

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTIETH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1984

I

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tél. 723-54-32

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTIETH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1984

I

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

The proceedings of the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU
comprise two volumes :

Volume I : Assembly documents.

Volume II : Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general
index.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
List of representatives and substitutes	8
Documents :	
966. Collective logistical support – Study by Lieutenant General C.J. Dijkstra (Retired), arranged by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in implementation of Order 51	10
967. Agenda of the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session, Paris, 18th-21st June 1984	11
968. Order of business of the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session, Paris, 18th-21st June 1984	13
969. Twenty-ninth annual report of the Council to the Assembly on the Council's activities for the period 1st January to 31st December 1983	16
970. Deterrence and the will of the people – Report submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur ..	45
7 amendments	63
971. State of European security – Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Sir Dudley Smith, Rapporteur	69
972. Control of armaments and disarmament – Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. de Vries, Rapporteur	110
973. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council – Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur	127
3 amendments	165
974. AWACS and Nimrod aircraft – Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Rapporteur	168
975. Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council – Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Rapporteur	178
976. Military use of space – Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur	182
7 amendments	199
977. Action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on the standardisation and production of armaments – Information report submitted on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments by Mr. Antretter, Rapporteur	203

978. Situation in the Middle East and European security – Report submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Lord Reay, Rapporteur	240
6 amendments	254
979. Political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council – Report submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Mr. Thoss, Rapporteur	257
2 amendments	281
980. Replies of the Council to Recommendations 396 to 402	283
981. Written questions 235 and 237 to 246 and replies of the Council to written questions 235, 237 to 239, 241 to 243, 245 and 246	301
982. Reactivation of WEU – Text authorised for publication by the WEU Council of Ministers, Paris, 12th June 1984	306
983. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1983 – Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration by Mr. de Vries, Rapporteur	308
984. Military use of space – Motion for an order tabled by Mr. Tummers	331

LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM.	ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
	BOGAERTS August	Socialist
	DE DECKER Armand	PRL
	DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
	MICHEL Joseph	PSC
	NOERENS René	PVV
Mrs.	STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP

Substitutes

MM.	BIEFNOT Yvon	Socialist
	BONNEL Raoul	PVV
	DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
	LAGNEAU André	PRL
	PECRIAUX Nestor	Socialist
	STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP
	VAN DER ELST Frans	Volksunie

FRANCE

Representatives

MM.	BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
	BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
	BEIX Roland	Socialist
	BERRIER Noël	Socialist
	BOURGES Yvon	RPR
	CARO Jean-Marie President of the Assembly	UDF-CDS
	FOURRE Jean-Pierre	Socialist
	JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
	JUNG Louis	UCDP
	LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
	MAYOUD Alain	UDF
	PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
	RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.
	SENES Gilbert	Socialist
	VALLEIX Jean	RPR
	VIAL-MASSAT Théo	Communist
	WILQUIN Claude	Socialist
	WIRTH Frédéric	UCDP

Substitutes

MM.	BARTHE Jean-Jacques	Communist
	BOHL André	UCDP
	CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
	DELEHEDDE André	Socialist
	DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
	DREYFUS-SCHMIDT Michel	Socialist

MM.	GALLEY Robert	RPR
	GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
	HUYGHUES des ETAGES Jacques	Socialist
	KOEHL Emile	UDF
	MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist
	MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left
	NATIEZ Jean	Socialist
	OEHLER Jean-André	Socialist
	PROUVOST Pierre	Socialist
	ROSSINOT André	UDF
	SOUVET Louis	RPR
	VERDON Marc	Socialist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM.	AHRENS Karl	SPD
	ANTRETTER Robert	SPD
	BOEHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
	ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
	GERSTL Friedrich	SPD
	HAASE Horst	SPD
	HARTMANN Klaus	CDU/CSU
	HORNHUES Karl-Heinz	CDU/CSU
	KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
	MUELLER Günther	CDU/CSU
	NEUMANN Volker	SPD
	REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
	RUMPF Wolfgang	FDP
	SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
	SCHWARZ Heinz	CDU/CSU
	SPIES von BUELLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
	UNLAND Hermann Joseph	CDU/CSU
	VOGT Roland	Die Grünen

Substitutes

MM.	BUECHNER Peter	SPD
	ERTL Josef	FDP
	GANSEL Norbert	SPD
	GLOS Michael	CDU/CSU
	HACKEL Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
	HAUFF Volker	SPD
	HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
	JAEGER Claus	CDU/CSU
Mrs.	KELLY Petra	Die Grünen
MM.	KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
	LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
	LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
	SCHAUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
	SCHEER Hermann	SPD
	SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
	SCHMITZ Hans Peter	CDU/CSU
	STAVENHAGEN Lutz	CDU/CSU
	WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM.	AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
	ANTONI Varese	Communist
	BIANCO Gerardo	Chr. Dem.
	CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
	CIFARELLI Michele	Republican
	FERRARI AGGRADI Mario	Chr. Dem.
	FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
	FRASCA Salvatore	Socialist
	GIANOTTI Lorenzo	Communist
	GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
	MEZZAPESA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
	MILANI Eliseo	PDUP
	PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
	RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
	RUBBI Antonio	Communist
	SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
	VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist
	ZAMBERLETTI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.

Substitutes

MM.	ACCILI Achille	Chr. Dem.
	ALBERINI Guido	Socialist
	BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
	COLAJANNI Napoleone	Communist
	FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs.	FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM.	GORLA Massimo	Prol. Dem.
	LAPENTA Nicola	Chr. Dem.
	MARCHIO Michele	MSI-DN
	MARTINO Guido	Republican
	MASCIADRI Cornelio	Socialist
	MITTERDORFER Karl	SVP
	PALUMBO Vincenzo	Liberal
	POLLIDORO Carlo	Communist
	RIZZI Enrico	PSDI
	RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
	SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
	TEODORI Massimo	Radical

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM.	BERCHEM Albert	Dem.
	MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
	THOSS Maurice	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM.	GLESENER Jean-Pierre	Soc. Chr.
	HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
	PRUSSEN Robert	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM.	AARTS Harry	CDA
	van den BERGH Harry	Labour
	BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
	de KWAADSTENIET Willem	CDA
	STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
Mrs.	van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA
Mr.	van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal

Substitutes

Mr.	EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
Mrs.	den OUDEN-DEKKERS Greetje	Liberal
MM.	van der SANDEN Piet	CDA
	van TETS Govert	Liberal
	TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
	de VRIES Klaas	Labour
	WORRELL Joop	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Sir	Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr.	Thomas COX	Labour
Sir	Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
Sir	Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Mr.	Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir	Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr.	James HILL	Conservative
Lord	HUGHES	Labour
Mr.	Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Mrs.	Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr.	Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr.	Maurice MILLER	Labour
Sir	John OSBORN	Conservative
Sir	John PAGE	Conservative
Lord	REAY	Conservative
Mr.	Stephen ROSS	Liberal
Sir	Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr.	John WILKINSON	Conservative

Substitutes

MM.	David ATKINSON	Conservative
	Robert BROWN	Labour
	Donald COLEMAN	Labour
	John CORRIE	Conservative
	Robert EDWARDS	Labour
	Reginald FREESON	Labour
	Edward GARRETT	Labour
	Ralph HOWELL	Conservative
Earl of	KINNOULL	Conservative
Lord	McNAIR	Liberal
MM.	Bruce MILLAN	Labour
	Michael MORRIS	Conservative
	Christopher MURPHY	Conservative
Lord	NEWALL	Conservative
MM.	John STOKES	Conservative
	Stanley THORNE	Labour
	John WARD	Conservative
	Alec WOODALL	Labour

Collective logistical support

STUDY

*By Lieutenant General C.J. Dijkstra (Retired),
arranged by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments
in implementation of Order 51*

This study has been circulated separately.

AGENDA
of the First Part of the Thirtieth Ordinary Session
Paris, 18th-21st June 1984

I. Report of the Council

Twenty-ninth annual report of the Council

II. Political Questions

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Thoss on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 2. Deterrence and the will of the people | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Lagorce on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 3. Situation in the Middle East and European security | <i>Report tabled by Lord Reay on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |

III. Defence Questions

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 2. State of European security | <i>Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 3. Control of armaments and disarmament | <i>Report tabled by Mr. de Vries on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |

IV. Technical and Scientific Questions

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Military use of space | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |
| 2. AWACS and Nimrod aircraft | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |
| 3. Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |

V. Budgetary and Administrative Questions

Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1983

Report tabled by Mr. de Vries on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

VI. Relations with Parliaments

Action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on the standardisation and production of armaments

Report tabled by Mr. Antretter on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments

ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the First Part of the Thirtieth Ordinary Session Paris, 18th-21st June 1984

MONDAY, 18th JUNE

Morning

Meetings of political groups.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the thirtieth ordinary session by the Provisional President.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business of the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session.
7. Situation in the Middle East and European security:
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Reay on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

TUESDAY, 19th JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Deterrence and the will of the people:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lagorce on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
2. State of European security:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. State of European security:
Resumed debate.

3.30 p.m.

2. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

3. State of European security:

Resumed debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

4. Control of armaments and disarmament:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Vries on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

WEDNESDAY, 20th JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

2. Political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Thoss on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

11.30 a.m.

3. Twenty-ninth annual report of the Council:

presentation by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

4. Resumed debate.

Votes on the draft recommendations.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Spies von Bülllesheim on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

2. AWACS and Nimrod aircraft:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Spies von Bülllesheim on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

3.30 p.m.

3. Address by Mr. van Houwelingen, Minister of State for Defence of the Netherlands.

4. AWACS and Nimrod aircraft:

Resumed debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

5. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1983:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Vries on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

THURSDAY, 21st JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

Military use of space:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

Action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on the standardisation and production of armaments:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Antretter on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

Debate.

CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE THIRTIETH ORDINARY SESSION

*Twenty-ninth annual report of the Council to the Assembly
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period
1st January to 31st December 1983*

INTRODUCTION

1. The Council of Western European Union transmit to the Assembly the twenty-ninth annual report on their activities, covering the period 1st January to 31st December 1983.
2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters :

I. Relations between the Council and the Assembly	17
II. Activities of the Council	19
III. Agency for the Control of Armaments	30
IV. Standing Armaments Committee	37
V. Public Administration Committee	40
VI. Budgetary and administrative questions	42

CHAPTER I

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY

Presenting the Council's twenty-eighth annual report to the Assembly, the Chairman-in-Office and French Minister for External Relations, Mr. Cheysson, recalled that this Assembly occupied a unique position as the only European parliamentary body empowered by treaty to debate defence matters.

He stressed the fact that the Council greatly appreciated the conscientious and serious manner in which the Assembly discharged its duties which, in the present circumstances, were of great importance.

The Council welcomed the reaffirmation by the Assembly, at its twenty-ninth ordinary session, of its determination to fulfil the whole range of its duties by dealing as thoroughly as possible with the many aspects of European security.

The exercise of this responsibility by the Assembly calls for a dialogue with the Council for which, as was reiterated in their reply to Recommendation 394, they hold themselves continuously available.

Throughout 1983 this dialogue has been maintained on questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty including – in accordance with the undertaking given in 1972 and subsequently renewed – those dealt with by member governments of WEU in other international fora.

A. Annual report of the Council to the Assembly

1. The activities of the ministerial organs of WEU during 1982 were described in the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council. The progress of co-operation between the WEU member states in other international fora in areas in which the Assembly is particularly interested was also referred to in that report. The Council noted that the Assembly particularly welcomed the information it received on European political co-operation.

2. Moreover, additional information was provided to the Assembly on the activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments in accordance with the procedure applied since 1971, which was set out in the Council reply to Written Question 123.

B. Work of the Assembly – Assembly recommendations to the Council, written questions put by members of the Assembly and replies by the Council

1. (a) The Council took note, with interest, of the reports presented by Assembly committees during the two parts of the twenty-ninth ordinary session.

It is recalled in this connection that the Council, in reply to a request from the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, had authorised the head of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee to offer technical help to this committee in its work of preparing and drafting, principally on the basis of information it had gathered, the second part of its report on the harmonisation of research in the fields of civil and military high technology¹.

(b) As the Chairman-in-Office stated in his speech to the Assembly, it is desirable, in view of the solid content of reports drawn up by the committees, that these documents be made available to the Council as early as possible before each session, in particular in order for ministers participating in the debates to make the fullest possible contribution.

2. The Council have followed the Assembly's debates with interest. They gave careful consideration to the eight recommendations² adopted during the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session and the first part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session and to the nine written questions³ put by members of the Assembly in 1983.

With the assistance of the national administrations, the working group and the Secretariat-General, the Council replied as substantially as possible to these recommendations and questions.

Through these replies the Assembly received information about the consultations in which representatives of the WEU member states had taken part in the framework of European political co-operation and of the Atlantic Alliance.

3. As a follow-up to the reply given to

1. See also Chapter IV.
2. Nos. 388 to 395.
3. Nos. 232 to 240.

Assembly Recommendation 380 concerning Annex IV to Protocol No. III, the Council informed the Assembly in November of progress in the matter¹.

C. Informal meetings between the Council and Assembly bodies

1. Three informal meetings took place in Brussels on 17th May 1983 after the ministerial session of the Council held under the chairmanship of Mr. Tindemans, the Belgian Minister for External Relations.

At a working lunch organised by the Belgian Chairman, the members of the Council met the Assembly Presidential Committee.

During the afternoon, the Council met two Assembly committees in succession and discussed with each the matters which it had proposed. The discussions with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments covered the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, the collaboration of the Standing Armaments Committee in the work of the Assembly committees, relations between NATO and WEU, relations between Europe and the United States on arms procurement and disarmament. The exchanges of views with the General Affairs Committee covered WEU activities, European union, the situation in Poland, East-West trade, the situation in the Middle East, relations between European countries and China.

On the same day, Mr. Tindemans, as Chairman-in-Office of the Council, received the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

D. Speeches made by the Chairman-in-Office and other ministers at the Assembly

1. It is customary for the Chairman-in-Office to present to the Assembly the annual report of the Council's activities.

The Council also encourage the participation of ministers, particularly defence ministers, in the Assembly's debates. At the Assembly's invitation ministers come to address the Assembly in as far as their many commitments allow them to do so.

2. During the first part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session, Mr. Cheysson, the Chairman-in-Office, outlined the main aspects of the activities of the WEU ministerial organs in 1982 and added certain information on the current year's activities.

Both Mr. Cheysson, as French Minister for External Relations, and Mr. Möllemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, outlined to the Assembly their respective government positions on topical questions concerning European security and the main aspects of their national defence policies.

The ministers took this opportunity to reaffirm their governments' interest in WEU and the great importance which they attached to the work of the Assembly.

During the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session, Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence, delivered a speech in which he emphasised the solidarity which united the member countries of WEU and stated that the thirtieth anniversary of the Paris Agreements should confirm and demonstrate Europe's ability, in the face of new challenges, to work towards common security. In this context, he pointed out that the French Government was giving detailed consideration to the possible measures to be taken to ensure that WEU played its full and rightful rôle. The minister also gave details on the direction and action being taken by France on defence.

After their speeches, Mr. Cheysson, Mr. Möllemann and Mr. Hernu answered questions put by members of the Assembly.

1. See Chapter II, part B.

CHAPTER II

ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL

Introduction

1. In presenting the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council, the Chairman-in-Office reaffirmed the member countries' attachment to WEU, the only European organisation which, by treaty, has been given competence in defence matters, and their determination to fulfil their obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty, among which the commitment to collective self-defence contained in Article V was one of the cornerstones of the European security system.

2. During 1983, the Council met at ministerial level on 17th May in Brussels under the chairmanship of Mr. Tindemans, the Belgian Minister for External Relations.

They held twelve meetings at permanent representative level. Their working group met twenty-six times.

3. The Council ensured that the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols were applied and observed, taking care to avoid – as required by the treaty – duplication of work with that in which WEU member states participate in other international fora.

Various aspects and phases of the implementation of the Paris Agreements appeared twenty-five times on the Council's agenda. In this context, the examination of the question of modifying Annex IV to Protocol No. III was continued.

The Council's discussions at ministerial level covered the development of East-West relations, the situation in the Mediterranean, and a set of proposals relating to the future work of the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU.

4. The Council maintained the dialogue with the Assembly, which constitutes an important part of their activities.

A. Political questions

*1. East-West relations*¹

(a) At the ministerial meeting in Brussels on 17th May 1983, the Council had a detailed

discussion on the development of East-West relations.

The Council noted with considerable concern that these relations continued to be seriously affected by a number of tension-inducing factors. In this connection, the ministers referred to Soviet military action in Afghanistan, which was continuing and intensifying, and to the crisis situation in Poland where government policy still failed to respect the deep-seated aspirations of the Polish people and where Soviet pressure was still felt; they also noted that the continued build-up of Soviet armaments greatly exceeded the Soviet Union's defence requirements and was a threat to the security of Europe.

The ministers reiterated the principles underlying their governments' policy, the prime aim of which was the maintenance of peace in freedom. The Council noted that the member countries of WEU were in favour of dialogue with all countries, that each country's security, essential for any genuine dialogue, had to be fully safeguarded and that it presupposed a military balance at the lowest possible level.

The ministers reaffirmed their governments' support for the two sets of negotiations taking place in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning, respectively, their strategic arms (START) and intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF); they expressed the hope that these negotiations would achieve positive results. As regards INF missiles, the ministers confirmed the different aspects of their countries' well-known positions.

They also referred to the progress of the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting and expressed the hope that this meeting would be concluded quickly with the adoption of a substantial and balanced concluding document which, in particular, contained a precise mandate for a conference on conventional disarmament in Europe. They emphasised that such a conference should, in a first phase, be devoted to the negotiation of a series of measures designed to strengthen confidence and security in Europe.

The Council noted that the member countries intended to maintain a firm, realistic and constructive attitude on questions relating to security and disarmament and that they attached great importance to the solidarity between European countries and between members of the Atlantic Alliance in this field.

Furthermore, the Council believed that it

1. See also Part B of this chapter.

was vital to alert and inform public opinion about the problems of defence. The ministers stated that their governments paid close attention to the trends of public opinion in their countries and would continue to answer any questions which might be raised. In this connection, they pointed out that the national parliaments and the WEU Assembly had, for their part, a vital rôle to play.

At the joint meeting between the Council and the General Affairs Committee, which took place in the afternoon of 17th May, the discussions centred, among other things, on two questions concerning East-West relations, namely the situation in Poland and East-West trade.

(b) In a press release issued after their meeting of 21st September, the Council stated that they strongly condemned the destruction of a civil airliner of the Korean Airlines¹. They added that they deeply deplored this action caused by Soviet military aircraft which resulted in the tragic loss of a great number of human lives. They also recalled that the member states of WEU had made public their positions and their reactions and that they had also expressed their determination within the ICAO, that the necessary measures be adopted to avoid any recurrence of such a tragedy.

(c) The member countries of WEU have taken an active part in the consultations concerning East-West relations which took place in 1983 within the frameworks of European political co-operation and the Atlantic Alliance.

In this part of their report, the Council would like to refer to the views expressed by the Ten and by the North Atlantic Council concerning the developments in Poland in the months following the WEU ministerial meeting and on the conclusions of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid.

In a declaration published on 20th June in Stuttgart, the European Council, noting the depth of the aspirations of the Polish people, expressed their conviction that only a national reconciliation which took full account of these aspirations could lead Poland out of its grave crisis.

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 27th September, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of the European Communities stated that: "The Ten have taken note of the measures adopted by the Polish Government on 22nd July 1983, some of which go in the right direction while others provide the authorities with the legal means to

repress more effectively possible dissident activities. In a spirit of friendship towards the Polish people, the Ten hope that these steps will be followed by further measures leading to reconciliation, dialogue and reform, in accordance with the aspirations of all the national and social elements of the population."

Turning to the outcome of the Madrid meeting, he expressed the satisfaction felt by the Ten and added: "Although the concluding document does not represent the maximum that could have been achieved, it was substantial and balanced. We attach as great an importance to the human dimension of that document as to its provisions concerning the convening of a conference on disarmament in Europe."

The views of the North Atlantic Council on these two subjects, expressed at the ministerial meeting on 8th and 9th December in Brussels, were recorded in points 5 and 8 of the published final communiqué¹.

On the question of economic relations between East and West, which the General Affairs Committee studied and which the Assembly debated during the second part of its twenty-ninth ordinary session, the conclusions reached by the North Atlantic Council were recorded under point 7 of the final communiqué² of that meeting.

(d) Finally, it should be mentioned that in a declaration published on 9th December in Brussels the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance extended to the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact the offer to work together with them to bring about a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity³.

2. *Situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East*

(a) At their ministerial meeting of 17th May in Brussels, the Council discussed the situation in the Mediterranean. They noted that the WEU member countries paid great attention to the developments in the various parts of the Mediterranean and that they were willing to do all in their power – both individually and within the appropriate international fora – to contribute to peace, security and co-operation in this region.

(b) The Council's hopes about the situation in the Middle East expressed in their last year's report were severely dashed in 1983.

1. See Annex I.

1. See Annex II.

2. See Annex II.

3. See Annex III.

The Council would like to point out that in the context of their reply in April to Assembly Recommendation 389 they reaffirmed their support for a global negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict – based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 – leading to the mutual recognition of the rights of the parties involved. They reiterated the opinion that such a solution should allow the Palestinians to realise self-determination, with all that that implied, as well as security for all the states in the region, including Israel's right to exist. They again voiced their deep concern and outright opposition to the continuing Israeli policy of settlement in the occupied territories, particularly in view of the fact that an opportunity for peace had been offered in September 1982 by the Reagan plan and by the declaration adopted at the Arab summit in Fez.

In their reply to the Assembly, the Council also emphasised that they considered it vital for the purposes of achieving lasting stability in Lebanon and for the restoration of its full sovereignty and political independence that all foreign forces whose presence was not explicitly requested by the Lebanese Government be withdrawn from the country.

The Council affirmed their solidarity with the Lebanese Government and their support for the full re-establishment of its authority over all its national territory; in this connection they emphasised the substantial contribution made by some WEU member countries (France, Italy and the United Kingdom) and the United States, in deploying a peacekeeping force in the Beirut area.

The Council pledged their support for all humanitarian aid to the civilian population of Lebanon who had been so cruelly afflicted by events in that country.

At the ministerial meeting of the Council the WEU member countries reaffirmed their support for all efforts to promote the restoration of the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

The Council also wish to recall that in the declaration¹ published by the Ten on 12th September in Athens, the latter stated that their governments were ready to work both jointly and individually for the objectives to be attained for a return to normality in Lebanon. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 27th September, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of the European Communities, noting that the cease-fire concluded on 25th September was to be followed by

1. See Annex IV.

a dialogue between the Lebanese, emphasised the Ten's hope that this dialogue would lead to national reconciliation and ensure the unity of the country; on that occasion he confirmed the position that the Ten had expressed in the past.

Moreover, following the meeting on 27th October after the tragic attacks on American and French troops of the multinational peace force deployed in the Beirut area, the foreign ministers of the four participating countries reaffirmed their support for this force, in the framework of the mission assigned to it; they reiterated their support for the process of national reconciliation in Lebanon and, launching an appeal for Lebanese unity, they urged in particular those who would be participating in the Geneva congress to agree to this end.

As regards the conflict between Iran and Iraq, it is recalled that the member countries of WEU had, in concert with their partners in the European Community, urgently appealed to the two belligerents to spare the civilian population and to abide by all international conventions applicable in time of war; they also made repeated calls for a cease-fire, the cessation of all military operations, the withdrawal of forces to internationally-recognised frontiers and for a just and honourable settlement, negotiated in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. The Ten confirmed their readiness, if requested by both parties, to participate in the efforts aimed at restoring peace in the area.

3. Asia

(a) In their April reply to Assembly Recommendation 389, the Council expressed their deep concern at the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan which had continued for more than three years and which was being met with the determined resistance of the Afghan people. They stressed that this occupation, together with the continuing violations of human rights which it involved, showed flagrant disregard for the principles of the United Nations Charter and remained a serious source of tension in East-West relations.

The Council stressed the urgent need for a negotiated settlement to the Afghan problem in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions, i.e. one based on an immediate and complete withdrawal of Soviet troops, respect for the independence, sovereignty and non-alignment of the country and the restoration of the right of the Afghan people to self-determination and conditions in which the Afghan refugees could return to their homeland in safety and honour. Only in this way, the Council believed, would it be possible to find a genuine political solution which could put an

end to the grief and destruction inflicted on the Afghan people.

In their reply to the Assembly, the Council also stressed the need to take all possible measures to alleviate the suffering of the Afghan refugees who had found welcome shelter in Pakistan from the horrors of an externally-imposed war.

As stated under point 1, the situation in Afghanistan was mentioned at the ministerial meeting of the Council in Brussels on 17th May. After the meeting, the Chairman-in-Office spoke of the deep concern expressed by the ministers at the recent increase of Soviet bombing raids in this country.

The member countries of WEU restated their position on the Afghan problem at the ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council which took place in Paris on 9th and 10th June and in Brussels on 8th and 9th December 1983 respectively. They also associated themselves with the overwhelming majority of the member countries of the United Nations who, in a resolution passed on 23rd November by the United Nations General Assembly, renewed the appeals regularly made by the Assembly since 1979.

The Council would finally like to mention the declaration published by the Ten on 27th December, the fourth anniversary of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, in which they stressed that the withdrawal of Soviet troops was the key to any long-term solution of the Afghan problem and recalled their proposal of 30th June 1981 concerning the calling of an international conference on Afghanistan.

(b) Developments in relations between the countries of Western Europe and the People's Republic of China was one of the topics discussed during the Council's meetings with the Presidential Committee and the General Affairs Committee of the Assembly in Brussels on 17th May. On this occasion, Mr. Tindemans, in his capacity as Belgian Minister for External Relations, spoke of his visit to this country in March.

The Council noted with interest Recommendation 393 on China and European security which the Assembly submitted in June.

In their reply, the Council began by giving the following information :

The member states of WEU individually maintained a wide range of political contacts with the Government of the People's Republic of China through exchanges or visits and other channels. These contacts provided good opportunities for consultations on international questions, and on many of these similar views were

shared. Moreover, in May 1983, the member states of the European Community, acting within their political co-operation framework, had decided to establish regular political consultations every six months between the Ten and the People's Republic of China. Pursuant to this decision, the first consultations had taken place at the end of May 1983.

Generally speaking, trade and economic co-operation between China and the individual member states of WEU were growing in a spirit of equality and mutual benefit. The member states of WEU welcomed this development and would endeavour to encourage its continuation. They did not consider that either individual national policies or other existing regulations currently presented a major obstacle to the development of trade and co-operation with China. They believed, however, that the application of those regulations to trade with China should be reviewed from time to time. The member states of WEU would continue to maintain close contact with the United States and their other OECD partners on this matter.

With regard to the other questions raised in the Assembly recommendation, the Council made the following comments :

As they had already stated within the alliance, the member states of WEU supported the position that the threat posed to Europe by Soviet missiles should not be reduced at the expense of countries of the Far East.

The member states of WEU had repeatedly declared their opposition to the presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, their demand for the complete withdrawal of these troops and their wish to see Cambodia return to its former neutral, non-aligned and independent status.

The United Kingdom's partners had complete confidence in the United Kingdom in its search for a negotiated solution for Hong Kong which would maintain Hong Kong's stability and prosperity.

B. Defence questions

During the year under review, the Council have carried out their customary tasks in the defence field, in accordance with the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols. In addition, they have pursued the matter of modifying the list of types of armaments to be controlled at Annex IV to Protocol No. III.

The Council's desire to adjust, where necessary, their activities in the matters of European defence for which they are competent in order to take due account of relevant developments in a wider context, while scrupu-

lously maintaining their traditional obligations, was reflected in the contributions made by ministerial representatives of member governments to the two part-sessions of the Assembly.

Thus, Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External Relations and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, in presenting the Council's annual report, reaffirmed the determination of the member states to honour their commitments under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty and more particularly the commitment to legitimate collective defence under Article V. He recalled, on that occasion, the care exercised by the Council to ensure that the provisions of the treaty and its protocols concerning control of the levels of forces and armaments of member states are implemented. The suggestions made by the Assembly in Recommendation 380 regarding Annexes III and IV to Protocol No. III were being very carefully considered by governments. Speaking on behalf of the French Government, Mr. Cheysson stressed that WEU had to remain the living and renewed expression of the solidarity of the member countries and that the overall structure created by the modified Brussels Treaty should remain intact.

For his part, Mr. Möllemann, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressing the Assembly, referred to adapting WEU to the changes that have occurred since its foundation in the political situation in Europe. Adjustments were needed, to ensure that WEU remains a viable and functioning body in the 1980s.

Mr. Hernu, French Defence Minister, recalled the solemn undertaking of mutual assistance in the event of aggression entered into by the member states in the modified Brussels Treaty. He further emphasised that the four component parts of WEU were in his government's view indispensable for the purpose of reinforcing the security of member countries. In this respect the Minister stated that the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Paris Agreements should be made an occasion for seeking to pursue further this aim.

1. Level of forces of member states

Control of forces (and of armaments for these forces) maintained by member states on the mainland of Europe remains a regular task of the Council, assisted by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, and also by NATO and SHAPE. The procedures governing this control remain unchanged, and accordingly the Council have carried out, in 1983, their usual duties in this field.

(a) Forces under NATO command

The maximum levels of ground, air and naval forces which member states of WEU place under NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty. Article III of the protocol provides for a special procedure, if necessary, to enable these levels to be increased above the limits specified in Articles I and II.

So that they may satisfy themselves that the limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II are not exceeded, the Council receive information every year concerning the levels in question, in accordance with Article IV of that protocol. This information is obtained in the course of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and is transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking officer designated by him to that end.

The information, as at the end of 1982, was conveyed at the appropriate time. It was presented to the Council on 13th April by SACEUR's representative to the Council. This occasion afforded the representatives of member governments in WEU an opportunity to be given up-to-date information on their countries' force dispositions, modernisation efforts and collaborative programmes. For his part, the United Kingdom delegate used this opportunity to state that his government's commitment to its obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty and to the defence of Europe remains firm (see also 2 below).

Information giving the status of these forces as at the end of 1983 was requested in December.

Furthermore, the Council take the necessary steps to implement the procedure laid down in their resolution of 15th September 1956, whereby the levels of forces under NATO command are examined in the light of the annual review.

For the year 1982, the permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, at a meeting held on 27th January in Brussels, examined the levels of forces of WEU member states and reported to the Council.

The Council, at their meeting of 22nd March, noted that the level of forces of the member states of WEU, as set out in the NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II, as at present in force. They also took note of a declaration on French forces made by the representative of France.

The same procedure is under way for the year 1983.

(b) Forces under national command

The strength and armaments of forces of member states maintained on the mainland of Europe and remaining under national command – internal defence and police forces, forces for the defence of overseas territories, and common defence forces – are fixed each year in accordance with the procedure specified in the agreement signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 in implementation of Article V of Protocol No. II.

*
* * *

By means of the methods set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have been able, in 1983, to carry out their obligations under Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty concerning levels of forces.

<i>Rôle</i>	<i>Aircraft/Equipment</i>	<i>Squadrons</i>
Strike/Attack	Buccaneer	1
	Jaguar	4
	Tornado	1
Offensive support	Harrier	2
Reconnaissance	Jaguar	1
Air defence	Phantom	2
	Rapier surface-to-air missiles	4
Air transport	Puma	1
	Chinook	1
Ground defence	RAF regiment	1

3. Annex IV to Protocol No. III

This annex lists armaments held by each WEU member state on the mainland of Europe (i.e. armaments for forces maintained under national command and under NATO command) to be controlled.

The Council have continued to examine in depth the technical, military and political aspects of varying the list of armaments at Annex IV to Protocol No. III. Their discussions on this complex question have been assisted by a technical study prepared by the Armaments Control Agency. The Assembly will be informed as soon as possible after the completion of the Council's examination of the problem.

2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe

In accordance with the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 331, the Government of the United Kingdom have informed the Council that the average number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1983 in accordance with the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty was 58,420. The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty there. In 1983 there were on average 995 men in Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated, these units would be speedily returned to their duty station in an emergency affecting NATO.

Furthermore, in accordance with the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 348, the Government of the United Kingdom have informed the Council that the strength of the United Kingdom's contribution to the Second Allied Tactical Air Force in 1983 was :

4. Study of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries¹

On 21st April, the Council received the updated classified version of the first section of the economic part of the SAC's study. On 27th April, in the course of his annual presentation to the Council on the SAC's activities, the head of its international secretariat commented on this updating.

The ministerial Council of 17th May examined progress made with the study. At the conclusion of their exchanges, it was agreed

1. See also Chapter IV, A.

that the economic study would be taken into consideration by member governments.

After subsequent discussions, the Council requested the SAC to carry out an annual, simplified updating of the economic study.

5. Set of proposals relating to the future work of the SAC¹.

The head of the international secretariat of the SAC presented to the Council on 27th April nine proposals for future SAC activity. One of them concerned the economic study, mentioned under 4 above. Another recommended that the Committee should carry out a study on the future position of Japan in the armaments market. These two suggestions received the endorsement of the Council.

The other proposals are still being examined by governments, bearing in mind the need to avoid unnecessary duplication of work with other fora.

The Council welcome the Assembly's interest in matters relating to armaments co-operation and in the SAC's activities. They will continue to keep the Assembly informed of developments in these fields.

6. Replies to Assembly recommendations and written questions

The Council continued to give careful consideration to the opinions expressed by the Assembly, the only European parliamentary body competent in the field of defence.

(a) In their dialogue with the Assembly, the Council have continued to emphasise the usefulness of information activity carried out within parliamentary bodies and also in the course of contacts between the elected representatives and public opinion. At a time of heightened world tension and deep public concern regarding security and defence issues, this rôle assumes particular significance.

(b) Thus, when the Assembly adopted Recommendation 388 on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism, the Council commented that this recommendation well illustrated the importance attached by the parliamentarians to these matters. Member governments, for their part, continued to believe that the security policy of the member countries – consisting of deterrence and defence as well as of arms control and disarmament – enjoys the genuine support of the overwhelming majority of public opinion.

1. See also Chapter IV, E, 2.

The theme of European security, and the need to maintain and improve the allied defence efforts, with more effective use being made of existing resources, was taken up again in the Council's reply to Recommendation 390. Member governments agreed that these efforts need to be accompanied by the active pursuit of arms control negotiations with a view to achieving balanced, equitable and verifiable agreements leading to enhanced security at a lower level of forces.

In the context of their reply to Recommendation 391 on the Falklands crisis, the Council stated that it does not appear that the deployment of British troops there need give rise to concern about the strength of allied forces in the North Atlantic. They noted that United Kingdom forces in the South Atlantic remain committed to NATO. The matter of the implications for alliance members of events beyond the NATO area which threaten vital allied interests – and in particular the consequences for NATO of deployments outside the area to meet such threats – was addressed in the same answer. The question of the export of defence equipment to non-allied countries was also referred to.

With regard to the Standing Armaments Committee, the Council, in replying to Recommendation 394, commented that the study of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries carried out by the Committee (see 4 above), appears to be a step towards improved co-operation between the members and could help them in directing their programmes and military investment expenditure. Reference was also made, in the Council's reply, to the proposals for study by the SAC, advanced by the head of the Committee's international secretariat (see 5 above).

(c) Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and French nuclear forces were the subject of Written Question 233. The Council's reply underlined the determination of member countries to honour the contractual obligations under the treaty, and in particular the commitment to collective self-defence agreed in Article V. It was also underlined that France fully assumed the obligations arising from her membership of WEU.

The Council used the opportunity provided by Written Question 238 to furnish information to the Assembly on the situation regarding procurement by France of an airborne warning system, and its place in the European AWACS cover; and on the United Kingdom's contribution to NATO AEW.

(d) Written Question 235 dealt with SS-20 warhead numbers. In order to formulate an

accurate reply, the Council requested NATO to contribute to the text being prepared.

(e) In December, the Council began their study of the three recommendations on defence matters transmitted to them following the second part-session of the Assembly. Where questions relating to the North Atlantic Alliance are concerned, the Council will as usual take into account, in preparing their replies, developments within that body and in particular the declaration issued by the alliance on 9th December 1983¹ on relations with the Soviet Union, to which all WEU member countries subscribed.

7. Meeting between the Council and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly

After their meeting at ministerial level on 17th May, the Council of Ministers held a joint meeting with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to discuss certain questions proposed by the committee (see Chapter I, C).

8. Contacts with SHAPE

The Council accepted a further invitation from SACEUR to exchange views on questions of mutual interest at a meeting to be held early in 1984 at SHAPE. Council representatives attended SHAPEX 83 in May and observed certain NATO military exercises.

9. Military archives of the Brussels Treaty Organisation

An ad hoc group of experts representing member governments met from 15th to 17th March in London to examine the 1948-1950 military files of the Brussels Treaty Organisation, with a view to their release for research purposes. On 13th July, the Council decided that these archives should be released in accordance with the recommendations of the group. The necessary preparations having been completed, arrangements were made for the Public Record Office in London to microfilm and store the archives, and make them available to approved researchers in accordance with agreed rules of access as from 1st March 1984.

As in the case of the Brussels Treaty Organisation political archives covering the same period, the President of the Assembly will be informed when the files have been opened for study.

¹ See Annex III (attached to parts A and D of Chapter II which are transmitted separately).

10. Meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on the joint production of armaments

The Council, after examining a request by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly, agreed to a meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee, to be held on 14th February 1984 in Paris. The Council noted that the purpose of the meeting was to examine with the parliamentarians, informally and in confidence, matters of mutual interest concerning the responsibilities of the Standing Armaments Committee which would be submitted to the Council beforehand.

C. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions

The Council noted with interest the reports prepared by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions¹. They followed closely the discussions arising from these reports during the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly.

The Council replied to Assembly Recommendation 392, relating to the energy situation in Europe, and 395, concerning the law of the sea, as well as to Written Question 237 put by a member of the Assembly on the subject of the future of the Airbus programme.

1. Energy situation in Europe

In their reply to Recommendation 392 on energy requirements and the security of Europe – Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements, the Council noted the importance of good relations between Norway and the other countries of Western Europe with respect, inter alia, to energy. They referred to consultations on the subject within OECD, of which Norway is an active member.

As regards future European energy requirements, the Council indicated that detailed studies were already available or taking place. They mentioned the OECD and International Energy Agency's study entitled "World Energy Outlook", which contained a thorough analysis of European energy requirements in the next decades, as well as the study on the energy supplies of OECD member countries and their security, currently being carried out within that organisation.

Considering that the result of these studies and other initiatives might provide further criteria for assessing the desirability of setting

¹ See also Chapters I, B, 1 and IV, E, 4.

up an interconnected intra-European gas pipeline network, the Council stated that they were not yet in a position to take a more definite stand on that subject.

Furthermore, the Council stated that they were confident that the measures which WEU member countries had taken both individually and collectively within the framework of the European Communities and – for those who are members of it – of the International Energy Agency for example, would be sufficient to ensure regular and adequate supplies of energy in order to meet their security requirements. The measures related *inter alia* to the pursuit of policies of conservation and of diversification by developing all sources of energy. The Council noted that the member countries of WEU were firmly determined to promote effective implementation of those measures.

2. *Law of the sea*

The Council wish to recall the main points of their reply in November to Assembly Recommendation 395.

The Council noted that two WEU member countries, France and the Netherlands, had signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, while the others did not at present intend to do so or had not yet taken a decision. They pointed out that the obstacles which prevented signature of the convention by the majority of member countries lay mainly, if not entirely, in the deep seabed régime, beyond national jurisdiction, as it had been drafted in the convention.

The Council therefore took the view that every effort must be made to arrive at constructive and acceptable solutions to the issue of the deep seabed régime. Success in this respect would undoubtedly advance the general acceptability of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Council noted that the WEU member countries would do everything possible, through the appropriate channels, to achieve this aim.

In the present situation, only France and the Netherlands, which have signed the convention, were members of the preparatory commission responsible *inter alia* for the elaboration of rules and regulations for deep seabed mining; the other WEU member countries participated as observers. The Council welcomed the fact that the first meetings of this preparatory commission had demonstrated that co-operation between WEU member states was very good. Those WEU member states with full voting rights, as members of the commission, had made every effort to ensure that the observers were allowed to participate in the work of the

commission to the full extent as laid down in Resolution I of the final act of the Conference on the Law of the Sea. In the view of the Council, the success obtained in this respect was of course in the interest of the commission as a whole because, in working out the deep seabed régime, it was necessary to make maximum use of the knowledge and expertise in the field of deep seabed mining, which was primarily available in those states which had a deep-sea mining capability.

Obviously, the influence of the preparatory commission members with deep-sea mining expertise would facilitate the establishment of satisfactory rules and regulations for the mining régime and help avoid any unnecessary control or protectionism. The Council noted that France and the Netherlands, together with WEU member countries participating as observers, would work to this end in the negotiations within the preparatory commission.

As the Council also noted, it was to be hoped that with the elaboration of a satisfactory seabed mining régime, the convention could be made fully acceptable not only to WEU member countries, but also to the United States whose position was referred to in the reply to the Assembly.

3. *European aeronautics*

In reply to Written Question 237 relating to the Airbus A-320, the Council in December gave the following information to the Assembly :

The industrial partners and the governments participating in the Airbus programme recognise the need to develop a more comprehensive range of Airbus products in order to enhance the competitive position of the European civil aerospace industry. The governments involved are aware that the industrial partners are concentrating their efforts on fulfilling the necessary conditions for the launching of the A-320 programme.

McDonnell-Douglas has expressed a firm intention to develop new versions of its intermediate DC-9 series of aircraft, although it has decided to abandon the launch of its new generation short medium-range aircraft MD-90. In the circumstances, the possibility is that Boeing will have the monopoly of the new 120-150 seat aircraft class. Moreover, Boeing will remain the only aircraft producer in the world able to offer a complete product range covering short-, medium- and long-range aircraft.

The member governments have signified their willingness to consider support for the launch and development of the Airbus A-320 provided it can be demonstrated that the

programme has sound prospects of commercial viability.

In principle an aircraft of the A-320 type is of possible interest to all airlines operating older design aircraft of this size which will need to be replaced from the late 1980s onwards. Orders for the A-320 have been placed by Air France, Air Inter and British Caledonian. Negotiations between Airbus Industrie and other airlines are continuing.

D. Secretariat-General

The Secretariat-General assisted the Council and its working group in all their activities during 1983.

The Secretary-General or his principal officers, representing WEU, attended a number of meetings of other international organisations when questions of concern to WEU were under consideration. As in previous years the most frequent of the Secretary-General's contacts were with the authorities of the Atlantic Alliance and the Council of Europe.

ANNEX I

Press release issued by the Council of Western European Union on 22nd September 1983

The Permanent Council of Western European Union at their meeting of 21st September 1983 strongly condemned the destruction of a civil airliner of the Korean Airlines on 31st August 1983. They deeply deplored this action caused by Soviet military aircraft, which resulted in the tragic loss of a great number of human lives.

The Council recalled that the seven WEU member states have already made public their positions and reactions, and also expressed their determination within the ICAO that the necessary measures be adopted to avoid any recurrence of such a tragedy.

ANNEX II

Points 5, 7 and 8 of the final communiqué of the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Brussels on 8th and 9th December 1983

5. The situation in Poland continues to give cause for serious concern. Some of the steps taken by the Polish authorities, such as the

lifting of martial law and the amnesty for most political detainees, contrast with the introduction of other measures which reinforce a repressive system. The allies call on the Polish authorities to respect the aspirations of the people for reform and to abide by the commitments in the Helsinki final act and the concluding document of the Madrid conference, particularly with regard to trade union freedom and civil rights. They are ready to respond to steps which create the opportunity for constructive political and economic relations with the West.

7. Trade conducted on the basis of commercially sound terms and mutual advantage, that avoids preferential treatment of the Soviet Union, contributes to constructive East-West relations. At the same time, bilateral economic relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe must remain consistent with broad allied security concerns. These include avoiding dependence on the Soviet Union, or contributing to Soviet military capabilities. Thus, development of western energy resources should be encouraged. In order to avoid further use by the Soviet Union of some forms of trade to enhance its military strength, the allies will remain vigilant in their continuing review of the security aspects of East-West economic relations. This work will assist allied governments in the conduct of their policies in this field¹.

8. The successful conclusion of the Madrid meeting contributes to the strengthening of the CSCE process. Although the concluding document agreed in Madrid falls somewhat short of the allies' proposals, it is nonetheless substantive and balanced. The allies attach equal importance to the implementation by all the CSCE countries of all provisions of both the Helsinki final act and the Madrid document, including their humanitarian aspects. An important result of the Madrid meeting was the agreement on a precise negotiating mandate for the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) due to open in Stockholm in January 1984.

ANNEX III

Declaration issued by the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance in Brussels on 9th December 1983

We, the representatives of the sixteen member countries of the North Atlantic

¹ Greece recalled its position on various aspects of this paragraph.

Alliance, reaffirm the dedication of the allies to the maintenance of peace in freedom.

Our alliance threatens no one. None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. We do not aspire to superiority, neither will we accept that others should be superior to us. Our legitimate security interests can only be guaranteed through the firm linkage between Europe and North America. We call upon the Soviet Union to respect our legitimate security interests as we respect theirs.

We are determined to ensure security on the basis of a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. Faced with the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20 missiles, the allies concerned are going forward with the implementation of the double-track decision of 1979. The ultimate goal remains that there should be neither Soviet nor United States land-based long-range INF missiles. The deployment of United States missiles can be halted or reversed by concrete results at the negotiating table. In this spirit we wish to see an early resumption of the INF negotiations which the Soviet Union has discontinued¹.

We urge the countries of the Warsaw Pact to seize the opportunities we offer for a balanced and constructive relationship and for genuine détente. In all arms control negotiations progress must be made among the states participating, in particular in :

- the strategic arms reductions talks (START) ;
- the intermediate-range nuclear forces talks (INF) ;
- the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) ;
- the endeavours for a complete ban on chemical weapons in the Committee on Disarmament.

We are also resolved to use the forthcoming Stockholm conference as a new opportunity to

1. Denmark and Greece reserve their positions on this paragraph ; Spain, not having been a party to the double-track decision of 1979, reserves its position on this paragraph.

broaden the dialogue with the East, to negotiate confidence building measures and enhance stability and security in the whole of Europe.

We shall continue to do our utmost to sustain a safe and peaceful future. We extend to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries the offer to work together with us to bring about a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity. For the benefit of mankind we advocate an open, comprehensive political dialogue, as well as co-operation based on mutual advantage.

ANNEX IV

Declaration issued by the Foreign Ministers of the European Community in Athens on 12th December 1983

The situation in Lebanon is more critical than at any other time in the last sixteen months. The number of innocent victims increases every day.

The international community must do all it can to help put an end to this tragedy before it leads to the disintegration of Lebanon.

The Ten appeal for an immediate cease-fire leading to the cessation of violence and pressure in Lebanon, and to national reconciliation.

They call upon all parties to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, and the authority of its government.

They stress the need for early progress towards the complete withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, except as the Lebanese Government may request otherwise.

They are ready to work for these objectives, jointly and individually.

They are convinced that the abnormal situation in Lebanon, so long as it continues, is a further obstacle to the achievement of a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East as a whole.

CHAPTER III

AGENCY FOR THE CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS

Under the terms of Article VII of Protocol No. IV, the Agency is required :

- firstly, to control the level of stocks of armaments held by member countries on the mainland of Europe, this control extending to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective ;
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the undertakings given by the Federal Republic of Germany not to manufacture certain types of armaments on its territory are being observed.

Subject to the restrictions referred to under point B of this chapter, the Agency's control activities in 1983 were performed at a satisfactory level.

A. General operating methods

The methods used by the Agency are determined by the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and by Council decisions on the subject. During the year under review, they remained basically unchanged.

Within the Agency's terms of reference, controls from documentary sources serve mainly for checking levels of armaments as a whole. They also contribute to the preparation of field measures for the control of levels and of the non-production of certain categories of armaments. This aspect covers all activities concerned with processing, for the purposes defined above, any useful documentary material including, in particular, countries' replies to the Agency questionnaire, and the results of field control measures carried out earlier.

The execution of test checks, visits and inspections, and all that is linked with these functions, constitutes that part of control carried out physically wherever there are activities and stocks subject to control and, more generally, wherever this is necessary to ensure that the information supplied is correct and that undertakings are observed.

The control system is based primarily on controls from documentary sources, the purpose of field control measures being to verify, physically, the accuracy of all the information collected in implementation of Part III of Protocol No. IV.

Documentary and field control measures are complementary, and equally essential for the accomplishment of the Agency's task.

Traditionally, the annual report has always presented documentary and field control measures separately, in the interests of both convenience and clarity. However, it must not be forgotten that these measures together make up a single control function.

Continuity of method allows the Agency, through a steadily growing knowledge of the organisation of the forces of each member state and of the progress of armaments production or procurement programmes, to develop its control activity efficiently and logically, both in the fixing of levels and quantities of armaments and in the choice and assessment of its control measures.

B. Situation concerning the control of atomic, chemical and biological weapons

1. Atomic weapons

Since the situation has remained the same as in previous years, the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of atomic weapons.

2. Biological weapons

All the member countries again gave their agreement, for 1983, on the renewal of the list of biological weapons subject to control as accepted by the Council in 1981. The Council noted the fact.

As in previous years, however, the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of biological weapons.

3. Chemical weapons

The Agency asked member countries for their agreement to renew in 1983 the list of chemical weapons subject to control. This agreement was given and the Council noted the fact.

The Agency therefore continued to use this list for its control activities during 1983.

- In accordance with the resolution approved by the Council in 1959 and in application of the Council directive extending to chemical

weapons the provisions laid down for the control of non-production of the armaments listed in Annex III to Protocol No. III, the competent authorities of the country concerned provided the Agency with a detailed, precise and complete reply. In addition, the procedure applied with these authorities since 1973 was again used.

The agreed non-production controls carried out by the Agency in 1983 are referred to under points D.2 (b) and 3 (b) of this chapter.

– In application of Article III of Protocol No. III, which lays down conditions to enable the Council to fix levels of chemical weapons that may be held on the mainland of Europe by those countries which have not given up the right to produce them, and in accordance with the Council decision of 1959, the Agency asked the countries concerned, in its questionnaire, whether production of chemical weapons on their mainland territory had passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage. As in the past, all the states replied in the negative.

– In addition, the Agency asked the member states, in the covering letter to its questionnaire, to declare any chemical weapons that they might hold, whatever their origin. Since all the member states replied in the negative, the Agency carried out no quantitative controls of chemical weapons in 1983.

C. Controls from documentary sources

In this field of control, the Agency studies the relevant documents with the main purpose of comparing the quantities of armaments held by the member states with the levels fixed by the Council and thus establishing whether these constitute appropriate levels within the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty.

1. Information processed by the Agency

During 1983, documentary controls were carried out in the normal way by studying, processing and collating documents and information obtained from various sources.

The principal source of information available to the Agency is the reply sent by each member state to its annual questionnaire which, when processed in conjunction with data provided by NATO concerning the forces placed under allied authority, allows the fixing of appropriate levels.

Secondly, the study of national defence budgets throws useful light on the replies to the annual questionnaire and to some extent

facilitates the surveillance of production programmes of armaments subject to control.

Finally, published material collected and circulated by the Central Documentation Office gives some confirmation of data obtained through official channels and allows the development of armaments programmes and the entry into service of equipment to be monitored.

(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies by member states

The follow-up action on the replies to the questionnaire sent, as every year, to member states was twofold. Some of the facts reported were checked physically by means of field control measures. In addition, all the replies were studied by the Agency experts who compared them with the other sources of information available, including member countries' earlier replies to Agency or NATO questionnaires and budgetary documents.

(b) Request for annual information

The control of undertakings' given by one of the member states regarding the non-production of certain types of armaments takes the form of field control measures.

These measures are partly prepared from a study of documents based on the replies of the country concerned to the annual questionnaire and to the Agency's requests for annual information.

As in previous years, the replies received from the country concerned in 1983 were taken into consideration for selecting and preparing the Agency's field control measures.

(c) Information provided by NATO

See point 2 (a) below.

(d) Information provided by the United States of America and Canada (Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV)

The Agency received, through the Council, information supplied by the Governments of the United States and Canada concerning their programmes of external aid in military equipment to the forces of member states stationed on the mainland of Europe. Since 1966, no aid has been provided by these countries to the forces concerned.

(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information

In accordance with the provisions of Article VII of Protocol No. IV, the aim of the

budgetary studies is to ascertain how the credits intended for the manufacture and procurement of armaments subject to control were apportioned and spent. They are based on an analysis of national statistical and budgetary documents, of the member states' replies to the Agency's annual questionnaire and of the specialist press.

As in previous years, timetable constraints dictated that the Agency's budgetary study for 1983 had to be based on the year before. Its findings confirmed the validity of the conclusions drawn from the declarations made by the member countries in 1982 and the information obtained from NATO. The still somewhat superficial study of the budgetary resources for 1983 in no way contradicted the appropriate levels of armaments drawn up by the Agency for that financial year.

(f) Processing of open sources of information

The documentation provided by the technical press specialising in armament matters, together with official documents from the member states, is a source of information of ever-increasing importance. Its evaluation permits the Agency to improve its awareness followed by a better understanding of matters arising within the context of its control mission. These sources also provide the means of keeping the experts up-to-date in matters of defence policy and armament techniques.

The Agency's Central Documentation Office maintains a range of documentation comprising: daily newspapers, specialised periodicals (military and technical reviews, publications of other international organisations such as NATO or OECD) and finally works of reference (basic studies, reports, catalogues concerned with armaments production, etc.).

2. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments

(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces placed under NATO command

After receiving and processing the member states' replies to the annual questionnaire and studying the statistical reports furnished by the authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Article VII, 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV) and, in particular, by the NATO international staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, for the annual consultations with the NATO military authorities called for by Article XIV of Protocol No. IV.

These consultations included a joint study session at Casteau on 18th November 1983 attended by Agency experts and the appropriate

officers from SHAPE, and concluded with a meeting in Paris on 2nd December 1983 which was attended by representatives of the Agency, SHAPE, SACLANT and CINCHAN and the International Military Staff of NATO. The meeting concluded that the quantities of armaments declared by the member states for their forces placed under NATO authority and stationed on the mainland of Europe corresponded to the appropriate levels for the control year 1983 within the terms of Articles XIV and XIX of Protocol No. IV, in respect of those armaments over which the Agency has hitherto been able to exercise its mandate of controlling stock levels.

(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe

In accordance with the procedure in force for the implementation of the Agreement of 14th December 1957, the Agency supplied the Council with the information relating to the armaments of this category of forces which had been supplied by the member states in response to the Agency's annual questionnaire. The Agency, having received from the Council the statements by the member states on force levels, analysed on the Council's behalf the data for armaments and forces, having regard to the rôles of their forces.

The Council subsequently accepted or approved for 1983 the maximum levels of armaments of these forces and notified the Agency accordingly with a view to drawing up the final tables of the abovementioned forces.

D. Field control measures

1. Principles governing the application of field control measures and general methods of execution

As recalled in the introduction to this chapter, the treaty requires the Agency to:

- satisfy itself that the undertakings not to manufacture certain types of armaments are being observed;
- control the level of stocks of certain armaments.

The field control measures provided for by Article VII of Protocol No. IV, which are an essential part of the Agency's work, continued during 1983 on the same basis as in previous years.

(a) Initial studies

The accumulated experience, information received and the results of its controls in 1982

led the Agency to draw up a programme for 1983 on the same scale and lines as those of recent years, i.e. :

- for non-production field control measures, a limited programme was considered adequate for verifying the undertakings of a member state not to manufacture specified armaments. The Agency was again aided in this task by the reply to its request for information from the member state concerned ;
- for the quantitative field control measures, the sampling methods were again thought adequate to verify the accuracy of the data supplied by the member states and thus provide an acceptable level of confidence in the Agency's documental control.

(b) Programme definition

(i) No factor has emerged to prompt the Agency significantly to vary the distribution of field control measures either between member states or between the armaments of their land, sea and air forces. However, a number of known armament procurement programmes in some member states were still thought to be vulnerable to change, perhaps at short notice, as a result of funding problems. Accordingly, the proposals for control measures in some production plants were prepared on the clear understanding that last minute changes could well be necessary. A number of depot stock controls were therefore prepared as readily available alternatives.

(ii) Depot and unit stock patterns were reassessed in the light of organisational changes and re-equipment programmes. The resultant basic programme of quantitative field control measures was examined in the light of production figures declared by the member states. Where these studies suggested the need to extend such controls to factories, their production programmes were reviewed to ensure that each such control measure took place at the most appropriate time. For those factories where different control measures (for example non-production and quantitative field controls) were indicated, proposals for all these types of control measures were co-ordinated with the aim of keeping the frequency of the Agency's visits to private concerns to a minimum.

(iii) To avoid duplication, Article VIII of Protocol No. IV provides for control measures to be undertaken by the appropriate NATO authorities themselves for those forces placed under NATO authority. Thus, the forces under the control of the Agency vary from country to country, a factor which should be weighed in

preparing the programme. The depots to which Article VIII equally applies are subject to different considerations. Since logistic support for forces under NATO authority remains a wholly national responsibility, difficulties could arise in defining which armaments in some depots are, or will be assigned to forces under NATO authority and which armaments would remain under national command. Accordingly, the system of joint Agency/SHAPE inspections introduced in 1957 and used each year since was again authorised in 1983. Some depots were programmed for inspection by an Agency/SHAPE team.

(iv) On the basis of these considerations and of the information already available to it, the Agency was able to draw up its 1983 programme with sufficient confidence early in the year. In keeping with the usual procedure, this provisional programme was later modified following analyses and reviews of the member states' replies to the Agency's questionnaire and some changes were made.

2. Methods, type and extent of field control measures

(a) In keeping with the customary practice, each inspection team included one member of the nationality of the establishment visited, the head of mission and another expert, all three of different nationalities.

No major changes were made in 1983 to the Agency's established procedure for the conduct of its field control measures.

(b) The total number of field control measures was seventy-two.

These measures fall broadly into the following categories :

- (i)* quantitative control measures at depots ;
- (ii)* quantitative control measures at units of forces under national command ;
- (iii)* control measures at production plants :
 - agreed quantitative control measures ;
 - agreed non-production control measures.

Most of the quantitative control measures related to ammunition (all services) and land matériel, others related to air matériel and naval matériel ; a significant number of those measures related to missiles.

The agreed quantitative control measures at manufacturing plants related to ammunition, tanks, missiles, aircraft engines and warships. The non-production agreed control measures were carried out at plants manufacturing chemicals or missiles.

At some plants, a production control measure was, for the reason mentioned under point D.1 (b) (ii), linked with a depot inspection, or a quantitative inspection of stocks under repair or a non-production control measure.

(c) It should be pointed out that the reports on field control measures are protected by the tightest security at all stages of their preparation, custody and subsequent analysis.

3. Conclusions

(a) In the fields where it is authorised to exercise its mandate, the Agency was able effectively to carry out its task of applying control measures. Such problems as arose in this very complex field of inspections were dealt with satisfactorily through the excellent relations maintained with the national authorities.

(b) On the basis of all the field control measures carried out in 1983, the Agency was able to report to the Council that :

- the measures taken for the control of the stocks of armaments at depots, units under national command and production plants amply confirmed the data obtained from documentary control measures ;
- the non-production control measures revealed no production contrary to undertakings.

E. Other Agency activities

1. Studies and documentary work

(a) At the Council's request, the Agency carried out a detailed technical study concerning a modification of the list of types of armaments to be controlled in accordance with Annex IV to Protocol No. III.

(b) Work continued on the updating of the "overviews" which summarise the way in which the armed forces are organised in each of the WEU member countries. These documents are intended to help the experts perform their control functions.

(c) Among the other Agency studies, mention should be made of the one carried out by the biological and chemical experts on the military use of herbicides.

2. Technical information visits

As in previous years, technical information visits were arranged in 1983 to keep the Agency experts up-to-date on defence forward thinking

and the state of the art of armaments subject to control.

The programme of visits was carefully tailored to make best use of the limited resources available to the Agency.

Agency experts visited the Ateliers de Constructions Electriques at Charleroi in Belgium where they were briefed on electric traction for armoured vehicles and saw production of major components for guided weapons and for warship weapon systems.

The land force experts were invited to make a guided tour of the "Satory 9" exhibition in France. They were also able to visit an explosives filling factory at Glascoed in the United Kingdom and the Royal School of Artillery at Larkhill. At the latter establishment, the team was briefed on the rôle of artillery in a European land battle and the requirements to be met by the next generation of artillery weapons for BAOR in the 1990s. They also heard a talk on the use of artillery in the Falklands campaign. They saw a demonstration of the Rapier anti-aircraft guided weapon system.

Before commencing an inspection mission in Italy, Agency experts attended a military exercise staged by the Scuola Militare di Paracadutismo of Pisa which included a demonstration of an attack and counter-attack with air/ground support and the use of helicopters.

Naval experts were invited to attend the Royal Naval Exhibition at Portsmouth in the United Kingdom ; during this visit, they heard a talk on the lessons of the Falklands campaign from a naval point of view.

The air force experts paid an interesting visit to the Le Bourget Air Show where mock-ups of the next generation of interceptors were on display. Finally, during a break in an inspection programme they visited the RSU Pratica di Mare in Italy to learn of ongoing flight trials and techniques.

The biological and chemical experts were invited to visit the Bayerische Landesimpfantalt at Munich in the Federal Republic of Germany to see the work being done on vaccines.

3. The information gathered by the Agency concerning the procurement and construction of various types of armaments in the member countries of WEU is set out in an annex to this chapter.

F. General conclusions

In accordance with Articles VII and XIX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency was able to report

to the Council that, as a result of the control exercised in 1983, the figures obtained in accordance with Article XIII of Protocol No. IV :

- for armaments of forces under NATO command under the terms of Article XIV of Protocol No. IV, and
- for armaments of forces maintained under national command under the terms of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of Protocol No. IV and the Agreement of 14th December 1957, concluded in execution of Article V of Protocol No. II,

represented for the control year 1983 and for each of the member states, the appropriate levels of armaments subject to control for those categories of armaments over which the Agency has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate.

As required by Article XX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of field control measures carried out at force units and military depots and during agreed control measures at production plants, it did not detect for the categories of armaments which it controls :

- either the manufacture of a category of armaments that the government of the member state concerned had undertaken not to manufacture (Annexes II and III of Protocol No. III) ;
- or the existence, on the mainland of Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of Protocol No. IV) or not justified by export requirements (Article XXII of Protocol No. IV).

In 1983, the Agency again applied controls in those fields which are open to it in an effective, simple and inexpensive manner. As in the past, the help and co-operation of national and NATO authorities, and of heads of staff of both the private firms and the military establishments visited played an important part in the accomplishment of its mission.

ANNEX

Production and procurement of various types of armaments in the WEU member countries

1. Armaments for land forces

In spite of the high cost of armaments, most of the member countries continued to re-equip their forces with modern weapons.

The German army has continued to introduce into service Leopard II battle tanks and APCs of the modern wheeled type TPZ-1. Its anti-aircraft capacity has been increased by the addition of Roland anti-aircraft tanks.

The Belgian army has modernised its anti-tank capacity by the introduction of Milan anti-tank missile launchers in addition to those launchers already in service. Belgium also purchased Milan missiles to increase overall operational effectiveness. A further delivery of M-113 APCs marked the commencement of the modernisation of armoured fighting vehicle holdings.

The French army has continued to re-equip its land forces with modern and more effective matériel. Large quantities of AMX-30 battle tanks, VABs (véhicule de l'avant blindé), AMX-10 variants and AMX RC (roues canons - wheeled guns) have been brought into service. In the field of artillery, self-propelled F-1 GCT (rapid firing) howitzers were procured and anti-aircraft Roland tanks based on the AMX-30 chassis have been delivered. The introduction of the rifled 120 mm mortar has increased the range accuracy of this type of indirect fire weapon. With regard to ammunition, anti-aircraft Roland missiles and considerable quantities of 105 mm tank guns, 120 mm mortars, and 155 mm howitzers have been procured.

The Italian forces have continued modernising their tank and anti-tank potential by procuring Leopard I battle tanks from national production and by importing Milan and Tow anti-tank systems. Modern APCs (VCC-1 type) have been brought into service to replace obsolete matériel. In the field of munitions, a large quantity of shells for the new FH-70 field howitzer is being procured and a significant quantity of missiles for Milan and Tow is due to enter the inventory.

The Netherlands is continuing to increase its stocks of ammunition in the following categories : 105 mm and 120 mm tank guns, 155 and 203 mm howitzers and anti-tank Tow missiles.

The British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) is slightly increasing the number of Chieftain battle tanks ; holdings of Tow launchers have also been increased during 1983.

2. Naval armaments

Procurement programmes for fleet modernisation in general went ahead as planned in the various WEU member countries, notwithstanding the continuing economic recession. However, in some cases their slowing-down to spread costs over a longer period was noticeable.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Rheinland-Pfalz and Emden missile frigates of type F-122 class, have been introduced. Delivery to the German navy of fast missile attack craft of the Gepard class has continued. Tornado attack aircraft have partially replaced the F-104 Starfighters. The Standard 1A, Kormoran and Sidewinder 9L missiles have also been added to the inventory.

In France, the Var, the third in a series of four under-way replenishment ships of the Durance class, was due for delivery in 1983. Super-Etendard attack aircraft were planned to enter into service and the delivery of quantities of the following guided missiles was due: Masurca, Crotale Navale, MM-40 (an upgraded Exocet missile), AS-12 and AM-39 (Exocet air-launched).

In Italy, the Scirocco and Aliseo, missile frigates of the Maestrale class, were due to join the fleet. The last of the hydrofoil fast missile attack craft of the Sparviero class have been procured in accordance with the programme. Deliveries of Terrier, Tartar and Otomat missiles were made.

In the Netherlands, the Crynssen, Van Brakel and Pieter Florisz, missile frigates of the Kortener class, were due for delivery, thus completing the programme for this class of vessels. ASM long-range maritime patrol aircraft of the Orion P-30 type were purchased.

3. Air force armaments

The member countries have not slackened their efforts to modernise their air forces during 1983, despite innumerable difficulties, principally of a budgetary nature.

Each air force has pursued its programmes either by procuring more modern armaments or by modernising and improving existing holdings.

In Germany, the programmes have continued with the manufacture and delivery to the air and naval forces of Tornado aircraft, with deliveries of the last Alpha-Jets, which will then raise their stocks to the foreseen holdings. A

large number of RB-199 engines (fitted to Tornado aircraft) have been manufactured. Finally, there has been a significant increase in the stocks of the Sidewinder 9L air-to-air missile, the components of which were purchased abroad except for the guidance system, which was manufactured in Germany.

The Belgian air force has continued its modernisation programme by procuring new F-16 aircraft. Production of the F-16 aircraft and its associated F-100 jet engine has proceeded as planned in 1983.

In France, the manufacture of Mirage 2000 aircraft has proceeded at a steady pace; the first production models of this aircraft have been delivered to the air force. The Strike version of this aircraft, the Mirage 2000-N (nuclear) two-seat version, which is capable of carrying a medium-range missile (100 km), made its first flight on 3rd February 1983. Similarly, the manufacture and delivery of the new Mirage F-1-CR, a reconnaissance variant, has continued, and this aircraft will replace the obsolete Mirage III-R. Production and delivery of the Mirage F-1-C (normal interceptor version) has continued.

There has been large-scale production of jet engines (Atar K-50 for the Mirage F-1, the M-53 and the Mirage 2000). There has also been extensive production of the Crotale surface-to-air and the Super 530 and R-550 air-to-air missiles.

In Italy, modernisation has continued with the production and acquisition of new Tornado aircraft. There is also a limited improvement programme for Nike Hercules missiles through the purchase of certain major components.

The production of Tornado aircraft and the associated RB-199 engine (end items of major assemblies) has gathered pace at Aeritalia and Fiat Aviazione.

In the Netherlands the modernisation of the air force has continued with the production of F-16 aircraft.

CHAPTER IV

STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE

In 1983, the Standing Armaments Committee met three times, on 18th March, 16th June and 14th October. At the invitation of the French authorities, the Committee visited the Cherbourg naval base on 15th June.

The main items on the agenda of its meetings were: the study on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU, the updating of WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 on trials methods for wheeled vehicles and the question of a similar agreement for tracked vehicles, the follow-up to a FINABEL agreement on a future light helicopter, the activities of Working Group No. 8 on operational research and the possible reconvening of Working Group No. 9 on possible hindrances to enemy action.

A. Study on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU¹

1. The Standing Armaments Committee has finished work on the updating (for the period 1972-81) of the classified version of the first section of the economic part of its study on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU. This updated version was sent to the Council in mid-April.

2. The SAC was instructed by the Council to provide a simplified, annual updating of the figures given in the economic study. In this context, the Committee approved a questionnaire drawn up by the international secretariat and a specimen set of graphs designed to make it easier to read and understand the statistical information.

3. With regard to the preparation by the SAC of the second section of the economic part of its study – which will give an analytical description of the armaments industries based on the information supplied by them – the Committee stuck to its decision to await the replies to the questionnaire sent out by the IEPG to avoid duplicating the work of this body.

B. WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 on trials methods for wheeled vehicles

The Standing Armaments Committee, having noted NATO's intention to produce a

standardisation agreement on vehicle trials (based on WEU Agreement 4.FT.6) and having also obtained information on the type of documentation required by FINABEL¹ for its own studies, convened the group of national experts on trials methods to determine WEU's future course of action in this field.

The group, which met on 20th December 1983 under the chairmanship of France, forwarded its findings to the SAC for consideration at its first meeting of 1984.

C. Follow-up to a FINABEL agreement

The SAC has examined the possibility of following up the FINABEL agreement on the military characteristics of a future light helicopter with development work. The replies received from the member countries to a questionnaire designed to ascertain whether they had any helicopter to propose which met the criteria laid down by the agreement or whether they were thinking of building or procuring one, led to the conclusion that there were no grounds at present for taking any follow-up action.

D. Activities of the working groups

1. Working Group No. 8 on operational research

The remit of Working Group No. 8 is to exchange the findings of national operational research studies, to organise symposia on operational research methods and techniques and to arrange visits to national operational research centres. The group held two meetings in 1983, on 16th-17th May and 6th-7th October respectively. The second meeting was coupled with a visit to the Fiat research centre in Turin (Italy).

(a) Exchanges of information

During the year, the delegations presented sixteen information forms, six of which related to new studies and ten to updates. The total

1. Co-ordinating committee between the army chiefs-of-staff of the WEU member countries. This committee draws up standard definitions of the military characteristics of future land forces' equipment.

1. See also Chapter II, part B.

number of studies presented by the member countries has therefore now reached 353.

(b) Visit to Turin (Italy)

At the invitation of the Italian authorities, the group visited the Fiat research centre in Turin.

Talks were given by engineers from Fiat and Elettra and these were followed by a discussion.

(c) Lexicographical activity

The group continued its work on the pilot study designed to assess the time needed to produce a second improved and extended edition of the five-language glossary of operational research terms.

(d) Seminar on methodology

Following the eight seminars previously organised by the group, it was decided that the next one would be held in spring 1984 on the following topic: "Operator/computer interface and related subjects".

(e) Exchange of documentation with NATO

The NATO Panel VII, having in 1982 received a copy of the annual report by the Chairman of Working Group No. 8, and reports on the visit to CELAR in Bruz and on the eighth seminar on methodology, reciprocated by sending the group a copy of the report by its Chairman and other documents relating to its work.

2. Working Group No. 9 on possible hindrances to enemy action

The Standing Armaments Committee has investigated the possibility of reconvening Working Group No. 9 to gather and analyse the information which FINABEL would like to receive on new methods of obstacle-building.

The question has still not been settled, but the international secretariat has been instructed to seek possible candidates for the rôle of pilot country for the proposed study.

E. International secretariat

1. The international secretariat has assisted the SAC and Working Group No. 8 in their work.

2. On 27th April 1983, the head of the international secretariat presented an oral report to the Council on the SAC's activities. His report contained nine proposals for the future work of the Committee¹.

Following the decision taken by the Council the international secretariat has begun a programme of research for the SAC study on the future prospects of the Japanese armaments industry.

3. The head of the international secretariat, who took up his duties on 1st November 1982, has begun to make contact with both the political and military authorities in the member countries of WEU. He paid visits to the Netherlands, Italy, United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany where he had high-level talks. He also took these opportunities to visit a number of armaments industries.

The head of the international secretariat subsequently had a further contact with the armaments directorate in The Hague concerning co-ordination of the work of the SAC with that of the IEPG, the chairmanship of which was to pass to the Netherlands with effect from 1st February 1984.

4. Acting on the Council's instructions², the international secretariat assisted the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in the preparation of the second part of its report on the harmonisation of research in the fields of civil and military high technology.

5. As a follow-up to each part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the WEU Assembly, the international secretariat distributed to SAC members a document containing extracts of any speeches, reports, debates and recommendations dealing with armaments questions.

6. Relations between the SAC international secretariat and the FINABEL secretariat have continued in accordance with the provisions for co-operation laid down in 1973. The results of this co-operation have been described under points B, C and D.2 above.

7. Acting on the Council's instructions, the head of the international secretariat forwarded to the Chairman of the IEPG the updated, classified version of the SAC economic study on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU.

8. As regards contacts with NATO, the head of the international secretariat took part as an observer in the June and October sessions of

1. See also Chapter II, part B.

2. See Chapter I, point B, 1.

the North Atlantic Assembly which were held in Copenhagen and The Hague respectively.

The international secretariat was also represented by an observer at the April and October

meetings in Brussels of the Conference of National Armaments Directors and also in the June and December meetings in Brussels of the NATO Naval Armaments Group.

CHAPTER V

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE

A. Meetings of the committee

The Public Administration Committee meets once every six months. The two meetings in 1983 took place in Luxembourg from 3rd to 5th May and in York from 4th to 6th October.

As usual, these meetings were devoted to exchanges of information on significant administrative developments in the member countries during the preceding six months and to the preparation of the multilateral course for government officials organised in the autumn of each year under the auspices of the committee.

The exchange of views between the members of the committee on administrative developments in the member countries is one of the most productive items on the agenda of each meeting. It provides the members with an opportunity to describe the most significant reforms or innovations which have taken place in their administrations, to identify the problems raised and, where appropriate, the obstacles with which they are confronted. Where the questions are of interest to all the member countries (gradual introduction of new techniques into government, repercussions on government of a difficult economic climate), these exchanges of view provide the opportunity for a valuable comparison of the experiments being carried out in a particular country, all of which are aimed at improving the way in which government departments and their staff adapt to the realities of modern society and to the constraints imposed by the economic situation. Occasionally, there is a natural follow-up to the discussions in the committee in the form of the subsequent study visits which provide officials from the member countries with an opportunity to familiarise themselves, through direct contact, with new, or especially successful experiments in another country.

Among the many subjects discussed by the committee during the year, two key issues emerged.

First, the importance of better training for officials was gaining greater recognition everywhere. It had been calculated in one of the member countries that the average time spent on training scarcely amounted to 1% of working time, although an increasing number of complex tasks required specialist training. It was hoped to increase this proportion. Special attention should be given to improving the management skills of senior civil servants and training

institutes were directing their efforts accordingly. One such institute had recently been set up in one of the member countries where none existed before. In another country, a programme of correspondence courses had been launched for the training of C-grade staff. At all levels in fact, efforts were being made to set up facilities to achieve more efficient use of the staff available.

At the same time, reductions in staff levels were being sought in several countries. Increasing interest was now being shown in the ideas of deregulation and privatisation which reflected the desire to reduce the rôle and activities of the state which had become increasingly costly and bureaucratic. Even in those member countries where these ideas had not been manifested, efforts were being made to limit recruitment in order to cut or at least stabilise the cost of the civil service. The concept of recruitment was, to some extent, giving way to that of redeployment of staff within each organic unit. Moreover, if (mainly young) people were to be given jobs to help cut the level of unemployment, this would have to be offset by a number of measures such as part-time work, early retirement, etc.

B. Courses for government officials

The twenty-eighth annual report of the Council outlined the main features of the course held in Bonn in autumn 1982 under the auspices of the Public Administration Committee, at which the following subject was studied: "Providing efficient government services on a reduced budget and the control of public expenditure". The course brought together some twenty officials from the administrations of the member countries who were interested in this subject. Participants' reactions and their evaluation of the course – which were received at a later date – could not be included in the report. Generally speaking, the conclusions reached on the basis of their comments were very positive and may be summarised under four points as follows:

- better knowledge, on the basis of a very detailed questionnaire, of budgetary techniques in the various member countries;
- detailed examination of a highly topical budgetary issue;
- definite contribution by the participants

from other countries to knowledge of techniques and regulations, thus enabling different approaches for one's own country ;

- contact with officials from various countries, opening up the prospect of subsequent exchanges of view at a personal level.

Clearly, the participants on the course were not able to solve the problems raised but this in no way detracted from the quality of the various delegations' contributions ; it arose from the fact that, in the difficult field selected for investigation, there were no clear-cut answers.

The 1983 course for government officials was held in Ostend, Belgium, from 16th to 22nd October. Its objective was to study the changes brought about in the public services by the introduction of office automation systems, i.e. the automation of administration services. In accordance with the committee's terms of reference, the discussion was not about techniques but about the administrative repercussions of the introduction of office automation systems.

The main topic of the course concerned the organisational changes in working methods and in the structure of administrative departments. A number of other side issues (e.g. psychosociological and legal consequences and the social and financial implications, etc.) were also discussed.

The course brought together seventeen senior civil servants in charge of personnel management or policy whose responsibilities included departments where office automation systems had been introduced. Each national group of participants had been asked before the course to answer a detailed questionnaire on

the main topic and to prepare a talk on one aspect of the subject considered to be particularly important.

An appraisal of the course would be made at the next meeting of the Public Administration Committee once all the findings and comments of the various national delegations had been made known ; as was customary, this would be reported in the next annual report of the Council.

C. Study visits

Examples of visits organised during the year are shown below : policy and practice in relation to prisoners serving long sentences, particularly those claiming political motivation (subject studied in the Federal Republic of Germany) ; the workings of the "Caisse centrale de coopération économique" (central fund for economic co-operation - subject studied in France) ; the training of managers in the public service (subject studied in Italy) ; staff welfare in the civil service ; local transport subsidies and operating arrangements (subjects studied in the Netherlands).

These study visits enable an official from one member country to study his own specialist subject in the administration of one of the member countries. It is regretted that the programmes of visits have been cut back in recent years as a result of increasingly restrictive budgetary policies for they are indeed a remarkable way of providing further training. It is to be hoped, however, that the growing attention, referred to earlier, being given to ways of improving the training and efficiency of civil servants will generate a revival of interest.

CHAPTER VI

BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS

A. Budget

As has already been noted in recent previous annual reports, the economic situation in the member countries necessitates the utmost discipline in expenditure, and this policy was also rigorously pursued in 1983.

The approved budgets for 1984 of the ministerial organs combined show an increase of the total net expenditure of exactly zero growth (6%), including the cost for pensions, over the 1983 budgets. If the total net cost for pensions were to be excluded, then the increase would have been just over half the combined anticipated inflation rate (3.4%).

Tables showing summarised versions of these budgets are attached in Annex.

The Council emphasise that these economies have been obtained without generally impairing the efficiency of the organisation.

The year 1983 has seen the end of a period, which may be said to have started in 1974, of radical administrative reforms applied in the organisation and to which reference has been made in earlier reports. The pension scheme, social security agreements, the provident fund, following sometimes lengthy negotiations with governments as well as discussions in the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts, have all now become matters of well-established routine procedures.

Although as mentioned in the twenty-eighth annual report, VI A, the 1983 budget increase of the Secretariat-General has been maintained in real terms at a below zero growth level (negative growth), it has nevertheless been possible within the budget constraints to complete modernisation of office equipment in two phases.

Detailed studies have been made of all such equipment. The central purpose has been to improve the general standard of presentation and quality of documents, considerably speed up and simplify their duplication by replacing old machines by others incorporating the most up-to-date techniques.

Programmes for a continuing process of modernisation are regularly reviewed by the Council's Budget and Organisation Committee. The results achieved so far in both the London and Paris offices have been highly satisfactory, while keeping the budgets within the governments' constraints.

Communications, heating and security systems have also been a part of this programme. Its application has enabled efficiency to be maintained whilst achieving economies.

As will be seen under section B, further significant changes, particularly as regards the salary structures of the co-ordinated organisations, are now being studied in the Co-ordinating Committee.

B. Activities in the framework of co-ordination

The Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts held nine meetings, each of one-and-a-half or two days' duration. In addition, there were thirteen meetings of the Heads of Administration, nine joint meetings of the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General and the Standing Committee of the Staff Associations, as well as two meetings of the Secretaries-General.

The main subjects dealt with, some of which are still under review, were as follows :

- the question of improving staff participation in the framework of co-ordination ;
- the introduction of wage restraint, starting 1st July 1983, on the remuneration of B and C grade staff salaries by phasing out :
 - (i) the flat-rate additional element of the expatriation allowance ;
 - (ii) a salary correction which compensates for differences in the number of working hours per week in the organisations and those in the civil service and private enterprise of the host country ;
 - (iii) a salary correction which compensates for fringe benefits, other than those relating to transport and canteen facilities ;
- the introduction of wage restraint in the remuneration of A and L grade staff by applying a temporary levy on the basic salary, starting 1st July 1983 and covering a period of three years, the first year of 1.5%, the second year of 3% and the third year of 4.5% ;
- the detailed implementing instructions for these wage restraints, incorporating a guarantee on basic nominal salaries ;

-
- the periodic adjustment of salary and allowances ;
 - the principle and the modalities to apply to a feasibility study on comparisons of duties, grades and levels of remuneration in the co-ordinated organisations, other international organisations, certain civil services and certain private sector firms ;
- the problem of retention or discontinuation of the use of international indices for salary comparisons ;
 - a comparison between the children's allowances in the international organisations and a number of reference countries.

APPENDIX

Summary of WEU main budget for 1983

	A*	B*	C*	Total B + C
	£	F. frs	F. frs	F. frs
Salaries and allowances	1,307,145	9,927,490	20,636,600	30,564,090
Pensions	113,290	1,390,000	2,676,500	4,066,500
Travel	26,850	207,200	512,700	719,000
Other operating costs	197,375	654,550	961,750	1,616,300
Purchase of furniture, etc.	10,290	70,250	115,300	185,550
Buildings	—	45,000	81,000	126,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	1,654,950	12,294,490	24,983,850	37,278,340
WEU tax	484,395	3,495,600	7,197,300	10,692,900
Other receipts	28,750	95,000	200,000	295,000
Pension receipts	45,460	258,550	672,000	930,550
TOTAL INCOME	558,605	3,849,150	8,069,300	11,918,450
NET TOTAL	1,096,345	8,445,340	16,914,550	25,359,890

National contributions called for under the WEU main budget for 1983

	600ths	£	F. frs
Belgium	59	107,807.26	2,493,722.52
France	120	219,269.00	5,071,978.00
Germany	120	219,269.00	5,071,978.00
Italy	120	219,269.00	5,071,978.00
Luxembourg	2	3,654.48	84,532.96
Netherlands	59	107,807.26	2,493,722.52
United Kingdom	120	219,269.00	5,071,978.00
TOTAL	600	1,096,345.00	25,359,890.00

*A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Agency for the Control of Armaments.

Deterrence and the will of the people

REPORT¹

*submitted by the General Affairs Committee²
by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on deterrence and the will of the people

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. Peace and deterrence
- III. Western public opinion and the defence of Europe
 1. Agitation against Euromissiles
 2. Elections in 1982 and 1983 and the defence of Europe
 3. Opinion polls
 4. Positions adopted by Christian churches
- IV. The will for defence

1. Adopted in committee by 16 votes to 1 with 3 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy, van der Werff (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier, Bogaerts, Caro (Alternate: Dreyfus-Schmidt), Hill (Alternate: Ward), Lagneau (Alternate: Pécriaux), Lagorce, Lord McNair, MM. Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann (Alternate: Böhm), Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden (Alternate: Blaauw), Thoss, Vecchiotti, Vogt, de Vries, Cavaliere.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on deterrence and the will of the people

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling its Recommendations 383 and 388 and welcoming the positive replies received from the Council;
- (ii) Recalling that, as long as more progress has not been made in disarmament, the security of Western Europe will be ensured only by deterrence and that nuclear weapons are an essential part of that deterrence;
- (iii) Considering that fear of the devastating effects of any armed conflict in Europe is still a prominent and justified concern of the peoples of Europe;
- (iv) Underlining however that deterrence is ensured not by the accumulation of armaments alone but also by governments and nations showing their determination to defend their freedom;
- (v) Regretting that the failure of the Geneva conference and the Soviet Union's continued deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons together with its refusal to hold negotiations on these weapons on a reasonable basis have compelled the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance to start deploying missiles of similar range in Western Europe in application of the twofold decision of December 1979;
- (vi) Noting that the need to apply this twofold decision has been recognised by all the democratically-appointed governments of the WEU member countries;
- (vii) Hoping that constructive proposals will soon be made to allow negotiations to be opened on the limitation of nuclear weapons of all kinds;
- (viii) Noting that the security of Western Europe forms an inseparable whole;
- (ix) Deploring that this de facto solidarity is not expressed in more intensive consultations on external and defence policies;
- (x) Considering that the improvement of relations between the countries of Western and of Eastern Europe in the context of the CSCE can be a significant help to negotiations on disarmament,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue to keep European public opinion informed of the threats to which the European members of the Atlantic Alliance are exposed and of the measures available for countering them with particular regard to the type and level of weapons deployed in Europe;
2. Show the cohesion of the alliance and of its European members by making optimum use of the organs of WEU and of the Atlantic Alliance;
3. Concert its views inter alia on the implications of the modified Brussels Treaty for the defence policy of each member and for working out a joint position on the limitation of armaments or disarmament;
4. Continue to apply the NATO twofold decision of 1979 while seeking, with the Soviet Union, ways and means for negotiating balanced and controlled disarmament, particularly in intermediate-range nuclear weapons;
5. In the appropriate frameworks, seek to develop exchanges of all kinds between Western Europe and the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union;
6. Bear in mind in future negotiations the relationship between the production of armaments and the North-South problem and recognise that the North-South dialogue should continue to engage attention.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. On 30th November 1982, the WEU Assembly adopted Recommendation 388 on problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism based on a report by the General Affairs Committee which your Rapporteur had had the honour to present and in which he defined the notions of pacifism and neutralism and considered that although they were quite distinct they embraced significant convergences in Europe today. In this report the Assembly stressed the gravity of the problems then raised by the development of pacifism in Europe and the need for the Western European states to take them fully into account in order to ensure peace and security, first by demonstrating their desire to do their utmost to ensure the success of the ongoing negotiations on the limitation of armaments and renunciation of the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons targeted on Europe, second by giving public opinion "full, accurate and objective information on the levels of forces and armaments" of both parties and third by strengthening their development assistance policy in order to demonstrate clearly to public opinion that their defence effort was set in the context of a policy which sought to consolidate peace in Europe and throughout the world. In its reply, the Council confirmed that such were indeed the intentions of the seven WEU member governments.

2. Since then, a number of events have occurred which, without detracting from these principles, might guide their application:

3. (i) At the end of 1983 it became evident not only that the Soviet Union was not at all prepared to stop deploying SS-20s in Eastern Europe but that it was starting to deploy new medium-range SS-22 missiles in certain countries in that area. This inevitably led the NATO countries to start deploying Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe in application of the twofold decision of December 1979, and the United States took the first steps in this direction in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic.

4. (ii) By insisting on including French and British nuclear weapons in calculating what the Americans and the Soviets consider as western theatre weapons in Europe, the Soviet Union showed that it had little interest in bringing the negotiations on the withdrawal of such weapons from Europe to a successful conclusion. On the one hand it put forward a prior condition which

was unacceptable politically, i.e. that the United States could negotiate for its allies, which would have meant that British and French forces were merely a back-up for American forces without specific deterrent value of their own. On the other hand, it denied the fact that missiles deployed on submarines cannot be counted as theatre weapons but merely as strategic weapons. Even the French missiles on the Plateau d'Albion cannot be considered, technically, as anti-personnel weapons since the type of nuclear warheads with which they are equipped and their main rôle in France's strategy of nuclear deterrence of the strong by the weak precludes such a rôle. These factors set them apart from the SS-20s and Pershing IIs in all respects.

5. There is every indication that the Soviet aim in adopting this attitude was to stir up trouble among the countries of Western Europe and break the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance, using the agitation of pacifist movements which were calling for nuclear disarmament.

6. (iii) After the deployment of American missiles had started, the Soviet Union announced that it was terminating all ongoing disarmament negotiations. However, this did not affect its participation in the Stockholm conference which was to start in January 1984 covering all problems relating to disarmament in Europe, following a proposal made by France at the Madrid conference on security and co-operation in Europe. Furthermore, the prospect of the MBFR talks on the level of conventional forces being resumed in Vienna in February 1984 seems to be accepted by both the Soviet Union and the United States. The resumption of the negotiations on nuclear weapons therefore no longer seems out of the question although the United States is criticising the Soviet Union for not keeping to its earlier undertakings, as President Reagan recalled on 22nd January 1984, and although the Soviet Union is accusing the United States of having prevented negotiations by the premature deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles on the territory of several of its European allies and is continuing to insist on the withdrawal of these missiles as a prior condition for negotiations.

7. (iv) The continued occupation of and war in Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the spread of conflicts in the Middle East with the formation of a force consisting of detachments from four western countries in Lebanon, the Chad crisis, the continuing highly tense situation in Central America and the landing on and occupation of

the island of Grenada by American forces enhanced the fears of many Europeans that one of these conflicts might deteriorate to a point where it would bring the United States and Soviet Union face to face outside Europe and thus trigger off a major war, this probability being augmented by the fact that the areas concerned are not directly protected by a system of nuclear deterrence, although it is still very improbable that Soviets and Americans will come to grips directly.

8. (v) In 1982, the United States military authorities adopted a new doctrine for the defence of Europe. Drawing the full consequences of the principle of flexible response, the new doctrine was to counter by the most appropriate means any Soviet attack on Western Europe while avoiding the use of their intercontinental weaponry. It was thus a matter of using the most sophisticated conventional weapons, tactical nuclear weapons and, in case of need, European-targeted strategic nuclear weapons to ward off an attack by engaging the enemy forces at the moment they were being concentrated and moved forward, i.e. before being deployed to positions which would make them less vulnerable to such preventive retaliation. NATO did not accept this doctrine but, because it was that of the American military authorities, it is liable to have decisive consequences for all the member countries of that organisation by committing them to action which is both offensive and preventive. One member of the committee pointed out that this difference between the doctrine of American forces and that of NATO was particularly unfortunate in that it was the same American general who commanded American forces in Europe and NATO forces, thus arousing serious and regrettable uncertainty about the true nature of the western allies' strategy.

9. These various factors explain the development of pacifism and neutralism in Europe since 1982. On the one hand the campaign against the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles can now be said to have failed, after reaching a climax in autumn 1983. Conversely, other aspects of pacifist unrest have emerged which are no less dangerous for western cohesion. These the Assembly should examine and assess their implications.

10. The main aspect is probably the growing awareness of the total vulnerability of North American territory to the possible firing of Soviet intercontinental missiles or submarine-launched missiles, and hence the realisation, through the increased risks to European territory, that there has been a remarkable weakening of the cohesion of Euro-Atlantic defence such as it had been guaranteed for more than thirty years. Henceforth, a potential

aggressor is able to speculate on what he knows about the new American strategy and the various reactions of public opinion in Europe and in the United States in order to work out the odds of the Atlantic Alliance not operating effectively, Europe being abandoned in practice by the United States or the American presence in Europe being rejected. The upshot of one or other would leave Western Europe at the mercy of the Red Army and consequently of any political or military pressure exercised by the Soviet Union.

II. *Peace and deterrence*

11. Before considering what is discernable concerning the will of Europeans in security, defence and deterrence, a number of fundamental aspects of relevant European policy should be recalled. First, the aim of European policy is to maintain, strengthen and organise peace. None of Western Europe's present problems can be solved by the use of force and any attempt to do so could but have catastrophic effects for Europe. In this connection, pacifist demonstrations in recent years have revealed a fundamental and quite legitimate aspect of the concerns of Europeans who well know that any war between the two great powers would devastate Europe and kill a large proportion of its population. No political or other goal is worth this price, not even the reunification of Europe, which has been divided for almost forty years, or of any European nation.

12. No absolute distinction can be drawn between a war in which limited use is made of nuclear weapons and a purely conventional war. The second world war, when no nuclear weapons were used in Europe, left more than forty million victims there. Subsequent progress in conventional weapons, greater urbanisation, the ever-greater sensitivity of the people and their dependence on transport, electricity and industry mean that most probably another war, even if relatively short – as experts generally believe but which is far from certain – would leave an even larger number of victims and would ruin Europe's economy for many years.

13. Furthermore, in view of the number of nuclear weapons of all strengths and ranges now deployed in Europe or on the territory of the two great powers, neither of which could possibly support the other taking over the whole continent of Europe, and particularly in view of existing imbalances in purely European-targeted strategic nuclear weapons and chemical weapons and of the existence of national nuclear deterrent forces in Europe, there is every chance of the nuclear threshold being crossed in the event of a war in Europe. No prior understand-

ing, no guarantee and not even partial or total denuclearisation of the European continent in peacetime could prevent this. Any speculation about the possibility of keeping a European war on the conventional level would be, to say the least, extremely risky.

14. The defence policies of the European countries, as well as that which a united Europe might have, can therefore have no aim other than to avoid war or, if hostilities were to break out somewhere, to circumscribe it and prevent it becoming a continental- or worldwide war. This is the principal meaning of the strategy of deterrence to which all members of the Atlantic Alliance have subscribed from the very outset. Deterrence is not designed to ensure political or other advantages for those practising it but solely to avoid war. Disagreements between allies have never been about this aim but solely about the means of attaining it.

15. Today western public opinion has a tendency – the scale of which your Rapporteur will try to assess in the next chapter – to refuse deterrence and consider peace would be better protected by abandoning nuclear weapons or even refusing to defend Europe in the event of aggression from without. This tendency is prevalent in the United States as well as in Europe and is illustrated in several ways which your Rapporteur will examine. It is based on moral disapproval of weapons of mass destruction and on the conviction that accumulating such weapons does not improve the prospects of true peace but increases the risk of war and would make hostilities worse.

16. This argument is not unfounded and your Rapporteur is prepared to subscribe to any proposition for limiting armaments and multi-lateral, progressive and controlled conventional and nuclear disarmament. Inter alia, he welcomes the opening in January 1984 of the Stockholm conference on confidence-restoring measures and on disarmament in Europe, as well as the current American-Soviet talks on the resumption of negotiations, be they on the limitation of intercontinental nuclear weapons or on the deployment of intermediate-range weapons or conventional forces in Europe. He is prepared to admit that for the entire world, expenditure on armaments is an unacceptable waste of material and intellectual resources which would be infinitely better used in trying to solve present international economic problems, relieve underdevelopment and reduce unemployment.

17. However, he feels that no serious start has ever been made with disarmament. This can be done really and truly only if international society is first organised so as to ensure new and more solid foundations for peace. As long as this is not so, deterrence with its stabilising

nuclear elements, will still be essential for maintaining peace. Admittedly, international order based on the balance of terror is far from satisfactory, but it is better than no order at all where one or other may feel he can impose his own order or his own peace. Conversely, within the order guaranteed by mutual deterrence, it is possible to envisage a more satisfactory organisation of international order.

18. There are two essential reasons why this organisation is becoming increasingly urgent. First, nations, particularly in Europe, are finding the financial effort of developing credible and consequently increasingly sophisticated weapons systems less and less bearable. It seems increasingly difficult for some to accept the feeling that their survival depends on the effective deployment of weapons of mass destruction over which they have no control but of which they would be the first victims should these weapons no longer fulfil their deterrent rôle to perfection. The other reason is that conventional and nuclear technological development is progressively calling in question the notion of deterrence. Whereas it was almost absolute while the doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons was one of massive retaliation, certain concepts of deterrence have led the Americans and NATO to resort to the doctrine of flexible response. The deployment of nuclear weapons of various strengths mounted on means of delivery of various ranges has resulted in a loss of credibility for the doctrine of massive retaliation as practised by the United States because it seemed hardly probable that the two great powers would take the risk of causing intolerable destruction on their own territory in the event of an aggression limited in area or by the type of weapons used by the aggressor. This obviously does not apply to France which, in its concept of deterrence of the strong by the weak, has kept to a strategy of massive retaliation against the adversary's demo-economic structure should an independent operation to re-establish deterrence fail.

19. Today it may be wondered whether this doctrine of flexible response is again being called in question by the miniaturisation and improvements due to the enhanced radiation effect of nuclear weapons and by improvements in conventional weapons making the limits of the nuclear threshold less clear-cut. This is the case with the new American air-land battle doctrine which in fact tables on the failure of deterrence and recourse to a near-preventive use of the most modern weapons to counter any serious threat of aggression.

20. The air-land battle is a combat doctrine worked out by the United States TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command). According to General Rogers, this doctrine would help

NATO forces to defend themselves without using nuclear weapons thanks to improvements in conventional weapons. The official United States army handbook (FM100-S), published in August 1982 to describe this doctrine, underlined two crucial elements: early offensive action in order to take the initiative in operations and in-depth attack on the enemy, i.e. action on his areas of concentration and movement, before he can deploy for attack. These notions, which are now applied to all United States army operations throughout the world, were specifically intended for Europe where Warsaw Pact troops were to be destroyed even before being brought in and while still in the distant rear areas of the pact countries. According to the handbook, nuclear and chemical weapons are very suitable for this type of in-depth attack. But the improvement of conventional weapons plays an important part in the new doctrine. In particular, it calls in sophisticated electronic equipment and so-called smart weapons. TRADOC explains that the United States army needs a new doctrine and new weapons systems because of the numerical superiority of Warsaw Pact conventional forces over those of NATO. Otherwise it would be necessary to resort more quickly to nuclear weapons in the event of Soviet attack.

21. This doctrine has given rise to some concern in certain European countries. For instance, Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence, told the WEU Assembly on 30th November 1982 that "to emphasise a single aspect, namely conventional weapons... is ultimately to cast doubt on the rest". In fact, certain observers feel that the corollary to this doctrine is the abandonment of all first use of tactical nuclear weapons or wonder whether it is compatible with the forward integrated defence concept. General Rogers himself in fact spoke of no early first use, which might seem to raise doubts about the American nuclear guarantee in Europe. But according to official American statements this guarantee is in no way at stake.

22. This evolution has led to the progressive weakening of deterrence, which still plays a major rôle and largely guarantees peace in Europe. But this guarantee seems more and more precarious, which probably explains the pessimism of part of European public opinion in face of the risks of war and the conceivable effects of present tension in East-West relations. It therefore means not waiting for deterrence, mainly ensured by nuclear weapons, to have disappeared before negotiating disarmament and organising peace in Europe and throughout the world.

23. However, this should certainly not be done by upsetting the international order prematurely

or unbalancing forces by raising doubts in the minds of possible aggressors about the people's will to defend themselves or by taking unilateral disarmament measures. The two steps would moreover probably be concomitant and any unilateral disarmament would be tantamount to political and military capitulation with incalculable consequences. In addition, it is very doubtful whether such action would avert hostilities.

24. Particularly if, as is likely, they both occurred at once, either of these phenomena would most probably make disarmament negotiations more difficult rather than easier because the potential enemy would no longer see any reason to yield ground if he could achieve his aims without concessions, i.e. obtain military superiority with all the inherent political advantages and thus be in a position to lay down the law throughout Europe. One has only to think back to the years just before the second world war to realise that peace based on such an imbalance would always be extremely precarious and the hope of the other party reducing its military effort merely because we showed no desire to defend ourselves would be little more than a pipe-dream.

25. Consequently, whatever threats there may now be to deterrence and however urgent it may be to bring about true disarmament, deterrence is essential for Western Europe. American public opinion and leaders do not necessarily see the matter in this light and some of their reactions – the American bishops for instance – bear witness to this, as will be seen in Chapter III of this report. They may indeed consider that hostilities several thousands of kilometres from American soil are better than the risk of a nuclear strike against the American continent. The adoption by American military authorities of the air-land battle doctrine appears to indicate that this degradation of the notion of deterrence is already having repercussions on American concepts. It is characteristic that this doctrine, which has been accepted by the United States, should have been refused by NATO, i.e. by the United States' European allies.

26. This difference of view between Western Europe and the United States makes it essential for Europe to retain the wherewithal to act independently in the event of emergency, i.e. to continue to exercise some degree of deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, even if the deterrent value of the American component is declining. In this respect the national character of the French and British nuclear forces is particularly essential since they at least leave the possible enemy uncertain about the type of reaction to aggression. The fact that the United Kingdom or France can decide that since its survival is at

stake the use of these forces might be justified helps to strengthen the alliance's deterrent capability, particularly as any consequent weakening of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the United States may make it hesitate about embarking upon any form of aggression on Western Europe. It is therefore essential for these forces not to be prematurely included in negotiations in which these two countries have not yet been invited to take part, nor should they do so until major cuts have been made by the two countries whose nuclear weapons are by far the most powerful. As stressed by President Mitterrand in his speech to the United Nations on 28th September 1983, the two great powers would have to accept very considerable reductions in the number of nuclear warheads they possess (between 8,000 and 9,000) before the question of France's ninety-eight missiles could be raised. It should be added that the disappearance of French and British nuclear weapons would change practically nothing in the count of nuclear warheads but the political balance and the balance of nuclear deterrence throughout the world would thereby be radically changed. If it is borne in mind that a reduction in the number of French and British nuclear weapons would reduce these deterrent forces to nought, it will be seen that the problem is in fact not one of numbers.

27. Here your Rapporteur wishes to refer to the interesting proposal for restoring deterrence made by General Copel in his very recent book *Vaincre la guerre*. His formula, which is reminiscent of General Rogers' no early first use, is not to pull the nuclear trigger away from home. It emphasises that nuclear armaments should remain purely defensive while strengthening their deterrent rôle since a conventional attack would be met by nuclear means. Such a strategy would imply the production and deployment of the enhanced radiation weapon, the so-called neutron bomb, which alone would be capable of making such retaliation credible because of the limited damage and losses it would cause in the zone in which it would be used. It would require close agreement between the European members of the Atlantic Alliance and is probably worthy of close consideration.

28. But deterrence is not ensured only by missiles with nuclear warheads. It is also ensured by all the other arms which the Atlantic Alliance possesses because it is unlikely that nuclear weapons would be used in cases not considered to be large-scale attacks. To exercise true deterrence, it is essential for the alliance to have retaliatory capability equal to the challenge. Even under the massive retaliation doctrine it was never considered that weapons of mass destruction should be the only ones used, particularly in the case of limited incidents.

29. But above all deterrence is also ensured by the potential aggressor's conviction that the West will actually use the weapons it has in response to aggression. This is one of the essential difficulties raised by any deterrent system: one must be determined to take action in order not to have to do so, and any hesitation increases the danger of actually having to use one's weapons. The psychological factor therefore plays an essential rôle in the success of a strategy of deterrence. But even though the ultimate decision on the use of nuclear weapons is in the hands of one man – the President of the Republic in the case of France – the potential aggressor's conviction that he will take such a decision depends on his assessment of the President's character and of the will of the people as a whole. Such an assessment is based on various factors and particularly how each nation accepts in advance the financial and other sacrifices necessary for maintaining its means of defence or retaliation. In this respect, the curve of military expenditure in western countries is an accurate thermometer of their deterrent capability because of the means made available and the will revealed. The inability of most of them to increase their defence budgets by 3% per year as they had agreed in the North Atlantic Council is cause for anxiety from this point of view.

30. There are other means of assessing the will for defence: for instance, consideration can be given to the type of scenario envisaged by military headquarters in the event of war, the views of military circles as exposed in specialised revues, their circulation among the public and its reactions, the positions adopted by politicians and political parties and the response to them. In short, the effectiveness of deterrence is ensured by the overall attitude of each nation towards defence matters.

31. For governments, this implies that a policy aimed at consolidating peace does not generally involve unilateral or spectacular pacifist-type measures, although there may be cases when such measures can help to end a stalemate and encourage the opening of negotiations on disarmament. But generally speaking for such negotiations to be successful they must be in the interest of each participant and none must hope to disarm the other without disarming himself.

32. For all these reasons, insofar as the European nations' will to defend themselves is accompanied by no aggressive designs, it is a factor of security and of peace and any sign of this will weakening is a threat to peace. This is why the development of what is rightly or wrongly called "pacifist" agitation directed mainly at the deployment of American medium-range weapons in Western Europe in

response to Soviet SS-20s is a source of concern for those responsible for Europe's security, even if they consider that such security can be firmly established only on the basis of negotiated disarmament. The aim of participants in this undertaking was to stop the application of NATO's twofold decision of December 1979 calling for negotiations with the Soviet Union to ban the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and fixing 1983 as the deadline for the deployment of such weapons in Western Europe if the Soviet Union did not agree to start such negotiations. One committee member underlined however that there was some credulity in pacifist movements and that in many cases they were taken in by Soviet propaganda, just as public opinion in many countries was once taken in by Hitlerian propaganda.

33. Agitation did not prevent a start being made with the application of the decision at the beginning of 1984, when it became apparent that the Soviet Union was not prepared to make enough concessions to allow negotiations to be held. But it has already had the effect of seriously placing in doubt the will of the western nations to defend themselves, thus weakening the deterrent value of the West's armaments. It probably even allowed the Soviet Union to feel that, given enough time for agitation to spread, it would manage to paralyse the application of the NATO twofold decision and cause a serious split between the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance. This is why an attempt must be made to assess the reactions of western public opinion in this matter and probably to do more to give it the "defence spirit" which it now sorely lacks.

34. Some members of the committee said they considered British and French nuclear weapons made no real contribution to Europe's security, as the North Atlantic Council had said at its meeting in Ottawa, and that the best way Europe could contribute to a deterrent policy was to develop its conventional capability. This is a perfectly rational view if it is felt that only the United States has to have nuclear weapons and can represent the interests of Europe and of its security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It is not so rational if account is taken of the considerations your Rapporteur has developed above. In any event, it is liable to make Europeans feel that they are no longer master of their fate and are but a toy in the relationship between the two great powers. This could but discourage them from any wish to defend themselves and hence deprive them of their deterrent ability. It seems wholly out of the question that any French Government would endorse such a point of view.

III. *Western public opinion and the defence of Europe*

35. There has been a spectacular spread of pacifist and neutralist movements in recent years which has not failed to attract the attention of the press, government authorities, political parties and even Christian churches and scholars and research workers interested in defence matters and trends in public opinion. As a result, the subjects broached by these movements have played a large part in electoral campaigns, e.g. in the Netherlands in September 1982, in the Federal Republic in March 1983 and in the United Kingdom and Italy in June 1983. They have also been the subject of statements by catholic and protestant church authorities in most western countries. Finally, they have been carefully studied and analysed in numerous press articles and national and international symposia. Thus, your Rapporteur has noted that in the French monthly *Défense nationale* alone, which as its name indicates specialises in defence questions, there were no less than eighteen major articles in 1983 on the Euromissile crisis and the ensuing discussion in the West whereas hitherto there had been very little reference to matters connected with pacifism.

36. This means that your Rapporteur had a wealth of background information, too much even for him to be able to take full cognisance of it before tackling the subject. He believes at least that he has thus managed to obtain more accurate and deeper knowledge than in 1982 of the various aspects of pacifist preoccupations in the West, which was essential for examining their political implications for the Western European countries.

1. *Agitation against Euromissiles*

37. Since 1979, the prospect of the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe has been the hub of pacifist activity and propaganda in Europe. The subject seemed likely to mobilise a broad section of public opinion since nuclear war, a possibility to be feared but improbable as long as it was linked with an exchange of missiles with nuclear warheads between the United States and the Soviet Union, assumed an infinitely more impressive and more directly threatening shape from the moment missiles with nuclear warheads were to be deployed in a number of Western European countries.

38. Moreover, for a time the prospect of deployment managed to bring pacifists and Soviets together in a joint stand against the NATO decision. Your Rapporteur does not mean that the pacifist movements were mere

auxiliaries, more or less subsidised with Soviet funds, even if this seems, on occasion, to have been the case, but simply that they engaged in a joint struggle against western nuclear armaments. This struggle, which sought to prevent the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe in implementation of the NATO twofold decision, advanced with renewed vigour after the election of President Reagan at the end of 1980, probably because of the bellicose tone adopted by the new president and by his Secretary of Defence, Mr. Weinberger, which was certainly repugnant to a section of European public opinion. It first came to the fore in October 1981. It happened a second time in autumn 1983 over preparatory work for the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles on the territory of certain Western European countries, including the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom. The sites for the first American missiles became the centre of large-scale, impassioned demonstrations, as emphasised by the press. Although one should be cautious about the figures mentioned for the number of demonstrators, it is clear that there were hundreds of thousands, if not millions, and they were extremely determined.

39. The various participants in these demonstrations put forward different kinds of argument which varied considerably from one country to another. Some purely and simply rejected all nuclear weapons. Others considered that the West had not tried hard enough to hold negotiations with the Soviet Union and called for a moratorium on further deployment to allow negotiations to be started on the basis of new concessions to the Soviet Union. These concessions would have involved a different way of calculating the balance of forces, including for instance French and British weapons in the negotiations. Yet others, particularly in the United Kingdom, asked their governments to make a unilateral gesture to start disarmament.

40. In reality, these various arguments worked unilaterally against the West. Admittedly, demonstrators in western cities also clamoured for the dismantling of Soviet missiles. But they had even less chance of making themselves heard since information given by the eastern press made little reference to this aspect of the anti-nuclear demonstrations to which they nevertheless gave widespread coverage. The demonstrations which started in certain eastern countries, including Poland and the German Democratic Republic, were immediately repressed, thus practically reducing an emerging pacifist movement to silence.

41. Moreover, a moratorium on the deployment of western weapons had serious drawbacks insofar as the Soviet Union continued to deploy its own weapons as described by Mr. Hernu,

French Minister of Defence, in a speech to the *Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale* on 15th November 1983:

“... in Europe and Asia, the continuous and unbalanced addition of new means of mass destruction is leading to a profound change in the international balance. More particularly, the number of SS-20 mobile missiles continues to rise: 135 at the time of the famous NATO twofold decision of December 1979 – and I point out that the Soviet authorities then said there was an approximate balance – 297 when President Brezhnev announced a unilateral moratorium on their deployment in March 1982, and 360 today. These 360 missiles carry 1,080 warheads which can strike more than fifty-six European, Asian or North African states in some twelve minutes, including more than two-thirds of the world's population. A particularity of these weapons is that they are keeping the countries of the old world hostage, their security thus being cut off from that of the American continent, which is alone beyond their reach. This is a potentially dramatic situation for those countries which depend entirely on the American guarantee for their security as is the case for instance of European or Asian countries which do not have a nuclear deterrent force.

In face of this the United States and the member countries of the NATO integrated system have come up to the deadline laid down by their sovereign twofold decision of December 1979. After two years of discussions, the Geneva negotiations have produced no satisfactory results. Unless there is a last-minute surprise, Pershing and cruise missiles will therefore have to be deployed. We hope this first step towards correcting the imbalance will, in the long run, allow the negotiations to be based on more solid foundations and lead at some time to an agreement providing for the lowest possible level of armaments. A great country like the Soviet Union cannot avoid this, particularly as the deployment of American missiles would not be a reason for breaking off discussions. The continued deployment of SS-20s – ninety-nine since the negotiations started – was not taken by the United States as a pretext for suspending the Geneva talks...”

42. Consequently, however well-intentioned pacifist agitation in autumn 1983 may have seemed, its military and political repercussions could have been more serious for Europe and for international peace if the governments had not shown considerable moderation in their reactions to the demonstrations and much

firmness in abiding by their December 1979 commitments. However, the magnitude of the demonstrations might leave room for doubts about the will of the people of Western Europe to give their backing to their governments. In any event, the impression they gave American public opinion was that Europeans did not wish to be defended and isolationist trends in the United States were thus strengthened. They probably also convinced the Soviet authorities that a further propaganda effort on their part might swing the balance in their favour. We must therefore delve deeper into the analysis of European public opinion in order to assess its true reactions.

2. Elections in 1982 and 1983 and the defence of Europe

43. The most usual and safest way to ascertain the opinion of the public in democratic countries is obviously to study the way it votes, particularly in general elections. Several of the WEU member countries most concerned by the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles and by pacifist agitation had general elections between summer 1982 and summer 1983: the Netherlands in October 1982, the Federal Republic of Germany in March 1983 and the United Kingdom and Italy in June 1983.

44. Deployment of these new weapons played a prominent rôle in the electoral campaigns in these four countries, although it cannot be said to have overshadowed other topical questions including economic and social matters. This is already a sign of the importance public opinion attaches to this matter and of the limits of this importance; it cannot be said that this alone determined the choice of the electorate.

45. Furthermore, in none of the four countries which held elections in 1982 and 1983 was there a shift in the vote to show a strong trend of public opinion. In the Netherlands, the Christian Democrat Party, which was then in favour of applying the NATO twofold decision, subject to the results of the Geneva negotiations but which still has to reconsider its position on the matter, obtained 29.34% of the votes in 1983 compared with 30.8% in 1981 but the Liberal Party, which was also in favour, obtained 23.07% compared with 17.32% and replaced the Labour Party in the coalition government, although the latter obtained 30.38% compared with 28.29%. It cannot therefore be said that the Netherlands elections showed that public opinion rejected the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in spite of the magnitude of pacifist demonstrations in the country on that occasion.

46. Nor can the elections in the Federal Republic on 6th March 1983 be interpreted as

repudiating the parties in government at the time, although they were in favour of applying NATO's 1979 twofold decision, since the number of votes for the CDU/CSU rose from 44.5% in 1980 to 48.8% in 1983, those for the FDP falling from 10.6% to 7%. This coalition therefore remained in power while votes for the party which had demonstrated its hostility to the deployment of Euromissiles the most vigorously, *Die Grünen*, rose from 1.5% to 5.6%, thus marking both the growth in and the limits of its audience among the German electorate. It should be noted, however, that the SPD, whose votes rose from 42.9% in 1979 to 38.2% in 1983, had been in favour of applying NATO's 1979 twofold decision, but had since changed its opinion and finally, at its congress in Cologne in November 1983, it rejected the twofold resolution adopted by NATO in December 1979. It is to re-examine its position on this matter in the coming months.

47. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative Party, which had very clearly stated its intention to apply the NATO twofold decision, won the elections on 9th June 1983, still receiving 42.4% of the votes compared with 43.9% in 1979 and increasing its majority from 332 to 397 seats. Finally, in Italy the Christian Democrats certainly lost some votes, the percentage falling from 38.3% in 1979 to 32.9% on 27th June 1983, but these losses were spread among several parties which did not all have the same position towards this matter. Moreover, none of the major Italian parties has officially rejected the deployment of Euromissiles outright, but none has given its unreserved agreement. It is therefore difficult to draw clear conclusions from the Italian elections on the trend of opinion towards that country's defence policy.

48. Decisive conclusion obviously cannot be drawn from these elections regarding the impact of the deployment of Euromissiles on public opinion in these four countries, but it may be pointed out that in no case did opponents of deployment win elections in those two years and governments democratically formed after these elections consisted everywhere of parties in favour of implementing the twofold decision. We should not therefore be impressed by the scale of demonstrations against deployment in these four countries in autumn 1981 and autumn 1983. It undoubtedly shows the size of a determined minority but certainly does not show the existence of a hostile majority. However, the fact that a silent majority exists, even if it votes, and a zealous minority, indicates that a reversal of the situation is still possible, particularly if there are difficulties in operating the Atlantic Alliance. It is clear that the start in the deployment of Euromissiles on the date fixed by the North Atlantic Council after these elections represented an initial defeat for

opponents of nuclear weapons. But there is no guarantee that this setback is final and the Soviet Union is making no secret of the fact that it is waiting for the right time to launch or foster further anti-nuclear action to improve its moral and political positions and divide the West.

3. Opinion polls

49. The spread of anti-nuclear agitation in Western Europe has led most organisations responsible for analysing the reactions of public opinion to conduct inquiries into the matter. They were urged to do so by requests from the press, governments or associations concerned with Europe's security. Your Rapporteur has been able to examine the results of a number of these inquiries, grouped inter alia by the *Institut français des relations internationales* in its publication *Pacifisme et dissuasion*, by the Atlantic Institute for a colloquy which it is to hold in spring 1984 and by the organisers of a meeting to study France's security and pacifism held in Paris on 14th and 15th September 1983 under the title of *Défense et recherche universitaire*. He is not unaware of the difficulties of analysing and comparing polls carried out in different circumstances, on different dates, in different countries and with different questionnaires proposed to cross-sections of people which do not correspond. In particular, he knows how difficult it is to estimate the intensity of reactions on the basis of answers to questions which leave little room for the expression of more subtle views. He nevertheless thought it interesting to mention some of the results of these inquiries because they check out indications obtained by other means.

50. Thus, a poll carried out in eight countries for the Atlantic Institute and the International Herald Tribune by the Louis Harris organisation asked: "Which of the following are your greatest concerns for yourself and your country?". Of ten possible answers "unemployment" came first in Italy, whereas "the threat of war" came only second in Spain, third in France, the United Kingdom and Norway, fourth in the Netherlands and Italy and seventh in the United States and the Federal Republic. "Nuclear weapons" came second in Norway, the Netherlands and the United States, third in the United Kingdom, fourth in the Federal Republic, sixth in Spain, seventh in France and eighth in Italy. "Inadequate defence" came tenth and last in all eight countries, the other concerns referred to relating to economic or social matters. Your Rapporteur will not give the percentages, which would be particularly difficult to interpret as totals are not the same in all countries in view of the fact that those questioned could give several answers.

51. Your Rapporteur considers it important, and it corroborates the various poll results that he has been able to consult, that international peace, defence, nuclear weapons and the balance of forces, although real and serious, are not the main preoccupation of the majority of Europeans. A pacifist campaign which has been going on for several years has admittedly managed to draw attention to the threats represented by nuclear weapons in several Western European countries. But the huge demonstrations which have taken place on this subject do not show so much anguish about such weapons as might have been thought. Conversely, the inadequacy of the West's means of defence, a fact stressed by all governments, does not seem very serious to a large majority of Europeans.

52. Answers to a question in the same inquiry: "Which of the following are most responsible for international tension?" are also revealing. In six countries the Soviet military build-up came first, but it came only fourth in France and fifth in Spain, whereas the United States military build-up came second in the Federal Republic, Norway and the Netherlands, fourth in Spain and Italy, fifth in the United Kingdom, seventh in France (the only one of the eight countries to have communists in its government) and eighth in the United States. Among the other answers, it is interesting to note that in France American interest rates and the rôle of the dollar came first and that all countries except Norway attached great importance to insufficient European unity. All except the United States attached little importance to the overconciliatory attitude of European governments towards the Soviet Union, and hardly more to the rise of neutralism and pacifism in European public opinion.

53. The question "Which of the following are most important to western security?" brought out three separate trends. In the answers from the United States, the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom first place was given to "effective United States-European co-operation", in the French, Spanish and Italian answers "strengthened economic unity in Europe" came first, and in the Norwegian and Netherlands answers "productive arms control talks".

54. Another inquiry, based on answers to 786 questionnaires sent to an "élite" in five countries by the Berlin International Institute for Comparative Social Research, the first results of which were published in August 1983, gave a number of interesting indications, although they are not comparable with those given by polls carried out on other bases. In response to the proposition "Deployment of NATO's intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF, i.e.

cruise missiles and Pershing II) should proceed under all circumstances", 65% in France agreed, 30% in the United States, 15% in the United Kingdom and 10% in the Netherlands and the Federal Republic, although the proportion of those who thought that "military strength should be a pre-condition for détente" ranged from 54% in the Federal Republic to 77% in France, i.e. a clear majority in the five countries covered by the inquiry. In any event, the proposition that "NATO INF deployment should proceed under no circumstances" obtained 40% support in the Federal Republic, 30% in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, 15% in the United States and 3% in France, i.e. nowhere did it obtain a majority.

55. However, a number of polls carried out in France between 1980 and 1982 indicate that although a large section of French public opinion trusts the deterrent value of the French nuclear force to avoid a possible attack (62% as opposed to 32% according to a poll published in *L'Express* in May 1980), in November 1981, according to a SOFRES poll published by *Le Figaro*, only 15% of French public opinion considered that "if the Soviet Union were to threaten France directly, every means including nuclear weapons should be used to resist it", whereas 75% considered that an attempt should be made "to negotiate a compromise". In August 1982, a Louis Harris poll published by *Ca m'intéresse* gave similar results: in the event of French territory being invaded by the Soviet army, 42% thought "France should try to negotiate", 39% that "it should defend itself by military means" and 10% that "it should use nuclear weapons". One-third (32%) of those questioned by IFRES for *Le Quotidien* in November 1981 said that if national territory were invaded they would "fight underground", 11% would "adapt themselves to the régime of the invader" and 39% would "go into exile".

56. Your Rapporteur does not know what answers would have been given to such questions in other countries but he feels the reactions of French public opinion somewhat compensate for the distortions which seem to emerge from comparative polls between France and the other western nations.

57. There can be no question here of giving a larger number of poll results or a more elaborate interpretation. But these few indications allow several points to be clarified, the first being that western public opinion is only very partially and very imperfectly reflected by the mass movements which have been seen in recent years. Opinion seems deeply attached to peace but divided over the kind of danger threatening it and the means of countering it. Above all, people seem to be ill-informed about the political and military facts on which

Europe's security depends and fail to provide the basis the governments need for pursuing an effective security and peace policy.

4. Positions adopted by Christian churches

58. On 7th June 1982, in a message to the second extraordinary session of the United Nations on disarmament, Pope John Paul II, after noting that little progress had been made in disarmament although the world wanted both peace and disarmament, gave some of his views on the matter. He said the catholic church deplored the armaments race and urged at least a progressive mutual and verifiable reduction, together with the greatest precautions against possible errors in the use of nuclear weapons. On peace movements, he said it was important to give due consideration, with the caution and objectivity they warranted, to all serious proposals aimed at contributing to real disarmament and improving the atmosphere. He said that in present circumstances deterrence based on balance could still be considered morally acceptable but reiterated his confidence in the force of loyal negotiations which should aim inter alia at a balanced, simultaneous and internationally-controlled reduction of armaments.

59. He then advocated a reduction in the production and sale of conventional weapons throughout the world, as well as of nuclear weapons, and said very particular attention should be paid to their improvement since this was one of the essential dimensions of the armaments race. He considered the work of experts on the link between disarmament and development deserved to be studied and followed up and added that the true cause of our insecurity stemmed from a deep-rooted crisis of mankind. It was no longer possible for rich and poor to live side by side without the emergence of resentment turning to violence.

60. The churches have since made an unusual number of statements about peace in 1983: the catholic episcopate in the Federal Republic, the United States, the Netherlands, the German Democratic Republic, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, Ireland, Belgium, Japan and France, and a number of protestant churches or ecclesiastical organisations. These statements were due to the apparent disarray of public opinion throughout the West, particularly following the discussion about the deployment of Euro-strategic missiles, and by the pastoral concerns of church leaders who are anxious to give their congregations guidance in a matter which is at one and the same time technical, political, military and moral. Generally speaking, these statements avoided taking the easy way out, which would have been to adopt

purely moral positions, and to varying degrees they showed a firm determination to respect ethical responsibility in the political and military order.

61. An examination of the various texts emanating from catholic episcopates shows that they reflect two concerns. First, they mark their adhesion to a moral position of the catholic church towards war as defined on 11th June 1982 in a speech by Pope John Paul II to the United Nations General Assembly. Second, they meet the specific preoccupations of the people to whom they are addressed. To refer only to the three texts of which your Rapporteur has direct knowledge, those by the German, American and French episcopates, he has noted a series of converging views, particularly about the following ideas:

- (i) recourse to force is acceptable only in a very limited number of cases, if it spares non-combatants and if it remains proportional to the aggression to which it is responding;
- (ii) nuclear weapons further increase the threat to humanity involved in recourse to force;
- (iii) the aim of any security policy must be the establishment of a system of inter-state relations based on non-violence;
- (iv) deterrence, exercised in particular by nuclear weapons, may be a means of attaining this aim and its only justification lies in the pursuit of action to replace the balance of terror by more just foundations for international peace. It may therefore be a guarantee of peace, albeit precarious, but cannot constitute its lasting basis;
- (v) on the contrary, lasting peace may be based on the promotion of greater political, economic and social justice;
- (vi) efforts must be made to work out non-violent means of solving conflicts.

62. Together with these principles, mention should be made of differences of tone between statements by national episcopates which take account of each country's specific problems. Thus, the American episcopate recommends support for immediate, bilateral and verifiable agreements to stop the testing, production and deployment of new nuclear weapons systems. But its statement draws a clear distinction between recourse to force in general and recourse to nuclear weapons in particular, the latter being justifiable only in response to the use of nuclear weapons by the enemy. This stipulation, which the American bishops explain is based on specific circumstances which may

change or be interpreted differently by people of good will, means condemning all first-use of nuclear weapons.

63. The statement by German bishops of 15th April 1983 associates moral tolerance of deterrence with the following criteria:

- (i) the immunity of civilians;
- (ii) the means considered or used should not make war easier or more probable;
- (iii) the means should be limited to what is essential for effective deterrence;
- (iv) the means should be compatible with the aims of limiting or reducing armaments and effective, bilateral disarmament.

64. The statement by French bishops certainly lays more stress on the fact that, on the one hand, possession of nuclear weapons may provide the Soviet Union, referred to by name, with means of blackmail whereby the advantages of war may be gained without paying the price of launching it and, on the other, the chemical, bacteriological or even conventional forms of modern warfare are just as dangerous as the nuclear form, and a firm stand is taken against unilateral disarmament.

65. The very nature of the protestant churches means that the very numerous statements about nuclear weapons which they have issued in recent years are far more difficult to examine and interpret overall. They of course include most of the points raised by the catholic authorities but are not unanimous on one essential point, i.e. the value of unilateral disarmament initiatives. For instance, on 10th February 1983 the Church of England General Synod negated by only 275 votes to 222 a unilateralist proposal in a draft text on nuclear weapons prepared by its drafting committee. Conversely, in November 1983 the General Assembly of French Protestants passed a resolution calling for a unilateral freeze of French nuclear weapons. Finally, German protestants were extremely divided about the value to be attached to ecclesiastical statements about means of maintaining peace.

66. This report is obviously not a suitable context for a close and critical examination of the positions adopted by the various Christian churches in this field. It can merely call attention to the importance all these churches attach to matters relating to security, deterrence and nuclear weapons and note that although their opinions may have sometimes diverged about how to achieve a peaceful international order, an area in which moreover they have no specific competence, their reactions closely resemble those of most western governments.

As they wish peace to be based on responsible disarmament, i.e. leading to properly-organised peace and international order, in most cases they have remained aloof from the pacifist demonstrations which tried to shelter behind their moral authority.

*
* *

67. The various elements available for examining and assessing the reactions of European public opinion to security and defence matters at least allow the pacifist demonstrations in the western countries in recent years to be placed in their proper context. They undoubtedly reflect deep-rooted uneasiness and the resolve of certain groups to oppose the defence policy of the Atlantic Alliance, including the deployment of Euromissiles following the Soviet refusal to hold negotiations on an equitable basis for limiting their number. But they do not show a radical about-turn in regard to their governments' defence policies. Elections in four of the countries where demonstrations were particularly widespread resulted in the election or re-election of representatives of parties advocating those policies. What is known of the trend of public opinion in the United States indicates that NATO-related considerations are unlikely to decide the outcome of the elections to be held at the end of 1984. Non-political organisations dominated by ethical considerations such as the Christian churches have not generally sided with the pacifist movements. In short, movements of opinion in favour of pacifism seem unlikely, because of their intensity or extent, to change the facts of the situation.

68. Nevertheless the deployment of Euromissiles has certainly revealed a feeling of uneasiness which it is politically impossible to ignore. It would certainly be a mistake to consider deployment as the final victory of one side over another and, although it has led to some discouragement among pacifists, they have lost neither their motivation nor their influence over public opinion, which is quite obviously inadequately informed of the facts of security and defence problems. Today's gains may slip away tomorrow if the governments fail to explain their decisions clearly enough and support them with arguments acceptable to the public. Those whose interest is to undermine western cohesion will be quick to exploit any weakening of public opinion in each country in the will to resist any form of pressure or aggression and, if they succeed, they will weaken the deterrent value of the West's forces and consequently, instead of strengthening peace, they will make it more precarious.

IV. *The will for defence*

69. The Soviet Union for its part seems to be showing a flawless will to do everything necessary to ensure its security, maintain its domination over Eastern Europe, including Afghanistan, and further improve its position in the international balance of forces. It is indeed difficult to discern any real hesitation in Soviet opinion towards this policy. Admittedly there are dissidents who strongly criticise the ever-growing militarism in the Soviet Union, but everything is done to control them, in Soviet society at least, and to keep them out either by imprisoning them with or without trial or by making them emigrate. Their action is discredited and presented to the Soviet people as pure and simple treason.

70. In an article in *Le Monde* on 3rd May 1983, members of the *Comité France-URSS* who had been to Moscow reported on the activities of independent Soviet pacifists and the actions brought against them. Part of this report read as follows:

"The Moscow group for the establishment of confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union, set up in June 1982 ... was in favour of disarmament based on détente from the base upwards, an essential condition for détente at the summit ... proposed to encourage the policy of détente ... by pursuing educative action among the Soviet people to make them aware of the realities of the armaments race ... and, while seeking to establish a dialogue with the official peace movement in the Soviet Union, it proposed that citizens reflect on the matter and take independent action... The initiatives taken by the group have drawn continual systematic insults and intimidatory measures by the authorities... The authorities then moved on to open repression. Arrested on 6th October 1982, a member of the group, Oleg Radzinsky, was imprisoned, accused of anti-Soviet propaganda ... and condemned on 13th October 1982 to one year's prison and five years' deportation. To date, eight members have been condemned..."

Furthermore, the West German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of 6th March 1984 relates that five Dutch pacifists, members of the IKV, who visited Czechoslovakia at the beginning of the month to try to hold a symposium there, were expelled from the country, as was a French woman member of the CODEME.

71. Furthermore, Soviet defence policy is presented as being solely to defend peace and the media depict the Soviet state as having a

monopoly of pacifism at home and throughout the world. There are no true elections, public demonstrations of any size or opinion polls to show how far the Soviet public accepts government propaganda, but the reactions of the Russian orthodox church to matters relating to defence and peace conform to the official line in every respect, which allows it to be thought that the Soviet state has largely managed to convince the Soviet people of the soundness of its views or to impose a régime of terror and silence on such a scale that no criticism can be voiced.

72. The situation is not quite the same in the people's democracies, where a few sporadic pacifist demonstrations against nuclear weapons, both Soviet and western, have been held, particularly in Poland and the German Democratic Republic. The catholic church and the Solidarity trade union in the former and the protestant churches in the latter have shown their independence of the political régime and at the same time their sympathy for the demonstrators. However, the official position has always been that, since the state was pursuing a true policy of peace, any demonstration against its defence policy was also against peace. The harsh measures taken against Solidarity by the Polish Government are no secret and it is clear that the catholic church used its influence and margin of freedom of expression to try to protect some degree of freedom in the country rather than endorse agitation whose effects would quite obviously have been nil and might have been further encouragement for the Soviet Union to intervene.

73. The East German protestant churches were associated, particularly in 1982, with the development of a pacifist movement which claimed to be christian. However, measures adopted by the state and the persecution of some of the movements' militants led church leaders to discourage demonstrations. Inter alia, they advised against wearing a badge representing a sword transformed into a ploughshare, inspired by a passage from the prophet Micah, because the badge exposed its wearers to harsh measures by the state.

74. These two examples and other indications emanating from most of the people's democracies clearly seem to mean that, contrary to what has sometimes been said, "pacifism is in the West but the arms are in the East". The deployment of SS-20s by the Soviet Union caused concern and discontent among public opinion in countries under Soviet domination. This discontent may be seen as a form of opposition to that domination since the local authorities firmly repress such reactions.

75. However, at the meeting of the seven Warsaw Pact Ministers for Foreign Affairs

which ended on 14th October 1983, the Romanians refused to accept nuclear weapons and announced that they would refuse to endorse the deployment of such weapons in other allied countries of the Warsaw Pact as a retaliation to NATO's deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles. The reason they gave for refusing was that they could not hold weapons of mass destruction because their country had collaborated with Nazi Germany. But it is clear that there were other reasons too for this reaction.

76. These various considerations make one question the solidarity of the eastern countries with the Soviet Union and the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact. But as there is nothing to prove that Soviet society proper has been affected by pacifist movements, one cannot deduce that there has been an actual weakening in the will of the Soviet people to defend themselves. The Eastern European régimes are such that the appearance of cracks in the people's allegiance to official policy, rather than auguring an early change in that policy, which is imposed by the Soviet Union, on the contrary forecasts a hardening of Soviet domination which will allow no criticism of the peace policy which the Soviet Union claims to pursue.

77. It is evident that the western governments do not want to pursue a policy of repressing pacifism, nor can they do so moreover. Even if they have serious reason to think that pacifist demonstrations might undermine their defence policies and jeopardise their deterrent effect, they consider that the only legitimate and, in the end, effective way of combating such an outcome is to accept open discussion with those who do not share their views, provided the latter more or less respect the law which is, on the whole, quite liberal. Certain practices, such as bomb incidents or kidnappings, can never be tolerated, but it must be said that such incidents have been exceptional in pacifist campaigns in recent years.

78. It is, on the contrary, through information and dialogue that the western governments can and must tackle the problem facing them through the spread of pacifist movements and it must be noted that, even if information and dialogue have not always been adequate, they exist in most Western European countries and in the United States.

79. When your Rapporteur speaks of information and dialogue, he does not mean that the European governments should merely uphold their views through the media, for instance, but he considers that many of the pacifists' arguments warrant detailed study and that some of their suggestions are particularly worthy of being followed up since they respond to the true concerns of public opinion. Your

Rapporteur will select three which he finds particularly legitimate and in conformity with the interests of peace: détente, negotiated disarmament and development of the North-South dialogue.

80. The word détente has often been misunderstood insofar as it has been assimilated with a policy of weakness towards the Soviet Union, particularly in the field of armaments and forces. On the contrary, according to your Rapporteur it implies the development of relations with the Soviet Union and its allies in all areas not relating to the balance of forces and is based on the conviction that western régimes have nothing to lose but everything to gain from an increase in such exchanges and the removal of all obstacles. This was clear after the signing of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe in Helsinki on 1st August 1975: the West had hesitated for a long time before embarking upon these negotiations which might have been interpreted as implying the de facto abandonment of some of its legitimate claims, particularly the reunification of Germany, but which were beyond hope, in order to secure a number of undertakings from the Soviet Union and its allies in regard to human rights and freedoms, international trade and measures designed to restore mutual confidence. This led to a text in which the two sides' concessions were balanced but which the Soviet Union and its allies have been unable to apply because their internal régimes could not stand the introduction of certain forms of freedom. In the end, it was the opposition to Soviet domination in Eastern Europe that was thus highlighted.

81. It is not therefore surprising that little valid progress could be made in the subsequent work of the CSCE. At least the Madrid conference which ended in autumn 1983 managed to agree to hold a conference in Stockholm at the beginning of 1984 on disarmament in Europe and mutual confidence-building measures since only here could balanced concessions be expected. It is too early to assess the results of this conference but the very fact that it started at a time when deployment of the first Pershing II and cruise missiles had strained East-West relations and the Soviet Union had just announced its withdrawal from current negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons constitutes a factor of détente, as immediately demonstrated by a Soviet proposal to resume the MBFR talks on limiting the level of conventional forces in Europe.

82. But détente is not merely a matter of multilateral negotiations. It is also practised by governments in their trade with the Soviet Union and its allies. Admittedly, as the General

Affairs Committee said in adopting Mr. Atkinson's report on East-West trade in November 1983, such trade must not help to increase Soviet military strength, nor make the western countries over-dependent on supplies or purchases from the Soviet Union, nor allow unduly advantageous trade conditions for the USSR. However, the development of trade is a good thing in itself: it encourages nations to be more open and, if conducted normally, is a token of peace. Western opinion polls on the interest accorded to this form of détente showed that large majorities were very much in favour of it. The desire to retain armaments at a level sufficient for maintaining balance and peace must not be linked with a refusal to practise détente lest opponents of the western armaments efforts be afforded arguments which might sway more public support to their side.

83. Naturally, disarmament proper cannot and must not be neglected at any price. In no case is it by refusing to disarm that those in favour of unilateral measures can be mollified; on the contrary, by proving that progress can be made towards negotiated disarmament, public opinion can be convinced of the inherent dangers of unilateralism. There is certainly a suspicion, particularly among younger anti-nuclear agitators, that the western governments do not really want disarmament and that the interminable negotiations which have now been going on for more than twenty years in various frameworks and with few results are but a screen to conceal their darker intentions. This idea can be usefully exploited in propaganda aimed at dividing the West and weakening its will to defend itself. The West must therefore make it quite clear that its firm rejection of any unilateral steps which would allow speculation about the weakness of its determination in no way means it rejects disarmament but, on the contrary, is intended to allow true negotiations to promote balanced, verifiable disarmament accepted by all.

84. This can be done only if it is quite clear that the nuclear weapons at the disposal of certain Western European countries, i.e. the United Kingdom and France:

- (i) contribute to the security of Western Europe as a whole;
- (ii) are the minimum credible for a strategy of deterrence and therefore cannot be reduced as long as the nuclear forces of the two great powers remain at their present levels;
- (iii) influence relations between Western European countries only insofar as the latter have never really concerted their views on defence policy;

(iv) play a deterrent rôle and are used only for defensive purposes.

85. Where nuclear and strategic nuclear bombers are concerned:

- the United Kingdom has 64 sea-to-surface strategic ballistic missiles with a range of 4,000 km, with three thermonuclear warheads per missile, on board four nuclear-propelled submarines;
- France has 80 sea-to-surface ballistic missiles with a range of 3,000 km, with one thermonuclear warhead per missile, on board five nuclear-propelled submarines, 18 surface-to-surface strategic missiles with a range of 3,500 km and 36 Mirage IV strategic bombers.

Where tactical nuclear forces are concerned:

- NATO has 306 surface-to-surface missiles with a range of between 40 and 740 km, 1,910 guns and 603 aircraft whose range of action varies between 950 and 2,500 km;
- France has 42 Pluton surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 120 km and Mirage III, Super-Etendard and Jaguar bombers capable of transporting one nuclear warhead per aircraft with a range of action of 700 km.

86. The means necessary for such government action can be combined only if there is close consultation between the Western European countries on all matters relating to their security and the use of their forces. This is one of the main reasons why, since May 1981, the French Government has been constantly proposing to its partners that new life be injected into WEU which associates seven of the countries most concerned by the security of the European continent and particularly the central area, since it is evident that neither the French and British nuclear weapons nor the conventional forces of the member countries of the organisation could decisively guarantee security in the eastern Mediterranean and Scandinavia.

87. In an address at the opening sitting of the thirty-sixth session of the *Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale* on 20th September 1983, Mr. Mauroy said:

"... I made a precise analysis of our links with our partners in the Atlantic Alliance since everyone can see they are decisive. But France endeavours to maintain other links, in Western European Union, for instance. This European organisation is the only one which can tackle matters relating to defence and security... France considers that European solidarity enhances Atlantic

solidarity without being merged with it. The similarity of the geo-strategic problems facing the European countries should lead them to take specific common decisions. In this respect WEU can be a privileged forum for reflection..."

88. In an article in *Le Monde* on 23rd December 1983, Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, said he placed some hope in the initiative aimed at making a renovated WEU the European pillar of NATO. He stressed that the notion of the defence of Europe should be replaced by that of European defence, but that United States disengagement from the European continent would raise a serious problem in view of the fact that western nuclear power was almost entirely in American hands.

89. The wish in some quarters for rapid strides in disarmament one way or another might give the impression that now is not a very suitable time to reactivate an organisation responsible for Western European security. Your Rapporteur holds absolutely the opposite view, i.e. that real progress towards negotiated disarmament with the Soviet Union requires consultation between European partners to ensure that they reach prior agreement on the implications of their joint security so that it is not jeopardised by a disarmament policy. Talks have been started between France and the Federal Republic on this subject and they already seem to have borne fruit. It is for their partners to say whether they consider the framework of WEU to be really appropriate for developing such consultations. Conversely, a display of hostility in principle towards French and British nuclear weapons can but convince the United Kingdom and France that they must rely only on themselves for their security and it might deter them from playing a constructive part in global negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons. However, certain British members of the committee felt British deterrence was not in itself credible because it could not seriously be thought that it would be used.

90. The third consideration arising from pacifist demonstrations in recent years relates less directly to WEU's responsibilities, although it is no less important. It stems from the irrefutable pacifist argument that expenditure on armaments is a waste of resources that is unacceptable in a world which is suffering from hunger and underdevelopment, particularly since the situation has been aggravated by an economic crisis which has lasted for more than ten years. Apart from the moral value of this consideration, it also implies that the West is digging its own grave by leaving the underdeveloped countries no choice other than the perpetuation of a situation which is intolerable

for them or to revolt against an international order which is unacceptable because it forces this situation upon them. The purpose of this report is obviously not to explore ways of helping the third world to transform its economy but merely to recall the urgent need for North-South co-operation which is also a token of peace.

91. Your Rapporteur wishes to recall that, although military expenditure is an unaccept-

able waste of resources and energy if security is assured, it becomes a prior condition for any other activity if security is not assured. Consequently, it is not by taking action liable to jeopardise Western Europe's security that the latter can seek to resolve the difficult political, economic, social and moral difficulties now facing it; only by ensuring security can it help to solve all these problems, including that of disarmament.

Deterrence and the will of the people

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Freeson and others

1. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out :
“and that nuclear weapons are an essential part of that deterrence”.

Signed : Freeson, Miller, Stoffelen, Hardy

1. See 3rd sitting, 19th June 1984 (amendment agreed to).

Deterrence and the will of the people

AMENDMENTS 2 and 3¹

tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others

2. In paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "Hoping that constructive proposals will" and insert "Emphasising that constructive proposals must".
3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after "informed of" insert "the probable effects of armed conflict whether of nuclear or of conventional character as well as of".

Signed : Stoffelen, Hardy, Freeson

1. See 3rd sitting, 19th June 1984 (report referred back to committee).

Deterrence and the will of the people

AMENDMENT 4¹

tabled by Mr. Antretter and others

4. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Continue to apply the NATO twofold decision of 1979 while seeking" and insert "Continue to seek".

Signed : Antretter, Tummers, Worrell, Neumann, Stoffelen

1. See 3rd sitting, 19th June 1984 (report referred back to committee).

Deterrence and the will of the people

AMENDMENT 5¹

tabled by Mr. Lagorce

5. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after “balanced” insert, “simultaneous”.

Signed : Lagorce

1. See 3rd sitting, 19th June 1984 (report referred back to committee).

Deterrence and the will of the people

AMENDMENT 6¹

tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

6. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "of all kinds".

Signed : Cavaliere

1. See 3rd sitting, 19th June 1984 (report referred back to committee).

Deterrence and the will of the people

AMENDMENT 7¹

tabled by Mr. Gianotti

7. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :
“Invite member governments to examine the possibility of introducing a moratorium on the deployment of Euromissiles and start making the necessary contacts for creating denuclearised zones in Europe ;”.

Signed : Gianotti

1. See 3rd sitting, 19th June 1984 (report referred back to committee).

*State of European security***REPORT¹**

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Sir Dudley Smith, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on the state of European security

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. The implications of membership of NATO
 - (a) General
 - (b) Consultation in NATO
 - (c) Defence and force planning in NATO
 - (d) Military decision-making in NATO
 - (e) The NATO military command structure
 - (f) Forces committed to NATO
 - (g) Infrastructure
 - (h) Logistics
 - (i) Defence production
- III. The status of individual countries
 - (a) General
 - (b) Scandinavia and Iceland
 - Iceland
 - Norway and Denmark
 - (c) The WEU countries
 - The central region
 - Air forces in the central region
 - Belgium and the Netherlands
 - Luxembourg
 - Germany
 - United Kingdom
 - Italy
 - France
 - (d) Greece and Turkey
 - (e) The Iberian Peninsula
 - Portugal
 - Spain
 - (i) General
 - (ii) External priorities of the socialist government

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Pignion (Chairman); MM. *Blaauw, Kittelmann* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *van den Bergh, Bonnel, Bourges* (Alternate: *Matraja*), Brown (Alternate: Dr. *Miller*), *Cavaliere, Cox, Dejardin, Ertl, Galley, Gerstl*, Sir Anthony Grant (Alternate: *Lord Newall*), MM. *Huyghues des Etages* (Alternate: *Caro*), *de Kwaadsteniet* (Alternate: *de Vries*), *Lemrich, Natiez, Pecchioli* (Alternate: *Amadei*), *Prussen, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Steverlynck, Stokes*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

- (iii) Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty
- (iv) The extent of Spanish participation in NATO
- (v) Will there be a referendum?
- (vi) The Spanish armed forces
- (vii) Military reforms
- (viii) The new Spanish-United States agreement
- (ix) Agreement with France
- (x) Agreement on the European combat aircraft
- (f) Gibraltar

IV. Intermediate-range nuclear forces

V. Conclusions

APPENDICES

- I. Comparison of certain articles of the North Atlantic and modified Brussels Treaties
- II. Principal committees of the North Atlantic Council
- III. NATO two-year force planning cycle
- IV. Comparative table of defence effort 1979-83
 - A. Financial effort
 - B. Manpower effort
- V. NATO military command structure
- IV. Senior Staff of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) by rank, nationality and service
- VII. List of acronyms

Introductory Note

In preparing this report *the Rapporteur* had interviews as follows:

6th February 1984 - Ministry of Defence, London:

Mr. David Nichols, Assistant Under-Secretary of Defence

19th & 20th March 1984 - Gibraltar:

H.E. Admiral Sir David Williams, Governor and Fortress Commander

Mr. John Bradley, Deputy Governor

Sir Joshua Hassan, Chief Minister

The Hon. Joe Bossano, Leader of the Opposition

Rear Admiral George Vallings RN, Flag Officer, Gibraltar

Brigadier John Pegg, Deputy Fortress Commander

Air Commodore J.M. Pack, RAF, Air Commander, Gibraltar

11th April 1984 - Headquarters, Allied Air Forces Central Europe, Ramstein, Germany:

Lt. General Fred Noack, German Air Force, Deputy Commander

Air Vice Marshal Peter Ward, RAF, Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Operations

The committee as a whole met in Madrid from 19th to 21st October. In the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the committee was briefed by Mr. Carlos Fernandez Espeso, Director General for Security Questions. It visited the CASA aircraft factory, where it was received by Mr. Fernando Caralt, Director General, and Mr. Carlos Navarro Cantero, Deputy Director, Programmes. The committee met with the bureaux and party spokesmen of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees of the Congress of Deputies, with Mr. Manuel Medina Ortega, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, in the chair. It then met to discuss the revised draft report. On 21st October the committee was received by General Santos Peralba, Secretary of State for Defence Policy, in the Spanish Ministry of Defence, and was briefed by Colonel Narciso Carreras Matas, Spanish Marines, on Spanish defence policy.

The committee met subsequently at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, on 14th February 1984, when Lt. General C.J. Dijkstra presented his study on collective logistical support, and the committee met subsequently with the WEU Standing Armaments Committee, attended by the following: Lt. Colonel de Winne (Belgium); Lt. Colonel Binet (Belgium); Mr. Marcoin (France); Mr. Schreiber (Germany); Colonel Pochesci (Italy); Mr. Zweerts (Netherlands); and Mr. Davies (United Kingdom).

Subsequently, at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 8th and 9th March 1984 the committee met with members of the parliamentary defence committees of the European NATO countries:

Belgium: Mr. Yves du Monceau de Bergendal, Second Vice-Chairman, National Defence Committee, the Senat;

France: Mr. Louis Darinot, Chairman; MM. Robert Aumont and Jean Combasteil, Vice-Chairmen, Defence Committee, Assemblée Nationale;

Germany: Dr. H. Schwarz, Vice-Chairman; MM. Karl-Eduard Claussen and Wolfgang Kahrs, Defence Committee, Bundesrat;

Italy: MM. Stegagnini and Baracetti, Vice-Chairmen of the Defence Committee, Camera dei Deputati;

Netherlands: Drs. Y.P.W. van der Werff, Chairman of the Defence Committee, First Chamber of the States-General;

United Kingdom: Sir Humphrey Atkins KCMG, Chairman; MM. Douglas and Mates, Select Committee on Defence, House of Commons;

Norway: MM. Ole Fr. Klemsdal and Bjorn Erling Ytterhorn, Defence Committee, Stortinget.

The meeting was briefed by Mr. Eric Da Rin, Deputy Secretary-General of NATO ; Lt. General T. Huitfeldt, Norwegian Army, Director of the International Military Staff ; Dr. Fredo Dannenbring, NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs ; and Ing. Gen. P. Naslin, Head of the Defence Research Section, NATO International Staff. The committee then discussed a draft of the present report.

The committee met finally at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 15th May 1984 when it adopted the present report.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of parliament, officials, senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or met the committee and replied to questions.

The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation
on the state of European security

The Assembly,

- (i) Reiterating its belief that a European view on defence policy should be formulated collectively in WEU and in close consultation with all other European allies;
- (ii) Paying real tribute to the vital contribution to the defence of Europe which the United States continues to make after forty years, and being convinced that collective defence should continue to be organised in NATO to which WEU is inextricably linked by the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (iii) Recognising however that the European allies today contribute 65 to 75% of the ready forces in Europe and believing that some adaptation of NATO is necessary for it properly to reflect the European view of defence requirements;
- (iv) Stressing the overriding importance of allied solidarity and the need for all countries, with due regard to their resources and geographical position, to accept their full responsibilities in the alliance;
- (v) Welcoming the perceptive study on collective logistical support by General C.J. Dijkstra,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments to recommend in NATO:

1. That the structure of NATO be modified to reflect properly the European view of defence requirements, and to improve efficiency; in particular:
 - (a) that the position of the Military Committee as the highest military authority under the Council and Defence Planning Committee should be clarified;
 - (b) that the International Military Staff be fused with the Defence Planning and Policy Division of the international staff, and that defence and force planning matters be handled by the Defence Planning Committee and Military Committee in joint session;
 - (c) that the prerogatives of the three major commanders be adjusted to place them on a more equal footing and to reflect the primacy of the Military Committee;
 - (d) that a European officer should be appointed as Chief-of-Staff in SHAPE, and a European as Special Assistant to SACEUR for international affairs;
2. That every effort be made to demonstrate the solidarity of the alliance, and to ensure that all members assume corresponding responsibilities;
3. That the NATO authorities take note of and act on the study on collective logistical support, and in particular:
 - (a) reaffirm the logistics authority of SACEUR under paragraph 9 of the North Atlantic Council Resolution of 22nd October 1954;
 - (b) establish a communications zone command in the central region, under the command of Deputy CINCENT;
 - (c) arrange common funding of sustaining stocks and greater use of NAMSA;
 - (d) agree that essential logistics units would be mobilised at the earliest stage of the alert process;
4. That, as a matter of urgency, a common IFF aircraft recognition system be introduced on all NATO aircraft.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. The terms of reference for the present report which the committee included in its programme of work for the first half of 1984, duly approved by the Presidential Committee, are for it to examine the various aspects of relations between the member countries and NATO. It is to refer in particular to the committee's visit to Spain in October 1983, and to logistical support in the light of the special study undertaken by General Dijkstra, the expert appointed on the proposal of the committee. The report is to mention the present status of INF deployments and negotiations compared with the situation described in the previous report.

1.2. The committee examines in another report¹ the future of WEU and its possible rôle as a forum for reflection between European governments on the problems of European security. The committee there points out that the effect of the London and Paris Agreements of October 1954 was to replace the rejected European Defence Community Treaty with a new allied defence structure, including in particular a German contribution, by incorporating many of the provisions of the EDC Treaty into a modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols on the one hand, and into the NATO Council Resolution of 22nd October 1954 on the other. NATO and WEU thereby became inextricably linked, the former in practice being designated the executive agent of the latter for the organisation of collective defence, through some twenty-eight references to NATO, its organs and procedures, which were written into the Brussels Treaty and its protocols in 1954. This report, which examines the obligations and activities of member countries in the framework of NATO and makes recommendations for its further "Europeanisation", is therefore the necessary counterpart of the other report which examines and makes recommendations on the scope for European discussion of defence questions in the WEU framework.

1.3. At a time when NATO ministerial communiqués have begun significantly to note reservations or particular positions of three or four member countries, and when renewed attention is being paid to the need for consultation on defence and security issues in a

European framework, without removing mutual defence planning from the NATO framework, the committee felt that it was both useful and timely to analyse in some detail the implications of membership of NATO. The precise obligations and activities of member countries in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty are not always as clearly understood as they should be. Misconceptions have arisen over the last decade and a half following the French decision of 1966 which left the impression in many quarters that France had withdrawn from NATO. In fact that country remains an active member of the organisation, having withdrawn only from its integrated military structure. The fact that French forces are not "under NATO command" has left the distinct impression that forces of the other allies *are* under NATO command – when in fact, with very few exceptions noted below, no country's forces are under NATO command in peacetime. The accession of Spain to NATO in 1982, followed at the end of that year by a freeze on negotiations concerning its integration into the military structure, has left that country temporarily in a somewhat ill-defined position in NATO, although as the committee discovered during its visit to Spain in October 1983, and from other evidence available to it, Spain is an active participant in all NATO committees. For all these reasons a major part of this report is devoted to the implications of membership of NATO.

1.4. In that context, this report discusses in part the situation concerning logistics supplies for forces committed to NATO, and examines in particular the important proposals made by Lieutenant General C.J. Dijkstra in his study on collective logistical support² which the committee arranged in implementation of Order 51 of the Assembly.

1.5. Having visited Spain last autumn, the committee also reports in a little more detail on the situation concerning that country and its relationship with the alliance. This was the first occasion that the committee as a whole had had the opportunity of visiting that country and it wishes to record its appreciation for all the helpful arrangements made to receive it by members of the Spanish parliament and by senior Spanish officials and officers.

1.6. Lastly, the report describes briefly the current situation concerning the deployment of

1. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty, Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker, Document 973.

2. Document 966, 20th December 1983.

INF forces in Europe by both sides, and the status of negotiations on their possible reduction. This subject was examined in detail by the committee in its previous report which described the situation at the beginning of November 1983¹.

II. *The implications of membership of NATO*

(a) *General*

2.1. The North Atlantic Treaty, to which today there are sixteen parties, is the same text as that signed by the original twelve parties on 4th April 1949. In addition to the commitment in Article 5 to collective defence in the event of an armed attack: "the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered as an attack against them all ..."², the treaty also provides in Article 3 that preparations for collective defence should be made beforehand: "in order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack".

2.2. Curiously, although the Brussels Treaty signed by its original five parties on 17th March 1948 contains more binding language in the commitment to mutual defence in Article IV (Article V of the modified treaty of 1954): "If any of the ... parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other ... parties will ... afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power", that treaty contained no corresponding explicit provision for peacetime preparedness. The Brussels Treaty powers nevertheless had already created the Western Union Defence Organisation (WUDO) under the Western Union Defence Committee, composed of ministers of defence, and the Western Union Military Committee, composed of national chiefs of defence staff, and comprising a field command established under the then General Montgomery in Fontainebleau, and an infrastructure programme for the construction of airfields and other military facilities.

2.3. NATO, from 1949 onwards, copied the WUDO model to some extent, as well as the joint command structure of world war II, in

establishing its own civil and military organisation. When the latter was in place, the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Organisation on 20th December 1950 agreed that the continued existence of WUDO was no longer necessary. The Fontainebleau headquarters was transferred and became in effect part of the NATO military command structure. While the Brussels Treaty Council affirmed that the new arrangements did not affect the right of Western Union defence ministers and chiefs of staffs to meet "to consider matters of mutual concern to the Brussels Treaty powers"³, they have not in fact since met in the Brussels Treaty framework. When the Brussels Treaty was modified in 1954, at the time of the accession of Germany and Italy, the new arrangements were confirmed in the terms of a new Article IV whereby the parties and any organs established by them work in close co-operation with NATO, and whereby the Council relies on "the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters". The committee's continuing and close concern with mutual defence arrangements in NATO flows directly from these decisions and statutory provisions which, in effect, make NATO in part an executive agency for implementing the mutual defence obligations of the Brussels Treaty.

2.4. The civil and military structure of NATO as it exists today was largely created in 1949 to 1952, with some further modification when the headquarters moved from Paris to Brussels, following French withdrawal from the integrated military structure in 1966. The following sections describe NATO today, and the obligations and activities of member countries in the framework of the treaty, which are designed in particular to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack" under the terms of Article II.

(b) *Consultation in NATO*

2.5. Consultation between members is a primary function of any international organisation, and in NATO there is more continuous consultation and joint decision-making than in most. The North Atlantic Council at the level of the permanent representatives in Brussels, meets regularly at least once a week and more frequently when necessary. In addition to the provision in Article 3 for maintaining and developing collective capacity to resist armed attack, Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides specifically that "the parties will

1. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance, Document 959, 7th November 1983, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson.

2. Full text at Appendix I.

3. Brussels Treaty Consultative Council Resolution, 20th December 1950, paragraph 4.

consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened". Unlike Article 5 providing for mutual defence in the event of an armed attack on one party, which is limited by the following Article 6 to cases of armed attack on the territory or armed forces of the parties in Europe, North America or the North Atlantic north of the Tropic of Cancer, provisions for consultations in Article 4 are not subject to explicit geographical restrictions.

2.6. Although the corresponding paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty may appear more comprehensive, in providing that at the request of any party the Council shall be convened for consultation "with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability", in practice consultation in the North Atlantic Council has progressively developed from the report of the "three wise men" (MM. Martino, Lange and Pearson, Foreign Ministers respectively of Italy, Norway and Canada) on non-military co-operation in NATO in 1956, which led to the establishment of a Committee of Political Advisors "to assist the Permanent Representatives and the Secretary General in discharging their responsibilities for political consultation", through the report of Mr. Harmel (Foreign Minister of Belgium) in 1967 which specifically recognised the need to consult on "out-of-area" matters that might impair NATO security:

"The North Atlantic Treaty area cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the world. Crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its security either directly or by affecting the global balance. Allied countries contribute individually within the United Nations and other international organisations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the solution of important international problems. In accordance with established usage the allies, or such or them as wish to do so, will also continue to consult on such problems without commitment and as the case may demand."

The usage concerning consultation on "out-of-area" (i.e. out of the area defined in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty) matters, was clarified most recently in the communiqué adopted by all sixteen members of NATO at the Bonn summit on 10th June 1982:

"All of us have an interest in peace and security in other regions of the world. We will consult together as appropriate on events in these regions which may have implications for our security, taking into

account our commonly-identified objectives. Those of us who are in a position to do so will endeavour to respond to requests for assistance from sovereign states whose security and independence is threatened."

One positive consequence has since been seen in the co-operative deployment of French, British and United States naval forces in the Indian Ocean area¹.

2.7. Consultation and joint decision-making in NATO today cover a vast range of subjects, as the names of the sixteen principal committees established by the Council suggest². If twelve of these are concerned with various aspects of the development of the collective capacity to resist armed attack, four at least have other functions. Close political co-operation takes place in the Council and the Political Committee where the allies inform each other as fully as possible on their respective policies and positions on specific questions arising in many parts of the world. Such consultations allow an exchange of views during the policy-making stage before governmental decisions are taken. The machinery established for political consultation includes regional experts groups, ad hoc political working groups, and the Atlantic policy advisory group, producing working papers and reports based on information supplied by national delegations. Experts from capitals are associated with their work in many instances. The Economics Committee assesses economic conditions in the Warsaw Pact countries, and the economic aspects of East-West relations. The Science Committee, the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, and the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations provide for the exchange of information in other areas.

2.8. What may be called the operational side of consultation in NATO has developed extensively since the headquarters moved to Brussels in 1967. Major NATO command post exercises such as Wintex and Hilex are run from the headquarters, which is now equipped with a situation centre. During these exercises national representatives on the Defence Planning Committee and its supporting committees such as the Alert Committee, the Political Committee, and the Military Committee (with the national representatives in direct touch with their national capitals) can test NATO plans and procedures, and simulate crisis management during an imaginary period of growing international tension leading to a declaration of alert and hostilities.

1. The committee has recently reported in detail on United States NATO discussions on out-of-area matters (Document 959, 7th November 1983).

2. See principal Council committees at Appendix II.

(c) Defence and force planning in NATO

2.9. One of the earliest steps taken by NATO to develop collective defence was the introduction of a review of national defence efforts. Under this system each country replies annually and in detail to a NATO questionnaire seeking information on the availability of forces and equipment for the following five years. Those resources reported as available for the first of the five years are considered to be firmly committed: the remaining four years provide indications of probable force availability. The questionnaire also contains a financial and economic section which seeks information on the resources constraints and availability within which national plans are formulated.

2.10. In the light of country replies to the questionnaire, and the ministerial guidance, the major NATO commanders develop biennially force proposals, setting out country-by-country what the commanders propose should be the contribution and force improvements of each during the planning period. The proposals are examined by NATO's international staff in discussion with the nations to ensure compatibility with the military and resource guidance issued by ministers and to establish an element of reasonable and realistic challenge. In short, NATO's planning process attempts to determine the forces required for collective defence, to co-ordinate national defence plans in the collective interest, and to monitor nations' performance against plans. The two-year force planning cycle culminating in ministerial acceptance of the NATO force plans in the Defence Planning Committee is described in Appendix III.

2.11. There are a number of obvious limitations in the effectiveness of NATO's planning cycle as an instrument of centralised planning. Defence remains a national prerogative, and most NATO nations have strong planning staffs, whose programmes look beyond the five-year NATO period, often earmarking resources for ten years or more. It is generally felt among NATO and national planners that resources are almost entirely committed in the short to medium term covered by a NATO cycle, leaving little room for collective NATO planning to exert much influence. However, this is not to say that NATO's planning mechanism has *no* effect or serves no useful purpose. The exchange of information and the exposure of national plans to alliance-wide scrutiny helps to build a consensus on military requirements and priorities, which might otherwise not exist. Nations have been persuaded to modify plans or defence reviews so as to minimise their adverse effects on collective security. More generally, nations have to conduct their national planning conscious of the commitments and

assurances they have made to NATO in the past. As an attempt to strengthen NATO's influence in the medium to long term, a system of long-term planning guidelines has been developed.

(d) Military decision-making in NATO

2.12. The North Atlantic Council is, of course, the supreme decision-making body in NATO. With the withdrawal of France from the integrated military structure in 1966, the Defence Planning Committee was established (composed of the Council, less France) as the decision-making body for those military matters in which France was no longer participating. Military matters in which France still chooses to participate – which include air defence and infrastructure, for example – are still referred for final decision to the North Atlantic Council.

2.13. Immediately under the Defence Planning Committee comes the highest purely military authority in NATO – the Military Committee, composed in permanent session of the permanent representatives of the national chiefs of defence staff under an elected permanent chairman who at the present time is General Cornelis De Jager of the Netherlands Army. By tradition the post is never held by a United States officer. In peacetime the Military Committee's task is to recommend those measures considered necessary for the common defence of the NATO area. It is the body to which the three major NATO commanders (MNCs, i.e. SACEUR, SACLANT and CINCHAN) are responsible; it is also the main source of military advice to the Council and DPC. While the scope of the Military Committee's duties in themselves is clear enough, there does seem to be a degree of ambiguity in its relations with the *MNCs*, whose responsibilities include the organisation, training and equipping of forces assigned and earmarked to their command. They are also responsible for preparing and finalising defence plans. The *MNCs* must go through the Military Committee to the NATO Council and DPC for endorsement of military plans of any significance (the various versions of NATO strategy are issued as Military Committee documents (MC)), or to request resources, but there is scope for planning independent of the Military Committee. SACEUR and SACLANT have the right of direct access to the chiefs-of-staff of any of the NATO powers, to defence ministers and to heads of government.

2.14. The Defence Planning Committee, and certain of its subordinate committees such as the Defence Review Committee, are serviced by the Defence Planning and Policy Division of

the (civilian) international staff, while the Military Committee is serviced by the international military staff, composed of officers seconded from their national armed forces. Some observers believe that efficiency and clarity of authority would be greatly improved if the present international military staff were fused with the defence planning and policy staff, to serve both the Military Committee and Defence Planning Committee, and if these two bodies were to undertake more of their work on defence and force planning in joint session, thereby greatly speeding it up by eliminating several successive steps of the process.

2.15. The authority of the Military Committee with respect to the three major commanders appears less clearly defined than would be expected in a military organisation. The matter is of concern to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in considering the extent to which the NATO structure permits European views to be given proper weight in defence planning – as the committee has pointed out¹, the European countries today provide between 65% and 75% of the readily available ground and air forces in Europe. The Chairman of the Military Committee, by usage, is not a United States general; it is important that the proper authority of the Military Committee over the three major commanders should be clarified, and publicly emphasised.

2.16. As far as these three major commanders – SACEUR, CINCHAN and SACLANT – are concerned, SACEUR for various political reasons has acquired symbolic importance. At the request of the European partners this appointment has always been a senior American officer since General Eisenhower was first appointed in December 1950. SACEUR is simultaneously Commander-in-Chief of United States forces in Europe, a combination of responsibilities that provides important material assurance of the United States commitment to allied defence. The various commanders who have held the post of SACEUR have varied, however, in the extent to which in their NATO functions they have acquired a truly alliance view of their responsibilities. Certainly the structure of SACEUR's headquarters at the top level², where, for example, the key functional post of chief-of-staff is also held by a United States officer, does not appear to provide a proper balance of responsibility. The two posts of Deputy SACEUR, held by British and German officers, are not positions of such direct functional responsibility as that of chief-of-staff.

1. Report on European security and burden-sharing in the alliance, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson, Document 959, 7th November 1983.

2. See Appendix VI.

There is a strong case for appointing a European chief-of-staff, and a European from the Political Affairs Division of the NATO international staff should be appointed to the post of special assistant to SACEUR for international affairs, as the Assembly has already recommended³.

2.17. There are three major NATO commanders. The two supreme commanders, for Europe and the Atlantic, are both United States officers, and have rights of direct access mentioned in paragraph 2.13 above. The third, Commander-in-Chief Channel, a British officer, does not officially enjoy the same status. The committee believes that if the authority of the Military Committee is clarified as proposed above, some of the prerogatives of the supreme commanders might be reduced, and the three major commanders placed on a more equal footing under the Military Committee, but with direct access to the Defence Planning Committee and Military Committee in joint session proposed in paragraph 2.14. This would further "Europeanise" the NATO structure, but the three major commanders should not become a substitute for the Standing Group of British, French and United States chiefs-of-staff, abolished in 1966.

(e) The NATO military command structure

2.18. Under the supreme authorities described above, NATO maintains in peacetime an operational command structure with a chain of command running from the three major NATO commanders listed above, down to the level of the central army group command for land forces and tactical air force command for the air forces. This structure is shown diagrammatically at Appendix V. The command level down to which integrated NATO military headquarters have been established varies in the different regions; the lowest level in each case is the level at which units under command in the event of hostilities are expected to be drawn from different countries of the alliance. Military headquarters which command forces of only one country remain purely national headquarters, and would pass under command of the superior NATO headquarters at an appropriate stage in a crisis.

3. See Recommendation 278 on developments in the Iberian Peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance, adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1975, and the corresponding report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 682, Rapporteur: Mr. Critchley. The Rapporteur there suggested that the NATO Secretary-General should assign political advisers to all NATO military headquarters, and that administratively they should come under the Political Affairs Division of the NATO international staff.

2.19. The various NATO headquarters have an essentially planning function in peacetime since, with the exceptions mentioned in paragraph 2.14 the forces committed to NATO by the member countries do not come under command unless alert is declared by the North Atlantic Council. In addition to their planning functions, however, the NATO headquarters can function under operational conditions during exercises which they may conduct, often with forces under command for exercise purposes, and NATO commanders are also responsible as part of the NATO force planning system for inspecting the state of training and equipment of national forces committed to their command. It should be noted particularly that the logistics function of NATO military headquarters is very small compared with any corresponding national military headquarters, because the logistics function remains a purely national responsibility even when NATO headquarters assume operational command of committed forces. This very unsatisfactory situation is discussed in paragraph 2.27 below, and the whole subject has been examined in significant detail by General Dijkstra in the study on collective logistical support arranged by the committee¹.

2.20. The principal exception to the rule that committed forces are not under NATO command in peacetime is that of the NATO air defence system, which in the European theatre is under operational control of the NATO military headquarters twenty-four hours a day. They control the early warning radars and communications systems, the Hawk and Nike air defence missile belts, and certain fighter interceptor squadrons assigned to an air defence rôle. The multinational AWACS force has recently come into service, operating exclusively under NATO command. The other exceptions are mentioned in paragraphs 2.23 and 2.24.

2.21. The military staffs of the NATO military headquarters are officers seconded from the national armed forces, who continue to wear their national uniform and to be paid by their own governments. The NATO military budget covers the capital and operating costs of the NATO military headquarters, and the salaries of a number of civilian international staff employed there.

(f) *Forces committed to NATO*

2.22. In agreement with the NATO bodies described above, and stemming from the recommendations of NATO force planning procedures described above, member countries have agreed to commit specified forces to

NATO in peacetime. As already pointed out, this does not imply that they are under NATO command in peacetime. Committed forces may be either *assigned* or *earmarked*. In the case of assigned forces, their peacetime location is agreed with the NATO commander concerned and such forces would pass under command when the appropriate alert measures are declared through the North Atlantic Council. Most land and air forces are assigned, and as mentioned above, elements of the air defence forces actually operate under NATO command in peacetime.

2.23. Forces which are earmarked for NATO command have merely to be available to NATO commanders at a specified time after declaration of alert by the North Atlantic Council. The delay in availability may be anything from one or two days to several weeks, depending on the forces concerned. Most naval forces and reserves for air and land forces, are in the earmarked category.

2.24. Since 1967 a Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) has been operating under SACLANT control in peacetime, chiefly as a flag showing operation and on-going exercise, to demonstrate the solidarity of the alliance. The force is composed of frigates or destroyers assigned to the force for a fixed period by most NATO countries with an Atlantic seaboard. The command rotates among contributing countries. Similarly, a Standing Naval Force Channel (STANAVFORCHAN) composed of mine-countermeasure vessels contributed by Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom and, occasionally, Norway and the United States, has been operating under Commander-in-Chief Channel since 1973. A naval on-call force in the Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) is activated from time to time and then operates under the control of CINCSOUTH and his subordinate COMNAVSOUTH - its most recent activation took place on 26th April 1984 with vessels from Greece, Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States under a Greek commander.

2.25. The first multinational force to be constituted by NATO was ACE Mobile Force, first formed in 1960. It comprises a land element of approximately brigade size composed of several battalions, and an air element composed of several squadrons, all drawn from several different NATO countries. The units assigned to this force are specially trained and equipped to be rapidly air-transportable. With the prior agreement of the DPC this force is available to SACEUR for rapid deployment to certain areas, in particular the NATO flanks where it regularly exercises in Norway, Denmark, Greece and Turkey. There is a small

1. Document 966, 20th December 1983.

permanent headquarters staff for planning purposes in peacetime located near to Headquarters Central Army Group.

(g) *Infrastructure*

2.26. One of the most successful aspects of military co-operation in NATO has been the construction of common military infrastructure projects throughout the NATO countries which have been jointly financed according to agreed cost sharing formulae which take account of various factors such as the degree of utilisation by the forces of a member country, and possible benefit to a host country on whose territory a facility is constructed, etc. The total cost of NATO infrastructure to date amounts to 3.5 billion infrastructure accounting units or more than \$11 billion¹. Projects completed include: a communications network with land lines, submarine cables, radio and satellite links; a fuel supply system with some 10,000 kms of pipelines and 2 million cubic metres of storage; naval facilities including moorings and ammunition and equipment stores; radar systems and other elements of the air defence ground environments; storage sites for nuclear weapons; missile sites for Nike missiles, etc.; underground war headquarters, radio navigational aids and, the largest single item, some 220 airfields.

(h) *Logistics*

2.27. In implementation of Order 51 of the Assembly², the committee arranged for a study on collective logistical support to be undertaken by Lieutenant General C.J. Dijkstra³. This excellent and realistic study details the history of logistics in NATO and the present situation whereby despite considerable planning and consultation within the international framework, logistics – i.e. the supply of equipment to the armed forces right down to the point of utilisation in the field – remains essentially a national responsibility. Even when forces pass under NATO command after the alert has been ordered, the main logistics units, and all supply lines and stockpiles remain under purely national command. As long ago as 1960 the committee in an important report on logistics⁴, and the Assembly, in Recommendation 56 adopted on the basis of the committee's report,

1. Taking the IAU to be \$3.159 according to the United States Secretary of Defence report to Congress on burden-sharing, March 1983.

2. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1979.

3. Document 966, 20th December 1983.

4. State of European security – Logistics in Allied Forces Central Europe, Document 180, Rapporteur: Mr. Frans Goedhart, adopted on 25th October 1960.

noted then: "...that while member governments, in assigning national forces to NATO command, have entrusted the lives of their soldiers to allied commanders, they have not transferred sufficient control over materials to enable these commanders to employ their forces effectively". As General Dijkstra points out, the situation has remained largely unchanged. In the penultimate Chapter 7 of his study, on "How to improve the logistic posture", he makes a number of realistic proposals to improve this very unsatisfactory situation. The most important of these, in the committee's view, are:

- (i) the creation of a multinational communications zone on the central front, under command of the Deputy CINCENT, who would be responsible for peacetime planning to co-ordinate logistic supply in the whole region, and would assume command of the corresponding national logistic resources in the event of hostilities. The territorial extent of such a communications zone would have to include not only the Benelux countries, but also in the event of hostilities, part of French territory, and would also require base facilities in the United Kingdom;
- (ii) agreement by member countries that those logistics units essential to the operation of forces assigned to NATO, but which themselves have only reserve status in peacetime, should be mobilised immediately when the NATO alert system begins to operate – General Dijkstra recommends that that should be at the earliest point when "military vigilance" is ordered by a NATO commander;
- (iii) the constitution of "sustaining stocks", in order to improve stocks of various supplies, especially ammunition of all types. Sustaining stocks would have to be drawn upon once basic stocks provided by nations to meet the first few days of hostilities have been consumed and would have to last until resupply could be arranged. They should be jointly financed by NATO, as infrastructure projects are at present, and should be located and controlled in accordance with NATO plans – on the central front they would of course be available to the proposed commander of the communications zone.

2.28. The committee has no hesitation in recommending the foregoing proposals for immediate reference to NATO in the real hope that they may be implemented at an early date. As far as the proposed mobilisation of logistics units at an early stage of the NATO alert

system is concerned, it might well be more realistic in practice to arrange for this to be linked to the declaration of "simple alert" by NATO, rather than "military vigilance" which can be ordered by NATO commanders in their own right, and which includes, for example, the manning of headquarters on a twenty-four hour basis.

(i) Defence production

2.29. For completeness in this survey of obligations and activities entered into in the framework of NATO, this report draws attention to the various attempts to achieve joint production of standardised defence equipment in the alliance which have been only partly successful. In NATO itself the Conference of National Armaments Directors is chiefly responsible for attempting to co-ordinate production plans for future equipment, while the European NATO countries approach the same problem at the European level in the Independent European Programme Group and, for the seven WEU countries, have also available the Standing Armaments Committee although the latter has not in practice been used to consider actual production projects since about 1960. As many reports of Assembly committees have pointed out, progress in this area has been all too slow, resulting in too many different models of high-cost non-standardised equipment being in service with the armed forces of different member countries. It is disturbing to see that this situation shows insufficient sign of improvement.

III. The status of individual countries

(a) General

3.1. The foregoing chapter describes in general terms the obligations and activities of the member countries in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty. A closer look at the relationship of each country to the organisation will usually show some differences in the way each participates.

3.2. Prior to 1966, communiqués issued after NATO ministerial meetings did not reveal reservations or special positions of individual countries. Following the decision of France to withdraw from the integrated military structure in that year, however, sections of subsequent communiqués have been qualified with phrases such as "countries participating in the integrated military structure", or "in the NATO defence programme" or "in the MBFR talks", to refer implicitly to all allies except France. Since May 1967 separate communiqués have also been

issued following ministerial meetings of the Defence Planning Committee, in which France does not participate.

3.3. More recently, since the end of 1981, footnotes have begun to appear in NATO communiqués explaining that certain individual countries – Denmark and Greece – have particular reservations on certain paragraphs, or that another – Spain – is in a particular position at present.

3.4. These reservations in NATO communiqués, however, are only one, rather visible, aspect of differences in the way different countries participate in NATO – differences which have historical, geographical or demographic, as well as political causes. The following sections attempt to describe the relationship to NATO of each European NATO country, grouped in geographical regions. The report does not describe the force contribution of each country¹.

(b) Scandinavia and Iceland

Iceland

3.5. Iceland is obviously in a very special position among NATO countries in that it possesses no armed forces. Iceland is nevertheless a very full participant in NATO in many senses. As a small country, Iceland's diplomatic representations abroad are limited in number, and its foreign policy is of course closely linked to its economic interests, in particular its fishing rights. Membership of NATO brings with it participation in meetings of the North Atlantic Council and its supporting committees, including the Military Committee, although Iceland is understood not to exercise its rights in all these domains very frequently. Nevertheless, participation at will in selected NATO bodies provides Iceland with both a voice in allied councils and access to diplomatic information that might not otherwise be available to the country. In 1951, two years after the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty, Iceland concluded a bilateral agreement with the United States, which provided for the presence on the island of the Iceland defence force supplied by the United States. This now includes both F-4 interceptor aircraft, AWACS E-3A early warning aircraft and Orion maritime patrol aircraft, as well as ASW helicopters which can also provide air-sea rescue facilities. Collectively these forces provide long-range air defence cover around Iceland well into the Greenland-

1. See for a summary description of national forces the committee's previous report, European security and burden-sharing in the alliance, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson, Document 959, 7th November 1983.

Iceland-United Kingdom gap. Together with radar and maritime surveillance facilities, Iceland, because of its vital geo-strategic situation, thus provides NATO with very important facilities for surveillance of Soviet aircraft as well as surface and submarine forces on passage between the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic.

Norway and Denmark

3.6. There are certain features common to the participation of both these Scandinavian countries in NATO. Neither permits the stationing of nuclear weapons or the permanent stationing of foreign troops on its territory in peacetime¹ both have small populations and rely on relatively small standing defence forces, but relatively large and rapidly mobilisable reserves and voluntary home guards; the air, water and underwater surveillance facilities installed on their metropolitan and distant island territories make a vital contribution to total NATO surveillance capabilities.

3.7. Norway faces special problems with the vast extent of a sparsely populated territory extending northwards to the Soviet frontier, and the bulk of its 4.1 million population concentrated in the south. The 40,000 men in the armed forces represent 2.5% of the active population (compared with the mean of 2.3% for the WEU countries, or 2.8% for NATO countries as a whole) backed up by 122,000 reserves and a home guard of 82,000. A significant proportion of the regular forces have to be stationed in north Norway, with greater reliance on the home guard in the more densely-populated southern area. In the event of hostilities Norway would rely heavily on reinforcements, chiefly from the United Kingdom and the United States; units from both countries and the Netherlands and Canada regularly exercise in Norway, and some of their equipment is now permanently stockpiled in the country. ACE Mobile Force, referred to in paragraph 2.25 above, also deploys on exercises to north Norway from time to time. The area of North Cape in the extreme north of Norway, linked by a SOSUS submarine detection system to the Norwegian territory of Bear Island some 250 nautical miles to the north, provides sites which assist in the surveillance of Soviet northern fleet movements from its bases in Severomorsk, Polyanyi, and Arkhangel.

1. Codified in part by Norway in its reply (to a Soviet note of 29th January 1949) assuring the Soviet Union that it would allow no foreign bases or stationing of foreign troops "as long as Norway is not attacked or exposed to threats of attack". Denmark originally stated nuclear weapons would not be stationed "under present conditions" in response to the United States' offer in the 1950s.

3.8. The NATO military headquarters for Allied Forces Northern Europe is located at Kolsås outside Oslo and is responsible for the area from the River Elbe in Germany to North Cape. There are NATO-financed infrastructure installations including radar, communications, three airfields and naval facilities in Norway and its air defence is under NATO command in peacetime.

3.9. Denmark, with a larger population of 5.1 million concentrated in a much smaller area, maintains standing armed forces of 31,000 representing only 1.6% of the active population. They are backed up by 74,000 reserves and 78,000 voluntary home guards. It may be said that Denmark's principal contribution to NATO lies in the continuous surveillance of the Danish straits and, with German forces, naval patrols into the Baltic to the west of the Danish island of Bornholm which also provides excellent radar and other surveillance facilities, located as it is off the Polish coast some 70 nautical miles to the east of Copenhagen. The Danish straits are recognised as international straits, but passage is regulated by national Danish regulations, and all transits of Soviet naval vessels, whether submarine or surface, are reported to NATO. Submerged passage of submarines is prohibited, and would be detected if attempted.

3.10. Like Norway, Denmark might have to rely on reinforcements if its territory were attacked. There are regular NATO exercises including deployment of ACE Mobile Force and German forces on Danish territory to practise such arrangements.

3.11. NATO Headquarters Baltic Approaches, subordinate to Allied Forces Northern Europe, is located at Karup on Jutland. Danish air defence, however, is not under NATO command in peacetime.

3.12. A Danish air force base and a LORAN navigation aid on the Faroe Islands are strategically located in the Iceland-United Kingdom gap. There are two United States bases in north Greenland, the airbase at Thule, a ballistic missile early-warning radar (BMEWS) and an extension of the North American distant early-warning (DEW) air defence radar line across southern Greenland.

3.13. Denmark, like all other NATO countries except France, participated in the December 1979 dual decision on intermediate-range nuclear forces concerning negotiations with the Soviet Union and the conditions of deployment of such forces in five NATO countries. Although INF forces were not earmarked for deployment on Danish territory, Denmark is a contributor along with all other NATO countries to the infrastructure programme which INF deployment would involve. On 7th December 1982,

however, the Danish parliament voted to suspend until further notice Danish contribution to INF infrastructure after funds already committed for 1983, and on 10th May 1984 voted finally, by 49 to 11 with the 77 members of the government coalition parties abstaining, to withhold payment of the balance of \$4.8 million due on a total scheduled Danish contribution of \$7.5 million. The \$4.8 million was to be devoted instead to national defence projects. On 26th May 1983, the Danish parliament had adopted by 83 votes to 70 a motion tabled by the opposition Social Democratic Party calling for the INF negotiations to be continued into 1984 and for there to be no deployment of INF forces by NATO during that time and for the number of such forces to be frozen at present levels. Dating from the NATO Defence Planning Committee communiqué of 2nd June 1983, all references in NATO communiqués to INF deployment have since contained a reservation by the Danish Government pointing out that the government supported the dual decision but at the same time drawing attention to the motion adopted by the Danish parliament.

(c) *The WEU countries*

3.14. The WEU countries, with the exception of France, may be seen as a coherent nucleus in European NATO, accepting comparable obligations and undertaking comparable tasks which could be described as "full participation" in NATO. Thus none of these countries is responsible for any reservations appended to recent NATO communiqués; all have committed the greater part of their armed forces to NATO; all participate in ACE Mobile Force which may be deployed to Norway, Denmark, Greece or Turkey; all have nuclear weapons stationed on their territories and the forces of all these countries assume some nuclear rôles, in the case of the non-nuclear countries through ownership of means of delivery (such as aircraft and the Lance surface-to-surface missile) for United States-owned warheads; all have accepted the principle of the basing of INF forces on their territory in the absence of any agreement in the INF negotiations. Such differences as there are in the relationships between these six countries and NATO stem more from their size or geographical position, than from differences in policy.

The central region

3.15. The central region of NATO, which stretches from the River Elbe in Germany south to the Swiss and Austrian frontier, with forces from eight different NATO countries permanently stationed there in peacetime, has the most integrated, most multinational structure

of any NATO command. Under Headquarters Allied Forces Central Europe at Brunssum in the Netherlands, there are five integrated subordinate headquarters. For the land forces these are Headquarters Northern Army Group (to which national corps from Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and the United Kingdom are assigned) and Central Army Group (with national corps from Germany and the United States, and a Canadian brigade).

Air forces in the central region

3.16. The air force chain of command passes from the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT) first to Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe and then to Second ATAF in the north (with national squadrons from the United States and the same countries as those assigning army corps to NORTHAG) and to Fourth ATAF in the south (similarly with national squadrons from the three countries which assign land forces to CENTAG).

3.17. CINCENT's (and hence AAFCE's) area of responsibility for *air defence* extends into the sea areas beyond the northern limit of the land area of responsibility. The Bonn Convention of 1952, as amended on 23rd October 1954, provided for special three-power responsibility to be exercised by France, the United Kingdom and the United States for peacetime security of German airspace. Because of this agreement only British or United States officers initiate orders for intercept missions in German airspace in peacetime. Officers from those two countries are permanently on duty in the sector operations centres – the air defence centres coming directly under Second ATAF and Fourth ATAF – and interception missions to challenge unidentified aircraft are first performed by aircraft of those two countries. France, despite its withdrawal from the integrated defence structure, is understood to have reserved its right to participate in this arrangement. At a specified state of the NATO alert procedure it is understood that the special provisions of the amended 1952 convention will cease to apply and air defence responsibility will be exercised normally by NATO command. The Nike and Hawk air defence missile belt which stretches across the whole central front is provided by German, Belgian, Netherlands and United States units. For *offensive air operations* CINCENT's (and hence AAFCE's) area of responsibility coincides with the area of CINCENT's land responsibility, extending north only as far as the Elbe. Under each of the two ATAFs there are two allied tactical operation centres (ATOCs), which task assigned wings in times of war. National commands in peacetime, they direct the operations and pilot training of national squadrons under command.

3.18. Headquarters AAFCE was established only in 1974 to centralise command of air forces operating in the central region. It is commanded by a United States air force general who holds simultaneously the national appointment of Commander-in-Chief United States Air Force Europe. Hitherto, the two ATAFs had developed as separate air forces under a British RAF commander in the north and a United States air force commander in the south. The committee last reported on the situation over eight years ago¹ when the new command structure had not been finalised – headquarters AAFCE was temporarily installed at the air force base at Ramstein in Germany but was originally due to be moved to be co-located with CINCENT in Brunssum. The committee then reported on several problems both of the command structure and with the equipment of the air forces assigned to it.

3.19. Headquarters AAFCE has not in fact been moved from Ramstein. Your Rapporteur visited the headquarters in April and is able to report that the new command structure is now on the point of becoming much more effective, with arrangements for the subordinate ATOCs to be internationally manned. The equipment situation has improved considerably with the introduction of more modern aircraft such as the Tornado, Jaguar, Harrier and F-16 – the latter replacing three different aircraft – and the entry into service of the first ten E-3A surveillance aircraft of the NATO airborne early warning (NAEW) fleet which will comprise eighteen E-3As and eleven Nimrods when complete. Simultaneously, however, the quality of Warsaw Pact aircraft has also increased. Other equipment problems identified by the committee in 1975 however remain just as acute today. Perhaps the most serious shortcoming is the absence of a single standardised IFF (identification friend or foe) device on all NATO aircraft. The United States has adopted an improved version of the sophisticated Mark XII whereas most other countries have an earlier NATO standard. As a consequence all NATO air defence systems – both landbased and airborne – would be considerably hampered by having to use longer procedural means to identify positively an aircraft as friend or foe before engaging it. In the words of General Billy M. Minter, Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe, “Right now we can’t take full advantage of the beyond-visual range capability that we have in the F-15 (aircraft) because we don’t have a NATO IFF system.”²

1. Air forces on the central front, Rapporteur: Mr. Roper, Document 690, 1st December 1975.

2. Reported in Armed Forces Journal International, January 1984.

3.20. Another major problem facing the air forces in Central Europe is the lack of space and the limited number of airfields available. Twenty-nine airfields in France, which had been financed through the NATO infrastructure programme or bilaterally by Canadian and United States forces, ceased to be available in 1966. While much has been done to improve and harden NATO airfields in Germany, there is a backlog of maintenance work on other NATO airfields. With the arrival of reinforcement squadrons from the United States there will be desperate overcrowding on the airfields available in the central region where several squadrons will have to share airfields – known as co-located operating bases (COB). To quote General Minter again: “What I need is to get the seventy COBs that we have identified and have them equipped with adequate POL (petrol, oil and lubricants), munitions and dispersal parking ... We really need hardened aircraft shelters. We need munitions, bunkers, etc. We can do it for anywhere between \$5 and \$6 million a copy.”³

Belgium and the Netherlands

3.21. As both countries participate fully in NATO there are few particularities to report. Actual deployment of INF forces on the territory of these two countries under the 1979 dual decision, is not due until 1985; both countries in different ways have reserved their position concerning a final assessment of the progress of INF negotiations which remains a factor to be taken into account before deployment begins. The Belgian contribution to the Hawk and Nike air defence belts remains a subject of much speculation because the obsolescent Nike missiles are being phased out; Belgium has not undertaken to finance the replacement United States Patriot missile, and talks are being held concerning the possible provision of such missiles by the United States. Belgium’s proposals to withdraw its Hawk units from the forward air defence screen to replace the Nike missiles have been energetically opposed in the NATO military command because it would leave a gap in the forward Hawk belt.

3.22. Both countries’ geographical situations provide important opportunities for the reception of external reinforcements. They both take part in NATO’s integrated air defence system, provide land and air forces for the forward defence of the central region and devote their maritime forces to countering the submarine and mine threats in the Channel and Atlantic, thereby contributing to the maintenance of the sea lines of communication. Belgium maintains

3. Op. cit.

a large army contingent stationed in Germany. The Netherlands has a brigade deployed forward in Germany to be reinforced through the rapid mobilisation of active and reserve forces. Modernisation of both air forces is underway through the introduction of the F-16, the purchase of which has absorbed a considerable proportion of investment funds.

Luxembourg

3.23. With a population of only 366,000, Luxembourg obviously has a special position concerning its participation in NATO. The committee visited the country in 1981. Together with Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, among the NATO countries, Luxembourg has purely voluntary military service which provides an army of 720 men representing only 0.9% of the active population. Luxembourg's contribution to NATO forces is one under-sized battalion assigned to ACE Mobile Force. The NATO supply depot NAMSA is located on its territory, as is a United States tank depot. Luxembourg's efforts in supporting reinforcements are important. Large storage sites are constructed there and the civil airport will be available for reception and onward movement of reinforcements. The government's offer to register all E-3A NATO AWACS aircraft in Luxembourg was also important.

Germany

3.24. Germany can be said to be the country whose armed forces are most integrated into the NATO military structure; to some extent this was a historical consequence of inheriting a pre-existing situation when the German armed forces were recreated following the 1954 agreements. A feature of the German military staffs is the absence of an operational planning staff, the functions of which are left to NATO military headquarters. The most senior German officer has the title not of Chief of Defence Staff but of *Inspekteur der Bundeswehr*, implying that his responsibility is for ensuring that German forces are properly trained and equipped to fulfil the tasks assigned to them in NATO defence plans, rather than to exercise operational command over the forces. The 1983 white paper states that "only in the Atlantic Alliance can ... (Germany) find protection and security." It is the only member of the alliance to have assigned all its combat forces (except the territorial army units) to NATO, thus contributing a large, well-equipped and readily-available contingent to the central region. Its maritime forces play a vital part, with those of Denmark, in protecting the Baltic Sea and its approaches.

3.25. Germany supports a significant social burden because of the stationing on its territory

of the integrated forces of six NATO countries and, since 1966 on a bilateral basis, those of France, together with six NATO military headquarters. As well as the barracks, storage sites and airfields required for these forces, provision has to be made as far as possible for training areas. The concentration of military force is greater than anywhere else in the NATO area, and the airspace is particularly crowded with military traffic in addition to considerable civilian traffic – a situation made worse in 1966 when eleven airfields in France used by Canadian and United States air forces ceased to be available.

3.26. The initial deployment of nine Pershing II missiles in Germany under the 1979 dual decision was duly accomplished before the end of 1983.

United Kingdom

3.27. Although the United Kingdom has largely abandoned a worldwide "east of Suez" defence policy, it still retains defence responsibilities outside the NATO area, as events in the South Atlantic in 1982 served to show. Nevertheless, British policy statements continue to state that: "the major threat to the security of the United Kingdom remains the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, and that our membership of NATO provides the only realistic way of countering that threat"¹. The first defence policy statement of the present conservative government recognised "the primacy of NATO in our defence policy"². A major part of the British armed forces are assigned to NATO including the strategic and tactical nuclear forces, it is the only country contributing forces to all three major commands, SACLANT, CINCHAN and SACEUR under which latter comes Commander United Kingdom Air Forces, although public statements do not appear to have been made concerning the total proportion of forces committed to NATO. In the annual report of the WEU Council to the Assembly, Britain regularly reports however on its contribution to BAOR under the terms of Article VI of Protocol II of the modified Brussels Treaty – in 1982 this contribution amounted to 59,567 men (of which 909 were temporarily serving in Northern Ireland) and some twelve squadrons of aircraft. In addition there is a brigade in Berlin. The United Kingdom is geographically and strategically important for the reinforcement of continental Europe, redeployment of United States reinforcements and base for strategic air assets.

1. Statement on the defence estimates 1983.

2. The United Kingdom defence programme: "The way forward", June 1981, Cmnd. 8288.

3.28. One of the three major subordinate NATO commands – Commander-in-Chief Channel – is located in the United Kingdom at Northwood, near London, the British commander of which serves concurrently as Commander Eastern Atlantic – a subordinate command to SACLANT.

3.29. Like Canada, Luxembourg and the United States, the United Kingdom relies on volunteer forces only, which represent 2.1% of the active labour force – the lowest percentage in WEU after Luxembourg – but defence expenditure at 5.6% of GDP is the highest percentage among the WEU countries where it averages 3.9%, compared with 5.4% for NATO as a whole.

3.30. There are 27,000 United States military personnel stationed in the United Kingdom, mostly United States air force but including 4,000 navy and 200 army, with 360 aircraft based on seven airfields including Mildenhall where HQ3 USAF is located, with a further three airfields in reserve. There is a United States nuclear submarine support facility at Holy Loch, and a number of other logistic, communications, intelligence and surveillance facilities including a BMEWs station¹, making a total of over fifty sites available to the United States in peacetime².

3.31. The United Kingdom as a full participant in the 1979 dual decision accepted deployment of the first sixteen cruise missiles at Greenham Common before the end of 1983, out of a total of 160 scheduled for the United Kingdom.

Italy

3.32. Separated from the other WEU countries by the neutral countries, Austria and Switzerland, and the chain of the Alps, Italian forces are committed to Allied Forces Southern Europe, the third subordinate command of SACEUR, the headquarters of which are located in Naples. The nature of the NATO southern region is quite different from that of the central region: NATO territory in the area comprises the four largely isolated landmasses of the Iberian peninsula, Italy, Greece and Turkey. The land and air threat to these countries, most acute in Turkey which has an extensive common frontier with the Soviet Union, is however less than on the central front and declines progressively with the countries further to the west. For these various reasons integration of forces from different nations is

not practised to the same extent as on the central front.

3.33. Italy's principal rôles in ACE are the maintenance of a stabilising maritime presence in peace and tension, a contribution to the control of the air and sea in the Mediterranean during hostilities, and defence of the north-eastern frontier. Given the strategic significance of the Mediterranean, the Italian navy is of particular importance. It has a wide variety of tasks to perform to maintain NATO's defence posture within the geographically disparate southern region. It is thus a comprehensive force which is currently undergoing an extensive programme of modernisation. In November 1983 the Defence Minister announced a plan for restructuring and redeploying the Italian armed forces to take account of possible threats from areas in the Mediterranean other than the north-east where a possible land attack by Soviet forces has long been the major threat considered in defence plans.

3.34. Italian forces are largely responsible for the defence of Italian territory with the assistance of the United States forces under the terms of the bilateral agreement of January 1952 with various later editions. The United States army has about 1,000 men in the Southern European Task Force based in Livorno and Vicenza which provide some tactical nuclear fire power as well as basic logistics support facilities. The United States air force has an important base at Aviano in north-east Italy from which tactical United States squadrons operate on a rotational basis, and an airfield at Sigonella in Sicily from which it operates Orion maritime patrol aircraft. The United States Sixth Fleet has base facilities at Catania in Sicily, at Naples and Gaeta, a submarine tender to the north-east of Sardinia, and its shore headquarters near Naples; it would come under the command of AFSOUTH in the event of hostilities. Altogether, there are some fifty-eight United States military installations on Italian territory including several communications sites and an intelligence gathering facility.

3.35. In addition to United States support, Portugal provides an armoured brigade which could serve in north-east Italy in the event of hostilities.

3.36. The NATO military headquarters located in Italy, subordinate to AFSOUTH already mentioned, are Headquarters Allied Air Forces Southern Europe and Headquarters Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe, both of which co-ordinate allied air and naval forces throughout the southern region. The subordinate air force headquarters Fifth ATAF located at Vicenza and Headquarters Allied Land Forces Southern Europe located at Verona are respon-

1. Statement on the defence estimates 1983 – 1, page 19, Cmnd. 8951-I.

2. The Times, 4th November 1983.

sible for the land and air defence of Italian territory. The NATO NADGE air defence radar chain continues down the line of the Italian east coast and with Italian air defence units provides an essential barrier to Soviet aircraft attempting to overfly Yugoslavia and Italy to reach the western Mediterranean.

3.37. As a participant in the 1979 dual decision, Italy has already accepted the first 16 out of the 112 cruise missiles scheduled for deployment in Sicily.

France

3.38. In 1966 France caused some consternation in the alliance in announcing its decision to withdraw from the integrated military structure; and in requiring NATO military headquarters, and all allied forces, to leave French territory. The North Atlantic Council with its attendant (civilian) international staff subsequently decided of its own accord to move from France to Belgium at the same time. Because the French decision gave the impression to the uninitiated that France in some way had "left NATO", whereas in practice the French withdrawal was stated to be only from the "integrated military structure" of NATO, this section describes in some detail the extent of French participation in NATO at the present time. The committee notes that, whereas official French statements often point out that French forces are not "under NATO command", and that there is no "automaticity" in any French decision to commit French forces to allied defence in the event of hostilities, the same in fact can be said for all other forces committed to NATO because, as pointed out above, they do not come under NATO command in peacetime and a decision to declare a state of alert under which forces would normally pass under NATO command requires the unanimous decision of the North Atlantic Council or Defence Planning Committee, and hence implies no "automaticity" for any country. Spain also does not participate as yet in the integrated military structure, but participates in all committees.

3.39. France continues, of course, to be a full participant in the supreme decision-making body of NATO – the North Atlantic Council – and maintains a full civilian and military delegation at NATO headquarters in Brussels. It is not, however, a member of the Defence Planning Committee, i.e. sessions of the Council in which most, but not all, decisions on military matters are taken, nor of the Nuclear Planning Group or Defence Review Committee. Altogether, France participates in fifteen of the eighteen principal committees of the North Atlantic Council shown at Appendix II, although it attends for only relevant business in the Council operations, and in the Military

Budget Committee. Although fewer than before 1966, there are French nationals on the civilian international staff, including an Assistant Secretary General and some staff in the Division of Defence Planning and Policy which includes civil defence. Spanish nationals have not yet joined.

3.40. France continues to participate fully in political consultation in the North Atlantic Council and the groups of political advisers. One important function includes the drawing up of an allied position in the various East-West disarmament negotiations (a subject also dealt with by the Ten in the framework of European political co-operation). France, however, has adopted a different attitude to its allies on many related issues; alone among NATO countries it is not a party to the partial test ban treaty, the non-proliferation treaty, and has only now decided to accede to the biological treaty. France made a comparable multilateral declaration in the second case and adopted national legislation to ban biological weapons. It does not participate in the MBFR negotiations. The way in which NATO communiqués provide for the special position of France has been described in paragraph 3.2 above.

3.41. France, although technically not a member of the Military Committee, maintains a military mission to the chairman of that committee, headed by a major general who attends most meetings in a non-voting capacity. Similarly, there are no French officers serving on the international military staff or in the various military headquarters of NATO, but there are French military missions attached to all major NATO headquarters.

3.42. Although all NATO military headquarters were removed from France following the 1966 decision, three NATO military agencies have remained in the Paris area – the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development; the Hawk Management Office; and the Central Europe Operating Agency which operates the NATO pipelines system bringing petroleum fuel from Le Havre and Marseille to airfields and filling points on the central front. Many of the system's fuel storage depots and pumping stations are on French territory¹.

3.43. While it is understood that France does not participate now in the NATO force planning review which has been described above, it continues to supply NATO statistics on its defence effort so that France appears in the table of comparative defence statistics published

1. See the diagram at Annex B to Appendix VII of the study on collective logistical support by Lieutenant General C.J. Dijkstra (Document 966, 20th December 1983).

by NATO each year¹. (Spain is not yet replying regularly to the questionnaire concerned and does not appear in this table.)

3.44. In 1966 France announced its intention not to participate in future NATO infrastructure projects, but shortly thereafter reversed that decision in respect of specific projects that continued to be of interest. Accordingly it is still a partial participant in certain NATO infrastructure programmes, making a proportional contribution to their cost – particularly as far as air defence and communications installations are concerned, where France participates to the extent of receiving information but not contributing forces. Prior to 1966 NATO, multilaterally, and the United States and Canada bilaterally, had financed the construction or improvement of twenty-nine airfields in France of which four are now unused and eight are standby fields only. Some others are in partial or civilian use. Many runways are in disrepair.

3.45. France remains a full participant in certain important military functions in NATO including the Conference of National Armaments Directors responsible for discussing the joint production of defence equipment, the Air Defence Committee, the Senior NATO Logisticians Conference, and Civil Emergency Planning. When final decisions have to be taken on such questions they are therefore handled in the North Atlantic Council where France is present, rather than in the Defence Planning Committee.

3.46. Although not now committed to NATO, France continues to station two divisions of its ground forces in Germany, in proximity to the French frontier, which do not have forward defence positions assigned to them like those assigned to the remaining NATO forces since “forward defence” was adopted. France, under the post-war agreements, maintains a brigade in Berlin and reserves the right to participate in the peacetime air defence arrangements for German airspace referred to in paragraph 3.20 above. French forces, particularly naval forces, still participate selectively in certain NATO exercises from time to time, and bilateral agreements have been concluded with SACEUR and SACLANT concerning certain conditions under which French forces might co-operate with NATO forces. France is now negotiating with Germany concerning logistical support for the newly created *Force d'action rapide* of 48,000 men which in one rôle could be rapidly deployed to Germany to counter, for example, an armoured breakthrough.

1. See Appendix IV.

3.47. Like the United Kingdom, France retains defence commitments outside the NATO area, in particular on the African continent and in the Indian Ocean.

3.48. In conclusion, it should be pointed out that although not a party to the 1979 dual decision, the present French Government has frequently supported the NATO INF decision in public, and even the principle of the integrated military structure of NATO as it applies to other NATO countries. If some French territory could again be made available for NATO purposes, such as the proposed communications zone command² and the NATO-financed airfields, the committee believes that allied defences would be greatly strengthened.

(d) Greece and Turkey

3.49. The committee last visited Greece and Turkey in 1981 and reported on the defence situation and relations of those countries to NATO at the time³. As in the case of Italy, in the defence of these two countries is primarily in the hands of their own forces, supplemented by United States air forces which operate in these countries, largely on a rotational basis from other United States bases in Spain, and offshore assistance from the United States Sixth Fleet. Both countries have bilateral defence agreements with the United States which has facilities in both countries which include airfields, naval bases, communications installations and intelligence gathering facilities. United States nuclear weapons, both for both United States forces and for Greek and Turkish forces, are stockpiled in each country. As relatively poor nations, Greece and Turkey devote disproportionately large amounts of their national resources to defence spending – 7% and 5.3% of their GDPs respectively. The Turkish army is the second largest in NATO. However, much of their equipment is obsolete and badly in need of modernisation. This modernisation, however, depends on assistance from the more wealthy allies – of whom only the United States and Germany provide assistance of any note.

3.50. Greece and Turkey make a vital contribution to the defence of the whole southern region in that they block Soviet naval and air access to the Mediterranean. The NATO NADGE air defence radar chain extends across both. Naval passage through the Turkish straits is regulated by the Montreux Convention which

2. See paragraph 2.21 above and Document 966.

3. European security and the Mediterranean, Rapporteur: Mr. Bozzi, Document 876, 4th May 1981.

is operated by Turkey. The passage of submarines is prohibited except for repair, and advance notice has to be given of passage of surface units. Thus there is complete NATO surveillance of movements of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet into the Mediterranean, and Soviet submarines operating there have to come from the Soviet Northern or Baltic Fleets.

3.51. There are two NATO military headquarters subordinate to AFSOUTH at Izmir in Turkey: Headquarters Allied Land Forces South-East Europe, and Headquarters Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force. These were originally intended for the co-ordination of the land and air defence of Greek and Turkish territory, but following the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974, Greece withdrew participation.

3.52. One proposal negotiated by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, was for the establishment of separate NATO headquarters at Larissa in Greece, to be responsible for the co-ordination for air and land operations in that country, but as recently as February 1984, the great Prime Minister, Mr. Papandreo, has stated "we will not set up the Larissa headquarters because the danger to Greece does not come from the north but from the east"¹.

3.53. The unsatisfactory state of relations between Greece and Turkey is a principal weakness of NATO arrangements in the area. Although withdrawing its forces from NATO command in 1974, Greece returned then and resumed participation in NATO on 20th October 1980 under an agreement in principle which left many details to be settled. Between those years Greece and subsequently Turkey suspended reporting to NATO on defence planning, chiefly in order to prevent the information reaching the other country, although NATO commanders in person continued to have some access to Turkish forces. The extent of Greek participation in NATO defence planning at the present time remains unclear.

3.54. Since the elections of October 1981 which brought the Pasok Socialist Party to power with Mr. Papandreo as Prime Minister, Greece has adopted an individualistic and critical attitude in many NATO councils. Mr. Papandreo, in his capacity as Minister of Defence, attended the ministerial meeting of the NATO Defence Planning Committee in December 1981 in person; it did not prove possible to issue a communiqué at the end of that meeting in the course of which it is understood that Mr. Papandreo called for a declaration to the effect that NATO would

defend member countries in the event of attack by other members – a declaration which could only have been directed against Turkey. Since that date NATO communiqués, whether of the North Atlantic Council, Defence Planning Committee or Nuclear Planning Group, have contained footnotes detailing reservations expressed by Greece. These have included some NATO criticism of Warsaw Pact régimes; allegations of the use of chemical weapons by the Soviet Union; recommendations concerning East-West trade, and energy supplies; and any NATO reference to INF negotiations and decisions on the deployment of these weapons.

3.55. Most recently Greece has embarrassed NATO countries by calling jointly with Romania for a freeze on the deployment of nuclear weapons, and took the lead in convening the recent Balkans Conference in Athens with delegates from Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece and Turkey to discuss a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans.

(e) The Iberian peninsula

Portugal

3.56. The committee visited Portugal in October 1982 and reported its conclusions at that time². Portugal is in every sense a participant in NATO, but being the most remote of the European NATO countries from the Soviet Union, its contribution to collective defence is chiefly to naval operations in the Atlantic and the important staging facilities on the Azores in mid-Atlantic. Forces from other NATO countries are not stationed on Portuguese mainland territory, but there are United States air force detachments at the Lajes air base in the Azores.

3.57. There is a NATO military headquarters, HQ IBERLANT, outside Lisbon which is a naval command subordinate to SACLANT, responsible for the co-ordination of naval operations in the area off the Portuguese coast as far as longitude 22° West, and extending eastwards to a point just west of the Straits of Gibraltar. The Commander-in-Chief is a Portuguese admiral and the headquarters staff is provided by Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States, and there is a French military mission attached to it.

3.58. Located at the most westerly point of the European landmass, Portugal makes a vital contribution to naval operations and maritime air control in the area of the very busy north-south maritime trade route in the Atlantic. NATO-financed infrastructure in Portugal has

1. Atlantic News No. 1598, 15th February 1984.

2. Report on the state of European security, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw, Document 936, 8th November 1982.

provided two airfields for maritime patrol aircraft, important naval fuel and ammunition storage facilities, excellent anchorage in the large natural harbour at Lisbon, and major NATO communications facilities including a satellite terminal. The air base at Porto Santo in the Madeira Islands is the most southerly available to NATO at the present time.

3.59. The United States has had a basing agreement with Portugal, modified in various ways since the original executive agreement of September 1951, which provides both naval and air bases in the Azores, as well as communication facilities, radio relays and navigational aids. The submarine surveillance facilities installed in the Azores are reported to be capable of tracking Soviet submarines within a thousand mile radius, which includes all approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar¹.

3.60. The Portuguese armed forces have undergone considerable reorganisation in the last eight years. Portugal now provides a mobile armoured brigade which can be deployed to north-east Italy and has once contributed an artillery battery to ACE Mobile Force. Like Greece and Turkey, the chief problem facing Portugal is that of modernising its equipment, and some military assistance is provided by other NATO countries.

3.61. When the committee visited Portugal in 1982, the formalities of Spanish accession to the North Atlantic Treaty had just been completed, and discussion had begun on the means of incorporating Spain into the integrated military structure. The Portuguese authorities, both military and political, made it clear that they foresaw some difficult problems with any reorganisation of the NATO military command structure in the area of the Iberian peninsula. It was held that Portugal should remain part of the SACLANT area, and that Portuguese land and air forces should remain under Portuguese command, and not form part of any integrated command for the Iberian peninsula. It was suggested that Spain was essentially a Mediterranean country and should form part of SACEUR's area of responsibility.

Spain

(i) General

3.62. Following its first visit to Madrid in October 1983, and in view of Spain's recent accession to NATO, the committee reports on that country in some detail. During its visit, the

1. Report prepared for the United States House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Europe and the Middle East, "United States military installations and objectives in the Mediterranean", Congressional Research Service, 27th March 1977, page 12.

committee was fully briefed by senior officials of the Foreign Ministry and by senior officers of the Defence Policy Staff; it held an interesting discussion with members of the Foreign Affairs and Defence committees of the Congress of Deputies. It did not prove possible to meet any ministers, a situation which no doubt reflected the difficulty of the Spanish Government's present position of having joined NATO but not yet having joined the integrated military structure, and being committed eventually to holding a referendum on continued membership.

3.63. By the time General Franco died in November 1975, Spain had become an ally of the United States and had a preferential agreement with the EEC but had been refused accession. With democracy and King Juan Carlos I's liberal monarchy, during the period of centrist governments, the general lines of Spain's previous external policy were pursued, with renewed approaches to the European Community. Even before the restoration of democracy the defence agreement with the United States had been replaced in January 1976 with a full treaty of friendship and co-operation, which inter alia required the removal of nuclear weapons and the nuclear submarine base from Spanish territory.

(ii) External priorities of the socialist government

3.64. Following the November elections, Mr. Felipe Gonzalez, leader of the Spanish Socialist Party, was elected Prime Minister by the Congress of Deputies on 1st December 1982 by 207 votes to 116 with 21 abstentions.

3.65. Accession to the European Community remains a priority of the Gonzalez government, but it is pursuing active policies in many fields. Relations with the Maghreb and Latin America remain important. On 20th April 1983 his government ratified the bilateral defence agreement with the United States² negotiated by the previous government with an additional protocol providing that Spain's membership of NATO, referred to in the agreement, must be taken as meaning adherence to the Washington Treaty but not to the military structure. Any change in Spain's status vis-à-vis NATO would be a reason for revising the agreement. According to the protocol, either of the parties may ask for the agreement to be revised whenever it wishes. In Bonn on 3rd May 1983, Mr. Gonzalez for the first time expressed his support for the NATO twofold decision on Euromissiles.

(iii) Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty

2. Described in paragraph 3.94 below.

3.66. As soon as he came to office in February 1981, but particularly after an attempted putsch in June 1981, the then Prime Minister, Mr. Calvo Sotelo (UCD - *Union del Centro Democrático*), showed his desire to speed up the process of Spain's accession to NATO which had hitherto been linked to the negotiations with the United Kingdom on Gibraltar and Spain's entry to the EEC. He ran into opposition from the socialist and communist parties, which called for a referendum on the subject.

3.67. On 30th August 1981 the Spanish Government set in motion parliamentary procedure for obtaining permission to join NATO. The then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jose Perez Llorca, said in an interview in the daily newspaper *Diario 16* that accession, "crowning the process of democratic transition", could be effected in two stages, the first being Spain's accession to NATO as a member and the second the integration of Spanish armed forces into the military co-operation system. The minister also underlined that Spain's Atlantic commitment would in no way change its position towards Israel or the Arab countries and that it did not imply acceptance of the deployment of nuclear weapons on Spanish territory (a prior condition which removed a major argument of those who were against accession).

3.68. For the socialists, Mr. Felipe Gonzalez said in an interview in *Politique Etrangère* (No. 3, October 1982):

"Let us be clear: we wish to encourage the proposal for joint European defence. This trend already exists in all Spanish political and social forces as it does in all the other western countries. It is admittedly difficult to bring about in the immediate future but it is an aim which must be attained. We are convinced that it is perfectly compatible with an external policy in which top priority is given to the defence of our frontiers against any aggression from without. Spanish socialists are true Europeans ... In parallel, if the contents of the bilateral agreements between Spain and the United States in the future meet the criteria of equality which should govern all relations between sovereign states, the Spanish socialist party will maintain Spain's military alliance with the United States while obviously seeking the conclusion of defence agreements with its neighbours in Western Europe. Our accession to the treaty will therefore be submitted to the people by referendum for its approval ..."

3.69. On 29th October 1981, the Spanish Congress of Deputies voted in favour of Spain's accession to NATO by 186 votes to 146 (there

being 350 seats in the Congress). The UCD deputies in power and the conservative and regional parties voted for and the socialists, communists and independents against. The Senate approved the proposed accession of Spain to the North Atlantic Treaty in November 1981.

3.70. Ratification by NATO countries was completed on 29th May 1982. The last signature was that of the President of Portugal, Mr. Eanes. Portuguese deputies' fears that Portugal might lose its rôle in Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) to Spain had been allayed by the fact that the Portuguese ratification law authorised only accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. Spain's integration into the NATO military structure cannot fail to raise questions about Portugal's place in the NATO command structure, etc.

(iv) *The extent of Spanish participation in NATO*

3.71. Since 30th May 1982, Spain has been a full party to the North Atlantic Treaty. It attends meetings of the North Atlantic Council, the Defence Planning Committee, the Military Committee and, as an observer, the Nuclear Planning Group. Generally speaking, Spain also takes part in meetings of all the many Council committees. It is also a full member of the non-NATO bodies IEPG (by decision of Mr. Gonzalez' government) and Eurogroup (of which France is not a member). Since May 1983, Spanish deputies have been attending the North Atlantic Assembly.

3.72. The progress of discussions from July to October 1982 on the integration of Spain into the NATO military structure has not been made public. According to the Spanish daily paper, *El País*¹, Spain and NATO had reached agreement on the military status of Gibraltar. Spain was believed to have obtained responsibility for commanding a strategic area stretching from the Canaries to the Balearics, of which Gibraltar would be the central point. In this framework, NATO would create a new regional command, entrusted to Spain. The Gibraltar naval command would remain wholly British or become a joint Spanish-British command, but be subject to the new Spanish regional command. NATO was believed to have refused a Spanish request for a new major NATO command for Spain, additional to the three existing commands (SACEUR, SACLANT, CINCHAN).

3.73. The Spanish Government announced in parliament that membership of NATO would not require nuclear weapons to be stationed on

1. October 1983.

its territory in peacetime. The position of Denmark and Norway on this subject has been described above.

3.74. As soon as the socialist government took office on 1st December 1982, the negotiations on Spain's integration into the NATO military structure were frozen, but Spain's full participation in the various NATO organs has not changed. Spain's special position has however been specified in NATO communiqués since then. For instance, in the communiqué issued after the Defence Planning Committee's ministerial meeting on 2nd June 1983:

"The Spanish Minister of Defence informed the Defence Planning Committee of the present state of the review that the Spanish Government is undertaking, regarding its participation in the alliance, pending which he reserved his government's position on the communiqué. At the same time, however, the Spanish Minister stated that his government shares in the communiqué insofar as it may reflect positions in the relations of Spain with the member countries of the alliance."

3.75. It remains to determine what responsibilities Spain will assume in NATO, in exchange for advantages enjoyed by it through its participation in all NATO's steering bodies.

(v) *Will there be a referendum?*

3.76. Before the October 1982 elections the Spanish socialist party committed itself to the principle of a referendum on Spain's continued membership of NATO. In his speech of investiture as Prime Minister on 2nd December 1982, Mr. Gonzalez said Spain had suspended all discussions about military integration in NATO. At a press conference on 16th March 1983, moreover, he said it would be inappropriate at the present time to hold a referendum on Spain's membership of NATO and that Spain would not change its attitude towards NATO or upset the balance as long as the atmosphere of international tension persisted. According to a statement from a Spanish diplomatic source on 29th December 1983, the referendum promised during the socialist electoral campaign is to be held before the end of the current legislature, i.e. before the end of 1986¹.

3.77. Opinion polls conducted in Spain to date show there is still very strong hostility towards NATO, for three reasons:

- (i) Spain's traditional isolationism, the country having remained neutral in two

world wars; this political and geographical isolationism is illustrated by hostility towards accession to the military alliance, although all Spaniards feel very close to the western world;

- (ii) the problem of Spain's accession to the Common Market. It is very difficult to ask the Spaniards to join an alliance they do not like while keeping them out of the group of European countries which they have been wanting to join for a long time. The Spanish Government was very disappointed by the ten-power summit meeting in Athens;
- (iii) the question of Gibraltar, which is regarded by most Spaniards as Spanish territory.

3.78. From its visit to Spain, the committee gathered the impression that the present Spanish Government did not regard either accession to the European Community or a solution to the Gibraltar problem to be prior conditions for continued membership of NATO, which would be judged solely in terms of its benefits for Spanish defence. The two questions, however, would be bound to have a major impact on a referendum. The present timetable for negotiations should permit agreements on Spanish accession to the European Community to take effect on 1st January 1986. One possibility is that a referendum on membership of NATO would then be organised later that year, possibly in association with parliamentary elections that autumn.

3.79. Since October 1982, it is understood that a small Spanish team has continued to discuss with the NATO secretariat and the other countries possible terms of participation. It is believed that Spain is not considering a non-integrated status such as that of France. On the other hand, there is a Spanish view that the present NATO military structure is outdated, and in any case unsuited to the special needs of Spain, which is far removed from immediate Soviet threat; on this view some quite special arrangement for participation should be made to suit the circumstances of the country. This approach however is not acceptable in NATO circles, which point out that the NATO structure and procedures have been constantly modified to meet changing circumstances, and that Spain can certainly be accommodated within them.

3.80. In February 1984, the press carried some details of a report on the attitude of the Spanish armed forces towards the expediency of a referendum and, above all, on Spain's integration in NATO². The report prepared by

1. Atlantic News No. 1586, 29th December 1983.

2. The Times, 9th February 1984.

General Eduardo Munilla, head of the Ministry's defence planning unit, brought out the advantages of Spain's presence as an observer on the NATO Military Committee in Brussels: "If we withdrew from NATO, the lost benefits in information and planning ... would create a void for the armed forces impossible to fill." This report also specified that the other NATO countries: "do not appear disposed to substitute the multilateral treaty with a series of bilateral agreements with Spain if our full integration has not been achieved beforehand." In view of world and European problems, the report therefore suggested postponing the referendum.

(vi) *The Spanish armed forces*

3.81. The Spanish armed forces are equipped largely with United States, French and locally produced equipment, some under licence. Considerable modernisation remains necessary and Spain, like Greece, Portugal and Turkey, continues to need some allied assistance, although its GDP per capita (\$4,620) is higher than those countries (\$3,640, \$2,361 and \$1,170 respectively).

3.82. Improvements have been made in the last five years with a larger proportion of the defence budget devoted to equipment and operations, less to personnel as the disproportionate size of the army is reduced. The number of exercises has been increased.

3.83. *The navy* is generally considered to be the most modern of the three Spanish services and would be the most valuable addition to NATO forces in the event of integration in NATO. It has adopted standard NATO procedure, signals and codes and taken part in numerous exercises with the fleets of NATO countries (United States, France and Italy). There are 54,000 personnel including marines. Vessels include one ASM aircraft-carrier (the *Dedalo*) laid down in October 1979 and commissioned in 1982-83, eight submarines: one of the *Agosta* class (1973-81), two of the *Daphné* class (the first, laid down in 1968, was commissioned in 1971 and the last, laid down in 1971, was commissioned in 1975) and three of the *Guppy-II-A* class (which date back to the forties); twelve destroyers: two *Roger de Lauria* class (1951-69/1951-70), five *Fletcher* class and five *Gearing* class (dating back to the forties), twenty frigates, of which those of the *Descubierta* and *Baleares* classes are relatively more modern than those of the *Audaz*, *Atrevida*, *Pizzaro* and *Alava* classes.

3.84. *The army* numbers 260,000 including 190,000 conscripts. Its equipment, apart from some 500 largely obsolete M-47E and M-48 tanks, comprises 210 AMX-30 tanks assembled in Spain under French licence.

3.85. *The air force*, with 33,000 personnel, has been undergoing modernisation which should be completed in the eighties, by which time it should have 144 aircraft: seventy-two Mirage F-1, which entered service in 1975, plus seventy-two F-18A and eight Orion maritime patrol. There are at present thirty-six F-4s, twenty-one Mirage IIIs and thirty-five F-5s in service with the Mirage F-1 and two Orions.

3.86. The socialist government seems prepared to make a considerable effort by relaunching investment in public firms in the armaments sector and by procuring modern equipment. Mr. Felipe Gonzalez has said Spain's security and independence were worth more than the 2% of GNP now being spent on defence.

(vii) *Military reforms*

3.87. Under General Franco the three Spanish armed services were organised in separate departments each under a chief-of-staff, co-ordinated through the *Alto Estado Mayor*, but with no central ministry of defence. The army was deployed largely with a view to internal security, and defence of Spanish territory in Africa.

3.88. Limited reforms were introduced by the first democratic governments including the creation of a Ministry of Defence, first under General Gutierrez Mellado, who was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in charge of military affairs, and subsequently under civilian ministers of defence, but the independent authority of the three service chiefs-of-staff did not appear to have been greatly reduced. A law of 1980 instituted a National Defence Council under the chairmanship of the King, of which the members were the Prime Minister and eight other ministers, the chairman of the joint chiefs-of-staff and the three service chiefs-of-staff, empowered to advise the government on defence matters; command was still exercised by the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee (JUJEM), directly responsible to the King. The plan "META" would have reduced somewhat the size of the army and redeployed forces in accordance with a joint services defence plan.

3.89. The present Minister of Defence, Mr. Narcis Serra, presented plans for reform to the Congress of Deputies on 17th November 1983, making the JUJEM directly responsible to the government through a chief-of-defence staff (JEMAD), created in place of the President of the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee, as the direct link between the Minister of Defence and the chiefs-of-staff. The changes received broad political support in parliament and were commended by the King in his traditional Epiphany address to the armed forces on 6th January 1984. They were implemented on 11th January with the appointment of

Admiral Lucini as Chief of Defence Staff – the first time a naval officer has held the most senior appointment in the armed forces – and three new service chiefs-of-staff including Lt. General Jose Santos Peralba as chief-of-staff of the Air Force. General Peralba is expected to succeed to the top post in a year's time when Admiral Lucini retires; in his former capacity as head of the recently-created Defence Policy Division of the Ministry of Defence, he received the committee during its visit to Madrid.

3.90. On 24th February 1983, Mr. Narcis Serra had already announced modernisation plans for the armed forces, more far-reaching than those of his predecessors, which include a reduction in the size of the army by 90,000 men, a reduction of military service from fifteen to twelve months (approved by parliament on 27th March), a new territorial organisation with redeployment of military units, and a reduction of military regions from nine to six, improved pay, training and equipment, with the emphasis on more production of equipment by Spanish industry.

(viii) The new Spanish-United States agreement

3.91. One month after Spain's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty, a new agreement of friendship, defence and co-operation was signed in Madrid on 2nd July 1982 by the then Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the United States Ambassador in Spain. This agreement replaced the earlier 1976 agreement which had expired on 21st September 1981 and had been prolonged for eight months. The socialist government ratified it in April 1983 with the addition of a protocol described in paragraph 3.62 above.

3.92. The agreement was negotiated in the light of the consolidation of the democratic régime in Spain, and the accession of Spain to the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to integration in NATO. As specified in the agreement proper, Spanish-United States co-operation is based on common views on the democratic system, the defence of human rights, justice and social progress. It hinges on respect for the sovereignty of each party in a relationship of equality between the two countries and *within a multilateral alliance*. The preamble also underlines that the full territorial integrity of Spain and the United States is linked with western security.

3.93. The new agreement abolishes the combined United States-Spanish command headquarters (which included areas of NATO commands in the western Mediterranean (SACEUR) and the Atlantic (SACLANT) provided for in the earlier one, because these functions were thenceforth to be performed by the integrated NATO command structure.

3.94. Annex 2 provides that the United States continue to use support installations on Spanish territory, consisting of the Rota naval base (on the south coast), the air bases at Torrejon (in the centre), Saragossa (north-east of Madrid) and Moron (in the south) and nine other smaller communications and navigation installations scattered throughout the country. For the first time in bilateral relations, arrangements for overflying and using Spanish airspace is covered by a guarantee of Spanish control. The new agreement maintains Spanish policy of excluding nuclear weapons for Spanish territory.

3.95. The new agreement pays attention to the need to maintain an advanced technological capacity for the North Atlantic Alliance, particularly in respect of the parties to this agreement and to reinforcing competition on a reciprocal basis and facilitating interoperability between items manufactured in Spain and those originating in the United States and other NATO countries, thanks to defence production plans which can be carried out unilaterally by Spain or jointly with the United States or multilaterally with one or more alliance countries. For the first year, \$400 million of United States aid was allocated by an exchange of notes (an increase of 234% as compared with the earlier treaty) and \$3 million for military training (an increase of 50%).

(ix) Agreement with France

3.96. The Spanish Minister of Defence signed a military co-operation agreement in Paris on 7th October 1983 providing for joint development and production of defence equipment, and for the exchange of military personnel and joint training.

(x) Agreement on the European combat aircraft

3.97. On 16th December 1983, the Spanish, French, Italian, United Kingdom and Federal German chiefs-of-staff signed an agreement on the preliminary plans for a European combat aircraft for the nineties, to be built jointly at an estimated unit cost of about \$22 million.

(f) Gibraltar

3.98. The committee has reported on the strategic importance of Gibraltar from time to time, in its various reports on the Mediterranean – most recently in 1981¹. Gibraltar is a rocky peninsula attached to the Spanish mainland, located just east of the narrowest point of the Straits of Gibraltar. It lies within 18 nautical miles of the Moroccan coast. Less than 6

1. European security and the Mediterranean, Rapporteur: Mr. Bozzi, Document 876, 4th May 1981.

square kilometres in area, mostly steep rock, Gibraltar has a civilian population of some 30,500 comprising 20,000 native-born Gibraltarians and over 7,000 other British subjects. It was the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht that ceded to Britain "the town and castle of Gibraltar, together with the port, fortifications and forts". The territory was declared a British Crown Colony in 1830 and became an important naval base in the two world wars. From 1950 onwards a series of constitutional reforms were made, leading to internal self-government. The present constitution of 1969 reserves to the Governor, as personal representative of the Queen, direct responsibility for defence, external affairs, internal security and ultimate responsibility for financial and economic stability. In the 1984 elections, the "Gibraltar Labour Party and Association for Advancement of Civil Rights" party of Sir Joshua Hassan, who has been Chief Minister with one three-year interruption since 1964, was returned to power, but the former opposition party, favouring integration with the United Kingdom, was replaced as opposition party by the Gibraltar Socialist Labour Party which is trade union based. About 60 to 65% of the Gibraltar GNP of £65 million is accounted for by British Government defence and other spending, but the naval dockyard is being closed at the end of 1984. The yard's continued operation as a private commercial yard with some initial British assistance is important for the future economy of Gibraltar.

3.99. While Spain does not apparently challenge the validity of the Treaty of Utrecht, successive governments have campaigned to "re-establish the territorial integrity of Spain" through the return of Gibraltar to Spanish sovereignty. In December 1965 the United Nations General Assembly called upon Britain and Spain to begin talks which duly began in 1966 but made little progress. A referendum in Gibraltar in 1967, with 96% of the electorate voting, showed 12,138 in favour of retaining the link with Britain and 44 in favour of a change to Spanish sovereignty. Successive British governments have undertaken not to transfer sovereignty over Gibraltar against the freely-expressed wishes of the inhabitants. After a series of restrictions the Spanish authorities completely closed the frontier with Gibraltar in 1969. According to the Anglo-Spanish joint statement issued in Lisbon on 10th April 1982, both governments then agreed inter alia on "the re-establishment of direct communications in the area" and that "future co-operation should be on the basis of reciprocity and full equality of rights". The frontier was reopened in December 1982 only for Gibraltar residents and Spanish nationals, and only for pedestrians. The airfield, mentioned in paragraph 3.100 below, is operated by the RAF but is used as a vital link by civilian airlines. It has suffered from severe

airspace restrictions affecting take-off and landing since Spanish airspace was closed to aircraft entering or leaving Gibraltar.

3.100. Gibraltar, as a dependent European territory of the United Kingdom, has automatically been a member of the European Community since 1973, although the common tariff, CAP and VAT, do not apply. If the accession of Spain to the European Community takes effect as planned at the beginning of 1986, Gibraltar's economic interests will need to be taken into account under the terms of the seven-year interim period, chiefly because the cost of living in Gibraltar is very much higher than in the immediately contiguous area of Spain, and Gibraltar could not, for economic reasons, grant immediately full mobility to daily migrant labour from Spain. Equal rights for Spaniards in Gibraltar remain, however, one of the prior claims of the Spanish Government in its negotiations with the United Kingdom; the transfer of sovereignty itself being now a less immediate issue, in part because of the implications that would have for the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the North African coast, where Spain has garrisons of some 8,000 and 11,000 respectively. Both of these are claimed by Morocco.

3.101. The United Kingdom maintains one infantry battalion and some artillery in Gibraltar, supported by the locally-raised volunteer Gibraltar regiment. The historical rôle of this force, to defend the territory against any threat from Spain, is becoming anomalous now that Spain is a democracy, has acceded to NATO, and is negotiating its accession to the European Community.

3.102. Britain also maintains a naval base and headquarters in Gibraltar under an admiral, Flag Officer Gibraltar, which has been kept busy during the last two years as a popular and convenient port of call for vessels of the Royal Navy en route particularly to the South Atlantic, or the Far East, but the guard ship previously based in Gibraltar has been withdrawn to the United Kingdom where it is available at short notice. This national naval headquarters becomes a NATO naval command when activated during exercises or an emergency, when the British admiral assumes the functions of Commander Gibraltar Mediterranean, immediately under Commander Naval Forces Mediterranean in Naples who in turn comes under Commander-in-Chief Southern Europe, also based in Naples. Some infrastructure in Gibraltar has been financed by NATO, including a satellite terminal and other important communications facilities and the part funding of an oil fuel jetty. The wartime fortifications have been adapted by the United Kingdom and provide a strongly-protected

operations room, as well as fuel storage and ammunition magazines. Gibraltar makes an important contribution to NATO through continuous surveillance of all shipping passing the straits, which are an important natural choke point, but underwater surveillance of submarines is supplemented from other more distant installations available to NATO because the water in the straits themselves are "noisy" to sonar.

3.103. The Royal Air Force maintains the airfield in Gibraltar which is built on the isthmus connecting the rock to the mainland, on the Gibraltar side of the boundary fence, but on what Spain claims is "neutral ground" not covered by the Treaty of Utrecht. The station commander is, unusually, an air commodore who, when Gibraltar is activated as a NATO command, becomes Commander Maritime Air Forces Gibraltar, reflecting the contribution the airfield makes to maritime air surveillance of the Mediterranean. The command comes immediately under the maritime air command subordinate to COMARSOUTH in Naples. It has been suggested that the Gibraltar title should be changed to Commander Air Gibraltar to reflect also an air defence rôle. The United Kingdom does not maintain a permanent squadron in Gibraltar, but there are usually two Jaguar fighter aircraft on rotation from the United Kingdom, largely for the same deterrent purposes as the ground forces maintained in Gibraltar. They also provide useful close photographic surveillance of Soviet naval ships passing through the straits. British maritime air surveillance Nimrods also operate out of Gibraltar from time to time.

3.104. Ships and aircraft from various other NATO countries including Canada, the Netherlands and the United States operate out of Gibraltar during NATO exercises, and vessels from Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States are earmarked for the command in the event of hostilities.

3.105. The future military rôle of Gibraltar in NATO will obviously be affected if and when the Spanish forces are integrated into NATO, but the importance of Gibraltar itself will remain. The nearest Spanish naval base is some 60 miles from the straits themselves at Cadiz, in close proximity to the United States naval and air base at Rota. One possibility is that a Spanish admiral might be responsible for a NATO western Mediterranean command with a subordinate British admiral retaining the Gibraltar command with its western boundary moved somewhat further west in the Atlantic to the line of the Portuguese frontier. But the military position of Gibraltar cannot be isolated from the political and economic situation of the territory.

IV. *Intermediate-range nuclear forces*

4.1. The committee reported in detail on the status of the INF question in its last report adopted on 7th November 1983¹. The following paragraphs bring that information up to date. The committee intends to report fully on this issue for the second part of the session.

4.2. The week before the committee's previous report was adopted, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group had announced its decision taken at Montebello in Canada to withdraw 1,400 nuclear warheads during the next few years. Taken together with the withdrawal of 1,000 warheads announced in connection with the 1979 dual decision, this made a total reduction of 2,400 to be effected over several years, a reduction which would not be affected by the forthcoming deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe in respect of which one further warhead would be withdrawn for each new one deployed.

4.3. In an important vote in the United Kingdom House of Commons on 31st October 1983, the government policy to deploy cruise missiles in the United Kingdom was approved by 362 votes to 218, and the first cruise missiles arrived at the Greenham Common base in the United Kingdom on 14th November. The press has reported a total of sixteen arriving in the United Kingdom out of the total of 160 to be deployed there under the 1979 decision. On 22nd November the Bundestag voted in favour of deployment of missiles in Germany by 286 votes to 226 with 1 abstention.

4.4. On 14th November, Mr. Nitze, the United States representative to the INF talks in Geneva, had made a final offer to accept a global ceiling on nuclear warheads on intermediate-range missiles of 420 - which would have limited the Soviet Union to 140 SS-20 missiles with three warheads each, and reduced planned NATO INF deployment from 572 to 420. The previous day, the Soviet Delegate, Mr. Kvitsinsky, is reported to have proposed informally that a proposal for "equal reductions of 572" warheads on each side in range of Europe would be acceptable to the Soviet Union - this would have permitted the Soviet Union to retain 120 SS-20s in range of Europe as well as others in the Far East. Following deployment of missiles in the United Kingdom, Mr. Kvitsinsky walked out of the INF negotiations on 23rd November, stating "the present round of negotiations has been discontinued and no date has been set for a resumption".

1. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance, Document 959, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson.

4.5. On 23rd November, Pershing II missiles began to arrive at the Ramstein airbase in Germany and were taken to their deployment place at Mutlangen, near Stuttgart. On 27th November, the Italian Foreign Minister announced the arrival of the first cruise missiles at the Sigonella air base in Sicily from which they were transferred to their permanent base at Comiso in March 1984 when they were declared operational. Altogether, it was understood that by the end of 1983, sixteen cruise missiles had been deployed in both Italy and

the United Kingdom, and nine Pershing IIs in Germany.

4.6. The press reported further arrivals of cruise missiles at Greenham Common in the United Kingdom on 5th April 1984¹ and the total deployment schedule under the 1979 decision is understood to be as follows²:

1. The Guardian, 6th April 1984.

2. Based on an article in the International Herald Tribune, 24th November 1983.

NATO INF deployment schedule

Country	Base	Pershing II	Cruise missiles	Dates
Belgium	Florennes	—	48	mid-1986
Germany	Mutlangen	36	—	first 16 deployed end 1983
	Heilbronn	36	—	late 1984
	Neu Ulm	36	—	late 1984
	Bitburg	—	96	1986
Italy	Comiso	—	112	first 16 deployed end 1983
Netherlands	Woensdrecht	—	48	1986
United Kingdom	Greenham Common	—	96	first 16 deployed end 1983
	Molesworth	—	64	1988
Totals		108	464	

4.7. Since the NATO deployment of missiles began, the Soviet Union has abandoned the moratorium on the construction of new bases for SS-20 missiles in range of Europe announced by Mr. Brezhnev in March 1982. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) communiqués of 23rd March and 28th October 1983 both referred to a total of 351 SS-20 missiles deployed with 1,053 warheads. Of these missiles, 243 were reported to be within range of Europe. The NPG communiqué of 7th April 1984 reports a total of 378 SS-20 launchers, comprising 1,134 warheads, with more bases, east and west of the Ural mountains, under construction, adding: "There are indications that the Soviet Union, for the first time, has taken steps to deploy forward SS-12/22 missiles in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia". The official ministerial figures for numbers of SS-20 warheads deployed do not confirm the claim made by SACEUR when addressing the Assembly on 7th June 1983

when he said: "There are over 2,100 SS-20 warheads deployed ... There is a second missile deployed at the launcher site ... There is some uncertainty whether there may be three missiles deployed at each launcher ...". SACEUR's figures prompted written question 235 put to the Council on 13th September 1983 which elicited the reply from the Council, communicated to the Assembly only on 7th February 1984: "The figures of SS-20 warheads given by NATO normally encompass only warheads on launchers, if not specifically stated as being otherwise. However, SS-20 launchers can be reloaded and the systems operational concept envisages reload missiles in its operational units". The Council's reply did not confirm the existence of a second missile at a launcher site.

4.8. As a basis for resuming INF discussions, the Soviet Union has continued to demand withdrawal of the NATO missiles already deployed. This was most recently confirmed by

the new Soviet leader, Mr. Chernenko in an interview published in Pravda on 9th April: "There is no need to convince us about the usefulness of dialogue, the usefulness of talks. The moment the United States and the other NATO countries who are acting at one with it take measures to restore the situation that had existed before the deployment of the new American missiles in Western Europe was started, the Soviet Union will not be found wanting. Such is the real road to negotiations." The statement was regarded as moderate in that it did not repeat statements made by his predecessor, Mr. Andropov, such as that read on Soviet television on 24th November, to the effect that in response to the NATO deployments the Soviet Union would deploy "corresponding" systems in "oceans and seas" and take "further measures". The official NATO position, reaffirmed in the NPG communiqué of 7th April, remains the same: "Ministers ... emphasised NATO's determination to continue the deployment of LRINF missiles as scheduled. At the same time, they repeated their willingness to reverse, halt or modify deployment – including the removal and dismantling of missiles already deployed – upon the achievement of a balanced, equitable and verifiable agreement calling for such actions."

4.9. Mr. Vreven, Belgian Minister of Defence, reported to parliament on 4th May 1984 that United States technicians had begun preparations for deployment of cruise missiles at the Florennes site in Belgium. The Netherlands parliament is due to vote on the situation probably in June before construction begins at the Woensdrecht base in the Netherlands, where deployment is scheduled for 1986.

V. Conclusions

5.1. The committee's chief conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation which reiterates the need for collective formulation of defence policy by the European allies. The committee deals in another report with defence consultation in WEU, but here stresses the vital importance of close consultation with *all* the European allies especially those of the flanks.

5.2. The Soviet Union held the largest yet naval exercise off the Norwegian coast at the end of March. On 26th March Denmark reported the first movement of vessels from the Baltic fleet; on 28th March aircraft from Norway sighted vessels west of the Lofoten islands. NATO sources reported some fifty aircraft and one hundred vessels altogether from the Northern and Baltic fleets, including more than twenty submarines and thirty combat vessels led by the nuclear-powered cruiser

Kirov. While SACLANT claimed to be surprised at the size of the exercise, British ministers pointed out that NATO systems had provided full warning of the movements. This illustrates the extreme importance of the flank countries Denmark and Norway from where first observations came. NATO could report the numbers of submarines taking part thanks to the submarine surveillance networks operating from these two countries, mentioned in Chapter III. It should be pointed out, in passing, that the Soviet exercise, albeit the largest yet, was smaller than the NATO naval exercise "Teamwork 84" held off the Norwegian coast from 28th February to 22nd March this year. Under the command of SACLANT it involved 400,000 men, 160 ships and submarines, and 300 aircraft from nine countries; members of the committee were invited to observe it; the Soviet Union under the terms of the Helsinki confidence-building measures, was invited to observe the land phase of the exercise.

5.3. The report describes the structure of NATO in some detail in Chapter II, and in paragraphs 2.12 et seq. makes detailed proposals both for improving efficiency and for "Europeanising" NATO, so that its civil and military institutions and its policy and strategy, more properly reflect the European view of defence requirements. It is pointed out that European countries now contribute 65 to 75% of the NATO ready forces in Europe. These practical proposals are set forth in paragraph 1 of the recommendation. The committee does not endorse the proposals recently put forward by Mr. Henry Kissinger, the former United States Secretary of State¹, for SACEUR to be a European and for the Secretary-General of NATO to be an American. The last thing Europeans would welcome would be for consultation in NATO to be thought to lead to an automatic endorsement of United States foreign policy. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe remains a most important symbol of the United States commitment to Europe, to which the recommendation pays tribute. The committee's proposals, it believes, are more practical.

5.4. Paragraph 2 of the recommendation is more generally worded. The committee intends to stress here the need, once NATO has come to reflect European views more effectively, for a greater solidarity to be expressed in NATO communiqués. In particular, there are too many expressions of dissent on the part of several countries as pointed out in paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 above. Spain is in a special position described in Chapter III (e), which the committee believes should be clarified by the

1. A plan to reshape NATO, article in Time, 5th March 1984, and widely publicised in the press.

assumption of the full responsibilities of NATO membership by that country, once the problem of accession to the European Community has been overcome.

5.5. Paragraph 3 of the recommendation draws attention to the important and critical

study on logistics described in Chapter II (b) above.

5.6. Lastly, in paragraph 4 of the recommendation the committee calls for urgent remedial action concerning the aircraft identification problem described in the section on air forces in the central region in Chapter III above.

APPENDIX I

Comparison of certain articles of the North Atlantic and modified Brussels Treaties

(headings added)

*North Atlantic Treaty**Modified Brussels Treaty**Collective defence capacity*

ARTICLE 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

No specific provision.

Casus foederis

ARTICLE 5

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area...

ARTICLE V

If any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other high contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

ARTICLE 6¹

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack

- on the territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France², on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer ;

1. As amended by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey

2. On 16th January 1963, the French Representative made a statement to the North Atlantic Council on the effects of the independence of Algeria on certain aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned the relevant clauses of this treaty had become inapplicable as from 3rd July 1962.

- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the parties, when in or over these territories or any area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the parties were stationed on the date when the treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Consultation

ARTICLE 4

The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened.

Co-operation between the organisations

Reference in paragraphs 3 and 14 of the Resolution of the North Atlantic Council of 22nd October 1954.

ARTICLE VIII

.....


3. At the request of any of the high contracting parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.

ARTICLE IV

In the execution of the treaty, the high contracting parties and any organs established by them under the treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.


APPENDIX II

Principal committees of the North Atlantic Council

* The SNLC is a joint civil/military committee which reports both to the Council or Defence Planning Committee and to the Military Committee.

** Command, Control and Information Systems and Automatic Data-Processing Committee

APPENDIX III

NATO two-year force planning cycle

A. FINANCIAL EFFORT

Country	National currency unit	Defence expenditure (national currency, current prices)					Defence expenditure (current prices - US \$ million) <i>a</i>					GDP in purchasers' values (current prices - US \$ million) <i>a b</i>					Population (thousand)					Defence expenditure as % of GDP in purchasers' values					Defence expenditure per head (current prices - US \$) <i>a</i>					Defence expenditure as % of total WEU				
		1979	1980	1981	1982	1983 <i>f</i>	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983 <i>f</i>	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983 <i>e</i>	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983 <i>e</i>	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983 <i>f</i>	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983 <i>f</i>	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983 <i>f</i>
(0)	(1)	(- 5)	(- 4)	(- 3)	(- 2)	(- 1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
Belgium	Million B. Frs.	106,472	115,754	125,689	132,127	137,163	3,632	3,958	3,385	2,892	2,829	111,125	119,325	97,369	84,745	83,905	9,837	9,847	9,852	9,856	9,870	3.3	3.3	3.5	3.4	3.4	369	402	344	293	287	4.37	4.01	3.84	3.38	3.19
France (c)	Million F. Frs.	96,439	111,672	129,708	148,021	164,248	22,668	26,425	23,867	22,522	22,880	574,053	654,345	571,537	540,090	541,203	53,478	53,714	53,963	54,219	54,382	3.9	4.0	4.2	4.2	4.2	424	492	442	415	421	27.28	26.76	27.05	26.31	25.80
Germany	Million DM	45,415	48,518	52,193	54,234	57,131	24,778	26,692	23,094	22,350	23,354	759,715	814,805	683,159	660,372	680,737	59,454	59,667	59,790	59,753	59,538	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.4	417	447	386	374	392	29.82	27.03	26.18	26.11	26.33
Italy	Milliard Lire	6,468	8,203	9,868	12,294	14,729	7,785	9,578	8,681	9,090	10,239	325,187	395,497	350,215	347,355	371,724	56,292	56,416	56,502	56,639	56,843	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.8	138	170	154	160	180	9.37	9.70	9.84	10.62	11.54
Luxembourg	Million L. Frs.	1,242	1,534	1,715	1,893	2,100	42	52	46	41	43	4,211	4,630	3,887	3,310	3,319	364	365	366	366	366	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3	115	142	126	112	117	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Netherlands	Million Guilders	10,106	10,476	11,296	11,921	12,302	5,038	5,269	4,527	4,464	4,510	157,507	169,358	141,592	137,593	137,025	14,038	14,150	14,247	14,310	14,344	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.3	359	372	318	312	314	6.06	5.34	5.13	5.21	5.08
United Kingdom	Million £ Sterling	9,029	11,510	12,144	13,849	16,090	19,155	26,776	24,627	24,242	24,841	409,354	524,671	502,349	472,182	446,022	55,946	56,010	56,020	56,010	56,021	4.7	5.1	4.9	5.1	5.6	342	478	440	433	443	23.05	27.11	27.91	28.32	28.01
TOTAL WEU							83,098	98,750	88,227	85,601	88,696	2,341,152	2,682,631	2,350,108	2,245,647	2,263,940	249,409	250,169	250,740	251,153	251,364	3.5	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.9	333	395	352	341	353	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Canada	Million C. \$	4,825	5,499	6,289	7,655	8,388	4,119	4,703	5,245	6,205	6,824	228,146	254,946	284,289	290,884	321,065	23,791	24,086	24,365	24,625	24,982	1.8	1.8	1.8	2.1	2.1	173	195	215	252	273	4.96	4.76	5.94	7.25	7.69
Denmark	Million D. Kr.	7,990	9,117	10,301	11,669	-	1,519	1,618	1,446	1,400	-	65,937	66,490	58,234	56,380	58,671	5,117	5,125	5,122	5,119	5,119	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.5	-	297	316	282	273	-	1.83	1.64	1.64	-	-
Greece	Million Drachmas	89,791	96,975	142,865	176,270	212,768	2,424	2,276	2,578	2,639	2,541	38,575	40,127	36,875	37,691	35,958	9,548	9,642	9,730	9,792	9,862	6.3	5.7	7.0	7.0	7.1	254	236	265	270	258	2.92	2.30	2.92	3.08	2.86
Norway	Million N. Kr.	7,362	8,242	9,468	10,956	12,078	1,454	1,669	1,650	1,698	1,692	47,129	57,711	57,244	56,176	54,979	4,073	4,087	4,100	4,116	4,123	3.1	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.1	357	408	402	413	410	1.75	1.69	1.87	1.98	1.91
Portugal	Million Escudos	34,343	43,440	51,917	63,817	79,021	702	868	844	803	817	20,262	24,757	24,312	23,716	23,894	9,863	9,905	9,970	10,030	10,158	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.4	71	88	85	80	80	0.84	0.88	0.96	0.94	0.92
Turkey	Million L.	93,268	185,656	313,067	447,790	556,738	3,001	2,442	2,815	2,755	2,761	69,366	56,918	57,683	52,472	56,177	43,741	44,737	45,747	46,788	47,859	4.3	4.3	4.9	5.3	4.9	69	55	62	59	58	3.61	2.47	3.19	3.22	3.11
United States	Million US \$	122,279	143,981	169,888	196,345	225,345	122,279	143,981	169,888	196,345	225,345	2,382,221	2,598,960	2,906,265	3,025,422	3,271,994	225,055	227,704	229,849	232,057	234,262	5.1	5.5	5.8	6.5	6.9	543	632	739	846	962	147.15	145.80	192.56	229.37	254.06
TOTAL NON-WEU							135,498	157,556	184,466	211,845	241,380(e)	2,851,636	3,099,909	3,424,902	3,542,741	3,822,738	321,188	325,286	328,883	332,527	336,365	4.8	5.1	5.4	6.0	6.3 (e)	422	484	561	637	718 (e)	163.06	159.55	209.08	247.48	272.14 (e)
TOTAL NATO (d)							218,596	256,306	272,693	297,446	330,076(e)	5,192,788	5,782,540	5,775,010	5,788,388	6,086,678	570,597	575,455	579,623	583,680	587,729	4.2	4.4	4.7	5.1	5.4 (e)	383	445	470	510	562 (e)	263.06	259.55	309.08	347.48	372.14 (e)

Note a: GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States \$ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency conversion.

For the period 1979-1983 the following rates of exchange have been applied:

Country	Unit	US \$ per unit	Units per US \$	Country	Unit	US \$ per unit	Units per US \$	Country	Unit	US \$ per unit	Units per US \$
Belgium and Luxembourg	Franc			Fed. Rep. of Germany	Deutschmark			Norway	N. Krone		
- 1979		0.03411	29.31898	- 1979		0.54558	1.83290	- 1979		0.19747	5.06411
- 1980		0.03420	29.24302	- 1980		0.55015	1.81770	- 1980		0.20246	4.93920
- 1981		0.02693	37.13096	- 1981		0.44248	2.26000	- 1981		0.17423	5.73951
- 1982		0.02189	45.69110	- 1982		0.41210	2.42660	- 1982		0.15494	6.45399
- 1983		0.02063	48.47897	- 1983		0.40878	2.44629	- 1983		0.14006	7.13980
Canada	Canadian Dollar			Greece	Drachma			Portugal	Escudo		
- 1979		0.85368	1.17140	- 1979		0.02700	37.03800	- 1979		0.02044	48.92296
- 1980		0.85521	1.16930	- 1980		0.02346	42.61703	- 1980		0.01998	50.06208
- 1981		0.83410	1.19890	- 1981		0.01805	55.40811	- 1981		0.01625	61.54604
- 1982		0.81057	1.23370	- 1982		0.01497	66.80294	- 1982		0.01258	79.47294
- 1983		0.81356	1.22917	- 1983		0.01194	83.72475	- 1983		0.01035	96.66319
Denmark	D. Krone			Italy	1.000 Lire			Turkey	T. Lira		
- 1979		0.19008	5.26100	- 1979		1.20351	0.83090	- 1979		0.03218	31.08003
- 1980		0.17743	5.63590	- 1980		1.16754	0.85650	- 1980		0.01315	76.03984
- 1981		0.14038	7.12342	- 1981		0.87966	1.13680	- 1981		0.00899	111.21998
- 1982		0.12001	8.33243	- 1982		0.73937	1.35250	- 1982		0.00615	162.55009
- 1983		0.11498	8.69724	- 1983		0.69519	1.43847	- 1983		0.00496	201.62998
France	Franc			Netherlands	Guilder			United Kingdom	£		
- 1979		0.23505	4.25450	- 1979		0.49850	2.00600	- 1979		2.12160	0.47134
- 1980		0.23663	4.22601	- 1980		0.50299	1.98810	- 1980		2.32630	0.42987
- 1981		0.18401	5.43461	- 1981		0.40077	2.49520	- 1981		2.02790	0.49312
- 1982		0.15215	6.57242	- 1982		0.37450	2.67020	- 1982		1.75050	0.57127
- 1983		0.13930	7.17865	- 1983		0.36657	2.72797	- 1983		1.54390	0.64771

Note b: GDP (p.v.) = Gross domestic product in purchasers' values, current prices.

Note c: France is a member of the alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure; the relevant figures are indicative only.

Note d: The corresponding statistical data for Spain are not available.

e = Preliminary estimate.

f = Forecast.

Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(83)28.

B. MANPOWER EFFORT - 1983


	Period of compulsory ¹ military service (months)			Total in armed forces ² military personnel (thousands) (e)	Total armed forces ² (military and civilian) as percentage of active population (e)
	Army	Navy	Air force		
Belgium	10 ³	10 ³	10 ³	111	2.7
France	12 ⁴	12 ⁴	12 ⁴	585	3.1
Germany	15	15	15	515	2.4
Italy	12	18	12	580	2.4
Luxembourg		voluntary		1	0.9
Netherlands	14-16	14-17	14-17	112	2.4
United Kingdom		voluntary		321	2.1
TOTAL WEU				2,225	2.3
Canada		voluntary		84	1.0
Denmark	9	9	9	31	1.6
Greece	22	26	24	214	5.7
Norway	12	15	15	43	2.5
Portugal	16	24	21-24	103	2.2
Turkey	20	20	20	694	4.6
United States		voluntary		2,294	2.9
TOTAL NON-WEU				3,463	2.9
TOTAL NATO				5,688	2.6

Sources :

1. IISS, Military Balance, 1983-84.
2. NATO press release M-DPC-2(83)28.
3. Eight months if served in Germany.
4. Eighteen months for overseas.

e = estimate

APPENDIX V
NATO military command structure
 (showing detail of Allied Command Europe only)



106

* Operational command of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEW) is shared by SACLANT, CINCHAN and SACEUR. SACEUR acts as Executive Agent in promulgating operational command directives and is designated as Executive Agent in the day-to-day exercise of administrative control.

Senior staff of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) by rank, nationality and service

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE (SACEUR)		
Supreme Allied Commander	General	US A
Executive to SACEUR	Brig General	US A
Asst Exec, Analysis, Research & Co-ordination	Lt Col	US A
	Major	UK A
	Capt	US A
Asst Exec, Scheduling	Major	US AF
Aide de Camp	Major	US A
Admin Asst to SACEUR	CW3	US A
Secretary	Mrs	BE CIV
Admin Section	SFC	US A

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SACEUR		
International Affairs		
Minister-Counsellor		US CV
Deputy	Lt Col	US AF
Admin asst	SFC	US A
Secretary	Mrs	US CV

DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER (DSACEUR)			DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER (DSACEUR)		
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (UK)	Air Chief Marshal	UK AF	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (GE)	General (DR)	GE A
Principal staff officer	Gp Cpt	UK AF	Principal staff officer	Capt	GE N
Executive officer	Lt Col	UK A	Special asst	Lt Col	US AF
Aide de camp	Flt Lt	UK AF	Special asst	Major	GE AF
Staff asst (Programme)	WOI	UK A	Aide de camp	CPT	GE AF
Personal Asst	Sgt	UK AF	Chief admin clerk	Sgm	GE A

SACEUR'S REPRESENTATIVE TO MC (SACEUREP)		
SACEUR rep to MC	Maj Gen	NL A
Deputy SACEUREP	Col	UK A
Asst to SACEUREP	Lt Col	BE A

OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR		
Leg adv	Dr	BE CV
Asst leg adv	Mr	US CV
Asst leg adv	Lt Col	BE A
Asst leg adv	Dr	GE CV
Asst leg adv	Lt Col	UK A
Asst leg adv	Mr	GE CV
Admin	Mrs	UK CV

CHIEF-OF-STAFF (COFS)		
Chief-of-Staff	General	US AF
Prin Staff Officer/Exec	Colonel	US AF
Asst Exec	Colonel	GE A
Aide de camp	Major	US AF
Secretary	Ms	US CIV
Secretary	Ms	US CIV
SHAPE liaison office	Colonel	US NC

PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE (PIO)		
Chief	Col	US A
Deputy	Col	BE A
<i>Media Sect/Shcgp/</i>		
Chief	Lt Col	US AF
<i>News Summary/Anal Sect/Shcgp</i>		
Chief	Mr	UK CV
<i>Public Svcs Sect/Shgpp</i>		
Chief	Lt Col	UK A
<i>SHAPE Off Assoc</i>	Mrs	BE CV

SACLANT REP. EUROPE & LIAISON OFFICE TO SACEUR		
SACLANT VADM	Rep,	NL N

OFFICE OF THE SCIENTIFIC ADVISOR (OSCAD)		
Scient adv	Mr	US CV
Asst scient adv	Dr	GE CV
Staff off	Col	US AF
Staff off	Col	US AF
Mil asst/sostc	Maj	US AF
Secretary	Mrs	UK CV

SECRETARY TO THE CHIEF-OF-STAFF (SECCOS)					
Secry to cofs, Staff officers	Brig	UK A	<i>Graphics/Photo cell</i>	Chief	Cpt US A
<i>Comd crp admin sect/shgsa/</i>			<i>Courier sect/shgsc</i>	Chief	SGM DA A
Admin off	Maj	US A	<i>Central reg & records sect/shgsr/</i>	Chief	W01 UK A
<i>Admin cell</i>			<i>Message dist ctr</i>	Chief	W01 IT A
Ch admin clerk	CWO	BE A	<i>NU/MS registry</i>	Chief	SGM GE A
<i>Case control cell</i>			<i>CTS/A registry</i>	Chief	SFC US A
Ch admin clerk	SFC	US A	<i>Central records</i>	Chief	Mr UK CV
<i>Distribution & records cell</i>			<i>Language services sect/shgsl</i>	Chief	Mr US CV
Ch doc cont clerk	MSG	GE AF	<i>Military library/shgsb/</i>	Librarian	Mr UK CV
<i>Secretariat/shgss/</i>			<i>Historical sect/shgsh/</i>	Chief	Lt Col US A
Chief	Col	IT AF	<i>Admin off (hist)</i>	Admin off	Mr US CV
Staff off	Maj	US A			
<i>Admin support sect/shgsd/</i>					
Chief	Maj	US A			
<i>Reproduction cell</i>					
Chief	CWO	NL A			

PROTOCOL OFFICE		
Chief	Lt Col	US AF
<i>Visitor Liaison Cell</i>		
Dep Chief	Lt Col	IT A
<i>Conference Serv Cell</i>		
Chief	Ms g	US A
Bookings, sfc higa	Sfc	US A
<i>Audio-visual lending closet</i>		
NCOIC	Sfc	NL AF

APPENDIX VII

List of acronyms

ACE	Allied Command Europe
AFCENT	Allied Forces Central Europe
AFNORTH	Allied Forces Northern Europe
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe
ASG	Assistant Secretary-General
CEOA	Central Europe Operating Agency
CEPS	Central Europe Pipeline System
CINCENT	Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe
CINCHAN	Commander-in-Chief Channel
CINCNORTH	Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe
CINCSOUTH	Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe
CNAD	Conference of National Armaments Directors
COMCENTAG	Commander Central Army Group
COMMZ	Communications Zone
COMNORTHAG	Commander Northern Army Group
COSCOM	Corps Support Command
DPC	Defence Planning Committee
EUROCOM	Eurogroup subgroup on battlefield communications
EUROGROUP	Title given to meetings of defence ministers of European allied countries (minus France)
EUROLAND	Eurogroup subgroup on co-operation on aircraft approach and landing systems
EUROLOG	Subgroup on co-operation in providing logistic support for NATO-declared European forces
FASCOM	Field Army Support Command
FINABEL	France, Italy, Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg (and now the United Kingdom) conference of chiefs of army staff to discuss matériel and logistics
FSS	Forward Storage Sites
IAU	Infrastructure Accounting Unit
IFF	Identification Friend or Foe
IMS	International Military Staff
LANDJUT	Allied Land Forces Jutland
LCB	Logistics Control Board
LCC	Logistic Co-ordinating Centre
LOC	Lines of Communication
MAS	Military Agency for Standardisation
MC	Military Committee (of NATO)
MNC	Major NATO Commander (SACEUR ; SACLANT ; CINCHAN)

MNCC	Multinational Co-ordinating Centre
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NADGE	NATO Air Defence Ground Environment
NAMSA	NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
NAMSO	NATO Maintenance and Supply Organisation
NAMSS	NATO Maintenance Supply Services System
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NICS	NATO Integrated Communications System
NLSC	National Logistic Support Command
PAPS	Periodic Armaments Planning System
PSC	Principal Subordinate Commander (COMNORTHAG, etc.)
RCA	Rear Combat Zone
SAC	(WEU) Standing Armaments Committee
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
SATCOM	Satellite Communications
SCEPC	Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SNLC	Senior NATO Logisticians Conference
STANAG	Standardisation Agreement
WEU	Western European Union

*Control of armaments and disarmament***REPORT¹**

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. de Vries, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on the control of armaments and disarmament

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. de Vries, Rapporteur

I. Introduction

II. General situation

III. The Conference on Disarmament in Europe

(a) Background

– French proposals of 1978

(b) Mandate for the conference*(c)* Opening positions in Stockholm

– NATO countries' proposals

– Soviet proposals

– Neutral and non-aligned proposals

(d) Allied consultation*(e)* Prospects*(f)* Conclusions of the committee

IV. Mutual and balanced force reductions

(a) Background*(b)* Warsaw Pact positions*(c)* NATO position*(d)* Differences*(e)* The western proposals of 19th April 1984

V. Chemical weapons

APPENDICES

I. Implementation of confidence-building measures

1. Notification of military manoeuvres under the CSCE régime by NATO countries

2. Notification of military manoeuvres under the CSCE régime by Warsaw Pact countries

3. Notification of military manoeuvres under the CSCE régime by neutral and non-aligned countries

II. Mandate approved in Madrid on 6th September 1983 for the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Pignion (Chairman); MM. Blaauw, Kittelmann (Vice-Chairmen); MM. van den Bergh, Bonnel (Alternate: De Decker), Bourges (Alternate: Matraja), Brown (Alternate: Dr. Miller), Cavaliere, Cox, Dejardin, Ertl, Galley, Gerstl, Sir Anthony Grant (Alternate: Lord Newall), MM. Huyghues des Etages (Alternate: Caro), de Kwaadsteniet (Alternate: de Vries), Lemmrich, Natiez, Pecchioli (Alternate: Amadei), Prussen, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Steverlynck, Stokes.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Introductory Note

In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows:

14th-17th March 1984

Conference on Disarmament in Europe, Stockholm:

H.E. Mr. Aleksander Bozovic, Ambassador, Head of the Yugoslav Delegation;

H.E. Mr. Petrus Buwalda, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation;

Mr. B.S. Ivanov, Member of the Soviet Union Delegation, and Mr. E.S. Volk, Expert;

H.E. Mr. J.M. Edes, Ambassador, Head of the United Kingdom Delegation;

H.E. Dr. Klaus Citron, Ambassador, Head of the Federal Republic of Germany Delegation;

H.E. Mr. Wlodzimierz Konarski, Ambassador, Head of the Polish Delegation, and Dr. Andrzej Towpik;

H.E. Mr. Curt Lidgard, Ambassador, Head of the Swedish Delegation;

H.E. Mr. Jan af Sillen, Ambassador, Executive Secretary to the Conference;

H.E. Mr. Jacques Lecompt, Ambassador, Head of the French Delegation;

H.E. Mr. Constantin Ene, Ambassador, Head of the Romanian Delegation;

H.E. Mr. James Goodby, Ambassador, Chairman of the United States Delegation, and Dr. Lynn Hansen, Deputy Chairman.

The committee as a whole met at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, on 14th February 1984, when Lt. General C.J. Dijkstra presented his study on collective logistical support, and the committee met subsequently with the WEU Standing Armaments Committee, attended by: Lt. Colonel de Winne (Belgium); Lt. Colonel Binet (Belgium); Mr. Marcoin (France); Mr. Schreiber (Germany); Colonel Pochesci (Italy); Mr. Zweerts (Netherlands); and Mr. Davies (United Kingdom).

Subsequently, at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 8th and 9th March 1984 the committee met with members of the parliamentary defence committees of the European NATO countries:

Belgium: Mr. Yves du Monceau de Bergendal, Second Vice-Chairman, National Defence Committee, the Senat;

France: Mr. Louis Darinot, Chairman, MM. Robert Aumont and Jean Combasteil, Vice-Chairmen, Defence Committee, Assemblée Nationale;

Germany: Dr. H. Schwarz, Vice-Chairman, MM. Karl-Eduard Claussen and Wolfgang Kahrs, Defence Committee, Bundesrat;

Italy: MM. Steganini and Baracetti, Vice-Chairmen, Defence Committee, Camera dei Deputati;

Netherlands: Drs. Y.P.W. van der Werff, Chairman, Defence Committee, First Chamber of the States-General;

United Kingdom: Sir Humphrey Atkins, KCMG, Chairman, MM. Douglas and Mates, Select Committee on Defence, House of Commons;

Norway: MM. Ole Fr. Klemsdal and Bjorn Erling Ytterhorn, Defence Committee, Stortinget.

The meeting was briefed by: Mr. Eric Da Rin, Deputy Secretary-General of NATO; Lt. General T. Huitfeldt, Norwegian Army, Director of the International Military Staff; Dr. Fredo Dannenbring, NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs; and Ing. Gen. P. Naslin, Head of the Defence Research Section, NATO International Staff.

The committee met finally at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 15th May 1984 when it adopted the present report.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of parliament, officials, senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or met the committee and replied to questions.

The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation
on the control of armaments and disarmament

The Assembly,

- (i) Concerned at the deterioration in the atmosphere of East-West relations, aggravated by the lack of personal contact between the superpowers at a time of change or prospective change in the leadership, and at the suspension of negotiations in three fields of arms control: a comprehensive nuclear test ban, INF, and START;
- (ii) Believing that all the more importance now attaches to the three remaining disarmament conferences in Geneva, Stockholm and Vienna, in all of which there is prospect of agreement in due course;
- (iii) Calling on member governments to take the initiative in these fields of primary interest to Europe by injecting a sense of urgency into the negotiations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge upon member governments the need:

1. To draft a joint, solemn declaration setting out their aims in the control of armaments and disarmament and to call on the superpowers to resume without delay negotiations which have been interrupted or to stimulate discussion when they take place;
2. To take every initiative in seeking to restore confidence in East-West relations, as a precondition of any arms control agreement, by promoting personal contact at the highest level between member governments and the new Soviet and other eastern bloc leaderships;
3. To study the possibility of concluding interim agreements this year in the conference on disarmament in Europe and mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations based on the common elements in present eastern and western proposals and taking account of the importance of verification measures.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. de Vries, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. In adopting its programme of work on 30th November 1983, since approved by the Presidential Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments decided that the present report should deal first with the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, and the current conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, known more briefly in the West as the conference on disarmament in Europe (CDE) which held its first session in Stockholm from 17th January to 16th March this year. The report is to deal secondly with the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations in Geneva, which are now in their tenth year.

1.2. Other topical aspects of arms control negotiations are for the most part dealt with by the committee in other reports. In particular the present status of the INF talks is dealt with in the report on the state of European security¹, while the committee has it in mind to prepare a further report on the control of armaments and disarmament for the second part of the session in December, which would deal in particular with the control of nuclear weapons, the INF and START negotiations, and other negotiations in the United Nations disarmament conference framework such as the prohibition of chemical weapons; the suspension of nuclear tests; and a ban on weapons in space, etc.

II. General situation

2.1. The general atmosphere of East-West relations has deteriorated since the active period of détente in the 1970s, which saw the conclusion of a number of arms control agreements, both bilateral between the United States and the Soviet Union, and multilateral agreements such as the biological weapons convention. The reasons for this deterioration, in the western view, include: the unabated increase in the Soviet defence effort, particularly weapons systems; the invasion of Afghanistan; and the indirect suppression of basic human rights in Poland.

2.2. At the same time, the Soviet Union perceives a lack of any genuine desire in the

West, or at least on the part of the present United States administration, to conclude further agreements on arms controls. As evidence, the Soviet Union can point to the fact that the United States has failed to ratify the last three bilateral arms control agreements signed by Mr. Brezhnev with three successive United States presidents, both republicans and democrats. These agreements are: the threshold test ban treaty, signed by Presidents Nixon and Brezhnev on 3rd July 1974; the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty, signed by Presidents Ford and Brezhnev on 28th May 1976; and SALT II, signed by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev on 18th June 1979. The United States has decided that it will not resume the trilateral negotiations (Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States) on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, suspended since the last year of the Carter administration. While the United States has hitherto stated that although it will not ratify the SALT II agreement, it will continue, for the time being, to respect the SALT limits, provided the Soviet Union does the same, it has now stated that it will decide in 1985 whether to cease to observe the two SALT treaties and possibly to withdraw from the ABM treaty; it is not prepared to consider arms control measures to prohibit weapons in space.

2.3. This is an unpropitious background for current negotiations. The situation is further complicated by the two successive changes at short interval in the leadership of the Soviet Union, and the presidential election year in the United States. Indeed, in retrospect it appears that the minimum mutual confidence between the United States and Soviet leadership that is needed for any far-reaching agreements has not been re-established since the period of Presidents Nixon and Brezhnev, which ended with the former's resignation from office on 8th August 1974.

2.4. The suspension of the bilateral INF and START talks, largely a consequence of the lack of East-West confidence, make all the more important the only three conferences where today representatives of both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries meet to discuss various aspects of arms control. These conferences are the CDE in Stockholm, the MBFR in Vienna, both of which are discussed in the present report, and the conference on disarmament in Geneva, which the committee will discuss in a future report.

1. Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith, Document 971.

III. The conference on disarmament in Europe

(a) Background

3.1. Under the final act of the Helsinki conference signed on 1st August 1975, participating countries agreed on certain confidence-building measures which included: prior notification of major military manoeuvres exceeding 25,000 troops taking place on their territory in Europe or – in the case of the Soviet Union and Turkey – within 250 km of frontiers common to other participants. Notification was to be twenty-one days in advance, or at the earliest opportunity in the case of manoeuvres arranged at short notice. Countries “may also notify smaller-scale military manoeuvres to other participating states, with special regard for those near the area of such manoeuvres”. In addition, “the participating states will invite other participating states, voluntarily and on a bilateral basis ... to send observers to attend military manoeuvres”. Lastly, countries “recognise that they may, at their own discretion ... notify their major military movements”.

3.2. The Helsinki final act is to be regarded more as a declaration of intent than a binding international agreement such as would be incorporated in a treaty or convention. Moreover, the language in which these various confidence-building measures are formulated deliberately expresses varying degrees of obligation ranging from “will notify” major military manoeuvres, through “may also notify” smaller manoeuvres, and “voluntarily and on a bilateral basis” for the invitation to observers, to “recognise that they may, at their own discretion” notify major military movements.

3.3. The record of implementation of these confidence-building measures so far is shown in the tables at Appendix I. This record shows a clear pattern. Both Warsaw Pact and NATO countries have duly notified their major manoeuvres (“major” is here used to denote a category of manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 men), the greater frequency of notification by NATO countries reflects only the larger number of manoeuvres conducted by them. On the other hand, NATO countries have been far more generous in inviting observers to nineteen out of twenty-two major exercises, than has the Warsaw Pact inviting observers to only eight out of seventeen major exercises, and not inviting observers from NATO countries to any exercises since 1979. Moreover, invitations from Warsaw Pact countries have mostly been extended to neighbouring countries only, whereas NATO and neutral or non-aligned countries have tended to address invitations to all participants. Observers from

NATO countries have found the facilities provided for observation to be largely inadequate. No country has provided any notification of major military movements.

3.4. Within the rather severe limitations of the Helsinki final act, it can be said that the confidence-building measures have been respected, more in the letter than in the spirit, all major military manoeuvres having been duly reported with the possible exception of the Soviet Zapad-81 exercise, notification of which by the Soviet Union did not apparently include notification of its size. It was the largest exercise conducted by any Warsaw Pact country since 1975 – 100,000 men was later reported by Tass¹.

French proposals of 1978

3.5. In May 1978 at the special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly, President Giscard d'Estaing of France presented a number of disarmament proposals, including one for a conference on disarmament in Europe. The French proposals were for the conference to deal with the geographical area extending from the Atlantic to the Urals; to exclude nuclear and naval forces; and to proceed in two phases – the first to deal with confidence-building measures, the second with force reductions. It was later agreed that a mandate for a CDE should be sought in the Madrid CSCE follow-up conference which opened on 22nd November 1980. The French proposals met with some scepticism at first, both from NATO countries, particularly the active participants in the Vienna MBFR negotiations, and inevitably from the Warsaw Pact countries. Subsequently, however, agreement has been reached within NATO on a collective approach to the proposed conference, open to all thirty-five participants in the CSCE, which does not conflict with the MBFR negotiations seeking actual force reductions on the territory of only some seven countries.

(b) Mandate for the conference

3.6. In the CSCE framework, at the Madrid review conference, agreement was finally reached between the participating NATO, Warsaw Pact and neutral and non-aligned

1. For a careful examination of implementation of confidence-building measures under the Helsinki final act see “Confidence-building measures: a conceptual framework”, J.J. Holst in “Confidence-building measures and East-West relations”, The Laxenburg Papers, published by the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Karl Birnbaum Editor, March 1983, and “European security and confidence-building measures”, J.J. Holst and K.A. Melander in *Survival*, July/August 1977.

countries on a mandate for a conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, the text of which was incorporated in the concluding document agreed in Madrid on 6th September 1983¹.

3.7. This mandate provides for a conference "to undertake in stages new effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament ..." but is specific only as regards a first stage which "will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe". These measures "will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area* and airspace. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content. As far as the adjoining sea area* and airspace is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all participating states taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe, as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe, as referred to above, which they will agree to notify". The footnote states that "in this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe". The next CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna from 4th November 1986 is to assess the progress of the first stage of the conference, and a future follow-up meeting is to consider supplementing the mandate for the next stage of the conference.

3.8. A preparatory meeting was held in Helsinki from 25th October to 11th November 1983, which agreed that the conference should hold four sessions a year: 17th January to 16th March; 8th May to 6th July; 11th September to 12th October; and 6th November to 14th December 1984.

(c) Opening positions in Stockholm

3.9. The opening week of the first session of the conference, from 17th January 1984, was attended by the foreign ministers of a majority of the participants, including Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Shultz, and afforded opportunity for informal bilateral meetings undoubtedly going beyond the framework of the conference. With the departure of the ministers, the conference got down to practical business, conducted by the heads of the permanent delegations. The sixteen NATO nations collectively submitted a

paper on confidence- and security-building measures on 24th January. While the Soviet Union has failed to table a paper, the Permanent Head of the Delegation, Ambassador Grinevsky, nevertheless made a fairly detailed statement of the Soviet position in his speech on 31st January. The eight neutral and non-aligned delegations (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Malta, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) similarly tabled a paper on 9th March, while Romania had done likewise on its own account on 25th January.

NATO countries' proposals

3.10. The paper tabled collectively by the NATO countries on 24th January is obviously a fairly general description of a number of proposals on which it is presumed NATO has already worked out its negotiating position in rather more detail. The main thrust of the NATO position is to call for greater openness about military activities to reduce the risk of surprise attack, reduce the possibility of accidental conflict through misunderstanding, and to inhibit the use of force for political intimidation. The need is for "transparency" in the words of Mr. Shultz, the emphasis is on concrete measures.

3.11. Specific measures proposed in the NATO paper are:

- (i) annual exchange of information on the structure of ground forces and land-based air forces in the area of application, and on regulations for accredited military personnel, with the possibility of a request for clarification;
- (ii) an exchange of annual forecasts of all notifiable military activities in the zone. Specific notification forty-five days in advance of out-of-garrison activities involving 6,000 or more ground troops or large numbers of tanks, etc.; mobilisation involving 25,000 or more troops; amphibious activities involving 3,000 or more troops. Alert activities carried out with less than forty-five days' preparation would be notified at the time orders were issued. Verification measures would include the invitation of observers and inspection;
- (iii) the invitation of observers from all other CSCE states to all notified activities of an agreed duration. Observers would be enabled to judge the routine nature of activities by direct observation;
- (iv) non-interference with verification by national technical means, (implying in particular satellite, radar and other

1. Text at Appendix II.

electronic observation) and the right for CSCE states to request inspection subject to limitations to be agreed;

- (v) improvement in the means of communication between the CSCE states which, it is understood from press reports, could include a telex network between all CSCE foreign ministries which would be used both for all notifications of activities and for extending invitations to observers.

Soviet proposals

3.12. The main thrust of Soviet and Warsaw Pact proposals has been to call for measures which the NATO countries view as declaratory, rather than concrete, and to reject specifically Mr. Shultz's call for "transparency". The Permanent Head of the Soviet Delegation, Ambassador Grinevsky, on 31st January then made the following specific proposals:

- (i) CSCE states in possession of nuclear weapons to assume a no-first-use obligation, either through formal agreement or by unilateral declaration;
- (ii) a treaty on the non-use of force and the maintenance of peaceful relations among states to be concluded by all CSCE countries.

Significantly, Mr. Gromyko, in his speech on 18th January, said of these two measures: "while the implementation of just one of those measures would signify a tremendous move forward, we are proposing both of them" – implying to many observers that the Soviet Union would not insist on both.

- (iii) an agreement by all CSCE states with major military potential on the non-increase and subsequent reduction of military expenditure in percentage and absolute terms – the resources released being devoted to economic and social development and assistance to developing countries in the CSCE area;
- (iv) the banning of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical weapons and, in the first place, the non-stationing of such weapons where they are not at present stationed;
- (v) the Soviet Union favours proposals for nuclear-free zones in various parts of Europe;
- (vi) significant confidence- and security-building measures, covering both limitation and notification, including limits on the scale of military manoeuvres; notification of major land and air force

manoeuvres; notification of major troop movements – to cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea and ocean area and airspace.

Neutral and non-aligned proposals

3.13. The neutral and non-aligned countries took longer than anticipated to agree the terms of their paper, eventually submitted on 9th March. After a preambular list of considerations governing the aims and proceedings of the conference, calling for concrete measures so as to give effect to the duty of states to refrain from the threat for use of force, they contained a list of concrete measures:

- (i) prior notification of major military manoeuvres – earlier and more detailed than in the Helsinki final act;
- (ii) prior notification of smaller-scale military manoeuvres if several cumulatively exceed the totals qualifying for notification for major manoeuvres;
- (iii) prior notification of amphibious or airborne manoeuvres on a smaller scale;
- (iv) prior notification of major military movements with detailed information;
- (v) prior notification of major military activities in adjoining sea area and airspace which affect security in Europe when they constitute part of other notifiable activities;
- (vi) invitation of observers to notifiable manoeuvres and movements with improved standardised conditions for observers;
- (vii) annual exchange of information on major military activities planned in advance;
- (viii) upper ceilings on the size of major military manoeuvres and separate lower ceiling on amphibious or airborne manoeuvres;
- (ix) constraints on the deployment in specified areas of equipment for sustained offensive operations.

3.14. Other suggestions in the paper included arrangements for rapid exchange of information and notification and the use by CSCE countries of the United Nations standardised reporting system for military expenditure.

(d) Allied consultation

3.15. Consultation between the NATO countries on a common position to be taken in the

conference appears to have worked well in NATO headquarters, although there is some feeling that the agreed proposals that have emerged are too restrictive for the negotiators in Stockholm. There is frequent further consultation within a caucus meeting of the NATO delegations in Stockholm. Unlike the CSCE negotiations, on the other hand, which of course included economic and social questions, consultations among the Ten in the framework of European political co-operation has been less important in the largely military area of confidence-building measures. The chief rôle of the ten-country caucus that occasionally meets in Stockholm appears to be to maintain links with Ireland, the only non-NATO member country of the European Community, but which has not joined the neutral and non-aligned countries' caucus.

(e) Prospects

3.16. Given the deterioration in the state of East-West relations, it can be said that the atmosphere in the conference has been business-like rather than vituperative; neither side appears to have excluded the possibility of agreement on the minimum requirements of the other. This would include some reference to the non-use of force to which the Warsaw Pact countries attach great importance, but whether this should be a formal treaty as Mr. Grinevsky, leader of the Soviet Delegation, proposed in his 31st January speech, or a "code of conduct" as suggested by Mr. Citron, leader of the Federal German Delegation, is a matter for negotiation. Agreement could not for the foreseeable future include a no-first-use of nuclear weapons undertaking by the NATO countries, although the possibility of adopting such a declaratory policy is now being discussed in certain western quarters, as the committee has noted in earlier reports; it is the position of most countries concerning chemical weapons under the terms of the 1925 Geneva Convention. An agreement will have to contain a number of the concrete confidence-building measures proposed by the West, the detailed parameters of which will inevitably involve hard bargaining. There is certainly interest among both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in reaching agreement, not least on the part of those Warsaw Pact countries such as East Germany and Czechoslovakia in which shorter-range Soviet nuclear weapons are now being deployed. Mr. Fischer, Foreign Minister of the German Democratic Republic, said in the conference on 17th January "with regard to the Swedish Government's widely-known proposal to establish a corridor free of battlefield and nuclear weapons in Central Europe, that the German Democratic Republic is prepared to make available its entire territory ...".

3.17. For two reasons, however, it is clear to your Rapporteur that there is little or no prospect of any early agreement emerging from Stockholm. Firstly, procedural considerations impose no urgency on the negotiations – the conference has to report only to the Vienna review conference on 4th November 1986, and the resumed session on 8th May 1984 will turn its attention only to procedural wrangles over the numbers and names of working committees which might be set up – procedural wrangles behind which lie significant points of principle concerning the priority of declaratory agreements sought by the Soviet Union or concrete measures sought by the NATO countries. Secondly, the present deteriorated state of East-West relations, coupled with the two recent changes in the leadership of the Soviet Union, its suspicion of the Reagan administration and obvious intention to await the outcome of the presidential elections, all make early agreement unlikely. The real intentions of the Reagan administration itself remain unclear. Mr. Goodby, the Ambassador leading the United States Permanent Delegation to the conference, alone among all delegation leaders, has the title of "Chairman" rather than Head of the United States Delegation, which is composed of officials from ACDA and the State Department, from the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defence where Mr. Richard Perle is reported in the press to be resisting any arms control agreements during the presidential election year.

(f) Conclusions of the committee

3.18. The committee is aware that agreement in negotiations such as the conference on disarmament in Europe is of vital importance to the European countries, who are much more closely concerned than the transatlantic partners. The committee therefore calls for a sense of urgency to be injected into the negotiations and proposes steps which the WEU countries themselves can take to achieve this:

- (i) a declaration setting out their aims on arms control and disarmament;
- (ii) member governments should be urged to promote personal contacts at the highest level with the new Soviet leadership, and with the eastern bloc leadership in general, with a view to establishing sufficient confidence to permit early agreement;
- (iii) by calling for every effort to be made to secure an interim agreement in the CDE in 1984, based on the common elements that can already be perceived in the present NATO and Warsaw

Pact proposals, and taking account of the importance of verification measures.

IV. *Mutual and balanced force reductions*

(a) *Background*

4.1. On 18th April 1984, the NATO countries participating in the MBFR talks in Vienna introduced a major new proposal. These talks, officially styled in the agreed East-West terminology "mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe" have been in progress since October 1973 without even an interim agreement on initial troop reductions. The origins of these talks lay in NATO proposals in the early 1970s for MBFR negotiations – made largely as a counter to Warsaw Pact proposals for a European security conference. Agreement to hold the talks in the first place was seen as a Soviet concession in exchange for agreement of the NATO countries to the original convening of the CSCE conference in Helsinki.

4.2. It is common ground that the aim of the talks is to seek reductions in forces and armaments within the area comprising the territory of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands on the NATO side, and of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Poland on the Warsaw Pact side. The status of Hungary in this context is not determined, the West originally having called for it to be included in the reductions area. The "direct participants" in the talks are the foregoing countries whose territories comprise the reductions area, and other countries having forces stationed within their area. Thus on the NATO side the direct participants are: Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. "Indirect" participants are contiguous countries with an interest in the negotiations; on the NATO side they comprise Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway and Turkey. France, although a contiguous country, declined to take part in the talks in 1973 because it opposed the principle of negotiations between countries drawn solely from the two military blocs of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Iceland and Portugal have not participated in the talks, being too far removed to be directly interested; Spain acceded to NATO only in 1982. On the Warsaw Pact side, the direct participants in the talks are: Czechoslovakia, the Democratic Republic of Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union. The indirect participants are Bulgaria and Romania, while the status of Hungary, as

mentioned above, is officially said to be "undetermined".

4.3. Despite the failure to sign a treaty on mutual reduction of forces, agreement has been reached in the course of the negotiations on many of the fundamental objectives:

- (i) reductions should lead to "common collective ceilings" on forces in the area of 900,000 men, including not more than 700,000 ground forces (the remainder being air forces);
- (ii) reductions would be in phases: in phase 1 only United States and Soviet forces would be withdrawn;
- (iii) reductions could affect armaments as well as numbers of forces;
- (iv) "associated measures" (including means of verification) would accompany an agreement on force reductions.

(b) *Warsaw Pact positions*

4.4. The most recent comprehensive Warsaw Pact proposals are those submitted by Poland on 18th February 1982 for a phase 1 agreement:

- reductions of 13,000 United States troops and 20,000 Soviet troops, each including a complete division and sub-units equivalent to an armoured brigade, together with all their armaments and combat equipment. The reductions would be completed within one year and the troops withdrawn to their own countries, located so as not to threaten the security of the other (indirect) participants;
- a freeze on all the other forces in the reduction area for the duration of phase 1;
- duration of phase 1 agreement – three years;
- in a subsequent phase 2 agreement there would be "proportionate reductions of forces of all direct participants to common collective ceilings of 900,000, reductions of each country to be proportionate to the country's proportionate contribution to the total forces in the area at the outset; the forces of no participant ever to exceed 50% of the 900,000 ceiling;
- associated measures to be "commensurate with the volume of the reductions", monitoring posts would be established at exit points during the actual period of reductions, comprising one representative from each of the United States, the

Soviet Union, and the country from which the forces were being withdrawn. There would be notification of troop movement and exercises and prohibition of exercises in excess of 50,000 men;

- the ceiling of 900,000 never to be exceeded even during exercises or rotation of troops.

(c) NATO position

4.5. Prior to the 19th April 1984 proposals, the NATO delegations on 8th July 1982 submitted a new draft treaty which was a more comprehensive document covering four stages of the reductions over seven years:

- reductions to achieve common collective ceilings on each side of 900,000 men including not more than 700,000 ground troops;
- reductions to be achieved in four stages within seven years, each stage to be fully verifiable;
- levels of forces agreed to be within the reductions area at the outset to be specified in the treaty;
- first stage withdrawals of 13,000 United States ground forces and 30,000 Soviet ground forces within twelve months;
- in a second phase lasting two years, a further reduction of 31,000 NATO forces and 93,000 Warsaw Pact forces, to include 33,000 Soviet forces;
- stages 3 and 4, over a total of four years, to bring levels down to the agreed collective ceilings.

The associated measures linked to the treaty, tabled by the NATO countries on 18th November 1982, provided for:

- prenotification for out-of-garrison activities by one or more divisions;
- observers to be invited to out-of-garrison activities;
- prior notification of major troop movements within the reductions area;
- an annual quota of eighteen ground or air inspections, or both;
- permanent exit/entry points with permanent observers, through which all forces entering or leaving the reductions area would be required to pass;
- exchange of information on forces to be withdrawn and continuing exchange of

information on strength and organisation of remaining forces;

- no interference with national technical means of verification.

(d) Differences

4.6. The remaining points of disagreement between East and West at that stage can be summarised as follows:

- the eastern participants have demanded some form of separate ceiling on the forces of each country – or at least the assurance that no single country should provide more than 50% of common collective ceilings;
- the eastern countries have called for a separate ceiling on air force personnel as well as on ground forces;
- the eastern countries have demanded more specific agreements about the withdrawal of armaments from the area, as well as a withdrawal of forces;
- the western countries have demanded more specific arrangements for verification including the permanent presence of observers at exit/entry points, and in addition the right to a defined annual quota of inspections; the maximum eastern concession so far was for fixed observer points during the actual period of withdrawals;
- the western countries have called for prior agreement on "data" – the number of forces agreed to be present in the reductions area at the outset. The eastern countries have implied that final agreement on data would be reached only after reductions have been made.

4.7. Data and verification have long been held by the western powers to be the major stumbling block to agreement although, as the committee has pointed out in a previous report¹, if agreement can be reached on effective monitoring of a phase 1 agreement, with permanent observers for the entire duration of the agreement to ensure against the surreptitious return of withdrawn forces, agreement on disputed data could be postponed until phase 2. Documents tabled by East and West in the Vienna negotiations, including various figures submitted by each side, concerning existing levels of forces, have not been made public – one sign at least that each side continues to

1. Disarmament, Document 909, Rapporteur: Mr. Vohrer, 20th April 1982.

take the negotiations seriously. The following table of NATO and Warsaw Pact estimates of present force levels compiled from various

sources, provides a general indication of remaining discrepancies:

Present levels of forces in MBFR reductions area

	NATO			Warsaw Pact			Warsaw Pact superiority		
	Ground defence	Air force	Total	Ground defence	Air force	Total	Ground defence	Air force	Total
NATO est. (iv)	790,000 805,000	203,000 200,000	993,000 1,005,000	960,000	220,000 200,000	1,180,000	170,000	17,000	187,000
(iv) Warsaw Pact est.	not disputed by W.P.			800,000 815,000	200,000 182,000	1,000,000 997,000	nil 25,000	nil	nil
Discrepancy	nil			145,000	nil (iv) 38,000	183,000	145,000		

Sources :

- (i) "East-West troop reductions in Europe: Is agreement possible?", report for United States House Sub-Committee on International Security and Scientific Affairs by the Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 21st April 1983.
- (ii) Keesings Volume XXIX, page 31990.
- (iii) Previous report of the committee, Document 909, *op. cit.* pp. 5-48.
- (iv) International Herald Tribune, 20th and 23rd April 1984.

(e) The western proposals of 19th April 1984

4.8. The major new proposal introduced by the NATO countries on 19th April, the last day before the Easter recess, goes a long way to meeting the eastern position of 18th February 1982; the new proposal is known to have been under discussion in NATO headquarters for many months; agreement there appears to have taken longer than usual.

4.9. From the description given at a press conference the same day by the Head of the Canadian Delegation on behalf of the NATO countries, the main points in the new proposal are:

- prior exchange of data would relate only to ground combat and combat support forces; such data would be for newly defined categories of forces and therefore not directly related with data exchanged so far; moreover, the West would accept eastern figures if they were within "an acceptable range" (5 to 10% was mentioned by officials) of western estimates;
- in a first phase reductions would comprise 13,000 United States and 30,000 Soviet combat and combat support forces, to leave an overall ceiling on United States and Soviet ground forces;

- these withdrawals would be mainly in complete units, with up to 10% as individuals;
- immediately after the first phase there would be a verifiable no-increase commitment covering the overall level of ground forces of all direct participants;
- during the second year of the term of a treaty information would be exchanged and verified on the overall forces of all participants to determine the collective reductions in levels of ground forces to be effected by each alliance in the third and fifth year in order to reach the agreed objective of 700,000 ground forces and 900,000 ground and air forces by the end of the fifth year;
- improved verification measures would be required including an exchange of more detailed information on forces in the area and improved co-operative observation and inspection measures, but it is understood that NATO has not completed its own discussion of the more stringent verification measures now proposed - the details will not be tabled in Vienna until after the resumption of the negotiations on 24th May.

(f) Prospects for agreement

4.10. This new western proposal goes a considerable way towards meeting the eastern proposal in easing the data problem, chiefly by excluding service support forces from the mutual count, by accepting the withdrawal of complete military units and by shortening the total reductions period to five years from seven. At the same time, however, it requires more stringent verification measures than before and still calls for the withdrawal of 30,000 Soviet forces in a first phase compared with 20,000 so far offered by the Warsaw Pact.

V. Chemical weapons

5.1. The committee is to report to the second part of the session on discussions in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. The committee takes note, however, of recent very important developments in the area of chemical weapons, and negotiations on a possible worldwide ban on their use, production or storage.

5.2. The annual report of the Council of WEU to the Assembly states in its Chapter III on the Agency for the Control of Armaments that all member countries, in reply to an Agency questionnaire, have reported that they possess no stocks of chemical weapons. The United States has not manufactured such weapons since 1969, but retains a large stockpile, in particular of nerve gas, mostly in the United States but with some weapons stockpiled in Germany, as the committee has earlier reported¹. In 1983, President Reagan requested funds for the resumed production of chemical weapons – of a new “binary” type – but the request was refused by Congress on a narrow vote, although finance for the plant now under construction had been authorised earlier.

5.3. The Soviet Union is known to possess considerable stockpiles of chemical weapons, but western governments have not provided quantitative estimates, nor is it clear whether they are claimed to exceed United States’ stockpiles or not. It is, however, generally assumed that there has been continual production by the Soviet Union since 1969, whereas United States’ stockpiles are all at least fifteen years old.

5.4. While the United States has alleged that the Soviet Union or its allies have made use of various forms of chemical weapons, both in Afghanistan and in South-East Asia, these

reports have been neither substantiated nor flatly refuted by independent United Nations investigators. Now, however, the use of chemical weapons, probably including both mustard gas and nerve gas by Iraqi forces against Iran, has been established by United Nations observers, leading to renewed international appeals for a complete ban on such weapons.

5.5. Negotiations on a chemical weapons ban have been proceeding in the framework of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva for some two years. The United Kingdom, on 14th February 1984, tabled a paper on verification and compliance, dealing with the right of on-site inspection by challenge, which should be incorporated in any treaty. The Netherlands, on 7th March, similarly tabled a paper on the size and structure of the chemical disarmament inspectorate. The Soviet Union, in a recent development, has indicated readiness to accept on-site verification of the actual destruction of chemical weapons, but has not conceded the necessary right to inspection by challenge of suspected clandestine production facilities.

5.6. Finally, on 19th April 1984, Vice-President Bush of the United States travelled to Geneva to present a draft treaty on a chemical weapons ban which contained “bold” verification provisions, especially those concerning inspection by challenge of suspected violations which, Mr. Bush admitted at a subsequent press conference, were more far-reaching than any in earlier United States proposals, and which had been criticised by some allies. The Soviet delegate, on 26th April, termed these proposals deliberately unacceptable to the Soviet Union, submitted only to cover a United States chemical rearmament programme. “Now he offers a treaty banning chemical weapons that makes such intrusive verification demands that the Russians do not take it seriously”, wrote one distinguished American columnist².

VI. Conclusions

6.1. The committee’s principal conclusions, described in paragraph 3.18, are set forth in the draft recommendation, the main thrust of which is the need to inject urgency into the search for at least interim agreements in the CDE and MBFR talks and, as a precondition, the need for member governments to take the initiative in seeking to restore mutual confidence in East-West relations.

1. Nuclear, biological and chemical production, Document 838, Rapporteur: Mr. Banks, 29th April 1980.

2. Flora Lewis, New York Times, 30th April 1984 (quoted here from the International Herald Tribune).

APPENDIX I

*Implementation of confidence-building measures¹**1. Notification of military manoeuvres under the CSCE régime by NATO countries*

Date	Sponsoring country	Name of manoeuvre	Size of manoeuvre (no. of men)	Notification given (no. of days)	Observers invited
<i>1975</i>					
September	FRG	Grosse Rochade	68 000	23	-
October	USA	Certain Trek	57 000	34	Yes
Oct/Nov	USA	Reforger 75	53 000	21	-
September	Turkey	Deep Express	18 000	21	-
October	Norway	Batten Bolt	8 000	24	-
Oct/Nov	Netherlands	Pantsersprong	10 000	14	-
<i>1976</i>					
September	FRG	Grosser Bär	50 000	21	Yes
September	USA	Gordian Shield	30 000	21	-
September	USA	Lares Team	44 000	21	Yes
Feb/Mar	Norway	Atlas Express	17 000	21	-
September	Norway	Teamwork	13 500	21	Yes
October	Denmark/FRG	Bonded Item	11 000	21	-
November	Britain	Spearpoint	18 000	23	Yes
<i>1977</i>					
September	USA	Carbon Edge	58 700	21	Yes
September	FRG	Standhafte Schatten	38 000	21	Yes
May	USA	Certain Fighter	24 000	23	-
September	Denmark	Arrow Express	16 000	21	Yes
September	Belgium	Blue Fox	24 500	21	-
Sep/Oct	Netherlands	Interaction	12 000	21	Yes
October	Turkey	Tayfun 77	15 000	30	Yes
<i>1978</i>					
September	FRG	Blaue Donau	46 000	24	Yes
September	USA	Certain Shield	56 000	24	Yes
September	Netherlands	Saxon Drive	32 500	24	Yes
September	FRG	Bold Guard	65 000	24	-
March	Norway	Arctic Express	15 300	30	Yes
September	Norway	Black Bear	8 200	30	-
<i>1979</i>					
Jan/Feb	USA	Certain Sentinal	66 000	25	Yes
September	USA	Constant Enforcer	29 000	21	Yes

1. Source: J.J. Holst, *op. cit.* in footnote to paragraph 3.4 of explanatory memorandum, supplemented for 1983 by the United States President's semi-annual reports to the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe on the implementation of the Helsinki final act.

Date	Sponsoring country	Name of manoeuvre	Size of manoeuvre (no. of men)	Notification given (no. of days)	Observers invited
September	FRG	Harte Faust	60 000	21	Yes
March	Norway	Cold Winter 79	10 000	30	-
Sep/Oct	Turkey	Display Determination 79	18 000	32	-
October	France	Saone 79	16 000	21	Yes
October	Britain	Keystone	18 000	21	-
<i>1980</i>					
September	FRG	St. Georg	44 000	24	Yes
September	USA	Certain Rampart	40 000	21	Yes
September	Britain	Spearpoint	90 000	24	Yes
March	Norway	Anorak Express 80	18 200	31	-
September	Norway	Teamwork 80	16 800	28	Yes
October	France	Marne 80	17 000	10	-
<i>1981</i>					
September	USA/FRG	Certain Encounter	45 600	24	Yes
September	FRG	Scharfe Klinge	48 000	21	Yes
October	Britain	Red Claymore	23 000	21	-
March	Norway	Cold Winter	11 000	21	-
September	Norway	Barfrost	9 000	21	-
Sep/Oct	Denmark	Amber Express	15 000	21	Yes
October	Belgium/FRG	Cross Fire	21 000	21	-
October	France	Farfadet	4 000*	14	-
<i>1982</i>					
March	Norway	Alloy Express	14 200	30	-
Sep/Oct	Denmark/FRG	Bold Guard 82	47 200	24	Yes
September	USA/FRG	Carbine Fortress 82	73 000	24	Yes
September	FRG	Starke Wehr	35 000	21	Yes
September	France	Langres 82	17 000	4	-
<i>1983</i>					
	Norway	Cold Winter 83	10 000		-
	USA/FRG	Confident Express	>25 000		Yes
	FRG	Wehrhafte Loewen	>25 000		Yes
September	FRG/Neth.	Atlantic Lion	>25 000		Yes
	Britain	Eternal Triangle	>25 000		-
September	Denmark	Ample Express	<25 000		-
	France	Moselle 83			-

* To Mediterranean CSCE countries only.

2. Notification of military manoeuvres under the CSCE régime by Warsaw Pact countries

Date	Sponsoring country	Name of manoeuvre	Size of manoeuvre (no. of men)	Notification given (no. of days)	Observers invited
1975					
None					
1976					
Jan/Feb	USSR	Kavkaz	25 000	21	Yes
June	USSR	Sever	25 000	21	Yes
April	Hungary	-	10 000	1	-
October	Hungary	-	15 000	0	-
September	Poland	Tarcza 76	35 000	21	Yes
1977					
Mar/Apr	USSR	-	25 000	21	-
July	USSR	Karpatia	27 000	21	Yes
1978					
February	USSR	Berezhina	25 000	21	Yes
July	USSR	Tarcza 78	30 000	21	-
September	USSR	Kavkaz II	25 000	21	-
1979					
February	USSR/CSSR	Druzhba	26 000	21	-
April	USSR	-	25 000	21	-
July	USSR	Neman	25 000	21	Yes
mid-May	Hungary	Shield 79	25 000	*	Yes
1980					
July	USSR	-	30 000	21	-
September	GDR	Brotherhood in Arms	40 000	21	-
August	Hungary	Dyna 80	18 000	1	-
1981					
September	USSR	Zapad 81	100 000**	21	Yes***
1982					
January	USSR/CSSR	Druzhba 82	25 000	21	-
September	Bulgaria	Shield 82	60 000	21	-
1983					
January	Hungary	Danube 83	over 20 000	few days	-
June	Hungary	Kunsag 83	14 000	6	-
July	USSR		50 000	21	-
July	USSR		26 000	21	-
September	USSR		23 000	21	Yes

* Verbal notification on 3rd May 1979.

** According to TASS on 5th September 1981.

*** Only from Warsaw Pact countries.

3. Notification of military manoeuvres under the CSCE régime by neutral and non-aligned countries

Date	Sponsoring country	Name of manoeuvre	Size of manoeuvre (no. of men)	Notification given (no. of days)	Observers invited
<i>1975</i>					
October	Yugoslavia	-	18 000	25	-
November	Switzerland	-	40 000	31	-
<i>1976</i>					
October	Yugoslavia	Golilja	24 000	24	Yes
November	Sweden	Poseidon	12 000	30	-
<i>1977</i>					
March	Sweden	Vönn 77	10 000	21	Yes
October	Spain	Podenco	8 000	53	Yes
November	Austria	Herbstübung	12 000	37	-
<i>1978</i>					
November	Austria	(Command Post Exercise)	5 000	20	-
<i>1979</i>					
March	Switzerland	Nussknacker	34 000	28	Yes
October	Switzerland	Forte	27 000	33	Yes
November	Austria	Area Defence Exercise 79	27 500	45	Yes
<i>1980</i>					
None					
<i>1981</i>					
Oct/Nov	Spain	Crisex 81	32 200	25	Yes
October	Switzerland	Cresta	25 000	33	-
<i>1982</i>					
March	Sweden	Norrskan	23 000	30	Yes
September	Sweden	Sydfront	25 000	30	-

APPENDIX II

Mandate approved in Madrid on 6th September 1983 for the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe

The participating states,

Recalling the provisions of the final act according to which they recognise the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament,

Have agreed to convene a conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe.

The aim of the conference is, as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, with the participation of all the states signatories of the final act, to undertake, in stages, new, effective, and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations.

Thus the conference will begin a process of which the first stage will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe.

The first stage of the conference will be held in Stockholm commencing on 17th January 1984.

On the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating states, and of their respective obligations concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area¹ and air space. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

As far as the adjoining sea area¹ and air-space is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating states taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will be made through the negotiations on the confidence- and security-building measures at the conference.

1. In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe.

Nothing in the definition of the zone given above will diminish obligations already undertaken under the final act. The confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon at the conference will also be applicable in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the final act relating to confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

The provisions established by the negotiators will come into force in the forms and according to the procedure to be agreed upon by the conference.

Taking into account the abovementioned aim of the conference, the next follow-up meeting of the participating states of the CSCE, to be held in Vienna, commencing on 4th November 1986, will assess the progress achieved during the first stage of the conference.

Taking into account the relevant provisions of the final act, and having reviewed the results achieved by the first stage of the conference, and also in the light of other relevant negotiations on security and disarmament affecting Europe, a future CSCE follow-up meeting will consider ways and appropriate means for the participating states to continue their efforts for security and disarmament in Europe, including the question of supplementing the present mandate for the next stage of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe.

A preparatory meeting, charged with establishing the agenda, timetable and other organisational modalities for the first stage of the conference, will be held in Helsinki, commencing on 25th October 1983. Its duration shall not exceed three weeks.

The rules of procedure, the working methods and the scale of distribution for the expenses valid for the CSCE will, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to the conference and to the preparatory meeting referred to in the preceding paragraph. The services of a technical secretariat will be provided by the host country.

(Madrid, 6th September 1983)

*Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council*

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. The Brussels Treaty and the 1954 modification
 - (a) Background
 - (b) The 1954 modification
 - (c) The scope of the 1954 modification
 - (d) The modified Brussels Treaty
 - (e) United States message to WEU
 - (f) The North Atlantic Council resolution
 - (g) The arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty
 - Limitations
 - (h) The Standing Armaments Committee
- III. The evolution of WEU 1954-82
 - (a) Collective defence
 - (b) Arms control and the Brussels Treaty
 - (c) The Standing Armaments Committee
- IV. The present activities of WEU – the annual report of the Council for 1983
 - (a) Activities of the Council
 - Levels of forces
 - United Kingdom forces on the continent of Europe
 - (b) The Agency for the Control of Armaments
 - Activities of the Agency
 - Conclusion on the control of armaments
 - Studies by the Agency for the Control of Armaments
 - (c) The Standing Armaments Committee
- V. Proposals for the future of WEU
 - (a) General
 - (b) Specific proposals
 - (c) The committee's recommendations

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Pignion (Chairman); MM. Blaauw, Kittelmann (Vice-Chairmen); MM. van den Bergh, Bonnel (Alternate: De Decker), Bourges (Alternate: Matraja), Brown (Alternate: Dr. Miller), Cavaliere, Cox, Dejardin, Ertl, Galley, Gerstl, Sir Anthony Grant (Alternate: Lord Newall), MM. Huyghues des Étages (Alternate: Caro), de Kwaadsteniet, Lemmrich, Natiez, Pecchioli (Alternate: Amadei), Prussen, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Steverlynck, Stokes (Alternate: Wilkinson).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

- WEU as a forum for the discussion of defence problems
- The Assembly
- The Council
- The Standing Armaments Committee
- Arms control provisions of the treaty
- The Agency for the Control of Armaments

(d) In conclusion

APPENDICES

- I. Rules of Access to the BTO archives
- II. Annex III to Protocol No. III to the modified Brussels Treaty –
Weapons which the Federal Republic of Germany further undertakes
not to manufacture on its territory
 - A. Original (1954) text
 - B. Text following the most recent amendment of 21st July 1980
- III. Declaration on East-West relations issued by the Ten on 27th March
1984
- IV. Resolution on European collaboration in the fields of defence equipment
adopted by the State Secretaries of IEPG, 3rd April 1984

Introductory Note

In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows:

13th February 1984 – Ministry for External Relations, Paris:

Mrs. Isabelle Renouard, Conseiller, Chef du Service Affaires Stratégiques et Désarmement

Mr. Philippe Guelluy, Conseiller, Sous Direction Affaires Stratégiques et Pactes

24th April 1984 – Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Bonn:

Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landruth, State Secretary

Dr. Hans Schauer, Minister, European and Atlantic Affairs Directorate

Dr. Wolf-Dieter Schilling, European Union Section

4th May 1984 – Ministry for External Relations, Paris:

Mr. Jacques Andréani, Minister, Director, Political Affairs

8th May 1984 – Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London:

Mr. Brian Cartledge, Assistant Under-Secretary of State

12th May 1984

Mr. Giovanni Spadolini, Italian Minister of Defence

In Belgium, the Rapporteur also met:

Mr. Léo Tindemans, Minister for External Relations

Mr. Alfred Cahen, Director-General for Policy, Ministry for External Relations

Baron Thierry de Grubben, Counsellor, Ministry for External Relations and is to meet Mr. Willem van Eekelen, Netherlands Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The committee as a whole met at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, on 14th February 1984, when Lt. General C.J. Dijkstra presented his study on collective logistical support, and the committee met subsequently with the WEU Standing Armaments Committee, attended by: Lt. Colonel de Winne (Belgium); Lt. Colonel Binet (Belgium); Mr. Marcoin (France); Mr. Schreiber (Germany); Colonel Pochesci (Italy); Mr. Zweerts (Netherlands); Mr. Davies (United Kingdom).

Subsequently at NATO Headquarters, Brussels on 8th and 9th March 1984 the committee met with members of the parliamentary defence committees of the European NATO countries:

Belgium: Mr. Yves du Monceau de Bergendal, Second Vice-Chairman, National Defence Committee, Le Senat;

France: Mr. Louis Darinot, Chairman, MM. Robert Aumont and Jean Combasteil, Vice-Chairmen, Defence Committee, Assemblée Nationale;

Germany: Dr. H. Schwarz, Vice-Chairman, MM. Karl-Eduard Claussen and Wolfgang Kahrs, Defence Committee, Bundesrat;

Italy: MM. Stegagnini and Baracetti, Vice-Chairmen, Defence Committee, Camera dei Deputati;

Netherlands: Drs: Y.P.W. van der Werff, Chairman, Defence Committee, First Chamber of the States-General;

United Kingdom: Sir Humphrey Atkins, KCMG, Chairman, MM. D. Douglas and Mates, Select Committee on Defence, House of Commons;

Norway: MM. Ole Fr. Klemsdal and Bjorn Erling Ytterhorn, Defence Committee, Stortinget.

The meeting was briefed by: Mr. Eric Da Rin, Deputy Secretary-General of NATO; Lt. General T. Huitfeldt, Norwegian Army, Director of the International Military Staff; Dr. Fredo Dannenbring, NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs; and Ing. Gen. P. Naslin, Head of the Defence Research Section, NATO International Staff.

The committee met finally at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 15th May 1984 when it adopted the present report.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of parliament, officials, senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or met the committee and replied to questions.

The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation

*on thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty –
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) Believing it to be urgent to reinforce deterrence and safeguard peace, to organise within the Atlantic Alliance a politically credible and militarily effective European pillar;
- (ii) Considering that setting up a European pillar of the alliance should in particular serve the object of strengthening the partnership with our American allies, while giving a more European dimension to the discussion of questions touching the security of our continent;
- (iii) Believing that WEU should be used fully by the member states as a forum for analysis, debate and concerted action on the requirements of European defence, and that the other European allies, and other partners in the Ten should be kept fully informed;
- (iv) Recalling its Recommendation 380 and reiterating its belief that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s, in particular through the abolition of controls on conventional weapons;
- (v) Aware that the controls on atomic and biological weapons provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty have never been applied, but considering that in present circumstances it is no longer appropriate to apply them,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine and redefine the problems of European security and, to this end,
 - (a) meet regularly at a high level;
 - (b) hold at least two ministerial Council meetings a year, in particular to prepare NATO ministerial meetings, with the participation of defence ministers at at least one of these meetings; and
 - (c) keep the Assembly informed of these proceedings;
2. Strengthen the Permanent Council through the attendance as required of the senior officials concerned from the ministries for foreign affairs and defence and of the chiefs of defence staff;
3. Be assisted in its work by the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments, instructing:
 - (a) the Standing Armaments Committee to assist the Council in preparing a European policy in new conventional armaments, with particular regard to problems raised by emerging technologies; and to help the Council lay the foundations of a policy on the defensive use of space technology;
 - (b) the Agency for the Control of Armaments to undertake, on behalf of the Council or the Assembly, studies and analyses of problems related to disarmament, the limitation of armaments and the problems of verification of disarmament agreements;
4. Pursue the adaptation of WEU to the needs of the 1980s by:
 - (a) abolishing the controls on conventional weapons set out in Annexes III and IV to Protocol No. III;
 - (b) reorganising the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments to enable them to accomplish their new tasks;
 - (c) making the necessary arrangements to co-locate the ministerial bodies of WEU in a single place;
5. Establish appropriate procedure for informing European and Atlantic bodies about the conclusions of ministerial meetings.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. The present statutory report, presented in accordance with the Charter of the Assembly, replies to the chapters of the annual report of the Council referred to the committee by the Presidential Committee under rule 27.2 of the Rules of Procedure. These are Chapter IIB: Activities of the Council – Defence questions; Chapter III: Agency for the Control of Armaments; Chapter IV: Standing Armaments Committee.

1.2. When deciding upon the terms of reference for the present report in the framework of its future programme of work, approved by the Presidential Committee, the committee proposed that for the thirtieth anniversary of the 1954 Paris Agreements it should, where defence questions are concerned, review the achievements and examine the future of WEU. The future of WEU is particularly important at a time when widespread attention has been attracted to proposals from several member governments to make fuller use of WEU as a forum for European consultation on defence matters, without however the Atlantic Alliance being “supplanted”¹ by a European alliance. These proposals are therefore examined with particular attention in Chapter V of the present explanatory memorandum, while the committee examines in a separate report the necessary counterpart to European consultation on defence matters – the organisation of collective defence in the framework of NATO².

1.3. In preparing this report, the Rapporteur bore in mind the requirements of a wider audience than that of the representatives to the Assembly – ministries and chancelleries and certain sectors of the public – likely to wish to be informed about WEU on the occasion of this thirtieth anniversary. The report therefore repeats certain information already given to representatives in earlier reports.

II. The Brussels Treaty and the 1954 modification

(a) Background

2.1. The Brussels Treaty of 17th March 1948 extended the defence alliance signed by France

1. Expression used by the President of France, Mr. Mitterrand, in his speech in The Hague on 7th February 1984.

2. State of European security, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith, Document 971.

and the United Kingdom at Dunkirk on 4th March to Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Although the 1948 text referred to the possibility of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression, it was in reality the Soviet threat demonstrated in the coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in 1947 which led to the conclusion of the treaty. The text of the mutual and collective defence undertaking in Article V of the present modified Brussels Treaty was already in Article IV of the 1948 treaty. While the treaty, in 1948 as in 1954, was entitled “Treaty of economic, social and cultural collaboration and collective self-defence”, it was already stipulated in the text that the economic activities should not duplicate those of other international bodies, and they were in fact left to the OEEC.

2.2. After the treaty was signed, the Brussels Treaty Organisation, as WEU was then called, set up its own Western Union Defence Organisation (WUDO) to implement the policy of mutual defence. According to the Council:

“Therefore the Council, set up by the treaty, at once established (17th April 1948) a Western Union Defence Committee, consisting of the defence ministers of the governments concerned. Under the auspices of this committee, a permanent organisation was set up in September 1948 to work out the joint defence policy which was to be applied by the general staff in each country.

Shortly afterwards (October 1948), a Committee of Finance Ministers was formed to consider the financial and economic aspects of problems arising from the organisation of joint defence.

During the first year of its existence, the defence organisation of the five powers studied a plan for their common defence, including an integrated air defence plan, based on the use of radar. It made suggestions for the production of arms and equipment which involved large-scale application of the principle of mutual aid. It set up the nucleus of a joint command organisation, agreed upon measures for training and organised a number of combined exercises of land, sea and air forces.

This ‘spade-work’ done by the five powers was of great assistance, not only in creating the atmosphere which made the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty possible, but

also in shaping the character of the organisation set up under that treaty.”¹

2.3. WUDO in fact created the nucleus of the integrated military structure of the future NATO with a Military Committee consisting of representatives of chiefs of defence staff of member countries (with Field-Marshal Montgomery of the United Kingdom as permanent chairman, designated senior commander in the event of war), with a headquarters at Fontainebleau, and a military infrastructure programme with joint financing amounting to £32 million, including aerodromes and telecommunications in France and the Netherlands. By decision of the WEU Council, the BTO's military archives for the highly innovative period 1948-50 were released on 1st March 1984 for the use of research workers and may be consulted at the United Kingdom Public Record Office at Kew, near London, in accordance with regulations approved by the Council².

2.4. Shortly after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4th April 1949, the Brussels Treaty Organisation decided in its resolution of 20th December 1950 to transfer the exercise of its defence responsibilities to NATO, while specifying in paragraph 4 that “these new arrangements will in no way affect the obligations assumed towards each other by the signatory powers under the Brussels Treaty”, and reserving “the right of the Western Union defence ministers and chiefs-of-staff to meet as they please to consider matters of mutual concern”.

2.5. In view of its importance, it is worth quoting the resolution of 20th September 1950:

“Resolution by the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Organisation of 20th December 1950 on the future of the organisation of western defence in the light of the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation military structure

1. The Consultative Council have considered the suggestion of the North Atlantic Council that the Brussels Treaty powers should review the status of the Western Union Defence Organisation in the light of the establishment of an overall North Atlantic Treaty Command Organisation.

2. The Consultative Council have noted:

(i) that it has been decided to dissolve the existing European Regional Planning Groups with their Regional Chiefs-of-Staff and principal Staff Officers Committees;

(ii) the view of the North Atlantic Council that, when the new NATO Command Organisation is established, it will be unnecessary and undesirable to have a parallel Western Union Command and that the new headquarters suggested for Western Europe should be directly under SHAPE and should not be responsible to the Western Union Defence Committee.

3. The Council agree that, in the light of this reorganisation, the continued existence of the Western Union Defence Organisation in its present form is no longer necessary. They accordingly instruct the Permanent Commission to consider in consultation with the Western Union Military Committee, acting on the instructions of the Defence Ministers, how the proposed reorganisation ‘can best be effected and what military machinery, if any, needs to be retained under the Brussels Treaty.

4. The Council affirm that these new arrangements will in no way affect the obligations assumed towards each other by the signatory powers under the Brussels Treaty. In particular, the Consultative Council established under Article VII, including the non-military organs set up under the Council, will continue to function, and the reorganisation of the military machinery shall not affect the right of the Western Union Defence Ministers and Chiefs-of-Staff to meet as they please to consider matters of mutual concern to the Brussels Treaty powers.”³

2.6. In spite of the provisions of paragraph 4 of the resolution, the ministers of defence and chiefs-of-staff have not since had occasion to meet in the framework of the Brussels Treaty.

(b) The 1954 modification

2.7. In October 1950 Mr. René Pleven, the then French Prime Minister, proposed the creation of a “European army” – a proposal addressed in the first place to the six parties to the European Coal and Steel Community, and seen as a further step on the road to European

1. Document 17, Reply of the Council to the supplementary questions in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 10th July 1956.

2. Text at Appendix I.

3. Published originally in the committee's report “State of European defence”, Document 29, 3rd October 1956.

integration associated in particular with Mr. Jean Monnet, Mr. Robert Schuman, Foreign Minister of France, Mr. Alcide de Gasperi of Italy and Chancellor Adenauer of Germany. Other preoccupations of the time combined to make a defence community a logical step along the "functional" road to European integration. The force goals agreed in the NATO framework, particularly on the central front, could not be met by the then 14 members of NATO; there was a growing demand for a German defence contribution, particularly from the United States. In the absence of agreement with the Soviet Union on a German peace treaty, and reunification of the two parts of Germany under democratically elected institutions, there was growing pressure for the restoration of full sovereignty to the Federal Republic. A European defence community was seen as the best framework in which a sovereign Federal Republic could make a defence contribution which would be integrated in both the European community and the NATO military structure.

2.8. The treaty of the European Defence Community, signed by the six parties to the Coal and Steel Community on 27th May 1952, was accompanied by a treaty between the six signatories and the United Kingdom and by a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty signed by the then 14 parties to the latter, both of which contained mutual defence guarantees. The military provisions of the EDC Treaty itself provided that homogenous national units would not exceed in size a division of 15,000 men, or equivalent for air force and navy, and that the various divisions within an army corps would be of different nationality; all the community forces were committed to NATO. Separate national forces could be raised only for the defence of any overseas territories or for United Nations and similar international missions. Article 107 on the production of military equipment provided at Annex I a list of ABC weapons and virtually all conventional military equipment which could be manufactured only under the direct authority of the commissariat established by the treaty. Appendix II to that article comprised a list of ABC weapons and certain major conventional weapons which would not be manufactured in "strategically exposed areas" which it was agreed the territory of Germany constituted. An unpublished special agreement annexed to the treaty was said to limit the future forces of the Republic of Germany to an army of 12 divisions, a tactical air force of about 1,350 aircraft, and a navy of light, coastal defence and escort vessels.

2.9. Following the failure of the French National Assembly to ratify the EDC Treaty on 30th August 1954, a nine-power conference of the six parties to the treaty, Canada, the

United Kingdom and the United States was convened in London from 28th September to 3rd October that year to deal with "the most important issues facing the western world, security and European integration within the framework of a developing Atlantic community dedicated to peace and freedom. In this connection, the conference considered how to ensure the full association of the Federal Republic of Germany with the West and the German defence contribution". The London conference agreed:

- (i) on the termination of the occupation régime in the Federal Republic of Germany;
- (ii) that the Federal Republic and Italy would accede to the Brussels Treaty which would be strengthened and extended and would provide both for limitations on the forces of member countries similar to those of the EDC, and include an agency for the control of armaments to apply controls based on those of the annexes to Article 107 of the EDC Treaty;
- (iii) the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada gave assurances concerning their intention to maintain forces in Europe;
- (iv) the participants recommended that the Federal Republic be invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty and that NATO be reinforced, in particular by placing all forces of NATO countries on the continent of Europe under the authority of SACEUR with the exception of those which NATO recognised as suitable to remain under national control.

2.10. The nine-power conference reconvened in Paris in October, where the North Atlantic Council also met. The work of the London conference was concluded in the following agreements:

- protocol on the termination of the occupational régime in the Federal Republic ;
- convention on the presence of foreign forces in the German Federal Republic ;
- Protocols Nos. I, II, III and IV modifying and extending the Brussels Treaty ;
- resolution of the North Atlantic Council to implement Section 4 of the final act of the London conference.

(c) The scope of the 1954 revision

2.11. The outcome of the 1954 conferences was to replace the failed EDC Treaty with a new European defence structure whereby certain key provisions of that treaty, with modifications, were incorporated in the modified Brussels Treaty signed on 23rd October, and others in the North Atlantic Council resolution adopted the previous day. The "supranational" provisions of the EDC Treaty, however, largely disappeared, although traces of them can still be found in the modified Brussels Treaty which provides, in some cases, for Council decisions to be taken by majority vote. In particular, the limits on force levels and the internal arms controls provisions of the EDC Treaty were largely incorporated in the modified Brussels Treaty; provision for the integration of units of different nationalities – at army corps level rather than the divisional level prescribed in the EDC Treaty – and the obligation to commit all forces¹ to the integrated command were incorporated in the North Atlantic Council resolution.

(d) The modified Brussels Treaty

2.12. The effects of the 1954 modifications to the Brussels Treaty can be summarised as follows:

- (i) the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy acceded to the Brussels Treaty;
- (ii) the references to the possibility of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression was replaced by a passage in the preamble expressing the resolution of the parties: "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe";
- (iii) a new Article IV was inserted making the links with NATO clear:

"In the execution of the treaty, the high contracting parties and any organs established by them under the treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the

1. "With the exception of those forces intended for the defence of overseas territories and other forces which the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has recognised or will recognise as suitable to remain under national command" (North Atlantic Council resolution to implement Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference adopted in London on 22nd October 1954).

appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters."

Throughout the treaty and its protocols some 30 references to NATO, its commanders and institutions, provide for NATO to be an agent of execution for military matters referred to in the treaty, especially as far as force levels and arms controls are concerned;

- (iv) the mutual defence obligations of the original treaty are maintained unmodified, becoming Article V of the new treaty:

"If any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other high contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power."

While mutual defence obligations are geographically restricted to the case "of an armed attack in Europe", the corresponding provisions for consultation retained from the original treaty in the renumbered Article VIII are not so restricted:

"At the request of any of the high contracting parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.";

- (v) the "Consultative Council" of the original treaty becomes known as the "Council of Western European Union", intended now as an organ of execution. The enlarged article, now number VIII, provides specifically that the Council "shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be considered necessary" and paragraph 4 of that article recalls the various majority voting procedures for cases provided for in the protocols to the treaty:

"The Council shall decide by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure has been or may be agreed. In the cases provided for in Protocols Nos. II, III and IV it will follow the various voting procedures, unanimity, two-thirds majority, simple majority, laid down therein. It will decide by simple majority questions

submitted to it by the Agency for the Control of Armaments.”;

- (vi) A new and laconic Article IX established the WEU Assembly for the first time which, in the mind of the ministers, authors of the modifications, was designed chiefly as an extra safeguard in the arms controls procedures:

“The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.”;

- (vii) A new Protocol No. II to the treaty, on forces of Western European Union, lays down in particular maximum levels of ground and air forces on the mainland of Europe, and of naval forces, which the parties may commit to NATO – levels which may be varied only by the WEU Council or by the North Atlantic Council. The protocol was to be supplemented by a subsequent agreement on force levels.

In addition, Protocol No. II contains in its Article VI the important undertaking by the United Kingdom whereby that country “will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, that is to say four divisions and the tactical air force, or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe regards as having equivalent fighting capacity. She undertakes not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the high contracting parties ... This undertaking shall not however bind her in the event of an acute overseas emergency. If the maintenance of the United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe throws at any time too great a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, she will ... invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions on which

the United Kingdom formations are maintained”;

- (viii) Protocol No. III on the control of armaments and Protocol No. IV establishing the Agency for the Control of Armaments formed the bases of the arms control régime established in the framework of the Brussels Treaty, largely taken from corresponding provisions in the EDC Treaty. The scope of these provisions is described below.

2.13. Explicit in the text of the modified Brussels Treaty was the requirement for the seven parties to agree a number of subsidiary measures, by Council resolution and by the conclusion of further agreements, to provide in more detail for the implementation of the force level provisions of Protocol No. II and the arms control provisions of Protocols Nos. III and IV. There was a further undertaking by the seven governments in the framework of the nine-power conference to set up a working group to study French proposals on the production and standardisation of armaments which led eventually to the establishment of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee.

(e) *United States message to WEU*

2.14. A final component of the 1954 agreements was the message, foreshadowed in the final act of the London conference, addressed by the United States President to the seven parties to the modified Brussels Treaty on 10th March 1955, before ratification of the modifications to the Brussels Treaty had been completed – they entered into force on 6th

1. This undertaking, supranational in character, since the forces will not be withdrawn “against the wishes of the majority of the high contracting parties” should be compared with the much less far-reaching unilateral declaration of British policy made on the occasion of the signature of the convention between the United Kingdom and the parties to the European Defence Community on 13th April 1954. That unilateral declaration of policy provided in particular:

“(b) The United Kingdom will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defence of the North Atlantic area, and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic Treaty strategy for the defence of this area. H.M. Government have no intention of withdrawing from the continent of Europe so long as the threat exists to the security of Western Europe and of the EDC.

(d) In order to promote the integration of the armed forces placed under the command of the supreme Allied Commander, Europe, the UK agrees to the inclusion, if the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, so requests, of British army formations and air force units in European formations, and *vice versa*, where military considerations make this desirable and logistic considerations make it practicable.”

May 1955. The message affirmed *inter alia* that when the Paris Agreements entered into force, it would be the policy of the United States:

- (i) to continue to be active in NATO and to consult on questions of force levels;
- (ii) to consult with the WEU Arms Control Agency to assist in preventing unjustified military preparations;
- (iii) to continue to maintain armed forces in Europe, including Germany "while a threat to that area exists";
- (iv) to co-operate in developing the closest possible integration among the forces assigned to NATO;
- (v) to continue to share information on new weapons as authorised by Congress;
- (vi) to regard any action threatening Western Europe as a threat to the North Atlantic Treaty parties calling for consultation under Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The message concluded by recalling that the North Atlantic Treaty was regarded as of indefinite duration.

(f) The North Atlantic Council resolution

2.15. The North Atlantic Council "resolution to implement Section IV of the final act of the London conference"¹ adopted in Paris on 22nd October 1954, the day before the signature of the protocols modifying the Brussels Treaty, provided the NATO counterpart to Article IV and other provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty, which made NATO an agent of execution for military matters, especially as far as force levels and arms controls were concerned. Paragraphs 3, 6 and 14 of the resolution provide for NATO authorities to take the necessary action to implement those Brussels Treaty provisions.

2.16. The North Atlantic Council resolution further incorporates undertakings on the integration of forces modelled on, but less far-reaching than those of the EDC Treaty. In particular, paragraph 4 provides that all forces of member nations shall be placed under the authority of an appropriate NATO commander, with the exception of forces for the defence of overseas territories "and other forces which the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has recog-

nised or will recognise as suitable to remain under national command". Paragraph 7 of the resolution provides that forces under SACEUR shall be deployed in accordance with NATO strategy; shall be located as determined by SACEUR in consultation with the national authorities, and shall not be redeployed without his consent. Paragraph 8 provides that integration of forces at army group and tactical air force level shall be maintained, but that integration at lower levels shall be achieved to the maximum extent possible. The increased logistic responsibilities to be conferred on SACEUR by paragraphs 9 and 10 of the resolution are referred to in a separate study arranged by the committee². Finally, paragraph 13 of the resolution confirms that the powers of SACEUR in peacetime "extend not only to the organisation into an effective integrated force of the forces based under him, but also to their training ...". SACEUR has "direct control over the higher training of all national forces assigned to his command ... It should be recalled that none of these provisions applies to French forces since France's withdrawal from the NATO integrated military bodies in 1966. French forces are therefore supervised only by WEU officials."

(g) The arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty

2.17. The arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty were at the centre of the 1954 discussions and, if only for historical reasons, are worth describing – especially as the Assembly was set up by the ministers chiefly with a view to supervising the application of the controls. There does not appear to have been an historical precedent or an arms control arrangement within the alliance to ensure against militarism on the part of any member.

2.18. The official texts incorporating the arms control provisions are: Protocol No. III on the control of armaments; Protocol No. IV on the Agency of Western European Union for the Control of Armaments; the regulations drawn up in execution of Article XI of Protocol No. IV, approved by resolution of the Council on 3rd May 1956; the resolution of the Council to implement Article XXI of Protocol No. IV adopted by the Council on 18th September 1957; and the "Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively, and making provision for due process of law in accordance with Protocol

1. Text reproduced in the Assembly's edition of the Brussels Treaty: "the texts of the treaty, the protocols and other documents concerning WEU", page 156 of latest edition.

2. Study on collective logistical support, Document 966, by Lieutenant General C.J. Dijkstra.

No. IV of the Brussels Treaty ...”, signed by the seven parties in Paris on 14th December 1957. In addition, the Council on 24th May 1963, in reply to Written Question 56 put by a representative to the Assembly, clarified the definition of atomic weapon as used in Protocol No. III.

2.19. It should be noted that the convention “... to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively ...” has not entered into force because it has been ratified only by Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Successive annual reports of the Council have drawn the attention of the Assembly to the shortcomings that result from the non-entry into force of that convention, and to the fact that the Council has never authorised the Agency for the Control of Armaments to apply controls to nuclear weapons or biological weapons.

2.20. The arms control arrangements prescribed by the foregoing texts can be summarised as follows:

- (i) Germany has given a unilateral undertaking not to manufacture atomic, biological or chemical weapons on its territory;
- (ii) Germany has given a further unilateral undertaking not to manufacture on its territory certain conventional weapons specified in the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III. That list, however, may be amended or cancelled by the Council if, “in accordance with the needs of the armed forces” a recommendation is made by SACEUR and a request submitted by Germany. That list has, in fact, been reduced by the Council on ten occasions between 1958 and 1980;
- (iii) the Council is to determine the level of stocks of atomic, biological and chemical weapons which countries may hold on the mainland of Europe when “effective production” has started;
- (iv) atomic, biological and chemical weapons, and significant conventional weapons, all specified in the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III, held by members of WEU on the mainland of Europe, are subject to control. That list may be varied by the Council by unanimous decision, but has not yet been modified since the list was originally agreed in 1954¹.

1. The Council is still considering the Assembly's proposal in Recommendation 380, adopted on 15th June 1982, that it should “vary by reducing” that list.

2.21. Protocol No. IV of the modified Brussels Treaty provides for the application of controls through various procedures. First, governments submit to the Agency for the Control of Armaments a statement of their requirements, holdings and procurement programmes in respect of the armaments subject to control specified at Annex IV to Protocol No. III, together with the names and locations of the depots and manufacturing plants concerned. Apart from atomic, biological and chemical weapons, of which the Council alone determines by majority vote the level of stocks the parties may hold on the mainland of Europe, the “appropriate levels” of armaments subject to control are then agreed or accepted by the Agency in accordance with various procedures laid down in Protocol No. IV. “Appropriate levels” for equipment for forces committed to NATO are determined chiefly through the NATO annual review process.

2.22. Controls are then carried out to ensure that “appropriate levels” of armaments are not exceeded. The Agency examines budgetary and other statistical information from governments and from NATO to ensure that there are no discrepancies with levels of stocks reported by member governments. NATO carries out test checks, visits and inspections with respect to forces and depots under NATO authority. The Agency carries out similar test checks, visits and inspections at other depots and forces, and at production plants. It also carries out non-production controls at plants in Germany which might be capable of producing armaments which that country has undertaken not to produce on its territory.

Limitations

2.23. The controls provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty are extensive; however, they have been applied only to a limited extent. As the convention for the due process of law referred to in paragraph 2.18 has not entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns take the form of “agreed control measures”. “One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' notice”². This limitation applies to any visits to private production plants, including the agreed control measures carried out in certain chemical plants in Germany to verify the non-production of chemical weapons. It is understood that, in the absence of other guarantees provided in the convention, the Agency's inspectors are not able to take samples of materials during such visits. The Agency has

2. Annual report of the Council, 1980, Document 833.

never been authorised by the Council to carry out any controls on atomic or biological weapons. The committee's understanding of the extent to which controls are applied in practice is mentioned in paragraph 3.11.

2.24. It is important to understand the scope of the controls agreed in 1954 in the context of the political compromise reached at that time, designed chiefly to reduce the discrimination against Germany which alone renounced the right to produce on its territory atomic, biological and chemical weapons, and the conventional weapons specified in Annex III to Protocol No. III. Quantitative controls on the levels of weapons specified in Annex IV to Protocol No. III – ABC weapons and the larger conventional weapons – were to be controlled on the territory of *all member countries* “on the mainland of Europe” – a proviso that exempted the territory of the United Kingdom from the application of controls. That country, however, is the only country which undertakes, in Article VI of Protocol No. II, to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, specified minimum forces which were assigned to SACEUR. While this minimum has been successively reduced by Council decision from the original four divisions and the second tactical air force, to the present 55,000 men for the ground forces and the same tactical air force, the United Kingdom remains the only country to be committed under the Brussels Treaty to maintaining minimum force levels.

(h) The Standing Armaments Committee

2.25. The last item in the modification of the Brussels Treaty, inherent in the London conference undertaking to study a French draft directive submitted on 1st October 1954, was the decision taken by the Council on 7th May 1955 – the day after the modifications to the treaty entered into force – establishing a Standing Armaments Committee. According to paragraph 10 of that decision, this committee “shall, in close relation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, seek to improve consultation and co-operation in the sphere of armaments with a view to finding joint solutions which would assist governments of member countries in meeting their equipment requirements. To that end it shall encourage, on a case by case basis, agreements or arrangements on such subjects as the development, standardisation, production and procurement of armaments...”. Paragraph 1 provided that “in order that the closest contact may be maintained with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation the Standing Armaments Committee's seat shall be in Paris” and paragraph 2 that “in order to ensure continuity, member countries will maintain permanent delegates at the seat of the commit-

tee, who may also be members of their delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”.

III. *The evolution of WEU 1954-82*

(a) Collective defence

3.1. Following the transformation of the original Brussels Treaty Organisation into Western European Union in 1954, the inter-governmental organisation had a number of functions in the non-military field, the most important of which was that the Council served as the chief point of contact between the six original members of the European Community and the United Kingdom, prior to the accession of the latter to the Community in January 1973. As far as defence questions are concerned, however, it is not an exaggeration to say that the Council's view as to the desirable extent of its activities has been influenced to a large extent by the Assembly.

3.2. Established, almost casually, by the laconic Article IX of the modified treaty, composed of representatives to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, receiving an annual report from the Council on its activities, and in particular concerning the control of armaments, the Assembly had been viewed by the ministers who created it as a part-time appendage to the Council of Europe's Assembly, to be used as a public parliamentary forum through which it would be seen that the arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty were duly implemented by the Council. The first annual report of the Council to the Assembly¹ had sections on cultural and social problems, on the Saar, brief sections on the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee, but contained no reference to the collective defence provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty or to any Council activity in this field. The Council held that such responsibilities had been transferred to NATO by its decision of 1950.

3.3. The Assembly, when set up, from the outset took a different view of its responsibilities. It was first convened at the seat of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 5th July 1955 and decided early on, in discussing its Charter and Rules of Procedure, to establish the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments which, in its first report on the activity of Western European Union in the sphere of security and

1. Document 3, 22nd October 1955.

the production and control of armaments¹ asserted "36. One of the purposes of this report is to stimulate discussion in the Assembly concerning the rôle of WEU in the field of security". The committee was dissatisfied with the attitude of the Council in replying to 34 questions the committee had earlier put to the Council. While the first 32 dealt with the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the last under the heading of "General questions concerning the progress made in the sphere of European defence and security" dealt with the development by the Soviet Union of an ICBM with a thermonuclear warhead. The only response to that question was: "The Council is unable to answer this question". In its reply to supplementary questions in the committee's report, the Council subsequently asserted that:

"4. At present, WEU should be regarded only as the repository of the solemn undertaking to afford mutual assistance embodied in Article V of the revised Brussels Treaty and the guardian of the procedure laid down in Article VIII. ... Therefore all questions relating to the maintenance and the defence of peace in Western Europe are, and in the present circumstances should remain, the responsibility of NATO ... The Council ... consider the Assembly as a part - though an independent part - of WEU as a whole and its very useful function of debating WEU activities could, in the opinion of the Council, only be weakened if the Assembly were to take up the problems which are not dealt with by the Council and which therefore could not be the subject of exchanges of views between the Assembly and the Council. This applies notably to the activities of the member states within NATO. Giving information on these activities would mean that the Council would have to discuss them first which, ... they are not in a position to do. The governments of member states within NATO act not as WEU members but as individual governments which are responsible only to their national parliaments."²

3.4. Within a year, however, at the urging of the committee, endorsed by the Assembly, the Council had changed its mind: "the Council appreciate the Assembly's desire to consider broader aspects of defence than those to which the Council must limit themselves, and to

1. Rapporteur Mr. Fens, Document 12, 17th April 1956.

2. Reply of the Council to the supplementary questions in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 17, 10th July 1956.

debate these activities against the background of a general policy"³. The Council at that time made arrangements for NATO to supply information to the Council on defence matters to enable the latter to reply to recommendations from the Assembly. At the same time, in the longest annual report (180 pages) ever submitted to the Assembly, the Council considered "... that the activities of the Council in the field of defence questions and armaments relate to:

- (a) matters which the contracting parties wish to raise, especially under Article VIII;
- (b) the level of forces of member states (Protocol No. II);
- (c) the maintenance of certain United Kingdom forces on the continent;
- (d) the Agency for the Control of Armaments;
- (e) the Standing Armaments Committee."

3.5. Despite opposition from the Council, which had sought to ensure that only an authorised spokesman conveying the agreed collective views of the Council could give evidence to it, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments soon established its right to be addressed by ministers of national governments and by senior officers of the armed services of the member countries or of NATO. The Assembly transferred the Office of the Clerk from Strasbourg to Paris where the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee had already been established, at that time occupying premises in the same temporary building as that of NATO Headquarters. The Assembly shortly afterwards abandoned the practice of meeting in the premises of the Council of Europe, and formally amended its Charter to state that its seat was in Paris.

3.6. In the following years since 1957 the committee has reported on every aspect of collective defence. While the activities of the Council in the sphere of defence have remained unchanged since the 1957 decision, the Council in recent years has nevertheless engaged in a full dialogue with the Assembly through its written replies to Assembly recommendations and written questions on all aspects of collective defence even if these replies have not always been found satisfactory.

(b) *Arms control and the Brussels Treaty*

3.7. The attitude of the Assembly, on reports from the Committee on Defence Questions and

3. Second annual report of the Council, Document 37, 25th February 1957.

Armaments, to the application of the arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty has changed considerably since the earlier years.

3.8. At the outset it appeared to the Assembly that the Council was being dilatory in applying the full provisions of the treaty concerning levels of forces and arms controls. Recommendations adopted on reports from the committee called for urgent action by the Council to apply the provisions of the treaty. Typical is Recommendation 29¹:

“Considering that the activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments in 1957 must be examined with the reservation that some of the legal instruments called for in the protocols to the modified Brussels Treaty are not yet in force;

Considering that by virtue of its duties and the most encouraging results already achieved the Agency for the Control of Armaments constitutes a most valuable experiment with a view to the future controlled limitation or reduction of armaments on a wider scale, in territories outside the WEU countries,

EXPRESSES THE OPINION

That the Agency for the Control of Armaments carried out its functions satisfactorily during 1957,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

1. That by May 1959 it should fix, in accordance with Article V of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty, the strengths and armaments of the internal defence and police forces on the mainland of Europe;

2. That it should now apply Article III of Protocol No. III as far as possible so that levels of stocks of any atomic, biological or chemical weapons produced by the continental members may be duly controlled by the Agency immediately effective production commences;

.....”

3.9. By the mid-1960s it was becoming clear that the policy of at least certain member governments did not permit the Council to apply the arms control provisions as provided for in the treaty. The Assembly fulfilled the rôle foreseen for it in Article IX of the treaty

1. Adopted on 18th December 1958 on the report from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee.

in drawing public attention to these shortcomings, calling for the full application of the provisions of the treaty, but at the same time in making constructive suggestions to alleviate certain of the discriminations inherent in the treaty, with a view to making the application of the controls politically acceptable to all member states. Recommendation 93 is representative of the committee's thinking at that time²:

“Reviewing the application of the amended Brussels Treaty in the light of the eighth annual report of the Council;

Aware that one of its tasks, stemming from the treaty itself, is to ensure the application of the treaty, in particular concerning the control of armaments;

Deeply concerned to note that the provisions of the treaty regarding the levels of forces and the control of armaments, particularly nuclear weapons, are still not applied in accordance with the treaty which has been in force for more than eight years;

Noting that the Government of the United Kingdom has recognised that it has not maintained the level of British forces on the continent at the minimum of 55,000 men fixed by the Council, and has undertaken to bring these forces up to strength;

Noting that the convention making provision for due process of law, signed in Paris on 14th December 1957, has still not been ratified by France and Italy³, and that until it enters into force the Agency for the Control of Armaments cannot fulfil its duties in the manner prescribed by the treaty;

Further noting that the obligation imposed on the Council under Article III of Protocol No. III of the treaty to decide the level of stocks of atomic weapons that a member country will be allowed to hold when effective production has started on its territory is not subject to notification of production by the country concerned,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. With a view to eliminating cases of non-application of the treaty noted by the Assembly in the field of armaments control:

2. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1963 on the report of the committee on Defence Questions and Armaments “Application of the Brussels Treaty...”, Rapporteur Mr. Housiaux, Document 267.

3. Italy ratified the convention on 22nd September 1966.

(a) urge the governments of France and Italy to accelerate the procedure for ratification of the convention of 14th December 1957;

(b) authorise forthwith the abovementioned Agency to recruit atomic experts and to prepare the visits and controls necessary for the verification of levels of stocks and non-production of atomic weapons laid down in the treaty;

2. With a view to removing the political obstacles to the application of the treaty arising from the discrimination contained therein, study the possibility of amending the treaty:

(a) by extending armaments control measures to the territories of all member countries;

(b) by making it compulsory for all member countries to maintain on the continent at the disposal of SACEUR, minimum force levels calculated to make a fair contribution to the force levels to be maintained on the central front."

At the same time, the Assembly supported the various amendments being made by the Council from time to time to the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III to the treaty, with a view to permitting Germany to manufacture various categories of conventional weapons necessary for collective defence.

3.10. By the late 1970s, however, the committee had come to doubt the usefulness of the controls. A draft recommendation submitted to the Assembly in 1978 read: "Noting that the armaments control provisions of the Brussels Treaty are incompletely applied and that the usefulness of those that are applied is contested"¹ although the Assembly deleted the proviso "that the usefulness of those that are applied is contested" in adopting the text as Recommendation 320. The committee, at the same time, was calling for the levels of United Kingdom forces maintained on the continent under the terms of Article VI of Protocol No. II to be published in Council reports, a request to which the Council acceded fully for the first time in its twenty-fifth annual report for the year 1979 communicated to the Assembly on 28th March 1980.

3.11. The committee has summarised from time to time its understanding of the extent to

1. See the report on the application of the Brussels Treaty, Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe, Document 777, 31st May 1978.

which controls were applied. In 1979, for example, it reported that:

"22. In conclusion, the committee believes it may be asserted that the controls provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty are being applied on the mainland in respect of aircraft and non-strategic missiles capable of carrying nuclear bombs and warheads. No controls are applied in respect of the French strategic forces and the other European mainland countries have no strategic forces. Nuclear bombs and warheads in United States custody are not subject to control by the Agency."²

The annual report of the Council the following year stated as usual that:

"The activities of the Agency do not extend to nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear components of such weapons (namely the missiles themselves and other specially designed equipment) are subject to control except as regards the weapons qualified as 'strategic' by one member state. Furthermore, as this state has declared that its nuclear capability as a whole is directed to one and the same objective of deterrence, its missiles with nuclear capability and its tract launches are no longer subject to control."³

The committee commented:

"3.2. The Assembly was thus informed for the first time that French Pluton tactical nuclear missiles had just been withdrawn from Agency control. Hitherto these missiles (but not their nuclear warheads) were controlled by the Agency as is still the case for Lance missiles and other similar missiles equipping Belgian, German, Italian, Netherlands, and United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe. (Nuclear warheads for these missiles, which are American property held in American depots, are not subject to the controls provided for in the treaty.)"⁴

3.12. The draft recommendation attached to that report recommended that the Council "delete paragraph 5 of Annex III to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty" – the effect of that recommendation was to remove the remaining restrictions on the production of naval vessels by Germany, and such an

2. Report on the application of the Brussels Treaty, Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe, Document 808, 22nd May 1979.

3. Twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (for 1979), Document 833, 28th March 1980.

4. Report on the application of the Brussels Treaty, Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe, Document 836, 29th April 1980.

amendment was indeed made by the Council on 21st July 1980.

3.13. Finally, in the historical Recommendation 380 adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1982, on a report from the committee¹, the Assembly took a clear stand in favour of the removal of controls:

“(iii) Believing that several arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty no longer serve any useful purpose, and noting the Council’s view that ‘in applying the provisions of Protocol No. III and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situation in Europe’;

(iv) Believing therefore that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. In application of Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III;

2. In application of Article V of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, vary by reducing the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III.”

The effect of these recommendations, as far as Annex III was concerned, was to remove the final restrictions on the production of conventional weapons by Germany and, as far as Annex IV was concerned, the effect would be to reduce the list of weapons of all member countries subject to control on the mainland of Europe. The restrictions on the production of conventional weapons in Germany had already been considerably reduced by the Council by 1980, leaving in effect only long-range missiles and bomber aircraft for strategic purposes on the prohibited list². Recommendation 380 is still under consideration by the Council; it was finally reconfirmed by the Assembly on 29th November 1983 in Recommendation 397 which recommended that the Council, in considering the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III, should take into consideration “the possibility of deleting the list concerned except for atomic, biological and chemical weapons³”,

1. Application of the Brussels Treaty, Rapporteur Mr. Prussen, Document 908, 20th April 1982.

2. The original list of prohibitions as agreed in 1954, compared with the list as it exists today, is attached at Appendix II.

3. Adopted on the report on the application of the Brussels Treaty, Rapporteur Mr. Prussen, Document 948, 18th May 1983.

although the preamble read: “Aware that the controls on atomic and biological weapons ... have never been applied, but considering in present circumstances that it is no longer appropriate to apply them”.

(c) *The Standing Armaments Committee*

3.14. In 1955 the Standing Armaments Committee at first discussed very actively the chief task it had been set up to perform: “...it shall encourage ... agreements or arrangements on such subjects as the development, standardisation, production and procurement of armaments. These ... would remain open to participation by other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”.

3.15. The Council’s annual report for 1957⁴ showed the Standing Armaments Committee had worked chiefly on (i) an exchange of information on existing equipment and (ii) the definition, production and development of new equipment. It was already clear under (i) that “there is little chance of arriving at efficacious joint production of existing equipment”. There was hope, however, for the joint production of standardised new equipment, and the report for the following year⁵ mentioned “two lists of equipment submitted by the United Kingdom on the one hand and by France, Italy and Germany on the other” which “were allocated, in accordance with their nature, between the appropriate WEU and NATO organisations.” These lists became known as the “shopping lists”.

3.16. Already, however, from the latter report it was seen that proposals for the joint production of air and naval and some ground armaments had been referred to NATO. But for some time WEU studied the prospects of joint production of: surface-to-surface missiles (long-, medium-, and short-range); surface-to-air weapons; anti-tank weapons; mine detection and clearance equipment. In the event progress on these items did not go beyond agreement on the military characteristics of some of them; none reached the stage of joint development, let alone production. Nor did many of the items of the 1958 “shopping lists” referred to NATO fare much better. Actual joint production, when agreed, remained largely an ad hoc bi- or trilateral affair.

3.17. During the 1960s the Standing Armaments Committee continued work on agreeing the characteristics for various items of army equipment, but it is not clear whether any such

4. Document 79, 21st February 1958.

5. Document 119, 16th March 1959.

agreed characteristics were applied to equipment in production. By the 1970s the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee were largely those described in the Council's latest report discussed in paragraph 4.19.

IV. The present activities of WEU – the annual report of the Council for 1983

4.1. This chapter discusses the present activities of the Council as described in the chapters of the annual report for 1983 which have been referred to the committee: Chapter II. The activities of the Council (B) Defence questions; Chapter III. The Agency for the Control of Armaments; and Chapter IV. The Standing Armaments Committee.

(a) Activities of the Council

4.2. In the introduction to Chapter II the Council reports that during 1983 it "ensured that the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols were applied and observed, taking care to avoid – as required by the treaty – duplication of work with that in which WEU member states participate in other international fora". The extent of the Council's activity was typical of that in recent years; it held one meeting at ministerial level and twelve at the level of permanent representatives.

4.3. At the ministerial meeting there was the now customary exchange of views on East-West relations and a discussion of the situation in the Mediterranean. The ministers also discussed proposals concerning the future work of the Standing Armaments Committee. At permanent level, the Council dealt with more detailed and procedural matters concerning the application of the Brussels Treaty. It continued its examination of modifying the list of types of armaments to be controlled at Annex IV to Protocol No. III – the question had been under discussion by the Council since the spring of 1982 when the Assembly adopted Recommendation 380¹.

Levels of forces

4.4. During the year the Council went through the various procedures now in force to ensure that the force ceilings provided for in Protocol No. II to the Brussels Treaty were not exceeded. Under the terms of that protocol and the subsequent agreement on the level of forces signed on 14th December 1957, the maximum

levels of forces to be maintained by member countries on the mainland are those laid down in the unpublished special agreement annexed to the unratified EDC Treaty of 27th May 1952. Under the terms of Protocol No. II of the Brussels Treaty and the corresponding resolution of the North Atlantic Council of 22nd October 1954, national forces are assigned to NATO except those which NATO recognises as suitable for remaining under national command. The levels of internal defence and police forces remaining under national command are then approved by the WEU Council, while SACEUR reports to the WEU Council on the level of forces under his command, and a meeting in NATO of the representatives of the seven WEU countries certifies that the NATO annual review does not involve proposals for exceeding the Brussels Treaty force limits. The Council reports that "by means of the methods set out ... above, the Council have been able, in 1983, to carry out their obligations under Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty concerning levels of forces". The only anomaly since 1966 appears to be that France does not take part in the meeting at NATO Headquarters of the WEU permanent representatives to NATO, but makes a subsequent statement to the WEU Council about French forces. The present status of French forces, especially those in Germany, is clearly not provided for under the terms of the Brussels Treaty and North Atlantic Council resolution of 1954. Certainly since the withdrawal of French forces from NATO command, the WEU Council does not appear to have treated them as "internal defence and police forces" under the terms of Protocol No. II and subsequent agreements.

United Kingdom forces on the continent of Europe

4.5. Under Article VI of Protocol No. II the United Kingdom initially undertook "to maintain on the mainland of Europe ... the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, that is to say four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force, or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, regards as having equivalent fighting capacity ... not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the high contracting parties ...". Following successive decisions of the Council, the level of this commitment is now down to 55,000 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force.

4.6. The committee again notes with satisfaction that the information concerning this commitment given in the Council's annual report for 1983 meets the wishes as expressed

1. See paragraph 3.13.

inter alia in Recommendations 331 and 348. The report states in fact that the average number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1982 in accordance with Article VI of Protocol No. II was 58,420. However, it continues: "The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty there. In 1983 there were on average 995 men in Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated, these units would be speedily returned to their duty station in an emergency affecting NATO." It may be deduced that the average number of British troops actually stationed in Germany was 57,425 men, whereas the commitment is for 55,000. In the previous year, 59,567 were declared for Germany and 909 for Northern Ireland, making an average of 58,885 actually on the spot.

4.7. The annual report again gives details on the strength of the United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force:

"Furthermore, in accordance with the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 348, the Government of the United Kingdom have informed the Council that the strength of the United Kingdom's contribution to the Second Tactical Air Force in 1983 was:

<i>Rôle</i>	<i>Aircraft/ equipment</i>	<i>Squadrons</i>
Strike/Attack	Buccaneer	1
	Jaguar	4
	Tornado	1
Offensive support	Harrier	2
Reconnaissance	Jaguar	1
Air defence	Phantom	2
	Rapier surface-to-air missiles	4
Air transport	Puma	1
	Chinook	1
Ground defence	RAF regiment	1"

Compared with 1982, these figures reveal the replacement of one Buccaneer squadron by one new Tornado squadron, the removal of a Bloodhound missile squadron, and the arrival of the Chinook helicopters.

4.8. Although the foregoing statements on United Kingdom force levels on the continent show that the United Kingdom has more than met the current Brussels Treaty commitment of 55,000 men plus the second TAF in 1981, 1982 and 1983, the June 1981 white paper "The way forward" announced that "(17) BAOR's man-

power which had been planned to continue to increase beyond the 55,000 level, will be held at that level". Planned reorganisation of BAOR over the period 1983 to April 1984 involves both some strengthening of units in Germany with armed regiments and Rapier missile units, but also net reductions of about 2,000 men with one divisional headquarters and an infantry battalion being withdrawn to the United Kingdom. The committee will wish to be assured in future years that the level of 55,000 men is met, irrespective of any temporary deployments to Northern Ireland or elsewhere.

4.9. The committee recalls that publication in the Council's annual reports of the level of British forces assigned under Article VI of Protocol No. II is in no way a requirement imposed by the treaty. The United Kingdom agreed to include these figures in the annual report only in response to Assembly Recommendations 331 and 348, and only after repeated requests by the Assembly in several consecutive years. The committee sees no reason why the other six member countries should not agree to include in the annual report similar declarations concerning the forces which they assign to NATO command or, in the case of France, the forces which they maintain in Germany and which, according to the Council's annual report, are treated by the latter, as far as approval of their levels is concerned, in the same way as forces under NATO command. The committee therefore repeats this proposal in the draft recommendation.

(b) The Agency for the Control of Armaments

4.10. Chapter III of the Council's annual report on the Agency for the Control of Armaments follows, with small differences, mentioned below, those of recent years. The situation described in the previous chapter remains unchanged – the Agency is allowed to apply controls only very partially.

4.11. Like earlier reports, the Council's present report refers to fields where the Agency does not exercise its activities:

"B. Situation concerning the control of atomic, chemical and biological weapons

1. Atomic weapons

Since the situation has remained the same as in previous years, the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of atomic weapons.

2. Biological weapons

All the member countries again gave their agreement, for 1983, on the renewal of the list of biological weapons subject to control

as accepted by the Council in 1981. The Council noted the fact.

As in previous years, however, the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of biological weapons.”

Previous Council reports have included a statement to the effect that:

“The non-nuclear components of such (nuclear) weapons (namely the missiles themselves and other specially designed equipment) are subject to control except as regards the weapons qualified as ‘strategic’ by one member state. Furthermore, as this state has declared that its nuclear capability as a whole is directed to one and the same objective of deterrence, its missiles with nuclear capability and traced launchers are no longer subject to control.”¹

The committee has noted² that the state in question was France and that Pluton tactical nuclear missiles had been withdrawn from Agency control as from 1979.

4.12. As far as chemical weapons are concerned, the report shows that quantitative controls are not applicable because all countries have reported that they hold no stock:

“In addition, the Agency asked the member states, in the covering letter to its questionnaire, to declare any chemical weapons that they might hold, whatever their origin. Since all the member states replied in the negative, the Agency carried out no quantitative controls of chemical weapons in 1983.”

However, the report for 1983 regrettably omits the very important reservation contained in all recent annual reports:

“As the convention for the due process of law³ has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1982, as in previous years, to take the form of ‘agreed control measures’.

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks’ notice. Since this agreement

1. Document 833, 28th March 1980.

2. Document 875, 4th May 1981.

3. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957).

has never been withheld, the 1982 programme of control measures at privately-owned plants was therefore drawn up with full confidence that it could be implemented as in previous years.”

With that severe limitation, the Agency conducted an “agreed verification visit” to a chemical manufacturing plant in Germany.

4.13. The annual report points out that (although no quantitative biological or chemical weapons controls are carried out) the lists of biological and chemical weapons subject to control, agreed and amended by the Council in earlier years, were renewed for 1983. The original versions of these lists were reported to the Assembly in earlier years, and the amended list of chemicals has been communicated to and published by SIPRI⁴, these amended lists have not been communicated to the Assembly, despite the reiterated requests of the Assembly.

Activities of the Agency

4.14. Although the WEU controls have lost their usefulness, and the Agency’s true areas of activity remain limited solely to conventional weapons, the number of inspections carried out by the Agency each year shows that generally speaking there has been no reduction in its activities, as may be seen from the following table.

4.15. The committee has found particularly useful the lists of armaments currently being produced, set out in Section E “State and problems of control in certain particular fields” in earlier reports which gave a summary of current armaments production programmes in member countries. However, the Council cut down this section considerably in last year’s report. The present report retains the information in respect of land forces armaments, naval armaments and air force armaments, but omits entirely the useful section on missiles found in earlier reports. The committee asks the Council to retain in future reports all the useful information which the Agency for the Control of Armaments can provide.

Conclusion on the control of armaments

4.16. The annual report of the Council stresses the limited nature of the field control programme, particularly visits to private firms, but it is clear that the Agency for the Control of Armaments performs its tasks efficiently in

4. The list of chemical agents subject to control, approved by the WEU Council, was published by SIPRI in 1973 in “The problem of chemical and biological warfare”, Volume II, “CB weapons today”, page 217.

Numbers and types of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments - 1983

	Quantitative control measures				Non-production control measures		Total control measures (all categories)
	at depots	at units under national command	at production plants	Sub-total	at production plants	(of which non-production of chemical weapons)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1961	29	15	12	66	7	(2)	63
2	26	20	11	57	7	(2)	65
3	35	13	13	61	10	(4)	74
4	39	19	13	71	9	(4)	80
5	26	16	11	53	7	n.a.	60
6	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	78
7	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
8	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	79
9	*	*	*	*	*	(3)	77
1970	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>	<i>a</i> <i>b</i>		<i>a</i> <i>b</i>
	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	82 72
1	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	82 72
2	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	66
3	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	66
4	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	71
5	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	72
6	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	71
7	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
8	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	68
9	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
1980	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
1	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
2	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
3	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	72

Notes a, b: From 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of figures (old and new style - *a* and *b*) for the years 1970 and 1971.

n.a.: Information not available.

Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from published annual reports of the Council. With regard to the various categories of controls (columns 1 to 6), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the published annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the Committee. Those for 1970 to 1983 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permission to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without significance.

* Confidential information available to the Committee deleted from the published report.

those fields which are open to it – i.e. quantitative control of certain conventional weapons for forces not committed to NATO, while NATO checks these weapons in respect of committee forces.

4.17. The Council's report in its general conclusions on the Agency states:

“As required by Article XX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of field control measures carried out at force units and military depots and during *agreed* control measures at production plants, it did not detect *for the categories of armaments which it controls*,

- either the manufacture of a category of armaments that the government of the member state concerned had undertaken not to manufacture (Annexes II and III of Protocol No. III),
- or the existence, on the mainland of Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of Protocol No. IV) or not justified by export requirements (Article XXII of Protocol No. IV).

In 1983, the Agency again applied controls *in those fields which are open to it* in an effective, simple and inexpensive manner. As in the past, the help and co-operation of national and NATO authorities, and of heads of staff of both the private firms and the military establishments visited played an important part in the accomplishment of its mission.”

The emphasis has been added by the Rapporteur, and the significance of these limitations on the Agency's activities are explained above.

Studies by the Agency for the Control of Armaments

4.18. The Agency for the Control of Armaments conducts important studies on the principles of arms control, sometimes in technical fields. Its experts are in contact with various outside bodies. In the following chapter on the future of WEU the committee calls for considerable expansion of this constructive activity.

(c) The Standing Armaments Committee

4.19. The Council's report states that the Standing Armaments Committee met three times in 1983. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments held a joint meeting with it on 14th February 1984. The Standing Armaments Committee's chief activity being

concentrated on its study of the armaments industry of member countries which so far, to avoid duplication with the IEPG or NATO bodies has covered only legal aspects and part (expenditure and production by value) of the economic aspects. Unclassified versions of these parts have been communicated to the Assembly in 1981 and 1982. In 1983, the SAC completed an updating for the period 1972-81 of the first part of the economic study and presented it to the Council in April 1983. The Council has not authorised the SAC to prepare an unclassified version of this updating for the Assembly.

4.20. For the future the head of the SAC international secretariat submitted a number of proposals for future SAC studies, but the Council has authorised the SAC only to undertake a simplified annual updating of the economic part of its industry study and to study the future position of Japan in the armaments market, but not to undertake the second part (analytical description of the armaments industry based on data from the industry) of the economic study.

4.21. The remaining items on the SAC's agenda cannot be said to have been very active in 1983. A WEU agreement 4.FT.6 on standardised trial methods for wheeled vehicles was communicated to the United States for comment at the latter's request in 1979 with a view to harmonising testing methods. The United States has not offered comments but NATO is now to prepare a standardisation agreement on vehicles trials. A working group on operational research is responsible for arranging exchanges of information between WEU countries on OR, to organise symposia on the subject and to arrange visits to national OR centres. This work continued in 1983 and a symposium on “operator/computer interface and related subjects” is being organised in spring 1984. The working group on obstacles and hindrances to enemy action is not being convened at present.

4.22. The committee's proposals for the future of the SAC are set forth in the next chapter.

V. Proposals for the future of WEU

(a) General

5.1. World history reminds us that each time a nation has relied on another to ensure its defence it has finished by disappearing. Hence, Europe must shoulder the major part of its own security. Europe, a human community with more than 270 million inhabitants and the world's leading commercial power, is also – and

Europeans should remember this – the land where democracy was borne and still survives. It is therefore in itself a treasure which we must have the will to protect and to defend. It should not be forgotten that ten-power Europe is wealthier than the Soviet Union, more populated than the United States and has all the knowledge necessary for acquiring the means of ensuring its security. In order to recover its dignity, it is therefore essential for Europe to set up within the Atlantic Alliance, which is more than ever indispensable, a more effective and credible European pillar. There is no denying that for several months the problem of Europe's security has again been arousing the interest of political leaders and observers.

5.2. There are various reasons for this phenomenon:

(i) *The impressive military potential* of the Soviet Union, which has unceasingly pursued its armaments effort, even during the period of so-called détente, whether in the field of conventional, nuclear or chemical weapons. As Mr. Tindemans, the Belgian Minister for External Relations, recently recalled:

“The necessity and the urgency for the strengthening of a European pillar comes from the fact that the USSR, after reassuring itself about strategic parity with the United States, has acquired regional superiority, as much with regard to Europe as to other regions of the world. This regional superiority – of which the massive deployment of SS-20s is only one fact – threatens us directly, us Europeans, to the extent that ‘the balance of terror’ existing between the two superpowers could dissuade American intervention and thus make a limited conflict on our continent possible.

It is therefore essential for us not only to strengthen the coupling which links us to our American allies but also to demonstrate to the USSR that a limited attack against Europe would come up against a determined and efficient reply.”¹

(ii) *Difficulties of understanding between American and European partners*

Another reason for the revival of interest in European discussion of security problems certainly stems from the difficulties felt by Europeans in understanding the policy pursued by the United States. On this side

of the Atlantic, it seems increasingly evident that European and American interests are not always identical. The monetary policy pursued by the United States Government, and even its agricultural policy, show to what extent the United States and the EEC have become rival commercial entities. Furthermore, Europeans are finding it difficult to understand the “great power” requirements of the United States. Moreover, they are feeling rather concerned at the United States turning towards the Pacific world.

(iii) *Difficulties with the political integration of Europe* in the framework of the responsibilities and institutions provided for in the Rome Treaty and the failure of the Athens and Brussels summit meetings give a vague feeling that it would perhaps be useful, if there is to be progress towards European political co-operation, to turn again to the question of Europe's defence which in any event must be re-examined in depth.

(iv) *The growing cost of armaments*, which means that in the future only an economic and technological entity of the size of Europe will still be able to design and produce the means needed for ensuring its security and defence. In the absence of European armaments co-operation, the day will come when only the United States will be able to produce the systems needed for defending the free world.

(v) *The necessary updating of strategic concepts for the defence of the European continent*

Recent Soviet superiority in the field of operational theatre nuclear forces, coupled with conventional superiority over and strategic parity with the United States, makes it necessary to re-examine the credibility of the flexible response strategy now in force in the alliance. Similarly, a study must be made of the consequences for Europe of the development by both the Soviet Union and the United States of anti-ballistic defence systems stationed in space.

5.3. The new but obvious interest shown by various governments in “relaunching” WEU, springs in part from dissatisfaction with the progress of discussions on matters relating to European defence in other frameworks. European political co-operation among the Ten, despite last year's Stuttgart declaration to the effect that “political and economic aspects of security” could be discussed by the Ten, is not at present progressing as rapidly as some participants would wish. The attitude of the

1. Opening speech by Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, at the eighth annual conference of European and American journalists, Knokke, 5th April 1984.

present Danish and Greek Governments is cited as a factor, as is the neutrality of Ireland, which, however, may be less permanent than has been thought¹. The most recent declaration on East-West relations issued by the Ten on 30th March 1984² shows nevertheless a concerted policy to arms control and disarmament negotiations.

5.4. The Independent European Programme Group which is concerned with the joint production of armaments has shown some signs of new activity having for the first time issued a press communiqué and resolution at the conclusion of a meeting in The Hague on 2nd and 3rd April at the level of secretaries of state³. The resolution in paragraph 1 stresses the importance of a search for European solutions in national armaments planning.

5.5. Proposals for "relaunching" WEU have been associated in particular with the French and Italian Governments for a number of years, but recently Belgian and German ministers have commented favourably on the idea. The French and Belgian Governments have put their views on the future of WEU into concrete and precise form in memoranda addressed to the governments of member countries.

5.6. President Mitterrand of France, without expressly mentioning WEU, has on a number of recent occasions referred to defence problems in a European context. On French television on 16th November 1983, he said:

"(Europe) must overcome some important obstacles born from the second world war which have left Germany with a particular status forbidding it certain military developments, especially in the nuclear field. That is the consequence of the war. The Soviet Union is very vigilant in this context; it is not the only one. I understand the strength of the idea of European defence, praiseworthy in itself and which should be an important objective of all those with political responsibility in Western Europe, provided ... the final division of Europe (is avoided)."

5.7. In The Hague on 7th February 1984, President Mitterrand said:

"There are many voices raised almost everywhere today in favour of European

1. See "Irish neutrality - a policy in course of evolution?", Trevor C. Salmon, NATO Review Volume 32, No. 1, March 1984, and "Irish neutrality: ideology or pragmatism?", Raymond J. Raymond, International Affairs, Volume 60, No. 1, Winter 1983-84 - Royal Institute of International Affairs (United Kingdom).

2. Appendix III.

3. Appendix IV.

defence. The excessive strength of the two superpowers, the setback in their disarmament negotiations, the tensions that result, the possession of nuclear weapons by five states, the effacement of Europe as a force capable of having its own plans, have aroused nostalgia and created a need which should not be underestimated.

.....

But an honest examination of the question leads to the following considerations: in the present state of affairs, Europe remains divided between the security that exists and the security that it hopes for. There is no doubt it would choose the first, the Atlantic Alliance which is not near to seeing itself supplanted by a European alliance. This comes from the fact that no military force is in a position to replace the American arsenal. France, in any case, will not use its nuclear capacity otherwise than for its own strategy of deterrence and Europe as a whole will not run the risk of finding itself exposed.

.....

France has not hidden from its allies that, apart from the protection of its national sanctuary and vital interests connected with it, it could not assume responsibility for the security of Europe. For strategic reasons and for reasons of international policy which follow, the decision on the use of the French nuclear weapon cannot be shared. There remains a vast field however where we can organise our security, not only with conventional weapons but also through the new possibilities that are going to burst upon the world scene."

President Mitterrand went on to propose that Europe should be able to launch an inhabited space station for military observation purposes.

5.8. Addressing the *Institut des hautes études de défense nationale* on 20th September 1983, Mr. Mauroy, French Prime Minister, said:

"On several occasions, the President of the Republic, the members of the government and I have had occasion to express the wish that Europe assert itself more and to underline the interests of an independent Europe in face of the dangers inherent in a world which is just bipolar.

We have also confirmed France's position: independent but solidarity with the Atlantic community.

At the beginning of this address, I made a precise analysis of our links with our partners in the Atlantic Alliance since

everyone can see they are decisive. But France endeavours to maintain other links, in Western European Union, for instance. This European organisation is the only one which can tackle matters relating to defence and security.

WEU has a unique structure for concerting views. Moreover, this structure is coherent with our more general commitments since all members of WEU are also members of the Atlantic Alliance and of the European Community, and only European states are members of it.

France considers that European solidarity enhances Atlantic solidarity without being merged with it. The similarity of the geo-strategic problems facing the European countries should lead them to take specific common decisions. In this respect WEU can be a privileged forum for reflection.

I would also recall that that organisation is the only European body with defence responsibilities where members of parliament can discuss problems affecting Europe's security. We wish members of parliament, and hence public opinion, to be associated with thinking about and then taking decisions on everything that concerns the security of each man and each woman in our country and our continent.

In the years to come, we must devote our efforts to developing the means of Europe's independence without sacrificing what has, for the past thirty years, been the independent guarantees of our security."

5.9. Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, in a much noted article in *Le Monde* of 23rd December 1983, wrote:

"For various reasons and particularly the better to oppose neutralist tendencies, I believe it is necessary to seek increased 'Europeanisation' of defence problems. I agree with Mr. Mauroy when he asserts that nothing at present can replace the American nuclear systems which guarantee the security of the European states, especially those which do not possess a national nuclear force. I think like him that reflection between our governments on the strategic concepts and certain forms of defence co-operation are today possible and desirable. Not everyone in the Community is of that opinion. We cannot therefore use the structures of political co-operation, which are the natural extension of this Community. There remains WEU, an old organisation, the structures and possibilities of which are largely unused. Personally, I see no reason why we should not try to use

it to develop a sort of co-operation on politico-military problems, provided that the organisation itself is open to all the members of the Community who accept its rules. A development of this sort would at least provisionally introduce the notion of a 'differentiated' Europe in the security field, similar to that which the European monetary system established in the monetary field. This notion obviously carries certain dangers for the cohesion of the whole. But provided that only those who exclude themselves are excluded, and provided that a serious attempt is made to bring the various structures together as far as possible, in practice, this way seems to me a lesser evil."

5.10. Addressing the eighth annual conference of European and American journalists in Knokke on 5th April 1984, Mr. Tindemans specified that:

"In second place, *confidence in our solidarity must be re-established as regards security and defence*. The Atlantic Alliance is coming up against a growing disenchantment in public opinion in the very least, as we have seen in certain European countries. In addition, I am afraid that the gap between us is tending to widen. It is in fact at the very time when ideas about pacificism, neutralism, Finlandisation and denuclearisation are multiplying in Europe, without however a very clear distinction being made most of the time between each of these notions, that the United States expects Europe to make a keen effort in the matter of defence of its own territory, so as to enable the United States to take on the growing responsibilities which are theirs on the world level.

I personally believe that the solution must now be taken up again and applied, a solution which is by no means new, which is to set up a '*European pillar*' within NATO. The defence of Europe is not only the business of Europeans. But a clearer confirmation of the European identity with regard to security and defence would respond to the development of European integration and would make it possible – without guarantee however – to make an extra European effort in the area of defence. Certainly, such a development would assume acceptance by the United States as a 'full partner'.

It also implies, on the part of the European countries, the will to give a European dimension to their security. It also implies that the efforts to be undertaken on one side and the other should be with common

agreement and according to a common strategy.

The objective of such a 'European pillar' is to reinforce the 'partnership' within the alliance, thus making it once again more in line with public opinion and better able to safeguard our common security in Europe.

The European pillar must have credibility and a political structure, without which we shall never be able to mobilise the degree of solidarity necessarily required in a common action in the matter of defence. Public opinion cannot be motivated without an ideal or a common heritage to defend, and a political concept as its expression. What is more, the responsibility for actions to be implemented, must be situated on a political level with true democratic control. These conditions are obviously best met within the framework of European integration of the Ten, always bearing in mind, however, that it will be fitting to reinforce, when the time comes, the political institutional facet.

Secondly, the action undertaken on the European front, should at least represent a reinforcement or, in any case, the maintenance of the present degree of security, this being as much for Europe as for America. It would be crazy indeed to want to enter upon a path which would lead to the weakening of the free world. This condition, in my eyes, means that the European pillar cannot damage the cohesion and credibility of the alliance.

And finally, a sufficiently realistic approach must be adopted so that the suggestions put forward have some chance of being achieved. It cannot indeed be forgotten that the failure of the European community on defence still remains fresh in the mind. Any project which is too ambitious, risks since then being seen as utopic and being therefore thrown out before an examination of its own merits is made.

A progressive approach strictly connected to the alliance but based on political co-operation between the Ten is certainly the best course. However, we know that certain member states are not in any case presently disposed to committing themselves in this direction.

And so it has been thought - and the French presidency has put out a memorandum about this - to have recourse in the first instance to WEU, which brings together those from amongst the ten European countries who advocated a

clearer confirmation of the European identity with regard to defence. But from the beginning, 'decoupling' must be avoided, as much in relation to the Ten as to NATO, an action linked on three levels, WEU, the Ten and NATO would doubtless be the best answer at this stage.

The interest of this approach linked to the WEU, the Ten and within NATO lies in clearly stating from the very beginning, that the WEU exercise cannot be a substitute for a development to be carried out by the Ten, nor can it be conceived or undertaken outside of NATO.

And so, Belgium, persuaded on the one hand by the need to rapidly reinforce European defence and mindful on the other hand of the limitations inherent in the operation, has put forward the following proposals:

It would be appropriate to reshape the WEU into the suitable framework for a common effort of reflection and co-ordination of policies of the Seven in matters of security and defence. This common thinking could then be proposed to NATO with increased political weight.

So that each member might make a balanced contribution to the common efforts in defence, it would be necessary to adapt existing measures as regards production and control of armaments.

In addition, within the WEU, the Seven should try on the one hand to promote a strict co-ordination of their policies with regard to conception, production and acquisition of armaments, and on the other hand to set up a forum on co-operation and analysis of disarmament questions.

It will probably be necessary, for the success of the envisaged reform, to adapt the different organs of the WEU, among others the Assembly and the Council, to the new tasks of discussion and initiative-taking which will be given over to them.

To this effect, we have submitted to our partners in the WEU a few concrete suggestions concerning the modifications we envisage. Our proposals are, at the moment, the object of thorough consultations, both with our Atlantic allies and with our partners from the Ten and from the Seven.

We have recalled, on each occasion, our deep attachment to the reinforcement of the European union and the maintenance of Atlantic solidarity, the only effective and credible guarantee of security in

Europe. The strengthening of the WEU and the development of its activities seem to us to be such that they will be able to contribute to these two objectives which are fundamental to our diplomacy.

I am already able to tell you that first reactions to our proposals have been largely favourable."

5.11. The press has reported the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Mr. van den Broek, as saying that Europe might play a greater part in security policy, but only as the partner of the United States and in the NATO context. The Netherlands was not in favour of the creation of alternative structures like a nuclear Europe or a European bloc in NATO. French insistence on revitalising WEU raised doubts and problems in relation to the non-nuclear countries and member countries of the Community or the alliance, which were not members of WEU, and in relation to European political co-operation. Mr. van den Broek felt that it would be better to consolidate Eurogroup and to exploit all the potential of the IEPG in which France was represented¹.

5.12. The United Kingdom Minister for Defence, Mr. Michael Heseltine, in a recent interview in the French press², said, "Britain considers NATO to be the most important guarantee for the security of Europe. There is no question therefore of putting it in doubt in any way." Asked about French proposals for relaunching WEU, he replied: "It is of course important for the Europeans to improve their defence co-operation, in WEU, but also in other forums linked to NATO such as the Eurogroup of which I am at present chairman.... We British are as attached as anyone to the European idea."

5.13. Speaking in Bremen on 10th April 1984, Mr. Genscher, the German Foreign Minister, said:

"...It must be recognised that America does not want a weak partner but a sound European pillar in the Atlantic Alliance. Instead of complaining that the Americans are abandoning Europe, we should do our utmost to make Europe a united, sound partner of the United States, aware of its worth.

It is not the Americans who are refusing to allow us more weight in the alliance, it is the Europeans who, through weakness and lack of determination, are willingly taking a back seat to the Americans ...

Strengthening the European pillar of the alliance means above all attending to the strengthening of European co-operation in the security field. There is a framework for this: Western European Union, in which France, the Benelux countries and Britain were first allied, to be joined in 1954 by Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany.

This association for common defence should be relaunched to ensure that there is greater awareness of common interests with regard to security policy and the contributions made by Europeans in the framework of NATO. Europe should increasingly speak with a single voice in the alliance and define its security interests collectively. Where its defence is concerned, it should also become more closely united and pool its forces. It must stop being the 'ward' of American strength and see that its security is more surely guaranteed thanks to its own efforts."

(b) Specific proposals

5.14. The view of the Assembly "that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s" and its specific recommendations concerning amendments to the arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty, contained in the historical Recommendations 380 and 397, have been quoted in paragraph 3.13 above. In the first of these recommendations, the Assembly identified the abiding features of the modified Brussels Treaty, which do not call for amendment:

"(ii) Noting that the Council and the Assembly alike recognise that fundamental provisions of the Brussels Treaty, particularly the mutual security provisions of Articles IV, V and VIII.3, retain their full value, and that there is interest in making greater use of Western European Union as an instrument of European security ; "

Recommendation 397 expressed the Assembly's views:

"that the fullest use should be made of the qualified staffs of the Standing Armaments Committee and of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, both for the study of problems within their respective competence for the benefit of the alliance as a whole, and to assist the Assembly in the preparation of its reports ..."

5.15. Specific proposals can now be made in the context of these recommendations, and the speech by Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence, in the Assembly on 1st December

1. Atlantic News, 4th April 1984.

2. *Le Point*, No. 602, 2nd April 1984.

1983 took up these specific proposals of the committee:

“Because the WEU Assembly is the only parliamentary body authorised by treaty to study and debate problems concerning the defence of the states of Western Europe, and because, under the modified treaty of 1954, the WEU member states solemnly undertook to afford assistance in the event of aggression against any one of them, I wish here to reaffirm how irreplaceable and indispensable we consider the set of institutions comprising Western European Union – the Council, the Assembly, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments – for strengthening the security of our countries.

.....

As your debates have shown, we are all aware of the need to develop, among Europeans, our thinking on defence. I repeat that this in no way conflicts with the development of relations between the Western European states and the United States of America. Our determination to see the balance of forces maintained in Europe rests precisely on the conviction that for a long time to come the security of our closest partners, those with whom we are associated on the economic level within the European Community, cannot be ensured without the guarantee of the United States and the latter's presence in Europe.

That, however, neither conflicts with nor excludes the development of links between Europeans. On the contrary, in view of the new challenges facing us, the Europeans – with WEU taking a leading rôle – must formulate their own demands, that is to say, their own priorities.

In my view, the thirtieth anniversary of the Paris treaty should affirm and demonstrate the ability of Europeans to advance along the path of common security.

.....

France has made proposals for further increasing the rôle of this (Standing Armaments) Committee. I know that the Secretary-General, for his part, has suggested initiatives which I can only support.

.....

WEU should be the vehicle for the expression of common European priorities and convergent options. There can be no effective common policy without close co-operation over armaments.

.....

It is a good thing that, in regard to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe of the negotiation of other treaties such as the ban on the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, the WEU states should be able, within the framework of WEU where they have technical expertise available, to add to their knowledge and develop their joint thinking on arms limitations, in accordance with their own security concepts. This dimension, already present in certain of the reports which your Assembly has examined, could, it seems to me, be made more systematic and thus help to enlighten the Council.

.....

There can be no question of intervening in the negotiation processes or of questioning the existing consultation machinery. On the other hand – and that might be a new dimension for the Agency for the Control of Armaments – it would be very useful for the European states to conduct studies, discussions and technical investigations in the field of arms limitation.”

5.16. The proposals to make the Agency for the Control of Armaments responsible for conducting studies and technical investigations in the field of arms limitation directly reflect the committee's own proposals in the last report¹.

(c) The committee's recommendations

5.17. In the view of the committee, the time has now come to give concrete form to some of the proposals for relaunching WEU.

WEU as a forum for the discussion of defence problems

5.18. Developments in the international situation require a firmer European presence in the Atlantic Alliance to which the WEU member countries are indefectibly attached. WEU, which groups countries belonging both to the Atlantic Alliance and to the EEC, is thus a privileged forum for in-depth reflection on the needs of Europe's security. Giving new life to WEU also implies greater awareness on the part of the seven member countries of the close commitments which bind them within the collective security system which is WEU. Strengthening the European pillar of the

1. Document 948, Application of the Brussels Treaty, Rapporteur Mr. Prussen, explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.12., 18th May 1983.

alliance necessarily implies improved co-ordination of member countries' defence policies and armaments programmes. In this context, the work of the Council and of the Standing Armaments Committee should lead to better co-ordination of the positions of the Seven in the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG). As Mr. Mauroy underlined, WEU also has the advantage of possessing a complete institutional structure – Council, Assembly and technical bodies – allowing those who have been elected, i.e. parliamentarians, and through them public opinion, to be associated with working out and then deciding on everything relating to the security of our continent.

The Assembly

5.19. It is clear therefore that in view of the questions which public opinion is rightly asking, any worthwhile revitalisation of WEU necessarily involves a greater rôle for the Assembly and the deepening of the dialogue between the Assembly and the Council. The parliaments of member countries and the Assembly itself should therefore ensure that parliamentarians particularly alive to defence and security problems are appointed members of the WEU Assembly. The Assembly should at last obtain the financial means necessary for fulfilling its task.

The Council

5.20. Since both the revitalisation of WEU and the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance depend above all on the political will expressed by the governments of member countries in the Council, the future of this twofold project will depend essentially on the work of the ministers meeting in Council. The committee therefore considers it essential that in future the Council meet at least twice a year at ministerial level (Ministers for Foreign Affairs and/or Defence). In this respect, the committee welcomes the fact that the ministers of defence of the Seven are to meet in Rome next October on the occasion of the commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the modification of the treaty.

5.21. Moreover, the committee considers that when the Council meets at permanent level, senior officials of the ministries for foreign affairs concerned, plus representatives of the ministries of defence and military headquarters, might be associated with the work of the ambassadors.

5.22. As for the contents of the agenda of these meetings, the following might be included, although this is not an exhaustive list:

- European defence policy priorities;

- European defence strategy;
- studies on and joint production of armaments and re-equipment programmes and the logistic support of forces;
- the military aspects of European space projects;
- the harmonisation of military service;
- threat assessment;
- the European position in negotiations on the control of armaments;
- etc.

5.23. To safeguard the links with the other European allies and with NATO, the committee proposes:

- (i) that the agenda proposed above for ministerial meetings be communicated to the other European members of NATO in advance;
- (ii) that the Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council be instructed to report the conclusions of such meetings on the one hand to the Ten and on the other to Eurogroup and to NATO ministerial bodies and, where arms production matters are concerned, to the IEPG.

The Standing Armaments Committee

5.24. As the committee has recommended in the past, more use should be made of the Standing Armaments Committee to study the capabilities of the European armaments industry, for the use both of governments and of committees of the Assembly when reporting on relevant topics. But the Standing Armaments Committee should also play a more effective rôle with regard to co-operation. Its rôle might consist of preparing and implementing political decisions reached by the Seven with regard to armaments. The committee also proposes that the SAC ensure seven-power co-ordination in the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG). It suggests that the head of the SAC international secretariat might attend meetings of the IEPG.

Arms control provisions of the treaty

5.25. The committee naturally reiterates its earlier proposals, which it understands have now been put formally to the Council by France, that the remaining restrictions on the production of conventional weapons in Germany be removed through the deletion of the remaining items on the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels

Treaty, and that quantitative controls on conventional weapons of all member countries on the mainland of Europe be abolished, by the Council varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III by the deletion of all paragraphs other than paragraph 1 (which covers atomic, biological and chemical weapons). The Council is empowered to modify the two lists in question under Articles II and V of Protocol No. III itself by a two-thirds majority in the first case and unanimously in the second.

5.26. The fact that the controls relating to atomic and biological weapons have never been applied and that the controls on chemical weapons are only very partially applied is explained in Chapter IV, paragraph 4.11, above. The preamble to Recommendation 397, adopted by the Assembly last year on the basis of the committee's report, states in this connection:

"Aware that the controls on atomic and biological weapons provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty have never been applied, but considering in the present circumstances that it is no longer appropriate to apply them;"

The Agency for the Control of Armaments

5.27. The committee considers that the Agency for the Control of Armaments, which has carried out important work in the past but will be relieved of the application of certain control measures, might in future turn its experience to good use by considering the problems of verifications linked with disarmament agreements. The Agency might become a forum for consultation on and analysis of all matters relating to the limitation of armaments in Europe. In this connection the Agency might take as a model the work carried out by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) which has conducted extensive studies into all aspects of arms control and disarmament. The United States ACDA is cited here as a model because it appears to be the most important example of a governmental institution, having direct links with both the parliament and the government of its country. The WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments should be at the disposal of the Council and the governments as well as of the Assembly.

5.28. It might for instance study the facilities required by observers for effective observation of manoeuvres and troop movements under the CSCE confidence-building measures, or conduct similar studies concerning verification measures

that might be involved when troops are withdrawn under the MBFR negotiations; the implications for arms control negotiations the introduction of new weapons systems; or the military budgets of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, etc.

5.29. The committee finally stresses the importance of such fundamental changes in the rôle of the Agency for the Control of Armaments being introduced gradually as and when it is relieved of its other tasks.

(d) In conclusion

5.30. WEU is the only European body with defence responsibilities. It groups countries which, over and beyond the economic solidarity of the Common Market, wish to assert their solidarity in the security field. This solidarity is expressed in undertakings and institutions. Full means are available for taking action. The mutual commitments entered into by the signatory countries of the modified Brussels Treaty are an undertaking to afford military assistance in the event of aggression (Article V) and an undertaking to consult each other, particularly in the case of a threat to peace (Article VIII). For the implementation of the treaty, Article IV provides for close co-operation with NATO.

5.31. An affirmation of European solidarity covering security matters, the modified Brussels Treaty is therefore also an appeal to Atlantic solidarity. In the framework of mutual assistance, it is easier to defend those who show the wish to defend themselves. To strengthen the European pillar of the alliance in no way means slackening links; it facilitates the operation of the alliance by establishing a better balance between North America and the hard core of Western European countries.

5.32. To allow member countries to fulfil their commitments, the modified Brussels Treaty set up a Council "so organised as to be able to exercise its functions continuously" (Article VIII). If it is recalled that WEU has a parliamentary assembly, an intergovernmental body for co-operation, the SAC, and a technical agency, the ACA, it can be seen that WEU has all the legal instruments and institutional means for taking continuous action to promote joint defence interests and assert a political will. Its potentialities measure up to the hopes of those in favour of a Europe capable of asserting its personality.

APPENDIX I

Rules of access to the BTO archives¹

The Council of Western European Union have agreed to the release for research purposes of the political and military archives of the Brussels Treaty Organisation covering the period April 1948 to December 1950 on the following conditions :

1. The original archives shall be retained at the offices of Western European Union and shall not be accessible. Copies of an inventory can be provided on application to the Secretary-General.
2. One microfilmed copy of the releasable archives will be available for study at the Public Record Office, Ruskin Avenue, Kew, Richmond, Surrey TW9 4DU, subject to the conditions stated below.
3. Applications from bona fide researchers must be accompanied by letters of recommendation from their organisation, university or embassy in London ; they should be made in writing to the Secretary-General of WEU and NOT to the Public Record Office. The subject and purpose of the research work must be clearly indicated.
4. The Secretary-General may reject an application. In assessing the latter he will take into consideration, inter alia, the rule of reciprocity whereby similar diplomatic archives shall normally be available for research purposes in the country of the applicant, and/or at the seat of a multilateral treaty organisation of which that country is a member.
5. The Secretary-General of WEU shall give written permission to the applicant, and written notification of this to the Public Record Office.
6. On receipt of the written permission mentioned in Article 5 above, the applicant should, at his convenience, present himself at the Public Record Office taking with him the Secretary-General's note of authorisation. A reader's ticket will then be issued to him.
7. A copy of any publication based on the study of the microfilmed archives, as well as transcripts of any public presentation, shall be supplied without charge to the Secretary-General as soon as possible.

1. The Council of Western European Union approved rules of access to the political archives on 11th February 1981, and to the military archives on 1st February 1984.

Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey
List of political files deposited by Western European Union

DG 1	Date	Description	File ref.
1	1948 July- 1949 March 1949 June- 1950 December	BRUSSELS TREATY ORGANISATION	
		<i>Records of sessions of the Consultative Council</i>	
		Vol. I : 2nd-5th sessions (indexed in DG1/3 file 8)	1
		Vol. II : 6th-10th sessions (sessions 6-9 indexed in DG1/3 file 8)	2
		<i>Minutes of meetings of the Permanent Commission</i>	
		Vol. I : 1st-46th meetings	3
		Vol. II (part 1) : 47th-69th* meetings	4
		Vol. II (part 2) : 69th*-71st meetings	4
		Vol. III : 72nd-95th meetings	5
		Vol. IV : 96th-128th meetings	6
		<i>Subject files</i>	
		China : recognition of communist government : extracts from minutes	7
		Consultative Council : index to the first nine sessions	8
Conventions : Correspondence and other papers concerning ratification procedures :			
Social and medical assistance between the Brussels Treaty Powers (signed 7th Nov. 1949)	9		
Social security schemes : extension and co- ordination (signed 7th Nov. 1949)	10		
Frontier workers (signed 17th April 1950)	11		
Student employees (signed 17th April 1950)	12		
Council of Europe : extracts from minutes and other papers (folios 1-108)	13		

* The English minutes of the 69th meeting are in piece 1 ; the French minutes are in piece 2.

DG 1	Date	Description	File ref.
4	1949 Feb.- 1950 March	Council of Europe : extracts from minutes and other papers (folios 109-229)	13
	1948	Discriminatory treatment amongst the Five : Secretary-General's note	14
	1949-1950	Relations with East Germany : extracts from minutes and other papers	15
	1949-1950	Relations with West Germany : extracts from minutes	16
	1948-1949	Relations with Israel : extracts from minutes and other papers	17
	1948-1949	Italy and the Brussels Treaty : extracts from minutes and other papers	18
	1950	Korea : extracts from minutes and other papers	19
	1948	Overseas territories : extracts from minutes and other papers	20
	1948	Permanent Commission : composition and relations with other bodies	21
	1948	Ditto : progress report	22
	1948-1950	Terms of reference of the Permanent Commission, the Consultative Council and various committees	23
	1948-1949	Press issues : communiqués and reports released by the Permanent Commission	24
	1950	Ditto	25
	1949	Soviet-Yugoslav relations : Secretary-General's notes and extract from minutes	26
	1948	Relations with Spain : extract from minutes and other papers	27
	1948-1950	United Nations General Assembly : records of meetings of experts prior to United Nations sessions	28

Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey
List of military files deposited by Western European Union

DG 1	Date	Description	File ref.
		BRUSSELS TREATY ORGANISATION	
5	1948	<i>Conference of five defence ministers and chiefs-of-staff of Brussels Treaty powers: minutes of meeting 30th April 1948</i>	29
	1948	Ditto: minutes of meeting 27th September 1948	30
	1949	Ditto: minutes of meeting 14th January 1949	31
	1949	Ditto: minutes of meeting 7th April 1949	32
	1949	Ditto: minutes of meeting 15th-16th July 1949	33
	1949	Ditto: minutes of meeting 23rd November 1949	34
	1950	Ditto: minutes of meeting 5th September 1950	35
6	1948-1950	<i>Chiefs-of-Staff Committee: minutes of meetings August 1948-June 1950</i>	36
	1948	<i>Military Committee: minutes of meetings August-December</i>	37
	1949	Ditto: minutes of meetings January-April	38
	1949	Ditto: minutes of meetings May-August	39
7	1949	Ditto: minutes of meetings September-December	40
	1950	Ditto: minutes of meetings January-April	41
	1950	Ditto: minutes of meetings May-July	42
	1948-1950	<i>Ministers of Finance meetings April-October 1948 and January 1950: reports</i>	43
	1948-1949	<i>Finance and Economic Committee: minutes of meetings November 1948 - May 1949</i>	44
8	1949	Ditto: minutes of meetings June-December 1949	45
	1950	Ditto: minutes of meetings February-December 1950	46
	1949-1950	Ditto: reports	47
	1949-1950	Ditto: documents	48
9	1950	<i>Western Union Supply Board, Supply Executive Committee: minutes</i>	49
	1949	Ditto: reports	50
	1950	Ditto: reports	51

DG 1	Date	Description	File ref.
		<i>Subject files</i>	
9 <i>cont'd</i>	1948	Military questions, Military Committee papers, progress reports and correspondence: April-September	52
10	1948	Ditto: October-December	53
	1949	Ditto: January-March	54
	1949	Ditto: April-December	55
11	1950	Ditto: January-December	56
	1948-1950	Defence co-operation	57
	1948-1949	Financing of military costs	58
12	1950	Ditto: January-April	59
13	1950	Ditto: May-December	60
	1950	Financing of infrastructure programme	61
	1949	Request to United States Government for military assistance	62
	1949	Bilateral agreement for distribution of military aid	63
14	1949-1951	Additional production programme	64
	1949	Status of members of armed forces	65
	1949-1950	Ditto	66
15	1949-1951	Expenditure on headquarters	67
	1949-1951	Supply of RAF equipment to Western Union air forces	68
	1948	Utilisation of certain armaments	69
	1949	Control of exports of strategic materials	70
	1950	Vulnerable key points that need protection	71
	1948	Ideological aspect of defence: note by Secretary-General and extract from minutes of Permanent Commission	72
	1949-1951	Non-warlike stores: Report and minutes of sub-committee	73

APPENDIX II

*Weapons which the Federal Republic of Germany further undertakes not to manufacture on its territory**Annex III to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty***A. Original (1954) text**

This list comprises the weapons defined in paragraphs IV to VI and the factories earmarked solely for their production. All apparatus, parts, equipment, installations, substances and organisms, which are used for civilian purposes or for scientific, medical and industrial research in the fields of pure and applied science shall be excluded from this definition.

IV. LONG-RANGE MISSILES, GUIDED MISSILES AND INFLUENCE MINES

(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (d), long-range missiles, and guided missiles are defined as missiles such that the speed or direction of motion can be influenced after the instant of launching by a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile, including V-type weapons developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications thereof. Combustion is considered as a mechanism which may influence the speed.

(b) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (d), influence mines are defined as naval mines which can be exploded automatically by influences which emanate solely from external sources, including influence mines developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications thereof.

(c) Parts, devices or assemblies specially designed for use in or with the weapons referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

(d) Proximity fuses, and short-range guided missiles for anti-aircraft defence with the following maximum characteristics are regarded as excluded from this definition :

- Length, 2 metres ;
- Diameter, 30 centimetres ;
- Speed, 660 metres per second ;
- Ground range, 32 kilometres ;
- Weight of warhead, 22.5 kilogrammes.

V. WARSHIPS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SMALLER SHIPS FOR DEFENCE PURPOSES

"Warships, with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes" are :

- (a) Warships of more than 3,000 tons displacement ;

(b) Submarines of more than 350 tons displacement ;

(c) All warships which are driven by means other than steam, diesel or petrol engines or by gas turbines or by jet engines ;

VI. BOMBER AIRCRAFT FOR STRATEGIC PURPOSES

B. Text following the most recent amendment of 21st July 1980¹

This list comprises the weapons defined in paragraphs IV to VI and the factories earmarked solely for their production. All apparatus, parts, equipment, installations, substances and organisms, which are used for civilian purposes or for scientific, medical and industrial research in the fields of pure and applied science shall be excluded from this definition.

IV. LONG-RANGE MISSILES AND GUIDED MISSILES

(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs (c) and (d), long-range missiles and guided missiles are defined as missiles such that the speed or direction of motion can be influenced after the instant of launching by a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile, including V-type weapons developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications thereof. Combustion is considered as a mechanism which may influence the speed.

(b) Parts, devices or assemblies specially designed for use in or with the weapons referred to in paragraph (a) shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

(c) Proximity fuses, surface-to-air and air-to-air guided missiles for anti-aircraft defence, air-to-surface guided missiles for tactical defence, and surface-to-surface guided missiles for naval tactical defence equipped with non-nuclear warheads and of a range not exceeding 70 km, are regarded as excluded from this definition.

(d) Guided anti-tank missiles are also regarded as excluded from this definition.

VI. BOMBER AIRCRAFT FOR STRATEGIC PURPOSES

1. The 1954 text has been amended by the Council on the ten following occasions : 9th May 1958 ; 16th October 1958 ; 21st October 1959 ; 24th May 1961 ; 19th October 1962 ; 9th October 1963 ; 2nd October 1968 ; 15th September 1971 ; 26th September 1973 ; 21st July 1980.

APPENDIX III

Declaration on East-West relations issued by the Ten on 27th March 1984

The Ten have a responsibility in regard to peace and stability in Europe and to the security of their populations. They consider that the process of European integration which they have launched and which they intend to pursue resolutely is of primary importance in this regard. They declare their determination to maintain and intensify their contribution to the improvement of relations between East and West. They appeal to the Soviet Union to cooperate in progress towards genuine détente on the basis of a balance of forces, of respect for the interests of all states, of the faithful implementation of the Helsinki final act in all its aspects and of the renunciation of the use and threat of force. In this connection, the Ten recall their position on the question of Afghanistan.

The Ten emphasise the particular importance of the implementation of the Helsinki final act for peace and security in Europe. Having made a decisive contribution to the creation of the CSCE process, which seeks to overcome the division of Europe, they will pursue their efforts aimed at conducting a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and its allies in Central and Eastern Europe. They hope to develop co-operation with each of them on a stable and realistic basis in all concrete fields. They consider that, if it is to have its full significance, co-operation between states must

benefit the individual citizen. They favour freer contact between people in both parts of Europe, in particular between those of the two German states.

The Ten wish to see the success of arms control and disarmament negotiations and the resumption of those which have been broken off. For their part, they are determined to make every effort required in order to ensure progress in the negotiations in which they are taking part, in particular the Conference in Stockholm on Disarmament in Europe where they consider that positive results can be attained.

They set as their objective the establishment of a state of peace and security in Europe in which man's right to unrestricted self-fulfilment and the right of peoples to self-determination will be recognised and respected. They assert that it is possible to make progress towards this objective by peaceful evolution. Convinced that all the European peoples wish to live in peace, they appeal to the Governments of the Soviet Union and its allies in Central and Eastern Europe to work for more constructive East-West relations in a spirit of equality and of respect for the legitimate security interests of all concerned. The Ten, for their part, are determined to make their own contribution, in the interests of Europe and of peace in the world.

APPENDIX IV

Resolution on European collaboration in the fields of defence equipment adopted by the state secretaries of IEPG, 3rd April 1984

State Secretaries of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) assembled in The Hague on the 2nd and 3rd of April 1984,

recalling the 1976 Rome resolution setting out the aims of the IEPG ;

recalling in particular the 1982 Bonn declaration of the heads of state and government seeking "to achieve greater effectiveness in the application of national resources to defence, giving due attention to possibilities for developing areas of practical co-operation" ;

considering the necessity of improving conventional defence in Europe, the adverse effects of the economic recession on the European defence effort and the need for greater co-operation in the weapon procurement field, which is now even more pressing than it was in 1976 ;

considering that the political will to cooperate is increasing and should now be transformed into concrete action :

1. agree that the spirit of solidarity and the search for European solutions must constitute a very important factor in the national armaments planning and decision-making process, thus enhancing the European contribution to the common defence effort ;

2. agree to widen the search for long-term collaborative opportunities, inter alia by a more effective and conscious use of IEPG equipment replacement schedules and by actively harmonising national operational requirements and timetables ;

3. agree to the importance of improving the capabilities of nations with less developed defence industries and of adequate compensa-

tion should these nations opt for European products ;

4. acknowledge the European Defence Industrial Group (EDIG) as the designated forum to advise the IEPG on industrial matters ;

5. agree to pursue, together with EDIG, a more rational production of defence equipment, operating in a less fragmentary way, improving cost-effectiveness and enhancing technological capabilities in selected key areas ;

6. recognising the need to avoid unnecessary duplication of R & D, agree to bring about a greater co-ordination of research and development leading to more co-operation within Europe ;

7. stress the vital importance of the transatlantic dialogue and a more balanced two-way street ;

8. agree to seek to exploit in an agreed conceptual framework of the alliance, newly available and emerging technology, which can enhance the performance of our conventional forces ;

9. agree to give due attention to the question of the transfer of militarily relevant technology, both to enhance and to safeguard the technological base of the alliance ;

10. stress that government-to-government co-operation is an essential prerequisite to both industry-to-industry co-operation and a more balanced two-way street ;

State Secretaries invited the Chairman of the IEPG to bring this resolution to the notice of the Governments of the United States and Canada.

*Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Hardy

1. At the end of sub-paragraph 3 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, add :
“and to secure international agreement to ensure that such developments are adequately and effectively controlled”.

Signed : Hardy

1. See 5th sitting, 20th June 1984 (amendment agreed to).

*Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 2¹

tabled by Mr. Dejardin and others

2. Leave out sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert :
“assessing the consequences for the Agency for the Control of Armaments of the possible abolition of Annex III to Protocol No. III and any changes which might be made to Annex IV”.

Signed : Dejardin, Stoffelen, Dreyfus-Schmidt

1. See 5th sitting, 20th June 1984 (amendment negated).

*Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 3¹

tabled by Mr. Pignion

3. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “the partnership” and insert “co-operation”.

Signed : Pignion

1. See 5th sitting, 20th June 1984 (amendment agreed to).

AWACS and Nimrod aircraft

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions²
by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on AWACS and Nimrod aircraft

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Rapporteur

1. Introductory remarks
2. Purpose of the United States AWACS
3. NATO requirements
4. Operational characteristics
5. Coverage
6. Interoperability
7. The chain of command
8. NADGE
9. NAPMO
10. NAPMA
11. Finance and production
12. Military or air crew personnel
13. United Kingdom participation
14. France
15. Other countries
16. Summing up

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Lenzer (Chairman); MM. *Wilkinson, Bassinet* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Adriaensens (Alternate: *De Bondt*), Amadei (Alternate: *Cavaliere*), Antoni, *Böhm*, Fiandrotti, Fourré (Alternate: *Lagorce*), *Garrett*, Sir *Paul Hawkins*, MM. *McGuire, Prussen, Schmidt, Souvet, Spies von Büllenheim*, Mrs. *Staels-Dompas*, MM. *Valleix, Worrell*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on AWACS and Nimrod aircraft

The Assembly,

- (i) Following with great interest the build-up of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Mixed Force composed of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force E-3A component at Geilenkirchen in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Nimrod component at Waddington in the United Kingdom;
- (ii) Welcoming the integrated nature of the NATO AWACS force's E-3A component in which airmen of nine continental European forces as well as from the United States and Canada participate and considering it to be an example for future schemes for multilateral units;
- (iii) Aware also that this NATO force is directed politically by the North Atlantic Council as such and militarily by SACEUR and his subordinate commander, the Commander of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Mixed Force;
- (iv) Noting with satisfaction that this important force is being set up speedily in accordance with the plans agreed to at the outset;
- (v) Welcoming the fact that France might also associate its air defence more closely with that of NATO by ordering the same type of AWACS aircraft and thus reinforce the common defence potential;
- (vi) Considering that the British decision on the Nimrod component might benefit the other member countries as well because of its maritime capability, but only provided its eleven aircraft are operational by 1986,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. Promote within NATO

- (a) Organisational structures to ensure that the national American AWACS force, the NATO E-3A component, the Nimrod component and any future French AWACS force will be equipped with the same type of hard- and software and with harmonised procedures so as to derive the maximum effectiveness from allied defence efforts and expenditure;
- (b) The improvement of the NATO E-3A component by providing its aircraft with airborne refuelling capabilities involving financially-acceptable modifications and appropriate training for its crews, taking into account the existence of American and British tanker aircraft;
- (c) Training for the necessary number of air staff officers in order to use the NATO E-3A aircraft as command and control aircraft in emergencies;
- (d) A set of rules which can be applied in the event of more multilateral military units being set up for common defence purposes thus codifying the lessons learned from the formation of the NATO AWACS force E-3A;

II. Remind the French Government of the importance it attaches to an early decision being taken on the procurement of its AWACS force.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Rapporteur)

1. Introductory remarks

1. The airborne radar system AWACS – airborne warning and control system – is most important for the defence of Western Europe. For this reason, NATO has decided to adopt this system notwithstanding its financial constraints and the fact that it is very expensive to acquire and maintain. The NATO E-3A command is still in the process of formation.

2. Public opinion has become aware of the importance of airborne radar stations in recent years since United States AWACS aircraft are being sent for given periods wherever there are crises in the world. Only recently, in mid-March 1984, the United States Government assigned two AWACS aircraft to Egypt to bolster the capability of Egyptian and Sudanese air defence systems against further attacks by Libyan forces. Saudi Arabia has procured its own AWACS aircraft for its air defence.

3. The Soviet Union has also developed such airborne radar stations, some of which are already operational.

4. With its Nimrod aircraft, the United Kingdom is developing its own airborne radar stations which will be assigned to NATO and integrated in the NATO airborne early warning force.

5. However, it is not only the military significance of AWACS and Nimrod that has prompted the committee to examine this airborne early warning system. The NATO E-3A force is in fact the first and only NATO unit. It is directed under NATO's sole responsibility and is not under the command of any single member country. In the NATO E-3A unit, soldiers of nearly all NATO nations work together fully-integrated. This is an important aspect which might set an example for other developments in other areas.

6. The NATO E-3A unit's main base is at the Teveren air base near Geilenkirchen in the extreme western part of the Federal Republic not far from Aachen, in your Rapporteur's constituency. For this reason he was involved in the political aspects of establishing the unit from the very start and this is an additional reason for your Rapporteur agreeing with pleasure to write this report.

7. In the preparatory phase, your Rapporteur had a series of discussions at the air base as well as in Bonn, Brussels and Mons. He wishes to express his gratitude to all the authorities for

the information obtained and the assistance given.

8. Your Rapporteur well realises that much detailed information on a system so important for our defence as AWACS is of a confidential nature. For that reason much important data could not be obtained or even, if obtained, could not be revealed in the report.

9. The AWACS unit is still being built up; the first two Nimrod prototype aircraft are at the moment being tested. It might therefore be advisable to allow for a follow-up report in a few years' time when the complete system has been established.

2. Purpose of the United States AWACS

10. The E-3A airborne warning and control system (AWACS) is an air defence system which can conduct permanent surveillance of aircraft and ships on a wide scale. AWACS is the United States air force designation also called "sentry". The NATO designation is: NATO airborne early warning and control (NAEWAC).

11. Production of the first six operational E-3A aircraft was authorised in the United States in early 1975, and the first system was delivered to the United States air force in early 1977. The air force originally required a fleet of twenty-three aircraft to replace its fleet of ageing Lockheed EC-121 surveillance and control aircraft.

12. Essentially, the E-3A is a modified Boeing 707, long-range jet aircraft equipped with communications, navigation, data-processing and display equipment to serve as a flying air surveillance and weapon control system. The key to the E-3A is its radar which is capable of "looking down" and separating targets from the ground clutter which confuses many existing radar systems. Antenna for this new radar is carried in a radome mounted above the rear fuselage of the aircraft.

13. The radar surveillance capability was proved during the first phase of the programme which ended in late 1972. Two testbed aircraft, each equipped with a competing radar, were used to conduct a radar test programme. The surveillance radar design of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation was selected for the E-3A rôle.

14. Boeing's E-3A design utilises the 707-320B intercontinental airframe, the largest of Boeing's 707 series aircraft, and four Pratt and Whitney TF-33 turbofan engines, each delivering 21,000 pounds (9,526 kg) of thrust. The United States air force uses a similar airframe with the General Electric-Snecma CFM-56 engine as an airborne tanker for the AWACS aircraft.

15. This combination provides an airborne, more survivable, warning control, and communications centre. The long-range and in-flight refuelling capabilities of the United States AWACS permit their political leaders and military commanders to deploy the system to distant regions of high interest.

16. In March 1977, the first American aircraft became operational and began to assume a rôle in the United States continental air defence. Overseas detachments of the American continental air defence were based at Keflavik, Iceland, and Okinawa, Japan.

17. The United States AWACS fleet has been programmed at thirty-four aircraft with the last production aircraft delivery in 1984. The Department of Defence has stated its intention to add twelve more aircraft to the force, the first three of which might be acquired in 1985-86. However, this proposal for twelve more aircraft has not yet been approved.

3. NATO requirements

18. The inadequacy of a radar cover at low level over NATO territory and the approaches to it was recognised long ago, but could not be rectified since no suitable system was available. In 1971, a NATO document on air defence problems emphasised the need for improved intelligence for low-flying aircraft (below 2,000 ft.). In 1975, a NATO document stated the military operational requirement and concept of operations for a land-based airborne early warning system. It mentioned the need to detect low-flying targets beyond the horizons of surface air defence radars. There was also a NATO requirement for detecting targets at least 200 km beyond NATO airspace in order to react promptly and adequately to possible violations of NATO airspace. Existing surface military radars were inadequate, had only limited detection capabilities for low-flying targets and were to some extent susceptible to electronic countermeasures which could significantly degrade their capabilities. The Warsaw Pact air threat has increased regularly with second and third generation aircraft which have enhanced capabilities, greater penetration depth and speed, weapons effectiveness and electronic countermeasures.

19. With regard to satellites, their information could be useful in detecting large-scale movements of troops and matériel. In detecting individual aircraft they are not yet sufficiently sophisticated. Satellites are either in a high geostatic orbit or in a low non-geostatic orbit. In both cases, means of detecting enemy air traffic are insufficient and hampered to a degree by weather uncertainties.

20. By the mid-1970s, it was evident that a new NATO system had to be introduced; the situation was further influenced by the decision of the United States in 1973 to start building a national AWACS fleet which, as such, was completely separate from NATO forces. In April 1976, the North Atlantic Council started to prepare for the NATO E-3A co-operative programme based on a multilateral memorandum of understanding to acquire a NATO-owned airborne early warning and control system.

21. Several possible solutions were considered by NATO prior to the decision to acquire the Boeing aircraft which was found to provide the best system. The American full-scale development test programme of the E-3A was completed in 1976.

22. The AWACS force also represents a political element; it is important as a means of surveillance and therefore is part of the alliance deterrent. A major reason for starting the development of AWACS was the lack of detailed knowledge of unfriendly air activity, for example that associated with the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

4. Operational characteristics

23. The NATO airborne early warning and control (NAEWAC) will provide:

- detection of aircraft and intercept control at all altitudes from lowest level to high altitude;
- detection of ships;
- information exchange with other early-warning aircraft, NATO air defence systems, maritime units and other suitably equipped tactical systems;
- increased warning time;
- a capacity to fill surveillance gaps when ground radars are unavailable or disabled;
- a capacity to reinforce surveillance and control facilities where and when required.

24. The aims of both the United States and NATO AWACS programmes should be to achieve and maintain a maximum degree of interoperability. One should, however, be aware that the European aircraft is not intended to have a command and control capability and is, in fact, a flying surveillance radar. The American AWACS have a self-contained command and control capability. Nevertheless, the European and American aircraft could fulfil the same functions if identical onboard equipment and personnel were installed.

25. The American AWACS can be refuelled in the air but not the E-3A component of the NATO force. This in-flight refuelling could be achieved with small modifications to the aircraft. The Americans and the British have a tanker air fleet; no special tanker aircraft would have to be bought. This refuelling capability is separate from the command and control aspect. The difference here between the American and NATO aircraft is due to the different perception of the operation of the force. European governments wish the command and control function to remain firmly on the ground close to the political leadership. Should the European perception change, the aircraft is large enough and has enough equipment on board to accommodate a high-ranking officer with a small staff.

5. Coverage

26. With the AWACS operating at an altitude of 30,000 ft. (10,000 m), detection of low-flying and sea-surface targets is extended beyond the horizon of the transponder-equipped friendly ground units. A high-flying aircraft target would also be seen beyond the horizon.

27. *Air defence operations* are assisted by providing early warning time of intrusion by hostile forces using "deep-look" tracking behind hostile borders, and continued tracking of low-level targets, and the ability of the NATO AWACS to fill gaps caused by coverage limitations of the ground radars. Close control of low-level interceptions is possible. By providing additional track data with air defence ground environment and their surface-to-air missile systems, these systems can be better prepared for action, thus improving weapon efficiency and survivability.

28. *Maritime operations* are concerned with defence of naval forces. The AWACS is designed to simultaneously detect, track and identify ships, hostile aircraft and control friendly missions. As a result of the extended ranges for these operations, AWACS provides a significantly longer warning time than the

ship-based sensors also limited to the horizon, thus enabling early defence measures to be taken.

29. *Threat assessment* will be aided by using the AWACS airborne platform and its capability for extended range surveillance of hostile aircraft and maritime targets. Data from regions of interest can be communicated to surface commanders for integration with data supplied from other sources to improve intelligence analysis of hostile forces

30. Although essentially conceived as a major contribution to improving NATO's air defence capabilities, *tactical air operations* could be improved through assistance to offensive aircraft at low altitudes beyond ranges of ground control sites. AWACS can also provide flight-path information to friendly aircraft operating over hostile areas to help avoid hostile surface-to-air missile defence systems and to warn of imminent interceptor attack. Also it enables early identification of returning aircraft and control and co-ordination of in-flight refuelling.

31. *Tactical ground force operations* could be aided by AWACS providing status and precise location of transponder-equipped mobile friendly forces and relaying tactical communications to and from control centres.

6. Interoperability

32. The AWACS will enable NATO commanders to operate with improved force effectiveness and provide better surveillance and control flexibility. The system will normally be used to transmit track and other data to ground or maritime command and control centres and act as a communication relay for these centres, where actual deployment defence measure decisions will be made. However, the AWACS can function as a control and reporting centre to some extent in the event that the ground control centres are disabled.

7. The chain of command

33. Under the NATO Military Committee the three major NATO commanders are the highest authorities. SACEUR at Mons in Belgium is the acting commander and co-ordinator of the NATO AWACS force. The other two are the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Command, Northwood, Middlesex, United Kingdom.

34. Thirteen countries participate in the NATO mixed force, Luxembourg participating

only financially. Moreover, the aircraft are registered as Luxembourg aircraft for reasons of international law. The other participating countries are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal¹, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The United Kingdom provides Nimrod aircraft as a contribution to a mixed force and participates financially in the ground-to-air interface.

35. An American general, at present Major General Leighton R. Palmerton, is Commander of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Mixed Force. The operational elements of the command are to comprise eighteen Boeing 707 E-3A aircraft and eleven Nimrod AEW Mk 3 aircraft. The United Kingdom has six staff officers in the NAEW force command and has placed an exchange officer at the NATO air base.

36. A German general, Brigadier General Rimmek, is the present commander of the E-3A component. This E-3A component is stationed at the NATO air base at Geilenkirchen in Germany. Up to six aircraft will rotate between this main base and the component's forward operating bases located in Greece, Italy, Turkey and the forward operating location in Norway where they may be deployed for about a week at a time. The main operating base for the eleven Nimrods is at Waddington in the United Kingdom, but there are also two forward operating bases in the United Kingdom.

8. NADGE

37. The NATO air defence ground environment system has radar and computer centres deployed from Norway to Turkey. The introduction of the AEW ground integration segment (AEGIS) has resulted in the replacement of the central computer of the data handling system, and provided new peripheral equipment such as the computer operations stations and other units. Several projects are currently being implemented for the upgrading of the system throughout NATO.

38. The NATO NADGE system is operated by NATO nations, assigned to SACEUR, and partly owned by the national governments while at the same time forming part of the integrated common infrastructure programme in which NATO has invested heavily. Since 1968 NADGE has been steadily improved and brought up to date.

¹ Portugal has a limited part in the NATO AWACS E-3A component.

39. The cost of the integrated segment of the air defence ground environment system, NADGE – made necessary by the introduction of the AWACS – is about 450 million in today's dollars. Thirty-four NADGE ground sites are being upgraded with improved equipment in order to make maximum use of the AWACS aircraft. The modification programme will continue to the end of 1985.

40. The military radars involved in the NADGE have not the capability to detect and to track low-flying aircraft over land and sea and their radar horizons are limited. A possibility for overcoming these inadequacies, which seriously handicap air defence operations, can only be provided by utilising elevated radar platforms such as the E-3A.

41. NADGE is linked with the national radar systems, military as well as civil.

9. NAPMO

42. In December 1978, the NATO AEWAC Programme Management Office (NAPMO) was established on the basis of a multilateral memorandum of understanding signed by twelve nations. Belgium became a signatory at a later date. It is run by a board of directors which meets every three or four months and in which all participating countries have a seat. Under the authority of the board is the NATO AEWAC Programme Management Agency (NAPMA). In accordance with normal NATO practice, decisions have to be taken unanimously as each country has a veto. NAPMO reports to the North Atlantic Council.

43. Three countries, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada are so-called major share nations and therefore have more industrial advantages. The others are minor share nations with no formal claim to major industrial participation in the acquisition phase of the force.

10. NAPMA

44. The NAPMA, NATO AEWAC Programme Management Agency, actually handles procurement activities; it has a German general manager and a United States deputy general manager and is divided into five divisions. The senior NAPMA representative in the United States is in charge of co-ordinating the programme in North America. Then there are the offices of the legal adviser and of the financial controller, the programme evaluation and co-ordination office and the testing department. Furthermore, the organisation is divided

into three divisions – the military factors division, systems engineering and integration division and the procurement, configuration and administration division which all have subdivisions. One subdivision of the military factors division is the office for Nimrod liaison.

45. At its peak NAPMA had a staff of about 190 but it is already in the process of decreasing as the procurement programme progresses towards its conclusion.

11. Finance and production

46. Total programme cost was agreed at \$1,826 million in 1977; production costs could be divided as follows: aircraft \$1,479 million; ground integration \$225 million; bases \$72 million; management \$50 million (1977 dollars). All this is laid down in the multilateral memorandum of understanding.

47. All countries have to pay their share on 1st April and 1st October. The United States pays 42%, the Federal Republic 30.7%, Canada 10% and the minor share nations – Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Turkey – together pay 17.3%. The total sum involved is \$1,826 million at the 1977 value. Except for an escalation utilising a 9% inflation factor, the total budget has not increased at all in real terms. Every nation pays its share in cash but the Federal Republic has paid also in kind by providing, for instance, the land for the base in Geilenkirchen.

48. AWACS has brought important advantages in high technology for European subcontractors such as Dornier, Telefunken, Siemens and its subcontractor, Italtel.

49. There are more than eighty subcontracting firms in the United States and Canada; the most important are Hughes Aerospace Systems, Westinghouse, IBM and Bendix and, in Canada, Canadian Aerospace Electronics.

50. Dornier's rôle is to install the mission avionics and to carry out the flight testing: from four to six flight tests and ground tests. Dornier, together with Boeing and the military authorities, has to take decisions regarding acceptance of the aircraft. NAPMA has to take decisions regarding acceptance of the aircraft from Dornier.

51. The financial contribution of the minor share countries was derived by taking account of their gross national product and their lack of participation in the production of equipment. There will be more involvement of European industry during the support phase, whereas American participation will be gradually minimised.

52. For development and production costs, the AWACS programme is one of NATO's most successful as there is no cost escalation in constant dollar terms and it is anticipated that the programme expenditures in total will remain within the original cost ceiling.

53. The AWACS programme cannot be compared financially to the Tornado programme, the former having a \$2 billion budget and the second \$8 billion. One main difference is, however, that development costs for AWACS have to a large extent been borne by the United States, as it was selected by NATO after being developed; the Tornado programme began with the development phase. Secondly, although of lesser importance, inflation and currency fluctuation have been able to be discounted.

12. Military or air crew personnel

54. The air crew is composed of a flight crew and a mission crew. The flight crew consists of four members – two pilots, one navigator and one flight engineer. The mission crew comprises thirteen members – the tactical director, the air surveillance section (five), a weapons control section (three), a communications section (two), one radar technician and one computer display technician.

55. All personnel involved in the NATO AWACS Training Centre and Operations Wing are integrated into the organisation of the E-3A component. The training centre provides basic qualifications for air crews, maintenance, software support personnel – a total of some 150 persons. The operations wing comprises some 600 personnel. Thirty multinational air crews are to be assigned to the component's operations wing which is divided into three flying squadrons, each with ten multinational air crews.

56. The initial cadre of instructor and operational personnel was trained in the United States, mainly with the United States Air Force AWACS wing. All training is now conducted in Europe apart from the very few highly specialised personnel; the cost of their training would be too high in Europe and this is therefore carried out in the United States.

57. As the American participation in the acquisition phase was 42% and the German participation 30%, the Americans are to provide the force commander and the Germans the component commander or vice versa. Since the United Kingdom contributes Nimrod to the mixed force, the deputy force commander is British.

58. The training of the integrated international crews is still continuing and experience so far

is very good. However, as only eleven aircraft are operating, there is as yet insufficient operational experience. The wing is expected to become fully operational in 1985 but, because of the rotation of the crews, training will be continuous.

59. It is the first time that a mix of personnel of several nationalities operates the same aircraft. There have been precedents for mixed international air crews but not to the extent of integrating personnel of many nations into one large air crew (seventeen members). For support functions a software support centre, a logistic wing and a base support wing are other integrated organisational elements of the NAEWF E-3A component.

13. *United Kingdom participation*

60. The American Government offered the AWAC system to the NATO countries in 1975. At that period, the British Government was as much in favour of adopting the system as the other European countries. However, in 1977, after a discussion between the German and British Ministers, Mr. Leber and Mr. Mulley, the British Government decided on a separate contribution. This, of course, changed the financial outlay for the other NATO countries and especially in the case of the Federal Republic whose financial contribution now amounted to more than 30% of the overall cost.

61. The British Government, in part because of the delay in the NATO decision but also under pressure from the unions as well as from the military establishment, adopted a national solution – the Nimrod system. The British would use the Hawker Siddeley Nimrod AEW Mk 3, a modified Comet, which will be optimised to survey the seas and oceans but will also have detection capability over land. Their system is planned to consist of eleven aircraft and would have originally cost \$300 million. Since then the cost has more than doubled as radar, as well as data processing equipment, has become much more expensive. In addition, it appears to take more than three years longer to convert the Nimrod aircraft into an AWACS aircraft. There are now two flying test prototype Nimrod AEW Mk 3 aircraft. Maintenance costs of the eleven Nimrod aircraft will be considerably more than if maintenance had been pooled with the E3-A component.

62. The United Kingdom's airborne early warning capability will of course, be greatly improved when the Shackletons – the old Lancaster bomber version – now being used are replaced by Nimrod over the next few years.

14. *France*

63. On the French side, from the beginning there has been little enthusiasm for participation in the AWACS programme. Between NADGE and French air defence sites there has been, and still is, an exchange of air defence data, but the French do not want to appear to be integrated into a NATO military system. However, since the British experience and following the French examination of several different types of aircraft, the French might now wish to buy three to five Boeing E-3A aircraft. These aircraft might be deployed in either the Mediterranean or the Atlantic areas.

64. The French Government's five-year defence plan allocates funding for the purchase of the initial AEW aircraft in 1986-88. The remaining units would be acquired after 1988.

65. Before the French Government's provisional choice for the Boeing E-3A and Grumman E-3C was made, it considered other solutions. For instance, the C-160 Transall transport built in an international consortium led by Aérospatiale was examined as well as the new generation Atlantic patrol aircraft manufactured in a multinational consortium headed by Dassault-Bréguet. However, one disadvantage of a refit programme is the delay in the aircraft's service introduction, but an advantage of this solution would be the creation of employment for France's aerospace industry. Other European aircraft possibilities considered in the past were the Airbus Industrie A-300 outfitted with the Marconi avionics and the Nimrod AEW Mk 3.

66. For the French navy's airborne early warning mission, the Grumman E-2C Hawkeye, or a follow-on aircraft, could also be evaluated. Serious consideration by the navy probably would not, however, begin for five to ten years and would be complementary to the Boeing E-3A land-based aircraft.

67. Elimination of European possibilities and the Grumman E-2C leaves Boeing's E-3A AWACS for the French air force airborne early warning capability. France is discussing acquisition with the United States together with French industrial offset packages to go with the purchase of E-3As.

68. France still has several months in which to make its final decision on the AEW buy. However, as Boeing is planning to close the production line in 1988 and as it would be extremely costly to reopen such a line for only three to five aircraft, the French Government cannot wait too long before coming to a decision. It is, however, evident that a solution involving use of the CFM-56 engine could be attractive for France since the French Snecma

has a 50% share of the CFM-56 engine programme.

69. Boeing is surveying the French industry to determine areas of offset applicable to an E-3A buy. One issue is the matter of non-recurring costs for the AWACS which were waived for NATO. Boeing might also order the CFM-56 engine for other similar aircraft. If France decides on the AEW buy and provides the necessary funding, arrangements will probably have to be made between France and the NATO authorities on maintenance and support facilities.

15. Other countries

70. Saudi Arabia requires five AWACS aircraft and eight 707 tankers for in-flight fuelling.

71. Israel, Australia and Japan also have airborne warning and control systems and use the Hawkeye aircraft constructed by Grumman.

72. Spain does not yet participate in the NATO system but, should it join the integrated NATO military structure, it might also participate in the AWACS force. The ground environment system now in existence in Spain operates in conjunction with the Portuguese system and is directly linked to the existing French Strida II system.

73. The Soviet Union has the Moss Tupolev Tu-126 and the Ilyushin Il-76, the latter is the same type of aircraft as the American Starlifter C-141. An AWACS version of the Il-76 has been under development since the 1970s. Known to NATO as Mainstay, it is said to carry a more capable early warning radar than that of the Tu-126, to have better data-transmission systems and to promise significant improvement of the ability of Soviet strategic and tactical aircraft to conduct longer-range surveillance operations.

74. Unconfirmed reports suggest that Mainstay has a conventionally located rotating "saucer" radome and a flight refuelling probe. Assessments that at least thirty Mainstays would support Soviet air forces by the mid-1980s might assume a too-early date for initial operational capabilities.

16. Summing up

75. The invasion of Czechoslovakia confirmed that NATO's surveillance coverage at low level over the approaches to alliance airspace was insufficient and demonstrated that the Warsaw Pact could mount operations at low level and that there appeared to be an increased low level

air threat for the NATO countries. This problem was then studied by NATO which eventually accepted a concept of operations for a land-based airborne early warning system.

76. A maximum degree of interoperability is in the interest of NATO as well as in that of the United States which is one of the main countries participating in the NATO airborne early warning force. Apart from the eighteen NATO E-3A AWACS, this force will also comprise eleven British Nimrods which will be operated and supported by the United Kingdom and assigned to NATO.

77. Contrary to the British Nimrods, the American AWACS were not originally sea-oriented but the NATO aircraft have a maritime capability. The Nimrod inclusion is therefore quite practical. When more Nimrods become operational, the advantages of co-ordination between AWACS and Nimrod aircraft will be evident.

78. The NATO and United Kingdom programmes are also planned to achieve a maximum degree of interoperability. However, if there are three different authorities deciding on the hardware and software configuration and on the procedures to be followed for the various systems, permanent efforts by all parties concerned are absolutely necessary as well as organisational structures to harmonise these efforts.

79. All NATO AWACS aircraft are newly-built and equipped with new electronics compared to the already existing United States AWACS aircraft. They have therefore different capabilities. United States programmes aim at bringing the original United States AWACS up to the same standard as the more recent NATO AWACS aircraft in order to maintain a common configuration.

80. The AWACS experience has so far been quite positive. However, it is not certain what will happen if there is enemy interference, such as direct attack, jamming, cuts in communications, etc. The system will probably be very useful. The force is in the build-up stage.

81. The first forward operating base for the airborne early warning force became activated on 25th October 1983 at Konya, Turkey. The forward operating location for the force in Norway was activated on 2nd November 1983.

82. Both bases are fully equipped and the Norwegian and Turkish ground crews are trained and in place. Full-scale deployment of the aircraft to the bases is not expected until mid-1984, though the NATO aircraft have already done proving flights to both bases.

83. NATO Airborne Early Warning Force E-3A forward operating bases are also sched-

uled to be operational at Preveza, Greece, in mid-1984, and Trapani, Italy, in early 1985.

84. The presence of the airborne warning and control E-3A aircraft at the forward bases will gradually increase as more of the aircraft are delivered. At the end of 1984 they will be present full-time at the forward bases.

85. As far as the organisation is concerned, the NAEW force is an integrated force and, contrary to other forces in NATO, support functions are the responsibility of the force commander.

86. Although it has happened before that an air crew of different nationalities operated the same aircraft – examples are: the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Programme, the Trinational Tornado Training Establishment and exchange programmes of operational air crew members – the integration of personnel of many NATO nations (17) into a large air crew is new, as is the integration of multinational personnel for support functions.

87. Not only are the multinational E-3A crews operating the same aircraft but they are also interchangeable on all aircraft. Crews of different nationalities have created no difficulties whatsoever. On the ground there were some general problems such as security and police regulations, registration of land vehicles, flying regulations, common medical standards, financial procedures and others. All, however, have been solved by selecting the best national regulations wherever possible. For instance,

flight safety regulations mainly based on Canadian regulations were developed.

88. Although many personnel problems have been solved, one still outstanding concerns the large civilian maintenance force. Decisions will have to be taken on the possibilities of transferring personnel to duty stations. Military personnel can of course be easily transferred from one base to another. This is not easy with civilian personnel but it will be necessary if the aircraft are to be dispersed in the NATO area.

89. The NAEW E-3A fleet is expected to become fully operational in late 1985 and might remain so for many years to come (twenty to thirty) as they have brand-new airframes and engines.

90. The ground radar stations will all be interconnected once the whole NAEW force is fully operational.

91. The training for the E-3A is a continuing process since new crews take over as old crews leave. Most of this training is conducted at Geilenkirchen.

92. Aircraft of the NATO AEW force will fly everywhere in NATO airspace.

93. If war were to break out, the NATO E-3A and Nimrod aircraft could be dispersed as fast as possible in order to complicate any enemy action aimed at their destruction. In view of their value as surveillance systems, they certainly would not be left just at their home bases.

Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions²
by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Introductory remarks
- II. The energy situation
- III. The law of the sea convention
- IV. European aeronautics
- V. Study on the Japanese armaments industry

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Lenzer (Chairman); MM. *Wilkinson, Bassinet* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Adriaensens (Alternate: *De Bondt*) Amadei (Alternate: *Cavaliere*), Antoni, *Böhm*, Fiandrotti, Fourré (Alternate: *Lagorce*), *Garrett, Sir Paul Hawkins*, MM. *McGuire, Prussen, Schmidt, Souvet, Spies von Büllenheim*, Mrs. *Staels-Dompas*, MM. *Valleix, Worrell*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council

I. Introductory remarks

1. This report replying to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council was submitted by your Rapporteur to the committee on 15th May 1984 when it was adopted unanimously.

2. As is not unusual, it was attached to another report by your Rapporteur on AWACS and Nimrod aircraft. However, in view of the diversity of the questions examined, your Rapporteur thought it unwise to follow that procedure on this occasion. At his proposal, the committee therefore decided to submit it to the Assembly as a separate report

3. The committee is fairly satisfied with the interest shown by the Council in scientific, technological and aerospace questions, but it has to repeat that the Council's interest goes no further than the bare subjects discussed by the committee and, even then, only from a very short-term viewpoint. The committee would, of course, have preferred a more detailed and longer-term discussion on the energy situation in Europe, the law of the sea problems and the future of the Airbus programme.

4. Particularly since the prospects of reactivating WEU are widely discussed outside WEU, it would have been of great interest if the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council had given an inside view of the direction Europe should take in scientific, technological and aerospace questions.

II. The energy situation

5. On the energy situation in Europe and especially relations between Norway and the other countries of WEU, it would have been extremely useful if the Council had given its views on further developments in the European energy situation and the relationship between gas supplied by the Soviet Union and that by Norway.

6. Furthermore, an intra-European gas pipeline network remains of the utmost importance for all Western Europe from the economic, political and security viewpoints. The Council states that it is not in a position to take a more definite stand on this subject but it should prompt the member governments to examine the question from a Western European angle rather than from a British or Dutch point of view for instance.

7. Of course, the Siberian gas pipeline to Western Europe will remain an important matter which should be discussed regularly.

8. A dialogue between the Assembly and the Council is not possible if the Council fails to elaborate on the policy aspects of the points under discussion and the opinions of member countries. There is no need to be a prophet to predict new shortages of energy in the next decade. Now that large supplies are available, an acceptable intra-European supply system should be worked out.

III. The law of the sea convention

9. With regard to the law of the sea convention, the committee is rather pessimistic about the final outcome since constructive and acceptable solutions to the issue of the deep seabed régime are still not in sight.

10. The convention, with its 320 articles and 9 annexes, deals with practically every possible use by mankind of the high seas, oceans and the seabed. As indicated in the report by Mr. Lenzer (Document 946), the convention is a huge package deal and it is regrettable that the European countries are staying in the rearguard of international co-operation.

11. From a security point of view, important parts of the draft convention are advantageous for all member countries of WEU. This fact is also recognised by the Council. The provisions on the free passage of ships through territorial waters, international straits and archipelagic states constitute an important concession by many governments in the developing world. Here the convention could make a significant contribution to international law and practice. It seems hardly possible to revert to the theses of Grotius and other international lawyers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

12. The committee understands full well the divergent interests of industrialised and developing countries in exploration and exploitation of the seabed, fisheries and maritime boundaries. But it is very worried about a majority of European states not accepting the convention.

13. Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom have not signed, mainly because they feel the provisions on deep-sea mining are unsatisfactory. The deadline for signing the convention is approaching rapidly, the limit being two years after the opening for signature on 9th December 1982.

14. The question now is should the abovementioned member countries sign the convention – although unwilling to ratify – in order to

become members of the preparatory commission for the international seabed authority and for the international tribunal for the law of the sea with the possibility of participating in pioneer activities.

15. The convention will only enter into force after sixty nations have become parties to it so there is still time to reflect on ratification. However, several governments have already declared that they will sign only if the seabed régime is acceptable to them. As it is not likely that this will be the case, the political questions to sign or not to sign will have to be debated within governments and parliaments. The time of decision-making is at hand.

IV. European aeronautics

16. On European aeronautics, your Rapporteur would like to underline very strongly the need for collaboration. From 19th to 22nd March the committee had discussions with authorities of the French aerospace industries in Paris, Marseille, Cannes and Bordeaux. A general conclusion from the discussions is that without European collaborative efforts these European industries might still be able to provide a next generation of transport or fighter aircraft but after that no individual country will be able to raise the money or provide the necessary know-how to build the following generation of aircraft.

17. For this and other reasons the committee has always been deeply interested in the Airbus programme. It is happy to note that Airbus Industrie's A-320 has now been endorsed by the Governments of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. The slow-down in the Airbus production rate has been felt by all European companies and particularly by Aérospatiale. Monthly output in 1983 at the Airbus Aérospatiale final assembly facility in Toulouse was at around five A-310 and this has dropped to three per month.

18. The new European 150-seat aircraft is expected to make its first flight in the spring of 1987. Certification and first deliveries are planned in the beginning of 1988. In the meantime, endurance tests will be held on two prototypes.

19. To improve the contract distribution in Europe the United States industry's present share of some 30% in the programme should be reduced.

20. The British Government was quite hesitant about approving funds mainly because it was not satisfied with the profitability of Airbus

Industrie and the distribution of equipment contracts for British industry.

21. The overall programme-sharing arrangement for the A-320 is that France will take approximately 36%, the United Kingdom will keep its 26%, the Federal Republic of Germany will take on 31% and Spain 6%. A memorandum of understanding will mention in detail the financial support commitments of each country and outline their industry's share in the programme. These figures will be about the same as those mentioned above: Aérospatiale 36%, MBB 31%, British Aerospace 26% and Casa 6%.

22. The engines to be incorporated will be General Electric Snecma CFM-56-4 which will give the aircraft a speed of Mach 0.74 to 0.80. Other engines – Rolls Royce – are possible.

23. The committee regrets that Fokker from the Netherlands will not take part in this venture and that the Dutch Government has agreed to guarantee loans of some \$300 million to allow Fokker to develop its proposed new Fokker 50 and Fokker 100 transport aircraft.

24. The United States Department of Trade is also very interested in this new aircraft since the value of United States participation in the Airbus A-320 might be much lower than in the Airbus A-300 or A-310 mainly because the engines will now be produced only partly in the United States whereas the engines for the earlier Airbus were wholly American.

25. In this respect political problems could arise between the United States and the European Community and between the United States and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The United States Government is concerned lest the various governments funding the programme dictate the equipment to be used. Your Rapporteur thought it useful to hint at some of the possible political problems.

26. During the abovementioned visit to French aerospace industries, the future of the European combat aircraft was of course also discussed. One of the problems here is that British Aerospace has its experimental aircraft programme which is a technology demonstrator aircraft for the British Ministry of Defence. The French demonstrator aircraft, called the ACX (*avion de combat expérimentale*), is being built by Dassault. Both aircraft are scheduled to make their first flights in 1986. The EAP will be powered by two turbo-union RB-199 engines and the ACX will be powered by twin General Electric F-404s.

27. The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Spain are not participating in these two prototype aircraft but are very

interested in the future European fighter aircraft. However, they do not wish to appear to be taking sides between the rival British and French proposals.

28. Although convinced that some competition is sound, the committee hopes that the Council and the Western European governments will take care that this intra-European competition will not be to the detriment of the European aircraft industries. In considering these questions one should realise that electronics in fighter aircraft now comprise one-third and perhaps 40% of the cost of the aircraft and that European technology is lagging well behind American technology in this field.

29. Your Rapporteur hopes – as declared by the Council in its reply to Written Question 239 – that “the chances of co-operation on a future European fighter aircraft are perfectly realistic and, in spite of the uncertainties that may be felt in this complex field where there are many underlying industrial interests, it is important to be optimistic about the results of present efforts to harmonise requirements”.

V. Study on the Japanese armaments industry

30. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to point out that in the chapter on the Standing Armaments Committee the Council has indicated that the international secretariat has begun a programme of research for a Standing Armaments Committee study on the future prospects of the Japanese armaments industry.

31. Here your Rapporteur recalls his remarks at the beginning of this chapter that it is regrettable that the Council is not providing more factual and political information. What is the purpose of this study and what is the Japanese armaments industry considered to be?

32. In the report by Lord Northfield (Document 956), it was pointed out that Japan's military industrial policy is becoming increasingly active in many high technology fields: aeronautics, communications, electronics, marine science and many fields of great importance for its energy supply.

33. Research and development in Japan is being conducted largely in private firms where of course no difference is made between civil and military research. The abovementioned fields are for them, however, of much greater importance in the civil than the military field which is directly related to the Japanese position on defence and security.

34. A study of prospects of the Japanese armaments industry will therefore become highly speculative as no clear-cut line can be drawn between civil and military programmes. This is especially true in the field of electronics and data-transmission research and development.

35. A more informative report by the Council should have indicated first of all the difficulties involved but, secondly, the purpose and possibilities of the Standing Armaments Committee for fulfilling its task meaningfully.

The military use of space

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions²
by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on the military use of space

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. The institutional framework
- III. The Soviet space challenge
- IV. Aspects of international space law
- V. Current initiatives and developments in defensive space systems
- VI. Long-term United States space strategy
- VII. United Kingdom military satellite communications
- VIII. A new European civil space programme for the 1980s and the 1990s

APPENDICES

- I. Extract from the speech by President Mitterrand in the Second Chamber of the States-General, The Hague, 7th February 1984
- II. Article II of the Convention for the establishment of a European Space Agency

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Lenzer (Chairman); MM. *Wilkinson, Bassinet* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Adriaensens (Alternate: *De Bondt*), Amadei (Alternate: *Cavaliere*), Antoni, *Böhm*, Fiandrotti, Fourré (Alternate: *Lagorce*), *Garrett, Sir Paul Hawkins*, MM. *McGuire, Prussen, Schmidt, Souvet, Spies von Büllenheim*, Mrs. *Staels-Dompas*, MM. *Valleix, Worrell*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation***on the military use of space***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the consistent interest shown by Western European Union in the strategic and industrial implications of the space capabilities of the member countries;
- (ii) Appreciating the considerable achievements of Western European countries in the space field both nationally and under the aegis of the European Space Agency, most notably in the Spacelab and Ariane and satellite programmes;
- (iii) Conscious of the need for Europe to initiate new projects in both the space science and applications fields if Europe's successful development of telecommunications and remote-sensing satellite systems, together with launch vehicles and manned work modules, are to be fully exploited;
- (iv) Understanding that the United States spends about ten times as much as Western Europe on space activities and that at least half the United States space programme is directly or indirectly funded by the Department of Defence;
- (v) Aware also that current efforts by the Soviet Union to expand its present space capability should not go unmatched by western countries;
- (vi) Concerned that in addition to the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, other major nations, such as Japan, India, Brazil and the People's Republic of China, are pursuing active space programmes which could jeopardise Europe's current position as the established third force after the United States and the Soviet Union in space activities;
- (vii) Believing that space capability will be a key determinant in future warfare, that in military terms the difference in potential between the space-capable nations and the others will be almost as great as the current difference in power between nuclear and non-nuclear nations and that Europe should not only take note but act upon this fact;
- (viii) Noting President Mitterrand's call in his speech of 7th February 1984 for a "European space community" and his remarks on the potential of a manned European space station as well as current Western European interest in this subject;
- (ix) Supporting initiatives to exploit space technology to bring about confidence-building measures such as the proposed international satellite monitoring agency and determined to use Europe's space capabilities in order to reduce the risk of war by eliminating the advantage of surprise through surveillance satellite systems;
- (x) Confident that WEU can offer a valuable forum for debate about and analysis of the implications for the defence of Western Europe of the latest military space technologies as well as an institutional framework untrammelled by the political inhibitions of the ESA convention for the initiation by the principal space-capable nations of Western Europe of a defensive European military space programme,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge the governments of member countries to do all in their power to secure negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union so as to prevent the military use of space through the deployment of offensive space weapon systems by promoting new international treaties and related verification procedures, as well as through the implementation of existing accords to limit the military uses of space;
2. Demand a larger European industrial involvement both in NATO telecommunications satellites and in NATO military satellite programmes as well as in the associated ground station infrastructure, in addition to supporting successful national military communications satellites like Skynet;

3. Commission a detailed analysis by the Standing Armaments Committee of the implications for European defence of developments in military space technology and in particular of Soviet research and development in this field;
4. Initiate a study by the Agency for the Control of Armaments of the confidence- and security-building measures that could be taken in Europe following the establishment of either an international satellite monitoring agency or of Western European oceanic and terrestrial surveillance satellite systems;
5. Establish a dialogue with the European Space Agency whereby the industrial implications of ESA scientific or applications programmes can be discussed in an institutional framework appropriate for the formulation of Western European security policy;
6. Set clear European space policy objectives and priorities in the course of its politico-military consultations in the key strategic fields of launchers, manned modules, space station integration, telecommunications, meteorological and remote-sensing satellites and manned reusable service and space transport vehicles;
7. Propose a European surveillance and reconnaissance satellite programme adapting and refining the sensor technologies in the existing CNES Spot project and the ESA ERS-1 project;
8. Concert a joint response by the member countries to the NASA proposals for European participation in the projected United States space station and evolve a common strategy to utilise the consequent technological expertise should a European space station programme be initiated;
9. Require the construction of a Western European military meteorological satellite programme to follow the successful series of civil Meteosat satellites.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The Assembly of Western European Union has taken a consistent interest for many years in space matters and in particular those aspects of strategic and military significance. The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in particular has produced a large number of reports in this field. There was the report published in 1966 on juridical problems and space policy (Document 388 – Rapporteur Mrs. Maxsein). In 1968 there was the report on the Soviet orbital bombardment system (Document 444 – Rapporteur Mr. Hansen). In 1972 there was the report on orbital stations and the civil and military consequences (Document 572 – Rapporteur Mr. Kahn-Ackermann). In addition, your Rapporteur himself has previously produced two reports for the committee, one on a European earth resources detection satellite programme (Document 842) and one on the future of European space activities (Document 883).

II. The institutional framework

2. The Assembly of Western European Union is the ideal forum for informed discussion and debate about the military uses of space. As the sole European parliamentary assembly with specific competence by treaty in the defence field, its statutory terms of reference have lent themselves ideally to serious treatment by WEU of both the strategic and industrial aspects of a European space programme and of the implications for Western European defence of developments in space technology. The industrial and technical ramifications of the European space programme have stimulated a keen interest on the part of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in the work of the European Space Agency (ESA) since its inception twenty years ago. It must at the same time be made quite clear that, while the Assembly of Western European Union has monitored carefully the growing industrial competence in space matters which has been developed within Europe under the aegis of ESA, there has been no attempt on the part of ESA to promote the militarisation of ESA's activities which is explicitly debarred under the terms of the ESA convention¹.

1. See Appendix II.

3. Of course the national membership of ESA and WEU are not conterminous since the European Space Agency has numerically more members, some of which are neutral countries like Sweden and Ireland. Nevertheless, the Benelux nations, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom do jointly constitute the inner core of space-capable countries in Europe. Other Western European countries like Norway, Sweden and Spain in particular have a significant industrial involvement in space but nothing to compare with the effort of the WEU nations.

4. Just as the WEU member nations have a particular importance in the context of European defence, since they all, with the exception of Luxembourg, have either NATO nuclear forces stationed upon their soil or a national nuclear deterrent or both, so they have a particular significance as far as space-based defence is concerned by virtue of their technical competence and sophisticated industrial base.

5. The organs of WEU lend themselves naturally to the promotion of a Western European strategy and policy for the defensive applications of space technology. First, the Ministerial Council should be used for politico-military consultations at the highest governmental level to bring about a strategic concertation of policy and planning. Second, the Assembly of WEU should be the forum for reflection certainly but much more – the forum for mobilising political commitment to an active European space programme. Third, the Standing Armaments Committee can undertake the detailed technical studies needed and guide the ministerial Council and parliamentary assembly on the implications of the highly complicated technical developments in the space field. Fourth and last, the Agency for the Control of Armaments can examine the arms control and limitation aspects of military space systems, the difficult problems of verification of international agreements in this field and related confidence-building measures.

6. In short, WEU is in most respects the only institutional framework for the political control of initiatives and developments in the military uses of space. These have an international and national dimension in Europe. There are both national space programmes and programmes based on international European collaboration. The argument that greater reliance on WEU would derogate from the existing rôle of NATO and its agencies in this field is fallacious since the European industrial competition for NATO

space-based systems, especially in telecommunications, has been woefully inadequate. Since initiatives are currently being undertaken at the highest level for reviving WEU and involving more actively the ministerial Council, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments, it would be timely and in step with current political thinking in Europe to make a study of the implications for European defence of developments in military space technology.

III. *The Soviet space challenge*

7. No sane person seeks the militarisation of space or an extension of the costly nuclear arms race to space-based systems. However, there is no doubt from an objective analysis of Soviet efforts in space that they are determined to obtain major strategic benefits from an extremely innovative, ambitious and costly space programme with clear military objectives.

The Soviet space programme

8. The Soviets have made much progress toward their dual military objectives of global support to military forces and denial of enemy employment of space during wartime. In addition, progress has been made toward the two other key objectives of enhancing the influence and prestige of the USSR and contributing to the Soviet economy. There has been no change in the heavy Soviet emphasis on the military applications of space, reflecting their view, noted as early as two decades ago in the classified Soviet military publication, *Military Thought*, that "the mastering of space (is) a prerequisite for achieving victory in war".

9. Since last year, the Soviet developmental programmes for providing a family of new space launch vehicles and reusable spacecraft suitable for military and civil purposes have come into sharper focus. Significant new launch and support facilities at Tyuratam are nearing completion. Some of these should be ready this year or next to support initial testing of new launch vehicles. These vehicles include a space transportation system (STS), that in many respects copies the design of the United States space shuttle, a new heavy-lift launch vehicle based on the core rockets of the STS and a new medium-lift launch vehicle that is evidently designed for high launch rates. The new spacecraft include a space shuttle that differs from the United States shuttle only in the respect that the main engines are not on the orbiter, a small spacecraft that could be a test vehicle or a scale version of a military spacecraft, and a space tug that would be used

in space to move equipment and supplies from one orbit to another. The Soviet shuttle could be first tested in the mid-to-late 1980s. The space plane scale model has already been tested three times, and the space tug probably will reach operational status late in the 1980s.

10. In addition, the Soviets evidently intend to continue using their many types of operational space launch vehicles for at least another decade. This current family of vehicles, which supports a space effort of 100 or more launches per year, combined with the new generation of systems, indicates that the Soviets will be able by the mid-to-late 1980s to increase significantly their space programme both in numbers and payload weight. In this regard, the new heavy-lift vehicle is estimated to have the capability to place payloads weighing upwards of 330,000 pounds into low-earth orbit. This is about seven times more than the largest operational Soviet booster can deliver today, and about five times the maximum United States capability. Despite the obvious civil and scientific uses to which these capabilities could be put, the Soviets will continue, as in the past, to devote most of their future space programme to military purposes.

11. Military systems now account for more than 70% of Soviet space launches. Another 20% have combined military-civil application, with less than 10% devoted to purely civil/scientific activities. Very little of their effort is devoted to programmes that have economic benefit.

12. The Soviets routinely conduct about four to five times as many space launches per year as the United States. This is necessitated primarily by the shorter system lifetimes and poorer reliability of most Soviet satellites. The fact that they routinely operate this way in peacetime, however, gives them an inherently greater capability to increase rapidly the number of military satellites in orbit and to replace lost or damaged satellites as long as launch facilities are intact.

13. The United States and USSR currently maintain about the same number of operational satellites in orbit, 110 to 120. The Soviet inventory of operational space systems provides the capability to perform the following military functions:

- reconnaissance and surveillance,
- command, control and communications,
- ICBM launch detection and attack warning,
- strategic and tactical targeting,
- navigational support,

- meteorological support, and
- anti-satellite operations.

14. The Soviets have satellites that are designed to perform naval surveillance and targeting missions. These satellites are strictly military systems intended to support Soviet naval operations against large surface ships and other surface ship formations.

15. The Soviets have a deployed anti-satellite weapon system that is capable of attacking satellites in low-to-medium earth orbits. Recent Soviet proposals to ban all ASAT tests and future deployments of ASAT weapons are intended to put the United States at a disadvantage in this area. It is important to note that the proposed treaty does not prevent developing and deploying advanced ground-based weapons – such as high energy lasers – that could be used in an anti-satellite rôle.

16. The Soviets continue to pursue their manned space programmes maintaining in orbit the Salyut space station, which is manned during most of the year. This gives the Soviets the capability to perform a variety of functions from space, including military research and development and the use of man to augment their other reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. A larger, permanently manned space station, expected during the next decade, will significantly increase their in-orbit operations capabilities. This station could be used as a stepping stone to interplanetary exploration and the establishment of bases on other planetary bodies. The Soviets, however, are more likely to use such a station to perform command and control, reconnaissance and targeting functions. During wartime, it could perform these functions and more offensively oriented missions as well. The Soviets believe in the military utility of maintaining cosmonauts in orbit. Over the next ten years, therefore, the Soviets are likely to develop primarily for military purposes:

- a permanently manned Skylab-sized space station to be operational in the next two to three years with a six- to twelve-person crew, and
- a very large modular space station, to be operational by the early-to-mid-1990s, which could house as many as 100 personnel.

17. By all measures, the Soviet level of effort devoted to space in the 1980s is increasing significantly over the activities noted in the 1970s. The projected annual rate of growth of the Soviet space programme is expected to outpace both the annual rate of growth in overall Soviet military spending, which is tailing off, and that of the Soviet gross national

product (GNP). This will be the case for a number of years to come.

18. The Soviets have embarked upon a long-term, broad-based effort to expand their operational military capability in space. A major Soviet objective is to expand warfighting capability in space and achieve a measure of superiority in that arena. Their technological base is being strengthened and enhanced by technology transfer from the West. Their launch capability is increasing with the development of new facilities and booster systems. They continue to operate the world's only operational anti-satellite system, while they test and develop more sophisticated space weaponry. It is clear the Soviets are striving to integrate their space systems with the rest of their armed forces to ensure superior military capabilities in all arenas.

IV. *Aspects of international space law*

19. Attempts to control by treaty the development of an exceedingly costly and ethically unwelcome extension of the arms race to space have continued in recent years. However, taken together, such international agreements as have been reached are mostly exceedingly difficult if not impossible to verify and unenforceable as well. In addition to the anti-ballistic missile treaty of 1972 (ABM treaty) which has implications for the offence/defence nuclear balance in that it favours the proliferation of offensive nuclear delivery systems by the superpowers rather than defensive systems to maintain mutual deterrence, there have been a series of international treaties and draft agreements to contain the militarisation of space. The principal ones are:

- (i) the treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, of January 1967, which is referred to as the outer space treaty;
- (ii) the convention on the rescue of astronauts, the return of astronauts and the return of objects launched into outer space, which is referred to as the rescue agreement of 1968;
- (iii) the convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects of March 1972;
- (iv) the convention on registration of objects launched into outer space of January 1975, which is referred to as the registration convention;

- (v) the draft treaty submitted by the United Nations General Assembly on banning the stationing of any weapons in outer space (1981).

20. Article IV of the outer space treaty bans the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction under certain conditions, prohibits military facilities on celestial bodies and restrains military manoeuvres on such bodies. However, it does not provide for the demilitarisation of outer space as such.

21. In none of these treaties were provisions agreed to that would ensure demilitarisation. One could say that celestial bodies are in part demilitarised but outer space is not.

22. A number of arms control treaties have dealt with outer space and activities therein, such as the treaties with respect to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the limited test ban treaty, the environmental modification technics convention and the SALT I agreement which declared that there would be no interference with the reconnaissance undertaken in outer space to ensure compliance with the agreement.

V. Current initiatives and developments in defensive space systems

23. A question under study is whether a combination of space technologies could provide a workable defence against nuclear missiles. The system being studied incorporates orbiting surveillance stations, space- and land-based laser weapons and particle-beam weapons. These possibilities are being studied at the space command with its headquarters at Colorado Springs which is related to the North American aerospace defence command. The command was set up in June 1982. The budget of the space activities of all three United States forces has passed from \$2 billion in 1973 to \$8 billion in 1983.

24. In Chapter II of Document 883 of 15th June 1981 on the future of European space activities – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council, your Rapporteur described the military aspects of space and stated in paragraph 37 that the United States was becoming increasingly dependent on space systems for the effective use of its military forces. The four principal elements of the United States space development programme were: improved space surveillance, increased satellite system survivability, development of anti-satellite capabilities and command, control and communication support.

25. In December 1983, the President of the United States approved in principle a five-year

\$21 billion plan to accelerate the development of an arsenal of space weapons – “ray-guns” – designed to prevent a Soviet nuclear missile attack. Other energy-beam weapons are also being developed in order to make available effective anti-satellite devices mainly because it is believed the Soviet Union might have them and could use satellites to target United States ships and other forces.

26. Speaking in the House Armed Services Committee on 28th February 1984, Richard D. DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defence for Research and Engineering, said that the Defence Department had begun work on a second generation of anti-satellite weapons that could destroy an enemy spacecraft in high orbit. For fiscal year 1984-85, the Defence Department wanted \$143 million for continued development in order to demonstrate the capability of the system and to study a follow-on system with additional capability to place a wider range of Soviet satellites at risk.

27. In paragraph 39 of the abovementioned report, your Rapporteur indicated that the Soviet space programme had made significant advances in both technology and operations to support their military and civilian objectives. Major operational capabilities were achieved by the Soviet Union in space communications, meteorology, navigation surveys, and manned orbital flights.

28. In the recommendation attached to the report, the Assembly called for the promotion of European military communications and observation satellites and the investigation of the military implications of space technology, this, of course, being conducted in a North Atlantic context.

29. The Council failed to answer this part of the recommendation in its communication to the Assembly on 26th November 1981.

A French proposal

30. The question is now raised again since President Mitterrand of France, in his speech in The Hague in February 1984¹, suggested that there be European co-operation in space-based military reconnaissance or observation programmes which eventually could lead to European development of a manned military space station².

31. According to the French President, a military reconnaissance capacity organised and

1. See Appendix I.

2. See also the question put to the Council by the Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Mr. Lenzer, on 28th February 1984.

controlled by European nations would provide a new level of protection against attack. This French suggestion for consideration by Western European governments was not however a formal proposal for a military space station programme.

32. The President said literally: "If Europe were able to launch its own manned space station allowing it to observe, transmit and consequently avert all possible threats, it would have taken a big step towards its own defence."

33. The thinking behind President Mitterrand's declaration was that within twenty to thirty years the importance of nuclear weaponry could diminish because of new developments in space. Europe should be present in order to participate in this new advanced technology without which it is not possible for Europe to remain at the same technological level as the Americans and the Russians. A precondition of such a European space station would be a space transportation system, either a launcher or a European space shuttle. The launcher should be of the Ariane 5 configuration.

34. France has been advocating an international space-based reconnaissance effort for a long time. In 1977, it suggested establishing a multinational satellite observation agency to provide verification data in respect of arms limitations. This plan failed in the United Nations, but France has continued to look for ways of organising such an operation. The idea was discussed at the United Nations meeting on the peaceful use of space in August 1982.

35. The European Space Agency has asked its member countries to comment on the possible formation of an international satellite group that would use such spacecraft to monitor the application of arms agreements.

36. In 1982, defence spending constraints prevented France from working on its own military observation satellite called SAMRO. This programme might be revived in future years if more favourable conditions are found.

37. The French President's suggestion might raise considerable interest in defence circles and among the supporters of European unity. It is relevant because it is increasingly acknowledged that in the very long-term a European arsenal not complemented by space stations would lose much of its effectiveness. Satellites are vital for communications with nuclear forces, for targeting missiles against the enemy and for ensuring early warning of an attack. The British Skynet IV programme is a recognition of this. Only a common effort by the European nations to build their own space station capable of detecting threats to their security might at least partially restore some balance between them and the two superpowers.

38. The two superpowers already possess a highly sophisticated satellite system and enjoy huge military superiority over all other nations including the minor nuclear powers such as France and the United Kingdom. In the future, the arms race in space between the United States and the Soviet Union will increase the gap tremendously. A second important fact is that everywhere it is now recognised that without a space defence system the nuclear arsenals of France and the United Kingdom will become obsolete as they cannot afford, by themselves, to develop such a space segment. A common effort is indicated but it certainly will involve a huge cost and presupposes a common will for the European defence policy.

VI. Long-term United States space strategy

39. The 1972 SALT I agreement on offensive weapons was accompanied by an anti-ballistic missile treaty (ABM) which limited the number of launchers and interceptor missiles which each side could deploy and the type and number of associated radars. The treaty also prohibits the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missile defences that are sea-based, mobile land-based or space-based. It also places restrictions on the development and deployment of future systems such as lasers. It did not define the characteristics of missile defence radars or limit the conversion and up-grading of air defence capability to provide a measure of defence against ballistic missiles, an omission which the Soviets have blatantly exploited.

40. Since the ABM treaty was signed in May 1972, the Soviet Union has deployed new, mobile phased-array radars and hypersonic interceptor missiles and expanded the missile defences around Moscow. At the same time, it has been particularly active in high-technology research into ballistic missile defence and anti-satellite capability. It has already developed, tested and deployed an ASAT system in space and demonstrated its effectiveness.

41. The United States has had under development for some years a low-altitude defence system designed to intercept incoming re-entry vehicles at the lower levels of their trajectory, using nuclear- or conventionally-armed interceptor missiles, with the aim of providing some protection for missile silos.

42. It has long been recognised that the only really effective BMD system is one capable of intercepting enemy ICBMs or IRBMs in the boost phase, minutes after launch, when they are most vulnerable. This should be supported by a mid-course and terminal system to take care of leakage of missiles or re-entry vehicles;

in other words, a layered ballistic missile defence system catering for exoatmospheric and endoatmospheric interception. The system would use non-nuclear destruct warheads or directed energy beams and would be both ground- and space-based.

43. The world strategic situation has changed since the 1972 ABM treaty was signed. Intelligence analysis of Soviet research and development at their Saryshagen, Semniplatinsk and Golvinno establishments confirms that they are developing high-energy laser, charged and neutral particle beam weapons and microwave and plasma systems for deployment as ground- and space-based defensive systems against both ballistic missiles and aircraft. It is possible that the Soviets are ahead of the United States in the development of these exotic weapons systems. It is known that they have tested a high-energy laser against one of their ICBMs and against aircraft and missiles using infrared sensors. It should come as no surprise to the West if the Soviet Union climaxed the present Soyuz/Salyut-7 space programme with the announcement that it has developed a space-based laser or particle beam weapon system, probably well before the end of the decade. If it succeeds, it will introduce a serious destabilising factor into the world balance of power equation.

44. The United States has also tested a high-energy laser weapon against drones, anti-tank and air-to-air missiles, but has not yet tested either a ground-based or space-based weapon against an ICBM or even an ASAT system. Europe has so far taken no part in any research in this important arena of military affairs. No European NATO countries were involved in the SALT negotiations or the ABM treaty, not even Britain and France although they both have nuclear forces. It is only recently, in the course of the intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations in Geneva, that the French and British nuclear forces have been recognised and only then as a ploy by the Soviet Union to further complicate the discussions. It is against this background that European NATO countries must consider their attitude to United States proposals for the development and deployment of strategic missile defences. They must decide whether any or all of them should contribute technically and financially to the development of projects recently approved by the Reagan administration which could provide defence against ICBMs and IRBMs such as the SS-20 and SS-22. There can be no doubt that it is in Europe's interests to do so.

45. The deployment of an effective ballistic missile defence system by both sides would, of course, greatly reduce the threat of nuclear attack and provide a better basis for arms

reduction negotiations in which the problem of verification would be less important. The Soviets are feverishly pursuing a policy of defence against ballistic missile, cruise missile and manned aircraft nuclear attack, coupled with a civil defence policy which would so reduce the effects of nuclear attack against them that their forces would be sure of victory and the Soviet Union would survive attack at any level. Dr. Edward Teller, commenting on the possibility of providing an effective defence against ballistic missiles which developments in high technology have made possible, described it as the most important military breakthrough since the atomic bomb. To the informed military strategist who has watched the unchallenged superiority of the offensive ballistic missile for more than twenty-five years, the creation of such a defence system would transform the military scene.

The state of the art in ballistic missile defence

46. When the United States safeguard ABM system was put in cold storage in 1972, little was heard of the prospects for a ballistic missile defence system until the subject was resurrected by a non-governmental organisation headed by Lt. General Daniel Graham and a small team of military experts which became known as High Frontier. They recognised that technological progress in the decade since 1972 had provided the means by which an effective non-nuclear defence against ballistic missiles attacking United States ICBM silos could be developed using technology already available. A nationwide defence was still not possible, but progress in computer technology, microprocessing and developments in laser, charged-particle beams and microwave systems had brought such defence within the bounds of possibility. The testing of Soviet ASAT systems in space indicated a developing threat to United States military satellites from conventional or directed-energy weapons deployed in space, which blind reconnaissance and early warning satellites on which United States strategic nuclear forces depend if they are to maintain a credible deterrent.

47. While informed scientific opinion recognised that the most effective ballistic missile defence system would be a layered system capable of attacking ballistic missiles in the boost, post-boost and terminal phases of the trajectory, high-energy directed beams were not likely to be available until probably the end of the decade. The High Frontier team cut through the academic verbiage that so often accompanies any new concepts in military strategy or developments in weapons systems and produced a study showing how an effective BMD system could be produced with existing technology

until more advanced systems were available. It was sufficient to galvanise the administration into serious study of the whole concept of BMD. The report of the defence technology study team is the result.

48. The High Frontier team had recommended a conventional ballistic missile defence system involving multiple satellites using kinetic energy pellets as the kill mechanism against missiles on their trajectories through space, augmented by point defence systems to defend against re-entry vehicles in the terminal phases of their trajectories. A committee on national space policy considered the state of the art in BMD, and the options open to the President, and recommended that the United States should, as a matter of urgency, develop space- and ground-based defence systems against ballistic missile attack.

49. Technologically feasible options for BMD were recommended by the defence technologies study team in November 1983. Their report pointed out what had been known for some time that the destruction of ICBMs in the boost phase of their flight is the ideal in any BMD system, but until recently the technology to achieve boost-phase or mid-course interception simply was not available. The safeguard ABM system of the 1960s, developed but never deployed, had a limited capability against ballistic missiles in the final stages of their trajectories (endoatmospheric) but little or none in the mid-course space phase (exoatmospheric).

50. The defence technology study team advocates a layered defence capability which would have a boost and post-boost destruct mechanism and a terminal phase defence to limit any leakage of nuclear-armed re-entry vehicles into the atmosphere on the terminal phase of their trajectories. Each layer would employ different technologies for acquisition, tracking, identification, aiming and interception with selected kill mechanisms.

51. Briefly, a layered BMD system would consist of boost phase interception by deployment of sensors that could detect and track ballistic missiles from the moment of ignition to post-boost burn-out in the first two to five minutes of trajectory. Interception and destruction could be achieved by one of a number of kinetic energy kill mechanisms such as a space-based electro-magnetic railgun firing hyper-velocity small projectiles. High-energy lasers, charged-particle beams and microwave systems would be more effective but are not yet developed and may take up to ten years to become operational. Power supplies for directed energy weapons could be provided by compact nuclear reactors which are being developed now.

52. Mid-course acquisition, tracking, identification and weapon aiming present different problems in that it becomes necessary to deal with individual re-entry vehicles released from the missiles which have much smaller signatures than missiles in the boost phase. The technology to achieve this is now within the state of the art, including the ability to discriminate between decoys, debris and genuine warheads. Kinetic energy kill mechanisms can be applied to this phase until directed energy teams become available. Multiple satellite space platforms could be deployed to accommodate the interception and kill mechanisms.

53. Terminal defence by mobile interceptor launchers with sensors capable of filtering out decoys at altitudes up to eighty miles would require interceptor missiles to be committed to each threatening object and be capable of homing on to an object to release low-yield nuclear warheads or kinetic energy pellets.

54. To produce a fully effective layered defence such as that outlined above requires a great deal of research and development. The United States has already allocated about \$2 billion to the project and a bill is now before the Senate which would create a unified space command for the direction of all ground- and space-based strategic defence activity. A new agency would be established to co-ordinate research into directed energy technology on similar lines to the Defence Nuclear Agency. The problems still to be overcome in designing, developing and deploying an effective layered defence system against ballistic missiles are formidable, but no longer impossible to achieve.

55. One promising approach to the problem might be the creation of a programme similar to the Manhattan project which would pursue multiple parallel research into various technologies in which European countries could participate with finance and technological input. But they would have to be convinced that such a programme would be of direct benefit to them and would reduce or nullify the threat of nuclear attack, which today is more menacing than ever before. They must be assured that the policy of mutual assured destruction can be replaced by one of assured survival and in the process reduce the threat of war, nuclear or conventional. European countries, particularly the United Kingdom, France and West Germany, have the technological knowledge to contribute to a Manhattan-type programme even though they have not so far been engaged in research into ballistic missile defence at any level.

VII. *United Kingdom military satellite communications*

1. *Background*

56. United Kingdom Ministry of Defence interest in satellite communications developed during the early 1960s when various research equipments using the moon and other passive reflecting satellites indicated that the technique would be practicable for defence communications. Theoretical studies showed that, both for strategic communications links and for links with the Royal Navy ships, satellite communications would be cost-effective. Formal collaboration with the United States Department of Defence started in 1965 in preparation for United Kingdom participation in the United States SHF interim defence communication satellite project, and collaboration with NATO on various studies and trials of the effectiveness of UHF satcoms for small mobile terminals started soon afterwards. Ever since those early days, close collaboration with the Department of Defence and NATO has remained a very important aspect of United Kingdom defence satellite communications.

57. The period mid-1967-70 was one of intense and rapid development. SHF activities concentrated on the use of the IDCSP satellites. A transatlantic link between a Department of Defence terminal and a Ministry of Defence 40-ft diameter terminal was established within hours of the first satellite launch (16th June 1966) and the United Kingdom soon had a total of seven 20-ft and 40-ft transportable and fixed stations in use. The first public demonstration of a small land-mobile station took place at the Paris air show in April 1967 and, following an early development using the trials ship HMS Wakeful, the first two of many Royal Navy ships were fitted with terminals. Very soon after the start of IDCSP trials a decision was taken to procure United Kingdom satellites and the first of these, Skynet 1A, launched in November 1969, was the world's first geostationary defence satellite. There was even at that time a strong emphasis on use of spread spectrum techniques and on system design to allow efficient service of small SHF terminals, primarily to meet the Royal Navy requirements.

58. Following Skynet 1A, two spacecraft (1B and 2A) were lost due to malfunction during launch operations. However, a second Ministry of Defence satellite, Skynet 2B, was launched into geostationary orbit on 20th November 1974. This had greater radiated power than Skynet 1A, was built by Marconi Space and Defence Systems Limited (MSDS) and still

today provides a useful communications capability.

59. Throughout the 1970s there was continued development of the Skynet system, particularly in the provision of terminals known as SCOT for Royal Navy ships. In parallel the Ministry of Defence maintained a vigorous research and development programme covering detailed evaluations of many potential applications of satellite communications, experimental work on the new techniques for satellite repeaters, terminals and traffic handling and a series of studies of the overall design of defence satcom systems. This work was both intramural and with United Kingdom industry. Midway through the decade all necessary project studies had been performed by MSDS Ltd. for the next generation of military satellites. However, following a defence review, it was decided that the lowest cost solution for maintaining a minimum number of essential satcom links would be Ministry of Defence participation in United States Department of Defence and NATO projects at least for the short term. Consequently the planned production contract for Skynet 3 satellites did not proceed.

60. The present Skynet 4 project stems from the Ministry of Defence's seventeen years of operational experience of satellite communications and from advances in technology which have allowed much smaller terminals, more cost-effective satellites and significantly improved performance against military threats. These developments have resulted in satcoms being a preferred solution for a wider range of defence communications purposes than hitherto, though it must be noted that in spite of the value and effectiveness of the new techniques, the importance of communications in defence is such that there cannot be sole reliance on satcoms any more than there can be on any other particular form of communication. A number of factors led the Ministry of Defence to conclude that the procurement of their own satellites was once again the most practicable and cost-effective way forward. These included the increasing requirement for satellite communication, the need for satellite transponders operating in a manner suitable to accommodate small terminals and new types of service, the requirement to have both SHF and UHF capabilities and the concern to have direct control over the satellite resource.

61. Ministry of Defence intramural studies during 1978-79 were followed by industrial project definition studies in 1980-81 and the instruction to proceed for the main production contract for two satellites and associated ground control equipments was issued on 8th December 1981. Complementing the new spacecraft project, United Kingdom industry has a number of

other contracts for enhancing the earth segment of the system, including production of improved SCOT terminals by MSDS Ltd. for the Royal Navy.

2. Industrial organisation

62. British Aerospace Space and Communications Division (BAe) is the prime contractor to the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence for the Skynet 4 project. Marconi Space and Defence Systems Limited, the major supporting contractor, is responsible to British Aerospace for the communication payload design and development together with the development and commissioning of the ground control facility.

3. Requirements

63. In the Skynet 4 programme a key theme has at all times been the achievement of the most cost-effective solution within the context of other communications options open to the Ministry of Defence. Highly desirable objectives, such as capability to meet the upper limit on projections of future satcom traffic, have had to be examined repeatedly from the cost-effectiveness point of view.

64. Among the more important of the general requirements on which this programme is based are the following:

- capability to serve maritime operations, which tend not to require high data rates but do demand coverage over substantial areas of the earth's surface;
- capability to provide strategic/trunk links using relatively large terminals;
- capability to serve small mobile terminals, mainly in the Western European area;
- strong resistance to electronic countermeasures and other threats;
- satellite design matching the capability of existing and planned earth-segment equipment;
- interoperability with United States and NATO systems;
- an autonomous spacecraft providing the necessary communications capability with a minimum of traffic management intervention;
- minimum use of manpower, especially skilled manpower for system operations. Small terminals normally would be expected to be operated unattended;

- flexibility to serve changing operational needs;
- maximum possible redundancy and step-by-step degradation in system performance.

65. These requirements and other considerations (launcher options, technical risks, cost, timescale) led to the decision to have:

- two UHF earth-cover channels;
- four SHF channels covering most of the available bandwidth in the 7/8 GHz band, incorporating a wide range of gain adjustment and served by a number of antennas having beamwidths varying from earth-cover down to 3 degrees;
- one EHF uplink channel sponsored by the Royal Signals and Radar Establishment for advanced research and development;
- signal-processing equipment provided as one of the measures necessary to achieve a high level of resistance to electronic countermeasures;
- known NATO requirements built into the spacecraft.

4. The space segment

66. The first phase of the Skynet 4 programme provides for two three-axis stabilised satellites in orbit. The satellites comprise developments of the proven hardware technology used in previous and current Skynet, DSCS and European communications satellite (ECS) programmes. They are planned to be launched in the mid-1980s and have a design life of seven years. The mass at lift-off is 1,270 kg and the end-of-life power is in excess of 1,200 watts.

67. A modular approach has been adopted for the satellites following the well-tried formula of the orbital test, European communications and Marescs satellites. Each satellite consists of a service module capable of providing all the basic service functions and a communications module which carries the payload.

68. The satellite is a three-axis stabilised cube with two solar paddles, each consisting of hinged panels, attached to the bearing and power transfer assembly mounted on the north and south sides of the satellite, and axially aligned along the satellite pitch axis. During launch and transfer orbit, the arrays are folded against the satellite's north and south sides so that the external faces provide power during this phase of the mission. In normal operation the arrays are deployed and the paddles are independently steered to track the sun by

revolving around the pitch axis. The SHF, UHF and EHF antennas are all located on the earth-pointing face.

69. The PAM-D rocket places the satellite in a conventional transfer orbit and a solid apogee boost motor injects the satellite into a geosynchronous orbit. The launch vehicle will inject the satellite in a spin-stabilised configuration which is retained until entry into the geosynchronous orbit. The satellite will then be despun using the on-board hydrazine system. The solar array paddles will be deployed. The three-axis earth-pointing stabilised attitude will be acquired. Finally the satellite will be moved to a location close to the Greenwich meridian. During the subsequent seven-year life the satellite will be maintained at plus or minus 0.1° East-West but the orbit inclination will vary by approximately 3° each way.

70. In the satellite there is very considerable provision of spare hardware ("redundancy") in order to minimise the probability of failure within the design lifetime. This has been seen to be of particular importance within the communications payload.

VIII. A new European civil space programme for the 1980s and the 1990s

71. The main programmes of ESA, such as Ariane, Spacelab and Marots, are all now coming to an end. It is therefore of the greatest importance to try to put together a new long-term ESA programme. One of the elements of such a programme would be the ERS-1 satellite which would be a follow-up of ESA's Meteosat programme and Europe's contribution to the World Weather Watch.

72. In the field of remote sensing ERS-1 is to be launched in 1988 for the global observation of ocean surface winds, sea states and waves, ocean surface topography and sea-ice distribution and dynamics.

73. In telecommunications new so-called piggyback systems will be developed for more up-to-date communications test satellites.

74. The ESA budget of 1 billion ECU, some 7 billion francs, will be divided between the future Ariane 5 development, an increased scientific programme, participation in the space station and the abovementioned earth observation and new telecommunications satellites.

75. The techniques used for civil purposes can also be used for military purposes and it is for the states and industries to decide what use they make of their knowledge or hardware.

76. 80% of the money assigned to ESA is invested in industry and most of the hardware

which belongs to ESA is in the laboratories and test facilities of ESTEC in Noordwijk.

77. It would be of great importance for European industry if a military dimension were given to their activities. One should take into account that Europe has a limited number of space experts and these people should therefore be used as rationally as possible. This means that in the aerospace industries work should be done on civil as well as on military applications.

78. Europe does not spend enough money on space activities. In the United States NASA spends some \$7 billion a year and the Department of Defence another \$10 billion. Europe spends less than one-tenth of the total American budget. Japan, India, Brazil and the People's Republic of China have an increasingly active space programme.

79. If Europe is to participate in a space station, it has to spend at least 10% more than it spends now on civil space applications.

80. A military effort would need another \$500 million at least. Such military funding would underpin the aerospace industry and the ESA studies and effort. All the technology acquired in the twenty years of ESA activities belongs to the participating countries. This fund of knowledge should be managed skilfully and according to the wishes of the participating countries.

81. One crucial member state of ESA is the Federal Republic of Germany which successfully completed the Spacelab 1 mission. This mission represented a convincing demonstration of the enhanced capabilities of the space shuttle and the European reusable spacelab. The primary objective of the mission was verification of the shuttle-spacelab combination.

82. As the scientific potential of the spacelab concept has been realised, a follow-up is needed and whether this will happen depends mainly on the Federal Republic of Germany. One way or another, the spacelab configuration is a step in the direction of the space station and the Italian-German project Columbus would constitute a modular spacelab development and be compatible with the United States space station.

83. On 9th and 10th May 1984, an informal meeting of the ESA Ministerial Council was held at ESTEC, Noordwijk, Netherlands, at the request of the Italian Minister for Science and Technology, Mr. Granelli. There was a general discussion on the goals of the European space effort in the short and medium term. A discussion was then held on the launch systems, European participation in the space station and future earth observation and telecommunication satellites. This meeting commemorated twenty years of ESA.

An American proposal

84. President Reagan's proposal to build a permanently manned space station within the next decade and the invitation to Japan, Canada and the European countries to participate in the space station programme was widely discussed at the beginning of this year. Co-operation could range from co-development of the space station to use of the completed facility.

85. Mr. James M. Beggs, the NASA Administrator, underlined that the space station would be a civil and not a military programme. It will be a logical conclusion of the existence of the space shuttle. The manned space station in low earth orbit will serve as a base for scientific, commercial and technological advances in space operations.

86. Mr. Beggs has informed the national European and ESA authorities that once the first space station for civil purposes has been built, several others will have to follow.

87. For Europe, it would be of great importance to participate in this new technological venture. The building time will be some twelve years and Europe might have its own space station in twenty to twenty-five years. Questions to be asked are: (a) what benefits will such a space station provide, and (b) what benefits will there be for Europe in participating in the construction of an American space station. Once these questions have been answered, the question of how European participation should be organised comes to the fore.

88. The question of the benefits to be derived from a space station is difficult to answer in specific terms. There will, of course, be the possibility of developing new materials, new medical drugs, etc. There will be considerable technological spin-off but will all these benefits be sufficient and worthwhile?

89. The main reason for the Americans offering the Europeans a rôle in building the space station is that money is tight in the United States and they would therefore welcome a European contribution. The space station as they foresee it will probably cost \$8 billion. Any European contribution would therefore be a worthwhile addition over and above this sum of money and would allow other experiments than those foreseen by NASA to be conducted.

90. On the European side the big question there is whether more money will be earmarked for space activities. France is now budgeting some 4 billion francs. The German budget is about half of that and the United Kingdom budget is even less. Within five years European budgeting should be at least double what it is now.

91. If a space station is built, it would probably not be an earth observation station in itself but a manned station from which action could be taken to recuperate satellites, repair and maintain them. From there civil or military observation satellites in low orbit could be controlled.

A European defensive space programme

92. Four major activities in space should interest Europeans if they wish to improve the defence of their national territories.

93. Firstly, all countries recognise that *telecommunications* are extremely important. The United Kingdom is equipping itself with a military network of telecommunications satellites called Skynet and the French forces will use a segment of the Telecom 1 satellite. Discussions are being held between French and British authorities on the possibilities of a co-ordinated effort. Once co-ordination is achieved, a logical step would be to Europeanise the bilateral achievement.

94. The Germans have not for the moment the same military needs but in the long term their national industries might be interested in participating in a joint European effort.

95. The second important space activity, which should now have first priority if a telecommunications satellite system is established, is *military observation satellites*. Such a system could be a logical development from the French civil system called Spot. The military authorities would, of course, want a more sophisticated system than Spot.

96. Apart from this French national programme, there is also the ESA ERS-1 programme which, of course, is a civil programme but could without too much difficulty become a military programme.

97. For lack of funds, the French national military observation satellite system called Samro (*Satellite militaire de reconnaissance optique*) is being set aside for the time being. This project will be reactivated as soon as financially possible.

98. It would be very desirable to set up such a system and Europe should study the different forms and characteristics of reconnaissance satellites. The range of reconnaissance satellites covers optical devices, synthetic aperture radar, hyperfrequencies, electronic listening and infrared devices and others capable of detecting missile launchings or nuclear explosions.

99. A European research and development effort would be necessary since a satellite system and ground installations would be extremely costly, particularly the ground radars.

100. In the United Kingdom, the military authorities preferred the hyperfrequency system and a co-operative American/British effort has been started.

101. Europeans should give highest priority to a satellite observation system as it would not be acceptable for Europe to leave this field wholly to the Americans and the Russians.

102. A satellite observation system with optical images could cost some 3 billion francs, the launching of the satellites included. The military segment would cost some 1.5 billion francs extra. For a complete system it would be necessary to have two and preferably three observation satellites which would gather such a mass of data that it would probably require a relay satellite such as the American TDRSS (tracking and data relay satellite system) which would allow data to be relayed from and between satellites and to command posts on earth.

103. The third type of satellite of interest to Europe is the *navigational satellite system* which is of great importance for military shipping and submarines and in which the British Government might be interested. The difficulty here is that airlines would be the first to be able to make use of such a system but the cost is considered to be too high.

104. The fourth system involves *attack satellites* from where missiles can be sent to destroy enemy satellites. This type of satellite would not have priority in Europe and all that could be done would be to follow American or Soviet developments.

105. However, for Europe, and especially for the United Kingdom and France, attack satellites are of great importance because their existence would reduce the military worth of their nuclear forces. It is clear that with an extremely limited number of nuclear weapons the possibility of destroying them in flight would reduce the deterrent value of the United

Kingdom and French nuclear forces. Politically, this is of great importance.

106. The implications of military satellites would be political, military, industrial and eventually commercial.

107. Once Europe has built these satellites, it would need to protect them and would therefore have to build anti-satellite weapons. The protection of satellites would, of course, also be extremely expensive but, as shown by the Americans with the F-15 and its anti-satellite weapon, it would be possible. So Europe could, for instance, use the Tornado F-2 for this purpose instead of the F-15, but the associated infrastructure would be astronomically costly.

108. With regard to launchers, the trend in the use of space will make it necessary to launch increasingly large payloads. The Ariane 2 launcher will be able to place a payload of over 2,000 kg in geosynchronous orbit and the Ariane 3 a payload of 2,580 kg. The Ariane 4 launcher, the development of which was approved in January 1982, will become operational in 1986.

109. In this context your Rapporteur wishes to mention a French study on Hermes, a hypersonic glider compatible for launching by the post Ariane 4 launcher now under study. It is capable of carrying four passengers plus 4.5 tons of cargo into a 400 km circular orbit of 28 degrees inclination or two passengers plus 1 ton of cargo in a circular heliosynchronous orbit (800 km). It has a 35 cu.m. cargo bay with a diameter of 3 m. The total mass of the vehicle at lift-off is some 15 tons.

110. As for the framework of space activities for military purposes, it would be possible to use ESA in a consultancy rôle. As such, it would be able to provide a technical contribution which would not infringe the ESA convention. Within the NATO framework American pressure would be extremely great. If done within a European framework, WEU would be more suitable than the EEC.

APPENDIX I

*Extract from the speech by President Mitterrand
in the Second Chamber of the States-General, The Hague,
7th February 1984*

.....

There is still a broad area in which we can organise our security however. Not only by conventional armaments but also by the new means about to erupt on the world scene. We must already look beyond the nuclear era if we are not to fall behind in a future that is closer than one might think. I will quote only one example, the conquest of space. If Europe were able to launch its own manned space station

allowing it to observe, transmit and consequently avert all possible threats, it would have taken a big step towards its own defence. Nor should one forget advances in electronic calculation and artificial memory, or the known capability to fire projectiles at the speed of light. To my mind, a European space community would be the response best adapted to the military realities of tomorrow.

.....

APPENDIX II

*Convention for the establishment
of a European Space Agency**Article II**Purpose*

The purpose of the Agency shall be to provide for and to promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, co-operation among European states in space research and technology and their space applications, with a view to their being used for scientific purposes and for operational space applications systems,

- (a) by elaborating and implementing a long-term European space policy, by recommending space objectives to the member states, and by concerting the policies of the member states with

respect to other national and international organisations and institutions;

- (b) by elaborating and implementing activities and programmes in the space field;
- (c) by co-ordinating the European space programme and national programmes, and by integrating the latter progressively and as completely as possible into the European space programme, in particular as regards the development of applications satellites;
- (d) by elaborating and implementing the industrial policy appropriate to its programme and by recommending a coherent industrial policy to the member states.

Military use of space

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by MM. Thorne and Edwards

1. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraphs 2 to 9.

Signed : Thorne, Edwards

1. See 6th sitting, 21st June 1984 (amendment negatived).

Military use of space

AMENDMENTS 2 and 3¹

tabled by Mr. Hardy

2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out :
“appropriate for the formulation of Western European security policy”.
3. In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “to utilise” and insert “for the civil and peaceful utilisation of”.

Signed : Hardy

1. See 6th sitting, 21st June 1984 (amendments negatived).

Military use of space

AMENDMENT 4¹

tabled by MM. Tummers and Garrett

4. In the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph 10 as follows :

“10. Postpone reaching decisions on the results of the analysis by the Standing Armaments Committee, the study by the Agency for the Control of Armaments and on the other abovementioned measures until the Assembly has had an opportunity to gain detailed knowledge about these and related military space problems through a broad-based symposium on the possibilities and desirability of the use of outer space for military purposes.”

Signed : Tummers, Garrett

1. See 6th sitting, 21st June 1984 (amendment agreed to).

Military use of space

AMENDMENTS 5, 6 and 7¹

tabled by Mr. Fourné

5. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, after "Soviet" add "and United States".
6. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add :
"and in the light of this study examine what tasks might be entrusted to the Agency for the Control of Armaments with a view to participating in verification that these measures are being respected".
7. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :
"Demand a larger European industrial involvement in telecommunications satellites and in military satellite programmes pursued at international level as well as in the associated ground station infrastructure, in addition to supporting existing national military communications satellites like Skynet and Samro;".

Signed : Fourné

1. See 6th sitting, 21st June 1984 (amendments 5 and 6 agreed to ; amendment 7 negatived).

*Action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted
by the WEU Assembly on the standardisation and production of armaments*

INFORMATION REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Relations with Parliaments
by Mr. Antretter, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INFORMATION REPORT

submitted by Mr. Antretter, Rapporteur

I. Introduction

II. Method of analysis

III. Analysis of Recommendations : 325
329
333
335
337
338
339
358
362
368

IV. Analysis of other activities in national parliaments

V. Conclusions

ABBREVIATIONS

ACA	Agency for the Control of Armaments
CNAD	NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors
ECA	European combat aircraft
FINABEL	Army chiefs-of-staff of France, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom
IEPG	Independent European Programme Group
SAC	Standing Armaments Committee
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Information Report

(submitted by Mr. Antretter, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The purpose of the present report is to examine the action taken in parliaments of the member countries on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on the standardisation and production of armaments.

2. In view of the wealth of documentation gathered, your Rapporteur proposes to confine himself to an analysis of the action taken on the recommendations adopted by the Assembly in the last five years.

3. Since the WEU Assembly is the only European parliamentary assembly empowered by treaty to handle defence matters and maintains most valuable relations with the national parliaments and ministers, it is not surprising to find such a wealth of documentation. In the course of his study, your Rapporteur has gathered the very vast documentation composed of government statements in the parliaments, and often in other places and circumstances too, as well as many written and oral questions put by parliamentarians, whether members of the national delegations to the WEU Assembly or not, and based directly or indirectly on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly.

4. In view of the breadth of the subject to be examined, your Rapporteur proposes confining himself to a study of the action taken in the parliaments of member countries on the recommendations of the WEU Assembly dealing with the production of conventional armaments and those referring to standardisation.

5. He has not therefore examined the possibilities of European co-operation in space technology, whose main application is in the sector of communications and navigation satellites, nor the use for defence purposes of existing meteorological satellites or the military applications of data processing. This omission is voluntary although these questions have been widely debated in the national parliaments. It might be worthwhile considering them in a second part of this report.

II. Method of analysis

6. In order to gather all the elements required to draw appropriate conclusions under part V, your Rapporteur deems it necessary to proceed as follows :

- in part III the operative text of each recommendation will be given in full with the date of adoption ;
- after each recommendation, the full text of the corresponding reply of the Council with the date of communication to the Assembly will be given, followed by a brief summary of both documents. Your Rapporteur is convinced that a profound knowledge of all elements of these documents is required for a meaningful evaluation of action taken in the different parliaments ;
- after each reply of the Council, the corresponding parliamentary questions and government answers are given, followed by a brief comparison with the contents of the abovementioned WEU texts ;
- part IV contains other activities in parliaments ;
- for the sake of clarity, the recommendations are presented in chronological and hence numerical order.

7. In the following documents and statements, the terms "standardisation" and "interoperability" are used several times. For a better understanding of the subject of this report, it is perhaps worthwhile explaining the significance of these two terms.

8. The idea of standardisation is the more attractive to a broad spectrum of opinion in that it meets the wishes of operatives for homogeneity and the economic wish to reduce unit costs.

9. According to the NATO glossary, standardisation is :

"The process by which member nations achieve the closest practicable co-operation among forces, the most efficient use of research, development and production resources, and agree to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use of :

- (a) common or compatible operational, administrative and logistic procedures ;
- (b) common or compatible technical procedures and criteria ;
- (c) common, compatible or interchangeable supplies, components, weapons or equipment ;

(d) common or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding organisational compatibility.”

10. The difficulties inherent in standardisation have helped to bring to the fore the notion of interoperability, which differs from the former in that it stresses the compatibility of matériel rather than their identity or interchangeability and seeks to solve the military problem but not the problem of economic production runs.

11. According to the NATO glossary, interoperability is :

“The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.”

12. It may therefore be said for example that interoperability is ensuring the compatibility of communications systems, identity of fuels and munitions and as many joint logistic rules as possible.

III. Analysis of recommendations

13. *Recommendation 325* on a European armaments policy presented on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was adopted by the Assembly on 22nd November 1978 as follows :

“The Assembly,

.....

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge that efforts to achieve joint production, interoperability and, when necessary for the security of Europe, the standardisation of defence equipment in the European countries of the alliance be concentrated in the independent European programme group with such assistance as the Standing Armaments Committee can provide ;

2. Give consideration to the restructuring of the European armaments industry under the aegis of the European Community, relying on its responsibility in the fields of industrial and customs policy and research ;

3. Ensure that once the present study of the European armaments industry is completed, full use be made of the resources of the Standing Armaments Committee to assist in the foregoing tasks ;

4. Request the governments concerned to arrange for the IEPG to submit an annual report on its activities to the Assembly.”

14. The reply of the Council was communicated to the Assembly on 21st March 1979. The Council rejected the specific proposal of the Assembly concerning the involvement of the European Community and the request for an annual report to be submitted by the IEPG to the Assembly.

“1. For the reasons previously stated in the reply to Assembly Recommendation 297, the Council consider that efforts to organise European co-operation in the field of armaments production are essential and should be vigorously pursued. This is the aim of the independent European programme group in its work on the joint development and production of weapons systems or equipment of major importance for the preservation of European armaments industries. Although detailed programmes have not yet been worked out, considerable progress has been made in some fields such as the harmonisation of equipment timetables, the defining of certain specific projects and the study of problems relating to practical aspects of co-operation.

At the same time, the IEPG has succeeded in working out a common European line of approach to offers of co-operation from the North Americans in the framework of the ‘transatlantic dialogue’. Current discussions relate to the possibility of sharing development and production between Europeans and North Americans for certain ‘armaments families’ with the Europeans seeking to redress the balance of production and trade in terms of both quality and quantity. Indeed, the search for standardisation must not be allowed to operate exclusively to the advantage of equipment of American origin, leaving the European industry with only a subordinate rôle as subcontractors which in the long term would be a threat to its existence.

2. The restructuring of the European armaments industry raises a number of complex problems which are not limited to industrial and customs policy or research policy, but directly involve the security of states.

The Assembly’s suggestion would therefore imply a wide interpretation of the field of application of the Treaty of Rome ; such an interpretation has already been opposed by a number of governments.

3. The first results of the Standing Armaments Committee’s study on the European armaments industry confirm that this body is a useful instrument for thought and analysis which can be used to good purpose by the governments. Like the

Assembly, the Council consider that the resources of the SAC should continue to be fully employed and when the current study has been completed they will consider the possibility of giving it new tasks in areas where its resources can be used without duplicating the activities of other bodies.

4. The independent European programme group brings together representatives of all the European states which are members of the alliance, except Iceland. The submission of a report on the activities of the IEPG to the WEU Assembly, with which they have no organisational links, would undoubtedly give rise to difficulties for some of these states. It is more appropriate for WEU Assembly delegates to be briefed through national channels on IEPG activities."

15. The reference to the European Community inevitably stirred up repercussions in all parliaments of the member countries and particularly in *France, Germany, Italy* and the *Netherlands*.

16. In the *French Senate*, Mr. Jeambrun put three questions on Recommendation 325. The first question on 30th November 1978 came before the Council had replied and read as follows :

"To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs to explain the French Government's attitude towards the recommendation on a European armaments policy adopted by the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) on 22nd November 1978. To ask him to give the French views on the respective possibilities of the independent European programme group and of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee and on the respective advantages of interoperability and standardisation in the production of armaments."

17. The answer by Mr. Barre, French Prime Minister, on 28th January 1979, was also communicated prior to the Council's reply and gave details of the French Government's position on all questions linked with international and particularly European co-operation in armaments questions :

"Maintaining a high-quality armaments industry in Europe meets economic, social and military needs. Safeguarding this industrial and technological potential implies organising intra-European co-operation and the French Government therefore affords active support to all bodies working in this sense. The Standing Armaments Committee of WEU is in this respect an excellent instrument for reflection and analysis as borne out by the first results of the study it made at the request

of the WEU Council on the situation of armaments industries in WEU member countries. The independent European programme group, which brings together all the European members of the alliance, is more particularly responsible for organising co-operation for the joint development and production of specific weapons systems or equipment. In the desire to safeguard European interests, the IEPG also, whenever possible, defines the common line of conduct which Europeans should follow with regard to offers of co-operation emanating from the North Americans. In particular, it is a matter of avoiding, in seeking the standardisation of armaments in the alliance, the adoption of a policy which would lead to the adoption of equipment of solely American origin. The French Government therefore considers that priority should be given to the interoperability of armaments, particularly where munitions, fuel and communications are concerned. The WEU Assembly's recommendation on a European armaments policy is therefore acceptable in its reference to the IEPG and the WEU Standing Armaments Committee. Conversely, for the reasons already described by the government in reply to earlier written questions (reply to the written questions put by Mr. Krieg on 21st June 1978 and by Mr. Debré on 23rd June 1978), the proposal to give the European Community responsibilities in respect of the production of armaments is not acceptable."

18. *Comment* : The question by Mr. Jeambrun refers mainly to paragraph 1 of the recommendation. The French Government's answer is in line with the content of the Council's reply. As for interoperability and standardisation, the recommendation mentioned both. The French Government expressed a far clearer attitude in favour of interoperability, whereas the Council said only that the search for standardisation should not be allowed to operate exclusively to the advantage of equipment of American origin.

19. The second question by Mr. Jeambrun dated 24th March 1979 came after the reply of the Council :

"To ask the Prime Minister what definite steps he intends to take in the context of the clear and detailed attitude he has adopted towards the respective responsibilities of the various European organisations concerned with defence matters. *Inter alia*, to ask whether he believes it would be desirable for the WEU Council to inform the parliamentary assembly of that organisation as soon as possible of the first results of the study undertaken by the Standing

Armaments Committee (SAC) on the position of armaments industries in Europe. Furthermore, to ask whether it would not be appropriate to seek a procedure whereby the independent European programme group might report regularly on its activities to the WEU Assembly, the only European assembly with responsibilities in defence matters."

The answer by Mr. François-Poncet, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was communicated on 29th May 1979 :

"The WEU Standing Armaments Committee has not yet completed the study on the position of armaments industries in member countries that the WEU Council asked it to undertake. It is for the Council to decide what use should be made of the study when it is complete. The French Government has already recommended that the information obtained be communicated to the Assembly of Western European Union in one form or another, and it will continue to act in this sense. In spite of the interest of such an idea, it does not seem possible to work out procedure whereby the independent European programme group (IEPG) might report on its activities to the WEU Assembly. The IEPG is merely a working body with no institutional structure and some of its members, several of whom are not members of WEU, would not agree to the establishment of an organic link with the Assembly set up under the modified Brussels Treaty. The Assembly might rather be kept informed in a pragmatic manner of the results obtained by the IEPG by means of communications as appropriate."

20. *Comment* : The questioner requests information on the first results of the study undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee (paragraph 3 of the recommendation) and refers to paragraph 4 of the recommendation asking for the French Government's views on an annual report by the IEPG to the Assembly. As for the Standing Armaments Committee's study, the French Government's answer refers to the competence of the Council without entering into the subject. The French Government rejected the idea of an annual request for a report from the IEPG as did the Council in its reply which concurred with the French approach.

21. The third question by Mr. Jeambrun, put on 24th March 1979, read as follows :

"To ask the Minister of Defence whether it would be possible to draw up a list of the main bilateral agreements since 1974 between the United States and the principal

European countries, including France, on the joint production, supplies or orders of military equipment. To ask whether this list appears balanced and in conformity with the Prime Minister's wish that the standardisation of armaments in the Atlantic Alliance should not be tantamount to the adoption of equipment of American origin alone."

22. The French Government's answer was communicated on 12th June 1979 by Mr. Bourges, Minister of Defence :

"Since 1974, only the Roland programme has been the subject of a tripartite intergovernmental agreement between the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and France. Where the other European countries are concerned, France is not generally aware of the agreements they conclude with the United States. The principal known agreements in recent years have been : procurement by NATO countries of licences to manufacture American equipment : the F-16 aircraft, the AIM-9L missile (successor to Sidewinder), the AWAC system ; procurement by the United States of licences to manufacture European equipment : Harrier aircraft, German tank gun. The balance of trade between the United States and most European countries is generally very unbalanced : each year France purchases equipment or components for some \$30 million from the United States and sells the latter \$3 million of equipment. This tendency is even more pronounced among our principal European partners (Federal Republic of Germany, Britain, etc.) which purchase about ten times more from the United States than we do. With an eye to operational efficiency, the government is seeking interoperability of equipment and munitions, which does not mean abandoning national production, rather than standardisation, which might mean procuring one type of equipment. Moreover, the aim of the independent European programme group is to encourage European co-operation for the development of armaments, an aim we wish to foster as much as possible. This policy has produced positive results from which European industries and in particular our national industry have benefited."

23. *Comment* : The question deals mainly with the problem of a two-way street in armaments with the United States as stressed in the preamble to the recommendation. The answer gives a very precise picture of the current situation in arms production co-operation between Europe and the United States.

24. In *the Netherlands*, on 6th February 1979, during the debate on the budget of the Ministry

of Defence, Mr. de Boer made the following statement :

"Thirdly, to obtain better and, above all, internal European co-operation in this field, one needs a more balanced relationship in arms-producing capabilities within the alliance. This in turn depends on a more balanced relationship in competition. To this end, the present compartmentalised structure of the European armaments market must be terminated and the market made a joint European problem.

Only by lengthening production runs – possible with European co-operation – and hence obtaining lower prices will it be possible to achieve prices which are more competitive than those of American producers. The Americans have already drawn attention to this point, although without any noticeable results so far.

On the European side, there is more or less only one series of bilateral negotiations of the two-way street type, between a few countries and the United States. The drawback of these agreements is that in the long run they will produce results which are contrary to the aim sought, i.e. the creation of a common European armaments market.

Furthermore, a common policy for the defence industry in Europe is something which does not concern only the Minister of Defence. It is too closely linked with general industrial and socio-economic policy. The best way of finding a solution would probably be to have the EEC intervene, specifically in regard to socio-economic and industrial policy problems.

It remains to be seen how this can be done in view of the fact that not all EEC member countries are members of NATO and not all the European members of NATO are members of the EEC. Is the government prepared to include this question in the agenda of the EEC? Recommendations in the same sense have been adopted in another parliamentary forum."

25. The answer by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary of State for Defence, was communicated on 7th February 1979 :

"The desire for a common European defence policy referred to by Mr. de Boer is a matter which goes somewhat beyond the defence field in the strict meaning of the word. For the time being, I consider that it is not for the Ministry of Defence to take the initiative, although we are perfectly prepared to associate ourselves with any move which may be made in the industrial

policy field. As Mr. de Boer knows, this problem was placed on the agenda of the parliamentary assembly of the European Communities through the Klepsch report. It might be possible to discuss this type of question more easily when most of the European member countries of NATO have become members of the enlarged European Communities."

26. *Comment* : Both the statement and the reply were pronounced before the Council had adopted a position. The statement refers mainly to paragraph 2 of the recommendation. The reply of the Netherlands Government shows that it was not in principle opposed to the idea of the European Community, an attitude which differed slightly from the Council's position.

27. In the *Bundestag*, on 28th June 1979, Mr. Handlos put the following question to the Federal Government :

"Does the Federal Government support the wish expressed by the WEU Assembly to receive a report on the activities of the independent European programme group ?"

28. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, answered as follows :

"The independent European programme group is not bound to publish a regular report. However, as in the past, the Federal Government will continue to transmit to it recommendations on the work of the group addressed to the Council by the Assembly and will do its utmost to ensure that the Assembly is provided with the desired information."

29. *Comment* : The question refers mainly to paragraph 4 of the recommendation. The Council had rejected the idea of the IEPG submitting an annual report to the Assembly and proposed briefing Assembly delegates through national channels on IEPG activities. The Federal Government's answer cannot be considered as a "briefing through national channels" since it says nothing in substance. But as the question did not ask for a briefing it was easy for the Federal Government to give an answer devoid of substance.

30. *Recommendation 329* on the industrial bases of European security presented on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 805) was adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1979 as follows :

"The Assembly,

.....

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge member countries to determine the military equipment :

- (a) to be produced on a co-operative basis ;
- (b) to be produced with due regard for interface conditions to ensure interoperability ;
- (c) to be the object of special efforts because of present shortcomings in Europe and their foreseeable importance ;

2. Assess the results and advantages of the various forms of industrial co-operation in these fields to date, together with the difficulties and setbacks encountered ;

3. Define methods of ensuring greater European co-ordination of research and development in such branches of advanced technology as integrated circuits, microprocessors, radar systems, lasers and infrared sensors for weapons systems ;

4. Improve methods of procuring armaments and, in close liaison with the industries concerned, introduce appropriate measures for facilitating the exchange of know-how and the protection of industrial proprietary rights ;

5. Seek frameworks for lasting co-operation between member countries by forming permanent industrial consortia, concluding European agreements on specifications and replacement schedules for military equipment and working out harmonised methods of financing ;

6. Work out methods and structures to improve decision-taking and production capacity in European co-operation."

31. The reply of the Council was communicated to the Assembly on 26th November 1979 :

"1. The Council recognise the usefulness of identifying weapon systems which can be the object of collaborative production, of achieving improved interoperability where appropriate and of seeking areas where European efforts need to be particularly concentrated. The machinery for this sort of consideration already exists however. Within the alliance as a whole, CNAD devotes considerable efforts to achieving interoperability in specific equipment areas and is at present testing a periodic armaments planning system designed to improve co-operation between the member countries particularly by increasing opportunities for standardisation and interopera-

bility of the equipment used by them. As the Assembly is aware, the IEPG bears the main responsibility for indentifying opportunities for collaboration in the design and production of defence equipment between European member countries. Its purpose includes the strengthening of the European factor in relationship with America and the maintenance of a healthy European defence industrial base. As part of its work the IEPG also looks regularly at areas of technology in the defence field to which member states should pay special attention.

Furthermore, as the Council observed in their reply to Recommendation 335, the study at present being made by the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU may provide governments with a detailed and comparative analysis of the armaments industries in the member countries and assist them to direct their choices and their programmes towards increased co-operation.

2. Industrial co-operation in collaborative projects has taken several different forms. In every project, the form of co-operative structure adopted must be that best suited to the particular circumstances. The Council believe that the governments, ministries and industries of member states are already fully aware of the advantages and disadvantages of different co-operative structures.

3. European governments are very conscious of the importance of certain areas of advanced technology for both civil and military applications. In this connection they make every effort to extend their co-operation to these particular fields, either under CNAD and IEPG auspices or bilaterally as appropriate, with those nations who have similar interests and requirements. Such co-operation can take the form of information exchange or collaborative research and development for projects. Devising further formal methods for co-operation of this sort does not seem for the time being likely to promote co-operation.

4. All nations have over the years devised procurement procedures best suited to their own circumstances. These are constantly being refined, and both CNAD and the IEPG have done work on harmonising procedures wherever this has been found possible or desirable. Certainly one example is in the field of industrial or intellectual property rights. This is a vital component of co-operation, and a sub-group of CNAD has been examining the problems. The Council do not believe that this work should be duplicated.

5. Permanent industrial consortia may well be established in the future as an effective means of undertaking collaborative armaments projects. However, industrial and management structures must be tailored to the particular circumstances of each project, and, before the establishment of a permanent consortium, the participants would have to be fully satisfied that there would be sufficient long-term work for the consortium, involving, in every case, the same nations and firms. The Council are aware that in CNAD, the IEPG, FINABEL considerable work is being done on agreeing concepts, specifications and on examining replacement timetables. The framework necessary to encourage co-operation already exists. As with industrial and managerial arrangements, methods of finance for co-operative projects must be flexible and must be those best suited to the circumstances of the project and to the budgetary systems of the participating nations.

6. The Council believe that the necessary framework for decision-making already exists. The governments concerned are necessarily concentrating on the specific problems raised by the consideration of particular projects where their interests and requirements appear to be in sufficient conformity. The Council believe that the improvement and tightening of European co-operation require first and foremost the consideration and setting up of concrete projects rather than the devising of new structures and methodology."

32. *Summary*: The focal point of the recommendation is the wish to establish new methods and structures in the field of industrial co-operation. The focal point of the reply is that the framework necessary to encourage co-operation already exists and that the improvement of European co-operation requires first and foremost the setting up of specific projects rather than establishing new structures and methodology.

33. On 7th August 1979, a member of the *Belgian Chamber of Representatives* put the following question to the government:

"The recent decision of the Council of Ministers on the procurement of mechanised infantry combat vehicles (MICVs) revived discussion about a concerted European approach to orders for armaments. This problem also has a place in the work of the Assembly of Western European Union which often considers that results achieved fall short of expectations.

Are consultations between the military headquarters of the European member

countries of the Atlantic Alliance regular enough to produce agreement on joint specifications for the military equipment required by these countries and on replacement schedules leading to the organisation of the joint production of armaments on a European basis?

What assessment may be made of the results achieved by FINABEL, the IEPG and the WEU Standing Armaments Committee respectively in this field?

Reply by Mr. Vanden Boeynants, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence (11th September 1979)

Co-ordination between military headquarters on both the definition of requirements and the harmonisation of replacement schedules is a major concern for each one, i.e. by reducing prices thanks to longer production runs, to be able to purchase the best equipment at the lowest cost, keeping within the limits of the sums available under the budget and the agreement of the government.

But there are obstacles to full integration, whether in the Atlantic or the European framework.

These political, economic, social, financial, legal or commercial obstacles – whether national or international – explain why results achieved so far by FINABEL, the IEPG and WEU's SAC, although encouraging, cannot yet be considered as the ideal solution."

34. *Comment*: The question was put prior to the Council's reply and the questioner did not refer directly to the wording of the recommendation but asked for specific information on the results of studies by the different working groups. The answer by the Belgian Government was also given before the Council had communicated its position. In substance the government's answer does not correspond entirely to the Council's position since it states that results so far could not yet be considered as the ideal solution because of various political, economic, social, financial, legal or commercial obstacles.

35. On 25th October 1979, Mr. Roper asked the *United Kingdom Government* the following question in the House of Commons:

"Mr. Roper asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he considers that consultations between military headquarters of the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance are regular enough to produce agreement on joint specifications for the military equipment required by these countries and on replacement sche-

dules leading to the organisation of the joint production of armaments on a European basis: and if he is satisfied with results achieved by FINABEL, the independent European programme group, the Conference of National Armaments Directors and the Standing Armaments Committee, respectively, in this field.

Reply by Mr. Pym, Secretary of State for Defence

The many international institutions available, including those mentioned, provide adequate machinery for exploring opportunities for collaboration in the defence equipment field. However, I recognise that the problems of reconciling different national interests and capabilities are formidable."

36. *Comment*: Both question and answer came before the Council had communicated its position. The contents of the question were very similar to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the question put in the Belgian parliament, in fact, nearly identical. As for the United Kingdom Government's answer, it is very general and does not enter into the substance.

37. On 10th October 1979, Mr. Ahrens put the following question in the *Bundestag*:

"To ask the Federal Government for its views on the results so far obtained by European co-operation in the planning, development and production of armaments and the possibility of concluding an agreement on programmes to allow standardisation or interoperability by the end of the century.

Reply by Mr. von Bülow, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence

At present, European armaments co-operation is mainly carried out in the framework of FINABEL (definition of the military requirements of France, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg), Eurogroup (tactical requirements and projects) and the independent European programme group, set up in 1976, in which France takes part (projects and problems of the armaments industry).

The permanent harmonisation of military concepts in the various countries, economic requirements and industrial possibilities of co-operation herald a development of common European projects."

38. *Comment*: The question was put before the Council had communicated its position. The answer was very general and does not offer

precise information about the Federal position towards the relevant recommendation.

39. On 29th November 1979, Mr. Meintz put the following question in the *Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies*:

"What does the government think of results obtained to date through European co-operation in FINABEL with regard to planning, developing and producing armaments and the possibility of concluding an agreement on programmes to allow standardisation or interoperability to be achieved before the end of the century?

What are the effects on the armaments of the Luxembourg army?

Reply by Mr. Krieps, Minister for the Armed Forces (28th December 1979)

Where FINABEL is concerned, the following remarks should be made:

1. The FINABEL Co-ordinating Committee is an organisation at the level of chiefs-of-staff of the land forces of the seven member countries (France, Italy, Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom) who wished to establish closer links.

FINABEL proposals and recommendations are transmitted to the governments concerned by their own representatives, their army chiefs-of-staff.

FINABEL's aim is to encourage military co-operation between member states of NATO in the following fields:

- exchange of information, tactical and logistic studies, studies on the use of units, study of training methods and procedure, joint tests.

FINABEL's task is not therefore the joint production of military equipment, such a rôle being outside the responsibility of chiefs-of-staff. It is nevertheless true that bodies responsible for developing such equipment take account, inter alia, of the requirements of defence staffs.

Joint production of armaments is rather among the principal objectives of the independent European programme group (IEPG) and the WEU Standing Armaments Committee.

The government notes that great efforts are made in these bodies in matters of standardisation and interoperability but that results are felt only very slowly because of the complexity of the problem and the national interests of producing countries.

2. Luxembourg was a founder member of FINABEL (1953). Since 1968, our participation has been confined to the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee, which meets once a year. This committee draws up general guidelines and examines the results obtained.

Luxembourg receives all the studies and agreements prepared by the various committees and working groups. Tactical and logistic concepts worked out by FINABEL are very useful to the Luxembourg army, as is information on the quality of equipment to be used."

40. *Comment* : The question is nearly identical with Mr. Ahrens' in the Bundestag. The answer by the Luxembourg Government is far more specific than that of the Federal Government. The Luxembourg Government considers the national interests of producing countries to be one of the main problems.

41. On 18th September 1979, Mr. Jeambrun put the following question in the *French Senate* :

"To ask the Minister of Defence to give France's position on Recommendation 329 of the WEU Assembly. To ask whether it is possible to assess the results and benefits obtained from the various forms of industrial co-operation practised so far in these fields, and also the difficulties and setbacks encountered. To ask further what progress has been made in drawing up the list of future programmes for international armaments co-operation decided on by the Ministry of Defence and to what extent this list has been prepared in the light of similar work carried out in the IEPG (independent European programme group)."

42. The *French Government's* answer is given in paragraph 48.

43. *Recommendation 333* on parliaments and defence procurement presented on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 807) was adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1979 :

"The Assembly,

Having studied the report of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments analysing the rôle of national parliaments in the national defence equipment procurement process ;

Considering that national parliaments and their defence committees, with the exception of those of Germany and the Netherlands, are usually inadequately informed on defence matters ;

Believing that parliaments exercise insufficiently their prerogative to control defence procurement policy ;

Recalling the terms of its Recommendation 197 on military security and parliamentary information ;

With a view to furthering joint production and standardisation of defence equipment in the armed forces of the countries of Western Europe or in the alliance, taking due account of the military and economic requirements of the alliance as a whole,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments :

A. To ensure that their parliaments, or where appropriate their parliamentary defence, budget, or other committees concerned :

1. Are fully informed in good time, within the limits imposed by considerations only of external security, not of political or administrative convenience, on all aspects of defence policy, at both the national and allied levels, especially on matters affecting the assessment of the military threat and the choice of defence equipment ;

2. Are enabled to exercise sufficiently close control of the defence budget and appropriations and of all stages of the defence procurement process, so as to improve defence capability and increase standardisation and interoperability of equipment ;

3. Are enabled to compile systematically information on current research and development projects in the national and European defence industry ;

B. To ensure that full information on national defence equipment projects in the planning stages is available to allied governments, and to take full account of alternative defence equipment projects available in allied countries ;

C. To provide as far as possible a common structure for the national defence budgets, national defence equipment procurement processes, and, finally, the procedure for supplying classified information with a view to instituting in the foreseeable future a European policy of common procurement of new weapons systems."

44. The reply of the Council was communicated to the Assembly on 20th November 1979 :

"A. It is a matter for national parliaments to determine the amount of information required on defence and other matters from governments. Detailed information on the defence budget is generally presented to parliament in nations' annual estimates; in addition, parliaments may also debate defence policy on publication of an annual defence white paper or policy statement. Parliamentary defence and finance committees may commission memoranda from ministries and question ministers or their representatives and submit reports on specific matters to parliament together with the guidance submitted to them.

B. The principal fora for equipment co-operation are the Conference of National Armaments Directors and the IEPG whose procedures are specifically organised to ensure that members are fully informed of the requirements and developments of other allies. Wherever potential common interests are identified detailed arrangements are made to exploit as far as possible the opportunities arising for collaboration in development or production of equipment.

C. Work is already in progress in the IEPG, CNAD and Eurogroup on exchanging information on different national procedures and bringing them into close conformity where possible. For instance the IEPG has done important work on procurement procedures, CNAD is at present testing a periodic armaments planning system designed to improve co-operation between the member countries and Eurogroup has a committee examining financial planning systems. Although this work is useful, it does not solve the real problems of trying to set up collaborative projects. These problems are not ones of procedures or lack of information, but relate to issues of requirements, costs, industrial arrangements, etc. and they can only be resolved by detailed compromise in relation to the particular circumstances of each project."

45. A member of the *Belgian* parliament put the following question on Recommendation 333 :

"The technological development of armaments and the emergence of new weapons systems seem likely to require yet further European consultations in respect of their procurement.

What measures does the government consider should be taken jointly by member countries of the Atlantic Alliance to facilitate the institution of a European policy of procurement of new weapons systems ?

Should not the structure for national defence budgets be made more homogeneous, as well as defence equipment procurement processes and procedure for supplying classified information ?"

46. Mr. Vanden Boeynants, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, answered on 9th October 1979 as follows :

"1. The Ministry of Defence shares the opinion of the honourable member and also considers that the technological development of armaments and the emergence of new weapons systems require yet further European consultations in respect of their procurement.

2. The Ministry of Defence therefore supports all steps likely to promote such consultations. Some are at present being taken in NATO, Eurogroup and the IEPG (independent European programme group) with a view to promoting international co-operation starting at the development stage for military equipment.

3. The practical achievement of such co-operation stretches beyond the strict framework of the Ministry of Defence. It encounters several obstacles including the effective independence of various countries, the political, economic, financial and technological implications of each major programme and the limits inherent in national interests or available resources.

4. Harmonisation of the structures of defence budgets and defence equipment procurement processes and procedure for supplying classified information would certainly be likely to facilitate European consultations on armaments procurement. But only a strengthening of political authority at supranational level would be able to produce an early and spectacular improvement in this field."

47. *Comment* : The discussion in the Belgian parliament was held before the Council had communicated its position. The Belgian Government's answer contains a clear confession to a strengthening of political authority at supranational level, an element which one cannot find in the Council's reply.

48. On 18th September 1979, in the *French* Senate, Mr. Jeambrun asked "the Minister of Defence to state France's attitude towards Recommendation 333 of the Assembly of Western European Union". On 30th November, Mr. Bourges, Minister of Defence, answered as follows :

"The honourable member is asked to refer to the statements made by the Minister of

Defence during the discussion on oral questions for debate Nos. 245, 247 and 257 on defence policy (*Journal officiel*, parliamentary debates (Senate), 24th October 1979, pages 3435 to 3445). The Standing Armaments Committee (SAC), which is kept regularly informed of the work of the independent European programme group (IEPG), informs the Defence Committee of the Assembly of Western European Union on its work and that of the IEPG at the customary joint meetings. The French Government makes certain, when authorising sales of military equipment, that contracts signed do not jeopardise its action for international détente and the defence of human rights and freedoms."

49. On 25th October 1979, Mr. Roper put the following question in the *House of Commons* :

"Mr. Roper asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will consider, with his colleagues in the Western European Union Council, measures to be taken jointly to provide a common structure for national defence budgets, national defence equipment procurement processes and procedure for supplying classified information, with a view to instituting a European policy of procurement of new weapons systems.

Reply by Mr. Pym, Secretary of State for Defence

The Western European Union Council is at present considering an Assembly recommendation on precisely these matters."

50. *Comment* : Since the question was put prior to the Council's reply to the Assembly, the United Kingdom Government referred to the competence of the Council and said nothing in substance.

51. *Recommendation 335* on political conditions for European armaments co-operation, presented on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 802), was adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1979 :

"The Assembly,

.....

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. In application of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, ensure that European armaments co-operation develops along lines which conform to the latest technological requirements and to the defence policy and strategy applied by the members of the Atlantic Alliance ;

2. Keep the Assembly informed, by what-

ever means it considers appropriate, of the results already achieved in the study undertaken by the SAC, of the progress made and of the goals towards which its work is directed ;

3. Ensure that the SAC has access to the sources of information it needs so that its study may be completed in the reasonably near future ;

4. Study attentively the results of the study with a view to preparing on this basis guidance to be addressed to the appropriate authorities in member countries and to the European organisations concerned ;

5. Keep the Assembly regularly informed of the progress of work in the IEPG ;

6. Examine the limitations which Europe should advocate in regard to exporters and importers of armaments and itself to prevent the trade in arms stepping up the armaments race, particularly in areas where peace is threatened."

52. The reply of the Council was communicated to the Assembly on 5th November 1979 :

"In their reply to Recommendation 297 the Council explained why they consider it necessary to develop armaments co-operation between European countries and in their reply to Recommendation 325 they described the common European line of approach to offers of co-operation in the framework of the transatlantic dialogue ; they also defined the aims which, in their view, should guide the action of member countries, whilst acknowledging the difficulties of such an undertaking, since it is carried out by countries whose armaments industries have widely differing structures and levels of development.

The Council wish to reaffirm the importance they attach to the continuation of the work at present being carried out, with a view to achieving greater harmonisation of national policies which should lead to genuine co-operation on specific programmes ; in this connection, they consider that the work undertaken by the independent European programme group and the study at present being made by the Standing Armaments Committee meet the Assembly's concern about the technical and political direction it would wish such co-operation to take.

As the Assembly is aware, only the legal part of the SAC's study on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries has so far reached the Council ; indeed the SAC was not in a position to submit its final report when the Ministerial Council

met in Rome on 16th May 1979; that meeting did, however, confirm the SAC's mandate and agreed that the first part of the economic study should be completed both swiftly and to the best effect, with the co-operation of the administrations concerned.

When the final report from the SAC is received, the Council will not fail, as was stated by the Chairman-in-Office at the second sitting of the twenty-fifth ordinary session, to consider how the Assembly might be informed of its content and its principal conclusions. It is still too soon, in the present state of this study, to express a view as to the practical follow-up action to be taken. The study may enable governments for the first time to have a detailed and comparative analysis of the armaments industries in the member countries and assist them to direct their choices and their programmes towards increased co-operation.

Within the IEPG, in the expert groups, European countries also continue to study the possibility of joint production in certain sectors of armaments; at the same time, they have started a dialogue with the United States with the basic hope of conserving their share of European interests while co-operating with that country for the production of certain types of armaments.

In their reply to Recommendation 325, the Council stressed the difficulties encountered by some countries which are members of the IEPG but not of WEU with regard to passing on the results of the work of that group to the Assembly of the organisation.

The Council have noted the Assembly's concern regarding the dangers of the trade in arms in areas where peace is threatened. This is an important problem which involves different political factors in each country; it would be unrealistic to deal with it in the European framework only, since in fact this excludes the principal armaments exporting and importing countries.

On the other hand, bearing in mind its responsibilities in this respect, every European country could draw relevant conclusions from the results of joint action that might be taken between countries of the same geographical area with a view to voluntary limitation of their own imports: such consultations, which would also bring in the main supplier countries, would indeed make it possible to envisage concerted limitation on the sales of conventional weapons."

53. *Summary*: The crucial points of the recommendations are to keep the Assembly informed of the results of the studies undertaken by the SAC and IEPG and to examine the limitations of the export and import of armaments. The Council states that the SAC study is not yet completed and that there are difficulties in giving information about the IEPG's work since some of its member countries are not members of WEU. Finally, the Council thinks that the problem of arms trade is an important one but it would be unrealistic to deal with it in the European framework only. Consultation should be held between the relevant European countries. Although paragraph 6 does not concern the present subject directly, it will be taken into account due to the high political relevance of the problem.

54. On 25th October 1979, Mr. Roper put three questions in the *House of Commons* on Recommendation 335:

"Mr. Roper asked the Lord Privy Seal, in application of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, what steps he has taken to ensure that European armaments co-operation develops along lines which conform to the latest technological requirements and to the defence policy and strategy applied by the members of the Atlantic Alliance.

Reply by Sir Ian Gilmour, Lord Privy Seal

Her Majesty's Government want to see European armaments co-operation develop in ways which meet the challenges of new technology and the needs of the alliance. Work in the European programme group – the main focus of European efforts in this area – is closely co-ordinated with work in NATO through NATO's Conference of National Armaments Directors.

Question put by Mr. Roper on Recommendation 335

Mr. Roper asked the Lord Privy Seal what is his policy regarding the limitations which should be placed nationally and within Europe on exporters and importers of armaments to prevent the trade in arms stepping up the armaments race, particularly in areas where peace is threatened.

Reply by Mr. Hurd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Proposed arms exports are carefully examined, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all relevant factors. Particular care is taken in considering sales to areas of tension. A policy of restraint by European states alone would not be effective, since it would exclude the major exporters. The government, however, support efforts to

focus attention on this matter in the United Nations.

Question put by Mr. Roper on Recommendation 335

Mr. Roper asked the Secretary of State for Defence what differences there are between the study undertaken by the European Commission on European armaments industries and the task allotted to the Western European Union Standing Armaments Committee on 31st May 1976; whether there is duplication of work in these two studies; and what steps he intends to take to avoid this being so.

Reply by Mr. Pym, Secretary of State for Defence

I hope that duplication between the two studies will be avoided although I understand that both cover similar ground. The scope of the European Commission study and how it will be used is a matter for the Commission, over which I have no influence."

55. *Comment*: The discussion in the House of Commons was held before the Council had communicated its reply to the Assembly. The British reference to CNAD is not to be found in the Council's reply. As for the arms trade, the United Kingdom Government introduces the involvement of the United Nations.

56. On 25th January 1980, Mr. Enders put two questions in the *Bundestag* on Recommendation 335:

"To what extent does the study by the Commission of the European Communities on the European armaments industry differ from that entrusted to the WEU Standing Armaments Committee on 31st May 1976 and what steps is the Federal Government considering to avoid duplication of work?"

Reply by Mr. Schnell, Secretary of State for Defence

It is true that both organisations have asked that a study be made of the European armaments industry.

On 31st May 1976, the WEU Council of Ministers instructed the Standing Armaments Committee to make a descriptive analysis of the situation in the armaments sector of member countries' industries. This analysis was to bring out the industrial and economic implications of greater standardisation of armaments.

At the same time the Council clearly indicated, at Germany's request, that duplication of work and overlapping with

studies being carried out by other organisations should be avoided.

According to statements by its secretariat, the Commission of the European Communities undertook its study on its own responsibility and in the framework of the resolution adopted by the European Parliament in June 1978 asking the Commission to submit an action programme with a view to a European armaments procurement policy. The Federal Government has not made its position known on this matter.

The Commission instructed Professor Greenwood of Aberdeen University to prepare the study on the European armaments market and this work is now completed.

In the meantime, the Commission has indicated that, for reasons of competence in defence matters, it has no intention of undertaking further work as a result of this study.

It is noted that although both studies are concerned with the armaments industries in member countries, there are differences due to the membership of the two organisations and to the course followed in the studies. The WEU study hinges on the improvement of armaments co-operation and on standardisation whereas the Commission's study deals with the importance of the armaments sector for overall economic development in Europe.

The Federal Government will endeavour to make the Commission's study available to member countries as a basic document."

Question put by Mr. Enders on Recommendation 335

"Is the Federal Government prepared to ask the WEU Council to undertake a study of member countries' armaments export policy designed to guide European policy towards a slowing down in the arms race, particularly in areas of tension?"

Reply by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

For the following reasons, the Federal Government considers there is little justification for asking the WEU Council to make such a study:

The governments of certain WEU member states consider arms exports to be an instrument of their foreign policy and a legitimate and essential part of their countries' economic relations with other states. They consider that they alone are empowered to take sovereign decisions in

connection with their armaments export policies and are consequently opposed to WEU organs handling matters relating to such policies.

In its reply to Recommendation 335 of the WEU Assembly, the Council underlined the differences between the structures of armaments industries and the various political factors peculiar to each member country; it stated that it would be unrealistic to handle the question of trade in arms in areas of tension in the European framework only since the principal supplying countries would be excluded. The Federal Government shares this view."

57. *Comment*: The first question by Mr. Enders corresponds to the third question put by Mr. Roper in the House of Commons. The Federal Government's answer is very detailed and substantial.

58. On 24th August 1979, Mr. d'Aillières put the following question in the *French* Senate on Recommendation 335, which was followed by a longer statement:

"To ask the Minister of Defence to give the government's views on the present state of European co-operation in the joint production of armaments on the one hand and the search for and improvement of interoperability between armaments and also to indicate the present state of relations between the United States and Europe in these two fields.

Statement by Mr. d'Aillières (23rd October 1979)

.....

Yet European co-operation in armaments production seems to be slowing down. What is the exact position? What definite programmes are there for the coming years? Is France playing a true rôle of initiator in the current negotiations?

And above all, Mr. Minister, I wish to know what progress has been made with the work of the independent European programme group which we joined and in which we rightly set such great store. Has the group at last managed to draw up a balance-sheet of further requirements for the armies of the various member countries? Is it about to make firm proposals for joint achievements?

The second point on which I wish to have your views, Mr. Minister, is the interoperability of equipment in use in the European theatre. This concept, which you originated, Mr. Minister, is essential. I do not need to tell you so.

However, I feel it would be most appropriate if, at every level, the armed forces of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance could easily, throughout the territory covered by the treaty, be supplied with munitions, spare parts or fuel. What is the present position in this respect?

The third and last factor about which I think it would be useful to have information is the question of co-operation between Europe and the United States.

.....

Reply by Mr. Bourges, Minister of Defence

Mr. d'Aillières placed co-operation in the armaments industry in the framework of European security. France, for its part, has undertaken a praiseworthy and large-scale military effort in order to obtain a defence instrument which meets the requirements of the situation. Armaments co-operation has a place in this policy.

For many years, in fact, we have been trying to promote the joint development and production of armaments in Europe itself. I would remind Mr. Boucheny that this co-operation began more than twenty years ago and that it was not necessarily, as he seemed to fear in certain respects, to the detriment of the interests either of our industry or of our defence.

.....

Mr. d'Aillières was concerned that since 1975 no major co-operative programme including our country had been launched. It should not be deduced from this that European co-operation is exhausted or that the government does not still attach importance or value to it. In fact, since that date, no major programme, apart from Mirage 2000, has been launched in any European country. This is why we cannot speak of the failure of European co-operation. On the contrary, most future equipment planned by France and by other European countries is at present the subject of numerous joint preliminary study agreements.

The value of seeking to carry out programmes jointly is evident. It leads to lower costs. It guarantees better use of industrial capabilities because of longer production runs and our share in them.

.....

If such research is carried out with a limited number of countries, it is because the harmonisation of timetables and operational specifications, and the management

of programmes, is less difficult. However, as you know, France also takes part in the work of the independent European programme group. Mr. d'Aillières asked me what the position was in this respect. It must be realised that, in European co-operation of this kind, it is not a matter of imposing the weapons systems we have adopted on our partners but of comparing and harmonising the requirements of our armies and seeking means of meeting them through a joint effort.

We start with the requirements of our own defence and try to see whether co-operation is possible with other countries having similar requirements and whether the same equipment can meet our requirements and those of our associates. We obviously try, thanks to longer production runs, to obtain lower costs. Our industry, Mr. Boucheny, loses nothing in the process.

.....

Since the independent European programme group was set up in 1976, it is admittedly rather too early for it to have achieved concrete results. But it has already proved to be a useful body for studying programmes in an exclusively European framework and in the conditions which I have just recalled.

For instance, certain IEPG working groups have carried out major work on identifying and comparing member countries' replacement schedules for armaments and have started to look for areas or programmes where co-operation might be possible.

Other working groups have studied procedure for different types of co-operation to be conducted efficiently in Europe to the mutual benefit of the co-operating countries.

Finally, other groups are studying how to co-ordinate the means of meeting American offensives in the field of armaments, thus safeguarding the varying interests of the European countries."

59. *Comment*: The discussion was held prior to communication of the Council's reply and does not entirely deal with matters of the recommendation.

60. On 7th August 1979, a *Belgian* member of parliament put the following question on Recommendation 335:

"Many voices of authority have spoken in appropriate circles, warning the political world about the revival of the arms race.

Although Belgium is an arms exporting country, it is not the only one in Western

Europe. Moreover, do not the defence and armaments responsibilities of Western European Union allow it to play a rôle in controlling the arms trade? Is the government prepared to take action in this sense?

If not, in what framework should an examination be made of the limitations to be applied to arms exporters and importers and also to be imposed on Europe in order to avoid trade in arms fostering the arms race, particularly in areas where peace is threatened?

Reply by Mr. Simonet, Minister for Foreign Affairs (2nd October 1979)

I fully share the concerns of the honourable member concerning the repercussions of the expansion of the arms trade on the arms race.

Moreover, the recommendation from the recent meeting of the WEU Assembly asking the Council to 'examine the limitations which Europe should advocate in regard to exporters and importers of armaments and itself' secured my full attention.

As implied in the question by the honourable member, it is true that what is needed above all is to find the appropriate framework for working out such limitations so as to facilitate their acceptance both by importers and exporters.

Indeed the problem involves many political, economic and defence factors and the question of sovereignty in general, to which are added the objections of those who do not wish a solution to be sought in the framework of Europe alone because this does not include the two main arms exporters.

Moreover, if the European countries concerned nevertheless managed to agree on a joint policy towards limitations, it is to be feared that the *de facto* application of these limitations on importers would be taken by the importing countries as an attack on their sovereign right to determine the level of their means of defence.

Belgium therefore advocates that this matter also be dealt with in the framework of a regional approach to disarmament the idea of which it submitted to the United Nations General Assembly and whose principle was approved in 1977.

Bearing this in mind, the European countries should promote and encourage the search for regional solutions, possibly in the form of agreements between countries in

the same geographical area for imposing their own limits on imports of conventional weapons. The possible association of the main supplying countries with such regional agreements would lead to a concerted limitation of sales of arms without the drawbacks mentioned above.

Loyal to the concept of a regional approach, Belgium strongly encourages the initiative taken by Mexico which seeks to conclude a regional agreement between Latin American countries on limiting the procurement of armaments."

61. *Comment*: The discussion was held prior to communication of the Council's reply. The Belgian Government's answer introduces the interesting aspect of a regional approach to the problem.

62. On 18th September 1979, Mr. Jeambrun put the following question on Recommendation 335:

"To ask the Minister of Defence to state France's attitude towards Recommendation 335 of Western European Union (WEU). In accordance with the course defined by the Prime Minister for keeping the WEU Assembly informed 'pragmatically by means of communications' about the work of the IEPG (independent European programme group), to ask whether, in agreement with our partners, he soon intends to start such communications, which would be of the utmost interest to the WEU Assembly."

63. The answer by Mr. Bourges, Minister of Defence, on 30th November 1979, was very general since it summarised three questions on Recommendations 329, 333 and 335 (see paragraph 48).

64. *Recommendation 337* on political conditions for European armaments co-operation, presented on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 819), was adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1979:

"The Assembly,

.....

Rejecting the assertions in paragraph 4 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 331 and in the corresponding paragraphs of the replies to Recommendations 325 and 330:

.....

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Use every means at its disposal to promote co-operation between its members in the production of armaments;

2. Examine, *inter alia* on the basis of the work of the Standing Armaments Committee, by what means it would be possible to establish in Western Europe, account being taken of the specific responsibilities of each institution:

(a) an organisation responsible for gathering and circulating all necessary information on European supply and demand in the field of armaments;

(b) a body responsible for analysing choices of armaments programmes and their overall financial, technical, economic and social repercussions;

(c) appropriate customs legislation for transfers of armaments between Western European states;

(d) appropriate legislation for transnational bodies producing armaments;

(e) legislation designed to promote exchanges of technology between European industries;

(f) legislation and effective action against the illicit production of and traffic in armaments;

3. Encourage all member states to co-operate by communicating all the information needed to facilitate this work;

4. Re-examine and explain the positions expressed in paragraph 4 of its replies to Recommendations 325 and 331 and inform the Assembly of developments in the work of the IEPG as it undertook to do in its reply to Recommendation 298."

65. The reply of the Council was communicated to the Assembly on 12th March 1980:

"1. The Council agree that all efforts should be made to promote co-operation in the defence equipment field and to exploit suitable opportunities in the interests of member countries.

2. (a) All members of WEU contribute, together with the five other members of the group, to the annual IEPG equipment replacement schedule. By cataloguing replacement intentions for a period of some fifteen years ahead this provides a comprehensive description of the demand side of the European armaments market. On the supply side mention should be made of the SAC's continuing work in this direction and of the studies undertaken in the IEPG Panel III. However, the present system of armaments co-operation in Europe is a sequential process in which matching national requirements (demands) are considered

against production possibilities (supplies) in participating countries or elsewhere. 'Supply' in this context is a complex matter since substantial development work and new production investment are required for many modern weapons. The Council do not consider that the cause of equipment co-operation would in practice be greatly advanced by formalising the collection of 'supply' information through an international organisation.

2. (b) There are formidable theoretical and practical difficulties in devising methods suitable to the needs of different governments for analysing choices of international armaments programmes from even the most comprehensive information. The technical, economic and social issues are very complex, and the nature of national interests involved do not lend themselves to uniform evaluation. Collective international analysis of such information, leading to agreed conclusions which are capable of implementation, is unlikely to be feasible at present. Furthermore, compromises on national equipment requirements are often necessary to secure agreement in collaborative projects: national governments alone have to take the decisions. The Council are doubtful of the value of creating further international machinery to supplement national policy makers' analysis of alternative methods of meeting equipment needs.

2. (c) No customs duties are payable on the transfer of armaments or any other manufactured goods between WEU countries, or other EEC states.

2. (d) The Council do not believe that specific legislation is required to facilitate the formation of transnational bodies producing armaments. As the Assembly is aware, several consortia, such as Euromissile and Panavia, already exist. Moreover, in the Council's view, legislation governing international bodies producing armaments should not be separated from the general body of national and EEC company law.

2. (e) The Council do not believe that transfer of technology between industries in member states of WEU can be significantly improved by legislation. In their view the primary requirement is the agreement of acceptable transfer terms within specific projects.

2. (f) Sharing the concern expressed by the Assembly, the Council agree that every effort should continue to be made to halt the illegal trading of arms.

3. The WEU Council are not empowered to make any statement to the Assembly on

behalf of the IEPG, but will continue to encourage appropriate exchanges of information. There are five members of the IEPG who are not members of WEU. Formally therefore the making of a report on its activities to the WEU Assembly is a matter for the Chairman and wider membership of the IEPG to consider. It is, however, open to members of the Assembly to question their own governments about developments in the IEPG through their national parliaments."

66. *Summary*: The crucial point of the recommendation is to inaugurate a new organisation and legislation to facilitate joint production and armaments co-operation. The reply of the Council stresses mainly that there is no need for new structures and new legislation but attention should be paid to special projects. It reiterates that information on the IEPG can be given only through national channels.

67. On 14th May 1980, in the *United Kingdom* House of Commons, Mr. Foulkes put the following question on Recommendation 337:

"Mr. Foulkes asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will raise with his European colleagues within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation the need to co-operate in the collection and circulation of information on European supply and demand in armaments, the choice of armaments programmes and their overall financial, technical, economic and social repercussions, as suggested in Recommendation 337 of the Assembly of Western European Union.

Reply by Mr. Hayhoe, Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army

My right hon. Friend will not be raising this matter with his colleagues, since the elaborate machinery suggested in the recommendation is unlikely to add usefully to the practical work of bringing together information on future equipment needs already being done within the independent European programme group and the Conference of National Armaments Directors."

68. *Comment*: The discussion in the House of Commons was held after the Council had replied. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether the questioner, who referred mainly to paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of the recommendation, had used the opportunity to take into account the relevant statements of the Council. The Council had stated that it did not consider that the cause of equipment co-operation would in practice be greatly advanced by formalising the collection of "supply" information through an internatio-

nal organisation. The questioner did not take up this attitude of the Council. Consequently, the United Kingdom Government was in a position to give a brief answer in line with the Council.

69. On 19th March 1980, Mr. Glesener put the following question in the *Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies on Recommendation 337* :

“To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would be prepared, *inter alia* on the basis of the work of the Standing Armaments Committee of Western European Union, to examine by what means it would be possible to establish in Western Europe, account being taken of the specific responsibilities of each institution :

- (a) an organisation responsible for gathering and circulating all necessary information on European supply and demand in the field of armaments ;
- (b) a body responsible for analysing choices of armaments programmes and their overall financial, technical, economic and social repercussions ;
- (c) appropriate customs legislation for transfers of armaments between Western European states ;
- (d) appropriate legislation for transnational bodies producing armaments ;
- (e) legislation designed to promote exchanges of technology between European industries ;
- (f) legislation and effective action against the illicit production of and traffic in armaments.

To ask the Minister whether he can indicate what rôle Luxembourg might play in implementing this programme.

Reply by Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs (16th April 1980)

Where Recommendation 337 of the Assembly of Western European Union is concerned, the proposed programme set out therein is certainly worthy of detailed and attentive examination *inter alia* in the framework of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee and the Council in accordance with that organisation's customary procedure and account being taken of the specific responsibilities of each of its institutions.

As regards the rôle which Luxembourg might play in implementing the programme referred to in Recommendation 337, I have to draw the attention of the honourable member to the fact that our country lacks

both the experience and the necessary staff for considering making a national contribution to the study and implementing the said programme.”

70. *Comment* : The questioner quoted directly the text of the recommendation. But it seems unlikely that he had already taken note of the Council's comments since the question does not discuss the Council's position. The Luxembourg Government's answer is very general but adopts a fairly positive attitude in contrast to the Council's position.

71. *Recommendation 338* on the definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe, presented on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 821), was adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1979 :

“The Assembly,

.....

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments :

1. To encourage, through their defence procurement policies, the restructuring of the European armaments industry through the creation of permanent international consortia in Europe leading eventually to fully European corporations for the production of the more sophisticated defence equipment ;

2. (a) To foster a policy of European preference for bi- or multilateral European defence equipment projects duly examined by the IEPG ;

(b) To foster creation of an alliance-wide market for defence equipment so that dependence upon exports to third countries can be reduced ;

3. (a) To keep their national parliamentary defence committees fully informed about future national and allied defence equipment requirements and projects, in particular through the communication to them of the equipment replacement schedules prepared by Panel I of the IEPG and completed by the Conference of National Armaments Directors ;

(b) To request the Chairman of Panel I to communicate these schedules to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the WEU Assembly.”

72. The reply of the Council was communicated to the Assembly on 30th April 1980 :

“1. The Council consider that the creation of a number of international consortia for

the production of defence equipment has been a useful contribution to a better organisation of armaments co-operation in Europe. In order to preserve the technological know-how and experience in management techniques gained by such co-operation when a continuing need is foreseen, these consortia, which might be opened to firms from other member countries, should be encouraged to bid for further co-operative projects and to adopt an appropriate structure; this would not of itself rule out the possibility of competition. Successful projects, such as the production of the Hot, Milan and Roland missiles and the Tornado aircraft clearly point the way to this new form of co-operation. The Council are of the opinion that if, in the context of their efforts towards harmonisation, member countries reach agreement on common requirements, this may stimulate the formation of such international consortia. Such agreement would provide opportunities for the industries to try to meet those common requirements by proposals for producing the necessary equipment jointly. It should nevertheless be left to the industries concerned to organise themselves and to choose the type of co-operation which best suits their requirements.

Although the Assembly recommendation and the points made in the previous paragraph primarily concern European armaments industries, the Council observe that this form of co-operation does not exclude joint production by European and North American firms together.

2. (a) As the Assembly is aware, the member states of IEPG already undertook at the meeting of armaments directors in September 1977 to give preference to future collaborative equipment selected for production in the framework of the IEPG rather than non-European equipment in competition. The countries represented in the IEPG agreed not to depart from this preference unless for overriding reasons, particularly performance, price and delivery date.

2. (b) The Council are fully aware of the advantages of an alliance-wide market for defence equipment. Much work in this respect has already been done. Already in 1975, in this spirit, two member countries which had developed the Roland weapons system granted the licence for that system to the United States on favourable terms. Furthermore, the proposals forwarded to CNAD by the United States representative constitute in the opinion of the Council a significant step towards achieving the goal

of greater co-operation within the alliance and a 'two-way street' in defence equipment with the United States insofar as this is consistent with the guidelines recalled in paragraph 2(a) above. In this respect, it may be recalled that the member countries of the IEPG have given a favourable reception to the proposals mentioned above, which are designed to bring about an alliance-wide co-operation in the defence equipment field through bilateral memoranda of understanding, dual production of defence equipment and the concept of families of weapons. Greater co-operation between the allies and a better division of the production of defence equipment will indeed reduce the economic importance of exports to third countries, a consideration which certainly has the sympathy of the Council.

3. (a) As stated by the Council in their reply to Assembly Recommendation 333, paragraph A, national parliamentary defence committees are generally kept informed on national defence budgets. However, it should be left to the governments of individual member states to decide within the context of existing national laws and procedures to what extent detailed information can be given about future national defence equipment requirements. The annual equipment replacement schedules prepared by the IEPG and completed by CNAD, which bring together the equipment requirements of the alliance as a whole, and, as a consequence, contain very sensitive information, are classified 'confidential', and the Council are not in a position to request member governments to communicate these documents to national defence committees.

3. (b) For the same reasons, the Council see no possibility of requesting the Chairman of Panel I of the IEPG to communicate these schedules to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly. The Council, though fully appreciating the wish of the Assembly to be kept informed, cannot ignore the difficulties encountered by some countries which are members of the IEPG, but not of WEU with regard to informing the Assembly or its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments about the work undertaken by the IEPG and consequently have to leave it to the member governments to brief their national delegates on IEPG activities."

73. *Summary*: The crucial points of the recommendation are: to encourage the creation of *international consortia* in Europe, to keep the national parliamentary defence committees fully

informed about future defence equipment requirements and projects and to communicate the equipment replacement schedules prepared by Panel I of the IEPG to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly. The Council shows a generally positive attitude towards the first point. As for informing national defence committees, it refers to the sovereignty of the individual member states. The schedules are classified "confidential." Consequently, the Council has no means to request member governments to communicate these documents to national committees. The Council reiterates its position that information about the work undertaken by the IEPG can be given only through national channels.

74. On 14th May 1980, Mr. Foulkes put the following question in the *United Kingdom House of Commons on Recommendation 338* :

"Mr. Foulkes asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will pursue a procurement policy designed to encourage the restructuring of the European armaments industry as suggested in Recommendation 338 of the Assembly of Western European Union

Reply by Mr. Hayhoe, Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Army

United Kingdom defence procurement policy is designed to encourage collaborative solutions to our needs when this makes sense. Such joint projects have led to the formation of important international consortia, such as Panavia, and I expect further similar developments in the future."

75. *Comment* : The question and governmental answer are very general without taking up particular aspects of the recommendation and the Council's reply.

76. *Recommendation 339* on the industrial bases of European security – guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979, presented on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 823), was adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1979 :

"The Assembly,

.....

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments :

1. To promote a continuous dialogue between their commanders-in-chief, lower echelon commanders, armaments directors and industrialists in the most suitable framework, and related to the independent

European programme group insofar as this is compatible with the Atlantic Alliance ;

2. To start discussions now on the battle tank of the 1990s ;

3. To bring to a successful conclusion without delay discussions on the successor, for the 1990s, to the Franco-British Jaguar, the F-4F Phantom of the Federal German air force and the further development of the British Harrier ;

4. To maintain Europe's warship building capability, to agree on the production of interchangeable components and to promote containerisation ;

5. To continue European co-operation in the production of missiles and to promote specialisation by ordering several versions of the same type of missile ;

6. To promote greater standardisation of telecommunications equipment and to create a joint integrated digital system for the new command communications which are to be developed ;

7. To pursue research and development in such branches of advanced technology as integrated circuits, microprocessors, radar systems, lasers and infrared sensors for weapons systems ;

8. To afford support to co-operation in their countries by maintaining existing structures, particularly in the form of permanent European consortia and, whenever possible, by setting up new ones."

77. The reply of the Council was communicated to the Assembly, on 30th April 1980 :

"The Council welcome the interest which the Assembly, as the only European assembly with defence responsibilities, takes in the future of the European industries and of the co-operation which must be established between them.

1. With regard to the framework and form of such co-operation, they consider that the most effective use should be made of existing machinery for concerting measures in the armaments field, in particular the IEPG and the Conference of National Armaments Directors. This co-operation, which involves many interests, is a complicated, large-scale undertaking.

2. The Assembly will be aware that, in the spirit of its recommendation, the French and German Governments have recently decided to develop jointly a battle tank for the 1990s and that other countries have expressed interest in this programme.

3. The IEPG is currently examining the problems connected with the future combat aircraft which is also the subject of intense tripartite discussions between the French, German and United Kingdom Governments. The Council share the Assembly's concern that these efforts to co-operate should produce European successors for the Jaguar, Harrier and Phantom F-4F.

4. The position of the European ship-building industries is a matter for concern but this state of affairs is not confined to Europe. The production of interchangeable components and standardisation would be very difficult in practice, firstly, because warships are not mass-produced and secondly, because they vary considerably in both design and type of service from country to country. In this particular field individual economic problems add further to the differences between states and supply and demand vary in the same way.

5. Co-operation on missiles through bilateral programmes or the Euromissile consortium is already producing very satisfactory results. The expediency of producing several versions of the same missile must be dictated by the operational requirements of the different armed forces; these requirements are taken into account, together with a number of constraints, particularly of a financial nature. The necessary choices must therefore be based on the findings of studies on the subject.

6. The Council are aware of the military requirements for joint communications in the field of command and control. On this point, as on the subject of advanced technology, it should be noted that several member countries of WEU have industries capable of competing with the industries named by the Assembly in the fields of telecommunications and lasers for example. However, the Council are not convinced that the standardisation of telecommunications equipment would help, in the immediate future, to promote the European equipment which they have already declared to be necessary. Governments are aware of the importance for the future of the armaments industries of mastering these techniques in a European context and of what has to be done to achieve this.

7. The creation of consortia forms the subject of Recommendation 338 to which the Council have replied separately."

78. *Summary:* The Assembly proposes promoting a continuous dialogue between commanders-in-chief, armaments directors and industrialists, and starting discussion on specific

projects such as a battle tank for the 1990s, future combat aircraft, warship building, production of missiles, standardisation of telecommunications, pursuing research in advanced technology and support for European consortia. The Council's attitude is generally positive except for the question of standardising telecommunications equipment.

79. On 17th March 1980, Mr. Ferretti put the following question on Recommendation 339 in the *French National Assembly* :

"To ask the Minister of Defence :

- (a) how soon does he expect to be able to release information about requirements for the battle tank of the 1990s, new transport and armoured assault helicopters and new air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles ;
- (b) when will decisions be taken on the successor to the Franco-British Jaguar and the F-4F Phantom of the Federal German air force and on the further development of the British Harrier ;
- (c) what action does he intend to take to maintain Europe's warship building capability ?

Reply by Mr. Bourges, Minister of Defence (30th June 1980)

Following the co-operation agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, France intends, as from the 1990s, to introduce a new battle tank to be built jointly; the French army has an expected requirement for 1,500 tanks of this type. Where new generations of transport and assault helicopters are concerned, current studies should be completed by 1981-82; these helicopters might be produced in co-operation with other European states (the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic for the transport helicopter; the Federal Republic for the assault helicopter); France is considering procuring some one hundred assault helicopters for delivery starting towards the end of the decade. Once the last air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles (Magic I, Super 530 F-1, AM-39 now being delivered) have become operational, the guided air-to-surface Laser AS-30L missile and the improved Magic II will be brought into service in 1984, and the Super 530D in about 1986; in the longer term, current work should determine the types and features of the new generation of missiles to equip the successor to Jaguar and which will constitute an improved version of the Mirage 2000's armament. Studies are now being carried out on the possibility of producing the future tactical fighter aircraft

in co-operation with the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom. A report prepared at the request of the Ministers of Defence of the three countries will be examined in a few months' time. In view of the particular effort devoted to study and research, regular investments to maintain and improve industrial capability, prospects opened up by the military programme law and responsibility for industrial firms depending on the Ministry of Defence should be ensured at a satisfactory level."

80. *Comment*: The question by Mr. Ferretti was put prior to the Council's reply. It refers especially to paragraphs 2 to 4 of the recommendation. The French Government's answer gives a detailed description of existing and future projects. On the other hand, the government does not answer the question concerning warship building capacity.

81. *Recommendation 358* on the future of European security, presented on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 854) was adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1980:

"The Assembly,

.....

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Set up a working group to examine measures to be taken by all member countries to adapt WEU to the present requirements of European defence and instruct it to study in particular:

- (a) the co-ordination of member countries' policies in its areas of responsibility, namely defence, armaments and disarmament;
- (b) the participation of Ministers of Defence or their representatives in its meetings when matters which concern them are discussed;
- (c) the convening of meetings before those of the North Atlantic Council with a view to identifying the joint views of its members on matters relating to Europe's security;
- (d) the question of inviting all countries which are members of the EEC, have applied for membership or are European members of NATO to take all steps and measures likely to promote the closest possible participation of their activities in the achievement of the aims of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (e) the action to be taken on the study being conducted by the Standing Arma-

ments Committee so that the outcome may be a true European armaments policy."

82. The reply of the Council was communicated to the Assembly on 8th May 1981:

"The Council have noted with interest the report on the future of European security presented on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, and have examined very attentively the contents of the Assembly's recommendation.

Among the various suggestions put forward by the Assembly in its proposal to set up a working group, two are matters of constant concern to the Council:

- the co-ordination of member countries' policies in its areas of responsibility is one of the reasons for the Council's existence. Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty gives the Council adequate scope to discuss a wide variety of subjects. The Council continue to be flexible and have sufficiently wide powers to embrace any debate relevant to the application of the treaty;
- the question of any follow-up to the study being conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee and which is to make a descriptive analysis of the armaments industry in member countries has yet to be considered by the Council. In any case, the Council are still willing to improve European consultation and co-operation in the sphere of armaments, 'with a view to finding joint solutions which would assist governments of member countries in meeting their equipment requirements' (Article 10 of the decision of the Council of 7th May 1955 setting up the Standing Armaments Committee).

The three other suggestions introduce new elements, which the Council analyse as follows:

- the participation of Ministers of Defence, or their representatives in Council meetings would certainly not be without its value. This would be possible where matters which are the direct responsibility of Defence Ministers were to be discussed. Where this is not the case, their participation in essentially political discussions would not appear to be strictly necessary;
- the systematic convening of Council meetings before those of the North Atlantic Council would scarcely appear to offer any new advantages over the current practice;

- the participation of other countries in the achievement of the aims of the treaty is in the first place a matter for those countries themselves, since the treaty sets out procedures for that purpose.

For all these reasons, the Council consider that the setting up of a working group as recommended by the Assembly is not a necessity in present circumstances.”

83. *Summary*: The crucial point of the recommendation is the proposal to set up a *working group* to study the co-ordination of member countries' policies in defence areas, participation of Ministers of Defence in relevant meetings, convening meetings before meetings of the North Atlantic Council, inviting other European countries, action to be taken on the *study* conducted by the SAC. The Council replied that there was no need for a working group because co-ordination was one of the reasons for the Council's existence. As for the study, the Council said that this had yet to be considered. The Council does not believe that Council meetings before those of the North Atlantic Council would offer any new advantages. The participation of other countries is in the first place a matter for those countries themselves.

84. On 4th June 1981, Mr. Ahrens put the following question in the *Bundestag*:

“What conclusions does the Federal Government draw from the study on a European armaments policy conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee of Western European Union ?

Reply by Mr. Penner, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence (17th June 1981)

On 31st May 1976, the WEU Council of Ministers instructed the Standing Armaments Committee to make a descriptive analysis of the situation in the armaments sector of industries in the member countries.

At the present stage, this analysis consists of a definition of the industrial sector and of defence equipment (based on the work of the IEPG), a juridical study (April 1978) and an economic study (May 1981).

The juridical study describes the juridical system and structure in force in member countries where armaments firms and international co-operative undertakings are concerned. The economic study, which has in the meantime been submitted to the WEU Assembly, attempts, by collating data available from national budgets, NATO publications and other statistical sources, to give an overall view of member countries' defence efforts through expenditure on defence and armaments.

Because of difficulties in collecting, presenting and harmonising data, it has so far been possible to give a clear and systematic presentation only of information which was, on the whole, already known. The main part of the study – a presentation of armaments capabilities in Europe, and more specifically in WEU member countries – still has to be carried out and work is continuing in the IEPG. Because of the difficulty of the subject involved, no early results can be expected.

The juridical and economic studies are more descriptive than analytical. Their information value is therefore minimal.

At its meeting on 3rd June 1981, the Council of Ministers took a decision on the continuation of the armaments study; only the updating of figures in the economic study was approved.

On the basis of the partial results of the study at present available, it is not yet possible for the Federal Government to draw conclusions for a European armaments policy. The figures are available as sources of information for practical co-operation in the armaments field.”

85. On 23rd February 1982, Mr. Ahrens put another question to the Federal Government on the same subject:

“Does the Federal Government consider that the study of European defence industries conducted by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee will point to concrete measures to ensure optimum returns from investments by member states ?

Reply by Mr. Penner, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence

In a reply dated 17th June 1981 (Bulletin 9/596, No. 48) I informed you of the progress made with the study conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee. In reply to your new questions:

The Federal Government will examine the results of the study as soon as it is complete. In view of the difficulty of the subject, results cannot be expected in the short term.

The governments of member states will examine together, in the framework of the Council, whether it is possible to draw conclusions from the study and if so what conclusions. So far, the Council has taken no decision on this subject.”

86. *Comment*: The questioner emphasised the problem of the study so that the Federal

Government could describe the progress of work.

87. On 4th June 1981, Mr. Kittelmann put the following question in the *Bundestag* :

“To what extent are restrictions in the WEU budget under the heading of general economy measures expected to affect the activities of that organisation and, in particular, to what extent will they prevent the implementation of certain tasks assigned to it under the Brussels Treaty ?

Reply by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (12th June 1981)

The budget adopted by the WEU Council in April 1981 (which does not include the Assembly budget) makes no provision for restrictions but more specifically for zero growth, account being taken of inflation. Guaranteed compensation for inflation allows the organisation to pursue its current activities without restriction.

The Federal Government and the governments of certain other member states think it quite possible to make savings without jeopardising the implementation of tasks assigned to WEU.

I wish moreover to underline that guaranteed full compensation for inflation in the WEU budget implies that the Federal Government's contribution will increase proportionally more than the federal budget in view of foreseeable rise in the rate of inflation in France, where the Assembly has its seat, and in Great Britain, where WEU has its seat.

The same applies to the WEU Assembly budget which the WEU Council considers should also remain within the limits of a simple compensation for inflation.

An ad hoc working group, also set up at the request of the Federal Government, is at present studying the staff structure of the Office of the Clerk, the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee with a view to making economies and simplifying administration.”

88. *Comment* : Neither question nor reply are quite within the purview of Recommendation 358.

89. On 11th February 1981, Mr. Maravalle put the following question on Recommendation 358 :

“To ask the Minister of Defence what action Italy has taken on Recommendation 358 on the future of European security

adopted by the WEU Assembly on 2nd December 1980.

The Assembly recommends that the Council set up a working group to adapt Western European Union to the present requirements of European defence, in particular by the co-ordination of member countries' defence policies prior to meetings of the North Atlantic Council with a view to identifying the joint views of its members on matters relating to Europe's security. It also recommends inviting countries which are members of the EEC, have applied for membership or are European members of NATO but which are not members of WEU to participate in the attainment of these aims.

Finally, it recommends that action be taken on the study being conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee so that the outcome may be a true European armaments policy.

Reply by Mr. Lagorio, Minister of Defence (14th December 1981)

The Council of Western European Union, after examining Recommendation 358 of the WEU Assembly, expressed in its reply to that recommendation the conviction that the setting up of a working group of the type envisaged would not be expedient for practical reasons and because the co-ordination of member countries' policies was one of the reasons for the Council's existence.

Apart from these reasons, which are undeniable, to set up a working group of this type would merely add to the proliferation of bodies handling the same matters without any particular advantage for WEU.”

90. *Comment* : The questioner could not take the Council's position into account because he put his question prior to the communication of the Council's reply. The Italian Government merely repeated the tenor of the Council's position. Apart from this, the Italian Government replies only to *one* aspect of the detailed question.

91. On 17th December 1980, Mr. Jager put the following question on Recommendation 358 in the *French Senate* :

“To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs to indicate the French Government's attitude towards Recommendation 358, recently adopted by the WEU Assembly, with particular regard to the participation of Ministers of Defence in the WEU Council, the accession of new members to the

modified Brussels Treaty and action to be taken on the study being conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee.

Reply by Mr. François-Poncet, Minister for Foreign Affairs (2nd April 1981)

As the honourable member knows, it is for the WEU Council to reply to Recommendation 358 recently adopted by the Assembly. It is in that framework and in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Brussels Treaty that the French Government will help to define the joint point of view of members of the Council on the proposals made in the recommendation."

92. *Comment* : This is an example of what may happen when the question in a national parliament is raised too early. The French Government simply refers to the competence of the Council without being bound to say anything of substance.

93. On 17th February 1981, Mr. Glesener put two questions in the *Luxembourg* Chamber of Deputies :

"1. To ask the government to explain what action it intends to take on the study conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee of Western European Union so that it may lead to a true European armaments policy.

2. With reference to the policy of limiting expenditure due to the general economic situation, to ask the government whether it is determined to ensure that any budgetary restrictions imposed on Western European Union will not reduce the activities of that organisation or prevent the implementation of certain tasks assigned to it under the modified Brussels Treaty.

Replies by Mrs. Flesch, Minister for Foreign Affairs (27th March 1981)

1. The study entrusted to the Standing Armaments Committee by the Council of Western European Union has not yet been completed. However, certain sections have already been transmitted to members of the Council and, if need be, the Luxembourg Government will use the data they contain.

When the whole study has been completed, it will be for the WEU Council to examine what action should be taken on it and how to keep the WEU Assembly adequately informed.

2. The general economic situation imposes a policy of budgetary restrictions on all our states. It is consequently normal that this policy of limiting expenditure should also

be observed in the framework of Western European Union. However, restrictions will not be such as to reduce the activities of the organisation or prevent the implementation of certain tasks assigned to it under the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols. The purpose of the policy of restrictions will be rather to allow a more rational use of funds with a view to improving methods of work and the way staff of the organisation are employed, without affecting its ability to carry out its commitments under the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols and the Council decision of 7th May 1955."

94. *Comment* : Both question and answer were prior to the communication of the Council's position. The first question follows a line similar to that of the two questions put by Mr. Ahrens. The second question is similar to that put by Mr. Kittelmann. The Luxembourg Government's answer to the first question is less informative than the Federal Government's answer. The second question is only indirectly linked with Recommendation 358.

95. On 17th March 1981, the following question was put in the First Chamber of the *Netherlands* parliament :

"What is the opinion of the government on the recommendation of the Assembly of WEU to the Council of that organisation to set up a working group to examine measures to be taken to adapt WEU to the present requirements of European defence (Recommendation 358 adopted on 2nd December 1980) ?

Reply by Mr. van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs (2nd April 1981)

In accordance with Article V of the Brussels Treaty as amended in 1954, the countries of WEU have pledged themselves to afford automatic aid and assistance should any of the parties be the object of an armed attack in Europe.

In the same treaty (Article IV), the WEU countries state that in implementation of the treaty they shall work in close co-operation with NATO. The assistance referred to in Article V will therefore be effected mainly within the framework of NATO.

The Netherlands Government has noted with interest the proposals set out in Recommendation 358 of the WEU Assembly. The government is of the opinion that WEU duly fulfils its tasks as laid down in the modified Brussels Treaty. The above-mentioned close link with NATO is a

decisive factor in determining this opinion regarding co-operation within WEU."

96. *Comment*: The questioner raised the problem of setting up a working group. The Netherlands Government's answer is rather evasive.

97. On 18th February 1981, Lord Northfield put the following two questions on Recommendation 358 in the *House of Lords*:

"1. To ask Her Majesty's Government what action they propose to take on the study conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee of Western European Union on how to achieve a truly European armaments policy.

2. To ask Her Majesty's Government to what extent the policy of limiting expenditure in the present economic situation will reduce the activities of Western European Union or prevent implementation of certain tasks assigned to it under the modified Brussels Treaty.

Replies by Lord Carrington, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (2nd March 1981)

1. The Standing Armaments Committee of Western European Union was instructed to make a descriptive analysis of the situation in the armaments industry in member countries; its work is complementary to work in the independent European programme group which is still in progress. The Standing Armaments Committee's report has been presented to the Council of Western European Union and is under study by member governments.

2. All member governments of Western European Union are aiming at limiting the 1981 budget to zero growth in real terms at most. Her Majesty's Government believe that it will be possible to accommodate this without loss of efficiency and that it will not affect the continued implementation of the tasks required of WEU under the modified Brussels Treaty."

98. *Comment*: The discussion was held prior to communication of the Council's reply. The questions are similar to those put by MM. Ahrens and Kittelmann in the Bundestag.

99. *Recommendation 362* on international industrial consortia and collaborative arrangements for the production of high technology military equipment, presented on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 863), was adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1980:

"The Assembly,

.....

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Monitor on a regular basis through the Standing Armaments Committee progress towards achieving the interoperability and standardisation of defence equipment within the alliance, and encourage where practical Western European industrial collaboration to achieve these objectives;

2. Persuade the governments of the Western European Union countries to establish a link whereby the Assembly of Western European Union is kept regularly informed of the work of the independent European programme group (IEPG) as this Assembly is the only European parliamentary assembly with a *locus standi* established by treaty on defence matters, and has invaluable connections with national parliaments and ministers;

3. Invite the governments of member countries to convene a West European strategic summit at the earliest practical opportunity to seek agreement at the highest political level on the collaborative definition and development of the next generation of military projects such as a new European combat aircraft (ECA) to replace the Jaguar in the French and British air forces and to replace the Phantom in the German air force;

4. Promote a European policy for high technology weapons with a view to ensuring the development of a genuinely balanced transatlantic market whereby the standardisation of equipment within the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole would be enhanced: such a two-way street on a strictly equitable basis between the United States and Western Europe should involve on an increasing scale co-operative production programmes and the placing of offset work rather than outright purchases of equipment 'off the shelf';

5. Press the member nations to ensure that when their military staffs issue requests for proposals (RFPs) to industrial manufacturers to meet a specified military requirement, they issue RFPs to existing industrial consortia as well as to individual firms;

6. Continue to press member countries working through the independent European programme group to harmonise to the maximum extent possible the requirements of their armed forces and the joint phasing of their re-equipment plans."

100. The reply of the Council was communicated to the Assembly on 3rd April 1981 :

"1. In view of the specific tasks of WEU and NATO, it would be difficult to entrust the SAC with the task of 'monitoring' the progress towards achieving the interoperability and standardisation of defence equipment within the alliance. The alliance, in fact, has its own structures for fulfilling this task and they do not need to be 'overseen' as it were, by the SAC.

2. As the Council have in the past made clear to the Assembly, not all the member states of the IEPG are members of WEU. Consequently, it does not seem logical to establish the proposed link between the IEPG and the Assembly as this would imply that the latter would be supplied with information by nations that are not members of both institutions. Such information, therefore, can only be transmitted to the WEU parliamentarians within a national framework and insofar as their governments participate in the IEPG.

3. As the Assembly is aware, the development of co-operative armaments programmes is, moreover, a long and arduous task requiring, in the countries concerned, consensus with regard to industrial, economic, military and political interests. Co-operation in the matter of armaments is more readily achieved by pragmatic and patient endeavour than by declarations of principle, whose limitations have been shown by past experience.

4. The 'transatlantic dialogue' and the 'two-way street' are necessities. In order to implement them, two conditions must be met :

- European co-operation in the matter of armaments must first have acquired sufficient weight for the dialogue to be a balanced one ;
- the problem of harmonising the standards in force on both sides of the Atlantic should be satisfactorily solved, as recently exemplified by the transfer of the Roland licence to the United States.

It should be emphasised in this context that the IEPG is striving to implement the transatlantic dialogue and has recently intensified its efforts in this direction.

5. The problem of 'requests for proposals' issued by military staffs touches on an area of national prerogative that is very sensitive. It is up to member countries to decide the ways in which requests for proposals are passed on to industry.

6. The member states are in fact maintaining their efforts through the IEPG to harmonise to the maximum extent possible the requirements of their armies and their re-equipment plans. They clearly intend to continue these efforts."

101. *Summary* : (i) The Assembly recommends a monitoring system through the Standing Armaments Committee for progress towards achieving interoperability and standardisation within the alliance ; (ii) the Assembly repeats the wish to be informed about the work of the independent European programme group (IEPG) ; (iii) it proposes a Western European strategic summit ; (iv) it advocates a European policy for high technology, standardisation and a two-way street ; (v) it proposes to use existing industrial consortia or individual firms ; (vi) it proposes harmonising the requirements of the armed forces through the IEPG.

102. The Council (i) rejects the idea of monitoring progress because the alliance has its own structures ; (ii) repeats that information on the IEPG can be given only through national channels ; (iii) thinks that co-operation is more readily achieved by pragmatic and patient endeavour than by declaration of principle ; (iv) believes the transatlantic dialogue and two-way street are necessities ; two conditions must be met : sufficient weight in the European co-operation, the problem of harmonising the standards in force should be satisfactorily solved, as for example transfer of the Roland licence to the United States ; (v) believes the problem of 'requests for proposals' is up to the member countries ; (vi) considers that the member states are in fact maintaining their efforts through the IEPG to harmonise the requirements of the armed forces.

103. On 21st January 1981, Mr. Glesener put the following question on Recommendation 362 in the *Luxembourg* Chamber of Deputies :

"What is the government's attitude towards this recommendation ? Is it prepared to support it in the Council of Ministers of Western European Union ?

Reply by Mr. Krieps, Minister for the Armed Forces (4th March 1981)

There is no doubt that Luxembourg still subscribes to the principles and aims of stronger armaments co-operation in Europe and hence in the alliance as a whole.

The aim of this co-operation is a more rational use of defence budgets, rationalisation of logistics and above all to make decisive progress towards standardisation and interoperability of military equipment.

It is clearly in the interests of a small country which has no real armaments

industry and therefore has to import all its arms, munitions, transport vehicles, etc., to subscribe to the abovementioned aims. Like other European countries with only a small armaments industry, Luxembourg has to make sustained efforts to find compensation in other branches of industry. In this respect, its representative at the annual high-level meeting of the independent European programme group held in Oslo in November 1980 laid particular emphasis on this question of compensation.

In the light of the foregoing, the Luxembourg Government can affirm that it is prepared to support Recommendation 362 of the Assembly of Western European Union."

104. *Comment*: The question is a sound and useful effort to influence the Council's position through the channels of a member government. The Luxembourg Government's answer is generally positive and somewhat different to the position communicated by the Council to the Assembly. Moreover, the answer gives an interesting insight into the position of European countries which have only a small armaments industry (question of compensation).

105. *Recommendation 368* on the European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments, presented on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 874), was adopted by the Assembly on 17th June 1981:

"The Assembly

.....

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Recall the need to design a multi-purpose aircraft adaptable to the specific requirements of the various WEU member countries;

2. Insist on such co-operation being organised flexibly and efficiently, drawing on the lessons of twenty years of European experience of co-operation;

3. Ask the interested governments to tackle their present study in greater detail and harmonise the specifications required by the staffs of the air forces so that the development of a European combat aircraft may be undertaken;

4. Ask the governments of the WEU member states, in the framework of the Standing Armaments Committee and of the independent European programme group, to show their interest in the development of this aircraft which should be available for procurement in about fifteen years' time;

5. Consider extending European co-operation to other types of aircraft (helicopters, transport aircraft, etc.)."

106. The reply of the Council was communicated to the Assembly on 20th November 1981:

"The Council welcome the interest which the Assembly, the only European assembly competent in defence matters, shows in projects arising from European co-operation in the field of aeronautics, notably the combat aircraft.

1. The Council are fully aware of the need to design a technologically advanced multi-purpose aircraft able to meet the various forms of threat to which European countries may be subjected.

2. The development of co-operative armaments programmes is a long and arduous task calling for consensus at national level between industrial, economic, military and political interests. The countries concerned with the combat aircraft are fully apprised of the importance of flexibility and efficiency in organisation, taking into account its requirements. Co-operation in the matter of armaments, which is the fruit of pragmatic and patient efforts, naturally draws upon the lessons of the past, even if the programmes present themselves under the same configuration.

3. The countries concerned will be considering together most carefully the way forward in this field. At the preliminary design stage, definition of characteristics and harmonisation procedures must involve using with maximum efficiency the already existing machinery for concerted action in the sphere of armaments and chiefly the IEPG and Conference of National Armaments Directors.

4. The future combat aircraft is notably the subject of intense tripartite discussions between the French, German and United Kingdom Governments. In addition, because of the interest shown by various European governments, a project group for this aircraft has been set up within the independent European programme group, thus providing a vehicle for concerted action and exchanges of information. Although the interest of the various countries within the IEPG has been stressed and regularly reaffirmed, the fact remains that any further progress within this project group will be dependent on harmonisation of characteristics, a matter currently being discussed in detail between the military authorities and the staff of the armaments directors of the various countries.

5. The efforts pursued within the framework of the IEPG are aimed at the maximum harmonisation of renewal plans and military requirements ; thus it examines on an annual basis the evolution of the schedules of each of the member countries and endeavours to promote machinery for co-operation whenever this is possible. With regard to aeronautics, in addition to the future combat aircraft, joint talks have started, particularly in connection with helicopters and transport aircraft. Regarding the latter, initial studies have led to the setting up within the IEPG of an exploratory group whose terms of reference are to determine the long-term requirements of the various European countries in the matter of transport aircraft."

107. *Summary*: The crucial point of the recommendation is to urge the governments of the WEU member states to use all existing structures to achieve the aim of constructing a future combat aircraft. The Council's attitude is generally positive. On the other hand, the Council refers again to the competence of member states and to existing machinery. The Council reports on the tripartite discussions between the French, German and United Kingdom Governments, the setting up of a project group within the IEPG and joint talks in connection with helicopters and transport aircraft.

108. On 8th August 1981 a *Belgian* member of parliament put the following question to his government on Recommendation 368 :

"In its reply to Recommendation 339 of the WEU Assembly, the WEU Council announced that the independent European programme group was examining the problems raised by the definition of a future combat aircraft which is the subject of intense tripartite discussions between the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United Kingdom.

Is it still possible for the governments of these countries to work out common specifications for the future combat aircraft ? Is an agreement on the specifications of this aircraft in sight ? Is the extension of European co-operation to other types of aircraft, including helicopters and a transport aircraft, being considered ?

Would it not be in the interests of our armed forces and industries for the Belgian Government to be associated with this multi-purpose aircraft project ?

Reply by Mr. Swaelen, Minister of Defence (29th September 1981)

1. On 9th April 1976, an ad hoc group set up within the independent European programme group and composed of representatives of five nations : Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, was instructed to identify the future requirements of the European NATO nations for a joint tactical combat aircraft and the possibilities of designing, developing and building it in Europe in an efficient and economical manner.

2. The work of this ad hoc group continued until 28th November 1978 when it was noted that there were divergencies of views, that the Netherlands and Belgium had been informally left out and that tripartite discussions were being continued between the other three nations.

3. At the meeting of IEPG national armaments directors held on 26th and 27th March 1981 it was noted that there was little likelihood of the talks between France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom reaching a conclusion in the near future and that therefore no enlargement of the IEPG's activities was to be considered for the time being. Nevertheless, in view of its importance, the directors decided that the group working on this project would not be dissolved but 'moth-balled' until such time as the member states consider it useful to reactivate it.

4. There are various bodies for promoting co-operation on and development of helicopters.

At military level, study groups have been set up in NATO, the IEPG and FINABEL, where Belgium is represented.

At industrial level, there is a quadripartite technical committee formed by France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. In practice, this forum has led to international developments, limited however to bilateral agreements.

5. In March 1980 the national armaments directors reaffirmed their interest in setting up a working group on the future transport aircraft. Since then, two meetings have been held. The first results are expected at the end of 1981.

The Belgian air force plays an active part in this group in the framework of the future replacement of its C-130H fleet. Other participants are France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. It is not out of the question that the Federal Republic of

Germany and Italy will join the working group at a later date.

6. Finally, emphasis should be laid on the unremitting efforts of the national armaments directors who, in the framework of Eurogroup and with the assistance of the independent European programme group, endeavour to identify common requirements and promote co-operation in armaments matters.”

109. *Comment*: The question deals mainly with the tripartite talks on the definition of a future combat aircraft and the rôle the Belgian Government could play in this connection. The answer gives a very detailed picture of the relevant stage of the discussion and the different projects.

110. On 24th July 1981, Mr. Jeambrun put the following question in the *French Senate* on Recommendation 368 :

“In its reply to Recommendation 339 of the WEU Assembly, the Council announced that the independent European programme group was examining the problems connected with the future combat aircraft which was also the subject of intense tripartite discussions between the French, German and United Kingdom Governments. Does the Minister of Defence still consider it possible for the governments of these countries to work out common specifications for the future combat aircraft? Is an agreement on the specifications of this aircraft in sight? Is the extension of European co-operation to other types of aircraft, including helicopters and a transport aircraft, being considered ?

Reply Mr. Hernu, Minister of Defence (8th December 1981)

For several years, France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany have been studying possibilities for European co-operation on a new combat aircraft programme. Consultations are continuing ; it is not yet possible to foresee the date for launching the programme for developing this aircraft and hence the date on which it will come into service. Furthermore, France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy signed an agreement of principle in 1978 expressing their intention to work together on the development and production of certain new types of helicopter. This co-operation remains open to the other member countries of the independent European programme group (IEPG), which are kept informed of work under way. Finally, an IEPG working group, in which France

takes part, is endeavouring to draw up the operational requirements for a transport aircraft.”

111. *Comment* : The question is nearly identical to the main part of the Belgian question discussed previously. The French Government's answer is far more general than that of the Belgian Government.

112. On 28th October 1981, Mrs. Knight put the following question to the *United Kingdom Government* on Recommendation 368 :

“Mrs. Knight asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he estimates that Her Majesty's Government and the Governments of France and West Germany will be able to work out common specifications for the future combat aircraft ; whether an agreement on the specifications of this aircraft is imminent ; and whether the extension of European co-operation to other types of aircraft, including helicopters and a transport aircraft, is being considered.

Reply by Mr. Pattie, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence Procurement

We are continuing discussions with potential partners on future combat aircraft, but it is too early to say what the outcome will be. Opportunities for European collaboration on future weapon systems, including helicopters and, in the much longer term, for transport aircraft, are under constant review.”

113. *Comment* : The question is particularly related to tripartite talks on the future combat aircraft. The answer is very vague and general.

114. This concludes the analysis of action taken in parliaments on the different recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly.

115. It is worth underlining that on 16th December 1983 the military chiefs-of-staff of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom signed an agreement on a preliminary plan for a European combat aircraft for the 1990s.

116. Though it is difficult to prove how this practical result was influenced by action taken in the relevant national parliaments, it shows that several suggestions in WEU recommendations manage, albeit slowly, to produce results.

117. The conclusion of the abovementioned agreement provoked several questions by Mr. Kolbow in the *Bundestag* on 23rd December 1983, to which Mr. Hiehle, Secretary of State for Defence, replied.

IV. Analysis of other activities in national parliaments

Belgium

118. On 30th May 1983, a member of the Senate put the following question on reciprocal armaments procurement by the United States and other NATO partners :

“What is the value of United States armaments procurement from its NATO partners and vice versa ?

Reply by Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations (26th July 1983)

1. Information about the procurement of armaments by the United States from its NATO partners and the procurement by those partners of armaments from the United States is a matter for each of the governments concerned.

2. However, the honourable member will probably find the following details of interest :

(a) the transatlantic dialogue was developed in 1975 on United States Government initiative recommending that restrictions under the Buy America Act be lifted and that the principles of the standardisation of armaments between allies be taken into account when the Pentagon procured equipment ;

(b) after seven years' experience, it is now possible to assess the results of the transatlantic dialogue. It must be noted that the Europeandefence industry is now healthier than it was in 1975 and that there have been definite improvements in the acquisition of American technology by the Europeans.

3. With particular regard to Belgium, it can be revealed that the United States has already concluded several major contracts with Belgian firms which are of particular scientific and technological interest.

I therefore note that the progress, although very long, is nevertheless under way and is developing favourably.”

France

119. The relevant problem had an echo particularly in the National Assembly, in debates on the draft budgets for 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984, and in opinions by the National Defence and Armed Forces Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee on these bills.

Italy

120. In December 1981, the Minister of Defence, Mr. Lagorio, spoke in the Chamber of

Deputies on progress with certain problems of modernisation, increasing the capability of the armed forces and the conclusions of the twenty-seventh session of the WEU Assembly in whose work he had participated to uphold the need to strengthen WEU's rôle in Europe in solving problems which arose in the defence sector. This speech was followed by many questions and a very lively debate.

Luxembourg

121. On 27th October 1983, Mr. Prussen made a statement in the Chamber of Deputies as follows :

“The WEU countries have a population of 255 million. It is a force of which many people and governments seem unaware.

It is therefore regrettable that the work of the WEU parliamentary Assembly, which is at least as intense and detailed as in the NATO parliament, is not seen in its true light.

The governments of signatory countries, such as France but also the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, are aware that, in the interest of closer European defence co-operation and without wishing to call NATO in question, greater efforts should be made in the exchange of information, the joint production and standardisation of armaments, ensuring interoperability in the defence of Europe or NATO and making it more effective.”

Netherlands

122. On 28th October 1983, Mr. Blaauw asked his government if the Standing Armaments Committee could not be used more actively for armaments co-operation in the European framework. His government answered as follows :

“The Council of WEU Ministers took note of the proposals of the new head of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee, Mr. Hintermann, on 17th May 1983, concerning work in the near future. In the meantime, a proposal by Mr. Hintermann to use the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee to help the IEPG has also been placed on the agenda of the Standing Armaments Committee. In view of the fact that the IEPG is based on a larger group of countries than WEU, it is logical that emphasis should be placed on the pursuance of wider co-operation in the IEPG framework. The course thus proposed by the Standing Armaments Committee is there-

fore considered right and acceptable ; it is in direct line with the question as put for using the Standing Armaments Committee more actively for co-operation in the European framework in the defence equipment field. Furthermore, it was stated in the decision setting up the Standing Armaments Committee on 7th May 1955 that this committee – in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – shall seek to improve consultation and co-operation in the defence equipment field.

It remains the considered view of my defence colleague and myself that discussions on questions concerning co-operation on defence equipment in the first instance should remain the purview of the IEPG and NATO.

Finally, in the view of the Netherlands, the economically weaker allies which are participating in NATO and the IEPG but not in WEU would not understand the industrially stronger countries concentrating their mutual co-operation in the smaller group of WEU countries.”

United Kingdom

123. On 4th May 1982, Mrs. Knight put the following question on the study of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee :

“Mrs. Knight asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether Her Majesty’s Government are taking action to follow up the study conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee of the Western European Union on the European armaments industries in order to gain maximum efficiency from military investment expenditure in the member countries.

Reply by Mr. Pattie, Under-Secretary of State for Defence Procurement

We take every opportunity to seek co-operation with our European allies, particularly on equipment developments, in order to improve the benefits from our military expenditure. Information contained in this study by the Standing Armaments Committee as well as related work by the independent European programme group and in other fora is taken into account during such discussions.”

124. *Comment :* The *United Kingdom* Government’s answer is rather general. Mr. Ahrens, for his part, had put two similar questions in the *Bundestag*, the Federal Government’s answer to which is given in paragraphs 84 and 85.

V. Conclusions

125. One of the major tasks of members of the WEU Assembly is to ensure that Assembly initiatives and recommendations are examined by their respective parliaments and transmitted to governments. The aim should be to have as much influence as possible, through national channels, on Council decisions in accordance with Assembly recommendations. More generally speaking, they also try to help to ensure that political leaders and public opinion become more aware of the work and aims of WEU.

126. This is particularly important at a time when governments are giving serious consideration to the idea of reactivating and giving new impetus to the WEU organs and redefining their rôle. Thus, the tasks and responsibilities of WEU parliamentarians are bound to increase.

127. After endeavouring to analyse the elements set out in the foregoing four chapters, your Rapporteur considers there are four aspects to his task, i.e. to determine whether :

- we have carried out our tasks as described above, taking as an example the standardisation and production of armaments ;
- the governments of member states take sufficient account of representatives’ initiatives and Council decisions ;
- parliamentary debates have had a noticeable influence on the working out of Council decisions and actual co-operation between member states ; and
- debates in parliaments might instigate further initiatives in regard to the Council or the governments of WEU member countries.

128. Your Rapporteur wishes it to be understood that, in accordance with the nature of the present report, he has not only made a critical analysis of the way the governments and the Council act but has also had to tackle the activities of representatives themselves from a critical standpoint. We shall be able to draw conclusions from this analysis which will be important for the future of our work.

129. Thus, as it emerges from the information in Chapter III of the report, action taken in parliaments on the recommendations with which we are concerned here is mainly in the form of oral and written questions. This is in fact one of the possible, useful and customary ways of inducing governments to adopt positions on the matters dealt with. However, this method raises a series of problems :

The time factor

130. It is well known that on average several months elapse between the adoption of a recommendation and the receipt of a reply from the Council. In the case of the recommendations studied in this report, this lapse of time varied from three to five months.

131. All representatives should consider whether relevant questions should be put to their governments before or after the Council has adopted a position. There are various arguments in favour of each of these possibilities :

- If a government is asked by a representative to adopt a position as soon as a recommendation has been adopted, i.e. before the Council replies to it, the advantage is that the recommendation is still topical. Moreover, it is still possible to encourage the government to make its position carry a certain amount of weight when the Council's decision is being worked out. In this way, a representative can try to influence the Council's decisions in the way the Assembly wishes. However, this is possible only if the question is put early enough for the government to have time to express its position in the Council. Once this stage has been passed, the government can but wait for the Council's reply and reproduce what it says.
- There are however other arguments in favour of waiting for the Council's reply and then putting a question to the governments. This method has the advantage of enabling the representative to take account of the Council's reply when working out his question and encouraging his government to draw conclusions from the Council's reply.

132. From Chapter III it can be seen that in the majority of the cases studied representatives have put questions to their governments *before* the Council has replied. Statistically speaking, your Rapporteur has noted – without claiming to have exhausted the subject – that of thirty-seven questions studied at least twenty-two were put to governments before the Council's reply was issued. In order to study the effect of questions more closely, account must be taken of another factor :

The nature and content of questions

133. Many questions were simple requests for information, not very likely to help to spur the governments to take action. A few examples are given below :

Effect produced by questions put and answered before the Council's reply

134. The question put in the House of Commons on Recommendation 329 (paragraph 33) was a request for general information which took no account of the Assembly's wish to find new methods and structures in the field of industrial co-operation. Consequently, the British Government was able to give only a very general answer. Hence it also seems doubtful whether it made use of this intervention in order to take a particularly determined stand in the Council.

135. The question put in the Bundestag on the same recommendation (paragraph 35) was also mainly a request for information, as was a similar question put in the Belgian parliament. The same may be said of a number of questions put on Recommendations 325, 335 and 368.

136. However, even in cases where the author of the question urged his government to adopt a firm stand, the answer was sometimes very superficial. An example is the answer to a question put in the House of Commons on Recommendation 333 (paragraph 47) : the Secretary of State for Defence merely indicated that the WEU Council was at present considering the matters referred to in the question. A question put to the French Government on Recommendation 358 fared hardly better (paragraph 89). The government recalled the Council's competence in the matter, without saying anything about the actual subject. Similarly, in most comparable cases the governments gave no particularly encouraging answers. This is for instance the case of the Netherlands Government's answer to a question on Recommendation 325, the Belgian Government's answers to questions on Recommendations 333 and 335, the French Government's answers to questions on Recommendations 338 and 339, the Luxembourg Government's answer to a question on Recommendation 358 and the British Government's answer to a question on Recommendation 358.

137. The Luxembourg Government's answer to a question on Recommendation 362 is a rare positive example of a government stating clearly that it was prepared to endorse an Assembly recommendation in the Council.

Effect produced by questions put before and answered after the Council's reply

138. An example is the action taken on a question put in the Italian parliament on Recommendation 358. The representative asked his government what action it had taken in application of Recommendation 358. The Italian Government took about ten months to answer. In the meantime, the Council had indicated its position. The Italian Government then merely quoted the Council's position.

Effect produced by questions put after the Council's reply

139. In the case of this type of question, it is rarely possible to decide whether the author of the question took account of the relevant reply of the Council when preparing his text.

140. For instance, a representative put a question in the Bundestag on Recommendation 325, in which he recalled the wish expressed by the Assembly to receive an annual report from the IEPG. But this request had already been rejected by the Council *inter alia* because not all members of the IEPG were members of WEU. The Council had therefore recommended that representatives be briefed through national channels. Neither the question nor the Federal Government's answer seems to take account of the position adopted by the Council.

141. Even in cases of this type, representatives often limit themselves to making simple requests for information. This is the case of a French question on Recommendation 325, a Netherlands question on Recommendation 329 and two questions put in the Bundestag on Recommendation 358.

142. However, even where questions are not just requests for information (e.g. the questions put in the Bundestag on Recommendation 335, in the House of Commons on Recommendations 337 and 338 and in the Luxembourg parliament on Recommendation 337), government positions very rarely go further into the subject. This seems partly due to the questions not being sufficiently incisive or to the fact that they do not dispute the position adopted by the Council.

Co-ordinating the text of questions

143. As a general rule, each WEU Assembly recommendation contains a series of proposals and considerations of various kinds for the Council to examine.

144. It is very rare for a representative to take up all the elements of a recommendation for a debate in his parliament. Hence it is exceptional that the major part of Recommendation 337, for instance, should have been included in a question put in the Luxembourg parliament.

145. Most representatives select the specific points in recommendations which they find of particular interest. However, there is rarely any co-ordination between members of the WEU Assembly in this respect. Your Rapporteur found no more than five examples of identical or similar questions being put in several parliaments. These were questions put by Mr. Dejardin and Mr. Roper on Recommendation

329, by Mr. Ahrens and Mr. Meintz on Recommendation 329, by Mr. Enders and Mr. Roper on Recommendation 335, by Mr. Glesener, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Kittelmann and Lord Northfield on Recommendation 358 and by Mr. Dejardin and Mr. Jeambrun on Recommendation 368.

146. Otherwise, highly varied questions were put on one and the same recommendation. It is therefore certain that the government often had no trouble in answering the questions since they were hardly liable to contradict the Council or the answers of other governments. It is even easier for the governments if questions relate only indirectly to recommendations.

Government answers

147. Your Rapporteur discerned no real contradictions between government statements and the Council's reply. However, it has happened that the governments concerned shift the emphasis and underline different points from the Council or another government. Even in such cases, it would be useful if representatives could grasp all the slight differences.

148. Your Rapporteur found only one example of a representative putting questions to his government on the same subject on more than one occasion: in the Bundestag, questions on the Standing Armaments Committee were put twice. In both cases, admittedly, the Federal Government gave very general answers.

149. In none of the cases studied was your Rapporteur able to note that a government was compelled to indicate in detail any differences between its position and that of the Council. This seems to be due to the type of questions put and to the fact that the subject was never taken up again once the government had answered.

150. The following few examples should allow this phenomenon to be better explained:

(i) Answering a question on Recommendation 325, the French Government clearly stated that it favoured the interoperability of armaments. In this recommendation, the Assembly had advocated "interoperability and, when necessary for the security of Europe, the standardisation of defence equipment". In its reply, *the Council* referred to "armaments families" and continued as follows: "... the search for standardisation must not be allowed to operate exclusively to the advantage of equipment of American origin, leaving the European industry with only a subordinate rôle as subcontractors which in the long term would be a threat to its existence". It emerges from these differences in wording that there seems to be very considerable nuances between the

Assembly, the Council and the French Government which might have provided a good starting point for other questions in parliament.

(ii) Answering a statement by a representative in the Netherlands parliament on the same recommendation, the Netherlands Government stated *inter alia* that the intervention of the EEC proposed by the Assembly might be more easily discussed when most of the European member countries of NATO had become members of the EEC. *The Council* on the contrary had stated that a number of governments had already opposed a wider interpretation of the Treaty of Rome. Here there was material for further questions.

(iii) Answering a question on Recommendation 329, the Belgian Government *inter alia* expressed the opinion that the results achieved so far by existing bodies such as FINABEL, the IEPG and the SAC could not yet be considered as the ideal solution because of the political, economic, social, financial, legal and commercial obstacles which existed. *The Council* had stated *inter alia* that it believed that the necessary framework for decision-making already existed.

(iv) Similarly, the positions adopted by the Federal German, British and Luxembourg Governments when answering questions on Recommendation 329 would have provided material for further questions.

(v) Answering a question on Recommendation 333, the Belgian Government said it was in favour of strengthening political authority at supranational level. This aspect was not referred to in the corresponding reply of the Council.

(vi) Answering questions on Recommendations 337 and 362, the Luxembourg Government adopted an attitude which was on the whole more positive than the corresponding statements of the Council.

Result

151. (i) From a strictly statistical point of view, an analysis of the questions put by representatives gives altogether positive results. However, no recommendation could be found which was the subject of questions in *all* parliaments. In this respect, Recommendation 358 had the best score, with questions put in five parliaments, followed by Recommendations 325, 329 and 335, each of which was the subject of questions in four parliaments. Questions were put on Recommendation 368 in three parliaments.

(ii) Nevertheless, the general impression obtained is that the results of questions and governments' response to them have to date been relatively modest. Governments have practically never (with only very few exceptions) stated that parliamentary questions would

encourage them to take action in the Council.

Furthermore, there are no discernible points of reference which allow the extent to which parliamentary questions may influence actual co-operation between member states to be verified. The only possibility they afford is on the whole to make governments abide by the partially positive positions they adopt. From this point of view, parliamentary questions can be useful. In order to make them even more effective, the following suggestions may be made:

(a) it should be ensured that if possible each recommendation is the subject of questions in *all* parliaments;

(b) account should be taken of the stage at which questions are put. A question will in fact follow a different line and have a different tenor according to whether it is put before or after the Council replies. In the first case, it will have to urge the government to bring determined influence to bear in the Council and in the second it will as far as possible have to bring up for debate the subject matter of the Council's reply.

(iii) Government answers should not be made too easy. In this connection, mere requests for information do not generally go very far. This is also the case of questions only indirectly related to a recommendation.

(iv) Members of the WEU Assembly should as far as possible agree on the stage at which they intend to put a question and on its contents. To this end, the same essential points of Assembly recommendations should be selected if possible.

(v) A question should not be systematically considered to have been disposed of as soon as the government has answered. An attempt should be made to verify that the answer accords with the Council's opinions and those of other governments and if necessary further questions should be put. In certain cases, it may be useful to put questions both before *and* after the Council replies.

152. The possibilities available to members of the WEU Assembly for bringing influence to bear by indicating guidelines in the parliaments should admittedly not be overestimated. In effect, one of the most arduous tasks of WEU parliamentarians is to arouse sufficient interest in WEU in the parliaments for relatively strong parliamentary pressure to be brought to bear on governments. Inclusion of a recommendation in the agenda of a national foreign affairs or defence committee would already be one step forward, but this raises a problem, i.e. that generally speaking members of the WEU Assembly are not at the same time members of such a national committee.

153. Topics such as those which are the subject of the present report are not very appropriate for discussion before a wide public, whose younger members in particular are more interested in progress achieved in disarmament, the maintenance of peace and the prevention of war.

154. It will therefore always be difficult to reduce to a common denominator in parliaments the various interests of representatives with different concepts.

155. Hence, on the first three aspects listed in paragraph 127, your Rapporteur's analysis leads to the conclusion that it is for parliamentarians themselves to increase their efforts to ensure that Assembly recommendations have an impact in member states.

156. As for the fourth aspect, the following questions seem to arise from the debates in parliaments :

(i) Standardisation and interoperability

157. Neither the Assembly nor the Council has ever given clear priority to either of these two matters, although they seem quite distinct subjects. Is it not necessary to invite the governments, through the Council, to work out a specific joint approach to these matters, indicating the various steps to be taken ?

(ii) Co-operation between Europe and the United States in the production of armaments

158. According to several governmental statements in parliaments, the relationship between Europe and the United States seems to be mainly in the shape of bilateral co-operation between various European states and the United States. Moreover, there do not seem to be very far-reaching reciprocal exchanges of information between European countries about their relations with the United States in these matters. Consequently, should the Council be asked to improve co-ordination and information

between the European governments concerned ? Should the governments be asked to examine more closely present United States legislation restricting European imports and to intensify efforts towards a real two-way street between Europe and the United States ?

(iii) Methods and structures of industrial co-operation

159. Several governments stressed the enormous obstacles to full integration of armaments production, whether in the Atlantic or the European framework. None of these statements entirely corresponds to the repeated affirmations of the Council that existing structures and methods are sufficient. Should the Council's attention be directed towards these divergences and should it be asked to reconsider the relevant recommendations of the Assembly including joint production ventures ?

(iv) Restrictions on the sale of armaments

160. Debates in several parliaments show that there were different approaches to the problem by the governments. Would it not be worthwhile to urge parliaments and member governments to reconsider this problem so as to reach a joint Western European Union position insofar as possible ?

(v) Study conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee

161. Several governments stressed the importance of the study conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee, underlining that this study could not be expected to produce results in the short term. Is the time ripe to ask for a report on the state of progress of the study and for a report on the work of the IEPG ? Should the governments not also be asked again to report on existing and future armaments projects ?

Situation in the Middle East and European security

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Lord Reay, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on the situation in the Middle East and European security

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Lord Reay, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. The war between Iraq and Iran
- III. The situation in Lebanon
 - (a) The civil war
 - (b) Foreign intervention
 - (c) Lebanon and European security
- IV. Palestine
- V. Conclusions

1. Adopted in committee by 16 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy, van der Werff (Alternate: Blaauw) (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier, Bianco, Bogaerts, Caro, Hill (Alternate: Lord Hughes), Lagneau, Lagorce, Lord McNair, MM. Martino, Masciadri, Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spitella (Alternate: Amadei), Thoss, Vecchiotti, Vogt, de Vries.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on the situation in the Middle East and European security

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling its Recommendations 341, 349, 361, 371, 386 and 389;
- (ii) Considering that armed conflicts in the Middle East are a serious threat to Europe's security;
- (iii) Considering in particular that there is a serious risk of the war between Iran and Iraq escalating and further endangering stability in the area and the world economy;
- (iv) Considering that the use of chemical weapons by either of the belligerents seriously undermines respect for international conventions in all international warfare;
- (v) Condemning also the use of children in an army at war, and the ill-treatment of prisoners;
- (vi) Considering that the situation of Lebanon continues to be likely to provoke international crises and that such a risk remains grave whilst part of the country is subject to foreign domination;
- (vii) Considering that the situation in Lebanon should not be seen only nor even primarily in terms of the East-West conflict;
- (viii) Welcoming the formation in Lebanon of a government which reflects the demographic balance and the rights of the different political and other elements in the country;
- (ix) Deploring the heavy losses suffered by units of the multinational buffer force and United Nations forces;
- (x) Convinced that all foreign forces other than those of the United Nations should leave Lebanese soil completely;
- (xi) Considering that the vicious circle of terrorism and repression and the installation of settlements are obstacles to the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East, which rather requires:
 - recognition by those who have not yet done so, including most Arab countries and the PLO, of the right of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers;
 - recognition by Israel of the fact that most Palestinian people still consider the PLO under its present leadership as their representative and of their right to their own national homeland;
- (xii) Welcoming the improvement in relations between the PLO and Jordan with a view to solving the Palestinian problem,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Co-ordinate the policies of member countries towards Iran and Iraq with a view to ensuring that no action is taken which might prolong the conflict and to help to restore peace between these two countries;
2. In order to confirm declarations by member countries that they have not supplied the belligerents, directly or indirectly, with chemical weapons, instruct the Agency for the Control of Armaments to verify declarations made by member countries in this connection;
3. Press for the complete withdrawal from Lebanon of all foreign forces, except for those of the United Nations, in application of United Nations Resolutions 508 and 509;
4. Formally reaffirm the joint views of the Western European countries expressed by the Ten in their Venice declaration of June 1980, and in particular:
 - (a) recall that stability in the Middle East depends, on the one hand, on the PLO and all nations recognising Israel and its rights and, on the other hand, on Israel recognising the fact that the Palestinian people have the right to their own national homeland and that they are represented by the PLO;
 - (b) repeat its condemnation of Israel's continued settlement policy on territories occupied since 1967 and warn that country that there must be no further expulsion of Arab populations from these territories.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Lord Reay, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. On 21st September 1983 the Presidential Committee of the Assembly decided to include a report on the Middle East in the agenda of the November session. However, so many amendments were tabled in plenary session to the draft recommendation in the report which the General Affairs Committee had adopted on 29th November 1983 by 13 votes to 2 with 3 abstentions that the Chairman and Rapporteur were led to request its withdrawal from the agenda for resubmission at the first part of the Assembly's thirtieth session.

2. The General Affairs Committee has already devoted considerable study and reflection in earlier years to matters relating to this important region. After Sir Frederic Bennett, who was Rapporteur in 1979, 1980 and 1981 (Documents 820, 844 and 871), your Rapporteur already presented a report on European security and the Middle East in December 1982 (Document 927) when he drew up a list of documents on the subject. Hence, the present document will not go back over past history but merely refer to developments in 1983 and the beginning of 1984. The committee's visit to Jordan in March 1984 and the information there obtained, particularly from HRH Crown Prince Hassan Bin Talal, not to speak of visits which your Rapporteur was personally able to make to other countries of the region have allowed the November 1983 report to be seriously updated.

3. In fact two matters which are at first sight quite separate have made events in the Middle East a subject of keen concern for Europe's security. One is the resumption of civil war in Lebanon during the summer of 1983 in which foreign powers have been involved in various ways, including certain member countries of WEU or the Atlantic Alliance. The other is the continued fighting between Iraq and Iran and the risk of this war spreading, which Europe cannot disregard, and the possible consequences for the entire region. However, the two matters cannot be completely isolated from each other or from all questions relating to the Middle East. Indeed, it seems evident that an Iranian success would have incalculable consequences for the regional balance of forces and also for the internal stability of all Moslem countries. It would then be difficult to avoid the great powers becoming involved and many observers fear, not without good reason, that this part of the world could be the detonator of world war.

4. Without wishing to subscribe to these apocalyptic views, your Rapporteur must recall a few facts which illustrate the extreme sensitivity of the region and its importance both for Europe and for the two superpowers. First, Iran has long frontiers with the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, which has been invaded by the Soviet army, and the state frontiers do not correspond to ethnic, religious and cultural realities. Second, the religious fundamentalism of Iranian Islam seems to be a growing attraction for a large part of the Moslem world, particularly its Shiite elements, which are numerous in the Middle East. It is linked both with highly reactionary aims from the standpoint of legislation, customs and freedom, revolutionary and terrorist methods which have total disregard for anything foreign to that form of religion, including human rights and respect for human life, and with radical hostility to anything foreign to Iranian Shiism, including the principal values of western civilisation.

5. Moreover, the Middle East countries have always had very close links with Western Europe in cultural, religious and personal matters, as well as in the economic field. It must not be overlooked either that the Gulf area contains 54% of known world reserves of oil and 25% of gas reserves and that in the decade 1973-83 it supplied 60% of the oil used in Western Europe, 70% of that used in Japan and 30% of that used in the United States, in spite of a sharp drop in its production during that period.

6. For all these reasons, Western Europe cannot disregard this essential region nor can it rely on the United States alone to exercise an influence, even if Europe does not intend to risk jeopardising its good relations with the United States, which are vital for its security.

II. The war between Iraq and Iran

7. While in the course of 1983 there seemed to have been a substantial shift in the balance of power towards Iran which was better able to maintain its oil exports and therefore its oil revenues than Iraq, Iraq became heavily dependent on subsidies from Saudi Arabia and certain Gulf states. This led to pessimism in Iraq and consequently a desire to end the war as soon as possible.

8. Iran has just managed to push the theatre of operations beyond its frontier. However, as

Iran has a larger population, abundant oil reserves which can continue to be exported through the Kharg terminal and the Strait of Hormuz, can replace its equipment, inter alia by procuring American weapons from Israel or directly from the United States, and has shown that Iraq is unable to break the Iranian national spirit, it seemed at the end of 1983 to be better placed than its enemy.

9. Since then, the situation seems to have shifted slightly in favour of Iraq. The major Iranian offensives in January and February in several sectors of the front in fact brought them only very limited advantages and very heavy losses, particularly in the attacks in the marshy region separating Shatt al' Arab from Basra. In spite of repeated offensives, the Iranians did not manage to cut the main road from Basra to Baghdad. Iraq seems to have managed to make up for its fewer numbers by clear superiority in equipment, military organisation and command and to inflict very heavy losses on the enemy. Figures given by the two sides in this connection are so contradictory that it is impossible for your Rapporteur to give further details. One way or another, losses on both sides now have to be counted in hundreds of thousands.

10. However, from what is known of operations in the early months of 1984, five remarks may be made:

- (i) While the foreign press is allowed no direct contact with the front on the Iranian side, Iraq has allowed many journalists to approach the front and report in detail on what they saw, including the difficulties encountered by the Iraqi counter-offensive in March 1984.
- (ii) According to direct and probably impartial sources, the Iranian offensive at the beginning of March was carried out by very young and inexperienced soldiers including many fourteen-year old children. Iraqi artillery is reported to have massacred these children, who were badly equipped, had little military training but had been turned into fanatics by unscrupulous politico-religious propaganda. Reports by western journalists who personally visited prison camps in Iraq bore out this fact.
- (iii) A number of Iranian wounded who had been very seriously burned were sent to hospitals in the West. The nature of their burns convinced the doctors treating them that they had been caused by chemical substances, particularly yperite and tabun.

The matter is particularly serious since the 1899 Convention of The Hague

bans the use of chemical weapons. Its provisions were renewed in the 1925 Geneva Protocol and have been almost respected since 1935. The use of such weapons would be a very serious setback in the application of the laws of war and in the organisation of international order. Iran has accused the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France of having delivered such weapons to Iraq. All three countries have formally denied doing so. But the production of such weapons seems in no way beyond the capabilities of the Iraqi or Iranian chemical industries and the Iraqi authorities attribute the effects noted by western doctors to an accident in an Iranian chemical factory. Your Rapporteur has no further information to clarify this most important point, but the use of such weapons reveals the bitterness of the fighting.

Your Rapporteur recalls that the stocks of chemical weapons of WEU member countries on the mainland of Europe are subject to verification by the Agency for the Control of Armaments under Article III and Annex II to Protocol No. III and under Article VII, paragraph 1, of Protocol No. IV to the modified Brussels Treaty and suggests that the Assembly question the Council about its conclusions regarding the application of these articles by the signatory countries and the possibility of them being able to supply such weapons to the belligerents. Convinced that none of the WEU member countries has supplied such weapons, he believes the Council should publicly confirm, with the full authority of an international organisation, the declarations of the countries concerned.

- (iv) Although in 1983 Iraq had considerable air superiority, ensuring true mastery of the air, in the first months of 1984 Iran carried out bombing operations on Iraqi towns, thus demonstrating that Iraq's mastery was slipping.
- (v) Iraq has several times threatened to use its air force to destroy the Kharg terminal and in three years of war it has sunk some fifty low-tonnage oil tankers flying the flags of non-belligerent countries in the Gulf. Iran for its part is blocking Iraq's only outlet to the sea and has threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz if the Kharg terminal is destroyed. Execution of this threat seems hardly probable as long as Iran is able to export its oil through this

strait since it would be the first to suffer the consequences. But it cannot be excluded if Iraq manages to halt Iranian exports and it is certain that this question is disturbing for all the Arab oil-exporting countries and all importing countries. It is therefore probable that if Iraq attacks Kharg or Iran attempts to block the Strait of Hormuz it would spread the conflict to the Arab countries around the Gulf. These countries have made a valiant effort in recent years to develop their armies, navies and air forces. They all fear Iranian hegemony in the region and probably the strength they have thus developed has helped to avert, so far, the implementation of these threats. Furthermore, the presence of American, British, French and Soviet warships in the area of the strait shows the importance all attach to maintaining navigation through this essential waterway.

11. At the present time Iran has still not dropped its demand for the removal of the present Iraqi Government as a precondition for peace. Obviously this demand cannot be accepted by the Iraqi régime. However, the purchase of five Super-Etendard aircraft from France with sixty Exocet missiles in autumn 1983 can be seen as an attempt by Iraq to increase its leverage in order to bring about peace as soon as possible. For more than a year Iraq has been calling for peace on the basis of the *status quo ante bello*. Thus, whatever opinion one may have of the respective responsibilities of the two governments at the beginning of the war, it is now quite clear that Iraq wants peace to be restored and it is Iran that is insisting on conditions which are unacceptable for its enemy.

12. Iran's uncompromising attitude is certainly a matter of concern for most Arab countries. Their history has taught them that Iran never considered Zagros to be a natural frontier for its area of influence but that it was rather nostalgic about its former empires which extended to the Mediterranean. Moreover, the repeated declaration by Imam Khomeiny and many other Iranian leaders that their fundamental aim was to "free" Jerusalem should hold the attention of all states in the region, whether Arab or not. The fact that Syria is hostile to Iraq and that Israel is at grips with Arab interests should not prevent them from perceiving the full dangers they would face with an increase in the power of Iran, the most densely-populated country in the region and at the same time the principal hotbed of an ideology the most subversive for peace.

13. Western Europe's reasons for being interested in this matter are not quite the same as for the fighting in Lebanon. There is obviously a fear of internationalisation which would be particularly dangerous as Iran is a neighbour of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The Soviet Union is the main supplier of weapons to the Iraqi army while the United States, after a long crisis in relations with Khomeiny's Iran, has apparently again begun to supply it with weapons.

14. But the Europeans are far more concerned about the oil question. In spite of a considerable drop in western oil supplies from the Middle East due on the one hand to reduced consumption and on the other to increased output in other regions – Africa, the Soviet Union, the North Sea, for instance – more than 12% of the world's oil consumption still comes from the Gulf. The shares produced by Iran and Iraq respectively have admittedly fallen to a very low level because of the war. But most of the output of Bahrein, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates still passes through the Gulf and it is now possible for Iran, which has taken control of the islands scattered in the Strait of Hormuz, to cut off oil shipments through this sole gateway to the Gulf. Any prolonged interruption of supplies would be enough to cause another oil crisis whose effects on the price of oil and on the whole world economy cannot be foreseen.

15. So far, the only measures taken by the West to avert this danger have been to build up the naval forces of countries – mainly the United States, France and the United Kingdom – in the Indian Ocean and the formation of the United States rapid deployment force, which is still far from complete, and the establishment of American bases in the north-west of the Indian Ocean. Perhaps the concentration of these forces in the area of the Strait of Hormuz and the co-operation of the still small naval forces of the Arab countries near the Gulf would be enough to stop any attempt by Iran to block traffic through the Strait. However this may be, the destruction of a few giant tankers in the Gulf would seriously perturb movement and cause severe damage through the resulting water pollution to the cost of the coastal countries.

16. France for its part has gone further than any other country in direct assistance to Iraq. Although one may wonder whether France has not allowed Iraq to incur too heavy a debt and whether the desire to maintain its armaments exports has not led it to take undue risks, it is now clear that support for Iraq has become essential to the stability of the region and to the restoration of peace which is hardly likely to result from an Iranian victory. Moreover, too

many restrictions on western assistance to Iraq would make it wholly dependent on supplies from the Soviet Union which already account for most of its weapons and would help to increase the risk of an internationalisation of the war. However, such assistance should be limited to types of armaments that would not make the fighting even more inhumane and it should exclude anything that might help the belligerents to violate international conventions setting out the rules of warfare.

17. Finally, the risks of Iraq being economically stifled by the closing of Shatt al' Arab seem to be diminishing, on the one hand because of the development of lines of communication linking Aqaba with Iraq through Jordan and, on the other hand, because of the forthcoming completion of the oil pipeline which is to link oilfields in northern Iraq with the Mediterranean across Turkish territory, allowing Iraq to resume its place among the principal Middle East oil exporters.

18. There still remains the possibility that Iraq could succumb to the continuing Iranian offensives. Iranian forces have not, at the time of writing, been dislodged from the marshes close to the Basra-Baghdad highway, despite intense Iraqi efforts to recover this ground, strategically important also for its hitherto unexploited oilfield. Incidentally, the retention of this oilfield by Iran has been suggested as a possible means of satisfying Iran's demands for reparations from Iraq. If Iranian forces were to penetrate Baghdad itself, the régime of Saddam Hussein must be at risk.

19. Alternatively, if superior Iranian resources are not going to be allowed to decide the outcome in the longer term, the explanation would very likely be the collapse of Iran's revolutionary cohesion, which could be the consequence of a power struggle to succeed Khomeiny.

20. These seem the most likely alternative ways to a decisive outcome to the war. It will certainly not be ended by missions or telegrams from anxious or peaceloving outsiders.

III. *The situation in Lebanon*

(a) *The civil war*

21. President Amin Gemayel, who was elected in Beirut in September 1982 at a time when part of the town was occupied by the Israelis and the assassination of his brother, President Bechir Gemayel, had raised the clashes between Lebanese communities to a new level, has not managed to impose his authority on Lebanon

as a whole. Syria was invited to come to the assistance of the Lebanese Government in 1976 but this invitation was withdrawn on 2nd September 1983 by President Gemayel, who then called upon the Arab League to withdraw Syrian and Palestinian troops from Lebanon, while Israel, which had invaded a large area of Lebanese territory in June 1982, withdrew its forces from part of this area to the Awali river. The north and east of the country are still occupied by Syria, while Israel occupies the south.

22. President Gemayel came under strong criticism from most Moslem and some Christian groups in Lebanon. They objected to his privileged relationship with Israel and with the United States and the collusion between the armed forces of the Lebanese state and the Christian Phalangists led by his father, Pierre Gemayel.

23. In these circumstances, the decision by the Israeli Government on 4th September 1983 to evacuate the mountainous Chuf area between Beirut and the River Awali, where Christian and Druze populations are closely intermingled, could but lead to a resumption of the civil war, each of the communities being determined to do its utmost to control the area. Israel and the Lebanese Government signed an accord on 17th May on the evacuation of Lebanese territory, but this accord was not ratified and made the departure of the Israelis dependent on the Syrians leaving too. Whether the United States could ever have persuaded the Syrians to leave Lebanon must remain doubtful. But what is absolutely certain is that the Syrians could never have accepted the 17th May accord – yet its implementation depended on their accepting it. Not only was the United States now demanding conditions for an Israeli withdrawal – namely Syrian withdrawal – whereas previously the United States had called for Israeli withdrawal unconditionally – notably in its support for United Nations Security Council resolutions to that effect. But also the accord would have left Israel with rights in Lebanon – along the frontier, overflight reconnaissance, etc. – which would not have been granted to Syria. The United States asked the Israelis to postpone their evacuation until Lebanese armed forces were able to occupy the area effectively, but to no avail.

24. The result was a month of open warfare between the Druzes and their Syrian allies on the one hand and the Lebanese army and Christian Phalangists on the other, and the military operations brought the Druzes and Syrians to the outskirts of Beirut. The international buffer forces composed of American, British, French and Italian units were under attack several times and the American and

French in particular suffered very serious casualties. The Americans and French have retaliated by shooting or bombing.

25. The attempt by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia at the beginning of October 1983 to convene a Lebanese national reconciliation congress led to the opening of a first meeting in Switzerland at the beginning of November. The refusal by several Lebanese heads of clans to take part had forced several postponements and changes in proposed meeting places and the idea of holding the congress in Lebanon had to be given up. Discussions in the Lebanese national congress were suspended to allow President Gemayel to implement the first decisions which were first to recognise Lebanon as an Arab country, then to insist on the evacuation of Israeli troops, confirm the cease-fire which began in the Chuf and Lebanese mountains on 25th September and, finally, accept the principle of a discussion on reforms to be introduced in Lebanon. Furthermore, most of the leaders other than President Gemayel insisted on the denunciation of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement of 17th May 1983. President Gemayel was finally instructed to consult the countries concerned by the situation in Lebanon in order to examine how to negate this agreement.

26. Certain steps by the clan leaders indicate that in any event several of them do not wish to revert to a state based on the national compromise of 1943. Thus, Mr. Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Druze community and of the Progressive Socialist Party, started to requisition land belonging to Christians in the Chuf, announced on 4th October the creation of a civil administration in that area and appealed to Lebanese soldiers and officers to show insubordination. The massacres perpetrated by all parties during ten years of civil war and quite recently during the occupation of the Chuf by the Druzes can certainly not be expected to end overnight. Many Lebanese have had to leave their homes to take refuge in sectors controlled by their political friends or co-religionists, particularly in certain quarters of Beirut.

27. In any event, it seems most unlikely that Lebanese unity can ever be restored on the basis of the 1943 national compromise. The numerical breakdown of the communities in Lebanon is no longer the same, the Moslems now comprising a majority. If the unity of Lebanon can be restored, it will have to be on new political bases.

28. The negotiations between President Gemayel and the Lebanese heads of clans, who held a second meeting in Lausanne in March 1984 without managing to agree on the bases for a new constitutional organisation of the

country, failed to halt the fighting for any length of time and the civil war is continuing in Lebanon, with alternating periods of calm and crisis, cease-fires which are not fully respected and fighting flaring up here and there. Such fighting is not between Christian and Moslem communities as a whole but often between factions of communities either side, for instance, in March 1984, between Mr. Nihbi Berri's Shiites and Mr. Walid Jumblatt's Druzes. On the Christian side, the Phalangists are encountering strong opposition from other leanings, such as the group led by Mr. Frangié, who is prominent among opponents of the Gemayel family as a result of the assassination of several members of his family.

29. Nevertheless the prospects for peace in Lebanon appear better than for some time. There seems little doubt that the withdrawal of the United States marines amounted to a watershed in Lebanon's history as an independent country. Although presumably motivated by President Reagan's memories of President Carter's débâcle at the hands of the Iranian hostage-takers, it in effect signalled an abandonment of United States support for the privileged Christian position in Lebanon and opened the way to the reassertion of Syrian influence, a realistic attempt to find a national backing for President Gemayel, based on a more up-to-date appreciation of the balance of national forces, backed by appropriate institutional changes, and to the abrogation by President Gemayel of the 17th May accord with Israel, sponsored by the United States but detested by the Moslems.

30. The fact that the Lausanne conference did not produce an agreement is of little long-term significance. Given Lebanese history, with its closely-woven net of internecine wars, rivalries, revenges and betrayals, peace cannot be produced out of a hat, but at least one can now believe that the foundation has been laid.

31. No doubt Israel will try and disturb any positive developments to the north of it. But it has its own difficulties. The Moslems probably expect that the 600,000 Shiites now under Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon will prove most dangerous subjects; no doubt they also hope that a weariness with this residue of its Lebanese adventure will tell with the Israeli public, both these pressures leading, they hope, to a final Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. No doubt there will be "many a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip". Nevertheless, the situation is dangerous. It only needs to be borne in mind that both Israel and Syria are countries on a war footing, and that with the Israelis in southern Lebanon they are only twenty-five miles from Damascus.

(b) Foreign intervention

32. The rivalry between Lebanese clans can certainly not be attributed to foreign intervention, but intervention considerably enhanced the effects of rivalry, not least by helping to provide certain communities with large quantities of very sophisticated weaponry.

33. (i) Until 1982, the main foreign force involved in Lebanese affairs was Palestinian, expelled from the territory which became Israel in 1949 and then from the territories occupied in 1967 and accepted into Lebanon as refugees. The revolt of the Palestinians in Jordan in September 1970 and the ensuing repression of the revolt further increased the number of Palestinians in Lebanon, which they made the PLO centre.

34. Forced to leave Lebanon in 1982 after the Israeli attack, some of them returned. Yasser Arafat, after the split in the PLO in June 1982, had to leave Syria where dissident elements had the upper hand under the protection of the Syrian authorities. He took refuge in Tripoli, in northern Lebanon, where the PLO exercised de facto control. But after a long beleaguerment, the Syrian army took the town in December 1983, and forced Yasser Arafat and his followers to leave. They were evacuated at the last moment by sea on Greek ships escorted by French warships to various Arab countries.

35. (ii) Moreover, the Syrian army controls a large part of Lebanon. It is powerfully equipped, thanks to military assistance from the Soviet Union which provides it with the latest weapons, particularly anti-aircraft missiles. Syria seems to have a twofold aim: first, to prepare an annexation or at least the establishment of permanent control over part or all of Lebanese territory which Syria has always considered to have been unfairly snatched from it after the first world war and, second, to obtain the complete submission of the Palestinian armed forces, perhaps with a view to using them to retrieve the Golan area, occupied by Israel since 1967.

36. Furthermore, Syria sponsored the development of a dissident movement in the PLO and used it to take control of Bekaa in eastern Lebanon and Tripoli in the north-west. With Syrian support, this dissident movement practically eliminated Yasser Arafat's PLO in Lebanon, although he apparently still has the support of other Arab countries and of Palestinians outside the territories controlled by Syria, in particular on the West Bank.

37. (iii) The Israeli army, which had been in the frontier area to the south of the Litani since 1978, reached Beirut in 1982. The evacuation of the Chuf seems to indicate an evolution in

Israeli policy: after trying to restore the unity of Lebanon round a government which was favourable to it, as provided for in the Israeli-Lebanese agreement of 17th May 1983, and having managed to chase the Palestinians out of Lebanon, Israel now seems to have given up the first of these aims and is relying on the division of Lebanon to protect its frontier. Among its reasons for doing so were the relatively heavy losses the Israeli army suffered in Lebanon. Almost 600 deaths have been reported since 1978, most of them in attacks.

38. The Christian forces formerly commanded by Colonel Haddad occupy the zone controlled by Israel and have made it their own area by forcing out the Moslem and Druze elements, thus helping to convince the latter that there was collusion between Israel and the Lebanese Christians to expel the other communities and bring about, if not annexation by Israel, at least the creation of a small state closely controlled by Israel, whose rôle would be to create a buffer zone between the Israeli frontier and Moslem territories. This would also allow Israel to control part of the waters of the Druze Djebel and use them to irrigate its own territory.

39. (iv) Although most Arab countries still consider the unity of Lebanon to be desirable for the restoration of peace in the Middle East, they hardly have the means to carry this into effect, with the possible exception of Syria.

40. (v) Although the United Nations force in southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been unable to play its rôle since 1982 because of the limits imposed on it, this is not true for the multinational buffer force which first came to protect the refugee camps, and was to a certain extent effective in preventing inter-community clashes from getting out of hand in the town of Beirut after the civil war flared up again in September 1983 before the Lebanese army was strong enough to take over. The very fact that it was the target of Syrian and Druze shooting and perhaps also of other elements shows that its political rôle was not scorned by the belligerents.

41. However, this involvement of the buffer force has led the governments concerned to re-examine the true task of the force. At the outset, it was simply a matter of keeping the various factions apart, at the request of the legitimate Lebanese Government, but implying no intervention in Lebanese policy or possible fighting (at least as far as the European elements were concerned). When the force was attacked and bombed, the question then arose as to whether it would retaliate, remain without reacting in positions which were liable to become impossible to hold, or be evacuated.

The countries concerned were not absolutely unanimous about the choice to be made.

42. The British and Italian units remained on the spot without reacting to attacks which, admittedly, mainly affected the French and American contingents. The question of evacuation was raised in Italy. Conversely, France and the United States had sent large naval forces, including aircraft-carriers. They reacted when attacks were perpetrated against the buffer force, the Americans with artillery and bombing and the French with an air attack on a Syrian artillery battery.

43. However, France and the United States do not appear to have had the same view of their rôle insofar as the United States, which equipped the Lebanese army, seemed to envisage the restoration of Lebanese unity not only round President Gemayel to whom it supplied strong political and military assistance but also on the basis of an accord with Israel, whereas France was far more reserved about the possible political aspect of restoring Lebanese unity and did not wish to appear to be supporting any particular party.

44. In the night of 22nd to 23rd October 1983, there were two extremely serious attacks which destroyed the buildings housing the United States and French forces in Beirut. There were 230 American and 58 French victims. These attacks were carried out with lorries loaded with explosives which were crashed into the buildings. Responsibility was claimed by an Islamic Jihad group about which few details are known, but the powerful means implemented seemed to indicate that it had the backing of a state seeking to whip up public opinion in the two countries contributing most troops to the buffer force against maintaining a contingent in Lebanon.

45. These attacks certainly influenced the decision taken by the governments of countries taking part in the multinational buffer force at the beginning of 1984 to withdraw their contingents from Lebanon. But the real reason for withdrawal is to be found in developments in Lebanon itself. The buffer force had been set up in September 1982 after the massacre of Palestinians by Lebanese Christians in sectors of Beirut then occupied by the Israeli army.

46. Since then, both the PLO and the Israeli army having left Beirut, the force was no longer a buffer between foreign forces on Lebanese territory but between Lebanese factions. As long as all the Lebanese factions accepted and were even pleased about the presence of this force, its maintenance was justified. This was no longer so from the moment certain Lebanese groups no longer wanted it, as shown in the October 1983 attacks.

47. It was then no longer a matter of being a buffer between foreign forces in Lebanon but of intervening in internal Lebanese affairs. In view of the failure of the Lausanne negotiations between the Lebanese parties, the presence of the buffer force in Beirut was no longer justified and Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States withdrew their contingents in February 1984 and France at the end of March only, probably to indicate that its position did not coincide with that of the United States.

48. (vi) One may wonder to what extent the Soviet Union has refrained from direct intervention in the fighting, since some of the missiles used by the Syrian army or by its Druze or Shiite protégés were in the hands of Soviet experts. It has, in any event, delivered arms to Syria and has replaced the missiles destroyed by the Israelis in the Bekaa Valley. The new missiles have been deployed on Syrian territory in order to be less provocative to the Israelis. The Soviet Union has at least 6,000 "military advisers" in Syria, thus ensuring control over Syria's use of the weapons it has supplied. It also protested at the American and French retaliation to attacks on the buffer force, but it seems anxious not to become too deeply involved in a matter beyond its control. It is still impossible to know whether the Soviet Union played a part in these attacks but it did not condemn the one on 23rd October and its presence was felt increasingly in the conflict.

49. The internationalisation of the Lebanese conflict has therefore become a fact which no longer concerns only neighbouring countries but in which European countries and the two great powers narrowly missed becoming involved. If the withdrawal of the buffer force could be an opportunity of agreeing with the Soviet Union to leave the Lebanese to settle their own affairs, it would probably be a worthwhile guarantee against the possible consequences of the Lebanese crisis for the rest of the world. It might also be strong encouragement to the Lebanese parties to make the mutual concessions necessary for a return to civil peace on the basis of a new constitutional organisation of the country.

(c) Lebanon and European security

50. The importance Western Europe attaches to restoring peace in Lebanon is evident, as is testified by the fact that at the 1983 economic and political juncture three Western European countries, without any national objective, maintained contingents in Lebanon for more than eighteen months and supported them in face of strongly-armed opponents merely to form a buffer between the combatants.

51. (i) First and foremost it is a matter of preventing continued fighting in Lebanon from bringing the two great powers into direct confrontation, first in that country and then in the rest of the world. The very special nature of the Lebanese civil war signifies that no solution can be found by a compromise between the two great powers, whereas they both might leave Lebanese affairs alone if they were sure that lasting peace could be restored in the country. In this case, it is quite obviously a local conflict whose duration has led to the direct or indirect intervention of the United States and the Soviet Union, and not a local form of a worldwide conflict.

52. (ii) Nor does Western Europe have any interest in the further continuation in Lebanon or elsewhere of a regional conflict which in this instance has been smouldering for thirty-six years and which is always liable to flare up, provoking more widespread hostilities which might cut off the West's oil supply lines, as was the case in 1956 and 1973.

53. (iii) For historic reasons, the West is committed to ensuring acceptable living conditions for Christian minorities in the East. As far back as 1860, fighting between Druzes and Maronites was at the origin of a conflict between France and Turkey. Today, too, the disappearance of the Christian minorities from the Levant in an Arab-Islamic world in the grip of a fundamentalist revival would be difficult for certain sections of western public opinion to accept since it would appear to be a renunciation of the values upheld for two centuries.

54. This is in no way a call for some kind of crusade as Mr. Jumblatt claimed in an attack on Lebanese Christians, the United States and France. On the contrary, your Rapporteur feels the western countries should confine themselves to the application of a few principles:

- (i) to spare innocent human lives constantly threatened by the relentless nature of the fighting;
- (ii) not to intervene in Lebanon's internal affairs, i.e. to leave it to the Lebanese themselves to decide what type of institutions should govern the restoration of peace in their country;
- (iii) to obtain the total evacuation of the country by all foreign armed forces and the full restoration of its sovereignty, which should be facilitated by the withdrawal of the PLO's armed forces. Moreover, it should be recalled that United Nations Resolutions 508 and 509 advocating this were voted for by the United States, the Soviet Union and its allies and all the Western European countries;

(iv) to consider that peace in Lebanon can be assured only with the agreement of the countries in the area and consequently with the establishment of peace throughout the Middle East on a sufficiently fair basis to inspire confidence that it will be lasting. This implies the re-establishment of fair peace between Israel and its neighbours and your Rapporteur considers that this can be achieved only through the application of the principles set out in Security Council Resolution 242. This is in any event what the General Affairs Committee has resolutely upheld since 1967.

55. For the immediate future, application of these principles implies:

- (i) seeking a negotiated agreement between Lebanese groups with a view to drawing up a national pact based on new bases which take account of the demographic trend in Lebanon since the 1943 compromise;
- (ii) continuing to refuse to intervene in Lebanese internal affairs and insisting on the withdrawal of remaining foreign forces;
- (iii) reaching agreement between all the Western European countries on the aims and the means which those countries might employ to achieve them;
- (iv) concerting the views of these countries and of the United States in order to encourage the latter to respect the same principles.

IV. *Palestine*

56. Although the Lebanese conflict has become international and is liable to worsen and spread not only to neighbouring countries but even to the great powers, it is evident that no lasting solution can be found as long as the Palestine question has not been solved. Some four million Palestinians are in fact now scattered throughout the Arab world. The map on page 74 of the brief on European security and the Middle East prepared by your Rapporteur in December 1982 showed their location at that time. They are still a factor of instability for the weaker states among those in which they are living and an instrument for action by others such as Libya and Syria.

57. Syria's attempt in 1983 to take control of the Palestinian organisations, first on its own territory and then in Lebanon, to the detriment

of the PLO which it tried to take over, although managing only to split the factions under close Syrian control and the independent PLO run by Yasser Arafat, gave that country possibilities of action, particularly terrorist action, throughout the world, but above all in Arab countries, to an extent still difficult to assess.

58. What has so far ensured the PLO's independence of any country in the region is that it represents, as validly as possible, the Arab people of Palestine both in the area which forms the territory of Israel and in the territories occupied by the Israelis since 1967. Admittedly, in 1950 the Palestinian territory which had remained Arab was incorporated in Jordan and its population is still represented in the Jordanian parliament where it has half the members. However, as King Hussein recalled on 16th January 1984 when opening the new session of the Jordanian parliament which had not met for ten years, the act of April 1950 which consecrated the uniting of the two banks of the Jordan proclaimed as its aim the preservation of Arab rights in Palestine and did not prejudice the eventual settlement of the Palestinian question. But in the same speech King Hussein said he intended to pursue a dialogue with the PLO with a view to finding means of practical co-operation with the Palestinian central body "Legitimate and Free Liberation Organisation".

59. This clearly meant that Jordan, while recognising its responsibility towards the West Bank where, in spite of everything, it still exercises certain sovereign rights, including paying the salaries of civil servants, refrained from acting without the agreement of the PLO but rejected the dissident Palestinian organisation sponsored by Syria and that it aimed at reaching agreement with Mr. Yasser Arafat on a future Jordano-Palestinian confederation of two independent states which is in a way already foreshadowed by the composition of the Jordanian parliament. Since about 60% of the present population of Jordan, excluding the West Bank, is of Palestinian origin, such a confederation should not encounter opposition from the population of the two territories.

60. In fact, in February 1984, Mr. Yasser Arafat was able to review the PLO troops incorporated in the Jordanian army and speak to them in the presence of Jordanian military authorities, just as he was able to meet West Bank representatives to the Jordanian parliament at the royal palace in Amman. However, Yasser Arafat, from the PLO headquarters in Tunis, is apparently making agreement with Jordan subject to a joint policy towards Israel and to the prior settlement of three questions: the status of Palestinians living in Jordan, granting the PLO the right to station armed

forces in Jordan and reactivation of the Jordanian parliament, which was done in January 1984.

61. These are highly delicate problems since experience of the uprising in September 1970 and the subsequent Lebanese crisis must make Jordan fear the reconstitution of a true PLO state in the Jordanian state. However, the weakening of the PLO by Syria certainly makes it no easier for it to lay down the law in Jordan, while Jordan, which has good reason to fear further expulsions of Arab populations by Israel with the serious consequences that would ensue for its economy and internal balance, needs to be on good terms with the PLO in order, one way or another, to achieve a settlement with Israel. As Crown Prince Hassan Bin Talal recently said, without the support of the Palestinians themselves, Jordan could take no realistic steps towards peace. He said 1984 would be decisive since the situation in the occupied territories continued to develop alarmingly.

62. Now even more than in the past, it seems clear that peace cannot be restored in the Middle East solely through agreements between Israel and the neighbouring countries but also by guaranteeing Palestinians their right to a homeland and self-determination, at the same time of course guaranteeing Israel secure and recognised frontiers. Israel's illegal occupation of the West Bank since 1967 has prevented the restoration of any such peace. It is to be hoped however that the government to be formed after the forthcoming elections in Israel will show greater understanding in the light of its composition and the serious internal problems it has to solve. The first measure one is entitled to expect is that settlements on the West Bank will be terminated.

63. These settlements, which multiplied under Mr. Begin's government and continued under Mr. Shamir's government, constitute hardly implicit threats to annex the West Bank and expulse the Arab section of the population which remained in that area. For instance, there have been large-scale displacements of Arab populations within the territories controlled by Israel, thus helping to uproot them and, according to Jordanian observers, to prepare for their expulsion.

64. The very nature of the state of Israel in fact precludes acceptance of long-term cohabitation between a native Moslem and Arab population and an immigrant Jewish population. Jewish immigration in Israel now accounts for only a small proportion of a population whose rate of natural reproduction is very low, like that of the population of most industrialised countries. Conversely, the Arab population continues to have a very high birth rate, which

means that in two decades it would be in the majority in a state of Israel to which the West Bank would be annexed. This in itself no doubt amounts to a discouragement to Israel to annex the West Bank formally. At the same time it adds further credibility to Jordanian fears that Israel may seek an early opportunity to provoke a mass exodus of West Bank Palestinians into Jordan.

65. It should also be recalled that the Palestinians are playing an increasingly important part in the public life of many Arab countries and consequently, the influence of the Palestinians remains strong in the Arab world. Any policy which sought to separate the Arab countries from the Palestinian cause would therefore have little future.

66. But the policy followed by the Israeli Government on the West Bank and in Gaza and heralded by various plans soon to be introduced in these territories seems to indicate that Israel wishes to incorporate them progressively as it has already done in the case of the city of Jerusalem and a large area of the surrounding West Bank. It is clear that the present political crisis in Israel makes it impossible to anticipate what will actually become of these colonisation programmes aimed at annexation, particularly the Ben Porat plan, following the legislative elections to be held on 23rd July 1984. But it is to be feared that the probably forced inactivity of the United States in the Middle East in an electoral year will be used by Israel to achieve its goals without delay, bearing in mind the very clear opposition shown by President Reagan's administration to the settlement of Israeli colonies on the West Bank. This opposition did not halt Israel but its government would probably prefer to act at a time when the United States is not eager to react. Nor is it certain that if a different majority were elected in Israel it would be willing to stop these settlements.

67. It is clear that the annexation of territories occupied since 1967 would make peace in the Middle East impossible, compromise the Camp David agreements between Israel and Egypt and, within the PLO and all Arab countries prepared to negotiate with Israel, bolster the most intransigent elements which are the most strongly opposed to any negotiated solution.

68. Conversely, agreement between the PLO and Jordan might considerably assist the search for such a solution because it would help to solve the prior condition which has prevented negotiations since 1967, i.e. recognition of the PLO by Israel and of Israel's right to exist by the Arab countries. From the moment the negotiations can tackle the root of the problem, i.e. Israel's security, the Camp David precedent

shows that realistic solutions might be envisaged.

69. However, it would be difficult to open such negotiations without the intervention of a third power which was not disqualified out of hand by Arab public opinion because of its relations with certain countries in the region. Members of the General Affairs Committee who visited Jordan in March 1984 were able to see that in this respect the position of the United States in the area was no longer the same as when it sponsored the Camp David agreements. The way it allowed Israel to shrug off its advice in the matter of the settlements on the West Bank without this resulting in a deterioration of relations between Israel and the United States, its opposition in March 1984 to the delivery of American weapons, particularly anti-aircraft weapons, to Saudi Arabia and Jordan and the ambiguities of American policy in Lebanon add up to a loss of confidence in the Middle East. A new wave of anti-Americanism has emerged in recent months.

70. Furthermore, the Soviet Union, which openly supports Syria and Libya and probably indirectly supplies arms to Iran through the intermediary of those two countries, is still suspected by many Arab countries of fanning the flames of present conflicts. Again, its hostility to Israel is too open for it to obtain a hearing there. Conversely, the Western European countries seem to enjoy a privileged position at present, although everyone is aware that their military resources are limited and their views far from unified.

71. In this connection it is to be regretted that internal European Community preoccupations should have prevented the heads of state and of government and the ministers for foreign affairs from tackling, as planned, the part of the agenda of their meetings relating to the preparation of a joint position on the Middle East. The difficulties of the multinational force in Lebanon, the various views held by the different parties on the local situation and Europe's means of taking action there, memories of the Venice declaration which remained without effect, not to speak of the concern not to split away from the United States, would in any event certainly not make it easy for the Ten to agree on this item.

72. It is nevertheless clear to your Rapporteur that European action would now be useful for those Arab forces which want a negotiated settlement with Israel, particularly as it would not show opposition between Europe and the United States but encourage the Americans not to view Middle East problems solely from the standpoint of East-West confrontation but to take greater account of the local situation, particularly the fate of the populations. Separ-

ated from the United States, Europe would in fact carry no weight. It is therefore by the content of its message, the moderation and realism of its language and the reminder that the problems of the region are interdependent that Europe can and must play a rôle and encourage the opening of negotiations between Israel and its moderate Arab neighbours without placing the latter before an impossible choice between restoring peace and abandoning the cause of the Palestinians, still represented by Yasser Arafat's PLO, which would probably in the long run result in the victory of the most subversive forces throughout the Arab world.

73. To sum up then, the Jordanian Government is trying to reach an agreement with Arafat on a solution to the Palestinian problem, based on a confederation of two apparently independent states, the Palestinian state to be situated on the West Bank and in Gaza. However, such plans can get nowhere unless Israel will negotiate, which it will not, at least in present circumstances, or unless they can be pressed by war which, again at least at present, the Arab countries are in no position to pursue. Moreover, Jordan feels at a great disadvantage. It finds itself quite unsupported by the United States, which explains King Hussein's recent and much resented interview with the New York Times in which he scathingly attacked the United States. It fears that Israel may feel less restrained than ever during a United States presidential election year, and may consider it has a unique opportunity to further consolidate its hold on the West Bank, and by implementing the abovementioned Ben Porat plan of relocating Palestinian refugees on the West Bank along the Jordan River to prepare a mass expulsion of Palestinians into Jordan.

74. At the same time the future of Arafat is far from secure. No one knows whether he would now secure a mandate for his policies from the Palestine National Council. The radicals much resent his visit to Cairo and his dialogue with Jordan. On the other hand, he enjoys overwhelming support on the West Bank, where the Palestinians see all other possibilities slipping away. This is shown by recent opinion polls conducted by the Jerusalem Post. Moreover, the Soviet Union has evidently tried to restrain Syria's opposition to Arafat.

75. For the time being the question remains unresolved and the Palestine National Council has not met. A further complication must be remembered: the West Bank members of the PNC, who form a large minority and who can be assumed to be Arafat supporters, are dependent on Israeli compliance for their ability to attend any meeting that may be called.

76. On the other hand, there are dangers in the present vacuum. The loss of credit sustained

by the United States for the débâcle of its Lebanese policy has had repercussions elsewhere. For one thing it has emboldened Syria and other countries to put pressure on President Mubarak to abrogate the Camp David accord. Moreover, radical extremists everywhere are given a chance to recoup their losses in Lebanon and become active again on the terrorist front. A new wave of Arab terrorism must seriously be feared.

V. Conclusions

77. The principal conclusion drawn by your Rapporteur from his visit to the Middle East in March 1984 concerns the close link between all the problems of the region, at one and the same time divided because of its heterogeneous populations and united because of the existence and increasingly strong affirmation of movements which cross the frontiers of existing states. The widespread intermingling of the populations in Palestine and neighbouring countries and then, with the development of oil, the nearby Gulf states add to these transnational movements and the fundamentalist tendencies which are emerging within all communities, be they Christian, Jewish, Shiite or Sunnite. The most important of these, and probably the most threatening, is no doubt Islamic fundamentalism directed against anything coming from Europe, including Soviet communism, Zionism and American civilisation. It is liable to sweep through the states and moderate régimes of the region and lead to extremely serious clashes. The present war between Iran and Iraq gives an idea of the degree of bitterness they can attain.

78. A division of the region into areas of influence for the two great powers would probably bring no solution to Middle East problems but would, as the present situation already suggests, radicalise hostilities, provide arms for the belligerents and heighten the dangers of internationalisation. That is why Europe, if it manages to co-ordinate its action, for instance in arms supplies, can still, in spite of the scepticism which may have been caused by its recent setbacks, particularly in Lebanon, play a rôle in the region, not by force of arms but by the disinterested nature of its statements. At present, these can but advocate:

- (i) the re-establishment of peace between Iraq and Iran on the basis of the *status quo ante*;
- (ii) the restoration of the Lebanese state, once the whole country has been evacuated by all foreign powers, on a constitutional basis previously agreed by all factions in the country;

(iii) application of United Nations Resolution 242 on Palestine, thanks to the opening of negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries prepared to

find a compromise solution guaranteeing the security of Israel and self-determination for the Palestinians.

Situation in the Middle East and European security

AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 4¹

tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

1. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph *(ix)* and insert :
“Paying tribute to the peacekeeping task accomplished by units of the multinational buffer force and deploring the heavy losses suffered by two of these units ;”.
2. In the first sub-paragraph of paragraph *(xi)* of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “and the PLO”.
3. Leave out the second sub-paragraph of paragraph *(xi)* of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :
“- recognition by Israel of the right of the Palestinian people to their own national homeland ;”.
4. Leave out sub-paragraph 4 *(a)* of the draft recommendation proper and insert :
“(a) recall that peace on the territory of former Palestine depends, on the one hand, on all Arab countries recognising Israel and its rights and, on the other hand, on Israel recognising the fact that the Palestinian people have the right to their own national homeland ;”.

Signed : Cavaliere

1. See 2nd sitting, 19th June 1984 (amendment I agreed to ; amendments 2, 3 and 4 negatived).

Situation in the Middle East and European security

AMENDMENT 5¹

tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt

5. In sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out :
“and warn that country that there must be no further expulsion of Arab populations from these territories.”

Signed : Dreyfus-Schmidt

1. See 2nd sitting, 19th June 1984 (amendment negatived).

Situation in the Middle East and European security

AMENDMENT 6¹

tabled by Mr. Jung

6. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph 4 (b).

Signed : Jung

1. See 2nd sitting, 19th June 1984 (amendment negated).

*Political implications of European security in 1984 –
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council*

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Mr. Thoss, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on the political implications of European security in 1984 – reply to the
twenty-ninth annual report of the Council

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Thoss, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. Threats to European security
- III. The West's uncertainties
- IV. WEU in 1984
- V. The twenty-ninth annual report of the Council
- VI. Conclusions

1. Adopted in committee by 12 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy, van der Werff (Alternate: Blaauw) (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier, Bianco, Bogaerts, Caro, Hill, Lagneau, Lagorce, Lord McNair, MM. Martino, Masciadri, Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spitella (Alternate: Amadei), Thoss, Vecchiotti, Vogt, de Vries.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

*on the political implications of European security in 1984 –
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the difficulties in defence policy, not only in Europe but throughout the western world;
- (ii) Aware also of the fact that in the medium and long term the only way to end the unbridled armaments race and the division of Europe is to find firm answers to the many political, social, economic and strategic questions of our era;
- (iii) Emphasising that in present circumstances a conflict between the two blocs might lead to the near-total destruction of Europe;
- (iv) Aware of the overriding need for:
 - a balanced, general, effective and verified disarmament policy;
 - political control of armaments and more particularly of recourse to nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces;
 - the meaningful pursuit of East-West disarmament negotiations in spite of the difficulties and setbacks in recent months;
 - political, economic and social co-operation between East and West in the spirit of the Helsinki final act;
- (v) Therefore underlining:
 - the growing importance of WEU for the security of Western Europe;
 - the need for the European members of NATO to assume greater weight but also greater defence responsibilities vis-à-vis their North American partners, while maintaining close co-operation with them;
- (vi) Welcoming the fact that the Council is examining the structural and operational changes to be made in WEU to allow it better to fulfil the rôle assigned to it under the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (vii) Considering that recent developments in Europe and in transatlantic and international relations make this an appropriate time for such an examination;
- (viii) Considering that the way the Council now operates does not allow it to give continuous political impetus to the organisation;
- (ix) Welcoming the Italian proposal to hold a meeting of ministers of defence of the WEU member countries in Rome in October 1984 and hoping this meeting will lead to decisions likely to promote a European armaments policy;
- (x) Regretting that the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council does not refer to the problems raised by the reorganisation of WEU and that the Assembly is systematically left without knowledge of the Council's activities on this essential matter,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Be guided at all times by the preceding considerations and general principles, particularly in the necessary reactivation of WEU;
2. Examine attentively the conditions in which better use might be made of WEU in the coming decades to achieve in particular:
 - (i) a permanent representation of member countries on the Council so that it may take more effective action;
 - (ii) more frequent meetings, particularly at ministerial level and the continuation, after the Rome meeting, of regular meetings of ministers of defence in the framework of WEU, *inter alia* so as to give steady encouragement to the European armaments policy;
 - (iii) a regrouping of the various WEU organs;

-
- (iv) an adaptation of the Secretariat-General to the organisation's new requirements;
 - (v) an agenda for its meetings allowing consultations on all matters relating to the security of Western Europe and the definition of a collegial European position prior to each meeting of the North Atlantic Council;
 - (vi) a possible enlargement of Western European Union;
 - (vii) co-operation between the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Independent European Programme Group without jeopardising the other tasks of the SAC, in view of the fact that paragraph 10 of the statute of the SAC specifies that agreements or arrangements concluded in the framework of that body remain open to participation by other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation;
 - (viii) an assessment of the consequences for the Agency for the Control of Armaments of cancelling Annex III to Protocol No. III and possible modifications to Annex IV;
 - (ix) a definition of Europe's present requirements in the control of armaments and the adaptation of the Agency for the Control of Armaments to a different rôle;
 - (x) the possible use of the competence acquired by the Agency for the Control of Armaments for the benefit of representations of member countries at international conferences on disarmament or the limitation of armaments and for more general research on the level of world armaments;
 - (xi) the provision of financial means for the Assembly allowing it better to carry out its rôle;
3. Keep the Assembly properly informed about the stage reached in its discussions on all matters relating to the future of WEU and in any event report on them either in its next annual report or in a supplementary report to be submitted to the Assembly on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of WEU.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Thoss, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The thirty-eight years since 1945 without armed conflict constitute the longest period of peace in the history of the European continent.

2. A peace, however, which has allowed Eastern Europe to be separated from Western Europe and the political gap between the two parts of our continent to become wider. At the present time it still offers little hope of a swing towards more liberal régimes and an end to Soviet domination of the Eastern European countries. The human problem stemming from the division of the German nation into two states is still acute, in spite of the efforts of the Federal Republic to establish a pragmatic dialogue between the two German states.

3. Still more serious is the fact that the degree of détente evident in East-West relations after the death of Stalin in 1953 has been seriously jeopardised by Soviet rearmament, non-application of the principles defined in the Helsinki final act of 1975, the build-up and improvement of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union's refusal to allow the Eastern European countries to glean a little more independence, as evidenced by the situation in Poland since 1981, and the increase in local conflicts outside Europe, where the great powers have to a varying extent been involved.

4. Moreover, threats of war in Europe which one might have hoped had gone forever, are again emerging and there are now widespread doubts about the effectiveness of a mainly nuclear deterrent. The improvement, diversification, increase and miniaturisation of nuclear weapons on both sides encourage military leaders to give closer consideration to the possibility of hostilities in which such weapons might be used without necessarily resulting in the almost total destruction of the world.

5. Their accuracy, like that of new conventional weapons, allows speculation about the possibility of disarming an enemy by the preventive destruction of his nuclear arsenal. Hence, while nuclear war might have seemed unthinkable a few years ago, recourse to nuclear weapons as a means of combat is gaining a place in strategic thinking and consequently is no longer playing the purely deterrent rôle which it had for so long.

6. The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is also diminished by the very understandable tendency of Americans to look for strategies destined to postpone for as long as possible the

use of tactical nuclear weapons thanks to the use of ultramodern conventional weapons capable of containing any conventional attack. This is the aim of the Rogers doctrine already adopted by the United States general staff and based on technology available only to the United States but which it would naturally be quite prepared to sell to its European partners.

7. There is little need to emphasise the gravity of this evolution since, on the one hand, particularly in view of the very high level of urbanisation in Europe, a purely conventional war might cause a still greater disaster than the second world war and, on the other, the risk of it degenerating into a nuclear war cannot even be ignored.

8. Again, whether one likes it or not, the security system set up by the West since 1949 has been called in question by developments in armaments. It no longer provides the same type or the same degree of guarantee of the maintenance of peace that it did hitherto.

9. This is probably one explanation and to a great extent one justification for the considerable spread of pacifist, or in any event anti-nuclear movements which have emerged in most European countries in the last five years and whose opposition has been centred on the deployment of American Pershing II or cruise missiles in most European countries directly concerned by this deployment.

10. As noted in several reports adopted by the Assembly, including Mr. Mommersteeg's report on the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe (Document 918) submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Mr. Lagorce's report on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism (Document 934) submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, the spread of pacifist movements in Western Europe, whose legitimacy and spontaneity were not in doubt is closely linked with the prospect of the deployment of new American missiles with nuclear warheads in several Western European countries and more general uneasiness perhaps stemming from the fact that less confidence is now placed in the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. The spontaneity and legitimacy of these pacifist movements had moreover already been rightly underlined in the report submitted by Mr. Page and Mr. Dejardin on the analysis and evaluation of action taken on Assembly Recommendations 383 on the problems of nuclear weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for European

security arising from pacifism and neutralism (Document 943) on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

11. Nor is there any doubt that there is a connection between the fear and mistrust expressed by currents of public opinion, on differing scales, certainly, but nevertheless real, in the two German states due to the fact that they would be the first and most severely affected by a nuclear holocaust in Europe, whereas this would not be the case, in Western Europe, of France, Italy or the United Kingdom. However, it is true that this connection is less real at the level of public authorities in the two German states as long as the GDR continues unreservedly to endorse Soviet strategy and bans any public expression of opinion whose importance cannot therefore be assessed and which remains without influence on the policy of the country.

12. Last but not least, it is evident that the disturbing rise in unemployment, particularly among the younger generations, and the resulting absence of firm prospects for the future are not likely to put an end to this undeniable uneasiness. In this connection, it should be recalled that at the end of September 1983 OECD experts forecast that there would be about 35 million unemployed in 1984 in the twenty-four industrialised western countries as a whole, i.e. an increase of 5 million as compared with 1982. This increase moreover will be reflected mainly in Western European statistics.

13. There would be no point in turning a blind eye to these facts, and the WEU Assembly has had the merit of tackling them head-on, whatever opinion one may have about the political and military conclusions it has drawn.

14. This trend in the concept of deterrence, with all its possible effects on the will of the European or American nations to pursue the task undertaken in 1949 by the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty, cannot and in any event must not be glossed over by organisations which claim to ensure the security of Western Europe. It has certainly not been overlooked by our governments, and the concern to which it has given rise can be discerned in North Atlantic Council communiqués in the last ten years. There are still more signs of this concern in addresses by representatives of several of our governments to the Assembly in recent years, particularly the Federal German and French Governments since 1980.

15. The purpose of the present report is to try to examine the possible consequences of the weakening of the traditional notion of nuclear deterrence and the emergence of new reactions among European public opinion about Western

Europe's security and, more particularly, what indications it can provide for the course WEU should follow in the coming years in every area of its activities.

16. Everyone knows that, as from the year 2004, any countries wishing to do so will have the right to denounce their adherence to the modified Brussels Treaty, although nothing at the present juncture indicates that any signatory country intends to make use of this right. However, it seems that some countries are considering giving the European Communities and their parliamentary assembly, in the defence sphere, perhaps not responsibilities but at least a course to follow and activities with regard to Europe's security. They wish, in 2004 in any event and perhaps even before that date, the Communities to extend their action in the sector which has so far belonged to WEU.

17. It is also known that these views, largely endorsed by the Colombo-Genscher proposal in 1982, have met with strong opposition, particularly from the United Kingdom and France which, for reasons connected with the type and means of their defence policies, seem opposed to giving defence-related responsibilities to Community bodies. Furthermore, Ireland's accession to a European security system seems most doubtful as long as the question of Ulster has not been solved in a manner it considers acceptable, Denmark's accession is not very likely at the present juncture and it is also hardly probable that Greece's partners would be prepared to accept it in such a system as long as its differences with Turkey have not been settled. It therefore seems very problematical to envisage organising European security in the ten-power framework, at least for quite some time to come.

18. As noted in 1981 in Mr. De Poi's report on European union and WEU (Document 894), WEU has a number of trump cards of its own which no other organisation will have unless the responsibilities conferred on WEU under the modified Brussels Treaty are officially transferred to it. Not only has this situation not changed since, but some of those who formerly called for the de facto transfer of WEU's activities to the Ten today recognise that the major part of the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly its Article V, is, now as in the past, one of the principal bases of European security. They would be reluctant for it to be deprived of content if similar guarantees could not be given to Western Europe through other instruments.

19. This is the case in particular of the Belgian Minister for External Relations, Mr. Léo Tindemans, who, writing in *Le Monde* on 23rd December 1983, said:

"I think that reflection among our governments on strategic concepts and certain

forms of co-operation in defence matters is today possible and desirable. Not everyone in the Community shares this opinion. We cannot therefore use the framework for political co-operation which is the natural extension of the Community. This leaves WEU, a long-standing organisation whose structures and possibilities are largely unused. I personally see no reason why we should not try to develop a form of co-operation in politico-military matters in WEU, provided the organisation itself is open to all the members of the Community that accept its rules.

Such a trend would, at least provisionally, introduce a 'differentiated' notion of Europe in the security field, similar to the one which the European monetary system has established in the monetary field. This notion obviously involves dangers for overall cohesion. But provided it excludes only countries which exclude themselves and provided a serious effort is made in practice to bring the various structures as close together as possible it seems to me that there is the least harm in this course.

Europe can no longer allow itself to miss any opportunity whatsoever on the pretext that it is not quite what the most demanding of us might wish."

20. However, this does not yet mean that WEU in its present form is able to continue to play that rôle, not just after 2004 but even today, if certain aspects of its activities are not reviewed with a view to adapting them to the new requirements of the international situation and of western security.

21. The question of adapting WEU's activities to new circumstances has already been raised in the Assembly's replies to the annual reports of the Council for 1981 (reports submitted by Mr. Prussen on the application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council, Document 908, on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and by Mr. Vecchiotti on the political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council, Document 913, on behalf of the General Affairs Committee) and for 1982 (report submitted by Mr. Ahrens on the political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council, Document 944, on behalf of the General Affairs Committee and the report submitted again by Mr. Prussen on the application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council, Document 948).

22. However, the very nature of these reports, being closely linked with the activities of the

Council, together with the reluctance constantly shown by the Council – but not by all its members – since the outset to go to the root of the problems and openly discuss its duties have not allowed the problem to be broached in full for quite a long time. This is what your Rapporteur will try to do in this report.

23. It is gratifying that the WEU Council for its part at last undertook to tackle this question in 1983 and it is to be regretted that the Assembly has not been better informed of this action which would probably have allowed it to form a more considered opinion about the questions under discussion. Nevertheless, what your Rapporteur has learned about the preoccupations of certain governments, particularly the views of the French Government as presented to the Assembly by the Defence Minister, Mr. Charles Hernu, in December 1983, and from certain articles in the European press in the first weeks of 1984, gives some guidance in this respect and allows him to hope that his approach runs parallel to that of the Council and can thus provide the Assembly with an opportunity of usefully expressing its opinion. He is comforted in this hope by the statements made by the ministers concerned in most the member countries in February and March 1984.

II. Threats to European security

24. When the Paris Agreements modifying the Brussels Treaty were negotiated in 1954, there was perhaps only one real threat to the continent of Europe: the Soviet Union's military strength, in terms of numbers of armed forces and conventional weapons. Consequently, it was essential that the rivalries between European nations up to the second world war be overcome so that their armed forces might be linked to ensure their common security and thus make the most of the ultimate guarantee afforded by the Atlantic Alliance and American nuclear strength.

25. The kind of threat which Europe might have to face has since changed considerably. The development of the Atlantic Alliance and the continuous presence of American forces on the European continent have made Soviet leaders understand that they could not hope to disrupt the independence of the Western European countries without the risk of unleashing a world war in which it might be difficult to avoid using nuclear weapons. In other words, the West's system of deterrence has played its part. However, the increase in Soviet nuclear strength led at the same time to the establishment of a balance which allowed the Soviet Union to impose its domination firmly on the eastern part of Europe.

26. Thus Europe as a whole was caught in a division inflicted upon it without any possibility of evading the consequences of a confrontation between the two blocs, of which both sides are part and parcel whether they like it or not, and any attempts so far to change the situation by tipping the balance in favour of one or other of the two blocs have failed.

27. The Soviet Union has admittedly had to face a number of difficulties in the part of Europe it dominates but it is now more aware than in the past of the disadvantages of using armed force to solve them. Although the crises in the German Democratic Republic and Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were fairly quickly settled through direct Soviet armed intervention, this has not been the case for Poland since 1981. The Soviet Union has so far avoided sending in its army to keep Poland under its domination, but it has not been able to avert the permanent threat of subversion in a country whose geographical position places it at the centre of its defence system in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union's doubts about the willingness, not of the governments, but of the peoples of the countries it dominates, may help to detract it from taking military action against Western Europe with armies of the Warsaw Pact.

28. Moreover, since December 1979, the Soviet Union has been involved in military operations in Afghanistan. Although on the Soviet scale the number of forces engaged in that country is not high, possibly not more than 115,000 men, the fact that no progress has been made towards the restoration of peace in the last four years must be a source of political and military concern for the Soviet leaders. They cannot neglect the danger of hostilities spreading to Afghanistan's neighbours or the fact that China cannot remain indifferent to developments in Central Asia. They must also take account of the negative effects this matter may have on international public opinion and among the Moslem population in the Soviet Union. These considerations must obviously encourage them to be even more cautious in their European policy.

29. Offsetting these factors is the considerable growth in and diversification of Soviet nuclear weapons. Although the SALT agreements allowed the establishment of a relative balance in the long-range nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union, the great majority of western military experts feel the same is not true for tactical nuclear weapons nor, above all, continental-range launchers. According to these experts, the deployment of SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe has now given the Soviet Union a near monopoly of medium-range weapons and consequently the possibility, in the event of

hostilities, of mastering escalation and selecting the type of forces it might use.

30. When making these comparisons, it is probably not possible to gloss over the undeniable United States superiority over the Soviet Union in practically all branches of basic technology relating to nuclear weapons nor to ignore the extra-European military effort of Japan and China and probably – as long as Western Europe is protected by American strategic nuclear weapons – the threat represented by the SS-20s is limited in strictly military terms. But the Soviet Union derives considerable political advantages from the SS-20s deployed in Europe by limiting the possibilities of reaction by European countries to actions such as the invasion of Afghanistan or pressure on Poland.

31. The pressure brought to bear on the western countries by the SS-20s is therefore still considerable and Mr. Andropov's recent proposals for including French and British nuclear forces among the weapons to be taken into account in the Geneva INF negotiations in August 1983 were also intended to make the most of this advantage in order to undermine the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance, deprive the European members of the alliance of much of their political influence and make the United States, from the very start of hostilities, face up to the impossible choice between a conventional war in which the Soviet Union would be in a position of force and all-out nuclear war, whereas the independent powers of decision conferred upon the United Kingdom and France by their nuclear weapons allows these two European states to have a word to say in these questions with all the advantages that involves for the deterrent capability of the alliance.

32. In this event, what would be the point of the American flexible response concept in Europe and how can one then be surprised that certain French political circles finally conclude that the idea of including French and British nuclear weapons in the calculation of the number of medium-range missiles is no more than a veiled but concerted attempt by the Soviet Union and the United States to bring France fully back under the American high command, thereby strengthening their respective positions in the two Europes. Admittedly, in absolute terms these forces do not add much to the American arsenal but they contribute to deterrence by creating an additional factor of uncertainty. It would therefore be vain to have them included in United States-Soviet negotiations, but if their existence allowed two Western European states to take part in the negotiations directly it might meet the need to give Europeans a say in the essential chapter dealing with the level of fundamental weapons in

Europe. However this may be, the United States did not agree to include British and French nuclear weapons in the calculations which were to serve as a basis for the bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations.

33. Soviet superiority in this decisive field is particularly serious since, although the deterrent strategy of the countries of the Atlantic Alliance has paved the way in Europe for starting a policy of détente in disarmament and co-operation, particularly in the framework of the CSCE, areas of instability have increased in the rest of the world. The Middle East continues to present the most serious dangers to international peace following the Iranian revolution because of the attraction which the Iranian theocratic régime seems to have for a large part of the Islamic world. The prolongation of the war between Iran and Iraq, where there is a strong risk of it spreading all round the Gulf, has to be added to the worsening of the conflict in the Middle East due to the invasion of Lebanon by the Syrians and by the Israelis and the activity of Palestinian resistance movements throughout this part of the world. So far, the Soviet Union has been careful not to intervene, at least directly, in all these questions, certainly encouraged to be cautious by the fact that more than a quarter of its population is Moslem and might feel concerned by conflicts which are fundamentally ideological and theological and at the same time disturbing.

34. A second area of instability is on the African continent where the Soviet Union has also refrained from intervening directly but where its allies, particularly Cuba, have sent military forces which are large if compared with African armies. The whole of southern Africa is unstable and conflict-rife, and Colonel Kadhafi's actions have made Libya a very disturbing factor in northern Africa. In summer 1983, the Libyan army provided considerable military support for the rebellion spreading in northern Chad and tried to use this rebellion to extend its influence to the heart of the African continent.

35. It would certainly be a great exaggeration to claim that the Soviet Union is behind Colonel Kadhafi's undertakings. But it is clear that no great power can remain indefinitely outside conflicts in which its interests may one day be jeopardised. The destabilisation of Africa is probably not contrary to Soviet interests.

36. Finally, Central America is becoming increasingly an area of conflict and instability. There is growing unrest and the governments, whatever their political inclinations, are having difficulty in finding enough support to maintain internal peace. So far, the influence of these internal conflicts has been limited and there has been no sign of direct Soviet intervention.

37. But there too Cuba is playing a significant rôle by supplying weapons for the revolutionary movements which have broken out in many countries and, insofar as the United States considers its own security to be threatened by any external intervention in matters relating to the American continent, the risk of internationalisation of the growing number of conflicts in Central and Latin America is particularly dangerous.

38. One must often question the wisdom of an American policy of supporting conservative and dictatorial régimes in countries where the economic and social situation of the people is deplorable and where it would consequently appear that the emancipation of the peoples lies in far-reaching political change. But one cannot forget how important the United States considers this area to be from a security point of view.

39. In disarmament matters, it is to be hoped that the government formed in the Soviet Union after the death of Mr. Andropov will show a more positive attitude than its predecessors. The latter, by accepting the proposals for a final act submitted by the western countries for the Madrid conference on security and co-operation in Europe, allowed the conference to achieve positive results, however, one of which should be the opening in 1984 of a conference on disarmament in Europe which should enable substantial progress to be made in areas where so far no serious result had been obtained.

40. It is yet too soon to anticipate the impact of the first conversations between the new General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Mr. Chernenko, and his western partners, but information available points to a determination to succeed which so far seemed to be lacking in Soviet diplomacy in these matters in spite of the fact that when NATO started deploying the first Pershing II and cruise missiles the Soviets broke off the Geneva negotiations on strategic armaments.

41. Thus, it now appears that it may be possible for both conventional and nuclear disarmament which, even in 1982, might still have seemed to be mainly an instrument of propaganda for the Soviet Union, to be the subject of serious negotiations between the eastern and western partners.

42. Conversely, for more than fifteen years there has been a considerable growth in Soviet naval strength which is now able to challenge the American fleet for first place in the world. In particular, it has built more nuclear-propelled submarines than the United States and the western countries all together. The latest information obtained about Soviet armaments indicates that these submarines have a better

performance than western submarines, particularly thanks to their ability to dive to great depths, allowing them to escape detection and destruction in the present state of technology, and above all thanks to the protection of a double hull which makes them far less vulnerable to anti-submarine weapons.

43. The Soviet Union has also built aircraft-carriers, although limited to a sub-sonic aircraft capability, and has fleets permanently deployed on all the world's seas, including the Indian Ocean. These fleets often include troop-carriers, at least in areas where the Soviet Union may have to conduct land operations with the support of air forces large in size but of limited capability. Thus the Soviet Union is now able to send in troops, equipment and combat aircraft anywhere in the world at short notice. Finally, it has just started building a first high-capability aircraft-carrier which, in a few years' time, should increase its capability considerably.

44. Moreover, at the present time, it seems more important for the Soviet Union to have access from the Norwegian Sea to the Atlantic and hence to the rest of the oceans than for it to be able to reach the central part of the European continent. Thus, the British Isles were relatively remote from Soviet threat in 1954. This allowed the United Kingdom to devote the major part of its defence effort to the collective security of mainland Europe. But it is now facing a far more serious air and naval threat, which has led a number of British observers to consider a redeployment of forces and a new direction for its military and naval effort at the expense of its army of the Rhine.

45. Two editorials in *The Times* on 13th and 17th August 1983 provoked a most interesting discussion on this matter in which a number of persons known for their knowledge of security and defence matters took part. This discussion brought to light the far-reaching repercussions the military disengagement of certain countries might have on the overall deployment of western forces in Europe. The maintenance of Belgian and Netherlands forces beyond the Rhine would inevitably be in doubt and the Federal Republic might have to review its defence system in depth.

46. It is admittedly more than probable that such ideas will not, at any rate in the immediate future, lead to political and military decisions. Reactions to the *Times* articles show clearly that no one is prepared to face such consequences. But there is a general tendency, particularly among the larger western military powers, no longer to consider Central Europe as almost the only place where their security might be threatened.

47. Several years ago, the United States started building up a rapid deployment force for intervention anywhere in the world, particularly in the Middle East. Part of this force was formed from troops stationed in Europe. In March 1984, the former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, raised, in an interview in *Time* magazine, the idea of a partial disengagement of American forces assigned to NATO. This idea has not yet been taken up again by the American authorities who, on the contrary, have endeavoured to reassure their European partners who were disturbed at this prospect.

48. France, which has forces in several African countries and in Lebanon and which has been involved in Chad since August 1983, has already decided to withdraw some of its troops from the Federal Republic to combine them with its overseas intervention forces in a new corps of some 47,000 men, which would be made particularly mobile so that it may, depending on circumstances, intervene either outside Europe or in the Federal Republic because, for some years to come, some of the means earmarked for the rapid deployment force will have to be assigned jointly to this force and to the first French army.

49. There would be no point in deploring these redeployments of forces by several WEU member countries and it would be unfair insofar as these forces are in fact intended to meet threats which concern Europe even if they occur outside our continent. But it must be ascertained that such redeployments are not made at the expense of Europe's security.

50. It may be possible to ensure security with fewer troops. It cannot be ensured if WEU member countries' confidence in each other weakens, in other words if redeployments are not discussed frankly between the European partners of the Atlantic Alliance. The modified Brussels Treaty makes such discussion compulsory before British forces are withdrawn from the mainland of Europe. This is not the case for the other signatory countries. However, the need for great confidence between partners in a common security policy makes understanding between them in this connection essential. France and the Federal Republic seem to have drawn the full consequences of this by deciding in October 1983 to extend their bilateral relations to defence matters. The partners of these two countries in WEU now have to face the question of whether they prefer to see this bilateralism develop or to use the WEU framework to extend such consultations to the Seven.

51. The new situation which has emerged in recent years is assessed differently not only among the various countries of the Atlantic Alliance but even within each country. Almost

everywhere in Western Europe public opinion is now deeply divided in assessing the nature and importance of the threats today. Thus in most countries in this area there is a strong current which, without denying outright the existence of a Soviet threat, seems to consider that the threat is largely caused by western policy, in armaments at least, and that the best way to avert it would be to take steps, prior to negotiations, to restore the confidence of the Soviet leaders. It seems difficult, however, to link purely psychological and hence less tangible considerations with an assessment of the Soviet threat which depends above all on the size of the forces and the armaments deployed.

52. This approach is behind opposition to the deployment of American Pershing II missiles in the Federal Republic or of cruise missiles in certain countries. Conversely, the governments of those countries, with the support of an unchallenged and unchallengeable electoral majority, whichever party may be in power, have said they are prepared to apply the NATO twofold decision of December 1979 by authorising such deployment in the case of the so-called INF negotiations failing to come to an agreement before the end of 1983. In this way they showed their conviction that the Soviet threat was undiminished and that it was impossible to disarm without negotiated agreements, otherwise Europe's security, already weakened by the unilateral deployment of SS-20s by the Soviet Union, would be seriously jeopardised. They considered the main problem was not to appease Soviet fears but to maintain deterrence based on the balance of forces.

53. Assessments of the nature and importance of the threats to peace in Europe, the development of Soviet naval strength and the increasing number of overseas conflicts also vary between western states and give rise to controversy in public opinion. Generally speaking, the United States is more convinced than its European partners that Soviet initiatives are behind most disturbances outside Europe. Without denying that the Soviet Union often tries to take advantage of conflicts to increase its influence or to undermine western solidarity, European members of the alliance often seem more reluctant to take such a view. They believe rather that the often justified discontent of the local populations in Iran, Africa and Latin America is the principal cause of such troubles. However, some consider that the best way to preserve international peace is to refrain from any initiative likely to internationalise such conflicts, while others consider that European action, if legally justified and effectively conducted in practice might solve some of the crises before internationalisation.

54. Often, these are not positions of doctrine but assessments of specific situations which vary

in the light of circumstances. It is normal for countries which once had colonial strength and responsibilities to be more aware than others of the local aspects of such crises, particularly in areas where they had, and sometimes still have, special interests. For instance, this was the case for the United Kingdom in the Falklands during the 1982 crisis and France in Chad in 1983.

55. There could be no question of other European powers taking part in fighting over these territories. However, insofar as forces were withdrawn from Europe to be sent to remote areas on these occasions, the partners of the United Kingdom and France could not consider the measures taken by their allies to be of no concern to them.

56. When the Assembly adopted a recommendation in November 1982 on the Falklands crisis (Document 935), submitted by Mr. Cavaliere on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, it showed clearly the importance for all the Western European countries of any overseas military commitment by one of them because it meant moving forces directly or indirectly assigned to the defence of the European continent or of maritime approaches vital for its security and because the solidarity of these countries in the defence field, as defined in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, required a degree of political solidarity, the exercise of which is provided for in Article VIII of the treaty. This is in no way limited to purely European affairs and the practice of holding political consultations between members of the European Community is a serious step towards applying the modified Brussels Treaty, even if in many respects insufficient.

57. Nevertheless, Western Europe, like the Atlantic Alliance, although having all the necessary institutional elements for consultations on matters relating to its security, even outside Europe, has not managed to apply them satisfactorily. Everything indicates that countries believing they should take action did so in almost every case without effective prior consultations with their partners and therefore obtained from them no more than verbal indications of support which had little impact.

58. The Falklands war, in which arms purchased in WEU member countries were used against one of them, testifies to the inadequacy of European consultations. Although it might have seemed inevitable in 1954 that certain European powers should retain total freedom of action overseas in respect of their WEU partners, this no longer corresponds to the realities of today.

59. Similarly, Mr. Andropov's request in August 1983 that British and French nuclear

forces be included in the calculation of weapons which Soviet SS-20s are supposed to counter makes it particularly necessary to reach agreement between WEU countries on defining a joint position towards the INF negotiations and furthermore that, for nuclear weapons, the negotiations should be conducted on the western side by the United States alone. Naturally, the necessary consultations between Europeans and Americans on this subject are held in the framework of NATO, but if a European voice is to make itself heard in NATO, the framework of WEU seems an obvious choice for concerting positions. It is to be hoped that the meeting of European Defence Ministers to be held in Rome in autumn 1984 will launch this procedure.

60. Indeed, the more Europe hesitates and is divided, the more the United States will feel justified in keeping to its own views on the subject. Compared with the reluctance so far of the United Kingdom and France to allow weapons which they consider to be purely national to be included in the Geneva negotiations, on 2nd September 1983 the Netherlands States-General passed a motion calling for the inclusion of these weapons in the enumeration of western missiles.

61. A similar attitude, moreover, was adopted on German television on 24th September 1983 by the leader of the SPD parliamentary opposition in the Federal Republic, Hans-Jochen Vogel, when he also quoted the Italian Prime Minister, Bettino Craxi, as stating that, after all, these 162 British and French missiles were not on the moon. In autumn 1983, certain British leaders, in line moreover with the United States Vice-President, Mr. Bush, and, for the East, Mr. Ceausescu, admitted that if certain conditions were met in the future and, in particular, a substantial reduction in the arms of the two superpowers, the question might be tackled. But the British, French and Americans agree that this time has not yet come.

62. In this matter there is moreover some confusion, principally due to the evolution of the relevant terminology. At the outset, the Soviet Union classified French and British nuclear weapons as strategic whereas only recently has the Soviet Union classified them as medium-range missiles.

63. As is known, to this is added some irritation in many European political circles about not being kept informed of what was really said during informal contacts in Geneva in July 1983 during the only too famous "forest stroll" taken by the American Paul Nitze and the Soviet Kvitsinsky. These contacts probably bore little resemblance to the idea which these political circles had formed of the serious nature of the negotiations required by the twofold

decision taken by NATO in 1979. As might be expected, the two spokesmen were finally disavowed by their governments.

64. Such conflicting positions and contradictions are obviously most likely to weaken Europe's standing in the world and give the Soviet Union the impression that skilful exploitation of dissent between European countries could shatter western cohesion. It is therefore of the utmost importance for such differences of opinion to be overcome if the deterrence exercised by the Atlantic Alliance is to be maintained, just as differences of opinion between one or other Western European country between 1949 and 1954, making it impossible to set up a European defence system, were settled by the Paris Agreements modifying the 1948 Brussels Treaty.

III. *The West's uncertainties*

65. The western world cannot tackle the question of its security without taking account of the economic recession during the past ten years. In spite of significant signs of recovery in 1983, some aspects at least of the crisis seem liable to persist for a long time to come: high unemployment, monetary instability, excessive foreign debts by many countries, high interest rates, low growth rates and state budgetary deficits. In particular, there are fears of the possible repercussions on the international economy of some of the debtor countries going bankrupt.

66. All these factors weigh heavily on the resources available to member countries of the Atlantic Alliance for their security efforts. In 1980, they agreed on the principle of an increase of 3% per year in their defence budgets in constant values. None of them has yet managed to respect this undertaking. Several have even reduced their defence budgets.

67. There would probably be little point in deploring this situation. It is not for lack of good will that the western countries failed to keep their promises but because of economic stresses beyond their control. Increasing taxation or reducing other state expenditure to meet defence costs would probably have made the crisis worse and led to social and political unrest whose effects on foreign and defence policy would perhaps have been even more serious. The fact that at present the threats are of more immediate concern to areas on other continents makes it even more difficult to convince the electorate in democratic régimes of the extent of the sacrifices needed to strengthen military potentials.

68. Admittedly, the Soviet Union also has many economic problems, but it is still capable

of allocating for defence purposes a proportion of its gross national product which is variously estimated at between 12 and 14%, whereas the members of the Atlantic Alliance spend only 1.8 to 6% of their GNP on defence. This is due to the existence in the Soviet Union of a totalitarian, highly-centralised, one-party régime which can keep the major part of the population largely in ignorance of budgetary realities and of living conditions in the rest of the world.

69. Logically, there can be no question of the West paying for its defence effort, however necessary, at the expense of the very values which it wishes to preserve and defend. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that a comparison only between the respective percentages of GNP earmarked for defence purposes is not enough: account must of course also be taken of the total amounts of the GNP to which they relate. Nevertheless, it is in difficult conditions that the West has to face up to external threats which are probably not so easy to discern as in the past. Prevailing differences between Europe and the United States over the measures to be taken to meet the economic crisis have grown deeper in recent years and have led to an increase in mutual mistrust. In the United States, there is greater lassitude in face of the burden of maintaining American forces in Europe and, in Europe, hostile reactions to United States policy have been expressed to a certain extent in the spread of agitation against the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles.

70. These reactions could probably be overcome more easily if Europe had stronger, more concerted positions to defend its viewpoints, particularly in the framework of NATO. Ever since that organisation was created, it has reflected an imbalance between American power and that of each of its European members. The imbalance is moreover a fact, particularly in defence matters because Europe's security is closely linked with the participation of the United States in its defence. All the European governments recognise this, including the French Government, as President Mitterrand recalled in his speech to the Netherlands States-General on 7th February 1984.

71. The development by the United Kingdom and then France of national nuclear weapons has not changed this situation very much since neither of those countries is able – nor do they claim to be able – to offer their European partners the support of a credible deterrent. Although in the 1975 Ottawa declaration, the members of the alliance acknowledged that these two countries' nuclear weapons made a contribution to common security and deterrence for the benefit of all, neither of them has ever

claimed that they could take the place of American conventional and nuclear forces. Quite the contrary: both have encouraged their partners to agree to the deployment of new American missiles in Europe since no agreement was reached in the Geneva negotiations by the end of 1983.

72. But we must have no illusions, there can be no truly European approach to defence without a minimum of agreement on what the United Kingdom and French nuclear forces represent for the security of Europe. There will be no possibility of organising a European pillar of defence if these two countries fail to define jointly the conditions for resorting to nuclear warfare on European territory, if only to remove any ambiguity about the interpretation of Article V of the Brussels Treaty. Admittedly, it seems difficult to imagine allies sharing the ultimate decision to use nuclear weapons, but to consecrate the sanctuary doctrine would make it impossible to organise European security. An intermediate formula is even less easy to find in that uncertainty about the cases in which nuclear weapons would be used adds to the deterrent effect of such weapons. Yet since autumn 1983 it seems that France has agreed to examine this question with the Federal Republic, obviously the country the most concerned, and its overtures for reactivating WEU signify that it is prepared to do likewise with its other European partners.

73. Ever since the Atlantic Alliance was set up, there has been a desire to establish a truly European defence organisation in the framework of the alliance in order to balance American influence. This was an aim of the proposed European Defence Community, the 1954 Paris conference which modified the 1948 Brussels Treaty and the subsequent creation of the NATO Eurogroup and of the Independent European Programme Group for matters relating to armaments.

74. However, some European members of the Atlantic Alliance were afraid a strong development of a European nucleus in the alliance might give the Americans a reason or a pretext for backing out of their commitments and, in particular, for reducing the level of their forces in Europe or even repatriating them, which would have deprived NATO of much of its deterrent power. Certainly no American government has ever used this threat but isolationist trends have been constantly evident among American public opinion and Congress, particularly after the serious setback in Vietnam which severely shook the Americans' confidence in their government and led them to wonder about the success of interventions abroad.

75. Moreover, because many European were afraid that a withdrawal of American conven-

tional forces from Europe would give the Soviet Union serious doubts about the firmness of the United States' intention to use its nuclear weapons if necessary to counter a massive Soviet attack in Europe, they preferred direct dialogues between each European state and the United States to the formation of a true European defence entity. In other words, they preferred, so to speak, the non-existence of Europe to the risk of Europe being separated from the United States. In many respects such a choice was understandable. But on the one hand it encouraged certain European countries, within the limits of their resources, to seek a national solution to the problem of their security, on the other hand it prevented any European organisation concerned with security problems from assuming true responsibilities and finally in many countries it led to reactions which may be interpreted as pacifist but whose success would perhaps not so much consolidate peace as diminish Europe's security.

76. These were not the only obstacles to the political and military organisation of Europe, particularly in recent years. When the main Soviet threat was levelled at Central Europe, all the countries in the area felt directly concerned by a European defence organisation. These countries have some geographical homogeneity since they constitute a fairly compact whole and the density of their populations in small areas raises special defence problems, making it almost unthinkable, for instance, to conduct warfare in which tactical nuclear weapons would be used on their territory in view of the incalculable devastation that would result. Likewise, the vulnerability of urban areas, their lines of supply and of communications, means that their defence cannot be planned in the same way as that of open spaces and civil defence raises very delicate problems. These are certainly questions whose implications Europeans in this area should examine and the framework of WEU would be particularly suitable for such joint reflection.

77. Conversely, the Scandinavian countries in the north and certain Mediterranean countries such as Turkey and Greece in the south could not expect a great deal from a European defence organisation and quite rightly consider that only the United States would be able to ensure their security. Defence Europe could therefore hardly assume the dimensions of the Council of Europe or of the European Community enlarged to include Ireland, Denmark and Greece. Only the seven WEU member countries could muster similar views on the main issue, i.e. the security of the central region of Europe including the western Mediterranean. Once the principal challenges to international peace shifted out of Europe, this situation changed. Various links between European

countries and their former colonies, special alliances and concerns or interests specific to certain countries led them to involve their forces in conflicts elsewhere.

78. Even if all the Western European countries have a common interest in maintaining peace throughout the world and respect for international law, there may be differences between those who consider that the best basis for peace lies in defence of the status quo by every means and those who think undue conservatism is liable in the long run to worsen conflicts and make a solution difficult. For instance, certain European countries, including France, were against United States action in Vietnam and Latin America.

79. Moreover, action by members, particularly European members, of the Atlantic Alliance outside the European continent inevitably lead to a reduction in their share of joint defence in Europe. Even when fully justified in international law and morally, it is often difficult to foresee their longer-term effects on the defence of Europe. Thus, the Royal Navy was weakened by its losses during the Falklands campaign and no one can at present foresee the possible consequences of the deployment of French forces in Chad.

80. Your Rapporteur does not intend to approve or condemn either of these operations but to underline that they cannot remain a matter of indifference for the European partners of the countries who have assumed responsibility for them.

81. Finally, the economic crisis has slowed down the implementation of our countries' armaments programmes and limits the possibility of recruiting troops, equipping them with modern weapons and replacing losses, thus enhancing the danger of Europe's forces being dispersed. The shift of the more immediate threat to other areas may admittedly make this dispersal seem acceptable. However, the shift was itself the consequence of the deterrence exercised by nuclear weapons and by the overall deployment of NATO forces in Europe.

82. Reactions to the Times editorials of 13th and 17th August 1983 show that the withdrawal of British troops from the army of the Rhine might discourage Belgium and the Netherlands from keeping troops in the Federal Republic and in the long run lead the Germans themselves, under pressure of public opinion, to seek a guarantee of their security outside a disintegrating NATO, particularly as the deployment of French forces may also weaken their presence in the Federal Republic and, above all, reduce their means of action there, particularly in combat helicopters.

83. In other words, any national choices made by one or other member of the Atlantic Alliance have a European aspect and concern all their partners. Both the Atlantic Alliance and the modified Brussels Treaty date back to the time when the then colonial powers were anxious to retain a free hand in all overseas matters.

84. This approach is no longer valid today and consultations between Western European countries on all matters relating to international peace, disarmament and joint security are now of far greater importance than in 1954. Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty provides the framework in which WEU member countries could fulfil this necessity. Neither the North Atlantic Council nor the meetings of the ministers for foreign affairs of the Ten can do so to the same extent because of problems specific to northern or southern European countries which belong to one or other of these organisations but not to WEU.

85. Obviously, a European security policy must not be matched against the national policies of certain states, particularly outside the NATO area. Most WEU countries do not have the wherewithal to conduct military operations in such areas and have no intention of taking part in them. Nor can countries which engage their forces in such operations be expected to make their freedom of action subject to a European consensus which it would be very difficult to obtain. They would not agree and their refusal is clear from their reluctance to handle defence-related questions in the framework of the ten-power Community.

86. Conversely, it may be imagined or hoped that the progressive integration of Community Europe and the development of political consultations will lead subsequently to the inclusion of security questions in the responsibilities of a future European confederation, although no early progress in this sense can be seriously expected.

87. The consultations which are needed can therefore be held only in a framework in which the problem of limits on states' freedom in foreign policy is not a matter of principle, the problem being that of the possible consequences for European security of a specific decision taken or, better, in the process of being considered by each member state. The proposal that "we Europeans should henceforth undertake an intensive effort of thinking and talking" on matters relating to security and disarmament was made to the Assembly by Mr. Jobert, then French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in November 1973, and the present French Government, particularly through Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations, in June 1983, has made it clear that the French Government still considers "WEU to be indispensable for

the discussion and formulation of decisions which link Europeans in the matter of security".

88. However, the Assembly has never been informed whether these proposals were actually submitted to the Council, or whether it examined them or, a fortiori, whether it took any action on them. But whereas until 1983 it had good reason to doubt that such proposals had been made to the Council, information given in the press indicates that since October 1983 this is no longer so: indeed, it has been reported that France and Italy have each made overtures in this sense and some of their partners, particularly the Federal Republic and Belgium, have responded favourably.

89. Thus, although the urgency of such initiatives was not evident even in 1973, this is no longer the case in 1983. Problems relating to disarmament, particularly as they arise in the Geneva negotiations because of the 1979 decision to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles on the territory of European members of the Atlantic Alliance and Mr. Andropov's proposal in August 1983 to limit the number of SS-20s deployed in Europe to the number of launchers belonging to the United Kingdom and France, directly concern the members of WEU, several of whom, as we have seen, have adopted very different positions to those of France and the United Kingdom on this matter.

90. But it is not enough for the Assembly to have discussed the matter to be able to talk of European consultations. These questions, like member countries' policies outside Europe, are at the hub of the main problem of political and military cohesion in Western Europe, itself essential for Europe's security and the maintenance of deterrence and peace.

91. If Europe wishes to avoid each country tackling or pursuing individually and separately a policy of détente to which they are all attached and consequently from a position of weakness, it is essential to maintain a security policy based on deterrence. Yet the confusion between détente and disarmament too often caused and encouraged by Soviet propaganda is now resulting in misunderstanding between Europe and the United States and also between European countries.

92. The main rôle of WEU in such circumstances should be to promote the pursuit of détente and progress towards disarmament by ensuring the maintenance of deterrence, which the alliance with the United States is no longer alone in ensuring. Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, nuclear weapons held by the United Kingdom and France or even the policies of those countries outside Europe may to varying degrees be a help in this context if it appears that the Brussels Treaty has produced

an alliance which is still alive thanks *inter alia* to the application of its Article VIII. This is not the case today: one only has to examine the annual report of the Council for 1983 to realise this. But any revival of the activities of WEU as discussed for some two years now depends perhaps on a revision of the treaty and in any case on a restructuring of each of its bodies.

IV. WEU in 1984

93. Western European Union is now faced with a choice which the governments will have to make in the next few years or months even. If they do not decide to pump new life into the WEU bodies which depend on them, the organisation will probably continue to jog along for another twenty years, i.e. until the date on which member states will be entitled to denounce their signature of the modified Brussels Treaty, and even longer if none of them does so, which is probable. But it is not very likely that the sole approach of that date will incite the European governments to make better use of this instrument than they do at present.

94. Your Rapporteur first wishes to examine the reasons why member countries show so little zeal where WEU is concerned. This is not easy insofar as these reasons are not generally voiced aloud but, on the contrary, are modestly shrouded in mystery by national administrations and by government authorities whose representatives on the Council generally manage to achieve the unanimity necessary for replying to Assembly recommendations or questions put by members only if the replies are as general or evasive as possible. Your Rapporteur nevertheless believes he can deduce some kind of reason from scattered information, speeches, studies published in the press, confidences or hints from certain officials.

95. (i) The development of sometimes violent agitation in several countries which extends to many different circles is making the governments avoid taking any action which might, rightly or wrongly, seem liable to revive East-West tension. They are not necessarily wrong in doing their utmost to avoid discussion about their foreign policy, and above all defence policy, which might cause too deep a split and, for internal policy reasons, result in a collapse of the will to defend oneself.

96. The French Government, by making known since the Assembly's December 1981 session its concern at the development of pacifist and neutralist movements in certain neighbouring countries, certainly had the merit of stressing that WEU's rôle was precisely to

tackle matters liable to affect Europe's security. But then, why did this statement concern only the Assembly and not the Council? Was it just because the French Government considered it had done all it could to make the Council deal with such questions and in desperation was reduced to inviting the Assembly to refer them to the Council in its recommendations? The answer is not easy. In any event there is nothing to show that these problems have been brought before the Council other than through Recommendation 388 of the Assembly and, if the French request has been followed up by a series of initiatives by the Assembly, it is not apparent that the Council has really tried to do anything more than seek a verbal compromise to meet its commitments without tackling the real roots of the problem.

97. (ii) In the past, the governments have been diverted from making full use of the possibilities offered by WEU because, as already mentioned, they feared that the development of activities for the defence of Europe outside the NATO framework might give the Americans a pretext for reducing their rôle in that organisation. Everything indicates that this fear is no longer so strong and that most member countries wish joint security matters to be considered between Europeans. In addition to the French proposals, this is also evident in the so-called Genscher-Colombo plan which includes the idea of developing consultations on these questions among the Ten. In view of present difficulties in applying this proposal, WEU may at the present juncture seem to be the most appropriate framework for doing so at least so long as the Ten have not managed to reach agreement in this connection, since the Seven already agreed in principle in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty that it should be done by the WEU Council. Moreover, it should be recalled that not only is there no antagonism between NATO and WEU, but the Paris Agreements which gave birth to WEU provided for and organised close co-operation, precluding overlapping, between the two organisations.

98. (iii) Furthermore, there are signs that the United States's longstanding wariness of the prospect of reactivating WEU has today been dispelled, mainly because of the French Government's positive attitude towards the application of NATO's twofold decision of December 1979 and, in general, the co-operation between the forces under French national command and those assigned to NATO. Indeed, at the present juncture the calls to reactivate WEU launched by the French Government can no longer be seen as attempts to separate the European allies from the United States but, on the contrary, the United States Government sees them as attempting to strengthen the western alliance. According to the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-*

tung of 29th February 1984, the Minister of State of the Federal Republic, Mr. Mertes, announced that Chancellor Kohl would enquire about United States support for reactivating WEU during his visit to Washington at the beginning of March. Information available to date throws no further light on this matter.

99. A certain apathy in Europe in recent years combines with the desire of some countries not to displease the United States on which they count for help in resolving their economic difficulties. But for a long time the United States was convinced that an organised Europe would strengthen the alliance and there is no valid reason why it should abandon that conviction if the Europeans themselves show equal determination and act in consequence.

100. (iv) The development of armaments and strategies in recent years has high-lighted certain specific aspects of Europe's defence and in particular medium-range missiles.

101. (v) The preference of several member governments for the Community framework for strengthening European co-operation has sometimes led them in the past to oppose the development of WEU activities or even suspend them for fear that they might be detrimental to Community Europe.

102. The article by Mr. Tindemans quoted in paragraph 19 shows a clear evolution by some towards WEU. Indeed, the limitations of ten-power consultations on truly political matters which have become evident in recent months, France's refusal, reiterated by Mr. Cheysson at the Assembly's last session, reservations by the United Kingdom and Greece, fundamental objections by Ireland and the prospect of the Communities being extended to include other countries whose positions on the subject do not yet seem to be definitely fixed, imply that the choice of the Community framework for developing co-operation on European security might delay progress and make it more difficult. If, when the time comes, the WEU member countries were to denounce the modified Brussels Treaty without another alliance having been set up beforehand in the Community framework Europe's defence would be weakened and the prospect of extending Community responsibilities to the security field would become more remote.

103. (vi) Under the modified Brussels Treaty, certain countries have more obligations than others and, not without reason, they feel they are victims of discrimination which, although perhaps justified in 1954, is no longer so today.

104. For instance, this is the case for the lists of conventional armaments in Annex III to Protocol No. III of the Paris Agreements that

the Federal Republic has undertaken not to produce.

105. It is perhaps also the case for the British commitments in Article VI of Protocol No. II on the maintenance on the mainland of Europe of four divisions and a tactical air force.

106. It is also the case for France, which, unlike the United Kingdom, under Article III of Protocol No. III has to submit its atomic weapons to control, although this has never been applied, because it would jeopardise an essential foundation of the deterrent rôle of these weapons. The Federal Republic for its part is subject, under Article II of Protocol No. II, to restrictions on its naval armament.

107. Finally, it is the case for members of WEU which do not have forces outside the European continent since all their forces are subject to control which is not the case for British forces other than the army of the Rhine.

108. When the Paris Agreements were signed, it was felt that these various commitments balanced each other relatively harmoniously and that they met the needs of the day. Control of the non-production of certain German armaments was understandable, partly because of memories of the second world war, still very recent. France, which did not yet have nuclear weapons, did not feel affected by Protocol No. III and the United Kingdom saw its commitments offset by the fact that its forces stationed on its own territory were not subject to control. Nowadays, it is apparent that some of them are no longer justified and your Rapporteur will later examine the consequences to be drawn.

109. Here he merely wishes to underline that certain changes might be made in this respect. Diplomatic practice during thirty years of application of the modified Brussels Treaty has been to play down or in any event to obfuscate as far as possible the problems raised by the application of the protocols; in fact, it paralysed the organisation so that the treaty commitments might be forgotten. But your Rapporteur feels that no revival of the Council is possible if the governments do no consent to lay their cards on the table and to consider together the difficulties, which in all cases are nothing to be ashamed of, that application of the treaty involves for them.

110. (vii) The composition of the Council has also sometimes been quoted as an obstacle to its functioning correctly. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs who have to attend innumerable international meetings now only meet once a year in the context of WEU and often send replacements to these so-called ministerial meetings.

111. For the ambassadors in London, who form the Permanent Council, WEU is a subsidiary activity, whereas to represent their countries at the Court of St. James takes first place. They are not urged by their duties, by the instructions they receive or by what their governments expect of them to take initiatives in the framework of WEU, and Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the treaty providing for emergency meetings of the Council to allow it "to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever areas this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability" has never in fact been invoked.

112. One might wonder, as was done in a German newspaper, the *General Anzeiger* of Bonn, at the beginning of January, whether moving the Council from London to Paris might not solve this question. It would have the obvious advantage of bringing the seat of the Council closer to that of the other WEU organs and reducing significantly the operating costs of the organisation. But the question is whether an effective reactivation of WEU would not mean the Council being attended by permanent representatives who might, moreover, at the same time be the permanent representatives of the member countries to NATO rather than ambassadors to one of the countries. In any case, this too is a question worthy of study and on which it would be interesting to know the opinion of the governments.

113. Compared with these difficulties, whose importance should not be underestimated and which have been largely responsible for paralysing intergovernmental action in the framework of WEU, a brief reminder should be given of the parts of the modified Brussels Treaty which have retained their full importance or whose importance has increased since 1954 and which any European defence organisation should be careful to preserve.

114. (i) The obligation under Article V to afford mutual assistance by all means within the power of each of the partners in the event of a member country being the object of an armed attack in Europe. This is a particularly binding provision and forms the main basis of Western European security. None of the signatories of the treaty has ever seriously questioned it, although the means by which France would intervene is still a moot point since that country left the NATO integrated military structure. Conversely, France's withdrawal from that structure means that Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty is the essential legal basis for its participation in joint European defence and, as the Council recalls in its reply to written question 233, France has never questioned that obligation.

115. (ii) In peacetime already, British participation in the defence of the mainland of Europe is ensured in the conditions described above. Directly or indirectly all British forces are associated with the defence of the mainland of Europe, thus giving it the benefit of the full deterrence of the United Kingdom's nuclear force.

116. (iii) In 1954, the principle that an international organisation should fix the maximum level of armed forces and armaments of the allied countries was an absolute novelty. Admittedly, the application of these measures gave rise to certain difficulties, particularly because the convention allowing the Agency for the Control of Armaments to make on-the-spot checks in private firms without the agreement of the firms, and hence of the governments concerned, has not been ratified.

117. Your Rapporteur considers however that an accurate, verified knowledge of the level of forces and armaments of all the members of an alliance by their partners is a factor of importance for security and for mutual confidence:

- for security because it allows the alliance to remind each party of the needs of collective defence and may on occasion help the governments to make public opinion understand these needs;
- for mutual confidence because it inhibits attempts inside or outside the countries concerned to weaken the alliance by casting doubts on the underlying motives of one country or another.

118. Finally, retaining a team of experts on armaments control may, when the time comes, be very useful to fall back on if disarmament negotiations in a wider framework than WEU should one day allow the development of controls, which would be all the more effective if the procedure had already been tested in the framework of WEU. This would moreover be even more convincing if the Agency's controls were to cover a list which tallied with present military realities more than the 1954 list.

119. Information gathered from the press in February 1984 indicates that the French Government has taken a major step in this direction since, in renewing its proposal to reactivate the WEU Council, it has also proposed deleting Annex III of Protocol No. III of the treaty. The Council's reply to Recommendation 380, adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1983, requesting this deletion will allow the joint position of the Seven on this point to be known. Your Rapporteur has every reason to hope that the deletion of what remains of this list will raise no objection of principle

from the member countries if the Federal Republic so requests under the procedure laid down in the treaty.

120. The question of maintaining Annex IV of the same protocol was also raised in Recommendation 380 and presumably in the French proposal. The speech by Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence, in our Assembly gives some idea of what this proposal may be, particularly when he said:

“It is a good thing that, in regard to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe or the negotiation of other treaties such as the ban on the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, the WEU states should be able, within the framework of WEU where they have technical expertise available, to add to their knowledge and develop their joint thinking on arms limitations, in accordance with their own security concepts. This dimension, already present in certain of the reports which your Assembly has examined, could, it seems to me, be made more systematic and thus help to enlighten the Council.

The limits to such an enterprise must be clearly set, however, as otherwise its chances of success will be jeopardised. There can be no question of intervening in the negotiation processes or of questioning the existing consultation machinery. On the other hand – and that might be a new dimension for the Agency for the Control of Armaments – it would be very useful for the European states to conduct studies, discussions and technical investigations in the field of arms limitation.”

121. It is obvious that if this proposal were to be retained it would result in a far-reaching transformation of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and of its rôle. So far its task has been to verify the statements of the member countries regarding force levels and armaments by means of regular documentary and on-the-spot checks. Certain members of our Assembly consider that these verifications are now obsolete. This is perhaps true insofar as the list of armaments to be controlled appearing in Annex IV was drawn up in 1954. It has never been changed since and includes outdated weapons and not others whose importance has since grown considerably such as combat helicopters. They are also no doubt obsolete because post-war distrust has been gradually replaced by full confidence in the intentions of the European allies, thanks mainly to armaments controls.

122. However, your Rapporteur feels that controls following a perhaps shortened but updated list might still have significance. On

the one hand, the fact that a military alliance is accompanied by a commitment to reveal the military means of each party has certainly not lost all meaning, even though the need is no longer felt so keenly. For instance, it might be an argument in East-West negotiations to be able to underline the effectiveness of this practice. On the other hand, since the main problem of the alliance today is not to restrain the partners from doing too much but to urge them to make an adequate armaments effort, verification not only of maximum levels but also of minimum levels might help to achieve this result and a protocol might be envisaged obliging the governments to declare their armaments efforts and to allow the Agency to verify them. Among the sectors of Western Europe's defence effort that might be subject to such controls, once the member countries have defined them by joint agreement, consideration should be given first and foremost to those outside NATO's reach such as logistics, which are essential to joint security. WEU might set joint goals as for instance for stocks of fuel and verify that the member countries take the appropriate measures.

123. The French Minister has not adopted a position on these two points but he mentioned a new way of using the Agency to make it respond to the new requirements of the European countries in affording them assistance in all international negotiations involving the establishment of arms controls. This is a rôle not mentioned in the modified Brussels Treaty but which could be of real interest since there is nothing appropriate in Europe. Furthermore, thanks to thirty years' experience, it might be used to train European controllers. Finally, the idea has been voiced of giving it the permanent task of studying the state of armaments in the world as does the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This task would still have to be spelled out and the Agency given the means to fulfil it: here it is recalled that the budget of the United States agency, which conducts no on-the-spot verifications, was fixed in August 1983 at \$ 23.4 million, i.e. about eight times that of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments which is F 24 million, or \$ 3 million. In all these cases, the Council might base itself on Article VIII, paragraph 2 of the treaty which, at the same time as it establishes the agency, stipulates that the Council “shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be considered necessary”, which obviously implies that it can assign to the agency tasks other than those defined in Protocol No. IV.

124. Your Rapporteur is gratified to note that the Council is studying these various possibilities. He nevertheless wishes the Council to keep the Assembly better informed and, above all, that budgetary considerations should not induce

it to sacrifice a well-tryed instrument such as the Agency without having first studied with the closest attention the future prospects of all forms of armaments control by a European agency.

125. (iv) Insofar as the Federal Republic wishes the undertakings not to manufacture ABC weapons into which it entered in 1954 in accordance with its basic law and which were confirmed, for nuclear weapons, by its signature of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to remain subject to international control, emphasis may be laid on the positive rôle played by WEU and its Agency for the Control of Armaments in an area which is of importance not so much for relations between WEU countries but for the development of an East-West policy of détente.

126. The very fact that the WEU member countries have joint security interests but very different positions towards the possession of weapons of mass destruction or the deployment of foreign nuclear weapons on their territory should lead them to examine together the possible effects of the use of these weapons in Western Europe and to define a joint attitude towards them.

127. Although few details are known of the content of the Franco-German discussions on security questions launched in autumn 1983, it may be thought that this problem was one of the subjects tackled. Many suggestions have been made in this respect and particularly to provide the Federal Republic of Germany with a second key for French nuclear weapons, at least when they are to be used on German territory. In any event, it is essential for the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to exchange views on this matter and work out a proper European nuclear doctrine, even if the weapons are to remain in the sole custody of the United Kingdom and France. The Agency for the Control of Armaments might then be called upon to verify that the commitments entered into by various parties in this matter are effectively respected.

128. (v) Even if in many respects Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty providing for consultations between its signatories with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace or a danger to economic stability, in whatever area this threat should arise, is in fact better applied through ten-power consultations than by the WEU Council, it should be recalled that the Brussels Treaty is the only text making such consultations compulsory, above all for questions arising outside the North Atlantic Treaty area.

129. (vi) Finally, Article IX, which brought the Assembly into being, and making it

responsible for all matters relating to the application of the treaty, is of real importance insofar as it associates freely-elected representatives of public opinion, delegated by their parliaments, with the application of a treaty of alliance, thus giving special impact to that alliance. If the official speeches by all the ministers who have described their governments' views to the Assembly are to be believed, they endorse this approach and count on the Assembly to make European public opinion more interested in European security.

130. For these reasons your Rapporteur concludes not only that WEU retains its full importance for European security in the years to come, but that events in the last decade – détente and the opening of new arms control negotiations and the spread of conflicts outside the NATO area – call for links to be strengthened between Western European countries in security matters and in present circumstances WEU is the only organisation which can provide a suitable framework.

131. On the other hand, WEU cannot play this rôle unless the discrimination mentioned at the beginning of this chapter is terminated with particular regard to the way members are not treated equally, which today is no longer justified.

132. Your Rapporteur therefore endorses the request in Recommendation 380, adopted by the Assembly in June 1982, that the Council "in application of Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III". He also suggests that governments experiencing special difficulties in applying the modified Brussels Treaty should explain them to the Council so that the seven governments might jointly seek a solution without jeopardising the treaty.

133. Your Rapporteur is convinced that member states' views have drawn closer enough in the last decade for most of them to be able to find such a solution, whether it be the easing of commitments relating to British forces stationed on the mainland of Europe or the practical consequences of the independence of the French nuclear force for Europe's defence. He believes fundamental clarification of these problems in particular might help to avoid clashes between European allies such as occurred over the motion passed by the Netherlands States-General on 2nd September 1983 asking that French and British nuclear weapons be taken into account in the INF negotiations, whereas the United Kingdom and France have shown their radical opposition to this point of view.

134. In the same way, your Rapporteur would willingly endorse paragraph 2 of Recommen-

dation 380, asking that the Council "in application of Article V of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, vary by reducing the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III" if the words "by reducing" did not seem to him alien to the problem raised. As he has tried to show, he considers it is less a question of "reducing", which would deprive the control of armaments of much of its significance, than of "updating" and modernising in the light of the evolution of weapons in the last thirty years.

135. Only insofar as it will be possible to remove obstacles to the control of armaments will all the WEU organs be able to break free and really play their due rôle. This is particularly true of the Council, about which the suggestions made by Mr. Jobert ten years ago are still just as topical, although it may be desirable to reconsider the composition of the Council. The Assembly has made proposals in this connection on several occasions and your Rapporteur will merely emphasise how important it is for the governments to provide themselves with the means of applying Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty effectively.

136. In February 1984, the press announced that the Italian Government had invited the WEU defence ministers to meet in Rome in October on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the Paris Agreements. This is a most interesting initiative which might be of considerable importance. It is rather surprising however that it took thirty years for the seven defence ministers to meet in the framework of the only European organisation with responsibilities in defence matters, with the exception of the meeting of WEU defence ministers held in Paris on 17th April 1958 on the occasion of a NATO Council meeting to co-ordinate WEU and NATO work in the joint production of armaments. Some press reports say that the members of WEU are not unanimous towards the Italian initiative.

137. The question is obviously what will be on the agenda of this meeting. In itself, the commemoration of the Paris Agreements is of only limited interest. Will the restructuring of WEU be mentioned on that occasion? Will consideration be given to the implications for Europe of the requirements of its security and of the negotiations on disarmament? Will the problems raised in 1958 be taken up again with a view to ensuring co-ordination between the SAC and the IEPG, with particular regard to having the secretariat of the former act also on behalf of the latter and reaffirming the open nature of the SAC with regard to all the members of the Atlantic Alliance? Will consideration be given to holding regular meetings of defence ministers in the WEU framework? It would obviously be necessary for the Council

to provide the Assembly with meaningful information on this matter which concerns WEU as a whole and, through it, the future of European security.

138. The activities of the Standing Armaments Committee too have fallen far short of the expectations of the authors of the Decision of 7th May 1955 setting up this body. This may be due to five quite different types of reason:

- the reservations sometimes shown, for reasons which have nothing to do with the point production of armaments, about all the activities of WEU;
- the creation and development of parallel organisations in the framework of NATO, its Eurogroup and the IEPG;
- the interest shown by the European Communities in the armaments industry, as described by Mr. Davignon, Vice-President of the Commission, at the symposium organised by the Assembly in Brussels in 1979;
- the reluctance with which several not to say most of the governments tackle any prospect of true co-operation in this field, either because they are anxious to protect their national industries or because they are afraid of co-operation between firms of different status (private or nationalised), as pointed out in the SAC study on the European armaments industries, or because they are not very anxious to have an international organisation looking into their external armaments trade, or finally because they grant priority to relations with the United States for everything connected by near or by far with defence;
- the very complexity of problems relating to the joint production of armaments gives some people, particularly the major armaments producers, the impression that it is pointless to seek such a goal at all costs in a framework as broad as the EEC or WEU. They believe it is better to proclaim the many successful bi- or trilateral programmes than to lose hope in pursuing broader-based efforts which fail.

139. This assertion, which carries some weight, calls for comment however. First, co-operation in the SAC does not mean everyone taking part in all programmes but remains extremely flexible. Second, the only results recorded for broad co-operation have been in the armaments for ground forces thanks to the work of FINABEL, i.e. after co-ordination between headquarters on specifications for the desired equipment. Whatever may be the specific

requirements of naval and air forces, could not consideration be given to applying to them a method which seems to have been successful for the ground forces? This is a suggestion which goes beyond the purview of the General Affairs Committee but which would merit close consideration.

140. Such reluctance obviously plays an important rôle since organisations which are in no way dependent on WEU, including the IEPG, have not achieved much better results than the SAC. This makes one wonder whether the fear of overlapping is not often used as an excuse for a lack of will to succeed.

141. This means that the removal of present obstacles to WEU's activities will probably not suffice to give the SAC the rôle assigned to it by those who set it up. If the Assembly's information is correct, the proposals submitted by Mr. Hintermann, head of the international secretariat of the SAC, to the WEU Council in spring 1983, of which Assembly committees were informed in Brussels in June, seem to have taken account of all the obstacles facing the institution.

142. Deliberately leaving it to the IEPG to study production programmes for which European co-operation might be developed, they direct the SAC, in the light of the conclusions of the study on European governments' concern to avoid duplicating the work of NATO, Eurogroup and the IEPG, the Assembly's approval of which was demonstrated in June 1983 when it adopted Recommendation 394, submitted by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, asking that the Council:

"In that context instruct the SAC inter alia to complete its study without delay, with the addition of proposals to remove economic and legal obstacles to better co-operation between the armaments industries of member countries and transmit the results of this study to the Assembly;

Instruct the SAC to study the possible implications for European armaments production of all the latest technological developments in the armaments field."

143. The chapters of the study made by the international secretariat of the SAC on the European armaments industries show the magnitude of the task to be accomplished in this field and the obstacles encountered, both legal and economic. Many of them, particularly those arising from the status of companies or the arms trade, cannot be overcome without the political will of the governments which, if they intend to take tangible action on the work which they instructed the SAC to carry out,

will have to draw up directives to solve each of the problems raised on the basis of the conclusions of the study.

144. Thus your Rapporteur feels the meeting of WEU defence ministers in Rome might be of considerable importance if it manages to set up a new organisation for European co-operation in armaments. The institutional flexibility of the SAC, insofar as it is not tied down by the modified Brussels Treaty, would allow it to adapt itself easily to the requirements defined by the ministers, provided they take this Rome meeting seriously and have the assistance of competent armaments experts including their usual representatives on the SAC. This would in no way prevent the ministers for foreign affairs, provided they attend the Council meeting in Paris on 12th June next in person, from re-examining the problem of the control of armaments and the activities, composition and seat of the Council.

V. The twenty-ninth annual report of the Council

145. The chapters of the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council concerning the General Affairs Committee reached the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly at the beginning of March. Their presentation has been improved, as requested by the committee, by providing the texts of documents or extracts from documents mentioned, which makes them infinitely more easy to read. The Council should therefore be thanked for its efforts to satisfy the Assembly's wishes, at least in form.

146. Conversely, the indications it gives about the Council's activities themselves are not likely to correct the impression the press seems to have: the prospect of reactivating WEU has fostered a large number of articles which do not fail to allude to the lethargy of the Council, even calling it on occasion the "Sleeping Beauty". Without wishing to associate himself with these judgments, your Rapporteur believes he has explained sufficiently in the previous chapter the reasons for this paucity of political work by the Council for him not to have to revert to it here.

147. He is, however, astonished that the twenty-ninth annual report makes no allusion to the possibilities of reactivating WEU since the press spoke about it at length at the end of 1983 and ministers, including the prime ministers of several member countries, spoke about this matter in relatively clear terms in the course of the year. It is just as if the Council had nothing to do with this matter, which concerns it directly, however, apart from an

allusion to thoughts on the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee.

148. This attitude of the Council is hardly in conformity with its statements, particularly when it refers, in Chapter I of the annual report, to the rôle of the Assembly as follows:

“The exercise of this responsibility by the Assembly calls for a dialogue with the Council for which, as was reiterated in their reply to Recommendation 394, they hold themselves continuously available.”

149. Its attitude differs from that of certain governments which have used the Assembly's rostrum to make their views known on WEU's future activities, as instanced by the French Minister of Defence, Charles Hernu, in December 1983. It is significant that in its summary of Mr. Hernu's speech the Council did not consider it useful to mention specifically the proposals he presented. Is it to be concluded that the seven governments were unable to reach unanimity in reporting the proposals of the Minister? In general, contrary to what the Council purports, the Assembly is the last to receive information about matters concerning WEU and its members have everything to gain by consulting the press rather than the communications of the Council to learn about these questions.

150. Admittedly your Rapporteur in no way suspects the Council of reserving its comments for newspaper men rather than for parliamentarians, since press correspondents in all capitals of the member countries, and not especially those resident in London, have signed the many articles referring to the revival of WEU which your Rapporteur has read. He considers the practice of systematically refusing to inform opinion to be both futile, since information always leaks out, and harmful, since for lack of official clarification the facts are sometimes deformed, and above all because too strict a concept of secrecy arouses distrust and diverts the interest of the public away from European affairs. Finally, this practice is contrary to the spirit of the treaty itself which gave WEU a parliamentary Assembly specifically so that European opinion might express itself on the questions within this organisation's competence. Whereas questions concerning the European Community are regularly posted in communications from the Community authorities to the press and to the European Parliament, one might well wonder why those concerning WEU are kept under cover on occasions when military secrecy can in no way justify such excessive discretion.

151. As for the Council's day-to-day activities, there is every reason to fear that the description given in the twenty-ninth annual report is

exhaustive: the publication of a press communiqué on 21st September condemning the destruction of a civil airliner of Korean Airlines was the only active factor in political matters, apart from the adoption of replies to recommendations of the Assembly. This amounts to little, even if the communiqué constitutes a step forward compared with the previous years when the Council published nothing at all.

152. Your Rapporteur wishes, however, to recall the General Affairs Committee's interest in the informal discussion it had, not with the Council, but with its Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Tindemans, in June 1983, on the evolution of relations between the countries of Western Europe and the People's Republic of China. He found the paragraph of the twenty-ninth annual report on this question most interesting and notes that the member states do not consider that existing regulations currently present “a major obstacle to the development of trade and co-operation with China”. He would like to know, however, whether this means that the WEU countries consider that the Cocom lists may stand in the way of their trade with the People's Republic of China.

153. The other comments solicited by the chapters of the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council referred to the General Affairs Committee concern questions dealt with in other reports of the committee, which makes it unnecessary for your Rapporteur to go into further details here. He considers however that all the questions raised in the previous chapter should constitute the principal material for the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly in 1984. He recalls that the revival of WEU, if it is to take place, will concern primarily the activities of the Council, without which the Assembly's work cannot find its normal political outlet, and it should lead to a true dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, which was hardly the case in 1983. The Assembly therefore has the right to hope for a report of a completely different kind covering 1984 and in any event one which should relate the conversations between governments on the direction WEU should take and the implications for the various organs of the institution.

VI. Conclusions

154. The link between the activities of the Council, the revision of the lists of armaments subject to the Agency control and the redirection of the work of the SAC, including assistance to the Assembly for certain studies, may not seem evident. However, it is very real insofar as WEU is still the only truly European organisation with security and defence respon-

sibilities. Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty cannot be expected to play its deterrent rôle if the governments fail to uphold the institution which is intended to guarantee its application, any more than the North Atlantic Treaty would play its rôle if the presence of American forces in Europe in the framework of the integrated military structures did not give its Article V its full deterrent value.

155. That is a point which cannot be overlooked by those who favour a transfer of WEU's activities to institutions which depend on the EEC. In any case, at the moment it seems wiser to consider WEU as the military arm of the Community than to envisage extending Community activities to defence questions. At least serious consideration should be given to Mr. Tindemans's proposal that WEU be opened to the member countries of the EEC wishing to join. The treaty makes provision for such an extension but the governments have always steered away from it.

156. Your Rapporteur wishes to recall here that the Spanish Prime Minister, Mr. Felipe Gonzalez, answered a question put by Mr. Valleix in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 31st January last, summarised as follows:

"Mr. Gonzalez answered Mr. Valleix that Spain had not yet adopted a final position on joining WEU. He recalled that his country had been sending an observer to that Assembly for many years. The Spanish nation took a fairly favourable view of Spain joining WEU since it realised that rapprochement between European countries was necessary to improve their collective defence."

157. At a time when the Assembly is about to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the Paris Agreements modifying the 1948 Brussels Treaty, your Rapporteur feels that the new type of threats to Europe's security, the reactions they have aroused among public opinion and innovations in armaments technology should encourage the WEU member countries to take this opportunity of reconsidering the present implications of the alliance concluded in 1954.

158. In doing this they should take full account of what already exists and has been gained for Europe's security, without relinquishing anything in favour of visions of the future of Europe whose achievement it is to be feared may suffer further delays. Your Rapporteur therefore thought it necessary in this document to recall a number of suggestions, most of which have already been submitted to the Council in the past but which have not been granted sufficient attention and which might form a better foundation for Europe's security

in the coming decade, the alliance with the United States remaining the cornerstone but perhaps on a less exclusive basis than hitherto.

159. In February 1984, the main problem, i.e. the possibility of maintaining the American commitment in NATO, was raised in an article by the former United States Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in *Time* magazine. Although he did not mention the possibility of reviving WEU, he expressed the wish that the United States withdraw part of its forces stationed in Western Europe and that a European general henceforth be appointed SACEUR, an American being appointed as Secretary-General of NATO. Nevertheless, all the WEU member countries were adamant about the United States commitment in Europe remaining unchanged and also wished SACEUR to remain American and the NATO Secretary-General European. This was Chancellor Kohl's message when he went to Washington on 7th March.

160. On the other hand, nothing in the opinion expressed by Mr. Kissinger could be viewed in any way as being an American veto on reactivating WEU. It is significant, moreover, that the former Secretary of State seemed to wish to encourage Europeans to take greater responsibility for the defence of Europe and in no way to oppose consultations between Europeans on questions of security. All in all, there seems to be little foundation for fears that the reactivation of WEU might make the United States lose interest in the defence of Europe.

161. In the first months of 1984, the governments of the member countries with the greatest reservations about reactivation spoke in far more positive terms about this matter and particularly Sir Geoffrey Howe, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a speech to the London Diplomatic Association on 6th March 1984, when he said:

"Providing it does not undermine the transatlantic links on which our security ultimately depends, any initiative which can usefully promote greater collaboration on security issues among European nations will certainly have British support."

162. The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. van den Broek, spoke in similar terms in response to a question by Mr. Blaauw in the Second Chamber of the States-General on 9th February. He then said that he would not close the door to discussion of the future rôle of WEU with his colleagues. Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, referred to Mr. van den Broek's view in answer to a question put by Mr. Dejardin in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives on 17th February, the summary report of which reads as follows:

"A member asked what the minister thought of the French and Italian statements on WEU and European defence. The speaker answered that WEU was the only European organisation with certain responsibilities in defence matters.

The Minister for External Relations specified that he largely agreed with the view of his Netherlands colleague, Mr. van den Broek, who had just been quoted. He referred to the report he had drafted himself in 1976 on European union in which he had already called for a joint foreign policy which, to start, should be conducted at four levels, including that of defence. The minister was consequently in favour of more far-reaching awareness of Europe within the Atlantic Alliance.

On the proposals to grant new tasks to WEU, the minister said that in the framework of European political co-operation preparations were now being made for new initiatives for co-operation in defence matters.

The problems were not yet solved, but the idea was to make a renovated WEU the European pillar of NATO, which called for an adaptation of the Brussels Pact (creating WEU). This pact, which had been worked out immediately after the second world war, contained a number of anti-German elements."

163. We should welcome the useful work our two colleagues have accomplished in obtaining from their governments details of their policies towards WEU and underline that the repercussions of the French and Italian initiatives, with the backing of the Federal Republic, seem most promising throughout the member countries.

164. We must therefore hope that the meeting of WEU defence ministers in Rome in October 1984 will allow all these problems to be discussed and a course to be set for WEU to enable it to play its full rôle in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and, in the terms of the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty, "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe".

*Political implications of European security in 1984 -
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

1. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "Welcoming the fact" and insert "Taking note".

Signed : Cavaliere

1. See 5th sitting, 20th June 1984 (amendment agreed to).

*Political implications of European security in 1984 -
reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 2¹

tabled by Mr. Gianotti

2. In the second sub-paragraph of paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out :

“and more particularly of recourse to nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces”.

Signed : Gianotti

1. See 5th sitting, 20th June 1984 (amendment negated).

*Replies of the Council to Recommendations 396 to 402***RECOMMENDATION 396¹***on European security and burden-sharing in the alliance²*

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the manifold difficulties of comparing national defence efforts but concluding that the European allies for the most part now carry a very reasonable share of the agreed burden, a share which has increased from 24% to 38% in the last twenty-five years, and increased most significantly in the decade of the 1970s; recognising that because of its substantial strategic nuclear deterrent and world rôle, the United States spends a higher proportion of its national wealth on defence than its European allies; but believing that certain specific improvements in defence efforts are required;
- (ii) Noting the existence of the independent nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom;
- (iii) Considering that an important factor in the continuing burden-sharing debate arises from the differing approaches of the European allies and the United States administration to relations with the Soviet Union, and consequently from the different views on the necessary size and composition of the allied defence effort;
- (iv) Believing that these differences call for increased consultation between the European allies on strategic policies and defence issues;
- (v) Convinced that within the alliance the political relationship between the European members and the United States should reflect more fully their economic, political and defence contributions to the security of Western Europe in the fullest sense;
- (vi) Aware that isolation in the United States is likely to grow to the detriment of western security unless the European members of the alliance can convince American public opinion and Congress of the adequacy of the European contribution to the NATO defence effort, and unless European public opinion and parliaments show reciprocal appreciation of all aspects of the United States contribution to allied defence;
- (vii) Welcoming therefore the annual report to Congress by the United States Secretary of Defence on allied contributions to the common defence; proposals by WEU; and statements by Eurogroup which identify the size of the European contribution;
- (viii) Believing that allied defence plans and commitments entered into in the Brussels Treaty must take account of the possible consequences of developments beyond the NATO area, and that in the case of such developments which the allies jointly recognise as directly threatening the vital interests of the alliance the ready assistance of all allies must be forthcoming within the area to facilitate United States deployments beyond the area;
- (ix) Recalling that problems of common defence and the support of public opinion for national defence projects cannot be isolated from the quality of economic, political and monetary relations between the United States and the members of WEU,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

A. Urge the WEU member governments concerned to define jointly for the attention of the North Atlantic Council the measures necessary:

1. To maintain and in the following specific cases improve their defence efforts:

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1983 during the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 959).

- (a) by maintaining collectively the NATO target of an increase in defence expenditure in real terms as long as the Soviet military build-up continues, and by adhering to the biennial force goals approved by the nations;
 - (b) by augmenting the combat sustainability of the alliance by providing a minimum of thirty days' stocks of fuel, ammunition, spare parts and consumables and by improving the capacity of reserve forces;
 - (c) by maximising conventional firepower and raising the nuclear threshold through the progressive introduction of proven systems incorporating emerging technologies jointly developed and produced on an equitable Atlantic-wide basis;
 - (d) by improving the flexibility, mobility, effectiveness and readiness of European intervention forces, both to improve national contributions to ACE Mobile Force and, in a crisis in Europe, to compensate as far as possible for any diversion outside the area of United States reinforcements destined for Europe;
 2. In the case of developments beyond the NATO area affecting their vital interests:
 - (a) to facilitate by all necessary measures within the area the deployment of forces of any NATO country beyond the area;
 - (b) in the case of those WEU member countries with appropriate military capability to participate in such deployments;
 3. To lend vigorous united support to the United States efforts on behalf of the alliance to secure satisfactory balanced and verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union in the field of both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces and, failing the latter by the end of 1983, to apply the decisions taken on 12th December 1979 by the NATO member countries concerning the deployment of GLCM and Pershing II missiles;
 4.
 - (a) To deepen and improve European defence deliberations with the WEU Council and the informal consultations in Eurogroup and arrange for the European position to be expounded clearly in the United States, especially to Congress committees and staffs, through a public information effort co-ordinated by the Washington embassies of those countries which provide the Eurogroup secretariat and Chairman-in-Office;
 - (b) To undertake a similar effort with the assistance of the Assembly of WEU to explain to the European public and parliaments the contribution which the United States makes to allied defence;
- B. Consider and report to the Assembly on:
 1. The expansion and deepening of the European defence activities of the Council, last defined in 1957;
 2. The obligation to invite all members of WEU to contribute to strengthening the European pillar of the western alliance.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 396***

1. The Council welcome the Assembly's analysis of the problems of European security and burden-sharing in the alliance. While the commitment of the United States and Canada is vital for the security of Western Europe, it is equally essential that the European members of the Atlantic Alliance, and especially the countries of WEU, make a determined contribution to the common effort.

The contribution of the European countries is considerable. Of the alliance's ready forces in Europe, they provide about 90% of the ground forces, 80% of the combat aircraft, 80% of the tanks and 90% of the armoured divisions; at sea, in European waters and in the Atlantic, they provide 70% of the fighting ships. Moreover, the United States forces deployed to strengthen Europe in time of tension, would receive a great deal of help through host nation support, secure lines of communication and means of transport.

During the 1970s, the European allies who are members of the integrated military structure of NATO increased their real defence spending by over 2% each year, while United States real defence spending declined on average by just over 1% per year. The extent and value of the European defence effort is recognised in Secretary Weinberger's reports to Congress on burden-sharing of 1982 and 1983.

Whereas the record does therefore appear to be fairly satisfactory, the Council still believe that the European allies must maintain and even strengthen their contribution to the common effort. In view of the present budgetary constraints called for in all the member states, it is clear that these efforts should inter alia concentrate on improved co-ordination. To this end, the WEU members of the integrated military structure of NATO approve the measure for maintaining and improving NATO's defence effort detailed in Section A, paragraph 1 of the Assembly recommendation.

2. The Council, aware of the Assembly's concern about possible developments beyond the NATO area which might affect the vital interests of the allied partners, reiterate the position adopted on 8th and 9th December 1983 by the NATO Council of Ministers who agreed to consult one another in good time about any such developments if it was recognised that their common interests were affected.

3. The Council fully support the effort of the United States to secure satisfactory, balanced and verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union in the field of nuclear forces, and deeply regret the Soviet absence from the Geneva negotiations.

4. The member countries wish to stress the importance of their consultations within the Council on the state of defence and security in Europe. They also wish to underline the need to put across the European position in an appropriate and more effective way in the United States. Useful work in this direction has already been started within the framework of the Eurogroup.

Likewise, public opinion and European political circles must be clearly aware of the United States contribution to the security of our countries.

The competent European organisations have an important responsibility in this regard, in particular WEU, which has a complete institutional structure suited to this task. The Eurogroup and the IEPG also have an important rôle.

The WEU Assembly should play a vital rôle in putting across to the European and American public the scale and effectiveness of both the European defence effort and transatlantic co-operation. The North Atlantic Assembly, for its part, can contribute to this work of explanation and presentation.

The Council fully endorse the Assembly's observations on the need for consultation within the alliance but challenge the assertion that differing approaches by the European countries and the United States to relations with the Soviet Union have led to differing views as to the necessary size and composition of the allied defence effort.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th June 1984.

There is no major difference of view on the nature of the Soviet threat and the need to meet it. At their ministerial meeting in December 1983, the North Atlantic Council instructed its Permanent Council to undertake a thorough appraisal of East-West relations with a view to achieving a more constructive East-West dialogue. This objective was reflected in the declaration issued at the NATO ministerial meeting held in Washington on 29th to 31st May 1984.

RECOMMENDATION 397¹

on the application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council²

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the wide agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the application of the Brussels Treaty, revealed in Recommendation 380 and the Council's reply thereto, and on the proposition that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s;
- (ii) Noting that the Council has received with great interest and is considering the Assembly's recommendation to cancel the few remaining restrictions on the production of conventional weapons in one member country, and is considering the technical, military and political aspects of the Assembly's recommendation to vary by reducing the list of weapons subject to quantitative controls;
- (iii) Aware that the controls on atomic and biological weapons provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty have never been applied, but considering in the present circumstances that it is no longer appropriate to apply them;
- (iv) Believing that the fullest use should be made of the qualified staffs of the Standing Armaments Committee and of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, both for the study of problems within their respective competence for the benefit of the alliance as a whole, and to assist the Assembly in the preparation of its reports, and warmly welcoming the first tentative experiment in the latter connection, in implementation of the Council's reply to Recommendation 331;
- (v) Deploring the severe reductions which the present United States administration has imposed on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with which the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments has co-operated from time to time;
- (vi) Welcoming the inclusion in the Council's annual report in response to Recommendations 331 and 348, of specific information on the levels of British ground and air forces assigned to SACEUR, and recognising that no provision of the Brussels Treaty requires this information to be included;
- (vii) Regretting however the Council's refusal in recent years to include in annual reports various other items the Assembly has requested,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. In application of Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III;
2. Submit to the Assembly in the near future the results of its consideration of the technical, military and political aspects of varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III, in application of Article V of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, while taking into consideration the possibility of deleting the list concerned except for atomic, biological or chemical weapons;
3. Instruct the Agency for the Control of Armaments to extend its studies of control, verification and exports of armaments, in co-operation with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with a view to assuming for the benefit of the alliance as a whole certain tasks which the latter agency is no longer in a position to undertake;
4. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to extend its study of the European armaments industry to include a survey of the status of the two-way street and an analysis of the factors which would help to increase the proportion of European equipment in the armed forces of all allied countries;
5. Request the international staff of the Standing Armaments Committee to assist within its competence in the preparation of reports of Assembly committees when these so request, and to extend such assistance to the collection of the necessary information;
6. To include in future annual reports:

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1983 during the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (7th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 948).

- (a) a statement of the levels of forces which the WEU countries make available to NATO, and of the French forces in Germany;
- (b) information as full as in reports for 1981 and earlier, on the production and procurement of armaments in member countries;
- (c) as far as possible the latest approved lists of chemical and biological weapons subject to control.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 397***

I. As already stated in their reply to point 1 of Recommendation 380, the Council have noted with great interest the position adopted by the Assembly in favour of cancelling paragraphs IV and VI of Annex III to Protocol No. III. As the Assembly is aware, the procedure governing a Council decision to this effect involves various aspects which are laid down in Article II of this protocol.

Following the supplementary reply to point 2 of Recommendation 380 given to the Assembly in November 1983, the Council, in replying to written question 243, stated that their deliberations regarding the list in Annex IV to Protocol No. III had not yet come to an end. They added that they intended further to examine ways in which the Agency for the Control of Armaments could be involved in fields other than the present one. As stated, the Council will inform the Assembly as soon as possible after completing their examination of this subject.

II. The Council have noted with interest the Assembly's suggestion to instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to extend its study of the European armaments industry to include a survey of the state of the two-way street and an analysis of the factors which could help to increase the proportion of European equipment in the armed forces of all the allied countries. The proposal that the SAC should be entrusted with preparing a study on the two-way street is one of those put forward by the head of the SAC international secretariat which are still being examined by the Council, whose concern is to avoid any duplication with the work being done elsewhere, in particular by the IEPG.

The Council's position concerning the possible assistance by the SAC and its international secretariat with the work of the Assembly committees has been explained in their replies to Recommendations 365 and 379 and during the joint meeting with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on 17th May 1983 in Brussels. The Council remain willing to examine, in accordance with the criteria already laid down, any requests submitted to them in future by the Assembly.

III. As already stated in their reply to points 3-4 of Recommendation 380 regarding the forces assigned to NATO, the Council see no possibility of including in their annual reports any statements other than those already given on the levels of forces in the WEU member states.

The Council will continue to provide as much information as possible in their annual reports on the production and procurement of armaments in the WEU member countries.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th April 1984.

RECOMMENDATION 398¹

***on the rôle and contribution of the armed forces
in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime²***

The Assembly,

- (i) Having taken note of the results of the information study conducted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of WEU on the rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime;
- (ii) Aware that the fundamental institutional task of the armed forces is to ensure national defence and security;
- (iii) Recognising the rôle of guidance and co-ordination incumbent on the civil authorities in establishing research and civil defence bodies, planning means of intervention and mobilising local authorities and the various civil protection agencies in order to afford assistance and relief to the victims of disasters;
- (iv) Stressing the essential contribution which the armed forces have to make in this context by affording relief and assistance in the hours immediately following disasters;
- (v) Stressing the international value in terms of human solidarity of the exchange of assistance between member countries in the event of disasters and of participation in assistance and relief operations in third countries thus struck,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To pay particular attention to the rôle and contribution of the armed forces in studying and planning civil protection means;
2. To this end to promote co-operation between member countries through:
 - (a) the exchange of information and experience;
 - (b) mutual invitations to and attendance at periodical national and, if possible, transfrontier civil protection exercises; and
 - (c) the conclusion of bi- or multilateral agreements on mutual assistance and relief;
3. Together with NATO, in co-operation with the United Nations relief agencies, utilising such humanitarian aid as provided by the EEC, and in collaboration through the Council of Europe, to contribute to assistance and relief to third countries struck by a natural or collective man-made disaster by establishing the necessary structures and means.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1983 during the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (7th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Pecchioli on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 960).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 398***

The Council have noted with great interest Assembly Recommendation 398 on the rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime.

They acknowledge that it is appropriate that the governments of the member countries pay particular attention to the establishment of legal and technical instruments designed to improve and enhance the effectiveness and speed of such a contribution.

In this connection, the Council consider that it would be beneficial to envisage greater collaboration between the member countries, in particular through the exchange of information and experience, mutual invitations to, and attendance at periodical national exercises and by considering possible multilateral or even bilateral agreements on mutual assistance and relief, also keeping in mind the existing NATO machinery.

The Council also consider interesting the idea of contributing to assistance to third countries struck by natural disaster by making best use of the instruments provided by various international organisations, whilst stressing the priority requirement to ensure the speedy arrival of relief in whichever part of the globe it is required.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th May 1984.

RECOMMENDATION 399¹

on the assessment of advanced technology in Japan²

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the limitations imposed on Japan's defence capabilities under Article 9 of the Japanese constitution restricting its military forces to defensive purposes;
- (ii) Conscious of the growing industrial power of Japan and of Japan's success in the field of micro-technology, in exploration of space and the oceans and in energy;
- (iii) Considering that defence-related expenditure is about 5% of the total budget and that Japan has by far the lowest per capita defence expenditure in the free world;
- (iv) Considering also that, although Japanese technological research and development is not directed towards military goals, new weapons systems or possibly the export of armaments, electronic developments make the dividing line between civil and military high technology increasingly difficult to trace;
- (v) Aware of projects of Japanese collaboration with the EEC and ESA, in OECD and with various member states and manufacturing companies in WEU and the United States in advanced technology and the impetus given by decisions at the Versailles and Williamsburg summit meetings on areas of co-operation;
- (vi) Noting the similarity of problems and of the approach to them by WEU member states and Japan;
- (vii) Convinced of the need for a joint approach to problems in the fields of science, technology and aerospace,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to study Japanese progress in military high technology, or technology which may have military applications, together with its prospects and submit the conclusions of this study to the Assembly;
2. Examine the whole field of possible collaboration with Japan so as to promote more joint projects on a bilateral or a multilateral basis;
3. Examine in particular the possibility of collaboration with the Japanese Institute for New Generation Computer Technology (ICOT) on the project for a fifth generation computer;
4. Examine the possibility of collaboration in production of military and civil aircraft;
5. Examine with the authorities of EEC member states how to make fuller use of the present arrangements for scientific and executive staff, government officials and others to familiarise themselves with Japanese culture, management techniques and scientific development by courses and periods of study in Japan;
6. In order to develop practical collaboration in space, and taking account of the fact that Japan has just appointed a permanent representative to Paris for space matters, propose the nomination of a permanent representative of ESA to Japan to enable ESA to consult continuously on collaborative projects.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 29th November 1983 during the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (7th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Lord Northfield on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 956).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 399***

The Council welcome Recommendation 399 on the assessment of advanced technology in Japan.

The Council are conscious of the high level of development of technology in Japan and of the need for even closer co-operation with Japan in the scientific and technological fields.

The members of WEU are individually, and in some cases on the basis of bilateral treaties, engaged in fruitful technological co-operation in numerous spheres with Japan, and also with ICOT. This co-operation can no doubt be expanded.

The conclusion of a basic agreement between the European Community and Japan on scientific and technological co-operation is being discussed among Community member states.

Conscious of the increasing public attention being paid to Japanese dual-use technology and Japan's arms industry, the Council have directed the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee to draw up proposals for a study on the prospects for Japan's arms industry and the repercussions for Europe.

The Council feel that one should consider whether it is expedient to allow the intensification of scientific and technological co-operation with Japan – in itself desirable – to hinge on the question of dual-use technology. They note that the United States, in spite of its privileged links with Japan, was, only with great difficulty, able to conclude an agreement with Japan for including dual-use or military technology in Japanese exports. They also point to Japan's strict ban on arms exports. Accordingly, the Council, who are ready to have further discussions on this point, feel that caution should be exercised in the field of military technology.

It should be left primarily to the relevant industries and institutions of the member countries to identify areas of co-operation, including aerospace. It is they who have until now promoted co-operation in individual sectors and carefully examined in which sectors co-operation is feasible and of benefit to Europe.

The Council welcome the suggestion of making even better use of the existing opportunities for becoming acquainted with Japanese culture, management practices and scientific developments through courses and periods of study in Japan.

The Council draw attention to the fact that the forthcoming international decisions on the continuation of outer space activities might, inter alia, offer opportunities for closer co-operation between ESA and Japan, in which context account must be taken of political and any industrial considerations.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th March 1984.

RECOMMENDATION 400¹*on the harmonisation of research in civil
and military high technology fields²*

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting with satisfaction that the governments of the WEU member countries have declared that they are fully aware of the security interests which determine European collaborative projects in high technology fields, including aeronautics, space and microelectronics;
- (ii) Considering that it is essential to master the principal branches of technology covering all material needed by the armed forces of member countries and that the evolution of defence research makes it necessary to develop intellectual capabilities by a sustained effort of continuous education at various levels – engineers, technicians, operatives;
- (iii) Considering that mastery of research and development in the defence field would strengthen the defence capability of the European states if they could co-operate without restriction in their respective financial and technological efforts;
- (iv) Considering that the growing cost of armaments programmes for the WEU countries calls for increased and balanced co-operation in a European framework so that the armaments industries of the member countries may contribute fully to defence by mastering new technology to the best of their ability;
- (v) Considering that intra-European exchanges of technology are already promising, as is the joint production of sophisticated devices of European design, and that further progress can be made in this direction by exploiting new technology to the full;
- (vi) Considering that the balance of technology exchange between member states and the United States favours the latter and results in a markedly unequal relationship within the Atlantic Alliance;
- (vii) Considering that it is essential not to confuse new technology, weapons systems and strategies but that on the contrary our countries should master new tactical concepts, any European effort in the field of emergent technology having to take account of the real possibilities of high technology co-operation and, as a first stage, of the possibilities offered by the existence of the Standing Armaments Committee for independent European thinking,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to prepare for it a study in the form of a review and proposals on the possibilities of co-operation between member countries in advanced technology for the development of future weaponry, this study, covering both research and the industrialisation of the products of such research, to include inter alia:
 - an analysis of the decision-taking structure and the budgetary facilities of each member country;
 - an analysis of means available and the possibilities of making optimum use of these means to protect innovative capabilities and ensure competitive production costs;
 - proposals on the direction the research and development policies of member countries should take to provide Western Europe with the industrial base necessary for future weaponry;
2. Invite the governments of member countries to encourage contacts between the responsible authorities in their industries with a view to promoting the establishment, as soon as possible, of a strong co-ordinated European industry for advanced military technology meeting our defence requirements;
3. Invite the governments of member countries to give preference to the procurement, as and when necessary, of new weapons whose design and production are the fruit of co-operation between several member countries.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1983 during the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (8th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Bassinet on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 963).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 400***

The Council have noted with interest the second part of the report on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields presented by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. They endorse the conclusions of this document regarding the need to strengthen co-operation between member countries in the field of high technology, considering that the joint development of these advanced technologies and the industrial-scale production of the resultant components is one of the prerequisites for co-operation in respect of future weapons systems and hence for the maintenance of a credible defence by the western countries. The Council however believe that co-operation could take place not only within the context of WEU but also on a wider European basis.

1. The Council point out that – as previously mentioned in their reply to Recommendation 394 – the head of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee has placed a number of study proposals before the Council and that one of the proposed topics was precisely concerned, in substance, with the implication of new conventional weapons for the armaments industries of the member countries. The Council also point out that the Assembly, in its Recommendation 399, recommends that the SAC be instructed to carry out a study on Japanese progress in high technology fields with potential military applications. The SAC is at present conducting a study on Japanese progress in high technology fields. There is thus considerable concern shared by all the member states regarding advanced technologies. The Council will have to consider, however, whether a study as recommended by the Assembly might subsequently be envisaged, taking into account *inter alia* the existing capacity of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

2. Industry has, unquestionably, an important part to play in any form of co-operation. The governments of the member countries fully accept the idea that the interests of industry should be taken into account since this, after all, is the key to the success of any programme in this field. Contacts should therefore be encouraged and diversified with a view to promoting the establishment of a European industry for advanced military technology. Such considerations could provide the framework for a symposium for the industries concerned; it could be modelled on the one on international aeronautical consortia held in London on 9th and 10th February 1982 under the auspices of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

3. The member states of WEU generally recognise the essential nature of European preference. The Council agree that the spirit of solidarity and the search for European solutions must constitute a very important factor in the national armaments planning and decision-making process, thus enhancing the European contribution to the common defence effort.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 29th May 1984.

RECOMMENDATION 401¹

on economic relations with the Soviet Union²

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that for several decades the development of the Soviet economy has given priority to the armaments effort and that in many sectors these armaments now exceed those of the countries of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (ii) Considering that Soviet military power is being developed at the expense of the standard of living of the population and that it is helping to keep several countries in a state of dependence;
- (iii) Hoping that the opening or continuation of various international negotiations on the limitation of armaments will allow the Soviet Union to apply new guidelines for its economic development;
- (iv) Regretting that the members of the Atlantic Alliance have not managed to define a common code of conduct for their trade with the eastern countries or to apply sufficiently-concerted economic sanctions in response to instances of Soviet abuse of military power;
- (v) Noting that the shooting down by Soviet military aircraft of a South Korean civil aircraft together with its crew and passengers on 1st September 1983 is an unacceptable violation of international law;
- (vi) Considering the allegations that forced labour was used for the construction of the Siberian gas pipeline to Western Europe,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Promote consultations between all democratic countries with a view to working out jointly the limits they would accept to ensure that their trade with the eastern countries does not help those countries to accumulate armaments and inter alia:
 - (a) to ban all exports of advanced technology which might be used for armaments purposes;
 - (b) to avoid long-term contracts making western signatories economically dependent on eastern countries;
 - (c) to avoid undue promotion of Soviet resources at the expense of those of the West or the third world;
 - (d) to avoid granting over-favourable credit terms to the eastern countries and not to tolerate their incurring too great a burden of debts;
 - (e) to refuse the principle of countertrade;
2. Adapt these principles accordingly in the light of results obtained in international negotiations on the limitation of armaments;
3. Urge the preparation, in the framework of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, of new international air navigation regulations to make a repetition of an incident such as occurred on 1st September 1983 impossible;
4. Investigate and report on all evidence of forced labour used on the Siberian gas pipeline.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1983 during the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (9th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 958).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 401***

The Council have noted with interest Recommendation 401 on economic relations with the Soviet Union and welcome the importance attached by the WEU Assembly to the security aspects of East-West trade.

A concerted, realistic and cautious approach towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in economic matters has long been a major concern of the WEU member countries. In this regard, the Council attach high importance to continuing western co-operation and consultation. They recall that western countries have met in various fora in order to discuss a common approach consistent with their political and security interests. Since 1982, a study dealing with these aspects of East-West economic relations has been undertaken within the Atlantic Alliance.

The Council recall that the outcome of this and other studies was reflected in the terms of various communiqués adopted at the conclusion of ministerial meetings such as those of the North Atlantic Council on 9th-10th June and 8th-9th December 1983.

The texts of both North Atlantic Council communiqués read as follows:

“Trade conducted on the basis of commercially sound terms and mutual advantage, that avoids preferential treatment of the Soviet Union, contributes to constructive East-West relations. At the same time, bilateral economic relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe must remain consistent with broad allied security concerns. These include avoiding dependence on the Soviet Union, or contributing to Soviet military capabilities. Thus, development of western energy resources should be encouraged. In order to avoid further use by the Soviet Union of some forms of trade to enhance its military strength, the allies will remain vigilant in their continuing review of the security aspects of East-West economic relations. This work will assist allied governments in the conduct of their policies in this field.”

The WEU member states consider that their security interests are best served by stable economic and political relations with the Soviet Union. The benefits of East-West trade to the Soviet and Eastern European economies must be weighed against this consideration, and against the advantages which such trade brings to western businesses and economies.

As they have already stated, the WEU member countries undertake to manage financial relations with the Warsaw Pact countries on a sound economic basis, including commercial prudence also in the granting of export credits.

The Council emphasise that the studies and consultations referred to above have been undertaken in a constructive and co-operative spirit. They have led to a clarification of national views and interests and to a greater common understanding of the issues at stake, thereby contributing to western unity and security. The member countries of WEU will therefore continue to seek ways of strengthening and intensifying this process within various bodies and at various levels.

The Council fully agree with the Assembly on the urgent need to prepare new international air navigation regulations with a view to making it impossible for an incident such as the one that occurred on 1st September 1983 to be repeated.

The Council therefore welcome the decision of the Council of the ICAO of 14th October 1983 to convene an extraordinary session of the ICAO Assembly commencing 24th April 1984 to adopt an amendment to the Chicago convention providing for an undertaking to abstain from recourse to the use of force against civil aircraft.

The Council learned of allegations of forced labour being used in the Soviet Union in the construction of the Siberian gas pipeline. They recall the special responsibilities of the ILO to watch over the application of international labour conventions. The ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations is at present examining the issue of forced labour in the Soviet Union and will report on its findings in March 1984. The committee's report will subsequently be submitted to the annual June ILO general conference.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th March 1984.

The Commission of the European Communities, taking account of the views of member states, including those of member states of WEU, has tabled a paper in OECD containing suggestions for a joint western approach to the problem of countertrade. The Commission has suggested that western nations should restate firmly their unwillingness to accept countertrade practices as a normal form of international trade, whilst at the same time expressing their readiness to discuss the practical problems that these practices present. In particular, the Commission has stated that it regards countertrade as a temporary and exceptional phenomenon which should be replaced as soon as possible by more normal forms of trade.

RECOMMENDATION 402¹***on Africa's rôle in a European security policy – Chad²***

The Assembly,

- (i) Condemning the invasion of Chad by Libyan armed forces as a threat to peace in an area which is of particular interest to the Western European countries;
- (ii) Considering that Libya is far better armed than the states of Central and West Africa as a whole;
- (iii) Considering that France's sending a military force to Chad at the request of its government and with the approval of a large number of African states is likely to discourage Libyan intervention;
- (iv) Considering that the respect of internationally-recognised frontiers is essential for the maintenance of peace on the African continent;
- (v) Approving the measures taken by France at the request of the Government of Chad to help to restore peace in Chad;
- (vi) Considering that the WEU member countries cannot disregard the maintenance of peace in Africa or the redeployment of a member's armed forces;
- (vii) Regretting that no member invoked Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty to call for relevant consultations between the signatories,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that France's partners are kept informed of the political and military measures taken as a result of the invasion of Chad by Libya;
2. Express the solidarity of the member countries in regard to the measures taken by France in Chad;
3. Examine the possible political and military consequences of these measures;
4. Express its desire for the early restoration of unity, integrity and peace in Chad.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1983 during the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (10th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Müller on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 957).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 402

The Council have given careful consideration to the Assembly's recommendation concerning the situation in Chad.

The member countries of WEU cannot remain indifferent to the crises which develop in Africa, especially when outside interference or intervention are involved. They have on various occasions exchanged views on this subject. However, WEU countries should clearly not take it upon themselves to interfere in the internal affairs of independent and sovereign countries.

With particular regard to Chad, this country has had almost nineteen years of civil war which has been fanned and fuelled from outside. The Chad Government has made its position clear before the OAU and the United Nations Security Council. In August 1983, it appealed to the French Government to help check the advance of foreign troops. Since then, the situation in the field has not basically changed. Nevertheless, localised military actions have been launched from the northern region of Chad and there is still a fear of a more widespread resumption of the fighting.

It also seems clearer than ever that a settlement of the Chad conflict presupposes the withdrawal of the foreign invading forces who are occupying the northern part of the country and also reconciliation between the people of Chad. In this connection, the member countries of WEU can only regret the failure of the meeting organised by the OAU at the beginning of January 1984 aimed at initiating this process and voice the hope that the interested parties will find ways of achieving a peaceful solution.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th March 1984.

*Written questions 235 and 237 to 246 and replies of the Council
to written questions 235, 237 to 239, 241 to 243, 245 and 246*

QUESTION 235

*put by Mr. Cox
on 13th September 1983*

In reply to questions in the Assembly on 7th June 1983, General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, said: "There are over 2,100 SS-20 warheads deployed. There are 351 launchers deployed today. There are three warheads to each launcher and there is a second missile deployed at the launcher site... there is some uncertainty whether there may be three missiles deployed at each launcher..."

This warhead count is double that of the latest NATO Nuclear Planning Group estimate in the communiqué of 23rd March 1983 which states that: "...the Soviet Union now has 351 launchers for the... SS-20 missiles deployed and operational, comprising 1,053 warheads."

Does the Council agree with General Rogers' estimate of SS-20 warhead numbers, and was he authorised to give it?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 1st February 1984*

The Council, having consulted NATO on the question put by the honourable parliamentarian, are able to provide the following information:

The number of 351 operational SS-20 missiles was valid on 7th June 1983. This figure was published earlier, for example, in the communiqué of the Nuclear Planning Group held on 23rd March 1983. The present number of operational SS-20 missiles is 378.

The figures of SS-20 warheads given by NATO normally encompass only warheads on launchers if not specifically stated as being otherwise. However, SS-20 launchers can be reloaded and the system's operational concept envisages reload missiles in its operational units.

No authorisation is required to use this information.

QUESTION 237

*put by Mr. Lenzer
on 21st September 1983*

Does the Council agree that the Airbus 320 is absolutely vital for the future of the European aircraft industry?

Is the Council aware that, if this aircraft is not produced, Boeing will have a world monopoly for this type of aircraft?

Will the Council urge member governments to give their financial and political backing to the production of the Airbus 320?

Which airlines have already shown an interest in this type of aircraft?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 15th December 1983*

1. The industrial partners and the governments participating in the Airbus programme recognise the need to develop a more comprehensive range of Airbus products in order to enhance the competitive position of the European civil aerospace industry. The governments involved are aware that the industrial partners are concentrating their efforts on fulfilling the necessary conditions for the launching of the A-320 programme.

2. McDonnell-Douglas has recently expressed a firm intention to develop new versions of its intermediate DC-9 series of aircraft, although it has decided to abandon the launch of its new generation short/medium-range aircraft MD-90. In the circumstances, the possibility is that Boeing will have the monopoly of the new 120-150 seat aircraft class. Moreover, Boeing will remain the only aircraft producer in the world able to offer a complete product range covering short-, medium- and long-range aircraft.

3. The member governments have signified their willingness to consider support for the launch and development of the Airbus A-320 provided it can be demonstrated that the programme has sound prospects of commercial viability.

4. In principle an aircraft of the A-320 type is of possible interest to all airlines operating older design aircraft of this size which will need to be replaced from the late 1980s onwards. Orders for the A-320 have been placed by Air France, Air Inter and British Caledonian. Negotiations between Airbus Industrie and other airlines are continuing.

QUESTION 238

*put by Mr. Blaauw
on 30th September 1983*

Could the Council inform the Assembly when France is expected to decide on procurement of an airborne warning and control system?

What is the place of the British AWACS unit in the overall NATO system?

What will be the place of the French system in the European AWACS cover?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 15th December 1983*

France is considering the procurement of an airborne warning system and funding is provided for in the 1984-88 military programme law. At present the appropriate departments of the French Defence Ministry are studying the various possible solutions, namely, a currently available United States solution (Boeing E-3A aircraft), a European solution that could be an adaptation of the British solution, or a French airframe with adaptation of the British radar.

The United Kingdom's airborne early warning capability is currently provided by Shackleton aircraft. This capability will be greatly improved as these are replaced by Nimrod AEW over the next few years. The aircraft are the United Kingdom's contribution to the NATO airborne early warning mixed force and will be interoperable with the Boeing E-3A (AWACS). The rôle of this contribution as an element of the NATO airborne early warning mixed force will depend on the operational concept and operational requirements of the major NATO commanders.

No decision regarding the choice has been taken. One of the objectives sought for the system is interoperability with the NATO air

defence systems, France of course having full responsibility of decision regarding the use of its system.

QUESTION 239

*put by Mr. Blaauw
on 30th September 1983*

Will a European procurement co-ordination body be set up to define joint specifications for the advanced combat aircraft for the 1990s?

If not, will there then be a tripartite group – United Kingdom, France, Germany?

If so, what is the timetable for defining such specifications?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 1st February 1984*

Representatives of the air staffs of five European countries, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, have been meeting in recent months to examine the operational characteristics for a future European fighter aircraft which might meet their potential national requirements for the 1990s and beyond. As a result of the progress made in these talks, it is anticipated that they will be followed by exploratory discussions among a number of nations of the technical and industrial possibilities of meeting such a requirement. Before the completion of this phase it would be premature to prejudge what type of co-operation could be set up: this would be the purpose of the next phase, the starting date of which has not yet been decided but which could be some time during 1984.

The chances of co-operation on a future European fighter aircraft are perfectly realistic and, in spite of the uncertainties that may be felt in this complex field where there are many underlying industrial interests, it is important to be optimistic about the results of the present efforts to harmonise requirements.

QUESTION 240

*put by Mr. Bassinet
on 13th October 1983*

Since European co-operation in armaments matters is essential, can the Council give

the Assembly information about the tripartite discussions between France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom in Paris on 21st September 1983?

Will co-operation in overall research and development be strengthened?

Is standardisation possible for NATO frigates, guided anti-tank weapons, helicopters and above all tactical combat aircraft?

*
* *

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

QUESTION 241

*put by Mr. Blaauw
on 20th December 1983*

Would the Council inform the Assembly of the consequences and implementation of the Colombo-Genscher plan for Western European Union with reference to the summit conference at Stuttgart, where the heads of state and government decided to postpone any action up to 1988, or for five years after the 1983 Stuttgart conference?

What might be the influence, if any, of the Athens summit conference on this postponement?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 5th June 1984*

The heads of state or government and the foreign ministers of the ten member states of the European Community signed the solemn declaration on European union at the European Council in Stuttgart on 19th June 1983. This document is the product of a "Genscher-Colombo initiative" which proposed a "European act".

The declaration constitutes a concrete, pragmatic step on the path towards a European union. Its basic goals are to bring existing achievements closer together, incorporate new areas into co-operation among the Ten, expand policies already being pursued and improve existing mechanisms.

The declaration is a political instrument, whose high political value is underscored by the

signatures of the heads of state or government and the foreign ministers. The member states have thus assumed a political commitment by which their future action will be measured.

In a so-called review clause, the option of a future treaty on European union is held open. The declaration is to be subjected to a general review as soon as the progress achieved towards European unification justifies such action, but not later than five years after signature of the declaration (i.e. 1988).

The Ten will, in accordance with the political undertaking entered into on 19th June 1983, continue their efforts in implementing the solemn declaration on European union.

QUESTION 242

*put by Mr. Tummers
on 21st December 1983*

Would the Council be prepared to promote the use of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee as the international secretariat of the Independent European Programme Group, which has no secretariat?

Could such a secretariat not contribute an effective link between WEU and the Independent European Programme Group and, indirectly, between WEU and NATO?

Could it not also establish a link between armaments procurement and armaments control?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 14th May 1984*

1. It is the Council's view that existing machinery and manpower should be used to optimum effect.

2. Use of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee by the Independent European Programme Group would require a decision by the IEPG and a decision by the WEU Council. As the Assembly is aware, the membership of the two bodies is different.

The Council are prepared to consider whether some kind of arrangement as suggested in the question would be feasible, at least as far

as WEU member countries are concerned. Among the many criteria for appreciation which should be taken into account within the framework of this examination, consideration should obviously be given to the question of whether such an arrangement might contribute to greater effectiveness as regards armaments co-operation in Europe as well as in the Atlantic Alliance.

3. As regards the last paragraph of the question, the Council would like to await further developments in the field of the activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments. As the Assembly has been informed, the Council intend to examine ways in which the Agency for the Control of Armaments could be involved in fields other than the present one.

QUESTION 243

*put by Mr. Tummers
on 21st December 1984*

Will the Council inform the Assembly of the results of its deliberations regarding the possible revision of the inspections conducted by the Agency for the Control of Armaments and indicate the general guidelines governing its approach to this matter?

How could the Agency's nearly thirty years of experience as a verification body be exploited in the context of the armaments control negotiations?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 20th March 1984*

The Council wish to inform the Assembly that their deliberations regarding their examination of the list in Annex IV to Protocol No. III have not come to an end yet.

The Council intend further to examine ways in which the Agency for the Control of Armaments could be involved in fields other than the present one.

The Council will inform the Assembly as soon as possible after the completion of their examination of this subject.

QUESTION 244

*put by Mr. Wilkinson
on 24th January 1984*

The European market for military flight simulators and training systems for the decade 1984-94 would amount to some \$8 billion – France \$286 million, Germany \$339 million, United Kingdom \$311 million – and further sizeable sums of money for Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands.

Would the Council promote a joint or at least co-ordinated effort by the countries concerned, not so much for existing basic needs but for new aircraft, helicopters and other weapon systems?

*
* *

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

QUESTION 245

*put by Mr. Lenzer
on 28th February 1984*

Will the Council examine President Mitterrand's initiative in calling for Western European co-operation on a defensive early warning station in space?

Would not such a challenge constitute a step towards countering any future threat, promote Western European cohesion, advance European space efforts and foster the modernisation of Western European aerospace and computer industries?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 14th May 1984*

The Council, which have always paid close attention to the space efforts of the European countries, have taken due note of the remarks made by the President of the French Republic at The Hague on 7th February last concerning a "European space community".

They nevertheless consider it too early to state a view as to how the Council might follow up his statement.

QUESTION 246

*put by Mr. Wilkinson
on 12th March 1984*

Why has it not been possible in the last thirty years to set up a workable procedure for concerting views agreed to by all parties to allow the Standing Committee of Staff Associations of the co-ordinated organisations, the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts, the Co-ordination Committee of member governments and the Committee of Secretaries-General to discuss the staff problems of the co-ordinated organisations and reach salary decisions in time and not six to nine months later?

What are the main difficulties involved?

Would the Council say whether they are willing to call for the formation of a group of experts to discuss and work out such procedure in order to achieve a consensus between all the parties involved?

Is it true that the co-ordinated organisations, and especially Western European Union, are no longer inclined to recruit staff on a permanent basis and, if so, what future possibilities will there be of acquiring a pension in the national framework of each member country?

In view of the diminishing purchasing power of salaries, is it not important to agree on acceptable working conditions for all staff in the co-ordinated organisations?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 29th May 1984*

1, 2 and 3. While the questions raise matters of general concern to all the co-ordinated organisations, the Council can only reply in the light of experience in WEU.

The procedure for determining annual adjustments in the emoluments of staff serving in the co-ordinated organisations is necessarily lengthy, when it is borne in mind that proposals for such adjustments have to be made in accordance with certain measures accepted by the councils of the co-ordinated organisations.

The method of salary adjustment provides, in respect of A and L grades, for the gathering of statistical data on the movement of civil service salaries in seven reference countries; for B and C grades, periodic surveys are made of the corresponding salaries paid by the best local employers in each of the host

countries and the results of these surveys are updated at the adjustment date (1st July of each year). On the basis of these figures a negotiation process then follows in which consensus and agreement are being sought among:

- (1) seven international organisations, each operating in special and differing circumstances, which jointly draw up salary scale proposals;
- (2) seven staff associations with whom these proposals must be discussed;
- (3) twenty-nine sovereign member governments, each with their particular national economic situations and budgetary policies, which make proposals to the councils through the Co-ordinating Committee.

This process requires sufficient opportunities for discussion and deliberation among the representatives of member states of organisations and of staff associations. They endeavour to concert their views on various, complex and often very detailed questions of staff and salary problems. The main difficulty involved is to find solutions which take account of all the concerns expressed and of all the wishes brought forward and which are, at the same time, acceptable to all as a consensus.

The Council recognise the imperfections of the present procedures within co-ordination and in particular the resultant delays in submitting recommendations and conclusions to governments. They are endeavouring, in cooperation with the secretaries-general and the staff associations, to seek improvements. At this stage there is no agreement between organisations that any practical purpose would be served in calling on a group of experts.

4. Western European Union may recruit new staff on contracts of limited duration of three/five years, as do other co-ordinated organisations, thus ensuring flexibility and allowing for variations in staff requirements. Article 11 of the WEU Staff Rules provides for this possibility. Contracts may be renewed after expiration, depending on circumstances.

Pension rights in the national framework inevitably depend on length of previous national service if any, age and national regulations.

5. It is, of course, important that working conditions shall be acceptable. Taking account of the foregoing and the relevant staff rules, the Council are confident that this is the case for the staff of Western European Union. It is, however, recognised that the situation must be kept under review in changing national and international circumstances.

Reactivation of WEU¹

The working group instructed by the Council and the political directors to examine the prospects for reactivating WEU considered that this question could be approached from three different angles as follows:

- Why reactivate WEU now?
- What content would such a reactivation have?
- What would be the implementing procedures?

The replies to each of these questions were as follows:

1. WEU is at present the only European organisation empowered by treaty to discuss defence and security matters. It has a well-developed institutional structure, in particular a Council and a parliamentary Assembly. Its reactivation is prompted by the following *considerations*:

1.1. Consultation and joint in-depth reflection by the member countries of WEU are needed on the problems liable to affect their security, together with a more assertive European presence in the field of defence and security.

1.2. The international situation and especially the continuing build-up of Soviet military forces deployed against Western Europe are a matter of major concern.

1.3. As partners in the Atlantic Alliance, the member states of WEU are aware of the need to step up their contribution to the transatlantic dialogue.

1.4. It is important that public opinion be involved in the debate about defence and security, principally through an improved dialogue between the WEU Council and the Assembly and by raising the profile of the activities of those bodies.

In these circumstances, a better utilisation of WEU would demonstrate that the member countries have the will to reflect jointly and in depth on the conditions of their security, in the face of the threat they have to meet. This will, however, require a determined effort to adapt and revive the organisation.

Such reactivation must, and perfectly well can, be achieved with due regard for the

areas of competence of the other existing Atlantic and European institutions. This will require an exchange of information, taking into account the activities of these institutions:

- As regards the Atlantic Alliance, with which WEU has very close links for co-operation under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty (Articles IV and VII), the proposed reactivation should be seen as a contribution to the cohesion of the alliance itself and not as an attempt to create a substitute for it. It is along these lines that the other members of the alliance, who are not members of WEU, would be kept informed; the ambassadors of the Seven to the alliance could play a useful rôle in this respect.

- Whereas the Ten, as they declared at Stuttgart, are called upon to discuss the political and economic aspects of security, this does not at present extend to the field of defence. A reactivation of WEU would serve as an example of what can be achieved through co-operation on the European plane, and as a device to keep this important area of European co-operation active which the Community and the Ten are at the present unable to exploit to the extent that some of them would wish.

2. As to the *content*, a reactivation of WEU should lead to a fuller dialogue on topics of common and major interest, taking into consideration the European dimension of security questions.

2.1. An urgent topic is the growing threat to Europe in its various guises, i.e. military, political and psychological. This is a problem which, unquestionably, can profitably be discussed within the Seven, without duplicating work and studies carried out elsewhere. Such a discussion among Europeans is even complementary as it may be conducted from a different and specific angle. Moreover, European public opinion expects its leaders to give thought to the problem and to present reasoned arguments which meet its preoccupations and worries.

2.2. The discussions could, as provided for by Article VIII.3 of the treaty, also focus on the effects of the international situation on European security. Even if the Seven have no special interests to express on all these problems, they at least have specific viewpoints and ideas.

2.3. Another topic could be ways of strengthening the transatlantic dialogue in all its forms.

1. Text authorised for publication by the WEU Council of Ministers, Paris, 12th June 1984.

2.4. In the field of arms co-operation, the magnitude of the tasks to be accomplished in Europe – in particular as regards the use of new technologies to strengthen conventional defence – demands that no opportunity for consultation at European level be overlooked. Without encroaching on bodies such as the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) or the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), which have their own structure and responsibilities, WEU could play a useful rôle as a forum for discussion and a source of political impetus.

3. As regards *implementing procedures*, this reactivation of WEU should lead to greater use of the existing institutions, with a number of changes. Special attention should be directed to the pair formed by the Council and the Assembly.

3.1. *The Council* has an essential rôle to play.

– It fulfils this rôle more particularly when it meets at ministerial level. These meetings thus provide the required political impetus and at the same time enhance the work of the Permanent Council. They could be held twice a year.

– The Permanent Council could, in turn, meet more frequently, these meetings being expanded, as appropriate, to include senior central government staff (political directors;

experts on politico-military and defence questions, ...).

3.2. Any reactivation of the Council will have implications for its subsidiary bodies – the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

3.3. The *Assembly* has a vital rôle to play as the link with public opinion on such an important issue as security. To this end, it would appear that a dialogue of greater substance should be established between the Council and the Assembly, independently of the work done by each.

In this context, it might be envisaged that:

- the exchange of views between the Assembly and the Council should be directed primarily to the reactivation of WEU and how this is to be brought about. The value of earlier Assembly studies and reports on the subject should be borne in mind;
- the procedure for answering Assembly recommendations and written questions should be improved.

Quite clearly the work of the Council and that of the Assembly interact and the debates in one of them cannot fail to stimulate discussions in the other.

**OPINION ON THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1983¹**

*submitted on behalf of
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Mr. de Vries, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1983

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. de Vries, Rapporteur

- I. Preliminary considerations
- II. Budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1983
- III. Considerations on staff policy

APPENDICES

- I. WEU budget estimates for 1983
- II. Establishment of Western European Union
- III. Extract from the 159th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts
- IV. Extract from the 94th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts
- V. Evolution of expenditure on pensions paid by WEU since 1978
- VI. Extract from the report of the Joint Pensions Administrative Section
- VII. Recommendation 340 adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1979 and reply of the Council

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Haase, Beix (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, Biefnot, Bohl (Alternate: Jung), Enders, Ferrari Aggradi, Foschi (Alternate: Giust), Freeson (Alternate: Woodall), Hartmann, Hengel, Jeambrun, Morris (Alternate: Lord McNair), Oehler, Pollidoro, Rauti (Alternate: Mitterdorfer), Schmitz, Stokes, van Tets, de Vries.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1983

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter ;
- (ii) Having taken note of the contents ;
- (iii) Considering that :
 - (a) the future structure of the ministerial organs of Western European Union depends essentially on the tasks devolving upon them in the framework of political decisions to be taken on this matter by the Council ;
 - (b) it would consequently be pointless at the present juncture to express an opinion on the cost-effectiveness of these organs ;
 - (c) it would however be possible to make budgetary savings if the restructuration of the ministerial organs included unification of the Paris and London headquarters and the integration of their services ;
 - (d) in preparing the budget the criterion of "zero growth" was applied,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine the possibility of uniting the London and Paris headquarters with a view to integrating joint services ;
2. Adopt flexible criteria in its staff recruitment policy, in view of new tasks to be accorded to the ministerial organs of Western European Union ;
3. Specify that the criterion of "zero growth" applies only to operating expenses and that expenditure and income relating to pensions should therefore be set out in a separate section of the budget ;
4. Inform the Assembly of the stage reached in the studies on improving the status of staff announced in the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 340 and the participation of staff associations in the consultation and conciliation structure of the co-ordinated organisations.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. de Vries, Rapporteur)

I. Preliminary considerations

1. Article VIII (c) of the Charter of the Assembly states that :

“The Assembly shall express its views in the form of an opinion or recommendation on the annual budget of Western European Union as soon as it has been communicated.”

To this end, a member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration is responsible for presenting a report which has to be technical since only budgetary and administrative questions are the responsibility of this committee.

Indeed, there can be no question of it tackling problems relating to the activities of the Council, the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Public Administration Committee from the moment the Presidential Committee refers these problems to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

2. However, within the specific framework in which it has to give its opinion, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration wishes to examine the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU from the cost-effectiveness point of view to ensure that the tasks entrusted to these bodies are fulfilled in the most economical and efficient manner.

Here it should be recalled that in 1981 the Council conducted a study of the tasks of the ministerial organs of WEU with an eye to achieving the greatest efficiency. The conclusions of this study have not been communicated to the Assembly. However this may be, it should be noted that the budgets for 1982 and 1983 show no change in the structure of the ministerial bodies.

II. Budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1983

3. As is the usual practice, the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1983 is presented in three different sections, one for each organ (cf. summary table, Appendix I). However, since each section is organised according to the same criteria, this budget can be examined as

a whole. Four main categories of expenditure then emerge :

- staff,
- travel,
- general services,
- pensions,

each of which should be examined separately.

4. Staff

4.1. Expenditure on staff consists of the emoluments (salaries and various allowances) for 128 officials in Paris and in London (cf. table of establishment, Appendix II). This represents 80% of the total budget expenditure. It is emphasised that emoluments – as in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly – correspond, for each grade and step, to the scales applied in the co-ordinated organisations. These scales are adjusted periodically in accordance with the procedure agreed upon by the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts in its 159th report. In this respect it is to be noted that the application of the criteria for adjusting salaries set out in this report (cf. extract at Appendix III) is detrimental to the staff in that it involves a not negligible reduction in its purchasing power. This is due mainly to the introduction of a parameter for making a comparison with national civil services and the application of price evolution indices in low inflation countries¹.

Furthermore, to take account of the present economic recession and the budgetary constraints on governments, the Co-ordinating Committee, in its 191st report, introduced a levy to moderate grade A and L salaries by 1.5% with effect from 1st July 1983, 3% with effect from 1st July 1984 and 4.5% with effect from 1st July 1985. There is no choice therefore but to note that the WEU staff is taking part in the effort of the governments of member countries to reduce the rate of inflation and emerge from the present economic crisis.

¹ The Inter-Organisation Section for studying salaries and prices has calculated that from 1st July 1979 to 1st July 1983 the purchasing power of Grades A6 and A7 fell by 11%, other A grades by 8% and B grades by 3%. Conversely, the purchasing power of C grades increased by 2%.

4.2. However, the committee feels that an answer might be found to the question of savings in this category of expenditure if the structure of the ministerial organs were examined more closely to assess its cost-effectiveness.

Indeed, where the Secretariat-General in London is concerned, one might wonder whether forty-eight persons are not too many for the present activities of that body: as was noted in the report submitted at the first part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, "far from extending its consultations the Council for its part persists in clinging to a very restrictive concept of its rôle".¹

In this perspective, a realistic assessment of the programme of work to be accomplished in the framework of an objective revision of the various tasks carried out by the staff might lead to a more efficient and less costly organisation of the Secretariat-General in London. In this connection, it should be underlined that the Secretary-General has already adopted a tighter staff recruitment policy: certain vacant posts are in fact not filled immediately and the relevant duties are taken over by other officials. Such is the case, for instance, of the post of Legal Adviser (Grade A6) which has remained vacant in the Secretariat-General following the death of its holder. When legal questions arise, the Secretary-General consults the Head of the Administration and Legal Affairs Division of the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

Of even more importance is that the existence of two WEU headquarters, one in London and the other in Paris, duplicates the duties of general services and translation and administrative sections. With particular regard to the latter, it is interesting to note the following staff figures:

	<i>London</i>	<i>Paris</i>
Assistant Secretary-General	1 HG	
Head of division	1 A5	1 A6
Head of the Finance and Administrative Section		1 A5
Deputy Head of the Finance and Administrative Section		1 A4
Deputy head of division	1 A3	
Administrator	1 A2	
Assistants	2 B4	3 B4
Secretary	1 B3	
Accountants		2 B2
	7	8

1. Document 944, paragraph 39.

Thus, fifteen officials of all grades are responsible for managing the budget of the three ministerial organs of WEU (amounting to F 25,359,890 plus £1,096,345) and the administration of 128 persons.

This consideration confirms the sound opinion expressed by Mr. Cavaliere in the debate on the Assembly's budget for 1984 that "if the two separate offices in Paris and London were given up, the WEU institutions could be reorganised for the better and better use could be made of the funds provided by member states for the Assembly"¹.

The structure of the Agency for the Control of Armaments seems to concord with the organisation laid down in Article IV of Protocol No. IV. However, under paragraph 2 of that article, its organisation may be modified by decision of the Council. The proposals made by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in his report on the application of the Brussels Treaty actually pointed either to a reduction in the staff of the Agency because of the fewer controls carried out or to a redistribution of responsibilities and tasks if the Agency was assigned new duties in examining and assisting the Council on technical questions which might be useful in various negotiations on disarmament or the control of armaments.

The same idea is valid for the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. In this respect the committee recalls the many proposals the Assembly has made for attributing new tasks to this ministerial body. Reference should also be made to the recommendations adopted during the last session on reports by Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Wilkinson and Lord Northfield.

On the basis of the preceding observations, the committee feels that, while generally speaking the staff of the ministerial organs may be considered too numerous for their present activities, they would be able to handle new or perhaps increased activities if organised more efficiently.

However this may be, the implementation of a programme for gradually modifying the structure and, in particular, agreeing to have a single seat would allow substantial savings to be made in future years, quite apart from the fact that by facilitating internal communications between the various WEU bodies their efficiency would be enhanced.

1. Proceedings of the twenty-ninth ordinary session, second part, eighth sitting, page 126.

5. Travel

Compared with overall expenditure, the cost of travel represents only a small percentage: about 1.6% for the Secretariat-General in London and the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee in Paris and 2% for the Agency for the Control of Armaments. The difference is due to the fact that many of the journeys of officials of the Agency are for on-the-spot verifications which are one of its institutional activities.

Even so, if the structure of the three organs of WEU were modified as explained in an earlier paragraph, significant savings in this category of expenditure might also be made.

6. General services

The sums allocated for general services may be considered to be the minimum necessary for the maintenance of the two seats in London and Paris (maintenance, repairs, fuel, electricity, water, cleaning, telephone, insurances) and for a limited renewal of furniture and equipment. Here it should be noted that the two ministerial organs of WEU in Paris (the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee) and the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly have effectively unified the services of joint interest under the responsibility of the secretariat of the SAC. Thus the items under sections B and C of the budget of the ministerial organs (and in the Assembly's budget) show the contribution of each body to the total expenditure (joint charges) to be established as follows:

ACA	45%
SAC	25%
Office of the Clerk	30%

Regarding the renewal of equipment and furniture, it is to be noted that for the sake of economy the credits requested are very small and do not allow all the furniture which wears out to be replaced nor the office equipment to be modernised. Here the committee believes greater attention should be paid to this category of expenditure. After all, the state of WEU's buildings and offices is in a way the outward manifestation of its vitality and confidence in its own future.

7. Pensions

This category of expenditure raises a fundamental problem discussed in the Assembly during its debate on its draft budget for 1984.

It is useful to recall that when the pension scheme was introduced the Co-ordinating Com-

mittee examined the various possible systems for financing it and concluded that "the only solution which can be recommended is to charge the full cost of retirement pensions to the budgets of the co-ordinated organisations". (Cf. extract from the 94th report at Appendix IV.)

The adoption of this solution brought an immediate benefit to the governments since they immediately received the very high sums paid by the staff for validating previous service; but as the years pass and as officials retire the cost of pensions which was covered by the contributions of staff still in service has risen well above income with the result that the annual contribution to be paid by the governments is becoming increasingly heavy. (Cf. table at Appendix V showing the evolution of expenditure on pensions in WEU.)

Because of this, a national delegation to the Co-ordinating Committee has envisaged the possibility of having one or several actuaries make a study of the cost of the pension scheme with a view to changing if necessary the rate of contributions. This question is now being discussed at the co-ordinating level. Where WEU itself is concerned, it appears that certain delegations are advocating including the sums for new pensions in the calculation of the rate of increase of the total budget fixed by the application of the zero growth criterion. This is tantamount to saying that the increase in credits for pensions should, at least partly, be compensated by reductions in credits for other heads of the budget. The committee cannot share this view - which also concerns the Assembly's budget - since in the long term the operational part of the budget of all the WEU bodies might be reduced to the point where its work would be so shackled as to grind to a halt.

The nature and scope of the work of the Council and of the ministerial organs is a political problem which cannot be decided by an administrative measure. It must be examined on its own merits and not in the context of how economies can be made to meet the increasing cost of pensions.

The zero growth criterion should therefore be applied during this period of serious world economic crisis to operating expenses alone, pensions being an acquired right of retired staff and an obligation for the governments of the member countries which have received the capital sums paid by the staff into the provident fund. To this end, it would be desirable for all the expenditure and receipts in regard to pensions to be set out in a separate part of the budget. The figures should also show the cost of participating in the operation of the joint pensions administrative section of the co-ordi-

nated organisations, which is at present an item in the budget of the Secretariat-General (Chapter A, III, 5m).

This joint section is responsible for the administration of pensions; at the end of 1983 it submitted to the Co-ordinating Committee an annual progress report, an extract of which is at Appendix VI. The ad hoc section of the budget should also indicate the evolution of expenditure for the payment of pensions for the next five years on the basis of estimates of staff due for retirement.

III. Considerations on staff policy

8. Traditionally, in examining the budget of the ministerial organs the committee describes the development of certain problems which specifically concern staff. These problems have already been set out in Recommendation 340, adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1979, to which the Council gave a provisional answer. Since that date the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts has continued, inter alia, its "feasibility study on comparison of duties, grades and levels of remuneration in the co-ordinated organisations, other international organisations, certain civil services and certain private sector firms".

No decision has yet been reached on this question which clearly is of great complexity. The Committee of Secretaries-General of the Co-ordinated Organisations has already given its opinion:

- that a firm of advisers or university experts should be invited to carry out this work;
- that this feasibility study should be undertaken only on the sine qua non

condition that the European Communities agree to take part.

As a follow-up to this study, it would be desirable for all problems connected with the status of the staff to be examined in detail, with particular regard to career possibilities to which all staff attach the greatest importance.

9. Finally, mention should be made of the problem of arrangements for concerting and reconciling the approaches of the three parties around the co-ordinating table, i.e.:

- the budgetary experts of the member countries,
- the representatives of the secretaries-general,
- the representatives of the staff.

The latter complain that they do not have the rights of initiative enjoyed, for instance, by representatives of a national civil service and hence cannot make proposals to the Co-ordinating Committee other than through the secretaries-general. In other words, they would ask for more active participation in the work of co-ordinating and regulating their rights which would give the staff represented the guarantee that their problems are well presented and defended in the arrangements for co-ordination.

It is evident that this problem can be examined only in the framework of the duties entrusted to the staff associations under the staff rules of the different organisations. This is a problem of co-ordination which has already been brought to the Council's attention in Recommendation 340, adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1979, and to which the Council has not yet given a final answer. The committee wishes this answer to be communicated to the Assembly without delay.

APPENDIX I

*WEU budget estimates for 1983**Proposed expenditure and income
for the total budget*

	Section A	Section B	Section C	TOTAL B + C
	£	Francs	Francs	Francs
<i>Expenditure</i>				
Salaries and allowances	1,307,145	9,927,490	20,636,600	30,564,090
Travel	26,850	207,200	512,700	719,900
Other operating costs	197,375	654,550	961,750	1,616,300
Purchase of furniture and equipment .	10,290	70,250	115,300	185,550
Building	—	45,000	81,000	126,000
Total ordinary costs	1,541,660	10,904,490	22,307,350	33,211,840
Pensions costs	113,290	1,390,000	2,676,500	4,066,500
TOTAL for all costs	1,654,950	12,294,490	24,983,850	37,278,340
<i>Income</i>				
WEU tax	484,395	3,495,600	7,197,300	10,692,900
Other receipts	28,750	95,000	200,000	295,000
Total ordinary receipts	513,145	3,590,600	7,397,300	10,987,900
Pension receipts	45,460	258,550	672,000	930,550
TOTAL for all receipts	558,605	3,849,150	8,069,300	11,918,450
NET TOTAL (whole budget) ¹	1,096,345	8,445,340	16,914,550	25,359,890
Budget surplus 1981 (-)	80,102	426,331	1,253,340	1,679,671
Contributions required in 1983*	1,016,243	8,019,009	15,661,210	23,680,219
1. Increase 1983/1982.	- 4.48%	+ 9.73%	+ 2.75%	+ 4.97%

*Contributions**

	600ths	£	Francs
Belgium	59	99,930.56	2,328,554.87
France	120	203,248.60	4,736,043.80
Germany	120	203,248.60	4,736,043.80
Italy	120	203,248.60	4,736,043.80
Luxembourg	2	3,387.48	78,934.06
Netherlands	59	99,930.56	2,328,554.87
United Kingdom	120	203,248.60	4,736,043.80
	600	1,016,243.00	23,680,219.00

APPENDIX II

Establishment of Western European Union

	1983 budget				1982 budget				+ or -			
	A	B	C	Total	A	B	C	Total	A	B	C	Total
Secretary-General	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Deputy Secretary-General	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Director	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-
Assistant Secretary-General	1	1	-	2	1	1	-	2	-	-	-	-
Hors grade	3	1	1	5	3	1	1	5	-	-	-	-
A7	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-
6	1	-	3	4	1	-	3	4	-	-	-	-
5	2	1	6	9	2	1	6	9	-	-	-	-
4	-	4	8	12	-	4	8	12	-	-	-	-
3	3	-	1	4	3	-	1	4	-	-	-	-
2	2	-	2	4	2	-	2	4	-	-	-	-
A grades	8	5	21	34	8	5	21	34	-	-	-	-
L5	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
4	1	2	-	3	1	1	-	2	-	+1	-	+1
3	1	2	2	5	1	3	2	6	-	-1	-	-1
2	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
L grades	4	4	2	10	4	4	2	10	-	-	-	-
B5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	8	4	9	21	8	4	9	21	-	-	-	-
3	7	7	6	20	7	7	6	20	-	-	-	-
2	5	-	3	8	5	-	3	8	-	-	-	-
1	2	-	-	2	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
B grades	22	11	18	51	22	11	18	51	-	-	-	-
C5	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-
4	1	4	-	5	1	4	-	5	-	-	-	-
3	8	3	9	20	8	3	9	20	-	-	-	-
2	2	-	-	2	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
C grades	11	7	10	28	11	7	10	28	-	-	-	-
Total	48	28	52	128	48	28	52	128	-	-	-	-

A - Secretariat-General.

B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.

Secretariat-General

No.	Grade	— Function
1	HG	Secretary-General
2	HG	Deputy Secretary-General
3	HG	Assistant Secretary-General
4	A6	Legal Adviser
5	B4	Personal assistant to Secretary-General
6	B3	Bilingual shorthand-typist
7	B4	Private secretary to Deputy Secretary-General
8	B4	Personal assistant to Legal Adviser
		<i>General Affairs Division</i>
9	A5	Head of division
10	A3	Deputy head of division
11	A3	Committee secretary
12	B4	Assistant/verbatim writer
13	B3	Secretary/assistant
		<i>Administration and Personnel Division</i>
14	A5	Head of division
15	A3	Deputy head of division
16	A2	Administrative officer
17	B4	Assistant (Personnel)
18	B4	Assistant (Administration)
19	B3	Secretary
		<i>Linguist Division</i>
20	L5	Head of division
21	LT4	Reviser
22	LT3	Translator French/English
23	LT2	Translator English/French

No.	Grade	Function
		<i>Registry and production services</i>
24	A2	Head of registry
25	B4	Documentation clerk
26	B4	Head of typing pool
27	B3	Bilingual shorthand-typist
28	B3	Bilingual shorthand-typist
29	B3	Bilingual shorthand-typist
30*	B3	Bilingual shorthand-typist
31*	B2	Shorthand-typist
32	B2	Shorthand-typist
33	B2	Shorthand-typist
34	B2	Assistant (distribution)
35	B2	Assistant (reproduction)
		<i>General services</i>
36	B1	Telephonist
37	B1	Telephonist
38	C3	Chauffeur/Mechanic
39	C3	Chauffeur/Mechanic
40	C3	Maintenance supervisor
41	C2	Messenger
42*	C2	Messenger
		<i>Security</i>
43	C4	Chief security guard
44	C3	Security guard
45	C3	Security guard
46	C3	Security guard
47	C3	Security guard
48	C3	Security guard

* No credits included for these posts.

Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee

No.	Grade	Function
1	HG	Head of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee - Assistant Secretary-General <i>Office of the Assistant Secretary-General</i>
2	B4	In charge of the private office and the private secretariat
3	B3	Secretary/Bilingual shorthand-typist
4	B4	Archivist, responsible for distributing documents
15	B3	Documentation clerk/Secretary, bilingual shorthand-typist
5	C4	Driver mechanic <i>Responsible officials</i>
6	A5	Assistant to head of international secretariat
7	A4	Committee secretary
8	A4	Committee secretary
9	A4	Committee secretary <i>Linguistic staff</i>
10	LT4	Reviser
11	LI3	Interpreter
12	LT3	Translator and minute-writer
13	LT4*	Reviser <i>Secretariat group</i>
14	B4	Assistant
16	B3	Bilingual shorthand-typist
17	B3	Bilingual shorthand-typist
18	B3	Bilingual shorthand-typist
19	B3	Bilingual shorthand-typist

* This position is currently listed as LT3.

No.	Grade	Function
		<i>Administrative and general staff</i>
22	A4	Deputy to Head of Finance and Administration Section, Head of Finance and Account Office
21	B4	Administrative assistant
23	C4	Roneo operator
24	C4	Storekeeper and technician
25	C4	Security guard
26	C3	Security guard
27	C3	Security guard
28	C3	Security guard
17 bis	B3	Telephonist

TOTAL : 28 posts

Agency for the Control of Armaments

No.	Grade	Function
1	HG	Director
2	A2	Director's assistant
3	A7	Deputy Director
4	B4	Assistant
		<i>Director's office</i>
5	A4	Head of Director's office, Security Officer
6	A3	Head of central documentation office
7	A2	Assistant, head of documentation office
8	B4	Assistant, documentation office clerk
9	LT3	Translator English/French
10	LT3	Translator French/English
11	B3	Secretary
12	B2	Shorthand-typist
13	B4	Assistant, head of central registry Assistant to the Security Officer
14	B3	Secretary
		<i>Other services and security service</i>
42	C5	Head designer and duplicator
43	C3	Driver mechanic
44	C3	Security guard
45	C3	Security guard
46	C3	Security guard
47	C3	Security guard
48	C3	Security guard
49	C3	Security guard
50	C3	Security guard
51	C3	Security guard
52	B3	Telephonist

No.	Grade	Function
		<i>Information and Study Division</i>
15	A6	Head of Information and Studies Division
16	A5	Expert, armaments industry
17	A5	Expert, chemical and biological weapons
18	A4	Expert, land armaments
19	A4	Expert, air armaments
20	A4	Expert, naval armaments
21	A4	Deputy to Head of Division for General Questions
22	B4	Assistant
23	B3	Secretary
24	B3	Secretary
		<i>Inspection and Control Division</i>
25	A6	Head of Inspections Division
26	A5	Expert, armaments industry
27	A5	Expert, guided missiles
28	A4	Expert, biological and chemical weapons
29	A5	Expert, air armaments
30	A4	Expert, land armaments
31	B4	Assistant
32	B3	Secretary
		<i>Administration and Legal Affairs Division</i>
33	A6	Head of Administration and Legal Affairs Division
34	B4	Assistant
35	A4	Legal expert
36	A5	Head of Finance and Administration Section
37	B2	Assistant accountant
38	B4	Accountant
39	B2	Senior clerk
40	B4	Head of group responsible for general services
41	B4	Accountant

APPENDIX III

*Extract from the 159th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts**Revision of remuneration adjustment procedure
New rules*

CHAPTER I

*General provisions**Article 1*

1. The Co-ordinating Committee shall carry out every year a review of remuneration of the staff of the co-ordinated organisations on the basis of a dossier compiled by the secretaries-general and containing their proposals as well as the elements for information and assessment provided for under the present rules.

2. The Co-ordinating Committee and the representatives of the secretaries-general shall agree at the beginning of each review on the timetable of work and the latest date on which the recommendations of the committee shall be submitted to the Councils.

Article 2

For the purpose of the present rules, "remuneration" shall mean, for the whole staff of the co-ordinated organisations, all the various elements which make up remuneration.

Article 3

These rules shall apply for the first time to the review of remuneration which takes effect from 1st July 1978. Should any amendments be made subsequently to these rules no provision which ceases to apply shall give rise to vested rights.

CHAPTER II

*Review of basic salaries of staff in categories A and L**Annual reviews**Article 4*

With effect from 1st July each year, and on the basis of comparable grades, the basic salaries of staff in categories A and L serving in Belgium shall be adjusted by the change in the international cost-of-living index in Belgium over the previous twelve months modified upwards or downwards by the applicable weighted average of the percentage changes in

real terms in the net remuneration in all the national civil services of the reference countries during the same period. This percentage adjustment shall be applied to the basic salary scales in force on 1st July of the previous year.

*Triennial reviews**Article 5*

1. The basic salaries of staff in categories A and L serving in Belgium shall be subjected to a full review every three years, based on the following criteria :

- (a) the increase in the cost of living in Belgium since the previous triennial review, on the basis of the international price index established in that country for the staff of the co-ordinated organisations, brought back to base 100 at the date on which that triennial review came into effect ;
- (b) the weighted average of the percentage changes in real terms that have taken place for comparable grades since the previous triennial review in the levels of net remuneration in the national civil services taken as reference ;
- (c) the level and trend of remuneration of staff of the European Communities and other international organisations ;
- (d) requirements in respect of staff recruitment in the co-ordinated organisations ;
- (e) the economic and social situation in the member countries of the co-ordinated organisations.

2. The starting date for the period of reference taken into consideration shall be the date from which the scales resulting from the previous triennial review took effect.

Article 6

For the purpose of Articles 4 and 5 above :

- (a) comparable grades means those grades of officials of national civil services whose duties correspond to those of category A staff of the co-ordinated organisations ;
- (b) the national civil services of the reference countries means the civil services of the following countries : Belgium, France,

Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom ;

- (c) net remuneration in the civil services means the arithmetic mean of gross minimum and maximum salaries to which are added all the other elements normally making up the remuneration of unmarried officials in the grade in question, but with the deduction of the amount of compulsory contributions to social security, and also income tax levied by the central authority on unmarried officials and calculated without taking into account non-automatic personal allowances ;
- (d) the applicable weighted average of percentage changes in real terms means the percentage obtained by the following operations :
- (i) taking into consideration in each national civil service of the grades comparable to those of category A staff ;
 - (ii) calculation, for each of these grades, of the changes in real terms of the relevant remuneration, by deflating the index for the trend in nominal salaries by the national index for consumer prices, the indices being brought back to base 100 at the date of effect of the last review of the same kind ;
 - (iii) calculation for each grade of the average percentage change for the whole sample by giving the data for each country considered the following weights : 9.6 for Belgium, 19.1 for France, 23.6 for Germany, 14.2 for Italy, 7.2 for Luxembourg, 10.2 for the Netherlands and 16.1 for the United Kingdom ;
 - (iv) calculation of the percentages to be applied by dividing the A grades into three groups, A7-A6, A5-A4, A3-A2, and calculating for each of these groups the arithmetic mean of the corresponding weighted percentages obtained for the whole of the sample.

Article 7

In the case of both annual and triennial reviews the basic salaries applicable in countries other than Belgium shall be obtained by multiplying the new basic salaries applicable to staff serving in Belgium by coefficients which ensure parity of purchasing power for all staff in the same grade and within-grade step.

CHAPTER III

Review of basic salaries of staff in categories B and C

Article 8

The basic salaries of staff in categories B and C shall be calculated on the basis of surveys conducted by the Inter-Organisations Section in member countries, among the best employers in these countries.

Article 9

1. The list of best employers in member countries shall include firms in the private sector, establishments in the public sector and international organisations. It shall be drawn up in agreement with the national authorities and transmitted to the Co-ordinating Committee for information, together with any subsequent modification.
2. Approximately half of the firms in the private sector shall be national, the other half multinational in character. The firms in the sample shall, so far as possible, be drawn from different sectors of the economy.
3. In order to maintain a certain degree of stability in the surveys, no new firm shall be added without valid reason to the sample used in the previous survey. The sample should not normally be modified to an extent exceeding 20% of the number of firms.

Article 10

1. The survey shall be carried out on the basis of the principles set out in CCG/W(73)1, clarified in the report by Working Party No. 16, document CCG/W(78)2 Revised. Its purpose shall be to establish, for each of the grades of categories B and C staff, the minimum and maximum basic salaries paid for comparable jobs by the employers in the member countries.
2. The results compiled for each of these jobs in firms in the private sector shall be :
 - (a) weighted by the numbers employed by the firms chosen in which the job under consideration exists ;
 - (b) calculated as the simple arithmetical average of the number of firms chosen in which the job under consideration exists.

The simple mean resulting from the operations described in (a) and (b) above shall determine the salary level for the job under consideration.

3. The results obtained from surveys of enterprises in the private sector, the public

sector and other international organisations shall carry weights of 80%, 10% and 10% respectively. If there is no international organisation in the member country concerned, the private sector percentage shall be increased to 90%.

4. However, the inclusion in the survey of the public sector of the member country concerned must not result in a reduction of the purchasing power of salaries of staff serving in the country unless the survey results reflect a general trend in that direction recorded in that country.

5. The percentages obtained as a result of the operations provided for in the present article shall be applied to the basic salaries of category B and C staff as they had been fixed

at 1st July of the previous year, with effect from 1st July of the current year.

Article 11

The surveys carried out by the Inter-Organisations Section shall take place every two years in turn in member countries where there are large numbers of staff of the co-ordinated organisations; in other member countries they shall normally take place every four years. Between two surveys the updating of the results so obtained, for the period between the survey date and the effective date of the annual review of salaries, shall be effected on the basis of information supplied by employers and by national delegations.

APPENDIX IV

Extract from the 94th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts

.....

PART II

Considerations which led the Co-ordinating Committee to the scheme which it recommends

31. The Co-ordinating Committee had to resolve three main questions :

- A. Should one think in terms of a number of separate schemes suited to the requirements of each organisation or adopt one single scheme applicable to all the organisations ?
- B. Depending on the choice made, what financing system(s) should be adopted ?
- C. On what principles and model should the standards applying to the pension scheme (or schemes) be based ?

A. Uniform scheme or separate schemes

32. Since the Council of Europe has its own pension scheme, it would theoretically have been possible to let each of the other organisations have its own scheme and, for example, to provide a scheme for the OECD as proposed by its Working Party on Staff Policy, but the Co-ordinating Committee considered that there would be the following serious objections to having separate schemes :

- (a) as the organisations concerned had for long operated a common system of remuneration which they had continually co-ordinated, it appeared illogical to adopt a different basis for pensions, which are a natural extension of salaries ;
- (b) as the benefits provided by the different pension schemes should theoretically be identical, the only difference among these schemes would lie in the method of financing them, but one could not disregard the risk that, if a scheme failed to provide the pensions laid down in its rules, it might become necessary to institute a co-ordination procedure for pensions under conditions of some difficulty ;
- (c) most important, there would be the risk that, if the schemes set up in the

different organisations developed on different lines, their staff would be continually making claims.

33. The Co-ordinating Committee therefore considers that it is clearly desirable as a matter of principle to set up a uniform pension scheme for all the co-ordinated organisations.

*B. Financing system**(a) Funding*

34. The Co-ordinating Committee considers that the need to guarantee a certain level of benefits is incompatible with a funded scheme, because the persistence of inflation in western countries makes it almost inevitable that there should in time be some subsidising from national budgets, i.e. at least a partial breach of the principle of funding.

(b) National scheme in the country of employment

35. If staff of the co-ordinated organisations joined the national pension scheme of the country in which they are serving, this would have the advantage of observing the principle of territoriality usually followed in social security matters and also of providing cover against the risk of sickness for retired staff, but the existence of a guaranteed level of benefits would result in staff being given advantages in addition to those granted by the national insurance system in the country. In view of the wide geographical dispersal of staff, the Co-ordinating Committee rules out this alternative which would be unduly complex and would involve administration costs out of proportion to the size of the group provided for.

(c) Pay-as-you-go system

36. Another possible way of financing would have been to use the pay-as-you-go technique whereby the proceeds of contributions paid by serving staff, or by the organisation on their behalf, would be shared immediately among the pensioners. The Co-ordinating Committee does not consider that this would be a reasonable solution for such a small group as the co-ordinated organisations, which does not seem likely to grow much. If in the long run the present rates of contribution (7% and 14%) proved to be inadequate, the further charge on member government funds would be exactly the

same as under a system financed out of budgets. In the short term, on the other hand, in view of the favourable ratio between serving staff and pensioners, a pay-as-you-go scheme would have the disadvantage that its apparent prosperity would encourage the payment of benefits at a high level, which it would be very difficult to reduce later as required by normal changes in the age structure of the group.

37. A more attractive solution at first sight would have been to affiliate the staff of the co-ordinated organisations to a pay-as-you-go scheme with a broader demographic base, as it would obviate the uncertainties to which their small numbers expose them, and this was in fact the solution proposed for the OECD alone by the group of actuaries whom the latter consulted.

38. This solution was attractive to governments, because in the case of the OECD it had been shown that benefits could thereby be provided, although admittedly at a low level, without changing the current contribution rate of 21%. It was also attractive for staff members, as in the case of the OECD it gave them the prospect of keeping all or part of their holdings in the provident fund.

39. However, the Co-ordinating Committee considers that such an arrangement would have the following considerable drawbacks :

- (a) uncertainty as to the future of the pay-as-you-go scheme to which the staff would be affiliated (such as the ANEP) making it necessary for states to commit themselves in certain circumstances to guaranteeing the payment of benefits out of the budgets of the organisations;
- (b) in the event of an organisation being wound up, the need to make a heavy compensation payment to the pension fund (such as the ANEP), or to accept a stoppage of pension payments from the fund, so again involving a charge on the budgets of the organisations and hence on the member states, when taking over this commitment ;

(c) financially speaking, if the demographic prospects of a scheme were unfavourable, the operation would become unsound, while if they were good, the operation would become a transfer from the economy of one member state to the budgets of the organisations, leading to undue distortion of the basis for sharing expenditure among the states. It was felt that endorsement of a system closely dependent on the future of the economy of one member state would be expecting too much of the member states as a whole ;

(d) the difficulty of transposing a solution devised for the OECD alone to the co-ordinated organisations as a whole. Affiliation to the ANEP – dependent on the affiliation of at least 66% of the staff – or to an equivalent French scheme might in the last resort be envisaged for organisations with their headquarters in France, but it could not be envisaged for the other organisations, as it would mean finding pay-as-you-go schemes outside France similar to the ANEP and prepared to accept their staff on equivalent conditions.

40. Taken as a whole, these disadvantages were felt by the Co-ordinating Committee to be serious enough to rule out the solution proposed for the OECD.

(d) Budgeting

41. As stated in paragraph 7 above, the Co-ordinating Committee considers that the only solution which can be recommended is to charge the full cost of retirement pensions to the budgets of the co-ordinated organisations. It has the merits of being flexible, easily managed and similar to known precedents (for example, the Communities, and the civil services of certain member countries). It would enable a single pension scheme to be established for the staff of the co-ordinated organisations in which pensions can be calculated and paid out by each organisation.

APPENDIX V

Evolution of expenditure on pensions paid by WEU since 1978

(a) Appropriations for pensions for the various organs of WEU (1978-1983)

	1978			1979			1980			1981			1982			1983		
	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)
	£	£		£	£		£	£		£	£		£	£		£	£	
Secretariat-General.....	666,705	27,425	4.11	786,660	66,420	8.44	895,600	81,500	9.10	1,021,160	104,160	10.20	1,113,957	104,880	9.41	1,028,515	67,830	6.59
Standing Armaments Committee.....	F 4,747,625	F 365,000	7.68	F 5,299,865	F 421,200	7.94	F 5,975,945	F 602,000	10.07	F 7,034,670	F 861,800	12.25	F 7,696,630	F 1,199,500	15.58	F 7,313,890	F 1,131,450	15.47
Agency for the Control of Armaments.....	10,207,655	704,300	6.89	11,928,930	2,007,400	16.82	13,013,155	1,905,000	14.63	14,907,470	2,217,100	14.87	16,461,940	2,803,100	17.02	14,910,050	2,004,500	13.44
Office of the Clerk.....	7,778,000	62,000	0.79	8,515,000	83,000	0.97	9,632,000	91,000	0.94	10,866,000	106,000	0.97	12,282,000	126,000	1.03	13,893,000	240,000	1.73

327

(b) Number of pensions paid out by WEU (1978-1983)

Pensions	1978					1979					1980					1981					1982					1983				
	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total
Retirement.....	4	16	8	1	29	5	17	8	1	31	7	19	8	1	35	7	17	9	1	34	7	18	13	2	40	7	20	14	3	44
Survivors'.....	1	5	1	1	8	1	7	2	1	11	1	8	3	1	13	1	10	3	1	15	1	9	3	1	14	1	9	3	1	14
Orphans'.....	3 ¹	-	-	1	4	3 ¹	1 ¹	-	1	5	1 ¹	2 ¹	-	1	4	-	1 ¹	-	1	2	-	1 ¹	-	1	2	-	1	-	1	2
Invalidity.....	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1
Totals.....	9	21	9	3	42	10	25	10	3	48	10	29	11	3	53	9	28	12	3	52	9	28	16	4	57	9	30	17	5	61
Total establishment ² ...	45	51	27	26	149	45	51	27	26	149	45	51	27	26	149	45	51	27	26	149	45	51	27	26	149	45	51	27	27	150

SG =Secretariat-General.

ACA =Agency for the Control of Armaments.

SAC =Standing Armaments Committee.

O of C =Office of the Clerk.

1. Paid in conjunction with a survivor's pension.

2. Excluding hors cadre officials.

APPENDIX VI

Extract from the report by the Joint Pensions Administrative Section

.....

II. *Work done*

5. The activities of the Joint Pensions Administrative Section during the financial year 1983 to be continued in 1984 may be summarised as follows :

In addition to their usual work, namely,

(i) for the study unit

- acting as the PACCO secretariat ;
- research, studies and reports ;
- documentation ;
- drafting information leaflets ;
- negotiating agreements on the transfer of pension rights ;
- proposing amendments to pension scheme instructions ;

(ii) for the two computation units

- managing monthly payments to some 1,400 pensioners ;
- processing tax adjustment data ;
- incorporating retroactive increases and changes in scales ;
- checking the files of new pensioners and assessing their pension entitlement,

the study unit and computation unit I played an active part in launching and carrying out two operations whose purpose was to extend and improve the quality of service to the co-ordinated organisations.

6. First, a new software package was introduced into the computerised management of pensions. Rather than amending the existing programme, which could no longer fully meet

the organisations' demands, the JPAS, after making a comparability study in 1982, went on in 1983 to a generalised and detailed analysis of the hard - and software required for an entirely new system. This incorporates strict checks ensuring greater reliability, and is designed to take advantage of the latest technical developments. As part of this task the JPAS revised all the monthly and annual printouts it supplies to the organisations.

With the valuable co-operation of the OECD computer services, the section hopes to complete this task in the coming year.

7. Secondly, with the agreement of the heads of administration, the section intends to standardise and simplify the questionnaire forms sent to pensioners as a regular check on entitlement, and also the vouchers they have to provide: pensioners had complained about their large number and complexity. There is a further advantage in that centralising these checks with the JPAS - which has all the necessary information, regularly updated, and the invaluable assistance of a computerised system - will relieve the organisations, if they so request, of a number of routine pension scheme management tasks.

The operation demanded a detailed study of current procedures in the five organisations and of the relevant documents. The JPAS has now moved on from the project and proposal stage to implementation, the first phase being semi-manual and the second complete computerisation.

8. Computation unit II, in addition to its usual tasks as set out above, has already succeeded in meeting most of the demands made on it by pensioners (issue of a monthly pay slip, etc.). It will continue its efforts to perfect the PMIS. Finally, it will do its best to supply all the facts and figures needed for better accounting and better management.

APPENDIX VII

*Recommendation 340 adopted by the Assembly
on 4th December 1979 and reply of the Council***RECOMMENDATION 340¹**
on improving the status of WEU staff²

The Assembly,

Welcoming the decision of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to grant a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for widows of male staff ;

Considering that the establishment of a single appeals board would be the logical follow-up to the establishment of a joint section for the administration of pensions ;

Again regretting that the Council has still not answered the Assembly's recommendation to set up a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations* :**

1. The creation of a single appeals board as soon as possible ;
2. The creation before 1983 of a joint body for the administration of pensions for staff of the co-ordinated organisations ;
3. The establishment of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy and in particular :
 - to review the structure of grades ;
 - to study the possibility of introducing a dual grading system at every level of the hierarchy ;
 - to study the type and length of contracts ;
 - to co-ordinate staff rules ;
 - to review the indemnity for loss of job ;
 - to study methods of transferring an official from one co-ordinated organisation to another ;
 - to make clear the financial consequences of their proposals ;

II. Invite the Secretary-General to inform WEU officials of all staff vacancies so that they may take advantage of all possibilities for promotion which may arise within the organisation.

* OECD, NATO, WEU, Council of Europe, ESA.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1979 during the second part of the twenty-fifth ordinary session (11th sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 824).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 340

Member governments have always been concerned that the pension scheme should be applied with maximum uniformity in all the co-ordinated organisations.

I. 1 and 2. However, the creation of a single appeals board specifically to deal with matters concerning pensions would only be feasible if the joint pensions administrative section were to be given the power to take decisions.

As it is, this body which started its operational work on 1st January 1980 and was set up with a view to achieving maximum uniformity in the implementation of the pension scheme is only an advisory body to the co-ordinated organisations. It should be noted therefore that final responsibility for the uniform application, entitlement and subsequent payment of pensions rests with each organisation and its secretary/director-general.

Commensurate therefore with the responsibility of each secretary-general and each autonomous organisation is the institution of an appeals board for each of those organisations with responsibilities covering all appeals arising out of the application of the staff rules.

The creation of a single appeals board to deal with pension matters and, even more, the establishment of a joint body for the administration of pensions as a legal entity could, in the interests of the staff, only be considered and gone into after an adequate running-in period – the length of which cannot be assessed at this stage – and in the light of experience.

Whilst not rejecting the idea of developments along the lines suggested by the Assembly, the Council therefore feel that any initiative of this nature would, in present circumstances, be premature. In this context it is recalled however that the Co-ordinating Committee, in its 149th report, recommended that a system of mutual information and concertation should be established among the appeals boards of the co-ordinated organisations in order to avoid their reaching different decisions regarding similar cases.

3. The Council have considered the possibility of setting up a committee of senior experts, but have come to the conclusion that the problems which such a group of experts would be qualified to consider should be discussed beforehand between the co-ordinated organisations themselves and, in the framework of the Co-ordinating Committee, with experts from the member governments.

Certain co-ordinating agencies are looking at the problem and any conclusions which may emerge from this consultation should be awaited.

In these circumstances, the Council recognise that the specific problems listed by the Assembly in point 1.3. of its recommendation should receive the attention of the organisation and, in particular, of its Secretary-General :

(a) With regard to the grading system and the introduction of a dual grading system the problems are still under consideration at the administrative level.

(b) The staff rules of each of the organisations contain many provisions, in particular regarding types and duration of contracts, which all have to take into account the specific circumstances of each organisation; nevertheless, those responsible within the organisation make every effort to harmonise these provisions wherever possible.

(c) The Council consider that the indemnity for loss of job is satisfactorily dealt with by the staff rules, particularly for staff members with long service in the organisation.

(d) The methods of transferring an official from one co-ordinated organisation to another are governed by both the staff rules and the pension scheme rules of each of the organisations concerned; as far as the Council are aware, this problem has given rise to little difficulty; only experience will show whether it will be possible in the future to consider simplifying these rules.

II. The Council can inform the Assembly that the Secretary-General has taken all the necessary measures to ensure that all members of staff are informed of vacancies within the organisation. It should be recalled in this connection that WEU policy is to take account first of the possibilities for promotion within the organisation before turning to the other co-ordinated organisations and, finally, to the open market. Moreover, selection of candidates is made in such a way that, as vacancies are filled, equitable proportions of nationals of the member states are observed, although this rule is not applied with such mathematical rigidity as to impair its implementation.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th May 1980.

Military use of space

MOTION FOR AN ORDER¹

tabled by Mr. Tummers

The Assembly,

Bearing in mind the text of Recommendation 410 on the military use of outer space, in particular paragraph 10,

Instructs its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to organise a broad-based symposium on the possibilities and desirability of the use of outer space for military purposes and to report back to the Assembly on the outcome of this symposium.

Signed: Tummers

1. See 6th sitting, 21st June 1984 (motion for an order referred to the Presidential Committee).

•

Photocomposition et impression
sofiacparis
8, rue de Furstenberg, 75006 Paris
Dépôt légal n° 6238
Imprimé en France

