

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

EXTRAORDINARY SESSION

October 1984

Minutes
Official Report of Debates

WEU

ROME

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tel. 723.54.32

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSSENS Hugo	SP	
BOGAERTS August	SP	
DE DECKER Armand	PRL	
DEJARDIN Claude	PS	
MICHEL Joseph	PSC	
NOERENS René	PVV	
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP	

Substitutes

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	PS	
BONNEL Raoul	PVV	
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP	
LAGNEAU André	PRL	
PECRIAUX Nestor	PS	
STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP	
VAN DER ELST Frans	VU	

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist	
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR	
BEIX Roland	Socialist	
BERRIER Noël	Socialist	
BOURGES Yvon	RPR	
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS	
President of the Assembly		
FOURRE Jean-Pierre	Socialist	
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left	
JUNG Louis	UCDP	
LAGORGE Pierre	Socialist	
MAYOUD Alain	UDF	
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist	
RUET Roland	Ind Rep	
SENES Gilbert	Socialist	
VALLEIX Jean	RPR	
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	Communist	
WILQUIN Claude	Socialist	
WIRTH Frédéric	UCDP	

Substitutes

MM. BARTHE Jean-Jacques	Communist	
BOHL André	UCDP	
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.	
DELEHEDDE André	Socialist	
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist	
DREYFUS-SCHMIDT Michel	Socialist	

MM. GALLEY Robert	RPR	
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR	
HUYGHUES des ETAGES Jacques	Socialist	
KOEHL Emile	UDF	
MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist	
MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left	
NATIEZ Jean	Socialist	
OEHLER Jean-André	Socialist	
PROUVOST Pierre	Socialist	
ROSSINOT André	UDF	
SOUVET Louis	RPR	
VERDON Marc	Socialist	

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD	
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD	
BOEHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU	
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD	
GERSTL Friedrich	SPD	
HAASE Horst	SPD	
HORNHUES Karl-Heinz	CDU/CSU	
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU	
MUELLER Günther	CDU/CSU	
NEUMANN Volker	SPD	
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU	
RUMPF Wolfgang	FDP	
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD	
SCHWARZ Heinz	CDU/CSU	
SPIES von BUELLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU	
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU	
VOGT Roland	Die Grunen	
ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU	

Substitutes

MM. BUECHNER Peter	SPD	
ERTL Josef	FDP	
GANSEL Norbert	SPD	
GLOS Michael	CDU/CSU	
HACKEL Wolfgang	CDU/CSU	
HAUFF Volker	SPD	
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD	
JAEGER Claus	CDU/CSU	
Mrs. KELLY Petra	Die Grunen	
MM. KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD	
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU	
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU	
SCHAUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU	
SCHEER Hermann	SPD	
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD	
SCHMITZ Hans Peter	CDU/CSU	
STAVENHAGEN Lutz	CDU/CSU	
WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU	

ITALY

Representatives

MM.	AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
	ANTONI Varese	Communist
	BIANCO Gerardo	Chr. Dem.
	CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
	CIFARELLI Michele	Republican
	FERRARI AGGRADI Mario	Chr. Dem.
	FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
	FRASCA Salvatore	Socialist
	GIANOTTI Lorenzo	Communist
	GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
	MEZZAPEZA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
	MILANI Eliseo	PDUP
	PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
	RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
	RUBBI Antonio	Communist
	SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
	SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
	VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM.	ACCILI Achille	Chr. Dem.
	ALBERINI Guido	Socialist
	BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
	COLAJANNI Napoleone	Communist
	FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs.	FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM.	GORLA Massimo	Prol. Dem.
	LAPENTA Nicola	Chr. Dem.
	MARCHIO Michele	MSI-DN
	MARTINO Guido	Republican
	MASCIADRI Cornelio	Socialist
	MITTERDORFER Karl	SVP
	PALUMBO Vincenzo	Liberal
	POLLIDORO Carlo	Communist
	RIZZI Enrico	PSDI
	RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
	SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
	TEODORI Massimo	Radical

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM.	BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
	GOERENS Charles	Dem.
	HENGEL René	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

Mrs.	HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
MM.	KONEN René	Dem.
	LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM.	AARTS Harry	CDA
	van den BERGH Harry	Labour
	BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
	de KWAADSTENIET, Willem	CDA
	STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
Mrs.	van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA
Mr.	van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal

Substitutes

Mr.	EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
Mrs.	den OUDEN-DEKKERS Greetje	Liberal
MM.	van der SANDEN Piet	CDA
	van TETS Govert	Liberal
	TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
	de VRIES Klaas	Labour
	WORRELL Joop	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Sir	Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr.	Thomas COX	Labour
Sir	Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
Sir	Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Mr.	Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir	Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr.	James HILL	Conservative
Lord	HUGHES	Labour
Mr.	Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Mrs.	Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr.	Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr.	Maurice MILLER	Labour
Sir	John OSBORN	Conservative
Sir	John PAGE	Conservative
Lord	REAY	Conservative
Mr.	Stephen ROSS	Liberal
Sir	Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr.	John WILKINSON	Conservative

Substitutes

MM.	David ATKINSON	Conservative
	Robert BROWN	Labour
	Donald COLEMAN	Labour
	John CORRIE	Conservative
	Robert EDWARDS	Labour
	Reginald FREESON	Labour
	Edward GARRETT	Labour
	Ralph HOWELL	Conservative
Earl of	KINNOULL	Conservative
Lord	McNAIR	Liberal
MM.	Bruce MILLAN	Labour
	Michael MORRIS	Conservative
	Christopher MURPHY	Conservative
Lord	NEWALL	Conservative
MM.	John STOKES	Conservative
	Stanley THORNE	Labour
	John WARD	Conservative
	Alec WOODALL	Labour

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 29th October 1984

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the extraordinary session of the Assembly.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Adoption of the draft order of business for the extraordinary session.
4. Changes in the membership of committees.
5. Political reactivation of WEU:
 - (a) Address by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council; questions and answers.
 - (b) Address by Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly.
 - (c) Address by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy; questions and answers.
 - (d) Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy; questions and answers.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 9 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the extraordinary session of the Assembly

The President opened the extraordinary session convened in accordance with Article III (b) of the Charter and Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 1 had been ratified by that Assembly, with the exception of Mr. Sinesio, representative for Italy.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure and subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of Mr. Sinesio.

4. Adoption of the draft order of business for the extraordinary session

The Assembly adopted the draft order of business for the extraordinary session¹.

5. Tribute

The President paid tribute to Mr. Berchem, member and Vice-President of the Assembly since 1980.

Speaker: Mr. Goerens.

6. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed the following changes in the membership of committees proposed by the Italian and French Delegations respectively:

- Mr. Sinesio as an alternate member of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges in place of Mr. Zamberletti;
- Mr. Koehl as a titular member of the General Affairs Committee in place of Mr. Caro.

¹ See page 13.

7. Political reactivation of WEU

(a) Address by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council; questions and answers

Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, addressed the Assembly.

(b) Address by Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly

Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Genscher answered questions put by Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Stoffelen, Blaauw, Gianotti, Wilkinson, Masciadri, Vogt and De Decker.

(c) Address by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy; questions and answers

Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Andreotti answered questions put by MM. Beix and Dejardin.

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Mr. Andreotti answered questions put by MM. Jäger and Fiandrotti.

Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Mr. Andreotti answered a question put by Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

(d) Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy; questions and answers

Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Andreotti and Mr. Spadolini answered a question put by Mr. Bianco.

Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Mr. Andreotti answered a question put by Mr. Rubbi.

8. Date and time of the next sitting

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.20 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Enders Gerstl Haase Hornhues <i>Jäger</i> (Kittelmann) Müller <i>Gansel</i> (Neumann) Reddemann Rumpf Schulte Schwarz Spies von Büllenheim Unland Vogt Zierer	Luxembourg MM. Burger Goerens Hengel
MM. <i>Pécriaux</i> (Adriaensens) Bogaerts De Decker Dejardin Michel Noerens Mrs. Staels-Dompas		Netherlands Mr. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) Mrs. <i>den Ouden-Dekkers</i> (van den Bergh) MM. Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen <i>Eysink</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) van der Werff
France		
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Berrier Fourré Jeambrun <i>Prouvost</i> (Jung) Lagorce <i>Koehl</i> (Mayoud) Pignon Ruet Sénès Valleix Vial-Massat <i>Dreyfus-Schmidt</i> (Wilquin) <i>Oehler</i> (Wirth)	Italy MM. <i>Alberini</i> (Amadei) <i>Pollidoro</i> (Antoni) Bianco <i>Accili</i> (Cavaliere) Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi Fiandrotti Frasca Gianotti Giust Mezzapesa Milani <i>Rodotà</i> (Pecchioli) Rauti Rubbi <i>Lapenta</i> (Sarti) Sinesio Vecchietti	United Kingdom Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. <i>Brown</i> (Cox) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Sir Anthony Grant Mr. <i>Woodall</i> (Hardy) Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Mr. Jessel Mrs. Knight Mr. McGuire Dr. Miller Sir John Osborn Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Sir John Page) Lord Reay Earl of <i>Kinnoull</i> (Ross) Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany		
MM. Ahrens Antretter Böhm		

The following representative apologised for his absence:

France

Mr. Bourges

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

23rd October 1984

ORDER OF BUSINESS

**of the extraordinary session to be held in Rome,
at the Chamber of Deputies, Via Campomarzio 74,
on Monday, 29th October 1984**

MONDAY, 29th OCTOBER

Morning 8.45 a.m.

1. Opening of the extraordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Adoption of the draft order of business of the extraordinary session.
4. Political reactivation of WEU.

9 a.m.

5. Address by Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
6. Address by Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly.
Questions put to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
Debate.

10 a.m.

7. Address by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy.
Questions put to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy.
Debate.

11.30 a.m.

8. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.
Questions put to the Minister of Defence of Italy.
Debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

Political reactivation of WEU.
General debate.

CLOSE OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SESSION

SECOND SITTING

Monday, 29th October 1984

ORDERS OF THE DAY

Political reactivation of WEU (*Resumed questions and answers*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the Appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of the proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

Speaker (point of order): Sir Anthony Grant.

3. Political reactivation of WEU

(Resumed questions and answers)

Mr. Andreotti and Mr. Spadolini answered questions put by Sir John Osborn and Mr. Gansel.

Speakers (points of order): Sir Anthony Grant and Mr. Vogt.

Mr. Ahrens spoke in his capacity as President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Mr. Andreotti and Mr. Spadolini answered questions put by MM. Lagorce, Cifarelli and Jessel.

The sitting was suspended at 4.05 p.m. and resumed at 4.15 p.m.

Speakers (points of order): MM. Schwarz, Müller, Reddemann and Haase.

Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Mr. Andreotti answered a question put by Mr. Vecchiatti.

Speaker (point of order): Sir Dudley Smith.

Mr. Andreotti answered questions put by MM. Vogt, Martino, Sir Dudley Smith, Sir Anthony Grant and Mrs. Knight.

Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Mr. Andreotti answered a question put by Mr. Baumel.

Speakers: The President and Sir Frederic Bennett; Mr. Pignion (point of order).

On the proposal of the President, the Assembly agreed to defer to the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session consideration of the draft order tabled by the Presidential Committee.

Mr. Andreotti answered questions put by MM. Hill, Tummers, Müller and Freeson.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Blaauw.

4. Close of the extraordinary session

The President addressed the Assembly and declared the extraordinary session closed.

The sitting was closed at 6 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Böhm Enders Gerstl Haase <i>Jäger</i> (Hornhues) <i>Hackel</i> (Kittelmann) Müller <i>Gansel</i> (Neumann) Reddemann Rumpf Schulte Schwarz Spies von Bülesheim Vogt Zierer	Luxembourg Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges
MM. <i>Pécriaux</i> (Adriaensens) Bogaerts De Decker Dejardin Michel <i>De Bondt</i> (Noerens) Mrs. Staels-Dompas		Netherlands MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) <i>Tummers</i> (van den Bergh) Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen <i>Eysink</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) van der Werff
France		
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix <i>Natiez</i> (Bourges) Fourré Jeambrun <i>Prouvost</i> (Jung) Lagorce <i>Koehl</i> (Mayoud) Pignon Sénès Valleix Vial-Massat <i>Dreyfus-Schmidt</i> (Wilquin) <i>Oehler</i> (Wirth)	Italy MM. <i>Mitterdorfer</i> (Amadei) Antoni Bianco <i>Martino</i> (Cavaliere) Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi Fiandrotti Giust Mezzapesa Milani Pecchioli Rubbi Sarti Sinesio	United Kingdom Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Cox Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Sir Anthony Grant Mr. <i>Millan</i> (Hardy) Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Mr. Jessel Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Garrett</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller Sir John Osborn Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Sir John Page) Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany		
MM. Ahrens Antretter		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	Italy	Luxembourg
MM. Berrier Ruet	MM. Frasca Gianotti Rauti Vecchietti	MM. Goerens Hengel
Federal Republic of Germany		United Kingdom
Mr. Unland		Mr. Ross

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 29th October 1984

SUMMARY

1. Opening of the extraordinary session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Examination of credentials.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business for the extraordinary session.
5. Tribute.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Goerens.
6. Changes in the membership of committees.
7. Political reactivation of WEU.
(a) Address by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
(b) Address by Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly.

Replies by Mr. Genscher to questions put by: Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Gianotti, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Masciadri, Mr. Vogt, Mr. De Decker.

(c) Address by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

Replies by Mr. Andreotti to questions put by: Mr. Beix, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Jäger, Mr. Fiandrotti, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

(d) Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.

Replies by Mr. Andreotti and Mr. Spadolini to a question put by: Mr. Bianco.

Reply by Mr. Andreotti to a question put by: Mr. Rubbi.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

1. Opening of the extraordinary session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Article III (b) of the Charter and Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open this extraordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

Before proceeding any further, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to stress the importance of our extraordinary session following the ministerial meeting of the Council in Rome, last Friday and Saturday, and to say that we shall today be hearing the views of members of the Assembly on the Rome Declaration, the text of which will be distributed shortly to all members; this has not so far been possible for purely material reasons.

I take this opportunity, Ladies and Gentlemen, to welcome Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, and Mr. Andreotti, Minis-

ter for Foreign Affairs of Italy, and to express my warmest thanks to them for attending. Their presence will enable us, I hope, not only to have a profitable debate but also to demonstrate the importance which the Assembly of Western European Union should have. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Minister, once again our thanks for favouring us with your presence.

3. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of credentials of the new representatives and substitutes appointed since the first part of our session, whose names are published in the notice for the extraordinary session.

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, all these credentials were ratified by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and are attested by a statement of ratification which has been addressed to the President, with the exception of Mr. Sinesio, Italian representative, who has been nominated since the conclusion of the meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

It is now for the Assembly to ratify the credentials not already ratified, under Rule 6 (2). The nomination is in proper form. No objection has been raised.

If the Assembly is unanimous, we may proceed to ratification without prior referral to a credentials committee.

1. See page 12.

The President (continued)

Is there any opposition?...

The credentials of Mr. Sinesio are ratified by the Assembly, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Mr. Sinesio is therefore admitted to take his seat in the Assembly of Western European Union. I bid welcome to our new colleagues.

4. Adoption of the draft order of business for the extraordinary session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before proceeding to the adoption of the draft order of business for the extraordinary session, as it appears in the document dated 23rd October 1984, I have to inform the Assembly that the Presidential Committee has decided to table a draft order which could be examined this afternoon. I suggest that the afternoon sitting should start at 3 p.m.

Is there any opposition to that new draft order of business?...

The draft order of business is adopted.

I should like to welcome all the many guests and observers who are present – unfortunately, I cannot mention them all by name – and, in particular, all presidents of assemblies and especially all former Presidents of the Assembly of Western European Union and many people who, out of interest for Western European Union or in the interests of our co-operation, have joined us here. I offer them a very warm welcome in the name of the whole Assembly and I thank them for having responded to our invitation.

5. Tribute

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, it is now my sad duty to say a few words in memory of our colleague, Albert Berchem, who was a member of our Assembly from November 1980 to August 1984 and was regularly re-elected as Vice-President from December 1980 onwards. It is since our last sitting that we have received the sad news of Mr. Berchem's sudden death.

Mr. Berchem had been a member of the Luxembourg Parliament since 1959 and a hard-working member of our European assemblies ever since then. From 1974 to 1979, he was a member of his own government as Secretary of State for Agriculture and he also served as Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies.

We extend our deepest sympathy to his widow and family, to the Luxembourg Delegation and to the Luxembourg Government. Ladies and Gentlemen, would you please observe a minute's silence.

Thank you.

I call Mr. Goerens.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – In the name of the Luxembourg Delegation, I thank you for allowing me a few minutes. You have just reminded us of the many stages of Mr. Berchem's political career. Mr. Berchem has just gone from us, after a life of exemplary political commitment, at both national and international level. My political group mourns the loss of a colleague who had many friends of all political persuasions. Mr. Berchem, who attached the greatest importance to the work of Western European Union, will continue to be an inspiration to us in our efforts to reactivate the work of our Assembly. His name will remain in our memory. My thanks to you, Mr. President, in the name of the Luxembourg Delegation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much, Mr. Goerens.

6. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Italian Delegation proposes the following change in the membership of a committee: Mr. Sinesio as an alternate member of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges in place of Mr. Zamberletti.

The French Delegation proposes the following change in the membership of a committee: Mr. Koehl as a titular member of the General Affairs Committee in place of Mr. Caro.

Is there any opposition?...

The changes are agreed to.

7. Political reactivation of WEU

(a) *Address by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council; questions and answers*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before asking you to come to the rostrum, Mr. Genscher, I should simply like to thank you for being here at this most important time. As you know, it is due to you that we are where we are today. We could not have held this extraordinary session without you as Chairman-in-Office

The President (continued)

of the Council or equally without the politician whose goodwill and open-mindedness are the promise of the success we can hope for after the discussions in Rome. It is therefore with great satisfaction and great pleasure that I invite you to address the Assembly.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in my capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers I am pleased to be able to inform you today of the outcome of the extraordinary meeting of Western European Union which was held here in Rome on 26th and 27th October. This is the second opportunity I have had in the space of a few months to report to this Assembly on the activities of the WEU Council of Ministers.

The Council and the Assembly are meeting here in Rome to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the modified Brussels Treaty. Thirty years ago Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany joined Western European Union, which France, the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries had founded in 1948. In the last thirty years Western European Union has performed various important functions, but we all know that many opportunities have not been seized.

At the meeting of the Council of Ministers in June 1984 we decided to make greater use of WEU, and here in Rome we have been able to lay the foundations for future activities. The political declaration we have adopted and the decisions supplementing it mark the beginning of intensive and extensive co-operation among the seven member states in the areas of security and defence policy. We are pursuing the following goals:

First, the seven member states of WEU, which also belong to the European Community, will in future co-operate closely in the areas of security and defence policy. They are thus giving an important new dimension to the process of European unification. Increased use of Western European Union – the name itself implies a programme – will bring us a step further along the path towards European union.

Second, better use of WEU will also serve to strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance. America wants a confident and strong Europe as its partner. The oft-lamented imbalance between Europe and America is not – as I said in June – due to America being too strong but to Europe's failure to play its full part. With the decisions they have taken in Rome the WEU member states have paved the way for a strong Europe in the alliance.

Third, the process of regular consultation within WEU will also cover aspects of the dialogue and prospects for co-operation with the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. A reactivated WEU will thus make a major contribution to the stabilisation of East-West relations, which will help to maintain peace in Europe and throughout the world.

Mr. President, I should now like to explain the most important decisions taken in Rome:

First, in future WEU will consider all major security and defence policy issues on which it is felt a joint European position should be adopted.

Second, to this end, the Council of Ministers will meet twice a year at ministerial level, as the Council's name implies. As they have done here in Rome, the Defence Ministers will always attend these meetings. The Foreign and Defence Ministers may also meet separately on other occasions.

Third, the Ministers also discussed a reform of existing WEU organs, i.e. the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee. They decided to phase out the quantitative controls on conventional weapons, which now serve no useful purpose. These two bodies will be reorganised and assume the following tasks: the examination of arms control and disarmament issues, while continuing to undertake the remaining control activities; the study of security and defence issues; the active promotion of European co-operation in armaments.

Fourth, WEU will seek close co-ordination with those members of the alliance which do not belong to WEU. The links between WEU and NATO, which are governed by treaty, must be cultivated and strengthened as necessary. Close co-operation with our partners in the alliance must be ensured. Well in advance of the meeting here in Rome, we consulted with our NATO partners. An official from the Foreign Ministry will be informing the NATO Council in Brussels of the discussions and the conclusions drawn at the meeting of 26th and 27th October.

Fifth, the Assembly of Western European Union will play an important part in the greater use made of WEU. Co-operation in the sphere of European security would be incomplete without the Assembly's active involvement. One of its tasks will be to solicit public support for our cause. The Council of Ministers cannot, of course, specify the Assembly's rôle in an enhanced WEU. That must be left to the representatives themselves. However, the Council of Ministers has put forward a number of proposals on how the Assembly might play a wider rôle and have closer relations with the Council of Ministers. The most important of these proposals are the following:

Mr. Genscher (continued)

- There should be more frequent informal contacts between representatives of the seven member states and representatives of the Assembly. Information must flow smoothly and quickly between WEU's two principal organs. This will not require any new institutional arrangements: it will be enough for the two sides to improve their contacts in a pragmatic and uncomplicated way, as we have indeed done in the last few weeks to our mutual benefit.

- Regular colloquies between the presidency and the committees of the Assembly should be held. Such colloquies between EPC and the European Parliament have already proved useful. They may also stimulate the dialogue between the Assembly and the presidency.

- The Assembly's dialogue with other parliaments could be intensified. Close contacts, which we are seeking at governmental level with the other members of the alliance, should also be cultivated between parliamentarians.

- Finally, the national governments are ready to provide the parliamentarians with information on major issues considered by the WEU Assembly.

In this context, I should like to stress the important reflections on aspects of WEU's reactivation which you, Mr. President, have summarised in a memorandum. Many of your proposals are to be found in the decisions that have been taken here in Rome.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, a number of important foreign and security policy issues were discussed at the Council's meeting. We considered East-West relations and their implications for European security. The dividing line between the two alliances runs through Europe. Changes in the balance between East and West directly affect Europe. Europe's specific security situation calls for a specifically European contribution to the dialogue between East and West. The states of Western European Union, together with the other European members of NATO, make a substantial contribution to defence within the Atlantic Alliance. We are prepared to accept the responsibility this entails. But we also want to be heard. Europe's voice will be duly heard in the transatlantic dialogue if the Seven adopt a common stance. WEU is the appropriate forum for the alignment of their positions on security issues.

The Ministers spent some time discussing ways of improving armaments co-operation within WEU. They took the view that the development of today's advanced technologies imposes a fresh and extremely costly burden on the armaments industries of all the member

states. The Europeans must accept this technological challenge together, or they will lag behind in international competition. They must therefore pool their resources and co-operate more closely in the armaments sector.

WEU will provide the necessary political impetus. It is also the appropriate body for the co-ordination of European interests in the spheres of defence technology and associated basic research.

The Ministers have instructed the Permanent Council to draw up reports, which will be considered at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers. The Permanent Council will submit proposals for a structural reform of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee, for the improvement of WEU's public relations activities, for ways of utilising the experience of military experts for the work of the WEU Council of Ministers.

The Ministers also expect a proposal on the application for WEU membership received from Portugal shortly before the meeting of the Council of Ministers. This application by Portugal is an indication of how attractive WEU has already become.

The Secretariat-General will be compiling a report on the measures that need to be taken to strengthen its activities. These measures must not entail an increase in the staff complement. The various reports must take account of the proposals which I made during my opening statement before the Council of Ministers: the establishment of a European research institute for security policy, which could become a forum for the discussion of questions of strategy, arms control policy and public relations activities in the area of security policy; purposeful co-operation among WEU members in basic military research and in the industrial maintenance of weapon systems that have already been introduced; prior clarification by the WEU member states of the question of the transfer of military technology; and, finally, the examination by WEU of the security aspects of new space technologies.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Western European Union has made considerable progress since the beginning of this year. The decisions taken by the Ministers at the meeting held in Rome to mark WEU's thirtieth anniversary are constructive and forward-looking. The great success of our meeting is highly encouraging for us all and for Europe. We must continue our work with the same vigour, with the Council of Ministers and the Assembly collaborating as closely as possible. I am convinced that the Assembly will play an active part in the achievement of our goals.

Mr. Genscher (continued)

The sign that has been given in the Rome Declaration shows that European defence policy is assuming definite shape. Greater European solidarity within WEU will strengthen the solidarity between Europe and North America. It will encourage the process of European unification and fortify the European pillar of the alliance. We shall thus all be making a major contribution to the maintenance of peace. Thank you, Mr. President.

(b) Address by Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, as President of the Assembly of Western European Union, I again wish to express to you the Assembly's gratitude, which stems first and foremost from the part you have played by making the fullest possible use of your powers as Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

We know that the task is not an easy one. It involves not only establishing co-ordination between the various governments and harmonising positions which are not always identical to begin with but also, for you and your associates, the heavy task of preparing the Council's work in detail, because if, in the near future, the reform of our institutions coincides with the intention to reactivate, the international secretariat of the Council at present available to you is mostly administrative.

In taking on this task, you were also determined to achieve concrete results which might form the salient points of an action programme for Western European Union; not simply an action programme to be carried through exclusively by the members of the governments concerned but also a programme to be implemented in a new spirit and in close consultation with our parliamentary Assembly, if possible, with better methods of consultation. And these are not mere words, Mr. Chairman, but already a reality to which we have been admitted in an impromptu and virtually informal manner, but seriously and in depth. After I had the honour of being appointed to my present office, you agreed, at the request of the Assembly and its President, to be closely associated with the preparatory work of the Council of Ministers of Western European Union which was to culminate in a meeting of such importance as that which has taken place in Rome. It is not for me to express an opinion on the substance of the Rome Declaration, as our December session will be devoted essentially to the reactions of the parliamentary Assembly to that declaration, our qualified committees will be making proposals and the Assembly will be taking a vote – and I hope you will be able to attend for this vital debate; at the same time, it is obvious that the

President of the Assembly of Western European Union cannot but express satisfaction at the fact that, in its declaration, the Council stresses, with reference to the Assembly, the value of continuing the work we have begun together in forms which we conceived and of seeking to enhance the results. As you will still be in office in June, your presence is a promise for us that the work will continue and I am quite sure that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy will take up the torch with his well-known vigour and his respect for the parliamentary institution.

I hope, also, Mr. Chairman, that when the Council comes to discuss the Assembly's rôle – which has perhaps not been well enough known to the general public and which we must now reactivate – it will give some attention to the somewhat gloomy and materialist subject of finance, as we politicians sometimes call it. I can give you an assurance on one point; since I became President of the Assembly, I have discovered just how short we are of resources. It is somewhat of a paradox to associate the idea of zero growth with that of reactivation. Reactivation means positive growth and while, from the budgetary standpoint, we all accept the need for economic restraint in all our countries in these particularly difficult times and must, of course, direct our efforts to improving our productivity and to organisation of our work, we must also continue to speak freely and state our needs clearly.

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, as I want my colleagues to have a chance to ask you questions, I will not go further into the details of the institutional reforms you have suggested; but I believe that there is one area where the Assembly will be able to play a major part, that of helping the Council in the studies it is to undertake over the coming year. We consider it essential that the programmes of work for both of us should be as closely-aligned as possible, which means that everything depends on sound preparation and also on good joint organisation. And I hope that the great experience acquired by the different parts of our organisation will allow them all to serve, possibly in a more up-to-date form, the new ideas which the governments have had the courage to set out in their Rome Declaration.

Mr. Chairman, as I am at present being fairly optimistic, may I express one regret, which you could well share with me, namely that we have not yet reached the point in which our institution can assert itself as being responsible for the defence of the peoples of Europe and as being the guarantor of their security, within of course the wholly united and indissoluble framework – as you yourself said – of the Atlantic Alliance. We need you, Mr. Chairman, and your Council colleagues. You need our parliamentary Assembly as spokesman for the general

The President (continued)

public, but you, the Council, and we, the Assembly, have a fundamental and growing need of public understanding and support. No government or parliament can go forward without public support and understanding. But the beautiful name Western European Union, with its three melodious vowels, which evokes the protection of a civilisation which we all treasure, has unfortunately aroused virtually no echo in the streets and estates of the towns and villages of the constituencies which elected us. We must win understanding for our work so that it can advance. And security is one of the most fundamental subjects of public concern. It is an instinctive need, not based on any technical study, and once the general public realises that, while remaining loyal to our Atlantic commitments, we are a European organisation with an executive Council and a parliamentary Assembly which are responsible for that security, the Rome Declaration will become the declaration of Europeans determined to continue their advance towards political unity within a united western world.

My last word is personal. We had in-depth talks with you on practical issues, and in confidence, because you announced to us a great deal of what has happened in Rome. Out of loyalty, we kept the talks to ourselves because it was for you to make them public. When we worked together at Gymnich under your high authority and as your warmly-received guests, the whole occasion was inspired by a spirit which impressed everyone. Now that the renaissance of Western European Union is going ahead, may it gather strength and, most of all, may the spirit of Gymnich be maintained. Thank you.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we shall now pass on to the questions to the Council.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, you pointed out earlier that if we are to be able to address any questions to Mr. Genscher, we should all be extremely brief and should keep our remarks to under five minutes and I propose to observe that restraint strictly. But it would be right firstly, I think, that, as the first questioner, I should just say to Mr. Genscher, both as a Britisher and a member of WEU and a leader of a group, that we really are immensely impressed with the enormous amount of fundamental re-thinking and work that has gone on since the decision was taken for what I prefer to call the rebirth of WEU rather than reactivation which to me has a rather mechanical sound of a distressed motor and I look forward to a rather more dramatic increase in our work in the future than just reactivation.

The three quick questions I want to ask, having paid my tribute to Mr. Genscher and especially to him above all the Ministers, is that in his own document which we have already received and many of us have read, there is one sentence in which he says that he does not think that the new rôle of WEU, although it is to be an expanded and a different rôle, need require any more expenditure – with greater efficiency it can be done within the same budgetary limits as at present. I would like Mr. Genscher to say whether that was a reflection of his solely on the work of the Council or whether it was a diplomatic hint to be conveyed to us as well, so far as the Assembly is concerned.

On the second question I want to ask, since the political groups have not had meetings beforehand, my three questions are not going to be controversial politically because I have no right, at this stage, to speak on behalf of anyone but myself, but I think no one in this Chamber, when we heard about Portugal's application, was surprised because if you make an institution more attractive and more effective, you must expect more people to want to join it. I would like Mr. Genscher to be able to say that these will not be allowed to come upon us in a series of surprises but that there had better be some fundamental work done by the Council and others as to how this is going to be dealt with in future. We do not want to wake up one day and find someone else has done it – there are already rumours, strong rumours, that Spain is about to do likewise and we must not get into a situation where ad hoc decisions are taken which annoy some people and please others, otherwise we shall actually cause a lack of unity in Europe rather than the opposite.

Finally, as a plea to Mr. Genscher, which I have already made to my own Ministers where I have received a favourable response, and that is that, in future, at least one or two Ministers should come to our two short plenary sessions of three or four days a year. This is no disrespect to the ambassadors who come there, but if we are going to have greater correlation between the political work of the Assembly and the political work of the Council I do really feel that it is not unreasonable, not necessarily all the Ministers of course, but that one or two Ministers should be present, not just for an hour and a lunch and a chat but throughout our plenary sessions. My own Ministers whom I have been bullying seem rather favourable to this and I make my plea to Mr. Genscher that he could raise these views with all his colleagues and with most particular regard, of course, to the session at the end of November when what we are discussing today will be the main topic of discussion for most of the time, but also in May 1985, when the implementation of much of what Mr. Genscher has been telling us will in fact be well under way. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Sir Frederic.

I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – In reply to your first question, the declaration in fact comments only on the question of whether or not the secretariat's staff complement should be increased. But this can be generalised. As you know, there is a church tax in my country. As a member of my church, I have always refused to believe that piety in the community could be improved by increasing the church tax. The same is true of the quality of the work done by institutions and other bodies.

As for Portugal's and Spain's accession, a formal application has only been received from Portugal. In his message to the Spanish nation, the Spanish Prime Minister also expressed interest, but an application has not yet been made. I think it is interesting to consider the reasons for this desire to accede to WEU, and the Council has, of course, reserved the right to submit these applications to a thorough examination, because we want to ensure that the enlargement – the possible enlargement – of Western European Union does not change or reduce its effectiveness, although we assume that Portugal, the only country so far to make an application, has no intention of making our work less effective and in fact wants to make it more effective.

Finally, as regards the Ministers' participation, the President has already pointed out that I unfortunately have to leave early today to attend the Franco-German summit – which was arranged before this session – in Germany, from which, being a member of the host government, I can hardly absent myself. But you may rest assured that we will do all we can to improve co-operation between the Council of Ministers and the Assembly by attending the Assembly's debates more frequently. The fact that the Italian Foreign Minister will be here all day today and that the Italian Defence Minister will also be coming shows that your suggestion was anticipated.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Genschler.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Mr. President, as Chairman of the Socialist Group, I want to thank first of all the Council of Ministers for their important, valuable and encouraging Rome Declaration and likewise the Chairman of the Council.

Mr. President, as you yourself said, the aim of this extraordinary session is to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary and, partly, to prepare a

normal parliamentary debate in December and not now. I want to emphasise that because political groups, as Sir Frederic Bennett already mentioned, did not have and do not have the opportunity to hold a normal meeting in order to prepare the debates. For that reason I restrict myself to four questions.

First question, within five minutes as Sir Frederic Bennett promised: the formal Rome Declaration is rather meagre and vague on the activities of Western European Union in disarmament – could the Minister be more specific?

Second question: I quote the Rome Declaration: "They [that is to say the Ministers] may also consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world." Would the Minister be so kind as to explain the meaning of the text and does the Council realise that, if not a majority, at least many members are strongly against any involvement of Western European Union in any military activity outside the territory?

Third question: the Rome Declaration spoke of the important task of the Assembly, and I quote again: "playing an increasing rôle, particularly by contributing even more to associating public opinion in the member states with the policy statements of the Council, which expresses the political will of the individual governments". Mr. President, does the Council realise that the first function of a parliament is to express feelings and opinions of the citizens of our countries? The first task is to represent the population and to control and influence governments and it is certainly not the task of parliament to act as public relations officer for governments.

Last question: the Rome Declaration is very vague on the very important aspects of the need to inform the other European member states of the alliance and the other partners in the European Communities. Could the Minister be more specific on the opinion of the Council and the way those other member states will be informed? Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Stoffelen.

I call Mr. Genschler.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – We are all aware that we cannot expect a final assessment of our proposals today, and we are aware that it would be beneficial to WEU's future development if the Assembly not only commented on our decisions but also came forward with its own ideas and initiatives. As you will have heard me say, the Council of Ministers has instructed the Permanent Council to draw up

Mr. Genscher (continued)

various reports, and we shall have to decide on these reports at our next meeting. The Council of Ministers will consider it a bonus if on that occasion it has to consider not only the Permanent Council's reports but also additional proposals from the Assembly of Western European Union.

I should now like to say a few words about the questions you have raised. First, on the question of disarmament, the discussions we shall be having in the months to come, including those at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers, will, of course, also cover the basic issue of disarmament. Our meeting in Rome was primarily devoted to deciding on the Rome Declaration and the possibilities for WEU's future development, and no conclusions were therefore drawn on the question of European contributions to arms control and disarmament.

You then referred to a sentence in the Rome Declaration, which I should like to quote: "They [the Ministers] may also consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world." This sentence must be seen in context. It is preceded in paragraph 8 by the following: "The Ministers therefore decided to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in particular..." and the various aspects are then listed: "defence questions, arms control and disarmament, the effects of developments in East-West relations on the security of Europe, Europe's contribution to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance, bearing in mind the importance of transatlantic relations and finally, the development of European co-operation in the field of armaments in respect of which WEU can provide a political impetus". These are the main tasks the Council of Ministers intends to perform. Then comes the sentence: "They may also consider [there thus being far less emphasis on this] the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world." I do not believe that we can fully define our security interests or analyse our security unless we include in this analysis and definition the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world. But - and here I agree with you - it cannot be for WEU as such to intervene in crises in other parts of the world. That is a different question. But crises obviously have implications for our security, and they cannot and must not therefore be underestimated.

Your last question concerned the Assembly's function, and here again, I think it is worthwhile to read the whole sentence: "They [the Ministers] stressed the major contribution which the Assembly has already made to the revitalisation of WEU and called upon it to pursue its efforts

to strengthen the solidarity among the member states...". That is, of course, the main area in which we expect help from the Assembly. The sentence then continues: "... and to strive to consolidate the consensus among public opinion on their security and defence needs." That is a task the Council and the Assembly must perform together. And I believe that the discussions in the last two years have at least shown that the importance of this consensus on security for the security policy of an alliance - in this case, Western European Union - must not be underestimated. In other words, if public relations are regarded more as a matter of self-portrayal, they will not do what they are intended to do in the case of security policy.

It is impossible to implement a cohesive, effective security and defence policy unless there is a consensus or at least general approval in each of the countries that belong to an alliance. We are also well aware that certain governments in the Atlantic Alliance do not have the backing of this consensus and are therefore unable to honour all the commitments they have entered into in the alliance by their own decision. I therefore consider a consensus of this kind to be crucially important if our alliance is to be in a position to take action. A security policy is worth only half as much if it does not have the support of this consensus. A security policy means more than numbers of guns, rifles and soldiers. It means approval of political and social conditions in the member states of the alliance and also approval of what is done to ensure security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, Mr. Genscher.

I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). - Mr. President, the Liberal Group has examined the Rome Declaration with great interest. It has noted its general agreement although the group has not yet been able to hold a discussion on the subject. We are not, however, completely satisfied as this is only the start of a new direction which Western European Union should take. Our satisfaction is the greater since we know that this declaration has been drawn up under the leadership of one of the greatest liberals now active in Europe, Mr. Genscher, Vice-Chancellor of the Federal Republic. We can assert that the Rome Declaration has in fact strengthened the European pillar - Mr. President, I see that you are raising your hand, I am coming to my questions but, nevertheless I need an introduction. Twice-yearly meetings of the Ministers are extremely important; I assume, at least, that it will be the Ministers who meet. Another point is will they consider regular meetings of military leaders, in other words the chiefs-of-staff, to seek, in this

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

framework, a strengthening of the European component of NATO?

Another important issue regarding the European member countries of NATO, and certainly the member states of WEU, is to what extent armaments exports to countries outside Europe should be discussed in the framework of the ministerial meetings? Is co-ordination in this area to be considered? Is anything to be done about restrictions on weapon exports? Another matter for discussion between the Ministers might be the repercussions of weapon replacements on security and the East-West balance and the effect the modernisation of weapons might have in accelerating the armaments race. There has, as yet, been no discussion of security policy mentioned in the Genscher/ Colombo plan. Is there not a danger that WEU might be made a body which acts in parallel to the European Community with the result that we might slowly come together? Are these views also being examined in the Council?

Mr. President, Western European Union is a valuable institution and I will continue to emphasise this, but it should remain safely within the NATO framework.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Blaauw.

I call Mr. Genscher.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The report the Ministers have called for on the extent to which military experts might be involved in the work of WEU's Council of Ministers will go some way towards answering your question. However, the report is to consider how compatible it would be with the purpose of Western European Union to include the advice of these experts in the co-operation among the member states. The meeting of the Council of Ministers revealed that there are serious objections to the establishment of permanent institutions or the organisation of regular meetings of the chiefs-of-staff, which would de facto result in the formation of a European general staff. Concern was expressed about the possibility of this leading to a military decision-making centre that would conflict with NATO. But the question of whether and to what extent the advice of military experts can be included is the subject of one of the studies to be carried out by the Permanent Council.

Your second question concerned the problem of arms exports. This is indeed an important question, which always becomes a practical issue when the discussion turns to armaments co-operation. From my own country's experience

I can say that trying to co-operate with other countries in arms production is a very complicated matter, although there is much to be said for it, not only because production then becomes cheaper, which is not usually the case in fact. Nonetheless, the larger numbers produced as a result of standardisation in the alliance would naturally help, and for the Europeans armaments co-operation would also have the advantage of improving the chances of the two-way street between the United States of America and Europe becoming a reality and replacing the present very unhealthy ratio of seven to one. On the other hand, armaments co-operation always requires some co-ordination of policies on arms exports. The study that is made of this subject will therefore have to consider harmonisation in this field too if we are to avoid insurmountable problems.

To turn to your third question, we shall have to consider the state of East-West relations and also the – I hope – rather less complicated subject of arms control and disarmament in preparation for the next meeting. I would hope that WEU's Council of Ministers could agree to meet some time before the NATO Council of Ministers. This would mean that, if the NATO Ministers met in May, WEU's Council of Ministers would have to hold its spring meeting in, say, April. Similarly, the December meeting of the NATO Ministers would be preceded by a meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in November. I say this, Mr. President, because I feel the Assembly should bear these dates in mind when drawing up its proposals. Although we have not yet fixed the dates for the meetings of the Council of Ministers, I personally should like the next meeting to be held in April.

As for your last question concerning security policy and the Genscher/Colombo act, it has unfortunately proved impossible for many of the ideas we introduced into European political co-operation, particularly those relating to security policy, to be put into practice because there were objections. Interestingly, these objections were raised by the member states of the European Community which do not belong to Western European Union. We therefore hope that the work of Western European Union will enable us to achieve what it has unfortunately been impossible to achieve in the European Community.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I call Mr. Gianotti.

Mr. GIANOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – One of the points stressed by the President was the representativeness of the Assembly, the fact that our purpose is to represent public opinion in Europe. The people in our countries ask that their security be ensured and this request we

Mr. Gianotti (continued)

endeavour to meet, but there is one thing that alarms millions in Europe and it is the nuclear arms race. In one of his answers Mr. Genscher, too, referred to the importance of public opinion. So, going back to the question already put by Mr. Stoffelen, I would like to ask the Minister whether, at its meeting on Friday and Saturday, the Council of Ministers considered the question of nuclear disarmament and diplomatic initiatives aimed in that direction and, more particularly, I would like to know what he thinks of the proposals that have been put forward for some time now with regard to the creation of denuclearised zones. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Gianotti.

I call Mr. Genscher.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – In our future and more intensive work we shall devote more attention to the questions of arms control and disarmament, which will also be considered during the formulation of our European ideas and proposals. This could not be done at the meeting here in Rome because our first task was to lay sound foundations for our future work. I cannot therefore answer on behalf of the Council of Ministers on the subject of nuclear-free zones, but I am willing to state my own and my government's views. I have always believed that the absence of nuclear weapons from a zone does not make it nuclear-free. A zone is nuclear-free in the sense of being a safer place for its inhabitants only if it cannot be attacked with nuclear weapons. I must unfortunately point out that it is precisely this latter requirement which the regions we regard as nuclear-free fail to satisfy, and we therefore consider nuclear-free zones not safer but in greater danger of being subjected to nuclear blackmail.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – We are all most appreciative, Mr. President, of Mr. Genscher's speech and what interested me particularly as Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was his observations on the fact that Ministers had discussed at length ways and means of achieving improved arms co-operation within WEU. Mr. Genscher said that they held the view that the development of modern high technology places new, highly costly demands on the armaments industries of all members and that the Europeans must jointly face this technological challenge or else they will be unable to

hold their own in international competition. We have in this Assembly, Sir, laboured long and hard to improve European arms collaboration and to enhance rationalisation, standardisation and interoperability of equipment. One area that interests us in particular is the potential application of space technology for military purposes and we are very conscious, Sir, that the European Space Agency, although it has many notable achievements, is precluded by virtue of its convention, by its founding statute, from any military rôle.

Could you say, Mr. Genscher, whether in the course of the review of the Standing Armaments Committee, you envisage that body taking an interest in the development of a European military space programme, were that to be appropriate in the judgment of the Council of Ministers, and would you also say whether it would be possible for the Standing Armaments Committee to be represented at the meetings of the Independent European Programme Group and then maybe report back to this Assembly, so that parliamentarians could be informed of the important work for the harmonisation of operational requirements and re-equipment time scales which is carried out in the IEPG? At present, the IEPG, as you know, Sir, reports entirely to national defence ministries and there is no feed-back to ourselves, which inhibits our work in this Assembly in the vital field of harmonising and standardising armaments. Thank you, Sir.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson.

I call Mr. Genscher.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. Wilkinson, I shall of course pass on to the Council of Ministers your request that the Assembly be more fully informed in this area. This can only benefit co-operation.

I will make a few general comments on technology as distinct from the question of arms in space, because our organisation must refrain from anything that might speed up the arms race in space. I and, I believe, all my colleagues were concerned about something else. We must realise that Europe's technological development is of crucial importance in political and economic terms and also for its security. The influence Europe is able to exert will depend on its technological efficiency. If we look back at the last two hundred years, we find that, whether or not it put it to good use, Europe's position in the world depended on and was determined by the leading rôle it played in technology. This leading rôle in technology is now under threat. It is threatened by develop-

Mr. Genscher (continued)

ments in the United States of America and by developments in Japan. We cannot blame the Americans or the Japanese for this. We can only blame ourselves. Europe has a large market, but it does not take advantage of it. The various member states of the European Community think in national, not European, terms when appointing staff. We are incapable of pooling our human resources. Research is duplicated, and the findings are jealously guarded. The physical resources of our countries, which are considerable, are used separately rather than being pooled.

Someone once asked how long 250 million Americans would go on protecting 250 million Western Europeans against 250 million Russians. To transfer this image to technology, how long must 250 million Americans go on being technologically and economically stronger than 250 million Western Europeans in the European Community? In other words, quite apart from armaments co-operation, we must step up our technological efforts and join forces if Europe is to play a key rôle. This is the criterion by which we are judged in the third world, Washington, Tokyo and even Moscow. Europe's technological development is therefore the main task, and it is here that we must provide impulses in both WEU and the European Community.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Genscher.

I call Mr. Masciadri.

Mr. MASCIADRI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Minister, of all the possible questions, I shall pick just one because I consider it to be a priority, or at least fundamental, and it is this. Is the Vice-Chancellor not afraid that replacing formal by informal procedures, as proposed yesterday and the day before in the Council of Ministers, will result in weakening the obligations laid on Western European Union by the modified Brussels Treaty and, to be even more specific and practical, that the Assembly may, if there is no official record, fail to be duly advised and informed of problems? The danger is that it will be informed about some problems only and this could possibly mean a kind of "diminutio capitis" of the Assembly vis-à-vis the Council. I would like to have an answer to this question because I consider it important in regard to the work that we shall clearly have to carry out, now or later, in the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Masciadri.

I call Mr. Genscher.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-*

in-Office of the Council) (Translation). – The question of the form the co-operation between the Council of Ministers and the Assembly takes is, of course, extremely important, for you as members of the Assembly and for me as a member of the Council of Ministers. What the Council of Ministers and its present Chairman are offering is the closest possible co-operation and contacts. How far you for your part should insist on formal procedures is not a question you can put to me: it is a question of the Assembly's self-image, and the Assembly will certainly have to choose between more formal procedures and more information. It will be difficult to have both. The Council of Ministers will consider any view the Assembly puts to it. We cannot presume to take a decision on this question. I believe you should have put it to the Assembly itself.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Minister, it might therefore be said that there is perhaps a greater need for improvement in the civilian infrastructure than in the military infrastructure. I should like to take up a remark made by the Chairman. He complained that the man in the street was still not in favour of many of the initiatives taken by the Council of Ministers. I feel we should perhaps consider the possibility that the public do not want what you have discussed in the Council of Ministers, that they may not want it because they do not want arms co-ordination, because they do not want a fresh arms build-up in their countries and because they want disarmament initiatives. And to judge by everything the Chairman of the Council of Ministers has said here, the Council obviously does not attach as much importance to such initiatives as to initiatives to integrate armaments. And it is to this that my questions refer.

My first question is this: although Mr. Genscher has said that the Council of Ministers now believes that quantitative controls over conventional weapons no longer serve a useful purpose, he has not said why it believes this is so, and I should like a clear answer on this.

Second, in his opening statement before the Council of Ministers he came down far more clearly on the side of disarmament and a co-ordinated initiative, with account taken of peace research, than he has done in his statement here. Is the conclusion to be drawn from this that this initiative aimed at disarmament and peace research was not so well received in the Council of Ministers as it might have been?

I have a further question in this context: has any thought been given – not only in the Council

Mr. Vogt (continued)

of Ministers but possibly in the European Community as well – to the establishment of an independent disarmament agency, perhaps akin to the ACDA in the United States of America, in formal structure at least? If so, how have such proposals been received?

And then I have a question which more specifically concerns the Federal Republic of Germany: the arms restrictions were removed in June owing partly to Mr. Genscher's initiative. My question is this: is the Federal Government prepared to take a calculated first step by issuing an internationally binding declaration that it will not take advantage of its right to manufacture strategic launchers, bombers and missiles? Mr. Genscher has said after all that we should like to be able to do what we want to do. But will you shortly be issuing a statement to the effect that the Federal Government voluntarily refrains from making use of its right?

Lastly, after the Council of Ministers had overcome the objections raised by Greece, Denmark and Ireland in the European Community to the proposed integration of armaments by rediscovering Western European Union, was there any appreciable opposition in WEU's Council of Ministers?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – As regards the quantitative controls, we are convinced that it will be more constructive to seek closer co-operation than to have quantitative controls, which have tended to be exercised technocratically.

You asked about a peace initiative and said my opening statement had been more explicit on this subject. It was no more explicit than my statement today, in which I said that the reports to be drawn up by the Permanent Council must also take account of the proposals I made in my opening statement, and they include a proposal for the establishment of a European research institute for security policy, which might become a forum for the discussion of questions of strategy, arms control policy and public relations activities in the area of security policy. I believe that, if this proposal is approved, and I have little doubt that it will be, it could make a valuable contribution along the lines you have indicated.

You then asked what the Federal Government's future position would be on the manufacture and possession of conventional strategic weapons now that the restrictions in this respect

have been removed by Western European Union. I can tell you that the Federal Government has already issued a statement to WEU's Secretariat-General on this subject. However, the Federal Government intends to repeat and confirm this statement before the German Bundestag. It plans to make a government statement before the German Bundestag on 8th November 1984 concerning a report on the meeting in Rome to mark the thirtieth anniversary of WEU. And in this government statement I shall also repeat the statement that we made to the Secretariat-General at the time the restrictions were removed.

The question of opposition was bound to be raised, of course. I had the impression that your question was based on a misunderstanding of what we were trying to achieve with the Genscher/Colombo act. During the deliberations on this European act, I was very disappointed by the lack of willingness to include aspects of security policy in the activities of the European Community. This has nothing to do with an arms build-up, since the European Community is not, of course, a military alliance. But I was disappointed by the claims constantly heard in Europe that the Americans are imposing their will on us, that they are trying to put pressure on us, that they have too much influence. And then, when the Europeans look for a body in which they can define and jointly express their interests, they are accused of contributing to militarisation. I find that completely inconsistent. As I have said before, it is not that the Americans are denying us our rightful position in the alliance but that certain forces in Europe are preventing Europe from defining its own position and abiding by it. And we want to overcome these forces. What we want is a European identity, European stature and culture in security policy, and it is here that Western European Union can achieve something. And I am afraid I must disappoint you, Mr. Vogt: there was no opposition to these ideas in the Council of Ministers, only approval. That is why I felt so encouraged after the meeting here in Rome.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. Minister, as Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, I am of course delighted that, this weekend, the Council of Ministers has transformed into decisions most of the recommendations which the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments persuaded the Assembly to adopt on 15th May last. I would, however, like to ask you three questions. An effective European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance can only be established by

Mr. De Decker (continued)

way of a series of sometimes modest decisions which, as they build up, will lead to the standardisation and harmonisation of our armaments, logistics, military service and defence concepts. In this context, may I ask you, Minister, if the Council intends that experts from the Foreign Ministries should be associated with the work of the Permanent Council and if it also intends to promote conferences of chiefs-of-staff of our seven armies?

Secondly, I am also delighted that the Council has seen fit to follow the Assembly's recommendations on the reorganisation of the work of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee. We hope that, over the coming months, the Council of Ministers will stress the vital rôle which these bodies can play, as part of a general reorganisation. When they have been reorganised, they will have to be given first-class staff with the resources needed to carry on their duties. Can you, therefore, Mr. Genscher, give us an assurance on this point in the name of the Council, because the decision of the Council of Ministers not to increase the WEU budget may raise doubts as to the shared determination to reactivate our union with new objectives?

My final question relates to the fact that Europe's military effort is not always appreciated at its true value across the Atlantic. Our American partner in the Atlantic Alliance which, in the event of war in Europe, plans to send twenty-one of its twenty-four divisions to Europe, is asking itself the important question of whether Europe's armed forces are capable of protecting this rapid reinforcement and of holding back an aggressor long enough. The recent vote on the amendment tabled by Senator Sam Nunn, which just failed to be approved by the Senate and called for the withdrawal of 100,000 American troops from Europe, shows that there are too many American politicians who think that Europe is not doing what can rightfully be expected of it in this field. Mr. Chairman, I think WEU should study this question very closely as a matter of urgency and, if necessary, should call on its members to make the effort which may be necessary, particularly as regards our ammunition stocks, our anti-aircraft defence and the equipment of our reserves. May I ask you if the Council intends to commission this study which is so vital for strengthening the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. De Decker.

I call Mr. Genscher.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-*

in-Office of the Council) (Translation). – As I said in reply to an earlier question, the establishment of a permanent conference of chiefs-of-staff is not envisaged because it is feared that a body of this kind might compete in some way with the NATO institutions. I believe this objection must be taken very seriously. On the other hand, the study on the benefits to be derived from the advice of military experts must indicate ways in which we can use such advice. I commented on resources at the beginning of this session. It will be important for our work to be performed more effectively with the resources available. The reports we have instructed the Secretariat-General and the Permanent Council to draw up will, I hope, suggest how this can be achieved. The Assembly also has its ideas on this question, of course, and we shall take them into consideration.

I should like to say a few words about the concern expressed in the United States about the ability or the will of the European allies to make their contribution to joint security. It can be said, of course, that some of the criticism to be heard in the United States is justified. But I must reject criticism expressed in other quarters as unjustified. I will begin with defence spending. The European allies – I know this for a fact where my own country is concerned – continuously increased their spending on joint security even in the 1970s. The United States, on the other hand, drastically reduced its spending on defence in the 1970s. It has therefore had to spend a great deal more to catch up. That is why an increase in defence spending in the United States does not automatically necessitate the same increase in Europe, because there is not this need to catch up in Europe or at least not everywhere in Europe. That is the first thing I should like to say about this.

Secondly, I want to refer to a factor that is underestimated in the United States, but it is something for which we must solicit support and understanding in that country in the interests of our alliance. At this juncture I must say that I shall not now have the unreserved approval of the British members of the Assembly, but it is clear that an alliance derives its defence strength not only from the number of active soldiers but also from the number of reservists it can mobilise in a relatively short space of time, which must be measured in hours and days. Reservists in appreciable numbers cannot, however, be mobilised by armies consisting solely of regular troops, only by armies which include a large proportion of conscripted troops. And my country has a conscript army, which is capable of more than doubling its strength in the space of a few days. This is a major contribution to joint security, which I am convinced is underestimated in the United States.

Mr. Genscher (continued)

You have referred to a problem facing various countries in Europe, including my own, the question of munition stocks. This is a very serious problem, which the various countries must tackle. This is certainly true of the Federal Republic of Germany: I do not want to point at others. And there is another factor to be considered: countries must, of course, be able to adjust to changing circumstances. My own country must adjust to the fact that from 1989 onwards the population will include fewer young people liable for national service. This will force us to increase national service from 15 to 18 months, and that is not a very popular decision. We shall do this, and I shall do my utmost to make it clear to the United States of America what it means to take this decision.

Doubt has also been expressed in the United States about the will of the Europeans to make their contribution in view of a change in the position adopted by European governments or parties on the implementation of the decision taken in 1979 on the arms build-up. When it came to implementing this decision in 1983, the British, Italian and Federal German Governments decided to take the step that had originally been planned in 1979. In other words, we did not, as we occasionally read in the press, do what the Americans wanted us to do: we did what we Europeans ourselves proposed in 1979, what we in Europe undertook to do together with the United States. But the question views the importance of public relations activities from a different angle. Not only must we win over our own public: it is also crucially important for the alliance that we should convince our allies on the other side of the Atlantic that what we are doing here is right and necessary. This brings me back to the point raised in an earlier question: there is, of course, some aversion to the concentration of Europe's interest on America. If we are to overcome this, there must be closer personal contacts and Europe must also demonstrate its vitality, and I consider it important for Europeans to be convinced that they can solve the problems. In any case, pessimism about the future is always a poor guide, nor is it attractive to prospective partners and allies. I feel what we are doing here is a sign of our confidence and our will to shape the future, and this is bound to have an impression in the United States.

Mr. President, as I said earlier I unfortunately have to leave you at 10.30 a.m. I am sorry that this has to be, but as the meeting with the French Government was arranged before this session, I have no alternative. I am pleased to say that the Italian Government is represented here. The Council of Ministers is not therefore abandoning the Assembly. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Our thanks are due to Mr. Genscher and we wish him every success with the rest of his work today.

Before calling Mr. Andreotti, as agreed, I should like to make a short announcement. As a result of the very kind efforts of our colleague and friend, Gerardo Bianco, Chairman of the Italian Delegation, I can inform you that the Assembly will be received tomorrow by His Holiness Pope John Paul II, at the Vatican.

(c) Address by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy; questions and answers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thanking you once again for being present, Mr. Andreotti, I now give you the floor.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have no need to tell you that I consider it a great privilege to be invited to participate in this extraordinary session of the Assembly, meeting here in Rome, and to represent the Council after Vice-Chancellor Genscher's enforced departure. I have very few points to add, more particularly from an Italian standpoint, which coincides, as it happens, with the common stance set out by Mr. Genscher on behalf of the Council.

The Italian Government attaches particular value to the revival of Western European Union or, as Sir Frederic Bennett described it, the rebirth of Western European Union, but this revival is part of an overall vision which I feel needs to be spelled out in absolutely precise terms, on this occasion of the Assembly's meeting in Rome and on others, so that public opinion in our different countries may be better informed about security problems. Reading the records of parliamentary debates at the time the founding treaties were ratified, we can see that the argument was keen and vigorous. Today it seems to me that the debate on these problems – despite the fact that many causes for concern remain – is less intense now than it was then and I feel that an assembly such as this can do much to help initiate discussion both inside and outside our parliaments on the real content of security problems and not just some of their aspects which are sometimes purely of an emotive nature.

In this instrument of Western European Union we see a means of consolidating both the broader Atlantic context that unites us to other European countries and to the great democracies across the ocean and the process of European construction which, I believe, remains a basic objective for all of us.

The central political issue, which we discussed very seriously in the Council of Ministers meeting here in Rome on Friday and Saturday,

Mr. Andreotti (continued)

is what this new or, if you like, renewed usefulness that we attach to Western European Union is to be. In that connection let me say that the financing problem cannot constitute a serious obstacle. I am well aware of the financial and economic difficulties of our governments and, generally, of all our situations, but when you think that the total WEU budget represents less than half the cost of a Leopard tank, it seems to me that the scale of the expenditure cannot, of itself, be an obstacle to programming a possible increase in our activity. I believe it is important – and if I repeat myself it is to stress the point – that we should see things this way.

I said before that the context is certainly that of the Atlantic Alliance but it is our duty to ask ourselves whether the sharing of the two shores of the Atlantic in our common defence which, to my mind, should be an enduring policy, does not call for a greater contribution from Europe and whether it would not be wise and prudent to plan for this and to map out the relevant policy.

It also seems to me that the European identity we are talking about would certainly be incomplete, or perhaps simply a form of words, if it were wholly to exclude the problem of joint security. This is one aspect of the requirement that greater responsibility be assigned to the European identity.

Now, whilst it is true that we have to rely upon common interest on the far side of the Atlantic as regards the need for a joint defence policy and whilst it is also true that we have to rely upon the need for a contribution matching that which is the development of our continent, another aspect stems from that requirement to which I will just make a brief reference. We often hear it said that the Pacific, in the long term and from not just the military but also the general viewpoint, may become more important than the Atlantic and that possibly in the not too far distant future the two areas will become equal. This should give us cause for thought and brings me to my conclusion.

If we have to make this greater effort – and a substantial part of our meeting on Friday and Saturday was devoted to drawing its main lines – we shall then need to study how to give it practical effect and to see, since our resources are not unlimited, what we can do to spend what we do spend on defence better and to ensure there is a spin-off from defence spending for all technological progress in industry generally. I would say that the United States is a striking example of this reciprocal integration of general technological progress with defence spending.

One instance of this collaboration is in standardisation, a problem that has been addressed

on many occasions but in which we have succeeded in making only partial – very partial – progress, including within the alliance. The other aspect – and I feel that Mr. Genscher did well to make this point – is to view this collaboration as one facet of a broader collaboration for the technological progress and development of a general nature that is our daily cross and concern in many other bodies, beginning with the European Economic Community.

Before I close let me say – and you will see this in the Rome Declaration and appended texts – that the fact that endeavours are also to be made to give more importance to the study of controls is an extremely valuable contribution and, to my mind, the most valuable contribution we can make to a peace policy because, realistically, no policy for the gradual reduction of armaments can be formulated without taking into account the fact that perhaps the biggest obstacle up to now has been the lack of mutual trust and the absence of control models which can and have to be accepted or without shouldering serious responsibilities. I believe that the emphasis laid on this subject shows not only that Western European Union is working for peace but also that its efforts are not limited to resounding statements for others' ears but are aimed at constructing the political basis that will enable negotiations to proceed and reach a concrete result.

That is what I wanted to say. To conclude, it seems to me that the decision taken by the Council of Ministers that the two annual meetings of the Council will, from now on, be joint meetings of Foreign and Defence Ministers is of considerable significance from both practical and political standpoints because, for one thing, there is no defence problem that can lie outside the context of general policy and, for another, there can be no statement of general policy objectives that has no effective relevance in the field of security. For this reason, it seems to me that this session – whether it is called historic or not I do not care – will have contributed to that integration (a word of special significance in the declaration because it is not generally easy to achieve agreement to its inclusion in communiqués) towards which we are endeavouring to make better progress through the instrument of supreme political and representative value that Western European Union constitutes. I believe that, in these few days, we shall really have made an effective contribution – and you are here in Rome to confirm it – to a certain optimism – which needs to be recovered – and to the cause of peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – On behalf of the Assembly, I should like to thank you, Minister, for your address and to say how greatly we shall benefit from your wisdom and experience. We welcome your participation in our

The President (continued)

work for several reasons, first among which I would name your status as the convinced, militant European you have always been, who carries others along with him by his example. I hope, therefore, that today will also take its place in the new departure we so much need. May I thank you again for your personal contribution.

I call Mr. Beix.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, you said several times in your speech that a common willingness to act and discuss in WEU can by no means be taken as read. While reactivation is generally accepted in words, it is still not sure in practice and the estimate comparing the cost of the Assembly to half that of a Leopard tank is an instructive comment on the initiative. But reactivation is bound to create problems for member states which belong to the NATO integrated command structure. I would like to ask the Minister how he sees the link between NATO and WEU and whether he is prepared to comment on the statements made by the French Minister of Defence to the effect that European solidarity enhances Atlantic solidarity. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Beix.

I call Mr. Andreotti.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – I think it almost inevitable, with the passing of the decades, for changes to have taken place within the very structure of the alliance itself because of differences, partly technical and military and partly political, in viewpoint. What counted, to my mind, was that those countries, starting with France say, that took a special position did not wish this to be interpreted as a break in their continued adherence to the basic principles of security and solidarity that constitute the alliance. So, first in the case of France and then in the case of Greece, we had to make political and structural adjustments to deal with the new situations as they arose.

To the specific question with regard to relations between WEU and the alliance I would give a twofold answer. First, when a moment ago I talked about integration, I was referring to political, not military, integration. It seems to me that having a forum in which our seven countries can discuss their views and experiences and work out common defence strategies and thus try to talk a common language, or at all events one they have gone very thoroughly into together in the other forums they are members of as well, beginning with the Atlantic Alliance, constitutes a considerable European contribution, particularly at the policy

level, to the problems of joint defence. Of course, my hope is that convergence will increase but, then again, we could say that the need to adapt its instruments to the political decisions of individual countries was perhaps a test of the quality of the Atlantic Alliance. I believe that the fact that WEU and other communities in which we are united maintain their reciprocal links is a solid guarantee that the particular requirements of this or that country will in no way diminish the overall effectiveness of common defence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. Personally, I greatly appreciate Mr. Andreotti's call for optimism. I have also heard many references to the renaissance of WEU. Mr. Minister, I do not think that the word is particularly appropriate. As WEU has never faded away completely thanks to the efforts of the parliamentary Assembly, you are right to speak of the renaissance of the Council. But if you will permit, let us rather speak of relaunching thanks to the Assembly's efforts over a long period. We are told, and we say it ourselves, that Europe does not assert itself sufficiently. The question is the one you yourself asked: "Will Europe ever be able to do so, if the number of members stays at seven?" The question of enlargement has, of course, been raised by Portugal's application to join and by the speech made by Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez to the Cortes last week. Europe does not assert itself enough because the Atlantic Alliance has at present only one pillar, which is in Washington. On the European side, our patchwork Europe is more like a wooden leg than a pillar. If we want Europe to become master of its own destiny and to participate as a true partner in the Atlantic Alliance, it must organise itself and that is why I welcome the Rome Declaration which has just been distributed to us. Mr. Genscher, I also welcome the determination which it expresses. In your document, Minister, you say that public opinion must back the effort to relaunch European union in the matter of security and defence. But how far do you intend that the national parliaments should be involved? Vice-Chancellor Genscher announced that there is to be a debate in the Bundestag, on 8th November next, I think. Does the Council intend to decide and to commit itself not to forget, perhaps less in Rome, but in Brussels, London, Paris or elsewhere, what has been said at these meetings and does it intend to ask the various governments to take steps – as Mr. Genscher has announced for the Bundestag – to hold a debate in the national parliaments on the relaunching of WEU?

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

Furthermore, as regards the Agency for the Control of Armaments, may I express my concern in a question? Vice-Chancellor Genscher spoke of the elimination of quantitative controls which are no longer applied but also of many controls which are still carried out. I am concerned because it is easier to destroy than to create and I fear that we shall soon be witnessing the dismantling of the only section of WEU which is truly operational, even though the text and clauses of the treaty are not always fully respected as regards controls.

Finally, the fear has been expressed here that, if military experts and chiefs-of-staff are regularly associated with the work of WEU, the result may be the creation of a second decision-making centre outside NATO. We must recognise that, if we are to form this European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, we Europeans must also promise to participate in the most direct and decisive manner both in appraising the threat and in establishing the force relationship and, of course, in strategic weapons because, European pillar of NATO or not, have you considered, Mr. Minister, putting an end to this unacceptable situation in which the strategic option for Europe, including the decision whether or not to use nuclear weapons in the event of war in Europe, is completely out of European hands and is in the hands of the other pillar of the alliance? What is the position today?

Mr. Minister, what is the position as regards Article V of the treaty which provides for automatic aid and assistance between the seven allies? Some recent statements in WEU may still leave doubts as to the complete and total acceptance by the seven governments of that article and its content. What is the position? Has the Council reaffirmed the full force of Article V which is the most valuable element of WEU? Mr. Minister, we are, it is true, at an important juncture but let us beware of political shows. We are enjoying the euphoria of the moment, but while some of us have been arguing for years in this Assembly for the relaunching of WEU, it is only in the days to come that the real intentions will become clear. Is this series of commitments merely a hotch-potch of the intentions of the seven governments or does it represent a unanimous determination to travel along the same road? It has been said during this weekend in Rome that the sleeping beauty had been awakened. I believe that what is to follow will be even more difficult, because do you not think that an attempt will have to be made one day to overcome national susceptibilities, stemming from what I regard as the out-dated concept of national sovereignty? Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

Does the Minister wish to reply?

(Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – On the various points the questioner has raised, it is true that the term revival should apply more to the Council of Ministers than to the Assembly which is very much alive. As regards the Council, I have to say that although up to now, for example, the Ministers themselves rarely attended the two meetings in person, their Secretaries of State practically always did. We have now undertaken to attend not only in person but together, i.e. both Foreign and Defence Ministers.

As regards making our work known outside, the problem – complicated by the many international activities going on – is how to inform the public about, and interest it in, the substance of the problems that we discuss, often on the basis of very lengthy documents. We have to find more effective techniques for communicating with the public. For example, maybe we have the vice of always making our documents very long. The Atlantic Council's annual publication is a tidy little volume that I do not think a single newspaper in the world would reproduce in full. But this is a matter of communication technique. What the questioner said seems right to me and perhaps we could take this opportunity of suggesting to our members of parliament that they set aside one day in the year to take stock of the activities of WEU. I think this specific annual rendezvous would be a way of stimulating closer acquaintanceship with our problems.

As regards the Agency for the Control of Armaments, I certainly feel that we should not underrate the work it has done. Some of its studies on control matters are very valuable and a sound basis for serious discussions on this subject. The decision we took in Council was that concrete proposals should be produced for improvements and changes, so it will be on the basis of these proposals that we shall be discussing and comparing views. I do not think there was any reluctance in the Council – and this, incidentally, can to some extent be inferred from the declaration – to call, in the preparatory phase of our deliberations, upon the active experience of the military – senior officers and experts. What seems important to me is that so far there is no provision, in the general framework of the new structures for our work, for another military body: a committee of chiefs-of-staff or some similar body. We shall be able to talk about this when we discuss the innova-

Mr. Andreotti (continued)

tions we shall need to introduce in the broader context of the new working methods.

The answer to the last question as to whether Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is still in force is yes. It is an unchangeable part of our commitment to the Atlantic Alliance in which no one would deny of course that the balance weighs heavily on the side of the United States. But I am able to say, and can so vouch from personal experience – I have taken part in many Atlantic Council meetings in various capacities – that in the building up of a shared determination and in the actual formulation of resolutions and defence and security policy orientations the importance of the Europeans has often been far greater than people outside normally tend to believe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Is Mr. Jäger present?

Mr. JÄGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Minister, in his opening statement Mr. Genscher referred to Western European Union's public relations activities in the area of security policy, and President Caro similarly stressed the need for improved public relations in his opening address. The specific questions I wish to put to the Minister concern this aspect.

We are facing a challenge, which is in no way solely a military challenge to our countries and their people, to them personally and their houses, but the challenge of an enormous propaganda offensive aimed at the minds of the people, and it sometimes seems to me as if the propaganda divisions directed against the countries of Western Europe are threatening us with more effective and better weapons than many of the missiles, ships, tanks or armoured units facing us.

In this respect I find that the question of a consensus, to which Mr. Genscher referred, has become very much the focal point of the European debate. It is after all said that the propagandists I have just mentioned have adopted the destruction of this consensus as their cause. Many organisations – led by the World Peace Council, which is controlled by Moscow – are trying to depict us Western Europeans as the real warmongers, the enemies of peace, the revanchists and the militarists, who are doing nothing other than prepare for a war which they intend to wage against the eastern bloc countries. The truth is precisely the opposite. But we have so far done too little in Western European Union to achieve a consensus, agreement on security, peace and defence issues among our peoples, the parliaments and governments of the countries represented in this Assembly and the Council of Ministers of Western European Union.

The specific question I want to put to the Minister is this: in his opening statement, which you, of course, heard, Mr. Genscher said that a European research institute will be established to consider, among other things, the question of public relations in the area of security policy. Is this all the Council of Ministers intends to do in this area, or does it have other projects and ideas for improving WEU's public relations in our countries with a view to increasing the public's understanding of the work we do here and making them realise that this Council is an instrument of peace and is not preparing for war?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Jäger.

Does the Minister wish to reply?

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – It is easy, I feel, to agree with what Mr. Jäger has said, namely that, for public opinion to be correctly informed, we have also to correct the disinformation that is generated by hostile propaganda, sometimes very insidiously and deviously, causing those who work for the requirements of defence to appear as dreadful militarists, almost aggressors, regardless of the fact that, instead, if no one committed aggression or were likely to commit aggression then there would certainly be no need for defence. There is one thing I can say which has always struck me. I was Defence Minister for eight years and I have never seen a NATO project that was one of offence, an attack on others. I have always found all the exercises, all the schemes and all the plans to be purely defensive. All in all, I would say that, whilst it might have been possible to doubt this in the early days of the alliance, it seems to me now, after several decades, that this is no longer justified.

In addition to Mr. Genscher's suggestions, which we have to discuss, we could promote other initiatives. You yourselves, the Assembly, could devote one debate to formulating suggestions to the Council of Ministers for initiatives that might be taken at the level of the different governments. In short, what I want to say is that the psychological problem is always difficult and that we should avoid the simplistic trap of believing in unilateral disarmament initiatives and those that fail to recognise the fact that the reduction of armaments and eventually disarmament itself can only be the fruit (a) of negotiation and (b) of a broad consensus and the widespread and enlightening support of public opinion in the various countries to make that negotiation possible. The fact – a very good thing in itself – is that war is now a long way away and people have forgotten that the requirements of defence have to be faced up to; we just cannot dodge them. I think there is a task of education that has been constantly put

Mr. Andreotti (continued)

off but which we have to try to perform, using the Council of Ministers as a forum for exchanges of experience gained or collected in each of our seven countries.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Fiandrotti.

Mr. FIANDROTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, undoubtedly today there is an absolutely new political will as those of us who have already served for some years now in the Assembly are aware. The existence of this new political will is, of itself, an important fact. But it seems to me that, if we stay with the structure of Western European Union as it is now, there will be many difficulties in implementing the first of the objectives listed by Mr. Genscher, namely strengthening co-ordination among European states and thus contributing to the process of European unification. The problem, in other words, is how to ensure that this greater contact - this higher-level contact as Mr. Andreotti has just said - and this increase, therefore, in purposeful co-ordination can be translated into binding decisions and institutional structures giving stability to the political will that is currently being voiced. I say this because this resolve could again fade away as it did thirty years ago and we could quickly find ourselves back at the starting point. The truth is that, given the fact that European union is somewhat moribund, the need - before revitalising it - is to see whether we cannot investigate, analyse and evaluate its real possibilities before taking steps to change it.

But probably this is not enough. I think in fact, and this is my second question, that a deeper analysis should be made - perhaps it has been made but then we would like to know about it - of the reasons why WEU has failed to work up to now and why it has failed to develop. It is true that this initiative is similar to what is in hand in the European Economic Community and we know all the measures that have been taken there but, in WEU, there are specific features that need to be studied more thoroughly.

Another question concerns WEU's rôle, the third goal listed, namely that of stabilising relations with the East European countries and developing a programme of - at least - clarification, the ultimate object, in my view, being an action for peace. Now, to play this part, it needs to perform a greater rôle of mediation. In a conference some time ago, the philosopher Bobbio said that the situation today was tragic and critical because there was no mediator. Throughout history, whenever there was no mediator between two great contending parties then the outcome was practically always war. Now WEU, or we could say Europe, needs to

aim at performing this rôle but, with international relations at their present low temperature, it needs to act quickly and courageously and take, for instance, a more distinct and specific position so that it stands out by comparison with the other parties and is able to make the transition from security to peace. So the problem is this: is the goal simply that of being more united, being a single entity, or is it also that of having a policy enabling this rôle of mediation to be performed? It will be the *ouest politique*, it will be a different policy, but one lying behind and going beyond what has so far been propounded.

My last question - with your indulgence - concerns the rôle of the Assembly. Pragmatically, the inference from what we have been given to understand is that this rôle will be to issue more information. True enough, information is power, or rather there are those who say that information is power, but it is clear that information is not enough. The Assembly, too, has to be able to move forward; it has to be able not only to make studies and recommendations but also to take decisions that are binding to some minimum extent on the Council of Ministers. From the standpoint of working efficiency, I feel it is essential, over and above what Mr. Andreotti said most clearly about the annual review by national parliaments of WEU's activities, that there be more extensive links between the work of the national parliaments and that of the WEU Assembly and a direct flow of information from the WEU Assembly to parliamentary commissions and national parliaments. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, Mr. Fiandrotti.

Would speakers please be as brief as possible.

I call Mr. Andreotti.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs for Italy*) (Translation). - To be brief: first, because the need for the revival of Western European Union stems precisely from the inadequacy of its instruments in view of the necessity to perform certain tasks that are a matter of assisting certain responsible bodies in their analysis of common defence problems from Europe's standpoint and acquainting public opinion with those problems. We are therefore trying, in different ways, to improve our structures and our image. I must say that another commitment also stems from this on which some points, it seems to me, are now settled and spelled out in the declaration and were described this morning by Mr. Genscher as concerns the functioning of the Assembly. Here I am referring to the last question and now I turn to the penultimate question and the one before that. As regards the work of the Assembly, I do not believe that all it needs is to be

Mr. Andreotti (continued)

informed. The Assembly must also discuss and I think that the fact that this morning the Minister said that the Council undertook to do its best to take part in all the meetings, specifically for this exchange, supports that interpretation.

As regards our rôle I would point out that the Chairman-in-Office will be able to transmit and explain the communiqué on our work outside the alliance and outside the Community because in it there is mention of the relations that need to be built up or maintained with the whole of the rest of the world and with that part of Europe with which – let us not forget – we have another forum where we discuss part of these problems: the Stockholm conference on security and co-operation in Europe. In this connection, let me say that, at Stockholm, two subjects that were not readily accepted by everyone at first but then practically became so – now it is a question of seeing how they may be given formal shape – namely the declaration of the renunciation of the use of force as a means of solving international conflicts – this, incidentally, was initially a Swiss proposal of a few years ago – and the request to the two superpowers to enter into negotiations on armaments in space, were two ideas that came from Europe and were then transferred to this wider forum.

To talk of mediation seems to me in a certain sense more difficult. The mediator is an outsider, not someone involved and, what is more, he is not always successful. Take the Iran-Iraq war. There have been at least eight attempts at mediation from all directions and the conflict is still not over. There is one last comment that we need to make in this regard. I think we have to bear in mind that there really is a lack of “security education” that serves the ends of those who do not want problems to be clarified. Remember Aesop’s old fable of the wolf and the lamb – there was not enough information really to know who was right and who was wrong.

(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much, Mr. Andreotti.

I should now like to welcome Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence in the Government of the Italian Republic and to thank him for having come to take part in this debate on the Rome Declaration. I will be able to give him the floor shortly.

I call Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

Mr. FERRARI AGGRADI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Andreotti’s address pleased me very much because it allied a keen

awareness of practicalities with great idealistic drive. In this context I must express my satisfaction at the decisions taken in Rome because there is no doubt that they clearly set out goals, lines of action and procedures and can be used as a very useful basis and foundation for the revival of Europe – but on one condition, namely that all this is put into action. They are therefore not an end but a beginning.

There are three questions I want to put.

First, when and how will it be possible to go ahead with what has been said? Soon, I hope, and with the biggest possible contribution from the Assembly.

My second question is this. You, Minister, said you were referring to integration primarily as political integration. This means that you are convinced, as we are convinced, that WEU must remain a political body, as it was to start with, whose members’ basic tasks for the purposes of peace – and here we have fallen behind – are to review together the problems we are faced with, to adopt common stances and initiatives, to further common interests and to develop unified lines of action, firstly among ourselves and then for all of us to apply vis-à-vis other countries. Is that what we shall be doing, Minister?

My third question is on concrete measures and here I also address myself to the Defence Minister, Mr. Spadolini. Achieving a high level of quality and efficiency in defence calls not only for a joint effort in the production of military equipment but also for a high degree of unification in the organisation of armament structures. So will it be possible to have reciprocal communication and exchanges of information, to standardise and integrate military structures and, for example, to organise joint training centres and formulate joint programmes with the object of creating co-ordinated forces with, ultimately, standardised equipment and a standardised system? I believe that this must really be the purpose of the higher level of quality and efficiency that we need to aim at. May I have your answer to these questions please, Minister?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

I call Mr. Andreotti.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – In the declaration, particularly its second part, the targets set by the Council of Ministers as being useful contributions to the effective revival of the union, particularly at the level of the Council of Ministers and relations between the Council and the Assembly, are set out in analytical form. In this connection I must say that Assembly/Coun-

Mr. Andreotti (continued)

cil relations were crucial in the preparation of these meetings in Rome. This morning, mention was made of the Gymnich meetings but I must add that the visits that the President, Mr. Caro, paid to each of us were the biggest contribution to the preparations for the Council of Ministers. With the help of your paper, with its practical suggestions, we were able, not just personally but as ministries, to make clear-cut arrangements for the anniversary meeting of the Council of Ministers on Friday and Saturday, which was therefore an example of effective collaboration. This kind of example needs to continue, with integration the ultimate aim.

Political integration is certainly our great and constant goal. We have to be careful not to disturb the balance by talking about other kinds of integration, in procurement or other things, because currently – not in the future, I hope – this comes up against differences of viewpoint. So we should not raise issues that would divide rather than unite us. But I feel that a set of practical targets such as those set out, the object of which is co-ordination, standardisation and the finding of a common denominator for energies and activities, are a very clear contribution to the definition of what the path that we have tried to chart needs to be. As Mr. Genscher said, the Council of Ministers will already, in its spring session, be reviewing what our officials and each one of us has been able to achieve between now and then and we shall try to show that this celebration has not been just an important event in abstract terms but has also been of considerable practical significance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much, Minister.

(d) Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy; questions and answers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, I can inform you that, like Mr. Andreotti, Mr. Spadolini will be attending our sitting starting at 3 p.m. this afternoon. I should first like to thank the Minister for being so helpful and then to recall our method of work now that Mr. Spadolini is here: this day is devoted to questions to the Council.

Mr. Spadolini, I am very happy to be able to give you the floor and I ask you to come to the rostrum.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, honourable members of the parliamentary Assembly, it is my duty and honour to come before you as, in a way, the spokesman for the Defence Ministers who, on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary

of this union, have met together with their colleagues, the Foreign Ministers, for the first time in the Council of Ministers in a spirit of close and effective collaboration. The stance of the WEU Defence Ministers may be summarised under four headings, arrived at after a definition of ideas and positions that gradually converged over the eleven months of hardworking preparation since November 1983.

The first point which finds us in agreement is the call for greater support from European populations for our common policy. We agreed that the debates, controls and analyses that each of us has to face in our national parliaments are not enough to communicate to European public opinion the real dimensions, dispositions and co-ordinated arrangements in which each national defence policy, with its political, military and industrial components, is situated in the European context. These are essential data, without which the citizens of each state are unable to understand fully or to verify fully the rationale of the scale of the economic sacrifices that governments demand for defence purposes. Now, the Rome Declaration names your Assembly as the responsible forum for achieving this transparency and bringing about this broader consensus. The dialogue between the Defence Ministers and this Assembly is likely therefore to become a procedure of great importance for these purposes.

The second point is the recognition of the need for the WEU Council of Ministers – having broken the ice, so to speak, of so long (too long) a separation – to continue to arrange, at least twice a year, for the joint participation of member states' Foreign and Defence Ministers with the further possibility of separate meetings on what we might call monographic topics. It is not a matter of mere protagonism. None of us feels diminished by the fact of continuing to be represented – with an essentially general mandate as previously – by the Foreign Minister of his own country; but there was certainly an anomaly needing to be put right in the fact that the Council of Ministers of a union set up around security problems should have failed to include, over a period of thirty years, the specific political and not just technical contribution of those responsible for member states' defence policies, in other words those ministers who are also the sources of reference for a complex system of co-production arrangements and trade and economic exchange hinging on the defence industry.

But everything matures with time. If we have arrived at this result today it is also because the ground was prepared by much practical experimentation in co-production with several partners, joint marketing, and technological co-operation agreements. There is a full-scale European economic network for defence, with

Mr. Spadolini (continued)

regard to which WEU Defence Ministers have developed a common sentiment and standard agreements on working methods. To have continued to limit them, therefore, to an indirect rôle in the working procedures of WEU, an organisation set up to deal with the problems of European security, would no longer have made sense.

The third point on which there seems to me to be unanimity is the need to equip our organisation with an instrument for the control of the level and quality of armaments and the terms of disarmament. Indeed, the technical policy change required of the present Agency for the Control of Armaments is that it must become capable of being an instrument that can be used in the hoped-for resumption of East-West negotiations. In our view, this European identity for peace is no less essential than the European identity for defensive missions. The reflection on questions of the controlled limitation of armaments and disarmament that is required of the reorganised Agency – the reorganisation will also apply to the qualifications of its staff – will constitute an essential dimension of WEU's work. It will give new tasks to a technical instrument that has functioned satisfactorily so far in place of control tasks that are now wholly outdated. With the revitalisation of the ACA we want Europe to show its practical and intense interest in the forces working for disarmament and in every technical clarification of the conditions in which negotiations between the super-powers could and should be resumed.

The fourth point relates to industrial co-production for defence, armament standardisation and trade relations. First under this heading comes the reorganisation of the Standing Armaments Committee, with a view to its making an active contribution, as the declaration states, to specific co-operation in this field. "Active contribution" here covers three aspects. First there is the overall organisational thrust, namely establishing a centre of policy guidance and stimulus with regard to contractual activities on a bilateral or multilateral basis, an area where, up to now, member states have acted with a certain empiricism if not by impulse. The purpose with this new orientation is to give WEU, with the support of its institutional instrument, the Standing Armaments Committee, the task of guiding and rationalising European industrial efforts under this heading, the organisations with which it will be in contact being those with specifically operational rôles like IEPG and the NATO bodies themselves.

One of the primary concerns shared by the whole Council on Saturday – but recommended by the Italian Delegation already on Friday – was that duplication and overlapping of effort

vis-à-vis these other organisations, and above all IEPG, be avoided. This is a wholly justified concern which should guide our hand in the concrete institutional design of WEU, a clear line being drawn between tasks of guidance, which are specifically those of this organisation, and operational tasks which are those of IEPG. In particular, in order to avoid any confusion of rôles and at the same time to ensure the necessary co-ordination, it was proposed by the Italian Delegation and accepted, though only as a working hypothesis for further investigation and assessment, that, in parallel with bringing together the Foreign and Defence Ministers at Council of Ministers level, a steering committee be set up of chiefs of defence staff and national armaments directors in member states. This informal body would, when necessary for disarmament and armaments questions, back up the Council of Permanent Representatives in London or the Standing Armaments Committee in Paris.

The second aim is economic. Rationalising the efforts of the European defence industry will make a considerable contribution to the balance of trade in armaments between Europe and the United States, which at the moment weighs heavily against Europe, and help to develop those synergies that are necessary for the production of new technologies, the first side effect of which would be a sizable return – fallout to use a word that I do not like but which is of course very eloquent – to the advantage of civil industry.

The third aspect, perhaps the most important in its direct relation to peace and security, is that of strategic policy, i.e. the choice of a strengthening of the conventional deterrent which automatically raises the nuclear threshold, thus making more remote the spectre of nuclear war that haunts us all.

The Rome Declaration also refers to the possibility that WEU member states might consider together the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world. There is clearly no question here of an increase in NATO's military tasks. The membership itself of WEU, which includes one country outside the military structure of the alliance, would make that impossible. But this must and cannot mean that WEU has to remain blind, deaf and dumb about situations of tension in areas of direct interest to Western Europe. Anyone with a vista of the latest crises in mind could imagine scenarios in which analysis and consultation within WEU could make a valuable contribution to finding possible formulae for peaceful solutions or for ending hostilities.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, these – from the standpoint of the Defence Ministers – are the lines drawn at the Rome meeting for

Mr. Spadolini (continued)

what we want to be the revival of WEU. Naturally they need consolidating and materialising in a package of meaningful and far-reaching institutional reforms. Woe betide if words are not followed by deeds. A vital step on the road to European unification – the most vital step because the innermost fibres of the national sovereignty of each member state are all involved together in defence problems – will have been missed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – On behalf of the Assembly I should like to thank you, Minister, for your statement and to stress the importance of your presence as Minister of Defence at our debates. You yourself emphasised that it was in that capacity that you were participating and you know that the Assembly has time and again demanded that the fundamental character of WEU should be given concrete expression at top executive level by joint meetings between foreign ministers and defence ministers. Rome has given a considerable impetus in that direction and we thank you for personifying this by your presence. I shall call on my colleagues to proceed as they do in their national parliaments and to help the ministers who are good enough to take part in our debates by stating to whom their question is addressed.

I call the first speaker on the list, Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I believe that this morning a series of general principles were established for what the rôle of WEU should be as regards both the founding treaty and, in a particular way, WEU's relations with the Atlantic Alliance. Perhaps there was some lack of concreteness – these are general principles – but it does not seem to me that we have had specific answers on a number of aspects that should be starting points for a real revival of this organisation.

However, I would like to put a question, please, to the Foreign Minister or the Defence Minister on one particular point. It was stated by both of them, and Mr. Andreotti has added his evidence from first-hand knowledge, that never at any time has a military project been advanced in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance that was offensive in nature or failed, in other words, to be in accord with a strictly defensive stand on European security, and I would say that this is fully in line with the principle that is the hallmark of the alliance's very doctrine and therefore of European security, namely deterrence, the purpose being to deter any potential aggressor.

Now the question I want to put is this. Somehow, the Atlantic Alliance and the United

States itself reached the point of accepting the principle very dear to the Soviet Union, namely the refusal to strike the first blow. I think it is even to be found in one of the speeches of the United States President. In all this, there is one fact that must not be left out of account, i.e. the situation of weakness in which European security finds itself because of the clear superiority in conventional arms of the Warsaw Pact. Hence my question: what position do the governments of WEU countries intend to take up in the Vienna negotiations? What bargaining has there to be because – there is no point in deluding ourselves – to induce the others to disarm, an answer has to be given in concrete terms, i.e. in terms of reciprocal concessions? What are the positions that the European countries mean to take in order to make headway in the Vienna negotiations which, to my mind, are essential at the present time because it is thence that stems the weakness in the conception itself of European security, namely its being based on deterrence. As against strategic nuclear parity, we still have the fundamental element of weakness in European security based on conventional weapons. At the present time, if we really want to make progress towards disarmament, then we have to move in the direction of bargaining and workable negotiation.

One last question, Mr. President. It has been said that there are objections to integrated procurement on the part of some countries – and we know which, including those, like France, that initiated the campaign for the revival of WEU – but may I ask whether any study has been made on the possibility of training and preparing nuclei of troops in the various armies for the purpose of joint experiments and whether it would be possible to start this on a trial basis. This would clearly help to create a European spirit, an increasingly European vision, in the achievement of an objective which is that of strengthening our position and playing that rôle of détente which Europe – but only a strong Europe – can play at the international level.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Bianco.

I call Mr. Andreotti.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – On the first of the three points, a clear distinction has to be made between the proposal for the renunciation of the use of force for solving international differences and the completely different proposal for the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons. This second proposal is not accepted by some countries in the West because we believe that, in spite of its attractions, it would fatally weaken the present security situation in Europe. So true is this – and there is no reason why I should not tell you – that in our

Mr. Andreotti (continued)

international relations the point has been made in the clearest terms to the Soviets and the Soviets themselves have accepted that the two subjects could be considered separately. I believe that the renunciation of the use of force which reflects our deepest convictions and which, as I said before, was an old Swiss proposal, was strongly urged last year by the Atlantic Council. In the Stockholm Conference we are trying to make progress with it, together – naturally – with a series of concrete measures to increase mutual trust that make up the technical content of that conference.

With regard to the Vienna negotiations, it will clearly be necessary, after the American elections – happily these elections are now imminent and this “after” is close at hand – to create a framework or to construct a scenario for the resumption of contact. There is one requirement on which basically both sides, starting from opposite positions, seem to me to be converging and that is the need to work out an informal and general framework for the resumption of negotiations and then have a whole series of negotiations.

Regarding integration, integrated headquarters are now out of the question, but certain joint attempts might be made. I shall not go into the merits of certain difficulties that we as Europeans will undoubtedly also have. One has only to think of integration. As an observer, I would say, all in all, that collaboration is fortunately far stronger than would appear to a literal interpreter of certain expressions, but it is true, I believe, that we ought to create opportunities for joint experiments. That is what we suggested should be studied. The proposal, incidentally, was initiated by the Italian Parliament and then shelved, not thrown out, for more thorough investigation. For example, small units could be set up in our countries for training youngsters from other countries. This would not be a foreign legion but it would do something to meet the hopes of young people, at least in those countries with compulsory military service, for this could be partly used to get to know new countries, new languages and new techniques. This is one of the subjects we have begun to look at although it will certainly come up against difficulties – but not insuperable difficulties. What counts is not this specific subject but the fact of recognising that round problems of military structures and techniques there are always problems of a political nature. A common awareness of security cannot be built up without major injections of a human and psychological nature.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Andreotti.

I call Mr. Spadolini.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – On the first and second questions I have nothing to add to what the Foreign Minister has said. I fully share his views both as regards the distinction between the non-use of force and renunciation of the right to the first nuclear response, that has never been accepted by the West, and as regards what we hope will come of the Vienna Conference. On the third point, I will confine myself to the comment that sometimes the apparent unyielding resistance to certain formulae is greater than it is in practice where, for example, in the thick of relations among the NATO forces, alongside France's non-participation in full-scale military integration, continuous and constant forms of integration are admitted that are forbidden in the political and diplomatic rulebook but help in fact to correct the over-rigid approaches bound up with political tradition.

As a reason for optimism for the future, however, let me tell you that, whereas the presence of the Defence Ministers in the periodical meetings of French and Italian ministerial delegations that began towards the end of 1981 was hitherto ruled out because of French ideas on national defence, at the next Paris summit to begin on 9th November next, the presence of the Italian Defence Minister has been requested by the French side, exactly as happens in discussions between Italy and the United Kingdom, the latter being in a different position from France. I make this point because it is possible that at this Paris meeting, which I shall be attending together with the Foreign Minister in the delegation led by the Prime Minister a few days from now, a number of subjects may come up which, over and above integrated procurement rejected as such by the French Government, may enable us to go into other possibilities of joint training and services because it is clear that the concerns touched upon in the fruitful and stimulating meeting of the Defence Committee of the Italian Parliament with integration possibilities in mind may possibly lead to gradual implementation. In a certain sense, integrated procurement will be the outcome of a long process to the development of which we have undertaken to apply all the energy at our disposal and that dash of imagination that sometimes enables us to study alternative means of expression. Thank you.

(*Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Spadolini.

I call Mr. Rubbi.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I would like to ask Foreign Minister Andreotti whether

Mr. Rubbi (continued)

he agrees that, if security is our goal, when we speak about security we are talking about security for all – the countries of the West, the non-aligned, neutral countries and the countries of Eastern Europe, in other words a security that stretches from the Atlantic to the Urals and spans the whole of Europe. I think that Mr. Andreotti – and Mr. Spadolini too, I hope – will agree with me that greater security can certainly not be ensured by a mounting level of confrontation or tension in international relations and still less by the accumulation of more and bigger weapons of every kind, nuclear, chemical, neutron and conventional, or using the new technologies that have been discussed during the last two or three days. I think that the Ministers will agree with me that the road to security – security for all, that is – is a lower level of armament of all kinds together with reciprocal guarantees and the necessary control and it is from that standpoint that I very much regret that this occasion of the WEU Assembly's thirtieth anniversary has not been seized to make proposals along those lines.

So not only do I agree with Mr. Andreotti that there can be no question of calling this Assembly historical, I would add that an occasion has been lost of identifying the Assembly with a positive and substantial contribution to détente, security and peace, which is the first objective set out in the Rome Declaration. Unfortunately, this declaration contains very little substance from that viewpoint and I agree with Mr. Bianco that its context is certainly not one of concreteness and reality nor, with regard to that reality, does it make or put forward concrete proposals. I therefore take the liberty of advancing three such proposals and with that I shall conclude. The first is this. The Minister, first replying to Mr. Ferrari Aggradi and then Mr. Bianco, raised the matter of the Stockholm conference. Why could not the suggestion we made there, e.g. the proposal for the non-use of force between the two blocs and between the countries in the two blocs, not be expressly mentioned in the WEU document? Why, Mr. Andreotti, has this proposal not been formalised as well? The countries of Eastern Europe have advanced it on several occasions and have it in their documents. You yourself have said that it is an old Swiss proposal. Recently, the representatives of the non-aligned, neutral countries met together and took it on board. I do not see, therefore, at this point from where or whom comes the reluctance to have this tackled and discussed straight away at the Stockholm conference where it could well immediately create a better climate in East-West relations. And in any case, I think that an Assembly like ours should include it in a document with the kind of claim to significance that the Rome Declaration makes.

My second question is on non-first use. Allow me to disagree with Mr. Bianco, but the United States is not just lukewarm, it is absolutely opposed to the principle of the non-first use of nuclear weapons and that is where the resistance lies. The proposal is not put forward because the United States does not want it. The East European countries want it, the non-aligned, neutral countries want it and all the peace and disarmament movements there are also want it. The United States does not want it and Europe has to say whether it wants it or not. So it may be true, Mr. Andreotti, that, in your experience as Defence Minister, you have always come across purely defensive frames of reference but the truth of the non-acceptance of this proposal lies in the fact that implicit in this strategy lies the use of nuclear weapons. You will tell me that this is so because there may be superiority in conventional forces on the other side of Europe and that brings me to the second proposal that I wanted to make.

It is WEU that needs to recognise the reality of things and to make proposals accordingly. And so at Vienna, too, we can make proposals. Our seven countries are involved in these negotiations, some directly and some as observers, and here too, to my mind, we can, if we really want to, make a contribution that will constitute a real step towards the balanced and controlled reduction of conventional arms. Lastly, and I am really coming to an end, I think that Western European Union can and should also gear itself up to making a technical and political contribution towards the resumption of negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. It should do this firstly in order to create a climate of dialogue for the resumption of contact and secondly with regard to the content of the negotiations. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Rubbi.

I call Mr. Andreotti.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – In the declaration of the Council of Ministers there is specific mention – admittedly in only a few words but quantity is not what counts – of the importance that the WEU member states attach to reflection on questions of the controlled limitation of armaments and disarmament. On second thoughts, I think that we could also have mentioned the fact there is a conference in which we are all participating with close attention and great hopes, namely the Stockholm conference. But the spirit in which the declaration is written is certainly not in conflict with our common commitment to the obligations of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

Mr. Andreotti (continued)

As regards the negotiations, these cannot – in their essential features – be other than global because, in the abstract, anyone who says “ I am not in favour of the commitment not to use nuclear weapons ” today would be regarded as the abominable snowman, an evil-minded person out to destroy mankind. But we have to be clear. After all, Mr. Rubbi, too, said we needed an organic and global proposal. The organic and global proposal stems from the reasons that create the necessity – the harsh necessity – for Europe to have a global response to deter a massive conventional attack breaking out against the West. It has not broken out, happily, and this I would say reassures us all. But clearly – and on this we are agreed – it will be important not to exclude one area from the negotiations – to be pursued technically in ways judged to be the most appropriate – and to aim firmly downwards, for all weapons, nuclear and conventional. We must avoid creating a third course completely at odds with all the good proposals we are developing. As a result of this twofold action to reduce conventional weapons and to bring about a balanced reduction of conventional arms, it will be really possible to say that the problem of having to use nuclear weapons in order to counter a conventional attack will cease to arise. To me, therefore, the

unity of the disarmament concept is absolutely complete and there is absolutely no disputing the fact that this balance at lower and lower levels and of increasingly small dimensions should be aimed at with great determination. This has to be the policy towards which we should advance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

8. *Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

Political reactivation of WEU (Resumed questions and answers).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.20 p.m.)

SECOND SITTING

Monday, 29th October 1984

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.

2. Adoption of the minutes.

Speakers: The President, Sir Anthony Grant (point of order).

3. Political reactivation of WEU.

Reply by Mr. Spadolini to a question put by: Sir John Osborn.

Reply by Mr. Andreotti to a question put by: Mr. Gansel.

Speakers: (points of order) : Sir Anthony Grant, Mr. Vogt; Mr. Ahrens (*President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe*).

Reply by Mr. Andreotti to a question put by: Mr. Lagorce.

Replies by Mr. Andreotti and Mr. Spadolini to a question put by: Mr. Cifarelli.

Reply by Mr. Andreotti to a question put by: Mr. Jessel.

Speakers (points of order): Mr. Schwarz, Mr. Müller, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Haase.

Reply by Mr. Andreotti to a question put by: Mr. Vecchiatti.

Speaker (point of order): Sir Dudley Smith.

Replies by Mr. Andreotti to questions put by: Mr. Vogt, Mr. Martino, Sir Dudley Smith, Sir Anthony Grant, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Baumel.

Speakers: The President, Sir Frederic Bennett; (point of order): Mr. Pignion.

Replies by Mr. Andreotti to questions put by: Mr. Hill, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Müller, Mr. Freeson.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Blaauw.

4. Close of the extraordinary session.

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

I call Sir Anthony Grant to put a point of order.

Sir Anthony GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I would just like to raise a brief point of order, Sir. It would be very helpful if you could clarify the exact course which our

debate is going to take this afternoon. I did endeavour, during the luncheon interval, to discover from the Clerk what exactly we were going to do, but I am afraid he did not seem to be any clearer on the subject than I was. So what I think we would like to know is are we continuing with questions to Ministers? Shall we be putting questions or making speeches to Ministers? What time is that going to finish? Are we then going to hold a general debate, and indeed if I wish to make a speech on the subject, when shall I make it? Shall I make it in the guise of a question to a Minister or do I have to wait until you have finished with the questions? Generally speaking, I think we would like some guidance as to what course we shall follow this afternoon. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Sir Anthony.

May I remind the Assembly that we shall be following exactly the same procedure this afternoon as we did this morning, as the Foreign Minister and Defence Minister of the Italian Republic are again with us. We are lucky to have this opportunity to talk to representatives of the Council. May I also remind you that it was decided, in agreement with the Ministers, that members wishing to ask questions should name the minister to whom their question is addressed. Lastly, speaking times should be observed within reason; four to five minutes

1. See page 15.

The President (continued)

were mentioned this morning and this would seem appropriate to me.

As to the debate, Sir Anthony, or rather the making of statements, quite clearly members may well make comments not requiring a reply; it is every parliamentarian's absolute right to speak. But the actual debate, prepared by the General Affairs Committee and probably by the other committees, will take place at the Assembly's ordinary session in December.

After this explanation, are there any other comments or requests for clarification?

3. Political reactivation of WEU

(Resumed questions and answers)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Osborn to put his question.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, my intention was to ask questions and in fact I will still do this and therefore I will keep my reservations, according to your advice, till the December debate.

At one time, Mr. President, I feared we were having too many questions on disarmament. Whilst I welcome realistic, mutual and balanced force reductions in the context of disarmament, I believe that peace will be achieved through strength in terms of European defence and therefore if this initiative, when we have thought about it, defines and clarifies the rôle of Western European Union, then I, for one, shall have to welcome it.

My questions were intended for Mr. Genscher, but perhaps I will now put them to the Minister of Defence, Mr. Spadolini.

There are three questions dealing with the European pillar of North Atlantic defence and the need for Europe to equip itself adequately for its own defence and not lean on the United States of America. But I think this declaration will give food for thought: which pillars concern Western European Union? Mr. Spadolini did stress the importance of avoiding duplication.

Firstly, following Mr. Wilkinson's remarks, what will be the relationship with the European Space Agency? Satellites have a military as well as a civil rôle. What will be the relationship with NASA? I ask this because the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was in the United States of America in July following the shuttle programme and responding to President Reagan's initiative about the construction of a space station. To what extent will WEU head this reaction? To

what extent the EEC and the Council of Europe, and to what extent will individual governments look to this?

Secondly, I welcome the observations on standardisation and procurement. For when I was in the European Parliament, a British colleague, Mr. Tom Normanton, then Mr. Klepsch and then Mr. von Hassel involved the EEC in this and we have debated it and we involved Etienne Davignon. In terms of procurement, what will be the future relationship with the EEC, first with the Council of Ministers and second with the Commission and will this initiative alter that?

Thirdly, with reference to the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee, we have in Western European Union a skill going over some thirty years in the techniques of control. Disarmament must be mutual, balanced but with adequate verification. To what extent can the skill of Western European Union be harnessed to this need for verification?

Mr. Bianco talked about the Vienna and Geneva talks following Helsinki and Madrid. Where will Western European Union fit in because hitherto this has been a superpower dialogue between the United States of America and the Soviet Union? A military dialogue between East and West will eventually be necessary when verification is realistic. I would like to know how these skills can be used.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Sir John.

Do you wish to reply, Mr. Spadolini?

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I shall begin with the third point concerning the rôle of WEU called for in the Foreign and Defence Ministers' document as regards the resumption of disarmament negotiations, and make the point that this is a political matter and, as I said in my statement this morning, a question of reaffirming the European identity in the détente process, too. So, even before studying the WEU institutions, and how and by what instruments this may be done, here we need to reaffirm Western Europe's vital interest, reflected in Western European Union whose thirtieth anniversary we have celebrated, in making its own individual contribution to the definition of a disarmament policy to supersede the obsolete phase of controls that goes back to the time when WEU came into being – with a preventive function that was essentially anti-German or at least had Germany in mind and has now been completely overtaken by events – and in planning WEU's rôle as a participant in a dialogue between the superpowers in ways that should and can be defined, as I have said.

Mr. Spadolini (continued)

On the first point, the general question of WEU's possible contribution to modes of arms co-production and standardisation, I have already made specific reference to a point which merits underscoring in this context. Things have gone ahead in Europe at the bilateral and multilateral level, disregarding and outside WEU, in the form of agreements bringing together the industrial capacities of the different countries in co-production efforts which have formed a feature of the defence industry landscape over the last ten years. With the fighter aircraft of the nineties, proposed in Madrid, we have a form of co-operation among five countries - United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain and Italy - committed to a European aviation industry programme which, in number of countries and pitch of ambition, is certainly an exception. It is absolutely vital that we should seek to route all these - let us say incompletely Europe-oriented - initiatives into the WEU channels and bodies whose purpose is to perform the WEU rôle of policy link-up and co-ordination - which in no way, of course, encroaches upon the responsibilities of bodies like the IEPG and others set up by NATO - and to which a country like France belongs although it does not subscribe to the military obligations of the alliance - or upon the sovereignty of the individual countries. In that sense, the Standing Armaments Committee's rôle is to stimulate the co-ordination of policy for a defence industry on the European scale fully aware of the increasing imbalance with the United States and intent on filling the gap by co-ordinated effort rather than by nationalistic armament policies which, currently, would be quite incapable of ensuring the competitiveness of individual countries' capacity as compared with the giant American industry. Here too there is no conflict with NATO but, on the contrary, the desire to integrate NATO forces and to give a European dimension to this form of co-production and standardisation in which WEU's rôle remains one of policy co-ordination.

The second point, the problem of the military use of space, raises two issues, namely the need to encourage every possible use of space for control and inspection - and in that sense the satellites perform a useful reciprocal deterrent purpose - and to urge that there be negotiations on demilitarisation. We have to study both. We could not do everything in the time set aside for the meetings of the Foreign and Defence Ministers but we have always recognised that this problem exists and that, in it too, the voice of European defence needs to make itself heard. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, Minister.

I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Mr. Andreotti's presence here prompts me to recall that the avowed intention of the Western European countries when they concluded the treaties of 1947 and 1948, the Brussels Treaty, was above all to protect themselves against renewed German aggression. The political situation changed as a result of Germany's demilitarisation, its division and the integration of the larger part of Germany into the western system. The Soviet Union's expansionist policy in Europe and the creation of NATO brought further changes. The Brussels Pact thus became obsolete. In 1954 it was revised to enable the Federal Republic to accede to NATO after the failure of the European Defence Community. Western European Union was established at this time to allay the fears of our Western European neighbours and to enable the new army and arms production in the Federal Republic of Germany to be controlled with the aid of the restrictions set out in the treaty and monitored by WEU's Agency for the Control of Armaments. I have never regarded these restrictions and controls as discrimination but as a consequence of and a lesson to be learnt from Germany's and Europe's history.

I mention this history because we can only learn from it if we always bear it in mind. The removal of these controls and restrictions is, in our opinion, a sign of the confidence our neighbours now have in us and of the equality of status the Federal Republic of Germany now enjoys with its allies. But I also refer to this history because it clearly reveals that the expression "reactivation of WEU" is wrong. If the Rome Declaration is to become reality, if it is implemented, there will be a new, a different Western European Union. This gives rise to practical fears and also to utopian expectations. Nonetheless, the target that has been set is of historical importance.

I therefore venture to put the following question to the representative of the Council of Ministers, who is at the moment the Italian Foreign Minister. What significance can a Western European Union of this kind assume for a security partnership between the present military blocs in East and West and for an arrangement that ensures peace in Europe and overcomes the division between these two blocs? This is a European question, but it also a German question. In fact, it is *the* German question, since only if this division is overcome will the Germans be able to decide for themselves, on the basis of the right of self-determination and with due respect for the interests of their neighbours, whether they wish to live in one or two German states. This will be a difficult decision, but at present it is not one that someone else can take for us, whether he be

Mr. Gansel (continued)

a German, Soviet, Bulgarian or American Foreign Minister or even an Italian Foreign Minister. I am convinced that in a European system of peace and freedom the German answer to the German question will be a European answer, and I say this as a German, as a European and as a social democrat.

We shall judge the success of WEU's reactivation by its contribution to the strengthening of existing joint positions in the Eurogroup and the European Community. We shall oppose this project if it should result in the goal of political union being confined to the present member states of WEU. It is therefore important to know whether, in accordance with Article XI of the treaty, the present member states will accept an application for membership from any other European country that is a member of the European Community or of the European part of the Atlantic Alliance.

I would also ask the Assembly to consider the possibility, pending a decision on this enlargement, of permitting Western European countries which do not yet belong to WEU at least to attend, in an advisory capacity, the informal meetings at which no decisions are to be taken. We must not exclude other Western European countries from WEU, especially at a time when it is being reactivated. But we shall also judge WEU's success by its contribution to the truly historic task of our times, overcoming the division of Europe into East and West. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Gansel.

I call Sir Anthony Grant.

Sir Anthony GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – The speech we have just heard was precisely the point I was seeking to clarify. Are we asking questions of Ministers or are we making speeches because, in point of fact, several of us put our names down to speak. I could have made a speech, I would like to make a speech, I know my colleagues would like to make speeches but we will defer ourselves to after question time provided people do ask questions. That was exactly what I was trying to clarify.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Sir Anthony.

I was about to point this out gently to our colleague, because everyone has to make a considerable effort, if we are to have a dialogue with the Ministers.

Mr. Vogt has asked for the floor to make a statement. I will allow him to do so, but I will not accept any further requests.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I feel that this whole procedure is unworthy of a parliamentary assembly. We have been asked to meet here to express our views on something which may change the course of future events. The first statement that dealt with this aspect of our decision was Mr. Gansel's, since he ignored the rules that have been laid down. I consider it completely unacceptable for an issue that may change the future course of history, turning the European Community, a civilian organisation, into a military organisation with the aid of Western European Union, so that it eventually becomes a superstate – you may well laugh, but that would be the result in a few years' time – to be dealt with in this way: we should not be reduced, like pupils, to asking the teacher questions. Nor do I think it a good thing that the methods are not clearly explained here. After all, you are in every respect jumping the gun, Mr. President, by asking us to approve a declaration, a draft order after only half a day of questions and answers. If all you want here is a round of questions and answers, leaving the general debate until we meet in Paris in December, you cannot expect us to vote on a draft order by some urgent procedure.

In other words, Mr. President, the decision is yours: either we continue with this game of questions and answers and ignore the draft order – that is something we can put up with – or you allow us to discuss the central issue in the form of a general debate. I make this suggestion as a formal motion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, I would remind you that the arrangements for the debate were decided by the Presidential Committee, that they were announced to the Assembly this morning and that the Assembly agreed to them. Next, I would remind you that points of order must be short and not the subject of a speech. Despite my total respect for your right to speak, Mr. Vogt, I should have interrupted you. As I said this morning, we are engaged in a debate in accordance with a practice we all know for questioning governments, because we decided that the debate on matters of substance, prepared by the committees, should take place in December. You may not agree, Mr. Vogt, but that is what the Assembly decided.

Having said this, I shall now give the floor to Mr. Andreotti, and I would ask all members to respect the order of business as agreed.

Mr. Andreotti, you have the floor.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall reply very briefly to Mr. Gansel. With regard to his second point, concerning enlarge-

Mr. Andreotti (continued)

ment, our treaty makes provision for new countries to be invited to join but in this case we have, not an invitation to, but a request from a country - Portugal - to join WEU. Quite rightly the Council of Ministers decided to have the request officially examined and that will be done. It will be discussed in one of the Council of Minister's forthcoming meetings. I certainly believe that the interests, specifically in the area of security, shared by our seven countries and other countries would make the widening of the circle fairly logical but naturally a community that has its own history and tradition must carefully assess what this would mean in its positive and possibly not so positive implications. In any case, it is a matter that will be looked into.

With regard to the objective, I do not wish to enter into any historical argument or discussion, but I certainly believe we must consider political problems as they are at the time they are discussed. If one day Mr. Gansel says we ought to contribute towards helping to thaw the bloc concept - and this is the whole thrust of the policy we have been following for many years - I would like to say that a decision - which would have its dangers but would be a responsible decision in a climate of security - in favour of a policy of détente, the Helsinki policy, would have no other aim than to bring about a thaw in this face-to-face confrontation of the two blocs, but this is, of course, a prospect that is beyond us to foresee. The younger ones amongst us may be able to look forward to it but the older ones cannot, I believe, delude themselves that the two blocs will melt away overnight. If that day comes, and I hope it does, it will be possible to tackle and solve all the problems implicit in increasing our democratic links. For the moment I feel we have to continue to work in that direction and before I end I would like to ask Mr. Gansel to remember that we Italians have always been very clear in our thinking on this subject. We did not sign the Brussels agreement precisely because underlying it there was coolness and hostility towards the Germans and De Gasperi said in parliament that this was a grave historical mistake that could well be the origin of another tragedy like that following the first world war. We voted to accede to the treaty in our parliament after a debate that was not easy - today it would be much easier - the same day, and it was no coincidence, that we ratified Germany's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, Minister.

I should like to inform you that we have the pleasure of welcoming among us, as observers, a number of assembly presidents, including Mr. Ahrens, President of the Parliamentary Assem-

bly of the Council of Europe, who is also a member of our Assembly, as well as Mr. Svend Jakobsen, President of the Danish Folketing, who has made the effort to be here, Mr. Gilbert Temmermann, Vice-President of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Mr. Georges Gramme, Vice-President of the Belgian Senate, and Mr. Jakob Aano and Mr. Jan Tore Holvik, representing the President of the Norwegian Storting. Through these distinguished representatives, I should like to welcome the even closer and more cordial relations so established with the national parliaments whose support is of vital importance.

I should now like to call Mr. Ahrens, President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

You have the floor, Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I offer you the congratulations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe not only on the anniversary of WEU but because I also have the impression that for the first time in the fifteen years that I have been a member of the WEU Assembly a serious attempt is being made to transform WEU into an active instrument of European policy. Although we have repeatedly been assured by Ministers that WEU is taken seriously and considered very important, I believe only now is it being taken really seriously.

I am very pleased to say, Mr. President, that the WEU Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe see no conflicts of interest in this respect. And I am convinced that what has sometimes been said in the Council of Europe about the relationship between its Assembly and the European Parliament, that our work in these two assemblies amounts to a complete or partial duplication of effort, will not be the case here, since I am quite sure that you will continue to observe the provisions of paragraph 8 of the Rome Declaration. However, Mr. President, in many respects the problems will be the same or at least similar. And if you endorse the new position adopted by the Council of Ministers and elaborate on the declaration, the Assembly and the whole of WEU will undoubtedly have to be restructured. I therefore have only three questions to ask.

First, the important question for this Assembly and for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: how can we concentrate our activities on just a few areas or at least on fewer areas than in the past? How can we be more successful in selecting areas of prime effort? This problem has not been solved by WEU, and it has not been solved by the Parliamentary Assembly.

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

Second, a question that concerns us both: how can we ensure that the debates in our Assembly are more topical? An urgent procedure, the introduction of a period for topical debates? This is a question that has been raised and, I believe, it must be answered.

As time is short, I will refer to only one other problem. As you all know, Ladies and Gentlemen, the national delegations to the Council of Europe and WEU are identical. In one respect, this has considerable advantages. It prevents us from allowing the two assemblies from growing too far apart. And to be honest, I must say that I have always regarded my membership of the WEU Assembly as a mandate to ensure that what we decide here in WEU does not depart too far from the political views and desires of the other fourteen countries that belong to the Council of Europe. But membership of both the Parliamentary Assembly and the WEU Assembly also has serious disadvantages. In fact, Mr. President, the three mandates we all have - our national mandate, our mandate in the Council of Europe and our mandate in WEU - are too much for us. And I feel we should give some thought to solving this problem.

I should also like to point out in this context that we all know from our national parliaments that we must specialise in very narrow fields if we want to achieve anything. It is therefore impossible for us to be experts at European level both in defence policy and in regional planning, cultural policy, the labour market and so on. But the treaty requires the delegations to be identical. But, as I see it, the treaty does not prevent us from appointing two sets of substitutes to our delegations, which means that each representative delegated by the parliaments could have two substitutes, one for the Council of Europe and one for WEU. Mr. President, as substitutes have the same rights as members in our committees, this Assembly, unlike the Council of Europe, might then be able to interest expert members of our parliaments in the work of our committees and persuade them to take part in their activities. This is a question which, I feel, we should all consider. Our two assemblies would undoubtedly benefit. It is my hope, Mr. President, that we will seek solutions together. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, Mr. Ahrens. Your presence here bears witness to your untiring efforts in both the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Assembly of Western European Union and I believe that the course you have outlined and the subjects you have raised should add to our desire to improve the work of our two assem-

blies. Once again my warmest thanks for your contribution.

I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to put a simple, precise and direct question of substance to the Chairman of the Council - possibly not exactly pertinent to the debate on the relaunching of WEU - concerning the Council's fundamental ideas regarding European security and defence. Have these ideas not changed or can they not change? I must admit that I am beginning to have doubts. In other words, is it the majority view if not the unanimous view of the Council, allowing for any reservations on the part of some member countries, that the nuclear deterrent should continue to be regarded as the indispensable or essential basis of our security and our defence? I was struck by the fact that the actual word "nuclear" was only used two or three times this morning. Or does the Council think that there are other more effective and less dangerous means of ensuring security and peace, and that, for example, certain unilateral disarmament measures of the kind demanded by the pacifist movements would lead to the neutralisation of the American missiles and their removal from European soil, followed of course by the French and British weapons. The necessary prior conditions and the essential psychological climate would have to be created before negotiations for the limitation of nuclear and conventional weapons could be started with any hope of success, as a prelude to the general disarmament of the two blocs which we all so earnestly hope for. After the growing number of pacifist demonstrations held in Europe - with limited success only - are the seven member countries of WEU showing signs of moving on this subject and, if so, how are their attitudes changing? Or does the sound of the pacifist demonstrations stop at the Council's door? They express the feelings of a relatively large part of public opinion in the seven WEU countries. Your reply, Mr. Chairman, will be of great help to me for my report on deterrence and the will of the people which I shall be submitting to the next session of the WEU Assembly. Thank you in advance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. Andreotti.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). - The reply to this question certainly reflects a traditional orientation in our political thinking and therefore I can say that it is definitely not a personal opinion. We did not, in fact, study the strategy of European security and defence on Friday and Saturday. I will make two points. The first is that peace demonstrations, of whatever inspiration, must certainly be treated with respect if they are objective, in other words if they are not

Mr. Andreotti (continued)

addressed to only one side. We all know that books can be written and speeches made to argue individual positions but an arms reduction policy cannot exist unless its provisions are bilateral and step-by-step and include negotiation. From that standpoint, therefore, we say that everything that contributes to peace education is good, but that everything that creates confusion in that respect is bad.

We know there has been a change in the strategy of the alliance with, incidentally, the support of our countries, namely the shift from the so-called global response to the flexible response. This clearly points to the increasing strength of our security systems. However, while the objective has to remain that of a steep reduction in nuclear and conventional arms that is balanced and fair from the standpoint of both sides, it seems to me that, as things stand, we cannot yet say – and this was what we meant this morning about not accepting the principle of not striking the first nuclear blow – that it is possible, in the present situation of severe imbalance, to separate the nuclear capability in its various forms from conventional forces. I repeat, the two questions, balance and arms reduction, go together; we are working on them with conviction but we cannot responsibly accept that the two be treated separately, particularly since the approaches would be absolutely unilateral.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I do not propose to make a speech disguised as questions. I would like to but I shall refrain and confine myself to two questions, one to the Italian Foreign Minister and the other to the Defence Minister.

My question to the Foreign Minister concerns what is, to my mind, the strong point of this Rome Declaration we have before us: the promotion of objectives set out by the Ministers in terms of strengthening peace, promoting unity and encouraging the gradual integration of Europe. It is clear that one benefit stemming from WEU is that the taboo on talking about defence has at last been overcome, at least in my country. European federalists used to talk about everything except European defence, their idea being to create a European union either without arms or simply dependent on those of the Atlantic Alliance. To my way of thinking the change is an advantage, but at this point I wonder whether we are not creating a two-speed, two-goal Europe: two Europes, one alongside the other, one on the way to European union *tout*

court, supposing the draft treaty approved by the European Parliament and now submitted to the member states is capable of bringing it about through the discussions in Strasbourg, and the other to be achieved by what we are calling the revival of Western European Union but which is really intended as the proper consideration of defence problems.

I shall be very interested in the Foreign Minister's reply because I well remember that whenever the subject of the European Defence Community came up in the days of De Gasperi, Sforza and Pacciardi, it was always stressed that ships and armies and troops could not be pooled, like so many economic "joint ventures". To hold together, they needed to do so in the name of an ideal, the power of the state, a union or a flag. In my view, this is still the case, though the ways of the Lord are manifold and therefore the use of WEU may also help provided it does not create a two-speed Europe. That is my question to the Foreign Minister.

My question to the Defence Minister, whom I thank especially for the clarifications he has given from the technical and political standpoints, is whether, via the Agency for the Control of Armaments which is to be used experimentally and reformed in the light of current requirements, WEU is to become the established instrument of Europe, alongside or in relation to participation in the disarmament conference and, above all, whether this control is designed to be applied solely to conventional armaments or instead extended, as I feel it should be, to all possible weapons including the necessary but terrible nuclear deterrent. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Cifarelli.

I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – The answer to Senator Cifarelli's first question is, I think, simple. We know that progress can only be gradual and presumably – let us be frank – slow in enhancing integration in our common defence policy. But unfortunately, and I stress the "unfortunately", there is little fear of a two-speed Europe. As regards economic Europe and European union, Italy is the only Community country to have accepted it by parliamentary vote except perhaps one, sad to say, so I do not believe that progress in Europe *tout court* or economic Europe will be so fast that security-integrated Europe will be trailing behind. I feel we have to strive with great commitment to push ahead with one and the other. They both reflect the same way of looking at European problems. Lastly, though I am not over-familiar with railway terminology as regards speed, in Italy we often have to

Mr. Andreotti (continued)

console ourselves with the words that are used: the slowest trains are called *accelerati*.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spadolini.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – In reply to Mr. Cifarelli, we want to create a European instrument available for negotiations wherever they may take place and that includes the framework of the disarmament conference as well. We have no ambition to be like the fly in the fable who thought he was driving the coach but simply to come forward with instruments that are helpful to our cause, that unite us all. On the second point, our intention is to maintain arms control in accordance with the WEU treaty, including nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons, and to extend it to cover all the technologically most advanced forms of armament. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I first wish to thank the Italian authorities for the excellent hospitality we have received and all the wonderful arrangements which I know we all greatly appreciated.

I would now, if I may, Mr. President, like to ask the Italian Foreign Minister, Mr. Andreotti, how he believes, as Foreign Minister, that the Western European countries together should view the present régime in Libya. Do the Ministers think that the régime in Libya presents any potential threat to peace or security in any part of Western Europe or any part of the Mediterranean area or in any part of North Africa and can they say how they believe – can he say how he believes – we, in the Western European countries, should co-operate within a reborn Western European Union to contain the conduct and the behaviour which we have recently come to expect from Libya which, I must say, Mr. President, was a very much more civilised country in the past when it was run as a colony by Italy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – I hope the verbatim record of Mr. Jessel's statement does not reach Colonel Kadhafi. Otherwise he will be claiming more compensation for the colonial period of Italy's occupation of Libya. I think my answer here has to be extremely brief. If Mr. Jessel would like a fuller answer I am always available.

I certainly believe that we have to start from the idea that each of our countries has many different kinds of relations with others including those that have only one party. If we were to rule out relations with one-party countries I think that the United Nations, for a start, could close the shutters on its New York building. With Mr. Jessel's permission, I must say, at the present stage in which, among other things, we do not have comfortable relations – but it is a good rule to try to have the best relations one can with one's close neighbours: distant ones can be chosen, but close neighbours are what they are – that we are dealing with things including, as I believe Mr. Jessel knows, the delicate problems of British citizens since it is Italy that is representing British interests in Libya at the moment. I would therefore be very grateful if he would put this question to me at the next meeting at which we have contact between the Council of Ministers and the Assembly and I hope that, by that time, these problems at least will have been solved.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

(The sitting was suspended at 4.05 p.m. and resumed at 4.15 p.m.)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, before calling the next speaker, I have to draw your attention to a few small problems which have arisen concerning the list of speakers. I say small problems, because I am not in a position to say whether one speaker has been chosen in place of another. Now I think Mr. Schwarz has a point of order.

I call Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. SCHWARZ (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, you have raised the question of speakers. I do not wish to criticise the way you conduct proceedings, but I consider it unacceptable that it should not be explained how the list of speakers reaches you. I put my name down to speak this morning, and I then checked my list, according to which I was to be the fourth speaker this afternoon. I find it very mysterious that my name should now appear right at the end of the list. I do not doubt that you are being objective, but I would ask it to be made clear to all representatives how and when speakers' names are entered in the list, which is in fact normal practice in any parliament.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Schwarz.

I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have the agenda for this sitting before me, and I feel much as Mr. Schwarz does. The agenda for this session

Mr. Müller (continued)

begins with addresses by the various Ministers this morning, followed by "Questions and debate", and for this afternoon it says "3 p.m. - Political reactivation of Western European Union - general debate". I naturally put my name down for this debate because I wanted to say something, not because I wanted to put questions to the Ministers. If that had been the case, I would, of course, have asked to speak this morning. I now find that my name is somewhere at the bottom of this list because, it is said, almost everyone wanted to speak during question time this morning. This lack of organisation beggars description and is unworthy of a parliamentary assembly. I feel that should be made very clear. The agenda should have been changed to prevent this happening.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, Mr. Müller.

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, I ask you to find out who is responsible for what is obviously the manipulation of this list, and I request that a report on this matter be presented to the Bureau at its next meeting with a view to preventing a recurrence of difficulties of this kind. This is not meant as a personal criticism of you, Mr. President. But, as a protest, I shall not speak again.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. Reddemann, mistakes may have been made but I can assure you that there has been no manipulation. I myself wrote down the names of speakers who raised their hands in the meeting and I can read the list to you. The names of members who could not speak this morning were carried forward to the afternoon. Later, I was given the list of speakers who had put down their names outside. Have there been complications? I do not know of any. I will do all I can to clarify the situation. Having said this, I should like to continue with the questions, unless I have to speak further on points of order.

I call Mr. Haase.

Mr. HAASE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - I too have no intention of questioning the way you conduct proceedings, Mr. President, but I agree with the previous speaker. I know for a fact that I put my name down to speak at a time when others who have spoken before me had not yet done so. I ask that this be noted. The second reason why I shall take no further part in the debate is that I cannot say what I wanted to say despite the fact that the agenda says: "General debate". And I cannot accept that I should have to put a question of a given length and in a given form.

I therefore prefer to take no further part in the proceedings.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I would like to call everyone who wishes to speak and I ask you to excuse any instances of names being called out of order. Moreover, this is the second time the question of the agenda has been raised and I would recall, Ladies and Gentlemen, that it was decided on the proposal of the Presidential Committee to devote the morning to questions and answers and, in the afternoon, if no ministers were present, to hold a debate, but if we were lucky enough to have ministers present to continue with questions and answers. Mr. Andreotti and Mr. Spadolini have assured me that they will be here throughout the afternoon, although Mr. Spadolini unfortunately will have to leave in a short time, and we shall therefore continue with questions and answers.

I call Mr. Vecchiotti.

(*Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, I certainly cannot hide the difficulty I feel in speaking in this present climate and using the procedures that have been adopted, whose consequences could have been foreseen. However, I shall observe the discipline that the President has several times called for and put a somewhat elaborate question to Mr. Andreotti, referring to what he said in reply to Mr. Lagorce. Of course, Mr. Andreotti, we all agree that a disarmament and arms reduction policy has to provide guarantees to both parties in the most objective way possible and be prudent and span the necessary time. That is not the issue. What I want to ask Mr. Andreotti is this. You say that WEU, which has been dormant, to put it diplomatically, for so many years, can acquire a value, a *raison d'être*, if in its revival it succeeds in answering the questions public opinion in Europe and the world is asking.

You, Mr. Andreotti, referred to the European identity, for example. I would like to ask in what way this European identity might be furthered. At the moment the answer, to my mind, would be for WEU to contribute to halting the nuclear arms race that has reduced our countries to military blocs with the United States and the Soviet Union confronting each other in the pursuit of nuclear equality or supremacy. We saw this during the course of the negotiations that were so laboriously pursued and then failed at Geneva. What I would like to know therefore is whether the revival of WEU aims or does not aim at making a valid contribution to a nuclear disarmament policy for the whole of Europe, naturally - I repeat - with gradual, balanced and controlled measures. I have no illusions about the difficulties of attaining

Mr. Vecchietti (continued)

this objective. They exist today as they did yesterday but it would be equally wrong, to my mind, to underrate the possibility of Western Europe rallying the broadest support for such a policy, as stated by Minister Genscher this morning, from public opinion not only in Europe but also elsewhere, in the third world and in that part of the industrialised world in the Far East that today combines with Europe in determining the course of world events. If we aim at this objective, then it seems to me that the resolve and endeavour to reorganise and renovate the production of conventional arms at the European level will have its value and political significance. I say political significance because it would signal the start of the gradual replacement of European security based on the threat of nuclear extermination by a new continental security based on conventional arms which would also be balanced and controlled at a level that did not go beyond the defensive requirements of the two sides. Were this not to happen, let us not delude ourselves, Mr. Andreotti, the revival of conventional weapons would not even become a vital feature of the present arms race because nuclear weapons would continue to be the main and decisive instrument of European security, however that is understood.

Now my last question. I do not know, Mr. Andreotti, whether you have reflected on the profound contradiction in which we now find ourselves, namely the threat of a reactivation of military bilateralism based on the nuclear arms race, by contrast with the apparent crisis in political and economic bipolarism, evidence of which, to my mind was furnished again last week when the deep gulf separating the Soviet Union and the United States did not prevent the European countries on both sides from meeting together, discussing and making proposals with an attitude of greater or enhanced independence which, however, I greatly appreciate. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Andreotti.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – I think that we are still with the same subject so my reply can be brief. First, as regards our rôle as Western European Union, is there something more that we can do in the present situation? I believe that, precisely because the Assembly is representative of all the political forces in our parliaments and therefore in our countries, it is in a position to debate these problems of security in exceptional depth and detail. I would go further. At one time this was not so. Even in some countries like ours there were far deeper

conceptual divisions in the general approaches to defence.

Second, I do not believe you can isolate nuclear disarmament from general disarmament and Mr. Vecchietti himself, incidentally, rightly said that, with regard to conventional disarmament as well, it was necessary to have the balance tending downwards and not rising since that would cause a race in conventional weapons. I would once again stress the oneness of the arms reduction concept and the fact that it cannot be split into nuclear and conventional.

Third and last – I apologise for the brevity but the time available is rather short – there is one field in which I maintain that we Europeans have taken swift and timely initiative, namely our efforts, through the Atlantic Alliance and relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, to set negotiations in motion to prevent a mad race for massive armaments in space. Even supposing, and with this I will conclude, it were technically possible to have complete protection, a nuclear umbrella, on the United States side – although there are many uncertainties in this regard and an MIT study rules the possibility out on technical grounds – then we well know that, even at the cost of a further reduction in living standards, the Soviet Union would follow suit. When that happened, what policy would the two superpowers, each with an umbrella protecting it from the other, follow? I think that every small country would then be in extreme danger. So, with our initiative, we have served not only the cause of peace but also the interests of our areas.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The Italian Foreign Minister said this morning that defence spending and concentration as a result of integration would stimulate technical and technological progress, and he also said that the United States was a fantastic example in this respect. Is he familiar with studies that have been carried out by the United Nations? They are critical studies, and they say precisely the opposite. They say that investment in military technology has far less impact on the civilian sector than the Foreign Minister assumed in his address. Is he prepared to consider these studies, and above all is he prepared to take part in a debate in this Assembly, if one is called, on the question of whether he has been correctly advised?

Secondly, I should like to ask whether the Foreign Minister, as a democrat, does not feel uneasy about his claim that, as a result of the rediscovery of Western European Union, a consensus of seven governments has now been reached even though, together with his colleagues

Mr. Vogt (continued)

in the Council of Ministers, he has rejected the moving and justified opposition of two European countries, Denmark and Greece. I would add that there is also considerable opposition to this question in the European Parliament and that its Rainbow Group has issued a statement opposing the plan for what we call the increased militarisation of Western Europe.

Thirdly - and this something the Foreign Minister must have heard about, especially as Peace Co-ordination organised a demonstration about this here in Rome on Saturday - is he aware that the peace movement, which, of course, advocates autonomy, but by other means - emancipation without the use of force - has expressed opposition to this project through its co-ordinating bodies in both Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany? Does he not think, if a truly democratic procedure is to be adopted, that these voices should be heard and that we should continue the discussion of this subject only when the views of all these opposition forces are known? In short, emancipation from a superpower is not achieved by emulating it and by believing, in what I see as a kind of mental blackout, that the United States is a fantastic example worthy of emulation.

I come to the last question I want to put to the Foreign Minister. As Foreign Minister and also as a political leader, does he see a link between the warning he issued regarding the pursuit of an active policy of reunification and his simultaneous support for the reactivation of Western European Union?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). - I do not know who this gentleman is. I am not querying what he says politically. All I know is that he is doing it at very great length. What does offend me very much, Sir, is that not only have the rules today been changed so we are not making ordinary speeches, we are supposed to be asking questions, but, to my knowledge, this is the second time he has been on his feet. Now there are a number of colleagues around and I am prepared to give my place to other people who have not had a chance to speak. Why has he been given two shots at the target? I think that this is quite disgraceful and, with great respect, far from saying to him now "Kindly finish your question", you ought really to ask the gentleman to resume his seat.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Sir Dudley, I think this was an opinion and not a proposal.

I call Mr. Andreotti.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). - I think that a book could well be needed to reply to all these questions. I will confine myself to four very brief comments. First, Mr. Vogt has recalled that a meeting of peace movements took place here in Rome on Saturday. I did not follow it because I was at the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers where, if I may say so, I think we worked at least as effectively for peace as did the meetings you have referred to.

I do not think it is possible to weigh the defence requirement against a number of different options. That, if you will allow me, is a rather specious way of arguing. We cannot say: but suppose the expenditure was applied to this instead of that? We are committed to this expenditure because it is imposed by virtue of our duty to maintain the security of our countries. So what is the line of argument I have tried to follow? It is that we need to ensure, by maximum co-ordination, that expenditure on defence be as cost-effective as possible and that its productivity generate spin-off in other sectors apart from defence. I do not know the United Nations study. I shall get it and study it as is my duty and if one day the Assembly would like to devote a few hours' debate to the links between defence and economic life and production in general I shall be very happy to take part. I may say that the links in the United States between the Department of Defence and both economic and university life are, in my view, a rather useful model, with a series of activities that have been repeated in another sector, namely space. Any visitor to the space exhibitions can see that research and development investment on space exploration has produced a series of spin-offs in industry. Two very ordinary examples are the watches, now seen all over the world, that came out after the first space flights and the coffee that needs no water and can be taken in the form of a pill, but the technological fallout from this expenditure ranges far beyond that.

I would like to assure Mr. Vogt that I have not come here to be a public relations man for the United States. He is very young and I, unfortunately, am not. I would like him to think about what we used to hear when we were young and when it was our misfortune to see the mistakes and horrors of the war: people used to say, if Mussolini had been to the United States he would not have gone to war. I feel this is perhaps well worth a little more thinking about.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). - Thank you, Mr. President. When we all talk about WEU, we are referring to problems of security and defence. I would like to give security and

Mr. Martino (continued)

defence their widest possible meaning and therefore ask the Minister does he not consider it feasible, and therefore proposable, for a European nucleus for rapid deployment formed of integrated and highly specialised forces to be set up within a reasonably short space of time which would be the first step in experimental operation and could be used both for military purposes in peacekeeping operations and for support purposes in civil security operations in the case of natural disasters. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Andreotti.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – I could well see the purpose of this nucleus for rapid deployment, whose indirectly positive aspects as regards integration, awareness and Europe's image I certainly appreciate. It seems to me that if we define the objective as a civil purpose for rapid deployment and support for reconstruction after disasters affecting the population, this could be a useful first step and would not, perhaps, create any particular difficulty. Conversely, were we to put forward today the idea of a newly formed, combined unit under integrated command it would encounter objections, like those made at the press conference the other day by Mr. Cheyson. So I believe that if we were able, during peacetime, to assign to the armed forces as a whole a highly effective civil rôle – which they have performed on many occasions – I feel that this could be a path leading in the direction of Mr. Martino's pertinent recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Vice-President, can I begin, without trying to be too controversial, and make my formal protest. As a member of the Presidential Committee I was under the distinct impression that today, certainly this afternoon, we would have short, succinct statements and speeches, of about three minutes each hopefully, and that the questions were this morning. That does not appear to be the case and I obviously have to bow to the ruling of the chair which, I realise, Sir, is not your ruling, but I do wish to enter a protest particularly in view of the fact that one gentleman, which I raised as a point of order, has had two bites at the cake already and I do think it is unfair to other members who have been waiting and wishing to make a short contribution.

Can I therefore, without going into a long dissertation and unlike some members who still have tried to insert a speech where they should ask a question, comply with what the chair has said and turn what I was going to say into two short questions to the Minister.

Firstly, would he agree that Europe's influence and rôle in the future of the NATO alliance is absolutely crucial and would he agree that in no way should we try, as a result of the admirable new initiative which is now being shown, to seek to diminish the influence and importance of the United States in the NATO alliance and that we should do everything we can to sustain the umbrella of the United States and to maintain close and effective liaison with America? And could he give us the comforting news, and I hope he can, that it is essential for us to have closer contact and understanding with the United States and that we can make it absolutely clear to them, in the new initiative which is now being shown, that, in fact, the overall rôle of NATO remains just as important as it was and that this should be the means of continual contact between all the nations of Europe and of the West to make certain that their defence is safe and secure and as advanced as it has been over recent years?

Secondly, can I ask another question which is perhaps a little bit more parochial but it certainly applies to what we have been discussing today and the statement which was made by Mr. Genscher this morning. Does he agree that it is absolutely wise, and I speak as the Chairman of the Budgetary Affairs Committee of the Assembly, for WEU to reform the Secretariat-General of WEU, and also to look very closely into and change the emphasis of the two standing organisations, the ACA and the SAC, and that we should bear in mind the various budgetary implications of these changes?

I also refer to the declaration of the Council of Ministers that in fact they wish to see the budget generally contained within the framework as it is without any great advances; that is, in other words, what can be saved in one direction might be added to another, so that we can enhance the work that we are undertaking both from the official level and from the Assembly level and also from the Council of Ministers level.

In those circumstances, I would be very grateful if he could comment firstly on the question of the position of the United States in all this and secondly on the reaffirmation of our determination to make WEU much more positive, to give it a rebirth as my British colleague said earlier this morning. Perhaps we can change the emphasis on some of its institutions to make it more effective, more efficient and to use the money available to the best advantage.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Andreotti.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – The indivisibility of our Atlantic Alliance and our western security is very clearly stated in the Rome Declaration that

Mr. Andreotti (continued)

we are now considering and any interpretation that might suggest any reserve or waning interest on our part in the United States' vigorous participation with us in common European defence would certainly be mistaken.

I would like to point to one fact of the highest importance, recognised not only by us western countries but by the whole of Europe, and that is that at the Helsinki conference and the conference on security and co-operation in Europe that began ten years ago the United States and Canada were constantly present in a rôle that is not generally recognised: not a transient or occasional rôle but one politically matching the importance of the security and defence of the European continent. So it does not seem to me that there should be any doubt on this point. Nor should there be any in prospect because, whilst it may admittedly seem that certain countries like China are attracting mounting interest in the whole Pacific area, as I said this morning, we know that this does not have to be to the detriment of our reciprocal interest in common defence or, in general, in protecting the common interests shared by the continent of Europe and the United States and Canada.

As regards the second point which is more specific to the Community, I believe that if – and not just as regards the Committee and the Agency – we want to give new drive to the life of the Community then we have to provide the means. If I may say so, what is ambivalent about the European case in the Community is really that we make resounding pronouncements on wanting to launch new policies together but when it comes to creating resources to finance them we always have great difficulty. Here, fortunately, the amounts are not the same as those needed to create new European Economic Community policies yet I feel, objectively, that while still calling for economies – every good administrator should do so at home and in the international organisations – certain increases in expenditure are, after all, necessary. I myself note that for forty years we have been making marvellous speeches about the need to reduce the national budget and every year we have had to increase it, at least we have here in Italy, but I do not think it is a purely Italian defect.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Anthony Grant.

Sir Anthony GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, may I be clear on one thing? Am I in fact at question time or am I able to deliver a speech in the general debate? I should like to be quite clear. Could you tell me?.. Well, nobody knows, so in that case I shall just do my best. I will assume, Mr. Speaker, that I

put my name down to contribute to the general debate. I did not put my name down to make a speech to Mr. Andreotti or anybody else though I am absolutely delighted that they are here.

I have been a member of WEU for some eight years and I have always thought that its great potential as a forum of defence has been largely unfulfilled and I think it has been very largely a moribund organisation up to this time. Therefore I very much welcome the initiative of the Rome Declaration and I believe it will strengthen the unity and the peace and security of the West. Nor do I believe that it is inconsistent with NATO, but I do agree with my friend, Sir Dudley Smith, that, in fact, if we are to be effective, we have really got to get our procedures rather better than we have conducted them today and I hope actually that the Presidential Committee, which I think has put the President in a very difficult position, will try and find a better way of conducting our business in the future.

I really only want to make two points and if, in fact, the Minister is to reply he can – I shall put them in the interrogative. First of all, I hope very much that the new WEU will not be too rigid concerning the parameters of its work. Boundaries, I think, must be flexible because one cannot divorce the defence of Europe from events in the rest of the world. For example, it would be absurd for Europe to pretend that its defence is not concerned with what happens in the Middle East, that war there or another oil crisis should not be discussed because that is to adopt the attitude of the ostrich which is as inelegant as it is ineffective. I hope, too, that the new WEU will pay closer attention to what is happening inside our own country. Now, Mr. Vogt, who has occupied a great deal of time in this Assembly today, of the Green Party, said in his first speech this morning that people in the streets and villages should be consulted as they might want disarmament. Well, I have news for him. They have been consulted, not only in opinion polls but also in real elections and they do want disarmament, but they do not want unilateral disarmament and they do not want the tyranny of dictatorship and they are not prepared to risk breaching the peace that has prevailed for thirty-five years by upsetting the delicate balance of power. That is the answer to Mr. Vogt, and the people have given it.

The danger is, Sir, that the will and the ability of the West to maintain the defence of freedom can be undermined as disastrously by internal subversion as by build-up of Soviet arms. Now examples of this are, of course, things like the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the so-called Peace Movement, but I speak with feeling because next to my constituency is the Molesworth cruise missile base. It is the scene of a minority of undemocratic protesters and they

Sir Anthony Grant (continued)

are undemocratic because none of those who seek to disrupt our defence capability or who cause immense trouble to innocent local communities or who impose extra burdens on the already overworked police have ever submitted themselves to election where the opportunity arose. They know their case is not acceptable to the electorate as a whole so they rely upon methods contrary to the concept of democracy and law, but they achieve an attention from the media which is out of all proportion to their significance.

In the new revised WEU, we should have the capacity, I believe, to explain the facts of western defence to our people through our parliaments. All of us in WEU are here because we have submitted ourselves to the democratic process. We all have the best of interests in defending that democracy. Many of us have bitter experiences of the alternative. Germany is up against the boundary of the Soviet empire and countries right the way through to, and including, Italy have all been occupied or oppressed by tyrannical régimes. I believe that we in WEU are in a unique position to strengthen that democracy, to influence our governments and parliaments and contribute to world stability and peace. Does the Minister agree with what I say?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mrs. Knight.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). - I shall follow the example set by my friend and colleague, Sir Anthony Grant, and I will be brief also. I very much endorse the Rome Declaration and it is of course extremely significant that, for the first time in thirty years, we have had the Foreign and Defence Ministers of WEU all assembled together and of course I welcome that. I have nothing but congratulatory approval for the intention behind the text of the declaration but I very much hope that it is not in fact set in tablets of stone with regard to one or two minor points. There are parts where the wording could be very much improved. For instance, we do not really have a word in English for "concertation" and I think it is not part of our job to reorganise the English language - co-operation or something would be much better. Then again, there is one phrase which I think could be very offensive. In paragraph 4 it says that "the Atlantic Alliance... had preserved peace on the continent for thirty-five years. This permitted the construction of Europe." Well, Mr. President, surely it did no such thing. Europe, I would imagine, was constructed many, many years ago and indeed how dare we say this here, in this place of all places? How can we pretend in Rome - although it is true that many of the beautiful and very, very

old constructions in this city have been almost destroyed by the mindless vandalism of the spray-paint graffiti artists and also I would say that I think that the wonderful, famous, historic Colosseum has been desecrated with an amount of white plastic steps - that we have been constructing Europe for only thirty-five years? So I think there may be quite a point about removing that part.

Now I would also like to say that I was very pleased to hear that the Ministers wish to foster dialogue and co-operation. I hope that they will also assist us in fostering dialogue and co-operation among the different parts of WEU. I consider the Standing Armaments Committee, for instance, the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the North Atlantic Assembly - all are important parts of WEU but we never talk to them. Perhaps it might be helpful if we were to get together more among ourselves within WEU before we start getting together with other bodies outside. I hope that we will have the approval of the Ministers for that because I have been a member of this body for many years. I have never had any contact with the North Atlantic Alliance nor the other bodies I mentioned and it seems to me that if we are to do all we can at WEU, then we must have more cohesion among ourselves.

I welcome the point in item I. 5 of the second part where the Ministers have suggested that there should not be an overall increase in the organisation's establishment. I think that is terribly important and I would like, if I may, to assure the Minister that many members here would warmly endorse and support what is decided here.

Now I would like to know how it is intended to implement a point in part II, paragraph 1, "The development of informal contacts between government representatives and the representatives of the Assembly". I did not quite understand that and I would like to have some clarification.

Finally, I want to echo the point raised by my colleagues with regard to the opposition, ill-formed and ill-informed, to American nuclear weapons being based in Europe, because I think WEU has a very important public relations job to do in explaining that those weapons are here for our defence, not for the American defence but for Europe's defence and we should make that point very strongly indeed. Now WEU revived will hopefully improve Europe's contribution to defence dialogue between the United States and ourselves, but what diplomatic changes are envisaged to bring this about? Like my colleagues, I warmly welcome the initiative we see because WEU had indeed reached the point where either it had to become stronger, more

Mrs. Knight (continued)

cohesive, more effective in doing its job or it had to die quietly into non-existence and none of us wants that. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Andreotti.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). - I would prefer not to be responsible for prolonging this question time just because I am here, but it is my duty to reply. To Mrs. Knight I would say - but just in passing - that I agree there was no need for an exhibition of the Italian economy between the two wars, particularly at the Colosseum, for one thing because it was an economy which I, personally, think is better forgotten.

With regard to the points she raised, I am not in favour of deleting the reference in paragraph 4 to the close connection linking the thirty-five years of the Atlantic Alliance with the development of Europe and the maintenance of security. It may be that peace could have been safeguarded without the Atlantic Alliance - no one will ever be able to say. But I would like to turn that sentence round. We can remember the fierce arguments there were at the start when the Atlantic Alliance was branded an instrument of war, an obstacle to peace. We must all agree that that, at least, did not happen. I believe that the connection between the alliance and the feeling of security (whence - to touch on the third point - the need for this balancing of missile positions in Europe, always in the hope of negotiations eventually bringing about arms reductions or, better, dismantling them altogether) will continue to be effective only if the commitments entered into are maintained with a firm resolve. As regards relations with other organisations and the possibility of new relations being formed around the work of the Assembly, the declaration clearly points out the usefulness of developing the dialogue between this Assembly and other parliaments and parliamentary institutions. I would also add that some of you I see here are already members of the North Atlantic Assembly and the Interparliamentary Union, which are part of other organisations where partly different but also partly common problems are discussed, and I think this is a tendency that we should warmly support and which should be one goal of the revival that is the occasion of our meeting here in Rome.

(*Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). - Mr. Minister, I think that we should first congratu-

tulate ourselves on this session and the Rome Declaration. I completely fail to understand what one member had to say. It is certainly four o'clock in the afternoon. I think that the real danger is that WEU, which has been the sleeping beauty for so long, does not now become, through the best of intentions, the celebrated "Palace of the Winds" in Agra where, behind a magnificent facade built by a mogul lover of the art, there is only wind. I believe that we have today taken a very important first step. But this must be followed by practical action and as we are not allowed to make a statement, I shall ask the Minister three precise questions. First: the documents submitted to us concerning the relaunching of WEU refer not only to armaments problems but also, several times, to the possibility of our involving ourselves in armaments control and even disarmament. We must be logical, however: while we are the only European organisation with powers in the matter of defence and security we should not concern ourselves with disarmament. That is a matter for other organisations. We already have little time and few resources or possibilities: let us not waste what we have on a problem which is not within the clearly-defined province of WEU.

Secondly: the basic issue is reform of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee. That is where we can work to best effect because there will be no European security policy so long as some members go on buying American equipment in preference to European and what is more at greater cost. The first thing to be done is to co-ordinate the standardisation of armaments and to give priority to European armaments purchased by Europeans. I am well aware that this may shock some of our members who cannot take a decision without asking the permission of the United States, but I believe that the interests of Europe and of the alliance, including the interests of the United States, demand a stronger European policy within NATO and we alone can bring this about. So, Mr. Minister, do the plans and discussions of the last few days make any provision for increasing the Agency's potential for controlling armaments and for giving priority to European military co-ordination and co-operation in the armaments field? Europe has just proved that it can build highly sophisticated armaments, equal or superior to those of the United States. I cannot see why, in deference to an inferiority complex or some kind of psychological subordination to America, we should spend our time not giving opportunities to European armaments.

And lastly, the third question posed by WEU as regards strategic problems and the old theory of flexible response which the whole of military,

Mr. Baumel (continued)

technical and political developments suggest is now an out-dated doctrine: must we Europeans approve a doctrine formulated fifteen years ago in the interests of the United States so that it could bring in its nuclear weapons at the latest possible moment, in order to protect its sanctuary without really caring about what might happen in Europe? Can we Europeans accept this thesis or can WEU envisage another strategy, another military doctrine, as it is idle for Europe to imagine that raising the nuclear threshold will give Europe a better chance? A war with modern, sophisticated conventional weapons would be just as destructive as a nuclear war in highly urbanised Europe. That will not be humanised by supporting what, in the light of military realities, is the irresponsible idea of a prolonged conventional war instead of a nuclear conflict. Particularly as – and this is my last point – it must not be forgotten that our potential enemies are not completely stupid and that, if they took the plunge and started a conventional war in Europe, they would not go back home having failed if Europe resisted. Quite clearly, if the potential enemy risked such a venture he would use every one of the most destructive weapons in order to win whatever the cost. In these circumstances what is the value of the doctrine of flexible response? That is my question.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Baumel.

Will you answer, Mr. Andreotti?

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Baumel will forgive me for being very brief in my answer. To me there seems no contradiction between our prevailing concern with armaments and the accent in the Rome Declaration on arms control and disarmament problems. I believe that it would have been a mistake, psychologically as well as otherwise, to have a paper that referred to the legitimate concern for arms standardisation and co-ordination but made no mention of our firm security policy at a time when we are working hard to bring about some movement towards arms reduction. What is more, control is an issue WEU is specifically responsible for and dealing with. We know that up to now it has often been the stumbling block in many negotiations. So I feel that the discussion and formulation of feasible and verifiable controls in an institution such as this, with its thirty years of experience and responsibility, is a contribution on our part to general policy for our continent and our countries.

As regards the proposals about what is to happen to the Agency and the Committee, which

are, incidentally, only just about to be studied, I consider it would be more proper for me, since I am speaking from the Council bench, not to give any views on what the results of this study, which we decided upon yesterday, will be. This will be a matter for whoever is then Chairman-in-Office. The concern that we should do more to help ourselves as Europeans is also right, but not taking a disputatious attitude from the outset. When the Americans buy Airbuses, for example, I imagine Mr. Baumel is very pleased at their choice of a European product. So we should certainly activate trade in both directions because we know that, especially in military equipment, European purchases in the United States far outweigh what the Americans buy in Europe.

With regard, lastly, to the flexible response, I have to say that it is not a question of choosing the most or the least harmful of two types of warfare: a war of extreme conventional sophistication could be just as destructive perhaps as a nuclear war. It is a matter of seeing which is the best system to prevent or banish war and this we can certainly discuss. We have been doing so these last few days. Again, it would not be proper for me here to discuss a problem of strategy but I would say that the flexible response, which – as a kind of science – can always be updated and verified, has one very great quality, that of being credible. Why, at a certain moment, was there a crisis about the global response? Because, it was said, it is not believable that, against an attack that can be contained in some other way, everything in the way of nuclear capability would immediately be activated. There was considerable discussion then and it is still going on. I do not think that it is within the brief space of one session that we can go into so important a debate on strategy, but I do think that a certain flexibility is essential simply because of the match there has to be between the risk of an attack and the defence against it, and the illogicality of responding with a kind of universal flood to something that can be countered in far less disastrous fashion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I still have nine members down to speak and at 6 p.m. we shall have to close the sitting as we are to be received by the President of the Republic. Has the Assembly any objection to postponing consideration of the draft order to the next session in December, so that all members down to speak may be called?

I take the opportunity, Mr. Minister, to thank you for all you have done: I am certain that few members of governments are obliged to answer questions for a whole day.

The President (continued)

Are there any objections to this proposal?...

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I have been seeking the opportunity to propose it. It is quite obvious that, for a long time, we have been asking that Ministers should attend our sessions and answer questions and we could hardly complain, therefore, when they do meet with our requests and come and answer questions. But this inevitably means that, flattered though we are by senior Ministers coming, we cannot at the same time debate an order, even in limited scope, and therefore I was about to make, rather earlier, the same proposition, I hope with unanimity, that this Assembly cannot in a few minutes then return to an order we have not debated at all, so I should like to second, I hope with unanimity, the fact that we now continue with the questions and the other itself be deferred until we meet in December.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Sir Frederic.

It is so decided.

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Just a word, Mr. President. On the subject of the order, I agree with you that it should be discussed in depth. I should simply like to ask you two questions. First, have any amendments been tabled to the order? Secondly, will it be possible to table amendments prior to the detailed discussion?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Pignion, I can answer on the basis of the announcement I made earlier. Let us therefore leave it for the Assembly to discuss the text in December. I have as yet no knowledge of any amendments and, as regards the in-depth discussion in December, there will be every opportunity for amendments. Have I answered your point? Thank you, Mr. Pignion.

I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, thank you. My speech was actually going to be part of the debate but I can modify it to include two precise questions. It will be remembered that, ever since 1961, the two-pillar concept of NATO has been under discussion within Europe and between Europeans and Americans. In the 1970s, proposals were made to establish a European union with a security dimension. This development was put on ice because it became clear that Ireland, Denmark and Greece did not wish to change their national approaches to security. For Ireland, the main concern was neutrality, for Denmark its relationship with

other Scandinavian countries and for Greece its relationship with Turkey. So now we revert to Western European Union which should and can be very actively reactivated or reborn. Of course, in the past, other European institutions have been similarly reactivated but, with only one exception, ESA, such efforts have not been very successful.

The question now before us all is which course WEU will take. For the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence, the decision should not be difficult.

First, there is NATO and although the United States has always in the past promoted European unity in defence matters too, many NATO countries are not willing to abandon national objectives and have underlined the danger of a separation developing between Europe and the United States. The presence of American troops in Western Europe and the American deterrent with its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons remain essential for the security of Western Europe.

The European defence effort, not divided, not inefficient, should nevertheless be co-ordinated and streamlined. Collaboration in armaments and armament production calls for a much greater political will between the Western European countries than now exists. Because of the so-called emerging technologies, new conventional weapons systems are now being developed. These systems require the use of military computers, an area in which Western Europe is rather weak. There is also the so-called smart weaponry, improved homing and guidance systems, instant communications, data-processing and data banks. These emerging technologies will mean that a new generation of conventional weapons systems will be developed and if Western Europe fails to act as one, our countries individually will be unable to compete with the Soviet Union, the United States or even Japan.

The reactivation of WEU should therefore mean political decisions on defence policy and more particularly a joint armaments policy. With the best intentions in the world, as Mr. Andreotti will probably say, this will be impossible without an increased budget to take in the increasing work, certainly in high technology, that I have described and, of course, the fact that if we do not do this, if we postpone this still further, Europe will probably have abdicated for ever its place in the world of advanced military technology. So, for all the good wishes, all the kind thoughts of the Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers, I am sure Mr. Andreotti will be like me in realising that budgetary considerations will have to be taken into account. Streamlining, finding of waste and inefficiency will not necessarily provide the

Mr. Hill (continued)

finance to enable us to do a job that is so worthwhile and the job that only we can do. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Andreotti.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). - I shall confine myself to one comment. What has been said is absolutely right. High technology will be of increasing importance in this sector as in a few others. There is something useful that we can do. Let me simply tell you of a plan that we have under study in the ten- and tomorrow twelve-country Community but which could easily be used by a smaller number, the seven of us here, for example. It is this. If you add together the budgets the ten countries earmark for technological research and applied research in general you will find it comes to twice what Japan spends. But each country operates on its own, except for ventures like the Esprit and Jet projects. I quote this latter example because it shows that when a significant European project is launched not only do other countries join in - Switzerland and Sweden in this case - but also we find that, in a restricted but significant area like nuclear fusion, we are five years ahead of the United States. So, if we managed, without making much of an increase in the Community budget, to take a substantial part of what we spend on research and put it together to finance a series of joint projects, I believe this could be the way forward, it being understood that, through our contacts with the United States and other countries making up, with us, the world's seven most industrialised countries, there should continue to be large-scale trade in technology and exchanges of experience for purposes of co-operative schemes. The only practical way to progress that I can see is this pooling together of a large part of the effort that each of our countries continues to make in isolation in the field of research and development.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). - Mr. President, since the debate on the report by Mr. Prussen, I have taken the floor in the Assembly at least four times on possible changes which should be made in the use of WEU as an institution. I thought that today I would be able to make a speech of the same kind as before, but at this particular moment I cannot change my prepared speech into a list of questions. I also hope that after thirty years in politics you will be hearing speeches which you deserve and not a written course which you have already heard before. One question still remains, apart from what we will read about this

meeting in the press tomorrow, and this is the question I want to put to the Minister: what is his impression of today's important session?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Andreotti.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). - My impression is a favourable one because I should say that if there is a flaw it is one that applies to many meetings, including the national parliaments, i.e. the fact that the problems of security and defence are practically never discussed when they are "hot", i.e. needing an immediate decision: missiles, yes or no; a time limit one way or another. It seems to me that, through the various speakers, the various experiences and the various political colours - that is the strength of a pluralist Assembly such as this - certain common orientations can be assembled on the basis of which it should be possible to construct a WEU doctrine. And so, just as this time we in the Council of Ministers - I made this point this morning, Mr. President - were helped by the document produced by the Assembly, now, in a reciprocal exchange of information, hopes and judgments between the Assembly and the Council of Ministers and also via all those external contacts with other parliamentary assemblies and other institutions in general to which we have referred, I believe that, for the most part, a favourable view - and I do not use the word simply out of politeness - may be taken of what has come out of the meeting this morning and this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I do not want to continue the debate that has been going on here all afternoon, but I am rather reminded that Turkey is a member of the Atlantic Alliance and it has not always been a democratic country. It is a democratic country today. Last century there was the Sultan and the gate and the seraglio, and those who announced their presence in the ante-room in good time were admitted to the Sultan's presence. The whole procedure was thus somewhat more democratic than perhaps in our countries today, when the situation is rather confused.

I should like to say something to Mr. Vogt, who is sitting behind me. He said, in his first statement, I believe, that he regretted that the European Community, which as a civilian organisation cannot pursue a common armaments and defence policy, was now to have a counterpart organisation in the shape of the reactivated Western European Union. I think that is what he said. I disagree with him, and I should like

Mr. Müller (continued)

to ask Mr. Andreotti a question. I must after all ask a question, otherwise I am not allowed to speak. This is an interesting situation: parliamentarians may only speak if they put questions to Ministers.

I want to ask Mr. Andreotti if he does not think that it has been one of the weaknesses of the movement towards European unification that it has been possible to discuss olive oil and wine quotas and milk quotas and grain prices but not the issue of main concern to us all in Europe of how we retain our freedom, how we defend this freedom and above all how prepared we are to make our contribution to détente. Consequently, I believe Western European Union may achieve something that cannot unfortunately be done within the European Community. Reverting to what the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Genscher, said this morning, I should like to ask Mr. Andreotti, who is still here, what his views are on this subject.

In his statement on the declaration, Mr. Genscher said the Ministers hoped the Assembly would take it upon itself to solicit support for the Council of Ministers. I believe it should be the other way round: it should be the Ministers' task to solicit the parliamentarians' support for what they decide, for what they advocate. It is not for parliamentarians to be given instructions: that belongs in the 19th, not the 20th century. It is for parliamentarians to lay down the guidelines for what is to be done and for Ministers to translate the political views of parliamentarians into practice.

As this is not a general debate and I must say everything I have to say in the form of questions, which, I repeat, I very much regret, I would be grateful to Mr. Andreotti if he could tell me to what extent the old goals of democracy, whereby the representatives of the people took first place and the executive second place, also apply to WEU, or whether there has already been a process of change in this respect.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Andreotti.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, I shall be glad to answer these two questions. I should first say that I, too, can reply only to the extent that a member of parliament is asking me the question; in other words there is, from that standpoint, a certain parity. But I say at once that I have pretty clear ideas about the primacy of the parliament. But turning to the subjects raised, with regard to the fair question as to whether the olive oil, colza or rapeseed problem is more important than defence problems, the

answer is definitely no, the truth being that those who felt the European spirit to be an integral part of their wonderful political mission first proposed a model that included integration at the military level. This proposal had no immediately combative aspect, it was not designed to counter old-style German militarism. It was, in a positive sense, the fruit of the realisation that, if a common defence structure were created, then very firm roots would be developed for political integration. The proposal failed and was thrown out and, realistically, new approaches had to be found, the first being the introduction of the coal and steel policy which has functioned satisfactorily for several decades. In so doing, it might be said, we were choosing possible paths to the economic integration out of which, step by step, political consultation could develop. I mean it was not a choice in which the common agricultural market was given preference over security problems. It was the result of a development that took shape because of the fact that some countries would not go along with the original treaty for a European Defence Community.

As regards relations between parliamentarians and the Council of Ministers, I feel that what Mr. Genscher said needs to be correctly interpreted. He did not, in fact, say that the Assembly should be the Council of Ministers' advertising agency. I think relations should be reciprocal; after all, many of us can be members of the government and of parliament at one and the same time - some of us are for a lifetime - and above all parliament today in practically every country cannot be compared with what it was like in the old days. We - in the government or parliament - belong to certain political forces with common roots. So I believe that the advertising has to be in both directions, i.e. learning what people want and informing and educating people is something that goes on at one and the same time whether in parliament, political parties or in the government. So I do not see any distinction, certainly not a conflictual distinction, but I also recognise that, constitutionally, priority belongs to the parliamentary institutions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). - Thank you, Mr. President. The task of parliamentarians is not simply to accept what is handed down from the executive but to formulate alternatives and to probe and challenge and to question before final decisions and final policies are worked out and it is in that spirit that I want to make a number of, I hope, fairly quick points.

If the primary objective of reactivating WEU is to take initiatives for peace, then all of us will be fully in support of such reactivation. How-

Mr. Freeson (continued)

ever, if among its primary objectives is the creation of a new form of nuclear hegemony in Western Europe, then many of us here and elsewhere will oppose it and we will do so actively. I do not consider that to be subversive as has been suggested by one of my colleagues. I would consider that to be acting democratically and constructively. The West is not weak and we should stop talking as if it is weak. We have more destructive power in our hands today than ever before and that goes for all sorts of other countries too. In my view there is no need for more arms in order to get security.

There may well be, I believe there is, a need for different arms strategies and I will put this point specifically. There is an urgent need for us to undertake within WEU at Assembly and Council of Ministers level that which is already taking place within NATO, as well as outside of NATO, that is a study of alternative non-nuclear strategy for defence. We should not act as if the argument and the discussion is not taking place – we know that it is and we should be participating in it, not just accepting it. We do not have to accept an increased Western European armaments programme as a kind of motor for industrial growth. We have too many military industrial complexes in the world on the eastern and western sides, dragging us towards war. We do not have to repeat this in Western Europe. Arms sales which emanate from this kind of policy and attitude, arms sales to troubled regions of the world, are massive and they are contributing to the already massive poverty and social unrest in many areas of the world. The source of instability exploited by big powers and their surrogates is poverty, massive poverty. It is exacerbated by the huge resources going into arms in the developed world and by sales to the so-called undeveloped world, resources that are needed for social and economic development in critical regions of the world. While the Council of Ministers was meeting on Friday and Saturday, one can estimate that something like fifty thousand, five oh, fifty thousand people died in Africa. Was there any discussion on this as a source of insecurity, instability and war at the meeting over the weekend? Action could have been taken in the past and could still be taken but it will require the diversion of resources towards economic and social development in the regions of the world that will give rise to more and more insecurity and war.

We need, and this is my last point, we need, and I make no apologies for making these points – it is about time that we started debating matters in this context because I end with this point. We need to study and to act on poverty

as the prime source of instability, insecurity and war. It is a far, far bigger threat to us in Europe and for the world at large than the direct threat of the Soviet Union to us in Western Europe and if we cannot accept that today, then I am quite convinced that with tears in our hearts and in the hearts of our children, we will be accepting it in a few years from now.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Blaauw, on a point of order.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – My point of order, Mr. President, is that what we have just heard was a political speech and I do not agree with that political speech, but I maintain that a political speech was made. On behalf of the Liberal Group, I state now that we hope that at the session in December we will really hold a political debate on the proposals made by the Council and the draft order prepared by the Presidential Committee. We should organise ourselves better in December, I hope, and also we should put questions on the same subject once only because those of us who have been here the whole day know that questions have been put by a distinguished delegate which were put already this morning. We have wasted some of our time and I really hope, Mr. President, that we will prepare for December in a far better way and have an organised debate on real political subjects. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Andreotti, would you like to answer Mr. Freeson?

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – I would like to make just one comment. I shall not repeat here what the connection is between strategy and general problems and how this applies to nuclear and other areas of security. I share the basic point that if mankind fails to find an answer to the great problems of the deep-rooted injustice whereby many parts of the world find themselves in conditions of poverty and famine, this will certainly be just as dangerous – I speak not from a moral but from a practical and political standpoint – as the possible explosion of nuclear arsenals. No one should be misled into thinking that such situations can go on without becoming unstable and I feel that all our countries, bilaterally and through international co-operation, should strive to do everything they can. If I may say so, it is to Italy's honour that, though not a rich country, it comes second after the United States as a contributor to UNICEF, the most valuable of the United Nations agencies because its object is to save children from death and poverty.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

4. Close of the extraordinary session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, no one else is down to speak. We shall close the sitting so that we can be on time to be received by the President of the Republic. But first allow me, Ladies and Gentlemen, to thank you all for having attended on this rather special day, because this is the first time that, immediately after such an important ministerial meeting as the one held in Rome, we have been able to react at once and to put questions to qualified representatives of the Council over a whole day. I am sure that this has been very worthwhile for the Assembly because, before embarking on an in-depth debate, we have been able to get information, which is after all the basis for detailed reflection. That is what we have done today and, even if there is some regret that we have not held a debate, it is what I would call wholly justified regret on the part of a

parliamentarian whose normal function is to debate. But the debate will follow the questions and answers and I can assure the Assembly that it will reap the benefit of the effort made today. And speaking of effort, Mr. Andreotti, may I once again say how grateful we are for the effort you have made here, on behalf of us European parliamentarians of WEU, for your willingness and readiness to answer and for your very pertinent remarks, which I am sure will be examined and studied in order to enhance the quality of debates in the committees and the plenary Assembly. All our thanks to you, Mr. Andreotti, and to your colleagues.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I now declare closed the extraordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6 p.m.)

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