way weaken the links between the allies on both sides of the Atlantic. We can in fact say that it is years since the United States first referred to the need for Europe to do more for its own defence. And more has been done. In my opinion and, I believe, in the opinion of the whole of this Assembly, more can be done. Western European Union must be the body that sets the course, acts as a parliamentary base and gives this movement strength. We must be able to bring pressure to bear on the member states from this Assembly.

All these aspects are covered by the reports. These points need to be raised again here. If we compare these reports with the working document we received from the Council on 12th June, I must say that the working document is very thin. Fortunately, what Mr. Genscher said revealed that the contents could be made more substantial. That must be done.

The co-operation between the Council of Ministers and this Assembly must be given substance. If we have to conclude WEU affairs in our national parliaments, we shall be outmanoeuvred by our ministers. It is here that we must be able to call them to account, it is

1. See page 33.

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

here that we must debate matters of this kind with them.

I feel there is one thing missing from the reports and the working document. What an advantage it would be if some kind of working link could be forged between the Council and the Assembly, since the Council put forward the idea and since we have put forward our ideas in the draft recommendations contained in both Mr. Thoss's and Mr. De Decker's reports. This may have to be discussed further in the Bureau. I at any rate think it is a good idea. Otherwise the Council of Ministers will come to a different arrangement and we then have to see how we can link it with the ideas we put forward as a consultative assembly.

I should now like to say a few words about the Agency for the Control of Armaments. Mr. van Houwelingen and various members have referred to it. It is difficult to match what has been said in this Assembly with what the reports say. We must take advantage of both the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee in any moves we make at this time to enhance and strengthen all the existing European bodies. We must certainly not try to set up other bodies. We must make very sure that the European Parliament does not succeed in taking over, but it must not be excluded. We must try to work alongside the European Parliament. Together we may be able to bring about a situation in which we can act as first and second chambers, as it were. I do not insist that this is the course we should take, but it is an idea that might be given some thought in the future.

We must be receptive to other impulses which widen the scope of this Assembly - including its geographical scope. This does not mean that we need to open up the treaty straight away but we must certainly be receptive to any indications from other countries of Western Europe, so that we may have a genuine Western European Union in the area of defence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). - I can understand that Mr. Ahrens, President of the Council of Europe, is very sorry to see two Dutchmen speaking in succession. Perhaps it will reassure him if I say that we are of different political complexions and that I belong to the same political group as Mr. Ahrens himself.

I do not have a great deal to add to the reports before us. In many respects I think they are excellent reports. It is the usual practice in this Assembly to begin the proceedings by compli-

menting members who present reports. This is often done as a matter of courtesy, but these really are excellent reports, and I am firmly convinced that they will play an important rôle in the debate on European defence policy, or on co-operation in this area.

Mr. President, it does seem that a number of European countries are at the moment seized with a kind of political desire to pursue a common security policy. I do not know for certain where these ideas are coming from, but it is striking how many reports of outstanding quality have been published in recent years on the subjects we are now discussing. Suddenly, in the last few months, something has come of the political will to give more substance to European defence co-operation without there being an independent European defence organisation. I feel we must take advantage of this new political situation. Some people are suggesting that this new political atmosphere has something to do with an aversion, which I share, to United States policy on East-West relations and other parts of the world and the need for some kind of European alternative. I share this aversion and endorse the criticism. But I would warn anyone against thinking that, if Mr. Mondale is elected President of the United States, and I hope he is, there would have to be an end to the desire to give shape to Europe. There is an objective need for European policy to be given some real substance in a number of areas, irrespective of whether the United States President is right-wing or reasonably moderate centre-left. A left-wing President is something we shall never see in the United States.

It is important that we in Europe should have a concept of our own. I cannot emphasise that enough. This concept should concern such aspects as our assessment of the balance of power and our relationship with the United States, which I believe must be maintained. The resultant questions with respect to the political, military and strategic concept must be discussed. The development of the emerging technologies is going to be tremendously important in the next few years in many areas, including the industrial field.

A prior political condition in our efforts to give shape to Europe may be summed up as follows: we must achieve greater European cohesion. But to think that we in Eastern and Western Europe can establish a new organisational basis for security without the co-operation of the United States and the Soviet Union will be an illusion for many years to come. As we belong to the NATO alliance, it should be stressed that, after further integration of European co-operation in many areas, our relationship with the United States will for the time being be unavoidable and necessary, for objective reasons. We must abide by this essential

Mr. van den Bergh (continued)

condition. I therefore have absolutely no sympathy for the idea of developing European defence into an independent system, which is a different matter altogether. Why am I so opposed? I believe that an independent form of European defence would lead to an independent European nuclear power, which already exists on a small scale. That would complicate the security situation considerably. So here we have a second political requirement that European co-operation in defence must satisfy: it can and must not result in the emergence of a European nuclear power, because that would set us back many, many years.

We must consider the link between the areas of policy we are now discussing and the areas of policy covered by EPC, the European Community and the European Parliament. It is naïve to think that many of the areas governed by the defence policy can be separated from civilian policy. This is industrially, economically, financially and politically impossible. We must therefore consider the connection between what we do in the context of the European Community and what we do here. I would add that I think our relations with the NATO countries who are not members of WEU is a major problem. We cannot discuss security policy in WEU when a number of not unimportant European countries are either provisionally or permanently outside the organisation. We must consider this relationship if the tensions of competition are to be avoided.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I am sorry to have to tell you that you have already been speaking for seven minutes. I am sorry.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I am sorry, Mr. President! I have just two more things to say. We in WEU must tell the countries of Europe what WEU is. They do not know. I ask the Rapporteur to propose a programme of information about WEU.

I do not know whether what happened yesterday evening will have improved the image of this organisation. To be honest, I doubt it. If we want to revitalise WEU, we must give some thought to our own operation, to make it more powerful and unequivocal. The organisational machinery at our disposal must be considerably strengthened. The Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments should also take on new functions.

Mr. President, thank you for the patience you have shown.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. van den Bergh.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – In offering congratulations to the Rapporteurs who have produced the reports, I extend my commendations to the Bureau, which decided to put the three reports together. That was a wise decision, because the three encompass the *raison d'être* of our organisation. Document 979 contains a wealth of information. The very title, "Political implications of European security in 1984", could form the basis of a debate lasting for hours or even days.

I am always intrigued by reports that give figures for the expenditure of countries such as the Soviet Union. Document 979 states that the Soviet Union spends between 12% and 14% of its gross national product on defence. That may be so, but I do not know how the committee arrived at that figure. I often wonder on what the Soviet Union spends the other 86% or 88% of its enormous GNP. The report is a *cri de cœur*, asking for WEU to be taken seriously and to be developed along the lines suggested in the recommendations.

Document 973 refers to the Standing Armaments Committee and links it with the possibility of WEU standardising armaments procurement. The report makes little mention of the IEPG, though previous speakers have referred to the group. It seems to have no effective control and I should like to see more progress on standardisation. We may have to go for the lesser option of interoperability. Not much progress has been made on that, but progress in that area might be easier.

I greatly favour WEU continuing to play the rôle that it has played since its inception thirty years ago. Indeed, I should like it to play a bigger part in the activities of our national governments.

Document 975 mentions the law of the sea convention. Perhaps I should declare an interest, because I am the medical adviser to the British National Union of Seamen, and therefore I have an interest in anything that improves matters for maritime nations. Paragraph 11 of the report says:

"The provisions on the free passage of ships through territorial waters, international straits and archipelagic states constitute an important concession by many governments in the developing world."

That is correct, but it is essential for the convention to have meaningful effects not only for national governments but for the men and women who go to sea.

As far as I can make out, although the convention deals with the rich deposits that will soon be reaped from the seabed, it does not mention the seafarers whose occupation is still fraught with

Dr. Miller (continued)

immense dangers – we all know of the number of ships that mysteriously disappear at sea every year. I should like the convention to include provisions for the betterment of the conditions of men and women who risk their lives for us all.

I repeat my congratulations to the committees on the wealth of material included in their reports and I add my voice to the plea that WEU should be expanded to become an integral part of the life of our national parliaments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Dr. Miller.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, when paragraph 14 of Mr. Thoss's report was discussed in committee, I pointed out that the function of WEU and the need for its reactivation had been spoken of here not only by the representatives of the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and France but also by Mr. Lagorio, the Minister of Defence, in December 1981. I mention this for the record, even though it may be of little import.

At the moment the work of this Assembly and each one of us appears to be in the grip of a certain euphoria, and everybody is talking about the rôle of WEU and its reactivation in connection with the establishment of a strong European pillar of defence in the service of western security. I also share this euphoria, but I hope that we can begin the process of renewal by dealing with minor matters. I look forward to hearing the Council's views on the budget and to learning whether there is still to be talk of saving on pencils and paper; I shall patiently await the decisions taken. Two years ago I suggested that all the WEU bodies might be brought together in one place. This was tantamount to blasphemy, and at the time the proposal met with a general profound distrust. It is with some pleasure that I note the report is now asking that this should receive official sanction. It will prove beneficial as regards both work organisation and the better use of available resources.

I would now like to make some brief remarks concerning the excellent report by Mr. De Decker, who has my high regard and friendship. In paragraph 5.1 of his report we are reminded of the lesson of history which tells us that every time a nation has relied on another for its defence it has ended up by disappearing. In general terms this is certainly true.

This morning – and I hope the interpreters provided us with a faithful translation – Mr. De Decker declared that Europe should assume sole

responsibility for its defence. On this point I would like to say that, while the general principle involved is broadly valid, it cannot be applied to Europe for reasons which include the fact that we have entered into an alliance with the United States and Canada to ensure the defence of the West, that is, not just the defence of the European countries but that of countries outside Europe as well. In other words, we have committed ourselves to defending all the territories included in the Atlantic Alliance.

To say now that Europe should itself shoulder responsibility for its defence may be no more than a gesture, but it does seem to me that statements of this kind are ill-judged, particularly as they could give rise to suspicions in the United States and in European countries themselves.

Mr. President, I am sorry to be taking up a good deal of the Assembly's time, but my name was in fact down to speak on both reports.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I wish to inform the Assembly that it has been decided to allow ten minutes to members who speak on more than one report. As this applies to you, Mr. Cavaliere, you may continue.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President.

(The speaker continued in Italian)

I should like to comment on two particular quotations in paragraph 38 of Mr. Thoss's report, which states that Europe should often question the policy pursued by the United States, which very often looks to conservative and dictatorial régimes in countries where the economic and social situation of the people is deplorable. In my view this is a superficial attitude, and if we add to this criticism of United States policy what is said in paragraph 35 of the same report to the effect that it is an exaggeration to claim that the Soviet Union is behind Colonel Kadhafi's undertakings, the reason is either lack of information or a mental aberration. Actually, it is quite clear to everybody that the Soviet Union is playing the rôle of instigator and adviser to Colonel Kadhafi's Libya in its terrorist activities in all the free countries of the world. If the present situation on the alliance's southern flank has become more precarious, this is mainly due to the destabilising activities of Kadhafi and the Soviet military advisers living and working in Libya.

We need to remind ourselves of these things to avoid making excessively biased statements and running the risk of nurturing in Europe suspicions about our non-European allies who are contributing resources to the defence of the West.

In conclusion, I would like to say that the reactivation of WEU depends first and foremost

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

on ourselves, on our commitment and on the quality of our relations within this Assembly. We must acknowledge that Europe's destiny is linked to that of the United States. Mr. Genschler was right this morning when he said that Europe and America are the western world's two bastions of security. If we keep this in mind we shall have no trouble in overcoming all our differences and in playing our rôle calmly and impartially.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). - This has been an important day for our Assembly; I shall try to be brief and go straight to the point. I shall not address my remarks to the reports of other Rapporteurs, excellent though they were, but speak only to the report of my friend and colleague, Mr. De Decker, as I had the privilege of serving on the Defence Committee with him.

This is an excellent report in every way, timely and well-researched. Above all, it is realistic. To begin with, it sets as its objective the strengthening of the European pillar to reinforce the partnership with our American allies. So many people quite falsely allege that any attempt to revivify Western European Union will drive a wedge between us Europeans and our American friends. That is far from the truth. On the contrary, were we not in Europe more effectively to concert our own defence, our American friends would rightly grow more and more disillusioned with us.

We have to recognise that time has marched on since the Paris protocols were signed some thirty years ago. We do not, I hope, wish for ever and for aye to remain, as it were, client states of our American friends. I trust that we wish to evolve a relationship of parity with our American friends. In 1954 we were bringing the Germans into the western collective security arrangements. It was a difficult exercise but now, thirty years on, a generation later, the Federal German Republic is in every way an exemplary democracy and we hope that the shackles and restrictions that have been placed on German defence, particularly conventional, can now be completely lifted so that the Federal German Republic can play a security rôle in the alliance fully commensurate with its economic, technical and industrial resources.

Why should we speak of a politically credible European pillar and why should Western European Union be just that? Of course the European group is the wider association of all the European members of NATO and of course we wish each and every European member of NATO fully to pull its weight, but we have to face facts.

Our Nordic friends have their own problem of the Nordic balance on the extreme periphery of the alliance. In the Norwegian parliament the vote on infrastructure support for INF deployment was won by only one vote. In Denmark the vote was not even carried; and on the southern flank, in Greece, Mr. Papandreou suggests that the Soviet Union is less of an imperialistic power than the United States, while Turkey has its own problems in its relationship with its NATO neighbour, Greece; and there is the perpetual irritant of Cyprus.

Here, however, at the heart of Western Europe, where we are faced with the main threat, the direct and preponderant threat, and where both national independent nuclear deterrents are located, in France and the United Kingdom, and where intermediate-range nuclear forces are to be modernised - in Germany, in the United Kingdom, Italy and, we trust, in Belgium and Holland as well - we can more closely co-ordinate our defence. To do so it is right that we should make this institution work. If we are not to make it work, we might as well pack up, go home and stop this empty charade. To make it work we shall need governments to play their full part, and the very least they can do is to take the trouble to attend the Ministerial Council meetings twice a year. If the Council is to be fully effective, if we are to evolve a security policy in the fullest sense, co-ordinating foreign affairs and defence, it is right, as Mr. De Decker suggests, that there should be the fullest support from the foreign ministries and defence ministries of member countries.

We have great advantages in this organisation. The Standing Armaments Committee could be the interlocutory body between the IEPG and members of the Assembly and between parliamentarians. As we exemplified in an exchange with Mr. van Houwelingen, we are conscious in this Assembly that we learn far too little about what is being done at an official level to concert operational requirements and time scales and to achieve greater standardisation and interoperability of arms through the IEPG.

Again, with the Agency for the Control of Armaments, we do not wish unilaterally in Europe to engage in arms control negotiations with the USSR. We would not dream of using the Agency for the Control of Armaments for that purpose. Those negotiations must be conducted at NATO level by our United States friends on behalf of the alliance as a whole. But our peoples in Western Europe are deeply interested in arms control and we can at least use the expert officials of the Agency for the Control of Armaments to maintain a better dialogue with this Assembly and, through this Assembly, with our national parliaments so that we may allay fears and anxieties and show that, hand in hand with the evolution of a more effec-

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

tive European defence in the context of the alliance as a whole, we are also seeking to achieve mutual, balanced and verifiable control of armaments.

Last, but by no means least, we have all been through the experience of direct elections to the European Parliament, and in many countries those elections were more of a public opinion poll on domestic policies than a true expression of public opinion upon European policy as a whole. The experience of direct elections has not been a happy one, because in the days when the European Parliament was indirectly elected members of national parliaments were better aware of the prime considerations and the main policy issues in the Community. At least members of the Assembly of WEU can go back to their national parliaments, can influence defence policy in national parliaments, can question ministers and can influence votes on defence subjects. That is surely the way forward and if the Council will maintain a really good and effective dialogue with the Assembly – and Mr. Genscher's remarks were very helpful in that regard – we can make considerable progress.

We are on the threshold of the evolution of a more mature European security policy, in the context of WEU certainly but also within the wider ambit of the Atlantic community as a whole, because the ideals and interests on both sides of the Atlantic are common and one. We are indissoluble and North American security is firmly bound up just as surely with Western European security as our own is with the American commitment to the defence of Western Europe.

(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Steverlynck.

Mr. STEVERLYNCK (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Western Europe has chosen the course of resolute democratisation, greater social justice and growing prosperity, with respect for human rights and individual freedoms, aware of its duty to show solidarity with the third world and determined to serve the cause of peace in Europe and the rest of the world. We must defend ourselves against the threat to these fundamental values. Part of Europe has already fallen victim to communist imperialism. Socialism with a human face is not tolerated. It has been made glaringly obvious in Poland that internal evolution towards trade union freedom is unacceptable.

Now we have the psychological war that is being fought in Western Europe through all kinds of peace movements. The Soviet Union

is encouraging this development, counting on it to cause the disintegration of Europe and to break European resistance.

We in WEU should analyse the present situation and take the decisions that are needed to promote peace and security in freedom. The time has come to analyse joint and mutual commitments, to evaluate the new resources that exist and to rationalise the various organs.

That is the substance of the report presented by Mr. De Decker, whom I congratulate on the serious way in which he has tackled his task and on the result of his efforts. I have two comments to add. The first concerns the relationship between NATO and the European Community. It is proposed that the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance should be strengthened by reactivating and revitalising WEU. I can fully endorse that. It may eventually lead to a reform of NATO, with the European partners coming more into their own and also assuming greater responsibility for their own defence. It must certainly not result in any divisions or loss of strength. The Western values of Christianity and enlightenment, as a European politician recently said, cast in the state mould of a free and pluralist parliamentary democracy, are not now, more's the pity, to be found throughout continental Europe as far as the Urals, but are almost exclusively confined to the western Atlantic community. These values must be protected so that they may act as a beacon for anyone who is deprived of them.

The report explicitly states that WEU is the only forum and instrument for co-operation among European countries in military matters. But defence has political and economic as well as military aspects. The European Community also intends to consider the last two, but I wonder whether these various aspects can in fact be separated. Should not one executive and one assembly have responsibility for them all? Splitting up defence matters among NATO, the European Community and WEU would be detrimental. The primary concern must therefore be proper co-ordination, so that the organisation of defence may be effective and efficient.

European defence must also be more than the sum of the European defence systems. Progressive harmonisation, as the report proposes, seems highly desirable to me.

My second comment concerns public opinion. Just as it is impossible to win a war that the public does not consider justified, so a good defence cannot be developed unless the purpose and benefits of this defence and the need for it are accepted by the public. Public opinion can be manipulated through the media and all kinds of organisations that are not muzzled in a free and democratic country. Hence the compelling

Mr. Steverlynck (continued)

need for correct information. Cogency always increases with truth. However rapidly progress is made in the military technologies needed to fight star wars, we can really defend ourselves only if we have the backing of the people and especially of young people.

Statesmen would therefore be well advised to recognise the signals being sent out by people and events. All around us we have an unstoppable evolution, the exact nature of which we must be prepared to accept. Let us not behave like the deaf old man who shook his head and sighed: "How the world has changed!" Then, pointing to the cock on the dung-hill: "He used to crow and now all he can do is yawn." There's none so deaf as those who will not hear!

Their efforts to achieve peace and disarmament have raised the consciousness of our peoples. The ethical problem cannot be isolated from the political problem. Look how all these movements demonstrate against nuclear missiles. We must also ask ourselves why public spirit and duty to the community have become so much weaker. How many of our young people see the point of doing their military service? How many parents try to find ways to enable their children to avoid military service? We cannot deny the desire for peace, but we must be able to appreciate its essence and to make it clear that those who want peace will not find it dropping into their laps - they must earn it. A democratic government can only govern with the approval of the people. It ignores the feelings of the people at its peril.

To conclude, I believe that we are doomed to defend ourselves, because we have a lot to defend. It would be cowardly and unforgivably foolish to abandon western values and so deprive future generations of them. Strengthening WEU is one way to help. Let us work on this, as the Council of Ministers has decided, and as the draft recommendations drawn up by the Rapporteurs of the committees propose. But let us be completely open about it and take account of the views of our peoples, who must be given the necessary information before they have their say.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). - Mr. President, our debate on this report is of great interest and of very high quality. For my part, I have been waiting for it ever since I joined the Assembly.

Need I recall the background to this debate? Need I recall the failure of the European Defence Community before the French National Assembly in 1954 - a failure marking a

turning which was difficult to negotiate? Indeed it was after this failure that it was decided to replace the strategy of global European integration by successive partial integrations, which in turn produced the EEC, Euratom, and, in our case, WEU.

What was feasible then, in the aftermath of the shock of the second world war, in the jubilation of a family reunited in Europe, has become much more difficult owing to the re-emergence of chauvinism and national selfishness.

True, the dilemma is not new, Mr. President, and you yourself, as a French parliamentarian, possibly know this better than others. Is it the right course to start by engendering a political will in the people and then endowing it with appropriate institutions, or conversely to begin with the institutions as a means of forcing states to show the necessary will?

In the case of WEU, that is exactly what was done and results have hardly been convincing in forcing the states to show a political will. It must be said that the deliberate surrender of certain of our responsibilities and activities to another defence organisation - NATO - has been disastrous in this respect. Since then NATO has masked and overshadowed the European defence structure which WEU ought to be. Faced with the popular will and with the realities within NATO, the Eurogroup carries no weight in the matter.

We now find ourselves in a new situation. No doubt the economic crisis affecting our seven member states has something to do with it, as has the popular disaffection for NATO. Much has been said about Soviet propaganda. However, I should have thought it would be confined to newspaper articles of limited circulation and that it would have no effect on intelligent people. As far as I am concerned, I can assert here - and more than twenty years of activity and responsibilities in peace movements entitle me to do so more than others who have never shouldered any - that I reject this affirmation that Soviet propaganda manipulates the will expressed by millions of people, whether rightly or wrongly. And I challenge the others to organise a single popular counter-demonstration.

Is there any need to say that there is a loss of confidence concerning defence and the concept of security? However, rather than examine the consequences it is necessary to consider the reasons for it and to ask ourselves why people have turned their backs on what they see as the business of technocrats at the service of interests other than those of Europe.

We are now witnessing moves to reactivate or revive WEU, which in fact stem from a growing awareness on the part of our governments of the political disengagement of the United States

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

from Europe due to a major change in American strategy – a global strategy which is turning more towards the Pacific than towards Europe.

Need it be said moreover that we cannot – let me repeat this once more here – ignore the historic, political fact of the vote by the European Parliament last February in favour of the draft treaty for a European union?

Lastly, the crisis, let me repeat, raises common problems for our countries that require common solutions. And yet, Mr. President, the attitude in this debate and in the reports sometimes seems ambiguous to me.

While I am in favour of an integrated European defence system that would constitute the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, I am in equal measure unable to agree to having WEU presented as NATO's European pillar. It is not the same thing at all. In my view, it is not the business of Western Europe to serve the global and planetary strategy of a superpower, whichever it may be, because that superpower's interests do not coincide with those of a democratic Europe, of Western Europe.

The end result of our labours and our action must be, I believe, to achieve European integration with a view to achieving the dignity of an independent, free Europe.

It seems to me, Mr. President, that in the message we put out we must emphasise the need for parliamentarians to behave as Europeans. Common values unite us where human rights, the concept of democracy, and peace are concerned. These are a unique heritage, and we who travel abroad, to other continents, realise that the concepts of human rights, freedom and peace are not understood there in quite the same way.

We want human rights for ourselves and for others. But need it be said that they are demanded elsewhere, not so much for their own sake but to serve some military strategy, and that there is a willingness to let them become blurred, resulting in situations like the one in Afghanistan, admittedly, but also like those in El Salvador, Chile, and other countries?

In our will to reactivate WEU, we must not lose sight of two things. First, the rôle which Europe must play in the service of peace, and hence of disarmament and consequently of arms control. And here we have a proper instrument, the Agency for the Control of Armaments, which cannot be hidden away. Secondly, if there is to be talk of a struggle for disarmament, against the arms race, there must be a willingness to tackle private interests in order to arrive at a European concept of the arms trade, even if this might hurt certain voters.

Mr. President, I am the elected representative of a constituency which includes the Herstal national arms factory, and what I say here I also say to my worker comrades who elected me. It is sometimes necessary to overcome the petty urge to win votes, in the interests of a broader cause than a seat in parliament, and as a rule voters recognise the merits of courage and determination.

Mr. President, we are now witnessing what might be called a "mouth-to-mouth resuscitation" of WEU. "WEU rises from the grave". Belgians are familiar with this expression, but this mouth-to-mouth resuscitation should be followed by action other than just speeches or meetings. The same speeches must be delivered not just in our countries' parliaments but also at cabinet meetings, otherwise the whole thing would be worthless to my mind. However, revitalising or reactivating WEU must neither imply nor lead to any running down of the valuable instruments which we have at our disposal, in particular the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee – just as we must have the courage, if we want to be the core of an integrated European defence, to consider expanding WEU to include other countries linked to us through other alliances.

In the reports which have been submitted, one by Mr. Thoss and the other by Mr. De Decker, there is a discrepancy concerning Annexes III and IV to Protocol No. III and concerning the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

May I remind the Assembly that WEU has three cornerstones: automatic assistance (Article V), armaments control (provided for under the treaty – there should be no need to recall Protocol No. II), and the presence of the British Army of the Rhine?

I draw the Rapporteur's attention to the problem. Proposing the deletion of a text in a draft is tampering with the treaty. I shall return to this point when I speak in support of my amendment.

Certainly, I shall vote for the draft recommendation, but I wish to record my reservations about the concept of deterrence as it is now worded, and especially about the proposal to eliminate controls, which are provided for under the treaty. Does the Assembly have the right, through such a recommendation, to propose unobtrusively and surreptitiously a measure which would culminate in modifying the Brussels Treaty?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Dejardin, thank you for having kept to your allotted speaking time.

I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Having already intervened, Mr. President, I forgo my right to speak.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Vogt.

I call Mr. Prussen.

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, first of all I wish to congratulate my friend Mr. De Decker for the excellent report he has submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

This report, whose excellence and historic importance it is surely unnecessary to stress, will doubtless remain one of the most important in the annals of WEU.

The report draws attention primarily to the urgent need to upgrade and reactivate WEU – a key notion which, if I may say so, has been to the forefront for many years and which is submitted to us at every opportunity, just as it is asserted to us at every opportunity by members of the Council of Ministers that our WEU Assembly is the only European institution empowered to deal with defence questions. This should induce our respective governments to recommend and persuade their elected representatives in the European Parliament to set the record straight for the benefit of the members of that assembly concerning competence in European defence matters, however tempting such powers may be to the representatives of the countries that are not signatories of the Brussels Treaty.

May I remind you of the commitments under this unambiguous treaty: military assistance in the event of aggression and a commitment to consult each other in the event of a threat of war.

Article XI of the treaty also provides for the accession of any other European country to the Brussels Treaty – a possibility which could well interest some European countries and could but strengthen the European pillar.

An upgrading of WEU is not synonymous with a desire to separate the American and European pillars but merely an encouragement to draw more attention to itself and its intention to step up its activity. It also indicates a serious realisation of the imminent danger which Europe runs in the face of the steady and relentless strengthening of the Warsaw Pact's military capacity, not just in conventional weaponry – which alone should suffice to inspire disquiet – but also in view of the threat which confronts us from the continuing deployment of missiles with nuclear warheads targeted exclusively on Europe and European industrial installations.

This danger is the main reason which should compel the Western European nations to streng-

then a politically credible and militarily effective European pillar.

Only this kind of action, stemming from such realisation could change the thinking of certain congressmen in the United States who regard Western Europe as a partner of doubtful reliability within NATO, who keep accusing us of an inadequate European defence effort and this at a time when the United States is making major financial commitments for defence – not just with European interests in mind – and who appear to forget that the economic spin-off is equally important, especially for industry on the other side of the Atlantic.

In my experience, meetings with congressmen and prominent political figures in the United States have almost always been humiliating for us European politicians in the past. At the last meeting of the assembly of NATO parliamentarians in Luxembourg, there was talk in this vein too.

All this should prompt the European industries to collaborate more closely or to establish a common programme aimed at achieving the interoperability and complementarity of European defence equipment. Ideas, guidelines and requirements for these programmes, regularly updated to keep abreast of evolving technology, should be made available to the Council of Ministers and to our Assembly, and specifically to our Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, in the form of Standing Armaments Committee studies.

These studies and this information should not be confined to the planning and organisation of a conventional defence but should also take account of the problem posed by modern military technology, by chemical and biological weapons and by the militarisation of space and satellites and the daunting prospect of star wars.

This said, some thought must also be given to the activity of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, provided for thirty years ago in the modified Brussels Treaty which, at the time, was merely an alibi to prevent remilitarisation of the Federal Republic of Germany and to permit regular verifications there. This concept has been outmoded for many years as a result of political events in Europe in recent decades.

When, in June 1982, I submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments a draft recommendation aimed at reducing and even abolishing controls of conventional armaments, there was a tendency to accuse me of seeking to abolish the Agency. There is no truth in this, for there were several instances of other reports which suggested that it be found a new rôle.

Mr. Prussen (continued)

Should we not ask ourselves whether these controls, which merely involve counting the conventional weapons of the signatory countries and only those not subject to control by NATO, still serve any purpose now that there is more and more talk of terrifying weapons with nuclear warheads and about the chemical and biological weapons I just mentioned, which the other side unquestionably possesses?

Should we not give further consideration to assigning it the rôle already suggested in previous reports, namely that of a European arms control and European disarmament agency at the disposal of the Council and our Assembly, along the lines of the ACDA, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the only government agency in the United States answerable both to Congress and the United States administration?

Such an agency would concern itself with disarmament verification problems arising in East-West negotiations.

Allow me also to express my satisfaction at what happened to Recommendation 380, which I had the honour of submitting to our Assembly in June 1982 and which was taken up again in Recommendation 397 in order to speed up proceedings.

This recommendation sought to delete paragraphs IV and VI from the list in Annex III to Protocol No. III and to abolish Annex IV. This recommendation was consequently adopted by the Council of Ministers. According to the latest information, the procedure for having paragraphs IV and VI of Annex III to Protocol No. III deleted, i.e. for having the last restrictions imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany rescinded, is under way and will probably be completed before the October session in Rome.

As for the elimination of Annex IV – problems concerning the future activity of the Agency for the Control of Armaments – discussions are under way.

I really fail to understand some of my socialist colleagues who appear to have gone into action once again with a view to retaining Annex IV at all costs, in other words the control of conventional weapons held nationally by the signatory countries, when nowadays such controls within WEU have no more than symbolic value; in fact, they could be said to serve no useful purpose whatsoever today.

I am surprised to see that whereas at committee level this draft recommendation was unanimously accepted, certain socialist colleagues and also the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments saw fit to vote against it in the plenary Assembly.

Is one to assume that they are still guided by exaggerated feelings of distrust?

I personally recall all the vicissitudes I experienced during the preparation both of my own report and the draft recommendation – I was even prompted on several occasions to give up the idea of submitting the draft recommendation in order to avoid a setback. This draft, which was also turned down at the time by certain French socialist colleagues, who consequently opposed their government's policy, was finally unanimously approved by the Council of Ministers, something in which I can hardly fail to rejoice and which leaves me with the feeling of having made a small contribution to upgrading WEU.

This said, I wish once more to extend my sincere congratulations to our President, Jean-Marie Caro. Knowing him well as I do, I am certain he will have the necessary tact and talent to promote this upgrading of WEU and thereby to set up a true European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance. I am quite certain that he will succeed in convincing our American friends of the need and importance of a politically credible and militarily effective European pillar, both for the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and in the interests of the security of Western Europe, and that he will succeed also in restoring the prestige of Europe and WEU among our transatlantic friends.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Prussen, I wish to thank you personally for your kind words and for your expressions of friendship. I say thank you as a friend. You can depend on me, and the reason why I am engaging in this dialogue with you now is to tell you, in the name of the Assembly, that I recognise in you one of the most faithful and determined artisans of the revival of WEU. And the reason I say this is that, unfortunately, we are faced with the certainty of not seeing you among us any longer. You will be greatly missed, but I believe that with a little imagination we ought to be able to meet again and enjoy once more not only your great understanding but also your long experience. Thank you, dear friend and colleague, for the suggestions you have just made.

Ladies and Gentlemen, after making certain contacts, collected suggestions and checked on the possibilities for tomorrow, I have an announcement to make concerning the orders of the day for the sitting. I believe some will be happy to hear that we shall be able to end our afternoon's work a little earlier than had been feared, by deferring until tomorrow morning the two reports of our colleague Mr. de Vries.

If you agree, all that remains to be done this evening will be to finish our general debate and to vote on the two draft recommendations sub-

The President (continued)

mitted to you. This should mean that the sitting can be closed between 7 p.m. and 7.30 p.m.

Does the Assembly agree with these proposals?

It is therefore agreed to.

I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – First may I heartily congratulate Mr. De Decker on his excellent report which contrasts with many of the other reports submitted to us over the years in the positive proposals it contains, which ought to provide useful food for thought.

Many reports have indeed passed through our hands over the years only to end up gathering dust in the Assembly's files. They have done nothing to change the contented purring of WEU at its labours and the Council of Ministers at its deliberations. If all the reports produced during the last ten or fifteen years were laid end to end we would have the longest Maginot line ever to defend us against the enemy – unfortunately it would only be made of paper.

I think this report is timely, coming as it does at a moment when, as each of us is aware, part of this institution's future is at stake. WEU can either continue as a Sleeping Beauty's castle where ministers, ambassadors and parliamentarians can in turn pass a pleasant moment mulling over defence problems, or it can realise that it, and it alone, has an essential rôle to play in the realm of defence and agree to take on certain responsibilities.

What are these responsibilities? The responsibility of defending Europe with Europeans, as Mr. de la Palisse would have said in my country. And I would like to clear up the misunderstandings which prevail on the subject of this much-heard expression "the European pillar". Let us be clear about this. If the idea is to use the European pillar within the NATO structures as they stand, we should have no illusions: it will neither change the present situation of the alliance nor strengthen it.

As we see it, the European pillar is a pillar controlled by Europeans. The proposals which should flow from this report and from others and which, I hope, will emerge from the forthcoming Rome summit must concern the organisation of Europe's own defence within the Atlantic Alliance. And let no one dare tax us with bad faith in any way! To strengthen the Atlantic Alliance is first and foremost to strengthen the European pillar, not to allow the present equivocal, unhealthy situation to continue.

In other words, the European pillar must embody a will for defence at all levels, beginning with all those who are members of WEU, be it governments, general staffs, top military figures or parliamentarians.

We must not hide behind that convenient mask used by a number of our dear allies in the Eurogroup. Everyone knows that to take refuge behind the Eurogroup is in fact to want nothing changed in the basic principle of an Atlantic Alliance dominated by the Americans. If this is accepted, then let us be frank and talk no more either of European defence or European responsibilities.

We must have the courage to offer ourselves and our Atlantic allies and partners a European organisation that would naturally include a European defence council, a European general staff and a European commander-in-chief commanding European forces – not an American general commanding Europeans.

I regret to have to mention matters as simple as this, which should stem quite naturally from logical thinking. But since this bad system has been maintained in spite of everything for years, it may not be a bad thing to repeat that if the Europeans wish to defend themselves and if it is hoped to strengthen their will for defence and to combat neutralism or pacificism, then those same Europeans must feel that their destiny is not being placed in even friendly foreign hands. This calls for some hard thinking about the restructuring of WEU and NATO.

It seems to me that this very welcome meeting in Rome – if it is something more than a Roman holiday for fifteen or so ministers – might produce such plans for reorganisation which would have to depart from those convenient formulae we keep hearing about regularly.

I must confess that I was a little disappointed by the report of the Council of Ministers of 12th June last, by Mr. Cheysson's statement and by everything that was said. We have been hearing this same old tune for years and years. It changes nothing and does not give the impression that we are tackling the real problems.

And yet it is becoming more and more necessary to do so, for the threat to Europe continues to grow. Today Europe is condemned either to throw in the towel – "The decline of Europe" was in fact the cover story in a major American magazine a fortnight ago – to "Finlandisation", or to the third solution which I advocate: a European defence effort together with the organisation of a European military force controlled by Europeans.

There is no way out of this choice, and whatever may be said affably in drawing-rooms, at general staff headquarters or in ministry offices

Mr. Baumel (continued)

serves only to camouflage the truth. Of course, the will must exist. Some countries have it. France has been making unremitting efforts for years to restore the substance and strength of WEU. Irrespective of the majority or government in power, no matter who the French minister of defence may be, a very widespread consensus exists in France on this issue.

We are pleased to see that the reservations which some of our partners have been voicing for years are tending to be heard less frequently. We note with pleasure that a similar trend is emerging and is gaining momentum among other neighbours of France. But speed is of the essence.

We are engaged in a race and it is not by advancing in small steps that we can win the battle, the political battle, the military battle, the battle of the future. We are faced with the challenges of the third millenium. The space war has already begun. What is Europe doing about it? What can it do? The most highly sophisticated weapons are already being developed in laboratories. What can Europe do? Nothing for the time being. And yet it spends twice as much as Japan on its national research effort and gets ten times fewer results in terms of advanced technology.

Whether it be in connection with electronic warfare, or the use of new materials, or devising certain space observation techniques – not to mention a manned orbiting station, to which Mr. Mitterrand referred in his speech at The Hague – we Europeans will be compelled either to make this effort or to recognise that we must unavoidably abandon all hope and remain under the thumb of the superpowers.

This could be the Yalta of tomorrow: a naked Europe faced by two sanctuarised superpowers who, having protected their territories, could do what they liked with Europe from one side or the other.

Mr. De Decker's report is very thought-provoking. I congratulate him for having spelt out very clearly certain guidelines which we must follow closely. It could prove to be a good working tool for us, and a useful element for the Council of Ministers and for all those who bear responsibility for WEU.

Like the previous speaker, I shall conclude my brief remarks by congratulating Mr. Caro on his election to the presidency of the Assembly. Mr. Caro is an excellent European parliamentarian, a man who has contributed greatly to our work, both within the Council of Europe and WEU. Over and above his personal merit, his assumption of the presidency of WEU is prob-

ably an affirmation of a certain resolve on behalf of our institution.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Baumel. I am greatly touched by what you have said.

I call Mr. Gianotti.

Mr. GIANOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am interested by both of these reports even though I do not share all the views expressed. The problem of European defence figures in the orders of the day and I wish to emphasise the point already made that this is just one aspect of the more general issue of European political integration, which has recently been through a highly critical period. As an Italian, I would like to take this opportunity of expressing my satisfaction that on 17th June 84% of Italians demonstrated their commitment by voting in the European elections. As an Italian communist, I also wish to express my satisfaction at the re-election of Mr. Altiero Spinelli to the European Parliament as an independent member. He it was who moved the proposal to increase the powers of the European Parliament, which was approved by a majority there some months ago.

I would now like to raise two questions which are among the most delicate dealt with in these two reports. The first concerns the relationship between European defence, NATO and the Atlantic Alliance. While we do not believe that European defence need conflict with the alliance or with NATO, the fact remains that there is clearly a problem of European autonomy in defence matters.

The second point concerns the relationship between armament and disarmament policies. Mr. De Decker said that Europe runs the risk of vanishing if it is not defended, but it is, indeed, in danger of vanishing – and the word is no longer purely metaphorical – if there is too much defence and too great a concentration of arms for exclusive use within our countries' boundaries.

Mr. Lagorce, replying to the debate on his report yesterday evening, and this morning Mr. De Decker, referred here to the spirit – the misguided spirit – of Munich and said that it must be avoided. May I remind the Assembly, however, that the spirit of Munich was to say the least ambivalent, being certainly inspired on one hand by the wish to avert war but on the other also by the idea that it might be possible, by giving in to Hitler, to deflect the force of hitlerite fury into another direction, that is, towards the East. By contrast today's aim – and it seems to me that the vast majority of pacifist movements stand for this idea – is to voice a demand for a balanced policy capable of bringing ideas on disarmament closer together.

Mr. Gianotti (continued)

Finally, I would like to express my support for everything contained in the two reports and repeated here by many speakers, underlining the need for a greater dialogue between the Council and the Assembly of WEU. I believe this to be a necessary precondition for increasing the effectiveness of the Assembly's work. The effectiveness of a parliamentary assembly depends among other things on the results which it is able to show and on its not being merely a forum for unproductive discussion.

I would add that there is a need for a better balance between the contributions made by different countries at various levels and here I feel I must express some disappointment at seeing Italians excluded from office in this Assembly and from acting as rapporteurs. While this exclusion is no doubt attributable in some measure to our tardiness and our tangled bureaucracy, these factors should not prevent us from taking a longer view. The Assembly needs to have a proper balance if it is to have greater impact. This brings me to my final point, which is that the work of our Assembly needs to be strengthened and developed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Mezzapesa.

Mr. MEZZAPESA (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in the short time available to me, I have three points to make. I refer in particular to the report and draft recommendation contained in Document 979 on political implications of European security in 1984, even though the points covered are also raised in Mr. De Decker's full and valuable report.

I want first of all to underline the point made in the report - for which my thanks go to Mr. Thoss, the Rapporteur, and the entire committee - when it more than once draws attention to the link which exists between disarmament policy - a responsible disarmament policy - and the Community's practical response to the whole range of political, social and economic problems. Paragraph (*iv*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation draws attention, among other priority needs, to the necessity of achieving political, economic and social co-operation between East and West in the spirit of the Helsinki final act. I take the view that it is this element which differentiates a responsible approach from an obsolete and archaic attitude which sees the problems of peace only in terms of armament and disarmament.

Of course, everything depends and will continue to depend on the commitment with which the common goal is pursued and on acceptance of the fact that peace is not merely the absence

of conflict but a concept embodying such values as liberty, justice and the growth of society.

The reports underline the growing importance of WEU for the security of Western Europe. This fact should lead it to shoulder greater responsibilities in defence matters, a step which should obviously be taken in close collaboration with our North American partners, but with that necessary degree of autonomy which is the vital and fundamental precondition if Europe is to play an active rôle as regards both the political dimension of the armaments problem and its immediate repercussions on the industrial sector, as Mr. De Decker quite rightly pointed out. Here I am in agreement with those who maintain that, prior to every meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the representatives of the European states belonging to NATO should endeavour to arrive at a concerted approach whenever the occasion arises.

The aim here is not to choose between a European or an Atlantic option, and the problem is perhaps incorrectly stated in these terms. The issue is one of integration, not differentiation. Western Europe cannot dispense with close collaboration with the North Atlantic countries, but by the same token our North Atlantic partners cannot do without the substantial contribution to defence made by Western Europe. In this sense the present situation cannot be considered satisfactory, irrespective of whether America is too strong within NATO or Europe too weak, as Mr. Genscher told us this morning.

My third point follows on from what has already been said. WEU must be reorganised and strengthened bearing in mind that times have changed and that WEU cannot stay a prisoner within the socio-economic framework which existed at the time of its creation. I should like to stress that WEU should be expanded to include other states. If it is true that WEU constitutes the military arm of the Community, it cannot but involve the other states in its work and political commitment. I refer here to the provision contained in the Brussels Treaty and retained in the modified version, which confirms the open nature of WEU in the words: "To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other states inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination". Success in widening our membership might well be the best way of celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of our union.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am convinced that the time is ripe for reactivating WEU and the aims for which it was created. The drive towards Europeanisation which we are now experiencing and which finds expression in the elections to the new European Parliament - although we would be less than realistic observers if we failed to recognise that this vote was to

Mr. Mezzapesa (continued)

some extent conditioned by internal events in individual states, notwithstanding the fact that people went to the polls as Europeans – and the eradication of certain individualistic ideas, like those which in 1954 led to the failure of the EDC, are factors which now favour the increased participation of public opinion. If, in 1954, we left the motorway to take a short-cut the short-cut may now grow into a motorway itself. It was this which prompted the Italian suggestion for a meeting in Rome in October of the ministers of defence and foreign affairs of Western European Union.

Will this meeting be the prelude to a serious European arms policy? We trust so. We hope that the initiative will not be an isolated episode but will be followed by further similar initiatives and above all by practical steps towards a new common defence policy in Western Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I believe that a profound longing for peace is close to the hearts of all those whom we represent and that our governments, too, are conscious of this longing and are endeavouring by every means possible to resume the interrupted dialogue with the countries of the East. But the problem which confronts us, if we are not to adopt a sterile pacifist attitude, is how to defend peace, and that is quite another matter. We have to ask ourselves which path we should follow to ensure mutual understanding, safeguard peace and reduce armaments.

I believe it to be the conviction not only of our own governments but also of the Warsaw Pact countries that the principle to be adopted should be that of a balance of forces, and we should naturally work towards a balance at the lowest possible level. What is more, the Soviet Foreign Minister said the same thing in Madrid when he stated that the principle of the balance of forces was one of the cardinal requirements for agreement between the countries of the East, the Atlantic Pact and the West. It follows that the problem we have to face if we wish to deal seriously with the issues of peace and equilibrium in the context of European security is how to establish whether or not such a balance has been upset.

At this point, having regard to the doubts which are being voiced in some countries, I wish to point out that it was the German Government, headed at that time by Chancellor Schmidt, and followed gradually by the other governments, which had to draw attention to the imbalance caused by the deployment of the SS-20s. This is the starting point for the discussion. History shows, I believe, that the possi-

bility of opening up avenues towards détente has always emerged in the aftermath of major differences and after Europe, the West and the Atlantic Pact have set the precise limits beyond which they are not prepared to yield to the Warsaw Pact.

It is not my intention here to review the history of the last thirty years. In the present situation, the Soviet Union, having withdrawn from the Geneva talks, is already reaping a number of benefits and sowing uncertainty and doubt in various countries. Our first response in this Assembly should, in my opinion, be to reconfirm the decisions taken in 1979. This is the necessary preliminary step if we are to re-establish conditions for a dialogue and achieve a reduction in arms in Europe and the European theatre.

I hope that this dialogue can be resumed in the international forums where it is conducted, sometimes perhaps only on an informal basis. But we cannot turn back, and I believe that the strengthening of the European pillar is a desirable objective. It would, however, be absurd, and in some ways create an imbalance, if we were to suppose that Europe is at present capable of confronting by itself the superior might of the Soviets. We must be a pillar of the alliance, and within the alliance we must become an increasingly incisive force, but, in present circumstances, we cannot do without close collaboration with the United States within NATO.

The word deterrence is one of the fundamental elements of NATO doctrine, and it has its special significance when applied to this collaboration and to our understanding with the United States of America.

I turn now briefly to some thoughts suggested by the reports which we are considering and for which I have a high regard. However, I, like others, must draw attention to a kind of disparity of dissonance which I perceive between the two reports with regard to the Agency for the Control of Armaments. This raises delicate problems, including some of a legal nature. In your address, Mr. President, to which I listened very closely and appreciatively, you very properly emphasised the rôle and function of this agency for trusting relationships between the various countries, and I believe that this element of the modified Brussels Treaty should not be altered at the very moment when contacts and discussions are taking place within the Council of Ministers. To do so would be to act prematurely in regard to matters which need to be considered and studied in depth. I can, on the other hand, unhesitatingly declare my support for the removal of those forms of discrimination which still affect a member country of our Assembly, specifically Annex III to Protocol No. III, which still imposes limits on a country

Mr. Bianco (continued)

such as Germany. It seems to me that these conditions are now totally obsolete and should clearly be abolished as being of a thoroughly discriminatory character.

There are some other points I should briefly like to stress. We are talking about the reactivation of WEU, and we are in agreement. We believe in the increasing importance of its rôle, although this is a point which needs developing. When Mr. Baumel was speaking, I called to mind the teachings of the great philosopher, Giovan Battista Vico, who spoke of the irony of history and the way good intentions backfire. To hear a representative of France appealing so forcibly for European defence when, in 1954, it was the decision of the French National Assembly which caused the idea of the EDC to come to grief is something I find interesting and proof of the irony of history. Nevertheless, we duly take note of it as a positive step, an important fact and an expression of the will to move forwards towards integration. If it is to be achieved, however, we must accept the recommendations of these reports, including the allocation of more funds to the Assembly. Without changing the structure and giving powers, including financial resources, to the Assembly, it will be impossible for it to fulfil its important rôle as an institution and resolve the problem of reorganising the structure of WEU.

But above all the important thing is that the existing bodies should be retained and improved, rather than disorganised or abolished. It would be absurd to think of building a new revitalised WEU and to begin by scrapping bodies like the Standing Armaments Committee or the secretariat, which have their counterparts in NATO and which perform an important function in reinforcing the mutual trust between governments. I think we should move forward a step at a time towards the strengthening of our organisation, making improvements in the light of experience and exhibiting, here too, a common resolve to use all the available means of defending, in security, our liberty and the peace of the world, but we should do so in a spirit of realism and responsibility towards the people we represent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. De Decker's first sentence gave me a shock, because it says that a strengthening of the deterrent is urgently necessary. The opponents of the arms build-up believe that the deterrent is strong enough already. The advocates of compensatory armament take the view that the effectiveness of

deterrence has been re-established by the start of missile deployment. What is the purpose of still more deterrence, still more weapons? Is it not more important to consider how we could contribute to dismantling the system of military deterrence? We are aware that such a contribution would have to be political.

But when I read further I realised that this is exactly Mr. De Decker's approach, as he is asking not for more weapons but for a revitalisation of WEU institutions. Indeed, only such a senior and outstanding authority on WEU as our Rapporteur knows, and can actually prove, that the deterrent effect of WEU as an institution is on occasion greater than its weaponry. The attendance in this chamber this evening at this important discussion would seem to provide evidence of that fact.

I mention this to demonstrate, by the injection of a little irony, how uncertain we ourselves are about the significance and course of this discussion. I will quote four examples.

In the first place we talk about strengthening the European pillar. What do we really mean by that? Does the pillar need to be made stronger because the American pillar has become weaker? Or because it will become weaker in future? Or in order that it can, or should, become weaker? Or has the Soviet threat become greater in spite of Pershing IIs, cruise missiles and efforts in the conventional field? It is always dangerous to use images, because all they really do is betray a lack of precise thought. The worrying thing about this particular image is that it is used by everybody and appears both in communiqués and in political chitchat. If we use this imagery we must accept that two pillars – one European and one American – may well serve as the entrance to a building, but are incapable of supporting a house on their own. On the other hand, many an edifice has been destroyed by the collapse of just one strong pillar.

Secondly, the image stands for something more: it indicates that the problem is not so much military as political. Basically we have increasingly come to recognise that European interests are not always identical to those of America. Sometimes we say this quite clearly; for instance when we say we want to strengthen the European element in NATO with the Americans, that really means vis-à-vis the Americans. We must appreciate the danger of its becoming against the Americans, thus contributing to the increasing political and cultural alienation from Europe, not only of the United States but of Canada, and inducing them to look increasingly towards the Pacific. As far as European security is concerned I believe that the attraction of many Americans to the Pacific is more dangerous than that of a few Europeans to pacifism.

Mr. Gansel (continued)

Thirdly, we probably have some fears concerning American hegemony. We must therefore be quite clear that if the European basis is to be strengthened this should not lead to the formation of new hegemonies in Europe. We must ensure that in a revitalised WEU France does not assume the rôle played by the United States in NATO, with the possible result that in such a WEU the United Kingdom might then assume the rôle currently being played by France in NATO. The Europe we want must have no hegemonies or axes. I strongly support what Mr. Genscher said this morning on the subject.

Fourthly, I think the greatest danger arises from discussion of the meaning of the clause providing for automatic assistance. Does this mean that the mutual support obligations within NATO are only second class? Would not such an interpretation contribute to weakening NATO's effectiveness in the prevention of war? Or is this a completely theoretical question since, as far as the actual implementation of mutual assistance is concerned, the WEU treaty has in any case handed over the military machinery to NATO? And finally, if WEU's automatic assistance clause really does take precedence over NATO commitments, what implications does that have for the French forces, and French nuclear weapons in particular? Are we really prepared to discuss the issue here in depth and in unequivocal, practical terms?

Mr. President, I have come to the conclusion that the contents of the reports and recommendations before us are not identical. In many respects they are even contradictory, but they are nonetheless equally informative, stimulating and shrewd. It is my opinion that we should adopt them, not in spite of but rather because of their contradictory nature, which accurately reflects the state of our internal discussions. This is something I think we should acknowledge. Discussion about the revitalisation of WEU is essential, therefore the debate is still open.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The joint debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish first to thank the speakers of different political opinion who have been kind enough to congratulate me and who, I think, spoke in far too flattering terms. Be this as it may, it is always pleasant for a rapporteur and I accept these congratulations gladly.

I shall reply very briefly to the various points raised because the debate touched upon extremely important matters. In point of fact, the

whole question of the defence of Europe was reviewed.

Mr. Blaauw made two important points. First, he suggested the creation of a joint Council-Assembly working group. He may be going a little too fast or a little too far, but in any event it seems to me that if the Council were to begin by agreeing to reactivate itself, by answering the Assembly's questions a little more quickly, the problems might not arise at all and Mr. Blaauw would not have mentioned them.

Secondly, he referred to collaboration with the European Parliament. This is unquestionably a very important matter, for no European institution enjoys a monopoly over the construction and interests of Europe. If we are empowered, by treaty, to study questions relating to Europe's defence, why not try to do so through greater collaboration and co-ordination with the European Parliament? It ought to be possible to work something out.

Mr. van den Bergh stressed the need for a European defence concept in the framework of good relations with the United States. He also urged the need for an information programme concerning WEU itself. I tried to draft this report in such a way that people outside WEU could, after a brief perusal, get a fairly broad picture of what WEU has been doing in recent years. I thank him for his comment about the need for a European defence concept. There, of course, he got right to the heart of the problem.

I would point out to Mr. Vogt that in Europe today it is not possible to oppose both the presence of American nuclear missiles on European soil and the establishment of a conventional European pillar. And yet this is precisely what you seem to be doing, Mr. Vogt, and I regret it. Let me thank Mr. van den Bergh and Mr. Dejardin for not having adopted such an extreme position.

Dr. Miller said that my report refers frequently to the Standing Armaments Committee but makes little mention of the IEPG. This is what the debate was all about this afternoon, in the presence of the Netherlands Minister of State for Defence.

Most certainly co-ordination is necessary between the Standing Armaments Committee and the IEPG. In fact the committee has put forward proposals along these lines, suggesting that the Standing Armaments Committee should co-ordinate the decisions of the seven within the IEPG and that, in order to effect this co-ordination, the head of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee be allowed to attend meetings of the IEPG. Acceptance of this idea would be a big step forward.

Mr. De Decker (continued)

Mr. Cavaliere would like the Council to take some minor steps to prove its will to reactivate WEU. He could be right, because a political will must be put to the test at all levels. He also regretted that history reminds us that when a country entrusts its security to another, it is in danger of disappearing. He has read into this mistrust of the Atlantic Alliance. This is obviously not what I wanted to say.

In my report and in my speech just now, I explained at length why the Atlantic Alliance was now more than ever necessary politically, militarily and strategically. It is my belief that Europe must play a more important rôle within the alliance, that we must assume the essential part ourselves, and that this would in fact enable us to improve our relations with the United States – as Mr. Wilkinson has pointed out. This emerged clearly from the visit we paid together last year, Mr Cavaliere, under your chairmanship. In particular, we unquestionably became aware of a certain irritation on the part of United States congressmen at the size of the bill to be paid for Europe's defence.

I believe that if we improve collaboration between European countries and this European pillar of defence within the Atlantic Alliance, we can only strengthen the alliance, not the other way round.

Mr. Wilkinson stressed the fact that today the Federal Republic of Germany is in every way an exemplary ally and that it was therefore basic and elementary to lift all restrictions and controls affecting that country. I thank him for having said this for it is essential. I shall be reverting to this point when I turn to Mr. Prussen's remarks.

Mr. Steverlynck referred to the relations which should exist between WEU and NATO on the one hand, and the European Community on the other. He is right. In his speech at Knokke, Mr. Tindemans insisted at length on the fact that this reactivation of WEU should be conducted in perfect co-ordination with both these institutions.

If the discussion of defence questions within the European Economic Community is not possible today the treaty contains no such provision and certain member governments – I am not saying states – of the EEC do not feel as concerned by these questions in the same way as the seven member countries of WEU, I believe that some day it will become necessary to co-ordinate and regroup all these European institutions.

Mr. Steverlynck also stressed the need to keep the public better informed. He is perfectly correct.

Thank you, Mr. Dejardin, for supporting the idea of reactivating WEU. Your attitude is completely consistent. However, I do not quite agree with you when you declare that the pacifist movements are not manipulated by the Soviet Union. On this point, we are each entitled to our own opinion.

When I look at the way the problems of the neutron bomb or of Euromissiles have been treated, I find that the Soviet Union has unquestionably tried to manipulate public opinion through the medium of some of these movements or certain elements in them. I do not want to generalise, however, or lump them all together.

These pacifist movements have tried above all to exploit the fear which people feel whenever there is talk of nuclear weapons – which is perfectly understandable. But it is up to our political leaders to try to supply more information so that reasoning and clear decision supersede fear. And this, once again, brings up the problem of informing people.

You also stated that WEU rests on three pillars: automatic assistance (Article V), arms control and the army of the Rhine.

You are certainly right to emphasise that arms control formed part of the foundations of WEU when it was created in 1954 shortly after the war. However, forty years after the war and thirty years after the creation of our organisation, it is high time for the last traces of that difficult period to disappear. The essential thing today is most certainly no longer arms control among allied nations. It is absurd for us to continue to check one another. I am referring of course to conventional weapons.

It is on the other hand absolutely imperative for Europe, acting primarily through WEU's Agency for the Control of Armaments, to be able to determine its position on such essential issues as disarmament, the balance of forces, the monitoring of armaments, manoeuvres and force withdrawals and the results of international conferences on disarmament. Here the Agency for the Control of Armaments has a fundamental rôle to play in halting the arms race and enabling Europe to play a decisive rôle in this area. But it is no longer true to say that in our countries conventional arms control is crucial to the well-being of WEU.

Mr. Prussen, you are most kind to describe my report as historic. It was yours that was historic, for had you not had the political courage to call for the removal of all production restrictions on the Federal Republic of Germany, it would not have been entirely possible today to talk of revitalising WEU, either here or within the Council of Ministers.

Mr. De Decker (continued)

It seems to me, Mr. Prussen, that we owe you a great debt of gratitude. You have played a decisive rôle in the events now taking place in WEU.

Mr. Baumel argues that the European pillar should be the expression of our will to defend ourselves. He is perfectly right. In other words, psychological arguments must be used to persuade the peoples of Europe to stop believing that their own security is no problem of theirs and that it is looked after by the United States. I am convinced that if there were to be an opinion poll on the subject, 90% of the people in our countries would say that their security was not their problem but that of the Americans. That is the heart of the problem.

This attitude must change, for while our alliance with the United States is indeed vital both to them and to ourselves, many things can happen as years and decades pass and political changes occur. It is up to the Europeans themselves to direct their thoughts to what is essential.

There has been a reference to the idea of placing a European commander-in-chief at the head of our armies. This idea was put forward some years ago by an Italian colonel - Colonel Davossa - and was recently taken up by Professor Kissinger at a colloquy held in Brussels. This is a subject which should be broached here some day. Such a solution would have advantages and drawbacks, but having a European commander-in-chief might create a greater awareness of our security.

Mr. Gianotti said that Europe runs the risk of disappearing if it defends itself too much. I both hope and fear that no such risk exists. I believe that European defence is lagging far behind and that our inferiority to the Warsaw Pact forces, especially in conventional arms, is unfortunately common knowledge. What it is important to do, through the reactivation of WEU, is quite simply to equip ourselves with whatever is necessary for deterrence in Europe, in other words with whatever is necessary for European defence.

Mr. Mezzapesa said that the time has come for a return to the short cut consisting of discussing defence policy in Europe, and that - in the context of European political integration - this short cut could again become the highroad to the construction of Europe. I think he is quite right and that it is not because the EDC failed in 1954 that an initiative of the same kind would fail today. What has changed fundamentally since then is that, whereas in 1954 we were living in the aftermath of the war when a deeply rooted mistrust still existed between the French and the

German peoples, today on the contrary Franco-German collaboration is essential in Europe: it exists, just like the chance of succeeding.

Mr. Bianco spoke of the attempt to achieve a balance of forces. He wonders whether this balance has changed.

He is right to remind us that Mr. Schmidt was the first to denounce the deployment of SS-20s. It seems to me that if the Soviets had not deployed the SS-20s, if they had not committed what may well be a historic error, we should not be gathered here talking about the revitalisation of WEU. For there is indeed a link of cause and effect between these two events, and it may well be wondered whether the Soviet Union has not made a terrible mistake in stepping up the arms race in Europe.

Mr. Gansel wonders whether there may not be doubts about the importance of reactivating WEU and whether the Soviet threat is greater today. What makes our exercise necessary is that although nuclear deterrence has been restored by the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles, the fear at the idea of a nuclear war is such that despite this nuclear deployment it is also vital to restore conventional deterrence. In all areas covered by a treaty, nuclear weapons have brought peace ever since the bomb has existed. What I fear today is that, with total nuclear deterrence achieved, the most pressing danger could be that of a conventional attack. This is where an effort is needed in order to raise the nuclear threshold.

These are my replies to members' questions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, Mr. De Decker. We appreciate your thoughtful replies.

I call the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Thoss.

Mr. THOSS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall be brief because I do not want to reopen the debate. My answers will be confined to a number of precise questions.

I welcome the interest aroused by the reports presented. The many speeches have lacked neither wit nor originality.

The first precise questions asked by Dr. Miller concerned defence expenditure by the Soviet Union.

Paragraph 68 of the report quotes between 12% and 14% of GNP. Naturally I cannot guarantee these figures but merely give the source, which is the brochure entitled *Military Balance*, published by the Institute for Strategic Studies in London. I do not know whether they have been verified in full, but they were the only ones available to me.

Mr. Thoss (continued)

Mr. Cavaliere, who sits on our committee and has followed virtually all the discussions, asked me a number of questions. The first concerns paragraph 14 in the text, namely the reference to France and the Federal Republic of Germany as regards the trend of the concept of deterrence. He did, in fact, ask in committee for an addition to this text. I wished to leave the initiative to him, but I duly note, if he so wishes, that he did make that request. In fact I spoke about this matter at length this morning, and it is obviously difficult to go into all the details in the space of twenty minutes.

Concerning paragraph 35, namely the question of whether or not the Soviet Union is behind Kadhafi's undertakings, I have no precise, detailed information allowing me to make such an assertion. If Mr. Cavaliere has such information, however, I should be grateful if he would make it available to me.

As for the question of the headquarters, also raised by several colleagues, I can only remind them that it was discussed at some length in committee and that, because opinions differed, it has not been possible to arrive at a more precise agreement. We therefore preferred to leave things deliberately vague.

I was asked other questions, in particular by Mr. van den Bergh, about nuclear co-operation within WEU. Here too, both the debate and committee discussions showed that there are at present too many differences for a recommendation to be drafted in precise terms. A look at the fundamental differences which exist at present between France and the Netherlands – to mention but one example – should suffice to show that it is impossible at present to agree on a common text.

Regarding the amendment tabled by Mr. Dejardin, I obviously support it since it reproduces exactly the text of the General Affairs Committee.

I shall not prolong the debate any longer. In view of the late hour and the torrid heat in here, everyone will want to get on with the vote at last!

(Mr. Blaauw, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hardy, Vice-Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I shall be extremely brief. We have had an interesting debate on the reports. If implemented with proper wisdom, those reports could be substantial and of much more than contemporary value. Naturally, as I am speaking in the stead of Mr. Michel, our committee Chairman, I shall

not strike too independent a note, but I can, however, properly express the extremely important nature of the reports.

A more vital and, perhaps, wiser approach to defence could emerge from the reports, an approach that will not merely see a European traffic control imposed upon the one-way street – that still describes our defence and defence industry arrangements – but, while ensuring that European security is adequately maintained, does so in a sensible context, giving the greatest priority to the pursuit of disarmament by negotiations in the cause of international good.

Europe has much to lose from conflict. Our people do not wish to see their civilisation destroyed nor our countries irradiated, but we can and must insist that life in Western Europe remains attached to liberty. That being so, a more determined and, perhaps, more independent commitment and assessment of security matters could emerge.

I am sure that this association will – indeed, it must – maintain a close interest in and careful supervision of all the developments that emanate from these reports.

I express my appreciation on behalf of the committee to all who have participated in the debate, the Rapporteurs, and especially Mr. Thoss.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Pignion, Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I will try to follow Mr. Hardy's example and be extremely brief too. Nevertheless, I wish to congratulate Mr. Thoss, which I was unable to do earlier.

This morning, Mr. Thoss and Mr. De Decker, your reports were heard with the closest attention. First and foremost because of their content and the way they were presented. If there are any representatives who have not seen them I can only urge them to read and reread these reports.

The historical section, as stressed in committee, is outstanding and deserves to be remembered. Allusions contained in it are couched more often in critical than in favourable terms. But that is history, it cannot be rewritten.

I wish to pay tribute to the quality of the reports themselves. For both our own Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the General Affairs Committee which is also concerned, today and yesterday, but especially today, have had many positive features, such as in the suggestions in the reports concerning the high commands or the reorganised military

Mr. Pignion (continued)

structures. It has already almost been forgotten that Sir Dudley Smith's report makes very clear reference to this.

The recommendations submitted provide a basis for reflection, and possibly in-depth reflection. Had I been able to speak after Mr. De Decker this morning – but time had to be saved – I would have indicated that his report rested on a number of key ideas or *idées-forces*, as they say in philosophy, on the basis of which it will be possible to continue working.

By virtue of their offices, the Rapporteur and the President have the advantage of being forced to stay and follow debates right through. Even if it is very warm and everyone is feeling extremely uncomfortable, it is impossible not to be struck by the fact that each of us expresses himself according to his temperament, his convictions and his past. This is why I too would have liked to welcome the idea this morning that the report concerning WEU's thirtieth anniversary had been entrusted to a representative of the new generation.

There are some of us who can call up certain memories, and this could perhaps be where the gap opens up between the generations and their ways of thinking. For each of us, I believe, expresses himself with absolute conviction. And yet we all fail here, even when dealing with simple issues, such as the question of deterrence. A basic question arises here: does it serve any purpose? Is it necessary? Is it indispensable? Just choose one of these epithets, and you will already have taken a big step towards understanding the problems involved.

I shall not elaborate, as I promised. But I did want to underline to the rapporteurs that the striking feature of what has been said is the fact it would merely be necessary to shuffle the commas around a little to provide us with a few key ideas if there is a real wish that WEU should fulfil its rôle – rôle, need I remind our young colleagues, of preparation to deal with defence and security problems. Are not our young colleagues struck by the fact that there is never any question of taking the offensive, that the situations envisaged are always defensive – not a context of retreat but rather as a way of coping that seeks to combine a number of factors in order to avoid making it too easy to write off Europe, before possibly writing off the whole world?

I am not one of those who have fixations about a particular potential enemy. I merely say that in addition to the work of WEU, to its main occupation which is with defence, the armaments problem and all political problems stemming from it – the matters dealt with by the General Affairs Committee – there are also

disarmament problems and the most appropriate ways of trying to halt the arms race. All this calls for deep thought.

In this area there are admittedly political differences, but I say today – as I have in the past – that I would not like these differences to be attacked as mutual shortcomings. When I say this, I have in mind the terms used by Mr. Baumele, a former French Government minister who had plenty of opportunities of preventing WEU from “purring”, as he put it. I am surprised that he should have said such things, considering the identity of views expressed by the speakers who followed one another.

We heard Mr. Cheysson on 12th June. Now it is hardly in character for Mr. Cheysson to purr. Then there was Mr. Genscher, and this consensus deserves to be emphasised.

You referred, Mr. Thoss, to the difference of views between France and the Netherlands. To gather round a table and discuss things is the only way to smooth over differences and misunderstandings. A French author once uttered this celebrated phrase: “There are always explanations but never understanding.” This situation is often repeated. Let us set out our problems, analyse them, and then work together. This is the best conclusion to be drawn from our debates.

If a political will is to emerge, that is the time. A beginning has been made. We are parliamentarians and it is up to us to spur on our ministers and our governments, so that we stop “purring” and turn to practicalities.

Mr. President, you are also a long-serving member of the Assembly, and you must have noticed that the word practical has never been bandied about so much as during these past two days. This must mean something. So let us make a move toward the practical, if possible, with a common spirit, a common political will and the same courage. Because what matters above all is to be part of a European system which safeguards us against unpleasant surprises, so that we can hope to advance not towards glowing horizons perhaps – that might be too poetic – but towards safe horizons for our peoples and for the rising generations.

I have taken too long, Mr. President. I am sorry, but I really had to speak my mind. This is a great day and I feel honoured to have had such rapporteurs, such helpers working with me on such extremely important subjects.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Pignion. With your heartening speech you again have given us more impetus personally to make something out of WEU.

I think that we may now conclude that we have adequately debated the three subjects. I

The President (continued)

declare that we have taken note of the report, Document 975.

We therefore proceed to Document 973 to which three amendments have been tabled. We shall take them in the order Amendment 3, and Amendment 1 and Amendment 2. I call Mr. Pignion to support his amendment:

3. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "the partnership" and insert "co-operation".

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – I love England, I like English! However, for the French text I would prefer "association" to "partnership". This is just a minor change in the wording.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I agree entirely.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, if you now wish to begin the discussion of the proposed amendments I must point out that that signals the start of the voting procedure. We have today had several opportunities to note – and the point has repeatedly been put to the chair – that there are doubts as to whether we have a quorum. It has also been stated on more than one occasion that this is a highly important debate involving crucial policy decisions. In view of the subject matter, I think we should know if we have a quorum.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for your intervention, Mr. Vogt, but we have a quorum according to Rule 36. We have had lengthy debates. I recall the discussion on Monday evening about quorums. We have a quorum. You can read Rule 36 in your own copy of the Rules of Procedure. We can proceed with the vote. Mr. Pignion spoke in support of the amendment. I call on any member who would like to speak against the amendment.

(*Mr. Vogt rose*)

Mr. Vogt, this is your last chance. You may make a point of order. I do not want to be dragged into a debate similar to that earlier. We are a grown-up assembly. I do not like to keep on having points of order. This is your second point of order. It is your last time unless you have something relevant to bring up.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Blaauw, I would remind you that you cannot adopt that tone to a colleague. We cannot be treated here as if some were adult and others less so, and I want to make that quite plain.

My second point is that I am dissatisfied with your comment and the manner in which it was made. Kindly establish how many persons, how many fellow delegates are in the chamber and whether they constitute a quorum. You should not respond in such general terms to a point of order which is both serious and adult in intent.

The PRESIDENT. – I should have liked to spare you this, but I shall read Rule 36 (1):

"The Assembly shall not take any decision by roll-call unless more than half of the representatives to the Assembly or their substitutes have signed the register."

More than half the members have signed the register. There is a quorum for the vote. There was a different system in the past but we now have a quorum, according to Rule 36. I should like to close this point of order. It has been spoken to sufficiently. I told you, Mr. Vogt, that you had two chances on this point of order. We have 89 votes, and 59 members have signed the register. We do not count the number of members present. The register has to be signed by enough people. That is the ruling of this Assembly which was set up in the last change of rules of procedure. I should like to stick to them. If you have a point of order to make, Mr. Vogt, which is not about the quorum, I give you the floor.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, if that is the situation and you are talking about altering the rules of the game then I shall call for a roll-call vote.

The PRESIDENT. – Your remark is noted.

Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 3 to Document 973 tabled by Mr. Pignion?...

As no one wishes to speak against, I put the amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

We come to Amendment 1 which reads:

1. At the end of sub-paragraph 3 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, add:

"and to secure international agreement to ensure that such developments are adequately and effectively controlled".

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – The fact that we are to have a debate tomorrow on space technology and defence suggests that it would be wrong for me to trespass on this subject at length. However, since it is mentioned in the

Mr. Hardy (continued)

report, it is right to insert this amendment, which is relevant to our considerations.

Many of us feel that Europe must contribute to sanity in the debate on space technology and defence. Some of us are worried about the prospect that highly sophisticated space technology may be used as a mere electioneering toy. Others fear that man's technological achievement has outstripped his political maturity and that, as a matter of urgency, we should seek to secure international agreement to save the world from madness and to try to make sure that we devote resources according to international needs rather than to seek to secure temporary political popularity.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. Hardy is therefore proposing to add the idea of an international agreement on space technology. No one in the committee is likely to oppose this amendment, which seems to me to be perfectly well founded. However, it might be more appropriately included in sub-paragraph (b) which deals with the Agency for the Control of Armaments and ends: "... the limitation of arms and the problems of verification of disarmament agreements" by adding the following words: "and to secure an international agreement on space technology and space defence to ensure that such developments are adequately and effectively controlled". The idea is to tie in this control in space matters, not with the sub-paragraph relating to the Standing Armaments Committee but to the one relating to the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I can see merit in the Rapporteur's suggestion, but the point that I was seeking to make was that we need a major political initiative and the matter cannot be handed over to an international bureaucracy – I do not use that word in a pejorative sense, as I usually do.

If a policy is established, it might be transferred to the Agency, but I believe that major political consideration is urgently needed and I should prefer, in the initial stages, the reference to control to be included in sub-paragraph (a). However, if the price of acceptance of my amendment is for it to be put into sub-paragraph (b), I should prefer that to losing the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

As you know, it is not possible to change amendments, though it is nice to try. As I allowed Mr. Hardy to speak twice, I should allow Mr. De Decker to do the same, but I ask

him to be brief because we should all like to get out of this hot place.

I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – One solution which might win general approval would consist in giving the Council, not the Agency, the task of negotiating such an agreement. It would require adding either a paragraph 3 *bis* or a paragraph 4 – in which case the present paragraph 4 would become paragraph 5 – worded as follows: "secure an international agreement on space technology or space defence...". In other words, give the Council the job of doing it in this way.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much Mr. De Decker.

We have twice heard the views of Mr. Hardy and Mr. De Decker. I should like to bring the amendment to a vote. I should like those who support the amendment to stand up. The vote is on the amendment as it stands.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*). – Mr. President, on the wording...

The PRESIDENT. – We have no rules about making supplementary amendments and changing the position of amendments. Such matters are set out in the rules. Let us stick to the rules. Mr. Hardy has moved an amendment. If members wished to change that amendment, they should have done so before. We have voted on the amendment. I should like a recount, because it was probably not clear on what matter we were voting. We are considering Mr. Hardy's amendment, which, as it stands, is not supported by Mr. De Decker.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Surely the rules are for our guidance. We should not be slaves to them. I am certain that, if the committee wishes to accept a slightly different wording in a slightly different place, that should be allowed at your discretion.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. It is refreshing to find a President who is firm and wants the rules to be kept. I appeal to my colleagues to give you complete support in following the rules. This is the first time in several months that I have noted this action in any European assembly.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – We are in a paradoxical situation. The words we are using, those used in the amendment, have been accepted by the Rapporteur and the Chairman. I believe it is possible to reach agreement.

It is fairly uncommon to see both a committee and chairman accept an amendment. It is a question of play on words. Paragraph 7 in Rule

Mr. Pignion (continued)

29 reads: "Amendments to amendments are in order only if they do not contradict the amendment; they may not be amended. They shall be debated after and put to the vote before the amendment to which they relate."

Mr. President, I really believe that with a combination of speed and strictness it should be possible to settle the issue. Let us save time. It is the best way of moving forward.

The PRESIDENT. – I should like to hear from the Rapporteur exactly what he wants and then ascertain whether that is possible according to the rules.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Paragraph 7 of Rule 29 is quite clear: amendments are permissible – and here we are talking about the admissibility of an amendment to an amendment – only insofar as they do not contradict the amendment itself. The amendment to an amendment which I am proposing in no way contradicts the amendment submitted by Mr. Hardy, who shares my point of view. All I am proposing is that a new paragraph 4 be inserted and that the present paragraph 4 become paragraph 5. It is the Assembly which recommends that the Council – new paragraph 4 – secure – and here I should like to ask Mr. Wilkinson whether it would be better to say "on space technology" or "on space defence" – an international agreement ensuring that such developments are adequately and effectively controlled. In my opinion, the expression "space technology" appearing in the first amendment could be used.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – On the Rapporteur's advice, could we not say "space defence technology"?

The PRESIDENT. – I am sorry, but this is not a market place for trading in amendments. Mr. De Decker's suggestion is no longer a supplement. We have problems in the wording. It has not been printed, signed and circulated, and if we start to proceed in this way, we shall be in a mess within fifteen minutes. I rule now that I cannot do anything about changes in amendments. As the amendment has been properly brought in by Mr. Hardy, I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment 2, tabled by Mr. Dejardin, which reads:

2. Leave out sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"assessing the consequences for the Agency for the Control of Armaments of the possible abolition of Annex III to Protocol No. III and any changes which might be made to Annex IV;"

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, trusting I am not showing disrespect for the military discipline you are imposing on the Assembly, I will try to justify this amendment by pointing out in particular that paragraph 4 (b) of the recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and paragraphs 2 (ix) and 2 (x) of the General Affairs Committee's recommendation are parallel as regards Annex III to Protocol No. III, i.e. concerning the removal of the discriminatory clauses relating to the Federal Republic of Germany's conventional weapons.

Mr. De Decker has also demanded the abolition of Annex IV whereas Mr. Thoss would like it modified. Annex IV concerns control of the level of forces and conventional armaments on the mainland of Europe. The abolition of this annex would obviously put an end to the main work of the Agency for the Control of Armaments in its present form. One need only reread Article III of Protocol No. III and the text of Annex IV to be convinced of this.

The Assembly obviously has to choose between Mr. Thoss's formulation and Mr. De Decker's, since it would be contradictory to adopt both of them as they are presented. I therefore propose an amendment to Mr. De Decker's draft recommendation, designed to update rather than abolish Annex IV.

This amendment is justified for three reasons: first, the modified Brussels Treaty introduced an absolutely new clause into the alliance which it created, by requiring that the defence resources of the allies be mutually verifiable under international control.

This mutual transparency helped greatly to bring about a reconciliation among the Europeans based on trust. It can still help to do so in the future, and here I refer to the President's speech. In any case, what expectation can there be of controlled disarmament of the East and the West if the idea of mutual control for Western Europeans is no longer bearable?

Secondly, purely and simply to abolish Annex IV is dangerous because, a priori, it means giving up an important part of WEU without getting anything in return other than vague promises about the future activities of the Council, the Agency, the Standing Armaments Committee or even the Assembly. A revival of WEU could have the effect of modifying the Agency's rôle. On the other hand, to do away

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

with the very essence of this body's work before any actual revival and before any precise functions have been assigned seems most improper to me.

And thirdly, to abolish the annex would be tantamount to modifying the treaty, the more so as, with reference to Annex IV, Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty provides that "the Council shall make an annual report on its activities, in particular concerning the control of armaments to our Assembly...".

In fact, abolishing Annex IV would prevent the Council from complying with the treaty and submitting a report on the control of armaments to the Assembly. It might be retorted that, if necessary, Annex III could cover A, B, and C weapons. But Annex IV deals with atomic, chemical and biological weapons.

I therefore request an updating of the annex, which it would be most dangerous and even legally indefensible to abolish.

The PRESIDENT. – We have had one speaker in favour of the amendment. We have a rule that I should call one for the amendment and one against.

I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like some clarification. Is the person tabling the amendment considered to be speaking in favour of it? I do not believe that is possible: one in favour and one against means that, after the amendment has been tabled, someone should speak in favour and someone else against it.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to speak very emphatically against the amendment. On Annex III of Protocol No. III, we recommended long ago that the restrictions on German naval armaments be lifted, and that was done in 1980. All that remains by way of limitations on German conventional armaments are restrictions on the building of offensive missiles and strategic bomber aircraft. It is an insult to the Federal Republic that these restrictions should formally remain. They should be lifted.

On Annex IV, the listing of weapons systems for control on the continent of Europe is a complete anachronism these days. It always was paradoxical that the United Kingdom, an off-shore island, should have been exempted from this process of arms control. That in itself was an anomaly and wrong. We definitely should not accept the amendment for those reasons.

I do not think there is any question of the manufacture of chemical, biological and nuclear

weapons being permitted in the Federal German Republic. Anyway, their manufacture would be not only a provocation and damaging to inter-German relations, but would probably be against the Federal Republic's basic law. I hope, therefore, that we do not accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – May we have the opinion of the committee – the Rapporteur or Chairman?

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this amendment is obviously extremely important and I believe very careful thought is necessary before voting.

The solution which I and the committee advocate seeks to abolish controls over the conventional – and I repeat only the conventional – armaments covered by Annexes III and IV.

Contrary to what you say, Mr. Dejardin, there is no question in this recommendation of abolishing an annex. Consequently there is no question of modifying the treaty. All that is intended is to lift controls on conventional weapons. Let me add that your amendment also concerns Annex III since you say: "by assessing the consequences for the Agency for the Control of Armaments of the possible abolition of Annex III...". I would draw the committee's attention to the fact that any talk today of the possible abolition of Annex III is taking a step back in relation to our Assembly's earlier recommendations, particularly in relation to Mr. Prussen's recommendation and report last year. If it is desired, through this amendment, to continue to discriminate against the Federal Republic of Germany, then we are wasting our time because the reactivation of WEU will not be possible. We must decide what we want. Since the amendment provides for contesting the abolition of Annex III and at the same time alludes to Annex IV, I ask the Assembly to reject it. This is a fundamental issue.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Dejardin was one speaker who supported the amendment, and Mr. Wilkinson was one speaker who spoke against the amendment. According to the rules, the Rapporteur or the Chairman has the right to speak. I see no points of order.

Mr. Dejardin, you have the floor for your point of order.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I am familiar with the courtesy of my friend De Decker, and I believe he is mistaken. For his reply calls upon my own text. This is unacceptable to me.

The PRESIDENT. – That is not a point of order. You are starting a discussion again. I

The President (continued)

told you about the rules. That is the system that we work.

I put the amendment tabled by Mr. Dejardin to the vote. We all know that Mr. Dejardin's amendment is important.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – You have a great gift for making my text say exactly the opposite thing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The PRESIDENT. – *Amendment 2 is negatived.*

That is the end of the voting on the amendments.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 973, as amended.

Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure as amended on 29th November 1982, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

There is no call for a roll-call, so we can decide by sitting and standing.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. You said that no one had asked for a roll-call. I do not want a roll-call vote, but Mr. Vogt has already said that he wants a roll-call. Surely your duty is to find whether four other members support him.

The PRESIDENT. – I misunderstood Mr. Vogt. I call Mr. Vogt to put his point of order.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to explain my point of order once again. I feel we are about to take an important decision. It should therefore be possible for members to show how they vote on the various points under discussion here. That is why I want a roll-call vote. I have been told that ten members must support this request, and I ask them to do so. I also ask that it be borne in mind that it is extremely difficult for someone who has worked on the assumption that this Assembly is democratically constituted to accept rules of procedure which require the support of so many members before a roll-call vote can be taken.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Vogt. The roll-call has to be supported by five members. The procedure is now different. Mr. Vogt calls for a roll-call and asks whether anyone will support it.

Does Mr. Vogt have the support of five members?...

That is not the case.

I am very sorry, Mr. Vogt, but there are not enough.

We continue with the normal procedure and vote on the draft recommendation in Document 973 by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – This is an explanation of my vote on the amendment. I abstained from voting for the following two reasons.

First, because you did not call me, Mr. President. I was not consulted. Second, as a mark of protest I say to my colleagues on the committee that these amendments should be discussed. The documents certainly arrived early enough; moreover, since we met at the beginning of the session, we could have examined them.

In my capacity as Chairman, I certainly hope never to find myself in such a situation again. We are men of good will. Together with Mr. De Decker, our technical advisers and the committee, we could have worked things out and consequently saved time, whereas now I am making you waste time!

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to give an explanation of vote. I can assure you that it is not easy to be the only one to vote against in an Assembly of this kind. I mistakenly made my statement before the general debate, and it took me by surprise, too. The reason why I voted against is that we feel the Europeans are in an historic situation in which they should not feel themselves forced out of dependence on the United States into laying the foundations for a militarised European superpower. While you complain that the European Defence Community did not come into being in 1954, we see the present situation as an opportunity for the European Community, or for the European nations, including the members of Western European Union, to recall their civilian background, their civilian character, and the desire for peace that gave rise to the establishment of the European Community, as reflected by the Schuman plan, for example. If

1. See page 34.

Mr. Vogt (continued)

you now choose to follow a different course – in good faith, I realise that – in the belief that it will be more efficient, make for greater independence and ultimately enable us to overcome the present dangerous situation, you are overlooking what every peace researcher knows: that the establishment of such armaments agencies and the introduction of such co-operation in fact sow the seeds of a new arms build-up. That is the main reason why I voted against.

The second reason is that, despite all that has been said – by non-German members only – about the existence of these arms controls constituting discrimination against the Germans, I do not in any way see this as discrimination. On the contrary, if these reductions are made and these restrictions are imposed, others will be encouraged to consider the wisdom of submitting to such restrictions themselves. What we have in these recommendations is not encouragement to reduce armaments but encouragement to increase them – as I said just now – with disastrous implications in the world market, since other countries will naturally want the new “intelligent” missiles that emerge from the co-operation among the European countries. They will have an effect on wars. They will be used by both sides, by Iran and Iraq and elsewhere.

Those are the main reasons for my voting against. I also feel we should go home and tell our people that this Assembly is behaving as if the militarisation of Europe had been legitimised, whereas this has been an Assembly that has seen fit to take such far-reaching decisions with a mere twenty-five elected delegates in attendance. I find this shameful. You yourselves should realise that this is not a sufficient basis for such far-reaching decisions.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I voted for Mr. De Decker's report because I consider it to be a good one. I abstained on Mr. Dejardin's amendment for a very definite reason. When I spoke, I said that we are fully in favour of scrapping all forms of discrimination against a member country, and I refer specifically to Germany. There is therefore no doubt that Annex III to Protocol No. III should be abolished.

There is however a problem which cannot be ignored and that is the retention of Annex IV to Protocol No. III. This question is correctly resolved in Mr. Thoss's report, which I have approved, but is missing from Mr. De Decker's report. This is the reason for my abstention. I consider that this section should definitely be retained, not least because talks are in progress at ministerial level and the question will have to be resolved in Rome. We are therefore faced

with an issue which cannot be dealt with in this way; hence my approval of this section of Mr. Thoss's report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for your brevity. I close the debate on the explanation of the vote on Document 973.

We shall proceed with Document 979.

We come to Amendment 2, tabled by Mr. Gianotti:

2. In the second sub-paragraph of paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out:

“and more particularly of recourse to nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces”.

I call Mr. Pollidoro.

Mr. POLLIDORO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I am taking the place of Mr. Gianotti. I believe that Amendment 2 is self-explanatory. There is, in fact, a contradiction in that the recommendation talks about a balanced policy which should be brought to the attention of governments and then goes on to refer to the possibility of recourse to nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces. Some time ago a German newspaper said that, up to the time of the last American president before Reagan, American policy could be summed up in the phrase “deterrence by détente”. Since Reagan, the attitude has changed totally, and can be summed up in the words “deterrence by cold war”. If WEU wishes to fulfil its revitalising and autonomous European rôle in the interests of disarmament policy, it must avoid conflicting positions such as would be created if the contradiction in the draft recommendation were allowed to stand. We therefore propose that the contradiction be removed.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Thoss.

Mr. THOSS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, since this amendment failed to get a majority in committee, it would be difficult for me to declare in favour of it. However, since this is not an essential point in the text, I leave it to the Assembly to decide in its wisdom.

The PRESIDENT. – I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

We proceed to Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

1. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “Welcoming the fact” and insert “Taking note”.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we cannot welcome the fact that the Council is considering what to do with WEU, especially as paragraph 10 makes no mention of any modifications to be made to the structure of WEU.

My proposal is therefore that the words “ Welcoming the fact ” be omitted and the words “ Taking note ” be inserted.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Thoss.

Mr. THOSS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I have no objection to this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 979, as amended.

Mr. THOSS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Because of the way the vote has gone on the other recommendation, it seems to me that the latter should be brought into line. It is not normal to have two different texts. I repeat, they should be brought into line.

The PRESIDENT. – I am very sorry, Mr. Thoss, but it was the wisdom of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to submit their own reports. They have been submitted here. They are the property of the Assembly and we have to decide on them and vote on them. For that reason, if we are to proceed honestly, I will quote Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure as amended on 29th November 1982: “...whenever five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire” a roll-call vote shall be taken.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?

No. As fewer than five members so desire – in fact no one so desires – I shall put Document 979 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

I call Mr. Pollidoro.

Mr. POLLIDORO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I reject this draft recommendation solely on the grounds that the document still contains the sentence I wanted deleted. I must

stress that it was I who proposed much of the content of this draft recommendation. I am therefore forced to reject this document because the sentence in question renders the recommendation itself practically pointless.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I agree with what the previous speaker said, but I should like to add that the main weakness of the document is that it omits any reference to disarmament based on disarmament measures.

I also feel that it should be noted in the records that, if I am not mistaken, no more than seventeen members were present for the vote on the final document.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Vogt. I declare the discussion and the explanations of voting closed.

8. Change in the membership of a committee

The PRESIDENT. – The United Kingdom Delegation proposes the following change in the membership of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments: Mrs. Jill Knight to be a titular member in place of Sir John Page; Sir John Page to be an alternate member in the place of Mrs. Jill Knight. They are now submitted for ratification of the Assembly in accordance with Rule 39 (6).

Is there any opposition?...

These nominations are agreed to.

9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 21st June, at 9.30 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Control of armaments and disarmament (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 972).
2. Military use of space (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 976 and amendments).
3. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1983 (Presentation of and

1. See page 35.

The President (continued)

debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 983).

4. Action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on the standardisation and production of armaments (Presentation of and debate on

the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 977).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 8.50 p.m.).

SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 21st June 1984

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. Control of armaments and disarmament (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 972*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. de Vries (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pollidoro, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Hardy, Mr. de Vries (*Rapporteur*).
4. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1983 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 983*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. de Vries (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pollidoro, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Woodall, Sir John Page, Mr. de Vries (*Rapporteur*).
5. Military use of space (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 976 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Hill, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Thorne, Mr. Brown, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Bassinet (*Vice-Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Thorne, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Brown, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Bianco (point of order), Mr. Tummers, Mr. Wilkinson; (explanation of vote): Mr. Vogt, Mr. Martino.
6. Military use of space (*Motion for an order, Doc. 984*).
7. Action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on the standardisation and production of armaments (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 977*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Antretter (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Brown, Mr. Rauti, Sir John Page, Mr. Antretter (*Rapporteur*).
8. Adjournment of the session.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Margue.

The sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

1. See page 40.

3. Control of armaments and disarmament

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 972)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the control of armaments and disarmament and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 972.

I call Mr. de Vries, Rapporteur.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). – At a time when all bilateral arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union are in abeyance, a report on those multilateral arms control conferences where both Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, including, of course, the United States and the Soviet Union, are still meeting is all the more important. As the report points out, there are three such international conferences meeting at the present time – the conference on disarmament in Europe in

Mr. de Vries (continued)

Stockholm, the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations in Vienna, both of which are discussed in this report, and the conference on disarmament in Geneva, on which the committee intends to report to the next part-session, although developments in chemical weapons which are discussed there are briefly touched on in the present report.

The explanatory memorandum points out at the outset that the present state of East-West relations is not propitious for arms control negotiations at the present time – the new Soviet leadership is obviously deeply suspicious of the present United States administration.

I should like to comment in passing on President Reagan's initiative in the area of anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile weapons, loosely described as the star wars proposals from his March 1983 speech, which have been criticised both by European governments and by much responsible military and scientific opinion in the United States. President Reagan reported to Congress on 2nd April this year that the United States would develop anti-satellite weapon systems and that, as any limitations on such systems were considered unverifiable at present, the United States would not engage in negotiations to ban such weapons. In his reply to questions put by the American Hearst newspaper group on 31st May, Mr. Chernenko has reaffirmed Mr. Andropov's moratorium on the launching of new anti-satellite weapons and has called for negotiations to ban them. As for anti-ballistic missile defence, the United States has stated that it will have to consider in due course possible withdrawal from the anti-ballistic missile treaty.

I am struck by similarities between the present situation and that of the mid-1960s, before MIRVs – multiple independent warheads – were introduced on strategic ballistic missiles. It was common ground then that it would not be possible to verify the presence or existence of MIRVs once deployed on missiles but that national means of verification then in existence made it possible to monitor all tests of such weapons systems so that it would have been possible to verify a ban on their development. The same is true at present of anti-satellite weapons.

In the mid-1960s the United States had unquestionable superiority in the then single-warhead strategic ballistic missiles of about 1,700 compared with 500 deployed by the Soviet Union. By the time the United States began to deploy its first MIRVs in 1970, the Soviet Union had reached near parity in single-warhead missiles. With its MIRV programme, the United States rapidly achieved overwhelming

superiority by 1976 with some 7,300 strategic missile warheads compared with 2,300 for the Soviet Union, but the following year the Soviet Union began deployment of its own MIRVs and within four years had again reached near parity but this time with some 6,300 warheads compared with the 7,300 of the United States. The net outcome of the MIRV programme was enormous military expenditure, a brief four years of United States superiority, followed by renewed stalemate at four or five times the previous levels.

For me the moral is very simple – the time to seek a ban on space weapons is now, before development gets properly under way.

I turn now to the committee's draft recommendation, which calls first and foremost for Europeans to take the initiative in restoring momentum to arms control negotiations, first, in paragraph 1, through a solemn declaration on the aims of arms control which would call on the superpowers to resume their negotiations without delay; secondly, in paragraph 2, through national initiatives to promote personal contacts at the highest level of our European governments with the new Soviet and other eastern bloc leaderships.

The committee's call for interim agreements this year in the conference on disarmament in Europe and in the MBFR is "based on the common elements in present eastern and western proposals". The wording of these paragraphs is deliberately general in character because it would be presumptuous to prescribe detailed terms of an agreement which, of course, have to be left to the negotiators. But in the CDE the shape of the compromise can already be seen, with some western spokesmen conceding that the Soviet demand for an agreement on the non-use of force could be met in some way. President Reagan himself, I note, in his speech to the Irish parliament in Dublin on 4th June, said :

" if discussions on reaffirming in principle not to use force... will bring the Soviet Union to negotiate agreements which will give concrete new meaning to that principle, we will gladly enter into such discussions "

and we remember that yesterday in this very hall the Foreign Minister of Germany made a statement very much on the same lines. The Soviet Union, for its part, as the committee's report points out in sub-paragraph (vi) of paragraph 3.12 of the explanatory memorandum, has included "significant confidence- and security-building measures" among its initial proposals. If the sense of urgency the committee calls for is injected into these negotiations, it should not be impossible, given the political will on each side, to include in an interim agreement this year some of the Helsinki-type

Mr. de Vries (continued)

confidence-building measures but with more obligatory provisions covering notification of manoeuvres of various sizes and invitations to observers with proper facilities for them to carry out their duties.

As far as the MBFR negotiations are concerned, the Warsaw Pact proposals of February 1982, described in paragraph 4.4 of the explanatory memorandum, are in themselves an advance on previous Warsaw Pact positions and, significantly, accept the principle of observation posts at entry and exit points to the reductions area, although only during the actual period during which troops would be withdrawn. The latest NATO proposals of April this year, described in paragraph 4.8, are a further very constructive step, designed in particular to overcome the problem of data concerning present troop levels – but it appears that NATO has still not reached agreement in itself on the new stringent verification proposals that it was expected to table in Vienna when the talks were resumed on 24th May.

That brings me to the whole subject of verification, which is referred to in the last phrase of paragraph 3 of the recommendation. The committee has always stressed the need for adequate verification measures to be attached to any arms control or disarmament agreement and, as is well known, such provisions have always presented the greatest difficulty to the Soviet Union, which appears to be reluctant to accept the controls necessary to provide confidence to all parties that any arms control agreements are being respected. Most bilateral arms control agreements, such as SALT I and the ABM treaty, rely on national means of verification, such as satellites and electronic measures, including radar observation of the adversary's test missile launches, and do not involve on-site inspections on Soviet territory.

As far as the two specific areas for interim agreement referred to in the draft recommendation are concerned – CDE conference and MBFR – more far-reaching measures than national means are needed. Verification per se is not, of course, critical in the case of the confidence-building measures discussed in the CDE since actual measures of disarmament are not involved, but the West must press for obligatory invitations for observers to notified exercises, with adequate facilities for them to carry out their duties – always remembering that such measures will of course have to be reciprocal and to involve Soviet observers at NATO exercises.

In the MBFR negotiations, proper verification measures are essential, and the West will need the right to maintain permanent observer posts at entry and exit points to the area of reductions,

even after any reductions have actually been completed, and the right to request further inspection measures should doubts arise thereafter about the numbers of troops actually in the area. The reduction area concerned in the MBFR talks does not involve the territory of the Soviet Union – and for that reason agreement on the necessary measures of verification may be easier to reach than, for example, in the case of a chemical weapons ban, which would necessarily involve the right of inspection on Soviet territory. But the failure of NATO so far to reach agreement on the details of the “more stringent verification measures” which it has said it will be proposing in the MBFR framework leads me to another aspect of the verification problem.

There is clearly a tendency on the part of certain elements in the present United States administration to call for quite unrealistic verification measures, leading to the suspicion that such demands are formulated with a view to blocking agreement on arms control measures themselves. Examples of this attitude are to be found, for example, in some of the details of the inspection measures proposed by the United States in its draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which was introduced by Vice-President Bush in the Geneva conference on disarmament in April this year and which, for example in Article X, paragraph 1 (b), provides for inspection of facilities “owned by the government of a party”, but makes no reference to privately-owned installations, which in the West might in some circumstances be suspected of involvement in chemical weapons production on behalf of the government.

Again, as the committee notes in paragraph 2.2 of the explanatory memorandum, the United States has failed to ratify the threshold nuclear test-ban treaty, signed by President Nixon in 1974, and the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty, signed by President Ford in May 1976 – both agreements negotiated, therefore, by a Republican administration but determined by the present Republican administration to be “not effectively verifiable in their present form”. Here I am quoting the United States Deputy Secretary of State, Kenneth Dam, in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 13th June. He continued:

“On a number of occasions last year, we approached the Soviets and invited them to discuss with us verification improvements to these accords. Each time the USSR rebuffed our request for talks”.

So far, Mr. Dam. Certainly the West would be deeply suspicious of the Soviet Union if it refused to ratify an arms control agreement duly signed after lengthy negotiations and sought to return to the negotiating table to secure further concessions from the West. It is hardly surpris-

Mr. de Vries (continued)

ing, therefore, that the Soviet Union should be deeply suspicious of the motives of the present United States administration.

The committee rightly stresses in the draft recommendation the need for proper and adequate measures of verification in any arms control agreement, but their purpose is to provide confidence in the respect of an agreement, not to hamper its conclusion.

The committee intends to pursue its work on disarmament by producing a report for the autumn session which will be written by the Rapporteur, Mr. Blaauw, who has already been appointed to do so. I hope that the committee will also be able to return to the issues discussed in this report, perhaps next year, to provide representatives with a regular report on developments in these areas crucial to our security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. de Vries, for your contribution to the work of the Assembly during this particularly important part-session.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Pollidoro.

Mr. POLLIDORO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, I concur with Mr. de Vries's analysis of the international situation; I share his general concern over the present situation marked by a steady deterioration of East-West relations, associated with profound changes on both sides both in the state of the economy and in leadership – as recently in the Soviet Union and with the election to come in the United States, not to mention the outcome of the European elections.

This deterioration is due to the two super-powers' opposing prejudices resulting in uncertainties which seriously threaten world peace – and this is where we must act; the harder line of the new Soviet leadership towards western proposals and the American position with the declared determination to negotiate from strength, even though differences in the West have since led to a change of attitude, recently at least, from the positions taken up by Reagan to which the Rapporteur referred a short time ago. This attitude of the new American administration will not improve the situation but will only lead to an increase in armaments.

If we want to reactivate WEU and if we wish Europe to stay independent of these attitudes we must take a different stance in favour of negotiations which will allow Europe to influence this situation; and that is why I share the concern and spirit of Mr. de Vries's report. It has been demonstrated in several ways that the current logic could lead to destruction while a policy of

even partial, step-by-step agreements is essential for recovery and the increased production of wealth to raise the living standards of mankind.

The report rightly stresses the need for a more independent Europe in order to lay a more solid foundation for peace. This is the line Europe must take for a number of reasons; it lies on the confines of East and West, it has a bigger concentration of destructive weapons than any other continent and it has the highest population density.

This is why disarmament is the only possible answer to the search for security, starting with the halting of stockpiling and moving on to controlled balanced reduction, the extension of zones free of nuclear and conventional weapons and the elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons. But meanwhile the dialogue must be resumed. Europe's intervention then becomes decisive, firstly, to combat any idea of the possibility of a limited or partial war, to which reference has already been made, as a trial of strength between the two great powers and, secondly, because the individual countries are not in a position to take action which the European Community can on the contrary take with authority in order to open fresh prospects for agreements between the two great areas.

For the rest, all government and opposition parties in the various countries will have to take account of the growth throughout Europe of the pacifist and ecological movements, which are not an aberration but a new factor in the situation which must be understood in all its essential aspects, above all as a new element in the world of today, demonstrating the weight and extent of public opinion which is exerting ever-growing influence over decisions even on matters of foreign policy. If European politicians deny this they will be taking a very negative attitude. On the contrary, due account must be taken of this aspect because the influence exerted by world public opinion, partly through these movements, is a factor which should be regarded as positive and highly democratic.

This being so, the committee's proposal to reverse the present negative process seems to be essential; in particular the proposal for action seeking to restore confidence in East-West relations as a precondition for halting the arms build-up by promoting more contacts between European leaders and the Soviet and Warsaw Pact leaders.

Efforts should also be directed to reaching agreement in 1984 at the conference on disarmament in Europe, in view of the fact that a glimmer of light has emerged in Stockholm precisely on the subject of confidence-building measures and this we must use at all costs both there and at the conference on conventional weapons in Vienna. Furthermore, the results of

Mr. Pollidoro (continued)

the Madrid conference, although limited, offered some hope for the development of relations, because the final document declares that "On the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity" confidence- and security-building measures and measures for disarmament are required in Europe, "must cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area and air space" and "must be of military significance and politically binding and provided with adequate forms".

I therefore agree with the analysis in Mr. de Vries's report and the committee's proposals for reopening the East-West dialogue, because, as the report itself states, "neither side appears to have excluded the possibility of agreement". What is needed is a solemn declaration renouncing use of force; a series of practical confidence-building measures will also have to be included, in particular measures for verification by way of an adequate number of inspections. While it is true that it is difficult to reach agreement on these points it is equally true that very recently the two positions have been moving a little closer together as Mr. de Vries's analysis shows. This movement can be used to step up the dialogue and meaningful meetings between the two sides.

For the rest, it is also true that the present Soviet and American attitudes have so far prevented the reaching of an early agreement, which is out of the question in fact at least until after the American elections; at the same time it is possible to work realistically for partial results in East-West relations and to prepare new conditions for the next conference on security and co-operation due to open on 4th November 1986. The committee's conclusions therefore seem to be both opportune and effective in declaring the need to search urgently for even partial agreements through the conference on disarmament and, as a precondition, the need for member governments to take every initiative in seeking to restore mutual confidence in East-West relations. This is essential because of the vast number of weapons in existence and their degree of sophistication. This has led Professor David Collingridge of the University of Birmingham to state that the present situation is making the control of technology more and more difficult and increasingly costly and is moreover, creating an ever more dangerous irrational attitude. Competition increases the cost of any mistake because it drives each side to try to provide against anything the other might do, which may lead to more and more absurd situations like that which arose a few years ago in the case of the MIRV missile systems. "Neither party wants a certain thing, but cannot afford to be without if the other party has it". Herein lies our great responsibility.

I should like to quote a recent statement by Mr. Berlinguer in an interview shortly before his death. He said that in Europe "we are the heirs, but also the witnesses, custodians and interpreters of the greatest human achievement ever known. We must therefore work to safeguard and preserve something which has become an historic testimony and a point of reference for mankind".

That is why I feel I must support the committee's conclusions and the draft recommendation because they reflect a new determination to find at all costs a solution to the problem of relations between the two superpowers and the great areas of the world and to build a different future. My group will therefore vote for the draft recommendation.

(Mr. Blaauw, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we have here a report which paints a perfectly adequate picture of past and present efforts to achieve disarmament. In other words, it includes all the formulas that have been used in the disarmament debate, although - I am sorry to have to add - they have not proved successful anywhere. For example, trust is placed in negotiations, and a system of verification is sought, and yet both have failed so far. Negotiations have failed because of the insistence on mutual, simultaneous and balanced actions. As we know from the negotiations that took place between the first and second world wars and immediately after the second world war, they have never yet resulted in genuine disarmament. You will not be able to give me one example of a case where negotiations have really led to disarmament. It must therefore be stressed that new initiatives and new attitudes have emerged from the peoples, who, like governments, really want disarmament. One of these attitudes, known as gradualism in the academic world, finds expression in the Federal Republic of Germany and elsewhere, particularly in churches throughout the world, in the concept of the policy of calculated prior concessions.

The difference between this and previous concepts is that the measures contemplated are no longer made conditional on the other side actually taking the same action on the same scale. As I think I said yesterday, this has been just as ineffective as two overly polite Germans meeting at a door. "After you, Claud", is no answer, because neither will go first and the result is stalemate.

The alternative - and I would be very pleased if the President would also listen - is for my

Mr. Vogt (continued)

country to announce its intentions and actually carry them out, having set a clear deadline for its action. So we have an action announced and taken. But it would also be laid down that, unless comparable – though not necessarily the same – action is taken to reduce armaments within the six or twelve months, the situation must be reviewed and reappraised. Conversely, if satisfactory action is taken in this period, more can be done, which may result in a progressive build-down. Hence my comment yesterday that, taking a kindly view, the Netherlands Government's action could fall under this heading, although it missed the chance of voicing the clear-cut expectation that suitable governments in the other alliance, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, for example, should not allow their territory to be used for the deployment of weapons as a so-called "counter-measure". That is the thinking behind the policy of calculated prior concessions.

Unfortunately, I see nothing of the kind in the draft recommendation, even though all the countries of Western European Union are thinking along these lines. I did, of course, wonder if some changes could be made through amendments, but I do not think that would have been the right way. The right way is to make a political analysis, as a basis for a study on such new approaches to the strategy of disarmament.

To turn to another subject, the Rapporteur, in the recommendations in particular, places considerable emphasis on the negotiations now taking place in Geneva, Vienna and Stockholm. I must tell the Rapporteur that unfortunately I cannot share his hopes in this respect. We were recently in Stockholm with a delegation of disarmament specialists from green parties and talked to various delegations there. The results were shattering. Some delegations admittedly gave the impression of being quite venturesome and of trying to make really creative use of the material. In this respect, I would pick out the Romanian and Swedish delegations, although Sweden as the host country was unable to behave as it might otherwise have done. As the host, it felt inhibited, rather than taking the line that it could have a stimulating influence. To begin with, there was the shattering interpretation of the Madrid mandate, according to which measures to do with nuclear weapons – the Palme corridor and so on – are absolutely incompatible with confidence-building measures, though if we consider the anxiety felt by the public – and the main potential danger in international relations – we must be forced to admit that this area must have priority.

What has happened? The western governments, and the NATO governments in particular

– the Federal Republic of Germany is playing an inglorious part in this – have from the outset exerted pressure in every conceivable direction, they have chosen to act as a bloc and, by slamming their NATO proposals down on the table, they have made sure that no discussion of nuclear weapons and their reduction, of nuclear-free zones, the Palme corridor and so on could possibly take place.

The simple, though erroneous reason given for this was that the spirit of the Madrid mandate excluded any such discussion because it would have too serious an effect on the strategic balance.

If we take what is happening in Stockholm as a basis, we do not at present have a negotiating forum in which a proper discussion on nuclear weapons can take place. That is why it is wrong to arouse the public's hopes that such rounds of negotiations will lead to disarmament. I therefore think that this draft recommendation does not go far enough, that it will again dash the public's hopes of disarmament, and I propose – I apologise for making this point so often – that we try new approaches based on new ideas, giving serious consideration to the trends expressed by the peace movement, the churches and other social groups, and that we draw up a further report in the Assembly, based on a political analysis of new concepts of disarmament. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate Mr. de Vries on his report. Given the nature of the modern media, if any attention is paid to the deliberations of the Assembly this week, it will be focused on yesterday's debates. I do not minimise their importance, but the cause of humanity demands that this debate command considerable attention.

The best form of security for Europe is the achievement of disarmament by negotiation. Our security would be greatly enhanced by such agreements, provided they are meaningful. I congratulate Mr. de Vries on his contribution to that part of the debate. It is the duty of Western Europe to pursue disarmament. That is Europe's greatest need and it should be a politician's highest duty. Mr. de Vries has admirably fulfilled that duty.

After some of the events of this week, you, Mr. President, may have some sympathy with my view that, although Mr. de Vries suggests that there should be more extensive personal contacts among the leaders of various power blocs, bad feelings as well as good feelings can be generated by such meetings. The circumstances at the time and even the climate in the meeting place may have an effect on such meetings.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

One would hope that one side would not insist on such long hours of meetings that the other side became irritable. Eyeball-to-eyeball meetings can sometimes lead to unsatisfactory as well as to good relationships. The management of such meetings needs to be carefully devised and adequately supervised. I have some hesitation about whether repeated meetings between the President of the United States and the leaders of the Soviet Union would inevitably and invariably be beneficial. However, it is right for those leaders to be reminded that, like us, they are human and mortal, though one hopes that that mortality will not be extensively demonstrated too soon.

I was pleased to see in the report a reference to the need for advances to be made elsewhere than in Geneva. In talk of disarmament, too much attention has been given to nuclear weapons. Given their genocidal capability, it is right that they should command attention, but people tend to think that conventional weapons are of relatively little importance. We need to remind mankind that the conventional firepower available to us is enormously destructive. One small warship today has the same firepower that a huge flotilla of ironclads had not long ago; one artillery shell today can cause as much devastation as could an enormous salvo of artillery shells in the second world war; and an infantryman's rifle today is more rapid and has more penetration than any of the small weapons of twenty or thirty years ago. We have to remember that conventional weapons can also kill horribly.

I am glad that Mr. de Vries made it clear that advances and agreements can be made in that area. I hope that WEU member states will note that fact. I congratulate Mr. de Vries and hope that Europe will pay attention to his recommendations. I trust that in future the Assembly will give the same priority to sanity that Mr. de Vries gives it in his report.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. de Vries.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). – I am indebted to my colleagues for the attention that they have given to the report and the recommendations that I had the honour to present. The debate adds a valuable dimension to the report and offers hope that the Assembly will look for new ways of expatiating on its anxiety and endeavours in disarmament matters.

I am grateful to Mr. Pollidoro for expressing his support for the report. He agreed that Europe, as well as the two superpowers, had a specific rôle. The draft recommendations refer to member governments making representations to the superpowers without delay.

Many have felt that the best way to proceed was for one side to call on the other to behave itself and to live up to what international behaviour requires. The committee thought that we needed to change the international setting. All sides have a duty not to remain silent and to sit back and wait for developments. This is an unproductive course. We have to contribute creatively to finding new ways of resuming negotiations.

Why does Europe have to speak out? As Mr. Hardy rightly said, given the existing arsenals in Europe, our hope for peace must lie in mutual restraint. We have to work on the political level and seek agreement with the other side to ensure that we have a *modus vivendi* and not a course that leads to disaster.

Mr. Pollidoro rightly pointed out that public opinion in Europe wants to have a say. It has been made clear here this week that Europe and the Assembly are trying to make up for something that we have neglected in past years. Everyone in Europe is suddenly aware that WEU exists. However, members could not reasonably have asked colleagues in their national parliaments that question a year ago. At that time, WEU was not so well known. Now we are all looking for new ways for Europe to take up its responsibilities and duties. In fact, we are repairing what went wrong a long time ago.

We must seek a dialogue between the Assembly and national governments and seek a new momentum and inspiration for a European contribution to security. It is difficult for some people to understand that our security policy will lead to more security. As politicians, we have to accept our responsibilities for providing credible answers to the public so that we have a strong basis for our policy on security, on defence, and on arms control and disarmament.

Mr. Vogt said that the present way of conducting negotiations was not productive. At first glance, everyone would agree with that, but we should not underrate the importance of the process that is now taking place. Arms control negotiations are relatively new phenomena and it is hard for countries to find ways of negotiating without, at the same time, contributing to the fuelling of the arms race by, for example, working on the development of weapons systems to use as bargaining counters.

The conduct of nations at the bargaining table must be sorted out. We must realise that a complication arises because the two blocs dealing with each other – the superpowers – have difficulty in avoiding making decisions by which the other side loses face. That is not a western mistake. We tend to discuss western policies openly and freely, and so we should. It is extremely hard to feel, on noting the Soviet

Mr. de Vries (continued)

negotiating behaviour and public utterances by its leadership, that the Soviet Union wants to seek arrangements with us on the basis of mutual respect and security. I agree that progress towards maturity in dealing with each other is probably occurring, but I agree with Mr. Hardy that we shall eventually reach a constructive result that helps to safeguard a peaceful future only by agreement between the two sides.

I do not say that I disagree with Mr. Vogt who said that we can create and explore possibilities and see where we come out. It is tempting, Mr. President, to dwell on this subject a little longer, but I know that you do not wish me to stay on the rostrum too long.

Essentially, governmental responsibility for security cannot be taken away by anyone. Governments are absolutely responsible and accountable for security policy. Governments seek arrangements with other parties only if those arrangements contribute to their security. In that sense, discussions about unilateralism sometimes lack a relationship with reality. Governments will always have to make unilateral decisions, which may be incorporated in their policies.

That responsibility cannot be taken from them. There is a possibility of negotiated constraints only when there is a mutual recognition that those constraints help both sides.

We have noticed that the behaviour of both sides in these matters does not always contribute to that feeling. That behaviour will be seen for as long as we must deal with treaties in which there is a lack of verification and about which allegations of cheating are made. Those points show how difficult the process is. There is no reason – I differ greatly from Mr. Vogt – to give up the process in which we are involved, granted that we should be constructive.

The contribution of the churches and peace movement is a source of inspiration. It can be called also a challenge to us to explore avenues with new energy and to ascertain whether we can respond to them and establish before the front of public opinion that we are seeking real security. In those circumstances, the methods that are advocated by those quarters would, without further consideration, be more appropriate than those we advocate in our forum.

Mr. Hardy has strikingly illustrated his extremely important subject by referring to the devastating capacity of modern weapons systems. I completely agree with him that we in Europe have more than enough of those weapons. We must find ways in which we can move faster in the negotiations, and that is why the resolution

calls for us to ask our governments to seek possibilities for an interim agreement. Let us concentrate on finding a way in which we can achieve something. Let us not wait until 1986 when there is a conference again. That would be like following Parkinson's law – expanding work to fill the time available. We should make it clear to our governments that we do not want that time to expand any further than is absolutely necessary. We should take a little step forward and move from there to ascertain whether we can find a more comprehensive approach.

I believe that I have responded to most of the questions, but another matter deserves further comment. Mr. Vogt criticised NATO governments for not allowing discussions in Stockholm on nuclear weapons. I can understand that, at a time when discussions on nuclear weapons are not productive, one may look for another forum. The issues discussed at the table in Stockholm and in Vienna are extremely difficult. It is difficult to agree about minor matters. I believe that the negotiations would be complicated tremendously and made unproductive if we tried also to bear the full load of the argument on nuclear weapons discussions. There are forums at which those matters could be properly discussed.

As I said, the recommendation calls on both superpowers to take the initiative to change the international setting so that they can discuss the issues again. If consideration of nuclear weapons were brought into the forum at Stockholm, the conference could end in an unbelievable mess. The issues of conventional weapons, CDE and MBF, are sufficiently complicated to be considered by different forums.

In those circumstances, people might start reaching out for approaches that have been advocated by, for instance, the famous gang of four in the United Kingdom to move towards a no-early-use posture. That would have tremendous implications for the way in which we organise operationally and for our defence posture in conventional weaponry. Those questions can be answered only when we have come to grips with the fragile elements which seem to be within our grasp in Stockholm and Vienna. The Assembly cannot do better than to say: "Perhaps we shall not make tremendous progress, but at least let us make progress."

The PRESIDENT. – We come now to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 972. No amendment has been tabled.

Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure as amended in November 1982 "whenever five or more representatives or substitutes present in

The President (continued)

the chamber so desire" the Assembly shall vote by a roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any representative wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

As that is not the case, the voting will be by sitting and standing.

I now put to the vote the draft recommendation as contained in Document 972.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

I thank the Rapporteur and Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments for their excellent report and the presentation made here.

4. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1983

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 983)

The PRESIDENT. – The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1983 and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 983.

I call Mr. de Vries, Rapporteur.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). – First, I have the honour to convey to the Assembly a letter to me written by Sir Dudley Smith, the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, which reads:

"Because the business was changed I find it impossible to be present today for Mr. de Vries's report, because I have to be in my constituency for an important meeting; but this is to let you know that the committee were unanimous in their support of Mr. de Vries's report and wish to commend it to the Assembly."

Sir Dudley asked me to read that letter to the Assembly, which I have been happy to do.

The report on the budget has been prepared in the committee after lengthy discussions on the future of WEU. As indicated in the first paragraph of the report, many substantial problems will be referred to specific committees by the

Presidential Committee, for example, to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. But as members of the Budget Committee we felt that from our perspective we should not be well advised to fail to give detailed attention to the intricacies of WEU's budget.

So we came up with a recommendation that is longer than usual and we point to one important feature. Not everybody realises that, whatever may be the implications for the functioning of the ministerial organs, it will be decided not in this body today but on the basis of the discussions we had yesterday, and on the basis of the discussions that our governments are trying to make more productive. We shall know more about that at the end of the year. For that reason the committee felt it unwise to suggest major changes, but we wanted at the same time to anticipate new possibilities. One feature stands out in the recommendation.

The committee does not believe that it serves any reasonable purpose to have two headquarters in different capitals, and it urges the Assembly to recommend to the Council that it examine the possibility of uniting the headquarters. From a merging of headquarters there would come many new opportunities for greater productivity, greater efficiency, and greater viability of WEU, and I certainly hope that the common interest of all WEU members will override some considerations of national pride that may be involved if one of the two capitals has to give up its own offices.

A second recommendation is to adopt flexible criteria in staff recruitment policy. If we think that new tasks are to be accorded to the ministerial organs, it would be unwise to conduct a staff policy on the basis of hiring personnel for almost a lifespan. We might want to consider contracting people to conduct specific studies. That would also help to create in the bureaucracy of our organisation, which is the institutional backbone and memory of anything we do, more flexibility in that new blood would make it possible to consider new possibilities. That would be greatly helped if we were to look at our past staff recruitment policy and try to make it as flexible as is socially justified. I know that the Secretary-General and his staff are always looking at these possibilities and perhaps they need the endorsement of this Assembly to help them.

A third recommendation specified is that the criterion of zero growth applies only to the operating expenses and that expenditure and income relating to pensions should be set out in a separate section of the budget. That may seem to be a detail, but if we do not agree to that

1. See page 41.

Mr. de Vries (continued)

in the long run our whole budget will be eaten up by the increments of personnel costs, so that we shall have to lower the operating expenses and, after all, that is not exactly the purpose of our organisation. There was harsh criticism in the committee of the lax attitude of the Council in responding to questions from the Budget Committee and the committee intends to follow the Council more stringently. It will be a great nuisance to the Council if the Council does not want to reply to our communications in due time.

I draw attention to the last paragraph on staff policy :

“The Council’s attention [was drawn to] Recommendation 340, adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1979, and to which the Council has not yet given a final answer.”

That is wholly irresponsible and unacceptable, and I can pledge to the Assembly on behalf of the committee that we shall try to become a little tougher with the Council in bringing it to live up to its responsibilities vis-à-vis this body.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Pollidoro.

Mr. POLLIDORO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to say a few words in support of the line taken in the report which favours cuts in expenditure and sets out a number of ideas for the application of strict criteria. I therefore support the suggested approach as regards the budget and the three fundamental proposals contained in the report for uniting the headquarters, separation of the operating expenses budget from the staff and pensions budget and the adoption of flexible criteria for staff recruitment.

I should however like some clarification of the proposal for integration of the London and Paris offices because as a new member of the WEU Assembly, I have no knowledge of the findings of the enquiry referred to in the report. As regards the reactivation of WEU to which the report refers, a new appropriately-formed budget will clearly be required.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I can be very brief, I am pleased to say. I should like to refer to just one point, whose financial implications we should perhaps examine.

Some of us have referred on several occasions to the importance of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and to the need, if Western

European Union is to be reactivated, for independent facilities for research into disarmament measures. This might mean a change of course for the Agency for the Control of Armaments, or additions to its terms of reference, to make it into an authority capable of seriously tackling disarmament concepts.

I have a specific suggestion to make, which I think might be taken up this year: I believe a visit should be paid to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the United States, which was set up under President Kennedy. It does not, of course, work well under every administration. In the present situation its activities tend to be geared to an arms build-up and deterrence. But the instrument does at least exist, and it can be studied. We can look at its history and see what it has achieved so far. We can look into the probable costs of such an agency, transposed into Western European terms.

Our findings should then be converted into a proposal for the redesigning of this authority, or organisation. This would undoubtedly have other implications, the cost of which would have to be considered. The question naturally arises as to whether some restructuring is possible – whether activities that have hitherto tended in another direction could be swung in the direction of disarmament and arms control. Additional costs would not then ultimately be incurred, but if the conclusion is that a completely new concept should be taken as a basis, a cost factor would naturally arise.

All these questions should, I feel, be considered. My suggestion – we cannot discuss it now in the context of an amendment – to the Rapporteur and the Assembly is that consideration should be given to an initiative of this kind.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Woodall.

Mr. WOODALL (*United Kingdom*). – I support the report and commend it to the Assembly. I congratulate our Rapporteur, Mr. de Vries, on bringing before us such an excellent report that deserves the full support of the Assembly.

As the Assembly knows, the report has the unanimous support of the Budgetary Committee, and I feel that the Assembly itself may eventually accept it unanimously. If it does, I make one plea, and I stress that I do so with some trepidation. The plea is that the Assembly will recommend that, if possible, the full recommendations of the report be implemented. I stress that with all the vigour at my command, because I fully realise that there are many difficulties in getting the relevant bodies to accept such a report.

Mr. Woodall (continued)

The report refers to Recommendation 340, which was approved by the Assembly on 4th December 1979:

“ Since that date the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts has continued... its ‘ feasibility study on comparison of duties, grades and levels of remuneration in the co-ordinated organisations ’ . ”

It states in the next paragraph: “ No decision has yet been reached on this question . ”

That was four and a half years ago. Surely budgetary experts should be able to bring forward some sort of recommendation in four and a half years. One of the main points in the recommendations of the report in the penultimate paragraph of section 4 is:

“ On the basis of the preceding observations, the committee feels that, while generally speaking the staff of the ministerial organs may be considered too numerous for their present activities, they would be able to handle new or perhaps increased activities... ”

We have before us in the report a recommendation that, in order to bring about cost-effectiveness, some consideration should be given to the merging of the London and the Paris offices. In the light of the views expressed in the report, that would be eminently sensible. I strongly urge the Assembly to accept the recommendation and make it possible for some savings to be made while increasing efficiency. I press that with the utmost vigour.

Much as I love Paris – and I do – it would be eminently sensible, if the two offices were to be merged, for the resultant office to be in London. I am attempting not to be too parochial. That shows that one cannot win. I hear a colleague on the right, who also loves Paris, expressing the contrary view. If the matter should come to a fierce argument, we should toss a coin to decide.

In view of the extract that I have read from the report, it would be eminently sensible to agree to the merging of the two offices. London or Paris matters not, but, in view of the economic situation and the recommendation that we should examine cost-effectiveness, we must at least seriously examine the proposal. I fully support the report and hope that it will be accepted.

The PRESIDENT. – Before giving you the floor, Sir John, I congratulate you on your knighthood.

Sir John PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – That was a charming introduction, Mr. President, and I am glad of your explanation because other-

wise, when you called that name, I would have looked around to see who was supposed to be speaking.

When I arrived here this morning I found that Mr. de Vries was already speaking, and I became anxious because I thought that he was presenting the report that we are now discussing. However, he has filled a dual rôle here today. Perhaps, as an ex-naval officer, Mr. President, you could arrange for a special flag to be flown outside in the lobby for Mr. de Vries so that we may know in which debate he is taking part and so save ourselves anxiety.

I am not a member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration now, although I was previously so for many years. I should therefore like to comment with a greater than usual lack of knowledge. It is interesting to note in the report that expenditure on staff amounts to 80% of the total budget expenditure, and that is to put the whole of the budget picture into perspective.

I draw attention to the staff section in Mr. de Vries's interesting report – paragraph 4.1, in particular – and remind the Assembly that staff in grades A to L have agreed to a moderation in salaries of 1.5% with effect from 1st July 1983, 3% from 1st July 1984 and 4.5% from July 1985. That should be regarded as a genuine effort by the staff who work for us in the Assembly in the fight against inflation.

That is why I feel that the Council's answer to Question 246 is unnecessarily obfuscatory. I do not wish to be too offensive to the Council of Ministers or to the distinguished ambassadors present when I say that, if there were a prize for ministerial speechwriters for covering three pages with impressive-sounding words that say absolutely nothing, the answer to this question would certainly be either the winner or a runner-up.

Our staff, who have shown willingness to co-operate, deserve better than that.

I do not wish to comment in depth upon the present pension position. I remind the committee that it was only four or five years ago that WEU staff pensions were disgraceful and the position chaotic. I was pleased to read that retired and existing elderly members of staff are being properly catered for at present. That is largely due, I believe, to the efforts over three years of Lord Selsdon, a previous member of our committee.

A new issue being raised is the possibility of uniting the London and Paris headquarters. It is right that that should be examined, but I do not go overboard to support the suggestion. Unless it can be shown clearly that there will be cash savings and the generation of greater

Sir John Page (continued)

efficiency, there is a certain wisdom in leaving things as they are. At this time I believe that it is wise for WEU to have a foothold in France but to keep its good relationship with the United States it is helpful to have a London base, where liaison with the United States is particularly easy to maintain.

I congratulate Mr. de Vries on his report and on the way in which he has presented what is nearly always a rather dull document.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. de Vries, Rapporteur.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). – May I join in congratulating our dear colleague, Sir John Page, on his knighthood. Though I am not criticising his government, I believe that it came rather late.

Mr. Pollidoro asked a question about combining the two headquarters. As Sir John Page warned, I do not think that we should go overboard with this proposal. It must be studied carefully. We must take into account all considerations of cost-effectiveness and the future of WEU – the kind of institution into which we want WEU to develop. We must first clarify what we want to do. Mr. Vogt pointed out that it is good to be efficient but that it is essential to decide what kind of tasks we want to perform.

We must realise that WEU is a low-budget operation. In military expenditure terms, we spend the equivalent of two high-quality tanks on WEU. If we are to take on new tasks, governments must be prepared to put up the money to enable us to do so. If we are to contemplate expanding the functions of the Agency for the Control of Armaments as Mr. Vogt described – he referred to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the United States – we shall have to expand our activities and therefore our budget. We must take that into account when we study the possibility of uniting the two headquarters. If WEU is to be a bigger organisation with more staff undertaking more activities, neither the London nor the Paris facilities will be sufficient to serve our needs. We must wait until we have decided the future of WEU before we seriously consider such a proposal.

Members have spoken about the headquarters being in either Paris or London but we should be wiser to widen our horizons. It would not be strange to have an organisation built on a modified Brussels Treaty in Brussels. If we want to strengthen WEU in the context of the Atlantic Alliance, it would be hard to find a better place. We could use the same diplomatic staff

and government representatives who deal with NATO affairs. Their knowledge could be brought into WEU's machinery. WEU could also be located in Luxembourg. It has been an attractive gathering place. It is the smallest of the WEU countries and for that reason an attractive place to base an organisation.

We should not limit ourselves. We should have an open mind to seek the best way to locate and use our association. There has been discussion on the revivifying of WEU, but there is a need to ensure that we shall not be discussing the reanimation of its members. The Paris facilities for our staff are beyond belief. They do not live up to the standard expected in a normal working place. If WEU is to be around for many years with a reactivated rôle, exploring great possibilities and potential, why do we not accept the ideas that seem to be shared by so many in Europe nowadays and try to create an association that radiates credibility to the outside world? If one visits the London headquarters, one cannot help but feel that governments have not been generous in keeping up the appearance of the organisation. To any casual visitor that reflects the organisation's credibility and the confidence that we may have in its future. A guest in the galleries at these meetings almost needs reanimation after a while. People ask whether we are taking ourselves seriously when we sit in a place without adequate facilities. They ask why we do not do things better.

I am grateful for the comments. Mr. Woodall was correct to say that there was a need for the Council to respond correctly to our recommendations. He suggested that London might be a good place to go. I agree with him, but I would not discriminate against Paris, which is also a great place to go to.

Sir John Page drew our attention to expenditure on staff. He is correct to point out that this is a manpower organisation, which is why it is so important to be careful when combining manpower and operating costs. We should not let one element of the costs push out the other. We need more clarity in the presentation of the budget.

Sir John Page correctly mentioned the contribution by staff in the co-ordinated organisations to lower their salaries. That was greatly appreciated. As I said in the report, it was a contribution to help member governments to recover from the present economic crisis. That is appreciated in an international organisation where all civil servants share the suffering that the crisis brings.

I should like to thank the members for their comments. I take from their comments the fact that the committee is on the right track but should have a more aggressive approach to these

Mr. de Vries (continued)

matters. I hope that next year we shall be able to expand upon our findings and considerations and report on what has happened.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 983.

Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure as amended on 29th November 1982 if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does anyone wish to have a roll-call vote?...

As that is not the case, we will vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

5. Military use of space

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 976 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the military use of space and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 976 and amendments.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – It is an honour for me to present this report, which was agreed unanimously by the committee. It is the latest in a long line of reports on space matters presented to the Assembly. I have previously introduced two such reports, one on a European earth resources satellite system and the other on the future of European space activity.

It is appropriate that WEU should have taken such a consistent interest in space technology and its impact on strategy and military operation. Furthermore, the Assembly, and particularly the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, have kept in the closest touch with the European Space Agency and the development of its civil space programme.

My report is the first of two. The second is due to be presented to the Assembly in

1. See page 42.

December this year, after the committee's forthcoming visit to the United States. That report will deal in detail with the latest American military applications of space technology and their potential. The detailed analysis in the second report should be invaluable for an informed discussion on, for example, the proposals of the High Frontier Team on the one hand and, on the other, on the fears of those who are haunted by the spectre of horrendous expenditure on a star wars defence system.

Therefore, this debate is not the occasion for a detailed discussion of the merits or otherwise of President Reagan's strategic defence initiative, the possibilities of an effective layered defence system against ballistic missile attack, or whether directed energy weapons will soon be sufficiently developed to destroy satellites or even the warheads of ballistic missiles. Even so, the recent successful destruction at 100 nautical miles from its target of a Minuteman warhead by the United States must be significant.

I hope that by passing the report we can demonstrate our serious interest in these crucial topics, but we shall keep our powder dry until we can debate the detailed and more technical aspects in December. The report seeks to open the military uses of space to informed parliamentary and political discussion. Attitudes in Europe have varied from a desire not to know how much space technology is already transforming the conduct of military operations to an understandable antipathy to any apparent extension of the arms race to space. Serious and informed analysis of the military aspects of space technology is, unfortunately, a minority interest in Europe. However, WEU cannot afford to ignore the technical developments of the superpowers in space science and related applications. There is no doubt that both the United States of America and the URSS are investing huge defence appropriations in this area. The Soviet Union has perhaps been reducing the rate of increase of its expenditure on conventional defence, but there has been no reduction in its expenditure on offensive nuclear systems – particularly strategic systems – or on the military uses of space. As we have to coexist with the USSR in the continent of Europe, we cannot shut our minds to the possible consequences of military space developments for deterrence as a whole and for the European deterrents in particular.

We must see how we can effectively use WEU to make a thorough analysis of the military uses of space and how we should jointly respond to developments in this area and utilise European technical capability to enhance Western European security. First and foremost, we must use our influence as allies to bring about negotiations between the USSR and the United

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

States of America to prevent the deployment of offensive weapons systems in space. The nuclear arms race between the superpowers is alarming enough. If it were extended to space, it would undoubtedly be a grave development.

As usual, the problem in that aspect of arms control is that, as Mr. de Vries eloquently pointed out in a report presented earlier today, verification, particularly of Soviet systems, is difficult to secure. There are already clear signs that, through the development of large phased array radar, the USSR is circumventing the ABM treaty. This is not, however, in itself sufficient cause for the abandonment of the idea of further efforts to secure more effective arms control in space. On the contrary, those efforts must be intensified.

Secondly, there are good strategic reasons in favour of the development of the already promising European space programme, which has made satisfactory progress at a national level and, more importantly for our organisation, under the aegis of the European Space Agency. At present, as Article II of the ESA Convention - I refer the Assembly to Appendix II to the report - stipulates the promotion by ESA of space research and technology and their application to exclusively peaceful purposes, there is no mechanism for evolving a concerted European strategic space policy. That should be a rôle for the Council of WEU, as, to its credit, the Council has already recognised.

Clearly, Europe has formed a formidable space capability through the development of the Ariane launcher, the manned orbital module, Spacelab, as well as telecommunications and remote-sensing satellite systems. The United States, however, spends more than ten times as much as Western Europe on space technology, and more than half of its space budget comes from the Department of Defence. In Europe, military funding of space technology is negligible, and none is channelled through the ESA programmes. It is interesting and worth while to note - the report has spent some time on this matter - that at a national level the United Kingdom has built its Skynet series, of which Skynet IV is the latest, and that France is wholly dominant in boosters and ballistic missile technology and is keen to extend its remote-sensing capability, which has already been developed through the Spot programme, via the construction with Germany of a military surveillance satellite system.

Clearly, there is a strategic and industrial interest for ESA to pursue a follow-on space programme for the 1990s and beyond. The Council of WEU could concert a view on that programme. Ariane will have to be uprated to Ariane 4 status, and perhaps Ariane 5 will

eventually have to be certificated for manned launches. Our experience of manned launches through Spacelab should be further developed so that Europe can provide modular components for the projected NASA space programme, as was recently proposed by the NASA Administrator, Mr. Beggs, on his European tour to Western European nations and to ESA. The German and Italian project, Columbus, could be utilised for that purpose.

There is general agreement in informed circles in Western Europe that participation in a NASA space station by the Western Europeans could be the building block for the development in Western Europe of an autonomous capability to build a purely European space station, as envisaged by President Mitterrand in his futuristic speech at The Hague, which is referred to in Appendix I. Western Europe will then have to refine and improve its remote-sensing satellite capability, which was already developed by the ESA Meteosat programme, the processing of the United States Landsat and Seasat data and the construction of the CNES Spot and ESA-ERS 1 satellite surveillance systems.

Surveillance satellites are essential for confidence-building between nations for arms control verification and minimisation of the risk of surprise attack. We are, of course, all familiar with the initiative taken by France through the United Nations, for which my friend and colleague on the committee, Mr. Fourré, has worked so hard, for an international satellite monitoring agency.

We may well be able to rely on United States intelligence data in this matter, but we should not decry the initiative of President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl to build a Franco-German military surveillance satellite, although I hope that the project will be fully Europeanised and open to wider Western European consideration and participation.

Last, but not least, there is the long-term objective of a European manned space programme. The recent repair by a United States shuttle crew of a satellite in orbit showed the unique flexibility, intelligence, versatility and potential of man, as opposed to the robot, in space. If we Europeans, for industrial, commercial and arms control reasons, are to be involved in space station construction, we cannot ignore the need for a European reusable space transport system and appropriate modules to service the station. In that regard, we should actively examine the French mini-shuttle project, Hermes.

I return to the need to use the organs of WEU to evolve a forward-looking and realistic space strategy and to obviate the worst dangers of the military uses of space. In addition to recommendation 1 in that regard, I refer the Assembly

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

to recommendations 3, 4 and 5 especially. I urge in recommendation 3 a detailed analysis by the Standing Armaments Committee of the implications for European defence of developments in military space technology and, especially, Soviet research and development. We badly need to be advised on those matters.

I urge in recommendation 4 a study by our Agency for the Control of Armaments of how the data obtained through an international satellite system under the international satellite monitoring agency – if it ever gets off the ground – or Western European surveillance satellite data can be used for our overall security.

Recommendation 5 urges the dialogue to which I referred between the Council of WEU as a political body and the Council of ESA.

Since the whole purpose of our alliance and its triad of conventional tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear forces is to prevent war and to ensure peace, we should not ignore any possibilities in space technology to enhance overall deterrence and our overall joint security. Defence and deterrence have for long gone hand in hand. Effective and verifiable demilitarisation of space would enhance détente and contribute greatly to the reduction of tension between East and West. That is why the report emphasises above all the need for negotiations between superpowers about space. It emphasises that we in Western Europe should not close our minds to the ways in which space technology could help the western democracies to reduce their vulnerability to aggression and to evolve a more open, trusting, and frank relationship with our neighbours in this continent – the Soviet Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I congratulate you on your report, Mr. Wilkinson, and on the habitual seriousness of your presentation, particularly bearing in mind the extremely important issues with which it deals.

The first speaker in the debate is Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate my colleague, John Wilkinson, on a first-class document, perhaps a little too technical for some of us but nevertheless a revealing picture of how he sees not only WEU but the space movement, and future progress in space. I was in committee with him when the first initiative came from President Mitterrand to involve WEU more and more in European defence. I said to the Rapporteur at that time that in this document we should emphasise that WEU, as one of the institutional networks of European defence, should be firmly planted in the minds of all those who read this document. I am pleased to note that in a new paragraph (x) the Rapporteur agreed to give the following wording, which I feel is self-explanatory, of the

position we face in this institution at this time :

“ Confident that WEU can offer a valuable forum for debate about and analysis of the implications for the defence of Western Europe of the latest military space technologies as well as an institutional framework... ”

I say this in the light of a debate in the United States Senate yesterday led by a United States senator from Georgia who obviously will be getting pressures from his own constituents and who said that the United States was spending far too much on European defence. He was calling for a reduction of over 90,000 troops in Europe over a period, to be accompanied, of course, by a correspondingly smaller budget to help Western European defence. It is probably wrong-ended for him to look at Western European defence as an onerous responsibility because, if he can think of it only in these terms, we shall be in the front line. We shall be the first area of land-mass to take the full brunt of any possible warfare, and the United States – and through President Reagan I am sure they recognise this – must support Europe simply because by supporting NATO it will be supporting its own final defence.

In the document itself it is made categorically clear – and I am grateful to the Rapporteur for pointing this out – that it is only too obvious that, if there were to be an outbreak of hostilities, these communications satellites, the whole of the satellite system, would be one of the first victims. There is the protection of our own satellites, whether it is protecting them by being able to repair the damage quickly, or being able to send more satellites into space as soon as those destroyed are taken out of the communications and military use sphere. These are the great problems not only for NATO but for Western European Union. Further studies will have to be made. There is to be a promising visit to the United States in a few weeks and I am sure that we can then go into greater depth about the future of satellite protection rather than just satellites in orbit.

I am sure that the Rapporteur and many others who think like myself will bring forward this subject in another document in the not too distant future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I can again be brief. Perhaps others could follow my example, because I am interested in hearing Mr. Antretter's presentation this morning.

To refer to just one aspect: the fact that the United States spends ten times as much on space research and space flight, as Mr. Wilkinson has said, should not be a yardstick for us. The Europeans should follow their own line by first

Mr. Vogt (continued)

examining their real needs. I would call this the "sovereignty of needs". It would be disastrous to be guided by the superpowers, because sooner or later this would result in Europe itself becoming a superpower simply because it was using the wrong yardstick. There are so many problems to be solved in Europe – the whole problem of environmental pollution, for example – that we should devote all our energy to solving them.

I have pointed out on several occasions that we have not made sufficient progress towards disarmament. We should therefore concentrate first on making progress in this area, focusing all our intelligence, resources, strengths, imagination, political good will and so forth on overcoming these problems, rather than flying straight up and out into space. There is something escapist about that.

I sympathise with the concern expressed by the Rapporteur over a possible European inadequacy as regards surveillance in space. I think this is a real dilemma. But the Europeans should make it clear that they have no interest in the use of space for military and strategic purposes. This might perhaps be emphasised more strongly. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – The exploration and use of outer space is in the line of historical development and even affects us all in our everyday life. I imagine that everyone sitting in this chamber has, at some time or other, in primary school, written down his name and address, giving the street, town, province, country, continent and, finally, the universe. In so doing we were aware, in our own way, of the step-by-step exploration and use of space. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that the exploration and conquest of space are the history of mankind, or, conversely: the history of mankind is the exploration and conquest of space. The poetic figure of Atlas is an example of this from antiquity; the Middle Ages had their "better" worlds in the Utopia of the "Sun states"; and Cyrano de Bergerac was probably the last person to "explore" space without a technological frame of reference. Jules Verne tried to incorporate the new possibilities opened up by modern technology in his literary vision.

However, in the second half of the twentieth century technological developments have surpassed the imagination. At this moment in history there is a real danger that uncontrolled military use of outer space could throw the world back into the stone age. To avoid the danger, disciplines other than military techno-

logy alone must be adduced vis-à-vis the exploration and conquest of space. For these reasons, Mr. Garrett and I have tabled an amendment pointing out the need for more detailed knowledge of these and related military space problems and for political control over these measures and their results. We hardly have the earth completely under control – think of the trouble it took to agree on the law of the sea – and a law of space will be indispensable at some stage. The custom dictating that the first to plant a flag somewhere had rights over the place has of course long fallen into desuetude. We should not allow ourselves to be tempted, for fear of being left behind or overtaken by other nations, into decisions that we have not fully considered in advance.

Before accepting everything in Mr. Wilkinson's recommendations, we must consider where these developments can and ought to lead, and how they fit into the general future of humanity. That is why I have tabled Amendment 4, Mr. President, and I understand that the Rapporteur is inclined to accept it. The committee should look at this matter more closely, and an order to that effect has been tabled through the appropriate channels.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – May I begin by congratulating Mr. Wilkinson on his excellent report. We are becoming accustomed to seeing him produce such excellent work. I would also ask him to forgive me for having missed the last committee meeting and having to table some amendments in plenary sitting.

I have asked to speak on this report because I think it is more important than ever to discuss the problems of the military use of space.

Not that the interest of nations in the military use of space is something new: numerous assessments of the impact of the advent of the space era on defence strategies have been carried out by national and international organisations, including this Assembly.

But today it is a burning issue. Things have speeded up, particularly since President Reagan's speech on 26th March 1983, the so-called star wars speech, and there has been a recent proliferation of very significant developments. The United States has just decided to invest \$2.6 billion in the development of a four-level interception system. The USSR is also equipping itself with an anti-missile defence system and, from 1975 onwards, will possess killer satellites. At European level we are witnessing a realisation of the fact that space has not only civil but also military potential, a realisation vigorously expressed on 8th February last at The Hague, when President Mitterrand

Mr. Fourré (continued)

launched the idea of a European space community, and by the recent decision to support the cryogenic engine project. On 10th June the Americans successfully carried out the first interception in space of a ballistic missile by another missile.

This raises many questions.

All these developments are connected. We need to analyse their implications for international peace, the disarmament process and arms control, the concept of deterrence, which is the basis of our defence strategy, the Europe-United States linkage and the possibilities of European and international co-operation. All these questions are of course already posed by our present armaments systems, but recent developments make them doubly important.

Permit me at the present stage, in a situation where everything is connected, everything is new and everything is problematic, where all our hopes and anxieties seem equally justifiable, to share with you both my certainties and my fears.

I begin with the certainties. There is a kind of military use of space which is a good thing and should be encouraged. I am referring to all those systems which serve to improve knowledge and the transmission of information: communication satellites, military observation satellites and navigation satellites. Such systems strengthen deterrence by making it possible to spot any threat efficiently, and – looking to the future – they can above all be of help in verifying the application of disarmament agreements by detecting violations, increasing the risk of detection and thereby deterring the parties from committing violations and providing the proof that an agreement is indeed being adhered to, thus strengthening mutual trust between the parties and creating conditions favourable to further progress on disarmament.

This has several implications.

At European level we should encourage research into technologies linked with information satellites and support the resulting decisions. This means, for example, encouraging national programmes – British Skynet and French Samro – and bilateral agreements – Mr. Wilkinson mentioned this a short while ago in connection with the recent Franco-German project for the production of a control satellite – and, above all, serious consideration of President Mitterrand's proposal for a European space station – a completely new idea whose methods and procedures remain to be seen.

Such a project would, like its American counterpart, doubtless have civilian aims to be achieved by the pooling of the industrial technology of tomorrow. It could doubtless also have

military aims which, in the present state of European strategic military conceptions, would be limited to observation and the transmission of military data.

Nor is it inconceivable that such a station could be equipped with the necessary technological facilities to verify the confidence-building measures now being worked out at the Stockholm conference and the disarmament measures that will perhaps be decided on during the second stage of the negotiations.

The operational aspects of such a station of course remain to be determined. Here, the discussion is open. Insofar as it had civilian aims, like the American project, the European Space Agency would necessarily be involved. Insofar as the station carried out military activities, WEU – and, more specifically, its Agency for the Control of Armaments – ought to be involved, as the only European organisation entitled to deal with defence matters. That is why I have tabled an amendment to make paragraph 4 of the recommendation more specific in this respect.

In the same spirit, at international level, support should be given to the United Nations project for the establishment of an international control satellite agency, a project, I would remind you, initiated in part by France, which tabled a memorandum at the United Nations General Assembly extraordinary session on disarmament in June 1978. This proposal was taken into account, and the United Nations General Assembly commissioned a study of the technical, legal and financial implications of the establishment of an international control satellite agency which was submitted in 1983. I therefore believe it would be easy to reach consensus on the need to develop satellites to strengthen controls and co-operation in the maintenance of peace.

We are, however, aware of the reticence of the United States and the Soviet Union, and are therefore taking steps to determine the precise technical and financial resources required for European and international co-operation in this domain.

As to President Reagan's proposal to build a manned space station and the invitation addressed in particular to the European countries, our attitude should be dictated by the certainty – which I have just expressed – that international co-operation is indispensable. It should, however, also be conditioned by the need to safeguard European interests. Co-operation on the American station should not be allowed to undermine strictly European projects and the technical and legal conditions of such co-operation should be negotiated in such a way as to permit Europe to derive real benefit from the technological progress resulting from exploi-

Mr. Fourré (continued)

tation of the station in the near and distant future.

We must avoid repeating our experience with co-operation on Spacelab, which all of us know was unfairly tilted in favour of the United States.

I come now to my anxieties. There is a more serious aspect to the military use of space about which our countries are all equally worried. I refer, of course, to what is commonly known as star wars or the age of the hedgehog, based on the idea that, instead of striving for weapons superiority, the superpowers will try to be the best defended against any attack.

The report rightly stresses the Soviet threat. It is true that the USSR is carrying out a large number of military launches and is said already to possess killer satellites. But should we not be equally worried about the American programmes?

In my opinion this does not mean opposition to NATO. I would like to endorse what President Mitterrand said at The Hague on the subject of European defence when he declared that "given the present state of affairs, Europe is divided between the kind of security that exists and the kind of security that it hopes to see". The Atlantic Alliance is not about to be supplanted by a European alliance, if only because no other military force can replace the American arsenal.

Nevertheless, in view of the star wars syndrome, prudence is obviously called for. I have therefore tabled an amendment adding to paragraph 3 of the recommendation accordingly.

What is the crux of the matter? The proponents of the system of anti-ballistic and anti-satellite weapons argue as follows: (i) the deployment of a defence against anti-ballistic missiles would remove the nuclear threat and facilitate the change to a purely defensive posture founded not on the doctrine of mutual destruction but on that of mutually assured survival; (ii) anti-ballistic defence would strengthen deterrence by introducing an additional element of uncertainty to the adversary's plans; (iii) the reduced effectiveness of intercontinental ballistic missiles would facilitate negotiations on their reduction and abolition; (iv) there would be a strengthening of the United States link with its allies, because the United States would be even more willing to intervene. Finally, the elaboration of such a programme by the Americans is justified by the simple fact that the Soviet Union is doing the same thing.

Those who, on the contrary, condemn this approach base their arguments on the following points: (i) most of the deterrent effect of nuclear

weapons would be lost; (ii) the expansion of offensive weapons programmes would continue because of the need to counter the anti-ballistic systems. A former colonel in the American air force, Mr. Bowman, has vividly conjured up an image of laser stations facing each other in space and capable of destroying each other at the speed of light; (iii) given that anti-ballistic missiles would not be a hundred per cent efficient, the system would give rise to a dangerous increase in the number of missiles; (iv) above all, for Europeans, the removal of nuclear weapons would increase the risk of conventional war in Europe.

At the Geneva conference on disarmament, on the morning after the successful American interception, France expressed through its Ambassador, Mr. de La Gorce, our fears about this new strategy: "In trying to make its territory totally invulnerable, without any guarantee of success, each of the two powers will be tempted to make a pre-emptive strike against the anti-ballistic systems of the other and to increase non-ballistic weapons, particularly cruise missiles." Anti-ballistic and anti-satellite weapons are destabilising, especially because, being automatic, they are likely to escape final political control.

For that reason the French representative proposed genuine multilateral negotiations with a view to placing properly controlled restrictions on the new anti-ballistic technologies. He added that international efforts should be concerted towards "prohibition of missiles capable of hitting satellites in high orbit, the safety of which is most important for strategic balance, and the banning, for renewable periods of five years, of directional energy systems."

This is a very recent development. France has reacted, as have other member states. But we have to reflect jointly on this new challenge and make ourselves heard with a single voice. That is why I personally approve the proposal to ask the Standing Armaments Committee to carry out a detailed analysis of the implications of the new technologies applied by the USSR and also - as I would remind you - by the United States.

Those are the points I wanted to make. I am happy that Europe, through the discussions here today in this chamber and outside, is jointly reflecting on such burning and decisive issues.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Thorne.

Mr. THORNE (*United Kingdom*). - The report is not, unfortunately, headed "Peace in the space age"; it is headed "Military use of space". It is a recipe for an extension of the arms race. To consider spending several thousand million pounds is an obscenity considering the problem faced by people in Eritrea,

Mr. Thorne (continued)

Ethiopia, Peru, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Africa, Latin America and elsewhere, where millions are starving or dying with little or no prospect of improvement in their rudimentary lives. There is nothing within this report that would seek to change the basic position and conditions in the third world. The continued failure of western civilisations to attend to the problem of the third world is a contribution that our children and their children will live to regret for many years.

Between four and five million people are unemployed in the United Kingdom. We face lower living standards. No production for peaceful purposes is envisaged in, or could arise from, the report. It in no way seeks to meet the needs of the peoples in Europe. The report and the use of resources that would follow its acceptance do nothing to alleviate Britain's and Europe's social, economic and political problems. That is why I tabled Amendment 1. Recommendation 1 is the only recommendation of value in the report. It urges governments to secure negotiations between the United States and the USSR to prevent the military use of space. I hope that there will be those in this Assembly – I am not unduly optimistic – who will find it possible to support Amendment 1.

I have been deliberately brief because it seems to me that the previous speaker was the opposite.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate my parliamentary colleague, Mr. Wilkinson, on the manner of his presentation of the report, although I cannot accept happily any or all of his conclusions. There can be no doubt, as my friend, Mr. Thorne has just said, that both sides of the iron curtain – the United States of America and the USSR – are spending enormous amounts in space.

The report talks about the need for a deterrence in space. That smacks of the nuclear and non-nuclear arms race, because exactly the same arguments are used.

The United States spends ten times the amount that Western Europe spends on space. Half is funded by the Pentagon. When the Pentagon funds measures to the extent that it does, there can be no suggestion that it is for peaceful application. The Pentagon is seeking a military application. I should have liked to think that we could have a report concentrating much more on the need to bring under control the obscenity of spending such sums with a world in its present state.

With 20% unemployment in my constituency of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, my constituents are not likely to be queuing at the offices of the European space travel agency to book holidays on the moon or the beautiful fringes of Jupiter or Mars. Indeed, even a week at Skegness, Whitely Bay or Scarborough becomes increasingly difficult for many of them to contemplate.

We could all spend much time talking about the deprivation being suffered by the four million unemployed in the United Kingdom and the fourteen million unemployed in the EEC, but in terms of human suffering our problems are minimal compared with those of the underdeveloped world. I understand that in India five kids die every three minutes because of contamination of water supplies. Such statistics could be multiplied throughout the world and it is nothing less than a complete and utter obscenity to spend countless millions on what is no more than another military adventure.

Sooner, or later, the world – East and West – must understand that if we are to live together, rather than die together, we must talk of reducing the appalling sums that we spend on military applications. If we diverted even a small portion of the enormous arms expenditure of the West into filling the hungry bellies of underdeveloped nations, we should make a much greater contribution to world peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to congratulate Mr. Wilkinson on this report. Events moved rapidly last year, but the various statements and recommendations the report contains could enable us to find a joint European response just in time.

Not being an expert in this field, I cannot appraise all the details of this report, but I would emphasise that the amendments, all of which I welcome except Amendment 1, which goes too far in my opinion in seeking the deletion of paragraphs 2 to 9, make useful suggestions for additions to paragraphs 1 to 9, with the object of making it quite clear, firstly, that the Europeans want space to be used for peaceful purposes only, secondly, that they want to prevent a military arms race in space and, thirdly, that we want to be less dependent on others for information. In other words, we need our own sources of information, and I should like to link this to the requirements of an arms control policy.

In Stockholm we are at present discussing confidence-building measures in the conventional sector at the conference on confidence-building measures and disarmament in Europe. But the advanced technology of the nuclear delivery systems which the East and West are

Mr. Scheer (continued)

aiming at each other has now reduced the early-warning period to less than ten minutes in some cases. This means that, if confidence-building measures are to be effective and produce something of benefit to us, as they should and must, they must be extended to include the nuclear sector, because it is almost grotesque that we should be talking about being able to recognise military preparations in the conventional sector a few days earlier than before – though this too is admittedly necessary – when all we have is minutes in the case of nuclear weapons. As we in Europe cannot decide on our own how rapidly progress can be made in nuclear arms control and disarmament, because the two world powers bear the main responsibility in this respect and without them no real progress can be made, Europe urgently needs its own sources of information to enable it to undertake confidence-building measures in Europe without having to rely on the superpowers for all the necessary information. This means that Europe must independently give priority in its policy on technology to the peaceful use of technology, taking due account of Europe's peculiarly ambivalent position in the military sector and without being party to the military use of space. On the contrary, we should curb any such tendency and try to guide such activities along reasonable channels.

In future we should discuss – and I therefore consider paragraph (x) of the preamble particularly important – whether Mr. Wilkinson's proposals concerning the institutional framework will have the required effect. I hope that further advantage will be taken of ESA's experience in the peaceful use of space, and that a WEU institution can actually take on the task proposed in paragraph 110 of the report. If that could be achieved, it would probably be the most important institution ever to be produced by WEU in its thirty-year history, and it would be worth the trouble.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I thank those who have contributed to this useful and important debate.

Mr. Vogt rightly set before us the almost metaphysical dilemma posed by this subject. He mentioned in particular the dilemma over surveillance satellite systems; are they, as I believe them potentially to be and hope that they will always be, instruments for the reduction of tension and the elimination of the risk of surprise attack and, therefore, a way of diminishing the chance of war, or are they yet another military dimension of the arms race?

I assure Mr. Vogt that the emphasis in the report is on using surveillance satellite systems and developing them in a European framework to enhance confidence-building measures and to improve relationships between East and West. I think that Mr. Vogt understands that that is the purpose behind the recommendations.

Mr. Tummers, in a thoughtful contribution, set our discussion in its historical and philosophical context. He was courteous enough to tell me about Amendment 4, which he and Mr. Garrett have tabled, and he was right to stress that mankind is on the threshold of a new age – the space age, as Mr. Thorne rightly described it.

That poses new challenges for us. We must consider the point that civilisation as we know it should be enhanced and improved by man's technical development of space technology. Mr. Tummers was right to warn us, yet again, of the nightmare that faces us all that the arms race – it is sufficiently grave and horrendous – in nuclear, let alone chemical and biological weapons, might be extended to space. I believe that he wishes – I support the wish – that we were better informed about all these matters. When I discuss the amendments, I shall say how much I welcome his suggestion that, before we fully consider the recommendations on space by the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments, we should have a chance to debate in a somewhat academic, but informative, context the implications of space technology for European defence. I should hope that we can do that in the symposium which the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions hopes to organise in Munich next year.

Mr. Thorne was understandably emotional about a range of issues. He reminded us of the starving millions around the world. It is a sad and sorry fact that two-thirds of the inhabitants of our planet are undernourished. He regarded it as an obscenity that we, the Europeans, should be contemplating spending millions which should be spent on alleviating suffering, undernourishment, famine and hunger, especially in the third world.

That is true, but it has always been the case that man has a great potential for evil as well as good. By removing, as Mr. Thorne intends to do in his amendment by deleting paragraphs 2 to 9, the meat of the report, he will not eliminate the fact that peoples in, for example, the USSR have at their disposal military instruments for space which are of great consequence to the preservation of our way of life and which could have a dramatic impact on the security balance between East and West. It would, therefore, be irresponsible of us to ignore a study of the poten-

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

tial impact of western security on space developments. The report suggests that we address ourselves to that challenge rationally and thoughtfully and that we think the matter through.

I do not advocate massive expenditure by Europe on a military space programme. I advocate a serious study by Europe of the implications for defence and strategy of the military uses of space. First and foremost – I have repeated this clearly – we call for negotiations between the superpowers to bring under control any possibility of an extension of the arms race to space.

Bob Brown's speech was along similar lines. I want as much as he does to see unemployment reduced. I wholly share his desire to see poverty, famine and hunger eliminated, but, paradoxically, I do not believe that helping technical developments – that may, incidentally, have a military application – will necessarily alleviate unemployment or cure poverty. The development of, for example, earth resource satellite systems has been of incalculable benefit to the third world providing for the better management of resources, the development of agriculture and fisheries, the better use of land, the prevention of erosion, and so on. If the western countries had not pursued the use of remote-sensing satellite systems, the third world would have been further impoverished. Likewise, the development of meteorological satellites has been of great consequence in alleviating drought and warning of hurricanes, typhoons and similar natural disasters that afflict especially the third world.

As with almost everything in life, technological development in space has a potential for military as well as civil use. We wish to maximise the civil potential, we should not ignore the military potential. An active space programme has a major impact on jobs. One has only to travel the United States visiting particular cities in the south and west, including California, to observe how the space-related industries have mushroomed and created tens of thousands of new jobs.

Mr. Scheer has rightly said that the Thorne amendment to delete the heart of the report was not a sound basis upon which to proceed. I am glad of his support for other amendments. I share with him the desire to see peaceful uses of space.

I was especially interested in what Mr. Scheer said about developing a purely European reconnaissance capability. I believe that to be essential and that the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and the French President were right to address themselves to that matter

and to suggest creating a purely European system.

When looking at, for example, the negotiations in Stockholm and at our predicament in Europe, because we are adjacent to the greatest threat – the Soviet Union – in facing an attack from delivery systems with a short range and short flight time, the arms control implications of surveillance satellites and confidence-building implications are so important that we should develop our own system. I am glad that that suggestion was made. I share Mr. Scheer's feelings about the institutional framework – the European Space Agency should be utilised to the full in the civil sector and the strategic implications are a matter for the Council of WEU.

Mr. Fourré, who, as usual, was kind and generous in his remarks, was eloquent, because this is very much his subject. I know how hard he has worked. He raised extremely big issues to which we shall revert in subsequent debates on this subject. He referred to whether the evolution of anti-ballistic missile defence, if it proves technically possible, would have a decoupling effect between the European and the American proponents of the alliance. He referred to whether that process would lead to a multiplication of offensive systems to obviate the effectiveness of defence, or to the contrary – I hope that this is true – to a greater desire on the part of the superpowers to come to the negotiating table and reduce the number of offensive arms.

Mr. Scheer raised what is for Europe perhaps the most important issue of all – a European space station. I am glad that in that context he addressed himself also to the possibility of European participation in the NASA space station. He was right to warn us of the example of Skylab. The Germans especially made a huge investment and did not receive a commensurate return. We need to ensure that European interests are safeguarded if we participate in the development of the American space stations.

Finally, I address myself to the first speech, which I thought particularly important and worthy and which I greatly welcomed, the speech of James Hill, who is to be a Rapporteur for our forthcoming American visit. He brought home to all of us the dramatic importance to defence as a whole of the strategy that space developments are bound to bring. It is a big subject and he did not seek in any way to minimise it. I hope very much that we have begun what could be a useful part in Western European Union's revivification by using the organs of this institution to the full to enable us to assess the implications for European defence of space technology, to assess the implications for arms control of space technology and, above all, to construct a European space strategy,

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

because we know that, useful as our individual contributions as nations may be, it is only by working together that we shall make progress and bring about important and significant achievements.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bassinet, Vice-Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – May I first of all apologise on behalf of Mr. Lenzer, Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, for his absence and, on his behalf and that of all the members of his committee, emphasise the amount of work put in by our Rapporteur. As usual, Mr. Wilkinson has carried out his task meticulously; his presentation was a model of clarity and everything he said had been scrupulously checked.

Mr. Wilkinson has accomplished to perfection the task of reporting on the military use of space, or at least the first stage of this task. He has taken stock of the strategic and industrial implications of space potential and outlined future or conceivable prospects. I need say no more.

Let me just remind you that the draft recommendation was approved by the committee unanimously. I appreciate that members' right of amendment is inviolable, but I am sometimes surprised to see amendments tabled that completely call into question the draft recommendation itself. Amendments that enrich the draft are of course to be welcomed. But when I see an amendment that aims, at a stroke of the pen, to delete almost every paragraph, I am really surprised – particularly when the amendment in question concerns a draft recommendation that – I repeat – was adopted unanimously in committee. That is all I wish to say on behalf of the committee, and I congratulate Mr. Wilkinson on his work.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before proceeding to vote on the draft recommendation we have to consider seven amendments.

I would remind you that we agreed on what seems to me a sensible rule in limiting speaking time in the debates to seven minutes, but I would strongly urge speakers on the amendments to stay within a maximum limit of three minutes. Thank you in advance.

Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Thorne and Mr. Edwards, reads as follows:

1. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraphs 2 to 9.

I call Mr. Thorne to speak in support of the amendment.

Mr. THORNE (*United Kingdom*). – I formally move the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?

What is the committee's view?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I think that all representatives in the Assembly realise, to be honest, that Mr. Thorne's amendment is what we call a wrecking amendment. It would undo weeks of conscientious work, not particularly by your Rapporteur but by the committee secretary and all the members of the committee who want the Assembly seriously to address themselves to what is bound to be an important subject.

We are due to go to the United States. We shall meet members of the United States Congress on our visit. We shall meet officials from government and from the armed forces, and we shall meet industrialists. If we go with a one-paragraph recommendation in our hands, I do not believe that, European parliamentarians as we are, we should be taken seriously, and that is not the kind of fate that I want to befall members of this Assembly on an important investigative mission.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

Amendment 7, tabled by Mr. Fourné, reads as follows:

7. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“Demand a larger European industrial involvement in telecommunications satellites and in military satellite programmes pursued at international level as well as in the associated ground station infrastructure, in addition to supporting existing national military communications satellites like Skynet and Samro;”.

I call Mr. Fourné to speak in support of his amendment.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this amendment has two aims: first, to ensure that the broad European industrial participation which is being sought is not limited to NATO; second, to support the national military communications satellites that already exist, such as Skynet and Samro.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?

What is the committee's view?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I am always keen to defer to Mr. Fourné's judg-

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

ment in the drafting, but in this instance, I regret to say, it is deficient because, for example, the Samro project is now dead and has been formally abandoned. While I naturally welcome the fact that he mentions Skynet, and obviously one wants a larger European industrial involvement, the particular paragraph 2 was drafted in the way we see it in the original text for a specific purpose. When the committee secretary and I went around European firms that are active in space development, they were unanimous, from whichever country they came, that the present system of procurement of NATO communications satellites was discriminatory in that European industrial companies as a whole did not get what they regarded as a fair share of the work to which they were rightly entitled in NATO programmes.

That is why I mention NATO. That was not done particularly to give emphasis to NATO as such, or anything of that kind, but to try to ensure that industrial companies in Europe had their rightful share, which they were technically deserving of obtaining, in the telecommunications satellite programme that NATO is initiating. The Samro project has not been pursued for some time now and, much as I appreciate the intention behind Mr. Fourré's amendment, I would not for those rather technical reasons wish to adopt it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 7 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 7 is negated.

Amendment 5, tabled by Mr. Fourré, reads as follows:

5. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, after "Soviet" add "and United States".

I call Mr. Fourré to move his amendment.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President I shall not detail the reasons for this amendment, as I have already indicated them in my speech. I would simply point out – as the amendment makes clear – that I think it important for the Standing Armaments Committee to look into everything being done in the field of space technology, both in the Soviet Union and in the United States.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?

What is the committee's view?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I am happy to accept the amendment. It is entirely right. It adds balance to the paragraph. As

Mr. Fourré said, there are implications for European defence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 5 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is agreed to.

Amendment 6, tabled by Mr. Fourré, reads as follows:

6. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

"and in the light of this study examine what tasks might be entrusted to the Agency for the Control of Armaments with a view to participating in verification that these measures are being respected".

I call Mr. Fourré to move his amendment.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – I also explained the reasons for this amendment in my speech. We support a draft effectively linked with arms control, as carried out by the International Agency for Control Satellites.

Various measures are needed at European level. It is now generally accepted that the European Space Agency has a part to play. However, since military problems are involved, the Agency for the Control of Armaments could also be usefully involved in verifying that such measures are being respected, apart from any studies which might have to be carried out.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?

What is the committee's view?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I am happy to accept the amendment. It strengthens the paragraph. Mr. Fourré is absolutely right to remind us that it is necessary for our Council to examine this study to see what task could properly be entrusted to the Agency.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 6 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 6 is agreed to.

Amendment 2, tabled by Mr. Hardy, reads as follows:

2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out:

"appropriate for the formulation of Western European security policy".

I call Mr. Brown to speak in support of the amendment.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to move the amendment on behalf of my colleague,

Mr. Brown (continued)

Mr. Hardy. It is linked with Amendment 3, both reporting the civil and peaceful utilisation of space.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?

What is the committee's view?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I cannot accept the amendment. It is an exceedingly important matter for our Council, which has the task of assessing the potential of technical developments in space for the evolution of European strategy and for European security, too. It is most important that it should know what purely civil technical developments can have a military implication. If there is no mechanism for the Council of WEU to be informed about, for example, ESA's development of booster rockets, guidance systems, and so on, I think that it would be gravely hampered in its work. That is something that no member of this Assembly would wish. I therefore urge the Assembly to reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

Amendment 3, tabled by Mr. Hardy, reads as follows:

3. In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "to utilise" and insert "for the civil and peaceful utilisation of".

I call Mr. Brown to speak in support of the amendment.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – I move it formally.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?

What is the committee's view?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I must again ask the Assembly to vote against the amendment. We all hope earnestly that the NASA space station will be primarily used for peaceful purposes. However, we should be deluding ourselves if we did not recognise that it will have military implications. Those implications are twofold. One is in telecommunications and the other is to do with confidence-building in the surveillance potential of the system. If we are keen to maximise deterrence, to prevent the risk of sudden attack, to enhance our security and to diminish the chances of aggression against our democracies, we should be foolish not to recognise that such a station is

bound to have a military potential. Were that not the case President Mitterrand would not have made at The Hague the speech that he did about the military space station in a European context. I can therefore understand the motivation behind the amendment, but it would weaken paragraph 8 if we accepted the amendment and, therefore, I urge the Assembly to reject it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Bianco has the floor on a point of order.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to ask whether, when the Rapporteur takes an understanding view of an amendment, the proposer can be asked if he is prepared to withdraw it before the vote is taken. The amendment would then not be rejected and the question would remain open. I think therefore that, before we vote, the proposer might be asked whether he is prepared to withdraw his amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Bianco, your point is a very important one. However, the accepted practice is that the initiative for the withdrawal of an amendment is left to the author himself, unless the request is put by a member of the Assembly or, particularly – as is the case here – by the committee. The chair does not have the right of initiative in this matter.

The absence of the author of the amendment from the chamber is not in itself sufficient reason for the chair to request withdrawal of the amendment, as it is also the custom that, if the author himself is absent, one of his colleagues, usually belonging to the same political group, moves it on his behalf.

This procedure has, so far, never been challenged. However, if you so wish, we shall look into this matter in the course of the review of the Assembly's Rules of Procedure, when we shall have plenty of time to discuss it.

I now put Amendment 3 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

Amendment 4, tabled by Mr. Tummers and Mr. Garrett, reads as follows:

4. In the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph 10 as follows:

"10. Postpone reaching decisions on the results of the analysis by the Standing Armaments Committee, the study by the Agency for the Control of Armaments and on the other abovementioned measures until the Assembly has had an opportunity to gain detailed knowledge about these and related military space problems through a broad-based symposium

The President (continued)

sium on the possibilities and desirability of the use of outer space for military purposes.”

I call Mr. Tummers to speak in support of the amendment.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*). – I move the amendment. I intervened during the debate on the case for the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?

What is the committee's view?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I am extremely happy to accept this most excellent recommendation. All of us in the Assembly, in our debate yesterday and previously, have expressed the wish that we should be apprised of the deliberations of the Standing Armaments Committee and of the Agency for the Control of Armaments so that we may work in the fullest co-operation with all the organs and institutions of WEU. It is a timely suggestion. The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions had it in mind to organise a symposium in Munich next year. We thought that it might be on the new European fighter aircraft, but I now think a more appropriate subject would be that addressed by the amendment. Of course, it would be for the Assembly and not for me to lay down the subjects of future symposia.

This is an excellent amendment. I welcome it wholeheartedly. I should like to thank all the members of the Assembly and the officers, Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Bassinet, members of our committee and, above all, the secretary of our committee, Mr. Huigens, who have brought our work to fruition. I should like to thank them, and Mr. Tummers and Mr. Garrett for their amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 4 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 976 as amended.

Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Do any five members present request a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case. We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I request the floor for an explanation of vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You have the floor, Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would have liked to abstain, but Mr. Wilkinson's attitude towards the amendments reveals a kind of double-think that is typical of Western Europeans: they always pretend they only want to pursue a peaceful policy, but they always have one reservation: that there is no alternative, when others make progress in certain areas. In this case, they are initiating a development which at first glance appears to have peaceful intentions, in terms of disarmament and also verification, but – particularly if the rapid advances in such armaments are considered – is bound to result in participation in the arms build-up in space.

If you want to know how another superpower fared, I recommend you to read Barbara Tuchman's "The Proud Tower". It shows how the United States originally wanted to adopt a democratic and peaceful position. Its development – partly due, of course, to new technologies – into the frightening and universally dangerous superpower that it now is, began with its involvement in the Mexican war, if not earlier.

If the Europeans fail to realise in time that they are pursuing a dangerous double strategy which will one day become uncontrollable, they will inevitably turn themselves into a military superpower. I am sorry, Mr. Wilkinson, but even you, despite your scrupulous and cautious approach, will have played your part in this.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I asked for the floor at the same time as Mr. Vogt to explain my vote but I was not called.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martino for an explanation of vote.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I have to admit, Mr. President, that the fact of being a new member is a genuine handicap when it comes to addressing any assembly. The European spirit which informs us here is certainly a link enabling this handicap to be overcome fairly quickly. And it is thanks to this spirit that I am speaking, not for the first

¹. See page 43.

Mr. Martino (continued)

time, in the certainty that contributions to the debate on subjects such as this one are always useful if not essential. This is true. I should have liked to present two amendments to the draft recommendation but am still shy as a new member. In particular, I should have liked to stress and recall, with a mixture of pride and modesty, what Italy has achieved in the aerospace field. I should have liked to add a clause to the preamble worded as follows: "Convinced that space technology can provide ample opportunities for peaceful industrial uses" as is already the case in the United States with the production of high-quality pharmaceutical products. And I should have liked to finish with a consequential further amendment recommending the Council "to call on the member countries of WEU to give preference in programmes to such working options which, subject to the essential strategic options for defence, could be used or converted for peaceful industrial purposes".

I voted for Mr. Hardy's Amendment 3 and I would have been satisfied with the bare and essential – and slightly ambiguous – wording of an idea, which in general implies what I myself would have asked.

I shall postpone until the December session a more precise and fuller statement on the subject; for the moment I am wholly in favour of the report submitted by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

6. Military use of space

(Motion for an order, Doc. 984)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have received from Mr. Tummers a motion for an order tabled under Rule 30, Document 984.

Since we have relatively little time left, I think this document should be referred to the Presidential Committee, which will be meeting at the beginning of this afternoon and is empowered to take decisions on behalf of the Assembly between sessions.

Ladies and Gentlemen, do you agree that we should refer Mr. Tummers's motion to the Presidential Committee?

Mr. Tummers, do you agree with this decision?

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Yes, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – It is therefore agreed.

7. Action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on the standardisation and production of armaments

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 977)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments on action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on the standardisation and production of armaments, Document 977.

I call Mr. Antretter, Rapporteur.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in view of the time constraints I shall attempt to summarise the essence of the report in such a way as to confine myself to only the most important points that need to be made by way of elucidation.

I must, however, begin by expressing my warmest thanks to all the members of the committee, because the material in this report is so complex that your Rapporteur could never have coped with it alone. Enquiries had to be conducted in all the parliaments, and all the initiatives had to be looked at. This was possible only because I had the outstanding and loyal support of all the members of the committee.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe we all agree that one of our major tasks is to ensure that Assembly initiatives and recommendations are examined in the national parliaments and transmitted to governments. The aim should be to influence Council decisions in accordance with Assembly recommendations. This task is particularly important at a time when we are all striving to improve the effectiveness of Western European Union.

The purpose of this report is, then, to examine the action taken by member countries on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly, taking as an example the standardisation and production of armaments.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to save you five or six minutes' debate by explaining the four main headings under which the report is arranged, so as to facilitate the discussion. In order to supply all the data which served as the basis for my conclusions, I decided on the following methodology. Chapter III gives the wording of the operative text of each recommendation. The recommendation is then followed by the complete text of the corresponding reply of the Council and a brief summary of both documents. Each reply of the Council is

Mr. Antretter (continued)

followed by the corresponding questions put by members of parliament, together with the answers received from governments. Then comes a brief comparison with the contents of the WEU texts.

Chapter IV analyses the other activities of the parliaments. Chapter V contains the conclusions.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the terms standardisation and interoperability occur frequently in the documents and in the report. The idea of standardisation is well received by large sections of the public, primarily because it meets both the operational requirement of uniformity and the economic demand for unit-cost reductions. However, the difficulties entailed in standardisation have helped to bring the idea of interoperability to the fore. Interoperability differs from standardisation by emphasising compatibility of equipment rather than identity or interchangeability. It is thus addressed to the solution of the military problem, but not the problem of economic production runs.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the report brings out four main aspects which I think need to be investigated and which themselves raise certain questions. For example, there is the question whether we as an Assembly have properly acquitted ourselves of the tasks we originally undertook. There is the question whether the governments of the member states took sufficient account of representatives' initiatives and Council decisions. There is the question whether parliamentary debates have had a noticeable influence on the working out of Council decisions and on actual co-operation between member states. Finally – and this is a whole complex of questions in its own right – there is the question whether debates in parliaments might instigate further initiatives by the Council or the governments of the WEU countries.

As far as the first three aspects are concerned, my analysis leads to the conclusion that the members of the Assembly must increase their efforts to give weight to the Assembly's recommendations in the member states. As far as the fourth aspect goes, it appears that debates in parliaments do succeed in raising certain questions, for instance the question of standardisation and interoperability. For neither the Council nor the Assembly has ever given clear priority to one of these concepts over the other, although they seem to be quite distinct subjects.

Is it not necessary to invite the governments, through the Council, to work out a specific joint approach to these matters, indicating the various steps to be taken? There is also the question of co-operation between Europe and the United

States in the production of armaments. Several governmental statements in parliaments seem to indicate that the relationship between Europe and the United States seems to be mainly in the shape of bilateral co-operation between individual European states and the United States. Moreover, there seems to be no far-reaching reciprocal exchanges of information between European countries about their relations with the United States in these matters.

Should not the Council be asked to improve co-ordination and information between the European governments concerned? Should the governments be asked to examine more closely present United States legislation restricting European imports, and to intensify efforts towards a real two-way street between Europe and the United States?

Questions also arise in connection with the methods and structures of industrial co-operation. Several governments stressed the enormous obstacles to full integration of armaments production, whether in the Atlantic or the European framework. None of these statements entirely corresponds to the Council's repeated assurances that existing structures and methods are sufficient.

Should the Council's attention be directed towards these divergences, and should it be asked to reconsider the relevant recommendations of the Assembly including joint production ventures?

Questions arise about restrictions on the sale of armaments. Debates in several parliaments show that there were different approaches to this problem by the governments. Encouraged by the statements of the new Chairman-in-Office of the Council and Federal German Minister for Foreign Affairs who was our guest here yesterday, may I ask whether it would not be worth while to urge parliaments and member governments to reconsider this problem so as to reach a joint Western European Union position, as far as possible?

Finally a question arises in connection with the study conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee. Several governments have emphasised the importance of this study, while pointing out that no results could be expected in the short term. I wonder if the time is ripe to ask for a report on the work of the IEPG? Should the governments not also be asked again to report on existing and future armaments projects?

Mr. President, although I am the Rapporteur for the whole committee, may I conclude with a personal remark. The purpose of this report, and of the conclusions we draw from it, is to achieve better armaments co-operation and a consequent improvement in our defence capa-

Mr. Antretter (continued)

bility. Precisely because we are a parliamentary assembly, we should be conscious of the fact that, in all our initiatives and recommendations there is nothing axiomatic about armaments policy deliberations. In dealing with these topics we must therefore also bear in mind the basic theory of our western security policy, as formulated in the Harmel report, that is to say, a credible defence capability coupled with the search for détente and disarmament. Within the framework of the contribution which we as a parliamentary assembly can make to increasing the effectiveness of WEU, we should also insist on greater transparency and parliamentary control of armaments co-operation. This would guarantee that the successful outcome of armaments co-operation efforts does not become involved in an automatic upward arms spiral. This too should constantly be drawn to the attention of national parliaments by the members of our Assembly – a worthwhile task, I believe, because it serves our defence capability while at the same time making peace on our continent more secure. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open and I call Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate the Rapporteur on his presentation of the report. He talks of the need for the reduction of unit costs, which of course is something we should continually strive to do. The increase in interoperability among the various NATO forces is something which, again, is probably easier to search for than the reduction of unit costs, as the Rapporteur so rightly says. We all have powerful arms lobbies exerting pressure on political groups and putting stress on the individual member of parliament with an arms factory in his constituency. Without doubt the most powerful and successful lobbies are those of the United States armaments industry.

The Rapporteur spoke of the need to strengthen the two-way street between the United States and Europe. I very much wish that we had a two-way street. I have been engaged in discussions on this question for a long time. I do not think that I am being unfair in suggesting that the United States will always be willing to talk about a two-way street but that at the end of the day it is banana skins all the way on the East-West carriageway, while the other carriageway is always open for the flow of armaments from that direction.

It is a major problem because clearly we are faced with a potential enemy which can produce as, when and what it likes with no question of this or that army wanting modifications. There is complete interoperability of equipment, which reduces unit manufacturing costs and makes its

military effort economically more efficient than ever.

The two-way street is something for which we have striven for a number of years, and, as the report says, we shall go on striving for it. I hope that we shall be successful in the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rauti.

Mr. RAUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should first like to congratulate the Rapporteur on his meticulous and detailed report, containing a wealth of material which none of us would have been able to obtain. However, this in no way affects the facts of the situation which can be presented as follows. Over the last five years, there has been little reactivation at national level and there have been few national political moves for the standardisation and production of armaments. What is more, there has been virtually no co-ordination of the various national initiatives in this field.

I should like to refer briefly to these points because I think that it is time to put an end to this inefficiency and because the intended reactivation and revitalisation of WEU is a move in the same direction. In this context, I should like to make a number of specific proposals relating mainly to our secretarial structure. So that every member of Western European Union can play his part in following up the Assembly's initiative and recommendations in his own parliament, it would be helpful if we could all receive after the end of the session a summary of the recommendations planned for the next inter-parliamentary assembly. I suggest this to give practical effect to the sound recommendation in paragraph 151.

I should also like to recommend that we ourselves should in principle adopt a single system for the purpose, in order to avoid the deficiencies listed in paragraphs 143, 144, 145 and 146 of the report. Lastly, every member of WEU should make it his business to forward all relevant documents to the Assembly or to the appropriate committee; in return, he would receive comments on that action or any other action taken in that direction. The purpose of all this is to maintain between sessions what I feel has until now been a very limited dialogue between the members of WEU and its permanent institutions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Page.

Sir John PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate Mr. Antretter on his report. I assure our parliamentary colleagues that he is a most co-operative and kind Rapporteur who is not too proud to accept amendments to his papers.

Sir John Page (continued)

I shall make just two remarks about the work of the committee. Through the committee, the Assembly should examine itself and go through a short period of introspection. We are told that there is a new rôle for WEU. The Assembly is not a sleeping beauty who has been awakened, somewhat to her surprise, by the kiss of six ministerial prince charmings. We are more like a well-established, traditional company with a well-known respected product which is to have an injection of new capital and managerial enthusiasm. It is up to us parliamentarians to become salesmen for WEU in our parliaments and countries.

I shall give you, if I may, Mr. President, two new tasks during your presidency. The first relates to the name of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. It should become the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and the Public. We should give ourselves a bigger megaphone from which to speak from the Assembly.

I hope that in future we shall not always be put on last, and will be made the entrée instead of the savoury of our Assembly work.

My second task for you, Mr. President, relates to the name of our organisation. I think that the name of Western European Union should be altered to become the Western European Defence Union or the Western European Union for Defence. That will make our organisation more understandable to the public by whom we hope our work will be given greater appreciation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – It is not customary for the chair to enter into a dialogue with a member. I have duly noted your comments.

Mr. Antretter, I must ask you to forgive me. Busy with my papers, I omitted to congratulate you, on behalf of the Assembly, on the work which you have done in producing an important dossier on the reactivation of WEU.

I invite you to conclude the debate.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I will try to respond in a very brief final statement to the compliments you, Mr. President, and members have paid me. What Mr. Brown, Mr. Rauti and Sir John Page have said shows that the report correctly expresses the concern for greater emphasis on co-operation with the United States in all its ramifications, or, in plain terms, for it not to be used as a one-way street, and for a clear statement to be made by the Council or the national governments as to what they prefer, interoperability or standardisation, what possibilities they envisage and how

seriously they take the subject. Not only must they say what possibilities they envisage and how seriously they take the subject: they must also say what steps must be taken. I am very grateful for these comments, which I believe I can regard as a general endorsement of our work.

I should also like to say a particular word of thanks to Mr. Rauti for supporting our proposal that WEU's recommendations should be put before the national parliaments. I would like to endorse this.

I should also like to thank Sir John Page for his kind words and his suggestion that in our debate on the reactivation of WEU we should turn our attention, in particular, to the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly takes note of the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

8. *Adjournment of the session*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, we have reached the end of our business.

Before adjourning the session, I would like to emphasise the importance of the deliberations which have taken place during this lively part-session. The level of debate has matched the high stakes involved – the future of Western European Union. When we reflect on the contents of the reports and the debates to which they have given rise, when we consider the scope of the proposals put forward and the large number of representatives who have made a point of attending these debates, we can say that this part-session is an advance expression of the revival that I hope we shall be seeing in the months to come.

The chair can only express its satisfaction. As for your President, he would ask the Assembly to be kind enough to show him the necessary indulgence, given his newness to the office to which he has been appointed.

May I particularly thank the permanent and temporary staff and the interpreters, who have been working in sometimes very difficult conditions, with sittings lasting late into the evening.

I would also like to thank the press for what it has done and will do in the future for the Assembly.

I conclude on a sadder note. Two of our Luxembourg colleagues – a Vice-President of the Assembly, Mr. Berchem, and Mr. Prussen, to whom I already addressed a few words during the session – will probably no longer be partici-

The President (continued)

pating in our work. I am sure I speak for the whole Assembly when I say how much we shall miss them and their participation.

You too, my dear Mr. Margue, are leaving us. We who are here today attended the sitting at the last session of the Council of Europe during which the President of the Consultative Assembly, Mr. Ahrens, expressed to you, in such moving terms, the gratitude of all the members of that Assembly.

The new President of the Assembly of Western European Union wishes, on behalf of the Assembly, to join with Mr. Ahrens in thanking you for everything you have done and in telling you how much your wise counsel will be missed. At the most crucial moments you were always there to point out the sensible solution.

May I be permitted a personal remark as a former senior official of the Council of Europe. The name of Margue is imprinted on my memory because I served both you and your father during my period as secretary to the office of the clerk of the Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Mr. Margue, my very best thanks for all you have done for us. I am sure we shall meet again. (*Applause*)

Mr. MARGUE (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – On behalf of my colleagues Mr. Berchem and

Mr. Prussen, and on my own behalf, I would like to thank you for your kind words on the occasion of our departure from this Assembly. In my case, departure is certain. For my colleagues, it is perhaps not final.

It is twenty-five years since I first attended the WEU Assembly which met in Strasbourg during the summer of 1959 to elect as President Mr. Badini Confalonieri. For five years I was substitute for the late Joseph Bech – one of the founding fathers of Europe – and for twenty years a full member of both assemblies. Although it is true that I have been less active in the WEU committees than in those of the Council of Europe, I have nevertheless attended almost all the plenary sessions of the Assembly. I hope that today's sitting will not be my last meeting with you, Mr. President, or with the Assembly over which you preside. I would be only too happy to welcome you to a part-session that the Assembly might perhaps decide to hold in Luxembourg – where, as you know, we are also well equipped for this kind of meeting. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Margue. As an Alsatian, I greatly appreciate your comments and your proposal. The Presidential Committee will look into it.

I declare the thirtieth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union adjourned.

The sitting is closed.

(*The sitting was closed at 1.10 p.m.*)

INDEX

INDEX OF PROCEEDINGS

	Page		Page
A		D	
Action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on the standardisation and production of armaments		Deterrence and the will of the people	
Presentation of the report	230-232	Presentation of the report	77-79
Debate on the report	232-233	Debate on the report	79-82, 95-111
Address by:		Amendment 1 by Mr. Freeson	111-112
- the Provisional President	46-47	- Adoption of the amendment	112
- the President	49, 84-88, 233-234	Reference back to committee	112-127, 127-129
- Baroness Young	88-91		
- Questions and answers	91-95	M	
- Mr. Genscher	145-148	Middle East	
- Questions and answers	148-157	(see: Situation in the - and European security)	
- Mr. van Houwelingen	161-165	Military use of space	
- Questions and answers	165-171	Presentation of the report	217-219
Attendance lists	17, 20, 24, 27, 31, 40	Debate on the report	219-226
AWACS and Nimrod aircraft		Amendment 1 by MM. Thorne and Edwards	226
Presentation of the report	173-174	- Rejection of the amendment	226
Debate on the report	174-177	Amendment 2 by Mr. Hardy	227-228
Vote on the draft recommendation	177	- Rejection of the amendment	228
		Amendment 3 by Mr. Hardy	228
B		- Rejection of the amendment	228
Budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1983 (see: Opinion on the -)		Amendment 4 by MM. Tummers and Garrett	228-229
		- Adoption of the amendment	229
C		Amendment 5 by Mr. Fourné	227
Committees		- Adoption of the amendment	227
Nomination of members to -	51	Amendment 6 by Mr. Fourné	227
Changes in the membership of -	203	- Adoption of the amendment	227
Control of armaments and disarmament		Amendment 7 by Mr. Fourné	226-227
Presentation of the report	205-208	- Rejection of the amendment	227
Debate on the report	208-212	Vote on the amended draft recommendation	229-230
Vote on the draft recommendation	213	Motion for an order	230
Credentials			
Examination of -	47	O	
		Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1983	
		Presentation of the report	213-214
		Debate on the report	214-217
		Vote on the draft recommendation	217

INDEX

	Page
Order of business	
Adoption of the –	50-51
Orders of the day	12, 18, 22, 25, 28, 37
Change in the –	171-172

P

Political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council	
Presentation of the report	142-144
Debate on the report	177-196
Amendment 1 by Mr. Cavaliere	202-203
– Adoption of the amendment	203
Amendment 2 by Mr. Gianotti	202
– Rejection of the amendment	202
Vote on the amended draft recommendation	203
President	
Election of the –	47-49
Address by the –	49, 84-88, 233-234

R

Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council	
Presentation of the report	144
Debate on the report	177-196
Report of the Council, twenty-ninth annual –	
(see also: Political implications of European security in 1984; Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty)	
Presentation by Mr. Genscher	145-148
– Questions and answers	148-157

S

Session	
Opening of the –	46
Adjournment of the –	233-234
Situation in the Middle East and European security	
Presentation of the report	52-54
Debate on the report	54-60, 63-68
Amendment 1 by Mr. Cavaliere	68-69
– Adoption of the amendment	69
Amendment 2 by Mr. Cavaliere	69-70
– Rejection of the amendment	70

	Page
Amendment 3 by Mr. Cavaliere	69-70
– Rejection of the amendment	71
Amendment 4 by Mr. Cavaliere	69-70
– Rejection of the amendment	71
Amendment 5 by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt	73-74
– Rejection of the amendment	74
Amendment 6 by Mr. Jung	72-73
– Rejection of the amendment	73
Vote on the amended draft recommendation	74-77
State of European security	
Presentation of the report	130-132
Debate on the report	132-137, 158-160
Vote on the draft recommendation . .	160-161

T

Texts adopted:	
Recommendations	
– 403 – Situation in the Middle East and European security	21
– 404 – State of European security . .	32
– 405 – AWACS and Nimrod aircraft	33
– 406 – Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council	34
– 407 – Political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council	35
– 408 – Control of armaments and disarmament	41
– 409 – Budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1983	42
– 410 – Military use of space	43
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council	
Presentation of the report	137-141
Debate on the report	174-176, 177-196
Amendment 1 by Mr. Hardy	197-199
– Adoption of the amendment	199
Amendment 2 by Mr. Dejardin	199-201
– Rejection of the amendment	201
Amendment 3 by Mr. Pignion	197
– Adoption of the amendment	197
Vote on the amended draft recommendation	201-202

V

Vice-Presidents	
Election of –	50, 62, 95

INDEX OF SPEAKERS

	Page		Page
A			
<i>Mr. Aarts (Netherlands):</i>			
State of European security	134-135		
<i>Mr. Antretter (Federal Republic of Germany):</i>			
Action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on the standardisation and production of armaments	230-232, 233		
B			
<i>Mr. Bassinet (France):</i>			
Election of the President	47		
Military use of space	226		
<i>Mr. Baumel (France):</i>			
Question put to Mr. Genscher	151		
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council	187-188		
<i>Mr. Beix (France):</i>			
Deterrence and the will of the people - Reference back to committee	126		
<i>Sir Frederic Bennett (United Kingdom):</i>			
Adoption of the order of business	51-52		
Situation in the Middle East and European security	66-67, 71, 73, 74		
Question put to Baroness Young	93-94		
Deterrence and the will of the people - Reference back to committee	124-125		
<i>Mr. van den Bergh (Netherlands):</i>			
Deterrence and the will of the people - Reference back to committee	118, 124		
State of European security	136-137		
Question put to Mr. Genscher	152		
Questions put to Mr. van Houwelingen	169		
Change in the orders of the day	172		
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council	178-179, 200		
<i>Mr. Bianco (Italy):</i>			
Election of the President	49-50		
Situation in the Middle East and European security	71, 76-77		
Deterrence and the will of the people - Reference back to committee	121, 124, 126, 129		
Questions put to Mr. Genscher	149-150		
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council	190-191, 202		
Point of order	200		
Military use of space	228		
<i>Mr. Blaauw (Netherlands):</i>			
Question put to Baroness Young	92		
Deterrence and the will of the people - Reference back to committee	123-124, 125		
Question put to Mr. Genscher	152-153		
Question put to Mr. van Houwelingen	170		
Change in the orders of the day	172		
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council	177-178		
<i>Mr. Brown (United Kingdom):</i>			
Military use of space	223, 227-228		
Action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on the standardisation and production of armaments	232		
C			
<i>Mr. Caro (France):</i>			
Address by the President	49, 84-88, 233-234		
Election of Vice-Presidents	50, 62, 95		
<i>Mr. Cavaliere (Italy):</i>			
Situation in the Middle East and European security	65-66, 69-70, 77		
Question put to Baroness Young	94		
Deterrence and the will of the people	96, 112		
State of European security	135-136		
Question put to Mr. van Houwelingen	169		
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council	180-181, 203		

INDEX

	Page
Mr. Cifarelli (<i>Italy</i>):	
Situation in the Middle East and European security	55-56, 70, 75
Deterrence and the will of the people - Reference back to committee	114
Mr. Cox (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Deterrence and the will of the people - Reference back to committee	116, 126, 127-128
D	
Mr. De Decker (<i>Belgium</i>):	
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council	137-141, 192-194, 197, 198, 199, 200
Question put to Mr. Genscher	156
Mr. Dejardin (<i>Belgium</i>):	
Deterrence and the will of the people - Reference back to committee	105-107 115
Question put to Mr. Genscher	151
Change in the orders of the day	172
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council .	183-184, 199-200, 201
Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt (<i>France</i>):	
Situation in the Middle East and European security	58-60
E	
Mr. Edwards (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Address by the Provisional President	46-47
Examination of credentials	47
Election of the President	47-49
F	
Mr. Ferrari Aggradi (<i>Italy</i>):	
Deterrence and the will of the people - Reference back to committee	116-117
Questions put to Mr. Genscher	153
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Points of order	72, 176, 198
Mr. Fourré (<i>France</i>):	
Military use of space	220-222, 226, 227
Mr. Freeson (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Adoption of the order of business	50
Situation in the Middle East and European security	64-65, 76

	Page
Deterrence and the will of the people - Reference back to committee	101-102, 111-112 113, 115, 117-118, 124, 128-129
G	
Mr. Gansel (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):	
Questions put to Mr. van Houwelingen	167
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council .	191-192
Mr. Garrett (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Situation in the Middle East and European security	63-64
Mr. Genscher (<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council</i>):	
Address by -	145-148
Replies to questions	149-157
Mr. Gianotti (<i>Italy</i>):	
Situation in the Middle East and European security	57
Deterrence and the will of the people	80-81
Question put to Mr. Genscher	155
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council .	188-189
Sir Anthony Grant (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
State of European security	159
Point of order	161
H	
Mr. Hardy (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Election of the President	48
Adoption of the order of business	50-51
Point of order	72
Deterrence and the will of the people - Reference back to committee	113, 122-123, 125, 127
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council .	195, 197-198
Control of armaments and disarmament	210-211
Mr. Hill (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Point of order	137
Military use of space	219

	Page
Mr. van Houwelingen (<i>Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands</i>):	
Address by –	161-165
Replies to questions	166-171
Lord Hughes (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Point of order	201

J

Mr. Jung (<i>France</i>):	
Situation in the Middle East and European security	69, 72-73, 74

K

Mr. Kittelmann (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):	
Situation in the Middle East and European security	63
Mrs. Knight (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Election of the President	47, 49
Deterrence and the will of the people	79-80

L

Mr. Lagorce (<i>France</i>):	
Deterrence and the will of the people	77-79, 108-110, 112

M

Mr. Margue (<i>Luxembourg</i>):	
Adjournment of the session	234
Mr. Martino (<i>Italy</i>):	
Situation in the Middle East and European security	77
Deterrence and the will of the people	108
Military use of space	229-230
Mr. Mezzapesa (<i>Italy</i>):	
Deterrence and the will of the people	98-99
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council ..	189-190
Mr. Michel (<i>Belgium</i>):	
Situation in the Middle East and European security	54-55, 68, 71
Deterrence and the will of the people	79, 110-111
– Reference back to committee	112, 113, 118, 120, 121, 123, 127
Mr. Milani (<i>Italy</i>):	
Situation in the Middle East and European security	69, 70

	Page
Deterrence and the will of the people	100-101
– Reference back to committee	114-121
Question put to Mr. Genscher	155-156
Dr. Miller (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Point of order	71-72
Situation in the Middle East and European security	74-75
Questions put to Baroness Young ..	93
Deterrence and the will of the people	99-100
– Reference back to committee	113-114, 118, 126
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council ..	179-180, 198

Mr. Morris (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Questions put to Baroness Young ..	94

Mr. Muller (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):	
Situation in the Middle East and European security	57-58
Deterrence and the will of the people	82
– Reference back to committee	127

Mr. Murphy (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Deterrence and the will of the people	81-82

P

Sir John Page (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1983	215-216
Action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on the standardisation and production of armaments	232-233

Mr. Pignion (<i>France</i>):	
Question put to Baroness Young ..	91
Deterrence and the will of the people	107-108
– Reference back to committee	118
State of European security	132-133, 160
Question put to Mr. Genscher	148-149
Questions put to Mr. van Houwelingen	167
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council ..	195-196, 197, 198-199, 201

Mr. Pollidoro (<i>Italy</i>):	
Political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council	202, 203
Control of armaments and disarmament	208-209

INDEX

	Page
Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1983	214
Mr. Prussen (Luxembourg):	
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council	185-186
R	
Mr. Rauti (Italy):	
Situation in the Middle East and European security	70
Deterrence and the will of the people - Reference back to committee .. .	121
Action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on the standardisation and production of armaments	232
Lord Reay (United Kingdom):	
Situation in the Middle East and European security	52-54, 67-68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74
Question put to Mr. Genscher .. .	157
Mr. Reddemann (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Election of the president	48
Situation in the Middle East and European security	60
Deterrence and the will of the people - Reference back to committee .. .	104-105, 114, 116
Mr. Rodotà (Italy):	
Deterrence and the will of the people - Reference back to committee .. .	102-103, 114
S	
Mr. Scheer (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Deterrence and the will of the people	103-104
Questions put to Mr. van Houwelingen	170-171
Military use of space	223
Mr. Schwarz (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Election of the President	48
Sir Dudley Smith (United Kingdom):	
State of European security	130-132, 159-160
Question put to Mr. van Houwelingen	165-166
Mr. Spies von Bullesheim (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Deterrence and the will of the people - Reference back to committee .. .	97-98, 122
Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council	144
AWACS and Nimrod aircraft	173-174

	Page
Mr. Steverlynck (Belgium):	
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council	182-183
Mr. Stokes (United Kingdom):	
Situation in the Middle East and European security	56-57
T	
Mr. Thorne (United Kingdom):	
Military use of space	222-223, 226
Mr. Thoss (Luxembourg):	
Political implications of European security in 1984 - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council	142-144, 194-195, 202, 203
Mr. Tummers (Netherlands):	
Deterrence and the will of the people	96-97
Military use of space	220, 229
- Motion for an order	230
V	
Mr. Vogt (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Situation in the Middle East and European security	69, 75-76
Questions put to Baroness Young ..	91-92
Deterrence and the will of the people - Reference back to committee .. .	95-96, 109, 114-115, 123, 128
State of European security	133-134, 160-161
Questions put to Mr. Genscher .. .	154
Questions put to Mr. van Houwelingen	168
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council; Political implications of European security in 1984 - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council ..	174-176, 185, 201-202, 203
Points of order	176, 197
Control of armaments and disarmament	209-210
Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1983	214
Military use of space	219-220, 229
Mr. de Vries (Netherlands):	
Change in the orders of the day .. .	171
Control of armaments and disarmament	205-208, 211-212
Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1983	213-214, 216-217

INDEX

	Page		Page
W			
Mr. Wilkinson (<i>United Kingdom</i>):		Mr. Woodall (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Question put to Baroness Young . . .	91	Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1983	214-215
Question put to Mr. van Houwelingen	166	Mr. Worrell (<i>Netherlands</i>):	
AWACS and Nimrod aircraft	176-177	Election of the President	48
Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council	181-182, 199, 200	Y	
Military use of space	217-219, 224-226, 226-227, 228, 229	Baroness Young (<i>Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom</i>):	
		Address by -	88-91
		Replies to questions	91-95

IMPRIMERIE ALENÇONNAISE
Rue Édouard-Belin, 61002 ALENÇON
Dépôt légal : 3^e trimestre 1984
N° d'ordre : 99885

PRINTED IN FRANCE

