ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-NINTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

November 1983

III

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tel. 723.54.32

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-NINTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

November 1983

III

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

The proceedings of the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III : Assembly documents.

Volume IV : Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, offical report of debates, general index.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM.	ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
	BOGAERTS August	Socialist
	BONNEL Raoul	PVV
	DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
Mrs.	HERMAN-MICHIELSENS Lucienne	PVV
Mr.	MICHEL Joseph	PSC
Mrs.	STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP

Substitutes

MM.	*BIEFNOT Yvon*	*Socialist*
	DE BONDT Ferdinand	*CVP*
	DE DECKER Armand	*PRL*
	LAGNEAU André	*PRL*
	PÉCRIAUX Nestor	*Socialist*
	STEVERLYNCK Antoon	*CVP*
	VAN DER ELST Frans	*Volksunie*

FRANCE

Representatives

MM.	BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
	BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
	BEIX Roland	Socialist
	BERRIER Noël	Socialist
	BOURGES Yvon	RPR
	CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
	FRÊCHE Georges	Socialist
	JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
	JUNG Louis	UCDP
	LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
	MAYOUD Alain	UDF
	PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
	RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.
	SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
	VALLEIX Jean	RPR
	VIAL-MASSAT Théo	Communist
	WILQUIN Claude	Socialist
	WIRTH Frédéric	UCDP

Substitutes

MM.	*BARTHE Jean-Jacques*	*Communist*
	BOHL André	*UCDP*
	CROZE Pierre	*Ind. Rep.*
	DELEHEDDE André	*Socialist*
	DREYFUS-SCHMIDT Michel	*Socialist*
	FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	*Socialist*
MM.	*GALLEY Robert*	*RPR*
	GRUSSENMEYER François	*RPR*
	HUYGHUES des ÉTAGES Jacques	*Socialist*
	KOEHL Emile	*UDF*
	MATRAJA Pierre	*Socialist*
	MERCIER Jean	*Dem. Left*
	NATIEZ Jean	*Socialist*
	OEHLER Jean André	*Socialist*
	PROUVOST Pierre	*Socialist*
	ROSSINOT André	*UDF*
	SOUVET Louis	*RPR*
	VERDON Marc	*Socialist*

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM.	AHRENS Karl	SPD
	ANTRETTER Robert	SPD
	BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
	ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
	GERSTL Friedrich	SPD
	HAASE Horst	SPD
	HARTMANN Klaus	CDU/CSU
	HORNHUES Karl-Heinz	CDU/CSU
	KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
	LINDE Jürgen	SPD
	MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
	REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
	RUMPF Wolfgang	FDP
	SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
	SCHWARZ Heinz	CDU/CSU
	SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
	UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU
	VOGT Roland	Die Grünen

Substitutes

MM.	*BÜCHNER Peter*	*SPD*
	ERTL Josef	*FDP*
	GANSEL Norbert	*SPD*
	HACKEL Wolfgang	*CDU/CSU*
	HANDLOS Franz	*Republican*
	HAUFF Volker	*SPD*
	HOLTZ Uwe	*SPD*
	JÄGER Claus	*CDU/CSU*
Mrs.	*KELLY Petra*	*Die Grünen*
MM.	*LEMMRICH Karl Heinz*	*CDU/CSU*
	LENZER Christian	*CDU/CSU*
	SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	*CDU/CSU*
	SCHEER Hermann	*SPD*
	SCHMIDT Manfred	*SPD*
	SCHMITZ Hans Peter	*CDU/CSU*
	STAVENHAGEN Lutz	*CDU/CSU*
	VOGEL Hans-Jochen	*SPD*
	WULFF Otto	*CDU/CSU*

ITALY

Representatives

MM.	AGRIMI Alessandro	Chr. Dem.
	ANTONI Varese	Communist
	BERNINI Bruno	Communist
	BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
	CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
	DELLA BRIOTTA Libero	Socialist
	DE POI Alfredo President of the Assembly	Chr. Dem.
	FORMA Renzo	Chr. Dem.
	FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
	FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
Mrs.	GHERBEZ Gabriella	Communist
MM.	MONDINO Giorgio	Socialist
	PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
	PETRILLI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
	RUBBI Antonio	Communist
	TRIPODI Antonio	MSI-DN
	VALIANTE Mario	Chr. Dem.
	VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Subsitutes

MM.	*AJELLO Aldo*	*Radical*
	AMADEI Giuseppe	*PSDI*
	BENEDIKTER Johann Hans	*SVP*
	CAFIERO Luca	*PDUP*
	CALICE Giovanni	*Communist*
	CONTI PERSINI Gianfranco	*PSDI*
	FIANDROTTI Filippo	*Socialist*
	GIUST Bruno	*Chr. Dem.*
	GUNNELLA Aristide	*Republican*
	MARTINO Leopoldo Attilio	*Communist*
	ORIONE Franco Luigi	*Chr. Dem.*
	PATRIARCA Francesco	*Chr. Dem.*
	POZZO Cesare	*MSI-DN*
	ROMANO Angelo	*Ind. Left*
Mrs.	*ROSOLEN Angela Maria*	*Communist*
MM.	*SPITELLA Giorgio*	*Chr. Dem.*
	STERPA Egidio	*Liberal*
	ZITO Sisinio	*Socialist*

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM.	BERCHEM Albert	Dem.
	MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
	THOSS Maurice	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM.	*GLESENER Jean-Pierre*	*Soc. Chr.*
	HENGEL René	*Soc. Workers*
	PRUSSEN Robert	*Dem.*

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM.	AARTS Harry	CDA
	van den BERGH Harry	Labour
	BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
	SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
	STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
	TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
Mrs.	van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA

Substitutes

Mrs.	*BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth*	*Labour*
Mr.	*EYSINK Rudolf*	*CDA*
Mrs.	*den OUDEN-DEKKERS Greetje*	*Liberal*
MM.	*van der SANDEN Piet*	*CDA*
	de VRIES Klaas	*Labour*
	van der WERFF Ymenus P.W.	*Liberal*
	WORRELL Joop	*Labour*

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Mr.	Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir	Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr.	Thomas COX	Labour
Sir	Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Mr.	Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir	Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr.	James HILL	Conservative
Lord	HUGHES	Labour
Mr.	Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Mrs.	Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr.	Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr.	Maurice MILLER	Labour
Sir	John OSBORN	Conservative
Mr.	John PAGE	Conservative
Lord	REAY	Conservative
Sir	Dudley SMITH	Conservative
MM.	Thomas URWIN	Labour
	John WILKINSON	Conservative

Substitutes

MM.	*David ATKINSON*	*Conservative*
	John BLACKBURN	*Conservative*
	John CORRIE	*Conservative*
	Kenneth EASTHAM	*Labour*
	Robert EDWARDS	*Labour*
	Edward GARRETT	*Labour*
	Harry GOURLAY	*Labour*
	Ralph HOWELL	*Conservative*
Earl of	*KINNOULL*	*Conservative*
Lord	*McNAIR*	*Liberal*
MM.	*John MORRIS*	*Labour*
	Michael MORRIS	*Conservative*
	Christopher MURPHY	*Conservative*
Lord	*NORTHFIELD*	*Labour*
Lord	*NEWALL*	*Conservative*
MM.	*Laurence PAVITT*	*Labour*
	John STOKES	*Conservative*
	John WARD	*Conservative*

Application of the Brussels Treaty
Reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council

REPORT[1]

submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments[2]
by Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted in committee by 15 votes to 1 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Cavaliere (Alternate: *Valiante*) (Chairman); MM. *Blaauw, van den Bergh* (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Bahr, Sir Frederic Bennett (Alternate: *Wilkinson*), MM. *Bernini,* Bonnel (Alternate: *De Decker*), Cox, Dejardin, Della Briotta, Duraffour (Alternate: *Baumel*), Edwards, Fosson, *Galley,* Sir Anthony Grant (Alternate: *Lord Reay*), MM. Kittelmann, Lemmrich (Alternate: *Müller*), Mayoud (Alternate: *Caro*), Ménard (Alternate: *Jung*), Pecchioli, *Pignion, Prussen,* Scholten, *Sir Dudley Smith,* MM. *Steverlynck, Vohrer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on the application of the Brussels Treaty
– reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council

The Assembly,

(*i*) Welcoming the wide agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the application of the Brussels Treaty, revealed in Recommendation 380 and the Council's reply thereto, and on the proposition that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s ;

(*ii*) Noting that the Council has received with great interest and is considering the Assembly's recommendation to cancel the few remaining restrictions on the production of conventional weapons in one member country, and is considering the technical, military and political aspects of the Assembly's recommendation to vary by reducing the list of weapons subject to quantitative controls ;

(*iii*) Aware that the controls on atomic and biological weapons provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty have never been applied, but considering in the present circumstances that it is no longer appropriate to apply them ;

(*iv*) Believing that the fullest use should be made of the qualified staffs of the Standing Armaments Committee and of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, both for the study of problems within their respective competence for the benefit of the alliance as a whole, and to assist the Assembly in the preparation of its reports, and warmly welcoming the first tentative experiment in the latter connection, in implementation of the Council's reply to Recommendation 331;

(*v*) Deploring the severe reductions which the present United States administration has imposed on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with which the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments has co-operated from time to time ;

(*vi*) Welcoming the inclusion in the Council's annual report, in response to Recommendations 331 and 348, of specific information on the levels of British ground and air forces assigned to SACEUR, and recognising that no provision of the Brussels Treaty requires this information to be included ;

(*vii*) Regretting however the Council's refusal in recent years to include in annual reports various other items the Assembly has requested,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. In application of Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III;

2. Submit to the Assembly in the near future the results of its consideration of the technical, military and political aspects of varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III, in application of Article V of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, while taking into consideration the possibility of deleting the list concerned except for atomic, biological or chemical weapons ;

3. Instruct the Agency for the Control of Armaments to extend its studies of control, verification and exports of armaments, in co-operation with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with a view to assuming for the benefit of the alliance as a whole certain tasks which the latter agency is no longer in a position to undertake ;

4. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to extend its study of the European armaments industry to include a survey of the status of the two-way street and an analysis of the factors which would help to increase the proportion of European equipment in the armed forces of all allied countries ;

5. Request the international staff of the Standing Armaments Committee to assist within its competence in the preparation of reports of Assembly committees when these so request, and to extend such assistance to the collection of the necessary information ;

6. To include in future annual reports :

(*a*) a statement of the levels of forces which the WEU countries make available to NATO, and of the French forces in Germany ;

(*b*) information as full as in reports for 1981 and earlier, on the production and procurement of armaments in member countries ;

(*c*) as far as possible the latest approved lists of chemical and biological weapons subject to control.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur)

Introduction

0.1. At its meeting on 2nd December 1982, the Presidential Committee followed usage by referring to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments the following chapters of the annual report of the Council: Chapter I: Relations between the Council and the Assembly (to the extent of the committee's competence, which covers defence questions); Chapter II: Activities of the Council – B. Defence questions; Chapter III: Agency for the Control of Armaments; Chapter IV: Standing Armaments Committee.

0.2. The committee notes that Recommendation 380 [1], adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1982 on the committee's previous report [2], was largely accepted by the Council and several ministers of member countries have commented favourably on the report in question. As the basic situation has not evolved, the principal ideas in the present report follow those of last year's report:

- The fundamental provisions relating to security in the modified Brussels Treaty (Articles IV, V and VIII (3)) are still as valid today as when they were signed. Public demonstration of their credibility is to be found in the dialogue between the Assembly and the Council.
- The WEU Assembly provides the best forum for public debate between European members of parliament on defence, security and armaments control matters, a debate which is essential in order to keep public opinion informed, and to support the defence effort for our countries' security.
- For the rest, and particularly as regards the control of levels of forces and armaments provided for in Protocols Nos. II, III and IV to the treaty, WEU must as far as possible be adapted to the political circumstances of the eighties.
- Allied defence plans proper continue to be the preserve of the NATO bodies in accordance with Article IV of the Brussels Treaty.

1. Text of Recommendation 380 and the Council's reply at Appendix I.

2. Document 908, adopted on 20th April 1982.

0.3. As the committee recognises in another report [1], European intergovernmental consultations on defence questions are necessary. These consultations are at present held in the flexible framework of the Eurogroup, and more general "security" questions in the framework of European political co-operation. The committee notes that since the Brussels Treaty was modified in 1954, no member government has asked that the WEU Council be convened, as provided for in Article VIII (3) of the treaty, to allow the seven governments "to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace...". This problem is discussed in the committee's other report [1].

I. *Relations between the Council and the Assembly*

1.1. Relations between the Assembly and the Council in 1982 were very good, as shown by the detailed replies given to the various recommendations adopted by the Assembly on the basis of the committee's reports. With regard in particular to Recommendation 380 of the Assembly on the application of the Brussels Treaty, adopted by the Assembly in June 1982, the approving words of the various ministers who in turn addressed the Assembly should be quoted.

1.2. Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations of Belgium and then Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressing the Assembly on 14th June 1982 once again underlined the importance of the treaty and indicated that the Council was prepared, where the control of armaments was concerned, to take account of the evolution of the situation in Europe:

> "By way of conclusion to this part of my statement, may I reaffirm WEU member countries' adherence to the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols and their determination to fulfil the obligations they have entered into. They stress once again the importance they attach to the commitment to collective self-defence contained in Article V of the treaty, which is one of the cornerstones of the European security system.
>
> .....

1. Burden-sharing in the alliance, Document 947, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson.

In the matter of armaments control, the Council has repeatedly indicated its wish to take account of the changing situation in Europe... "

1.3. It was then the turn of Mr. Leister, Minister of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, to describe on 16th June the broad lines of his country's defence policy, stressing the importance of NATO and expressing his government's agreement with the Assembly's proposals for adapting WEU to the needs of the day and deleting those treaty provisions which seem obsolete :

" There is no doubt that when speaking of collective security policy for Europe we have to think above all of NATO and the NATO security system which includes our North American partners. However, against the background of the present global – and not exclusively military – threat to our free way of life, it appears increasingly necessary to direct our deliberations to the possibilities arising from European co-operation in the various existing forums.

In this connection the WEU Assembly is of particular importance as a forum for the discussion of European security policy. Not only is WEU the sole European parliamentary forum dealing with matters of security and defence policy, but by pledging military assistance in the form of a treaty it also contributes decisively to deterrence and, consequently, to the safeguarding of peace.

The Federal Government is following with interest and attention the Assembly's endeavours to adapt the WEU treaty to present requirements. We were therefore pleased to note that the Assembly passed, by a large majority, a proposal to cancel some provisions of the treaty which seem outdated. Let me stress, however, that the Federal Government's commitment to its WEU treaty obligations will remain as unreserved as in the past. "

1.4. Addressing the Assembly on 15th June 1982, Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of France, laid particular emphasis on the need for a public debate on peace, the balance of forces, security and disarmament and the importance of the WEU Assembly in this context :

" ...Let me ask you this : how many years is it since our national parliaments last had any real debates on peace, the balance of forces, security and disarmament ?

You are an elected Assembly, the only one in our European countries at present to have the competence, the qualifications and the interest to discuss these matters. You must help the governments, you must help those responsible by enabling this debate to take place. Furthermore, you are the elected representatives of our European countries, and in this debate the European countries have an interest, an approach and ideas of a specific and particular nature.

Do not misunderstand me. There is no question of dividing the defence of Europe from that of the other countries of the alliance. With the present imbalance of forces on the continent of Europe itself that would be a fatal risk...

So there must be absolutely no doubt that defence on the continent of Europe and global defence go hand in hand. Nothing could be more dangerous than to doubt this, until there is something like a balance of forces on the continent itself, a balance of forces and weapons capable of reaching the continent and sited there. But while nothing must be done which might separate the defence of Europe from that of the alliance as a whole, it is nevertheless extremely useful for us to be able to express our own ideas. They do exist, and in some variety, too.

... So it is a good thing, when public attention is at last involved and a genuine debate on these defence problems begins, that the opinions and constraints peculiar to the people of these countries should be expressed.

Mr. President, this is the French Government's appeal to this Assembly. It must become the main forum in which our peoples can discuss, through their elected representatives and with the necessary feedback, all the problems connected with our security... "

1.5. Reporting to the National Assembly on 6th July 1982 on his address to the WEU Assembly, Mr. Cheysson again underlined the latter's importance :

" The other day, on behalf of the French Government, I addressed the Assembly of Western European Union, not because the executive of WEU seems to have a very great future but because the Assembly is an elected one, elected in the second degree. This elected Assembly is competent to handle these matters, which must be discussed among members of parliament... "

Perhaps to a greater extent than his predecessors, Mr. Cheysson in fact stresses the importance of the NATO integrated command for the security of non-nuclear European countries which cannot be protected by the French nuclear force. This is what he affirmed in his article in the Wall Street Journal of 25th February 1983 :

> " Adequate to guarantee our vital interests, our nuclear arms are not now intended – nor will they be in the future – to insure the protection of the entire European zone of the Atlantic Alliance. Nor may they be used to this end, since we retain exclusive control over them. The guarantee of European territories that do not have nuclear weapons therefore can come only from the integrated command of NATO, that is to say, in fact, the United States. For this reason, maintaining the American nuclear deterrent and continually modernising it insofar as this is necessary are in our view essential. "

1.6. Most recently, on 1st December 1982, Lord Belstead, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, particularly showed his government's agreement with the Assembly's views as expressed in the last two recommendations on the application of the Brussels Treaty : 365, adopted on the report by the Defence Committee (Rapporteur : Mr. Tanghe) in June 1981, and 380, already mentioned, adopted in 1982 :

> " Also this [WEU] is the only European parliamentary forum empowered by statute to address defence matters. This is of great importance and will continue to be so. But it is also important to be realistic about the aims we pursue here. Recommendation 365 was right to acknowledge that ' for greater effectiveness the material organisation of collective defence is undertaken in the wider framework of the North Atlantic Council and the Independent European Programme Group '. We cannot consider collective defence adequately without giving full weight to the contribution of the United States.
>
> If I have understood correctly the views expressed in the Assembly in recent years, the Assembly now believes that, twenty-eight years after the Brussels Treaty was modified, the time has come for some adaptation. The message which emerges from Recommendations 365 and 380 is that the political situation has evolved since 1954 and the Assembly therefore questions, for example, the need to defray so many of WEU's limited resources on checking on member governments' armaments... Checks on armaments data lie at the heart of arms control negotiations with the Warsaw Pact, but the records of the member states of WEU are not closed books and I am sure that it is right that the Council should be giving careful thought to Recommendation 380.
>
> In the preamble to Recommendation 380, the Assembly urged that WEU should be adapted to the needs of the 1980s. With this the Government of the United Kingdom agree. However, I do not mean to imply support for complete revision. For one thing, the United Kingdom Government, along with our European partners, regard the mutual defence commitment in Article V of the Brussels Treaty as of fundamental importance. It is a commitment that uniquely expresses our support to each other as Europeans. "

1.7. The committee finds it particularly encouraging that its recommendations, ratified by the Assembly, should be listened to so carefully by the governments.

1.8. In its reply to Recommendation 380, the Council lastly undertook to endeavour to communicate its annual report to the Assembly by the end of February. As the last chapter reached the Office of the Clerk in mid-March this year, committee members had time to examine it before discussing the draft of the present report.

II.B. *Activities of the Council – defence questions*

1. *Level of forces of member states*

2.1. Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty, completed by the Council's resolution of 15th September 1956 and the agreement of 14th December 1957, imposes limits on member countries' armed forces and provides that changes in the level of these forces must receive the approval of member countries expressed either in the WEU Council or by the representatives of the seven member countries on the North Atlantic Council. With regard to the land and air forces which the six mainland countries place under the command of SACEUR in peacetime, these are subject to upper limits laid down in a special (unpublished) agreement appended to the stillborn European Defence Community treaty. When NATO defence plans make provision for increases in the levels of forces assigned by these countries, any increase must receive the

unanimous approval of the seven member countries, which may be expressed in NATO.

2.2. The annual report for 1982 informs us that:

> " The Council, at their meeting of 24th February, noted that the level of forces of the member states of WEU, as set out in the NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II, as in force at that time. They also took note of a declaration on French forces made by the representative of France.
>
> On 15th October, the Council examined the report of a further meeting of the same six permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council, and approved the acceptance by one member state of the increase in its force level recommended by SACEUR. "

This is believed to refer to an increase in the number of helicopters which Germany assigns to NATO. This cumbersome procedure for approving the levels of various categories of member countries' forces provided for in Protocol No. II and related documents, like the control of armaments provided for in the treaty, has clearly been overtaken by events. However, the treaty provisions do not allow the procedure to be modified unless the treaty itself is modified.

2. *United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe*

2.3. Under Article VI of Protocol No. II, the United Kingdom initially undertook " to maintain on the mainland of Europe... the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, that is to say four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force, or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, regards as having equivalent fighting capacity... not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the high contracting parties... ". Following successive decisions of the Council, the level of this commitment is now down to 55,000 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force.

2.4. The committee notes with satisfaction that the information concerning this commitment given in the Council's annual report for 1982 again fully meets its wishes as expressed inter alia in the Assembly's Recommendations 331 and 348. The report states in fact that the average number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1982 in accordance with Article VI of Protocol No. II was 59,567. However, it continues:

> " ...The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty there. In 1982 there were on average 909 men in Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated these units would be speedily returned to their duty station in an emergency affecting NATO. "

It may be deduced that the average number of British troops stationed in Germany was 58,658 men, whereas the commitment is for 55,000. In the previous year, 58,885 were declared for Germany and 1,899 for Northern Ireland, making an average of 56,986 actually on the spot.

2.5. Like last year, the annual report gives the following details on the strength of the United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force:

> " Furthermore, in accordance with the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 348 the Government of the United Kingdom have informed the Council that the strength of the United Kingdom's contribution to the Second Allied Tactical Air Force in 1982 was:

Rôle	*Aircraft/Equipment*	*Squadrons*
Strike/Attack	Buccaneers	2
	Jaguars	4
Offensive support	Harrier	2
Reconnaissance	Jaguars	1
Air defence	Phantom	2
	Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles	1
	Rapier surface-to-air missiles	4
Air transport	Puma	1
Ground defence	RAF regiment	1"

These figures have not changed since last year but the report does not indicate whether, as was supposed, Rapier units were sent to the Falklands in 1982.

2.6. Although the foregoing statements on United Kingdom force levels on the continent show that the United Kingdom has more than met the current Brussels Treaty commitment of 55,000 men plus the second TAF in 1981 and 1982, the June 1981 White Paper " The way forward " announced that " (17) BAOR's manpower which had been planned to continue to increase beyond the 55,000 level, will be held at that level ". Planned reorganisation of BAOR over the period 1983 to April 1984 involves both some strengthening of units in Germany with armoured regiments and Rapier missile units, but also net reductions of about 2,000 men with one divisional headquarters and an infantry battalion being withdrawn to the United Kingdom. The committee will wish to be assured in future years that the level of 55,000 men is met, irrespective of any temporary deployments to Northern Ireland or elsewhere.

2.7. Last year, in its report on the application of the Brussels Treaty, the committee proposed the tacit extension to the other member countries of the commitment to maintain adequate forces under allied command. In fact, under the Brussels Treaty only the United Kingdom (which escapes most controls on armaments) has to maintain a minimum number of forces on the mainland of Europe assigned to SACEUR. In its reply to Recommendation 380, the Council rejected the Assembly's proposal to invite the other member countries taking part in the NATO integrated system to make unilateral declarations concerning the level of forces which they undertake to assign to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Nor did the Council agree to include in its annual reports a declaration on the level of such forces, similar to the one already made with regard to United Kingdom forces.

2.8. The committee recalls that publication in the Council's annual reports of the level of British forces assigned under Article VI of Protocol No. II is in no way a requirement imposed by the treaty. The United Kingdom agreed to include these figures in the annual report only in response to Assembly Recommendations 331 and 348, and only after repeated requests by the Assembly in several consecutive years. The committee sees no reason why the other six member countries should not agree to include in the annual report similar declarations concerning the forces which they assign to NATO command or, in the case of France, the forces which it maintains in Germany and which, according to the Council's annual report, are treated by the Council, as far as approval of their levels is concerned, in the same way as forces under NATO command. The committee therefore repeats this proposal in the draft recommendation.

3. *Control of armaments*

2.9. In the context of its proposals for adapting WEU to the needs of the eighties, the committee has for several years been pointing out that the provisions relating to the control of armaments contained in the Brussels Treaty and its protocols have completely lost their point in the circumstances now prevailing in Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. The committee proposed that the control system be reduced to the minimum which could be achieved by using the procedure for amendment contained in the treaty itself and its protocols, but without having recourse to international negotiations which would be required to modify the treaty texts themselves.

2.10. Two lists of armaments subject to control can be amended by the procedure laid down in the treaty :

(*i*) the list of certain conventional weapons which Germany undertook not to manufacture on its territory (Protocol No. III, Annex III) ;

(*ii*) the list of atomic, biological and chemical weapons and certain conventional weapons subject to quantitative controls on the mainland of Europe (Protocol No. III, Annex IV).

2.11. With regard to the first list, which concerns Germany, this may be amended or cancelled " in accordance with the needs of the armed forces " if a recommendation to this effect is made by the competent supreme commander of NATO, if the German Government submits a request accordingly, and if the WEU Council approves the proposals by a two-thirds majority. Since it was signed, this list has been reduced on several occasions, most recently on the Assembly's recommendation, and now includes only strategic bomber aircraft (paragraph VI) and long-range surface-to-surface missiles (paragraph IV). Last year, in Recommendation 380, the Assembly recommended that the Council cancel these last two items. In its reply, the Council recalled that in applying the controls provided for in the treaty " account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situation in Europe... The Council have received with great interest and are considering the Assem-

bly's recommendation to cancel paragraphs IV... and VI... ".

2.12. Last year's proposal is taken up again by the committee in the draft recommendation. It is suggested that Germany take the initiative (as provided for in the treaty) of asking for this cancellation not because it intends to manufacture such weapons in the immediate future but in order to put an end to an obsolete situation.

2.13. With regard to the second list, which applies to all member countries on the mainland of Europe, Article V of Protocol No. III to the treaty provides quite simply that " the Council of Western European Union may vary the list in Annex IV by unanimous decision ". Last year, in Recommendation 380, the Assembly asked that the Council " vary by reducing the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III ". In its reply, the Council informed the Assembly that " the Council are considering the technical, military and political aspects of this problem ". Now this three-page list has not been amended since the treaty was modified in 1954. The Council is at present examining the proposal made by the Director of the Agency for the Control of Armaments on the amendment of this list. The committee for its part considers that the Council should report to the Assembly on the result of its consideration of the problem, and should consider deleting the list except for atomic, biological and chemical weapons.

2.14. It might have been thought that for political reasons it was wise to retain controls on the atomic, biological and chemical weapons which head this list. In reality the Council has never allowed the controls provided for in the treaty to be applied to atomic or biological weapons, and the committee considers in present circumstances that it would no longer be sensible to apply them. Quantitative controls are not applied to chemical weapons because no country has declared that it has stocks of such weapons. But by retaining atomic, biological and chemical weapons on the list of weapons subject to quantitative controls by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, a certain degree of reciprocity of commitments will be maintained with Germany, which has renounced the right to manufacture these weapons.

III. *Agency for the Control of Armaments*

3.1. Chapter III of the Council's annual report of the Agency for the Control of Armaments follows, with one slight difference (referred to in paragraph 3.9 below), the one for the previous year. The committee therefore considers it worthwhile to repeat in the present report the same explanations as it gave last year on current practice relating to the application of controls.

3.2. The extent of the Brussels Treaty controls is not widely understood, nor is the fact that the Council failed to apply many of the control provisions from the outset. The control provisions of the treaty may be summarised as follows:

(*i*) Germany undertook not to manufacture atomic, biological or chemical weapons on its territory;

(*ii*) Germany also undertook not to manufacture certain conventional weapons, the list of which may be amended or cancelled in accordance with a special procedure, the Council deciding by a two-thirds majority;

(*iii*) the Council determines the level of stocks of atomic, biological and chemical weapons which countries manufacturing them may hold on the mainland of Europe[1];

(*iv*) levels of atomic, biological and chemical weapons and certain conventional weapons held by member countries on the mainland of Europe[1] are subject to verification by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments. The list of these ABC and conventional weapons may be modified by a unanimous decision of the Council;

(*v*) the Agency for the Control of Armaments verifies that the above provisions are respected, except for the weapons of forces assigned to NATO, which are verified by the latter.

(*a*) *Non-application of controls*

3.3. In the earlier days when the controls could be held to serve some purpose, the Committee had frequent occasion to draw attention to the major shortcomings in their application by the Council. The twenty-eighth annual report of the Council indicated no change in this situation.

3.4. Like earlier reports, the Council's present report refers to fields where the Agency does not exercise its activities:

> " *Atomic, chemical and biological weapons*

1. The expression " on the mainland of Europe " excludes British weapons on British metropolitan territory.

The position described in the last annual report of the Council has remained unchanged.

The activities of the Agency cover neither nuclear nor biological weapons.

The control activities dealt with in this chapter do not, therefore, concern these two categories of armaments.

In the case of chemical weapons, only non-production controls take place; no quantitative controls are made since the member states have always declared they possessed no such armaments. "

Previous reports have included a statement to the effect that:

" The non-nuclear components of such [nuclear] weapons (namely the missiles themselves and other specially designed equipment) are subject to control except as regards the weapons qualified as ' strategic ' by one member state. Furthermore, as this state has declared that its nuclear capability as a whole is directed to one and the same objective of deterrence, its missiles with nuclear capability and tracked launchers are no longer subject to control. "[1]

The Committee has noted[2] that the state in question was France and that Pluton tactical nuclear missiles had been withdrawn from Agency control as from 1979.

3.5. The Council's report goes on to say:

" As the convention for the due process of law[3] has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1981, as in previous years, to take the form of 'agreed control measures'.

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' notice. Since this agreement has never been withheld... "

3.6. The annual report also specifies that:

" In application of Article III of Protocol No. III, which lays down conditions to enable the Council to fix levels of chemical weapons that may be held on the mainland of Europe by those countries which have not given up the right to produce them, and in accordance with the Council decision of 1959, the Agency asked the countries concerned in its questionnaire whether production of chemical weapons on their mainland territory had passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage.

All the member countries concerned once again gave an explicit negative reply in 1982.

In addition, in the covering letter to its questionnaire, the Agency, as in previous years, asked the member states to declare any chemical weapons that they might hold, whatever their origin. In reply to this questionnaire, no country reported holding any chemical weapons and, because of this, the quantitative control of weapons of this nature raised no problems. "

3.7. On the subject of biological weapons the Council's report states:

" All the member countries reported their agreement on the renewal in 1982 of the list of biological weapons subject to control as accepted by the Council in 1981. The Council noted the fact. "

The Committee calls as far as possible for the revised list of biological weapons subject to control to be communicated to the Assembly, together with the list of chemical weapons subject to control, a first version of which was communicated to the Assembly in the annual report for 1960, whereas the list of chemical agents which the Council has added to the list in the meantime has been communicated only to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)[1].

(b) Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments

3.8. Although the WEU controls have lost their usefulness, and the Agency's true areas of activity remain limited solely to conventional weapons, the number of inspections carried out by the Agency each year shows that generally speaking there has been no reduction in its activities, as may be seen from the following table. Non-production controls no longer apply to

1. Document 833, 28th March 1980.
2. Document 875, 4th May 1981.
3. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954. (Signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 but ratified by only six states: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.)

1. The list of chemical agents subject to control, approved by the WEU Council, was published by SIPRI in 1973 in " The problem of chemical and biological warfare ", Volume II, " CB weapons today ", page 217.

German shipyards because, following a recommendation to that effect by the Assembly, the Council in 1980 deleted warships from the list of armaments not to be produced in Germany. Quantitative controls still apply to shipyards of all member countries on the continent.

Numbers and types of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments

	Quantitative control measures				Non-production control measures		Total control measures (all categories)
	at depots	at units under national command	at production plants	Sub-total	at production plants	(of which non-production of chemical weapons)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1961	29	15	12	66	7	(2)	63
2	26	20	11	57	7	(2)	65
3	35	13	13	61	10	(4)	74
4	39	19	13	71	9	(4)	80
5	26	16	11	53	7	n.a.	60
6	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	78
7	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
8	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	79
9	*	*	*	*	*	(3)	77
	a *b*	*a* *b*	*a* *b*	*a* *b*	*a* *b*		*a* *b*
1970	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	82 72
1	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	82 72
2	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	66
3	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	66
4	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	71
5	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	72
6	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	71
7	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
8	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	68
9	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
1980	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
1	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
2	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70

Notes a, b: From 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of figures (old and new style – *a* and *b*) for the years 1970 and 1971.

n.a.: Information not available.

Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from published annual reports of the Council. With regard to the various categories of controls (columns 1 to 6), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the published annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the Committee. Those for 1970 to 1982 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permission to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without significance.

* Confidential information available to the Committee deleted from the published report.

3.9. The committee finds particularly useful the lists of armaments currently being produced, set out in parts 1 to 4 of Section E on the state and problems of control in certain particular fields which is a summary of current armaments production programmes in member countries. However, in the present annual report the Council has cut down this section considerably. The committee asks the Council to retain in future reports all the useful information which the Agency for the Control of Armaments can provide.

(c) Conclusion on the control of armaments

3.10. The annual report of the Council stresses the limited nature of the field control programme, particularly visits to private firms, but it is clear that the Agency for the Control of Armaments performs its tasks efficiently in those fields which are open to it.

3.11. For the reasons given above, the committee now recommends that the Council *abolish non-production controls of conventional weapons and consider abolishing quantitative controls.* The Council is empowered to take this step under the terms of Article V of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, by modifying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III. This step will leave in force the unilateral undertaking by Germany not to manufacture nuclear, biological or chemical weapons on its territory. It continues to be the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany not to manufacture such weapons. While controls on these non-production undertakings would remain in force under the treaty, as noted above the Council applies them only in the case of chemical weapons and then only in the form of " agreed verifications ". The unilateral undertaking by Germany not to manufacture specified conventional weapons on its territory would come to an end with the cancellation in accordance with Article II of Protocol No. III of the only weapons still on the list: long-range surface-to-surface missiles and strategic bombers.

(d) Studies by the Agency for the Control of Armaments

3.12. The Agency for the Control of Armaments conducts important studies on the principles of arms control, sometimes in technical fields. Its experts are in contact with various outside bodies. In the past the Agency has co-operated with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, particularly in connection with the observation of military manoeuvres organised by ACDA on Salisbury Plain (England). But this United States agency which, since it was set up, had acquired a worldwide reputation for the objectivity of certain of its publications[1], has been partly dismantled by the present United States administration[2]. The committee proposes that the WEU Agency re-establish its former contacts with ACDA to examine to what extent it might take over from it, for the benefit of the alliance as a whole, certain major studies on principles governing the control, verification or export of armaments which ACDA is having to relinquish for lack of funds. Such a contribution on the part of the WEU countries to studies hitherto conducted by the United States alone would be a further contribution to defence burden-sharing in the alliance.

IV. *Standing Armaments Committee*

4.1. As in recent years the work of the Standing Armaments Committee in 1982 was concentrated chiefly in exchange of information by countries in Working Group No. 8 on operational research. It is also updating the economic (first section) part of its study of the situation of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU. An unclassified version including the updated legal section and the " presentation " of the first section of the economic part was communicated to the Assembly on 10th May 1982.

4.2. The Council has agreed, in its reply to Recommendation 331, to consider the possibility of the SAC assisting the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to undertake specific studies " within the competence of the SAC as defined in the decision of 7th May 1955 " (the Council decision whereby the Standing Armaments Committee was established) and Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the French Minister of Defence, addressing the Assembly on 12th December 1981, added:

> " And rather than need to obtain the Council's consent each time, could not the SAC be authorised, at each session of the Assembly, to give help with the various studies decided upon?... If the political will exists, I do not think anyway that institutional obstacles could hinder the expansion of the SAC's rôle. "

1. See for instance the series " World military expenditures and arms transfers ".

2. Since President Reagan took office the ACDA annual budget has been reduced from $ 18.5 m to $ 15 m; its staff reduced from some 200 to 150 and one-third of senior posts left unfilled; its operational analysis office abolished; its computer removed and twenty years of research material transferred to a Washington University. Mr. Eugene Rostow, the Director originally appointed by President Reagan, was dismissed on 12th January 1983 and replaced by Mr. Kenneth Adelman after a controversial confirmation by the Senate. Mr. David Emery, who has now been nominated as Deputy Director, is likely to face equally controversial confirmation hearings.

However, in its reply to Recommendation 379, communicated to the Assembly on 24th November 1982, the Council unfortunately did not follow Mr. Lemoine:

> " As regards the Standing Armaments Committee, which also was the subject of proposals by the State Secretary of the French Ministry of Defence, the Council recall that this body was set up on 7th May 1955 to promote co-operation in the matter of armaments. If in this respect the international secretariat of the SAC were occasionally to assist the Assembly in the study of clearly-defined themes, this could only be done under a procedure involving a case-by-case examination by the Council, under whom the SAC is placed. It is clear that such work could not have the effect of relieving the SAC of its responsibilities nor could it affect its competence, these being the Council's exclusive responsibility. "

4.3. However, agreement has now been reached with the Council to allow the secretariat of the SAC to assist in the preparation of the major report by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields[1]. The committee welcomes this first attempt at co-operation, which will have to be extended in the future. As Mr. Lemoine said in the abovementioned address:

> " With, as it were, an information and research department available to it, the Assembly would be in a position to initiate more ambitious studies. "

4.4. The Standing Armaments Committee could make a further useful contribution to joint production among the allied countries if it were to extend its study of the armaments industry to include a survey of the present status of the two-way street, and an analysis of the factors which help to increase the proportion of European equipment in the armed forces of all allied countries.

V. *Conclusions*

5.1. The committee's principal conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation which relates to this explanatory memorandum as follows:

Draft recommendation	*Explanatory memorandum*
Preamble	
(*i*) and (*ii*)	Appendix and Chapter I
(*iii*)	Paragraphs 2.14 ; 3.4.
(*iv*)	Paragraphs 3.8 to 3.12 ; 4.2 to 4.4.
(*v*)	Paragraph 3.12.
(*vi*)	Paragraphs 2.3 to 2.8.
(*vii*)	Paragraphs 2.7 ; 3.7 ; 3.9.
Operative text	
1 and 2	Paragraphs 2.9 to 2.14 ; 3.10 and 3.11.
3	Paragraph 3.12.
4	Paragraph 4.4.
5	Paragraph 4.2 ; 4.3.
6(*a*)	Paragraph 2.7.
6(*b*)	Paragraph 3.9.
6(*c*)	Paragraph 3.7.

5.2. In paragraph 2.6 above the committee also notes the need for assurance in future years concerning the levels of United Kingdom forces on the mainland.

VI. *Opinion of the minority*

6.1. The report as a whole was adopted by 15 votes to 1 with 1 abstention. The minority which voted against did not state in committee its reasons for so doing.

1. However, it appears that the SAC secretariat has been unable to assist in the collection of data from public sources for the Scientific Committee's report. The committee accordingly recommends that the SAC be empowered to collect information.

APPENDIX

RECOMMENDATION 380[1]

on the application of the Brussels Treaty
– reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council [2]

The Assembly,

(*i*) Welcoming the wide agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the application of the Brussels Treaty, revealed in Recommendation 365 and the Council's reply thereto;

(*ii*) Noting that the Council and Assembly alike recognise that the fundamental provisions of the Brussels Treaty, particularly the mutual security provisions of Articles IV, V and VIII.3, retain their full value, and that there is interest in making greater use of Western European Union as an instrument of European security;

(*iii*) Believing that several arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty no longer serve any useful purpose, and noting the Council's view that " in applying the provisions of Protocol No. III and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situation in Europe ";

(*iv*) Believing therefore that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. In application of Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III;

2. In application of Article V of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, vary by reducing the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III;

3. Call on member countries which participate in the integrated system of NATO, and are not already bound by Article VI of Protocol No. II, to make unilateral declarations concerning the level of forces they undertake to assign to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and station as agreed with him, and not to withdraw against the wishes of a majority of the high contracting parties;

4. To include in future annual reports a statement on the levels of all assigned forces;

5. To communicate its annual report, as in the past, before the end of February.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (2nd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 908).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL[1]

to Recommendation 380

The Council welcome the fact that the Assembly recognises that the fundamental provisions of the Brussels Treaty retain their full value and that it stresses the importance of WEU in the sphere of security.

1. The Council recall their position, namely, that in applying the provisions of Protocol No. III and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situation in Europe. This is why Annex III of that protocol has been amended on several occasions since 1958. The Council have received with great interest and are considering the Assembly's recommendation to cancel paragraphs IV (" Long-range missiles and guided missiles ") and VI (" Bomber aircraft for strategic purposes ") of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III according to the procedure laid down in Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty.

2. As regards varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III, the Council welcome the fact that, as a result of the debate and vote by the Assembly, the initial draft recommendation was amended to take account of certain legal and political considerations.

The Council are considering the technical, military and political aspects of this problem.

3 and 4. The overall system organised under the treaty and its protocols, the implementation of which, as regards level of forces, regularly appears in the annual report, enables the Council to be informed of and to assess the situation of the level of forces and their armaments assigned to SACEUR for the common defence.

The level of forces thus assigned results from the undertakings made by the member states within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance as stated notably in II.5 and 6 and IV of the final act of the nine-power conference, held in London between 28th September and 3rd October 1954. The forces assigned by the various countries to the common NATO defence are in fact defined on the basis of a plan which is kept up to date within NATO. Decisions relating to the forces result from the joint effort of the member countries in accordance with the capacity of each to contribute and with the aim of ensuring at all times an adequate level of forces.

Consequently, there appears to be no need to invite the states concerned to make unilateral declarations to the WEU Council concerning a matter which is already dealt with in the multilateral context of NATO. Nor does there appear to be any possibility of including in future annual reports any statements on the level of forces other than those which are already given.

5. The Council will endeavour, as in the past, to communicate its annual report to the Assembly before the end of February.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 15th November 1982.

Document 948 **29th November 1983**
Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4

Application of the Brussels Treaty
reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council

AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 4 [1]

tabled by Mr. Lagorce

1. In the last line of paragraph (*ii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " by reducing ".

2. Leave out paragraph (*iii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

3. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " while taking into consideration the possibility of deleting the list concerned except for atomic, biological or chemical weapons ".

4. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed : Lagorce

1. See 7th sitting, 29th November 1983 (amendments negatived).

AGENDA

of the Second Part of the Twenty-Ninth Ordinary Session Paris, 28th November-1st December 1983

I. Political Questions

1. Economic relations with the Soviet Union — *Report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the General Affairs Committee*
2. Middle East crises and European security — *Report tabled by Lord Reay on behalf of the General Affairs Committee*
3. Africa's rôle in a European security policy – Chad — *Report tabled by Mr. Muller on behalf of the General Affairs Committee*

II. Defence Questions

1. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council — *Report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*
2. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance — *Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*
3. Rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime — *Report tabled by Mr. Pecchioli on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*

III. Technical and Scientific Questions

1. Assessment of advanced technology in Japan — *Report tabled by Lord Northfield on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*
2. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – Part II — *Report tabled by Mr. Bassinet on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*

IV. Budgetary and Administrative Questions

1. Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 — *Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1982 – The Auditor's report and Motion to approve the final accounts — *Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

V. Relations with Parliaments

The Assembly of WEU and the North Atlantic Assembly – Impact of the existence and work of the North Atlantic Assembly on relations between the WEU Assembly and national parliaments and on public awareness of the existence of WEU — *Report tabled by Mr. Stoffelen on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments*

ORDER OF BUSINESS

of the Second Part of the Twenty-Ninth Ordinary Session Paris, 28th November-1st December 1983

MONDAY, 28th NOVEMBER

Morning

Meetings of political groups.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session.
5. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance:
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
   Debate.

4 p.m.

6. Address by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO.
7. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance:
   Resumed debate.
   Vote on the draft recommendation.

TUESDAY, 29th NOVEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council:
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
   Debate.
   Vote on the draft recommendation.
2. Rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime:
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Pecchioli on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
   Debate.
   Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Assessment of advanced technology in Japan:
   presentation of the report tabled by Lord Northfield on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

   Debate.

   Vote on the draft recommendation.
2. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields - Part II:
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Bassinet on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

   Debate.

WEDNESDAY, 30th NOVEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields - Part II:

   Resumed debate.

   Vote on the draft recommendation.
2. Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984:
   presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1982 - The Auditor's report and Motion to approve the final accounts:
   presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

   Debate.

   Votes on the draft texts.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Economic relations with the Soviet Union:
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

   Debate.

   Vote on the draft recommendation.
2. The Assembly of WEU and the North Atlantic Assembly - Impact of the existence and work of the North Atlantic Assembly on relations between the WEU Assembly and national parliaments and on public awareness of the existence of WEU:
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Stoffelen on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

   Debate.

THURSDAY, 1st DECEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Africa's rôle in a European security policy - Chad:
   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Müller on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

   Debate.

10.30 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. Hernu, Minister of Defence of the French Republic.
3. Africa's rôle in a European security policy – Chad:

   Resumed debate.

   Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

Middle East crises and European security:
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Reay on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

CLOSE OF THE TWENTY-NINTH ORDINARY SESSION

Document 953 3rd June 1983

Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly for the Financial Year 1982

THE AUDITOR'S REPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Report of the external Auditor to the Assembly of Western European Union on the accounts for the financial year 1982

General

1. The following financial statements, together with an explanatory memorandum, were submitted to me by the President:

(*a*) Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1982 and financial position as at 31st December 1982 (Appendix I).

(*b*) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1981 (Appendix II).

(*c*) Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of Western European Union, London, in respect of contributions to the Assembly of Western European Union budget for 1982 (Appendix III).

(*d*) Account of the provident fund for the financial year ended 31st December 1982 (Appendix IV).

2. My examination of the accounts has been carried out in accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

Summary of income and expenditure

(Appendix I)

(*a*) *Financial position during 1982*

3. The budget provided for expenditure of F 12,709,000 of which F 427,000 was expected to be covered by miscellaneous receipts and the balance by contributions.

4. Actual expenditure in the year amounted to F 12,244,050. Income amounted to F 12,799,492 comprising F 12,282,000 from contributions and F 517,492 from miscellaneous receipts. There was thus an excess of income over expenditure of F 555,442 arising from a budgetary surplus of F 464,950 (as shown at Appendix II) and extra miscellaneous receipts of F 90,492.

(*b*) *Pension scheme*

5. Under the common pension scheme implemented in 1977 by the co-ordinated organisations, Western European Union, Council of Europe, NATO, OECD and the European Space Agency, pension benefits payable by the Assembly of WEU are charged to the Assembly's budget and staff contributions under the scheme are credited to the budget as miscellaneous income. In 1982 these staff contributions amounted to F 312,124 (Appendix I).

6. Staff members who had been employed before 1st July 1974 and who had decided to join the new scheme were required to meet the cost of validating their past service through surrender of their provident fund holdings. Where, because of withdrawals, the holdings were insufficient for that purpose, staff were required to meet the deficiency, plus compound interest at four per cent per annum, by monthly payments over a period of five years from 30th June 1978. In 1982 payments under these arrangements amounted to F 16,060 and were credited to the budget as miscellaneous income.

Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits

(Appendix II)

7. The transfers between sub-heads within the same head of the budget were duly authorised in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulations. These regulations contain no provision for the authorisation of transfers between heads. However, in accordance with a procedure approved in 1973, the Council has been informed that expenditure of F 8,622 on Head III and F 45,009 on Head VI was incurred in excess of the budget provisions for these heads, and that these excesses were met from savings on Heads I and IV.

Provident fund

(Appendix IV)

8. The provident fund continues to operate for those members of staff who opted to remain affiliated to the fund when the pension scheme was introduced. At 31st December 1982, three staff members were fully affiliated to the fund and four others maintained balances in it. The assets of the provident fund of the Assembly are amalgamated with the assets of the provident funds of the other organs of Western European Union in joint deposits administered by the office of the Secretary-General. These deposits were held in French francs, sterling, United States dollars and German marks and, due to variations in the exchange rate between the French franc and the other currencies, a gain of F 121,583 was made in the value of the deposits during the year . This gain has been credited to the individual accounts of the members of the fund in proportion to their holdings.

9. I have received a certificate from the fund's bankers showing the amount of the joint deposits held at 31st December 1982 and a statement from the office of the Secretary-General confirming the share of these deposits standing to the credit of the Assembly's provident fund at 31st December 1982. This share is equivalent to the balance of F 2,741,026 on members' accounts as shown at Appendix IV. Thus, at 31st December 1982, the assets of the fund were sufficient to meet its liabilities.

10. I wish to record my appreciation of the willing co-operation of the officers of the Assembly during my audit.

Gordon DOWNEY
(Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom)
External Auditor

3rd June 1983

Explanatory Memorandum

(communicated by the President to the Auditor of the Assembly in connection with the financial year 1982)

1. The statements attached hereto refer to:
   (*a*) Summary of income and expenditure – financial position as at 31st December 1982 (Appendix I);
   (*b*) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits (Appendix II);
   (*c*) Contributions (Appendix III) ;
   (*d*) Provident fund (Appendix IV).

2. The statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits shows that a sum of F 464,950 remains unexpended, whereas the final balance of income over expenditure was F 555,442. The difference between these two figures, F 90,492, represents the excess of receipts over those estimated made up as follows:

	F	F
– Bank interest.....	137,066	
– Sundry receipts.....	18,758	
– Sale of publications...	33,484	
– Contributions 7 %	312,124	
– Reimbursement of loans on validation ...	16,060	
		517,492
– Receipts for 1982 estimated in the budget.....		427,000
		90,492

Validation of pensions

3. On 31st December 1982 there remained one outstanding loan on validation of pensions totalling F 17,106. In accordance with the regulations the outstanding loan must be cleared in 1983.

Transfers

4. Excess expenditure amounting to F 344,583 has been met by transfers between sub-heads within heads. Nevertheless excess expenditure resulting from the payment on renovations of offices (Head III) amounting to F 8,622 and payment of a pensioner which had not been foreseen when preparing the budget 1982 (Head VI) amounting to F 45,009 has been deducted from the overall amount of unexpended credits in Heads I, II, IV and V. The Council has been informed of this.

Contributions

5. All contributions were received from the Secretary-General WEU London before 31st December 1982.

Provident fund

6. The Assembly's funds are incorporated with those of the other organs of WEU and the entire fund is administered by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Clerk of the Assembly.

7. The Secretary-General has continued to receive advice from the advisory panel set up within WEU and from outside bankers on the investment of the funds. On 31st December 1982 the fund was held in French francs, sterling, German marks, United States dollars with the International Westminster Bank, London.

8. The Assembly's provident fund on 31st December 1982 amounted to F 2,741,026 as shown at Appendix IV. At 1st January 1982 there remained loans to three staff members amounting to F 67,900. Repayments of F 39,650 reduced the loans outstanding as at 31st December 1982 to F 28,250.

9. The President would like to take this opportunity of expressing the appreciation of the Assembly for the help which was extended to the Office of the Clerk by the United Kingdom Comptroller and Auditor General.

Fred MULLEY

President of the Assembly

17th May 1983

APPENDIX I

Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1982

(in French francs)

Per attached statement

Assessments of member states (see Appendix III)		12,282,000
Miscellaneous		
(A) Sundry receipts		
Bank interest	137,066	
Sundry receipts	18,758	
Sale of publications	33,484	
(B) Pensions		
Contributions (7 %)	312,124	
Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.)	16,060	
		517,492
		12,799,492
Expenditure under budget authorisation	12,190,419	
Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Heads III and VI	53,631	
Total expenditure (see Appendix II)		12,244,050
Excess of income over expenditure		F 555,442

Financial position as at 31st December 1982

Assets

Cash at bank	902,222	
Sundry advances	110,196	
Accounts receivable	129,558	
		1,141,976
Liabilities		
Accounts payable	586,534	
Excess of income over expenditure	555,442	
		F 1,141,976

Certified correct :

Fred MULLEY	Georges MOULIAS	Hugo ADRIAENSENS
President of the Assembly	*Clerk of the Assembly*	*Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

I have examined the foregoing summary of income and expenditure and the statement of assets and liabilities. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion these statements are correct.

Signed: Gordon DOWNEY

Comptroller and Auditor General,
United Kingdom
External Auditor

3rd June 1983

APPI

STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE AN

DETAILS			Total budget for 1982[1]
HEAD I - EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF			
Sub-Head 1	*(a)*	Salaries of permanent establishment	5,388,000
	(b)	**Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades A, B and C), including travelling expenses and insurance**	72,000
Sub-Head 2		*Allowances, social charges, etc.*	
	(A)	*Allowances*	
	(a)	Household allowance	195,000
	(b)	Children's allowance	183,000
	(c)	Expatriation allowance	453,000
	(d)	Compensatory rent allowance	20,000
	(e)	Overtime	33,000
	(f)	**Guarantee against currency devaluation for non-French staff**	
	(g)	Education allowance	100,000
	(h)	Allowance for language courses	2,000
	(B)	*Social charges*	
	(a)	Social security	470,000
	(b)	Supplementary insurance	184,000
	(c)	Provident fund	116,000
	(C)	*Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and departure of permanent officials*	
	(a)	Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers	1,600
	(b)	Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons	1,500
	(c)	Removal expenses	3,400
	(d)	Installation allowance	7,500
	(e)	Biennial home leave for non-French officials	12,000
	(f)	Medical examination	10,000
		Total of Head I	7,252,000

1. Document 891.

X II

NEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1982

in French francs

Transfers +	Transfers −	Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	212,301	5,175,699	5,031,806	143,893
102,743		174,743	174,743	–
		195,000	170,498	24,502
		183,000	152,280	30,720
		453,000	387,669	65,331
		20,000	10,536	9,464
2,993		35,993	35,993	–
		100,000	81,814	18,186
		2,000	370	1,630
106,565		576,565	576,565	–
		184,000	170,604	13,396
		116,000	113,247	2,753
		1,600	–	1,600
4,785		6,285	6,285	–
5,165		8,565	8,565	–
	5,165	2,335	–	2,335
	4,785	7,215	4,865	2,350
		10,000	6,051	3,949
222,251	222,251	7,252,000	6,931,891	320,109

DETAILS	Total budget for 1982
HEAD II - EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY	
Sub-Head 3 1. *Temporary staff*	
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly	671,000
2. *Linguistic staff*	
(*A*) *Interpretation services*	
(*a*) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly	270,000
(*b*) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions	267,000
(*B*) *Translation services*	
Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly	560,000
3. *Insurance for temporary staff*	5,000
4. *Installation of equipment for sessions*	305,000
5. *Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions*	65,000
Total of Head II	2,143,000
HEAD III - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT	
Sub-Head 4 1. Premises	356,000
2. Work on the building	53,000
Sub-Head 5 Capital equipment	27,000
Total of Head III	436,000

Transfers +	Transfers −	Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	17,740	653,260	612,207	41,053
		270,000	239,802	30,198
		267,000	251,421	15,579
	30,128	529,872	521,073	8,799
		5,000	3,366	1,634
30,128		335,128	335,128	–
17,740		82,740	82,740	–
47,868	47,868	2,143,000	2,045,737	97,263
		356,000	360,771	-4,771
		53,000	53,100	- 100
		27,000	30,751	-3,751
		436,000	444,622	-8,622

DETAILS			Total budget for 1982
HEAD IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS			
Sub-Head 6		Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents	370,000
Sub-Head 7		Office supplies and hire of machines	237,000
Sub-Head 8		Printing and publishing of Assembly documents	1,110,000
Sub-Head 9		Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.	33,000
Sub-Head 10		Official cars	35,500
Sub-Head 11		Bank charges	500
		Total of Head IV	1,786,000
HEAD V – OTHER EXPENDITURE			
Sub-Head 12		Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs	96,000
Sub-Head 13		Expenses for representation and receptions	150,000
Sub-Head 14		Committee study missions	3,000
Sub-Head 15		Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	240,000
Sub-Head 16		Expenses of experts and the auditor	56,000
Sub-Head 17		Expenditure on information	203,000
Sub-Head 18		Expenses for groups of the Assembly	203,000
Sub-Head 19		Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3,000
Sub-Head 20		Non-recoverable taxes	12,000
		Total of Head V	966,000
HEAD VI – PENSIONS			
Sub-Head 21		Pensions, allowances, etc.	
	(A)	*Pensions*	
	(*a*)	Retirement pension	70,000
	(*b*)	Invalidity pension	–
	(*c*)	Survivors' pension	36,000
	(*d*)	Orphans' pension	18,000
	(B)	*Allowances*	
	(*a*)	Household allowance	–
	(*b*)	Dependants' allowance	–
	(*c*)	Education allowance	–
	(*d*)	Relief allowance	–
	(C)	*Severance grant*	–
	(D)	***Supplementary insurance***	2,000
		Total of Head VI	126,000
		TOTAL	12,709,000

The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 198-

Fred MULLEY
President of the Assembly

Georg
Clerk of t

Transfers +	Transfers -	Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
44,483		414,483	414,483	-
654		237,654	237,654	-
	45,658	1,064,342	1,050,565	13,777
521		33,521	33,521	-
		35,500	29,275	6,225
		500	73	427
45,658	45,658	1,786,000	1,765,571	20,429
		96,000	81,270	14,730
		150,000	134,265	15,735
3,966		6,966	6,966	-
	27,065	212,935	201,990	10,945
23,099		79,099	79,099	-
		203,000	171,061	31,939
		203,000	203,000	-
		3,000	1,967	1,033
		12,000	5,602	6,398
27,065	27,065	966,000	885,220	80,780
1,323		71,323	107,777	-36,454
	1,264	34,736	34,736	-
	477	17,523	17,523	-
			3,311	-3,311
			5,244	-5,244
418		2,418	2,418	-
1,741	1,741	126,000	171,009	-45,009
344,583	344,583	12,709,000	12,244,050	464,950

aid for up to 31st March 1983, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

MOULIAS
Assembly

Hugo ADRIAENSENS
Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

APPENDIX III

STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY BUDGET FOR 1982

Member states	600ths	Contributions overpaid in 1981	Budget surplus 1981	Revised budget for 1982	Net contributions required
		F	F	F	F
Belgium	59	(-) 35,595	(-) 78,256	1,207,730	1,093,879
France	120	(-) 72,396	(-) 159,166	2,456,400	2,224,838
Federal Republic of Germany	120	(-) 72,396	(-) 159,166	2,456,400	2,224,838
Italy	120	(-) 72,396	(-) 159,166	2,456,400	2,224,838
Luxembourg	2	(-) 1,207	(-) 2,651	40,940	37,082
Netherlands	59	(-) 35,595	(-) 78,256	1,207,730	1,093,879
United Kingdom	120	(-) 72,396	(-) 159,166	2,456,400	2,224,838
	600	(-) 361,981	(-) 795,827	12,282,000	11,124,192

APPENDIX IV

PROVIDENT FUND

ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1982

in French francs

	F		F
Balance brought forward :			
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1982	2,096,450		
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly of Western European Union	167,336	Withdrawals	11,500
Repayments of loans by staff members	39,650		
Interest received during the year	327,507		
Gain on valuation at 31st December 1982	121,583	Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st December 1982	2,741,026
	2,752,526		2,752,526

Fred MULLEY
President of the Assembly

Georges MOULIAS
Clerk of the Assembly

Hugo ADRIAENSENS
Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

I have examined the foregoing statement. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion this statement is correct.

Gordon DOWNEY
Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom
External Auditor

3rd June 1983

Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1982

MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1982 [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration [2]
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur

The Assembly,

Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1982, together with the Auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the financial regulations,

Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith* (Chairman); Mr. *Haase* (Vice-Chairman); MM. Adriaensens, Biefnot (Alternate: *Bogaerts*), Delehedde (Alternate: *Baumel*), *Hartmann*, Hengel (Alternate: *Margue*), Lord Hughes (Alternate: *Sir Paul Hawkins*), MM. Jeambrun, Linde, *Martino*, Michael Morris (Alternate: *Lord McNair*), Orione, Petrilli (Alternate: *Amadei*), Schleiter (Alternate: *Oehler*), Schmitz, *Stokes*, Tripodi, *Tummers*, *de Vries*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Document 954 26th September 1983

DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1984[1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration[2]
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Summary of estimates of expenditure and income for the financial year 1984

Details	Estimate for 1984 F
Head I : Expenditure for staff	8,496,800
Head II : Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly	2,593,000
Head III : Expenditure on premises and equipment	561,000
Head IV : General administrative costs	2,246,000
Head V : Other expenditure	1,157,000
Head VI : Pensions	677,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	15,730,800
TOTAL RECEIPTS	571,000
NET TOTAL	15,159,800

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee and approved by the Presidential Committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith* (Chairman); Mr. *Haase* (Vice-Chairman); MM. Adriaensens, Biefnot (Alternate: *Bogaerts*), Delehedde (Alternate: *Baumel*), *Hartmann*, Hengel (Alternate: *Margue*), Lord Hughes (Alternate: *Sir Paul Hawkins*), MM. Jeambrun, Linde, *Martino*, Michael Morris (Alternate: *Lord McNair*), Orione, Petrilli (Alternate: *Amadei*), Schleiter (Alternate: *Oehler*), Schmitz, *Stokes*, Tripodi, *Tummers*, *de Vries*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Allocation of expenditure under heads and sub-heads

Details	Estimate for 1984 F	
Head I – EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF		
Sub-Head 1: Salaries of permanent establishment	5,670,000	
Sub-Head 2: (A) Allowances	1,101,300	
(B) Social charges	920,500	
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and departure of permanent officials	112,000	
(D) Provision for revising emoluments (salaries, allowances, etc.)	693,000	
TOTAL OF HEAD I		8,496,800
Head II – EXPENDITURE RELATING TO SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY		
Sub-Head 3: 1. Temporary staff	742,000	
2. Linguistic staff	1,235,000	
3. Insurance for temporary staff	5,000	
4. Installation of equipment for sessions	350,000	
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions	82,500	
6. Provision for revising emoluments	178,500	
TOTAL OF HEAD II		2,593,000
Head III – EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT		
Sub-Head 4: 1. Premises	446,000	
2. Work on the building (joint areas)	30,000	
Sub-Head 5: Capital equipment	85,000	
TOTAL OF HEAD III		561,000
Head IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS		
Sub-Head 6: Postage, telephone, telex charges, transport of documents	465,000	
Sub-Head 7: Office supplies and hire of machines	300,000	
Sub-Head 8: Printing and publishing of Assembly documents	1,400,000	
Sub-Head 9: Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.	40,000	
Sub-Head 10: Official cars	40,500	
Sub-Head 11: Bank charges	500	
TOTAL OF HEAD IV		2,246,000
Head V – OTHER EXPENDITURE		
Sub-Head 12: Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs	125,000	
Sub-Head 13: Expenses for representation and receptions	150,000	
Sub-Head 14: Committee study missions	3,000	
Sub-Head 15: Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	290,000	
Sub-Head 16: Expenses of experts and the auditors	68,000	
Sub-Head 17: Expenditure on information	253,000	
Sub-Head 18: Expenses for groups of the Assembly	253,000	
Sub-Head 19: Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3,000	
Sub-Head 20: Non-recoverable taxes	12,000	
TOTAL OF HEAD V		1,157,000
Head VI – PENSIONS		
Sub-Head 21: (A) Pensions	613,000	
(B) Allowances	55,000	
(C) Severance grant	–	
(D) Supplementary insurance	9,000	
TOTAL OF HEAD VI		677,000

Analysis of estimates of expenditure

Head I – Expenditure for staff

Sub-Head 1

SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT

Estimate : F 5,670,000

(*a*) Basic salaries — *Estimate :* F 5,595,000

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
The Clerk	Hors cadre	1	391,700
Senior Counsellors	A6	2	710,600
Counsellors	A5	3	1,013,800
First Secretaries	A4	2	577,000
Secretaries	A3 [1]	2	379,500
Secretaries-Translators/Publications Administrative Assistant/Assistant Translator	A2	3	587,200
Chief Accountant	B6	1	195,000
Personal Assistants	B4 [2]	5	710,300
Bilingual Shorthand Typists	B3	5	591,000
Switchboard Operator	B3	1	97,000
Head of Reproduction Department	C6	1	130,900
Assistants in Reproduction Department	C4	2	211,000
		28	5,595,000

(*b*) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades A, B and C), including travelling expenses and insurance

Estimate : F 75,000

1. Transformation of the A3 post approved for one year into a permanent post.
2. Regrading of a Grade B3 requested in 1983.

Sub-Head 2

ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC.

(A) ALLOWANCES

Estimate: F 1,101,300

(*a*) Household allowance — *Estimate:* F 231,300

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
Clerk	Hors cadre	1	23,000
Senior Counsellors	A6	2	42,600
Counsellors	A5	3	60,800
First Secretary	A4	1	17,300
Secretaries	A3	2	22,800
Personal Assistants	B4	2	16,500
Bilingual Shorthand Typists	B3	4	27,700
Head of Reproduction Department	C6	1	7,900
Assistants in Reproduction Department	C4	2	12,700
		18	231,300

(*b*) Children's allowance — *Estimate:* F 203,000

9,247 F per year per child × 22: ..... F 203,000

(*c*) Expatriation allowance — *Estimate:* F 496,000

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
Senior Counsellors	A6	2	142,000
Counsellors	A5	1	68,000
First Secretary	A4	1	57,600
Secretaries	A3	2	75,800
Secretary-Translator/Publications Administrative Assistant/Assistant Translator	A2	2	64,700
Personal Assistants	B4	2	45,700
Bilingual Shorthand Typists	B3	2	42,200
		12	496,000

(*d*) Compensatory rent allowance — *Estimate:* F 16,000

(*e*) Overtime — *Estimate:* F 33,000

(*f*)

(*g*) Education allowance — *Estimate:* F 120,000

(*h*) Allowance for language courses — *Estimate:* F 2,000

(B) SOCIAL CHARGES

Estimates : F 920,500

(*a*) Social Security — *Estimate :* F 644,000

28 officials — F 644,000

(*b*) Supplementary insurance — *Estimate :* F 176,000

(*c*) Provident fund — *Estimate :* F 100,500

14 % of basic salaries × 717,200 F — F 100,500
(for 2 officials who opted to continue with the provident fund)

(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS

Estimate : F 112,000

(*a*) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris who are convened for examinations and interviews and cost of marking examination papers

Estimate : F 10,000

(*b*) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons

Estimate : F 10,000

(*c*) Removal expenses

Estimate : F 40,000

(*d*) Installation allowance

Estimate : F 30,000

(*e*) Biennial home leave for non-French officials

Estimate : F 15,000

(*f*) Medical examination

Estimate : F 7,000

(D) PROVISION FOR REVISING EMOLUMENTS (SALARIES, ALLOWANCES, ETC.)

Estimate : 693,000

Head II – Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly

Estimate : F 2,593,000

Sub-Head 3

1. TEMPORARY STAFF

Temporary staff required for sessions of the Assembly

Function	Paris : 10 days		
	Daily remuneration F	No.	Total F
Head of the sittings office	850	2 *b*	27,200
Heads of sections	690 740	2 *a* 2 *b*	31,600
Sergeant-at-Arms	645	1 *b*	7,800
Secretaries for the Assembly	495 645	3 *a* 2 *b*	30,300
Précis writers	495 645	3 *a* 3 *b*	38,000
Verbatim reporters	645 808	14 *b* 6 *c*	160,000
Assistants	325 282 475 432	6 *a* 10 *a* 4 *b* 27 *b*	210,000
Head ushers	263	2 *a*	5,300
Ushers	238 388	12 *a* 3 *b*	42,500
Offset/Assemblers	238	10 *a*	28,500
		112	581,200

a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside France.
c. Recruited as free-lance staff.

Travelling expenses	F	160,800
	F	742,000

2. LINGUISTIC STAFF

(A) *Interpretation Services*

(a) Interpretation services required for sessions of the Assembly

Function	10 days	
	No.	Total F
Interpreters	12	252,000
	12	252,000

Travelling expenses ..... F 18,000
F 270,000

(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions .... F 330,000

(B) *Translation Services*

Temporary translators for sessions of the Assembly

Function	Daily remuneration F	No.	Estimate [1] F
Revisers	742 1,202	3*a* 4*b*	234,400
Translators	594 1,003	3*a* 5*b*	227,500
Assistants	282 325 475 432	4*a* 3*a* 3*b* 2*b*	145,100
		27	607,000

1. Based on 32 days for the revisers and translators.

a Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside France.

Travelling expenses ..... F 28,000
F 635,000

3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF

Estimate : F 5,000

4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SESSIONS

- Installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment ..... F 340,000
- Installation of telephone booths ..... F 10,000

Estimate : F 350,000

5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING SESSIONS

- Removal expenses
- Medical service (Doctor and Nurse)
- Hire of typewriters, a technician and screens
- Servicing of lifts
- Cleaning
- Overtime for switchboard staff
- Snacks for reproduction service

Estimate : F 82,500

6. PROVISION FOR REVISING EMOLUMENTS (SALARIES, PER DIEM ALLOWANCES)

Estimate : F 178,500

Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment

Estimate : F 561,000

Sub-Head 4

1. PREMISES

- Hire of committee rooms outside Paris and installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment ..... F 15,000
- Joint overheads, furniture for the premises and insurance ..... F 390,000
- Minor repairs to equipment and machines and removal of furniture ... F 26,000
- Miscellaneous ..... F 15,000

Estimate : F 446,000

2. WORK ON THE BUILDING
(joint areas)

- Changing the switchboard

Estimate : F 30,000

Sub-Head 5

CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

- 1 duplicating machine ..... F 61,000
- 2 typewriters ..... F 24,000

Estimate : F 85,000

Head IV – General administrative costs

Estimate : F 2,246,000

Sub-Head 6

POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEX CHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS

- Postage ..... F 300,000
- Telephone ..... F 145,000
- Telex ..... F 15,000
- Transport of documents ..... F 5,000

Estimate : F 465,000

Sub-Head 7

OFFICE SUPPLIES AND HIRE OF MACHINES

- Purchase of duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies
- Hire of machines for photocopying and printing

Estimate : F 300,000

Sub-Head 8

PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS

- Printing of Assembly documents (includes the record of debates, minutes of the Assembly and Assembly documents)
- Printing of reports of the Council
- Printing of texts adopted
- Miscellaneous – bulletins, printing of the agenda and order of business of the Assembly, voting lists, etc.
- Reprints
- Brochures

Estimate : F 1,400,000

Sub-Head 9

PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC

Estimate : F 40,000

Sub-Head 10

OFFICIAL CARS

- Hire of official cars for the President
- Maintenance, garage, petrol and insurance for the official car of the Clerk

Estimate: F 40,500

Sub-Head 11

BANK CHARGES

Estimate: F 500

Head V – Other expenditure

Estimate: F 1,157,000

Sub-Head 12

TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS

Estimate: F 125,000

Sub-Head 13

EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS

Estimate: F 150,000

Sub-Head 14

COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS

Estimate: F 3,000

Sub-Head 15

OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Estimate: F 290,000

Sub-Head 16

EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITOR

Estimate: F 68,000

Sub-Head 17

EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION

Estimate: F 253,000

Sub-Head 18

EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY

Estimate: F 253,000

Sub-Head 19

CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR

Estimate: F 3,000

Sub-Head 20

NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES

Estimate: F 12,000

Head VI – Pensions

Estimate : F 677,000

Sub-Head 21

PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC.

(A) *Pensions*

Estimate : F 613,000

(*a*) Retirement pension ..... *Estimate :* F 381,600
(*b*) Invalidity pension ..... *Estimate :* F 170,300
(*c*) Survivors' pension ..... *Estimate :* F 40,800
(*d*) Orphans' pension ..... *Estimate :* F 20,300

(B) *Allowances*

Estimate : F 55,000

(*a*) Household allowance ..... *Estimate :* F 16,500
(*b*) Dependants' allowance ..... *Estimate :* F 30,500
(*c*) Education allowance ..... *Estimate :* F 8,000
(*d*) Relief allowance ..... *Estimate :* pro mem.

(C) *Severance grant*

Estimate : pro mem.

(D) *Supplementary insurance*

Estimate : F 9,000

Income

(A) *Sundry receipts*

Estimate : F 140,000

(*a*) Sale of publications ..... F 25,000
(*b*) Bank interest ..... F 100,000
(*c*) Social security reimbursements ..... F 15,000

(B) *Pensions*

Estimate : F 341,000

(*a*) Contributions (7 %) (× F 4,870,000) ..... *Estimate :* F 341,000
(*b*) Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.) .. *Estimate :* nil

(C) *Levy on basic salaries of Grade A officials*

Estimate : F 90,000

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. The draft budget now before you amounts to F 15,159,800. The budget for 1983 amounted to F 13,893,000. The difference is therefore F 1,266,800, i.e. an increase of 9.10 %.

2. *Head I – Expenditure for staff*

This estimate, in accordance with the instructions given to the Office of the Clerk, takes into consideration:

(*i*) the maintenance of two Grade A.6 posts;

(*ii*) the transformation of the Grade A.3 post, approved in 1983 for a period of one year, into a permanent post. This would become effective at the end of the fixed-term contract (1 year) given to the current holder of the post. The 1984 budget consequently takes into account the salary of that official until 15th July 1984 (F 135,000) and with effect from that date the salary and allowances of a non-French official, married, with 2 dependent children (F 200,000). However, actual expenditure for this post would be less if an unmarried official is recruited.

(*iii*) the regrading already requested in 1983 of a Grade B.3 post to Grade B.4; the additional cost would be F 700;

(*iv*) annual increments;

(*v*) the " Provision for revising emoluments (salaries, allowances, etc.) " (9 %).

Salaries and allowances have been calculated on the basis of those in force on 1st January 1983.

3. *Head II – Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly*

Sub-head 3.1 – Temporary staff
Sub-head 3.2 (A) – Interpretation services
Sub-head 3.2 (B) – Translation services
Sub-head 3.6 – Provision for revising emoluments (salaries, per diem allowances)

Salaries for temporary staff (as in the Council of Europe) are calculated on the basis of salary scales for permanent staff. The figures given are those in force on 1st January 1983 and include " provision for revising emoluments (salaries and per diem allowances) ".

Sub-head 3.4 – Installation of equipment for sessions

A new temporary installation carried out in 1983 has proved economical and no change has therefore been made in this estimate for 1984 in spite of inflation.

4. *Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment*

Sub-head 4.1 – Premises

This estimate covers the Assembly's share in the upkeep of the premises and the urgent problem arising from the fact that the office furniture and certain floor coverings are in poor condition.

Sub-head 4.2 – Work on the building (joint areas)

This estimate covers the Assembly's share of the hire-purchase of a new switchboard over a period of five years under a contract concluded in 1983.

Sub-head 5 – Capital equipment

The sum of F 85,000 is for the replacement of two typewriters purchased in 1968 and 1971 and of some of the reproduction equipment which, now more than five years old, is no longer reliable enough for carrying out the Assembly's work.

Moreover, it should be recalled that the volume of work has increased considerably over this period, making it necessary for the reproduction service to use two other offset machines during peak periods, this equipment having been made available to the Assembly by the manufacturer free of charge until the last session. For future sessions, this absolutely essential equipment will have to be hired provisionally. This matter will be examined in the context of the replacement of present equipment. A credit of F 61,000 has therefore been requested.

5. *Head IV – General administrative costs*

Sub-head 6 – Postage, telephone, telex charges, transport of documents

The increase of F 58,000 in this estimate is to cover expected increases in postage and telephone rates and the hire of a telex and attendant costs.

It should be noted however that the telex requested in 1983 has not yet been hired. This matter will be examined in the context of future measures.

Sub-head 7 – Office supplies and hire of machines

The increase of F 38,000 in this estimate is to cover the higher cost of paper and office supplies. Account is also taken of the hire of a photocopying machine and an addressograph machine.

Sub-head 8 – Printing and publishing of Assembly documents

The increase of F 188,000 in this estimate is to meet expected increases in the cost of printing and paper.

Sub-head 10 – Official cars

This estimate covers the maintenance, garage, insurance, etc., of the official car, account being taken of the expected increase in the cost of living, plus the hire of an official car for the President.

6. *Head V – Other expenditure*

Sub-head 12 – Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of committees and Rapporteurs

The increase of F 15,000 in this estimate is to cover the expected increase in travelling expenses and per diem allowances.

Sub-head 13 – Expenses for representation and receptions

The increase of F 6,000 corresponds to rising prices.

Sub-head 15 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk

The increase of F 26,000 is based on the expected increase in travelling expenses and per diem allowances in 1984.

Sub-head 16 – Expenses of experts and the auditors

The increase of F 6,000 is to cover the higher fees of the auditor and experts.

Sub-head 17 – Expenditure on information

The increase of F 23,000 takes account of the expected increase in the cost of living.

Sub-head 18 – Expenses for groups of the Assembly

The increase of F 23,000 takes account of the expected increase in the cost of living.

7. *Head VI – Pensions*

The increase in this head corresponds to the payment of a pension for a Grade A.6 official who has retired and an invalidity pension for a Grade A.3 official.

8. *Sundry receipts*

Expected receipts of F 571,000 in 1984 include:

(*i*) sale of publications;

(*ii*) bank interest;

(*iii*) social security reimbursements in respect of staff on sick leave;

(*iv*) income from the 7 % contribution from staff subscribing to the pension fund, the reimbursement of loans and levies;

(*v*) levy on the salaries of Grade A officials.

Comparison between the draft budget for the financial year 1984 and the budget for the financial year 1983

Head I – Expenditure for staff

Sub-Head 1

SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT

(*a*) Basic salaries

Estimate for 1984	F	5,595,000
Budget for 1983	F	5,404,100
Net increase	F	190,900

1982 expenditure : F 5,031,806

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2.

(*b*) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades A, B and C), including travelling expenses and insurance

Estimate for 1984	F	75,000
Budget for 1983	F	75,000
Estimate unchanged		

1982 expenditure : F 174,743

These salary scales are the same as those in force on 1st January 1983. See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2.

Sub-Head 2

ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC.

(A) ALLOWANCES

(*a*) Household allowance

Estimate for 1984	F	231,300
Budget for 1983	F	191,300
Net increase	F	40,000

1982 expenditure : F 170,498

This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff.

(*b*) Children's allowance

Estimate for 1984	F	203,000
Budget for 1983	F	170,000
Net increase	F	33,000

1982 expenditure : F 152,280

This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff.

(*c*) Expatriation allowance

Estimate for 1984	F	496,000
Budget for 1983	F	468,200
Net increase	F	27,800

1982 expenditure : F 387,669

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of non-French staff entitled to the allowance.

(*d*) Compensatory rent allowance

Estimate for 1984	F	16,000
Budget for 1983	F	10,100
Net increase	F	5,900

1982 expenditure : F 10,536

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the rent allowance now paid and the number of officials qualifying for an allowance.

(*e*) Overtime

Estimate for 1984	F	33,000
Budget for 1983	F	33,000
Estimate unchanged		

1982 expenditure : F 35,993

(*f*)

(*g*) Education allowance

Estimate for 1984	F	120,000
Budget for 1983	F	130,000
Net decrease	F	10,000

1982 expenditure : F 81,814

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance.

(*h*) Allowance for language courses

Estimate for 1984	F	2,000
Budget for 1983	F	2,000
Estimate unchanged		

1982 expenditure : F 370

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance.

(B) SOCIAL CHARGES

(*a*) Social security

Estimate for 1984	F	644,000
Budget for 1983	F	608,500
Net increase	F	35,500

1982 expenditure : F 576,565

This takes account of increases in 1983

(*b*) Supplementary insurance

Estimate for 1984	F	176,000
Budget for 1983	F	180,400
Net decrease	F	4,400

1982 expenditure : F 170,604

(*c*) Provident fund

Estimate for 1984	F	100,500
Budget for 1983	F	112,600
Net decrease	F	12,100

1982 expenditure : F 113,247

This calculation is based on 14 % of basic salaries for staff having opted to remain in the provident fund scheme.

(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS

(*a*) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers

Estimate for 1984	F	10,000
Budget for 1983	F	10,000
Estimate unchanged		

1982 expenditure : nil.

(*b*) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons

Estimate for 1984	F	10,000
Budget for 1983	F	10,000
Estimate unchanged		

1982 expenditure : F 6,285

Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff.

(*c*) Removal expenses

Estimate for 1984	F	40,000
Budget for 1983	F	40,000
Estimate unchanged		

1982 expenditure : F 8,565

Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff.

(*d*) Installation allowance

Estimate for 1984	F	30,000
Budget for 1983	F	30,000
Estimate unchanged		

1982 expenditure : nil.

Calculated on the basis of possible replacement requirements.

(*e*) Biennial home leave for non-French officials

Estimate for 1984	F	15,000
Budget for 1983	F	15,000
Estimate unchanged		

1982 expenditure : F 4,865

Based on the number of staff entitled to home leave in 1984.

(*f*) Medical examination

Estimate for 1984	F	7,000
Budget for 1983	F	7,000
Estimate unchanged		

1982 expenditure : F 6,051

(D) PROVISION FOR REVISING EMOLUMENTS (SALARIES, ALLOWANCES, ETC.)

Estimate for 1984	F	693,000
Budget for 1983	F	664,800
Net increase	F	28,200

1982 expenditure : nil.

Head II – Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly

Sub-Head 3

1. TEMPORARY STAFF

Temporary staff required for sessions of the Assembly

Estimate for 1984	F	742,000
Budget for 1983	F	682,500
Net increase	F	59,500

1982 expenditure : F 612,207

The basis of the calculation is two part-sessions in Paris making a total of 10 sitting days.

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

2. LINGUISTIC STAFF

(A) *Interpretation Services*

(*a*) Interpretation services required for sessions of the Assembly

Estimate for 1984	F	270,000
Budget for 1983	F	270,000
Estimated unchanged		

1982 expenditure : F 239,802

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

(*b*) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions

Estimate for 1984	F	330,000
Budget for 1983	F	300,000
Net increase	F	30,000

1982 expenditure : F 251,421

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

(B) *Translation Services*

Temporary translators for sessions of the Assembly

Estimate for 1984	F	635,000
Budget for 1983	F	573,000
Net increase	F	62,000

1982 expenditure : F 521,073

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF

Estimate for 1984	F	5,000
Budget for 1983	F	5,000
Estimate unchanged		

1982 expenditure : F 3,366

4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SESSIONS

Estimate for 1984	F	350,000
Budget for 1983	F	350,000
Estimate unchanged		

1982 expenditure : F 335,128

This calculation is based on the installations necessary for two part-sessions held in Paris.

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING SESSIONS

Estimate for 1984	F	82,500
Budget for 1983	F	82,500

Estimate unchanged

1982 expenditure : F 82,740

6. PROVISION FOR REVISING EMOLUMENTS (SALARIES, PER DIEM ALLOWANCES)

Estimate for 1984	F	178,500
Budget for 1983	F	164,000
Net increase	F	14,500

1982 expenditure: nil.

Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment

Sub-Head 4

1. PREMISES

Estimate for 1984	F	446,000
Budget for 1983	F	396,000
Net increase	F	50,000

1982 expenditure : F 360,771

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the Assembly's share in maintenance costs and the hire of committee rooms.

2. WORK ON THE BUILDING
(joint areas)

Estimate for 1984	F	30,000
Budget for 1983	F	60,000
Net decrease	F	30,000

1982 expenditure : F 53,100

This represents the Assembly's share in work to be carried out in the building and for changing the switchboard. See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4.

Sub-Head 5

CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

Estimate for 1984	F	85,000
Budget for 1983	F	36,000
Net increase	F	49,000

1982 expenditure : F 30,751

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4.

Head IV – General administrative costs

Sub-Head 6

POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEX CHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS

Estimate for 1984	F	465,000
Budget for 1983	F	407,000
Net increase	F	58,000

1982 expenditure : F 414,483

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 7

OFFICE SUPPLIES AND HIRE OF MACHINES

Estimate for 1984	F	300,000
Budget for 1983	F	262,000
Net increase	F	38,000

1982 expenditure : F 237,654

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 8

PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS

Estimate for 1984	F	1,400,000
Budget for 1983	F	1,212,000
Net increase	F	188,000

1982 expenditure : F 1,050,565

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 9

PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC.

Estimate for 1984	F	40,000
Budget for 1983	F	37,000
Net increase	F	3,000

1982 expenditure : F 33,521

Sub-Head 10

OFFICIAL CARS

Estimate for 1984	F	40,500
Budget for 1983	F	37,500
Net increase	F	3,000

1982 expenditure : F 29,275

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 11

BANK CHARGES

Estimate for 1984	F	500
Budget for 1983	F	500
Estimate unchanged		

1982 expenditure : F 73

Head V – Other expenditure

Sub-Head 12

TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS

Estimate for 1984	F	125,000
Budget for 1983	F	110,000
Net increase	F	15,000

1982 expenditure : F 81,270

Travel and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly attending committee meetings, including meetings of the Presidential Committee, are paid by the governments.

The Assembly is responsible for travel and subsistence allowances for visits by the President of the Assembly, Rapporteurs and, on occasion, Committee Chairmen when such visits are connected with the preparation of a report or Assembly business. Journeys by Chairmen and Rapporteurs are subject to the approval of the Presidential Committee.

Sub-Head 13

EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS

Estimate for 1984	F	150,000
Budget for 1983	F	144,000
Net increase	F	6,000

1982 expenditure : F 134,265

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 14

COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS

Estimate for 1984	F	3,000
Budget for 1983	F	3,000
Estimate unchanged		

1982 expenditure : F 6,966

Sub-Head 15

OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Estimate for 1984	F	290,000
Budget for 1983	F	264,000
Net increase	F	26,000

1982 expenditure : F 201,990

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 16

EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITORS

Estimate for 1984	F	68,000
Budget for 1983	F	62,000
Net increase	F	6,000

1982 expenditure : F 79,099

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 17

EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION

Estimate for 1984	F	253,000
Budget for 1983	F	230,000
Net increase	F	23,000

1982 expenditure : F 171,061

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 18

EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY

Estimate for 1984	F	253,000
Budget for 1983	F	230,000
Net increase	F	23,000

1982 expenditure : F 203,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 19

CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR

Estimate for 1984	F	3,000
Budget for 1983	F	3,000
Estimate unchanged		

1982 expenditure : F 1,967

Sub-Head 20

NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES

Estimate for 1984	F	12,000
Budget for 1983	F	12,000
Estimate unchanged		

1982 expenditure : F 5,602

Head VI – Pensions

Sub-Head 21

PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC.

(A) *Pensions*

(*a*) Retirement pension

Estimate for 1984	F	381,600
Estimate for 1983	F	166,000
Net increase	F	215,600

1982 expenditure : F 107,777

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7.

(*b*) Invalidity pension

Estimate for 1984	F	170,300
Budget for 1983		nil
Net increase	F	170,300

1982 expenditure : nil

(*c*) Survivors' pension

Estimate for 1984	F	40,800
Estimate for 1983	F	36,400
Net increase	F	4,400

1982 expenditure : F 34,736

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7.

(*d*) Orphans' pension

Estimate for 1984	F	20,300
Budget for 1983	F	18,600
Net increase	F	1,700

1982 expenditure : F 17,523

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7.

(B) *Allowances*

(*a*) Household allowance

Estimate for 1984	F	16,500
Budget for 1983	F	6,200
Net increase	F	10,300

1982 expenditure : F 3,311

(*b*) Dependants' allowance

Estimate for 1984	F	30,500
Budget for 1983	F	9,300
Net increase	F	21,200

1982 expenditure : 5,244

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7.

(*c*) Education allowance

Estimate for 1984	F	8,000
Budget for 1983		nil
Net increase	F	8,000

1982 expenditure: nil

(C) *Severance grant*

pro mem.

(D) *Supplementary insurance*

Estimate for 1984	F	9,000
Budget for 1983	F	3,500
Net increase	F	5,500

1982 expenditure : F 2,418

The Assembly of WEU and the North Atlantic Assembly

Impact of the existence and work of the North Atlantic Assembly on relations between the WEU Assembly and national parliaments and on public awareness of the existence of WEU

INFORMATION REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments by Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman and Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Information Report

(submitted by Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman and Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1. It is quite clear that perhaps the main task of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments is to try to communicate the decisions of the Assembly of WEU to national parliaments and the public. In a way we have to sell Western European Union, the activities of WEU and in general the defence of Europe to the public.

2. We had to conclude several times that awareness of the existence and the activities of WEU is very poor.

3. In practice the problem is confusion – not just with the European Communities and the Council of Europe, but with the North Atlantic Assembly too. No doubt the Atlantic Alliance is better known than WEU. Even the activities of the North Atlantic Assembly are perhaps better known than the activities of our own Assembly.

4. There is no doubt that the activities of the North Atlantic Assembly have an impact on our activities in our efforts to communicate and publicise more widely and effectively the activities of the WEU Assembly to parliaments and the public. For that reason it is worth while to compare the North Atlantic Assembly with our Assembly and to try to draw conclusions on the basis of such a comparison.

II. *North Atlantic Assembly*

A. *General information and background*

5. The North Atlantic Assembly is the interparliamentary organisation of member countries of the alliance and as such it provides the forum where North American and European parliamentarians meet to discuss problems of common concern.

6. The assembly was founded in 1955 and, until 1966, was known as the Conference of NATO Parliamentarians. Its aims are to strengthen co-operation and understanding among the countries of the alliance, to encourage governments to take the alliance viewpoint into account when framing legislation and to encourage a common feeling of Atlantic solidarity in national parliaments.

7. Although the assembly is completely independent of NATO, it constitutes a link between parliamentarians and the alliance. The highest military and civilian authorities of the alliance address the assembly at their annual sessions and at meetings of the assembly's committees during the year, when the range of alliance policies and activities are examined and discussed in detail.

8. The North Atlantic Assembly constitutes a link between NATO and parliamentarians of member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance.

9. The assembly plays an important rôle in acting as a forum through which NATO policies and activities can be discussed in detail by alliance parliamentarians.

10. It also acts, more specifically, as a medium for disseminating precise military information about NATO's defence and strategic aims, as explained by the military authorities of the alliance.

11. Assembly staff maintain close working relations with the NATO secretariat and with specialist NATO agencies.

12. The Secretary-General of NATO usually presents a comprehensive statement on the state of the alliance for the assembly's consideration at the annual plenary session.

(a) Members

13. The assembly is composed of serving parliamentarians from the sixteen member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance who are appointed in their respective parliaments under national procedures.

14. The number of effective members is 184 distributed as follows: United States 36 ; United Kingdom, France, Federal Republic of Germany and Italy 18 each ; Canada and Spain 12 ; Turkey 10 ; Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands 7 each ; Denmark, Norway and Portugal 5 each ; Iceland and Luxembourg 3 each.

15. Each country's representation is determined according to its population and by a sliding scale formula which decreases representation per capita as population increases.

16. National delegations are multi-party and thus represent the ideas of a cross section of the community.

17. No serving minister or government member may be a delegate to the assembly.

18. Alternates are included in national delegations. However, while more than one alternate

may sit and speak in place of a member, only one alternate may vote for him.

19. Delegates are normally appointed for a minimum period of one year and, where possible, for the duration of their current national legislature.

(*b*) *Officers*

20. The officers of the assembly are the President, three Vice-Presidents, of which one is the retiring President, and the Treasurer.

21. They are elected by a simple majority vote of the members present at the annual plenary session.

22. Their mandates are renewable with the exception of the longest serving Vice-President. The three Vice-Presidents must always be of different nationality.

23. North America must always be represented among the officers by a Canadian or United States parliamentarian.

(*c*) *Standing Committee*

24. The Standing Committee, as the governing body, has overall responsibility for directing the activities of the assembly.

25. It is composed of one member and alternate from each delegation with the right of substitution.

26. The President, Vice-Presidents and the Treasurer are ex-officio members of the Standing Committee, and are entitled to vote in Standing Committee meetings only in the absence of the member representing their delegation.

27. The main responsibilities of the Standing Committee are to represent the interests of the assembly between sessions, to prepare the assembly's budget and manage the funds accordingly, to draw up the proposed agenda for the assembly's plenary sessions and to take all possible steps to secure the implementation of the recommendations and resolutions of the assembly.

28. The Standing Committee appoints the Secretary-General and has final authority over the size and functions of the secretariat.

29. Each member of the Standing Committee has one vote, except on decisions involving additional expenditure, when the votes are weighted according to national contributions.

30. Meetings of the Standing Committee are held at least three times a year – in the early spring, prior to the spring committee meetings and during the full autumn plenary session. However, additional meetings of the Standing Committee are held at other times during the year according to prevailing circumstances.

(*d*) *Committees*

31. The assembly operates through five committees which cover the assembly's wide range of activities.

32. The committees are the Economic Committee with 36 members, the Education, Cultural Affairs and Information Committee with 22 members, the Military Committee with 40 members, the Political Committee with 46 members and the Scientific and Technical Committee with 28 members.

33. The national representation of membership of the five committees reflects the same proportional pattern as for membership of the assembly itself.

34. The committees meet twice a year – once during the spring and a second time prior to the autumn plenary session.

35. With the occasional exception of the Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information, meetings are closed to the public.

36. Each committee annually elects its officers – a Chairman, one or more Vice-Chairmen and a General Rapporteur. They often serve for more than one year. Special rapporteurs may also be selected to deal with specific topics. The Rapporteur's function is to present a report to his committee which serves as a basis for debate and, usually, as a source of draft resolutions and recommendations for consideration by the members. Each committee submits its proposals to the plenary session for consideration by the full membership.

(*e*) *Sub-committees*

37. When committees wish to analyse in depth specific problems of the alliance arising from their committee work, they may appoint, subject to the approval of the Standing Committee, sub-committees for limited periods of time composed of their own members.

38. Recent examples of sub-committee interests include European defence co-operation, economic relations between member countries, negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), energy supplies, work of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS), reserve forces and home guard units and Soviet maritime threat.

B. *The plenary session of the North Atlantic Assembly*

39. The North Atlantic Assembly meets in plenary session once a year in the autumn to debate the subjects it feels are of concern and interest to the Atlantic Alliance. For the most part, the plenary session considers issues presented to it by the committees, although individual members have the right to introduce their own proposals.

40. The assembly's position on various matters is expressed through a recommendation, a resolution, an opinion or an order.

41. A recommendation is directed to the North Atlantic Council requesting it to take certain action in pursuit of the aims of the assembly and in expectation of a reply from the Secretary-General of NATO expressing the Council's views. A recommendation requires a two-thirds majority vote.

42. A resolution is a formal expression of opinion on a particular matter and is usually addressed to member governments and parliaments of the alliance, or to international organisations. A resolution may be adopted by a simple majority vote.

43. An order deals with matters of internal procedure and is usually directed to the Standing Committee or the secretariat. A simple majority vote is required.

44. Delegates normally vote as individuals and by show of hands, although in certain circumstances delegates may choose to register their votes by a roll-call of national delegations.

C. *Examples of decisions by the North Atlantic Assembly*

Recommendations

78. on support for the North Atlantic programme for the advancement of science, culture and society ;

79. on the adoption by NATO of a dynamic information policy ;

Resolutions

121. on East-West relations after the events in Poland: the search for an alliance consensus ;

122. on Afghanistan ;

123. on the economics of Atlantic security ;

124. on Poland and the first anniversary of the introduction of martial law ;

125. on support for the initiative by the President of the United States to promote exchanges between American and European youth ;

126. on alliance armaments co-operation ;

127. on alliance security ;

128. on East-West relations ;

129. on international terrorism ;

130. on East-West relations after Brezhnev ;

131. on acid rain ;

132. on arms control in outer space ;

133. on the International Atomic Energy Agency ;

134. on nuclear weapons in Europe.

Order

24. on the establishment of an Atlantic foundation for culture and the signing by the member countries of the alliance of a Euro-Atlantic cultural charter.

45. Especially interesting is the recommendation on information policy, which reads as follows:

" The Assembly,

Considering the pressing need for the alliance to promote a better public understanding of its rôle in the service of peace ;

Considering also that the citizens of the member countries of the alliance should be informed clearly, fully and objectively of NATO's decisions in the military field and of the reasons for them, as well as of the western positions on the control and reduction of nuclear weapons ;

Convinced that it is necessary to develop now a new and more forceful information policy to be implemented by NATO with the aim of publicly promoting the principles of NATO as a free and peace-loving association of nations bound together by their attachment to common values,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:

1. Make every effort to strengthen the rôle, scope for initiative, and facilities of the NATO international staff, and to strengthen the press or public relations services of the various bodies of the Atlantic Alliance ;

2. Ensure that the information published by these services keeps the public clearly and properly informed, in order to obtain public support for those decisions ensuring the future of the Atlantic community. "

III. *Modified Brussels Treaty*

A. *Origins*

46. In 1950, the United States asked its European allies for Germany to be associated with the Atlantic Alliance. The European members of the Atlantic Alliance consequently looked for a way to allow the Federal Republic to take its place in the defence of Europe and, on 24th October 1950, Mr. Pleven, then French Prime Minister, proposed that a European army be set up to include all the forces of the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance.

47. The ensuing negotiations led in May 1952 to the signing of a treaty by which the six countries which had just set up the European Coal and Steel Community (Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) would form a European Defence Community. This community was to place member countries' integrated forces under the guidance of a single European authority. However, on 30th August 1954 the French Parliament, in a vote on a previous question, rejected the proposed European Defence Community and another treaty had to be prepared.

48. The seven governments then decided to take up the text of the Brussels Treaty of 17th March 1948, which extended the defensive alliance formed in Dunkirk on 4th March 1947 by France and the United Kingdom to Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and to modify it to allow the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to accede. The 1948 treaty provided for economic, social and cultural co-operation between the member countries and included provision for automatic mutual assistance. It also laid the foundations for a European defence organisation since it allowed a political Consultative Council and a standing Military Committee to be set up to prepare a defence plan and to ensure the co-ordination of military means. However, this treaty still bore traces of the aftermath of the second world war, since its preamble stipulated that the high contracting parties were resolved " to take such steps as may be held necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression ". This called for far-reaching changes which were sought in the Paris Agreements of 23rd October 1954 modifying the Brussels Treaty.

49. The signatories of the 1954 Paris Agreements clearly indicated their aims in the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty: " to reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights... and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations... to preserve the principles of democracy... to strengthen... the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united " by co-operating " to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery... to afford assistance to each other... in resisting any policy of aggression... to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe ". This was tantamount to saying that they considered Europe's unity and security to be closely linked, as well as its economy and defence, which explains the place they accorded in the framework of WEU both to armaments co-operation and to the establishment of mutual confidence which, at that time, implied collective control of levels of forces and armaments. Consequently, while Protocol No. I to the Paris Agreements modified the Brussels Treaty, Protocols Nos. II, III and IV contained further provisions relating to the levels of forces and armaments of member countries.

B. *The treaty*

50. The cornerstone of the treaty is Article V, which lays down that:

> " If any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other high contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power ".

It thus defines a defensive alliance far more binding than the North Atlantic Treaty or any other treaty now in force since it commits the forces of all the member countries unconditionally in the event of an attack on one of them.

51. Article VIII of the treaty sets up a Council so organised as to be able to exercise its functions continuously and deciding by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure had been agreed. The Council's aim is to strengthen peace and European security and also to promote unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe. At the request of any of the high contracting parties it may be immediately convened to consult " with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability ". No limit is placed on the Council's responsibilities and the preamble to the treaty underlines that its aim is to " preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitu-

tional traditions and the rule of law " and " to strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties " uniting the signatory countries. In other words, nothing is outside the responsibilities of WEU.

52. Article IX sets up " an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe " to which the Council has to make an annual report on its activities.

53. Protocol No. II to the Paris Agreements makes it incumbent on signatory mainland countries not to exceed a certain level of forces without the unanimous agreement of their partners and to submit their force levels to the Council for approval. The United Kingdom for its part is committed to maintain four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force on the mainland of Europe. This undertaking is subject to verification but there is no check on British forces stationed elsewhere.

54. Protocol No. III provides the framework for the Federal Republic's renouncing the production of certain armaments and makes all member countries' heavy weapons subject to verification by WEU, for which purpose an Agency for the Control of Armaments was set up under Protocol No. IV.

55. Finally, Article IV of the treaty stipulates that the WEU Council is to " rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters ".

C. *Application of the treaty*

56. While the modifed Brussels Treaty gave Western European Union extremely vast, not to say unlimited, responsibilities, it also demonstrated its signatories' concern that the body they had set up should not duplicate the work of other international organisations. Already, following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4th April 1949, the Brussels Treaty Organisation had decided in its resolution of 20th December 1950 to transfer the exercise of Western Union's defence activities to NATO, while specifying in paragraph 4 of that resolution that " these new arrangements will in no way affect the obligation assumed towards each other by the signatory powers under the Brussels Treaty " nor " affect the right of the Western Union Defence Ministers and Chiefs-of-Staff to meet as they please to consider matters of mutual concern ".

57. Although not fundamentally changing it, the Paris Agreements amending the treaty described the relationship between WEU and NATO. Article IV of the treaty stipulated that the signatory countries and any organs established by them " shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation " and recognised " the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO ". The statute of the Agency for the Control of Armaments specified, for instance, the nature of the information on the level of forces of member countries that NATO was to submit to it each year. Conversely, the exercise of the WEU Council's strictly military responsibilities was transferred to NATO from the outset.

58. The same concern to avoid duplication of work led the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, obviously with the approval of the WEU Council, to transfer in 1960 the exercise of WEU's social and cultural responsibilities under Articles II and III of the modified Brussels Treaty to the Council of Europe with the exception of those exercised by the WEU Public Administration Committee. This measure affected the Council's activities but not its actual responsibilities, as the Council specified in its annual report on its activities in 1959.

59. The Council's activities in the economic field, defined in Articles I and VIII of the treaty, have effectively been pursued, particularly since the agreement of 11th July 1963 organised exchanges of views between the United Kingdom and the then six member countries of the European Economic Community. However, when negotiations began between the United Kingdom and the Communities on 14th September 1970 the Council decided to halt its activities, without however calling in question the agreement of 11th July 1963 and the principle of consultations.

60. Finally, the Council's activities in the political field proper diminished considerably as and when consultations developed between the member countries of the European Communities in this field. Thus, consultative meetings between representatives of member countries prior to meetings of many international organisations, including the United Nations General Assembly, came to an end as a result of a decision of the WEU Council of 24th May 1972, without however this measure prejudicing the future of political consultations in the framework of WEU.

61. Conversely, in application of Article VIII.2 of the treaty, the Council decided on 7th May 1955 to set up a Standing Armaments Committee to promote the joint production of armaments. However, the creation and development of NATO bodies with parallel tasks, subsequently Eurogroup and finally the Independent European Programme Group prevented the Standing Armaments Committee assuming the importance which the authors of the 1955 decision undoubtedly expected.

62. The main reason why the WEU Council has found itself gradually deprived of many of

the activities for which the treaty had made it responsible is certainly that all the WEU member countries were also members of NATO, the Council of Europe and then the enlarged EEC, together with other countries.

63. In order to understand the present situation of WEU, three main factors must therefore be noted:

(*i*) its Council is mainly concerned with the implementation of the protocols;

(*ii*) nevertheless, it retains all the responsibilities conferred on it by the treaty and may at any time be called upon to resume this exercise;

(*iii*) the Assembly is still responsible for the overall application of the modified Brussels Treaty and although the Council has relinquished the practical aspects it must reply to recommendations by the Assembly or questions put by its members relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even if the treaty is applied in other frameworks. It has always recognised this principle and has furnished effective replies in many cases.

IV. *Comparison between the two assemblies*

64. Your Rapporteur believes a number of useful indications may be drawn from the above observations. First, although the WEU Assembly supervises an organisation which is far smaller than NATO, it has certain advantages, and particularly that it was set up by the modified Brussels Treaty itself, which confers upon it an official status which the North Atlantic Assembly lacks. This means that the WEU Council and its member governments have commitments towards the Assembly: it must be kept informed of all matters covered by the modified Brussels Treaty – and these are very vast – and the Assembly's recommendations must be followed up even if this is restricted to the seven member countries having to reach agreement on the replies to such recommendations. But the Assembly does not seem to have derived full benefit from this advantage because the Council has never agreed to apply the treaty correctly, i.e. to consider the Assembly as a true partner, as so strongly emphasised by Mrs. Knight in the report she presented on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments in June 1981 on relations between parliaments and the press.

65. Admittedly, the sanctions which the WEU Assembly can take against the Council, mainly a " motion to disapprove ", do not, as matters now stand, constitute a very serious threat for the governments and the Assembly has probably been right not to display its disapproval too often, in spite of its feelings about the way in which the Council treats it, because this sanction would very quickly have lost all credibility once observers noted that it was ineffectual.

66. However, this does not mean that members of the Assembly have no means of action since, all being members of parliament, they are all able, in their own parliament, to call upon their governments to apply the modified Brussels Treaty more seriously. They have often tried to do so by putting written questions, whose results have generally been mediocre, but they have probably not resorted often enough to procedure resulting in a debate which would have been more effective because it would have been more likely to reach public opinion.

67. Moreover, the WEU Assembly benefits from the fact that the WEU member countries are in close proximity geographically, thus allowing more frequent committee meetings than is the case for the North Atlantic Assembly, not to speak of the advantage of holding two plenary sessions a year instead of one. This allows the WEU Assembly's reports to be prepared in closer touch with political events and the reactions of public opinion and its debates are better able to portray these reactions. Even so, these facilities should be put to better use particularly by parliamentarians being more assiduous in attending committee meetings and by the more systematic use of procedure making it binding on rapporteurs to mention, in their reports, objections and views conflicting with their own during the discussions in committee.

68. In the case of the North Atlantic Assembly, this difficulty is however at least partly alleviated by the existence of sub-committees which may meet more often – up to eight or nine times a year – and gather information for preparing reports. There is provision for this in the Rules of Procedure of the WEU Assembly but it is in fact hardly ever applied.

69. The methods of work of the North Atlantic Assembly often allow it to have reports which are more fully documented than those presented to the WEU Assembly. However, the standard of this information often results in the reports having no political orientation, being hardly controversial and provoking no real debates in plenary session. This allows the North Atlantic Assembly to adopt a large number of reports in short sessions which are largely taken up by addresses by guest speakers, a practice which is not entirely satisfactory for a parliamentary assembly. Conversely, the documents emanating from the North Atlantic Assembly are often more useful for the work of

the national parliaments on security matters than are those of WEU.

70. It is not evident that in this respect the Assembly should follow the methods of the North Atlantic Assembly, it being beneficial for each assembly to retain its own characteristics.

71. Moreover, the fact that the WEU Assembly holds sessions more often allows there to be fewer items on the agenda and hence the possibility of more substantial debates than in the North Atlantic Assembly. To a certain extent, this is already the case, but it might be even more so if the Presidential Committee conformed to the wishes so often expressed by our committee and ensured that the order of business for each session was not too full and included matters of topical interest.

72. Conversely, the North Atlantic Assembly has a number of advantages, but it might perhaps be possible for the WEU Assembly to learn some lessons from its own organisation.

73. The first is probably that as the North Atlantic Assembly has no permanent chamber in which to meet it holds sessions in the capitals of the various member countries in turn. It is naturally easier to interest the press and local public opinion in sessions held very infrequently in the same town than in sessions of an assembly which always meets in the same place. Foreign correspondents in Paris cannot consider WEU Assembly sessions to be exceptional events. They do not necessarily specialise in defence questions. The French press is almost alone in being able to send specialised journalists to cover WEU Assembly sessions, whereas at each of its sessions the North Atlantic Assembly enjoys the presence of journalists from the country in which it meets who are specialised in defence questions.

74. Your Rapporteur well realises that the organisation of sessions away from the seat of the Assembly involves considerable expense and that at the present juncture economies have to be made. However, he suggests that a rather greater effort be made than in the past to ensure that sessions are held outside Paris from time to time so as to make a greater impact on the press and public opinion. This has been done several times in the past since the Assembly has already held sessions in London, Rome, Brussels and Bonn, but this experience might be renewed from time to time.

75. A second significant advantage for the North Atlantic Assembly is the presence of American parliamentarians at its sessions. Everyone knows the overwhelming place occupied by the United States in the defence of Europe, and the dialogue between European and American parliamentarians is of undeniable interest. Public opinion and the press are well aware of this. It is obviously impossible for there to be such a dialogue in the WEU Assembly since the United States is not a member. It could however do rather more than in recent years to invite representatives of non-member countries to take part in its work, particularly as observers with the right to speak during debates on matters of direct interest to their countries. It could also be more systematic in inviting ministers from non-member countries to speak on reports which concern their countries directly. If for instance a minister from the People's Republic of China had taken part in the debate leading to the adoption of Mr. Caro's report on China and European security in June 1983, it would certainly have been of great interest to the European press. Generally speaking, invitations to persons outside the Assembly, whether parliamentarians or government representatives, should not become routine or seek solely to attract the press, but should correspond to the requirements of the Assembly's work. Flexible, varied procedure is already applied in this field.

76. These are the thoughts which come to your Rapporteur's mind after a first analysis of the statutes, regulations and work of the two assemblies. He has no doubt that more detailed analysis and the development of exchanges between the two assemblies would allow these thoughts to be carried further.

V. *Conclusions*

77. What conclusions can be drawn from a comparison between the North Atlantic Assembly and our Assembly? To be brief and concrete I mention the following conclusions:

(*i*) Apparently there is no Eurogroup activity in the North Atlantic Assembly, though one could say that a Eurogroup does exist in the NATO Council of Ministers.

(*ii*) Certainly several equal or comparable elements exist between the aims and activities of the North Atlantic Assembly and of the WEU Assembly.

(*iii*) Although there are supposed to be good and close contacts between the North Atlantic Assembly and the WEU Assembly, in fact no communication or relations between the two assemblies exist.

(*iv*) In general, we must promote the establishment of such relations and communications with the North Atlantic Assembly. We have to propose that to the Presidential Committee. The fact that certain parliamentarians take part in the work of both assemblies might allow them to be better informed about each other's work, for instance by means of a verbal or written

report once or twice a year presented to the appropriate committee. Of course, this suggestion would have to be worked out.

(*v*) Apparently the NATO Assembly faces the same problems with its information policy as our Assembly. It might therefore be very interesting for our committee to contact the authors of the recommendation on information policy.

(*vi*) Once again it is clear that we have to urge WEU and our Assembly to restrict themselves more to European security and the defence of Europe.

(*vii*) Most probably our committee will have to concentrate its activities more on European security and the defence of Europe than primarily on details of specific decisions taken by our Assembly.

(*viii*) Perhaps after contacts with members of the North Atlantic Assembly we will be able to develop more and/or better concrete proposals.

(*ix*) It would be in the interest of our Assembly to organise sessions more often in the capitals of member countries other than the one in which it has its seat.

(*x*) Considering that the very name of the Assembly of Western European Union poorly describes, for an uninformed public opinion, the nature of its activities, the committee proposes that the competent authorities consider the possibility and usefulness of changing the Assembly's name in order to give a better idea of its security and defence responsibilities.

APPENDIX I

Table of action in the parliaments of member countries

(Totals by country for each session)

Recommendations adopted in	Member countries							
	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total
1956	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
1957	4	0	1	0	0	5	2	12
1958	2	0	3	0	0	4	3	12
1959	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
1960	3	12	2	8	0	3	1	29
1961	0	2	0	3	0	6	0	11
1962	2	4	4	6	2	3	10	31
1963	0	0	13	22	1	2	3	41
1964	4	14	9	11	1	5	2	46
1965	0	11	12	24	0	5	28	80
1966	2	12	12	49	1	4	18	98
1967	14	9	22	29	2	6	16	98
1968	6	14	20	22	1	16	47	126
1969	11	15	17	8	0	4	36	91
1970	3	15	15	7	2	3	10	55
1971	0	4	19	9	0	6	10	48
1972	0	6	2	1	0	1	0	10
1973	0	4	2	6	1	0	0	13
1974	0	1	3	13	2	0	0	19
1975	10	28	8	19	3	11	3	82
1976	16	40	13	14	2	3	8	96
1977	4	18	4	15	1	1	14	57
1978	20	26	12	21	4	8	14	105
1979	16	15	16	10	12	1	4	74
1980	0	34	24	15	14	0	10	97
1981	15	42	14	4	16	5	38	134
1982	0	20	10	6	5	3	10	54
Total	132	346	269	322	70	105	287	1,531
Annual average ..	4.88	12.81	9.96	11.92	2.59	3.88	10.62	8.09

APPENDIX II

Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1978

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session
June 1978	312									–	33
	313	×	2	2					2	6	
	314	×	2	2		1	2	3	2	12	
	315			2		2				4	
	316									–	
	317			2		1				3	
	318	×	1	3		1			2	7	
	319									–	
	320									–	
	321					1				1	
Nov. 1978	322					1				1	72
	323	×		6		1				7	
	324					1				1	
	325		7	2	2	1				12	
	326	×	2		4	3			2	11	
	327									–	
	328	×	2		2	4	2	2	4	16	
Other action			4	7	4	4		3	2	24	
June 1979	329	×	2	2	2		2		2	10	37
	330									–	
	331		2							2	
	332									–	
	333	×	2	2					2	6	
	334									–	
	335	×	2	2	4				6	14	
Resolution 63						3				3	
Other action				2							
Dec. 1979	336									–	47
	337	×			2		2		2	6	
	338	×	1	2					2	5	
	339	×		2						2	
	340									–	
	341	×	2	2			8			12	
	342									–	
	343									–	
	344									–	
Other action			5	3	6	7		1		22	

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session
	345									–	
	346									–	
	347					2				2	
	348			7						7	
June	349	×		1	2		6	2	2	13	56
1980	350					2				2	
	351			2	2					4	
	352	×		2	4	2				8	
	353			2		2				4	
	354				6					6	
Other action				4		2			2	8	
	355										
	356					2				2	
	357										
	358	×		6	4	2	2		2	16	
Dec.	359	×			4		2		4	10	45
1980	360										
	361										
	362						2			2	
	363						2			2	
Other action				10	2					13	
	364	×	2	2					2	6	
	365	×	2	4					4	12	
	366	×	2	4			2		2	10	
June	367	×		2			2			4	79
1981	368	×	2	2					2	6	
	369	×	2	2					10	14	
	370	×		2			2	2		6	
	371	×	2	2			2		4	10	
Other action				7	2					11	
	372	×		4			2		2	8	
	373	×		4	2				2	8	
Dec.	374			2	2		2			6	
1981	375			2	2					4	53
	376										
	377										
Other action			3	3	2	3		3	10	27	

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session
June 1982	378										
	379										
	380										
	381										
	382	×				2				2	
	383	×				2				2	27
	384										
	385										
	386										
	387										
Other action				7	4	3	1	2	6	23	
Nov. 1982	388	×									
	389										
	390	×			4					4	27
	391										
	392										
Other action				13	2	3		4	4	23	

Document 956 **27th October 1983**

Assessment of advanced technology in Japan

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions [2]
by Lord Northfield, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. *Lenzer* (Chairman); MM. Wilkinson, *Bassinet* (Alternate for Mr. Fortier) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Aarts, Adriaensens, Amadei,* Antoni, Barthe (Alternate: *Lagorce*), *Bohm,* Fiandrotti, Forma, *Fourré, Garrett,* Sir Paul Hawkins (Alternate: *Howell*), MM. McGuire, Prussen, *Spies von Bullesheim, Schmidt,* Mrs. *Staels-Dompas,* MM. Valleix, *Worrell.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

APPENDICES

Draft Recommendation

on the assessment of advanced technology in Japan

The Assembly,

(*i*) Aware of the limitations imposed on Japan's defence capabilities under Article 9 of the Japanese constitution restricting its military forces to defensive purposes ;

(*ii*) Conscious of the growing industrial power of Japan and of Japan's success in the field of micro-technology, in exploration of space and the oceans and in energy ;

(*iii*) Considering that defence-related expenditure is about 5 % of the total budget and that Japan has by far the lowest per capita defence expenditure in the free world ;

(*iv*) Considering also that, although Japanese technological research and development is not directed towards military goals, new weapons systems or possibly the export of armaments, electronic developments make the dividing line between civil and military high technology increasingly difficult to trace ;

(*v*) Aware of projects of Japanese collaboration with the EEC and ESA, in OECD and with various member states and manufacturing companies in WEU and the United States in advanced technology and of the impetus given by decisions at the Versailles and Williamsburg summit meetings on areas of co-operation ;

(*vi*) Noting the similarity of problems and of the approach to them by WEU member states and Japan ;

(*vii*) Convinced of the need for a joint approach to problems in the fields of science, technology and aerospace,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to study Japanese progress in military high technology, or technology which may have military applications, together with its prospects and submit the conclusions of this study to the Assembly ;

2. Examine the whole field of possible collaboration with Japan so as to promote more joint projects on a bilateral or a multilateral basis ;

3. Examine in particular the possibility of collaboration with the Japanese Institute for New Generation Computer Technology (ICOT) on the project for a fifth generation computer ;

4. Examine the possibility of collaboration in production of military and civil aircraft ;

5. Examine with the authorities of EEC member states how to make fuller use of the present arrangements for scientific and executive staff, government officials and others to familiarise themselves with Japanese culture, management techniques and scientific development by courses and periods of study in Japan ;

6. In order to develop practical collaboration in space, and taking account of the fact that Japan has just appointed a permanent representative to Paris for space matters, propose the nomination of a permanent representative of ESA to Japan to enable ESA to consult continuously on collaborative projects.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Lord Northfield, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1. During the 1970s some members of the committee were able to visit Japan in their national capacities and it was considered within the framework of the committee's tasks to study the numerous advanced technology projects in this country, their direct relationship with Western Europe as a whole and the individual European countries and the impact those projects would have on advanced technology here. With the agreement of the Presidential Committee, contact was established with the Japanese Embassy in Paris and, through the good offices of the Embassy, a programme was drawn up for a committee visit to Japan from 3rd to 10th July 1983. The committee asked your Rapporteur to prepare a list of questions for discussion in Japan [1]. This was sent to the competent Japanese authorities in Tokyo and to the science and technology committees of the House of Representatives and the House of Counsellors.

2. Your Rapporteur wishes to express his and the committee's gratitude to the competent officials from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA), the Agency for Science and Technology and the members of the competent committees of the houses of parliament. Of great interest for the committee was the visit to the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries factory at Nagoya and the Fujitsu computer firm where the committee was able to visit a factory and some laboratories.

3. In its contacts with the competent committees on science and technology from both houses of parliament, many questions related to high technology and employment or re-employment were discussed.

4. Your Rapporteur also expresses the committee's sincere thanks to the ambassadors of the member countries in Japan and their collaborators as well as to the EEC Ambassador who gave the committee and individual members great assistance by briefing them on Japanese problems. They also helped to resolve the language difficulties.

5. During the visit, special attention was paid to the general technological policy of the Japanese Government, foreign policy aspects connected with the law of the sea and space developments, the activities of the Science and Technology Agency in the field of nuclear energy, computers and Japanese achievements in major conventional industries. Japan has become an important competitor in many fields, especially electronics, new communications and computerisation of industrial programmes. It is already applying robotisation in the car industry and this process is now being extended to the aircraft industry and elsewhere. Great attention was also paid to Japanese development in nuclear and conventional energy. At all times in the discussions special emphasis was laid on the political and military aspects of science and technology developments. Apart from the United States, no other country could offer so much information to the committee and was willing to do so. Japan's military industrial policy is becoming more and more active in many high technology fields – aeronautics, communications, electronics, marine science and many fields of great importance for its energy supplies.

II. *The Japanese miracle*

6. " *The disease suffered by industrialised countries*

> If one sees the trends in industrialised countries from a slightly long-term standpoint, it is clear that most of them suffer what may be called an advanced nations' disease characterised by such symptoms as increasing absenteeism, growing bureaucracy and a decline in enthusiasm for investment, which often leads to deceleration in the improvement of labour productivity, continuation of stagflation and other examples of poor economic performance. "

7. This diagnosis is from a 1982 report by the Longterm Outlook Committee of Japan's official Economic Council. What, by contrast, explains the dynamism and momentum of the Japanese economy? This is not the place for a thorough study; but the main reasons for the catching-up and passing of western economies are essential background to a description of Japanese advances and applications in science and technology.

8. There is increasing understanding of factors behind the " Japanese miracle ". Talk of " rice-standard wages ", excessive hours of work and others forms of over-exploitation of the workforce has virtually ceased. Instead, observers appreciate the success of Japanese manage-

1. See Appendix I.

ment techniques in the large firms, the vigour of the small-firm sector, the guiding rôle of government, and the historical factors that have provided a favourable setting for the growth of the national economy. The high level of the national educational system plays an important rôle, as does their thorough professional training.

9. Average annual growth in Japan was 3.1% from 1885 to 1940 – a faster pace than in Western European nations, but falling short of that in the United States. It was a period of self-sustained industrialisation, leaving behind the stage of a developing nation. After the collapse and devastation of the second world war, Japan entered a " catching-up " period of very high growth, the annual average being no less than 9.5% from 1955 to 1973. This phenomenal rate was due to several causes: the process of rapid reconstruction and the reform of the economic and social systems after the war; growth for a substantial period behind protective trade barriers; the period of undisturbed power of the liberal-democratic government devoted to free enterprise and close relations with the United States – giving stability and continuity which helped long-term planning and confidence to invest; correct choice of investment so as to catch up and then overtake many western nations in the new technologies; low defence spending commitments; a vast and educated young labour force; the high savings ratio of the nation and the government's guidance system to promote growth sectors and wind down others; propitious international conditions, including a stable world monetary system, expanding world trade and falling barriers; and cheap oil. From 1973, the Japanese economy has shifted from high growth to medium growth of under 5% per annum – as a result of the energy crisis, the consequent recession and slowing in world trade, and a rise in the age of its capital goods. Government expects growth to be about 4% per annum for the rest of the century, well ahead of our expectations in Western Europe.

10. Today, despite the need to import most of its energy requirements, Japan's overseas trade is back in surplus, interest rates are about 5%, inflation is running at under 2% per annum, there is little unemployment and real GNP per head is up to the standard of the average of countries in the EEC. Gross national product was 3% of the world total in 1960; it is 10% today (about half that of the United States) and is set fair to exceed the combined total of that of EEC member states by the year 2000, when its population will be about 130 million. Spurred by age-structure projections which show that the present youthful population will give, by the year 2030, a greater proportion of elderly people than in the western countries, the Japanese are beginning to consider how to use the intervening period to avoid the very problems of an overmature society that they see in the West today. " The forthcoming twenty years will constitute a valuable period left for us to ensure a soft landing on the advanced-aged society in the coming twenty-first century. " (Economic Council report.)

(a) Growth and productivity in the sector of large manufacturing firms

11. Productivity, however measured, certainly grew faster in Japan than in most of the European industrialised countries in the crucial period from 1955 to 1973. Of course, some of the growth reflects a backlog of inefficiency and a low starting point. Nevertheless, there are indicative figures in sectors like automobiles and steel: annual output per worker of over forty vehicles as against twenty-five in the United States and eleven in Germany (1979); annual production per worker in steel double that in the United States and Germany. There are many other examples. Some studies indicate that about half the growth in Japanese production was due to increased education and skill per worker. But when you come down to the microeconomic level – particularly in the performance of individual large manufacturing firms – the following are the main aspects in which the management of Japanese firms has succeeded in achieving greatly-improved productivity.

(i) Labour management

12. Japanese wage levels have soared in the post-war years. Today, per hour, they are approaching those in the United States and Germany, and are above those in other Western European countries. Hours per week are only slightly greater. With approaching comparability in these respects, it is other factors that help make the Japanese workforce more productive. For example, working days lost as a result of industrial disputes are a fraction of our levels in Europe. To the extent that " lifetime employment " is applied, labour turnover rates are low, with consequent savings in training and orientation costs and a useful stock of work experience. The turnover rate is about half that of the United States. In addition the rates of tardiness, absenteeism, work stoppages, sick-outs and the like are low.

13. There may be some misunderstanding about the extent of lifetime employment in Japanese factories. In fact, the actual recipients of this job-security arrangement are only about 25% of the entire Japanese workforce. It applies only to full-time (not part-time) employees in the main large corporations. Moreover, a Japanese Ministry of Labour survey shows that nearly half of the workforce in their twenties change their job at least once, and about

a quarter of those aged between thirty and forty-four. Some 20% of workers under nineteen years of age change their job and leave voluntarily.

14. High morale and loyalty in Japanese companies derive in part from a policy of direct and continuous involvement of management in factory-floor problems and of making sure that as many employees as possible are included in problem-solving. This has been brought out by recent research [1] into management style in Japanese manufacturing companies located in the United Kingdom. Because management involves itself so obviously in the actual production processes, there is a stronger sense of unity between management and the shop-floor, without the sort of division that is all too common in the western world. " While we have been puzzling over the intractable problems of bringing workers close to management through participation or industrial democracy, the Japanese firms have been rooting management more firmly in the workplace. "[2] This closeness, this sharing of work disciplines results in a commitment to work that greatly improves productivity, and succeeds in evoking that set of traditional values that is usually referred to as the " work ethic ".

15. Such means as factory-floor meetings before and/or after shifts in order to brainstorm production problems and resolve grievances have a significant and measurable effect on output. A general principle of decision by consensus, involving as many people as possible, underpins the general approach. The system is given added strength through the racial homogeneity of Japanese society and through the ethical code that is indebted to Confucian philosophy: great emphasis is placed on the concepts of harmony, loyalty and hard work, and this has led in turn to a sense of cohesion in groups. The prospect of approaching western standards of living, the high cost of food and housing in Japan and the lower welfare state benefits – all these have combined with the factors mentioned earlier to make the young workforce ambitious, anxious to receive extra training and to earn enough to put aside significant savings. The trade union system, mainly company unions, does protect members' interests, and strikes are not unknown ; but the identity of goal and the tradition of loyalty predominate in most large enterprises.

(ii) Plant and equipment investment

16. Strong and effective labour management has been backed up by close attention to use of new machines and technology. Capital investment as a proportion of GNP was as much as double that of Western European countries in the 1960s and 1970s. At least half of the industrial robots in the world are in the larger Japanese factories and the government has made arrangements to lease robots to small- and medium-sized companies that cannot afford to buy them. Most of the welding in the large automobile plants is done by robots ; and the world knows of the spectacular machine-tool plant that now works day and night virtually without a human workforce in attendance. Japanese management assumes that labour costs will grow annually, whereas the cost of robots will fall with increased production. In the areas of machine and equipment yield, the Japanese steel industry's rebuilding in the post-war years resulted in fourteen out of the twenty-two largest blast furnaces in the world being in Japan by 1978. At the other end of the production scale, Japanese companies in household electrical products have consciously maximised use of key components (e.g. small electrical motors) to produce a huge variety of gadgetry, resulting in price reductions while the price of western equivalents was inexorably climbing. Production for domestic and export markets is combined for production planning, giving economies of scale from that global approach.

17. Again, there has been spectacular benefit from adapting machinery and equipment bought from overseas, so as to achieve speed of output or savings in changeover time for other or modified products. Much of this comes again from shop-floor involvement of the management and from seeking workforce co-operation in practical problem-solving.

18. Finally, there is conscious attention to economy in the use of materials and of energy – a high percentage of grain recovery, for example, and high use of by-products (e.g. chemicals). The per capita consumption of energy is the lowest among industrial economies. The energy-saving campaign has been outstandingly successful and has helped Japan to surmount the oil-price crises and to revert quickly to balance of payments surplus.

(iii) Quality control

19. Anyone familiar with the atmosphere in a Japanese plant knows that this is a cardinal feature of the approach to productivity. What is called the " hidden plant " – the resources needed to repair the defects, to retest the product, and honour the guarantee to customers – can eat up a large part of productive capacity: figures of 10% or even 15% of sales revenue are not uncommon in some western companies. The Japanese, anxious to eliminate memories of shoddy goods from pre-war Japan, have a special extra-incentive to reduce these costs. The

1. " Under Japanese management " by White and Trevor, PSI and Heinemann, London.

2. Ibid, page 139.

individual worker on the production line is made responsible for quality: the overall aim is 2 % or less of sales revenue and there are well-known examples of the way figures have been reduced when Japanese companies have taken over plants abroad.

20. Given that many large firms in Japan are assemblers rather than producers, the control over quality has to extend to tight control over quality in bought-in components, tough specifications and inspection of the subcontractor's plant and working methods. Indeed, this problem has often been a main concern and deterrent to Japanese companies planning to start assembly plants overseas and to buy components locally. In essence western management is often defect-*detection* orientated, whereas the Japanese are defect-*prevention* orientated. Careful records are kept of experience with quality control problems so as to ease the situation when new designs or modified products are developed. Matsushita's slogan is: " The better the quality, the lower the price. "

(*iv*) *Inventory control*

21. This again is a hallmark of the Japanese approach in many large manufacturing companies. The " Kamban " system (" Just in time ") results in considerable cost savings. The large numbers of component suppliers are highly organised so as to supply, where possible, virtually direct to the assembly line. Inventory costs are minimised. The supply is often measured in hours and can be as low as thirty minutes of supplies at any one time during the shift.

(*b*) *The small firm sector*

22. A major factor that gives Japan its present price advantage in such sectors as automobiles is undoubtedly the low price of many components bought from the thousands (estimated at 32,000 in the case of the car industry) of small suppliers. In one sense it is in this sector that Japan has noticeably not yet " caught up " with the West and is not yet " mature ". In numbers of firms, the one-man business is a far larger sector than in our countries of Western Europe.

23. The assemblers are powerful enough to be able to dictate not only the quality but also the price to the small suppliers, and every labour overhead or management cost is ruthlessly pared. Wages in these small firms can be reduced to 70% or even 40% of those in the large companies, and the hours, particularly in the myriad one-man businesses, can be substantially greater. Of course there is not a totally homogeneous sector of small firms. The front-line suppliers might typically employ up to 200 workers, with wages and conditions just below those of the main customer's plant. Then there will be enterprises employing ten to seventy workers, sometimes in substandard premises, making small components and paying rather lower wages and bonuses. Finally, there is the large number of family enterprises, working perhaps in substandard workshops or at home, making all kinds of small parts, making a living by long hours. But the net result has been that the large assemblers get their components at an estimated 30% below the price of comparable producers in Western Europe.

24. Distribution has also not " caught up ". Some writers see the excessive numbers of staff employed in shops and distribution generally, and the continued survival of a surplus of small shops, as the way in which the Japanese economy absorbs the real surplus in the youthful workforce. Supermarkets have grown only slowly against a conservative tradition in choice of food and purchasing habits. There is no doubt that, if this sector were to be rapidly westernised, the levels of unemployment would grow appreciably. Indeed, the committee was warned that some young people were now staying on for extended education precisely because they cannot find employment, and there is no doubt that there is a lurking fear that the present full employment cannot be secure, particularly since the tradition of lifetime employment is making some companies – faced with prospects of increasing automation – take on rather less young people than they have done traditionally. Nevertheless, in looking ahead to the year 2000 and beyond, the Economic Council report seems optimistic: it sees continued growth in the machinery manufacturing sector centring on electronics, and a substantial switch of labour to those parts of the services sector that supply individual and social services like health – compensating for further decline in the primary sector and such " troubled " sectors as textiles, aluminium refining and shipbuilding.

(*c*) *The organisation of the economy and the rôle of government*

25. The banking system, the trading companies, the government acting through the educational and taxation systems, through its machinery for planning and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) work together in ways that assist economic growth. The banks have played a major financing rôle – closely regulated by and to a large extent reliant upon government funding or guarantees through the Bank of Japan (which is under the control of the Ministry of Finance): they have been used to fund industry with short- and long-term loans in the absence of an adequate capital market. The high level of personal saving, direct tax incentives to improve it still further, and the low level of credit available to individuals have made it easier for companies to seek finance from the banks ; and

there are many examples in manufacturing or distribution of a group structure led by a bank (e.g. Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo). Bank assistance has been supplemented by government aid through the Joint Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of Japan and the Small Business Corporation. The laws concerning help for small businesses are complex and all-embracing, relying heavily on enforced co-operation between small firms in some cases, and designed to prevent small enterprises from being out-distanced by the huge resources and technology of the large firms. There are special loans, at low interest rates, for modernising equipment, and an elaborate structure of consultation. At the same time, the educational system encourages the practical professions: university research is very much geared to the needs of industry and there are strong links between the two (e.g. in space research).

26. The integrated trading companies (sogo shoshas) play a special rôle. Nine companies, highly integrated with major industrial groups and with financial organisations, account for more than half of both exports and imports. They are closely connected with the banks, which give them consistent support. Apart from financing international trading operations that are vital to the whole economy, the trading companies are virtually banks for the small business sector (loans, guarantees, etc.) and thus the sector is heavily dependent on them. They are closely involved in energy and raw material supply, factory development and domestic wholesaling. All in all, they are more powerful than their near-equivalents in France or Germany: they have a highly developed information network and close links with the whole of the manufacturing sector.

27. Taxation has generally remained fairly light by western standards. In Europe, heavy taxation has often been an impediment to progress. Despite pressure for increased spending to protect the environment from damaging industrial pollution, to improve the poor infrastructure and to develop the social services, public and social expenditure has been kept below 30% of GNP as opposed to 40% and more in WEU countries. The momentum of the economy and restraint in wage demands as growth brings satisfactory increment in take-home pay, have enabled the state to operate with a significant budget deficit (5% to 8.5% of GDP) and low interest rates, without inciting inflationary pressures. As in Europe, there are substantial tax incentives for capital investment and direct assistance for over 200 projects designed to improve development and application of new technology.

28. MITI – a huge department of state – has agencies and divisions, all highly specialised, enabling it to study and to intervene discreetly in all parts of the productive economy so as to ensure success for the indicative multi-annual plans that are drawn up through MITI machinery in the first place and then become a national plan outlining and charting the strategic path of the whole economy. The plans are not detailed or coercive and are usually successful more by strengthening confidence in investment rather than by showing a precise way ahead. The key companies and the agencies of MITI work together so as to elaborate growth and contraction plans for various industries and to allocate funds, e.g. for research programmes. Industries with high growth potential are identified (e.g. communications and data-processing; housing; nuclear power; ocean development; labour-saving equipment; leisure) and " structurally troubled " industries, such as those threatened by products of developing countries (textiles) or by excess capacity (shipbuilding, for example), are singled out for determined contraction. The speed of voluntary redeployment of labour and resources compared with that in the other industrialised countries is remarkable; and only France in Western Europe has proved to be anything like so adaptable when enforced decline has proved to be necessary for particular industries.

III. *General policy*

29. The committee was received on Monday, 3rd July 1983, by Mr. Ishikawa, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In his welcoming address he mentioned the committee's visit to Japan ten years ago and stated that in Japan they say that ten years in the past is already history. Looking back on the past ten years, it was noticeable that the environment in world politics and the economy had become difficult. In politics, 1973 was a year which saw a further strengthening of the tendency to relax tension between East and West and it was then that the multilateral force reduction talks were started. In recent years, however, East-West relations centring on the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have become increasingly strained.

30. Turning to the economy, the Minister stated that in these ten years the world had experienced two oil crises and had not yet completely shaken off their consequences. In such circumstances what was needed more than ever to revitalise the world economy and also to contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of peace and stability among nations was unity and co-operation between Japan, the United States and Europe which share in common the basic values of freedom and democracy.

31. Unfortunately, in relative terms, ties between Europe and Japan had been undeniably weak compared to the relationship between Japan and the United States or between the United States and Europe. However, they were now being strengthened rapidly. It was urgent for Japan and Europe to build a co-operative relationship in economic matters and also over a broad range of activities covering politics, culture, science and technology, aware of our respective positions and responsibilities in the world for " we are in the same boat ".

32. The field of science and technology was an aspect of co-operation between Europe and Japan which should be further strengthened. It would not be an exaggeration to say that never before had there been such awareness or expectation that science and technology could revitalise the world economy and increase the welfare of mankind ; nor had so much emphasis been placed on the importance of international co-operation in that field. Progress in science and technology could increase opportunities for economic growth and employment. It could enrich the lives and energies of our societies and finally serve to protect the most important values, namely freedom and democracy. Japan, fully conscious of the important rôle that science and technology has to play, has been actively promoting international co-operation in this field. With countries in Europe, Japan has been building a continuous co-operative relationship through the exchange of research and joint research projects and with some countries agreements in science and technology have already been concluded for promoting co-operation in a comprehensive manner. Japan wishes to continue to strengthen such relations with countries of Europe as their standards of science and technology are among the highest in the world.

33. The Minister finally expressed the hope that the committee would be able, within the limited time available, to achieve the desired objectives during its visit in Japan and asked it to continue co-operation in that regard.

Training programmes

34. Answering questions, the Minister pointed out that, in order to promote a better understanding between Europe and Japan, there were training programmes for young people coming from different European countries on an exchange basis. The first seven young people were now working in different industries and activities in Japan in order to acquire a better understanding of Japanese society. Japan's contacts with the EEC countries were to be intensified and there would be visits of ministers and high-ranking officials to discuss the difficulties and friction which were harming relations between Europe and Japan.

Free trade

35. As the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Nakasone, said at the summit in Williamsburg, it was of the greatest importance for the United States, Europe and Japan to strengthen the free trade system. Japan would take serious measures to open up its market and there was no alternative to international co-operation. The assembled strength of Europe, the United States and Japan could be used for many purposes, such as problems of the environment, energy and many fields of science and technology.

Technological collaboration

36. With the EEC Japan is now participating in eighteen subjects of advanced technology and in sixteen of these it will play a major rôle. Agreements on science and technology co-operation have been and will be concluded in the future with many countries. For example, the Minister mentioned France and the Federal Republic of Germany and also future agreements with Brazil, the United Kingdom, Canada and Ireland. Japan was well aware that it could not limit itself to co-operation with industrialised countries. It also had a rôle to play with regard to ASEAN countries with which private industry in Japan was now being actively encouraged to pursue research and development activities.

Areas of special interest

37. The government realises that Japan needs to deal with other industrialised countries on a competitive basis. For this reason it has taken a special interest in a number of areas. However, one should remember that the governmental sector is relatively small compared to the private sector as far as research and development is concerned. But the government hopes that Japan can keep its position in the following fields:

(*i*) nuclear fusion ;
(*ii*) developments in space ;
(*iii*) marine science development ;
(*iv*) the life sciences ;
(*v*) life in extreme conditions ;
(*vi*) new materials ;
(*vii*) electronic and data transmission research and development.

The government recognises that basic know-how in these fields has to be promoted whereas applied technology should be left to private industry.

Relations with western countries

38. No difference is made between civil and military research because basic research is also of great importance for military research. On

the other hand, it is up to industry to find the necessary applications in the civil or military field. The type of relationship Japan wanted with the Western European countries was highlighted during President Mitterrand's visit to Japan. During this visit, it was agreed that Japanese-French co-operation would be established for basic research. Second, biotechnology would be studied jointly. Third, marine science development was considered of great importance and the French would send their deep-ocean submarines to collaborate with the Japanese. This, of course, was of great importance to Japan because of its practical significance in the science of earthquakes and their prediction. Fourth, a joint development effort would be made on solar energy and other new sources of energy. Fifth, new materials research was also of importance to both countries, particularly new metals which would be strong, light and resistant to corrosion.

39. There had been similar contacts with the Federal Republic of Germany and others were envisaged with the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and other European countries as well as with the EEC Commission. The joint study of communications, transportation, medicine and comparative educational systems with ASEAN countries was most important, and the government is considering sending a research mission to explore which would be the most suitable projects for collaboration.

Relations with the United States

40. Japan is intent on maintaining a smooth collaborative policy with the United States. During recent years several Japanese prime ministers have visited the United States and its president and a front of solidarity and trust has been built up between the two countries. The mutal defence and security arrangements dating from the Mutual Defence Agreement of 1954 can be maintained if there is general agreement between Japan and the United States. The government is constantly aware of the need to find agreements with the United States on many science and technology developments.

The United Nations and disarmament

41. With regard to the United Nations, the Government of Japan believes that effective verification measures are essential for the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. Japan has contributed to the work of the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament by submitting many working papers on the question of verification. It would be in favour of an international organisation for verifying these agreements. Any such agency should be formed in the framework of the United Nations. In view of the important rôle played by monitoring satellites in arms control and disarmament, the idea that the United Nations should own such satellites could be useful. In this connection, Japan hoped that the idea of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency proposed by France at the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in 1978 might help to solve the problem of verification. At the same time, however, Japan considered that co-operation among major countries possessing monitoring satellites was essential if such an agency was to be set up and agreement should be reached among the countries concerned on the legal, financial and technical matters involved.

Relations with Latin America

42. Regarding Japan's relations with Latin America, there was traditional friendship through nearly one million Japanese immigrants and Latin Americans of Japanese descent. Latin America and Japan complemented each other in the economic field. There has never been a serious conflict between Japan and Latin America, either politically or economically. Japan considered that this traditional friendship should be preserved and it attached great importance to consistency and continuity in relations between Japan and the Latin American countries.

Brazil

43. Of special importance were the Japan-Brazil relations which dated back to 1885 when a treaty of friendship and commerce was signed between the two countries. Emmigration of Japanese to Brazil started in 1908, encouraging even closer relations and the Japanese people see Brazil as one of the more familiar countries. Nearly 800,000 Japanese immigrants and Japanese Brazilians live in Brazil. During the second world war relations between the two countries were severed but as Japan recovered from the aftermath of the war economic relations between the two countries became closer. With regard to Japanese foreign investment, Brazil stands in first place and nearly 600 Japanese enterprises are active in Brazil today.

44. In 1982 trade between the two countries reached $2.65 billion, of which Japanese imports from Brazil and its exports amounted to $1.603 billion and $1.043 billion respectively. Main export articles are machines, electric appliances, steel and imports from Brazil are iron, coffee, cocoa, pulp in addition to industrial products which are gaining an increasing share.

Law of the sea

45. In the framework of the law of the sea conference the government believed that the convention overall would serve the long-term and comprehensive interests of Japan as a

maritime nation as well as the general interests of the international community including the industrialised countries of the West. The deep-sea mining régime as set out in the convention was not satisfactory from the point of view of the industrialised countries of the West, including Japan; nor is the Government of Japan convinced of the workability of the régime in practice. Japan was prepared to explore ways and means of improving aspects of the régime through the future work of drafting the rules and regulations of deep-sea mining in the preparatory commission.

46. With regard to the provision on marine mammals (whales), Article 65, Japan believed that this article should not be interpreted as intending to expand the competence of an international organisation but rather that due regard should be paid to the right of a coastal state in the functioning of an international organisation. As Japan has signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it is in the basic position of supporting the convention and it believes that deep-sea mining activities should be carried out within the framework of the régime stipulated in the convention. It therefore finds it difficult to support the idea of establishing a different deep-sea mining régime outside the framework of the convention. However, with regard to the problem of overlapping claims of mine-sites, Japan was prepared to continue to participate in the informal consultations initiated by the United States so as to resolve the problems of overlapping claims among the countries concerned, without prejudiding the position of Japan as a signatory state to the convention.

IV. *The Japanese space programme*

47. The Japanese space programme is very similar to the European programme in ESA. In Japan, money is earmarked for the whole plan and, if not available one year, is provided a year or two later. The unspent parts of the annual budget are carried forward and reserved to be used when the programme can start. The main subjects are communications, broadcasting, meteorology, a microgravity programme, space science and a remote-sensing programme. With regard to the latter, Japan is the only country to build land and sea application satellites in the framework of its remote-sensing programme.

48. The space programme in Japan is executed under the aegis of the Space Activities Commission (founded 1968) which is an organ under the Prime Minister. Following the proposals of the supervising ministry, i.e. the Science and Technology Agency, and working on the advice of the commission, the Prime Minister decides the government's basic space development programme and directs bodies concerned with research and development. The central body is the National Space Development Agency (NASDA) which was started in 1969 and undertakes the development of satellites and launch vehicles in the field of applications and the launching and tracking of satellites.

49. As for the scientific space programme, the Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science of the Ministry of Education undertakes the research and development of scientific satellites and their launch vehicles.

50. Several ministries and agencies are concerned with space activities [1]. In 1970, the budget for space activities was some $50 million and $450 million in 1982. NASDA activities take 80%, the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science 12% and other space activities some 8%.

Launchers

51. In order to acquire an independent launch capability, NASDA has developed the N-1 launch vehicle which is capable of launching geostationary satellites. By the end of fiscal year 1982, NASDA had launched seven N-1 vehicles and succeeded in six launches. To cope with the demand for launching large-scale satellites in the 1980s, NASDA has developed the N-2 launch vehicle which is capable of placing in geostationary orbit a satellite weighing about 350 kg. In a second phase, a new launch vehicle is to be developed – the so-called H-1, which will be able, from 1987 onwards, to launch geostationary satellites of approximately 550 kg.

52. The N-1 launch vehicle has been developed by combining technology introduced from the United States with that developed independently by NASDA. The N-2 is also based, for some main parts, on United States technology but more and more Japanese technology is being introduced. The N-2 will be used as NASDA's main vehicle until the larger H-1 is operational.

Satellites

53. The demand for launching the third generation of geostationary satellites, after 1985, concerns a variety of fields such as meteorological observations, communications, broadcasting and navigational satellites, as well as satellites for earth observations. In future years, up to 1985, the N-2 launch vehicle will put into orbit six applications satellites, communications, meteorological and broadcasting satellites and four engineering test satellites [2]. NASDA will also participate in shuttle experiments with

1. See Appendix II.
2. See Appendix III.

material processing testing equipment and with life science experiments in the first spacelab programme. In 1988, Japan hopes to participate in a United States space station.

A new space programme under discussion

54. Japan may embark on a national space programme aimed at developing a new launch vehicle and launching seventy-eight satellites in 1984-2000. The programme will be submitted soon to the Japanese Government by the Japan Space Activities Commission which will ask for some of the funding in the fiscal 1984 budget. Officials said the programme will cost more than $10 billion.

55. The new launch vehicle, tentatively designated the H-2, will cost $1-3 billion. The programmes call for a 5-10% increase in Japan's space budget every year for seventeen years. Japan has been spending $400-450 million a year.

56. The launch vehicle will be designed to take a number of satellites into orbit on a single launch. Japanese launches are limited to two months a year at Kyushu Island - February and August - because of agreements made with the Japanese fishermen's union. Fishermen claim the launches, twenty-three so far, decrease their catches substantially.

57. The long-term plan would be to offer launch services and to construct ground stations and develop software.

58. The commission said the H-2 launch vehicle would have to be built at a cost competitive at international level in terms of cost, performance and reliability.

59. National developments proposed to the council include:

- communication satellites for remote island and emergency communications. Under consideration is a large satellite with a capacity of 100,000 to 200,000 telephone circuits utilising multi-beam technology ;
- broadcasting satellites to cover wider areas. The broadcasting satellite, to be launched by an N-2 vehicle in 1984, is expected to improve television services ;
- navigation aids, rescue and inter-satellite communications systems to be developed for the Pacific region as part of a future worldwide network. The first would be launched in 1992 by an H-1A vehicle to aid aircraft and ships ;
- earth observations, similar to the United States Landsat programme, starting with a marine observation satellite launched by an H-1A vehicle in 1986 as an experimental maritime satellite prototype. An experimental earth-resources satellite would be launched by an H-2 vehicle in 1990 ;
- meteorological observation satellites. Japan continues to share in the World Meteorological Organisation's World Weather Watch programme in launching these satellites into a geostationary orbit. The third satellite would be launched in 1984 to measure cloud and sea surface temperatures ;
- ionospheric observation involving an electromagnetic environment survey satellite called Emeos to be launched in 1993 ;
- space support satellite for assembly and repair of space stations if Japanese participation in the United States space vehicles materialises. First would be a 1993 satellite called Ersat for experimental work on use of robots in space ;
- three engineering test satellites for communications experiments with moving vehicles in 1987, multi-beam and digital three-axis controls in 1992, and another aimed at attitude control and research into lightweight structures.

Co-operation with the United States and Western Europe

60. The main international co-operation is with the United States. Japan and the United States are conducting eighteen joint projects under an agreement concluded between Japan's Space Activities Commission and NASA for the United States.

61. Annual consultations are held with Europe (ESA) and information is exchanged on such matters as remote-sensing communication satellites and tracking. Still under discussion is the possibility of co-operation with Canada.

62. The reason for lack of concrete co-operation up to now with ESA and with individual European countries has been inequality of technical competence. But Japan feels it has now caught up and practical co-operation can therefore start. Specialists are exchanged and there are conferences in Paris/Tokyo in alternating years. Papers on mutual use of scientific and communications satellites, on the spacelab and on electronic equipment are discussed for example. Agreement has been reached with NASA and ESA on wave frequencies, on a 1986 launch by Japan of a marine observation satellite and use of tracking sites in Guyana and Australia, on standardisation of electronic parts being developed in ESA and Japan, and with France on the tracking of the Spot satellite to be

launched in 1985. It was emphasised that the NASDA law prohibits military activity in the Japanese space programme.

63. Discussions on the space programmes of ESA and Japan certainly indicated a reinforced willingness to develop practical co-operation now that Japan feels it is technically equal.

64. Japan is collaborating with other Asian and Pacific nations in the meteorological field and organises training courses on satellite communications and remote-sensing data analysis. There is international co-operation in the United Nations, as mentioned earlier, and also in the International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation (Intelsat) and the International Maritime Satellite Organisation (Inmarsat). Japan wishes to belong to international organisations which provide space services to use and test its products in an international environment.

Tanegashima Space Centre

65. The committee visited the Tanegashima Space Centre which is the largest launch complex in Japan located on Tanegashima Island near the southern edge of Kiushu. Other major facilities include tracking and data acquisition stations. Ten satellites have been launched from this site using the N-1 and N-2 vehicles. The committee also visited the space exhibition hall where it saw models of various satellites and rockets which gave an overall view of the Japanese space effort. The main purpose is to achieve a system based on autonomous Japanese technology. Japan is not conducting any military research in space. On that score they have complete confidence in the United States. Their own activities are conducted for peaceful purposes only.

V. *Industrial affairs*

MITI

66. One of the committee's first visits was to the Ministry of Trade and Industry for intensive technical briefing. MITI is responsible for Japan's Agency for Industrial Science and Technology with its subsidiary research institutes (e.g. on energy) [1]. It was emphasised that Japan sees as very important an increase in international co-operation – e.g. in energy research as a means of revitalising the whole economy. The Versailles summit decided upon, and the Williamsburg summit progressed in, about eighteen areas of co-operation, e.g. in advanced robotics. Co-operation with the United States, Canada, West Germany, France and the United Kingdom is particularly valued in projects concerning nuclear energy research, the environment and marine research. Japan is funding twenty-three joint research projects mainly with ASEAN countries as one means of assisting the third world.

67. As far as expenditure in Japan on research and development is concerned, the committee was informed that it is estimated at 10% of the world expenditure, 75% of it being by the private sector, and the aim is to increase it to 3% of national income. The 25% contributed by the government is compared with 44% to 58% in the United States and larger Western European countries, when defence expenditure is included (32% to 47% when defence is excluded).

68. Examples of industrial co-operation involving a significant interchange of technology could be multiplied, but the table hereafter gives some indication of this increasing tendency.

69. On 18th April 1983, the Japanese Minister of International Trade and Industry declared that one of the most important functions of the state was to facilitate economic development and to enhance welfare. Japan, like all other industrialised countries, is no exception in promoting industrial policy for welfare. The most important issue for industrial policy today is to encourage frontier technologies and promote positive industrial adjustments in industries which have lost their economic rationality. The main thrust of Japanese efforts to develop such frontier technologies is in the private sector and the government's rôle is restricted to areas where, despite strong social need, the long lead times, enormous funding requirements and the high risk nature of the work make it impossible to expect the private sector to undertake the necessary research.

Computers

70. One of the most interesting visits the committee made was to the Fujitsu Atsugi laboratories and the Fujitsu Numazu complex. There, as well as at MITI, the committee learnt of the Japanese proposal for long-range research projects in advanced computers.

General policy

71. Japan sees the growth of industrial computers from 1970 and the years 1980 to 2000 as the era of sophistication and miniaturisation. Japanese industry plans to build revolutionary, artificial intelligence computers and supercomputers which are a thousand times faster than today's machines. Supercomputer speed is already being used commercially for aircraft design, oil and mineral exploration, weather-forecasting and computer circuit design, all

1. See Appendix IV.

Cases of industrial co-operation with some European countries[1]

	Investment exchange	Joint technological research and development	Co-operation in third country markets
United Kingdom	In July 1982, Sanyo Electric Co. started production of colour TV. In September 1982, NEC started production of IC. In October 1982, JVC started production of VTR. In January 1983, Sanyo and Mitsubishi decided to manufacture VTR. In January 1983, Hitachi Maxell decided to manufacture video tapes. In March 1983, Fanuc established a joint venture with 600 groups for the manufacture and sales of robots in the United Kingdom.	In November 1982, Osaka Gas Co. and British Gas Co. concluded an agreement for city gas-making technology In April 1983, Hitachi granted GEC a licence to manufacture industrial robots. In April 1983, technical co-operation between Honda and BL for the joint development of passager cars.	In March 1982, Hitachi Dosen and Davy McKee accepted jointly an aluminium plant in the United States.
France	In December 1983, Toray established a joint venture with Elf Aquitaine for the manufacture of carbon fibre. In June 1983, Canon decided to manufacture photocopiers.	In April 1982, technical co-operation between Honda and Cycles Peugeot for joint development and production of motorcycles. In January 1983, supply of technology by Hitachi to Thomson to manufacture TV camera tubes. In April 1983, JVC transferred to Thomson Brandt technology to manufacture VTR.	In November 1982, JGC and Technip accepted jointly a residue desulfurisation plant in Taiwan. In June 1983, Mitsui & Co., Toshiba and Alsthom Atlantique accepted jointly a power station in Malaysia.
West Germany	In November 1982, Hitachi established a company to manufacture VTR. In December 1982, Toshiba established a company to manufacture semiconductors. In January 1983, Matsushita-Bosch started manufacturing VTR.	In September 1981, Nissan concluded a contract to produce Volkswagen passenger cars in Japan.	In November 1982, ITOH and Mannesmann joint acceptance of a wire rod plant in South Korea.
Belgium	In June 1981, Asahi Glass Co. made a capital participation in a local company making glass sheet.	In November 1982, Dainichi Seika Kogyo provided technology to UCB to manufacture polyurethane emulsion. In April 1983, technology for the incineration of non-inflammable radioactive waste was supplied from Belgo-Nucléaire et JGC.	In August 1981, Marubeni, MHI and Coppers accepted jointly a fertiliser plan in the Philippines.
Italy	In December 1980, a joint venture by Nissan and Alfa Romeo to make automobiles. In October 1981, a joint venture by YKK and Catera to manufacture marble construction materials.	In September 1982, Mitsui Petrochemicals and Montedison (Italy) provided ICI (UK) with technology to manufacture catalysers for polypropylene production.	In July 1982, Marubeni and Nuovo Pignore to co-operate in the Algerian LPG plant.

1. For industrial co-operation with the United States, see Appendix V.

of which require vast amounts of calculation. Supercomputers may soon be put to work in the automobile and shipbuilding industries, genetic engineering and economic forecasting, and futuristic laser weapon systems based in space. Before the end of this century, computer scientists hope to develop machines that not only produce numbers in several hundred million operations per second but also exhibit artificial intelligence - computers that can think and reason somewhat like human beings and that can understand information conveyed by sight and voice.

72. The Japanese Government has announced a two-point plan to develop advanced computer technologies. One project is the $100 million eight-year national superspeed computer project which aims at producing machines ten times faster than the advanced computer being built now.

Fifth generation computer

73. The other, the $500 million ten-year so-called fifth generation computer project, is focusing on artificial intelligence. To build the

computers that will dominate the 1990s, both Japan and the United States are dependent on increasing technical advances in microelectronics. In the last thirty-five years, as computers have become immensely more powerful, the basic scheme of their operation has not changed. To build the next generation of supercomputers, scientists are now experimenting with a variety of this science that will use all executing instructions simultaneously through two or more processes and shared memories all executing the instructions simultaneously. A new architecture for parallel processing is therefore required because devise speed has approached the limit for sequential processing. Also parallel processing should be realised and as current computer technology lacks the basic functions for non-numeric processing of speech, text, graphic and patterns a fifth generation computer system should be developed.

74. The Science and Technology Agency of the Japanese Government therefore concluded that it was meaningful to pursue research and development of the fifth generation computer system as an innovative information technology. The government helped to create the Institute for New Generation Computer Technology (ICOT) by co-operation among eight major companies, and the institute is guiding research on the fifth generation system.

75. As to co-operation with other countries in this research, the committee was informed that Japan could see two possible forms. First, there could be exchange of information and research results. Second, there could be co-operation through " task sharing" – i.e. identifying specific fields in the complicated research needed and agreement on which countries would aim to specialise on the various concrete research projects. It appears that preliminary meetings to discuss such co-operation have taken place, but no official agreement has been reached so far.

Integrated conference systems

76. At the Fujitsu laboratories telephone video data have been combined into an integrated system of data-processing and telecommunication services which could cover worldwide conferences. Such a system will require integrated computers and communications networks.

77. Of great importance is optical fibre communications technology used for this service. Fujitsu is now endeavouring to make this technology feasible at much reduced cost for future communications networks. Fifth generation computers feature artificial intelligence, but this is not necessarily demanded of the networks. Fujitsu will need ten more years to make those computers feasible. It expects, on the other hand, that optical fibre communications will prevail much earlier.

78. The committee witnessed a demonstration of possibilities of holding international conferences between people in different places such as the Philippines, Japan and California, thus avoiding travelling and having instant communication with different parts of the world. Fujitsu has already developed some integrated systems of data-processing and telecommunication services. At the Numazu complex, however, these systems have not yet been in use for practical purposes. The teleconference system utilised there at present is not combined with data-processing service.

Numazu complex

79. At the Numazu complex, the committee visited the plant responsible for the assembly and testing of Fujitsu's medium-, large- and very large-scale computer systems as well as for the development of operating systems. The main complex is divided into closely-affiliated hardware and software plants, an arrangement which permits joint production of hardware and software products based on an integrated design philosophy. The computerisation of all sections of the plant permits a comprehensive and systematic approach to software and hardware production. The committee was shown a Fujitsu supercomputer named FACOM VP-200, which will be used for scientific and engineering applications such as nuclear research and geophysical research.

80. Fujitsu considers that the fifth generation computer system will be operational in 1992 at the earliest. They are now in the first stage and the second stage will start in two or three years' time. The testing stage will be reached in 1989-90 and future improvements will, of course, be tested. The fifth generation computer will be used inter alia for satellite applications; mention was also made of meteorological satellites.

81. Some 460 employees work at the Fujitsu laboratories at Atsugi; 30% of them are physicists and 60% electronic engineers. The average age of the personnel is thirty-two years. Fujitsu has been investing a great deal in research and development activities and spends some 10% to 12% of its sales figure on these activities. The know-how of Fujitsu, as utilised now in the laboratories, is 98% original and 2% from outside affiliated firms.

82. The main European partner of Fujitsu in the beginning was Siemens. However, Fujitsu now has a business association with Siemens and ICL and is also looking forward to the establishment of business associations with other major manufacturers in Western Europe.

83. In the medical field, the laboratories use the latest electronics technology to develop revolutionary new medical equipment. One example is the ultrasonic echo imaging equipment for heart diagnosis. The development of other medical equipment in ultrasonic technology such as a Doppler blood flowmeter is also being pursued for faster and more accurate diagnosis.

Tsukuba Science City

84. During the discussions at the Fujitsu laboratories and plant it was pointed out that in the last twenty years the Japanese Government has constructed the Tsukuba Science City which includes two national universities, thirty-one government research institutes, seven other government facilities, six governmental enterprise facilities and seven private institutes. There were two main purposes behind the idea of building the Tsukuba Science City – one was to help relieve the excessive concentration of population in Tokyo, simultaneously it was thought that the Tsukuba Science City could help in the development of the Ibaraki prefecture – one of Japan's underdeveloped areas. Another purpose was to provide new modern spaces and well-equipped research facilities to replace the antiquated facilities in Tokyo which were no longer appropriate for performing the type and scale of research and development that was becoming necessary for an increasingly high technology-based economy. By locating research facilities in one place the government also wanted to improve research co-ordination among laboratories of different government ministries and agencies. Tsukuba Science City population is over 130,000 of whom about 7,000 are research workers at the institutes and universities.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries

85. Another aspect of Japanese industry which the committee was able to visit was the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The company was established in 1870. Its wide range of operations encompasses all key industries from shipbuilding and steel structures to power systems, chemical plants, aircraft and special vehicles, environmental control equipment, industrial construction and precision machinery, industrial robots, engines and refrigerating and air-conditioning machinery. The total number of employees in 1983 was some 68,000, not including subsidiaries.

Mitsubishi Nagoya aircraft works

86. The committee discussed the aircraft industry when it visited MITI. Government expenditure was given as 440 billion yen per annum, 80% being for military use. The Defence Council decides on requirements; MITI's job is to secure supply through competition among major manufacturers.

87. In civil aircraft, it was emphasised that Japan was increasingly involved in and interested in international co-operation. The YS project, now terminated, had been accomplished by Japanese companies only, but the Boeing 767 programme involved Japan (15%), Italy and the United States. The YXX project for a civil plane is in planning for the late 1980s/early 1990s. There have also been proposals for Japanese participation in development of the A-320 Airbus (from Airbus Industrie) and of the D-3300 McDonnell Douglas aircraft. As far as future engines are concerned, international co-operation (involving Japan/United Kingdom/Pratt and Whitney/Germany/Italy) seemed inevitable because of the huge development costs.

88. In Nagoya the committee visited the Mitsubishi Nagoya aircraft works. The works are one of Japan's few large-scale aerospace manufacturing works for aircraft, engines, missiles and space equipment. The most important is aircraft manufacturing which accounts for 53% of the sales. The total number of employees at the Nagoya aircraft works is some 6,500. The main products are F-15 jet fighters, F-1 support fighters, T-2 supersonic jet trainers and several types of helicopters, all for the Japanese Defence Agency.

89. In the civil field, one of the most important products is the business jet, Diamond, which is an executive jet plane developed wholly by Mitsubishi and which has received the approval of the United States federal administration and is being delivered to customers. Three companies – Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd., Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd. and Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd. – have agreed to sign a memorandum of understanding with Boeing Co. in the middle of this year on joint development of a new generation 150-seat passenger plane by the latter half of the decade. Agreement has been reached on the terms of joint development, distribution of profits, production and sales. A final agreement may be reached at the end of this year or the beginning of 1984.

90. Other important products of Mitsubishi aircraft works are engines and silencers, hydraulic equipment, hydraulic testing apparatus, air-to-air and surface-to-air guided missiles and other weapons as well as test equipment for aircraft and rockets. Industrial robots are manufactured at the Nagoya machinery works and torpedoes at the Nagasaki shipyards and engine works. About 70-80 % of the material for these aircraft is made in Japan. Of this percentage, about half is built by Mitsubishi itself. The production of the Nagoya works is 20% civil and 80% military. The committee inspected produc-

tion of jet fighters and a helicopter; the F-1 jet support fighter was developed by Mitsubishi from its T-2 supersonic jet trainer. It seems that the VTOL aircraft, much talked about ten years ago, is not now being developed.

91. Mitsubishi is producing the N-2 rocket and the H-1 rocket for NASDA.

92. Of great importance are research and development activities aimed at promoting the efficient development and manufacture of various products. Its personnel are engaged on practical application of digital control technology which results are applied to aircraft production and many other products to improve their function and performance. Computers are used not only for engineering calculations but also for data-processing of test results. Complete research and development procedures are available under the integrated research system.

93. After a discussion with the general manager, the committee made a tour of the plant.

VI. *Energy*

Alternative energy sources

94. One sector which the Japanese Government clearly wants to promote is energy as was emphasised when the committee met with representatives of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. It was pointed out that Japan's level of dependence on oil was the highest amongst the industrialised nations. One of its most urgent tasks was therefore to promote the development and introduction of alternative energy sources in order to reduce excessive dependency on oil, secure a steady energy supply and fulfil Japan's international responsibilities.

95. Current government projections anticipate the dependence on alternative energy to be 50% in fiscal year 1990. Alternative energy development designed by the government, such as the promotion and development of nuclear energy and the solar project, will be carried out as a priority and planned with maximum participation and understanding on the part of private industries.

96. The government established for this purpose the New Energy Development Organisation which is a governmental body operating with the assistance of the private sector to promote the general development of technology for the purposes of commercialising alternative energy and developing alternative energy resources except for nuclear energy. It is the intention of the government to reduce dependency on oil from 66% to 49%. The percentages for nuclear energy are to grow from 5% to 11%, for natural gas from 6% to 12%, for coal from 17% to 20%, for geothermal energy from 0 % to 1 %, for new energy resources from 0.2% to 3% and those for hydroelectric energy will fall from 5.6% to 5%.

Nuclear energy

97. Japan's approach to the development of nuclear energy is laid down in the basic law on nuclear power and is in accordance with the spirit of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Japan would strive to do its share in preventing nuclear proliferation and would steer its nuclear energy development efforts strongly towards peaceful purposes. The government will systematically pursue the development of nuclear power, taking into account necessary social and economic considerations. In 1982, the nuclear-power generating capacity was twenty-four commercial nuclear power stations with an aggregate capacity of 17.17 million kW in operation. Eleven nuclear power stations are under construction with a total capacity of 10.7 million kW. About 46 million kW will be available in fiscal year 1990 rising to approximately 90 million kW by the year 2000.

98. The light-water reactor will remain the nation's main vehicle for nuclear power generation for some considerable time. Its reliability and economic efficiency will be improved. The plutonium and uranium recovered from spent fuel will be treated as domestically-held energy resources, thereby contributing to the effective use of uranium resources and to the lessening of dependency on foreign fuel supplies in the nuclear power industry. With a view to ensuring its freedom to use plutonium, Japan will in principle reprocess spent fuel on its own. The plutonium derived from reprocessing will be used in fast-breeder reactors which Japan hopes to develop on a commercial basis towards the year 2010. As a substantial quantity of plutonium may be accumulated before and after the fast-breeder reactors become commercially operational, such plutonium will be used as fuel for thermal neutron reactors.

99. The policy for nuclear research and development is based on the following principle. Reseach and development relating to the light-water reactor will be undertaken primarily by private firms. In order to establish a viable nuclear fuel cycle, the government will extend appropriate assistance to the private firms and undertake research into the safety of nuclear power generation and the disposal of nuclear waste. With regard to advanced thermal reactors, fast-breeder reactors and their nuclear fuel cycle, the government will conduct research and development aiming at early commercial application. Research and development of nuclear fusion will be promoted intensively. Nuclear

technology developed independently in Japan will eventually be transferred to private firms for commercial application. The government will give the necessary assistance.

100. The government has taken measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation. Bilateral negotiations with nuclear fuel supplying countries have been held and the government is upgrading its safeguards and the physical protection of nuclear materials to a level which meets international expectations. Japan co-operates with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna for improving the safeguard system and contributing to creating a new international framework for the control of plutonium and guaranteeing supplies of nuclear materials. In transferring nuclear materials and know-how to other countries, especially developing countries, Japan is studying the measures for making international co-operation compatible for nuclear non-proliferation.

101. With regard to nuclear power generation, the government is promoting all sorts of safety measures, improving light-water reactor technology and has taken the necessary measures to remove discarded reactors. In 1981, there were thirty-six accidents and breakdowns and in 1982 about twenty. There were, however, no injuries or radiation casualties.

102. As the number of nuclear power facilities increases in the coming years, the need for tightening security will grow. The Japanese Government will therefore strengthen security measures for its own nuclear power facilities. For this purpose also it will co-operate with the IAEA in order to incorporate effective security devices. These have to be internationally-accepted and the forum of the IAEA is therefore necessary.

103. For the nuclear fuel cycle, the government strives to secure a supply of natural uranium. The enrichment of uranium will be based on the technology of the centrifugal separation method. For reprocessing spent fuel a reprocessing plant has been built with a yearly capacity of 1,200 tons. In addition to the Tokai reprocessing plant of the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation, a private reprocessing plant is being planned for completion and commercial operation around 1990. Efforts have been made to reduce the volume of low-level radioactive waste. Its volume will be compressed and solidified for sea dumping or ground disposal. The government will build a pilot plant which is designed to start operation in the second half of the 1980s to test vitrification, solidification and storage techniques and will conduct research into the techniques for underground disposal and similar methods for development at the earliest date possible after the year 2000. In order to secure a steady supply of nuclear power, it is considered desirable to build a stockpile of uranium. The cost will be divided between the government and private firms. With regard to fast breeders, the government is building a prototype reactor which will become critical around 1990. This will be followed by a demonstration reactor, the construction of which is planned to start in the early 1990s.

104. With regard to nuclear fusion, the government believes that the condition for a critical plasma will be achieved in the second half of the 1980s, thanks to the construction of the Tokomak critical plasma test facility. The next goal is to achieve a self-igniting condition and thus establish the technological viability of fusion in the second half of the 1990s.

105. It is the purpose of the government to strengthen the base of the nuclear power industry. It wishes to establish the independence of this industry including an independent nuclear fuel cycle and to lay the basis for the export of nuclear power plants in the future. The industry, in order to export, has to develop its own technology by accumulating experience in the construction of such plants by creating a service system for the nuclear fuel cycle and by studying financial measures.

106. With regard to the development of nuclear power, financial requirements and especially the funds for research and development might be extremely high. It is foreseen that in the next ten years 5.4 trillion yen will be necessary, 1.9 trillion yen for developing advanced reactors and other nuclear power equipment, 1.9 trillion yen for developing the nuclear fuel cycle and 1.6 trillion for developing nuclear fusion and for conducting other basic research.

107. As far as personnel is concerned, by fiscal year 1990 the government research bodies will need approximately 66,000 nuclear energy engineers including about 40,000 for energy utilisation fields and about 26,000 for radiation utilisation fields. A large number of technical personnel will have to be retrained in the private and public research organisation which specialises in nuclear energy development.

108. The government is undertaking a number of measures for siting nuclear power facilities. For the moment there are twenty-four nuclear power plants in operation, eleven under construction and six in preparation. Moreover, two research and development power plants are either in operation or under construction.

Further new sources of energy

109. With regard to new sources of energy, the government is developing the following projects:

(*i*) coal energy (coal liquefaction, coal gasification);

(*ii*) solar energy (photovoltaic power generation; solar energy for industry, etc.);

(*iii*) geothermal energy (power-generating plant utilising hot water, etc.);

(*iv*) others (fuel cells, wind energy, etc.).

In fiscal year 1983, this will amount to some 52,973 million yen.

New Energy Development Organisation

110. The New Energy Development Organisation is governed by the law for the promotion of development and the introduction of alternative energy sources. The Minister of International Trade and Industry is responsible for the New Energy Development Organisation. The organisation is in charge of:

(*i*) new energy development, research and development for new energy technology, coal energy liquefaction and gasification, solar energy, geothermal energy, advanced energy conversion and storage;

(*ii*) assistance measures for overseas coal development and service, exploration and rationalisation of the domestic coal industry;

(*iii*) the production of alcohol.

Coal energy

111. Research and development for new energy technology is concerned first of all with coal liquefaction. A large-scale pilot plant is being developed to accelerate the process development and to add the research necessary to commercialise coal liquefaction as soon as possible. The technology seeks to produce clean fuel from coal under high pressures, under high temperatures, and consequently to hydrogenate the coal directly. The techniques will have to be developed by 1990. For coal gasification, the technology exists for producing clean fuel gas from coal through different processes.

112. With regard to the rationalisation of the domestic coal industry, this has become necessary and the government encourages the development of a national policy for modernising the domestic coal-mining industry and developing oil-alternative industries.

113. As Japan has not enough coalfields of its own and is aware that there are extensive coal reserves in the world, great efforts are being made to promote the economical development of coal in other countries taking into account the demand situation. The organisation makes loans and guarantees bank loans for this purpose for private companies engaged in this business.

114. For Japanese engineers to participate in international projects to develop overseas coal for import, they must be able to work alongside engineers from other countries. Training schemes are therefore being conducted by the organisation.

Solar and other new forms of energy

115. With regard to solar energy, research and development funds are set aside for solar thermal electric power plants, photovoltaic power generation, solar thermal energy for industry and wind energy. The aim is to get costs of production per unit down to a competitive level and to secure efficiency in operation.

116. A nation-wide survey of geothermal resources has been undertaken and a basic map of the nation's geothermal resources had to be revised. It is estimated that there is a 30,000,000 kW potential.

117. A 100 kW pilot plant for wind power is planned, but strong enough winds are not common in the main islands of Japan for this to be a main alternative source.

118. With regard to advanced energy conversion and storage problems, research and development and demonstration programmes are being undertaken. Such a system will become feasible commercially in 1990. A key technology for energy conservation is to store surplus electric power and supply it during peak periods. This improves operating efficiency of power systems in addition to securing the power supply in peak periods. Combining the results of research and development, pilot plants of 1,000 kW scale are planned for field tests of the advanced battery energy storage system. The same is true for a field test plant for fuel power generation with a capacity in the megawatt class which will be completed in the mid-1980s.

Budget

119. The budget for these activities in 1983 is 180.1 billion yen compared to 166.1 billion yen in 1982. In order to obtain the maximum inputs from the private sector, experts in this sector have been integrated into the activities of the New Energy Development Organisation.

Energy conservation

120. In order to promote energy conservation in Japan, the government has established an energy conservation centre. In response to worldwide instability and the rising prices of energy supply, which are expected to continue long into the future, the object of the energy conservation policy is to reduce the increase in energy demand as much as possible without influencing unfavourably the long-term direction

of economic growth. Consequently, the energy conservation policy is to encourage people to avoid waste at each phase of energy consumption and to use energy as efficiently as possible: for instance, in the industry sector, rationalisation of energy use by improving production facilities and manufacturing processes, etc.; in private homes, the introduction of heat-insulating structures, effective use of air-conditioning facilities for buildings, improvement of energy consumption efficiency of electric home appliances; and in the transport sector, improvement of energy consumption efficiency of automobiles.

121. Financial aid is given to energy conservation investment and tax concessions are made for energy conservation investment in large factories. An energy conservation law pushes industry towards manufacturing energy-efficient equipment, aiming at a 20% reduction in energy use in products. Already it seems that, particularly through conservation, Japan has been able to economise up to as much as 30% of its energy requirement compared with a few years ago. Educational and publicity measures (e.g. one day per month with events to enhance conservation awareness) have proved particularly successful.

VII. *Marine development in Japan*

Marine Science and Technology Centre

122. Because of its geographic surroundings, Japan has had marine-related activities for centuries. The Japan Marine Science and Technology Centre was established in 1971 based on the marine science and technology centre law and with the co-operation of public, academic and private circles. It was founded for promoting the marine science and technology of Japan. Some fourteen government agencies and ministries are involved in marine science and technology developments. The most important are the Self-Defence Agency and the Science and Technology Agency. From the ministries, there are the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Transport.

123. In the private sector, there are some 120 business organisations and private companies interested in the centre. The most important private circles are shipbuilding, electricity, steel, machinery, etc.

124. The centre is the only comprehensive central organisation for the promotion of marine science and technology in Japan. The tasks of the centre are:

(*i*) research and development of all marine-connected technologies;

(*ii*) to hold training courses on diving techniques and marine engineering for researchers and technicians;

(*iii*) actively to disseminate information on marine science and technology to interested agencies;

(*iv*) to offer its large-scale testing facilities to the government, universities and private enterprises for research and development of marine science and technology.

The total budget for marine science and technology was some 64,154 million yen in 1982.

125. Japan's exclusive economic zone ranks sixth in the world in terms of area. Thus Japan's area of administration has rapidly expanded since the era of exclusive economic zones. The area of marine development and exploration covers: (*i*) mineral resources, oil, gas and manganese nodules; (*ii*) development of living resources such as fish; (*iii*) the development of sea-water resources, sea-water desalination and extraction of materials such as uranium; (*iv*) development of marine energies, use of oceanic currents for power generation, wave power, etc.; (*v*) utilisation of marine spaces, ocean-based plants, airports and marine recreational centres; (*vi*) development of marine science and technologies.

126. In order to develop and utilise minerals and biological resources, the centre is promoting the development of a deep-submergence research vehicle system which allows for direct viewing of the deep seabed by the human eye, acquisition samples and data as well as the installation and recovery of deep-sea measuring instruments. It has also developed unmanned deep-sea exploration systems, remotely-operated vehicle systems and deep-sea cameras. The budget for deep-sea research is some 5.78 billion yen for the year 1983.

127. The Science and Technology Agency is especially interested in the research and development of manned and unmanned deep-sea working systems. Deep-sea research now reaches depths of 2,000 metres but if the necessary budget allocations are provided it may reach 6,000 metres.

128. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry is especially interested in the development of deep-sea mineral resources, the development of the recovery of uranium from the oceans, seabed oil production, as well as basic research concerning oil and natural gas on the sea shelf around Japan.

VIII. *The visit to the National Diet*

129. The committee was received in the room of the chairmen of standing committees in the House of Representatives of the National Diet of

Japan. The House of Representatives has eighteen standing committees each with twenty to fifty members and the House of Counsellors has sixteen standing committees each with ten to forty-five members. The committee met members from the Science and Technology Committees of both houses of the Diet [1].

Space

130. After the introduction of members, a wide-ranging discussion was held on space questions. From the Japanese side, it was agreed that Japan was in a certain way behind Europe as regards launchers but it was mainly interested in building satellites and especially telecommunications satellites. They had had many contacts with the American space agency (NASA) especially on communications satellites. The purpose of the National Space Development Agency was solely civil. Japan was not involved in any military use of satellites. Japan would be interested in United Nations satellites, especially for verification of disarmament measures.

Employment problems

131. Members of the committee discussed employment and re-employment with Japanese members of parliament. It was generally agreed that the introduction of electronics in factories might lead to fewer workers and could therefore lead to unemployment. On the other hand, the manufacturing of robots and other electronic instruments might lead to an expansion of total production.

132. As long as productivity rises and the economy expands, the problems of employment and redeployment could be mastered. However, once production no longer rises and there is no further expansion it becomes extremely difficult to keep employment at the same level. Moreover, although workers are probably more flexible than in Western Europe, not all employees can be transferred to other jobs or to the service sector; nor is it possible to transfer workers of a certain age for retraining. This is also true of female workers who, after a certain period of family-raising and work, are too old to be usefully employed in factories. The results will therefore be that many younger people can be adapted to robotisation but older people and women who, for family reasons, have interrupted their careers, will be much more difficult to redeploy. Partial employment is still being practised but it is no real solution for many people. Trade unions are becoming disquieted and want discussions before further robots are introduced.

1. See Appendix VI.

133. Once electronic production methods reach medium and small industries, there will be a sharp reduction in the workforce. Now already many high school pupils cannot find employment and are therefore swelling the ranks of university students. Because of the system of lifetime employment in Japan, new recruits are engaged with caution.

Industrial aspects

134. As far as Japanese industry is concerned, one should not forget that in Japan, for instance, the former highly developed chemical industry and the textile industry are greatly reduced due to the structural depression.

135. Japan has an import promotion organisation to develop commerce with Europe and the United States.

136. One factor responsible for the present world economic stagnation is the slow growth of investment in plant and equipment and low productivity due to slow technological innovation.

137. If the world economy is to be revitalised, it is imperative that this should be through industrial co-operation in both trade and capital investment and technological exchange. This should lead to much closer and stronger economic ties between Japan, the United States and the European countries. Industrial co-operation means the exchange among advanced countries of capital and technology and know-how to foster mutual industrial activities. This would involve joint ventures, direct investment to and from overseas, technical co-operation and joint technical research and development and joint construction of industrial plants in third countries. Between Japan and Europe many such cases of co-operation are being planned or are already in progress. Japan invests directly in electronics and technical co-operation in joint production of automobiles, machine tools, industrial robots, computers, as well as joint developments in the civil aircraft industry [1].

IX. *Conclusions*

138. The outside observer can but applaud and envy large parts of the Japanese miracle. On the one hand, and through various favourable circumstances and factors, the Japanese economy, in applying the new technologies, has been able to acquire the seemingly unstoppable momentum and vitality – and flexibility – that characterised the major Western European economies in the industrial revolution after it got under way two centuries ago, or the United States economy in the mid and late nineteenth

1. See Appendix VII.

century. " Nothing succeeds like success " we can only ruefully reflect. The momentum is enabling Japan to take in its stride or simply to ignore influences that in recent years have seemed to cripple older industrial economies - energy price rises, resultant inflationary tendencies, budget deficits, negative development of worker power, or the need continuously to restructure. At the same time, the Japanese have been able to identify the mistakes of the " overmature " advanced economies - inadequate management techniques, lack of attention to key elements of cost efficiency, confrontation with and poor motivation of the workforce, for example - and successfully, so far at least, to avoid them like the plague. The traditional strengths and cohesiveness of their society have endured through great changes and have facilitated and even assured the processes of growth and the transition to a fully industrialised society. It is a remarkable spectacle.

139. Respect for this achievement need not blind us to obvious defects and concerns for the future. The social benefits in the European countries are still much more balanced and reach all levels of society. It is by no means certain that industrial peace will endure as the pressures of an anonymous industrial society push traditional values of Japanese society further into the past. Already young people are increasingly westernised and somewhat divorced from historic culture. Demand for leisure may eat away at the work ethic as increasing free time and personal pursuits become preferable to further material acquisition, and as the acquisitive society becomes less palatable after a certain stage. Despite group decision-making in all its applications, and a substantial sense of equality in Japanese society, there could be a growing resentment against the vast power of a small number of entrepreneurs that make the main decisions and against a state machine that works so closely with them. Hard times or hostile world market conditions could shake a system so dependent on exports. Parts of the infrastructure are poor or have been hideously deformed by polluting industry. Rising expectations in respect of the environment or of social provisions could force a degree of social spending that can eat away at the incentives to private investment on a continuing scale.

140. Nevertheless, we must realise the immense success of the Japanese economy, the need to live with it and to cope with its competitive power, and the lessons we can learn. It is widely said that the twenty-first century will be the century of the Pacific zone - with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the emerging ASEAN countries and communist China setting the pace together with the United States and Australia. Japan will, by the year 2000, be on level economic terms with the whole of the USSR, with the EEC bloc, and almost with the output of the United States, dominating a large part of the world trade in new technologies - and all from nothing a few decades ago. Understanding Japan and Japanese ways will be vital for Western Europe as we run the danger of being increasingly eclipsed.

141. It is in this context that we should look at education and experience of European executives, businessmen and men of affairs in Japanese studies: here is a deficiency. For European governments it could be useful for a study to be made of innovation practices in Japan. Why do new products reach the market in Japan so quickly after being invented whereas in Europe the process is so much slower? The European Community does have a programme which enables some executives and management to visit and study Japan. An executive training programme for young executives who have had, say, a minimum of two or three years in industry, offers thirty places for eighteen-month stays in Japan, including six months in industry. There is a mixed programme for special industrial sectors - e.g. retailing or telecommunications - bringing groups of about twelve to Japan for experience of Japanese industry. Finally, there is a management secondment programme for 35 to 40-year-olds, to be started as a pilot scheme for about five people from middle management who will stay in Japan for, say, three months. These numbers need to be substantially increased. Moreover, since WEU itself needs to co-operate more closely with Japan in technology, in space, in ocean exploration, and perhaps in special sectors like aircraft manufacture, the Council should examine whether WEU as such should sponsor both more intensive Japanese training for special groups in the particular sectors, as well as for key personnel and officials in government departments concerned with the sectors in question, including defence. Your Rapporteur realises the difficulties of co-operating with the Japanese in the technological field where they have superior know-how and knowledge, but he is also convinced that co-operation is possible. Europe should however speak with one voice and take the necessary steps jointly. Too often in the past national short-term interests have jeopardised joint action.

142. Although Japanese competition in military high technology is not just round the corner, one should be aware of its possibilities in the near future, in particular in electronics. The fifth generation computers, for instance, will certainly have implications in the military field, especially with regard to guidance instruments for aircraft and missiles.

143. Throughout the visit, your Rapporteur was impressed by the interest of Japanese officials, businessmen and politicians in intensified

technological co-operation with Western European countries now that Japan has passed through its " catching up " phase and feels technically equal or ahead in crucial sectors. At the same time, Japan increasingly realises that it must invest and produce in overseas countries. Examples of where the co-operation has been and could be developed have been given in various parts of this report, and we must hasten the contacts and the projects.

APPENDIX I

(*a*) *Programme of the visit to Japan*

3rd to 10th July 1983

Sunday, 3rd July	
3 p.m.	Arrival at Narita international airport near Tokyo.
Monday, 4th July	*Tokyo*
Morning	Visit to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
Afternoon	Visit to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.
Tuesday, 5th July	*Nagoya-Kagoshima*
Morning	Leave Tokyo central station for Nagoya by the Shinkansen super express train.
	Visit to Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, Nagoya aircraft works.
Late afternoon	Leave Nagoya by air for Kagoshima.
	Arrival at Kagoshima.
Wednesday, 6th July	*Kagoshima-Tanegashima-Tokyo*
Morning	Arrival at Tanegashima.
	Visit the space centre.
Afternoon	Return by air to Tokyo.
Thursday, 7th July	
All day	Visit to Fujitsu laboratories and the Fijitsu Numazu complex.
Friday, 8th July	
Morning	Visit to the parliamentary committees at the Diet.
Afternoon	Visit to the Science and Technology Agency.
Saturday, 9th July	
	Visit of Tokyo.
Sunday, 10th July	
10.30 p.m.	Departure Narita international airport for Europe.

(*b*) *List of participants*

MM. AARTS	(Netherlands)
ANTONI	(Italy)
ADRIAENSENS	(Belgium)
BIEFNOT	(Belgium)
BOHM	(Fed. Rep. of Germany)
DE BONDT	(Belgium)
FIANDROTTI	(Italy)
FOURRÉ	(France)
LAGORCE	(France)
LENZER (Chairman)	(Fed. Rep. of Germany)
MARTINO	(Italy)
McGUIRE	(United Kingdom)
Lord NORTHFIELD (Rapporteur)	(United Kingdom)
MM. SCHMIDT	(Fed. Rep. of Germany)
SPIES von BULLESHEIM	(Fed. Rep. of Germany)
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS	(Belgium)
MM. VALLEIX	(France)
WORRELL	(Netherlands)

Mr. HUIGENS
Counsellor

(c) *Questions for discussion in Japan*

General policy

1. What are the general policy guidelines for science and technology in Japan in the 1980s and 1990s ?

2. How can the international political aims of Japan's scientific and technological programmes be defined ?

3. How does Japanese policy fit in with the rôle of the United Nations in space and otherwise ?

4. Would it be possible for the United Nations to have its own reconnaissance satellite to monitor the implementation of disarmament agreements ?

5. What is the government's position on collaboration with Western European countries in the near future in the scientific and technological field ?

6. What is the government's view of the 1985 exhibition at Nagoya ?

7. Can an estimate be given of Japanese investment in the Common Market countries as a whole and country by country ? What is the present trade imbalance with the Common Market and the individual European countries ?

8. What is the expected effect of relaxation of trade barriers between Japan and the WEU member countries and does this allow more important European exports to Japan ?

9. What relationship is there between Japan and the countries of South-East Asia in the scientific and technological field ?

10. What relationship is there with the Latin-American countries and especially Brazil ?

11. Relations with the United States are the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy. What agreements link Japan and the United States ? (Defence ? Others ?)

12. In the framework of the law of the sea conference, will the Ministry for Foreign Affairs give its opinion on the convention signed in 1982 with regard to freedom on the high seas, fishery conservation (whales), resources of the continental shelf and deep-sea mining issues ?

13. What is its opinion on the United States proposal for an alternative régime for exploiting the seabed ?

Space activities

14. What specific guidelines has the government drawn up for Japan's long-range space activities ?

15. How does the decision process work in Japan ? In particular, what are the rôles and influence of the Space Activities Committee, of the Science and Technology Agency, of NASDA, ISAS (Institute of Space and Astronautical Sciences), and the MITI ?

16. How big is the Japanese governmental budget for space activities and how is it broken down by the main agencies and ministries concerned (STA, NASDA, ISAS, MPT, MITI, etc.) ?

17. What are the Japanese programmes concerning:

- telecommunications ;
- meteorology ;
- earth resources ;
- science (astrophysics through material sciences) ?

18. What is the situation concerning launchers:

- ISAS: the MU family and the Kagoshima launch centre ;
- NASDA: the N and especially H family and the Tanegashima launch centre ?

19. What is the proportion between the financing of space activities and research and development by government as compared with that of industry and private organisations ?

20. How have the budgets evolved since 1973 ?

21. The Science and Technology Agency has received approval of $436.65 million for space development programmes including the CS-2 and the CS-3 Satcoms, the BS-2 TV-Sat, the GMS-3 Metsat, the MOS-1 Marine Sat, the ETS-5 engineering Testsat and the H-1A launch vehicle. The agency also was allotted $22.5 million for development of the Kawasaki C-1 transport-modified experimental STOL aircraft. Can details be given of these programmes ?

22. The total space budget is to be $2.4 billion for fiscal year 1983. Apart from the abovementioned, can a breakdown of expenditure programme by programme be given ?

23. Will the industrial development of private satellite services be allowed ?

24. Will Japan build its own shuttle ?

25. Would Japan be interested in participating in future spacelab developments ?

26. Japanese industries such as Melco, Toshiba and Nec collaborate closely with American firms such as Hughes and Ford Aerospace.

To what extent is Japanese space industry dependent on United States industry ?

27. Apart from communications, which other domains would private industry wish to be responsible for in space services ?

28. What are the latest developments in the field of co-operation in space between Japan and the United States ?

29. What is the rôle of the joint commission for science and technology ?

30. Has Japan concluded special agreements with the United States for the reception of Landsat and other remote-sensing satellite data ?

31. How does Japan consider international co-operation in space ?

32. What is the rôle played by Japan in Intelsat ? What rôles does Japan play in Inmarsat ?

33. Does Japan participate in other international space-oriented organisations ?

Industrial aspects

34. What leadership is still given by trading companies in product definition before industrial capacity is built up ?

35. Transport infrastructure is of great importance and it would be most interesting to receive information on the further construction of advanced high-speed rail systems. Are new lines to be opened ?

36. What is the financial position of the Japanese national railways ? If it is true that the financial position is not sound, what measures are planned to rectify this situation ?

37. Are new super high-speed railways or other systems of conveyance being built ?

38. Motor vehicle transport is still being developed. What measures has the government taken to stop traffic congestion on main roads with due account being taken of environmental considerations and alternative means of transport ?

39. What are the results of the work of the Traffic Safety and Nuisance Research Institute of the Ministry of Transport and the Mechanical Engineering Laboratory of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry ?

40. In 1973 electric cars and small electric trucks were considered a feasibility. What are their chances now ?

41. Japan's aerospace industry, employing over 25,000 workers is growing at about 15% annually. What are its main products and what goals has the government set for this industry ?

42. What is the breakdown between civil and military production ?

43. With which European aircraft companies is Japanese industry collaborating on airframes, aero-engines, helicopters and other aerospace products ?

44. The Japanese aerospace industry is collaborating with Boeing and McDonnell Douglas in the United States. What collaborative ventures are being implemented and what new ones are planned ?

45. What are the aerospace products which Japan produces, what are the criteria for their selection and what are the Japanese Government's objectives ?

46. What types of fully Japanese made aircraft are being planned for the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s ?

47. Regarding computers, government and industry are pursuing a fifth generation computer project which will involve some $500 million. What are the aims of government and industry in developing this project ? What is the timetable and what results are to be expected ?

48. What kind of leadership does MITI give to individual big companies with regard to industrial production for the world market ?

49. What growth is considered possible for industrial production once the market in office and household appliances is saturated ? Will miniaturisation provide a solution ?

50. According to the Herald Tribune of 7th June 1983, Japan will hold a strong lead in the next generation of computer memory chips. What is the governmental and industrial opinion on this ? How large a part will it play in Japanese production ?

51. What part will be played by robotisation in Japanese industry and what will be its consequences on employment ?

Energy

52. Has Japan established a national nuclear industry based on national technology ?

53. Nuclear research and development is of great significance. What percentage of the national research and development effort is connected with nuclear energy ?

54. What is being done on uranium enrichment, plutonium fuel and fast-breeder reactors for which Japan developed sodium-cooled reactors as a national product ? When is commercial utilisation of fast-breeder reactors expected ?

55. What stage has been reached in the development of advanced thermal reactors using

various kinds of fuel, such as slightly enriched uranium and natural uranium mixed with plutonium ?

56. What is the state of the fusion reactors in Japan now being studied by the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute ?

57. What enrichment facilities have been installed in Japan ?

58. What measures are taken for nuclear reactor waste disposal ?

59. Can science and technology in Japan play a rôle in avoiding a crisis between energy requirements and various forms of environmental pollution ? Would this mean a change in the present pattern of Japan's industrial structure ?

60. What percentage of the total electricity generating capacity comes from nuclear resources ?

61. How much of the capacity of nuclear generators of electricity is under construction or in operation ?

62. Which utilities are ordering, constructing and operating nuclear power stations ?

63. Which companies, consortia or groups are the main constructors of nuclear power stations ?

64. Is research being carried out on new sources of energy - solar energy, wind, biomass and geothermal ?

65. How is the energy conservation programme developing ? How does it relate to the rise in world oil prices ?

66. Most European electricity boards consider it of great importance to be in the same technical community and this is one of the main reasons why all European countries have ordered light-water reactors. Do you agree with this approach ?

67. Could you give your views on the future of:

(*a*) the advanced gas-cooled reactor ;

(*b*) the liquid metal-cooled reactor ;

(*c*) the high-temperature reactor ;

(*d*) the steam-generating heavy-water reactor ?

Marine developments

68. What are the main projects of the Council for Ocean Development and in which direction will Japan extend its marine activities for the effective use of its marine resources ?

69. What are the main projects regarding the continental shelf around Japan ?

70. What are the activities of the Japan Marine Science and Technology Centre ?

71. What is its budget and what are the main activities of this centre ?

72. What are the main research goals of the underwater habitation project, Seatopia, and the deep-sea submersibles ?

73. What are the goals in deep-sea mining ?

74. What is the share of government agencies and of private industry in research and development ?

APPENDIX II

Chart of the national organisation of space activities



APPENDIX III

Satellites programmes

Satellites of N-2 programme

Satellite	Mission	Launch date/Vehicle
Engineering Test Satellite-IV (ETS-IV) "KIKU-3"	Confirmation of launching performance of N-2 vehicle, acquisition of data on launching environment as well as technologies for production and management of large-scale satellites, and test of functions of equipments on board the satellite.	11th February 1981 N-2
Geostationary Meteorological Satellite-2 (GMS-2) "HIMAWARI-2"	Improvement of meteorological service in Japan, and development of meteorological satellite technology. Almost the same performance as "HIMAWARI".	11th August 1981 N-2
Communications Satellite-2 (CS-2a)	Development of communication satellite technology in accordance with increasing demands for satellite communications. Its performance is comparable to "SAKURA".	January to February 1983 N-2
Communications Satellite-2 (CS-2b)	On orbit spare of CS-2a, assuming the same mission as above.	August to September 1983 N-2
Marine Observation Satellite (MOS-1)	Observation of marine phenomena, especially colours and surface temperature of the sea, and establishment of the fundamental technology of earth observation satellites.	FY 1986 N-2 (2 stage)
Broadcasting Satellite-2 (BS-2a)	Elimination of the poor TV reception areas, and development of technology for broadcasting satellites, having a performance comparable to "YURI".	FY 1983 N-2
Broadcasting Satellite-2 (BS-2b)	On orbit spare of BS-2a, assuming the same mission as above.	FY 1985 N-2
Geostationary Meteorological Satellite-3 (GMS-3)	Improvement of meteorological service in Japan, and development of meteorological satellite technology. Almost the same performance as "HIMAWARI-2".	FY 1984 N-2

Note: Electronic Navigation Research Institute, Ministry of Transport

Satellites of H-1 programme

Satellite	Mission	Launch date/Vehicle
Payload for the test flight.	Confirmation of launch capability of H-1 and development of technology for geodetic satellites.	FY 1985 ETV-II
ETS-V CS-3a CS-3b		After 1987

* *Note:* Geographical Survey Institute, Ministry of Construction.

Space experiment programme

Mission name	Principal purposes	Launch date
First Material Processing Test (FMPT)	To conduct experiments on material processing and life science using space shuttle/spacelab, and develop manned support technology needed for human activities in space.	FY 1987 (TBD)

APPENDIX IV

(a) The present state of science and technology in Japan

1. Investment in research and development (R & D) (1981):
   - 5,360 billion yen ($24 billion)
     one-tenth of world R & D expenditure
     75 % by private sectors.
2. Number of researchers (as of April 1982):
   - 330,000 persons.
3. Primary objectives of science and technology (S & T):
   - increase of R & D investment to 3 % of national income ;
   - reinforcement of creativity and originality in R & D ;
   - enhancement of effective co-operation among the industrial, academic and government sectors ;
   - further development of international co-operation.
4. Administrative organisations (cf. chart):
   - Council for Science and Technology
     the top consultative organ in the administration of S & T in Japan for formulating basic policies concerning all areas of S & T.
   - Science and Technology Agency
     an overall co-ordination agency among various ministries and agencies (excluding universities).
5. Government budget for S & T (1982):

	Yen (billion)	$ (million)
- Nuclear energy:	290	1,200
- Other energy:	93	390
- Space development:	109	450
- Ocean development:	60	250
- Disaster prevention:	28	120
- Universities:	657	2,740
- Government budget for S & T:	1,448	6,000

$1 = 240 yen

(b) Administrative structure of science and technology



APPENDIX V

Cases of industrial co-operation between Japan and the United States

Automobile

Honda Motor built a passenger car factory in the state of Ohio. Construction started in 1981. Went into production at the end of 1982.

Nissan Motor built a truck factory in the state of Tennessee. Production commenced in 1983.

Toyota started the feasibility study of joint production with GM in March 1982.

Steel

Sumitomo Metal Industries provided technology to US Steel's Baytown plant of integrated manufacturing of large-diameter pipes. Actual guidance started in 1980.

Nippon Steel examined the Armco's Houston plant with regard to the improvement of operation. This was commenced in August 1980.

Semiconductor

Hitachi established a semiconductor plant in the state of Texas in 1978.

Nippon Electric took over a semiconductor plant in California in 1978.

Toko and Motorola agreed to establish a company jointly to manufacture and sell semiconductor, setting up a plant at Aizu, Japan. Completed in October 1980.

Toshiba took over a semiconductor plant in California in April 1980.

Fujitsu set up a semiconductor plant in California. Construction commenced in 1979, and production in 1980.

Hitachi provided technology to Hewlett-Packard to manufacture 64KDRAM in March 1982.

Toshiba and Zailog entered into a technical co-operation agreement for production technology of 16KSRAM and micro-computer in April 1982.

Machine tool

Makino Milling Machine made a capital participation in Leprond in Ohio, acquiring 51 % of its stock, provided MC production technology and gave it the rights to sell Makino's products.

Hitachi Seiki constructed a NC lathe plant in the state of New York. Production began in May 1981.

Fujitsu Fanuc established a joint company in Michigan jointly with GM in March 1982 for the purpose of developing, manufacturing and selling industrial robots.

Mitsubishi Electric supplied welding robots to Westinghouse (OEM ordinary equipment) in March 1982.

Electronics

Leading manufacturers of electronic equipment in Japan invested in many states.

Civil aircraft

Joint project for development of YX by Japan Civil Air Transport Development Association, Boeing (USA) and Alitalia (Italy). Scheduled to be commissioned at the end of 1982.

Proposal for joint development project with Boeing for YXX, the 150-passenger aircraft.

Proposal for joint development project for YXX with McDonnell Douglas.

APPENDIX VI

Members of the Science and Technology Committees

House of Representatives

Mr. R. Nagata (LDP)
Mr. J. Komiyama (LDP)
Mr. K. Yosano (LDP)
Mr. F. Kishida (LDP)
Mr. S. Kusakawa (Komeito Party)
Mr. Y. Yoshida (Democratic Socialist Party)
Mr. K. Yamahara (Communist Party)

House of Counsellors

Mr. A. Nakano (Komeito Party)
Mr. M. Goto (LDP)
Mr. M. Yoshida (Japanese Socialist Party)
Mr. A. Ota (Komeito Party)

APPENDIX VII

Current situation of Economic Community-Japan industrial co-operation

1. *Investment exchange*

(*i*) *Japan's direct investment in the Economic Community for manufacturing (total 119)*

A. Trends by country:

No. 1	West Germany	28
No. 2	United Kingdom	23
No. 3	France	17
No. 4	Belgium	13
	Netherlands	13
No. 6	Italy	10
	Ireland	10
No. 8	Greece	3
No. 9	Luxembourg	1
	Denmark	1

N.B.: Numbers include projects which are just after decision stage.

B. Trends by decade:

1960s - 12 - zipper, stationery, motorbike, TV, etc.;

1970s - 67 - bearings, plastics, lens, colour TV, etc.;

1980s - 40 - colour TV, automobiles, IC, VTR, robots, etc.

(*ii*) *Economic Community's direct investment in Japan for manufacturing*

The Economic Community's investment in Japan is not brisk when compared with the Japanese investment in the Economic Community. Main fields of Economic Community investment are oil refinery, chemicals, rubber products, pharmaceuticals, machinery and electric machinery.

(*iii*) *Japan-Economic Community-United States cross investments*

Cross direct investment between Japan and the Economic Community has been increasing, but is still far behind the level of cross investment between the Economic Community and the United States.



N.B.: As of end March 1982. Figures of cross investments between Economic Community and United States are as of end 1981. Figures in brackets are percentages of the figure of the investment from the United States to the Economic Community.

2. *Technology exchange*

As for the technical co-operation extended by Japanese enterprises to the Economic Community, notable is an increase in the fields of automobiles, electronics and robots.

Technical co-operation extended to the Japanese in recent years is notable in the fields of chemicals, aircraft, nuclear power, public utilities (electricity and gas), etc.

3. *Co-operation in third countries*

West Germany and France are major partners for joint construction of industrial plants in third countries. Main fields are steel mill, power plant, oil refinery and cement production plant.

Document 957 **31st October 1983**

Africa's rôle in a European security policy - Chad

REPORT[1]

submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee[2]
by Mr. Muller, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Adopted in committee by 15 votes to 1 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee* Mr *Michel* (Chairman); MM. Hardy (Alternate, *Lord Hughes*), van der Werff (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. *Ahrens*, Mrs. *Baarveld-Schlaman*, *Sir Frederic Bennett*, MM. Berrier (Alternate: *Baumel*), Bertile, Bogaerts, *Conti Persini*, De Poi (Alternate: *Cavaliere*), *Hill*, Lagneau (Alternate: *Péridier*), Lagorce, *Lord McNair*, MM. *Muller*, Prouvost, Lord Reay (Alternate *Atkinson*) MM. *Reddemann*, Rumpf, van der Sanden, *Thoss*, *Valiante*, *Vecchietti*, *Vogt*, Wilquin, Zito.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on Africa's rôle in a European security policy - Chad

The Assembly,

(*i*) Condemning the invasion of Chad by Libyan armed forces as a threat to peace in an area which is of particular interest to the Western European countries;

(*ii*) Considering that Libya is far better armed than the states of Central and West Africa as a whole;

(*iii*) Considering that France's sending a military force to Chad at the request of its government and with the approval of a large number of African states is likely to discourage Libyan intervention;

(*iv*) Considering that the respect of internationally-recognised frontiers is essential for the maintenance of peace on the African continent;

(*v*) Approving the measures taken by France at the request of the Government of Chad to help to restore peace in Chad;

(*vi*) Considering that the WEU member countries cannot disregard the maintenance of peace in Africa or the redeployment of a member's armed forces;

(*vii*) Regretting that no member invoked Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty to call for relevant consultations between the signatories,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that France's partners are kept informed of the political and military measures taken as a result of the invasion of Chad by Libya;

2. Express the solidarity of the member countries in regard to the measures taken by France in Chad;

3. Examine the possible political and military consequences of these measures;

4. Express its desire for the early restoration of unity, integrity and peace in Chad.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Muller, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1. In December 1979, your Rapporteur was asked to present a report on Africa's rôle in a European security policy. This report was adopted by the committee but referred back to it on 20th June 1979 since the Assembly could not adopt the recommendation for lack of a quorum. On 17th October 1979, the General Affairs Committee agreed not to ask for this report to be included in the already particularly full agenda of the December 1979 session but, on 5th December 1979, it confirmed your Rapporteur's appointment. His report has not yet been included in the agenda of any subsequent session. However, on 21st September 1983, the Presidential Committee instructed the General Affairs Committee to submit a text on Chad at the December 1983 session and Mr. Michel, Chairman of the committee, considered that preparation of the corresponding report came within the terms of reference given to your Rapporteur on 5th December 1979.

2. Chad was certainly not one of your Rapporteur's main concerns in 1979 and the present document is quite different from the draft report referred back to committee in June 1979. However, the reason why the General Affairs Committee has not asked for that report to be reincluded in the agenda of a session in the last four years is that during that period other regions of the world have moved into the limelight, while Africa remained calm, although only relatively. At least, Europe's security did not seem threatened by events in that part of the world.

3. In summer 1983, however, the invasion of northern Chad by forces rebelling against the government in office, backed by armed forces from a foreign power, Libya, jeopardised the maintenance of balance and stability in Africa. A European power, France, to which the Government of Chad had appealed for assistance, sent a strong force to that country, an action which was inevitably of interest to France's European allies. This is the reason for the Presidential Committee's decision to ask the General Affairs Committee to present a report on Chad at the December 1983 session.

II. *Chad*

4. Chad is a vast territoty between latitudes 7° and 24° north with an area of more than 1 million sq. km., i.e. twice the size of France, the largest country in Western Europe. More than three-quarters of the country is Saharan desert, while the remaining quarter in the south and south-east has a more humid tropical climate and is more fertile round the water courses. Nature has not been very generous to Chad; it has few mineral resources and its agriculture is confined to a few oases in the north and the south-eastern part of the country. It now has more than 4 million inhabitants but they are far from homogeneous. The north of the country is dominated by white nomads, with black populations descended from former slaves in the rare oases. The population in this area is very sparse and has never shown much respect for the state or for the law it would impose. In the south, on the contrary, there is a sedentary, relatively concentrated black population with far more peaceful traditions.

5. As in all areas in the southern Sahara, the nomads have constantly tried to dominate the sedentary population and to set up vast and always short-lived empires. France colonised Chad in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Colonisation was mainly military and administrative and provided protection for the work of catholic missionaries who converted a large part of the black population in the south, while Islam spread throughout the nomads in the north of the country. No Europeans settled there and means of communication remained rudimentary throughout this vast territory.

6. However, Chad occupies a particularly important geographical position since it links Moslem North Africa with Equatorial Africa and West Africa with Sudan. It is this position more than the country's natural resources that has made it a state in international relations and which, together with the lack of unity, explains the turbulent history of Chad since it became independent.

7. The limits of the present report do not allow your Rapporteur to go into the intricacies of this history; he will merely recall the principal stages since independence was proclaimed on 11th August 1960. Mr. François Tombalbaye, from the south, was then elected President of the Republic. The new state made a peaceful start and, at the request of the National Assembly of Chad, the French force stationed in the country was withdrawn in April 1964.

8. In November 1965, trouble began in the north of the country, accompanied by the creation of a Chad National Liberation Front in Sudan. Recalled in 1968 by President Tombal-

baye to fight the rebellion in the north, French forces stayed there until June 1971, while Libya afforded Frolinat growing military assistance. In 1973, Libya occupied a fringe of Chad territory along its frontier, more than a hundred kilometres wide, the Aozou Strip, to which it laid claim. Was its aim to take control of possible uranium resources? It is not certain: it must be borne in mind that Saharan frontiers have little meaning geographically and that nomad tribes cross them in every direction, uncontrolled by the frontier states.

9. After the assassination of President Tombalbaye on 13th April 1975, the army placed General Malloum in charge and in 1977 he again called for French logistic support in putting down the rebellion. He failed and, on 31st August 1978, had to call on one of the leaders of the Toubou rebellion, Mr. Hissène Habré, to become his Prime Minister.

10. This agreement lasted only a few months and in February 1979 hostilities broke out between the head of state and the Prime Minister. It was solved only through the intervention of neighbouring African countries which, under the agreement signed in Kano (Nigeria) on 23rd March 1979, obtained the resignation of General Malloum and of Mr. Hissène Habré. A transitional national union government, grouping the eleven tendencies in Chad and presided over by the leader of Frolinat, Mr. Goukouni Oueddei, took charge of the country's destiny. But in March 1980, Mr. Hissène Habré again stirred up the north of the country. Libya came to the help of the government and its forces occupied N'Djamena from December 1980 to November 1981. The government also had the support of the Organisation of African Unity, and a contingent from Zaire, the first unit of an intra-African force, took over from the Libyan army in N'Djamena. It did not prevent Mr. Hissène Habré retaking the capital on 7th June 1982 and Mr. Goukouni Oueddei took refuge in Cameroon. Just when the Organisation of African Unity, at its nineteenth summit meeting in Addis Ababa on 9th June 1983, recognised Mr. Hissène Habré's government, a revolt broke out again in the north in the name of the transitional national union government under Mr. Goukouni Oueddei, with the participation of land and air forces supplied by Libya. On 24th June, the insurgents took the principal oasis in the north, Faya-Largeau, lost it on 30th July and took it back on 10th August. Mr. Hissène Habré, with the support of the OAU, then appealed to France which, after sending defence equipment, began on 10th August to send forces, in principle intended to train the Chad army. At the end of August, a French force of about 2,500 men and some ten combat aircraft were deployed in Chad, to the rear of the operational zone, and at the time of writing the troops have not yet intervened directly in the fighting. In fact, the fighting has calmed down somewhat since the beginning of September, apart from the failure of a transitional national union government offensive beyond Faya-Largeau, not far from the Sudanese frontier at Oum Chalouba on about 15th September and limited operations by government forces to the north of that locality.

11. The indications are that positions have now become stabilised and unless something unforeseen happens it will be a long time before they change. The security line, known as the red line, to the south of which the French forces are deployed, could be crossed only with difficulty by transitional national union government forces because this would take them beyond the range of action of the combat aircraft deployed on Libyan territory and they would thus be deprived of reliable air support. The government forces for their part, thanks to the presence of French aircraft, have air superiority only up to that line.

12. Thus, in September 1983, there was a de facto partition of Chad between two powers, one in the north, with Libyan support, the other in the south, armed by France, assisted directly by forces from Zaire and indirectly by the presence of some 2,500 French troops intended to deter a further offensive from the north rather than to wage battle. However, if this situation were to last, Libya would be able to repair and re-equip the landing strips it is occupying in northern Chad and consequently move closer to the red line and shift it further south.

13. The ten aircraft which France is deploying in N'Djamena might then be no match for Libya's 550 modern combat aircraft, even if their crews do not seem to be backed up by adequate ground facilities and the Libyan air force consequently is far less to be feared than the number of its aircraft might indicate.

III. *African aspects*

14. It is difficult to discern clear-cut political differences between Mr. Hissène Habré and Mr. Goukouni Oueddei. Both derive most of their support from the north and north-east of the country and the people in the south seem favourably inclined towards whichever one is installed in the capital. It is obviously not because of their respective merits that the OAU and France have taken an interest in the conflict.

15. On the other hand the intervention of Libyan forces is of serious concern to many African states. In the first place, Libya, although sparsely populated with a population of little more than 3 million, is militarily one of the most powerful African countries. Much of its oil income has been spent on building up extre-

mely well equipped armed forces. They number only 65,000 men, of which 55,000 in the army, but they have about 3,000 modern tanks of Soviet origin and 550 combat aircraft of French or Soviet origin. The technical ability of its troops may be doubtful but many mercenaries have been recruited who may be very well trained. It is admittedly unlikely that it has the means to maintain, service and repair its equipment, but it is difficult to assess just how much is usable immediately. Even with half this equipment Libya would easily outclass the forces of most African countries.

16. In the second place, the strict Islamism of Colonel Kadhafi, Libya's head of state, makes him a charismatic leader in the Moslem world and the hero of the more revolutionary sections of Islam. Islam is the dominant religion throughout northern and western Africa and the leaders of the African states fear that the establishment of Libyan forces at the heart of the continent may cause serious trouble in their countries. Libya is known to be supplying arms and money to Frolinat in Chad, to the Sarahouis revolting against Morocco in the former Rio de Oro and to many subversive movements in Africa. Although it may be wondered how far it is encouraged and assisted by the Soviet Union, there is no clear answer to this.

17. Thirdly, the de facto annexation of the Aozou strip, then the occupation of N'Djamena in 1981 followed by half the territory of Chad in 1983 indicate that Libya is pursuing an expansionist policy aimed at modifying the colonial frontiers to its own advantage. However debatable these frontiers may be, the Organisation of African Unity decided from the very outset to keep them and defend them because all African states know that to question them would upset the balance and peace throughout the African continent for many years.

18. These are probably the reasons why the OAU has always recognised and supported whatever government was in office in N'Djamena. Its support has been expressed on the one hand by twice sending forces from Zaire to confront the Libyan invader and on the other by several African countries such as Cameroon, Gabon and Senegal appealing to France to maintain military units on their territory and, if necessary, to use their territory as a base to send assistance to Chad.

19. It would certainly be desirable for the OAU itself to ensure peace and order on the African continent since any European intervention may revive accusations of neo-colonialism. However, most African countries do not have enough armed forces to be able to take part in such operations. These countries have been wise enough to devote most of their efforts to trying to solve difficult economic and social problems and, although they are often among the poorest countries in the world, they are also among those which spend the smallest proportion of their GNP on defence. For instance, most of them have no modern combat aircraft, the largest, Nigeria and Zaire, having 30 and 17 respectively. None of them is capable of standing up to Libyan power. Even combined, they would not be able to do so.

20. This is obviously a reason why many former French colonies which became independent in 1960 concluded treaties of alliance with France, which thus continued to contribute to their security. Chad concluded a new agreement with France in 1976 providing for the assistance of French forces in training the Chad army. French personnel would have Chad military status, but the Government of Chad could not have them take part in war operations or the maintenance of order. This agreement also implied that the Government of Chad, responsible for the logistic support of its units, benefited for this purpose from supplies of French equipment " on a paying or, exceptionally, non-paying basis ". Strictly speaking, it was not therefore an alliance but a co-operation agreement which left France free to decide on the type of military assistance it should give Chad or whether it should intervene on its behalf.

21. However, once a power such as Libya intervened militarily in Chad at the side of the rebels, France had to take account of the reactions of the member countries of the OAU because to let Libya gain a foothold in Chad would endanger the security of many of its African allies.

22. The way the French intervention was conducted was emphasised subsequently with great care by President Mitterrand in an interview published in *Le Monde* on 26th August 1983. First, France had waited for an appeal from the government in N'Djamena and the OAU before sending forces to Chad. Second, these forces, of which there are less than 3,000, have not yet taken part in any fighting but are deployed so that the attackers would quickly run up against them if they pursued their advance on Chad territory. In other words, they play a deterrent rather than an active rôle and President Mitterrand let it be clearly understood that they would take no part in winning back the north of the country. Thirdly, France has shown that it would not follow up American suggestions to pursue the operation further and take advantage of the Chad problem to put an end to Colonel Kadhafi's régime in Libya. Finally, France has tried to bring the two Chad factions to the negotiating table and has sounded the Libyan Government with a view to restoring peace. It cannot be said that it has yet achieved its objectives.

23. It is not for your Rapporteur to express an opinion on the appropriateness of the strategy adopted. Some observers have held that an earlier and more determined operation might have inflicted a fatal blow on Libya. Others, such as Mr. Hissène Habré, stress that France, by causing the red line to be formed, made too many concessions to Libya by preparing for a partition of Chad which would quickly become permanent. Others, on the contrary, fear that France may have become involved in another African venture from which it will be difficult to extricate itself and it will not have any real chance of bringing about a valid agreement between the two sides in Chad or between itself and Libya.

24. This is criticism of the military aspects of the French intervention and not of its political aspects which nevertheless seem the more important. Insofar as the French Government took all the precautions which have just been recalled, its intentions cannot be suspected of ambiguity and Mr. Hissène Habré's protests have shown that it has not placed itself at his service. It now has to succeed in restoring peace and unity in Chad before Libya acquires air superiority in the area.

IV. *Europe, France and Chad*

25. France's European allies are not parties to its African alliances. They have never tried to be and do not have the means. No one has asked them. Moreover, the French Government seems hardly to have informed them and certainly did not consult them.

26. However, for several reasons this matter is not of no concern to them.

27. (*i*) France, which also has forces in other African or Oceanian territories as well as in Lebanon, had to withdraw forces if not from the central front at least from mainland Europe in order to send them to Chad. There are not very many of them but they are professional troops and in fact a significant part of the French army has been removed from the European theatre. This obviously concerns the countries which ensure the joint security of Western Europe side by side with France.

28. Information published by the French authorities shows that there are just under 15,000 French troops actually deployed overseas. In view of the need to rotate troops thus deployed, it may be deduced that all these commitments correspond to about the limit of French availabilities, which are about 20,000 men, and this level can hardly be raised since the French Government cannot use conscripts for operations abroad without a vote in parliament, apart from volunteers, and such troops require considerable professional support.

29. These considerations may have played a major rôle in the French Government's decision to set up a special force of 45,000 men partly drawn from French forces in Germany for deployment depending on requirements on the mainland of Europe, i.e. mainly in the Federal Republic, or overseas. This decision clearly shows the close link between the defence of Europe and France's use of forces overseas. The same is true for the United Kingdom and for the rapid deployment force being built up by the United States which would also, if necessary, call on forces deployed on the European continent.

30. (*ii*) Article VII of the modified Brussels Treaty stipulates that "The high contracting parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the international engagements now in force between him and any other of the high contracting parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of the present treaty", which obviously implies that member states should not subsequently enter into any engagement contrary to the treaty provisions and also that member states are entitled, in the framework of the WEU Council, to put forward any objections they may have to one or other treaty signed by one of them. As far as your Rapporteur knows, no member country has ever objected to the treaties concluded between France and African states. They cannot therefore criticise France for fulfilling its commitments and, to a certain extent, without being committed to join France, they owe it diplomatic support as for the United Kingdom during its war with Argentina in 1982, particularly as Libya's actions constitute a far more serious threat for Europe than the attack on an archipelago in the Atlantic by a South American state.

31. (*iii*) However cautious the French Government may have been in deploying its forces in Chad and however concerned it may be to achieve a negotiated settlement, the danger of the conflict worsening and spreading remains. The differences of views between France and the United States in August which led the United States to withdraw the observation aircraft it had sent to Africa to gather information about the military situation in Chad show that the Atlantic Alliance may feel the back-lash of such differences. It is of course normal that the decisions should be taken by the country whose forces are involved and none of its allies should dictate the military and political conduct it should adopt. To say the least, Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty implies consultations which do not yet appear to have been held any more than they were in 1982 during the Anglo-Argentine conflict.

32. (*iv*) However this may be, France's partners in the European Community are involved in a form of African policy because of the develop-

ment of economic co-operation between the EEC and a large number of developing countries, many of which are African, under the Lomé agreements, the second renewal of which is now being negotiated. Although this co-operation is purely economic, its aim is not only to ensure outlets and satisfactory prices for the products of signatory developing countries, including Chad, but also to help to maintain peace within these countries and at international level. The two aims are closely linked and the Community could not and should not afford direct or indirect assistance to countries which would use it to disturb the peace. In fact, the small amount spent by most African states on their defence is a success for Community policy in economic co-operation. But this means that the EEC must not disregard the security of the co-operating countries.

33. (v) Insofar as the Soviet Union pursues a policy of destabilisation in Africa and affords assistance, advice and armaments to Libya, the situation in Chad cannot be isolated from the overall international balance and the members of WEU have to take account of the very serious disturbances and effects on the balance which might result from Chad being occupied by Libya.

34. (vi) Libya's actions have several times endangered international peace and the internal order of states in various areas close to Europe in which the WEU countries have major interests. They cannot therefore remain indifferent to an operation designed to halt the dangerous agitation fostered by Libya.

35. For all these reasons, the French operation in Chad cannot leave France's European allies indifferent and they must, in the most appropriate framework, including that of WEU for everything relating to Europe's security, examine together the developments in Chad, the nature and consequences of the deployment of French forces in Chad and measures to be taken jointly should the situation deteriorate.

V. *Conclusions*

36. A very large majority of the General Affairs Committee expressed its approval of the presence of French forces in Africa and the assignment of a large contingent to Chad. Your Rapporteur has tried to analyse the reasons as objectively as possible and to point to the consequences for Europe's security by showing that all questions raised by the crisis in Chad and by France's participation in the search for a solution acceptable to the people of that country, to the African states and to the West concern France's WEU partners to a high degree. In this matter, they can offer France their sympathy, understanding and diplomatic support.

37. To respond to this concern at the present time, the French Government should keep its allies informed and they should exchange views in application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. In the longer term, the increasing number of challenges to international peace outside Europe has led France, the United Kingdom and the United States to envisage or even begin redeploying their armed forces. This forces the allies to reassess the implications of the new deployments and your Rapporteur is not convinced that the national authorities of certain countries gave their allies enough information about the decisions they took nor has there been a joint study of their implications for the overall system of western alliances to which WEU belongs.

Document 958 **31st October 1983**

Economic relations with the Soviet Union

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee [2]
by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted in committee by 10 votes to 5 with 3 abstentions.

2 *Members of the committee:* Mr. *Michel* (Chairman); MM. Hardy (Alternate: *Lord Hughes*), van der Werff (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. *Ahrens*, Mrs. *Baarveld-Schlaman*, *Sir Frederic Bennett*, MM. Berrier (Alternate: *Baumel*), Bertile, Bogaerts, *Conti Persini*, De Poi (Alternate: *Cavaliere*), *Hill*, Lagneau (Alternate: *Pécriaux*), Lagorce, *Lord McNair*, MM. *Muller*, Prouvost, Lord Reay (Alternate: *Atkinson*), MM. *Reddemann*, Rumpf, van der Sanden, *Thoss*, *Valiante*, *Vecchietti*, *Vogt*, Wilquin, Zito.

N.B *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on economic relations with the Soviet Union

The Assembly,

(*i*) Considering that for several decades the development of the Soviet economy has given priority to the armaments effort and that in many sectors these armaments now exceed those of the countries of the Atlantic Alliance;

(*ii*) Considering that Soviet military power is being developed at the expense of the standard of living of the population and that it is helping to keep several countries in a state of dependence;

(*iii*) Hoping that the opening or continuation of various international negotiations on the limitation of armaments will allow the Soviet Union to apply new guidelines for its economic development;

(*iv*) Regretting that the members of the Atlantic Alliance have not managed to define a common code of conduct for their trade with the eastern countries or to apply sufficiently-concerted economic sanctions in response to instances of Soviet abuse of military power;

(*v*) Noting that the shooting down by Soviet military aircraft of a South Korean civil aircraft together with its crew and passengers on 1st September 1983 is an unacceptable violation of international law;

(*vi*) Considering the allegations that forced labour was used for the construction of the Siberian gas pipeline to Western Europe,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Promote consultations between all democratic countries with a view to working out jointly the limits they would accept to ensure that their trade with the eastern countries does not help those countries to accumulate armaments and inter alia:

   (*a*) to ban all exports of advanced technology which might be used for armaments purposes;

   (*b*) to avoid long-term contracts making western signatories economically dependent on eastern countries;

   (*c*) to avoid undue promotion of Soviet resources at the expense of those of the West or the third world;

   (*d*) to avoid granting over-favourable credit terms to the eastern countries and not to tolerate their incurring too great a burden of debts;

   (*e*) to refuse the principle of countertrade;

2. Adapt these principles accordingly in the light of results obtained in international negotiations on the limitation of armaments;

3. Urge the preparation, in the framework of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, of new international air navigation regulations to make a repetition of an incident such as occurred on 1st September 1983 impossible;

4. Investigate and report on all evidence of forced labour used on the Siberian gas pipeline.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1. When your Rapporteur suggested that the General Affairs Committee should prepare a report on various aspects concerning trading relations between the western alliance and the Soviet bloc, he particularly had in mind the crisis which the alliance faced a year ago when the United States attempted to apply sanctions on western firms which were supplying technology for the Siberian gas pipeline.

2. This action by President Reagan, although he did not make it particularly clear at the time, was an indirect retaliatory measure against the Kremlin for the imposition of martial law and the suspension - later the outlawing - of Solidarity in Poland.

3. Also concerning the United States at the time was the generous use of western credit to defaulting Comecon countries, the unhealthy influence which the Soviet Union would have on those European countries which had contracted for Siberian gas, and the use of "slave labour" on the pipeline.

4. At the same time, President Reagan avoided damage to his own political base and to American farmers by refusing to apply a grain embargo which President Carter had done in retaliation for the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Subsequently the United States has signed a new five-year contract for the sale of American grain to the Soviet Union and the European Community continues to make up for Soviet food deficiencies in other areas. And in July this year West Germany granted a massive new loan to East Germany negotiated by no less than Mr. Franz-Josef Strauss.

5. All this could be said to represent a crisis of confidence within the alliance and in particular wide differences of opinion on the use of trade as a weapon in diplomacy. That such differences remain to be solved has been shown most recently by western reaction to the shooting down of the Korean B-747.

6. Clearly for a so-called alliance to be meaningful beyond its, hopefully never-to-be-tested, raison d'être of mutual defence and for its specialist activities such as Cocom to be effective, there is today a pressing and crucial need to arrive at a convergence of philosophy on the part of its members on the need to meet the Soviet threat.

7. Without the evidence of a greater consensus and unity of purpose and action by all members of the alliance, the Kremlin will know that it can continue to risk imposing its might on Poland, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

8. Beyond these recent events there exists a wider and more historic background to this report. The years of *Ostpolitik* in the sixties, of détente in the seventies which led to the Helsinki final act in 1975 encouraged a new climate of peaceful coexistence ("the Kissinger years") during which East-West trade increased, encouraged and subsidised by generous western credit, western technology was transferred to the Soviet Union by fair means and foul, and the western alliance allowed itself to be lulled into a sense of false security whilst the Kremlin maintained its own relentless aim - set by Khrushchev following the Cuban crisis - to secure superiority in arms.

9. It was in 1978 that the West woke up to these realities, when the Helsinki review conference in Belgrade showed that the Soviet Union had no intention of implementing the final act, when NATO decided to modernise its defences and when the Kremlin made its decision to invade Afghanistan and to reactivate the world peace movement in an attempt to undermine anticipated western retaliation and rearmament.

10. It is your Rapporteur's hope that the report will draw some lessons from these events and will contribute to policies which will avoid such damaging crises occurring within the western alliance again.

II. *Economic relations and western security*

11. The latest edition of "Soviet Military Power", produced by the Pentagon, gives a picture of Soviet military efforts during the period 1974-83. This picture is largely confirmed by the comparison given on pages 132 and 133 of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies' publication "The Military Balance 1982-83" between the means available to NATO and to the Warsaw Pact. The balance is shown to be strongly in favour of the Soviet Union in almost all areas except the navy, and particularly in conventional armaments.

12. According to the Pentagon, the Soviet Union has built three times as many tanks as the United States in the last decade, twice as many tactical combat aircraft, six times as many inter-

continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and about sixteen times as many nuclear submarines. This growth of Soviet military power far exceeds the requirements of a policy which is purely defensive. The Soviet Union has built far more ICBMs than it could need for retaliation, and its arsenal of these weapons exceeds that of the Americans as was already admitted in the SALT I agreements. It has acquired a missile replacement capability not available to the United States. It has also considerably increased the accuracy of its missiles with the assistance of technology largely imported from the United States. It is now able to destroy a high percentage of American surface-based missiles in a first strike.

13. The Warsaw Pact conventional forces, which were for long considered inferior to those of the West in mobility and other technical aspects, are being modernised, trained and equipped for rapid deployment outside their own frontiers and sometimes over considerable distances. Through negotiations or other means these countries have signed many security and co-operation agreements with African, Latin American, Middle East and East Asian countries. They have obtained bases, overflying rights and the right to set up naval bases and they are distributing arms to the third world on a massive scale, in fact twice the quantities supplied by the United States between 1977 and 1981. The effects can be seen inter alia in the present war in Lebanon where the power of artillery and armoured vehicles supplied by the Soviet Union to Syria have played a major rôle in intensifying and internationalising the hostilities.

14. Faced with these facts it is clear that economic problems cannot be handled in complete isolation from security problems.

15. East-West economic relations were established and developed at a time when there was a balance of forces which might have been expected to remain relatively stable. As a result, they facilitated massive rearmament by the Soviet Union which in the last ten years has significantly changed the strategic and conventional military balance in its favour. Now as in the past the development of such relations involves a potential danger for our security.

16. To what extent does the expansion of East-West relations in trade, technology transfer, investment and credit help to develop and strengthen the Soviet Union's strategic infrastructure or to build up its military potential? Again, does it bring economic advantages for the West? What is the probability of technology acquired in the West directly promoting the Soviet military potential? When western technical know-how acquired for peaceful purposes filters into the defence sector, to what extent does this make a significant contribution to the development of Soviet military power? What risks are involved in exploiting Siberian gas and distributing it in Western Europe? Are there alternatives for guaranteeing Europe the energy resources it needs? Is it not true that the credits granted to the Soviet Union and acceptance of the principle of compensatory trade constitute a premium for Soviet military power?

17. Admittedly, as several committee members have rightly underlined, the development of trade is in itself a positive factor in several respects. It helps to consolidate peace and gives substance to a policy of détente in international relations which would amount to little if it were based only on declarations of intention and good will. It also plays a sometimes decisive rôle in each of the partners' economies, which is of particular importance at a time when the western countries are desperately trying to break out of an economic recession which has lasted for almost ten years. Moreover, it is to be hoped that if the Eastern European countries agreed to open their frontiers wider and develop trade with the West this might encourage their societies to move towards greater freedom in all areas.

18. However, trade should not be developed no matter what the cost lest the drawbacks outweigh the advantages, particularly if it merely helped to strengthen Soviet military power or Soviet domination over its satellites.

19. Since the 1947 split which affected both economic and political East-West relations, the points of view of the eastern countries, Western Europe and the United States about economic relations between the two blocs have changed and one of the aims of the present report is to ascertain on what bases it would be possible to work out a common doctrine for the whole western world in these matters. So far the Atlantic Alliance has not managed to define a valid strategy for its members' economic relations with the eastern countries. It has only just managed to draw up a list of so-called strategic products which its members agreed not to deliver to the Soviet Union and its allies. But many countries now query certain items on this list and it is not clear to which countries the ban should apply, as instanced by the West's trade with the People's Republic of China.

20. However, nothing positive can be gained from a clash between Europe and the United States on this question. Public opinion must not be given the impression, because of unilateral initiatives, that there are serious differences among the members of the alliance in this connection. In view of the Soviet threat, it has been necessary for a long time, and now more than ever, to strengthen allied solidarity by

defining conditions for granting credit to the Soviet Union and its associates, by improving the system for controlling exports of high technology products and by re-examining the allies' energy requirements and how to meet them without accepting compensatory trade. It is similarly necessary to make an overall redefinition of the principles which should underly economic relations between all the western countries and the East. The fact that in the next few months East-West economic relations will be on the agenda of various bodies (NATO, OECD, Cocom) shows how highly topical this question is.

III. *Détente and East-West trade*

1. *The economic rift between East and West*

21. The formation of the Kominform and certain striking events such as the Prague coup in February 1948 and the Berlin blockade a few months later were considered by the western countries to be definite proof that the Soviet Union was pursuing an expansionist policy. The West reacted by forming the Atlantic Alliance which opened a gaping political rift between East and West.

22. The West's economic retaliation to Soviet political and military expansionism was the adoption by the United States in February 1949 of the Export Control Act and the creation in November of the same year of a committee for co-ordinating trade between East and West (Cocom). The aim was to prevent the export of products which might help to strengthen the military potential of the eastern bloc countries.

23. But in fact the economic division of the world can be traced back to the Soviet Union's refusal to join the International Monetary Fund, set up in July 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference. It was confirmed in 1948 when the Soviet Union refused to join, or to authorise its allies to join, the Marshall Plan and the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation whose task was to allocate American credits. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), set up in March 1947 to establish and promote East-West economic co-operation, had no means of averting this division.

24. The creation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), also called Comecon, in January 1949 marked the official adoption by the Soviet Union of a policy intended to make it economically independent of the West by setting up an economic bloc of eastern countries. A planning system similar to the Soviet system was set up in the CMEA.

25. In all these countries the state has a monopoly of all internal or external transactions and western firms wishing to negotiate with eastern firms have to go through the body which has the monopoly of external trade, which allows the latter to derive the maximum advantage from competition between western firms.

26. Only later did some eastern countries begin to join a few international economic organisations. Although Czechoslovakia was a founder member of GATT in 1947, Poland became a member only at the beginning of 1967, followed by Romania and Hungary in 1971 and 1973 respectively. Bulgaria has had observer status since 1967. The Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic have not joined GATT and show little interest in doing so. The eastern countries' economies were in fact based on state management of firms, which brought about a discriminatory situation with regard to foreign firms and made it difficult if not impossible to apply the principles on which GATT was based. The fact that some of these countries nevertheless joined GATT was a sign that they wished to improve economic relations with the West and adapt their trade structure accordingly.

2. *Recourse by eastern countries to external trade*

27. The CMEA was a response to the Marshall Plan which was accused of jeopardising the sovereignty and interests of the Soviet Union and of the countries of Europe. Its aim was to establish wider economic co-operation between the peoples' democracies and the Soviet Union. Soviet political and economic pressure restricted the Eastern European countries to developing their trade relations among themselves and with the Soviet Union. This restructuring of trade imposed on the Eastern European countries by the Soviet Union did not have the same effects on trade relations with the West for the Soviet Union as for the Eastern European countries. While in 1946 the European socialist countries already absorbed 55% of Soviet trade as a whole, two years later their share had reached 60%. At the same time these countries to varying degrees lost their former markets in the West : all in all, their exports to the West fell by 78% between 1950 and 1953 whereas Soviet exports to the West increased by 91% during the same period. Similarly, Eastern European imports of machinery and capital equipment from the West fell by 34% whereas the Soviet Union's imports increased by 23%. In relation to total trade by CMEA countries, trade with the West fell from 42% in 1948 to 14% in 1953.

28. However, from 1953 onwards the CMEA's closed trade policy was increasingly contested in member countries. Before 1960 Polish and, a little later, Czechoslovak economists challenged the theory of certain aspects of the controlled economic system. This led to a reappraisal in

most eastern countries of the pros and cons of trade with the West. External trade began to be considered as an economic means of alleviating the slowing down in growth rates which was then being felt.

29. At the same time and for similar reasons the Western European countries began to react very favourably to the prospect of new markets and adopted a more flexible attitude than the United States towards trade with the eastern countries.

3. *The growth of East-West trade*

30. East-West trade, still slight in terms of world trade, representing about 3% since 1973, increased significantly after 1960, while the increase in trade between CMEA countries during the period 1961-65 was the lowest in recent times: 55% compared with 71% for 1956-60 and 85% for 1951-55.

31. As from 1965, East-West trade picked up speed, particularly between 1972 and 1975. The reality or fiction of détente offered both West and East a political context for economic rapprochement [1].

32. Unlike the eastern countries, which seem to have always given priority to economic considerations in their efforts to develop trade with the West, the West pursued, and continues to pursue, objectives which were not the same at all times and in all cases. Western Europe has always been guided by its desire to have access to eastern markets. It therefore sought to establish closer trading links with the eastern countries while political considerations were relegated to second place. The case of the United States is a little different. Admittedly, economic interests and promises of trade profits were factors which led trading and industrial firms to intensify trade with the East. However, for the United States Government political considerations, over and above economic considerations, were an essential, or even the main, reason for tightening trade relations with the East and particularly with the Soviet Union. It may even be considered that encouraging trade was often felt to be a card in negotiations whose final aim was to attain political goals such as slowing the arms race or improving the atmosphere of détente.

4. *The policy of détente: its significance and failure*

33. On the American side, détente was essentially viewed as a means of slowing down the nuclear arms race. At political level, American leaders saw it as a means of turning the communist world in certain directions. The détente objective gave the United States means of pressure with which it hoped to tie down the Soviet Union through trade and technology and multiply the disadvantages ensuing from any attempt to break the links of détente. That is why one of the major aims of the policy of East-West détente as conceived by the United States Government under the presidencies of Mr. Nixon and Mr. Ford was rapid expansion of trade relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries. It was thus hoped to induce the Soviet Union to put a brake on its policy of military intervention in order to obtain imports of products such as wheat and also the technology it needed to ensure the country's internal development. Trade, and above all technology transfers, seemed appropriate means of encouraging moderation.

34. The basic assumption of the policy of détente was that even if the expansion of economic relations involving a massive transfer of American technology to the Soviet Union presented new and potentially dangerous dimensions American diplomacy could nevertheless derive some gain. The process of integrating the Soviet economy, planned by the central authorities, into a world-scale market economy would, it was believed, set in motion irreversible forces leading to no less irreversible changes which would, in turn, promote the interdependence of nations and international stability.

35. Massive rearmament by the Soviet Union and the proof it has given that it is pursuing a policy of expansion and domination by every means leave no doubt about its application of the western technology it has acquired nor about its conversion to true international interdependence.

36. That is why relations with the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc, whether viewed from the standpoint of trade or of military implications, have considerable disadvantages for the West without affording any advantages other than those which may be derived from the transaction itself. There must be no illusion about the possibilities of achieving any significant change in Soviet policy, at least in the short and medium term.

IV. *Economic implications of East-West trade*

1. *General economic developments*

37. Looking back, western economies had one of their most difficult years since the second world war in 1981-82. The second oil shock in 1979-80 contributed to what was in effect a recession in most industrialised countries with a

1. Cf. Table I.

TABLE I

Trend of trade between Comecon countries and the OECD

Comecon countries	Exports [1]				Imports [1]			
	1970	1979	1980	1981	1970	1979	1980	1981
	(in '000 million transferable roubles) [2]							
Bulgaria	0.26	0.93	1.15	1.13	0.32	0.88	1.10	1.50
Czechoslovakia [3]	0.70	1.79	2.21	2.18	0.82	2.30	2.53	2.40
GDR	0.90	2.34	2.96	3.94	1.17	3.74	4.13	4.18
Poland	0.91	3.53	4.04	2.96	0.84	4.56	4.51	3.30
Romania	0.54	2.49	3.03	2.70	0.70	2.64	2.78	2.32
Hungary	0.59	1.72	1.99	1.89	0.67	2.18	2.43	2.64
Comecon (six-power)	3.90	12.80	15.39	14.80	4.52	16.28	17.48	16.34
Soviet Union	2.21	12.80	16.19	17.57	2.57	13.34	15.83	18.24
Total Comecon (seven-power)	6.11	25.60	31.58	32.37	7.09	29.62	33.31	34.58
	Annual growth rate (%)							
Bulgaria	+ 10.1	+ 76.6	+ 23.7	- 1.7	+ 38.0	+ 10.5	+ 25.0	+ 36.4
Czechoslovakia	+ 9.4	+ 20.9	+ 23.5	- 1.5	+ 26.0	+ 15.4	+ 10.0	- 5.2
GDR	+ 7.8	+ 19.8	+ 27.0	+ 32.7	+ 32.1	+ 34.7	+ 11.0	+ 1.1
Poland	+ 19.2	+ 12.2	+ 14.5	- 26.4	+ 4.2	- 1.0	- 1.0	- 27.0
Romania	+ 20.2	+ 33.7	+ 21.7	- 10.9	+ 5.1	+ 10.9	+ 5.3	- 16.6
Hungary	+ 22.5	+ 30.0	+ 15.7	- 4.8	+ 42.2	+ 1.0	+ 11.5	+ 8.7
Comecon (six-power)	+ 20.8	+ 24.4	+ 20.2	- 3.8	+ 19.0	+ 10.8	+ 7.4	- 6.5
Soviet Union	+ 4.7	+ 45.6	+ 26.5	+ 8.5	+ 11.5	+ 18.7	+ 18.5	+ 15.2
Total Comecon (seven-power)	+ 14.4	+ 34.2	+ 23.4	+ 2.5	+ 16.2	+ 14.3	+ 12.4	+ 3.8
	Share of trade with OECD (Total exports or imports = 100)							
Bulgaria	14.2	15.8	16.8	14.9	19.1	15.5	17.2	19.9
Czechoslovakia	20.4	20.4	22.0	19.8	24.9	24.3	24.8	22.2
GDR	22.1	20.8	24.2	29.1	26.7	31.0	30.7	29.1
Poland	28.4	31.2	34.6	29.5	25.9	37.3	34.4	28.2
Romania	32.3	38.1	37.5	30.0	40.4	36.1	31.4	28.3
Hungary	28.4	24.2	25.0	21.2	29.6	28.3	29.3	29.2
Comecon (six-power)	24.0	25.2	27.1	26.0	27.2	29.9	29.0	26.5
Soviet Union	19.1	30.2	32.6	30.8	24.3	35.2	35.6	34.7
Total Comecon (seven-power)	22.0	27.5	29.7	27.5	26.1	32.1	31.8	30.2

For 1981, provisional figures.

1. FOB value. For Hungary: CAF imports. Classification by buying country and selling country except for the Soviet Union and Hungary as from 1975: country of origin and country of destination.

2. The transferable rouble is a monetary unit common to the Comecon states ; in 1970, it was equal to $ 1.11, in 1975 $ 1.39, in 1978 $ 1.47, in 1979 and 1980 $ 1.53 and in 1981 $ 1.39.

3. In this case, trade with so-called capitalist industrialised countries (forming a single category).

Source. Comecon external trade statistics.

consequential fall in the gross national product, continued high inflation, a dramatic rise in unemployment, enormous balance-of-payments deficits and a fall in demand and investment. All the economic indicators show a very depressed economic situation, which has considerably reduced governments' margins of manoeuvre in their policies for maintaining social benefits and in their search for appropriate means of relaunching the economy, stabilising prices, ensuring employment and stimulating a resumption of investment.

38. The Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies also have serious economic difficulties as instanced by the virtual collapse of the Polish economy, the economic and financial crisis in Romania and both countries' inability to pay their debts. In all the eastern countries too growth rates have fallen sharply. The price system governing trade in the CMEA is not operating effectively and a number of eastern countries are having great difficulty in obtaining the raw materials they need. Balance-of-payments deficits and the smaller countries' debts to the Soviet Union and to the West have increased dramatically. Thus, there are three CMEA countries among the thirteen countries with the highest external debts: Poland, with $27,000 million, the Soviet Union with $17,000 million and Romania with $10,000 million.

2. *Trade*

39. On average, trade with the East represents only a relatively small proportion of the total volume of trade by OECD countries. Hence it is not likely to play a decisive rôle in improving the general economic situation although in certain cases economic considerations may encourage the establishment of closer trade relations with the East. For commercial firms co-operation may offer promise of profits. From the standpoint of national policies co-operation may seem desirable for various reasons: some countries, such as Canada, view co-operation as a means of diversifying their external trade. For Japan, co-operation is a means of ensuring its supplies of raw materials and oil products. Like the Western European countries, it began long before the United States to call for a more liberal policy towards trade with the East.

40. The slogan " if we don't do it, someone else will " therefore met a favourable response in American Government circles. Little consideration seems to have been given to the possibility that, thanks to trade, the eastern countries and particularly the Soviet Union might become competitors.

41. Nevertheless, fear of competition has become particularly strong recently among firms specialising in chemical products and plastics. Regarding competition in durable consumer goods or industrial raw materials, it is generally felt among heads of firms that the Soviet Union might soon be able to use manufacturing technology imported in recent years.

42. The Soviet Union's ability to reproduce imported technology is in fact feared by western industrialists, as is its ability to set up after-sales service networks in industrialised countries. Finally, certain heads of industry also fear Soviet competition on third world markets for the products of slow growth technologies and also advanced-technology items.

43. Your Rapporteur believes trade with the Soviet Union or between East and West have only a slight effect on the growth of western economies and the idea that they can but benefit from the development of trade with the East is merely a sign of impatience in some quarters to reduce western balance-of-payments deficits quickly by relying, sometimes naively, on the existence of vast new markets. Markets might well prove far narrower than expected. Difficulties in concluding business might be more serious and conditions of payment often doubtful.

44. Advocates of a more flexible trade policy towards the CMEA countries believe on the contrary in the prospect of a favourable trend of employment through increased trade with the East. In any event, any benefits derived would be quite minor. In the United States, workers' unions have asserted that liberalisation of trade, opening the door to an increase in America's imports, would lead to large-scale dismissals and a sharp fall in production, which is probably highly exaggerated.

3. *Economic consequences of East-West trade*

45. There is at present keen discussion about whether closer East-West economic relations: (*i*) will or will not make the eastern countries more dependent on the West and in the end lead to a readjustment of the Soviet Union's economic priorities; (*ii*) will or will not change the basic characteristics of the eastern countries' societies and régimes.

46. Every aspect of the economic and political behaviour of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries shows that their aim is to rely purely on themselves. The Soviet Union and all the other CMEA countries are and will probably remain determined to retain their freedom of action and to avoid all economic and technical dependence. The commercial or political price which the West may hope to set in exchange for its technology is not very high and the vision of a closely-interdependent international economic entity consisting of industrially-advanced states is very remote from the actual situation arising from the trend of trade relations with the eastern countries: the latter are still firmly attached to the CMEA both because of Soviet requirements and because, in the short and medium term, they have only very limited means of reorganising their economies in order to try to expand their trade with the West. Moreover, following their bitter experience of fluctuating prices and supplies on the world market since 1973 they appreciate more than ever the advantages of the stability afforded

by the trade agreements concluded in the framework of the CMEA. The fact that the East has only occasionally asked the western countries for special conditions very probably indicates that the Soviet Union's aim in its economic relations with the West is to obtain economic advantages rather than consider détente as an end in itself. Soviet leaders seem very firmly attached to the idea of their country's economic independence, and their industrial policy explicitly excludes economic integration with the West. Soviet and other eastern authorities have on several occasions declared that the principle of intra-industrial specialisation implied that trade between countries can develop without requiring substantial changes in the partners' internal production structure.

47. The East's support for the notion of international division of work is also subject to reservations: economic and social systems are intrinsically different; consequently, a common socio-economic base cannot be created even if significant progress can be made in sharing work.

48. Moreover, the fragility of East-West relations, which have always been directly affected by political events, may justify some degree of scepticism as to the possibility in the long term of establishing a stable relationship of interdependence. Furthermore, since an increase in Soviet imports of western products in the long term means an increase in Soviet exports to the West, the insufficiency of Soviet export capacity has always kept the level of trade between the socialist countries and the West within narrow limits.

49. Certain American businessmen consider that the co-operation agreements concluded between private American firms and the state commission for science and technology are used by the Soviet Union as a means of importing technology while limiting the impact of external contacts on the internal system. Thus, it has been seen that Soviet research institutes are now being watched more closely by their governing bodies. For the Soviet authorities, it is a matter of maintaining the continuity of science's subordination to the political system and the party's control of research workers and technicians. Hence the East considers the development of economic and technical relations with the West as an alternative to economic reforms which it is considered would involve too many political drawbacks and dangers and, in any event, it is a means of improving the growth rate.

4. *Soviet economic priorities*

50. Until now, the Soviet authorities have given almost total priority to pursuing a continuous, general and massive armaments effort and the economy, designed to back this up, has done its best to provide the material and technical basis needed for this effort whose scale seems to have met with hardly any opposition in government circles or, of course, in military circles. Everything indicates that there is very wide agreement on this priority. Consumers, i.e. also the workers, have obviously had to pay the price of this option, but although certain signs of discontent have sometimes been discerned there is no reason to think that this will soon lead to social or economic disturbances or, a fortiori, to a social upheaval.

51. For about twenty years Soviet statisticians have given only a minimum of information on the structure of national expenditure. Nevertheless, Soviet plans are an excellent instrument for analysing Soviet economic intentions thanks to the figures they give. Those given in the eleventh five-year plan (1981-85) show, although not absolutely explicitly, that options have been taken in favour of the armaments industry sector about which the plan says very little. But one interesting part of the eleventh plan is the abrupt slow-down in the development of gross investment expenditure; its average annual growth rate is expected to be about 2.1%. In view of the Soviet Union's need to modernise its equipment, particularly through replacements, net investment will certainly increase even more slowly than gross investment. Yet the expected progression of national income is higher: 3.4%. A comparison of these two indicators shows that the proportion of GNP earmarked for investment will have to fall very sharply.

52. If one tries to draw up a list of heads likely to benefit from the resources diverted from investment, consumer goods of course have to be considered first. Admittedly, this category is not sacrificed in the eleventh plan since the party cannot openly neglect consumers in view of its concern for economic security. As in any other country, everyday life concerns the population directly and in the long run determines their attitude towards the government. It was probably for this reason that Leonid Brezhnev proposed increasing the share of this category in net national expenditure from 75.3% in 1980 to 77.3% in 1985. At first sight, such an increase offers an acceptable explanation for falling investment. However, Soviet commentators on the eleventh plan have indicated that the combined share of consumer and non-productive investment in 1985 will remain similar to the present figure, i.e. slightly more than 80%.

53. This is therefore a very considerable slowdown in non-productive investment. Nevertheless, it affects productive programmes even more. Which sector therefore is to benefit from the drop in investment as a whole and where

will increased consumption come from in the eleventh plan ?

54. The most plausible answer to this twofold question would be found in the assumption that priority was to be given to developing armaments industries, i.e. by admitting that the true priority in the eleventh plan was to be given to the development of armaments industries to the detriment of equipment industries, even if this conversion were used to offer the consumer more spin-off from this armaments policy.

55. State reserves, mainly represented by the procurement of military equipment, are the real beneficiary of the eleventh five-year plan and the development of industries able to bring in income for the state is probably also an explanation for the leaders' views on consumption. This is quite clear from an examination of the indicators given in the plan for the industrial sectors and their output. For consumer goods, the highest growth rates are proposed for industries producing for defence.

56. The probability of an increase in the armaments effort is confirmed by a few facts relating to the Soviet economic system and to the way the eleventh plan is balanced.

57. (*a*) In view of the structure of the system of production, appropriations may be transferred most easily between the heads for investment and armaments.

58. (*b*) The systematic CIA analysis of Soviet military expenditure draws attention to the rigidity of its growth. Hence difficulties in economic growth can have only a marginal effect on the implementation of military programmes. It is not therefore necessary for Soviet military expenditure to increase very quickly to understand the options of the eleventh plan. It is sufficient to note that they stem from the wish to maintain steady progress in the military effort as compared with general economic growth which is now too low to be able to keep pace.

59. (*c*) The increase in armaments expenditure and the reduction in investments can be explained by the official Soviet assessment of the international situation – of which the party makes no secret – as a basis of its economic policy. This assessment implies a stabilisation of economic relations and a cooling of political relations with the West. The reduction in purchases of equipment from the West explains the slow-down in net investment, very dependent in the last twenty years on imports of western equipment. The cooling of political relations with the West also forces the Soviet Union to make a further armaments effort for which the way is clear because of the reduction in the rate of investment. The apparent rôle of the military in running the country makes such a theory even more plausible.

60. Examination of certain internal adjustments to the draft plan clearly shows the leading rôle given to the armaments industries. At the same plenum in October 1980, when he referred to the participation of armaments industries in consumption, Leonid Brezhnev explicitly asked these industries' research and development services to join in the production of civil equipment to improve their technological capabilities. Moreover, the same may be said for the industrialisation goals set for the various Soviet republics.

61. Frequent references by leaders to the positive spin-off for the Soviet civilian population of armaments production are probably intended to reassure the Soviet people in view of the fearful handicap this priority constitutes for a growth potential which is already very limited by an unfavourable demographic situation, a major increase in the cost of raw materials and stagnating productivity.

62. This inflation of armaments expenditure can but make a large hole in Soviet investment capacity and thus even further limit the possibilities of expansion of other economic sectors. If therefore it should be confirmed and continue for very long, one might wonder whether it might not eventually slow down the expansion of the military sector too. But this remark probably does not apply in the short and medium term. In any event, in view of the importance of investment for the country's industrial future the planned rate of investment will probably not allow Soviet firms to achieve any great increase in national production.

63. With the eleventh plan, the planned progression of employment becomes very low in the Soviet Union. Admittedly, the planners set very high goals for the progress of labour productivity but it seems unlikely that they will be reached. The draft plan notes that society can share only what has been produced and asks the people to make a further productivity effort, even if the type of consumption imposed on them is unlikely to be strong encouragement. Only official propaganda plays such a rôle. In reality workers are asked to compensate for the low level of investment by their eagerness to work in the ultimate hope of thus improving their standard of living.

64. In fact, for a country which has reached the level of industrial development of the Soviet Union, capital formation is the only major factor of its growth. A slow-down in this formation in the Soviet Union is not a new tendency. It was already very clear during the tenth plan. Nevertheless, everything indicates that the Soviet economy has a difficult period ahead after a decade of reduced investment, and once again the sectors directly linked with consumption may have to bear the brunt of

inadequate investment. This means that unless there is a radical change in economic policy in the coming years rationing will have to be extended to ever wider sectors of consumption, thus seriously compromising the whole material basis of Soviet strength.

65. It can therefore now be predicted that when the twelfth (1986-90) plan starts the Soviet Union may have a crisis on its hands: first, an exhausted economy, a discontented population and an international environment probably no more amenable than today; second, power decimated by age, bureaucracies fighting over the meagre surpluses of collective resources and an over-blown military apparatus.

66. This is not necessarily a reassuring picture for the West. Rather than admit itself beaten in the armaments race, the Soviet Union might be induced to accept the risk of war before its economy becomes asphyxiated. The alternative would be to conclude meaningful agreements with the United States on the limitation of armaments and particularly nuclear armaments. It is clear that Soviet initiatives in the disarmament field depend on both internal and international considerations although to what extent it is difficult to say. This means, on the one hand, that the West can count on the Soviet Union wishing to achieve some degree of success in the Geneva negotiations and, on the other, that if the negotiations do not succeed nothing could avert the threat of ill-considered decisions being taken by the Soviets with all the inherent dangers for world peace. It should be added that uncertainty about the devolution of power in the Soviet Union is not reassuring, although it may encourage the Soviet leaders to pay more attention to the wishes of consumers.

V. *Technology transfers*

1. *Their share of East-West trade*

67. External trade seems to be playing a larger part in the Soviet economy, particularly if account is taken of the value of imported products in terms of Soviet currency. The proportion of imports in the net national product rose from 8.3% in 1960 to about 17% in 1980, while the corresponding percentage for exports rose from 3.7% to 7.1%. With particular regard to investment, the proportion of imported equipment is believed to be about 25%, of which 5% to 6% for machinery.

68. In order to assess the amount of transfers, it is essential to specify what we mean by technology transfer. It is a process by which inventions, whether new products or new technologies, the work of one country are transmitted to another for use there. It consists essentially of transmitting know-how, which implies an active rôle by both exporter and importer. The share of advanced technology in total exports from the fifteen most industrialised nations to the eastern countries did not vary much between 1972 and 1977. Five groups of products alone accounted for some 70% of the value of technology exports by these countries to the countries of Eastern Europe in 1976 and 1977: machine tools for metal-working, pumps and turbines, electric machinery and apparatus, taps, cocks and fittings, and electric measuring and control apparatus.

69. But at the same time the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies are increasingly becoming exporters of capital equipment, particularly towards underdeveloped countries, whose imports of machinery and transport equipment from the eastern countries are comparable to those from the OECD countries. The Soviet Union even supplies a higher percentage of machinery whereas in trade with the OECD countries the quantity of machinery imported by the Soviet Union is particularly high.

70. So far, technology transfers have been almost entirely from the advanced western countries, i.e. the OECD countries, to the eastern countries. The level of imports from the eastern countries has not been constant and at times there has been wariness of the possible effects of dependence on imports of technology from countries against which the Soviet Union is waging an ideological war. However, there has always been a strong demand for western technology in the East because the Soviet Union has always considered it essential for its own economic development.

71. Paradoxically, it was when transfers were on the decline that the invasion of Afghanistan and the establishment of martial law in Poland led the West to impose limits, noting that they had made a significant contribution to modernising Soviet military strength by their sales of advanced technology. Transfers slowed down from 1975 onwards, particularly for machinery, whereas the share of food products in the West's exports to the Soviet Union and its allies increased. Weighed down by debts and affected by the world crisis which slowed down their exports, the eastern countries had to limit their imports under the eleventh Soviet five-year plan although they had been considered crucial in 1971.

2. *Industrial co-operation*

72. Little is generally known about the number and content of agreements signed between western firms and their Eastern European partners because they are veiled in secrecy on both sides. But available infor-

mation indicates that industrial co-operation is concentrated in the so-called advanced industries.

73. The most widespread form of industrial co-operation is specialisation by the partners with a view to co-production. In 1978, the proportion of this form of co-operation amounted to 45.2% of total East-West co-operation agreements and to 57.4% in the case of agreements with the Soviet Union.

74. In second place come deliveries of factories. Their share fell between 1976 and 1978 and amounted to only 17.4% of the total in 1978 for the seven CMEA countries. 71.4% of deliveries were to the GDR, 27.2% to the Soviet Union and 24.1% to Poland.

75. The share of contracts for the transfer of licences in exchange for products manufactured in factories with the assistance of equipment and licences amounted to 28.2% in 1972, 17.1% in 1976 and 6.1% in 1978 for the seven CMEA countries. But it must be borne in mind that a large part of licence transfers is effected in the framework of major contracts for the delivery of factories or co-production projects and is not shown separately in statistics. Consequently, such transfers certainly represent a much higher proportion than the figures appear to indicate in technology transfers to the eastern countries.

76. Other forms of East-West industrial co-operation play only a secondary rôle. However, the recent increase in tripartite co-operation agreements associating at least one western country, one eastern country and one third world country should be pointed out.

3. *Military implications and controls*

77. Western experts who do not believe the Soviet military potential has been enhanced significantly by Soviet access to western technology base their opinion on a number of hypotheses which all count on the inefficiency of Soviet management :

(*i*) that the separation between firms working in the civil sector and those working for defence in the Soviet Union prevents the latter using the know-how of the former ;

(*ii*) that the independence and above all the technological progress of military production is such that it does not have to call on technology acquired for civil purposes ;

(*iii*) that Soviet bureaucracy is incapable of developing the country's innovative capability and is consequently, by its own weight, paralysing any attempt to catch up with the West.

78. The validity of these hypotheses is very doubtful. After the world strategic and military balance tipped in favour of the Soviet Union in about 1970 there can no longer be any doubt about the use the latter has made of western technology. Faced with this evidence, it is no longer possible to deny that anything which delays Soviet production capability helps to ensure the West's security. Moreover, the distance between the technological level of the eastern countries and that of the western countries has shrunk considerably in the last decade. The first conclusion from these observations is that the transfer of technology becomes significant as soon as there are fewer sales of equipment and more of technology. The second is that it is essential, in order to protect the western advance, to exercise strict control over exports of technology.

79. But to achieve this result a number of obstacles must first be overcome. The first of these is probably the difficulty of finding common ground when national interests, as understood by governments, clash with firms' specific interests. But the main obstacle stems from disagreement about what is meant by " strategic potential " or " maintaining the military balance ". Such disagreement has weighed heavily on efforts to define a concept of strategic items in practical terms to serve as a basis for a system of controls of exports to the eastern countries. It comes clearly to the fore when lists of such items are drawn up or periodically reviewed.

80. In 1949 Cocom was an economic response to the Soviet threat : it is an informal intergovernmental body. Without legal status, it exists only insofar as the partners of the United States accept regulations which the United States imposes on itself. Participants co-ordinate their efforts to avoid exporting to the Soviet Union and its allies weapons and other irreplaceable military equipment as well as products and technology which might increase their military power. Cocom includes all the NATO countries except Iceland, plus Japan. The permanent team works in Paris and is assisted by officials of the embassies of participating countries in Paris. It holds frequent meetings to study the problems raised by the interpretation of the lists of items whose export to communist countries is banned by Cocom and by any exceptions which may be made. All decisions relating to the preparation of these lists, their interpretation and the exceptions have to be taken unanimously and consequently any country may exercise its right of veto. Cocom has no executive powers. It is therefore the responsibility of each member country to apply its decisions. No high-level meeting was held before that of ministers' deputies in Paris on 19th and 20th January 1982. At the beginning

of October 1982, representatives of member countries began to revise Cocom lists to adapt them to new technology. In Paris in April 1983 a high-level meeting dealt in particular with the need to limit exports of technology relating to oil and natural gas.

81. Cocom lists cover three fields:

(*a*) nuclear material;

(*b*) munitions;

(*c*) industrial and commercial items.

82. Whereas goods covered by the first two lists are defined relatively clearly for their military and strategic implications and consequently the technology subject to embargo, the third category includes all items which may have a dual use concerning which western policies for transferring technology have had different approaches in the past. It is well known that opinions differ between the United States and Western Europe about what constitutes a strategic item. Until the adoption of the United States Export Administration Act in 1969 the United States maintained that the word strategic applied to items of great economic importance whereas the Western European countries would not agree to the inclusion in these lists of certain products if based only on an intention to slow down the economic growth of the communist countries. Many Western European leaders felt the Americans attached too much importance to the control of exports of products liable to be used for military purposes and they considered trade was a justification in itself, in purely economic terms. Further, they persisted in including China among the communist countries concerned by the Cocom lists, whereas the European members of the alliance wished it to be excluded.

83. From the Soviet point of view there are enormous advantages in exploiting the West's advanced technology: considerable savings, a gain of several years' research, avoidance of trial and error, guaranteed reliability and knowledge of the weak points of industries and products.

84. Moreover, the list of technology for military use purchased in the West is very long. It includes high-speed computers used for the design of weapons systems, signal processing, data command, control and storage, processes for producing semi-conductors allowing the Soviet Union to produce more reliable and more accurate weapons, guidance technology for aircraft, ships, submarines and missiles, and equipment allowing Soviet military industries to be improved, be it high-precision machine tools or technology for industrial processes.

85. The fact that the Soviet Union manages to acquire such products bears witness to the weaknesses of the western control system and shows that in spite of the lists and in spite of the embargoes the Soviet Union can in one way or another obtain anything it needs. Cocom controls have not prevented products of considerable strategic importance being exported legally to the Soviet Union.

86. The United States Government is now calling for a stricter limit on supplies of advanced technology to the eastern bloc. It is insisting that Cocom strengthen its control of technology transfers in the form of licences, plans and technical information so as to complete existing controls of the sale of end items. This raises the question of whether the time is not ripe to work out a true western economic strategy and whether the existing institutions can pave the way. It is not merely a matter of making the lists and controls more effective but above all of defining a western policy for economic and technical relations with the Soviet Union and its allies.

87. Finally, as one committee member pointed out, a sufficiently-precise limit for products considered to be usable in armaments industries should be fixed so that the European members of the alliance are not, as has been the case in recent years, given the feeling that the lists of products whose export to the Soviet Union and its allies is banned do not vary according to the ups and downs of the American economy. This view seems to have been widely shared by committee members.

88. This does not mean that committee members considered practising a restrictive policy towards exports to the Soviet Union by the European members of the alliance alone. Such an attitude would be pointless and lead to its own downfall, but there should be more logic in American policy, which certain committee members considered had been especially illogical recently. Thus, to quote an example given by one committee member, the question of how far satellites are connected with military technology brings Europeans, who have no military satellites, into conflict with the United States which uses them for military purposes, as does the Soviet Union.

VI. *Energy*

89. The prominence assumed by energy problems in the world economy since 1973 has perforce made them of particular importance to the Soviet Government and to western leaders. A matter such as the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 is closely linked with Soviet energy policy, just as Europe's energy supplies are a question on which the western allies differ most. A brief analysis of the main points should therefore be made.

1. *Afghanistan*

90. The present absence of satisfactory statistics conceals from foreign observers most of the transformations now under way in the Afghan economy and prevents an assessment being made of the consequences of the war in that country. It is possible to discern awkward attempts to assist a poor, backward country. CMEA's interest in Afghanistan is strategic rather than for its potential economic resources or the possibilities of trade.

91. Nevertheless, it seems that the expression " plundering the natural resources of the third world countries ", frequently used by Soviet analysts, cannot be applied only to those they call the western imperialists.

92. The Soviet Union is by far the country with the world's largest natural gas reserves: 35% approximately according to the latest data. However, since 1967 it has been exploiting gas in Afghanistan after having prospected for productive fields, in the framework of assistance to poor countries.

93. The first gasfield, believed to contain reserves of 15,000 to 20,000 million cu.m., came into service in 1967 near Shibirgan, at Yetimdagh. Output rose rapidly, attaining 342 million cu.m. in 1967-68 and steadily rising to 2,583 million cu.m. in 1970-71. It marked time from 1970 to 1979 but research has given it new vigour since 1980.

94. From the outset, this gas was exported to the Soviet Union. Work was started on a gas pipeline in 1967 to carry the gas to Kelift on the frontier and then on to Bukhara. But it was not until 1975 that 55 million cu.m., i.e. 1.98% of that year's production, was used in Afghanistan itself to run the Mazar i Sharif thermal power station, also built with Soviet assistance. There were successive plans for building a chemical fertiliser factory, also at Mazar i Sharif, which would have consumed on the spot 200 million cu.m. per year. There is no proof of its coming into service nor even of its existence.

95. Two facts confirm that the exploitation of Afghan gasfields was intended to repay the Soviet Union for its efforts to develop Afghanistan, whether on a civil or on a military basis:

(*i*) Gas output has been continuously increasing since 1971. A new deposit came on stream in 1971 at Jarkuduq and as from 1974 produced 2,000 million cu.m. each year. Up to the end of 1979, annual production was about 2,500 million cu.m. and Soviet geologists have prospected methodically for new deposits. In 1980, the Afghan state announced that output would rise to 3,500 million cu.m. per year. The 1981 Soviet-Afghan agreements then provided for exports to the Soviet Union to increase to 5,000 million cu.m. per year.

(*ii*) In 1980, the Mazar i Sharif thermal power station was transformed to run on coal. This coal, mined in Afghanistan itself, is not worth exporting and there is no other market for it in the country. No factories run on gas in Afghanistan.

96. One can understand a country agreeing to mortgage one of its natural resources completely in order to ensure its economic " take-off ", but in the present case, although the mortgage is real, since the 120,000 million cu.m. known reserves, extracted at the rate of 5,000 million per year, will last only twenty-four years, the take-off is uncertain, whereas compared with the Soviet output of 385,000 million cu.m. of gas Afghanistan produces very little.

97. To understand the Soviet Union's interest in the exploitation of Afghan gas, it is therefore necessary to go beyond the simple matter of repaying expenses in that country. A comparison between the trend of Afghan and Soviet gas prices and of world rates is instructive, particularly if it is borne in mind that the Soviet Union sells a large part of its gas to western countries.

98. The table of gas prices throughout the world shows clearly the Soviet Union's interest in increasing Afghan output as much as possible. Soviet gas, the most expensive on the market, is paid for by the West in foreign currency at $180 per 1,000 cu.m. whereas Afghanistan is paid nothing for its gas because it is deducted from its debts and is, moreover, calculated at half the price of Soviet gas. Western currency may therefore be indirectly financing the Soviet army and its war effort in Afghanistan. In such conditions, one may wonder about the feeling expressed by certain committee members that helping the Soviet Union to exploit its resources is a contribution to peace.

2. *Gas agreements*

99. More than half the energy consumed in Europe is imported although the degree of dependence on imports varies considerably from one country to another. Belgium and Luxembourg import more than 93% of their energy requirements, France 92%, Italy 83%, the Federal Republic 60%, the United Kingdom 17% and the Netherlands 8%.

100. Oil represented 51% of Europe's energy consumption in 1981 compared with 61% in 1973. This led to a fall in imports due to the economic crisis, energy-saving measures,

increased national output, the exploitation of North Sea oil and recourse to other sources of energy. Since 1973, while the price of oil rose twelvefold the western countries' consumption fell by about 10% and the principal European oil companies are seriously thinking of reducing their refinery capacity. One may now wonder whether, after the oil decade, the world is preparing to enter a decade in which gas will be an essential energy stake for the old world. Demand for gas for domestic, commercial and industrial use has increased very rapidly since 1973. At a time when energy consumers and governments were trying to limit their oil requirements, it was hoped that large-scale gas projects could reduce dependence on oil and strengthen energy security. The development of new techniques for laying pipelines and of complex transport and distribution systems encouraged gas consumption.

101. Thus the Soviet project for building a gas pipeline linking the principal gasfields of the northern Soviet Union with Western Europe interested several European countries, which were prepared to help to build this pipeline which should come into service in 1986 and, for at least twenty-five years, provide Europe with large quantities of gas.

102. There is every indication that in present circumstances the conclusion of such contracts involves high risks for the western countries. Even though the countries which have signed contracts do not plan to meet more than 7% of their energy needs in this way, their decision means converting some of their industries to operate with this form of energy, investing large sums for transport and distribution and, above all, makes them unduly dependent on Soviet energy. For one reason or another, the Soviet Union is in a position to cut off supplies from one day to the next and therefore exercise economic and political pressure which is very dangerous for Atlantic cohesion. A German committee member said the possibility of the Federal Republic becoming dependent on the Soviet Union had been carefully examined by the Bundestag when the gas pipeline agreement was ratified but it had been concluded that in the long run the proportion of energy the Federal Republic would thus obtain would not place it at the mercy of Soviet blackmail.

103. However, not only do the contracts signed allow the Soviet Union to acquire equipment for the research, exploitation and transport of natural gas which are the results of advanced technology without giving anything of substance in exchange but, because they provide for the acquisition of Soviet gas for a period of twenty-five years, they thus provide the Soviet Union with currency which frees resources for military use. Furthermore, these investments for the benefit of the Soviet Union, generally granted at interest rates much lower than the market rate, or even at the rate of devaluation of western currencies, make it highly unlikely that signatory countries would take part in any policy of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union and its allies and divert large sums of money from western domestic investments.

104. Proof of this is the difficulty oil companies are having in finding the sums necessary for opening up the vast reserves of natural gas recently discovered in the North Sea in areas under the jurisdiction of NATO member countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom.

105. Countries having signed contracts for the Siberian gas pipeline could have invested in prospecting, extracting, transporting and distributing offshore natural gas. As far as is known at present, this gas could cover more than thirty years' natural gas consumption throughout Western Europe if the appropriate investments were made.

106. The United States for its part said it was prepared to supply Europe with the gas it might need during the period 1982-85 until the investments made bore fruit.

107. The Assembly already adopted a position on this point of view when, on 2nd December 1982, it adopted the recommendation in the report submitted by Mr. Bassinet on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on energy requirements and the security of Europe – Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements (Document 930), which reads:

> "One of the most useful means of reducing such risks would be for all the European countries concerned to take co-ordinated measures, particularly the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, energy-exporting countries, which should agree to take part in a general network of intra-European gas pipelines. In this respect, the building of new pipelines to bring Norwegian gas from such new deposits as Sleipner and Troll to Western Europe should be studied...
>
> .....
>
> ... However, it assumes that the British and European networks will be connected up by means of an extension of the Scottish network towards the continent."

108. Several committee members raised the question of the extent to which the Siberian gas pipeline was being built with forced labour.

3. *Forced labour on the Siberian gas pipeline*

109. The Soviet Union has in fact often been accused of using cheap prisoner labour for its

construction, among whom are human and civil rights campaigners, prisoners of conscience and victims of religous persecution, including women.

110. Should such an allegation be substantiated, it would mean that Western European countries, including member states of WEU, have been guilty to being party to the exploitation of forced labourers, thus violating Article 4 (on slavery and servitude) of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) convention (on forced labour), and ignoring the Nuremberg condemnation of the use of concentration camp prisoners as forced labour.

111. Soviet authorities have dismissed the reports of slave labour on the pipeline as " filthy lies ", yet western journalists have persistently been refused permission to visit sites on the pipeline where the initial stages of construction took place. It is known that many prison labour camps line the routes of both the Urengoy and Komi Assr pipelines to Europe.

112. As a result of a letter from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions about such reports, the ILO sought a Soviet invitation to send representatives to an on-site inspection of construction sites. However, a United States State Department report to Congress this year says that the ILO delegation only inspected a 180-mile section of the project, mainly by helicopter. The ILO has since denied that such a visit took place at all.

113. The State Department report refers to more than 10,000 of the forced labour workforce being political or religious prisoners, and to the employment of about 11,000 Vietnamese " volunteers " on the project whose wages were reduced to pay Vietnamese debts to the Soviet Union.

114. It was to attempt to substantiate the several reports that forced labour was used in the difficult and dangerous site preparation and other preliminary work related to the pipeline, and to separate fact from fiction, that the International Society for Human Rights (ISHR), Frankfurt, in co-operation with the International Sakharov Committee, Copenhagen, held an international hearing in Bonn on 18th and 19th November last year (1982).

115. A prestigious group of panelists presided over by Mr. Alfred Coste-Floret, a joint prosecutor for France at the Nuremberg trials, questioned a wide range of expert witnesses and analysed the testimony and documents of former Soviet prisoners.

116. The Commission concluded that:

(*i*) the USSR continues the deplorable practice of forced labour in manufacturing and construction projects, including the Siberian gas pipeline;

(*ii*) prisoners, including political prisoners and those imprisoned for their religious beliefs, among them women and children, are forced to work under conditions of extreme hardship, including malnutrition, inadequate shelter and clothing and severe discipline. Many prisoners have died.

117. The ISHR called upon the Soviet Union to end the vicious practice of forced labour and upon all nations and enterprises for support of its conclusions. It stated: " We have presented the truth to the world and no one can say: I did not know. "

118. A brief account of the international hearing is provided at appendix to this report.

119. From the foregoing, it must be obvious to the governments of WEU member states that to ignore such allegations is to turn a blind eye to one of the most serious crimes against humanity since the use of concentration camp labour in Nazi Germany. Hence your Rapporteur's recommendations.

VII. *Financial aspects*

1. *Access to the western capital market*

120. The debts contracted by the CMEA countries are part and parcel of the eastern countries' growth policy and of the western countries' search for markets. The process however is disquieting for western lenders. The socialist countries, which owe more than $80,000 million to the West, including some $60,000 million for Eastern European countries other than the

TABLE II

Bank loans contracted in 1979-81 (medium and long term)

($ million)

Borrowing country	1979	1980	1981
Bulgaria	201.8	-	-
Hungary	950.0	550.0	550.0
Poland	861.1	736.0	-
GDR	656.0	397.1	497.0
Romania	280.0	457.6	337.0
Czechoslovakia	450.0	475.0	-
Soviet Union	320.0	50.0	25.0
CMEA banks	-	-	100.0
TOTAL	3,718.9	2,665.7	1,509.0

Source OECD.

Soviet Union, are now on the high risk list of western creditors.

121. Past and present restrictions in socialist countries on imports from the West in an attempt to rectify the situation are accompanied by more restricted access to international credit, particularly on the private capital market which has become cautious with the Polish case.

122. According to OECD statistics (cf. Table II), the CMEA had medium- and long-term bank loans amounting to $1,500 million in 1981 as compared with $2,660 million in 1980 and $3,720 million in 1979.

123. This declining trend in external loans has since been confirmed, particularly because of the higher cost of credit in 1982. Not without difficulty, the OECD countries adopted a compromise, the arrangement on guidelines for officially supported export credits, presented by Mr. Wallen, Swedish Chairman of the OECD's Export Credits Working Party on 30th June 1982, making variable increases in minimum rates for official export credits and partly abolishing subsidies. The Soviet Union, the GDR and Czechoslovakia were included among the wealthy countries (whose GNP exceeded $4,000 per head in 1979, according to the World Bank) for which minimum interest rates were increased by 1.15% in every case. For Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania, considered to be intermediary countries, the increase was 0.35% (cf. Table III).

TABLE III

Interest rates for official credits

	Wealthy countries	Intermediary countries	Poor countries
November 1980 to November 1981:	(%)	(%)	(%)
2-5 years	8.00	8.00	7.50
5-8.5 years	8.75	8.50	7.75
After 15th November 1981:			
2-5 years	11.00	10.50	10.00
5-8.5 years	11.25	11.00	10.00
For 30th June 1982 to 30th April 1983:			
2-5 years	12.15	10.85	10.00
5-8.5 years	12.40	11.35	10.00

Source East West (fortnightly bulletin), 9th July 1982, page 6.

124. For the wealthy and intermediary countries no official credits will be granted for any period exceeding 8.5 years.

125. This compromise does not apply to the financing of the Urengoy pipeline which will benefit from the rates in force before November 1981.

126. In the opinion of those who signed this compromise, the international political and financial situation is in the end as important as a consensus on rates and to all intents and purposes the OECD countries will be hardly inclined to depart from the agreed rates.

127. But it might be appropriate to establish quotas for credits guaranteed to the Soviet Union even if, by reducing the gap between interest rates for official export credits and those for commercial credits, the Eastern European countries can no longer hope to keep the level of interest to be paid at its present level, by using mainly official credits.

128. The hopes of the debtor countries are clear: they wish to develop their exports to the West and obtain satisfactory conditions of payment and further credit allowing them to resume their imports.

129. Although in 1981 the Soviet Union was again in deficit in its exchange of services with the West, its balance of current payments remained in surplus thanks to the sale of 200 to 250 tons of gold compared with 90 tons in 1980 as well as to sales of arms. In spite of everything, as shown by highly different estimates of its debt, in 1981 the Soviet Union had considerable financial requirements. Greater recourse to unguaranteed credits, short-term commercial credits and even publicly supported export credits are proof of this. Variations recorded by the Bank of International Settlements in currency reserves are further proof.

130. If it is considered that all credits, whether or not at privileged rates, are a premium for Soviet military power, as shown in the present

report, the West should stop rescheduling the external debt of the Soviet Union and its allies, allowing them to benefit from particularly advantageous interest rates and encouraging their investments by granting export credits. That is why your Rapporteur sincerely hopes the allies can achieve continuing consultation and a concerted position on conditions for granting credit to the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc countries. It is admittedly possible to consider that the pursuit and development of trade which is beneficial to all the partners justifies the granting of credits to those countries but nothing can explain why preferential rates, which in the end make the West pay for Soviet military expenditure, are granted or why credits are granted which the countries concerned cannot repay nor even pay the interest. The present situation in Poland shows that neither borrowers nor lenders benefit in the end from an unduly lax approach to such questions.

2. *Countertrade*

131. The eastern countries wish to make compensation - i.e. the seller buys goods of equal market value from the purchaser - a permanent factor in their trade relations with the West so as to avoid paying for their purchases in currency. This practice is increasingly widespread.

132. The often exaggerated figures quoted by the media in the eastern countries on the amount of such trade shows a tendency to have it assume greater importance in the future. Furthermore, there has recently been increased pressure by the eastern countries to obtain commercial compensation more systematically. At the same time, their conditions have been hardened. The proportion of their purchases for which they request and obtain promises from the sellers to take their products has increased everywhere and they have obtained higher financial penalties in the event of default.

133. The eastern countries' interest in compensation is due first to their aim of balancing their trade. A secondary reason is their difficulty in producing and marketing products which are competitive on the world market.

134. The specific situation of the Soviet Union is a little different from that of the other eastern countries. Its problem is not so much how to finance its current purchases in the West but rather to be able to make large-scale investment in certain key sectors. It still requires considerable amounts of western equipment to develop some of its resources and to improve the productivity of its industry by making it more economical as regards labour. The Soviet Union is therefore more interested in signing new import contracts than in compensation.

135. The share of compensatory operations in East-West trade is difficult to ascertain accurately. It probably represents no more than 15% or 20% of East-West trade as a whole in the case of bilateral relations where the practice of compensation is the most widespread. In all other cases, the figure is over 10%. Transactions accompanied by compensation seem to be concentrated in trade in certain categories of products, for instance sales of industrial products, where the percentages are far higher.

136. Whatever the figures, attention should be paid to the extension of these trade practices for two reasons. First, the upper limits of such practices should be examined. Second, the conditions governing compensatory operations are fixed unilaterally by the eastern countries but there is no agreed standard nor are they discussed multilaterally.

137. Can the western countries therefore remain passive towards a trend whose pace they cannot control and which might in the long run strengthen the trade position of the eastern countries without adequate reciprocity?

138. Consideration should be given to the unequal treatment to the East's advantage which these practices involve such as, for instance, the unbalanced negotiating ability of western firms compared with the position of the purchasing body in the East. The advantages of countertrade for western firms are very limited. It is mainly the eastern countries that benefit from this type of trade which helps them to elude deficiencies in their production and trade. Furthermore, this type of trade allows a method of management which satisfies their taste for bilateral balance at all levels, while being compatible with their bureaucratic structures and planning system.

139. Western exporters should be more demanding for their own purchases. As a general rule, they are favourably inclined towards contracts for supplying equipment in exchange for long-term supplies of energy or primary products. Compensation makes it possible to avoid the impossibility of transferring and investing capital in eastern countries in order to develop useful sources of supply.

140. This being so, industrial compensation agreements must be judged case by case. There can be no question of being systematically in favour of them nor of considering them as a model of industrial co-operation, as the eastern countries wish. In particular, attention should be paid to the kind of products imported from the East. The eastern countries, which wish to develop their exports of manufactured products, are anxious to conclude agreements which allow them to export end-products. In certain cases, the agreements lead to a division of work which

makes the western industries subcontractors to eastern countries' industries. In other cases, these contracts may imply imports of large quantities of finished or semi-finished products, agreed upon several years beforehand, whereas it is very difficult in present circumstances to foresee market trends. It can therefore be seen that one way or another the disadvantages of the compensatory system largely outweigh the advantages. The disadvantages may affect the general trade interests of the OECD countries, the interests of exporting firms or the interests of the eastern countries themselves.

141. From the point of view of the OECD countries, whose interest is to defend an open, non-discriminatory and dynamic trading system, the development of compensation might well introduce a factor of instability and regression into East-West trade, since East-West trade relations would be largely based on ill-defined, unnegotiable and statistically-undefinable practices, the price of counterpart products being fixed in the light of criteria which have no link with the market, thus considerably increasing the risk of distortion or disturbance.

142. When buying back the products of eastern countries is imposed, as one might say, the interest of the partners in maintaining trade relations is not the same for all. Economically strong firms with diversified activities have a very clear advantage. Thus, the practice of compensation can but lead to a contraction of trade flows and induce western governments to intervene more directly in the negotiation of contracts.

143. The major danger of developing compensation therefore emerges: increased bilateralism in East-West trade, making it more like trade between the CMEA countries. From the point of view of western firms, it is particularly awkward to have to conduct two parallel negotiations, one generally relating to a matter outside its province. The subsequent obligation to conduct import and distribution operations diverts a firm from its main aims and may be a source of risk, error and expense.

144. On a more practical level, western firms which accept the compensation principle encounter difficulties in implementing it because of procedure imposed by the eastern countries.

145. (*a*) First, the western firm is uncertain about the scale of compensation which will, in the end, be fixed in the contract. The eastern countries do not publish directives which are in all probability imposed on the appropriate external trade bodies by the technical ministries. The amount of compensation required varies widely according to country and sector. It is always negotiable but the margin of the western negotiator is difficult to determine beforehand.

146. (*b*) The second uncertainty for the exporting firm is the nature and specifications of the product it will have to acquire. In the system set up by the eastern countries, the foreign purchaser is almost wholly without freedom of choice and contact with the source of the products, which would allow him to verify whether he finds their quality acceptable. To that must be added the various restrictions the eastern partner may impose on the resale by western firms of the products imported on a compensatory basis. These provisions illustrate the effort made by the Soviet Union and its allies to control, or at least to supervise, the distribution of their products in the West and thus recover some of the power they lose by not effecting the operation themselves.

147. Western exporters might legitimately call for official directives to be published, regarding lowest rates, for instance. This would at least have the advantage of placing competing western firms on an equal footing. But assuming that the eastern countries accepted, this operation would not be without drawbacks, particularly as it would legitimise the practice of asking almost systematically for compensation, and it would allow a fixed, non-negotiable rate to be imposed unilaterally.

148. The above leads to the conclusion that the principle of countertrade should be clearly opposed and not only the procedure. The West gains nothing from such trade and is merely playing the game of Soviet and eastern bloc interests by encouraging their growth, production and trade and, consequently, their political system and military strength.

VIII. *Sanctions and the South Korean Boeing incident*

149. At its meeting on 21st September 1983, the Presidential Committee of the Assembly discussed the problem raised by the shooting down of a South Korean civil aircraft by a Soviet fighter on 1st September. It instructed the President of the Assembly to issue a press communiqué immediately expressing the indignation of European opinion regarding this incident and asked the General Affairs Committee to instruct your Rapporteur to refer to this matter although it is not linked directly with the subject of the report. It is nevertheless linked indirectly since the question of possible economic sanctions against the Soviet Union has been raised.

150. During the night of 31st August to 1st September 1983, a South Korean civil aircraft on a regular flight between the United States and Korea with 269 persons aboard was shot down by a Soviet fighter aircraft over the Sea of Japan near the island of Sakhalin. All

the passengers and crew perished. The aircraft was well off course and should not have had to fly over Soviet territory. Passing first over Kamchatka and then Sakhalin, it penetrated sectors banned to all non-Soviet aircraft. It was quite clearly infringing Soviet legislation.

151. However, an infringement of this kind cannot in any event justify what amounts to the assassination of a large number of people. Such infringements occur frequently in many countries and if the authorities decide to intervene it is generally to call to order the aircraft which has left its flight path. In more serious cases, it is forced to land at the nearest airport for verification, particularly if it is suspected of having obtained information illicitly.

152. At the time of writing, some elements relating to the circumstances of the incident are still missing, including the aircraft's black box which has been detected but not yet recovered. However, the broad lines are known from information published on the basis of Japanese and American monitoring:

153. (*i*) It is not known exactly why the South Korean aircraft deviated by a slight angle from its route which, after several hours' flight, left it several hundred kilometres west of its correct position.

154. (*ii*) Not the slightest proof has been given of Soviet accusations that the crew of the aircraft had been spying.

155. (*iii*) The Korean civil aircraft had been intercepted and followed for more than two hours by Soviet fighter aircraft, which do not appear to have managed to transmit orders to land by radio, but apparently after having seen optical signals the South Korean aircraft had begun to descend.

156. (*iv*) Obeying orders from Soviet military authorities based in Siberia, one of the Soviet fighters apparently then used missiles to bring down the South Korean aircraft. This is in any case the explanation given by the Soviet Government.

157. (*v*) The American authorities admitted that one of their RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft had been on a monitoring operation off Kamchatka, but it is believed to have been more than 1,000 km from the South Korean aircraft at the time of the incident. It has never been suggested that it penetrated Soviet air space.

158. (*vi*) The Soviet fighters were very close to the aircraft they destroyed and could not therefore not know that it was a civil aircraft of a type quite different from the RC-135.

159. (*vii*) The Soviet authorities gave tardy and contradictory explanations of the drama, all aimed at imputing responsibility to the Americans. Several of these explanations were subsequently contradicted by the decoding of radio communications between the Soviet aircraft and their base, particularly the argument that the Korean aircraft had not been showing regulation lights.

160. (*viii*) While recognising the substantial facts, the Soviet authorities treated the fighter pilot as a national hero and accepted no responsibility for the incident. They have made no apologies, nor have they agreed to grant damages to the families of the victims.

161. The conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that the Soviet military authorities shot down a civil aircraft which they must have identified and thus killed a large number of persons for the sole reason that the aircraft had violated Soviet air space. Such action for reasons of state shows no regard for the most elementary humanitarian sentiments. It also shows, as avowed by the Soviet authorities, that local military authorities are able to assume responsibility for acts of this kind, which are, in effect, acts of war, with their government's concurrence, which tells much about the rôle of the military in the Soviet state.

162. All the western governments have subsequently voiced their indignation. The United States Government considered taking sanctions against the Soviet Union but no effective measures have been taken. Most European governments refused to take any sanctions. Only the international federation of airline pilots associations decided on 13th September to cancel flights to the Soviet Union for a month. The resistance of certain governments and airlines to these measures, particularly in France, Greece, Spain and Turkey, will probably quickly be overcome in face of the firmness of the pilots. But there now seems to be little likelihood of any more energetic action by European governments.

163. It is to be hoped that all western governments will agree that the 1944 Chicago Convention on civil air transport should be revised, since the responsibility of states for aircraft flying over their territory is not set out clearly enough. It is essential to revise the convention without delay so as to clarify the rights and duties of all parties and to assure passengers on civil aircraft that a navigational error will not condemn them to execution without appeal by the armed forces of a country which is supposed to be civilised.

164. The question of applying economic sanctions against the Soviet Union thus arose again. It was not part of your Rapporteur's study, which had been devoted to the permanent factors of the problems raised by East-West trade. However, the committee tackled the

subject during its first reading of the present document on 11th July 1983.

165. All who took part in that discussion expressed disappointment about the application of economic sanctions envisaged or agreed upon after the invasion of Afghanistan and the introduction of a state of emergency in Poland. It was noted that, even going back to before the war and to the boycott measures against Mussolini in 1936 when he attacked Ethiopia, history provided no instance of significant political results being obtained by economic sanctions. Even the embargo effectively applied in the case of South Africa has brought no change in the policy of apartheid.

166. Some members underlined that in their opinion any such measures against the Soviet Union might heighten international tension, make the Geneva negotiations on medium-range missiles more difficult and jeopardise détente of which the development of trade was an important part.

167. Finally, others recalled the difficulties of having any collective economic measure applied by all members of the Atlantic Alliance, and that although, after the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States had proposed a ban on exports of certain products to the Soviet Union it had excluded wheat, of which it was the principal seller, in order not to upset its farmers, although wheat was a product urgently needed by the Soviet Union and through which strong pressure could have been brought to bear on its government. It is quite clear that there can be no understanding between Europeans and Americans on such bases, i.e. giving priority to the internal political concerns of one member of the alliance.

168. Your Rapporteur fears that as matters now stand it may be very difficult to reach agreement to apply a boycott effectively. Only the international federation of airline pilots associations has managed to apply fairly satisfactorily the boycott of Soviet airports after the shooting down of the South Korean Boeing. Other cases in which economic sanctions were desirable did not involve professional groups so aware of their responsibilities and organised for international action. Although other measures, such as reduced contacts with representatives of Poland in all the western capitals, without having very obvious results, continue to remind the Polish authorities that the West has not accepted their repressive measures against trade unions nor their infringement of individual freedom, these were not economic measures and, however reluctant, the same western countries have had to agree at the same time to reschedule Poland's debts.

169. If, one way or another, the western countries could manage to draw up and apply certain rules of conduct in their trade with the East, eliminating, for instance, over-generous credit terms, dumping as practised by the EEC for certain agricultural products including butter (some of which is apparently re-exported at a higher price by the Soviet Union), transfers of advanced technology without adequate compensation and contracts involving undue dependence on their eastern partners, it would be easier for them to change these rules if necessary in order to apply sanctions.

IX. *Conclusions*

170. In recent years, East-West trade has indubitably and significantly favoured the economic growth of the Soviet Union and consequently, directly or indirectly, the growth of its military capability. This is why the strategic and military balance, which was the basis on which increased East-West trade had been based, swung in favour of the Soviet Union with effect from 1973. Faced with massive and continuous rearmament by the Soviet Union and its aggressiveness, international co-operation between western countries is necessary for security reasons.

171. Competition between Europe and the United States can bring nothing positive in this field. Apart from improving the effectiveness of Cocom and its lists, a permanent code of conduct should be worked out for economic relations with the East. This code should naturally be thoroughly revised as soon as it appears that the development of East-West trade, instead of favouring the Soviet armaments effort, is helping to improve the well-being of the people and fostering really productive investments. In this respect, some committee members stressed that they considered the success of the Geneva negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons would be a decisive test. The aims of a policy for trade with the Soviet Union might be defined at western summit meetings, as was done at Williamsburg for certain matters relating to western solidarity, and the OECD might be made responsible for implementing it.

172. Following interallied misunderstanding after the Versailles and Bonn summit meetings, the meeting at La Sapinière, the seven-power talks and the raising of sanctions announced by the President of the United States on 13th November 1982, the western summit meeting at Williamsburg and the European summit meeting in Stuttgart in 1983, it is now mainly a matter of finding a new consensus for a joint approach to East-West relations, particularly in economic and trade matters, with due regard for the general policital context. It is not possible to act as though nothing had happened in Afghanistan or Poland or to ignore Soviet

rearmament. Western policy must take account of the economic aspect of the Soviet Union's challenge which it has never concealed but which it has made the justification for peaceful coexistence, whose sense it has always considered to mean a shifting of its permanent class struggle with the capitalist countries to the economic field. Moreover, this choice will not prevent it from reverting to a more aggressive policy towards the West the day it considers a reversal of the balance of forces which it is now bringing about will allow it to win by the threat or use of force.

173. For the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, several decisions are at present possible. They might include:

(*a*) a restrictive policy for exports of advanced technology to the East;

(*b*) avoiding the West and particularly the Europeans being dependent on raw materials and above all energy supplies from the Soviet Union;

(*c*) not promoting Soviet resources at the expense of those of the West or the third world;

(*d*) restricting western credits to the Soviet Union and other eastern countries;

(*e*) not accepting the principle of countertrade.

174. Your Rapporteur is well aware that the free development of international trade is a factor of peace and prosperity and particularly important in a period of economic recession. He believes, however, that competition between western countries in trade with the eastern countries helps to distort free trade to the unilateral benefit of the country whose economy is the most closely directed and controlled by the political powers. He is not at all of the opinion that the West should be asked to deviate from its fundamental principles but merely that the democracies should be protected against the actions of a totalitarian country which exploits for political purposes all the advantages it may derive from its external trade and makes use of its economic monolithism to sow trouble among the democracies. He is not advocating hostile action against the Soviet Union but adapting western policies to the realities of trade with the East.

175. At the present international juncture, the Soviet military threat is serious and is steadily spreading. It cannot be hoped to guarantee peace by demonstrations against the deployment of nuclear weapons in the West, but rather by pursuing a policy which, although not claiming to prevent the Soviet Union from pursuing its military deployment, at least ensures that the West stops contributing to it on the economic, technological and financial levels. Should it appear that the Soviet Union was using advantages it derives from trade with the West in a new manner, it might be possible to be more flexible in encouraging such trade.

APPENDIX

The Siberian gas pipeline

I. *Brief account of the proceedings of the International Hearing concerning the use of forced labour on the Siberian gas pipeline held at Stadthalle, Bonn/Bad Godesberg on 18th and 19th November 1982*

The purpose of the hearing was to examine witness accounts concerning the use of forced labour on the Siberian gas pipeline network. It was pointed out at the hearing, that contrary to reports from bodies such as the CIA, the initial heavy excavation work for laying a pipeline does not have to be carried out by skilled labour. Furthermore, as one of the witnesses stressed there are many skilled workers imprisoned in the USSR who have the technical knowledge required to construct and maintain a gas pipeline.

Throughout the course of their testimonies all the witnesses, with the exception of Mr. Gasko, discussed at some length the poor conditions of their imprisonment, for example, constant hunger, lack of warm clothing and extremely long working hours (up to sixteen hours a day). Although Mr. Gasko had never been a prisoner he had worked closely with many prisoners in the construction of pipelines and supported the witnesses' reports of the poor living conditions suffered by the prisoners. Mrs. Wosnessenskaja also gave the Commission an insight into the physical abuse suffered by female prisoners, from the age of about sixteen years, and added that the appalling conditions of imprisonment frequently led to permanent infertility.

Mrs. Wosnessenskaja did not work on the pipeline herself but she testified that many of her fellow inmates had done so.

Mr. Kulmagambetov had worked for some time in compressor stations along the pipeline, and finally in October/November 1979 he had visited Ukhta where, at construction site KS-10, conditionally released prisoners were still working. Mr. Kulmagambetov presented to the Commission his Soviet labour book, which documented his work on the construction of gas pipelines in the USSR.

Mr. Bergmann testified that in 1974 he was shown technical films about laying pipes and he said that he knows of many Russian prisoners of German origin working on the Siberian gas pipeline. He added that the prisoners know the destination of the gas pipeline because the pipes are made by the German company Mannesmann.

Mr. Belov gave evidence on behalf of Vladimir Grigorjewitsch Titov, who is at present in a psychiatric institution in Kaluga. Mr. Titov was identified as Mr. P.S. in the report on the use of forced labour. Mr. Titov worked on the pipeline in 1980 and 1981.

Mr. Paustian testified that as a conditionally released prisoner he was transferred to work on the gas pipeline in September 1974.

Mr. Makarenko testified that he had not worked on the pipeline himself but since he left the Soviet Union four years ago he has collected material on the use of forced labour in the USSR, which he has presented to the ILO.

Finally, confusion arose regarding what was meant by the " new " gas pipeline. Mr. Kulmagambetov said that there is no reason to believe that the " new " gas pipeline to Western Europe has only been under construction since 1980 and he had in his possession an article from " Socialist Industry " (27th July 1976) which discussed the Siberian gas pipeline. He also added that the pipeline supplying gas to the West is not a single pipeline but a network of pipes which have been under construction for ten to fifteen years, and he referred to an article in Pravda (4th October 1982) which states that two pipelines will meet at Ushgorod, to take gas to the West.

II. *Statement of the International Commission on Human Rights in conclusion of the hearing " Forced Labour - Siberian pipeline " in Bonn/Bad Godesberg (Stadthalle) on 18th and 19th November 1982*

The hearing was arranged by the International Society for Human Rights (ISHR), Frankfurt, in co-operation with the International Sakharov Committee, Copenhagen. Presiding was Mr. Alfred Coste Floret, a joint prosecutor for France at the Nuremburg trials.

Based upon the testimony of expert witnesses and upon the testimony and documents of former Soviet prisoners, the Commission finds:

1. The USSR continues the deplorable practice of forced labour in manufacturing and construction projects including the Siberian gas pipeline.

2. Prisoners, including political prisoners and those imprisoned for their religious beliefs,

among them women and children, are forced to work under conditions of extreme hardship, including malnutrition, inadequate shelter and clothing and severe discipline. Many prisoners have died.

The Commission calls upon the Soviet Union to end the vicious practice of forced labour and upon all nations and enterprises for support of our conclusion.

We have presented the truth to the world and no one can say: " I did not know ".

Members:

Alfred Coste Floret, President of the Commission, France;
Marcel Aeschbacher, Landesverband Freier Schweizer Arbeitnehmer, Switzerland;
Senator William L. Armstrong, USA;
Jim Baker, AFL/CIO, USA;
Professor Felix Ermacora, Ph. D., Austrian representative in the UN Commission for Economic, Social, Political and Civil Rights, Austria;
Hans Graf Huyn, MdB, member of the CDU/CSU parliamentarian group in the Deutscher Bundestag, West Germany;
Detlef Lutz, Vice-Chairman of Christliche Gewerkschaft Bergbau - Chemie - Energie, West Germany;
Ludwig Martin, State Attorney General (retired), West Germany;
Carlo Ripa di Meana, MEP, member of the Socialist Parliamentarian Group in the European Parliament, Italy;
Victor Sparre, Author, Norway.

Since the publication of the report by the International Society for Human Rights (ISHR) on the use of forced labour on the Siberian gas pipeline (August 1982) two main and several minor facts have emerged. Two events have taken place which have given the allegations made in the ISHR report substance.

1. A CIA report has been issued which says that the Soviet Union has some four million prisoners - including 10,000 political prisoners - employed on arduous tasks ranging from logging and mining to road building and farming. " An estimated 3% of the work force in the USSR consists of prisoners compelled to perform jobs for the state ", says the report.

2. On 18th and 19th November the ISHR held an international hearing (a summary is enclosed) which separated fact from fiction. A prestigious group of panelists questioned a wide range of witnesses and concluded that: " the Soviet Union continues the deplorable practice of forced labour in manufacturing and construction projects including the Siberian gas pipeline ".

The following facts have also now been established:

(*a*) Starting from the Yamal Peninsula, forced labour concentration camps are located along the line Urengoi, Surgut, Punga, Tavada, as well as along the Salekhard-Vuktyl line.

(*b*) Construction of the pipeline uses the labour of prisoners (mainly for hard manual labour in clearing the route) from a number of main camps (i.e. those located directly along the route of the pipeline). Labour is also used from subsidiary camps (i.e. these are the camps which tend to specialise in specific areas such as brick-making, road building, woodwork or sewing overalls).

(*c*) Both the main and subsidiary camps are located primarily in the Komi ASSR, the Vologda district, and the Perm, Tumen, Kirov, Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk districts.

(*d*) The sewing of overalls and other special garments for the prisoners in the camps along the pipeline route, including for prisoners who are engaged in the construction work, is conducted primarily by female prisoners in the following camps: in the workers settlement of Zuyevka, Kirov district, Dobriye Vody and Kopychilitski, Perm district and in the town of Nizhniy Tagil. In each of these camps between 800-2,000 women are held.

(*e*) Between Khalmer-U and the town of Siktivkar, Komi ASSR, there are 36 concentration camps with 500-1,000 inmates in each, " Workers " from these camps have been used on the pipeline. The camps in this area are located in the following settlements: Kochma, Promishlenniy, Yeletskiy, Knyazhpogost, Abez, Makarikha, Mylva, Mutniy, Materik, Mikun, Ust'-Vym, Mordino, and Kobra.

Economic relations with the Soviet Union

AMENDMENT [1]

tabled by Mr. Galley

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (*e*).

Signed: Galley

1. See 9th sitting, 30th November 1983 (amendment negatived).

European security and burden-sharing in the alliance

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments [2]
by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted in committee by 12 votes to 3 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. *Pignion* (Chairman); MM. *Blaauw*, Kittelmann (Vice-Chairmen); Sir Frederic Bennett (Alternate: *Wilkinson*), MM. van den Bergh (Alternate: *Tummers*), *Bernini*, Bonnel, *Cavaliere*, Cox, Dejardin, Della Briotta (Alternate: *Amadei*), Duraffour, Edwards, Ertl, Fosson (Alternate: *Giust*), *Galley*, Gerstl, *Sir Anthony Grant*, MM. *Lemmrich*, Mayoud (Alternate: *Caro*), Ménard (Alternate: *Jung*), *Pecchioli*, *Prussen*, Scheer, Scholten, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Steverlynck.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Introductory Note

In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows:

7th April 1983 – SHAPE, Casteau

Major General Tabary, Belgian Army, ACOS Logistics;

Mr. Jonathan Stoddart, Minister, Special Assistant for International Affairs;

Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Terry, RAF, Deputy SACEUR;

Lieutenant General Cacciola, DCOS Logistics;

Colonel Fox, USAF, DCOS Intelligence;

Mr. Pozzi, Italian civilian, strategic analyst;

Air Vice Marshal J. Gilbert, RAF, ACOS Policy.

8th April 1983 – NATO, Brussels

General Lewis Melner, United States Army, Deputy Chairman, Military Committee;

H.E. Mr. Tapley Bennett, Ambassador, United States Permanent Representative; Mr. Savage;

Dr. Joseph Luns, Secretary-General;

H.E. Sir John Graham, Ambassador, United Kingdom Permanent Representative; Mr. Colin Balmer; Admiral Sir Anthony Morton, United Kingdom Military Representative;

H.E. Dr. H. Wieck, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany; Dr. A. Böcker, Minister;

H.E. Mr. Jean-Marie Merillon, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France.

11th April 1983 – Bonn

Ministry of Defence:

Mr. Manfred Wörner, Minister of Defence;

Mr. Lothar Rühl, Minister of State for Defence;

General Tandecki, Führungsstab III; Colonel Rode; Colonel Weige; Colonel Wieland; Colonel Flasse; Colonel Ertmann; Colonel Siebert; Colonel Lingan; Colonel Vorwerck.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs:

Dr. W. Hofmann, Director of Atlantic Alliance and Defence Affairs.

12th April 1983 – Ministry of Defence, London

Mr. David Fisher, DSI;

Mr. David Wilson, DS 12.

19th April 1983 – Headquarters CINCHAN and COMEASTLANT, Northwood

Rear Admiral Pröpper, Royal Netherlands Navy, Chief of Staff;

Captain Morin, Belgian Navy.

The committee as a whole met at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on Monday, 14th February 1983, when it discussed a draft outline of the present report.

It met subsequently in the United States from 21st to 30th March where, in the United Nations, New York, it was briefed by Mr. Jan Mårtenson, United Nations Under-Secretary General. Department for Disarmament; Mr. Brian Urquhart, United Nations Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs; Mr. Charles Lichtenstein, United States Deputy Representative to the Security Council. In Washington it met with Mr. Gerard Smith, former Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Chief Negotiator for SALT I; Mr. George Kennan, former United States Ambassador to Moscow; Mr. Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defence. In the State Department it was briefed by Mr. Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs; Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, Director for Politico-Military Affairs; Mr. Richard N. Haass, Director, Office of Regional Security Affairs; in the Department of

Defence it was briefed by Dr. William E. Hoehn Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy; Mr. Franklin C. Miller, Office of the Secretary of Defence, Director for Strategic Policy; Mr. Abram Shulsky, Office of the Secretary of Defence, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy; Mr. George W. Heiser, Office of the Secretary of Defence, Theatre Nuclear Policy; Lieutenant Colonel Edward A. Hamilton, Joint Chiefs of Staff, International Negotiations: Major General Earl G. Peck, Office of the Secretary of Defence (Policy), Director for Intelligence and Space Policy; Colonel Kent Montavon, Office of the Secretary of Defence (International Security Policy), Director for NATO Affairs; Colonel James L. Gould, Office of the Secretary of Defence (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics), Director for Mobilisation Plans and Operations; Mr. James W. Morrison, Office of the Secretary of Defence (International Security Policy), Director for European Policy.

The committee then met with Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman of the Defence Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee; and with Mr. Joseph Addabbo, Chairman of the Defence Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, and the following members of the subcommittee: Mr. Les AuCoin; Mr. Norman D. Dicks; Mr. W.G. Hefner; Mr. John P. Murtha; Mr. J. Kenneth Robinson.

In the White House Executive Building the committee was briefed by Mr. Sven Kraemer and Colonel Mayer of the National Security Staff. The committee then visited the Patuxent Naval Air Test Centre, where it was briefed by the Commander, Rear Admiral E.J. Hogan, and saw the AV-8, F/A-18, SH-60B, E2 and P3 aircraft. The committee then visited the Lockheed-California Company, Los Angeles, where it was briefed by Mr. Ed Cortright, President, and Mr. Ben Rich, in particular on the TR-1 and SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft. It visited Hughes Aircraft Company and was briefed by Mr. George E. Todd, Senior Vice-President, International; Mr. David M. Snyder, Associate Director, Middle East and Africa; Mr. Paul H. Kennard, Vice-President and Manager, Advanced Projects Division; Mr. Louis E. Greenbaum, Manager, Communications Systems Division, Ground Systems Group; Mr. Leonard Gross, Vice-President, Electro-Optical and Data Systems Group; and Mr. Robert L. Roderick, Vice-President, Missile Systems Group, on various aspects of the company's activities; visited the Douglas Aircraft Company where it was briefed by Mr. E. Curtis, Senior Vice-President, Fiscal Management; Colonel John Patterson, United States Air Force Plant Representative; Mr. L.J. Colapietro, Manager, Government Customer Relations; Mr. E.A. Chambers, Manager, Government Marketing, and Mr. D.C. Caldwell, Programme Manager, T-45TS Programme, in particular on the VTXTS, C-17 and KC-10.

At the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, the committee was received by the Superintendant, Major General Robert E. Kelley, and Captain Crowley, USAF. The committee then visited NORAD Cheyenne Mountain Complex, where it was received by Lieutenenant General Kenneth Thorneycroft, Canadian Forces, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and briefed by Major Bob Tracy, Major Don Read, Lieutenant Colonel Dick Farkas, and Captain Rick Kniseley.

The committee then met in the Sala del Consiglio, Pisa, on 3rd May where it discussed a draft of the present report, and also visited the Italian Parachute Training School where it was received by Colonel Valdimiro Rossi, Commandant. On 4th May it visited the Oto Melara works in La Spezia, where it was received by Mr. Fiaccavento, Mr. Ricci, and Mr. Ferrari, and then visited the NATO SACLANT ASW Research Centre where it was briefed by the Director Dr. Rolf Goodman and staff.

The committee met in Brussels on 17th May for a joint meeting with the Council under the chairmanship of Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, and on 18th May when it discussed and adopted the first version of the report (Document 947) which the Assembly referred back to the committee on 7th June 1983.

The committee then met in Paris on 12th September to discuss the reference back to the committee, when it was agreed that the parts of the report on nuclear weapons, burden-sharing and Europe would be updated. On 13th September the committee visited the nuclear ballistic missile submarine base on Ile Longue, Brittany, and was briefed by Vice-Admiral Jacques Bonnemaison, Commander of the Force Océanique Stratégique, and Vice-Admiral Christian Brac de la Perrière, Maritime Prefect, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic.

The committee then met in Madrid from 19th to 21st October. In the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Madrid, the committee was briefed by Mr. Carlos Fernandez Espeso, Director General for Security Questions. It visited the CASA aircraft factory, where it was received by Mr. Fernando Caralt, Director General, and Mr. Carlos Navarro Cantero, Deputy Director, Programmes. The committee met with the bureaux and party spokesmen of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees of the Congress of Deputies, with Mr. Manuel Medina Ortega, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, in the chair. It then met to discuss the draft revised report. On 21st October the

committee was received by General Santos Peralba, Secretary of State for Defence Policy, in the Spanish Ministry of Defence, and was briefed by Colonel Narciso Carreras Matas, Spanish Marines, on Spanish defence policy.

The committee met finally at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 7th November when it adopted the present revised report.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of Congress, officials, senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the committee and replied to questions.

The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation

on European security and burden-sharing in the alliance

The Assembly,

(*i*) Aware of the manifold difficulties of comparing national defence efforts but concluding that the European allies for the most part now carry a very reasonable share of the agreed burden, a share which has increased from 24% to 38% in the last twenty-five years, and increased most significantly in the decade of the 1970s; recognising that because of its substantial strategic nuclear deterrent and world rôle, the United States spends a higher proportion of its national wealth on defence than its European allies; but believing that certain specific improvements in defence efforts are required;

(*ii*) Noting the existence of the independent nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom;

(*iii*) Considering that an important factor in the continuing burden-sharing debate arises from the differing approaches of the European allies and the United States administration to relations with the Soviet Union, and consequently from the different views on the necessary size and composition of the allied defence effort;

(*iv*) Believing that these differences call for increased consultation between the European allies on strategic policies and defence issues;

(*v*) Convinced that within the alliance the political relationship between the European members and the United States should reflect more fully their economic, political and defence contributions to the security of Western Europe in the fullest sense;

(*vi*) Aware that isolationism in the United States is likely to grow to the detriment of western security unless the European members of the alliance can convince American public opinion and Congress of the adequacy of the European contribution to the NATO defence effort, and unless European public opinion and parliaments show reciprocal appreciation of all aspects of the United States contribution to allied defence;

(*vii*) Welcoming therefore the annual report to Congress by the United States Secretary of Defence on allied contributions to the common defence ; proposals by WEU ; and statements by Eurogroup which identify the size of the European contribution;

(*viii*) Believing that allied defence plans and commitments entered into in the Brussels Treaty must take account of the possible consequences of developments beyond the NATO area, and that in the case of such developments which the allies jointly recognise as directly threatening the vital interests of the alliance, the ready assistance of all allies must be forthcoming within the area to facilitate United States deployments beyond the area;

(*ix*) Recalling that problems of common defence and the support of public opinion for national defence projects cannot be isolated from the quality of economic, political and monetary relations between the United States and the members of WEU,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

A. Urge the WEU member governments concerned to define jointly for the attention of the North Atlantic Council the measures necessary :

1. To maintain and in the following specific cases improve their defence efforts :

   (*a*) by maintaining collectively the NATO target of an increase in defence expenditure in real terms as long as the Soviet military build-up continues, and by adhering to the biennial force goals approved by the nations;

   (*b*) by augmenting the combat sustainability of the alliance by providing a minimum of thirty days' stocks of fuel, ammunition, spare parts and consumables and by improving the capacity of reserve forces;

(*c*) by maximising conventional firepower and raising the nuclear threshold through the progressive introduction of proven systems incorporating emerging technologies jointly developed and produced on an equitable Atlantic-wide basis;

(*d*) by improving the flexibility, mobility, effectiveness and readiness of European intervention forces, both to improve national contributions to ACE Mobile Force and, in a crisis in Europe, to compensate as far as possible for any diversion outside the area of United States reinforcements destined for Europe;

2. In the case of developments beyond the NATO area affecting their vital interests :

(*a*) to facilitate by all necessary measures within the area the deployment of forces of any NATO country beyond the area ;

(*b*) in the case of those WEU member countries with appropriate military capability to participate in such deployments ;

3. To lend vigorous united support to the United States efforts on behalf of the alliance to secure satisfactory balanced and verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union in the field of both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces and, failing the latter by the end of 1983, to apply the decisions taken on 12th December 1979 by the NATO member countries concerning the deployment of GLCM and Pershing II missiles ;

4. (*a*) To deepen and improve European defence deliberations within the WEU Council and the informal consultations in Eurogroup and arrange for the European position to be expounded clearly in the United States, especially to Congress committees and staffs, through a public information effort co-ordinated by the Washington embassies of those countries which provide the Eurogroup secretariat and Chairman-in-Office ;

(*b*) To undertake a similar effort with the assistance of the Assembly of WEU to explain to the European public and parliaments the contribution which the United States makes to allied defence ;

B. Consider and report to the Assembly on :

1. The expansion and deepening of the European defence activities of the Council, last defined in 1957 ;

2. The obligation to invite all members of WEU to contribute to strengthening the European pillar of the western alliance.

Draft Resolution

on European security and burden-sharing in the alliance

The Assembly,

Reaffirming its rôle as the only European parliamentary assembly empowered by treaty to discuss defence matters ;

Stressing the need for the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance to be strengthened through agreement between all European allies on the basic principles of alliance defence policy and strategy ;

Recalling its Resolution 15,

CALLS on the parliaments of the European NATO countries not members of WEU to appoint observers to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to participate in the preparation of its forthcoming report on the state of European security ;

DECIDES that such observers shall have the right to speak.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1.1. Under the original terms of reference of this report, as submitted to the first part of the session in June, it was to examine European and American contributions to common defence in the alliance, and the fair sharing of the burden, under the title " Burden-sharing in the alliance ". As, however, the Assembly referred the report back to the committee, it has been judged necessary to broaden the scope, in particular to cover in more detail the problem of nuclear weapons as the deadline for the possible initial deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles approaches. The revised report submitted to the second part of the session is accordingly entitled " European security and burden-sharing in the alliance ". In revising the report, the opportunity has, of course, been taken to improve certain sections and to bring it up to date in the light of developments since the committee adopted the original version on 18th May 1983.

1.2. A collective security system including Western European Union and the Atlantic Alliance must be founded upon the principle of equitable participation in a common defence. Since an attack upon one member is, under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, to be regarded as an attack upon all the members of the alliance, the interdependence of the signatories is not in doubt. The national defence provisions of the Brussels Treaty are even more binding and the commitment of the WEU nations to each other's defence lies at the heart of Western Europe's security.

1.3. Every national contribution, whether political, financial, military, industrial, in manpower or matériel, contributes towards a sharing of the joint burden of defence in the western alliance. However, certain fundamental concepts should underlie the efforts that are made:

(*a*) alliance nations must pursue an agreed strategy – in the case of NATO of forward defence and flexible response underpinned by the availability of nuclear weapons to assure deterrence;

(*b*) the burden of the military and economic efforts to implement this strategy must be distributed in a manner which all members of the alliance can accept as fair.

1.4. Implementing these concepts is not easy. A free association of independent states has few sanctions it can realistically apply on those members whom the majority of the alliance believe to be in default of a reasonable and realistically attainable contribution to their common defence. A too intense debate over the criteria to be applied to achieve a fair assessment of national obligations can all too easily prejudice political willingness to pursue national security objectives in an alliance context.

1.5. An objective assessment, therefore, of burden-sharing must be very comprehensive and take into account as wide a range of factors as possible if the political susceptibilities of member countries are not to be dangerously aroused. Such factors should include:

(*a*) what outlays are required to meet multilaterally-recognised force goals;

(*b*) the contributions of each nation both in input (expenditure and manpower) and in output (forces and equipment) terms;

(*c*) what a fair share of the effort required for every individual country actually is on a consensus basis;

(*d*) how the burdens can be redistributed to match national circumstances and capabilities and the strategic imperatives recognised by the alliance as a whole.

1.6. Coalition defence between wholly sovereign states has inherent stresses and inner tensions which can only by surmounted through a recognition that the interests of the alliance as a whole transcend those of its individual members. This is particularly so when, as in the case of NATO, there is great geostrategic, topographical, economic, historical and political diversity within it. A constant effort of political magnanimity, imagination and goodwill is required to overcome those potentially fissiparous qualities within the alliance.

1.7. The NATO collective security system evolved in the aftermath of World War II out of an evident necessity to harness preponderant American power to redress a military imbalance in Europe. A relationship of virtual American protectorate, perhaps symbolised by the NATO

military doctrine of the conventional force tripwire guaranteed by the strategy of massive United States nuclear retaliation which characterised the 1950s, has evolved to the point today where diminishing nuclear advantage at a strategic level and unfavourable nuclear and conventional balance at a theatre level call in question the ultimate American security guarantee which Western Europeans have conveniently taken for granted for so long.

1.8. At the same time, this relationship of strategic dependency upon the United States, which the European members of the alliance still assume, does not any longer correspond to the economic relationship between the United States and Western Europe, or to the respective parties' physical involvement in and economic dependence upon strategic developments in the wide areas of the world outside the area of responsibility of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The institutional and consultative mechanism must evolve so that the Europeans assert collectively their growing political authority within the alliance more effectively.

1.9. In short, there is a temptation on the part of the Europeans in NATO to continue to display the military dispositions of client states while adopting the independent-minded political postures commensurate with their newfound economic power. Understandably, public opinion in the United States, with the perspective of a people with global responsibilities, does not understand why certain West European countries, where the standard of living is certainly higher than in America, should spend little more than half the proportion of the national product expended by the United States, much of whose military budget goes to defending the more affluent Europeans. The argument can all too easily become simplistic and dangerously emotive unless it is clearly borne in mind that some of the deepest disagreements between members of the western alliance have very fundamental causes. One of the most obvious is a difference of view about the military threat and hence what is militarily required to meet it.

1.10. Geography, history and economic circumstances all play their part in influencing perceptions of the threat. Concern to preserve the unique relationship with fellow Germans in the German Democratic Republic and to maintain West Germany's traditional trade with Central Europe must influence the Federal Republic's perception of the threat and modify the Bonn Government's formulation of security policy in the widest sense. Likewise, the Nordic balance concept of Norway and Denmark is evolved in response to the neutralist foreign policy of Sweden and Finland and not just to the Soviet threat to the north flank of NATO.

1.11. Following the collapse of the European Defence Community in 1954 and notwithstanding the political consultation within WEU; the Eurogroup; and the process of European political consultation among the Ten, there are bound to be variations in foreign policy, threat analysis and diplomacy between the individual European members of the alliance let alone between the West Europeans and the United States. Issues such as East-West relations, trade with the Soviet bloc, linkage with human rights questions, financial credits, food aid and technology transfers to Eastern Europe, arms control and the implementation of the Helsinki final act often receive markedly different treatment by governments within the western alliance.

1.12. This foreign policy diversity explains why the greatest care must be exercised before reaching definitive conclusions about burden-sharing. Not only are political assumptions often misleading, but a universally acceptable statistical basis of comparison is almost impossible to attain. In the words of a NATO Financial and Economic Board report written as long ago as 1951:

> " A final decision as to what constitutes an equitable distribution can never be derived from the mechanical use of any purely statistical formula. Even if the statistics available to the board were wholly comparable, no mechanical formula could be devised or take account of the varying circumstances and peculiar problems of each country. Differences in size, population, economic structure and stage of development of the various countries make simple comparisons impossible. "

1.13. Since then, to quote from the United States Secretary of Defence's report to the United States Congress on allied contributions to the common defence, March 1962: " despite many efforts and agreement that there is a need for burden-sharing, NATO has been unable to agree on an acceptable definition of the burden or how to measure it ".

1.14. An objective definition of the guidelines for fairer burden-sharing within NATO is easier to achieve than a consensus among the individual nations within the alliance as to whether their own contributions are equitable. Countries with low living standards or economic problems argue that a sound economy is a prerequisite for an effective defence. Countries with strong peace movements or a strong ethical tradition in the conduct of foreign affairs will stress the importance of carrying public support for national defence policy. Countries with a weak balance of payments may be reluctant to incur the foreign exchange costs of stationing

forces overseas or of purchasing defence equipment abroad.

1.15. As recorded in the introductory note this report draws on information derived from the visit of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the United States in March 1983 and particularly from the briefings and discussions at the State Department, Pentagon, National Security Council, on Capitol Hill and from industry and the United States air force. In Europe information was derived at SHAPE, NATO, CINCHAN and from national defence ministries.

II. *The concept of allied defence*

2.1. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 was the first collective security agreement after World War II which was directed against the growing Soviet threat. Its provisions as modified by the Paris Protocols of 1954 form the basis of Western European Union and bind the signatories to mutual assistance in the event of external attack in Europe [1]. There is no geographic limitation to the applicability of the treaty for consultation purposes [2] and its unambiguous nature ensures that regardless of political developments among NATO countries in either Northern or Southern Europe and regardless of political developments in North America, there will be a Western European inner security zone among the seven nations of WEU.

2.2. Although by contrast there is a stricter geographic limitation to the applicability of mutual defence under the North Atlantic Treaty, this should not inhibit alliance consultation and co-operation in response to threats to the interests of member countries outside the NATO area. Even so, following the collapse of the southern and eastern tiers of Foster Dulles' alliance system created to contain communist expansion (CENTO and SEATO), the NATO nations did very little to concert their security policies to protect their joint interests in the Middle East, Arab/Iranian Gulf, South-West and South-East Asia and Indian Ocean. Indeed, the Government of the United Kingdom compounded western problems by closing military bases east of Suez even when in 1971 the rulers of the Gulf sheikhdoms still wanted the British to stay.

2.3. Soviet support for the Marxist régimes in Ethiopia and South Yemen and Vietnam at each extremity of the large area of instability along the southern edge of the Eurasian landmass together with the Iranian revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the heart of the highly volatile region bordering on the oil-rich Arab/Iranian Gulf convinced the Government of the United States that it must be prepared militarily to fill an alarming power vacuum in an area of huge oil reserves and great strategic importance to the West.

2.4. The United States has now created a new South-West Asian Command autonomous of SACEUR and has earmarked a rapid deployment force of up to six divisions to be assigned to it. Base facilities at Diego Garcia, Mashirah Island and elsewhere around the littoral of the Indian Ocean have been built up. The United States navy was already overstretched in view of the Soviet naval challenge worldwide, and with the redeployment of assets from the Mediterranean fleet and elsewhere to the Indian Ocean is almost a four-fleet navy.

2.5. The determination of the United States Administration not to afford to the Soviet Union a monopoly in underpinning the global competition for political influence and economic advantage by military means was heightened by the two shocks towards the end of Mr. Carter's presidency of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the failure of the United States mission to rescue the American hostages from the United States Embassy in Iran.

2.6. The European members of the alliance may or may not agree with the new military rôle which the United States has assumed in South-West Asia but an urgent accommodation on their part with the practical consequences to them of growing American commitments beyond the NATO area is required. Open disagreement with the Americans over their military strategy in South-West Asia would deepen the misunderstanding that already exists within the alliance. Quiet emphasis on the merits of a grand strategy involving diplomacy, aid, political and economic support to complement military preparedness and deployment would be a valuable contribution in terms of European expertise in ensuring the formulation of an effective alliance security policy for a notoriously unstable region where geography affords to the Soviet Union great advantages in any power struggle which might arise.

2.7. Mutual defence arrangements under the North Atlantic Treaty are of course limited to the Atlantic Treaty area defined in Article 6, but the treaty imposes no geographical limit-

1. Article VI: " If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power ".

2. Article VIII.3: " At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, *in whatever area this threat should arise,* or a danger to economic stability ".

ation on *consultation* under Article 4 whenever the security of any party is threatened. Nevertheless, discussion of out-of-area defence matters has evolved only slowly in NATO, the most recent statement of the position being in the texts adopted by the sixteen members at the Bonn NATO summit on 10th June 1982:

> " All of us have an interest in peace and security in other regions of the world. We will consult together as appropriate on events in these regions which may have implications for our security, taking into account our commonly-identified objectives. Those of us who are in a position to do so will endeavour to respond to requests for assistance from sovereign states whose security and independence is threatened. "

The document on integrated defence adopted by representatives of the countries contributing to the integrated military structure contains the following paragraph :

> " Noting that developments beyond the NATO area may threaten our vital interests, we reaffirm the need to consult with a view to sharing assessments and identifying common objectives, taking full account of the effect on NATO security and defence capability, as well as of the national interests of member countries. Recognising that the policies which nations adopt in this field are a matter for national decision, we agree to examine collectively in the appropriate NATO bodies the requirements which may arise for the defence of the NATO area as a result of deployments by individual member states outside that area. Steps which may be taken by individual allies in the light of such consultations to facilitate possible military deployments beyond the NATO area can represent an important contribution to western security. "

It is considered in NATO that " developments beyond the NATO area " which " may threaten our vital interests " are only events involving a risk of conflict with the Soviet Union or its allies.

2.8. There are two responses which the European members of the alliance must make in the event of United States out-of-area deployments. First, they have to be prepared to compensate from their own resources not only for any United States redeployments from the NATO theatre to South-West Asia but also to make contingency plans for a situation where, in the event of a simultaneous military threat in Europe, United States reinforcements currently scheduled for rapid deployment to Europe were diverted instead to South-West Asia. Notwithstanding American assurances that the defence of Europe will remain the highest priority of the United States, the danger of a confrontation on two fronts, and of a Soviet feint or diversionary move to tie down United States forces in the Middle East or South-West Asia must be recognised. It can be met primarily by the provision of some additional forces by the Europeans themselves, although the intervention forces of some European nations, notably France and the United Kingdom, are by no means negligible and can have a valuable rôle to play out of the NATO area as their respective deployments in recent years to Chad, Zaïre, Zimbabwe and the Falkland Islands have shown.

2.9. Secondly, where under the Bonn arrangements quoted above NATO collectively recognises that some specific " development beyond the NATO area " does indeed " threaten our vital interests ", the European allies must be prepared to facilitate by action within the NATO area movements of United States forces, or indeed the forces of any other NATO country, passing through the NATO area. Overflying, staging and refuelling and port facilities of all sorts may be involved. The United States on the other hand cannot expect to secure, as it appears to be requesting, open ended agreements from its European allies to facilitate any future United States troop movements for whatever purpose they may be undertaken.

2.10. There is a third response which only certain European allies are in a position to offer. Often the early despatch of a very highly trained experienced force early in a crisis can prevent its development into a full-scale emergency. For this certain European airmobile or amphibious units, such as British marines, and French paratroops, would be particularly appropriate. Certainly an exercised and preplanned determination by some European countries to bear if only a small part of American out-of-area burdens would greatly enhance mutual understanding in the alliance. So would improved host-nation support, logistic infrastructure, refuelling, docking and maintenance facilities in Europe, not just for United States forces assigned to NATO but also for United States forces en route to South-West Asia.

2.11. Within the NATO area there is undoubtedly potential for increased rôle specialisation but this is politically a highly sensitive issue since defence impinges upon national susceptibilities on sovereignty in a direct way. Few countries are prepared for example totally to assign to other nations the protection of their air space or the defence of their territory. However, the United Kingdom could rationally specialise more in naval, air and intervention

forces but this could only be at the expense of its Brussels Treaty commitment on the continent in Germany which would be politically unwelcome to its allies. The Netherlands could logically concentrate its naval forces more in the North Sea and Channel, but that country understandably sets great store by its blue water anti-submarine rôle in the North Atlantic. The Federal Republic could at a cost increase still further its land and air forces in Central Europe although for demographic reasons it would be difficult and would have implications for inner-German relations. France in its latest defence plans has already decided to modernise the whole spectrum of its nuclear capability and Italy with its deployments to the peacekeeping forces in Sinai and Lebanon has demonstrated its intervention capability and concern for security within the Mediterranean basin as a whole.

2.12. In short, geography, history, manpower, industrial and economic potential already dictate a substantial degree of national specialisation. Only France and the United Kingdom in Europe maintain independent nuclear deterrents. Likewise, only Britain and France maintain balanced forces in all three services together with a substantial overseas intervention capability. The Federal Republic of Germany is the dominant European nation on the central front. The Netherlands concentrates on the larger naval vessels which appertain to an oceanic rôle at sea. The maritime rôle of Belgium is primarily coastal. In air defence there is a worrying tendency for Belgium to downgrade its air defence commitments, particularly as regards its contribution to modernising its section of the Hawk SAM belt. Denmark and Norway have evolved the concept of total defence and have large home guards. Italy plays a key rôle in all three services on the southern flank.

2.13. There is little prospect therefore of any dramatic initiative to achieve either a more equitable sharing of the burdens or a more cost effective defence by means of a rationalisation of national rôles and responsibilities. Modest progress can always be achieved but bold radical changes would be politically fraught with danger. It has to be borne in mind that for an alliance committed to deterrence its cohesion and unity in peacetime is no less important than its combat capability in war. Of course it would be logical for the British to do more at sea and to concentrate more on intervention forces than on the central front, but with the German armed forces already fully stretched and in view of the alliance strategy of a forward defence reliant upon substantial in-place allied force contributions, there is no immediate prospect of such a change in allied rôles. Nevertheless for the defence of Central Europe there are good military and economic reasons why the seven WEU nations at least should better co-ordinate their defence policies. Franco-German military co-operation is valuable for European security as is the integration of French air defence forces with the NATO early warning system. The security of the United Kingdom Air Defence Region and Eastern Atlantic and Channel Command areas are vital for the reinforcement of Europe. It would, therefore, be better if national initiatives like the United Kingdom defence review of 1981 and the French defence review of 1983 were the subject of prior consultation within at least the WEU Council and preferably the Eurogroup Council to facilitate appropriate readjustments within the alliance.

2.14. Although the preponderance of the Warsaw Pact in both armour and manpower on the central front puts a premium on the value of mobility, manoeuvre and concentrating defence firepower at the decisive point, there is such a narrow defence depth available in West Germany that the Federal Republic's total commitment to forward defence has been inevitably espoused by the alliance as a whole.

2.15. SACEUR's proposals for the use of emerging technology to develop new land/air tactical doctrines to interdict the battlefield more effectively and to prevent the follow-through of second echelon Warsaw Pact formations are promising but they are no panacea. They will be costly and should be regarded as part of the evolutionary process of improving the combat effectiveness of NATO as and when new weapons systems become available. Certainly they should increase the confidence of western public opinion as these doctrines would appreciably raise the nuclear threshold. But to satisfy Western European public opinion the procurement of the new intelligent weaponry and precision munitions essential to enhance NATO's air/land capability to offset Warsaw Pact armoured preponderance on the central front must be achieved on an equitable basis, and it should not distort further in the United States' favour the alliance defence equipment market.

III. *Measuring and comparing the defence effort*

(a) General

3.1. Measuring a country's "defence effort" as a general concept is not a simple task; definitions are needed before measurements can be made. It is still more difficult to compare the defence effort of one NATO country with that of another because of different national views of the requirements of defence resulting partly from social, economic and geographical diffe-

rences, and partly from different political attitudes to defence. Furthermore, financial comparisons involving currency conversion may be distorted when exchange rates do not closely reflect purchasing power. But at least the NATO countries can be compared in terms of a market economy; comparisons between NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact countries with their centrally-directed communist economies are more conjectural, not only because of the incomplete disclosure of defence expenditure in the official Soviet defence budget, but also because of the difficulty of assigning comparable prices to articles in a communist economy.

3.2. In the 1983 report to Congress on allied contributions to the common defence, the United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. Weinberger, points out that " NATO has not developed a precise definition of the burden, nor a methodology for measuring it ". Recalling that " burden-sharing is not a simple comparison of expenditures but must somehow translate into equitable sacrifice relative to a nation's capability ", he quotes from a recent NATO report to the effect that :

> " In the last analysis our assessment and comparison of burdens required a collective act of judgment which cannot be substituted by any mechanical principle... " [What should be] " aimed at is an assessment of the reasonableness of the defence effort of each country, having regard to its overall economic position as shown by a series of economic indicators. This reasonableness would involve a broad equality of sacrifice which takes into account each country's capacity. "

Mr. Weinberger continues that " what might be added is that the political burden should also be considered, as well as offsetting benefits, such as industrial contracts and jobs, technological fallout, foreign military sales, and political freedom of action ".

(b) Defence expenditure

3.3. Defence effort is usually assessed in terms of defence expenditure and in terms of manpower in the armed services – the so-called defence inputs. It is more difficult to assess the defence capacity which can be produced from those resources. Countries differ in the items which they include in their defence budgets, and one of the earliest tasks undertaken by the NATO international staff, in the framework of the annual review, was to draw up a common definition of " defence expenditure " for NATO purposes. This (unpublished) definition adopted in 1952 is known to include government payments to service pension funds, and costs of internal security forces that would serve under military command in war. In general, defence budgets to NATO definition tend to be slightly higher than national defence budgets submitted to parliament, largely because it was easier to agree on a common NATO definition by including items already included in the defence budget of at least one NATO country, rather than by excluding items not included in the national definitions of a majority of countries. Still excluded from the NATO definition, however, are items which certain NATO countries would consider defence-related. These include actual payments of service pensions, war damage, civil defence, strategic stockpiling of industrial war materials, and, in the case of Germany, major host-country support costs, economic assistance to Berlin and Turkey. Figures of defence expenditure at Appendix I are given to NATO definition and have been published regularly in committee reports each year for more than twenty years. The European countries today provide about 38 % of total NATO defence expenditure compared with 24 % in 1958 when the committee first published these statistics.

3.4. It should be noted that defence effort measured in this way is the total defence effort of every NATO country, irrespective of the tasks to which particular elements of the armed forces may be assigned. Not all defence tasks assumed by certain NATO countries would be recognised by a majority of the allies as being " NATO-related " defence tasks. In fact no attempt has been made to assess defence effort in terms of " NATO-related " defence, partly because of the flexibility of defence forces which, for example, recently permitted the United Kingdom to repossess the Falkland Islands in an operation which most NATO countries would not regard as " NATO-related ", whereas the bulk of the forces concerned normally operate within the NATO area where they are allocated very much to NATO-related tasks. Similar examples can be cited in the case of military operations conducted in recent years by several NATO countries

(c) Manpower contribution

3.5. Appendix I.B. compares the present manpower contribution of the NATO countries to the armed forces. The European countries collectively provide 60 % of total NATO military manpower. The 1983 Weinberger report referred to above draws attention to recent trends in armed forces manpower – United States manpower declined by 19 % between 1971 and 1981, while non-United States NATO manpower declined by about 5 % between 1974 and 1975, partly because of reductions in British, Italian and Portuguese forces which more than offset increases in Turkish manpower. Overall, the United States share of the allied total (NATO plus Japan in the United States report)

fell from 45.9 % in 1971 to 41.7 % in 1981. As the European countries except Luxembourg and the United Kingdom rely on conscription, whereas the United States has purely regular forces, there are further hidden defence advantages and economic costs of lost opportunity in the European contribution. The defence advantage is the large pool of trained reserve manpower which conscription automatically leaves in the population at large after completion of compulsory service. This can be particularly impressive and important as in the case of the Federal Republic of Germany which can mobilise its Landwehr rapidly, and in the case of Denmark and Norway which have large home guards and a concept of " total defence ".

3.6. The hidden opportunity costs of conscripting manpower can be assessed in various ways. " If allied manpower costs for 1979 are computed at United States pay rates, the value of non-United States NATO total defence would increase relatively to the United States by approximately 20 % reaching a total approximately equal to that of the United States. As a result, several countries such as Canada, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, whose average pay and allowances are higher than in the United States, would have their defence expenditures adjusted downwards; others, notably Turkey, Italy, Portugal and France, would see theirs increased. " [1]

(d) Ability to contribute and comparison between NATO countries

3.7. Defence expenditure statistics published by NATO (Appendix I) include some measures of ability to contribute – gross domestic product; population; and gross domestic product per capita – and derive from these comparative statistics of national contributions to allied defence. The most widely quoted are defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and armed forces as a percentage of the active population because international comparison between these figures is not distorted by conversion of national currencies. Defence expenditure itself, and defence expenditure per capita can only be compared when converted to a single currency with the reservations noted above.

3.8. The are, however, limitations in measuring defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Not all countries can be expected to devote the same percentage of their domestic product to defence – countries with the lowest per capita domestic product will be expected to make a prior claim on it to provide basic living standards for the population before making any significant contribution to allied defence beyond a local domestic defence effort. The " wealthier " countries in terms of GDP per capita can be expected to have a larger " available " GDP after basic living standards have been met, part of which can then reasonably be devoted to allied defence. The graph at Appendix II, therefore, shows defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP plotted against GDP per capita. Surprisingly, this graph shows a very significant defence effort on the part of the three poorest countries of the alliance – Turkey, Portugal and Greece – and a below average defence effort among some of the wealthier countries – Norway, Canada, Denmark and Luxembourg.

3.9. The comparative prosperity of countries as measured by GDP per capita, converted to dollars at current exchange rates, shows a relative decline in the position of the United States compared with the other allies over the last decade. At $11,348 per head for 1980, the United States came only seventh among NATO countries, among which Norway led with $13,766. This perception of ability to contribute has bedevilled the transatlantic argument on burden-sharing which is discussed in the following section. It has, however, been pointed out that the exchange rates used in this calculation, and inflation rates assumed for constant price comparisons over a period of years, do not accurately reflect the purchasing power of national currencies. When conversions are carried out using purchasing power parity instead of fluctuating exchange rates, the United States remains a significantly wealthier country measured by GDP per capita ($11,348 in 1980) than any other member of the alliance. Luxembourg, the second in this table, had only $9,430 [1].

3.10. Since March 1981, in response to the amendment introduced by Senator Levin to the fiscal year 1981 Defence Authorisation Act, the Secretary of Defence has submitted an annual report to Congress on allied commitments to defence spending (1981) and allied contributions to the common defence (1982 and 1983). This report goes into burden-sharing in considerable statistical detail. In particular it has investigated other possible measures of ability to contribute than those mentioned above. The most original feature is a " prosperity index " which is derived for each country first by multiplying that country's percentage share of the total allied GDP by its per capita GDP expressed as a percentage of the highest per capita GDP of any NATO country (Denmark).

1. United States Secretary of Defence report to Congress on allied contributions to the common defence, March 1982.

1. Sharing the defence burden, Rainer W. Rupp, Economic Directorate of the NATO International Staff in NATO Review, December 1982.

NATO countries' gross domestic product per head in 1980, in US $

Country	Based on exchange rates			Based on purchasing power parity		
	US $	Index NATO = 100.0	Rank	US $	Index NATO = 100.0	Rank
(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Germany	13,306	137.1	1	9,411	106.3	3
Denmark	12,957	133.5	2	9,094	102.7	4
France	12,136	125.0	3	9,046	102.2	5
Belgium	12,084	124.5	4	8,924	100.8	6
Luxembourg	12,059	124.2	5	9,430	106.5	2
Netherlands	11,851	122.1	6	8,599	97.1	7
United States	11,348	116.9	7	11,348	128.2	1
United Kingdom	9,344	96.3	8	7,622	86.1	8
Italy	6,906	71.1	9	7,205	81.4	9
Spain	5,648	58.2	10	5,843	66.0	10
Greece	4,236	43.6	11	4,713	53.2	11
Portugal	2,423	25.0	12	3,675	41.5	12
Other NATO countries (a)	5,082	52.3	×	5,508	62.2	×
TOTAL NATO	9,708	100.0	×	8,852	100.0	×

(a) Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey.

The resultant product is totalled for all NATO countries and an individual country " prosperity index " is expressed as its percentage share of the allied total (" allied " is taken in the Secretary of Defence's report as the total for NATO plus Japan). Other indicators of ability to contribute contained in the report are: percentage share of total allied GDP; percentage share of total allied population; per capita GDP as a percent of the highest nation.

3.11. The same report lists seven selected indicators of defence contribution: defence spending as a share of total allied expenditure; defence spending as a percentage increase since 1971; percentage share of total allied defence manpower; percentage increase in defence manpower since 1971; total active and reserve defence manpower share of the allied total; ground forces as a percentage share of total allied ground forces (expressed in armoured division equivalents); and tactical combat aircraft as a percentage share of the allied total. Selected indicators from this report, comparing contribution with ability to contribute, are reproduced at Appendix III.

3.12. Mr. Weinberger's 1983 report referred to above points out that:

> " There are several economic factors which contribute to a full understanding of the burden actually borne by NATO members in their collective defence. The nation's particular economic situation and its balance of payments position are important short-term determinants of the assets a nation will find it feasible to make available for its defence. A nation's stage of economic development is a longer-term and less tractable limit on a nation's potential commitment. Other more or less indirect contributions should also be taken into account: resource transfers to less developed countries, both official and private; contributions in kind, e.g. land, buildings and facilities; lost tax revenue; and lost commercial opportunities. Non-NATO defence expenses, such as the German Government's defence of Berlin, must also be considered in order to round out the total expenditure picture. "

(e) Trends of defence expenditure

3.13. Figures for defence expenditure for a single year are less informative than the trend of defence expenditure over a number of years, partly because with some countries expenditure in a single year may be distorted through the costs of some equipment procurement programme falling particularly heavily in one year. Also in 1977 NATO defence ministers agreed to increase defence spending " in the region of 3 % per annum in real terms " over the planning period 1979 to 1984, reaffirmed in 1980 for the period up to 1986. The extent to which countries have fulfilled this commitment

can be seen from the table of annual defence expenditure, if expressed in constant prices (to allow for inflation). NATO, however, has not yet been able to reach agreement on the deflators to be applied to defence expenditure in the different countries in order to produce a fair statement of expenditure at constant prices. As a consequence of this, the official NATO defence expenditure statistics published each December do not include a series of country expenditures at constant prices. Curiously, however, for the last few years these statistics have included figures of defence expenditure per capita for six successive years expressed at constant prices. These can only have been produced through the use of some provisional deflator by the NATO staff, and by multiplying by the populations concerned it is possible to deduce from these figures a table of total defence expenditure at constant prices. This is shown at Appendix IV. Annual percentage increases in real terms actually achieved by member countries from 1978 to 1982 have fluctuated widely between one year and another, and between different countries, Greece showing a decrease of 8.8 % between 1979 and 1980, while Luxembourg recorded the largest increase of 16.3 % from 1979 to 1980.

(f) NATO-Warsaw Pact comparisons

3.14. It is instructive to extend the foregoing methodology for international comparison of defence *inputs* to a comparison of the defence efforts of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Most publicity is attracted to East-West comparisons of defence *output* – assessments of the defence capability the inputs produce. As pointed out in paragraph 3.1, however, to make input comparisons an attempt has to be made to assign values to the Soviet defence effort in terms of western market economies. It is of course widely accepted that the officially published Soviet defence budget records only part of defence expenditure, and is known to exclude the large amount spent on research and development.

3.15. For the past fourteen years, the United States Government has published annually estimates of Soviet and Warsaw Pact defence expenditure in the ACDA series " World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers ". Figures for defence expenditure in dollars given in this publication are calculated by the CIA on the " building block " method whereby separate estimates are made of the value of research and development (nearly a quarter of the total); procurement of equipment and construction (about one-half); and operating costs (a little over one-quarter, of which 60 % is personnel costs). These official United States estimates for NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the United States and the Soviet Union are shown at Appendix V. The March 1981 version of World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, quoting constant 1977 prices, shows NATO as a whole to have outspent the Warsaw Pact in defence spending in every year from 1970 to 1978 – the last covered in the publication. The March 1982 version, however, using constant 1978 prices, shows total Warsaw Pact expenditure slightly exceeding that of NATO for the years 1976 to 1978 inclusive, while NATO again overtook the Warsaw Pact in 1979. What, of course, is more disturbing for the United States authorities was the trend of Soviet defence expenditure in these calculations which from being less than that of the United States up to 1970, significantly overtook it in the years 1971 to 1979 – the last quoted in the 1982 edition. Press reports on 7th April of the 1983 edition referred to an estimate for Soviet expenditure of $188 billion in 1980 compared with United States expenditure of $131 billion. However, the press one month earlier [1] reported that the CIA estimates on which the WMEAT figures were based had been revised for the year 1981 to show Soviet expenditure of $160 billion compared with United States $154 billion. The basis of the reduction was CIA intelligence analysis that the Soviet Union had produced less military equipment than predicted, leading the CIA to revise downwards its estimate of annual increase in Soviet defence expenditure from 3 or 4 % to 2 %. Accepted by the State Department, the CIA findings had been disputed by the United States Defence Intelligence Agency which had suggested that original estimates of expenditure were correct, but that higher costs had led to less equipment being produced.

3.16. Independent academic comparisons of Soviet and United States, and of Warsaw Pact and NATO expenditure claim that the CIA dollar estimates of the components of the Soviet defence effort, particularly the research and development and manpower costs, are overstated. The following bar chart shows two official and three independent academic comparisons for 1978 which show an excess of NATO over Warsaw Pact expenditure ranging from about 40 % to 5 % (excluding of course the Warsaw Pact estimate).

3.17. Estimates of numbers in the armed forces are not subject to the uncertainties involved in cost comparisons between the unlike economies of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The United States ACDA WMEAT reports referred to above show total NATO armed forces for 1979 (the latest year available in that publication) of 5.29 million compared with 6.16 mil-

1. International Herald Tribune, Guardian, 4th March 1983.

lion for the Warsaw Pact. The IISS Military Balance estimate for that year is 4.88 million for NATO compared with 4.76 million for the Warsaw Pact; the difference is unexplained. The latest IISS estimates for 1982 are NATO 5.35 million; Warsaw Pact 4.82 million.

Military expenditures of the major alliances, 1978 – five views



1 Defence budgets and official rates of exchange, as reported to UN.

2. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-78.

3. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1979-80. (IISS has since discontinued publication of an estimate for USSR).

4. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI Yearbook 1981.

5. This publication, Table II.

Source World Military and Social Expenditures 1981. Ruth Leger Sivard. Publisher World Priorities Inc.

Burden-sharing in NATO compared with the Warsaw Pact

	Defence effort	
	Man-power	Expen-diture
United States	40%	62%
Rest of NATO	60%	38%
Soviet Union	81%	93%
Rest of Warsaw Pact	19%	7%

3.18. As far as burden-sharing within the Warsaw Pact is concerned, it should of course be pointed out that the allies of the Soviet Union contribute a far smaller percentage of the total Warsaw Pact effort than the Europeans contribute to NATO, a situation that reflects the disparity in populations and national products of the countries concerned.

IV. *The transatlantic debate*

4.1. The burden-sharing debate at the present time has arisen largely through United States, especially Congressional, perceptions of supposed shortcomings on the part of the European allies. These include inadequate European contributions to what the United States believes the allied defence effort should be, or failure of the European allies to follow United States policy in economic and political relations with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. Typical of some attitudes in Congress, seeking reductions in public spending yet believing that United States superiority in naval and air power was its chief guarantee of protection from the Soviet Union, was the enactment by the Senate last autumn requiring the level of United States troops stationed ashore in Europe by the end of fiscal year 1983 (30th September) not to exceed their real levels at September 1982 (315,600). The move led by Senator Stevens, Chairman of the Defence Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, had originally sought a freeze at the lower level of March 1980.

4.2. The United States Administration itself has to face both ways – at times assuring Congress that the European allies make a large proportionate contribution to the total allied defence effort, at others exhorting the Europeans to make a bigger effort, or to align themselves more closely with United States policy towards the Soviet Union.

4.3. Typical of the first is evidence given by Mr. Eagleburger, Under-Secretary of State, to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 26th March 1982 on "the critical importance of maintaining the United States military presence in Europe". Noting that over the thirty years since the creation of NATO "the United States-Soviet balance has moved from United States superiority to, at best, a precarious balance, with powerful adverse trends", he asserted that "we are now running hard to make up for nearly a generation of neglect in our military programmes. The allies in contrast, have turned in a remarkably steady performance. Roughly speaking they have sustained an increase of between 2 and 3 % for more than a decade."

4.4. The Secretary of Defence's annual reports to Congress referred to above [1], submitted in accordance with the Levin amendment to the 1981 Defence Authorisation Act, provide a systematic, objective, and on the whole optimistic assessment of the European contribution. In the words of the 1981 report:

> " There is no question that the United States and its allies can provide the forces necessary to meet the Soviet threat and to execute agreed NATO strategy. Collectively we have more than adequate resources – human, industrial, technological and financial – to provide a reasonable margin of security...
>
> The NATO allies maintain on active duty about three million men and women compared with about two million for the United States and 250,000 for Japan. If we include reserves... the allied total is over six million compared with about three million for the United States. If we add civilian defence manpower... the totals come to just under eight million for the allies and just over four million for the United States. The GDP of all the non-United States NATO nations combined represents around 45 % of the NATO and Japan total. Our NATO allies account for over 60 % of total NATO and Japan ground combat capability, around 55 % of the tactical air force combat aircraft and around 50 % of the total tonnage of naval surface combatants and submarines. "

4.5. " ... We have devised for the purposes of this report a number of indices of burden-sharing and have developed an overall assessment. We believe this approach – while imperfect and certainly not agreed by the allies – can give a better perspective of burden-sharing than any one individual indicator. Using this formulation, the aggregated NATO allies appear to be shouldering their fair share of the total NATO and Japan defence burden. "

4.6. The 1983 report finds similar percentages for the non-United States contribution to the forces of NATO and Japan combined. Measuring ground forces in armoured division equivalents, this shows a contribution by Europe and Canada combined of 56% of all ground forces available to NATO plus Japan, compared with less than 40% provided by the United States. Measuring navies by tonnage, the corresponding percentages are 33% compared with 64 % for the United States; or, when measured in terms of principal combat ships, over 40% provided by Europe plus Canada compared with 50% by the United States. For totals of combat aircraft the figures are 48% each for the United States and Europe. If the Japanese percentage is subtracted from the totals concerned, the corresponding contributions work out as follows:

Percentage contributions (recalculated to exclude Japan)

	Ground forces (as armoured division equivalents)	Naval forces		Tactical aircraft
		by tonnage	by principal surface combatant	
European NATO + Canada	58	34	45	50
United States ...	42	66	55	50
NATO ..	100	100	100	100

Mr. Weinberger's 1983 report concludes, as previous reports have done, that " based on the major quantifiable measures examined for this report, the United States appears to be doing somewhat more than its fair share of the NATO and Japan total ", but recognises that: " The allies might argue: (1) that the United States is getting full value for the extra effort it appears to be expending and (2) that its leadership rôle obligates it to do more than simply achieve a statistically computed fair share ." It recognises that " the non-United States NATO allies appear to be shouldering roughly their fair share of the NATO and Japan defence burden... " but " among the non-United States NATO nations there are wide differences regarding the amount of burden shared, with some countries doing far less than seems equitable. "

4.7. The informal meeting of defence ministers of all European NATO countries, except France but now including Spain, known as Eurogroup regularly publishes its assessment of the European contribution to defence within the alliance. The last communiqué of 29th November 1982 noted a more favourable European share than did the foregoing reports:

> "4. Within the NATO partnership, Eurogroup countries participating in NATO's integrated military structure make a substantial and significant contribution to the alliance's military forces. Their active armed forces total some two-and-a-

1. On allied commitments to defence spending, March 1981; and on allied contributions to the common defence, March 1982.

half million and they provide approximately 75 % of NATO's readily available ground forces in Europe, 75 % of the tanks, 65 % of the air forces and 60 % of the warships... "

A list of new military equipment being introduced by the Eurogroup countries was appended. The percentages would of course be increased if account were taken of French forces.

4.8. In the light of the foregoing authoritative assessments, and the Rapporteur's extensive discussions in NATO, SHAPE, and Bonn, the committee concludes that on the whole the European countries are providing a very reasonable share of the allied defence burden. Required improvements in the European effort call for a long-term commitment to steady enhancement, particularly in " sustainability " of the conventional forces – the ability to offer sustained resistance beyond the first few days of any possible attack. This requires an improvement in the ammunition stockpiles of many countries and in rapidly available reserves to relieve the combat fatigue of forward troops, although there is more insistence in some quarters on the need to be able to " re-establish deterrence " if the forward defences were in danger of being overrun. Certainly a 4 % increase in real terms in defence budgets called for by SACEUR to provide new generations of conventional equipment and weapons to permit detailed reconnaissance, target acquisition and selective attack on the second echelon of Soviet forces will not be forthcoming; the need is rather for steady investment in new weapons technology as proven weapon systems become available. Mr. Weinberger's emerging technology on which he has reported to NATO can be incorporated only progressively into the NATO armoury.

4.9. With the present United States Administration there have been significant failures of allied consultation. President Reagan's address to the National Association of Evangelicals on 8th March 1983 – dubbed the " Darth Vaders " speech by the Washington establishment – portraying the Soviet Union as an implacably hostile power reveals an outlook not shared by European, governments. His proposal for research on new ABM systems in his television address of 23rd March – dubbed the " Star Wars " speech – was not conveyed by Mr. Weinberger attending the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO defence ministers in Portugal a few hours earlier the same day. Mr. Weinberger was either himself unaware that the proposal would be made, or still hoping that President Reagan would heed the advice of Department of Defence advisers not to make the proposal. It is a lesser failure of communication that the otherwise valuable briefings given to the committee in the Pentagon only a few hours before the Presidential speech should have contained no inkling of the ABM proposal.

4.10. Differences between the present United States Administration and European governments in general policy issues related to defence are frankly recognised in the Secretary of State's 1982 and 1983 reports on allied contributions to the common defence already quoted in the burden-sharing context above :

> " Emphasising social and economic viability as their first priority, many Europeans continue to view the Soviet threat less seriously than the United States. Moreover, United States and European views of how best to counter the Soviet threat remain divergent, in spite of major United States efforts over the past year to portray the threat graphically for European élites and publics... Europeans believe Soviet policy can be moderated through traditional forms of social, economic and political contact. They are less enthusiastic than the United States about the build-up of military force as a counter to the Soviet challenge. "

Referring to foregone economic benefits of defence contributions, the report continues :

> " Occasionally however the common interest is overridden. An especially painful example occurred during 1981 and early 1982 when several allies opted in favour of economic expediency rather than defence interests in agreeing to the West Siberian pipeline despite strong opposition by the United States. In this case some NATO countries chose to place the interests of their domestic industry ahead of national security considerations. This occurred even though it was far from clear that the cost of delivered natural gas would be economical, given the hidden charges in the long-term bargain struck with the Soviet Union. In addition, despite the projected massive dependency on Soviet gas of western areas such as Bavaria, no safeguards have been planned by the allies to offset the danger of a gas cut-off. This is a very critical development in the alliance and it may have serious consequences in the future. "

4.11. The 1983 report of the Secretary of State is a substantially longer document which, in taking fuller account of many political considerations, is more moderate in its criticism of United States allies but still attempts to prescribe

policies for allied countries with the single-minded aim of improving allied defence :

" While many of the solutions advanced by the peace movements of the last several years would, in fact, undermine the prospects for lasting stability and security in Europe and worldwide, these movements do reflect many deeply felt concerns of free citizens in our western democracies about key issues of survival and security and human decency. The United States and allied governments must deal seriously and forthrightly with these concerns, making their policies and the sacrifices needed to implement those policies intelligible and supportable by the citizenry.

Examining the record sheet against the backdrop of these political and politico-economic constraints, it is clear that despite shortfalls between targets and achievements there is much concrete evidence that our partners are taking seriously the principle of burden-sharing.

- In almost all cases, defence spending was accorded a degree of priority over social spending, i.e. while the defence budgets may not have increased in most cases at the target 3%, social spending was similarly restrained, or even decreased in real terms.

- The allies are moving forward steadily on bilateral arrangements for expanded wartime host nation support, much of which is committed on a non-reimbursable or on a 'cost' basis. They are also making further efforts to reduce United States costs in improving United States force facilities and the quality of life for United States personnel abroad.

- Over the past several years, the allies have agreed on expanded construction programmes financed by common funding under the NATO infrastructure programme. In response to United States concerns, criteria were broadened to permit financing of certain types of projects (e.g. storage sites for United States forces) previously funded entirely by the United States. By decision of the Defence Ministers in December 1982, NATO now has under study the question of further augmentation of the infrastructure programme.

- NATO's evaluation and planning procedures have been steadily improved to assure more rational and effective allocation of resources to assigned missions.

- In terms of political burden-sharing, the allies are holding firm, despite the Soviet 'peace offensive' and elements of organised domestic opposition, in their basic support of NATO's 1979 decision on intermediate-range nuclear force modernisation and arms control efforts.

- Our NATO partners have formally recognised that certain out-of-area developments can impact on vital western interest, that individual alliance members may have to take actions to protect those interests and that other partners can contribute to the common cause by facilitating such actions, while all take appropriate compensating measures to assure the maintenance of an adequate defence posture in Europe.

- While divergencies of policy have received major media and popular attention, there has, in fact, been a considerable degree of consensus on responses to such developments as Poland and Afghanistan, and a significant degree of allied co-operation and co-ordination, both with respect to national measures and to actions in multilateral fora. "

4.12. The 1983 report goes into some detail concerning support by NATO allies for United States " out of (NATO) area " activities, referring in particular to South-West Asia :

" NATO ministerial communiqués in the spring and fall of 1982, as well as the NATO summit declaration of June 1982, make clear allied recognition of the importance of out-of-area developments to the alliance. During 1982, we worked closely with our NATO allies in the development of specific steps which they can take to assist in the defence of vital western interests in South-West Asia. One of the most significant contributions the allies can make is to compensate for United States forces which might be diverted from the defence of NATO to deal with a South-West Asian contingency. The NATO military authorities are in the process of developing their recommendations for compensatory measures. We expect these to form the basis for specific compensatory measures to be included in the national force goals of the allies.

Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the allies have taken a number of actions in connection with South-West Asia. These include :

(1) Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, NATO developed a series of measures to improve alliance defence and give a clear signal of alliance resolve to the Soviets. For the most part, these measures called for the acceleration of

measures already in the 1981-86 NATO force goals and in the long-term defence programme. They included such areas as acceleration of the introduction of major equipment, readiness, reinforcement, reserve mobilisation, war reserve stocks, maritime measures, air defence, host nation support, communications, electronic warfare, and aid to Portugal and Turkey. Many of these measures were implemented and most NATO nations participated in their implementation.

(2) The United Kingdom and France, and more recently Italy, have contributed directly to stability in the SWA area through deployment of forces to the region.

(3) Some NATO allies maintain continuing security relationships in SWA: The United Kingdom maintains close ties and provides advisors in Oman. France maintains a close security relationship with Djibouti and maintains forces there.

(4) The United Kingdom has provided support through arrangements for United States use for Diego Garcia.

(5) Eight nations have contributed to United States RDJTF annual exercises in South-West Asia in 1980, 81 and 82, through provision of overflight rights and en route access and support for deploying United States forces.

(6) Ten NATO nations with suitable vessels have contributed to the commitment of 600 allied commercial ships to supplement United States shipping in the reinforcement of NATO-Europe. These ship commitments would make possible a greater United States effort in South-West Asia should a SWA action and the need for reinforcement of Europe become simultaneous.

(7) Nine NATO nations with suitable aircraft have committed allied civil long-range cargo aircraft and are in process of committing civil wide-body passenger aircraft to supplement United States aircraft in the reinforcement of NATO-Europe. These European aircraft also provide the United States greater flexibility with respect to a SWA deployment."

4.13. The tendency of the present United States Administration to assume that its approach to East-West relations is the correct one for the alliance as a whole has led to an increase in consultation on defence and security issues among the European countries independently of the United States, and for calls for further improvement in such arrangements – discussed in the next chapter.

V. *The European pillar*

(a) General

5.1. There is a growing feeling today among European members of NATO, reflected strongly among members of the committee, that the European members of the alliance must concert their views, on the main principles of allied defence policy and strategy as they affect Europeans.

5.2. Lord Carrington, in the 1983 Alistair Buchan Memorial lecture, delivered in London on 21st April 1983, called for a more confident approach to East-West relations, stressing the existing military strength of the West:

> "Today we are entitled to approach our problems, and particularly those of East-West relations, with more confidence. We are now in a position of considerable strength, not only militarily, but economically and politically too... It is a plain, simple fact that, for a third of a century, the alliance has succeeded in this primary aim of deterring an attack on Western Europe. This has been achieved by a combination of military strength and political will... Do not let us overlook the size of existing nuclear forces in the West, not to speak of their accuracy. Look too at the quality of our conventional forces and take into account the advantages enjoyed by the armies of a free alliance, compared with the conscripted countries of the Warsaw Pact... It is my view that one of the reasons for the upsurge of nuclear debate in the West is that this mood of sobriety and calm resolution has not always been encouraged by western governments... We must also breed a mood of sober and responsible self-confidence about the military balance. We must know ourselves when enough is enough, and we must have the patience as well as the power to dissuade the Russians from their antiquated habits of over-insurance. And finally, we must make absolutely clear our belief that arms control is in everybody's self-interest, not only economically but in terms of real security... Our own tradition must be for the peaceful resolution of potential conflict through energetic and forceful dialogue. The notion that we should face the Russians down in a silent war of nerves, broken only by bursts of megaphone diplomacy, is based on a misconception of our own values, of Soviet behaviour, and of the anxious aspirations of our own peoples... There are those who regard dialogue itself as dangerous – and so it might be if we were talking from a clear position of weakness.

But armed as we are, and with the long-term structural advantages the West enjoys, who can possibly claim that this was the case ?"

5.3. Lord Carrington also stressed the rôle of Europe :

" The United States was among the prime movers towards European unity after the war. There were some suggestions last year that, economically as well as politically the Americans might be having some regrets... The political integration of Europe does not threaten the alliance... indeed, it is a major contribution to its cohesion... Nor can there any longer be any serious suspicion about domination : ' one free people cannot govern another free people '... but the increased weight of Europe in the alliance brings increased responsibilities... I can think of three areas where much could be done at minimal cost. The first is in the rationalisation of a production of arms... the second is in a more rational division of labour between major European members of the alliance... the third area where Europe can pull its weight more effectively lies in what I would call national security consciousness... Like the French, we would do well to think of defence in more national terms. If we do, we come inescapably to the conclusion that nationally we can do little to augment the combined power of the alliance apart from fulfilling our NATO obligations ; but that collectively in Europe we could do much. Over the past few years, we have developed a new political consciousness in Europe through the mechanisms of political co-operation. We now need to build, equally cautiously, but equally purposefully, a European security consciousness too. Not as an alternative to the Atlantic partnership, but as a complement to it. "

5.4. Mr. Mauroy, the French Prime Minister, in his traditional address to the French *Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale* on 20th September 1983, devoted half his speech to French loyalty to its alliances and its contribution to reducing tension and crises in the world. While stressing the autonomy of French decision, he affirmed that " France has always asserted its loyalty to the objectives of the Atlantic Alliance and has known how to demonstrate it. " He recalled the French links with NATO and the existence of staff agreements with NATO commands for the possible effective operation of French forces. But " if we feel very much at ease within the Atlantic Alliance, we do not want to develop over the years an alliance with different speeds "... which would happen " if our integrated partners were to accept for themselves additional obligations which do not appear in the signed treaties and which, for our part, we would refuse... From the American side over the last ten years the trend has been towards a ' globalisation ' of all terms of the threat. Consequently, in their eyes, the response also should be ' globalised '. This is true in particular in the economic field. Some would like to see East-West economic relations integrated into the security strategy of the alliance... France, for its part, does not share this analysis. To embark upon a logic of economic blockade is to embark on the logic of war. ... the alliance must not take this road. It must not go outside its ' subject '. " Similarly, Mr. Mauroy was opposed to a geographical enlargement of the zone of the alliance which was limited to the Atlantic area, north of the Tropic of Cancer : " Considering that the Soviet threat has become worldwide, the temptation has arisen for an equally worldwide response. This is not the French view. Extending beyond the Atlantic region, an East-West area of confrontation, in fact, faces third countries with a Manichean choice... Moreover, we have specifically refused this, both in Central America as well as for Chad or the Middle East. " Mr. Mauroy did not, however, exclude South-West Asia, where French contribution to stability and security relationships has been welcomed by the United States [1] and Mr. Mauroy recognised that " problems outside the North Atlantic area can be the subject of an exchange of views between allies, but they remain matters for purely national decision. "

5.5. Like Lord Carrington, Mr. Mauroy then turned for a while to security in Europe. " At the beginning of this address I made a precise analysis of our links with our partners in the Atlantic Alliance, since everyone can see they are decisive. *But France endeavours to maintain other links, in Western European Union, for instance. This European organisation is the only one which can tackle matters relating to defence and security... France considers that European solidarity enhances Atlantic solidarity without being merged with it. The similarity of the geo-strategic problems facing the European countries should lead them to take specific common decisions. In this respect, WEU can be a privileged forum for reflection.* "[2] Here, Mr. Mauroy appeared to echo a suggestion made by a former French Foreign Minister, Mr. Jobert, who said to the WEU Assembly in November 1973 : " If all its members were in agreement, WEU could constitute a valid framework for the dialogue and reflection which I have just suggested. " Mr. Mauroy then recalled that WEU was also the only European

1. See paragraph 4.12 above.
2. Rapporteur's italics.

body where elected representatives could discuss defence. He continued: " In the years to come we must devote our efforts to developing the means of Europe's independence without sacrificing what has, for the past thirty years, been the independent guarantee of our security... The notion of the defence of Europe must be distinguished from that of European defence. The idea of European defence implies an integrated collective organisation which could be set up only if a single political authority existed. Conversely, the European public's awareness of the imbalances which have emerged in the East-West ratio of forces makes the idea of the ' defence of Europe ' particularly topical. " Mr. Mauroy's practical suggestions which followed included a reference to the new emphasis given to the military provisions of the Franco-German treaty of 1963, and the need for a concerted armaments production policy in Europe, a concept which France appears to be promoting through the recent tripartite meeting of the defence ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

5.6. The European pillar of the alliance must be strengthened. That observation has been made many times before. The question on which there is less agreement is on what topics and to what extent should the Europeans consult independently, and in what institutional framework? Several are available and are considered separately below.

(b) Western European Union

5.7. Western European Union is primarily a defence organisation as Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty makes clear. After signature of the treaty by the original five members in 1948, the Brussels Treaty Organisation, as WEU was then known, created its own Western Union Defence Organisation and established the first post-war allied headquarters at Fontainebleau. But even in the eyes of the five signatories WUDO was a stop-gap, awaiting the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty which took place the following year. Once the NATO integrated military structure was in place the BTO dissolved its own defence organisation as superfluous and transferred its existing military headquarters and infrastructure programme to NATO. The relevant resolution of the Council of 20th September 1950 is worth quoting:

> " *Resolution by the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Organisation of 20th December 1950 on the future of the organisation of western defence in the light of the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation military structure* [1]
>
> 1. The Consultative Council have considered the suggestion of the North Atlantic Council that the Brussels Treaty powers should review the status of the Western Union Defence Organisation in the light of the establishment of an overall North Atlantic Treaty Command Organisation.
>
> 2. The Consultative Council have noted:
>
> (*i*) that it has been decided to dissolve the existing European Regional Planning Groups with their Regional Chiefs-of-Staff and principal Staff Officers Committees;
>
> (*ii*) the view of the North Atlantic Council that, when the new NATO Command Organisation is established, it will be unnecessary and undesirable to have a parallel Western Union Command and that the new Headquarters suggested for Western Europe should be directly under SHAPE and should not be responsible to the Western Union Defence Committee.
>
> 3. The Council agree that, in the light of this re-organisation, the continued existence of the Western Union Defence Organisation in its present form is no longer necessary. They accordingly instruct the Permanent Commission to consider in consultation with the Western Union Military Committee, acting on the instructions of the Defence Ministers, how the proposed re-organisation can best be effected and what military machinery, if any, needs to be retained under the Brussels Treaty.
>
> 4. The Council affirm that these new arrangements will in no way affect the obligations assumed towards each other by the signatory powers under the Brussels Treaty. In particular, the Consultative Council established under Article VII, including the non-military organs set up under the Council, will continue to function, and the reorganisation of the military machinery shall not affect the right of the Western Union Defence Ministers and Chiefs-of-Staff to meet as they please to consider matters of mutual concern to the Brussels Treaty powers. "

It will be noted in particular that under paragraph 4 of the resolution the new arrangements " shall not affect the right of the Western Union defence ministers and chiefs-of-staff to meet as

1. Reproduced previously in Document 29, 3rd October 1956, and Document 557, 16th November 1971.

they please to consider matters of mutual concern to the Brussels Treaty powers ".

5.8. However, since that date defence ministers and chiefs-of-staff have not met in the Brussels Treaty framework, and when the treaty was modified in 1954 to create the seven member WEU the 1950 resolution was in effect confirmed in the new Article IV of the modified treaty which expressly provides that NATO military bodies will not be duplicated :

> " In the execution of the treaty, the high contracting parties and any organs established by them under the treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
>
> Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters. "

In fact, under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty the military provisions concerning levels of forces and control of armaments incorporated in Protocols Nos. II, III and IV, are inextricably linked to the integrated military structure of NATO which is made responsible in part for implementation of some of the WEU treaty obligations.

5.9. While the Council recognises that its defence *responsibilities* – notably under Articles V and VIII of the treaty – are not diminished by post-1950 arrangements, the desirable extent of the Council's defence *activities* has been the subject of debate between the Council and the Assembly ever since the latter was established under the same 1954 modifications. As a consequence of this debate the Council was led in 1957 to define formally the scope of its residual defence and related activities. The seven governments considered that the activities of the Council in the field of defence questions and armaments should relate only to :

> " (*a*) matters which the contracting parties wish to raise, especially under Article VIII;
>
> (*b*) the level of forces of member states;
>
> (*c*) the maintenance of certain United Kingdom forces on the continent;
>
> (*d*) the Agency for the Control of Armaments;
>
> (*e*) the Standing Armaments Committee. " [1]

1. Second annual report of the Council, Document 37, 25th February 1957.

Since then it is understood that no government has in fact raised any matter under Article VIII of the treaty, so that Council defence activities have been limited to discussion of force level limitations, arms control and Standing Armaments Committee matters discussed in another report by the committee[1]. As the committee points out in that report, on the basis of extensive quotations from ministers of member countries who have addressed the Assembly, although member governments today are unanimous in stressing the importance of the *Assembly's* functions as a contribution to public debate on defence issues, no WEU government has proposed that the defence activities of the WEU *Council* should be increased; indeed, Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of France, reporting to the French National Assembly on 6th June 1982 on his earlier address to the WEU Assembly, commented specifically on the lack of any great future for the executive of WEU :

> " The other day, on behalf of the French Government, I addressed the Assembly of WEU, not because the executive of WEU seems to have a very great future but because the Assembly is an elected one... competent to handle these [defence] matters, which must be discussed among members of parliament... "

The French Prime Minister, Mr. Mauroy, on the other hand, has recently referred to WEU as a possible " privileged forum for reflection " (see paragraph 5.5. above).

5.10. The fact that despite intermittent urging by the Assembly over the last twenty-five years the Council since 1950 has chosen not to discuss allied defence planning, is not in itself a reason why it should not do so at the present time. It should be noted that, on 21st September 1983, the WEU Council at Permanent Representative level issued a press release in which it " strongly condemned the destruction of a civil airliner of the Korean Airlines on 31st August 1983. They deeply deplored this action caused by Soviet military aircraft which resulted in the tragic loss of a great number of human lives... ". This appears to have been the first political statement by the WEU Council to have been made public since April 1970, and was partly motivated by the failure of the European political co-operation machinery under Greek chairmanship to issue any similar condemnation. The committee believes that without seeking to replace the organs of NATO concerned with detailed allied defence planning, and taking full account of member states' obligations to NATO, the Council of WEU

1. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council, Document 948.

should today deepen and improve its defence deliberations. The advantages of reviving Brussels Treaty defence activities in this way are obvious: the seven member countries collectively provide the great bulk of the European defence contribution to NATO ; their forces man the vital central front: they include all the most important defence production industries in Europe ; they include all the countries on whose territory it is proposed to deploy a new generation of intermediate-range nuclear missiles if the INF talks fail. Most important, France, which has withdrawn its forces from the integrated military structure of NATO, remains a full member of WEU as does the only other European nuclear power, the United Kingdom.

5.11. There is, of course, a political disadvantage in discussing collective defence policy among only an inner nucleus of European allies. Your Rapporteur was made very much aware of it during his extensive discussions in preparing the present report, and it has obviously inhibited member governements in making any such use of WEU since 1950. Any proposal for a " caucus " meeting of European countries within NATO is a delicate matter because of the obvious exclusion of the United States and Canada from such discussions. Any inner caucus meeting of seven countries within the fourteen European allies will be particularly resented by the remaining seven just as much as suggestions for defence meetings of a " big three " or " big four " - put forward occasionally in the past have been bitterly resented by other members of WEU. As it happens the peripheral European members of NATO, although the defence efforts of some of them may appear smaller than the average contribution of European countries, all make a vital contribution to allied defence through the strategic location of their mainland and island territories which almost completely block sea and air access of Soviet forces to the open oceans, or provide important naval bases, maritime patrol bases and submarine listening posts. Norway and Turkey alone among NATO countries have common frontiers with the Soviet Union itself.

5.12. For the foregoing reasons many members of the committee feel that in any attempt to agree on a European approach to the main principles of allied defence strategy it is essential to ensure the participation of all European members of NATO. On a number of occasions in the past the Assembly has recommended that other European NATO countries should be invited to join WEU[1]; the Council has never agreed to extend such invitations knowing that they would not be taken up as was once made clear by one of the countries concerned[1]. The political obstacles to accession to the modified Brussels Treaty by other European allies are several: first the treaty embodies many outdated restrictions on force ceilings and internal arms control; secondly accession at the present late stage could be seen as a vote of no-confidence in NATO and in the United States commitment which is particularly important to the countries of the periphery. Lastly, some European allies may not wish to subscribe to the terms of the mutual defence obligations in Article V of the Brussels Treaty which are more constraining than the corresponding Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

5.13. For all these reasons the draft recommendation proposes in paragraph B.1 that the Council should consider and report to the Assembly on the expansion and deepening of its European defence activities. The defence activities of the WEU *Assembly* remain uncontroversial. The draft resolution included in this report recalls the earlier Resolution 15 of the Assembly adopted on 18th June 1959, on a report from the Presidential Committee[2] whereby the Assembly considered the interests " of member states of NATO which are not members of WEU " and decided that the committee could invite observers from any NATO country to attend its meetings with the right to speak. In implementation of that resolution, the committee did in fact invite parliamentary observers from Denmark and Norway, some of whom duly attended meetings at that time, but the practice appears to have fallen into abeyance. The draft resolution now proposed would specifically invite parliamentary observers from all European NATO countries not members of WEU to participate with the right to speak in meetings of the committee which will be concerned with the preparation of the forthcoming report on the state of European security. In paragraph 4 (*b*) of the draft recommendation the committee also proposes that the Assembly should assist governments in explaining to the European public and parliaments the contribution which the United States makes to allied defence.

(*c*) *Eurogroup*

5.14. Eurogroup describes itself as " an informal association of defence ministers of European member governments within the framework of NATO... " open to all European members of the alliance. It was founded in 1968 at the suggestion of Mr. Denis Healey (the then United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence) " as a means of responding to a widespread desire for closer European co-operation within

1. Recommendation 41 of 3rd December 1959; Recommendation 372 of 1st December 1981.

1. Reply of the Council to Recommendation 41.
2. Text at Appendix IX.

the alliance "[1]. In particular, the Eurogroup "provides an informal forum for an exchange of views by defence ministers on major political/strategic questions affecting the common defence".

5.15. Originally an informal dinner of defence ministers in 1968, discussion among participants today continues between the Permanent Representatives to NATO of the participating countries and their staffs. Participation in Eurogroup has extended progressively and now includes all European members of NATO with the exception of France. Significantly Spain, which does not yet participate in the integrated military structure of NATO, took part in the ministerial Eurogroup meeting on 29th November 1982. Eurogroup has no international staff, or formal structure. Secretarial services are provided by the staffs of the various participating delegations. Meetings are held in the NATO headquarters. Eurogroup also aims at co-ordinating more closely the defence efforts of participating countries and for this purpose has established some nine subgroups which have had varying degrees of success.

5.16. It is as an informal forum for discussion of political and strategic questions affecting common defence that Eurogroup activity appears to have increased during the last two years, as the European NATO countries have increasingly felt the need to co-ordinate the European attitude to the United States within NATO. Such "caucussing" within the NATO framework is of course a politically sensitive matter, but Eurogroup provides a flexible and discreet framework because meetings between officials within the NATO headquarters need not attract publicity.

5.17. France does not participate in the Eurogroup; the then French Minister of Defence, Mr. Debré, took some weeks to consider the invitation to attend the first Eurogroup dinner of defence ministers in 1968. One factor at that time was that the British initiative was suspected of being a "back door" to British membership of the European Community then being negotiated. The other factor undoubtedly was the link with NATO.

5.18. The first of these obstacles to French participation in Eurogroup disappeared in 1973 with British accession to the European Community. As for the second, it can be said that Eurogroup as such has no closer links to NATO than France which, despite the 1966 withdrawal from the integrated military structure, has always remained a fuller participant in NATO as a whole than is generally recognised. France, of course, is a full participant in the North Atlantic Council, as it is now in such NATO bodies as the new Air Defence Committee, in the Conference of National Armaments Directors, as well as in the three NATO military agencies based in France. Some French nationals remain in the NATO International Staff, chiefly in the economic and political sections; French military missions are of course appointed to the NATO Military Committee and to all military headquarters. On balance it would seem that the political obstacles in the way of French participation in Eurogroup are fewer than those in the way of the accession of six or seven European NATO countries to WEU. It was noted at the time of the NATO summit meeting in Bonn in June 1982 that the attendance of President Mitterrand at the concluding formal dinner was a precedent. It could not be a greater precedent for a French Defence Minister to attend the next Eurogroup dinner of defence ministers – it is understood that an invitation was extended on one recent occasion.

5.19. The committee suggests in paragraph B.2 of the draft recommendation that the Council consider and report to the Assembly on the obligation to invite all members of WEU to contribute to strengthening the European pillar of the western alliance. Many members believe that Eurogroup, where all European members of NATO except France are already present, remains the most flexible and appropriate method of concerting European positions on NATO-related defence issues, without having a disruptive effect on allied defence planning. There is a case for strengthening the ability of Eurogroup to make its position better known in the United States, particularly to members of Congress. This can be co-ordinated through the United Kingdom Embassy in Washington, as that country provides the permanent secretariat to Eurogroup, and additionally through the Washington Embassy of the country which for the time being is chairman-in-office of the Eurogroup as happened during a recent tour by Eurogroup officials and senior officers to the United States as a public relations exercise.

(d) European political co-operation

5.20. European political co-operation among the ten countries of the Community has been increasingly successful on a number of issues including Middle East policy. It is now agreed among the ten foreign ministers that "security" policy can be discussed in that framework. The Falklands is a recent example of very rapid decision-making by the Ten in this framework in a resolution condemning the Argentine invasion. Other "security" matters discussed by the Ten include the European position in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and aspects of disarma-

1. Quotations from "The Eurogroup" pamphlet published by Eurogroup, issued by NATO information service.

ment usually considered in the United Nations framework.

5.21. European political co-operation is a largely informal arrangement although the functions of the " presidency " have developed around the three ministers comprising the foreign minister who is chairman-in-office for six months, associated with his immediate predecessor and successor. In the foreign ministry of the chairman-in-office room is provided for one official from each of the two other countries associated with the " presidency " for the time being. However, European political co-operation remains outside the framework of the European Community treaties themselves, and two or three member countries at least have reservations about extending the defence functions of this institution at the present time. The neutral position of Ireland remains a problem.

(e) *Independent European Programme Group*

5.22. The IEPG is yet another informal grouping, without treaty or international staff, in which all European NATO countries participate. Concerned with European armaments production, and co-ordination with the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors in pursuance of a two-way street in defence equipment between Europe and the United States, this is not a body which is likely to become involved in discussing more general aspects of European defence policy.

VI. *Defence production*

6.1. In measuring progress on the concept of a two-way street in defence equipment between the United States and its European allies, a concept formally adopted by the NATO Defence Planning Committee in May 1975, it is useful to compare the attitudes of the Carter and Reagan administrations.

(a) *The Carter administration*

6.2. A few days before Ronald Reagan arrived at the White House on 20th January 1981, a report on rationalisation/standardisation within NATO (report to the United States Congress, January 1981) by Mr. Harold Brown of the Carter administration, outgoing Secretary of Defence, was published. According to this report, the United States expects each NATO nation to do its fair share in support of the collective defence of the West, but joint European defence production is considered to be the best means of improving the two-way street. The 3 % formula goes hand in hand with a recommendation that Europeans place their industries on a " united and collective basis ". Yet Europe and North America are the two richest, most technologically advanced industrial economies in the world. Together we have a combined GNP more than twice that of the Warsaw Pact. If we were to pool our resources and efforts and pull together, we could produce a credible and capable coalition defence, without economic strain. In his address to the NATO summit in London in May 1977, President Carter emphasised that:

> " A common European defence production effort would help to achieve economies of a scale beyond the reach of national programmes. A strengthened defence production base in Europe would enlarge the opportunities for two-way transatlantic traffic in defence equipment, while adding to the overall capabilities of the alliance.
>
> The Europeans have sought the economic benefits (jobs and technological pride and progress) of developing, producing and selling weapons to the United States in order to earn the foreign exchange needed to buy weapons from the United States. But here we confront a structural problem within Europe itself that compounds the problems already mentioned. Only Britain and France (and in some areas, Germany) can produce weapons to a continental scale. No country in Europe can produce to an intercontinental scale. Thus the economies of scale in the alliance needs – and the benefits the Europeans seek – cannot be fully realised until (in the words of the Culver-Nunn Legislation) the European nations organise their defence procurement on ' a united and collective basis '. Europe's fragmented defence industrial base also makes it difficult for its industries to develop and produce weapons competitive in quality, quantity and price with those produced in the United States. "

6.3. The attitude towards the IEPG is not negative either:

> " As a result of the Eurogroup initiatives, the European members of the alliance established the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) in February 1976 with France as a full member. The Congress, in the Culver-Nunn Legislation of July 1975, encouraged the European governments to accelerate their efforts to achieve European armaments collaboration. President Carter at the London NATO summit in June 1977 also encouraged these collective European defence industrial efforts, and pledged to work

with the Independent European Programme Group as it gathered strength and cohesion. The United States has participated in a transatlantic dialogue with the IEPG in a series of meetings sponsored by the alliance as a whole. However, the IEPG has not developed into a strong device for co-ordinating European contributions to alliance armaments development. "

6.4. According to Mr. Brown's report, standardisation and interoperability are essential:

" The challenges to standardisation and interoperability are many. In meeting them, we have had a number of important successes in the past year. In our triad of rationalisation, standardisation and interoperability (RSI) initiatives, we signed the first memorandum of understanding (MOU) for a family of weapons, culminating two years of negotiations. We also made substantial progress towards a second family. We signed two more bilateral general reciprocal procurement MOUs. Dual production of many major systems continues and is planned for others. The periodic armaments planning system (PAPS) and the NATO armaments planning review (NAPR) programmes have started, marking a major step toward an integrated and unified NATO arms planning system. The NATO airborne early warning and control programme is moving from planning to operational status. The alliance Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) has become increasingly active and effective in its support of arms co-operation programmes. The European national armaments directors and defence ministers strongly expressed their sense of progress and commitment to NATO co-operative programmes at their fall 1980 meetings. We also continue to revise DoD directives so that the principles of standardisation and interoperability are reflected in our internal standard operating procedures. Moreover, we are undertaking two major new initiatives: (1) reviewing the feasibility of establishing a second source in Europe for selected systems and (2) examining our foreign ownership, control or influence regulations and procedures and how they affect cross-national investment in arms industries.

Meeting challenges to standardisation/ interoperability

To meet the challenges we have outlined, the United States has continued to take three primary approaches for increasing defence co-operation with allies: (1) reciprocal procurement agreements, (2) dual production of weapons systems which have already been developed, and (3) sharing development of next-generation families of weapons. In addition, we are pursuing efforts at developing a NATO-wide acquisition process, have continued to work on the NATO AEW&C programme, and are working toward production of a multiple-launch rocket system. We have also begun a programme by which DoD evaluates weapons and technologies of our allies in terms of potential utilisation in the United States in order to save research and development funds. Finally, the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) has been extremely active in the past year. We continued to make substantial progress in all of these areas. "

6.5. Mr. Brown considers results achieved in 1980 to be satisfactory:

" The past year has been one of great success in NATO standardisation and interoperability. The momentum that has been building for several years has resulted in a rapid movement forward. Under the triad of initiatives, we have signed our first family of weapons MOU and have almost completed all of the reciprocal general procurement MOUs. Dual production of systems has proven most valuable. The CNAD has been extremely active with PAPS and NAPR now activated. The NATO AEW&C programme is nearing operational status and other new initiatives are under way. Congress has provided important support for United States and alliance efforts at standardisation and interoperability. In sum, 1980 was a year in which many of our efforts came to fruition and others are being refined and/or are nearing fulfilment. "

6.6. Where armaments co-operation is concerned, Mr. Brown's analysis lays greater emphasis on progress accomplished than on the imbalance of trade between the United States and Europe:

" The alliance has made significant progress toward greater co-operation in armaments. The Conference of National Armaments Directors has become a much stronger organisation which is now working on major co-operative programmes for the future. Under its auspices, the family of weapons concept promises a more efficient division of effort in the field of weapons development. The first family of weapons agreement signed in

August 1980 covers air-to-air missiles and provides for the Europeans to develop an advanced short-range missile while the United States develops an advanced medium-range missile. Thus, the family of weapons has moved from concept to reality within four years. Also, the United States has negotiated bilateral MOUs for reciprocal procurement of defence equipment with individual allies (eleven have been signed, and one is pending). These agreements are designed to improve open competition in systems acquisition by waiving buy-national and other restrictive provisions. Ongoing or pending co-operative programmes include:

(A) Dual production in the United States: Roland air defence system, MAG-58 armour machine gun, 120 mm tank gun, CFM engine (KC-135 re-enginging), squad automatic weapon.

(B) Dual production in Europe: F-16, MOD Flir, M483, improved conventional munition; Stinger man-portable air defence system, AIM-9L improved short-range air-to-air missile, Patriot.

(C) Co-operative programmes: NATO AWACS, multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS), rolling air frame missile (RAM), NATO small arms ammunition.

6.7. Mr. Brown therefore asks for the support of Congress:

> " The Department of Defence appreciates the support Congress has given NATO rationalisation / standardisation / interoperability. Our efforts in this regard continue to be bolstered by the Congressional affirmation in the FY 77 Defence Appropriation Act that it is United States policy for equipment procured by the United States for use in NATO to be standardised or at least interoperable with that of our allies and that progress toward realisation of standardisation/interoperability objectives would be enhanced by expanded inter-allied procurement of arms and equipment within NATO and greater reliance on licensing and coproduction. "

(b) The Reagan administration

6.8. With the Reagan administration the United States seems not only to be keeping up the transatlantic dialogue but also wishing to strengthen it, recognising its political importance for the Atlantic Alliance. This was affirmed by Mr. Richard DeLauer, United States Under-Secretary of Defence, at the CNAD meeting in Brussels on 5th May 1981. The Reagan administration strongly supports United States and NATO arms co-operation programmes but apparently, unlike the Carter administration, lays greater stress on the fact that industry must play a more active rôle in the process of armaments co-operation than on the need for widespread intra-European co-operation so that Europe may become a real competitor for the United States.

6.9. The programme of the symposium on industrial co-operation with NATO, held in Brussels in April 1983, also offers a number of ideas, for instance:

> " (*a*) review of mandatory DoD contract clauses and subcontract flow-down provisions to delete those which are inapplicable or unnecessary for contractors/subcontractors located outside the United States;
>
> (*b*) negotiation of ' contract administration' and ' pricing/auditing ' annexes to general MOUs to provide for reciprocal exchange of government services
>
> - audit agreements exist for France and United Kingdom
> - first contract administration annex signed with the Netherlands in April 1982 ;
>
> (*c*) strong emphasis on ' industry-to-industry ' seminars to explore mutual business opportunities ;
>
> (*d*) defence acquisition circular no. 76-25, issued on 31st October 1980
>
> - first major change to section VI ' Foreign acquisitions ' in over 20 years
> - includes all NATO general MOUs
> - creates new part 14 ' Purchases from NATO participating sources '
> - waives ' Buy American Act '; customs duties etc.
> - stresses open subcontracting with NATO sources. "

6.10. Mr. Weinberger, United States Secretary of Defence, in his report on the allied contribution to the common defence (Department of Defence, March 1982) considers that NATO has developed major programmes for improving the alliance's defence capability:

> " These are the coproduction, dual production and families of weapons programmes. These programmes provide

for the sharing of development and production costs and can produce substantial savings in R&D expenditures. Such savings can improve the industrial base in the United States, Canada and Europe and assist technology transfer within the alliance. These transfers take place in both directions – from Europe to the United States and from the United States to Europe. "

Major examples quoted by Mr. Weinberger are United States procurement of the MAG-58 machine gun and the 120 mm smooth bore tank gun. He underlines that Europeans have derived benefits from coproduction in the framework of the F-16 aircraft programme:

" Both sides may benefit from future air-to-air missile weapons families. Dual production, coproduction and the family of weapons programmes enable industry to distribute large R&D costs, to reap the benefits of economies of scale and to share in advanced technology. "

6.11. Unlike Mr. Brown, he also stresses the problem caused by the imbalance in the equipment trade between the United States and its partners:

" In 1980, eight major NATO trading partners (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom) accepted United States manufactured defence equipment deliveries amounting to $1.85b. In contrast, the United States accepted deliveries on only $0.20b from those same NATO countries – a ratio of 9.4:1 favouring the United States. The comparable ratio was 5.3:1 in 1977 and has been increasing consistently since then in favour of the United States. "

The 1983 report on allied contributions to the common defence, however, finds only a 6:1 ratio :

" In defence equipment trade, the balance is still well in the United States' favour. In dollar terms we sell approximately six times more equipment to Europe than they buy from us. This may be partly explained by the preponderance of big ticket items (warplanes) we sell to Europe, but the trade situation might be healthier if the 6:1 ratio could be lowered. "

6.12. In the report standardisation of equipment within NATO (report to the United States Congress, January 1983), Mr. Weinberger comments on the efforts of the Department of Defence and NATO allies to standardise, or at least make interoperable, equipment (including weapons systems, ammunition and fuel) of allied forces committed to NATO. Mr. Weinberger considers progress has been made in the effort to strengthen alliance conventional forces and to adapt the alliance defence posture to the changing needs of the 1980s:

" Improvements in NATO planning procedures are contributing to the process of improving standardisation and interoperability within NATO. NATO has agreed to explore urgently ways to improve its conventional defence by taking advantage of emerging technologies. "

6.13. Mr. Weinberger considers it necessary to:

" ... improve NATO's efforts to allocate development of related weapon types to specific allies under the family of weapons concept. Artificial barriers to trade in defence equipment must be removed under the reciprocal memoranda of understanding that we have with our allies.

Coproduction may be selectively employed to provide industrial participation to allies who agree to adopt standardised systems.

Finally, the two-way street/armaments co-operation must be made a reality through increased trade in defence equipment in both directions across the Atlantic resulting in benefits to NATO as a whole. "

6.14. Another difference between Mr. Weinberger's approach (see abovementioned text) and that of Mr. Brown is the emphasis he places on the need for a major leadership rôle for industry (in this process) and his desire to see a reduction in obstacles to direct industry-to-industry agreements.

6.15. In the United States, it has been decided that the determination of allied governments is not enough. It is also necessary to obtain United States Congress backing and ensure a will on the part of American industry to carry out European projects jointly. Anxiety about unemployment also carries great weight in this analysis. Mr. Weinberger concludes the introduction to the abovementioned report with remarks about Congress's attitude:

" We welcome the positive statement of the Congress for greater co-operation with our allies as expressed in the FY 1983 Defence Authorisation Act.

We will intensify consultations to meet these objectives. At the same time we solicit the assistance of Congress in elimination of obstacles to co-operation, e.g. specialty metals legislation which is seriously undermining NATO's arms co-operation efforts. "

6.16. Nevertheless the rhetoric exceeds tenfold the practical progress made towards achieving an equitable two-way street. True there are notable examples of European equipment's being accepted for the United States armed forces but primarily where the European produce was outstanding such as the Harrier for the United States Marine Corps, the Hawk for the United States navy and the CF-56 powerplant for the KC-135 tankers of Strategic Air Command.

6.17. Surprisingly, amendments in favour of NATO industrial co-operation like the Roth-Glenn-Nunn Amendment (Appendix VI) can be passed by the Senate and yet amendments like the Speciality Metals Amendments and the Defence Appropriations Bill are carried which do immense damage to the prospects of the procurement of European equipment by the United States armed forces and to transatlantic relations.

6.18. The Europeans do not help their own cause by their slow progress towards interoperability, standardisation, and joint development and procurement. The IEPG has had great difficulty, inevitably, in harmonising national operational requirements and procurement time-scales. Some promising examples exist of greater co-operation such as the Tornado programme or the new generation of collaborative anti-tank guided weapons. Others such as the tortoise-like progress towards a new European combat aircraft for the Italian air force, Luftwaffe and Royal Air Force show how hard it is even for the Europeans to concert their procurement among themselves let alone with the United States.

(c) *Conclusions*

6.19. Both the democratic and republican administrations placed and are placing emphasis on the need for standardisation and/or at least interoperability of allied equipment. Both show interest in the principle of the two-way street, considered to be essential for enhancing the defence capability of the alliance itself.

6.20. However, there are differences of tone or rather of emphasis in the two approaches. Mr. Carter's administration underlined the idea that large-scale intra-European co-operation could have been a means of making Europe a true competitor for the United States. The 3 % formula goes hand in hand with this idea. The Reagan administration makes more direct reference to the imbalance of trade between the United States and Europe but in its strong desire to pursue cross-Atlantic industrial teaming does not mention the expediency of intra-European co-operation (at least in the reports examined by your Rapporteur) and, although on the one hand it proposes to repeal the Buy American Act, on the other hand it vigorously asserts the need for a " major leadership rôle for industry " and a reduction in " obstacles to direct industry-to-industry agreements ".

VII. *Forces of WEU countries*

(a) *General*

7.1. This section briefly summarises the forces which the WEU countries make available for allied defence. There are of course other important forces in Europe: those of the United States and of the other European NATO countries - Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey.

(b) *Belgium*

7.2. Most Belgian forces are available to NATO, the greater part are either under NATO command in peacetime - all offensive and defensive air force units, the Hawk units of 1 (BE) Corps and one warship - or assigned - all the active units of 1 (BE) Corps and most naval craft, four frigates, seven minehunter/sweepers, one logistics support ship.

7.3. Certain units are deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany: two improved Hawk battalions in the extreme east (in the forward interception area), reconnaissance units of 1 (BE) Corps to provide cover, a division with one armoured infantry brigade and one armoured brigade, corps support troops for logistic support on both sides of the Rhine and Nike surface-to-air missile units.

7.4. The main task of ground forces carried out by the intervention force (chiefly 1 (BE) Corps) is in forward defence. The army assigns a strengthened parachute commando battalion to the ACE Mobile Force; internal forces ensure the military defence of the territory.

7.5. The army has 359 main battle tanks (334 Leopard, 25 M-47), 133 Scorpion light tanks, 153 Scimitar armoured combat vehicles, 1,123 armoured troop carriers, anti-tank missiles such as Milan and Swingfire, surface-to-surface missiles, short-range anti-aircraft artillery with Gepard.

7.6. Some army and air force units have a nuclear capability: two 155 mm howitzer battalions, two 8 inch howitzer batteries, one Lance surface-to-surface missile battalion, ADM (atomic demolition mine) detachments, two F-16 flights, one of which is still being transformed, and six Nike SAM flights up to NSP (NAMSA support plan) standards.

7.7. The air force has three commands. The tactical air force command groups all combat units, i.e. a total of 144 assigned combat aircraft (F-16 and Mirage V), twenty-four transport aircraft (including C-130), eight search and rescue helicopters, and eight Nike surface-to-air defence missile flights (reduced to six as from 1st July 1983).

7.8. The Channel, the North Sea and their approaches are the area of action of the navy which has three main tasks: anti-submarine warfare in the Channel, the Atlantic approaches and the North Sea, protecting merchant shipping and convoys in the same area, and minesweeping in the Channel and the North Sea. The Belgian navy is highly specialised in mine counter-measures. It set up a mine warfare school which is now commanded and operated jointly by Belgium and the Netherlands. It has some forty ships, including four frigates, some thirty minesweepers and hunters and two logistic support ships.

7.9. As far as NATO is concerned, the most controversial aspect of current Belgian defence plans concerns air defence missiles. The obsolescent Nike is being gradually phased out before any decision has been taken to procure the proposed successor – the American Patriot which is not yet available in any case – and Belgium plans to remove its shorter-range Hawk missiles from the forward NATO screen in Germany to protect areas in Belgium at present covered by Nike. This would leave a vulnerable gap in forward NATO air defences.

(c) France

7.10. France, although a member of the NATO alliance, does not assign forces to NATO and does not participate in the integrated military structure, although elements of these forces participate from time to time on a bilateral basis in military exercises outside the NATO area with allied nations.

7.11. France has a 50,000 strong army in the Federal Republic, with three armoured divisions (soon to be strengthened by about a hundred additional tanks) and a two-regiment garrison of 2,700 men in Berlin. It also has contingents in the Middle East: in Sinai as part of the multinational observer force, in southern Lebanon with the United Nations force and in Beirut as part of the multinational security force.

7.12. It also has 16,500 troops stationed in dependencies in the West Indies, Guyana, Polynesia, the southern Indian Ocean and New Caledonia, and a further 7,200 in Africa: the Republic of Djibouti, Cape Verde (support base), Gabon and the Ivory Coast, in accordance with military agreements concluded between France and the country concerned.

7.13. French strategic nuclear forces consist of three complementary systems: thirty-six manned bombers (six Mirage IV squadrons), eighteen S-3 surface-to-surface ballistic missiles on the Plateau d'Albion and five nuclear missile-launching submarines, each with sixteen M-20 missiles. Tactical nuclear weapons are the same for all three forces: the AN-52 bomb, whether carried on the army's Pluton missiles or by the air force's Mirage IIIEs and Jaguars and the navy's Super-Etendards.

7.14. For their modernisation, the 1984-88 programme law confirms the introduction in 1985 of the sixth nuclear missile-launching submarine, the Inflexible, which will be armed with sixteen M-4 multiple-warhead missiles. Four of the present five other submarines of this class will subsequently be refitted for M-4 missiles and their equipment will be modernised. The law also provides for a new-generation nuclear missile-launching submarine to be ordered, the first for entry into service in 1994. Eighteen Mirage IVs will be transformed to take the medium-range air-to-surface missile as from 1987. The Mirage IV and S-3 missiles of the Plateau d'Albion will be replaced in 1996 by a new mobile SX missile. There are three programmes for the tactical nuclear forces: an order for seventy Mirage 2000Ns which will carry air-to-surface medium-range missiles, the transformation of fifteen Super-Etendards which will be equipped with the same missile and the development of the Hades system (which will have a longer range than the Pluton). No decision has yet been taken on the production of the enhanced radiation weapon.

7.15. The French army has 1,140 AMX-30 and 30 30B-2 battle tanks, 1,010 AMX-13 light tanks, 620 AMX-10P motorised infantry combat vehicles, 65 AMX-10RCs, 250 Panhard EBR motorised armoured vehicles, 500 AML light armoured cars, some 4,000 combat vehicles and armoured troop carriers. There are six helicopter regiments with some 600 helicopters, some equipped with Hot. The army also has surface-to-air weapons systems (Hawk and Roland) and anti-tank guided weapons (Milan, Hot, Entac). Plans for reorganisation give priority to helicopters for all-weather flight and night-firing and for the modernisation of AMX-30 tanks.

7.16. The navy has 18 attack submarines (including one nuclear-propelled), 19 destroyers equipped with ASW surface-to-surface missiles (Exocet, Malafon) and surface-to-air missiles (Masurca, Tartar) and Lynx helicopters, 23 frigates (some of which are equipped with Exocet). The naval air force has one helicopter-carrier and two full-sized aircraft-carriers and air units of 36 Super-Etendards (single jet-engine assault and interception aircraft with AN-52 nuclear weapons), 16 Crusader (single jet-engine

all-weather interception aircraft) and 16 modernised Alizé (ASW single turboprop engine). Maritime reconnaissance capability is provided by four squadrons with 27 Atlantics and one squadron with six Neptunes, plus a squadron with eight Etendard IVPs. Amphibious capability includes two assault ships, five tank landing craft and two light carriers. In the 1984-88 programme law, the maritime patrol aircraft programme is given priority over orders for nuclear attack submarines.

7.17. The French air force has 700 combat aircraft and some 300 transport and liaison aircraft. The air defence command has six interceptor squadrons (one in Djibouti with 30 Mirage IIICs), of which 120 Mirage F-1Cs and 15 Mirage F-1Bs, 10 squadrons equipped with surface-to-air missiles, with 21 Crotales, 104 anti-aircraft batteries with 20 mm guns and R-530, Super-530, R-550 Magic and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. The tactical command has five strike squadrons with 45 Jaguars, 30 Mirage IIIEs (with the AN-52), 12 fighter-ground attack squadrons (with 75 Mirage IIIEs, 30 Mirage 5Fs, 75 Jaguar As) and three reconnaissance squadrons with 45 Mirage IIIR/RDs (of which two are to be replaced by Mirage F-1CRs). It has air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles (Sidewinder, R-550 Magic, R-530, AS-30/30L, AS-37 Martel) and uses mobile detection and control means. The programme law provides for the order of 165 Mirage 2000s (in either nuclear or air defence version) and the procurement of airborne early warning aircraft.

7.18. The three tasks of the French army - national defence; allied defence; and assistance to other friendly countries - are not kept separate. The rapid action force (FAR)[1] whose creation is an important part of the reorganisation now under way thanks to the 1984-88 programme law, passed on 23rd June 1983, could be deployed with those of its allies if France so decides (not being part of the NATO integrated military structure means that its commitment would not be automatic) but it can also act alone, particularly overseas. The 1984-88 programme law also provides for a new overall deployment of units of the first army beyond the Rhine and between the plains of Flanders and Alsace, the establishment of a Hades tactical nuclear force command and the assignment of territorial operational defence to the police forces of each department. The law concentrates on equipment rather than on the number of men (it provides for a cutback of 22,000 men) and maintains the priority given to nuclear forces which allow the weak to defend themselves against the strong thanks to the strategy of deterrence.

1. Currently of three, shortly to be of five, divisions.

(d) Federal Republic of Germany

7.19. Almost without exception, the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany, which include conscripts, are based in the Federal Republic. The army, however, has a training facility in Canada and the United Kingdom for tank formations and the air force, until recently, has maintained an F-104 pilot training facility in the United States which will be closed due to the establishment of a new facility in the United Kingdom for training Tornado pilots at RAF Cottesmore for aircrews of the Luftwaffe, German naval air arm, Italian air force and RAF.

7.20. The white paper 1979 on the security of the Federal Republic makes clear that:

> " The air defence forces are under NATO command in peacetime. Most of the German formations are either assigned to NATO or earmarked for such assignment. In a given phase of the NATO alert system, territorial army formations remain under national command. "

7.21. For the defence of the Federal Republic's eastern frontier, the land forces place an army corps size formation under Northern Army Group and two army corps under the command of the Central Army Group. A further formation operates in the Jutland area under the command of Allied Forces Northern Europe. Reserve formations are assembled during developing situations to reinforce NATO and to protect lines of communication.

7.22. The field army assigned to NATO comprises six armoured divisions, four armoured infantry, one mountain and one airborne division. It is equipped with some 580 Leopard-2, 2,500 Leopard-1, and 1,200 older M-48 main battle tanks. After deployment of Leopard-2s in replacement of the M-48s has been completed, the army will have in its units and in reserve 4,887 main battle tanks compared with some 4,000 today. Anti-tank weapons include some 2,000 Milans, 350 Tows and 300 Hots. Air defence includes some 400 Gepard SP guns, 100 Roland SAMs and Redeyes. Nuclear support is provided by 26 Lance missiles and nuclear-capable 203 mm and 155 mm artillery - warheads for all of these being in United States custody.

7.23. German naval forces include some 24 conventional submarines, 14 destroyers and frigates equipped with Tartar and Exocet surface-to-surface missile launchers and Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missile launchers, 30 fast attack ships equipped with missiles, 18 Lindau (anti-mine counter-measures) and 39 coastal minesweepers. The German navy has the

support of three attack squadrons (with 54 F-104Gs and seven Tornadoes), one reconnaissance squadron (with 27 RF-104Gs), two maritime reconnaissance squadrons (with 14 Atlantics and five Elint Atlantics), one search and rescue helicopter squadron and one squadron of ASW helicopters (with Sea Lynx MK-88s). The white paper stresses that the principal areas of operation of the navy are the Baltic Sea, the Baltic approaches and the North Sea, which call for different types of operation and different means of naval warfare. Priority in recent years has been given to the improvement of the defence capability in the Baltic Sea and the Baltic approaches through the commissioning of 18 type 206 submarines and 30 type 148 and 143 fast patrol boats.

7.24. The air force has some 500 combat aircraft. The tactical command consists of nineteen fighter ground attack squadrons (with some 100 F-104Gs, 60 F-4Fs and 30 Tornadoes), seven squadrons of light fighter aircraft (with some 160 Alpha-Jets), four squadrons of interceptors (with 59 F-4Fs) and four squadrons of reconnaissance aircraft (with 60 RF-4Es), eight squadrons equipped with 72 Pershing-1A surface-to-surface missiles (216 Nike Hercules launchers and 216 improved Hawks).

(e) Luxembourg

7.25. Luxembourg, which like the United Kingdom has no conscription, maintains one under-strength regimental combat team, with an infantry battalion only 350 strong, normally assigned to NATO for ACE Mobile Force (see below). It is equipped with Tow anti-tank weapons. It may be mentioned that the NATO jointly-owned early warning aircraft E-3A are legally registered in Luxembourg. Two are now operational and a further fourteen are on order.

(f) Italy

7.26. All three services of the Italian armed forces are largely committed to NATO, deployed in Italy. In recent years Italy has concluded a number of bilateral agreements with other Mediterranean countries and the United States: e.g. Italian guarantees for Malta's neutrality and military co-operation with Tunisia, Lebanon, Sudan and Somalia.

7.27. Italy's present doctrine of defence according to the 1977 normative as set out in publication "900", is that defence must be conducted in the framework of the strategy of flexible response, "as far forward as possible" and cover the Gorizia gap. Of the twenty-four brigades making up the army, five (one alpine, two mechanised, one armoured, one motorised) are deployed in the north-western sector, four (one parachute, two motorised and one mechanised) in central Italy, one (mechanised) between Puglia and Campania and one (motorised) in Sicily. The other thirteen (four alpine, four Armoured, five mechanised) are deployed in the north-eastern sector, which includes the three Venezias, Emilia Romagna and the provinces of Bergamo and Brescia.

7.28. There is some discussion about the need to reorient defence – including land forces – towards the south of the country, through the creation of operational defence of the territory as in France, the United Kingdom and Germany. Where equipment is concerned, the aim of the reorganisation decided upon in 1975-76 was to ensure full mechanisation of forces intended for the defence of the eastern frontier by increasing the strength of armoured forces, field artillery, engineers, light aviation and communications. In the five sectors covered by the programme, good results have been achieved, particularly with the procurement of systems for unit command and control and for the management of equipment as well as in increased tactical and logistic mobility.

7.29. Apart from 550 M-47 main battle tanks (which came into service in 1953), 300 M-60Als (in 1965) and 910 Leopard-1s (in 1970), the Italian army has 4,200 armoured troop carriers, including M-113s which came into service in 1962. Artillery and anti-tank weapons are being modernised through the procurement of 400 Tows, 1,330 Milans, 1,370 Folgores and 60 A-129 armed attack helicopters. There are 40 SAM Hawk and nuclear support is provided by Lance and nuclear-capable artillery (warheads in United States custody).

7.30. The air force includes six fighter-ground attack squadrons (with 18 Tornadoes, 54 F-104Ss and 36 G-91Ys) three squadrons of light attack/reconnaissance aircraft (with 54 G-91s), six interceptor squadrons (with 72 F-104Ss), two reconnaissance squadrons (with 24 F/RF-104Gs), one electronic countermeasure/reconnaissance squadron (with 12 G-222s and six PD-808s), and two maritime reconnaissance squadrons (with 14 Atlantics assigned to the navy). With the Spada/Aspide surface-to-air missile system, operational testing of which is currently proceeding at Grosseto, the air force will for the first time have a modern air defence system (against the low-altitude threat of the eighties) for its bases and possibly for other major installations.

7.31. The navy has nine submarines, one helicopter-carrier, two cruisers, four guided-missile destroyers, one Impetuoso class destroyer, eleven frigates (equipped with surface-

to-air and surface-to-surface missile launchers (Aspide, Sea Sparrow, Otomat), eight corvettes, four fast attack craft (two of which equipped with Sea Killer SSMs) and some thirty-two minehunter/sweepers. It is supported by five anti-submarine helicopter squadrons.

7.32. The commander-in-chief of the fleet (consisting at operational level of four naval divisions and submarine command) is also NATO Commander, Central Mediterranean (COMEDCENT). At present, Italy provides contingents for the ACE Mobile Force which are transported by its own aircraft and takes part in the United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon and in the Sinai observer force. The creation of a standing, institutionalised intervention force is still an open question.

(g) *Netherlands*

7.33. The Netherlands armed forces are largely committed to NATO, with one armoured brigade and support elements stationed in Germany and one destroyer, usually stationed in the Dutch West Indies together with one amphibious unit and two F-27 MPA (maritime patrol aircraft) for coastal surveillance.

7.34. The army, assigned for forward defence in the framework of the flexible response strategy, comprises two armoured brigades and four mechanised infantry brigades equipped with 811 main battle tanks (468 Leopard-1s, 105 Leopard-2s and 342 Centurions), 126 AMX-13 light tanks, 1,600 armoured combat vehicles and 1,051 YPR-765 armoured lorries. It has six Lance surface-to-surface missiles and nuclear-capable artillery (warheads in United States custody), 350 Dragon and Tow anti-tank guided weapons and 95 Gepard SP-AA guns. Orders have been placed for a further 340 Leopard-2s, 850 YPR-765s, 464 Stinger surface-to-air missiles and 37 M-110A2 203 mm self-propelled howitzers.

7.35. The navy's main theatre of operations is the Eastern Atlantic, Channel and North Sea and it assigns units to the Atlantic and Channel standing forces and carries out minesweeping operations jointly with Belgium.

7.36. The fleet has six submarines, two Tromp destroyers with guided weapons (eight Harpoon surface-to-missiles, nine surface-to-air missiles, one Standard and eight Sea Sparrow). Twelve frigates with guided missiles, six Wolf corvettes, five large patrol boats and two Poolster (fast support craft) and thirty-one minehunters/sweepers. The navy is supported by two maritime reconnaissance squadrons (with six SP-13A Atlantics, seven P-3C Orions, two F-27MPAs), two anti-submarine helicopter squadrons (with seventeen Lynx HAS-27s) and one SAR helicopter squadron (with six Lynx HAS 25s).

7.37. The air force, almost entirely under NATO command, has four fighter ground attack squadrons (with 54 NF-5As and 18 F-104Gs, which are being replaced by F-16s), three fighter/interceptor squadrons (with 54 F-16s), one reconnaissance squadron (with eighteen RF-104s), 12 F-27 transport aircraft and four Alouette-III helicopters for the SAR. The air force has AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, 66 improved Hawk surface-to-air missiles (some of which are in Germany), 16 Nike Hercules, 25 Shorad/Flycatchers and 40 L-70 anti-aircraft systems.

(h) *United Kingdom*

7.38. The latest British white paper, " Statement on the defence estimates 1983 ", recalls the four rôles played by British armed forces committed to the alliance's collective deterrence : " (1) the provision of independent strategic and theatre nuclear forces committed to the alliance ; (2) direct defence of the United Kingdom homeland ; (3) a major land and air contribution on the European mainland ; (4) the deployment of a major maritime capability in the Eastern Atlantic and the Channel. "

7.39. The white paper also recalls that the United Kingdom has large-scale military activities outside Europe. In addition to garrisons in Cyprus, Hong Kong, the Falklands and Belize, it takes part in peace-keeping operations, in Lebanon and Sinai for instance, through deployment, manoeuvres, the loan of personnel and training teams and after-sales assistance.

7.40. The United Kingdom strategic nuclear deterrent force now comprises four ballistic missile nuclear-propelled submarines, each carrying sixteen Polaris A-3 missiles with three warheads (not independent) which are being modified with the Chevaline system. This force is to be modernised by the construction of four new nuclear-propelled submarines and the procurement from the United States of Trident D-5 missiles with which they will be armed. The new force will begin to enter service in the mid-1990s. The Vulcan bombers have been phased out. British theatre nuclear forces are based on dual capable Tornado, Buccaneer and Jaguar aircraft equipped with British nuclear bombs. Two Tornado squadrons are now based in the United Kingdom and in the future seven will be based in Germany in the dual nuclear/conventional rôle in place of the present Jaguar and Buccaneer squadrons. The United Kingdom also has its own nuclear anti-submarine weapons for helicopters.

7.41. The British army comprises three armoured divisions in Germany and an infantry brigade in Berlin. There are a further infantry division, twelve armoured regiments, seven reconnaissance regiments, forty-seven infantry battalions and three parachute battalions. There are a further six Gurkha battalions. These forces are divided between UKLF (United Kingdom Land Forces), UKMF (United Kingdom Mobile Force) and headquarters Northern Ireland and other overseas posts. Equipment includes 70 Challengers, 900 Chieftain main battle tanks (60 in reserve), 271 Scorpion light battle tanks, and over 5,000 other armoured vehicles, some 240 helicopters, Rapier/Blindfire and Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles and Milan, Swingfire and Tow guided anti-tank weapons. Nuclear support is provided by 12 Lance missiles and artillery for all of which warheads remain in United States custody.

7.42. The Royal Navy – mostly earmarked for NATO – has 27 attack submarines (of which 11 nuclear), three ASW aircraft-carriers, 13 destroyers with guided weapons, 44 multipurpose frigates, and smaller craft. It is supported by three fighter aircraft squadrons (with 15 Sea Harrier FRS-1s), eight ASW helicopter squadrons (with 41 Sea King HAS-2/5s and eight Lynx HAS-2s), two assault command squadrons (with eight Sea King HU-4s and 18 Wessex HU-5s), seven SAR and training helicopter squadrons and three helicopter flights with Wasp (hydrography/reconnaissance).

7.43. The Royal Air Force – largely assigned to NATO with United Kingdom air defence under NATO command in peacetime – includes an operational home command (strike command) responsible for the United Kingdom air defence region and the Near and Far East, and one overseas command (RAF Germany). It has thirteen strike/attack squadrons (with some 26 Tornado GR-1s, 45 Buccaneer S-2A/Bs, 72 Jaguar GR-1s), three ground attack squadrons with 44 Harriers, nine interceptor squadrons (two with Lightning F-6/F-3s, seven with 87 Phantoms), three reconnaissance squadrons (two with 24 Jaguar GR-1s, one with 20 Canberra PR-9s), one AEW squadron (with six Shackleton AEK-2s, five being in reserve), four maritime reconnaissance squadrons (with 28 Nimrods), seven helicopter squadrons (with 102 Wessex, Puma HC-1s, CH-47 Chinooks, Sea Kings) and training units. There are Sidewinder, Sparrow, Red Top, Firestreak and Sky Flash air-to-air missiles, Martel and Harpoon air-to-surface missiles and Bloodhound and Rapier surface-to-air missiles.

7.44. When the Tornado G-R1 squadrons have been formed in the United Kingdom and RAF Germany, Jaguar will remain in service for ground attack and tactical reconnaissance for operations on NATO's flanks.

7.45. The improvement in UKADGE (United Kingdom Air Defence Ground Environment), with the order being passed for 22 transportable three-dimensional air defence systems, seeks to enhance the Royal Air Force's detection capability. The first of the 11 Nimrod MK-3 airborne advanced warning aircraft should become operational next year and the air defence version of the Tornado F-2 should come into service in mid-decade.

(i) ACE Mobile Force

7.46. The committee has frequently drawn attention in the past to the political importance of Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) which, when activated, draws on specially trained and equipped units supplied by of WEU countries (except France), the United States and Canada. In a crisis it can be rapidly deployed by air to either NATO flank to provide a military demonstration of the political solidarity of the alliance. The force comprises a land component of brigade group size drawn from infantry battalions and support units supplied by Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States, and an air component of some four squadrons one of which is provided by the Netherlands. AMF is a tangible demonstration of burden-sharing in a joint allied force and it is essential that participating countries meet their commitments. At present the land component needs more local air defence, and the Luxembourg infantry battalion – the only military unit which Luxembourg contributes to NATO – is at less than half strength.

VIII. *Nuclear weapons*

8.1. In view of the imminence of the deadline for implementing NATO's decision of 1979 concerning the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe, in the absence of a satisfactory arms control agreement covering intermediate-range nuclear forces, this chapter deals with this category of nuclear weapons in particular detail, and more briefly with others.

(a) Current levels of nuclear weapons

8.2. Current information on levels of nuclear weapons by category is given at Appendix VIII.

(b) Intermediate-range nuclear forces

(i) History of INF deployment

8.3. The history of the deployment of intermediate-range missiles goes back to the end of the 1950s when the Soviet Union began deployment of the liquid-fuelled SS-4 missile, followed by the longer-range SS-5 at the beginning of the sixties. The NATO countries were simultaneously introducing comparable liquid-fuelled missiles - 60 Thors in the United Kingdom, 30 Jupiters in Italy and 15 in Turkey. Until 1963 or 1964, the Soviet Union gave priority to deployment of this category of weapon system rather than to ICBMs capable of reaching United States territory. Its combined SS-4/SS-5 force reached its peak of some 700 at that time, while its ICBM force was only 100, compared with 424 United States ICBMs.

8.4. By 1963, the United States and the United Kingdom (which had procured the Thor missiles from the United States and controlled them under a dual key system) had come to consider the liquid-fuelled missiles vulnerable and obsolete. They were phased out in that year, their targeting rôles being taken over by the United States Polaris submarine-based force and Minuteman force, which were already operational. The Soviet Union which had deployed seven times as many intermediate-range missiles clearly continued to place considerable reliance upon them. The priority targets must have included forward bases for United States nuclear weapons systems, including the submarine bases in Holylock in the United Kingdom and Rota in Spain, as well as United States airforce bases in those countries, the British strategic bomber bases and, as it became operational in 1968, the British Polaris submarine base.

8.5. In 1968, the Soviet Union initiated a replacement programme for some SS-4s and SS-5s by testing its SS-11 ICBM at intermediate ranges. By 1972, 300 SS-11s had been deployed within the IRBM missile fields, and 100 SS-4s and SS-5s had been phased out, leaving only 600 in service. The SS-11 was a more modern missile with a storable liquid fuel, giving it a much shorter reaction time. In 1972, however, the Soviet Union halted its phasing out of SS-4s and 5s. In can be inferred that this was because the SS-11 (and its successor, the SS-19 ICBM which the Soviet Union has also tested and deployed at intermediate ranges in addition to the full intercontinental range) were included in the interim freeze agreement of SALT I in 1972 and in the ceilings imposed by SALT II in 1979[1]; no doubt the more suitable solid-fuelled SS-20 with three warheads was already under development, and intermediate-range systems were not constrained in SALT agreements although, ironically, the Soviet Union had sought to have United States " forward-based " systems included in the negotiations.

8.6. As deployment of the SS-20 began in 1977, the SS-4 and SS-5 have been phased out in approximately equal numbers, the figures of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group communiqué of 23rd March 1983 refer to 351 SS-20s and imply a further 231 SS-4s and SS-5s, making a total of 582 missiles compared with 600 SS-4s and SS-5s alone in 1972. The number of warheads has of course nearly doubled from the original 700 to 1,300.

8.7. The geographical distribution of the SS-20 has, however, been more heavily weighted towards the Far East than was that of the SS-4 and SS-5. 108 of the total of SS-20 missiles are now deployed at Novosibirsk and to the east of Lake Baikal, compared with 70 SS-4s and SS-5s deployed in the Far East before their replacement with SS-11s by 1970. A further 45 SS-20s are deployed in the area of Omsk to the east of the Urals and the remaining 198 in the European Soviet Union.

8.8. The SS-20 has been tested up to a range of 4,000 kilometres, which would bring the Novosibirsk site just within range of north Norway and the very eastern part of Turkey, but not any other NATO territory. The United States has claimed that the missile would be capable of further development to a range of 5,000 kilometres, which would bring the whole of Norway, Denmark and Turkey within range of the Novosibirsk site.

(ii) The NATO decision of December 1979

8.9. The 1979 deployments of SS-20s came at a time when the Soviet Union had reached rough parity with the United States in strategic nuclear weapon systems on which NATO, since 1963, had been relying in part to offset the Soviet IRBM monopoly which the western powers had permitted by default when they phased out Thor and Jupiter in 1963. The deployment of the modern, very accurate SS-20 with three warheads each was perceived as a significant increase in Soviet nuclear capability threatening Western Europe. A high level group under United States chairmanship was established in NATO and considered NATO force improvement proposals ranging from 200 to 600 missiles. In April 1979, NATO established a similar special group to examine the arms control aspects of theatre nuclear forces. At the conclusion of these deliberations a special meeting of NATO foreign and defence ministers

1. See " The Soviet SS-20 Decision ", Raymond L. Garthoff, Survival, May/June 1983.

announced the " dual track " decision on 12th December 1979 whereby NATO decided on the deployment in Europe of 572 United States nuclear missiles distributed as follows :

Country	*GLCM*	*Pershing II*	*Total*
Belgium	48	-	48
Netherlands	48	-	48
Germany	96	108	204
Italy	112	-	112
United Kingdom	160	-	160
TOTAL	464	108	572

8.10. The communiqué said :

" As an integral part of TNF modernisation, 1,000 United States nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible... The 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level. "

8.11. The communiqué stressed the importance of arms control and supported the United States decision to negotiate LRTNF limitations with the Soviet Union along the following lines :

" A. Any future limitations on United States systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems.

B. Limitation on United States and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach.

C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on United States and Soviet land-based long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable. "

8.12. The communiqué concluded :

" 11. The ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defence and thus maintain the security of its member states.

A. A modernisation decision, including a commitment to deployments is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defence needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF.

B. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet build-up can enhance alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF requirements, and promote stability and détente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defence and détente as enunciated in the Harmel report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations. "

8.13. The communiqué stressed the importance of arms control and SALT II :

" 8. Ministers regard arms control as an integral part of the alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member states and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard they welcomed the contribution which the SALT II Treaty makes towards achieving these objectives. "

8.14. A fundamental premise of the December 1979 decision - that the SALT II Treaty signed on 18th June 1979 after seven years of negotiations would very shortly enter into force, leading to the opening of SALT III talks for which it made provision - was subsequently undermined through the failure of the United States to ratify SALT II. SALT III was to have provided a single forum for bilateral United States-Soviet Union negotiations on both strategic and long-range theatre nuclear systems. In its absence, bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union limited to theatre nuclear forces were opened formally in Geneva towards the end of 1980 under the Carter administration, and then adjourned. It was not until 30th November 1981 under the Reagan administration - nearly two years after the 1979 decision - that the INF talks got properly under way.

(*iii*) *The INF negotiations*

8.15. The Geneva INF negotiations are of course confidential, and although both sides have periodically made public, largely for public relations or propaganda purposes, the main points of their negotiating position, there must

be many details, not least concerning verification and non-circumvention, which have not been publicly aired, but which are quite as important to any agreement as the more publicly discussed issues concerning numbers of missiles or warheads.

United States opening position

8.16. President Reagan defined his initial " zero option " in a speech on 18th November 1981 :

> " The United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. "

The United States made it clear that the zero option would require the Soviet Union to dismantle all such missiles " globally " - i.e. whether in range of Europe or based in the Far East in range of China or Japan. It is unlikely that such an offer could ever have been seriously considered by the Soviet Union which would have been required, in exchange for the non-deployment of United States weapons over three or five years from 1984, to eliminate one of its major nuclear weapon systems which, in one form or another, had been continuously in service from 1960, and one-third of which since 1977 had been deployed in the Far East where the Chinese nuclear force had increased from zero in 1960 to over 110 ground-based missiles and 12 submarine-based missiles today.

The " walk in the woods "

8.17. In July 1982, the United States negotiator, Mr. Nitze, and his Soviet counterpart, Mr. Kvitsinsky, during informal talks while walking in the Jura, discussed possible grounds for compromise, apparently on their own initiative, various differing reports of which appeared in the press only in January 1983. The following approximate version has appeared more recently[1] :

> " Heading : ' This is a joint exploratory package for the consideration of both governments ; it is not an offer or a proposal by either government. '
>
> 1. The agreement covers medium-range nuclear systems based in Europe. Medium range means 1,000 kms-5,500 kms.
>
> 2. Each side will be limited in Europe to 75 land-based missile launchers.
>
> 3. The Soviet 75 may be SS-20 launchers, each launcher carrying one missile.
>
> 4. The eastern boundary of Europe is defined as the line of longitude 60 degrees east. However, because of the missile's range, the limit on the SS-20 applies over a wide area, the eastern boundary being longitude 80 degrees east.
>
> 5. East of the 80 degree line, the Soviets will be permitted a further 90 SS-20 launchers.
>
> 6. No other SS-20 launchers will be deployed.
>
> 7. The aircraft covered by this agreement will be, on the United States side, the F-111s and, on the Soviet side, the Backfire, Blinder and Badger designated for land [as opposed to naval] missions. Neither side will deploy in Europe more than 150 of these aircraft.
>
> 8. Missiles with ranges between 500 kms-1,000 kms will be held to existing numbers and capabilities [i.e. no increase in range allowed ; no increase in numbers ; no MIRVing of warheads]. Subject to these restrictions they may be modernised. [This covered the Soviet SS-22 and arguably the SS-23. But it would allow NATO to upgrade its Pershing I to Pershing IB, which will have greater accuracy at the same range.]
>
> 9. Deployment within the areas covered by this agreement of new land-based missiles with ranges between 1,000 kms-5,500 kms is prohibited [i.e. no European deployment of Pershing II].
>
> 10. To allow this preliminary agreement to be turned into a treaty immediately upon its acceptance by both sides there will be a three-month moratorium on preparations for further deployment of systems covered by this agreement.
>
> 11. Immediately after this agreement has come into effect, both parties will promptly sit down to negotiate further reductions. "

Other press reports referred to the possibility of United States zero deployment in exchange for a reduction of Soviet INF missiles in range of Europe to 50 and the freezing of those in the Far East to the then level of 100. However, the proposal, which both negotiators took back to their respective capitals, was not endorsed by the Soviet Union and in the United States led to the dismissal of Mr. Eugene Rostow, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to whom Mr. Nitze was directly responsible, and was followed by the virtual dismantling of part of that agency.

1. The Times, 1st June 1983.

Soviet position of 21st December 1982

8.18. Mr. Andropov made a public statement on 21st December 1982, key excepts from which are:

> "... We have suggested an agreement renouncing all types of nuclear weapons – both medium-range and tactical – designed to strike targets in Europe... We have also suggested another variant: that the USSR and the NATO countries reduce their medium-range weaponry by more than two-thirds. So far the United States will not have it... It has submitted a proposal which, as if in mockery, is called a zero option. It envisages elimination of all Soviet medium-range missiles not only in the European, but also in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, while NATO's arsenal of nuclear missiles in Europe is to remain intact and may even be increased... We ... will continue to work for an agreement on a basis that is fair to both sides. We are prepared, among other things, to agree that the Soviet Union should retain in Europe only as many missiles as are kept there by Britain and France – and not a single one more. This means that the Soviet Union would cut down by hundreds of missiles, including dozens of the latest missiles, known in the West as SS-20... If later the number of British and French missiles were scaled down, the number of Soviet ones would be additionally reduced by just as many. Along with this there must also be an accord on reducing to equal levels on both sides the number of medium-range nuclear-delivery aircraft stationed in this region by both the USSR and the NATO countries."

The Soviet Union's count of British and French missiles was 162, comprising the submarine-launched missiles of both countries plus the 18 French ground-based missiles. There was then no undertaking to destroy Soviet missiles in Europe in excess of 162, and the possibility appeared to remain open for the Soviet Union to remove such missiles to the Far East.

United States interim offer of 30th March 1983

8.19. On 30th March 1983, President Reagan, apparently responding to urgings from most European allies, announced that the United States had informed the Soviet Union in the INF talks in Geneva that the United States was "prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in which the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II and GLCM provided the Soviet Union reduce the number of its warheads on longer-range INF missiles to an equal level on a global basis", and had proposed that the talks, which had adjourned for Easter, resume on 17th May. The zero option remained on the table. Press reports had earlier suggested the proposals would imply an interim level of 300 INF warheads on each side, but the statement made no reference to numbers, nor did it link an interim agreement to Soviet acceptance of zero levels as the ultimate aim. By referring to "a global basis", the statement included all Soviet INF systems in the Far East as well as Europe. The proposal still included the deployment of Pershing II which the "walk in the woods" formula would have eliminated.

President Andropov's interviews with Pravda of 26th August and 27th October 1983

8.20. In a speech in Moscow on 3rd May 1983 on the occasion of a visit by the East German leader, Mr. Honecker, Mr. Andropov had already said that the Soviet Union was prepared to count warheads as well as missiles in the INF negotiations, but a more significant statement came in answers to questions put by the newspaper Pravda and circulated by the Soviet news agency, Tass, on 26th August. He first summarised the previously known Soviet positions:

> "It was the Soviet Union that proposed a genuine, and not a false, zero solution for Europe: to destroy both medium-range and tactical nuclear systems in their entirety. The United States, however, does not even want to discuss the idea...
>
> Since the West is not ready for such a radical solution, while we remain prepared for it, we have proposed another variant, which, though less radical, is also far-reaching: to forgo deployment in Europe of any new medium-range systems, whereas the existing ones would be reduced by approximately two-thirds, with the USSR and NATO each retaining for the time being 300 such systems.
>
> ... We declared our readiness to retain after the reductions in Europe precisely as many medium-range missiles as Britain and France possess. Accordingly, both sides would also retain an equal number of medium-range nuclear delivery aircraft.
>
> Then certain people have mounted a new 'hobby-horse' by claiming that even with an equal number of missiles on both sides the Soviet Union would allegedly have an advantage in the aggregate number of warheads on its SS-20 missiles.

But they could not ride that 'hobby-horse' for a long time either, for the Soviet Union expressed its consent to reach agreement on equality both as regards the delivery vehicles (missiles and aircraft) and as regards the weapons on them.

As a result, the Soviet Union would have in the European zone significantly fewer medium-range missiles and war-heads on them than prior to 1976 when we did not have any SS-20 missiles, which, according to the NATO version, were the spark that set the forest on fire... "

8.21. Mr. Andropov then added his significant new proposal to " liquidate " any missile surplus under an agreement including the SS-20 :

" Should a mutually acceptable agreement be achieved, including renunciation by the United States of the deployment in Europe of new missiles, the Soviet Union, in reducing its medium-range missiles in the European part of the country to a level equal to the number of missiles of Britain and France, would liquidate all the missiles to be reduced. In this event a considerable number of the most modern missiles, known in the West as the SS-20s, would be liquidated as well ." [1]

In a similar interview published in Pravda of 27th October 1983, Mr. Andropov declared:

" ... in order to secure parity of missile warheads of the USSR on one hand and of Great Britain and France on the other... bearing in mind the number of warheads in British and French missiles at present, the USSR could have in Europe about 140 launchers for the SS-20 missiles, i.e. notably less than the medium-range missile launchers now possessed by Great Britain and France.

.....

... in case an agreement be reached on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe and as soon as it goes into operation, the deployment of SS-20 missiles in the eastern part of the USSR will also be stopped at that moment... provided that [no [2]] tangible changes in the strategic situation in Asia take place. This means, above all, that the United States would not deploy new medium-range nuclear weapons in areas from which they could reach the eastern part of the USSR territory.

Sometimes it is said that our proposal that each side would have left, after reduction, no more than 300 carriers of medium-range nuclear weapons, supposedly, ham-strings too much the United States planes of corresponding range.

.....

In this case too we are prepared to express additional flexibility: to establish equal for the USSR and NATO levels of medium-range plane carriers in mutually-acceptable numerical range, which may be substantially different from the level we had previously proposed. The concrete numerical levels could be agreed upon and the types of the limitable plane carriers could also be finalised.

.....

... eighteen months ago the USSR introduced a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in its European part. And this moratorium is being strictly observed... The additional deployment of missiles beyond the Urals, in areas from which they could reach Western Europe, was also stopped.

Moreover, the USSR has discarded several dozens of its medium-range missiles in Europe, within the period that the talks are being held. To date, all the SS-5 missiles... have been removed from our fighting strength.

.....

... if the United States gives up the deployment of its missiles in Europe within the announced period and thus would produce an opportunity to carry on talks and seek for mutually acceptable solutions. In that case we could start already now to reduce our SS-4 missiles (we have over 200 of them) and complete their liquidation in 1984-85. And if it were possible to reach an agreement on a just footing in Geneva about which we have spoken many times, then, naturally, a considerable part of the new existing SS-20 missiles would also be liquidated. "

8.22. Clarification of Mr. Andropov's " liquidate missiles " proposal was given by Marshal Akhromeyef, the Soviet First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, at a press conference in Moscow on 14th September :

" As to the term 'scrapping', it implies the scrapping of both launchers and

1. Some United States sources have questioned whether Mr. Andropov really undertook to " liquidate SS-20 missiles " or only launchers. The text quoted above, referring to missiles, is the official English version of the Pravda interview contained in " Soviet News " of 31st August 1983, published by the Soviet Embassy in London.

2. The negative appears in the Pravda article. There appears to be an error in this English text taken from the official Moscow News of 6th November 1983.

missiles. A specific order of missile scrapping would be determined by the procedures which would be worked out during negotiations. Of course, the corresponding facilities and equipment which are being installed by the United States in Europe in preparation for the basing of Pershing and cruise missiles should also be subject to dismantling or elimination." [1]

President Reagan's proposals of 26th September 1983

8.23. The next public statement by the United States was made by President Reagan in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 26th September, which described in outline detailed proposals tabled by the United States at the INF talks in Geneva a day or so earlier:

> "First the United States proposes a new initiative on global limits. If the Soviet Union agrees to reductions and limits on a global basis, the United States for its part will not offset the entire Soviet global missile deployment through United States deployments in Europe. We would, of course, retain the right to deploy missiles elsewhere.
>
> Second, the United States is prepared to be more flexible on the content of the current talks. The United States will consider mutually acceptable ways to address the Soviet desire that an agreement should limit aircraft as well as missiles.
>
> Third, the United States will address the mix of missiles that would result from reductions. In the context of reductions to equal levels, we are prepared to reduce the number of Pershing II ballistic missiles as well as ground-launched cruise missiles. ... We cannot, however, especially in light of recent events, compromise on the necessity of effective verification."

8.24. A fact sheet issued by the White House in Washington on the same day contained a basic criteria for any agreement:

> "– there must be equality of rights and limits between the United States and Soviet Union;
>
> – there can be no negotiation of or compensation for third country forces;
>
> – there must be global limits on LRINF missiles and no exportation of the security threat in Europe to other regions, such as the Far East;
>
> – there must be no adverse impact on NATO's conventional defence capability;
>
> – there must be measures for effective verification."

8.25. The chief concession in the American position was to temper the insistence on "global" equality between the United States INF missiles and all Soviet INF missiles, whether in range of Europe or based in the Far East. While the right to global equality would be retained, if agreement on reductions in present Soviet levels were reached, the United States would not offset "the entire Soviet global LRINF missile deployment" by United States deployments of LRINF missiles in Europe, but would retain the right to deploy missiles elsewhere to reach the global ceilings. Agreed reductions on the NATO side would include reductions in the level of Pershing II. Aircraft could be included in the agreement, as well as missiles.

Summary of NATO position, 28th October 1983

8.26. The communiqué of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, meeting in Canada on 28th October 1983, summarised the NATO position:

> "[Ministers] also supported the United States determination in Geneva to explore every proposed solution for an INF arms control agreement that meets the legitimate security concerns of the alliance.
>
> The basic criteria of such an agreement are: significant reductions based on equality of rights and limits between the United States and the Soviet Union, no inclusion of or compensation for third-country systems, global limitations, no weakening of the United States contribution to NATO's conventional deterrence and defence, and effective verification.
>
> [Refusing to accept Soviet] insistence to take into account British and French forces and their refusal to accept the principle of equality in LRINF missile deployments. ...
>
> ...Ministers noted with attention the most recent Soviet proposals. The Soviets are invited to explain fully their proposals at the negotiating table. Ministers stated that NATO would continue to examine

1. Official English text from "Soviet News", 21st September 1983.

carefully all proposals in light of the alliance's agreed criteria described above.
...

...Ministers stressed that the alliance commitment to negotiations would continue even after initial deployments and that they remain willing to reverse, halt or modify deployments - including the removal and dismantling of missiles already deployed - if and when a balanced, equitable and verifiable agreement is achieved in Geneva. "

Position of China and Japan

8.27. The Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister, Mr. Qian Qichen, informed the press beforehand that at his meeting with the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Ilyichev on 6th October, he would be calling for the removal of the Soviet SS-20 missiles deployed in the Far East. The Chinese and Japanese Foreign Ministers had agreed at a meeting in New York in September to seek the removal of these missiles as a joint goal. On 5th October a Chinese news agency quoted a Japanese defence agency counsellor to the effect that the Soviet Union was preparing bases to increase the number of SS-20 missiles in the Far East of the Soviet Union from the present 108 to 135.

(*iv*) *Position of British and French nuclear forces*

8.28. From the outset of the INF negotiations the Soviet Union has insisted on counting British and French ballistic missiles - both submarine- and land-based, totalling 162 - as part of its perceived missile balance in Europe. The Andropov offer of 26th August to " liquidate " all Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe in excess of the number of British and French missiles, if his definition of " Europe " is to cover " missiles in range of Europe ", would have involved the destruction of 247 obsolete SS-4 and 5 missiles, but also the destruction of a further 81 SS-20 missiles, to bring Soviet levels down to 162.

8.29. The British and French Governments, fully supported by the United States, have steadfastly refused to accept the Soviet position, the chief grounds being that the French and British forces are national strategic forces of last resort, and that they each represent only a small fraction of the nuclear forces possessed by the superpowers. The countries concerned have recently reaffirmed their position on this issue in speeches to the United Nations General Assembly. Both have commented on circumstances in which their nuclear forces could be the subject of negotiations.

8.30. On 28th September, President Mitterrand said :

" The idea cannot be rejected that the five nuclear powers should discuss together, when the time comes, a lasting limitation of their strategic system. The conditions for an advance in this field should therefore be clearly stated. The first supposes that the fundamental difference in both kind and quantity which separates the armament of the Big Two from the others should be corrected, as well as the difference which separates a country which might use these armaments to bolster its power, from the country which might be obliged to use them to ensure its own survival. The second condition stems from the considerable gap between conventional forces, particularly in Europe. A gap which has been increased, I fear, by the existence of chemical and biological weapons, the manufacture and stockpiling of which should be absolutely forbidden by a convention. The third condition would require that an end be put to out-bidding in anti-missile, anti-submarine and anti-satellite weapons. To make provision for the people against threats from space is another imperative... "

8.31. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, on 28th September said :

" It would be absurd as things stand for us to seek to trade reductions with a superpower. But we have never said, ' never '. On the contrary, we have made it clear that if the Soviet and United States' strategic arsenals were very substantially reduced, and if no significant changes had occurred in the Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would want to review her position and to consider how best she could contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat. "

Unlike President Mitterrand, Sir Geoffrey made no proposals for five-power talks, and did not include rectifying the conventional imbalance among the preconditions.

8.32. Remarks by Mr. George Bush, the United States Vice-President, at a luncheon on 28th September attracted some attention. Without in any way contradicting the official United States, or indeed British or French positions, he was quoted as saying :

" We can't negotiate for the British and the French, and we don't intend to dictate to them "

but the idea of merging the negotiations on European missiles with the strategic START

talks had been " kicked around " within the administration. " There has to be an answer found for the British and French missiles "... if the... " idealistic goal of significant reductions " was to be achieved. Referring to the exclusion of British and French missiles from the INF negotiations, he said " someone has to come up with a better answer to that ". [1]

(v) *Unofficial proposals*

8.33. Opposition circles in the United States and some European countries have regarded the " zero-zero " option as unrealistic on the grounds that the Soviet Union has had 600 intermediate-range missiles deployed since the early 1960s and cannot be expected to reduce these weapons to zero in exchange for the non-deployment by NATO of weapons that do not yet exist. Mr. Paul Warnke, the former Director of United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and negotiator of SALT II, has proposed that :

> " 1. all intermediate-range missiles be taken into account, regardless of nationality or whether launched from the land or sea ; and
>
> 2. the United States would cancel the Pershing II and GLCM deployment if the Soviets reduced an equivalent number of warheads. " [2]

This would involve the dismantling by the Soviet Union of all 280 remaining obsolete SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and about 100 of the SS-20 missiles. " The result would be equilibrium between the Soviet land-based force of SS-20 missiles and the western (British, French and American) sea-based missiles of intermediate range. The Soviets would have 215 SS-20 missiles (100 of which would remain targeted only on China or Japan) carrying 645 warheads, and the West would have 184 missiles carrying 544 warheads. (There are also eighteen land-based French IRBMs and approximately thirty Soviet SS-N-5 SLBMs.) " Mr. Denis Healey, a former United Kingdom Secretary of Defence, in his address to the WEU Assembly Socialist Group in December 1982, specifically endorsed Mr. Warnke's proposals.

(vi) *Present position*

8.34. Reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on a number of occasions have endorsed both aspects of the NATO dual track decision of December 1979, but have stressed that any attempt to measure " nuclear balance " between East and West can only be done globally, taking account of all categories of nuclear weapons on both sides, because of the great complexity of defining categories of nuclear weapon which should be deemed " of interest " to the European theatre. Reports have similarly stressed that for deterrent purposes reliance must be placed on the whole range of nuclear weapons available to the West, so as to avoid any risk of " decoupling " the United States strategic deterrent through mistaken reliance on a supposed separate nuclear balance within Europe. Any agreement on the reduction of weapons on the other hand would almost certainly have to be limited to narrow categories of weapons systems. Reports have stressed that although there can be no question of France or the United Kingdom accepting reductions in the present relatively small levels of their nuclear weapons, while levels of Soviet and United States weapons remain very large, nevertheless existing numbers of British and French weapons are inevitably taken into account by the Soviet Union in its own assessment of the balance.

8.35. The current round of INF talks in Geneva began on 6th September and is scheduled to end on 15th November. Expectations of substantive agreement before then are fading, and the United States appears to be making final preparations for the deployment of the first 41 missiles before the end of 1983 - 16 cruise missiles in Italy and the United Kingdom, and 9 Pershing II missiles in Germany - as the first step in a continuous programme to deploy 572 missiles over the next five years.

8.36. The obvious crux of the INF negotiations is numbers of nuclear missiles in range of Europe. Although there is some doubt over the definition of " Europe ", the Soviet Union in proposing to reduce its missiles in Europe to 162 - the numbers of present British and French missiles - appears to be offering to dismantle 328 Soviet missiles including at least 81 SS-20s. In exchange the United States would have to forego any missile deployment in Europe. The United States, for its part, appears to have agreed to limit its actual missile deployment in Europe to whatever number of Soviet missiles remain in Europe after agreed reductions, but is insisting that the mix of United States missiles shall include Pershing II.

8.37. One feature of the abortive " walk in the woods " proposals was that NATO would forego Pershing II deployment, which it emerges the Soviet Union particularly objects to. A feature of Pershing II is that it is extremely accurate (a CEP of only 30 metres is quoted) and has a flight time of only 5 to 8 minutes. It is particu-

1 Guardian, 29th September 1983, from A.P. report.

2. *Source*. Committee for National Security - statement released on 16th September 1982.

larly suitable for use against hardened targets including missile sites:

> " Potential Pershing II targets include: hardened and soft missile sites; airfields; naval bases; nuclear, biological and chemical storage sites; command and control centres; headquarters; rail yards; road networks/choke points; ammunition and petroleum storage facilities; troop concentrations and facilities; and dams/locks. Pershing II is particularly effective against hard point and underground targets because of its high accuracy and the unique earth penetrator warhead capability. " [1]

8.38. While numbers of missiles may appear the crux of the Geneva INF negotiations, it could still take a long time to reach agreement on many subsidiary but still very important issues including categories of aircraft which may or may not be included in any limitations. All such aircraft being dual-capable, any restrictions would have an immediate impact on the conventional balance in Europe; as the different assessments of the INF balance at Appendix VII C shows, there is wide disagreement concerning categories of aircraft to be counted. Other non-circumvention provisions will have to cover shorter-range nuclear systems. Finally, verification provisions seem hardly to have been touched upon as yet.

(c) Shorter-range nuclear weapons

8.39. The Soviet Union is simultaneously deploying a new generation of shorter-range nuclear missiles: the SS-21 of 120 km range (replacing the Frog of 80 km range), some now in service with Soviet forces in East Germany; the SS-23 of 500 km range (replacing the 300 km Scud), about to come into service – the Scud is issued to the forces of most Warsaw Pact countries; the SS-22 of 900 km range (replacing the SS-12), sited only on Soviet territory, but in range of Norway, Germany, Greece and Turkey.

8.40. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group, at its meeting in Canada on 27th and 28th October, announced its " Montebello Decision ":

> " ...the Nuclear Planning Group has decided on 27th October 1983 to withdraw 1,400 warheads during the next several years. This Ministerial decision, taken together with the already accomplished withdrawal of 1,000 warheads, will bring to 2,400 the total number of warheads to be removed from Europe since 1979. Moreover, this reduction will not be affected by any deployment of longer-range INF (LRINF) since one warhead will be removed for each Pershing II or ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) warhead deployed.
>
> The detailed implementation of this decision as to the precise composition of the stockpile is a matter for the responsible military authorities to determine and a programme to effect this will be worked out and implemented over the next five to six years. In this context, appropriate consideration will be given to short-range systems. ...
>
> Recognising that for this minimum level stockpile to make the most effective contribution to deterrence, both the delivery systems and the warheads must be survivable, responsive and effective, Ministers accordingly identified a range of possible improvements. Ministers established broad criteria which will remain valid for the next decade, including the continuing importance of strengthening conventional forces. The alliance must, however, take account at all times of changes to Soviet capabilities during this period.
>
> Contrary to the impression that NATO has been fuelling an arms build-up by adding to its nuclear armoury, this sustained programme of reductions will have reduced NATO's nuclear stockpile to the lowest level in over 20 years. "

(d) Strategic nuclear weapons

8.41. As part of the United States strategic force modernisation programme the air-launched cruise missile became operational for the first time on 16th December 1982 when a squadron of fourteen specially marked B-52s were fitted with twelve ALCMs each, the first of 201 B-52s earmarked to carry ALCMs of which 4,348 have been ordered[1]. The special marking of the B-52s in accordance with SALT II is to permit external verification. Plans for deployment of the controversial MX ICBM are still in abeyance pending further decisions on the basing mode. A bi-partisan Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces appointed by President Reagan, under the chairmanship of retired Air Force General Brent Scowcroft,

1. Testimony of former Secretary of the Army, Clifford L. Alexander to the United States House Appropriations Committee, February 1979 " Department of Defence Appropriations for 1980 " – quoted in " Targeting for Strategic Deterrence ", Desmond Ball, Adelphi Paper 185, IISS, summer 1983.

1. Press reports have suggested the existing ALCM will shortly become vulnerable to Soviet AWACS and improved defences, it will be replaced by a new model with small radar image.

reported on 12th April that the Soviet ability to destroy United States land-based missiles (as claimed by the Reagan administration) was theoretical only, because of " problems of operation accuracies " and " planning uncertainties ". The commission recognised that reasonable survivability of ICBMs " may not outlast this century ", that the MX could not be invulnerable, but that 100 should be deployed in Minuteman silos, and that a new small mobile ICBM with only one warhead should be developed. On 17th December 1982 the forty-eight British Vulcan bombers were withdrawn from service.

8.42. The SALT II Treaty negotiated during the successive presidencies of Nixon, Ford and Carter, signed by the last on 18th June 1979, has not been ratified. The Reagan administration has found it " fatally flawed " but declared that it will not " undercut " it provided the Soviet Union does not do so either. SALT II was signed on the assumption that negotiations on a SALT III, to include restrictions on theatre or forward-based nuclear systems, would have started at once, and the attitude of the United States Administration to the protocol to SALT II is not clear. The protocol would have expired on the last day of 1981 and forbids: (*i*) the deployment or testing of mobile ICBMs; (*ii*) the deployment of GLCMs or SLCMs with a range greater than 600 km; or the testing of such missiles with MIRVs; (*iii*) the testing or deployment of air-to-surface ballistic missiles.

8.43. United States proposals for reductions of strategic nuclear weapons in the START talks, proceeding parallel to the INF talks in Geneva, were announced by President Reagan on 9th May 1982 in general terms, concentrating on a reduction in ICBMs, the category in which the Soviet Union is superior to the United States. Officials at that time said the proposal was for a common ceiling of 850 ballistic missiles (SLBMs plus ICBMs) with a total of not more than 5,000 warheads, of which only 500 warheads could be on ICBMs. This was said to involve a reduction of 1,500 Soviet missiles and 1,300 warheads compared with a reduction of 850 United States missiles and 2,200 warheads, the reductions to be carried out over ten years.

8.44. Mr. Andropov, in his speech of 21st December 1982, proposed a 25% reduction in all strategic weapons of both sides, restrictions on improvements to nuclear weapons, and a freeze at present levels while negotiations were in progress. Comments in Pravda of 2nd January 1983 pointed out that this proposal amounted to a 25 % reduction in the ceilings of SALT II to leave each side with a combined total of 1,800 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers by 1990. The Soviet Union has proposed a total ban on all new types of strategic weapon including ALCMs, GLCMs and SLCMs.

8.45. On 4th October, prior to the resumption of the START talks in Geneva the following day, President Reagan announced that:

> " The United States will introduce a proposal for a mutual, guaranteed build-down designed to encourage stabilising systems. The proposal will include specific provisions for building down ballistic missile warheads and, concurrently, for addressing a parallel build-down on bombers.

The White House issued a " Fact Sheet " on the talks:

> " ... initiatives, taken during the previous round IV of START, included:
>
> - a relaxing of the proposal to limit the total number of ballistic missiles on each side to 850;
> - a shift from an approach which envisioned two phases of negotiation, with the initial emphasis on ballistic missiles, to an approach embodied in a single phase agreement, with everything on the table;
> - the proposal of limits on the number of bombers on each side and limits on the number of cruise missiles permitted to be carried on each bomber which are below SALT II levels;
> - an offer to explore alternative approaches to limiting the destructive capability of ballistic missiles.
>
> In addition, the United States increased its efforts to negotiate a number of confidence-building measures involving the notification of ballistic missile launches and other activities that could be misinterpreted in times of crisis... "

The President has instructed the United States Delegation to propose a number of new initiatives in START, specifically including a proposal for a mutual, guranteed build-down designed to encourage stabilising systems:

> " The build-down proposal will include:
>
> - a provision which links reductions to modernisation using variable ratios which identify how many existing nuclear warheads must be withdrawn as new warheads of various types are deployed;
> - a provision calling for a guaranteed annual percentage build-down (an

approximately 5% mandatory build-down per year) ;

- a provision that ensures that the reductions would be paced by whichever above rule produces the greatest reductions.

In addition, the United States Delegation will be prepared to :

- address concurrently the build-down of bombers ;
- discuss additional limitations on the air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) carried by United States bombers ;
- negotiate trade-offs, taking into account Soviet advantages in missiles and United States advantages in bombers, in ways that provide each side maximum flexibility consistent with movement towards a more stable balance of forces ;
- propose the establishment of a working group in START to discuss the United States build-down initiative in round V."

IX. *Conclusions*

9.1. The present burden-sharing problem arises chiefly because of differences in the way that the European allies on the one hand and the present United States administration on the other approach relations with the Soviet Union, differences which lead to differing views as to the necessary size of the total allied defence effort.

9.2. Because of these difficulties the committee fully recognises that there is a greater need for defence consultation between European allies and for a more equal political relationship between the European members and the United States. The relative merits of WEU and the Eurogroup as a forum for discussion among European allies are examined in Chapter V above and the committee's conclusions are presented in paragraphs A.4 and B of the draft recommendation and in the draft resolution. There is a need for the European position to be expounded clearly in the United States, especially to Congress committees and staffs, through a public relations effort coordinated by the Washington embassies of the countries which provide the Eurogroup secretariat and chairman-in-office. Reciprocally there is a need for European public opinion and parliaments to show greater appreciation of all aspects of the United States contribution to allied defence; WEU, especially the Assembly, has an important rôle to play in this connection.

9.3. International comparisons between the defence efforts of different countries are difficult to make, both because of problems of methodology discussed in Chapter III above, and because of differences in military manpower policy, geography, economic and industrial capacity, logistic infrastructure, political priorities and perceptions of the threat. The committee concludes however that the European allies for the most part now carry a very reasonable share of the agreed burden, a share which has increased from 24 % to 38 % in the last twenty-five years, and has increased most significantly in the first eight years of the last decade during which the United States effort declined.

9.4. It is important to maintain the collective commitment to an annual increase in defence expenditure in real terms as long as the Soviet military build-up continues, and to meet the NATO biennial force goals as approved by nations on proposals from the supreme commanders. Certain specific improvements listed in paragraphs 1 (*b*), (*c*) and (*d*) of the draft recommendation are also required.

9.5. Unilateral decisions by any allied country to opt out of a specific defence rôle which forms a part of collective allied defence plans can be particularly damaging. Despite its theoretical attraction the committee has not identified specific rôle-sharing opportunities that would permit any greater specialisation by member countries in specific military rôles than exists at present.

9.6. In the case of developments beyond the NATO area threatening their vital interests (discussed in paragraph 2.7 above), the ready assistance of all WEU countries must be forthcoming within the area to facilitate deployments by the United States, or by any NATO country, beyond the area. Certain WEU countries, such as France and the United Kingdom, should be ready to participate in such deployments.

9.7. The British and French independent nuclear forces constitute an additional centre of strategic decision and national riposte to potential Soviet aggression ; they must not be bargained away in any accommodation between the Soviet Union and United States over the balance of intermediate-range nuclear forces between them.

9.8. The United States and its allies should seek to balance although not necessarily to match at every level the growing nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union. However, the deployment since the end of 1977 of some 350 SS-20 ballistic missiles by the Soviet Union has had a seriously adverse effect upon the theatre nuclear balance in Europe, and unless this deployment is substantially reduced or coun-

tered it could have a gravely intimidating impact upon the Soviet Union's neighbours around the Eurasian landmass. The first objective therefore of the " twin track " decision of 12th December 1979 remains a priority. If it cannot be met in verifiable manner there must be no departure from the agreed national commitments to deploy GLCMs or Pershing II ballistic missiles. It is to be hoped that the deployment process would induce the Soviet Union to reach an accommodation with the United States over INF on a mutually-acceptable basis of balance as a first step to reductions on both sides.

9.9. Every effort should be made at all levels both politically, diplomatically and militarily to maintain trust and mutual confidence between the European and American components of the alliance. This can only be achieved in the long term if the Europeans show an understanding of America's concern over its worldwide peacekeeping rôle in view of the emerging Soviet global threat and if the Europeans make a financial and military contribution to the alliance commensurate with their economic potential.

X. *Opinion of the minority*

10.1. The revised report was adopted in committee by 12 votes to 3 with 0 abstentions. The minority opposed the report first because of a perceived acceptance of United States policy of global confrontation between two military blocs, which the minority held to be unsuited to a regional defensive alliance, and secondly because of the report's support for United States policy in the Geneva INF and START negotiations which the minority would have criticised, recalling that the United States had not ratified SALT II. Finally, the minority wished the report to deal with security and co-operation in Europe with reference to the Madrid and forthcoming Stockholm conferences.

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1978-1982

A. FINANCIAL EFFORT

Country	National currency unit	Defence expenditure (national currency, current prices)					Defence expenditure (current prices — US $ million) *a*					GDP in purchasers' values (current prices — US $ million) *a b*					Population (thousand)					Defence expenditure as % of GDP in purchasers' values					Defence expenditure per head (current prices — US $) *a*					Defence expenditure as % of total WEU				
		1978	1979	1980	1981	1982 *f*	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982 *f*	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982 *e*	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982 *e*	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982 *f*	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982 *f*	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982 *f*
(0)	(1)	(— 5)	(— 4)	(— 3)	(— 2)	(— 1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
Belgium	Million B. Frs.	99,726	106,472	115,754	125,689	127,901	3,175	3,632	3,958	3,385	2,958	97,251	111,127	119,327	97,369	90,259	9,841	9,849	9,859	9,873	9,887	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.5	3.3	323	369	401	343	299	4.63	4.37	4.01	3.84	3.31
France (*c*)	Million F. Frs.	85,175	96,439	111,672	129,708	145,155	18,874	22,668	26,425	23,867	23,651	474,450	573,422	652,775	569,395	575,436	53,277	53,478	53,713	53,962	54,124	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.2	4.1	354	424	492	442	437	27.51	27.28	26.76	27.05	26.45
Germany	Million DM	43,019	45,415	48,518	52,193	54,553	21,417	24,778	26,692	23,094	23,097	639,810	759,722	814,818	683,159	677,858	59,409	59,454	59,667	59,763	59,850	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4	361	417	447	386	386	31.22	29.82	27.03	26.17	25.84
Italy	Milliard Lire	5,301	6,468	8,203	9,868	12,066	6,246	7,785	9,578	8,681	9,349	261,887	323,998	395,900	350,226	359,877	56,714	56,914	57,069	57,197	57,403	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.6	110	137	168	152	163	9.11	9.37	9.70	9.84	10.46
Luxembourg	Million L. Frs.	1,154	1,242	1,534	1,715	1,876	37	42	52	46	43	3,562	4,245	4,575	3,750	3,567	362	364	365	365	365	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2	102	115	142	126	118	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Netherlands	Million Guilders	9,146	10,106	10,476	11,296	11,932	4,228	5,038	5,269	4,527	4,577	137,291	157,501	168,929	140,486	141,745	13,942	14,038	14,150	14,246	14,280	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.2	303	359	372	318	321	6.16	6.06	5.34	5.13	5.12
United Kingdom	Million £ Sterling	7,616	9,029	11,510	12,154	14,186	14,619	19,155	26,775	24,647	25,726	315,713	407,140	523,373	497,079	484,886	55,902	55,946	56,010	56,021	56,032	4.6	4.7	5.1	5.0	5.3	262	342	478	440	459	21.31	23.05	27.11	27.93	28.78
TOTAL WEU							68,596	83,098	98,749	88,247	89,401	1,929,964	2,337,155	2,679,697	2,341,464	2,333,628	249,447	250,043	250,833	251,427	251,941	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.8	275	332	394	351	355	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Canada	Million C. $	4,662	4,825	5,499	6,289	7,415	4,087	4,119	4,703	5,245	6,044	205,596	228,483	253,348	279,950	297,052	23,493	23,701	23,959	24,213	24,564	2.0	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	174	174	196	217	246	5.96	4.96	4.76	5.94	6.76
Denmark	Million D. Kr.	7,250	7,990	9,061	10,230	..	1,315	1,519	1,608	1,436	..	56,464	65,047	66,594	57,579	58,883	5,104	5,117	5,125	5,120	5,118	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.5	..	258	297	314	280	..	1.92	1.83	1.63	1.63	..
Greece	Million Drachmas	77,861	89,791	96,975	142,865	171,968	2,125	2,420	2,276	2,578	2,745	31,690	38,519	40,138	36,707	39,912	9,360	9,450	9,599	9,707	9,775	6.7	6.3	5.7	7.0	6.9	227	256	237	266	281	3.10	2.91	2.30	2.92	3.07
Norway	Million N. Kr.	6,854	7,362	8,242	9,468	10,844	1,307	1,454	1,669	1,650	1,803	40,647	47,130	57,400	57,143	59,179	4,060	4,073	4,087	4,100	4,107	3.2	3.1	2.9	2.9	3.0	322	357	408	402	439	1.91	1.75	1.69	1.87	2.02
Portugal	Million Escudos	27,354	34,343	43,440	51,917	61,859	623	702	868	844	871	17,758	20,326	24,076	23,485	25,533	9,820	9,863	9,905	10,005	10,106	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.4	63	71	88	84	86	0.91	0.84	0.88	0.96	0.97
Turkey	Million L.	66,239	93,268	185,656	313,067	447,790	2,728	3,001	2,442	2,815	3,031	52,499	69,371	56,886	57,560	57,355	42,926	43,821	44,737	45,672	46,718	5.2	4.3	4.3	4.9	5.3	64	68	55	62	65	3.98	3.61	2.47	3.19	3.39
United States	Million US $	109,247	122,279	143,974	170,033	198,509	109,247	122,279	143,974	170,033	198,509	2,131,801	2,376,828	2,587,100	2,881,512	3,008,587	222,585	225,055	227,627	229,805	231,988	5.1	5.1	5.6	5.9	6.6	491	543	632	740	856	159.26	147.15	145.80	192.68	222.04
TOTAL NON-WEU ...							121,432	135,494	157,540	184,601	..	2,536,455	2,845,704	3,085,542	3,393,936	3,546,501	317,348	321,080	325,039	328,622	332,376	4.8	4.8	5.1	5.4	..	383	422	485	562	..	177.02	163.05	159.54	209.19	..
TOTAL NATO (*d*)							190,028	218,592	256,289	272,848	..	4,466,419	5,182,859	5,765,239	5,735,400	5,880,129	566,795	571,123	575,872	580,049	584,317	4.3	4.2	4.4	4.8	..	335	383	445	470	..	277.02	263.05	259.54	309.19	..

Note a: GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States $ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency conversion.

For the period 1978-1982 the following rates of exchange have been applied:

Country	*Unit*	*US $ per unit*	*Units per US $*
Belgium and Luxembourg	Franc		
— 1978		0.03184	31.41000
— 1979		0.03411	29.31860
— 1980		0.03420	29.24260
— 1981		0.02693	37.13101
— 1982		0.02312	43.24500
Canada	Canadian Dollar		
— 1978		0.87664	1.14073
— 1979		0.85371	1.17136
— 1980		0.85523	1.16928
— 1981		0.83409	1.19891
— 1982		0.81518	1.22672
Denmark	D. Krone		
— 1978		0.18134	5.51462
— 1979		0.19008	5.26097
— 1980		0.17743	5.63593
— 1981		0.14038	7.12337
— 1982		0.12594	7.94010
France	Franc		
— 1978		0.22159	4.51276
— 1979		0.23505	4.25445
— 1980		0.23663	4.22604
— 1981		0.18401	5.43458
— 1982		0.16294	6.13738
Fed. Rep. of Germany	Deutschmark		
— 1978		0.49785	2.00863
— 1979		0.54559	1.83288
— 1980		0.55016	1.81767
— 1981		0.44248	2.26000
— 1982		0.42338	2.36195
Greece	Drachma		
— 1978		0.02729	36.64843
— 1979		0.02696	37.09694
— 1980		0.02347	42.61666
— 1981		0.01805	55.40842
— 1982		0.01596	62.63780
Italy	1,000 Lire		
— 1978		1.17832	0.84866
— 1979		1.20357	0.83086
— 1980		1.16761	0.85645
— 1981		0.87969	1.13677
— 1982		0 77484	1.29059
Netherlands	Guilder		
— 1978		0.46224	2.16336
— 1979		0.49849	2.00608
— 1980		0.50299	1.98812
— 1981		0.40077	2.49520
— 1982		0.38361	2.60680
Norway	N. Krone		
— 1978		0.19076	5.24224
— 1979		0.19747	5.06406
— 1980		0.20246	4.93922
— 1981		0.17423	5.73951
— 1982		0.16627	6.01421
Portugal	Escudo		
— 1978		0.02276	43.94021
— 1979		0.02044	48.92344
— 1980		0.01998	50.06208
— 1981		0.01625	61.54642
— 1982		0.01407	71.05603
Turkey	T. Lira		
— 1978		0.04118	24.28216
— 1979		0.03218	31.07752
— 1980		0.01315	76.03811
— 1981		0.00899	111.21862
— 1982		0.00677	147.75632
United Kingdom	£		
— 1978		1.91951	0.52097
— 1979		2.12155	0.47135
— 1980		2.32628	0.42987
— 1981		2.02791	0.49312
— 1982		1.81350	0.55142

Note b: GDP (p.v.) = Gross domestic product in purchasers' values, current prices.

Prior to 1978, tables of defence statistics published in reports of the committee used gross national product (GNP) as a measure of national wealth. In line with the practice of other international organisations, the tables are now given in terms of GDP which is somewhat higher than GNP. Consequently, the figures for defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP are slightly lower than the percentages of GNP previously published.

Note c: France is a member of the alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure; the relevant figures are indicative only.

Note d: The corresponding statistical data for Spain are not available.

e = Preliminary estimate.

f = Forecast.

Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(82)24.

B. MANPOWER EFFORT – 1982

	Period of compulsory [1] military service (months)			Total in armed forces [2] military personnel (thousands)	Total armed forces [2] (military and civilian) as percentage of active population
	Army	Navy	Air force	(e)	(e)
Belgium	10 [3]	10 [3]	10 [3]	109	2.8
France	12 [4]	12 [4]	12 [4]	578	3.1
Germany	15 [5]	15 [5]	15 [5]	495	2.5
Italy	12	18	12	517	2.4
Luxembourg	voluntary			1	0.8
Netherlands	14-16	14-17	14-17	106	2.6
United Kingdom	voluntary			335	2.2
TOTAL WEU				2,141	2.6
Canada	voluntary			81	1.0
Denmark	9	9	9	31	1.6
Greece	22	26	24	186	5.9
Norway	12	15	15	40	2.5
Portugal	16	24	21-24	91	2.3
Turkey	20	20	20	769	4.4
United States	voluntary			2,189	2.9
TOTAL NON-WEU				3,387	3.0
TOTAL NATO				5,528	2.8

Sources:

1. IISS, Military Balance, 1982-83.
2. NATO press release M-DPC-2 (82) 24, 1st December 1982.
3. Eight months if served in Germany.
4. Eighteen months for overseas.
5. To be eighteen months.

e = estimate.

APPENDIX II

Defence expenditure as percentage of GDP plotted against income per capita – 1981



APPENDIX III

Selected indicators comparing defence contribution with ability to contribute

Country	Ratio defence spending share/ GDP share			Ratio defence spending share/ prosperity index share			Ratio active defence Manpower share/ population share		
	1981	1982	1983	1981	1982	1983	1981	1982	1983
Belgium	0.88	0.86	0.85	0.77	0.77	0.94	1.29	1.11	1.11
France	1.08	1.05	1.03	0.99	0.93	1.05	1.24	1.25	1.23
Germany	0.89	0.84	0.83	0.71	0.68	0.81	1.02	1.02	1.02
Italy	0.67	0.63	0.61	1.16	0.98	1.07	0.89	0.91	0.92
Luxembourg	0.33	0.29	0.30	0.29	0.25	0.32	0.36	0.40	0.33
Netherlands	0.92	0.81	0.79	1.11	0.74	0.87	0.85	0.90	0.88
United Kingdom	1.38	1.33	1.31	1.90	1.52	1.59	0.96	0.98	0.97
Canada	0.53	0.50	0.50	0.55	0.51	0.46	0.46	0.47	0.47
Denmark	0.56	0.63	0.61	0.43	0.53	0.59	0.85	0.80	0.80
Greece	1.50	1.45	1.73	3.60	3.63	4.93	2.07	2.09	2.05
Norway	0.86	0.75	0.71	0.71	0.58	0.55	1.17	1.15	1.13
Portugal	1.00	0.92	0.88	4.29	4.13	4.06	0.87	0.94	0.93
Turkey	1.18	1.21	1.29	7.65	10.20	11.02	1.61	1.62	1.63
United States	1.37	1.39	1.38	1.27	1.31	1.19	1.28	1.26	1.27
Japan	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.29	0.32	0.28	0.21	0.21	0.21
NATO less United States	0.95	0.92	0.90	0.97	0.91	1.02	1.09	1.09	1.09
NATO plus Japan less United States	0.77	0.76	0.72	0.81	0.79	0.82	0.86	0.87	0.87
Total NATO	1.15	1.13	1.15	1.12	1.09	1.12	1.16	1.16	1.16
Total NATO plus Japan	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Note. *Years* are date of Secretary of Defence report.
" Share " means " share of total for NATO plus Japan ".

Source: Successive reports to United States Congress by the Secretary of Defence on allied contributions to the common defence.

APPENDIX IV

Defence expenditure at constant 1980 prices [1]

$ million

Country	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982 (e)
Belgium	3,799	3,881	3,963	3,999	3,727
France	24,880	24,974	26,427	27,467	27,387
Germany	25,724	26,100	26,671	30,419	27,530
Italy	8,904	9,106	9,588	9,552	9,816
Luxembourg	43	45	53	55	57
Netherlands	5,145	5,363	5,264	5,442	5,555
United Kingdom	25,491	26,015	22,773	27,226	28,016
TOTAL WEU	93,986	95,484	94,739	104,160	105,815
Canada	4,581	4,551	4,696	4,867	5,011
Denmark	1,592	1,597	1,609	1,613	1,662
Greece	2,555	2,485	2,275	2,796	2,766
Norway	1,608	1,641	1,667	1,714	1,754
Portugal	766	789	872	880	859
Turkey	2,361	2,410	2,461	2,466	2,523
United States	132,438	137,509	143,860	151,212	163,784
TOTAL NON-WEU	145,901	150,982	157,440	165,548	178,359
TOTAL NATO	239,887	246,466	252,179	269,708	284,174

1. Calculated from NATO figures for per capita expenditure.

APPENDIX V

United States ACDA official world military expenditures and arms transfers

(Military expenditure, constant prices)

$ billion

March 1981 edition – 1977 prices			March 1982 edition – 1978 prices				
	NATO	Warsaw Pact	United States	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Soviet Union	
1970	174.7	129.4	128.8	192.4	150.0	127.8	1970
1971	166.9	133.0	117.9	184.2	153.4	130.2	1971
1972	169.3	138.0	117.4	187.1	158.9	134.4	1972
1973	165.2	144.3	112.1	183.3	165.8	140.5	1973
1974	167.8	150.1	112.3	185.8	173.1	147.2	1974
1975	164.9	154.6	108.5	183.3	178.1	151.4	1975
1976	161.5	161.2	103.3	179.8	185.4	158.2	1976
1977	167.5	161.7	108.0	186.3	187.2	159.9	1977
1978	169.1	165.1	108.4	188.8	189.0	161.6	1978
1979	–	–	112.3	195.2	193.6	166.7	1979

APPENDIX VI

Roth-Glenn-Nunn Amendment [1]

The full text of the Roth-Glenn-Nunn Amendment on NATO Defence Industrial Co-operation follows :

Sec. 1122. (*a*) The Congress finds that–

(1) the United States remains firmly committed to co-operating closely with its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereinafter in this section referred to as NATO) allies in protecting liberty and maintaining world peace;

(2) the financial burden of providing for the defence of Western Europe and for the protection of the interests of NATO member countries in areas outside the NATO treaty area has reached such proportions that new co-operative approaches among the United States and its NATO allies are required to achieve and maintain an adequate collective defence at acceptable costs;

(3) the need for a credible conventional deterrent in Western Europe has long been recognised in theory but has never been fully addressed in practice;

(4) a more equitable sharing by NATO member countries of both the burdens and the technological and economic benefits of the common defence would do much to reinvigorate the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation alliance with a restored sense of unity and common purpose;

(5) a decision to co-ordinate more effectively the enormous technological, industrial, and economic resources of NATO member countries will not only increase the efficiency and effectiveness of NATO military expenditures but also provide inducement for the Soviet Union to enter a meaningful arms reduction agreement so that both Warsaw Pact countries and NATO member countries can devote more of their energies and resources to peaceful and economically more beneficial pursuits.

(*b*) It is the sense of the Congress that the President should propose to the heads of government of the NATO member countries that the NATO allies of the United States join the United States in agreeing–

(1) to co-ordinate more effectively their defence efforts and resources to create, at acceptable costs, a credible, collective, conventional force for the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty area;

(2) to establish a co-operative defence-industrial effort within Western Europe and between Western Europe and North America that would increase the efficiency and effectiveness of NATO expenditures by providing a larger production base while eliminating unnecessary duplication of defence-industrial efforts;

(3) to share more equitably and efficiently the financial burdens, as well as the economic benefits (including jobs, technology, and trade) of NATO defence; and

(4) to intensify consultations promptly for the early achievement of the objectives described in clauses (1) through (3).

1. Approved by the United States Senate by 87 votes to 1 on 13th May 1982.

APPENDIX VII

Major United States equipment procured by European countries and vice-versa

A. *European equipment being procured by the United States*

- MAN truck for weapon systems in Europe (Germany)
- MAG-58 armour machine gun [1] (Belgium)
- 120 mm tank gun [1] (Germany)
- 5.56 mm squad automatic weapon [1] (Belgium)
- Muzzle bore sight (training) (United Kingdom)

B. *European equipment being evaluated by the United States*

- Anti-tank weapons :
  LAW-80
  M72-750
  M72A3
  Jupiter
  Panzerfaust III
  Armbrust
  Apilas
  Strim
- Plessey groundsat rebroadcast radio
- 90 mm Cockerill Mk III gun
- Large-calibre bore brushes
- Underground field shelter, MK-2
- MH-842 (Markhandler rough terrain forklift truck)
- 7.62 mm machine gun mount
- Chemical agent monitoring system
- Conventional generic mine devices (training mines)
- HC smoke pots
- Cartridge, 5.56 mm, ball, practice, Xm 858
- 4.2 inch mortar sub-calibre training system
- Cartridge, 50 calibre, ball and tracer, plastic training ammunition
- DM 82 (hand grenade fuse)
- FH-380 (personal dosimetry system)
- Lightweight decontamination system (SANATOR)
- Inflatable decoy system for United States Hawk air defence system
- 150 kW low noise generator
- Aerial radiac system
- 105 mm kinetic energy practice ammunition
- Kinetic energy recovery rope
- Penguin missile
- PAP-104 mine neutralisation system
- Minesweeper hunter (MSH-1) procurement
- Searchwater radar
- Versatile exercise mine (VEM)

C. *United States equipment being procured by European countries*

- M113 APC
- AN/TSQ-73 missile Minder (a part of the fire direction centre of the improved Hawk battery)
- I-Hawk (air defence system)
- 66 mm M72 Law (a squad-level anti-tank weapon)
- Projectile 155 mm M483A1 (anti-personnel round delivered by the 155 mm Howitzer)

1. Produced in the United States.

- 2.75 inch rocket (air-delivered anti-personnel round)
- MOD Flir
- Tow W/helicopter roof-mounted sight
- M109A3 SP Howitzer
- Stinger missile (man-portable infrared-homing air defence missile system)
- Harpoon anti-surface ship missile
- Submarine-launched Harpoon
- MK-46 light-light anti-submarine torpedo
- Sparrow advanced monopulse missile (AMM) AIM/RIM-7M
- AIM-9L infrared air-to-air missile (The AIM-9L will be employed on the F-14, AV-8, F-16, F-15, F/A-18 and the MRCA Tornado. This Sidewinder missile differs from its predecessors principally in having an all-aspect attack capability.)
- High-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM)
- F/A-18 naval strike fighter aircraft
- P-3 patrol aircraft Orion
- Super rapid-blooming offboard chaff (SRBOC)
- E2-C early warning aircraft
- F-16 multinational fighter programme [1]
- Airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) programme
- Navstar global positioning system (GPS)[1]
- Joint tactical information distribution system (JTIDS) (system adopted for the NATO AEW&C programme)
- Advanced medium-range air-to-air missile [1]
- KC-135 (tanker fleet) re-engining (CFM-56)[1]
- Electronic countermeasure simulator
- Peace Green communications equipment
- ALQ-131 electronic countermeasure pods
- ALQ-101 electronic countermeasure pods

1. European coproduction.

Source Standardisation of equipment within NATO (report to the United States Congress by Mr. Weinberger, January 1983).

APPENDIX VIII

Levels of nuclear weapons

A. *Total warheads all systems*

Numbers of nuclear warheads mid-1983 (Figures rounded to nearest hundred)		
	United States	Soviet Union
ICBM	2,100	5,300
SLBM	5,200	2,400
Strategic bomber	1,900	300
Total strategic [1]	9,500	8,000
All other [2]	14,500	8,000
Grand total [3]	24,000	16,000

Sources. 1. As in following table.
2. Deduced by difference.
3. Hearings United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 13th November 1981.

B. *Levels of United States and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons (covered by SALT)*

(i) United States strategic systems (covered by SALT)

Type	Maximum range (km)	Number	Number of independent warheads each	Assumed total number of warheads
ICBMs				
Titan II	15,000	45	1	45
Minuteman II	11,300	450	1	450
Minuteman III	13,000	250 (160 kt) 300 (353 kt-Mk 12A)	3	1,650 [1]
Sub-total		1,045		2,145
SLBMs				
Poseidon C-3	4,600	304	10-14	3,040
Trident C-4	7,400	264	8-14	2,112
Sub-total		568		5,152
BM total		1,613		7,300
Aircraft B-52 (G and H)	16,000	241 [2]	up to 10 or 12 ALCM	2,220
TOTAL		1,854		9,500

1. On the assumption that the maximum number of warheads are fitted.
2. Assuming all remaining 31 B-52Ds withdrawn from service by 30th September 1983 as planned.

(ii) Soviet strategic systems (covered by SALT)

Type	Maximum range (km)	Number	Number of independent warheads each	Assumed total number of warheads
ICBMs				
SS-11	10,500	550	1	550
SS-13	10,000	60	1	60
SS-17	10,000	150	1 or 4	600 [1]
SS-18	9-10,500	308	1 or 8	2,464 [1]
SS-19	11,000	330	6 or 1	1,600
Sub-total		1,398		5,300
SLBMs				
SSN-5	1,120	48	1	48
SSN-6	2,400-3,000	384	1	384
SSN-8	8,000	292	1	292
SSN-17	5,000	12	1	12
SSN-18	8,000	224	3-7	1,514
SSN-20 [2]	8,300	20	6-9	150
Sub-total		980		2,400
BM total		2,378		7,700
Aircraft	Combat radius (km)			
Bear Tu-95	5-6,000	100	2-4	210
Bison Mya-4	4-6,000	43	1-2	90
Sub-total		143		300
TOTAL		2,521		8,000

1. On the assumption that the maximum number of warheads are fitted.
2. Entry into service expected before end 1983.

Note: Forces loadings for aircraft deduced from total warheads (rounded to nearest hundred).

Source:

- IISS, Military Balance 1983-84.
- United States Department of Defence Annual Reports fiscal years 1982, 1983 and 1984.
- Soviet military power, United States Department of Defence, March 1983.
- Whence the threat to peace, Soviet Ministry of Defence, January 1982.

C. *Levels of intermediate-range nuclear weapons of interest to Europe*

Maximum range or combat radius (km)	Assumed warheads per system	Weapons	Western estimates[1]		Soviet claims[3]
			Total inventory	In range of Europe[2]	
		USSR:			
5,000	3	SS-20	351[5]	243	
2,000	1	SS-4	223	223	"land-based" 496
4,000	1	SS-5	15[7]		
1,000	1	SS-12	120	70	
1,000	1	SS-22	100	100	
1,120	1	SS-N-5	48	48	"sea-based" 18
4,000	3 or 4	Backfire	100	44	
2,800	2	Badger	220	88	
3,100	2	Blinder	125	50	"air-based" 461
1,600	2	Fencer	800	160	
720	1	Flogger D	650	260	
600	1	Fitter C/D	650	130	
		TOTAL	3,412	1,416	975 (938[8])
		NATO inc. France:			
1,900	2	F-111	150	75	
2,000+	4 or 6	FB-111A	56	56	
750	1	F-4	238	71	
800	1	F-104	261	78	
		F-16	234	70	
1,000	2	A-6/A-7	68	34	
950	2	Buccaneer	45	25	
720	1	Jaguar	117	58	
1,600	1	Mirage IV-A	34	34	46
560	2	Super-Etendard	16	8	
720	1	Pershing I	180	180	
4,600	1	Polaris	64	64	64
3,000	1	M-20	80	80	80
3,000	10 or 14	Poseidon[6]	40	40	(all other 723)
		TOTAL	1,583	870	913[4]

1. IISS Military Balance 1982-83 and 1983-84 and NATO NPG communiqués of 23rd March 1983 and 28th October 1983.
2. Military Balance estimate of numbers available in nuclear rôle in Europe.
3. Lev Semeiko in Moscow News, 17th January 1982.
4. Omitting 55 Vulcan bombers phased out in February 1983.
5. Bases for some 27 further SS-20s being constructed in Soviet Far East.
6. 400 Poseidon warheads are assigned to SACEUR but are also included in strategic table B.
7. Withdrawn from service according to Andropov Pravda interview of 27th October 1983.
8. 938 according to Moscow press conference of Marshal Akhromeyev, 14th September 1983.

D. *Historical levels of SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 missiles*

Year	Total of SS-4 and SS-5	SS-20	Total missiles	Total warheads[1]	Total yield MT[2]	Total equivalent megatons[3]	Total warheads in range of Europe[4]	Notes
1962	200	–	200	200	200	200	200	Period of SS-4 and SS-5 build-up
1963-1971	700	–	700	700	700	700	525	
1972-1976	600	–	600	600	600	600	450	
1977	600	(20)	620	660	609	617	440	
1978	590	100	690	890	635	675	642	Start of SS-20 deployment
1979	590	120	710	950	644	692	682	
1980	440	160	600	920	512	576	650	
1981	380	230	610	1,070	483	575	745	
1982[5]	230	324	554	1,200	376	504	820	
1983[5]	239	351	590	1,300	397	447	970	

Source : Successive editions of IISS Military Balance.

1. Assuming 3 warheads on all SS-20 missiles, but ignoring any reloads.
2. Assuming 1 MT on SS-4, SS-5 warheads; 0.15 MT on SS-20 warheads.
3. Total of $Y\frac{2}{3}$ where Y is yield of each warhead in MT.
4. Assuming $\frac{3}{4}$SS-4, 5 and $\frac{2}{3}$SS-20 in range of Europe.
5. Figures from NATO NPG communiqués up to 28th October 1983.

APPENDIX IX

RESOLUTION 15 [1]

on the participation of observers in certain meetings of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments [2]

The Assembly,

Considering the interests of member states of NATO which are not members of WEU,

DECIDES

1. That the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments may invite observers to attend its meetings from member states of NATO which are not members of WEU;

2. That such observers shall have the right to speak.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1959 during the first part of the fifth ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum : see the report tabled by Mr. Patijn on behalf of the Presidential Committee (Document 130 and Addendum).

Document 959
Amendments 1, 2 and 3

28th November 1983

European security and burden-sharing in the alliance

AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3 [1]

tabled by MM. Bernini, Antoni and Martino

1. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (*viii*) and insert:

" Aware of the seriousness of the interruption of the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, of the risks of a further increase in rearmament and of the ever-growing dangers for European security that ensue ; ".

2. Leave out paragraph A.2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

" To promote steps for bringing about significant action by the great powers, postponement of the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles and the start of the dismantling of the SS-20s in order to encourage, with the help of the European countries, the resumption of the Geneva negotiations and the conclusion of an agreement on the level of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe at the lowest level of balance ; ".

3. Leave out paragraph A.3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

" To help to define adequate mutual confidence-building and joint security measures to ensure the complete success of the forthcoming Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe ; ".

Signed: Bernini, Antoni, Martino

1. See 6th sitting, 29th November 1983 (amendments negatived).

European security and burden-sharing in the alliance

AMENDMENTS 4, 5, 6 and 7 [1]

tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

4. In paragraph (*viii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after " which the allies jointly recognise as ", leave out " directly ".

5. At the end of paragraph (*ix*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add " and the other countries of the Atlantic Alliance ".

6. In the first sentence of paragraph A of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " WEU member governments " and insert " governments of member countries of the alliance ".

7. In paragraph A.2 (*b*) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " WEU member countries " and insert " allies ".

Signed: Cavaliere

1. See 6th sitting, 29th November 1983 (amendments not moved).

Document 960 **7th November 1983**

Rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments [2]
by Mr. Pecchioli, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. *Pignion* (Chairman); MM. *Blaauw*, Kittelmann (Vice-Chairmen); Sir Frederic Bennett (Alternate: *Wilkinson*), MM. van den Bergh (Alternate: *Tummers*), *Bernini*, Bonnel, *Cavaliere*, Cox, Dejardin, Della Briotta (Alternate: *Amadei*), Duraffour, Edwards, Ertl, Fosson (Alternate: *Giust*), *Galley*, Gerstl, *Sir Anthony Grant*, MM. *Lemmrich*, Mayoud (Alternate: *Caro*), Ménard (Alternate: *Jung*), *Pecchioli*, *Prussen*, *Scheer*, Scholten, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Steverlynck.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

APPENDICES

Draft Recommendation

on the rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime

The Assembly,

(*i*) Having taken note of the results of the information study conducted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of WEU on the rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime;

(*ii*) Aware that the fundamental institutional task of the armed forces is to ensure national defence and security;

(*iii*) Recognising the rôle of guidance and co-ordination incumbent on the civil authorities in establishing research and civil defence bodies, planning means of intervention and mobilising local authorities and the various civil protection agencies in order to afford assistance and relief to the victims of disasters;

(*iv*) Stressing the essential contribution which the armed forces have to make in this context by affording relief and assistance in the hours immediately following disasters;

(*v*) Stressing the international value in terms of human solidarity of the exchange of assistance between member countries in the event of disasters and of participation in assistance and relief operations in third countries thus struck,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To pay particular attention to the rôle and contribution of the armed forces in studying and planning civil protection means;

2. To this end to promote co-operation between member countries through:

   (*a*) the exchange of information and experience;

   (*b*) mutual invitations to and attendance at periodical national and, if possible, transfrontier civil protection exercises; and

   (*c*) the conclusion of bi- or multilateral agreements on mutual assistance and relief;

3. Together with NATO, in co-operation with the United Nations relief agencies, utilising such humanitarian aid as provided by the EEC, and in collaboration through the Council of Europe, to contribute to assistance and relief to third countries struck by a natural or collective man-made disaster by establishing the necessary structures and means.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Pecchioli, Rapporteur)

Introduction

0.1. On 18th December 1980, your Rapporteur and several of his colleagues wrote to the Chairman of the committee proposing that the committee prepare a report on the rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural disasters [1]. My colleagues and I were motivated by our country's experiences during the earthquake which struck southern Italy in 1980. At its meeting on 16th February 1981, the committee approved the proposal in principle but extended the scope of the report to include man-made disasters too. The committee appointed your present Rapporteur on 16th June 1981.

0.2. To gather basic information on arrangements made for this purpose by allied countries and on the experience they have acquired, your Rapporteur prepared a questionnaire on the various aspects of the subject which he arranged to be sent in February 1982 to the Ministers of Defence and of the Interior of the fourteen NATO countries having armed forces [2].

0.3. Answers from most of the countries concerned were received by the Office of the Clerk in 1982 and the rest, after a letter of reminder, in spring 1983. These answers [3] provide the basis for Chapter I of the present explanatory memorandum in which the conditions for using military units in the countries of the alliance are examined.

0.4. Your Rapporteur wishes to take this opportunity of conveying his thanks to all the ministries which answered his questionnaire.

0.5. In recent years the armed forces have often come to the assistance of victims of disasters.

0.6. They have intervened in various ways:

- planned operations in the case of floods or forest fires;
- more or less improvised participation in the case of pollution of the sea;
- emergency action in large numbers after earthquakes or cyclones.

0.7. Implementation of these humanitarian tasks has allowed a number of lessons to be learned which should be emphasised at the start of this report.

0.8. Humanitarian interventions must in no event jeopardise the implementation of the operational tasks of military units. This being said, the latter are generally well adapted to this type of task thanks to their graded structure, the flexibility of their chain of command and communications and their abundant means of transport, engineering equipment and field medical equipment.

0.9. Apart from units of the medical corps, certain independent units responsible for field installations or supplies for troops can form the nucleus of an intervention group in the event of major disaster.

0.10. It will be noted however that the intervention of the armed forces is not automatic. It is the civil authorities that have the power and responsibility to call in the army.

0.11. In this general context, consideration should be given to how various countries have approached this tricky problem and defined procedure for the use of the armed forces, account being taken of political structures, geographical situation and the degree of risk involved. The answers from countries of the alliance to the Rapporteur's questionnaire are examined hereafter.

I. *Analysis of conditions for the use of military units in various countries*

(a) Belgium

1.1. Civil defence problems are governed by two legislative texts:

1.2. The law of 31st December 1963 defines the aim of civil defence and describes the duties of the Minister of the Interior who is responsible for co-ordinating the preparation and application of the measures necessary for civil protection.

1.3. The royal decree of 23rd June 1971 describes disasters in terms of extent, stipulates those which automatically lead to intervention by the civil protection services and defines the respective responsibilities of burgomasters, provincial governors and the Minister of the Interior.

1.4. When a disaster calls for the application of means of assistance which depend on the state, province and communes, the burgomaster directly concerned informs the provincial governor, who passes the communication on to the

1. See extract from the letter at Appendix I.

2. Iceland has no armed forces and Spain was not yet a member of NATO.

3. The text of the questionnaire is given at Appendix II; the text of the answers from the ministries concerned may be consulted at the Office of the Clerk.

Minister of the Interior and the provincial head adviser on civil defence.

1.5. The governor, assisted by this adviser, is in principle responsible for co-ordinating assistance operations. However, if the Minister of the Interior, assisted if necessary by other ministers, calls in the army in application of the powers delegated to him, it is he who is responsible for co-ordination.

1.6. As can be seen, there is no permanent government body responsible for combating disasters. Conversely, there are five civil defence units, available round the clock, each of which is responsible for one area of intervention which together cover the whole territory.

1.7. These intervention services are manned by 445 full-time employees of the state with the help of about 150 conscientious objectors carrying out fifteen months' civil service.

1.8. When these units are activated, volunteers are brought in through provincial civil defence offices. These volunteers undertake to join their units within three to eight hours depending on circumstances. They number more than 9,000 and are trained in NBC lifesaving and defence techniques by qualified instructors from the Royal Civil Defence School.

1.9. Intervention equipment for this personnel is stocked in depots near the provincial capitals for forming mobile civil defence units.

1.10. There is no working relationship between voluntary charitable associations and the Civil Defence Corps, which operates as a self-sufficient body.

1.11. The civil defence annual operating budget amounted to 1,239 million Belgian francs in 1983, of which 440 million Belgian francs for expenditure on staff. To this figure should be added the cost of communal fire services, i.e. 6,643 million Belgian francs. In all, some 0.5% of the annual budget is spent on civil defence to which should be added special appropriations voted for specific disasters.

1.12. In the field of international relations, agreements have been signed with the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, France and the Federal Republic of Germany for mutual assistance in the event of major disasters.

1.13. Intervention by the armed forces must be requested by the civil authorities concerned, and in such an event a special chain of command is set up. Starting from the top, there is the commander of internal forces, then the provincial military commander, the military assistance commander, responsible for contacts with local civil authorities and calling in the relevant military units or detachments, and the commanders of such units. In principle, there is no specific provision for a special organisation or structure for civil defence, with the exception however of a helicopter squadron responsible for rescue at sea. Conversely, the commander of internal forces and the provincial commanders have issued orders defining the responsibilities of military leaders and the principles and procedure to be applied in handling disasters on national territory. Furthermore, there are intervention plans for floods and measures for the emergency recall of military personnel from leave in such circumstances. Apart from this particular task, the army may be asked to carry out any task compatible with its means and its operational missions, which continue to be given priority.

1.14. For this purpose, it makes use of all military equipment considered necessary for the accomplishment of the task, e.g. means of transport, engineering equipment, medical equipment, signals equipment, camping equipment, field kitchens, mine detection and disposal equipment, etc.

1.15. No units are designated a priori for conducting rescue operations; the choice is made according to the means available. However, in view of their equipment and the training of their personnel, engineering units are the most suitable for intervening in the early stages of emergency operations.

1.16. There is no provision in the national defence budget for civil defence; hence the use of military means for rescue operations is not free of charge. Authorities requesting army assistance must reimburse the cost of such operations to the Ministry of Defence.

1.17. Depending on circumstances, the provincial governor or the Minister of the Interior ensures co-ordination of assistance measures.

1.18. If the disaster is confined to the territory of a province, the Minister of the Interior delegates responsibility to the governor; if several provinces are affected, the Minister of the Interior himself assumes responsibility. Similarly, either the provincial military commander or the commander of internal forces joins the co-ordinating committee, depending on whether it is chaired by a provincial governor or by the Minister of the Interior.

1.19. The technical director co-ordinating assistance operations on the spot is a civil servant appointed by the governor. It will be noted that there is no permanent link between the civil authorities, the armed forces and voluntary associations. In the event of disaster, the latter may be given appropriate tasks.

1.20. At the level of implementation, there are no rules for stationing troops on the basis of a possible intervention in the event of disasters;

the size of the country and the mobility of units allow resources to be brought in within a few hours without resorting to national emergency transport plans. However, measures have been taken to meet the risk of flooding. The national territory has been divided into three intervention areas, in each of which is stationed an engineering regiment.

1.21. The greatest risk is in fact flooding due to the collapse of dykes when tides are exceptionally high or when there are violent storms. In the last twenty years, only two other noteworthy disasters have required the intervention of the armed forces: the collapse of a tip and a fire in a city department store.

1.22. Most lessons have been learned from flood-fighting and they have been turned to good account. It may therefore be said that Belgian engineering units now have proven ability in this field.

1.23. Interventions abroad have been implemented in the framework of international assistance to disaster areas:

- transport of food, medical supplies, etc., by sea, air and road;
- transport by air of a mobile surgical team and its equipment to take part in medical assistance after the Friuli earthquake;
- transport of civil defence teams and their equipment by the air force after the earthquake in southern Italy.

1.24. These interventions abroad were carried out as military operations and did not allow any lessons to be learned which directly concern civil defence.

(b) Canada

1.25. In Canada, the intervention of the armed forces is governed by Emergency Planning Order PC (Privy Council) 1981-1305 of 21st May 1981 which defines the responsibilities of the various ministers. There is further supporting legislation, i.e.:

- acts of parliament establishing federal departments, agencies and crown corporations and giving details on sections of the acts dealing with emergency and disaster responsibilities;
- acts of parliament designating a specific minister to administer a field of federal responsibilities concerning emergency planning and response;
- records of a cabinet decision indicating the authorities responsible for action in the event of emergencies or disasters;
- customs and conventions which have been used to assist in emergencies and disasters.

1.26. Each province and territory has promulgated a provincial act to enable it to co-operate with the federal government in carrying out its responsibility for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of its people in the event of peacetime disasters. In accordance with the Emergency Planning Order, every minister has permanent, specific emergency responsibilities in respect of civil defence and the organisation of relief. Furthermore, at federal, provincial and municipal levels disaster legislation provides the legal authority for an effective response by governments and government officials, just as it makes clear the extent of that authority and outlines procedures to be followed and measures to be implemented.

1.27. The minister or other authority in control of relief operations is empowered to call on the armed forces for civil protection duties. Requests are set out on approved forms and addressed to the Minister of Defence and must be signed by the Premier or a cabinet minister designated by him.

1.28. When the forces provide assistance, they act in a supporting rôle to the civil authorities and orders should come down the military chain of command of the units concerned.

1.29. A feature of Canada is the abundance of permanent means available for meeting emergencies at federal level:

- the Interdepartmental Committee on Emergency Preparedness includes officials of the departments most usually involved in the response to emergencies. It advises the cabinet on measures taken;
- the Emergency Planning Secretariat of the Privy Council Office is responsible for developing emergency planning policy and providing direction;
- Emergency Planning Canada is responsible for co-ordinating the emergency planning of federal departments, agencies and crown corporations and between them and the provincial governments;
- Emergency Planning Canada regional directors provide liaison between the federal government, provincial governments and private organisations.

1.30. Provinces and municipalities also have a specific organisation on the lines of those existing at federal level.

1.31. The President of the Privy Council is responsible for emergency planning and pro-

vides ministerial guidance. However, the federal government is not responsible for organising relief; it assists provinces, territories and municipalities at the request of their authorities. But the federal government plays a leading rôle in the case of oil spills at sea or when disaster strikes in two or more provinces simultaneously.

1.32. As regards the control of resources, the situation is very similar to the abovementioned procedure. Resources are decentralised in the various departments, agencies and crown corporations in accordance with the kind and amounts of resources which might be needed and the situations in which they would be required.

1.33. In the field of research, federal action is confined to sponsoring research and preparing plans to prevent or limit injury to persons or damage to property. In order to be able to intercept and interpret correctly indicators of impending emergencies, Emergency Planning Canada operates one central emergency situation centre and ten regional centres where reports from across Canada are received and the news monitored daily so that the government departments and provincial authorities concerned may be alerted.

1.34. As it is the responsibility of the Emergency Planning Canada emergency situation centre to inform the public on emergency preparedness, it is also responsible for alerting the government.

1.35. There are no non-military units organised to ensure civil protection. However, there are embryonic organisations at the provincial level in various fields:

- health, first aid, collection, evacuation and treatment of casualties;
- distribution of prepared food;
- fire-fighting;
- search and rescue teams;
- auxiliary police;
- public works.

1.36. All these services would have to be supplemented by volunteers and special types of equipment.

1.37. There are also a number of charitable organisations whose activities cover such varied fields as medical assistance, the provision of food, clothing and shelter for victims and the organisation of transport. These organisations take part in exercises on a municipal level in the setting of a disaster generally of minor importance. They receive no public subsidiaries and depend on fund-raising campaigns.

1.38. Civil protection on the contrary has its own budget, amounting to $8,800,000 for the financial year 1982-83 of which $2,800,000 for operating costs and the rest for the joint emergency planning programme.

1.39. At international level, Canada, which is a member of the United Nations and of NATO, has concluded agreements with those bodies to which it provides information and assistance in disaster relief. In 1967, it also concluded an agreement with the United States for co-ordinating planning in peacetime between border states and provinces. An emergency communications link exists which is especially designed for the passage of civil defence information.

1.40. Requests for the assistance of the armed forces normally originate at the provincial level. To provide a coherent military structure to respond to these requests the country has been divided into six military regions, each being superimposed over a functional military organisation with a regional command.

1.41. If regional resources are inadequate, additional resources are co-ordinated by National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) and in principle it is the regional commander concerned who has operational control of all resources. Military regional staff are responsible for co-ordinating the use of troops with the responsible civil authorities. Regional staffs are available on a 24-hour basis and NDHQ operates a 24-hour operations centre.

1.42. The use of armed forces for civil protection tasks is planned and prepared on the basis of permanent orders, i.e. " the provision of services to non-defence agencies " and " the Canadian forces' plan for internal security operations ". These tasks, for which all available military equipment and manpower resources are potentially available, concern natural disasters such as floods, forest fires, hurricanes, earthquakes, landslides and severe snow storms. Land combat arms and land service support units and air transport units are most frequently employed but there are no military units specially designed, trained or equipped to provide civil protection. Nor is there a budgetary head intended a priori to cover the cost of carrying out operations. The cost is recovered from the requesting authority unless it is waived by the Ministry of Defence.

1.43. In principle, requests for assistance must be made through the provincial authorities. In cases of life and death, however, the most direct route is acceptable. There are moreover links between the civil and military authorities. They are established on a geographical basis and are outlined in municipal and provincial emergency response plans. However, military participation in local planning exercises is usually limited to advice by regional staff as the diversion of defence resources to other than defence tasks must be prompted by necessity.

(c) Denmark

1.44. There has been no major natural disaster in Denmark for a long time and no need has been felt to draw up special legislation for civil protection. Should it be necessary to call on military units on the occasion of such a major disaster, this would be done in the framework of the total defence concept which co-ordinates the use of the armed forces, the police and civil defence. In this event, the military elements would operate under the police force which, in Denmark, is responsible to the Ministry of Justice, whose attributions include the right to call on military resources.

1.45. There is no permanent body for disaster relief. However, the civil defence mobile columns, of which there are seven, spread out geographically in the light of requirements, each maintain a detachment of two officers (civil servants) and sixteen conscripts [1] in a permanent state of alert so as to be able to intervene without delay if required.

1.46. According to Danish doctrine, civil defence, which is intended for a wartime situation and organised independently of the armed forces, can meet the requirements of a disaster. There is a civil defence directorate covering seven civil defence regions which have authority over forty-six police districts plus Copenhagen, 102 defence areas and seven mobile columns, i.e. a potential total of 65,000 men, including municipal firemen, volunteers and conscripts [1] with special status and access to the equipment of the mobile columns.

1.47. There is no official relationship between civil defence and charitable organisations which receive no state subsidy. Nor is there a budgetary head for civil protection. Finally, no bi- or multilateral agreements have been concluded between Denmark and its neighbours.

1.48. Denmark would probably envisage calling for military assistance only as a last resort. This would be under the authority of the police, the required personnel and equipment being defined case by case in the light of the situation. Similarly, the units called in would depend on the type of situation. Since no military unit is specially designated for civil protection operations, there is no provision in the defence budget for such an eventuality. In the circumstances, there is little reason why units should be stationed with a view to such use; such a measure would moreover be of little interest in view of the size of the country.

1.49. Apart from heath or forest fires which have been extinguished easily, Denmark has fortunately had no natural disasters and has practically no experience in this connection. At international level, Denmark afforded assistance to the Netherlands during the 1953 flooding, Hungary during the 1956 revolt and Yugoslavia after the 1963 and 1969 earthquakes. These operations were all carried out through the civil defence authorities and the Red Cross and no particular lessons seem to have been learned from them.

(d) France

1.50. In France, mayors and prefects are responsible for protecting the population against disasters in application of the communal law of 5th April 1844, confirmed by Articles L131, 2, 7, and 13 of the Communal Code, all included in Law 82-813 of 2nd March 1982 (Rights and freedoms of communes, departments and regions).

1.51. Under these texts, it is quite logically the Minister of the Interior who has permanent responsibility for civil protection; in certain special cases, this responsibility passes to the Prime Minister, for instance in the case of coastal oil pollution. These authorities are therefore empowered to call on the armed forces through the Minister of Defence. At departmental level, these powers are delegated to the prefects, who are responsible for applying special relief plans.

1.52. The Civil Security Directorate was set up to help them in this task. It depends on the Ministry of the Interior and is to organise and co-ordinate services responsible for studying and implementing prevention and relief measures intended to ensure the safeguard of persons and property in the case of accidents or disasters or in circumstances connected with civil defence.

1.53. The Civil Security Director may sign on behalf of the Minister of the Interior for matters within his purview. The civil protection organisation relies mainly on fire-fighting units:

- firemen and marine firemen with military status: 8,000 men respectively in Paris and Marseilles;
- firemen with civil status: 220,000 volunteers and 12,000 professionals;
- resources directly dependent on the Civil Security Directorate:
  - an air unit consisting of 26 helicopters and 12 aircraft for spraying water;
  - two battalion-size military units for civil security training, consisting of conscripts;
  - one mine-detection service.

1.54. The Civil Security Directorate also has a sub-directorate on prevention and studies. It is

1. Recruited for eight months' national service.

responsible for conducting research and experiments to assess risks, publishing security regulations and developing equipment and intervention tactics.

1.55. Finally, the directorate has a command centre which groups information necessary for providing and co-ordinating assistance.

1.56. Prefects are responsible for alerting the population, for which they use the fire service.

1.57. Apart from firemen, marine firemen and civil security training units which have a personnel of 23 officers, 65 non-commissioned officers and 528 conscripts equipped for clearing operations, forest fire-fighting and handling chemical pollution, there are no permanent military units specially assigned to civil protection. Conversely, there are volunteer corps which have various kinds of equipment stocked in areas where there is the most probability of their being used; more than 160,000 such civil protection volunteers are on call.

1.58. Apart from these units, whose services are free of charge, special mention should be made of the work of the French Red Cross.

1.59. The Civil Security Directorate assists charitable organisations by granting them subsidies and making its training facilities available to them.

1.60. It supervises the training given and issues national diplomas; it also ensures that these associations are geared with the overall assistance arrangements should the ORSEC plan be activated. This happens during major disasters in order to provide first aid, clothing, food and provisional housing for victims.

1.61. They take part in ORSEC exercises organised periodically at departmental level on specific themes such as railway accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, etc.

1.62. For all these tasks, the Civil Security Directorate has a small annual budget of about 0.09% of the national budget.

1.63. At international level, France has concluded many bilateral agreements but none providing for the use of armed forces. There are agreements with Algeria, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Morocco, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia and the United Kingdom. France also acceded to the Atlantic Alliance's multilateral civil defence agreement and the Civil Security Directorate is represented on the NATO Civil Defence Committee. It belongs to a permanent communications network which sends data to its operational centre (CODISC) by telex.

1.64. With regard to the rôle and contribution of the armed forces, whereas the civil authorities are responsible for organising and implementing assistance, the military units made available to them are responsible for deciding how to carry out the tasks entrusted to them. These units remain under their normal military chain of command. However, if military resources are used on a large scale, tactical headquarters may be set up to co-ordinate the use of these resources. In all cases, the framework of command is the same as for military operations. There is therefore no specific structure of command and organisation for civil protection. Similarly, the armed forces have drawn up no emergency plans for tackling disasters; conversely, they are prepared to intervene on the various levels provided for by the Ministry of the Interior: ORSEC: organising relief, POLMAR: fighting sea pollution, SATER: land rescue, SAMAR: sea rescue, etc.

1.65. In this framework, they may be called upon to carry out many tasks:

- medical assistance with deployment of a medical unit able to intervene at short notice (EMIR),
- medical evacuation,
- rescuing flood victims,
- forest fire-fighting,
- snow clearing,
- cleaning polluted coasts, etc.

During these operations they use all necessary equipment: wireless, bridges, transport vehicles, clearing equipment, ships, aircraft, helicopters, medical equipment, mobile kitchens. These resources are always used by military personnel but others may be loaned and used without military assistance: tents, electric generators, pierced steel plates, etc.

1.66. Generally, the army assigns complete units, infantry companies of 100 men and engineering companies with machinery, and it goes without saying that naval and air force units may be brought in in special cases.

1.67. It should be noted that there are army units specially earmarked for civil protection tasks, in addition to the firemen, marine firemen and two civil security training units already mentioned; fourteen self-contained units known as specialised military units have been set up. These are companies of 100 men formed in certain regiments stationed south of the Loire. In addition to military training, they receive specialised training for fighting forest fires at the request of the civil authorities.

1.68. In principle, there is no provision in the defence budget for civil protection and expenditure incurred by such operations normally has to be reimbursed by the authorities which request the assistance of the armed forces. In

general, the armed forces charge only for additional expenditure arising from the humanitarian operations they carry out and such services are frequently given free of charge.

1.69. The work of the military units is simplified by the fact that the territory is divided up administratively and militarily in the same way: defence regions correspond to military regions, economic regions to military divisions and departments to departmental military delegations.

1.70. Close liaison between the departmental military delegate and the prefect and specialised military units designated according to their probable use combine to make it easier to bring reinforcements into operation at short notice. Reinforcements may be transported to the scene of the disaster by helicopter or aircraft and even in the case of movement by road it takes no more than four hours to bring in the most conveniently-placed unit.

1.71. Armed forces have been used in the case of disasters in metropolitan France and overseas departments, for floods, cyclones, volcanic eruptions, forest fires and oil pollution of coasts. Their intervention under the responsibility of the civil defence authorities has proved very useful and experience acquired has allowed stand-by and alert warning times to be improved and has strengthened operational command arrangements.

1.72. Interventions in other countries based mainly on the use of airborne rapid intervention medical units were conducted as military operations and did not allow any particular lessons to be learned with regard to civil protection.

(e) Federal Republic of Germany

1.73. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the choice of measures to be taken to protect the population against disasters is the responsibility of the Länder.

1.74. In peacetime, the Ministers of the Interior of the Länder are responsible for organising assistance and can therefore call on the federal armed forces when civil resources prove inadequate. Tasks are assigned to the armed forces by the civil authorities concerned, usually an official of the district or commune affected by the disaster. When carrying out such tasks, these forces remain under the command of their usual officers.

1.75. The conference of Ministers of the Interior of the Lander set up a working group to harmonise measures to be taken in the event of disaster and to standardise equipment and training methods. It is composed of the directors responsible for assistance measures at the level of the Länder. Its rôle is purely consultative; it has no decision-taking powers and has no responsibility for research, prevention or alert in respect of the most probable disasters.

1.76. The organisation of assistance in both peacetime and wartime depends on some 1,300,000 volunteers (excluding the DLRG) in the framework of a large number of associations:

- the League of Samaritan Workers (more than 15,000 members);
- the German Red Cross (more than 300,000 members);
- the St. John's Ambulance Brigade (14,000 members);
- the Order of Malta relief service (more than 26,000 members);
- the German Lifesaving Association (DLRG) with 1,400 lookout posts and 1,300 lifeboats;
- fire-fighting units with some 946,000 members, of which 20,000 professional;
- the technical support service (52,000 members).

1.77. Of all these, 142,000 auxiliaries are equipped and trained for carrying out special tasks in wartime, but it is obvious that they are also used in the case of disasters in peacetime. All these associations - provided they have informed the authorities that they have the requisite degree of preparation - are used for their specific specialities: medical assistance, distribution of food and clothing, provisional housing of victims, fire-fighting, rescue work, clearing ruins.

1.78. In principle, charitable and official organisations attend joint training sessions organised at district level under the supervision of the official responsible for organising assistance. Charitable associations receive grants which vary from one Land to another. Such sums are difficult to assess.

1.79. Disaster control operates on funds granted by districts and Länder according to local conditions for carrying out operations.

1.80. At international level, the Federal Republic takes part in EEC and NATO working groups dealing with civil defence and the organisation of disaster relief. It has also concluded bilateral agreements with Belgium, France and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg which concern solely the organisation of civil resources and in this context there has been an exchange of telex and telephone numbers between the centres concerned.

1.81. The armed forces intervene without any break in the normal hierarchical chain. The civil servant responsible for organising assistance is empowered to tell the commander of the

unit designated to intervene what his task is to be. The military commander works out the methods to be used and gives the necessary orders through the normal chain of command.

1.82. These operations are conducted in accordance with " directives for the federal armed forces " relating to assistance to be afforded in the event of disaster or serious accident.

1.83. On the basis of these directives, detachments of the armed forces, in addition to their normal tasks, also have to be on call around the clock and ready to reinforce other means of assistance already being used. Other military elements may also be placed in a state of alert on a case-by-case basis, for instance when flooding is expected. Emergency plans have obviously been prepared to speed up the action of these reinforcements and although no specific units are used for assistance in the event of disaster it is mainly engineering, medical, communications and transport units which prove the most useful in the circumstances. However, no unit is specially organised or trained to carry out civil protection tasks.

1.84. Similarly, there are no budget estimates to cover expenditure incurred by the intervention of armed forces. In principle, civil authorities who call in the armed forces must reimburse the expenditure incurred, but there are arrangements for dispensing them from paying all or part of such sums.

1.85. By delegation of the Ministers of the Interior of the Länder, the district and communal authorities may call in the armed forces in the event of disaster. To this end, they set up liaison headquarters to co-ordinate the action of civil bodies and military commands. In the event of a major disaster, the rule is that a liaison officer is seconded to the group responsible for organising assistance.

1.86. Although troops are not stationed in the light of the requirements of assistance operations, the regional territorial command organisation acts as an intermediary between the civil authorities and the armed forces. These territorial commands are responsible for co-ordinating measures for training and using armed forces for civil protection operations. Their task is facilitated by the liaison which exists in garrison towns between the military and civil authorities. However, it is not easy to work out exactly how long it takes to bring in the military reinforcements made available to the civil authorities, but as units are highly mobile their deployment throughout national territory shows that it is possible to bring the first elements into the regions affected within a few hours.

1.87. In spite of favourable conditions, experience at national level during relatively minor disasters such as floods, tidal waves and snowstorms required very considerable work at headquarters level due to lack of training and the unsuitability of available equipment.

1.88. Co-operation has been good but it cannot be said that optimum efficiency has been achieved. Consequently, command post exercises, joint manoeuvres and the participation of civil defence units in armed exercises have been organised, as well as increased civil/military contacts at command level.

1.89. Experience at international level has been derived mainly from earthquakes in Italy and the organisation of air transport toward countries affected by disasters.

1.90. Lessons learned from these operations do not prompt the setting up of special structures at international level since the authorities consider that available military resources allow rapid, effective assistance to be given to countries suffering disasters in peacetime.

(f) Greece

1.91. Assistance to disaster victims is governed by detailed legislation which allows the mobilisation of civilians, the requisition of transport, specific equipment and food. It also provides for various stages of alert.

1.92. The relevant legislation is the Royal Decree 356/71 and Legislative Decrees 857/71 and 17/74, which make the Ministers of the Interior, Defence, Health and Social Welfare, Public Works and Public Order and the local prefectures permanently responsible for organising assistance to victims of disasters in peacetime.

1.93. The Minister of the Interior, sometimes through the prefectures, is empowered to call on the armed forces in the event of disasters on land. The Ministry for the Merchant Marine has the same powers in the case of serious disasters at sea. Depending on the extent of the disaster, the armed forces are under the control of the Ministry of Defence or of the local military commander.

1.94. There is a co-ordination relief body under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, which brings into action the control and direction centres which exist in the abovementioned ministries, but it does not have its own resources since it is mainly responsible for controlling the equipment of the state and private sectors.

1.95. There is no permanent body responsible for implementing assistance. There are no private associations and no exercises are held to test the capabilities of the means required. There is no head in the state budget for civil

protection; funds are released on a case-by-case basis in the light of requirements.

1.96. Greece has a special arrangement with the NATO member countries for assistance in case of natural disasters. It has concluded no other bilateral agreements. Consequently, there is no provision for the use of units of the armed forces in the event of mutual assistance operations and Greece does not belong to a specialised signals network for supplying mutual assistance.

1.97. In the event of major disasters, a joint civil/military organisation under the authority of the Prime Minister is set up at the Ministry of Defence. In local cases, a similar command centre is set up under the prefect and the military commander.

1.98. The armed forces have a permanent round-the-clock command system designed to set in motion and conduct an emergency plan known as the Xenokrates plan.

1.99. Under this plan, the main tasks of military units are to provide personnel, specialised equipment, means of transport, food, assistance to persons in danger and transport of casualties.

1.100. To carry out these tasks, the armed forces use transport (ships, aircraft, helicopters, transport vehicles, ambulances), mechanical equipment, tents and field kitchens.

1.101. The special forces and engineering units which are the most appropriate for this type of operation are generally called in to provide prompt assistance in the early stages of a disaster. The navy also participates when the stricken area is an insular area. However, there are no units specially earmarked for assistance operations or budgetary estimates to cover the cost of humanitarian operations. These are normally paid for by transfer of funds between ministries.

1.102. As already indicated, it is the prefectures that call on the armed forces. To this end, liaison is established between civil and military authorities so as to make the best use of the territorial deployment of the armed forces. There are no special units deployed in possible danger areas; it is generally considered that the mobility of units is sufficient and movement plans drawn up allow calls for assistance to be met within an acceptable lapse of time.

1.103. Reactions have been tested on the occasion of earthquakes, fires and floods. The Greek armed forces have proved to be perfectly suited to such tasks and their assistance to victims of peacetime disasters is particularly effective in the early stages.

1.104. Apart from its participation in NATO peacetime disaster assistance, Greece has entered into no other agreements on bi- or multilateral assistance in the event of disaster in peacetime. However, it assisted Italy and Turkey when there were earthquakes recently by providing supplies through military channels.

(g) *Italy*

1.105. Struck by several national-scale disasters, Italy has introduced legislation governing the organisation of assistance to civilian victims of disasters.

1.106. The organisation of civil protection in Italy is in a transitional stage. A Minister responsible for civil protection has been appointed whose main task is to co-ordinate the various forces deployed in the event of a disaster and to plan forecasting and prevention. However, although this Minister is already in office, the relevant law has not yet been passed by parliament. Under Law 996 of 8th December 1970 and its implementing regulations and Presidential Decree 66, the Minister of the Interior was directly responsible for measures to be taken in both the preparatory and subsequent stages – this situation will be changed by the law which is to be promulgated.

1.107. In this framework, the interministerial civil protection committee at present:

- promotes studies for defining preventive measures likely to limit damage;
- collects and circulates useful information to those concerned with civil protection;
- co-ordinates the various emergency plans;
- organises preliminary measures necessary for government intervention.

1.108. The mainspring of this committee is the general directorate for civil protection and fire-fighting services, which depends on the Ministry of the Interior. It is assisted by the interministerial technical committee, which is more directly concerned with the technical aspects of organising civil protection.

1.109. At regional level, a regional civil protection committee is responsible for deciding upon measures to be taken for avoiding or limiting the risk of disaster and determining the contributions to be made by the region, communes and other local bodies in the event of a serious disaster.

1.110. The abovementioned bodies play a research and planning rôle whereas the law has made the Minister of the Interior responsible for directing assistance and co-ordinating action undertaken by the various administrations.

1.111. In the event of a large-scale disaster, a commissioner responsible for directing assist-

ance and applying government directives is generally appointed by decree of the Prime Minister on the proposal of the Minister of the Interior. In the case of less serious disasters, responsibility for assistance is delegated to the local authorities, assisted by civil protection bodies.

1.112. Participation by the armed forces in rescue operations is provided for in Article 1 of Law 382 of 11th July 1978 on the principles of military discipline.

1.113. Prefects ask for the assistance of troops in accordance with plans drawn up by headquarters and commands at the various levels. These plans describe the organisation of the command, the designation of tasks to be accomplished and implementing procedure.

1.114. At government level therefore there is a general directorate for civil protection under the Minister of the Interior with powers which are mainly limited to research and planning. It is assisted by the interministerial civil protection committee and the interministerial technical committee which, in the event of a disaster, become the combined operational centre providing all assistance by using the regional civil protection committees under it.

1.115. For planning operations, each province has its own plan; there is also a plan for assistance by armed forces in each territorial military command and a series of specific plans covering possible accidents, particularly in high-risk activities.

1.116. The resources and chain of command are as outlined. There are:

- at national level, the civil protection operations centre which works round the clock. It is responsible for collecting, assessing and circulating information, alerting all administrations concerned and finally activating, on the instructions of the minister, the combined operations centre by convening those responsible for the units providing assistance;
- at lower levels, mobile rescue units of firemen and depots situated in strategic areas where equipment and material are stocked to provide provisional housing and food for survivors of the disaster.

1.117. Apart from the armed forces, the fire brigade, organised in units, is also used for civil protection and charitable organisations also play a part which is far from negligible. Mention may be made of the voluntary civil protection service set up by Law 996 of 8th December 1970, the Red Cross, the Automobile Club and amateur radio associations. There are also the military corps of the Italian Red Cross and the volunteer nursing corps which form a military element of the Red Cross, calling up those necessary for setting up rapid intervention units. It is subsidised by the Ministry of Defence.

1.118. Apart from these necessarily small subsidies, the civil protection service, which includes the national fire brigade, had a budget of 415,411 million lire in 1982.

1.119. Highly organised at national level, there have not been many bilateral civil defence agreements. Apart from its membership of specialised NATO and United Nations committees, the only plan in view is a protocol with France.

1.120. The place of the armed forces in the abovementioned system will now be examined.

1.121. In normal times contacts between the civil authorities concerned and the military commands allow the use of armed forces in the event of a disaster to be planned. Provision is made for:

- placing in a state of alert and earmarking the military personnel and equipment considered necessary;
- requesting reinforcements in the event of insufficient forces being available immediately;
- setting up the necessary communications networks;
- seconding military personnel to all the civil bodies concerned;
- implementing special tasks resulting from the disaster (evacuation and hospitalisation of victims, supplying food and clothing, provisional housing for victims, implementation of a road traffic plan).

1.122. In case of emergency, the Minister of the Interior or the Special Commissioner asks for the armed forces to be brought in, or the prefect may apply directly to the territorial military command in his area.

1.123. These requests are met by the territorial commands within the limits of available resources and by the Ministry of Defence if reinforcements are necessary and co-ordination measures required.

1.124. The commitment and action of the forces is directed by a functional command chain set up at the start and working twenty-four hours a day.

1.125. An inter-branch operations centre is opened at defence headquarters to co-ordinate interventions at national level; it organises assistance operations centres at the level of territorial military commands involved in assistance oper-

ations and co-ordination groups for assistance operations carried out in the areas affected.

1.126. The tasks to be carried out vary according to the situation to be tackled: earthquakes, floods, forest fires, ecological accidents. They usually mean committing suitably-equipped units and providing various equipment, medical supplies and camping equipment. The most needed are transport of all kinds, engineering machinery and signals, sanitary, cooking and camping equipment.

1.127. The units most suited to taking part in relief operations are those with technical knowledge of work in the field and which have large numbers of personnel and means which make them very mobile, e.g. sappers, motorised infantry, parachutists, ski regiments, signals units, light aviation, helicopters, air force transport and photographic reconnaissance aircraft and naval landing units.

1.128. At present, there are no units specifically earmarked for civil defence tasks; however, the formation of a rapid intervention force is now being studied. This measure is connected with the budget in which, since 1981, there has been an item allocating to defence purposes a proportion of the appropriations earmarked for civil protection. These financial resources are intended for the procurement of suitable equipment and improved training of units for action in the event of disasters.

1.129. The Ministry of Defence bears the expenditure resulting from the intervention of armed forces for civil protection purposes, but if troops are sent to reinforce other state bodies the expenditure incurred is charged to the administrations concerned.

1.130. The territorial organisation of the armed forces is not necessarily adapted to interventions in areas where there is the greatest risk of earthquakes. Studies are being conducted on the deployment of forces and logistic infrastructure to reconcile operational requirements and the assistance needed in known disaster areas. However this may be, units likely to be used for civil protection are mobile enough to be able to intervene within acceptable time limits. Movement plans provide for the immediate commitment of available resources in the disaster area, the arrival of the first reinforcements within twenty-four hours and the subsequent deployment of other units, depending on the scale of the disaster.

1.131. These plans were put to the test on the occasion of the earthquake in Friuli in 1976 and Campania and Basilicata in 1980. Without counting helicopters and transport aircraft, almost 14,000 men and 2,000 vehicles were used in Friuli and 35,000 men and more than 3,000 vehicles at the time of the 1980 earthquake.

1.132. Although the participation of the armed forces was very effective, these operations demonstrated the need to improve training and reduce the time it took to bring in units.

1.133. At international level, recent experience has been confined to the use of the armed forces to assist Algeria when it had an earthquake. No particular lesson was learned from that relatively limited experience.

(h) Grand Duchy of Luxembourg

1.134. The organisation of civil protection in the Grand Duchy is governed by the Law of 18th November 1976 which lays down that civil protection covers all measures and means intended to protect and come to the assistance of the population in the event of disasters.

1.135. The Minister of the Interior is responsible for civil protection; he co-ordinates preparation and implementation of appropriate measures in ministerial departments and public bodies. For this purpose, he may call upon the armed forces and in that event is responsible for co-ordinating operations.

1.136. To carry out this task he has the national civil protection service which brings in the national alert centre, run by voluntary operators, and organises the ambulance service and the rescue service which operate twenty-four hours a day throughout the country with the help of almost 2,500 volunteers.

1.137. There is a national NBC assistance group and a group of frogmen.

1.138. In case of need, the national civil protection service may call on two charitable organisations, the national federation of voluntary firemen and the Luxembourg Red Cross with which it has close relations.

1.139. Local civil assistance centres organise frequent exercises with the participation of voluntary firemen.

1.140. The civil protection service has a budget equivalent to that of the army and 50% of the cost of procuring fire-fighting equipment is met by the state and the rest by the communes.

1.141. At international level, the Grand Duchy has concluded agreements on mutual assistance in the event of disasters with its neighbours (Belgium, France and the Federal Republic of Germany). These make no reference to the possible use of military units. Finally, no special agreements have been signed with international organisations.

1.142. No very elaborate plans seem to have been made for using armed forces for civil protection work. On the one hand, the army is

very small and could provide only limited reinforcements and on the other hand the Grand Duchy has been very largely disaster-free and has probably felt no need to introduce procedure intended to allow the army to be used to assist victims of disasters.

(i) Netherlands

1.143. The Netherlands has suffered from frequent natural disasters, particularly flooding, and has wide-ranging legislation for protecting the population. This legislation is in the process of being revised and two new texts are of special interest: the civil defence act and the emergencies act. In the event of disasters, section 37 of the civil defence act and the municipal disaster plans will be declared applicable by royal decree. The remainder of the legal framework is contained in various statutory regulations which define the powers of local, district and national authorities in peacetime.

1.144. Interim regulations govern mutual assistance on a district and inter-district basis while the provision of intra-district assistance is left to co-operation between the municipalities in the district.

1.145. Requests for assistance from districts within a province are submitted through the Queen's Commissioner (of the province) while requests for assistance from other provinces are submitted to the Minister for Home Affairs.

1.146. A request for assistance is issued by the burgomaster responsible for disaster control, who submits requests for assistance from provincial and national services to the Queen's Commissioner.

1.147. He may also, in very urgent cases, submit requests for military assistance to the provincial or district military commander. The maintenance of public order and disaster control therefore lies with the burgomaster who is empowered to give any order which he deems necessary to maintain public order or to restrict the common danger.

1.148. Those taking part in controlling the disaster are subject to his orders.

1.149. The Queen's Commissioner ensures that arrangements are made for assistance and co-ordinates organisation if provisions from more than one municipality are necessary. He may give burgomasters policy guidance and also provide for operational control.

1.150. The Minister for Home Affairs gives Queen's Commissioners instructions concerning disaster control, decides on requests for assistance to be given by the provincial services of other provinces, applies to the minister concerned for the assistance of national services and applies to the Minister of Defence for military assistance.

1.151. Should the framework of legal regulations be inadequate under normal circumstances a number of suitable emergency acts may be brought into force by royal decree to broaden the powers of the authorities.

1.152. Under the constitution, the armed forces were created " to protect the interests of the state ". The law distinguishes between various kinds of aid, three of which are:

- military assistance for the maintenance of public order ;
- special military assistance to support the judicial authorities in the event of acts of terrorism ;
- military support in cases not covered by the above categories.

1.153. Although there is a very elaborate legal basis for the intervention of armed forces in maintaining public order or fighting terrorism, the only legal basis for military support in the event of disaster or threat of disaster is an article of the constitution under which burgomasters and Queen's Commissioners may in very urgent cases request military support from the provincial military commander.

1.154. This support seems very limited and units work under the command of the civil authorities which request assistance although the unit leaders have some degree of latitude in the methods used.

1.155. There is no permanent body at government level for co-ordinating resources for limiting the consequences of natural disasters.

1.156. The central body for disaster control comes under the Minister for Home Affairs. Once the fire services bill and the disasters bill have been enacted, the fire service directorate, under the directorate general of public order and security, will be charged with this task, and it will have its own budget. The directorate will be charged with the statutory tasks of preparing and co-ordinating the control of disasters and providing operational leadership in the actual work involved.

1.157. The directorate has a division concerned especially with prevention and information.

1.158. The protection of the population is at present the responsibility of the civil defence organisation, assisted by organised self-protection.

1.159. There are now almost 300,000 professionals and volunteers able to assist in the event of major disaster:

- 175,000 emergency guards; to be reduced to 50,000 in 1983;
- 27,500 firemen, including 3,000 professionals;
- 130,000 persons trained for industrial protection.

1.160. The civil defence organisation is to be run down between 1983 and 1986 and its work will be taken over by district fire services (about 25,000 persons) and the Red Cross (about 17,000 persons).

1.161. The Dutch Red Cross Society is a private organisation which has contacts with local or district authorities for the preparation and integration of certain tasks which the Red Cross will fulfil in the framework of the new disasters act.

1.162. Should there be a disaster serious enough for a disaster command to be set up, the staff of the regional Red Cross Corps will join the commander of disaster control and a Red Cross Corps liaison officer will be attached to each sector command. Red Cross staff will be placed under the regional fire service commanders.

1.163. Each year part of the budget is reserved for civil defence and in 1983 this amounts to 2% of the annual national budget, i.e. 216 million guilders, spread over various ministries.

1.164. At international level, the Netherlands has concluded few agreements with other states. Apart from a convention on air pollution and arrangements with Belgium for civil co-operation in the event of disasters which might arise from irregularities in the functioning of nuclear power stations at Doel (Belgium), there is only the proposed agreements with Germany on assistance in the event of disasters and mutual support for sea rescue operations. These are still being negotiated.

1.165. Regarding the position of the armed forces, the authorities appear to have been anxious to limit recourse to their use and to keep military units under the orders of the local civil authorities in all circumstances.

1.166. Probably due to the acts of terrorism in 1977, the texts go extensively into the participation of specialised military units in anti-terrorist operations or maintaining public order but are relatively discreet about using armed forces to assist victims of a disaster.

1.167. Requests for the provision of armed forces emanating from civil authorities must be immediately transmitted by provincial commanders to the national territorial commander who refers to the commander-in-chief.

1.168. Operational command of units selected for providing support is exercised by a commander appointed by the national territorial commander who acts on the instructions of the civil authority requesting assistance. Conversely, administrative and logistic command is exercised by the commander-in-chief whose directives prescribe procedure to be followed.

1.169. In general there are two types of intervention: emergency non-planned support and pre-planned support (in the event of floods, forest fires, snow clearance, etc.) if the civil authorities are not fully capable of fulfilling these rôles and have requested support.

1.170. Military equipment used in such cases may be maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, naval vessels, communications equipment, mobile kitchens, tents, etc.

1.171. Among the units the most suited for the above tasks is the corps of mobile columns, intended primarily for use on the outbreak of hostilities.

1.172. This is a military unit under the responsibility of the Minister of Defence but for control and deployment there are common directives defining the responsibilities of the Ministers of Defence, Home Affairs and Health and Environmental Protection.

1.173. After the reorganisation of the civil defence organisation, the corps of mobile columns will render assistance in case of disasters in peacetime.

1.174. In principle, the cost of assistance operations is charged to the body requesting assistance as there is no explicit provision in the defence budget for civil protection, except for sea rescue operations. The body requesting support must bear the cost of the operation, including any damage caused.

1.175. As already noted, the authorities empowered to request the support of the armed forces are the burgomasters and Queen's Commissioners, the latter being the normal channel. Command is exercised through liaison between the burgomaster and the relevant divisional commander.

1.176. In principle, no exercises are held specifically to co-ordinate the use of civil and military means, but, to improve co-operation between the bodies which have to work together, attempts are being made to draw lessons from civil defence exercises.

1.177. These indicate that, in view of the size of the country, the deployment of military units should not be geared to the requirement for civil protection since the armed forces are mobile enough to reach disaster areas quickly.

1.178. Although the Netherlands has wide experience of dealing with floods, little inform-

ation is available regarding missions accomplished abroad. They were often once-only operations and do not therefore allow general suggestions to be made.

(j) Norway

1.179. The Ministry of Justice and Police is responsible for co-ordinating disaster relief, but disasters are generally dealt with at local or regional level by the police authorities, if necessary with the assistance of non-governmental organisations such as the Norwegian Red Cross.

1.180. Any local or regional police authority is empowered to call on the armed forces for civil protection duties. In this event they are placed under the command of the police.

1.181. Depending on the extent of the disaster, the contribution and ways of using military means and also the home guard, the coastguard, civil defence and the Norwegian search and rescue service are established on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the requirements of each situation.

1.182. To this end, it should be pointed out that a squadron of ten Sea King helicopters purchased by the Ministry of Justice for search and rescue operations is used by the air force. Humanitarian operations abroad are co-ordinated by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which has at its disposal about 200 million kroner per year. These operations are carried out by voluntary organisations. The armed forces have apparently never been used for such operations.

1.183. In conclusion, Norway, which seems so far to have been spared natural disasters, intends to resort to a pragmatic case-by-case policy to overcome any problems arising from a disaster, without taking undue account of the speed with which assistance must be afforded.

1.184. However, it should be noted that the Norwegian authorities seem to have been impressed by the disaster on the North Sea oil platform in 1980 and have set up a search and rescue service under the police force which calls on the air force, the navy, the army, civil defence forces, the ambulance service, voluntary firemen and the Red Cross.

1.185. The search and rescue service is a permanent body whose two rescue co-ordination centres work round the clock. There are rescue sub-centres most of which are established at Norway's fifty-three police headquarters. They have considerable communication facilities and employ qualified permanent staff assisted by air traffic controllers. This service can call on large-scale resources emanating from most state bodies. On a small scale they foreshadow what might be a large civil protection service capable of affording with minimum delay the assistance required for saving victims of a disaster.

(k) Portugal

1.186. Portuguese legislation has attempted to define the limits of responsibility for assistance to the population on the basis of territorial criteria.

1.187. There are three levels of responsibility for possible interventions:

- the local level, meeting the requirements of municipalities ;
- the regional level, meeting the requirements of departments ;
- the national level, meeting the country's requirements.

1.188. A special regulation has been introduced for disasters at sea. In that event, the naval authorities are responsible for organising assistance. The Prime Minister delegates responsibility for the general organisation of civil protection to the Minister of the Interior. However, the civil protection service is empowered to call on the armed forces. This power may be delegated according to circumstances to local or regional civil protection organisers, who depend on the central body which is mainly responsible for the general co-ordination of studies, plans, programmes and action to be carried out by state services and private associations in the framework of disaster prevention and the organisation of assistance.

1.189. When there is a disaster, it sets up a civil protection operational centre to co-ordinate all assistance operations.

1.190. As the civil protection service is under the authority of the Prime Minister, who in this field delegates his powers to the Minister of the Interior, the decision to bring the civil protection operational centre into action and to make available to it the means and resources required by the situation is a government responsibility.

1.191. Consequently, in normal circumstances the civil protection service has only two permanent bodies responsible for listing available means and drawing up emergency intervention plans:

- the study and research directorate for civil protection ;
- the planning and operations directorate for civil protection, responsible for activating the alert network.

1.192. It has emergency telephone exchanges which may be reached by a national emergency

number and are connected to the communications networks of the armed forces, the police and fire brigade.

1.193. The latter form the nucleus of Portuguese civil protection, with more than 400 units consisting mainly of volunteers.

1.194. Round this nucleus there are volunteer members of the Red Cross, the lifesaving institute, UNICEF and Caritas.

1.195. The national fire brigade, the Red Cross and the lifesaving institute are represented on the higher civil protection council, which is a ministerial body at the emergency operational centre for civil protection, and in departmental civil protection co-ordination centres.

1.196. There are no official subsidies as such for supporting the work of charitable associations. However, the national fire brigade receives 14% of all fire insurance premiums. Civil protection does not have its own budget but a share in those of the departments.

1.197. The international effort to develop the possibilities of mutual assistance is still small. Apart from its membership of the NATO Civil Emergency Planning Committee, Portugal has only signed a mutual assistance convention with Spain, mainly covering forest fire-fighting. This agreement is now to be applied, although there is as yet no relevant communications network. It provides for the use of military resources since water-spraying aircraft belong to the air force both in Spain and Portugal.

1.198. When assisting the population, the armed forces retain their independence. They are not placed under the civil authorities responsible for the operation, but a command liaison as close as required by the co-ordination of efforts to fight disasters is set up at all levels. The armed forces are represented in all civil protection centres. It has therefore not been considered necessary to set up a special command channel to direct relief operations or to set up special units. Forces work in their usual structures and carry out the orders contained in emergency plans drawn up mainly for floods and forest fires. Military means are used for various tasks: fire-fighting, receiving, sorting out and evacuating casualties, transport, distributing prepared meals, creating emergency housing centres, operating specialised communications networks, clearing debris and roads, building emergency bridges, supplying electricity, etc.

1.199. The variety of tasks shows that transport equipment, means of communication and engineering equipment are widely used and that apart from specific tasks reserved for specialised units (engineers, medical service, signals units) all units may be called upon to accomplish ordinary tasks.

1.200. There is no budgetary provision for these operations. Expenditure is partly reimbursed by certain civil services, but part of the expenditure incurred is borne by the armed forces.

1.201. In principle, it is the prefects who request the assistance of military units which remain under the orders of their usual officers, who are in close liaison with the departmental civil protection co-ordination centre responsible for directing the operation as a whole. Apart from this co-ordination in action, there is provision for exercises designed to improve performances, but none have yet been held.

1.202. As in most other countries, the territorial deployment of troops has not been influenced by the degree of risk of catastrophe, but present deployment allows any civil protection requirements to be met, although not all units are mobile enough to reach the scene of a disaster quickly.

1.203. The most likely cases in Portugal are, in order of priority, forest fires, floods and earthquakes. The most recent disasters were the Ribatejo floods in 1979 and the Azores earthquake in 1980.

1.204. The work of the armed forces proved essential, but the efficiency of the means used suffered from a certain lack of preparation. To overcome this, national and regional emergency plans have been drawn up.

1.205. Finally, it should be pointed out that Portuguese armed forces have never taken part in assistance operations outside the country.

(l) Turkey

1.206. In accordance with Article 119 of the Turkish constitution, the cabinet is empowered to declare a state of emergency in the event of natural disasters. Law 7264 concerning the protection of the civil population in the event of peacetime disasters deals with the measures to be taken and assistance to be provided in the event of disasters, including earthquakes, fires, floods, ground movements and avalanches.

1.207. The Ministry of Construction and Housing and provincial governors are responsible for taking charge of disaster relief.

1.208. The cabinet or, in the provinces, the governors are empowered to call on the armed forces for civil protection duties. They operate under the direction of their commander and in compliance with the instructions of the governor concerned.

1.209. Government duties relating to specific civil protection measures are carried out by the general directorate of disaster affairs of the Ministry of Construction and Housing which

has access to " disaster funds " and can use various municipal bodies for organising emergency relief. One organisation giving very considerable assistance is the Red Crescent which distributes aid from abroad. Moreover, it is the only Turkish body to have concluded mutual assistance agreements with other countries.

1.210. If a state of emergency is declared, civil and military rescue units work within their own command channel and have no special command arrangements or contingency plans.

1.211. Civil and military rescue units work in mutual co-operation and can perform tasks such as removing debris and providing health and medical services and temporary accommodation.

1.212. There is no rule for choosing units. They may be drawn from the army, the air force or the navy, and are financed from the defence budget.

1.213. The present territorial deployment of the armed forces meets likely requirements for civil protection and they are sufficiently mobile. There are no contingency plans.

1.214. Turkey's civil protection experience appears to be limited to the country itself.

1.215. There have recently been earthquakes, floods and forest fires in Turkey and it considers the armed forces can ensure most efficient service in the event of disaster. Improvements are possible, particularly new legal arrangements providing for action by the armed forces in civil protection operations ; once this basis has been laid it will be possible to ensure the necessary equipment and train staff.

(m) United Kingdom

1.216. In the event of disaster, if a substantial portion of the community were deprived of the essentials of life, the Emergency Powers Act 1920 as amended by the 1964 act would be invoked. Following proclamation of a state of emergency by Her Majesty the Queen, regulations may be made under the act for securing the provision of the essentials of life to the community. This act provides that the Defence Council may authorise the employment of servicemen on urgent work of national importance.

1.217. In the case of localised incidents, the police and local authorities act under the Local Government Act 1972 (in England and Wales) and the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 obliging local authorities to provide essential services to the community. In Northern Ireland, the Emergency Powers (Northern Ireland) Act 1926 as amended in 1964 provides for equivalent services.

1.218. No minister is designated a priori to take charge of civil protection ; usually the minister most closely involved would take the lead except in Northern Ireland where responsibility rests on the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Lead ministers may call for the assistance of the armed forces which would operate under control of their own military commanders.

1.219. For England, Scotland and Wales the Cabinet Office ensures that arrangements are made for the co-ordination of activities and provision of resources in connection with civil protection. This is the level at which contingency plans are made and kept up to date to cope with foreseeable civil protection needs. They also provide a basis for planning in the event of an unforeseen disaster.

1.220. Similar considerations apply in Northern Ireland but co-ordination there is undertaken by the Northern Ireland Emergency Steering Committee.

1.221. In accordance with those guidelines, units independent of the armed forces may be used for civil protection: the police (numbering about 150,000), the fire service (about 60,000 firemen) and the ambulance service (about 18,000 personnel). Mention should also be made of voluntary organisations capable of intervening in the event of disaster: the Red Cross, the Women's Royal Voluntary Service, St. John's Ambulance Brigade, St. Andrew's Ambulance Association and the Samaritans.

1.222. In England, Scotland and Wales the efforts of voluntary organisations in disaster relief are co-ordinated by the local authority emergency planning officer. The Women's Royal Voluntary Service looks after the homeless and those in need of emergency feeding, clothing, etc. Samaritans also assist in this area. The WRVS receives an annual grant of about £4 million from the Home Office, while the Department of Health and Social Security makes small annual grants to the Samaritans and St. John's Ambulance Brigade. Some local exercises organised by the health authorities are carried out with voluntary associations.

1.223. In Northern Ireland, the Red Cross, St. John's Ambulance Brigade and the Order of Malta have informal contact with officials in the Department of Health and Social Services for Northern Ireland. They provide an ambulance service for which they are paid a mileage allowance.

1.224. There is no annual civil protection budget as such. The public expenditure plans include a reserve for contingencies which would,

if necessary, cover expenditure in response to unforeseen disasters.

1.225. Outside the national framework, apart from co-ordination at NATO level, there are no permanent links with neighbouring countries for disaster purposes, but a bilateral agreement is being negotiated with France for dealing with nuclear incidents. It will not involve the use of armed forces.

1.226. At purely national level, the appropriate local authority may request service assistance.

1.227. Requests may be made at unit, district, command or Ministry of Defence level. The most important levels are the Ministry of Defence, working to requests by other government departments, and the military districts, working to civil authorities. In the event of widespread disasters, headquarters United Kingdom Land Forces will control the operation using tri-service resources. However, there is provision for special procedure for specific cases. The navy and air force carry out search and rescue work at the request of the police or the coastguards and in the event of oil pollution at sea, naval assistance may be requested by the Department of Trade. In the event of onshore pollution, requests for assistance may be made by local authorities or the Department of the Environment.

1.228. Apart from bodies specially designed to meet specific requirements (search and rescue and pollution control) which can be made available to the civil authorities, there are no special command arrangements for disaster relief work. The army's normal command chain is used and the duty officer system at all service commands provides a twenty-four hour response to any requests for assistance.

1.229. Apart from a plan for assistance in the event of major flooding in London, all other disaster relief work requires ad hoc planning. The services can perform any task within the capabilities of their expertise: transport, communications, medical assistance, engineering and technical assistance, using any appropriate item of service equipment. No units are specially trained, organised or equipped for disaster relief. There is no provision in the defence budget to cover expenditure incurred by the services in providing assistance which is generally financed by the civil authority requesting the assistance.

1.230. Where an immediate threat to life exists, anyone may request service assistance by approaching the nearest service unit or military district headquarters. Guidance on using military aid to the civil community is distributed to local authorities. The police organise joint exercises of all emergency services and voluntary bodies concerned.

1.231. The territorial deployment of armed forces meets the requirements for most contingencies. The country is divided into ten military districts which provide a framework for any necessary reallocation of resources in the event of major or widespread disaster, particularly as units have sufficient mobility to reach possible disaster areas rapidly. There are movement plans in Northern Ireland but not elsewhere since there are no specific possible disaster areas. There have been no disasters in Great Britain in recent years and the effects of occasional major accidents such as floods or oil pollution have been purely local.

1.232. In conclusion, except for the provision of emergency communications and transport, the armed forces have had no recent experience of protracted disaster relief work in the United Kingdom. Conversely, the air force with army support supplied 1,005 tonnes of grain to famine-stricken villages in Nepal. The navy gave first aid relief to victims of hurricanes in Dominica and St. Lucia. Royal Engineers subsequently provided assistance in the repair of public buildings. After the earthquake in Italy in November 1980, Royal Engineer teams supervised the construction of buildings at two villages.

(*n*) *United States*

1.233. The 1974 Disaster Relief Act (Public Law 93-288) prescribes the assistance available from the Federal Government to supplement state and local government efforts to save lives and protect property, public health and safety, or to avert or lessen the threat of a disaster.

1.234. In addition, the 1941 Flood Control Act, as amended, authorised an emergency fund to be expended in flood emergency preparation, flood rescue operations or the repair or restoration of any flood control work threatened or destroyed by flood, including the strengthening, raising, extending or other modification thereof as may be necessary at the discretion of the chief of engineers. In an emergency he may at his discretion repair and restore any federally authorised protective structures damaged or destroyed by wind, wave or water action.

1.235. The chief of engineers is further authorised to provide emergency supplies of drinking water to any locality confronted with a source of contaminated drinking water.

1.236. Congress has given the President authority to implement the provisions of the Disaster Relief Act. He has delegated most of his authority under the act to the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

1.237. The chief of engineers of the United States army corps of engineers is designated to

oversee the provisions of the 1941 Flood Control Act. The administrator of the Agency for International Development is designated as the President's special co-ordinator for international disaster assistance pursuant to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act. The office of United States foreign disaster assistance co-ordinates all official United States assistance to disasters abroad.

1.238. If military personnel are sent to a disaster area they come under the operational authority of the United States Ambassador to the country concerned while remaining under United States military command.

1.239. Inside the United States, the director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency or his designees may request the Department of Defence to provide military forces for use in civil emergency relief activities.

1.240. The forces are under the command of their military superiors. However, the military representative(s) on the scene respond to the requirements of the federal co-ordinating officer who is the lead federal official appointed with the concurrence of the President. The chief of engineers may also request assistance from the active military. When provided, military personnel function under their normal command channels.

1.241. Operating in a well-defined legislative framework, there are two permanent governmental disaster control bodies in the United States.

1.242. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has authority to " establish federal policies for, and co-ordinate, all... civil emergency planning, management, mitigation and assistance functions of executive agencies ".

1.243. The agency operates under the delegated authority of the President pursuant to the 1974 Disaster Relief Act. It may direct any federal agency to utilise its resources in support of state disaster assistance efforts. It operates a programme of disaster preparedness. It organises research, prevention and warning in areas likely to be affected by hurricanes, floods and earthquakes. A national warning system is used to alert local governments in areas endangered by disasters.

1.244. The chief of engineers supervises implementation of the 1941 Flood Control Act. The corps of engineers is organised into districts based on flood risk. Under the act, each district monitors conditions, constructs and inspects flood control works and fights floods in its own district. The chief of engineers has direct control over the resources of the corps of engineers, which is authorised to expend funds for flood and coastal storm preparedness.

1.245. As can be gathered from the above information, FEMA maintains a staff of approximately 130 professionals located at its headquarters or in each of its ten regional offices to administer the programme of disaster relief. This number can be increased if necessary by the employment of disaster reservist personnel and by augmentation from within the agency.

1.246. FEMA maintains continual contact with volunteer agencies, including them in its activities. These agencies have entered into memoranda of agreement with FEMA that provide for their accepting direction and co-ordination from the Federal Co-ordinating Officer when the Federal Government is engaged in providing disaster assistance.

1.247. Major volunteer agencies are the American National Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the Mannonite Disaster Services, the Seventh Day Adventists and Church World Services. They assist in relief operations and distribute medicine, food and other consumable supplies. The Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance maintains regular contact with the American Red Cross and its international affiliates and also calls on private voluntary organisations already functioning in a foreign disaster area to participate in providing relief and rehabilitation assistance. Emergency grants may be made for this purpose but no subsidies are paid to the organisations as such.

1.248. FEMA continuously involves representatives of major volunteer agencies in its preparedness planning and programmes of public education, including those exercises conducted periodically by FEMA regional staffs.

1.249. To carry out its work, FEMA has access to the President's disaster relief fund, set up by Congress. The fiscal year 1982 appropriation to this fund was $301 million, of which $27 million was appropriated for foreign disaster assistance purposes.

1.250. Where international assistance is concerned, the United States uses a mechanism within NATO to exchange information on disasters affecting member nations. It also exchanges information with the United Nations Disaster Relief Office and Red Cross agencies.

1.251. These relations are informal but work satisfactorily in the event of major disasters. There is a formal bilateral agreement with Mexico for disaster relief along the Rio Grande and arrangements with Canada for assistance in case of forest fires.

1.252. On the purely national level, the Secretary of Defence has designated the Secretary of the Army as executive agent. The operations readiness mobilisation directorate, military

support division, serves as the point of contact between FEMA and the Department of Defence.

1.253. The military is capable of responding to requests for support to civil authorities on a 24-hour basis provided the resources to be used are not immediately required for the execution of the primary military missions. General plans have been developed whereby appropriate military commanders have the task of providing the necessary resources to conduct relief operations. Military forces can perform any tasks for which they have an expertise and the necessary equipment. Their assistance is generally restricted to the immediate emergency phase of disaster relief and limited to functions which cannot be performed by the public sector. Military forces are authorised to use whatever equipment they have with the exception of weapons. Equipment requested most often includes helicopters, communications equipment, earth-moving equipment and lorries. Particular military units are selected at the time of the request for support based on the mission to be accomplished, the location of the emergency situation and other defence priorities. No single unit of the armed services is specially earmarked for civil protection duties but the corps of engineers has been organised, trained and equipped to react during disaster situations, inter alia in the case of floods. It is considered to be the best able to act at short notice and the most efficiently. The chief of engineers is empowered to determine necessary emergency measures.

1.254. The defence budget makes no provision for financing civil protection operations and the Department of Defence requests FEMA and the corps of engineers to reimburse expenditure incurred, especially for expenses incurred in flood-fighting.

1.255. Under American legislation, any local or state government official may request emergency assistance from armed forces located within his area of authority. The army and the national guard are organised by state to provide the necessary military resources to state governments.

1.256. In such cases, local government officials may go directly to the commanding officer of a military unit located within their area of authority. If resources are not locally available or the situation is massive in scope, they may process such requests through the state office of emergency services to FEMA. Local governments from time to time conduct disaster preparedness exercises. Military units and voluntary agencies are generally involved.

1.257. Although no units are stationed with a view to likely requirements for civil protection, territorial deployment does to a large extent enhance the availability of the military for civil emergencies, particularly as all units are sufficiently mobile to reach disaster areas rapidly without there being any contingency movement plans specifically for response to natural disasters.

1.258. Floods, tornadoes and severe storms are the most frequent causes of requests for disaster assistance, although hurricanes, earthquakes and volcanoes have had a great impact upon the American economy.

1.259. On the occasion of such disasters, the military's ability to respond quickly has had an immediate impact, and it has also been seen that prediction, warning and mitigation preparedness planning lessens the effects of natural disasters.

1.260. These conclusions have been confirmed in over a hundred American interventions throughout the world.

1.261. Help is often in the form of military airlift of relief commodities (food, medical supplies, field kitchens, tents, etc.), plus skilled expertise.

1.262. Many lessons have been learned. It must be ensured that help is provided at the right place at the right time. It is therefore very important to have complete communications and liaison, clear identification of needs, careful prior planning and responses tailored to actual needs. Finally, there must be clear understanding of the mission to be performed and the capabilities of the resources to be provided.

(o) Conclusions on country replies

1.263. To close this review, the following remarks may be made:

- most countries have introduced legislation to overcome disaster prevention problems, to provide assistance and to define the duties of those responsible ;
- with some exceptions, such legislation does not cover action abroad and in any event the use of military resources for that purpose ;
- except in the United States, where the corps of engineers is permanently responsible for flood-fighting, armed units do not automatically intervene in the case of disasters, even in France, where there are units specialised in fire-fighting, and in Belgium, where three engineering regiments are earmarked for requisition for special tasks in the event of flooding ;
- it is therefore the civil authorities, usually the Minister of the Interior or

an official delegated accordingly, who are empowered to call on the armed forces when other means prove inadequate ;

- military units called in receive their orders from the civil authorities but in most countries implementation of these orders is left to the initiative of the military commander, who organises resources and assigns tasks through normal channels ;
- when a centre for co-ordinating assistance is set up, in the majority of cases it is directed by civil protection experts who usually belong to the Ministry of the Interior. When armed forces take part in relief operations, a military representative participates and his rank depends on the level at which the centre is set up ;
- while in most countries a small budgetary head covers civil protection, there are no appropriations to cover military expenditure incurred in relief operations and the cost of operations has to be reimbursed to the Ministry of Defence ;
- in general, the civil authorities organise the first stage of assistance using the civil protection service's own means and assisted by firemen and voluntary organisations like the Red Cross, voluntary ambulance drivers and other charitable associations ;
- the armed forces intervene only in the second stage and when the problems are more than the civil authorities can cope with ;
- for relief operations, military resources are chosen in the light of their specialisation and may use all their equipment except weapons ;
- depending on circumstances, engineering, medical, signals, transport, light aviation or air force transport units may be called upon, but it is also possible to call on rapid intervention units which are well-equipped with signals equipment and have a large number of personnel ;
- there are some contingency plans but this is not general since the civil and military authorities find it difficult to define probable objectives ;
- it is evident that having military staff at every level on duty round the clock and means of transport in a state of readiness in all units means that they can react at very short notice ;
- similarly, these factors and the need to give priority to defence tasks means that it has not been considered useful to deploy troops in accordance with the degree of risk of disaster ;
- the problem of intervention abroad has hardly been touched. Most such operations, whether purely civil or calling upon specialised military means (air transport, field surgical hospitals or engineering units) are definitely planned on a case-by-case basis ;
- agreements concluded between countries are rudimentary, concern only certain aspects of operations and do not cover the use of armed forces ;
- finally, when rescue operations have involved armed forces, they have been handled as military operations using traditional military techniques. Few noteworthy lessons have therefore been learned, although three points are an essential basis for preparations:
  - Is assistance wanted ?
  - Where is it required ?
  - When should it be given ?

II. *Carrying out relief operations - possibilities and limitations of the armed forces*

2.1. Without in any way claiming to suggest plans for operations or conduct to which the armed forces should conform and which are quite obviously dictated by principles and standards in force in the various member countries, your Rapporteur feels, on the basis of experience of natural disasters in Italy, that it might be useful to present a few considerations aimed at giving a fuller picture of the action required of national armed forces.

(a) Earthquakes

2.2. Earthquakes are generally considered to be major disasters in view of their suddenness, the large number of victims, the extent of the damage caused, their psychological impact and the emotional processes they set in motion.

2.3. Of all natural disasters, earthquakes demand the broadest spectrum of means of assistance. For this reason it has been decided to use the case of a large-scale earthquake as a basis for examining measures to be taken to limit insofar as possible the effects of a natural disaster.

2.4. After this examination, the main differences between techniques for affording assis-

tance required by the type of disaster concerned will be defined.

2.5. In the specific case of a large-scale earthquake, the chronological sequence of operations may be described as follows.

2.6. Assistance is implemented in two stages depending on the nature of the operations and the means used.

2.7. The first stage corresponds to the state of emergency, when as many human lives as possible have to be saved, the distress of survivors alleviated and acceptable living conditions established for them without delay. This stage lasts a few weeks or a few months, and all available means of assistance, including military resources, should be called on.

2.8. The goal of the second, so-called reconstruction, stage is to re-establish the traditional lifestyle of the region and at least all the services which existed before the disaster. This stage may last several years.

2.9. The state of emergency corresponds to the first stage and may be divided into three phases which are rather artificial because they follow one from the other although not continuously. The first covers immediate action, the second more general assistance and the third is concluded when acceptable living conditions have been achieved for the victims.

2.10. Armed forces can take part in operations as long as the state of emergency exists. As soon as the disaster is announced, the most suitable units are alerted but are deployed only after the geographical limits of the disaster have been ascertained.

2.11. This is the task of the seismological service. If it operates correctly it can quickly pinpoint the epicentre and intensity of the disaster, measured on the Mercalli scale, and the general outline of the area affected. In principle, it can also indicate the approximate extent of damage in the light of habitation and its position in relation to the epicentre of the earthquake.

2.12. If the seismological service fails, the area of destruction can be measured by military means. Weather permitting, this is done by visual or photographic air reconnaissance and in greater detail by land units reconnoitring the area, but recourse to such methods delays the start of relief operations.

2.13. As soon as the extent and the worst areas of damage are identified, headquarters allocate sectors of responsibility and determine the tasks of the operational groups which are sent in as and when they arrive.

2.14. Assignment of tasks is based on known information and the nature of the available units. While first aid is being started, rescue workers have to look for victims and bring them in. This essential task cannot usually be given to the armed forces as it requires special techniques in which engineering troops are not expert. In such cases, speed is essential ; rescue operations must start as quickly as possible since the number of human lives saved depends on action being taken immediately.

2.15. In the meantime, the armed forces can open first aid posts for preparing the evacuation of victims while areas of responsibility are determined at higher levels. A command and communications chain is set up and logistic supply areas are organised in the light of the possibilities of access and foreseeable requirements. The reopening of main roads is also started.

2.16. This phase of the first stage lasts several hours. It may be compared to a military operation and the results obtained depend on two main factors:

- the efficiency of the seismological service which provides information;
- the speed with which the troops intervene, this obviously depending on the peacetime location of units but also on their degree of immediate availability – in other words their operational value.

This last remark illustrates the usefulness of using armed forces in a disaster situation. In view of their organisation, training and state of preparedness they are practically the only state body able to intervene in large numbers and without delay.

2.17. Their own transport affords them free movement on the whole road network to reach the place where they are needed the most.

2.18. Once first aid facilities have been progressively installed, there will be a gradual move to the second phase. Co-ordination of the mobilisation of various national resources, the armed forces, civil protection services, firemen, Red Cross, charitable associations, etc., will be the biggest problem to be solved, while the search continues for victims to be rescued and more and more military assistance is brought in.

2.19. Military units are particularly suitable for transporting items essential for the survival of the victims and equipment needed to protect them from bad weather. The army will set up bakeries, butchers shops and field kitchens to distribute hot meals. It will distribute clothing, blankets and means of heating and put up tents. At the same time, medical aid will be organised, fleets of ambulances and, if necessary, medical helicopters will be organised between relief centres. Mobile field surgeries will handle

the more urgent cases and field hospitals will give longer-term treatment.

2.20. Engineering units will continue the work started, clearing roads for relief units and building temporary bridges.

2.21. Communications networks set up during the first phase will be progressively reinforced to form a grid ensuring that centres co-ordinating relief may know what is required throughout the area and allocate appropriate assistance.

2.22. The existence of permanent communications centres makes it easier to exercise command and to ensure close liaison between civil and military personnel at all levels.

2.23. Finally, as units arrive in the disaster area, military detachment commands will be set up in tandem with local political authorities on a territorial basis.

2.24. The establishment of such working units enables the centre of gravity of the efforts made to be correctly positioned.

2.25. The psychological effect of this coexistence is undeniable; it easily calms susceptibilities and automatically settles the problem of subordination. The civil authorities concerned have legal responsibility. They usually know where there is the greatest urgency while the military commander is generally able to respond to it by using his own resources or calling on a higher level. The civil authorities indicate the task to be fulfilled and the military commander carries it out in accordance with normal command procedure. Thus, during the second phase and in the light of the damage recorded at every level, integrated civil/military teams, mayor/squad leader, company commander/prefect, battalion or brigade commander, etc. working in close co-operation are set up in order to make optimum use of available resources. Progressively, linked by communications networks, these homogeneous command structures exist all along the line, from the relief co-ordination centre – integrating the government representative, leaders of various relief bodies and military authorities at every level – to the relief command post of a small village where the mayor and the seconded adjutant squad leader work together.

2.26. Bringing in reserves, engineering machinery and first aid equipment can be arranged through logistic centres whose location is chosen in the light of the available road network for setting up within easy reach stocks of food, essential items and field or works equipment.

2.27. The third phase follows on from the first and second phases and starts imperceptibly. As soon as the victims have been rescued, the dead removed and first aid given, acceptable living conditions have to be provided for the survivors.

2.28. To this end, an attempt is made to replace tents by temporary housing as soon as possible and to re-establish essential public services (drinking water, electricity, etc.). Thus, clearing ruins and repairing roads proceeds simultaneously and as soon as the necessary equipment has been assembled a start is made on building temporary housing.

2.29. Engineering units with their equipment can carry out preparatory work: levelling the ground, laying concrete, etc. At the same time, transport units, and even helicopters, bring in pre-assembled wooden frames and partitions. Assembling huts is the responsibility of civil experts, possibly with the help of military labour working in crews.

2.30. During this phase, improvisation is progressively replaced by detailed planning and the systematic organisation of work in which military personnel can still take part but on an ever-smaller scale. Non-specialised units are withdrawn and, as soon as permanent hospital services can take over, field medical services are also withdrawn.

2.31. Engineering units are the last to leave.

2.32. The second stage is a period of rebuilding with durable materials. It may begin before the end of the first stage. As the work is spread over several years, it is mainly the responsibility of the civil authorities.

2.33. Military assistance is limited to specific operations such as the removal of temporary bridges after they have been replaced by permanent ones. In the absence of tasks suitable for the armed forces, such operations become gradually fewer and come to an end within a relatively short lapse of time.

(b) Other disasters

2.34. Taken as examples, disasters such as floods, forest fires and oil pollution of the sea have special features which distinguish them from earthquakes.

2.35. Flooding from seas or rivers is not usually so unexpected as earthquakes. A study of meteorological conditions and the state of dykes usually allows forecasts to be made, the problem to be diagnosed and the population to be alerted. Consequently, the number of victims is often small and assistance can be afforded before the disaster has reached its climax. However, there is always widespread material damage and livestock is often destroyed, thus causing a major health problem.

2.36. As soon as the alert has been given, the fire brigade is called and then, at the request of the local authorities, the army. During daylight hours, aircraft and helicopters can observe how the flooding is developing, detect persons cut off by rising water and indicate the location of breaches in dykes, etc. Depending on the degree of urgency, victims are rescued by helicopters, which can operate only in daylight, or by naval and engineering craft operating both day and night.

2.37. While victims are being rescued, civil engineers try to contain the flooding with the assistance of armed forces, by strengthening dykes which are still intact or trying to fill in breaches.

2.38. For this purpose, use is made of engineering units and also crews from units of all services and all means of transport. These crews fill sandbags and load them on lorries to be taken to dykes which are threatened, where engineering personnel use them to fill in breaches or strengthen installations.

2.39. As in the case of earthquakes, the implementation of relief operations means setting up logistic centres where appropriate items (food, blankets, etc.) can be assembled before being distributed in the light of requirements.

2.40. In principle, the problem of medical care for victims will not be so acute as in the case of an earthquake. Similarly, until the water goes down, it will generally be possible to accommodate victims in public buildings, schools, concert halls or convents near the flooded area.

2.41. The great problem will be to repair houses when the water goes down. At the same time, a health problem will also have to be solved so as to limit the risks of epidemics. This will normally require the assistance of many teams of health service workers. For health reasons, too, there will be a need for amphibious equipment to remove the bodies of dead animals even before the water goes down.

2.42. Problems caused by major forest fires are different. Except in special cases such as the Côte d'Azur, where many holiday homes and camping sites have been built in the pine forests, the population density in wooded areas is relatively low and the number of human victims is small.

2.43. In order to limit damage, speed of intervention is essential. Therefore, fire-fighting will always start with specialised civil means located near the fire and with specific fire-fighting equipment such as water-spraying aircraft. If the army is called in, use is mainly made of engineering equipment to establish fire barriers and large teams of troops, who are often brought in by air, to try to stop the progress of the fire with extinguishers under the orders of civil experts.

2.44. Oil slicks are another ecological disaster and are usually fought with the help of the maximum possible military means.

2.45. As soon as an alert has been given, helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft reconnoitre the polluted area. The progress of the oil slick, its size, the speed and direction at which it is moving, are indicated by small naval craft.

2.46. To avoid the oil slick reaching sensitive areas such as oyster beds, the navy puts in place floating anti-pollution barriers to divert the oil and treat it with special detergents.

2.47. As soon as it reaches the coast, army units can be brought in, particularly engineering troops with earth-moving equipment to try to divert as much oil as possible towards areas where it can be contained and if possible pumped away. Units of all branches are responsible for cleaning beaches.

2.48. Although varied, the examples studied therefore show that there are a number of constant factors in fighting disasters :

- the alert must be given without delay ;
- speedy action allows many human lives to be saved and adds considerably to the effectiveness of relief operations ;
- for maximum effectiveness, the various means of assistance must be co-ordinated.

2.49. Finally, whatever type of disaster is involved, logistic centres must be set up where everything needed for the conduct of relief operations (food, clothing, blankets, tents, other essential items, spare parts, fuel, etc.) can be stocked within reach of the area of operations.

2.50. There are obviously limits to the use of armed forces in relief operations. For instance, it is essential that they remain operational and it is out of the question to designate a covering unit to take part in a humanitarian operation hours away from its area of responsibility.

2.51. Similarly, armed forces cannot carry out just any task; the search for and rescue of buried victims, for instance, usually requires experts in view of the risk of false movements.

2.52. Finally, it is also obvious that as well as technical units, which are given specific tasks, it is essential to call on units of all branches which can at very short notice provide a large number of troops in groups under the command of their usual officers and aware of the capital importance of the operation.

III. *Lessons learned from recent disasters*

Proposals

3.1. The foregoing demonstrates the importance of organising civil-military co-operation for conducting relief operations in the event of a major disaster.

3.2. This is fundamental for establishing the framework for effective civil protection in which all efforts have to be co-ordinated. Legislation must therefore specify the powers and responsibilities of all who have to intervene in this field, it being understood that the civil authorities have the responsibility of directing operations. For instance, depending on the extent of the disaster, a prefect or government representative appointed by the minister concerned should be made responsible for co-ordinating available means. He should exercise his duties with the assistance of a co-ordination centre which will include leaders representing all the means deployed. He should be immediately located in a position in the disaster area from which he will be able to direct to good avail the means at his disposal, particularly the military units which play an essential rôle during the state of emergency.

3.3. The organised structure of the armed forces makes them practically the only state bodies able, twenty-four hours a day, to assign large numbers of personnel, grouped in units with their leaders and having their own means of transport and communications.

3.4. The military functions of these units naturally require them to be prepared to take immediate action and at every level men are therefore on permanent duty who, correctly alerted, are able to take the measures required to go into action. Thanks to this permanent state of readiness, when the armed forces are called on for assistance in disasters, the first relief units can thus be despatched at extremely short notice. Moreover, military ethics, based on the principles of service and discipline, require the priority of the task to be respected in all circumstances and help to shape a state of mind found in all officers and men when in action. A military presence in all places affected by a disaster therefore helps to speed up the provision of assistance.

3.5. Although it is absolutely essential to co-ordinate all rescue efforts, it must be borne in mind that when means of assistance are brought in it is not possible to co-ordinate them all. Thousands of persons have to be used to counter a disaster, and it would be difficult to control all their activities. As a large number of persons are provided by the armed forces it is logical for the civil authority to leave a margin of initiative to lower-ranking officers who are prepared for such tasks by their training for wartime operations.

3.6. Similarly, in order to make best use of the specific characteristics of the agencies available, the civil authorities concerned should co-ordinate their work with due regard for the operational capabilities of the military units involved, leaving them the maximum amount of initiative compatible with the task.

3.7. In this connection, experience has shown that civil protection operations are considerably more effective when integrated teams are set up grouping the civil authority concerned (the mayor) and representatives of the armed forces and other bodies working in the area for which he is responsible. Such teams provide a basis for efficient assistance and the psychological repercussions are considerable. Although these teams are essential links in the chain of assistance, there is no question of them being able to work alone and out of touch with the higher levels or even their neighbours. It is therefore essential to organise a chain of command with reliable communications for conducting successful assistance operations. The chain of command and its network of communications should be given legal authority. Their operation should be verified periodically during command post type exercises, together with frequent spot checks of communications.

3.8. Another lesson has been learned from recent experience, i.e. the importance of the military territorial infrastructure in the area where the disaster occurs. While it is evident that the requirements of operational deployment do not always allow military installations to be spread uniformly throughout national territory, a minimum presence is in all circumstances a useful factor. Relief equipment, food, medical supplies, blankets, clothing, tents, huts, etc., have to be available at very short notice. This is possible insofar as stocks have been built up in high-risk areas and plans have been drawn up for their handling and transport to logistic centres by all available means (air, road, rail) and kept up to date.

3.9. Finally, although there may be an efficient civil protection organisation, the disaster might be so extensive that immediately-available national resources fall short of requirements. This points to the need for organising international co-operation for assistance to areas affected by natural disasters.

3.10. It would be useful, therefore, to make international arrangements which, as a minimum, would allow, without prior diplomatic consultations :

- an exchange of information on the organisation of civil protection and lessons learned from major disasters ;

- the loan of equipment essential for relief workers ;
- simplification of administrative procedure for unarmed units crossing frontiers and for obtaining overflight authorisation for military transport aircraft.

3.11. Thus, in case of need, the intervention of specialised medical and engineering units from neighbouring countries would be simplified and speeded up.

3.12. Such international co-operation might also be developed without committing large sums of money. To this end, a first step might be to set up a permanent regional warning network, using existing means, for instance the networks of the meteorological or civil aviation control services.

3.13. The efficiency of such a service would obviously depend on the standardisation of warnings, requests for assistance and responses by the countries concerned. This means defining a joint doctrine for the organisation of assistance and keeping up to date national stocks of assistance equipment. However, when the decisions to set up a warning and request network and to standardise doctrines have been taken to obtain maximum efficiency, it will in practice be necessary to create the nucleus of an international co-ordination centre to avoid duplication of effort and delays in bringing in external assistance.

3.14. This nucleus of a centre, which might be attached to committees handling similar matters in NATO, the United Nations or the European Community, would be activated in case of emergency and serve as an intermediary between the country affected by a disaster and countries able to provide appropriate assistance.

IV. *Existing international arrangements*

4.1. International assistance in cases of disasters in peacetime has been discussed in various governmental and non-governmental international organisations, but not apparently with specific reference to the possible use of armed forces. NATO, in particular, has had the matter under review since 1953, the present status of its arrangements being defined in a document last revised in 1971[1].

4.2. The NATO document mentions in particular the need for international agreements to cover questions of cost and frontier crossing formalities :

" C. *Financial and other responsibilities*

20. Insofar as possible, emergency assistance should be given without cost to the stricken member country.

21. In regard to questions of pay and insurance coverage of disaster assistance personnel, transport of non-expendable equipment and supplies used by them, customs clearances, cost of local transportation, accommodations, feeding, etc., experience has shown that the absence of appropriate bilateral or multilateral agreements was a serious hindrance to expeditious actions in times of disaster.

22. This deficiency could be gradually overcome by drawing up model memoranda of understanding, which member countries could develop into bilateral or multilateral agreements applicable in the case of disasters. Such model memoranda of understanding should be introduced in NATO, at the level of the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee. "

4.3. NATO action in a peacetime emergency is essentially limited to making available the NATO situation centre and alliance-wide communications system for the dissemination of information and requests for assistance from a member country, and establishing contact with international relief agencies. These arrangements are described in Annex II to the NATO document, which also has a useful summary of international emergency relief agencies at Annex I – these two texts are reproduced at Appendix III to the present report.

4.4. The Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO) at the United Nations Headquarters in Geneva has been created and reinforced by three recent resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly[1]. The text of the latest UNDRO information sheet is at Appendix IV.

4.5. UNDRO organised an international meeting on mobile reserve units in Geneva in 1982, the proceedings of which show that several countries have military units specially organised for providing international disaster relief: these include France (Elément Médical Militaire d'Intervention Rapide EMMIR) and Sweden (Swedish Stand-by Force for Disaster Relief). Appropriate military units of many countries have of course been involved in international disaster relief, organised both through United Nations auspices and in other frameworks.

1. NATO co-operation for emergency disaster assistance in peacetime, Document C-M(58)102, 1971 edition, 15th November 1971.

1. Resolutions 2816 (XXVI), 14th December 1971, 36/225, 17th December 1981 and 37/114, 17th December 1982.

V. *Conclusions*

5.1. The committee's principal conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation.

5.2. (Paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation) Particular attention should be paid to the possible rôle and contribution of the armed forces in planning for disaster relief. They can play a vital part in an emergency and in the first stage of disaster relief; within the framework of the civil authority the armed forces, when called upon, should be given a sufficient margin of initiative in order to make the best use of their resources. Multi-service depots for the storage and management of equipment and consumables (food, medicines, tentage and huts, clothing) can be established in proximity to areas of high disaster risk.

5.3. (Paragraph 2) Co-operation between countries can be invaluable in many fields:

(*a*) Exchange of information. Rapid and effective disaster relief requires the immediate dissemination of warning and the communication of as accurate information as possible on the nature, location and extent of the catastrophe, as well as of the damage caused. Information can be gathered through aerial and surface reconnaissance, and through the seismological, flood control, fire-watching and coast-guard services. Such information can be exchanged internationally through the NATO-wide communications system (paragraph 4.2 above). Information on experience of past disasters and lessons learnt should also be exchanged internationally.

(*b*) The co-ordination of resources available to relieve disaster cannot be improvised effectively; it should be prepared in advance through command post exercises involving the directing authorities, the testing of communications, and designed to cope with the most likely disasters. International participation in such exercises should be fostered.

(*c*) Bi- or multilateral agreements, covering inter alia frontier and customs formalities and payment for services, are necessary to prevent administrative delay in providing international assistance in disaster relief (paragraphs 3.10 and 4.2 above). They could cover communications links and channels to be used in emergencies.

5.4. (Paragraph 3) International arrangements for disaster relief should also provide for assistance to third countries.

APPENDIX I

Letter to the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments

Rome, 18th December 1980

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Further to the initial exchange of views we had with you at the last meeting in Paris, we take this opportunity of officially proposing to include in the programme of work of our committee for the coming months a study of the rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural disasters.

This is an especially topical question for our country in view of the recent earthquake which so severely struck areas in the south. It is also a subject of great importance and of international significance. In various countries in recent years, the armed forces, in the event of earthquakes, floods and other natural disasters, by their supporting action often at international level, have played an important and often irreplaceable rôle in affording assistance to the populations who have suffered and by acting quickly to organise essential emergency services and to commence the work of reconstruction.

A study of past experience would allow useful knowledge to be exchanged on the type of assistance practised, the organisational structure that possibly had to be set up in the various armed services and their relations with the organisers of civil defence services, and proposals and suggestions might be prepared for the attention of member governments, national parliaments and the WEU Council.

The importance of this study would be enhanced if it were sent, not only to member countries, but also to the governments of countries which are not members of WEU as a contribution – for the latter countries too – to the development of a relationship of mutual understanding and co-operation essential for détente and security.

.....

Signed : Pecchioli, Bernini, Calice

APPENDIX II

Questionnaire on the rôle and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime

(submitted to Ministers of Defence and of the Interior of the allied countries by Mr. Pecchioli, Rapporteur)

Scope of the report

The Committee is to prepare a report with the above title which will examine chiefly the rôle of the armed forces and their possible contribution to the protection of the civil population in peacetime :

(*a*) To meet emergencies due to :
- natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, earth movements, avalanches, forest fires, etc.) ;
- industrial disasters (large-scale pollution, rail accidents, accidents at sea, etc.);
- terrorist acts (attacks on dams, nuclear plants, public buildings, etc.);

and to save endangered human lives.

(*b*) By providing fundamental assistance:
- prevention (systems for collecting and studying data, preparation and alert);
- rapid intervention (first aid to those affected);
- restoration of essential services (communications, housing, hygiene).

Aim of the questionnaire

The first part of the report will describe existing arrangements and the experience acquired in this field as far as the armed forces of the allied countries are concerned. In order to compile this information in comparable form, the Rapporteur is addressing the following questionnaire to the Ministries of Defence and of the Interior of the allied countries.

Terminology

The questionnaire employs the expression " *civil protection* " to mean *protection of the civil population in peacetime* – the sense in which the expression is used in many countries. It is *not* synonymous with " civil defence " which concerns measures to protect the civil population in war.

Questionnaire

I. *Arrangements at the level of national governments*

1. What legislation is in force concerning protection of the civil population in the event of disasters in peacetime (" civil protection ")? Describe briefly its provisions.

2. (*a*) Which government ministers or other authority are designated to take charge of civil protection or disaster relief? Are such designations permanent, or are they ad hoc in the event of particular disasters ?

(*b*) Which government minister or other authority is empowered to call on the armed forces for civil protection duties, and under whose control do they operate if called upon ?

3. (*a*) Is there any permanent governmental disaster control body or organisation with specific civil protection functions ? If so describe briefly and state :

(*b*) under whose authority it operates ;

(*c*) what powers it exercises in an emergency ;

(*d*) what resources it controls ;

(*e*) whether it has a research, prevention and warning function in respect of the most likely disasters, and if so whether it operates data collection posts and alert warning systems in peacetime.

4. Are there any civil protection/disaster relief personnel organised in units independent of the armed forces? If so, give details of numbers of personnel, equipment, etc.

5. What official contact is maintained with private organisations with a possible civil protection function (e.g. Red Cross) and how are their efforts co-ordinated with official operations?

(*a*) Which are the voluntary organisations concerned?

(*b*) What are their respective functions ; what tasks do they undertake?

(*c*) What joint exercises are conducted by voluntary organisations with official bodies?

(*d*) What public subsidies are paid to these organisations?

6. Is there an annual civil protection budget (apart from special funds voted for specific disasters)? If so, state amount and percentage of total government expenditure.

7. What bi- or multilateral arrangements exist with other countries to provide exchange of information or experiences of disasters, or mutual assistance in disaster relief:

(*a*) specific multilateral agreements or agreements in the framework of international organisations (United Nations and specialised agencies; NATO; OECD; Council of Europe; European Community);

(*b*) bilateral with neighbouring allied countries (e.g. Franco-German convention on mutual assistance in the event of disasters or serious accidents, signed in Paris on 3rd February 1977);

(*c*) bilateral with other neighbouring countries?

(*d*) Do any of the foregoing arrangements specifically cover the use of elements of the armed forces for mutual civil protection assistance? If so, in what way?

(*e*) Are any communications links established, permanently or on an ad hoc basis, with neighbouring countries for the provision of mutual assistance or the co-ordination of protection in the event of disasters?

II. *The rôle and contribution of the armed forces*

8. (*a*) What is the command channel within the armed forces between the civil authority referred to in questions 2 and 14 (*a*) and the military unit called on to intervene?

(*b*) Are there command and organisation arrangements within the armed forces specially concerned with civil protection or disaster relief? Are they on 24-hour duty?

(*c*) Do contingency plans exist within the armed forces for particular civil protection functions?

9. What particular civil protection tasks can the armed forces perform when called upon?

10. What equipment held by the armed forces can be used in civil protection functions, e.g. transport (trucks; ships and boats; aircraft; helicopters); engineering (cranes, bulldozers); telecommunications (radio); medical services; emergency feeding arrangements; emergency accommodation (tents, etc.)?

11. What particular types of unit, of which service (army, navy, air force) is most suited to performing the tasks intended in question 9?

12. Are any units of the armed services specially earmarked for civil protection duties and if so are they:

(*a*) specially organised;

(*b*) specially trained;

(*c*) provided with special equipment for civil protection duties?

13. (*a*) Is there any provision within the defence budget for civil protection purposes; if so what is the amount and is it included under question 6?

(*b*) If not, how are costs incurred by the armed forces on civil protection duties financed (e.g. cost of fuel; expendables; damage to equipment)?

III. *Territorial structure of civil protection – the armed forces and the population*

14. (*a*) Is any delegated local civilian authority empowered to call upon the armed forces in his area for civil protection functions?

(*b*) Further to questions 2 and 8, what is the local channel of authority between civilian (municipal or local representative of central government) and the armed forces?

(*c*) Are local links established and rehearsed, formally or informally, between the armed forces; the local authorities, and local voluntary organisations (e.g. Red Cross)? (See also question 5).

(*i*) Which are the voluntary organisations concerned?

(*ii*) What particular tasks do they perform?

(*iii*) What joint exercises are conducted locally between the voluntary organisations and official bodies?

15. (*a*) Does the territorial deployment of the armed forces happen to meet the likely requirements for civil protection?

(*b*) Are some units specially stationed in areas with possible civil protection requirements?

16. (*a*) Do units of the armed forces most likely to be concerned have sufficient mobility to reach possible disaster areas rapidly?

(*b*) Do contingency movement plans exist for civil protection duties, and how long is it anticipated that units will take to reach possible disaster areas?

IV. *National and international experience*

17. What national catastrophes and disasters have occurred the most frequently in your country?

18. What has been the most significant experience of the contribution of the armed forces in such cases?

19. What conclusions have been drawn and what measures taken to strengthen specific sectors of civil protection?

20. On what occasions and in what form have the armed forces provided civil protection assistance to other countries? What lessons have been learned therefrom and what suggestions can be made?

APPENDIX III

Extracts from NATO document on NATO co-operation for emergency disaster assistance in peacetime

15th November 1971

I. *International emergency relief agencies*

1. While the basic document is oriented to assistance actions taken by member countries, it is necessary also to speak to the emergency relief activities of the non-governmental agencies, both at the time of the emergency and early rehabilitation phases of post-disaster assistance. An interrelationship exists between measures taken by the governmental and non-governmental sectors. Many emergency relief items arising from governmental stocks are provided to the disaster victims through the national and international non-governmental voluntary agencies.

2. The exchange of information proposed by the basic document envisions the exchange of data on both the governmental and non-governmental assistance to the stricken country. This hypothesis, carried to its logical conclusion, would indicate that each nation should, so far as it could, take appropriate steps to ensure that the responses from the non-governmental sector, especially the national Red Cross/Red Crescent societies and other voluntary organisations, both private and religious, are properly co-ordinated and considered in any national disaster assistance action. Further, it is sensible that national disaster plans consider and integrate, where possible, the capabilities for action of the non-governmental relief agencies.

3. Among the many agencies providing disaster relief directly to stricken countries and the victims of a disaster, several at the international governmental and non-governmental level are of interest:

(*a*) *The League of Red Cross Societies,* founded on 5th May 1919, is the world federation of national Red Cross, Red Crescent and Red Lion and Sun societies. The objectives of the league are to encourage and facilitate at all times the humanitarian activities of the national societies, with a view to assisting them in the organisation and exercise of their activities, both national and international. When a disaster occurs, the relief programmes of the Red Cross provide emergency assistance including food, clothing, shelter, medical and nursing care, and other basic necessities of life, and such social services to individuals, families, groups and communities as are needed.

Several European countries do not yet have national disaster relief plans, while others have not perfected their plans. From the league's viewpoint, this not only weakens the responsiveness of the national Red Cross societies, but also makes the national effort, governmental and private, less than totally effective. The LICROSS secretariat, in recent years, has been encouraging and assisting national societies to organise and prepare for relief actions. They have suggested that, where national disaster relief plans do not exist, national societies take action to remedy this deficiency. The LICROSS has published and distributed a " Guide to a national disaster relief plan " for use by all governments and national societies. The LICROSS secretariat would welcome the endorsement and efforts of NATO governments towards national disaster relief planning, both for internal and external application.

The LICROSS " Guide to a national disaster relief plan " sets forth the following four principles and rules for disaster relief:

- Prevention of disasters, assistance to victims and reconstruction are first and foremost the responsibility of the public authorities. In principle, Red Cross help is of an auxiliary and complementary nature and operates basically in the emergency phase. However, if circumstances require and provided the Red Cross is assured of the necessary resources and means, it may undertake longer-term assistance programmes.

- In order to cope with the effects of disasters, each country should have a national plan outlining an effective organisation of relief. If such a plan does not exist, the national society should instigate its establishment.

- To ensure rapid mobilisation as well as complete and effective use of material and personnel resources, the national plan should envisage co-ordination through the establishment of a centralised direction. Such central direction should be able to provide precise and official information on the effects of a disaster, its evolution and the needs.

- The extent of the Red Cross relief programme depends on the responsibilities delegated to the national society by its government or by the national relief plan. As a general rule the Red Cross programme is limited to the provision of: first aid, medical and nursing care, food supplies, clothing, shelter, social welfare, tracing services and other forms of emergency assistance.

  (Approved by the XXIst International Red Cross Conference, Istanbul, September 1969, with the participation of governments and Red Cross societies.)

(*b*) *International Relief Union.* At present only five members of the alliance retain membership in this organisation.

The objectives of the IRU as stated in Article 2 of the 1927 convention are to:

(*i*) provide first aid to stricken populations in disasters due to acts of God, the exceptional seriousness whereof exceeds the people's capabilities and resources, and to collect therefore donations, resources and assistance of all kinds ;

(*ii*) co-ordinate, if need be, the efforts of relief organisations in all public disasters ; (generally, to encourage studies and measures for the prevention of disasters) and to intervene so that all nations put into practice mutual relief on an international scale.

During the period 1967-68 an agreement was formulated and executed by the union whereby UNESCO assumed the responsibility for the continuance of the union's work encompassed by the bracketed working above. Efforts have not yet been successful to have the United Nations assume the other aspects of the union's objectives.

(*c*) *International Council of Voluntary Agencies.* The ICVA results from a 1962 amalgamation of three existing non-governmental co-ordinating bodies primarily concerned with refugees' and migrants' problems. The formation of the ICVA was intended to enable non-governmental groups to bring to bear experience acquired in other fields, such as assistance to developing countries and peacetime emergency assistance. The present membership of the ICVA is approximately 100 organisations. Included in this council are such agencies as Caritas Internationalis, the World Council of Churches, OXFAM, with significant resources and worldwide interests, along with similar non-governmental societies having a specialised and localised character.

Three commissions drawn from its membership have been established, one on refugees and migration, one on emergency aid and a third on social and economic development.

The Commission on Emergency Aid is primarily concerned with promoting and strengthening relationships among the voluntary agencies themselves, and between the voluntary agencies collectively and the League of Red Cross Societies. The league is viewed as the best equipped organisation for mobilising relief resources in emergency situations. The ICVA Commission on Emergency Aid has the following functions:

> " In its activity in the emergency aid sphere, ICVA thus aims firstly to be of assistance to its membership in promoting voluntary agency participation in pre-disaster planning, at the national and international level, including improving liaison with bodies outside the immediate ICVA circle. Secondly, ICVA aims to assist the agencies better to co-ordinate with each other and with outside institutions in their responses to actual disasters. In all of this, there is clear importance to be attached to the channelling of public responses, and to informing a wider public on the existence of the agencies and on their potentiality for useful work prior to and in disaster situations. "

(*d*) *The United Nations Organisation.* The United Nations specialised agencies have been active in disaster matters in accordance with their resources and constitutional obligations. Over the years they have built up a considerable capacity for assisting governments, at such times, and for contributing to the control or mitigation of the effects of disasters. Due to the severity of several recent disasters, the members of the United Nations have urged the Secretary-General to accelerate activities and planning for disaster assistance within the United Nations. To this end, the United Nations Secretary-General has recently forwarded for the consideration in the fall of 1971 of the Economic and Social Committee, United Nations document E/4994, 13th May 1971, containing a number of recommendations, identifying four main areas in which international assistance might be strengthened:

- prevention, control and prediction ;
- planning and preparedness ;
- better organisation of relief action when the disaster occurs ;
- rehabilitation and reconstruction.

The United Nations Economic and Social Council at its 51st Session adopted a resolution (E/RES/1612(LI) of 29th July 1971) which in the

main accepted the United Nations Secretary-General's document and recommended that the United Nations General Assembly at its 26th Session endorse the proposals and recommendations of the resolution. It is pointed out in the United Nations document that while the government should be able to count on the help of the international community, provided through governments, the League of Red Cross Societies and other voluntary agencies of the United Nations Organisation, in its preparations against or its efforts to meet such emergencies, *the primary responsibility for protecting the life, health and property of people within its frontiers and for maintaining the essential public services rests with that government.*

Many areas of activity will, on the other hand, require strengthening if the United Nations system (in co-operation with donor governments, the League of Red Cross Societies and other voluntary agencies) is to play the larger rôle expected of it. The document states: to stimulate further action in the various areas in question and to help in ensuring that international assistance is as effective and well co-ordinated as possible, will call for a concerted effort among the organisations of the United Nations system. The rôle of the competent organs of the United Nations – including that of the Secretary-General himself – in ensuring co-ordination will be of particular importance. The United Nations Secretary-General, in recommending a more active rôle for the United Nations, wishes a modest increase in staff for this purpose. Briefly, this office would:

(*i*) maintain continuing contacts with the governments of potential recipient and donor countries, as well as countries of transit; with the United Nations aid-giving agencies and programmes which will be expected to maintain close contact with the office and keep it advised of all relevant activities, as well as with the League of Red Cross Societies and other major voluntary agencies; and with the resident representatives, to whom it must be in a position to provide the support of experienced staff in time of emergency;

(*ii*) arrange assistance to disaster-prone countries in pre-disaster planning and disaster-preparedness arrangements;

(*iii*) collect, digest, keep up to date and disseminate to those concerned the mass of detailed information concerning the affected country and its resources which is essential for the effective organisation of assistance, as well as concerning available aid from within and outside the United Nations system.

The United Nations document, in one of the closing paragraphs of the recommendations, sounds a note of caution:

> " While the office, at least at the outset, can be quite small, it would in the Secretary-General's view be better not to increase United Nations involvement in the area of assistance in connection with natural disasters if the funds necessary for the modest staffing and other costs required (including facilities for rapid communication) cannot be guaranteed. The risk must be avoided of raising hopes that cannot be fulfilled. "

II. *NATO headquarters arrangements for disaster assistance information and co-ordination*

1. On behalf of the Secretary-General, the Director, Civil Emergency Planning Directorate will be responsible for taking, in a disaster situation, the actions specified in document C-M(58)102 – 1971 edition.

2. The NATO Situation Centre, operating on 24-hour basis, provides a means for following events as they occur in a disaster situation, since it has direct access to the alliance communications systems and news services' teleprinters. The duty watch officer of the Situation Centre will normally be the first officer of the headquarters to have information of a disaster. This would be particularly true in regard to such incidents occurring outside of normal duty hours and on holidays and weekends. Accordingly, he will immediately inform the Director, Civil Emergency Planning Directorate, or his representative, of all pertinent information received and indicate the source.

3. The Civil Emergency Planning Directorate will furnish the Situation Centre with a list of assigned officers in the order in which they are to be called in the event of a disaster, by the Situation Centre duty watch officer.

4. The Director, Civil Emergency Planning Directorate will establish an ad hoc watch system to closely follow events and take such actions as may be necessary. The physical location of this ad hoc watch will be determined by the severity of the disaster and the degree of activity emanating therefrom. For this ad hoc system he will first draw on personnel of his own staff and then on other elements on the international staff, as may be required.

5. Functions of the Director, Civil Emergency Planning Directorate or his delegated staff officer in carrying out the rôle of information co-ordinator are to:

(*a*) *Pre-disaster preparedness:*

(*i*) maintain, on a current basis, a list of the national central co-ordinating agencies, as designated by each member government, which would be the source and recipient of all official messages concerning a disaster;

(*ii*) maintain a list of telephone numbers of the central co-ordinating agencies and key individuals in each capital; this list will only be used when telegraphic communications will not suffice;

(*iii*) consider and recommend changes, modifications or updating of procedures as may be required either in the C-M or in its annexes to the appropriate committee, or to the Secretary-General where internal procedures are concerned.

(*b*) *Disaster operations:*

(*i*) advise the Secretary-General of the situation;

(*ii*) contact the appropriate delegation officer of the stricken member country;

(*iii*) ensure that the information received from the stricken member country is retransmitted, as necessary, to all capitals, delegations and NATO authorities concerned;

(*iv*) maintain liaison with the Directorate of Council Operations and the Situation Centre;

(*v*) maintain an overview of the situation as it develops with the aim of providing information to assisting countries which may facilitate or help expedite the delivery of assistance to the stricken country;

(*vi*) establish contact, as may be required and on instructions of the Secretary-General, with international relief and assistance agencies, with a view to obtaining supplemental information;

(*vii*) prepare, as necessary, briefings for the Secretary-General and/or the Council on the disaster and the assistance being provided.

(*c*) *Post-disaster:*

prepare a report for the Secretary-General for his consideration and subsequent dissemination in accordance with his directions.

APPENDIX IV

UNDRO [1] information sheet

Organisation

Disaster Relief Co-ordinator

A Disaster Relief Co-ordinator was appointed at Under-Secretary-General level, in March 1972. He acts on behalf of the UN Secretary-General and reports directly to him. The Co-ordinator's Office is a separate entity within the UN Secretariat, and consists of a Relief Co-ordination and Preparedness Branch and a Prevention and Support Services Branch.

Co-ordinator: M'Hamed Essaafi (Tunisia).

Field organisation

UNDRO is represented in developing countries by the UN Resident Co-ordinators/Resident Representatives of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNDRO also has a Liaison Office at UN Headquarters in New York.

Functions

The Co-ordinator's mandate derives from a number of General Assembly resolutions, mainly resolution 2816 (XXVI) " Assistance in case of natural disaster and other disaster situations ", resolution 36/225 " Strengthening the capacity of the UN system to respond to natural disasters and other disaster situations ", and resolution 37/144 " Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator ".

The Office has three broad functions. The first is that of relief co-ordination: to ensure that in case of natural disaster or other disaster situations, emergency relief activities of all donor sources are mobilised and co-ordinated so as to supply the needs of a disaster-stricken country in a timely and effective manner. Its second function is that of preparedness: to raise the level of pre-disaster planning and preparedness, including disaster assessment and relief management capability, in disaster-prone developing countries. Thirdly, there is the function of prevention: to promote the study, prevention, prediction and mitigation of natural disasters, through the application of appropriate measures. These include the collection and dissemination of information concerning scientific and technological developments. In order to strengthen the collective efforts of the United Nations system, UNDRO developed and signed with most of the agencies, a series of Memoranda of Understanding defining areas and means of co-operation.

Activities

During 1982, UNDRO was directly involved in and launched international appeals for some 15 major natural disasters and three man-made emergencies, the most important of which were drought and civil strife in Chad, cyclones in Madagascar, Tonga and Viet-Nam, floods in Nicaragua, Honduras, Tunisia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, volcanic eruptions in Indonesia, the emergency in the Lebanon, and earthquakes in the Yemen Arab Republic. As a co-ordinating Office, UNDRO is not itself a principal source of relief assistance, although the Co-ordinator has the authority to make from his regular budget and from his voluntary trust fund direct emergency grants not exceeding US $50,000 for any one disaster (and not exceeding in total US $600,000 in one year) to meet immediate emergency needs, such as medicines, food or the transport of life-saving equipment. The Co-ordinator has moreover been empowered to receive from donors contributions in kind and in cash which are used for the provision of relief supplies. However, the greater part of the emergency assistance provided by the international community goes direct to the country concerned and it is expected that the amount and nature of these contributions will be based upon the information given in UNDRO's disaster " situation reports " which are sent by telex to donor sources and other interested organisations throughout the world. During 1982, contributions for emergency relief reported to UNDRO, mobilised by it or channelled through it, exceeded 400 million dollars. UNDRO staff members are often sent to a disaster-stricken country to assist governments in the tasks of assessment of damage and needs, and of local co-ordination of relief activity. During the year, UNDRO organised or participated in almost 30 multi-agency disaster assessment missions. The most important of these missions took place in China, Benin, Chad, the Lebanon and Poland.

Disaster preparedness advisory missions are usually undertaken by UNDRO staff or by

1. Established in 1972 to mobilise and co-ordinate international emergency relief to disaster-stricken areas, and to promote disaster preparedness and prevention.

consultants hired by the Office. They advise governments on the best methods of improving their organisation to deal with all kinds of disasters, and not just those which arise from natural causes. The recommendations of these missions sometimes call for specific projects to be carried out, and if these cannot be funded by the government then UNDRO may be asked to seek the necessary financing from donors. Preparedness organisations naturally need trained personnel, and UNDRO arranges or takes part in many seminars for disaster managers and others concerned in relief work, in the preparation and issue of warnings, and in the application of new technologies to disaster work generally. UNDRO is also engaged in attempts to remove obstacles to the rapid delivery of international relief, and this requires willingness by donors as well as by potential recipients to streamline procedures and to waive normal legal requirements for the movement of relief goods and personnel.

UNDRO operates a Co-ordination Centre with a modern computerised communications system, which processes and distributes information before and during emergency situations. The Centre's Data Bank and Reference Library complete UNDRO's data base.

In the area of disaster prevention UNDRO is engaged in the development of techniques of vulnerability analysis and their application: in trying to ensure that precautions against existing hazards are observed in the planning of new development projects, and that the projects themselves should not create new hazards; and in promoting the use of legislation, land-use planning and other inexpensive methods of reducing or eliminating disaster risks. During 1982 technical assistance in disaster prevention and preparedness was provided to countries in the Caribbean, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Western Samoa and Yugoslavia.

The amount allocated to UNDRO in the regular budget of the UN for the biennium 1982-1983 is US $5,136,700. Additional expenditures, which amount to approximately $800,000 per year, are met from the voluntary trust fund, established by the General Assembly in 1974.

Publications

- *Annual Report to the UN General Assembly.*
- *UNDRO NEWS (six issues each year).*
- *Ten Questions on UNDRO (leaflet).*
- *Disaster Assessment Mission Reports.*
- *Case Reports.*
- *Disaster Prevention and Mitigation:*
  A Compendium of Current Knowledge (ten volumes).
- *Guidelines for Disaster Prevention (three volumes).*
- *Technical Papers.*

Geneva, March 1983.

Replies of the Council to Recommendations 393 to 395 and supplementary reply to Recommendation 380

RECOMMENDATION 393 [1]

on China and European security [2]

The Assembly,

(*i*) Considering that the priority given to internal development in the People's Republic of China is directing it on a lasting basis towards the search for international peace;

(*ii*) Considering that the People's Republic of China is an essential factor in the world balance and that the development of its economy should lead it to play an increasingly important rôle in international relations;

(*iii*) Considering that in spite of differences in their political and social régimes the interests of Western Europe and of China converge in many fields;

(*iv*) Considering that the development of trade and co-operation between Western Europe and China is in their joint interests;

(*v*) Considering that the People's Republic of China is now making proposals to European states and firms for co-operation of mutual interest;

(*vi*) Reaffirming the commitments which closely link Western Europe with the United States, particularly for all aspects of defence and security,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that the Western European countries start regular consultations with the Government of the People's Republic of China in the most appropriate frameworks on matters relating to the maintenance of peace in the world;

2. Carefully examine in the appropriate frameworks the possibility of increasing Western Europe's trade and economic co-operation with China;

3. Remove as far as possible all current obstacles to the development of this trade and co-operation and, in particular, no longer subject the latter to Cocom restrictions on trade with the eastern countries;

4. Impress this point of view on the United States and on its partners in the OECD;

5. Insist that the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons do not allow the Soviet Union to deploy in Asia weapons withdrawn from Eastern Europe;

6. Urge its members to pursue a concerted policy in order to lay the foundations for lasting peace in Eastern Asia and, inter alia, to endeavour to re-establish an independent state in Cambodia and to facilitate the search for a negotiated solution for Hong Kong.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1983 during the first part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (2nd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Caro on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 945).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL[1]

to Recommendation 393

The Council have noted with interest Recommendation 393 from the Assembly on China and European security.

The Council are pleased to inform the Assembly that :

- The member states of WEU individually maintain a wide range of political contacts with the Government of the People's Republic of China through exchanges of visits and other channels. These contacts provide good opportunities for consultations on international questions, and on many of these similar views are shared. Moreover in May 1983, the member states of the European Community, acting within their political co-operation framework, decided to establish regular political consultations every six months between the Ten and the People's Republic of China. Pursuant to this decision, the first consultations took place at the end of May 1983.

- Generally speaking, trade and economic co-operation between China and the individual member states of WEU are growing in a spirit of equality and mutual benefit. The member states of WEU welcome this development and will endeavour to encourage its continuation.

- The member states of WEU do not consider that either individual national policies or other existing regulations currently present a major obstacle to the development of trade and co-operation with China. They believe however that the application of those regulations to trade with China should be reviewed from time to time. Member states will continue to maintain close contact with the United States and the other OECD partners on this matter.

- As they have already stated within the alliance, the member states of WEU support the position that the threat posed to Europe by Soviet missiles should not be reduced at the expense of countries of the Far East.

- The member states of WEU have repeatedly declared their opposition to the presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, their demand for the complete withdrawal of these troops and their wish to see Cambodia return to its former neutral, non-aligned and independent status.

- The United Kingdom's partners share complete confidence in the United Kingdom in its search for a negotiated solution for Hong Kong which will maintain Hong Kong's stability and prosperity.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th November 1983.

RECOMMENDATION 394 [1]

on the political activities of the WEU Council – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council [2]

The Assembly,

(*i*) Reaffirming its determination to fulfil the whole range of its duties by dealing as thoroughly as possible with the many aspects of European security;

(*ii*) Recalling that the exercise of its responsibilities calls for a meaningful dialogue with the Council;

(*iii*) Convinced that this dialogue will be easier to develop if the Council plays a more active rôle in concerting European activities in areas within its competence;

(*iv*) Welcoming the full-bodied report on European political co-operation submitted by the Council but noting that, in exercising its mandate, the Council does not yet seem to have taken account of the desire expressed by several of its members to strengthen their co-operation in various fields relating to their security;

(*v*) Welcoming the transmission by the Council of the declassified version of the study by the Standing Armaments Committee on member countries' armaments industries and noting that in its reply to Recommendation 379 the Council confirmed the task given to the SAC;

(*vi*) Recalling that the mandate instructing the SAC to promote European armaments co-operation implies that it take account of all the latest technological developments in this field,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Apply its competence in full by studying and tackling certain security problems which call for a concerted European approach;

2. In that context instruct the SAC inter alia to complete its study without delay, with the addition of proposals to remove economic and legal obstacles to better co-operation between the armaments industries of member countries and transmit the results of this study to the Assembly;

3. Instruct the SAC to study the possible implications for European armaments production of all the latest technological developments in the armaments field.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1983 during the first part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (2nd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 944).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL[1]

to Recommendation 394

1. The Council welcome the reaffirmation by the Assembly of its determination to fulfil the whole range of its duties by dealing as thoroughly as possible with the many aspects of European security. The proper exercise of this great responsibility requires a dialogue with the Council, for which the Council hold themselves continuously available.

As the Council explained in their reply to Assembly Recommendation 379, European consultations on security questions take place in various bodies at various levels. The twenty-eighth annual report referred to in the recommendation contains details of exchanges of view which took place in the Council on a number of security-related problems, including East-West relations, the situation in Afghanistan, in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and elsewhere. The Council naturally intend to continue fulfilling their responsibilities under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.

2. The study carried out by the Standing Armaments Committee on the member countries' armaments industries appears to be a step towards improved co-operation between the members and could help them in directing their programmes and military investment expenditure. The Council consider it expedient that the study be concluded without delay. They have asked the SAC to carry out, with the assistance of its international secretariat, the annual updating, in simplified form, of the statistics contained in this study.

3. The head of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee has, as stated to the Assembly, made a number of study proposals to the Council which might be carried out by the Committee for which he is responsible. One of the proposed topics, which echoes the concern expressed by the Assembly in its recommendation, basecommendation, basically relates to the implications of new conventional weapons on the armaments industries of the member countries. This proposal is at present before the Council, who duly note the interest shown by the Assembly in this topic.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th October 1983.

RECOMMENDATION 395 [1]

on the law of the sea [2]

The Assembly,

(*i*) Welcoming the Council's reply to Recommendation 377 on implications of the law of the sea conference that the aim pursued by the governments of member states was to reach a universally-accepted international convention on the law of the sea, which would constitute an important factor in maintaining peaceful and friendly relations between states, especially between western industrialised countries and developing countries in the third world;

(*ii*) In agreement with the Council's opinion that a satisfactory international regulation of deep-seabed mining was strategically and economically of great importance, especially for industrialised Western European countries which are highly dependent on imports of raw materials;

(*iii*) Conscious of the third world's claims to a share of deep-sea mineral resources;

(*iv*) Aware of the shortcomings of the proposed seabed mining régime and regretting the individual and divergent positions which the member states of Western European Union, the EEC and NATO have taken up as to whether the convention should be signed;

(*v*) Considering that these positions may be detrimental to Europe's strategic position in the world, more particularly in relation to the developing countries;

(*vi*) Aware of the danger of losing what has been gained in some fourteen years of negotiations and the benefits to be derived from the convention for the greater part of the globe, whereas the navies of the signatory countries, including those of the Soviet bloc, may derive far-reaching advantages with the backing of international law,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine the strategic and tactical disadvantages of the present situation and seek to eliminate the differences in the policies of member countries towards the draft law of the sea convention;

2. Request the Governments of France and the Netherlands to devote their efforts in the preparatory commission to the introduction of rules and regulations to govern the seabed mining régime in an equitable manner with less state control and protectionism than proposed by the Soviet bloc and many third world countries;

3. Request the Governments of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom to adopt policies with a view to making full use of Europe's political and industrial influence in the preparatory commission to achieve constructive and acceptable solutions to problems relating to the seabed mining régime;

4. Pursue its efforts to convince the United States Government of the negative consequences of its policy and of the advantages of a duly-signed unambiguous convention on the law of the sea and, consequently, the rule of law of the world oceans, as opposed to a mere customary law situation which cannot be enforced.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1983 during the first part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (4th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 946).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 395

1. First, the Council have to acknowledge that there exist different views among WEU member countries concerning the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea due to the fact that member countries have differing interests in marine matters.

Two member countries of WEU (France and the Netherlands) have signed the convention while the others do not at present intend to do so or have not yet taken a decision. This fact has been an obstacle to their acting unanimously on issues related to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It should be noted that the obstacles which prevent signature of the convention by the majority of member countries lie mainly, if not entirely, in the deep-seabed régime, beyond national jurisdiction, as it has been drafted in the convention. The Council therefore take the view that every effort must be made to arrive at constructive and acceptable solutions to the issue of the deep-seabed régime. Success in this respect would undoubtedly advance the general acceptability of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

2. In the present situation, only France and the Netherlands, which have signed the convention, have voting rights as members of the preparatory commission responsible inter alia for the elaboration of rules and regulations for deep-seabed mining. Those member states which have not yet signed the convention may participate fully in the commission's deliberations as observers, but are not entitled to participate in the taking of decisions. The Council welcome the fact that the first meetings of this preparatory commission in Kingston, from 15th March to 8th April and from 15th August to 9th September 1983, demonstrated that co-operation between WEU member states, whether in the capacity of full voting members or of observers, is very good and that the WEU full voting members of the preparatory commission made every effort to ensure that the observers are allowed to participate in the work of the commission to the full extent as laid down in Resolution I of the final act of the conference. Their success in defending observers' rights of participation in the negotiations in a constructive manner is of course in the interests of the commission as a whole. For in working out the deep-seabed régime it is necessary to make maximum use of the knowledge and expertise in the field of deep-seabed mining which is primarily available in those states which have a deep-sea mining capability.

Obviously the influence of the preparatory commission members with deep-sea mining expertise will facilitate the establishment of satisfactory rules and regulations for the mining régime and help avoid any unnecessary control or protectionism. France and the Netherlands together with WEU member countries participating as observers will work to this end in the negotiations within the preparatory commission.

3. The Council can give the assurance that all WEU member states will do everything possible, through the appropriate channels, to achieve constructive and acceptable solutions to problems relating to the deep-seabed régime.

4. In this context it should be observed that the United States is not participating in the preparatory commission sessions in Kingston. As is known, the United States has serious objections to the régime for deep-sea mining as laid down in the convention. Although WEU member states also subscribe in part to these objections, only the United States among potential deep-sea miners has adopted the point of view that it should not participate in the preparatory commission, not even as an observer.

It is to be hoped that with the elaboration of a satisfactory seabed mining régime, the convention can be made fully acceptable not only to WEU member countries, but also to the United States.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 19th October 1983.

RECOMMENDATION 380[1]

on the application of the Brussels Treaty
– reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council [2]

The Assembly,

(*i*) Welcoming the wide agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the application of the Brussels Treaty, revealed in Recommendation 365 and the Council's reply thereto;

(*ii*) Noting that the Council and Assembly alike recognise that the fundamental provisions of the Brussels Treaty, particularly the mutual security provisions of Articles IV, V and VIII.3, retain their full value, and that there is interest in making greater use of Western European Union as an instrument of European security;

(*iii*) Believing that several arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty no longer serve any useful purpose, and noting the Council's view that " in applying the provisions of Protocol No. III and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situation in Europe ";

(*iv*) Believing therefore that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. In application of Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III;

2. In application of Article V of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, vary by reducing the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III;

3. Call on member countries which participate in the integrated system of NATO, and are not already bound by Article VI of Protocol No. II, to make unilateral declarations concerning the level of forces they undertake to assign to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and station as agreed with him, and not to withdraw against the wishes of a majority of the high contracting parties;

4. To include in future annual reports a statement on the levels of all assigned forces;

5. To communicate its annual report, as in the past, before the end of February.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (2nd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 908).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL[1]

to Recommendation 380

The Council welcome the fact that the Assembly recognises that the fundamental provisions of the Brussels Treaty retain their full value and that it stresses the importance of WEU in the sphere of security.

1. The Council recall their position, namely, that in applying the provisions of Protocol No. III and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situation in Europe. This is why Annex III of that protocol has been amended on several occasions since 1958. The Council have received with great interest and are considering the Assembly's recommendation to cancel paragraphs IV (" Long-range missiles and guided missiles ") and VI (" Bomber aircraft for strategic purposes ") of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III according to the procedure laid down in Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty.

2. As regards varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III, the Council welcome the fact that, as a result of the debate and vote by the Assembly, the initial draft recommendation was amended to take account of certain legal and political considerations.

The Council are considering the technical, military and political aspects of this problem.

3 and 4. The overall system organised under the treaty and its protocols, the implementation of which, as regards level of forces, regularly appears in the annual report, enables the Council to be informed of and to assess the situation of the level of forces and their armaments assigned to SACEUR for the common defence.

The level of forces thus assigned results from the undertakings made by the member states within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance as stated notably in II.5 and 6 and IV of the final act of the nine-power conference, held in London between 28th September and 3rd October 1954. The forces assigned by the various countries to the common NATO defence are in fact defined on the basis of a plan which is kept up to date within NATO. Decisions relating to the forces result from the joint effort of the member countries in accordance with the capacity of each to contribute and with the aim of ensuring at all times an adequate level of forces.

Consequently, there appears to be no need to invite the states concerned to make unilateral declarations to the WEU Council concerning a matter which is already dealt with in the multilateral context of NATO. Nor does there appear to be any possibility of including in future annual reports any statements on the level of forces other than those which are already given.

5. The Council will endeavour, as in the past, to communicate its annual report to the Assembly before the end of February.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 15th November 1982.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 380

Annex IV to Protocol No. III
of the modified Brussels Treaty

In their reply of 15th November 1982 to Recommendation 380, the Council stated that, as regards varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III, they were considering the technical, military and political aspects of this problem. At the joint meeting in Brussels on 17th May 1983 with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the Chairman-in-Office stated that the Council had asked the Agency for the Control of Armaments for a technical opinion, which had recently been transmitted to them and was being studied by the governments.

The Council wish to inform the Assembly that this question remains on their agenda and that they are continuing to examine it in depth, bearing in mind the various aspects of a problem whose complexity the Assembly clearly perceives. The Council will naturally inform the Assembly as soon as possible after the completion of their examination of the problem.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 22nd November 1983.

Written questions 233 to 240 and replies of the Council to written questions 233, 234 and 236

QUESTION 233

put by Mr. Dejardin on 7th June 1983

Answering a question put in the Assembly on 7th June, Mr. Claude Cheysson, French Minister for External Relations and Chairman of the Council, said French nuclear forces were not intended to protect the other European members of the Atlantic Alliance.

Such a declaration may seem highly disturbing in the event of an attack on one of the other six WEU member countries.

In application of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, should France not be notified that it must react in such circumstances?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

communicated to the Assembly on 27th July 1983

The French Minister for External Relations, in his reply to the WEU Assembly on 7th June, did not make the remarks attributed to him by the honourable parliamentarian. Mr. Cheysson, in reply to questions put to him after his speech, simply made the observation that " French nuclear weapons are not intended for the protection of all the countries of the alliance, of the continent of Europe. " (Official Report, page 72)

All the same:

- as recalled by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council in that same speech, the member countries are determined to honour the contractual obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty and in particular the commitment to collective self-defence agreed in Article V. This is true of France who fully assumes the obligations and solidarities arising from her membership of WEU. No one could question France's fidelity to the the commitments that she has concluded and the determination that she would show alongside her allies if the conditions required for the implementation of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty were to come about;
- at the same time, account should be taken of the particular nature of nuclear weapons, which imply specific conditions of use for all the powers in possession of such weapons.

Based on the doctrine of the deterrence of the strong by the weak, France's nuclear strategy is aimed at the defence of her vital interests which, as emphasised on several occasions, could not be defined. This factor of uncertainty, rather than weakening the deterrent, tends, on the contrary, to strengthen it.

QUESTION 234

put by Mr. Dejardin on 10th August 1983

The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the parliamentary Assembly has often visited national or NATO military installations.

During these visits, in particular to NATO installations, it seems that committee members have access only to unclassified information.

On 4th May 1983, the committee was received at the NATO anti-submarine warfare research centre of SACLANT at La Spezia. The SACLANTCEN Director stated at the outset that briefings would be limited to the subject of anti-submarine and oceanographic research since systems research was secret.

He also said he would be prepared to answer certain questions provided this did not mean giving classified answers. He added that it was SACLANT's principle to apply a security procedure whereby only persons specifically empowered by the responsible authority could have access to secret information.

What does the Council think of the strict application of this principle to members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the WEU parliamentary Assembly?

Does it consider that this is likely to facilitate understanding and acceptance of military requirements by parliamentarians who, in particular, vote appropriations intended to cover defence expenditure?

Could not such an attitude be considered as an affront to parliamentary democracy and, in this case, to the dignity of members of the Assembly?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

communicated to the Assembly on 21st October 1983

1. The Council have taken note of the points put forward in the honourable parliamentarian's question.

2. The Council wish to recall that in the past, in response to concerns expressed by the Assembly, they have carefully considered, in consultation with the North Atlantic Council, means of giving the maximum possible information to the Assembly on military questions which are within NATO competence.

3. In 1958 a procedure was established covering the communication by NATO to the WEU Assembly of unclassified information. This procedure has subsequently been reviewed, but NATO security regulations do not permit the release of classified information. The Council therefore can only say that there is no possibility of changing it.

4. While tight security measures are sometimes difficult to reconcile with the requirements of parliamentary democracy, they are necessary for effective defence. The Council fully appreciate the interests of the Assembly but trust that the honourable parliamentarian will recognise the need both for the military requirements to which he refers, and for the security measures designed to ensure their maximum effectiveness. However, whenever they can, the Council will naturally continue to keep the Assembly as fully informed as possible.

QUESTION 235

put by Mr. Cox on 13th September 1983

In reply to questions in the Assembly on 7th June 1983, General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, said: " There are over 2,100 SS-20 warheads deployed. There are 351 launchers deployed today. There are three warheads to each launcher and there is a second missile deployed at the launcher site... there is some uncertainty whether there may be three missiles deployed at each launcher... "

This warhead count is double that of the latest NATO Nuclear Planning Group estimate in the communiqué of 23rd March 1983 which states that: " ...the Soviet Union now has 351 launchers for the... SS-20 missiles deployed and operational, comprising 1,053 warheads. "

Does the Council agree with General Rogers' estimate of SS-20 warhead numbers, and was he authorised to give it?

*
* *

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

QUESTION 236

put by Mr. Blaauw on 15th September 1983

Since the EEC Council of Ministers failed to condemn the shooting down of the South Korean Airlines Boeing 747 flight 007 by the Soviet Air Force killing 269 people from 13 different countries, would it not be in the interests of the defence of Western Europe for the WEU Council to express their unambiguous condemnation of this action?

Will the Council consider convening a special meeting for this purpose?

Could the Council inform the Assembly what measures have been taken in the member countries as a result of this aggression?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

communicated to the Assembly on 28th September 1983

As stated in the press communiqué, the text of which was transmitted for information to the President of the Assembly: " The Permanent Council of Western European Union at their meeting of 21st September 1983 strongly condemned the destruction of a civil airliner of the Korean Airlines on 31st August 1983. They deeply deplored this action caused by Soviet military aircraft, which resulted in the tragic loss of a great number of human lives. "

The Council, consequently, do not envisage calling an extraordinary meeting.

In their communiqué the Council recalled that " the seven WEU member states have already made public their positions and reactions, and also expressed their determination within the ICAO that the necessary measures be adopted to avoid any recurrence of such a tragedy. "

QUESTION 237

put by Mr. Lenzer
on 21st September 1983

Does the Council agree that the Airbus 320 is absolutely vital for the future of the European aircraft industry?

Is the Council aware that, if this aircraft is not produced, Boeing will have a world monopoly for this type of aircraft?

Will the Council urge member governments to give their financial and political backing to the production of the Airbus 320?

Which airlines have already shown an interest in this type of aircraft?

*
* *

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

QUESTION 238

put by Mr. Blaauw
on 30th September 1983

Could the Council inform the Assembly when France is expected to decide on procurement of an airborne warning and control system?

What is the place of the British AWACS unit in the overall NATO system?

What will be the place of the French system in the European AWACS cover?

*
* *

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

QUESTION 239

put by Mr. Blaauw
on 30th September 1983

Will a European procurement co-ordination body be set up to define joint specifications for the advanced combat aircraft for the 1990s?

If not, will there then be a tripartite group – United Kingdom, France, Germany?

If so, what is the timetable for defining such specifications?

*
* *

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

QUESTION 240

put by Mr. Bassinet
on 13th October 1983

Since European co-operation in armaments matters is essential, can the Council give the Assembly information about the tripartite discussions between France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom in Paris on 21st September 1983?

Will co-operation in overall research and development be strengthened?

Is standardisation possible for NATO frigates, guided anti-tank weapons, helicopters and above all tactical combat aircraft?

*
* *

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields - Part II

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions [2]
by Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted in committee by 12 votes to 2 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. *Lenzer* (Chairman); MM. *Wilkinson, Bassinet* (Alternate for Mr. Fortier) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Adriaensens, *Amadei,* Antoni, Barthe (Alternate: *Lagorce*), *Böhm,* Fiandrotti, Forma, Fourré, *Garrett, Sir Paul Hawkins,* MM. *McGuire, Prussen, Spies von Büllesheim, Schmidt,* Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. *Valleix, Worrell.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields

The Assembly,

(*i*) Noting with satisfaction that the governments of the WEU member countries have declared that they are fully aware of the security interests which determine European collaborative projects in high technology fields, including aeronautics, space and microelectronics;

(*ii*) Considering that it is essential to master the principal branches of technology covering all material needed by the armed forces of member countries and that the evolution of defence research makes it necessary to develop intellectual capabilities by a sustained effort of continuous education at various levels – engineers, technicians, operatives;

(*iii*) Considering that mastery of research and development in the defence field would strengthen the defence capability of the European states if they could co-operate without restriction in their respective financial and technological efforts;

(*iv*) Considering that the growing cost of armaments programmes for the WEU countries calls for increased and balanced co-operation in a European framework so that the armaments industries of the member countries may contribute fully to defence by mastering new technology to the best of their ability;

(*v*) Considering that intra-European exchanges of technology are already extensive, as is the joint production of sophisticated devices of European design, and that further progress can be made in this direction by exploiting new technology to the full;

(*vi*) Considering that the balance of technology exchange between member states and the United States favours the latter and results in a markedly unequal relationship within the Atlantic Alliance;

(*vii*) Considering that it is essential not to confuse new technology, weapons systems and strategies but that on the contrary our countries should master new tactical concepts, any European effort in the field of emergent technology having to take account of the real possibilities of high technology co-operation and, as a first stage, of the possibilities offered by the existence of the Standing Armaments Committee for independent European thinking,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to prepare for it a study in the form of a review and proposals on the possibilities of co-operation between member countries in advanced technology for the development of future weaponry, this study, covering both research and the industrialisation of the products of such research, to include inter alia:

   - an analysis of the decision-taking structure and the budgetary facilities of each member country;
   - an analysis of means available and the possibilities of making optimum use of these means to protect innovative capabilities and ensure competitive production costs;
   - proposals on the direction the research and development policies of member countries should take to provide Western Europe with the industrial base necessary for components for future weaponry;

2. Invite the governments of member countries to encourage contacts between the responsible authorities in their industries with a view to promoting the establishment, as soon as possible, of a strong, co-ordinated European industry for advanced military technology meeting our defence requirements;

3. Invite the governments of member countries to give preference to the procurement, as and when necessary, of new weapons whose design and production are the fruit of co-operation between several member countries.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1. In the first part of its report dated 18th May 1982, the committee drew attention to the need to draw up a list of priority areas for improving co-operation in science and technology. Because of their cost, technical complexity or special interest, military research and development programmes require special attention, being directly related to European or international co-operation. In its reply communicated to the Assembly on 24th November 1982, the Council considered it opportune that such a list should be drawn up by the Standing Armaments Committee and this task might be included in its future arrangements concerning the Standing Armaments Committee's activities.

2. In its reply to Recommendation 385 [1] on international aeronautical consortia - guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982, the Council stated further that the Standing Armaments Committee had been set up in 1955 with the aim of increasing the efficiency of the forces of the countries of WEU by improving their logistics and the use of the resources available to them for equipping and supplying their forces and by sharing, in the best interests of all, the research on, development of and production of new armaments. The Council stated further:

> " It maintains an interest in operational research and several technical areas; furthermore, it was instructed by Council to carry out a study of the armaments industry of the WEU member states. The completed parts of this study have been transmitted to the Council, who have kept the Assembly informed. At the 1974 Conference of National Armaments Directors, it emerged that many more countries were interested in co-operation than the member states of WEU. As a result of this conference, the Independent European Programme Group was set up. That body is now an important instrument of European multinational co-operation in the sphere of armaments. The fact that its composition is not identical with that of WEU suggests that members of the WEU Assembly should receive progress reports on its work by way of national procedures. The IEPG is already directed by a high-level political figure.
>
> The Conference of National Armaments Directors of the Atlantic Alliance is a body through which the countries of the alliance are able to co-operate in the definition and execution of equipment and research projects. It is a forum where information on military requirements, national concepts and programmes as well as emerging technology is exchanged in order to promote equipment collaboration and standardisation. Considerable efforts are made, moreover, to rationalise and co-ordinate the activity of its subsidiary groups.
>
> Finally, the military staffs of the WEU member countries are fully aware of the need to have a solid industrial basis for equipping their forces as economically as possible, thereby promoting marketable equipment at competitive prices. "

3. One of the reasons why it has become so difficult to achieve better co-operation is the fact that all countries wish to strengthen their national competitive positions which they fear might be endangered by more co-operation. However, co-operation and competition should be regarded as complementary. This was acknowledged in the many discussions your Rapporteur had in preparing this report but it was often difficult to make the political will prevail over national short-term goals.

4. Individual national laws and regulations are often a great handicap for co-operation between armaments industries. Administrations are of course used to their own laws and have to overcome many psychological difficulties in order to handle collaborative ventures.

5. Despite persistent negative attitudes in certain sectors of the public with regard to specific instances of scientific and technological development in the military field, there is nevertheless increasingly widespread general appreciation of science and technology as prime movers in economic progress. The policy of science and technology is often found more at fault than science and technology itself. Priority should therefore be given to better policy and the rôle of governments in providing the correct climate. At the Versailles summit meeting of the seven most industrialised countries in 1982, the decision was taken to set up a technology task-force. At the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bonn on 10th June 1982, the heads of state and of government participating in the meeting stated:

> " Modernisation and expansion of Warsaw Pact conventional forces continue

1. Document 916.

to accelerate and include the addition of advanced aircraft, surface ships, submarines, a full range of armoured vehicles and artillery and other systems. In this context, and recognising particularly the need for strong conventional forces, Ministers discussed the results of the 1982 annual defence reviews, adopted the NATO force plan for 1983-87, and agreed to provide resources to implement the necessary force improvements.

.....

Ministers endorsed the need to seek ways to redress escalating defence costs by more effective application of national resources to defence, particularly in the conventional field. Some improvements can be achieved through the rationalisation and better co-ordination of NATO defence planning aimed at a greater harmonisation of such planning activities as those involving infrastructure, armaments and logistics. In this context Ministers emphasised the special importance which they attach to armaments co-operation within the scope of the transatlantic dialogue and especially with regard to the concept of families of weapons.

Consistent with the Bonn summit mandate, Ministers received a United States paper on taking advantage of emerging technologies to improve conventional capabilities and thereby enhance deterrence and defence. They agreed that NATO should actively seek ways to exploit these technologies within the co-operative defence planning process and endorsed the pursuit of NATO efforts to look for the economical and efficient application of emerging technologies. "

II. *New technology and defence costs*

6. New technology offers promising innovations in virtually every category of weapons systems. Unfortunately, their development calls for heavy expenditure. The central problem for all countries in defence is cost escalation.

7. Lord Trenchard, United Kingdom Minister of State for Defence Procurement, stated at the colloquy on international aeronautical consortia in London on 9th and 10th February 1982 that as an industrialist and a minister he had found no other area where cost escalation was so great a problem as in defence equipment. One of the reasons was that the Soviet Union continued to add great numbers of new weapons systems to its existing strength. In particular the improving quality of their weapons made it increasingly expensive to sustain the numbers of traditional main weapon platforms such as warships, tanks and aircraft. Another was the microelectronic revolution which had an important degree of applicability of new technology to the weapons and equipment of the armed forces.

8. Looking at the figures one has to accept that the cost of an aircraft, its armaments or of a ship is increasing at more than 5% of the general rate of inflation and in many cases it is much higher. Member countries are therefore obliged to increase their defence budgets [1] every year in real terms in order to avert a steady reduction in the numbers of aircraft, ships and tanks. The consequence of trying to keep pace with the growing size and sophistication of the threat is that unit production costs increase in real terms from one generation to the next. Unless one is willing to do something to alter these trends, countries will find themselves with too few extremely sophisticated weapons. They have therefore to be very selective in choosing where to apply new technology. They have to select which aspects of each new weapon system must be fulfilled by new technology and which should be manufactured according to existing technology. Here, of course, a risk has to be taken. Each member country and, to a large extent, each industrial company within each country needs to select areas where it has a lead technology and develop them.

9. All countries need a greater degree of self-discipline than they have shown in the past in selecting a smaller number of areas where they should apply their limited research and development resources. Your Rapporteur was told several times that governmental international collaboration would be more successful if it followed the pattern already set by collaboration between industrial firms in various countries. Industries should be prepared to move ahead and collaborate across frontiers and governments should encourage industries by pledging orders and money for collaboration. They should offer industries national support and financial backing provided they established workable conditions for harmonisation. It has also been said that the impetus should also come from the industries concerned. Probably the discipline of taking operating results (profits and losses) into account will impel industrial firms to seek and strengthen international collaboration in their areas of activity.

10. There is no doubt that cost control for individual nations can help to make collaboration work. They should try to agree on different areas in which they will concentrate their research and their main industrial thrust.

1. See Appendix I.

This would give greater volume to each country and it could make two-way street work between European countries and between the United States and Europe.

11. The circumstances of low growth and pressure on defence budgets will induce governments to achieve the most effective return from resources available for defence through maximum co-operation and rationalisation. This has been discussed for many years in NATO and elsewhere with only relatively meagre results so far. Pressure is now, however, much stronger than in the past and in civil fields new technologies have led to important benefits for the industries concerned. One can point to the microelectronic revolution which has brought many benefits to the television and watch industries but also to the general public. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that many industrial firms carry out both civil and military work.

12. New technology will also change the nature of defence concepts, strategic and operational. However, to achieve this important sums of money will have to be released for research and development and therefore less can be spent on traditional weapon platforms. New technology should be used for example to find news ways to meet the tank threat by more effective anti-tank weapons (warheads), to develop new sonar data-processing technology against submarines, new early-warning systems, better control systems, weapons systems with lasar beams, etc.

13. Using advanced computing techniques and the latest large-scale integrated circuits, the size of individual components and even of whole weapons may well be reduced much further and make production far more economic. If member countries at the same time could improve co-operation by avoiding overlapping in research and development, production costs could be reduced. New technologies should be capable of bringing costs down in the defence field just as well as in many civil fields.

14. Your Rapporteur is happy to learn that the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society is studying the problems arising from new technology. They are aware that the current major technical changes, microelectronics, robotics, communications, bio-technologies and the exploitation of space and the oceans will have a great impact on socio-economic structures. Moreover there are continuous increases in productivity in all branches of production and in the service sector which will accelerate the impact to an ever-increasing extent. The question is how the relationship between technological developments and economic and social change can be influenced in order to reduce social risks and make full use of the benefits of new technologies.

15. In the military field, the question will become more acute because of the central rôle of the United States in defence from the economic point of view. Considerable distrust between some European countries and the United States has developed as the former sometimes think that American stress on the need for arms standardisation is just another version of a " buy American " campaign or a formula for relegating the Europeans to a subcontractor rôle, which often also means high production costs. On the other hand, Americans regard European attitudes as narrow and leading to the continued manufacture of obsolescent weapons.

16. Your Rapporteur wishes to conclude the chapter by referring to the address given by Mr. Klapperich, Managing Director of Panavia Aircraft Company. He stated that the financial advantages for the participating governments in adopting the consortia approach when starting development of advanced systems were clearly evident. The industries of Western Europe had clearly demonstrated that they had the management tools and experience to handle the challenges of international programmes. On the government side, it was necessary to establish cost control interfaces between national accounting systems, avoiding duplicating efforts between the participants.

III. *Research and development activities within NATO*

17. The rôle of NATO is one of advice and co-ordination on armaments co-operation, planning and support. It is not a supranational organisation but consists of sixteen sovereign nations each responsible for equipping and maintaining its own armed forces. Nevertheless, NATO activities can and do catalyse the different national defence requirements and procurement executives [1]. This means that common denominators should be found for defence research and development. The defence ministries in the member countries could and should be influenced towards harmonising their respective equipment policies and armaments production industries. Such an influence can be exerted through committee work and through personal contacts. Research and equipment expert groups provide the means of exchanging information on operational concepts, national equipment programmes and appropriate technical and logistical matters. Through them valuable aid is given for harmonisation of national concepts and practices in many fields. The main aim is to inform

1. See Appendix II.

national authorities of what is being done in member countries and invite them to participate in common ventures.

18. Direct research and development in NATO is carried out on a small scale at the SHAPE technical centre at The Hague and the SACLANT submarine research centre at La Spezia.

19. The SHAPE technical centre was set up in 1954 to overcome the weaknesses of air defence within the NATO defence system. Initially the task was limited to air defence problems but since 1963 its programme has been directed towards three major areas of concern to the political and military authorities of the alliance; they are: force capability and force structure including effects of new weapons technology, command and control including application of automatic data-processing and, thirdly, communications, systems engineering and support to operations. It retains its original task of helping SHAPE in its function as executive command for the integrated air defence system.

20. The SACLANT anti-submarine warfare research centre has been in existence since 1959 and provides scientific and technical advice to SACLANT in the field of anti-submarine warfare. The centre may also render scientific and technical assistance to individual NATO nations in this field. It carries out research and limited development including oceanography, operational research and analysis. The scientific programme covers underwater acoustic research, oceanographic research and anti-submarine warfare studies.

21. In this context mention should also be made of the von Karman Institute for fluid dynamics which is at the disposal of the NATO countries through the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD). It was founded in 1956 by Dr. von Karman and provides a number of academic and research programmes for postgraduate students. The same Dr. von Karman was also at the origin of a section which deals with aerospace questions within the Military Committee.

22. Since 1966, the main NATO body for research, development and production of armaments has been the *Conference of National Armaments Directors.* It helps the member countries to join together in equipment and research projects and also provides the means for exchanging information on operational concepts, national equipment programmes and appropriate technical and logistical matters. It further encourages discussions on longer-term research activities with a view to providing guidance on the possibility of meeting future military needs through the application of advanced technology or scientific discoveries.

23. Six main organs operate under the auspices of the Conference of National Armaments Directors: the three service armaments groups (the NATO Naval Armaments Group, the NATO Air Force Armaments Group and the NATO Army Armaments Group), the Defence Research Group and the Tri-Service Group on Communications and Electronic Equipment. Another group having equal status is the NATO Industrial Advisory Group.

24. In 1981, a new system was accepted by which a more organised and pragmatic approach to armaments co-operation was adopted. The new system is more flexible in order to allow countries wishing to co-operate to act in as free a manner as possible, subject only to such general rules as are necessary in an alliance. The new system is called " the periodic armaments planning system " and its overall objective is to provide a systematic and coherent framework for promoting co-operative programmes on the basis of harmonised military requirements. The procedures and guidelines for implementation are based on two general principles: the recognition of the sovereignty of nations regarding equipment decision-making and the utilisation of the basic existing alliance structure, rôles, relationships and responsibilities. The periodic armaments planning system would reconcile the two general principles with (*i*) fulfilling the most pressing military equipment needs of the alliance, (*ii*) adapting to political, economic and technical realities, and (*iii*) establishing and maintaining broad co-operation throughout the weapon system's life cycle. Important decisions have to be made during the life of a weapons systems programme and the periodic armaments planning system is intended to provide a structured approach to aid decision-making at the crucial stage. The system also clarifies the rôles of the national and international military authorities and the NATO staff in the decision-making process. This system should contribute to enhanced armaments co-operation and the collective defence effort.

25. The Defence Research Group has sponsored several joint ventures of a scientific or technical nature. The group encourages discussions on long-term research activities with a view to providing guidance on the possibility of meeting future military needs through the application of advanced technology or new scientific discoveries. A number of sub-groups have been established: (*i*) on long-term scientific studies, (*ii*) on physics and electronics, (*iii*) on optics and infrared, (*iv*) on defence applications of operational research, (*v*) on defence applications of human and biomedical sciences, (*vi*) on electronic warfare concepts and technology, (*vii*) on long-term research related to air defence, and (*viii*) a special group of experts on concealment, camouflage and deception.

26. Nearly all participants of these groups are representatives of governmental institutions or laboratories and industrial representatives are very rarely present. The sub-groups work up to the level of a prototype; for instance, with regard to electronic warfare, studies are being undertaken on the best type of equipment to be used to prevent jamming by enemy forces. So far as basic research is concerned, few member countries hesitate in participating. In the case of high technology applications, the working groups automatically become more restricted.

27. When direct economic and industrial interests are involved and industrial secrecy plays an important rôle, some of the most advanced countries might not want to participate in the working groups and member countries are not inclined to provide the necessary information needed to bring the studies to a successful conclusion.

28. This is true not only for the Defence Research Group but also for the main groups under the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD). Nevertheless, as soon as sensitive information is considered the initial open working groups become closed working groups and the participants are obliged to keep all information received within such a working group to themselves. The crucial moment arrives when participating countries provide money for detailed studies on requirements. Those countries which do not want to invest money in more advanced studies are then excluded from further participation. This is what happened with the Tornado multi-rôle combat aircraft and what might happen now with the NATO frigates for the 1990s. Your Rapporteur will return to this issue later on as it provides a good example of how such projects are developed and progress. Even if only a few countries participate in a venture originating in NATO it still remains a NATO venture as this may facilitate means of collaboration and especially budget allocations earmarked for longer periods or even for the duration of the venture. It is also possible that some projects are not pursued further within NATO but bilaterally or trilaterally instead. Reports are sent periodically to member countries to keep them informed on the state of activities of the organs under the CNAD.

29. In June 1968 the Conference of National Armaments Directors established the *NATO Industrial Advisory Group.* Although the members of the group are representatives of specific industries they represent at the same time the whole of the industry from their home country. Normally there are three to four representatives from each country and two governmental representatives. The objectives of this group are to provide a forum for free exchanges of views on the various industrial aspects of NATO armaments questions. It promotes international involvement in research, development and production amongst the industries of the member countries and encourages exchanges of information between defence ministries and defence industries. It has undertaken a wide range of prefeasibility studies accompanied by estimated costs and other economic and technical data. It has become a significant aid in NATO's co-operative equipment endeavours.

(*a*) *Eurogroup*[1]

30. The Eurogroup is an informal grouping of European member countries created in 1968 at the suggestion of the then United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Healey, to co-ordinate European defence efforts within the alliance. The basic aim was to ensure that the European contribution to the common defence would be as strong, cohesive and effective as possible. It is an informal body which operates without a permanent secretariat. It usually meets twice a year just before the NATO Defence Planning Committee.

31. Every year the Eurogroup countries bring into service a wide range of new equipment[2], both additional and replacement, and make qualitative improvements to equipment already in service. They are placing increasing emphasis on equipment collaboration and in achieving standardisation or interoperability in this field.

32. Various Eurogroup countries are involved in a number of collaborative projects such as the Tornado multi-rôle combat aircraft. On other occasions Eurogroup countries have undertaken joint procurement of United States equipment such as the F-16, the Lance missile system, the improved Sidewinder air-to-air missile, and the Harpoon anti-surface ship missile.

33. Joint procurement of defence equipment led to the establishment of meetings of the national armaments directors of Eurogroup member countries (EURONAD). They concluded an agreement on the exchange of information on their plans for acquiring new equipment for their forces.

34. A result of the Eurogroup meetings was the establishment in 1975 of the Independent European Programme Group. EURONAD activities were then more or less taken over by this group.

1. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom.

2. See Appendix III.

(b) Independent European Programme Group [1]

35. The four main objectives of the IEPG, set out in February 1976 when the group was created, were:

- to make more effective use of the financial means available for research, development and procurement ;
- to increase standardisation and inter-operability of equipment in view of improving co-operation in logistics and training ;
- to ensure the maintenance of a sound European industrial and technological base in the field of defence ;
- to give the European countries greater weight in their relations with the United States and Canada.

36. There were two basic ideas in favour of creating a framework for co-operation of all the European partners of the alliance (including France, given the fact that the non-participation of one of the biggest defence industries in Europe would have been a very serious drawback) :

(*i*) striving for a kind of " European preference " in armaments research/development and production ;

(*ii*) reversing the trend in the transatlantic dialogue in research and development and in procurement in favour of Europe, by increasing the European part in this two-way street.

37. The first goal demands that the European defence industries achieve closer co-operation right at the research and development stage, and in parallel with the efforts by the IEPG to establish a long-term framework for planning and for harmonising the national military requirements. The evidence available suggests that up to now little progress has been achieved in this field.

38. The prospects are not too bright today as far as the major weapons systems are concerned. Decisions on a new battle tank for the 1990s (originally a German-British-Dutch project, but which, in February 1980, became merely a Franco-German one) and on a new tactical fighter plane (with the four major European weapons producers involved) have been postponed, due to financial uncertainties and acute problems of research funding. The project for a medium-range transport plane seems also to be in doubt. There are areas of totally new equipment, however, where a common European effort could come to fruition: electronic warfare systems, guided missiles (tactical) of the third generation and terminal guided munitions and submunitions.

39. In the years of financial stringency ahead, rationalisation of arms production and procurement is more necessary than before ; the IEPG could play a more active rôle.

40. The IEPG meets at the level of Under-Secretaries of Defence or of National Armaments Directors. At working level it has three panels.

41. Panel I of the IEPG, composed of representatives of the National Armaments Directors under the chairmanship of the United Kingdom, draws up each spring a schedule of the major equipment replacement intentions of each member country for a period up to fifteen or twenty years ahead, under general headings such as: " guided weapons - air ", " mine systems - land ", " control and ADP systems ", etc.

42. For each item of equipment the schedule shows first: the task or mission of the proposed equipement ; the planned or expected in-service date ; details of equipment presently in service ; type of replacement equipment ; quantities envisaged.

43. Identified opportunities for co-operation are then passed to Panel II, chaired by Belgium, which establishes special groups for detailed study of particular projects or requirements.

44. The schedules are passed then from the IEPG to the NATO Armaments Planning Review Co-ordinator who adds similar information supplied by Canada and the United States for use by the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors in which these two countries participate together with the twelve IEPG countries. In this way opportunities for purely European co-operation are investigated first, before transatlantic opportunities are considered.

45. Panel III of the IEPG, under the chairmanship of Germany, is concerned with economics and defence co-operation procedures. It is also considering models of compensation, competition, work-sharing, industrial co-operation and export arrangements for jointly-produced equipment [1].

IV. *Common efforts*

(a) A NATO frigate for the 1990s

46. As your Rapporteur indicated earlier, a more detailed description of the studies made in NATO for about two years on a frigate for the

1. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom.

1. See Appendix IV.

1990s might be useful in this context. Tentatively the frigate replacement plan for the 1990s is aimed at having the new ships entering service towards the middle of the 1990s. This suggests that these vessels will not be intended only to replace the present generation of frigates which at that time will be between ten and fifteen years old, but also to fill other replacement needs. The programme will be the single most important NATO naval project of the future. This type of frigate of some 4,500 tons has been the subject of joint prefeasibility studies by all maritime member countries of NATO. The defence ministries of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States are participating; the NATO Industrial Advisory Group was heavily involved in preparing the prefeasibility study.

47. Different variants of this standard frigate have been studied depending on whether the ship is to be used in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean or the North Sea and the Baltic. The variants will also have different weapons systems since, for instance, anti-submarine warfare requirements are not the same for the Mediterranean, the Atlantic or the more shallow waters of the North Sea and the Baltic. The assumption is that 100-200 frigates will have to be built for the participating countries in the last decade of the century and with identical hulls considerable cost-saving can be achieved. Much more important savings could be achieved if the weapons and electronic systems could be reduced to two or three standard models. It appears that industry and governments are favourably inclined towards both aspects.

48. The national authorities are expected to sign the memorandum of understanding on the NATO frigate for the 1990s in February 1984 in order to start work on the feasibility study.

(b) Anti-tank guided weapons

49. Another example is the third generation anti-tank guided weapon. On 16th February 1983 France, Germany and the United Kingdom signed an intergovernmental agreement on definition studies. Euromissile Dynamics Group would lead the technical and industrial organisation of the project, France being represented by Aérospatiale and Germany by MBB. The sum involved would be F300 million and the joint studies should be concluded in the middle of 1985. The anti-tank guided missile should be operational in 1992 to replace the second generation missile. Two types will be developed, one for short distances in replacement of the Milan and one for long distances in replacement of the Franco-German Hot missile and the American Tow missile. The potential market might be in the 100,000s for a total sum of some F30,000 billion. The prime contractor for this project is the Euromissile Dynamics Group, which comprises Aérospatiale, British Aerospace Dynamics Group and MBB. Within this framework, Aérospatiale will take the lead in co-ordinating the development of the medium-range missile, while BAe and MBB will take the lead in co-ordinating the long-range ground-to-ground and air-to-ground versions respectively. Other European countries from the IEPG have been invited to participate but this will not basically change the industrial set-up as agreed.

(c) Transport aircraft

50. In the field of air transport aerospace companies from three European countries and the United States have agreed to study future civil and military cargo airlift requirements. They involve Lockheed, Aérospatiale, British Aerospace and MBB. Long-term airlift needs will first be defined followed by an evaluation of transport concepts to meet the needs thus defined. The arrangement was set up in accordance with a memorandum of understanding signed by the four companies. The preliminary study effort does not necessarily mean that the four companies will jointly develop a new transport aircraft.

51. Up to now, new military transport aircraft have not been given high priority and governments might be inclined to opt eventually for a version of the Airbus. This should be used to replace Transall and Hercules military transport planes. For long-distance air transport, flight-fuelling facilities are a first priority as the Falklands war clearly showed.

(d) Helicopters

52. The Anglo-French helicopter package of the late 1960s led to the family of weapons concept whereby the need for more than one system in a given class of family of weapons was recognised by all participating countries. A new opportunity may now arise because of the initiative taken by the helicopter industries of France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom in the 1970s which resulted in their Ministers of Defence deciding that they would endeavour to meet future helicopter requirements amongst themselves.

53. The Italian and United Kingdom Governments, having similar requirements for a new naval helicopter of some thirteen tons for the 1990s, took a bilateral initiative recently to meet these requirements jointly. An agreement on the EH-101 has now been concluded between the governments and the work will be carried out by Westland and Agusta which have jointly set up a company, EH Industries Ltd., which has its

offices in London. The helicopter will be used for civil as well as military applications and a large export market can be expected. The Ministries of Defence and of Industry were involved in this venture and, as the market for the Anglo-Italian helicopter may be much larger than initially envisaged, the civil sector was a key element which of course also had consequences for the funding of research and development for this new type of helicopter.

54. A NATO helicopter project is being discussed between France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. The project concerns a helicopter of nine tons to be used mainly in the NATO frigate. The operational requirements are being discussed and prefeasibility studies are being conducted. The possibility is being considered whether this helicopter could also be used for army purposes. British participation might be possible.

55. Anglo-French collaboration on the Puma, Lynx and Gazelle helicopters has been quite successful but, considering the above, no decision has yet been taken on the follow-up.

(e) *European wind tunnel*

56. A project of great importance now being considered by France, Germany and the United Kingdom concerns the establishment of a European wind tunnel. The European transonic wind tunnel (ETW) had its origins in an AGARD conference that took place in 1971 on the needs for high transonic wind tunnel testing. This led to the formation of a working group which noted United States intentions to proceed in this field and provided a focus for European thought which was subsequently channelled into a specially formed NATO/AGARD large wind tunnel group (soon to become known as LAWS). Two specific requirements emerged from discussion in LAWS – the need for a low speed tunnel and one for transonic operation which eventually was identified as the ETW.

57. Design studies proceeded on the feasibility of different forms of operating principle until the mid-1970s when opinion crystallised in favour of a cryogenic tunnel utilising cooled nitrogen to achieve the required density and, hence, operating Reynolds number. The interests of the major constructing countries, comprising the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Netherlands were protected in the ETW steering group which was appointed to prepare the ETW specification. The expert representation in the ETW steering group was provided by seconded government wind tunnel experts, joined before long by representatives from European aerospace companies.

58. The specification went through a series of stages as the requirements evolved to provide full-scale RN testing over virtually the whole flight envelope of the kind and size of civil aircraft that Europe was interested in, typified by the A-300B, plus the capability of meeting the extreme manoeuvring requirements of military aircraft. The latter had the effect of enhancing the wind tunnel performance specification. The tunnel was also intended to have a low supersonic capability. The final specification provided full-scale RN testing up to Mach 1.3/1.35 in a working section of 8 ft by 7 ft (roughly 2.5 metres square).

59. The initial design studies have virtually ended and the tunnel go-ahead awaits high-level government decisions which will require express commitments to cost sharing and agreement on the country in which the tunnel is to be sited. The participating governments are at present formally declaring their positions in order to establish support for the tunnel. In determining national positions governments are known to be asking their industries if they would be willing to contribute a proportion of the national expense.

60. If and when the go-ahead decision has been taken, which will require ministerial endorsement in the participating countries, the close connection with NATO will be discontinued in favour of more specific government-to-government co-operative arrangements.

61. The three main countries will each contribute an equal share and the Netherlands slightly less. A feasibility study is now being conducted and the country in which the wind tunnel will be located will pay an extra 10%. France and Germany have both offered sites. If such a European facility is established it will be used for civil and military aircraft and would have the same functions as the corresponding NASA facility. The original outlay would be some £100 million.

V. *Research and development in individual countries*

62. In the *United States* military planning circles, Congress and the administration are afraid that the United States' dominant technology rôle is being eroded through a lack of long-range planning while other industrialised nations increase their advance in research. The United Kingdom, France and Germany are moving towards exports of high technology products and Japan, which has severe strictures on military spending, is moving its funding into consumer goods while maintaining a technical base for military projects. It is going into consortia in engines, airframes and parts and in the 1990s will probably become a strong competitor in the aerospace field. The United States Government is proposing substantial growth for its

research and development outlay in the 1983-84 budget. This will be increased from $23.5 billion to $30.5 billion. The civil research and development budget will remain at $16.6 billion.

63. A large-scale increase in defence research and development includes about $900 million for research in microelectronics, computer hardware and software and high-speed integrated circuits. There will also be major increases for strategic programmes, missiles, advanced technology aircraft such as the B-1B bomber and satellite command and control systems.

64. From 1984 onwards great emphasis will be put on the development of manufacturing tools and techniques for a manufacturing basis. The air force is studying the requirements for the advanced tactical fighter, built with composites and with stealth characteristics. Composite technologies are vital to this aircraft and work is already being done in many American aircraft factories as well as in British Aerospace. Full research is also being conducted on vertical take-off and landing aircraft operating off small carriers. This would be an improvement on the British Aerospace AV-8A and the McDonnell AV-8B (Harrier).

65. New focus is being put on ram jet propulsion to upgrade the advance medium-range air-to-air missile, AMRAAM. The navy budget earmarks $1.5 billion for the development of new ballistic missile systems and the army budget the same amount for ballistic missile defence.

66. Within industry as well as at government level important policy papers have been drawn up on national priorities in order to strengthen technological innovation capacity (and, as far as private firms are concerned, to consider new institutional arrangements between universities and groups of industrial firms) as well as on co-operative industrial research ventures. Tax incentives should be offered for research and development investments and anti-trust laws should be changed to allow for co-operative research between firms of related industries.

67. The *United Kingdom* defence activities include a comprehensive science and technology research programme, closely linked to the development and procurement of defence equipment and systems, and carried out both in government research laboratories and industry. The total budget of the British Ministry of Defence for 1982-83 is £15 billion, of which £7 billion is assigned to procurement. Of that sum, £1.8 billion is assigned for research and development combined, and within this sum, £285 million is assigned to research, mainly applied. This is some 2% of the total defence budget. Overall, three-quarters of government defence research and development funds are spent in industry ; government policy now being implemented is that this ratio, particularly as regards development, should increase, to improve the exploitation of defence technologies and to make more Ministry of Defence research and development establishment effort available for longer-term research.

68. Discussions are proceeding on a new technology research programme between industry, several departments of government, Department of Industry, Ministry of Defence, and Department of Education and Science, directed towards the overall field of information technology and covering such topics as very large-scale integrated electronic components, software engineering, man-machine interfaces and intelligence knowledge-based systems. The programme is planned to run for five years, with an overall cost of some £350 million.

69. The question has also been raised whether the originally-proposed five-year period can be maintained and whether the programme should not be extended to seven or ten years, adding other technology areas in the meantime.

70. Apart from the Ministries of Defence and Industry the British academic community is expected to participate through the Education and Science Ministries.

71. The British Government has committed a substantial sum to an experimental aircraft programme designed to explore the technologies needed for a next generation combat aircraft. This parallels the separate agile combat aircraft project launched by British Aerospace with German and Italian industrial partners. Many studies have been conducted and the British Government is convinced that in Europe there is no place for research and development on two separate types of combat aircraft. The French firm, Dassault, should therefore come in as well to make this a quadripartite venture.

72. British Aerospace is also seeking funds for the research and development of an advanced vertical take-off and landing fighter aircraft.

73. Rolls-Royce hopes for development funds for an advanced engine for this type of aircraft. It also is looking for funds to power the proposed 150-seat civil transport aircraft.

74. In *France* the task of the Ministry of Research and Industry includes spearheading improvements in research and development and transferring them into French factories. On the defence side the Defence Minister presides over a council for defence research and studies which draws up guidelines for the research effort in areas for which it is responsible. A centre dealing with prospects and assessments works out details with the active participation of the general staffs of the armed forces. The military programme law for 1984-88, apart from giving

acknowledged priority to nuclear forces, starts a process of modernisation and reorganisation of conventional forces. These preparations for the future involve strengthening industry and making a greater defence effort. Appropriations for research will represent one-quarter of investment appropriations. At present the defence department's share of research is 30% of the national research effort. In particular, this allows the French armaments industry to remain in the vanguard of technological developments.

75. The French Government attaches particular importance to the continuation of its key development programmes in the aerospace and electronic sectors. France's aerospace industry is in a strong position because of the emphasis placed in recent years on research and development. High priority is now given to the development of new materials linked with the implementation of aerospace projects. The materials must be available at the start; for instance, Concorde was made of aluminium because titanium technology in France and the rest of Europe was not ready.

76. France can only hold its leading rôle in composite materials if the research and development effort is not only maintained but improved.

77. A focal point for French aerospace research and development effort is the *Office nationale d'études et de recherches aérospatiales* (ONERA). This government-sponsored organisation receives its main funding through the French Ministry of Defence as the technical aspects of nearly all French military and civil programmes come under its jurisdiction. Activities at ONERA cover a wide range of aerospace technologies such as active flight controls and new wing designs. Separate research activities are the wind tunnel establishment at Modane and the hydrodynamics laboratory at Chatillon.

78. In co-operation with CNES, ONERA studies and defines future space systems, including the follow-on launchers to the Ariane family.

79. Other specialised establishments are the Franco-German institute for research and development in St. Louis and the nuclear energy agency for nuclear research and development for civil and military purposes.

80. The five-year defence plan proposed by the French Government calls for spending approximately F 830 billion (about $114 billion at current exchange rates) on France's land-, air- and sea-based military forces between 1983 and 1988. This total represents an 11% real growth in defence spending.

81. Projected systems acquisitions include continued purchase of Dassault-Bréguet Mirage 2000 fighters in both conventional and nuclear attack configurations, purchase of an airborne early warning aircraft, placement of initial production orders for Dassault-Bréguet's Atlantic New Generation patrol aircraft and the acquisition of airborne command and control centres, to be carried in Aérospatiale C-160 Transall transports, to provide hardened and redundant communications links for the use of French nuclear forces.

82. The French air force will retain a front-line complement of 450 combat aircraft, including the 165 newly-acquired Mirage 2000s that will be ordered in yearly lots of thirty-three. France is proceeding with development of its ACX future fighter-demonstrator aircraft and is continuing to seek European support for it.

83. New programmes for the French nuclear deterrent force include construction of an advanced generation submarine to be operational in 1994, the start of studies on the mobile SX strategic missile, which will replace nuclear-armed Dassault-Bréguet Mirage IVs beginning in 1996, and acquisition of the Hades mobile tactical nuclear missile in a programme leading to activation of the first Hades regiment in the early 1990s.

84. Target acquisition capability for French nuclear forces will be improved with the deployment of Dassault-Bréguet Mirage F-1CR combat reconnaissance aircraft and the Canadair/Dornier CL-289 drone.

85. The Defence Minister, Mr. Charles Hernu, said the government had not yet selected an aircraft as the platform for its airborne early warning system, narrowing the competition to the Boeing E-3A AWACS, Grumman E-2C, British Aerospace Nimrod or a French airframe. He said France was considering all these aircraft types to ensure the best negotiating position for the airborne warning system purchase.

86. France's effort in the field of defence research is comparable to that of the United Kingdom but very much less than that of the United States and probably of the Soviet Union for which there is a lack of reliable statistics.

87. This remark must, however, be taken with moderation. There is still a lack of comparable data, even in the western industrialised countries, so great is the feeling of governments that military secrets must be concealed behind silence or budgetary approximation.

88. In *Germany* the Federal Government is of the opinion that the Conference of National Armament Directors (with the Americans) and the Independent European Programme Group (with the French) provide all the necessary possibilities for co-operation. The only question is how effective the organisations are. Everyone agrees on the need for co-operation in general

but when practical conclusions have to be drawn and political agreements executed, then many obstacles arise. Everyone is also in agreement that, in order to collaborate with the Americans, Europe should speak with one voice. Only then would it be possible for Europe to talk with the United States as equals.

89. The past has taught us that collaboration between two or three states is the most effective. The most pragmatic solution would probably be to seek to develop collaboration between two countries and then try to increase this to include three or four countries. Secondly, one needs concrete projects and a definite goal on which to base science and technology research. Thirdly, the best results can be achieved only if the general staffs indicate limited well-defined requirements. Here again, detailed agreements are a necessity without which no results can be achieved. One should not forget that weapons systems are becoming more and more expensive because they require the most advanced technology. Agreement on specific operational concepts are much easier to arrive at in a bilateral or sometimes trilateral framework. There are examples between France and Germany, such as the Nordatlas, Transall, Alpha-Jet, Roland, Hot, Milan, etc.

90. Once agreement has been reached on operational concepts and projects are being executed, as in the abovementioned examples, great economies can be achieved and financial, logistic and commercial advantages then follow.

91. Apart from the working groups within the NATO and IEPG frameworks, bilateral Franco-German and German-British working groups are considering possibilities of collaboration in the production of military hardware based on the general staff requirements of those countries.

92. On 24th September 1983, a trilateral summit meeting took place of defence ministers (British-Franco-German) to consider the possibilities of collaboration in microelectronics which are of great importance for the air forces, the navies and for communications in general. Experts are now studying the possibilities of such co-operation. Other groups of experts are considering joint weapons systems, tanks, aircraft construction and marine technology for the future procurement of the forces. Each of the three countries is convinced that " going-it-alone " is no longer possible and that bilateral or trilateral collaboration has therefore become an absolute necessity. Once agreement is reached, then a decision will have to be taken on which country should have the leadership. The other two countries, however, should produce important essential complete subsystems.

93. As far as transport aircraft are concerned, the German air force will continue with the Transall up to the year 2000. This is made possible due to many new elements having been built into the second generation of this aircraft. Under discussion are a further wide range of projects which, if developed, would become operational in the 1990s. They include larger and faster Airbuses and, in the military field, the Franco-German construction of a new second-generation anti-tank helicopter. The largest project which will come up for decision in the near future is the replacement for the McDonnell Douglas F-4F Phantom fighter. Several possibilities are being studied each involving a French and/or British partner or a possible deal with a United States aerospace company. The German aerospace firm MBB is studying requirements for the new combat aircraft, whose primary mission would be air-to-air combat. The government is hesitant because of the ultimate cost of launching such a plane.

94. Dornier, the other German aircraft manufacturer, is proposing an alternative and possibly less costly plane in collaboration either with Dassault or Northrop in the United States. At the same time studies are being conducted on the possibility of producing a new powerful European jet engine for this type of plane. There is no doubt that in Germany the Tornado venture has not received general approval.

95. Nevertheless, government and industry are aware that no individual European country would be able to obtain a European market without bi- or multilateral co-operation. Only a collaborative project would open the market for some 800 to 1,000 planes whereas a national market would mean not more than 200.

96. The discussions on the European tank did not come to a successful conclusion as France, Germany and the United Kingdom all had their own model and too much national work had gone into the development of these for them to agree on a common type. In the early 1960s the German army had already ordered what later became the Leopard tank and once a country has a good product it is extremely difficult to accommodate the elements for joint production. The British developed the Chieftain and now have the Challenger and the French army the AMX. Moreover, timetables have never been fully harmonised.

97. In *Italy* the government is firmly convinced of the need to co-operate on armaments for the year 2000 and of the great importance of arriving at a European consensus on the building of new weapons systems. It has adopted a pragmatic approach and is of the opinion that institutional arrangements are of less importance. In the military aeronautical field its policy is to promote European collaboration and the main issue in the Directorate-General for armaments procurement is the successor to the F-104F. This aircraft could be replaced by a European

combat aircraft or by an aircraft ordered from the MRCA consortium which built the Tornado ; a third solution is the establishment of a new European construction project and the fourth solution would be to order such a plane from the United States and produce it in Italy under American licence. Such a venture would be the last chance to build a European fighter aircraft for the 1990s and to establish a European partnership for such a production. The United Kingdom, Germany and Italy are working on it on a governmental and industrial level and a partnership with France is hoped for. However, the air forces of the four countries do not have identical requirements for their future combat aircraft and alternatives are still being considered.

98. From the institutional point of view a lightweight structure has now been set up between Agusta and Westland for building the EH-101 helicopter which might be better than the MRCA organisation. The latter is rather heavy ; the Agusta-Westland structure has been copied from the Franco-British construction for the building of the Jaguar.

99. With regard to the light fighter, Italy is working with the Brazilian company, Embraer, which has great experience of collaboration with the Italian firm, Aermacchi.

100. The Italian budget for aeronautical construction and development is some $1,000 million a year, half of which is allocated for the MRCA. For real research there is only some $80 million per year which, of course, is mainly used for applied research, for instance for the development of a new engine for the Agusta-Westland helicopter.

101. In missiles the Selenia Spada-Aspide programme is now at the production stage and these missile systems are being exported. An alternative version of this missile system, the ship-to-air Albatros, has also been developed and is ready for export. There is therefore not much room for further joint development.

102. In Italy research and development is carried out in military establishments for each of the three armed forces, in nationalised industries and in private industries. Nearly all research is applied research and where it is carried out depends entirely on the projects undertaken. The government is careful to avoid duplication or overlapping.

103. The emphasis is on industrial collaboration both in the case of complete systems or of a series of subsystems.

104. In each sector of the three armed forces there is considerable awareness of the needs of the national industrial economy and the necessity to use the money voted in the national parliaments as efficiently as possible. National considerations were preponderant and it is doubtful whether there is great willingness in national administrations to co-operate. Export considerations also count very much and are difficult to reconcile with international ventures such as the Tornado or the standardisation of frigates.

105. It would, of course, be possible to establish international consortia for the production of major weapons systems but this might weaken European competition. Theoretically harmonisation in electronics equipment, for instance, could be possible if one part of a single electronics industry could be established in each of the four main countries, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom but until now this has not been possible because of the various types of national laws, regulations and customs.

106. In the *European Community* scientific and technological research and development activities are largely concentrated on energy problems such as reactor safety, the long-term project on thermonuclear fusion, new forms of energy and energy saving. There has also been a certain amount of activity in the field of industrial competitiveness, particularly in the steel sector and new technology industries such as computers. All efforts made until now fall well short of matching up to the importance of the issues involved. A new scientific and technological strategy is therefore proposed for the years 1984-87. In order to cope with international competition three main priorities should be adopted: development of standardised measurements, modernisation of traditional industries and promotion of new technology such as information technology which will be the largest sector of manufacturing industry by 1990.

107. One of the main difficulties in co-ordinating research and development in Western Europe stems from the fact that governments are not willing to provide extra research and development money for a joint effort. Some of the national research and development funds have to be used for European projects too and it was logical for national organisations to be unwilling to spend their own money on European projects, especially since research in a European framework was automatically more costly than in a national framework. Any international programme should place research in a stronger position to face up to the challenges of the second half of the 1980s and 1990s.

108. The European Commission has attempted to create a uniform European public market by encouraging common standards in telecommunications and computer hardware, urging the development of microelectronic technology and co-ordinating work of telecommunications organisations. In addition, the twenty-six-

member Conference of European Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) and other groups urge a unified approach and co-ordinated strategy in numerous areas – components, terminals, networks – to provide larger markets for manufacturers and a cost-effective range of products for consumers. But, such efforts notwithstanding, each European country still has its own data-processing, microelectronics and telecommunications industry. It appears that if a project is too expensive to finance domestically, like the Airbus wide-bodied aircraft or the Ariane launcher, a collaborative programme will be started.

109. One potential project is the $1.5 billion European strategic programme of research and development in information technology (ESPRIT) which might produce a serious five-year crash research effort. ESPRIT would co-ordinate EEC research and development and curtail duplication in European laboratories. Participating companies have mapped out goals in microelectronics, software, artificial intelligence systems, office automation, and computer-aided design.

110. On 5th November 1983, the EEC Council reached important conclusions. With regard to financial appropriations, a majority of eight countries voted for a sum of 700 million ECUs for the five-year period 1984-88 ; two member states (the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom) adopted no position on the amount of the appropriations pending the results of the European Council meeting in Athens on budgetary reforms. However, these two countries did not question the unanimously acknowledged importance and priority attached to the ESPRIT programme.

111. The EEC Council is to continue its discussions at its next meeting on 13th December with a view to taking a final decision on the whole of this important programme.

VI. *A possible rôle for WEU*

112. The preceding chapters have shown the interest of improving co-operation between WEU member countries in research and development, particularly in sectors relating to advanced technology.

113. A few examples have also shown that current activities in this area (if not the result of bilateral agreements) are mainly conducted, not without difficulty, in:

- *NATO*, in the SHAPE and SACLANT research centres, in multilateral groups which depend on the Conference of National Armaments Directors (e.g. the Defence Research Group and its various sub-groups) or between industries concerned which are members of the NATO Industrial Advisory Group; and
- *the IEPG* (grouping the European members of NATO), a main aim of which is precisely to make the most of the financial resources available for research, development and procurement.

114. Finally, an outline has been given of the course now being followed in the United States and the principal European countries in research and development.

115. This is an incomplete framework with which the Assembly cannot be satisfied in view of its responsibilities as the only defence-oriented European assembly.

116. The fact that European armaments co-operation takes place in wider frameworks than that of WEU does not prevent the latter, as an independent organisation with its own structure and organs, following the possibilities which exist in this area of primordial importance and being able to take initiatives to the specific advantage of its member countries.

117. The Assembly has on many occasions recommended that the Council instruct its Standing Armaments Committee to carry out one or other task, but it has often had a reticent reception due to the legitimate concern to avoid duplicating the work of other bodies, particularly the IEPG.

118. Yet in its twenty-eighth annual report to the Assembly, the Council asserted that:

> " Inspired by a constantly reaffirmed political will, the various competent international bodies, each within the framework of their responsibilities, have a particular rôle to play in this co-operation. In the Council's opinion, the machinery available for consultation must function as efficiently as possible within the Independent European Programme Group, the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU and the Conference of National Armaments Directors of the Atlantic Alliance. "

119. When presenting this report, Mr. Cheysson, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, informed the Assembly that Mr. Hintermann, as head of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee, had " submitted a number of proposals, mainly for fresh studies by the SAC which might provide governments with the information required to enable member countries to progress with the standardisation, production and procurement of armaments ".

120. Your Rapporteur trusts that these studies will include one on the subject of the present

report; in any event, the committee considers the governments should not be the sole beneficiaries of information gathered by the Standing Armaments Committee; the Assembly too is interested.

121. As already said, your Rapporteur understands the difficulties encountered by governments and industries in divulging " sensitive " information at the level of research and in such a delicate area. However, it should not be difficult - as was already the case for the study on armaments industries - to publish, for this study too, a declassified version giving the Assembly, without too many technical details but on the basis of official data, information about the true extent of the effort made by each member country in high technology research and present and planned harmonisation of such research at European level.

122. To proceed in this way would give the WEU governments the Assembly's support even in the case of efforts in forums other than WEU, particularly as the Standing Armaments Committee might turn to advantage the links which its international secretariat has, or is to have, with the other bodies concerned.

123. In this last respect, it should be remembered that the active rôle of the Standing Armaments Committee is particularly desirable since it is distinguished from other European bodies in that:

- it works in the context of political directives from the ministers for foreign affairs;
- it has an international secretariat;
- it brings together representatives of all the more industrialised European countries, the usual partners in agreements on armaments co-operation.

VII. *Conclusions*

124. In Europe, and usually in close liaison with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, there is an extensive network of connections, institutions, working groups, etc. which can be used for starting or improving co-operation in the armaments field and particularly in branches of technology necessary for our future defence.

125. This observation leads to the following conclusions:

(i) European co-operation in the armaments field is necessary

126. Three factors have to be borne in mind: the evolution of the threat, the growing cost of equipment and economic difficulties.

127. The Warsaw Pact is steadily increasing its present potential by introducing many new systems whose technological quality has definitely progressed. This effort is based on a far higher proportion of the GNP earmarked for defence than in the western countries and on the availability of a large reserve of manpower through a period of military service which is, on average, three times longer than in France or in allied countries which still have military service.

128. In the face of this evolution, the western countries cannot respond with a like effort for obvious economic and social reasons. They have to use their own means and capabilities, i.e. their capacity for technological innovation. Since the level of their forces and equipment is traditionally lower than that of the Warsaw Pact, their forces have to be more efficient and their equipment of a higher performance.

129. But this requirement leads, on the one hand, to very significant growth in the cost of research and development as a percentage of the total cost of each armaments programme and, on the other, to the cost of equipment rising more quickly than inflation.

130. This phenomenon is further amplified by the emergence of a specifically military aspect in certain branches of technology. In the last fifteen or twenty years, the development of new armaments programmes has drawn extensively on technology, basic components, etc., available on the civil market and developed for civil purposes: electronics, computers, special materials, etc. The effort to be made to meet defence requirements has therefore generally been limited, where the research and development sector is concerned, to the militarisation of components already on the market and their integration into systems.

131. The need for radical improvements in future armaments in terms of survivability and efficiency is now leading to technological developments which can generally find no short- or medium-term outlets in the civil field. Hence these developments must be financed mainly by defence budgets. This is the case of high-density and/or high-speed microelectronics (submicronic VLSI, VHSIC), optronics, software (processing of signals), etc. In other words, the military sector, after having been the driving force in technology during and just after the second world war (mainly in the United States and then in France at the beginning of the sixties with the launching of strategic and nuclear programmes), as from the mid-sixties benefited from the existence of a civil industrial technological base and once again became (for how long we do not know) primarily an initiator of research and development in a large number of advanced technological sectors, but also the payer...

132. Such a trend would require an increase in the defence budgets of the western countries only with difficulty compatible with present economic possibilities. The only solution is therefore co-operation. The sole or main aim of such co-operation is no longer, as it was in the past, to reduce the cost of producing one or other piece of equipment by lengthening production runs but must now also take account of the need to share the cost of research and development.

(ii) But this co-operation, essential for the western, or at least European, countries, is encountering obstacles

National interests.

133. Each state has so far considered that the research sector should in general be kept clear of active co-operation, in the absence, moreover, of a clear-cut requirement. Admittedly, there have been many and generally fruitful exchanges of information. But few examples can be quoted of real co-operation in the early stages, apart from that practised in the Franco-German Institute at Saint Louis.

134. The same is obviously true for each firm whose future survival depends partly on its investments in research and the risk inherent in every effort made and every long-term contingency. Transferring or sharing technology is often considered to be an unacceptable short-term sacrifice, whatever the long-term benefits may be.

Timetables

135. Until now, co-operation between European countries has mainly been within well-defined armaments programmes for which participating countries have been able to harmonise their timetables and specifications. These timetables are obviously directly linked with schedules for replacing equipment in service. The weight of the past therefore plays an essential rôle and in many cases is the reason for failures or difficulties (for instance, the Franco-German tank). It is difficult to find a compromise: the obsolescence of certain equipment does not allow its replacement to be delayed too long and for budgetary reasons this cannot be brought forward. Difficulties are probably less in the case of co-operation in the earlier stages not so directly linked with a given weapons system. Common objectives still have to be defined since at industrial level co-operation will have to produce components which can be used in one or several programmes. Perhaps emphasis should be placed on co-operation in research or development of subsystems usable in several programmes.

Specifications

136. Here too the past carries great weight. All general staffs have their own ideas about the use of their forces, often in spite of the desire to achieve harmonisation which exists in the alliance or in bilateral relations between countries. But there are also real differences: the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, in view of its geographical position does not have the same air defence problem as the United Kingdom and France. Logistic problems are also different. In certain cases, therefore, the aim should be to seek, for a given system, the highest possible common denominator rather than try to work out identical systems: the existence of several versions of a system must be accepted.

The free use of technology resulting from co-operation.

137. Each country has its own policy for arms exports. For some of them the decision to export certain matériel or not is a major part of their foreign policy and the independence of that decision must be preserved. Co-operation must not lead to the co-operating countries aligning themselves on the country with the most restrictive policy. Sooner or later, this would considerably reduce Europe's weight in the international concert.

(iii) How can co-operation be improved, at least in Europe?

138. It is evident that political will is an essential factor. This will must be shown by a real effort by each country to harmonise the timetables of programmes and operational and technical specifications in order to reach realistic compromises, solve problems relating to the free use of jointly-developed technology, etc. An essential factor should be to take greater account of the possibilities of co-operation when working out the long-term equipment plans of the forces of each nation. But these plans are generally drawn up in terms of national requirements alone and once they have been fixed there is little room for adjusting timetables.

139. But political will is not enough without the active support of industry. There are many examples of programmes with political support which have failed because they were too remote from industrial interests. There is not a single example of a programme which has succeeded against the will of industry. Conversely, certain successes are due solely to industrial initiatives. Co-operation must correspond exclusively to a definite advantage for participating industries. Such initiatives must therefore be encouraged and obstacles to the establishment of close, intra-European, inter-firm links should be removed. Obstacles include: different policies and options for basic types of components (electronics, optronics), standards and procedure for procurement, financing research, protecting patents, etc.

140. These difficulties and obstacles would be fewer if European co-operation were developed in the earlier stages: joint research on advanced technology, joint exploratory work, etc. An effort to co-operate in these fields can but lead to joint options for components, standards, etc. Moreover, co-operation is necessary to strengthen or establish links between given firms since it allows joint future goals to be established and hence conditions for their joint survival, thus facilitating transfers of technology and the optimum use of the capability of each co-operating party.

(iv) Co-operation in high technology

141. The factors to be taken into account to promote or to improve co-operation are explained in the above analysis. To sum up:

(*a*) Certain aspects of technology, necessary for the maintenance of credible defence in the western countries, now have to be developed for strictly military purposes, the civil sector having, in the short- and medium-term at least, no clearly-established requirements or specifications.

(*b*) Such technology relates to the attainment of two essential goals of any future defence: the survival of forces and the efficiency of equipment. Survival is mainly a problem of resisting a first enemy strike, whether conventional or nuclear, and of countermeasures. Efficiency is a question of accuracy (intelligent weapons) and obtaining information. The corresponding technology may be divided into three categories:

- various electronic components - VLSI (submicronic) or VHSIC (high-speed);
- sensors: optronic or millimetric;
- software for processing signals or data.

(*c*) Industrial components stemming from current research into such technology will probably not be available on the market of the West, contrary to what has been the case in the last twenty years. There is in fact a certain hardening of American policy towards trans-atlantic exchanges in this field. If Europe wishes to retain its independence for supplies, and hence also for its decisions, it must develop an independent industrial capability. This raises a question of markets: no individual European country is large enough, compared with Japan or the United States, for its domestic market to allow competitive production of basic components. Serious consideration should be given to setting up a common market for these components, i.e. a pooling of research efforts and means of producing the components resulting from this research.

(*d*) The joint development of advanced technology and the co-ordinated industrialisation of the resulting components are prior conditions for co-operation in the weapons systems of the future insofar as these components are the key to the performances required of these systems.

(*e*) Such an attitude or course must first be based on better mutual information and a concerted approach to future requirements. Co-operation in advanced technology must no longer be solely in the framework of agreements on the joint development of specific systems, it must increasingly be a particular goal.

(*f*) Such a course must take account of two apparently contradictory constraints: the need for competition, essential in research and creativeness, and the need to group production in order to meet Japanese and American competition.

(*g*) Moreover, this course means solving difficulties inherent in each country's own structure or policy:

- different weight carried by the decisions and financing of different ministries: defence, economy, industry and research;
- different financing structures: research budgeted or financed by a percentage of each contract concluded with industry, etc.;
- ratio of research to the total budget which varies widely among European countries;
- independence of decision of each country on the use of jointly-developed technology.

(v) Initiatives to be taken by WEU

142. While recognising that for several reasons multilateral armaments co-operation is concerted in wider frameworks than that of Western European Union, there seems to be a rôle for WEU in research on advanced technology if it is borne in mind that such research is an aim in itself, that the European countries the most concerned are members of WEU and that Japanese and American competition must be met.

143. The first step in this direction would be independent European reflection in which the Standing Armaments Committee, appropriately instructed by the Council, might afford its assistance.

APPENDIX I

National defence expenditure figures for WEU countries

On 1st December 1982 NATO published the following figures relating to national defence expenditure for the WEU countries.

The expenditure is at current prices in national currency units.

		NATO figures
Belgium	127,901 million BF	($ 3.56 billion)
France	145,155 million FF	($ 26 billion)
Germany	54,553 million DM	($ 25 billion)
Italy	12,066 billion lira	($ 8.89 billion)
Luxembourg	1,976 million LF	($ 50.6 million)
Netherlands	11,932 million guilders	($ 4.93 billion)
United Kingdom	14,186 million £	($ 28.66 billion)

This represents as a percentage of the gross domestic product:

Belgium	3.3 %
France	4.1 %
Germany	4.3 %
Italy	2.6 %
Luxembourg	1.2 %
Netherlands	3.2 %
United Kingdom	5.3 %

Equipment expenditure as a percentage of the total defence expenditure:

Belgium	15.3 %
France	29.0 %
Germany	17.6 %
Italy	18.1 %
Luxembourg	2.5 %
Netherlands	20.4 %
United Kingdom	27.8 %

APPENDIX II

Department of Defence report on allied commitments to defence spending

Report to United States Congress by Caspar W. Weinberger Secretary of Defence (March 1981)

In recent years most of the allies have been allocating a growing share of their defence spending to capital expenditures, thereby reversing a downward pattern that existed during the late sixties and early seventies. (The information available on allied spending by resource category for 1980 and beyond is not sufficiently refined to enable us to provide relatively firm figures for those years. Based on preliminary data we are inclined to believe that the patterns depicted here will not change drastically during 1980 and 1981.) "Capital" is defined to include RDTεE, procurement of major equipment and ammunition and construction of facilities including NATO infrastructure. The share allocated to capital by the non-US NATO nations combined declined from 30 % in 1967 to 23 % in 1971, but increased to 28 % in 1979. A similar pattern is indicated for procurement of major equipment and ammunition – the largest component of capital. This category declined from 19 % in 1967 to 14 % in 1971 and then gradually increased to 19 % in 1979. During the same period the US capital percentage fell from around 40 % in 1968 to 30 % in 1975, reflecting in part the South-East Asia phasedown. This share remained in the neighbourhood of 30 % during 1975-78 and moved upward to 33 % in 1979. US spending for major equipment and ammunition followed a comparable trend, declining from 30 % to 18 % between 1968 and 1975, holding steady at about 18 % during 1975-78 and increasing to 22 % in 1979.

In May 1979, when the NATO Defence Planning Committee ministers set the current 1 billion IAU ($ 4.721 billion) ceiling on infrastructure funding for five years (1980-84), they also agreed, among other things (1) to seek means of expediting the programme and (2) to have a mid-term review of the adequacy of the fund ceiling. They also agreed to allow the major NATO commanders (MNCs) latitude in programming early in order to deal with priority military requirements. (An IAU is an international accounting unit which was worth $ 4.721 in 1980 and $ 4.61 in early 1981).

Accordingly, the MNCs have programmed heavily in Slice 31 (285 million IAU) and in their proposed Slice 32 (352 million IAU). They have maintained the need to press forward with high priority projects in these two slices, in order to cope with the changes in the world situation and the threat to NATO since the May 1979 decision. In addition, the MNCs have now cited the need for an increase of almost 700 million IAU above the current 1 billion IAU ceiling to handle additional high priority military projects, after having deferred other projects estimated at an additional 700 million IAU.

The US has pressed for these increases both to enhance NATO burden-sharing and to secure funds sufficient to permit fulfilment of NATO missions stemming from agreed ministerial guidance, force goals, the LTDP and other urgent programmes, including many large projects for the use of US forces under the new reinforcement support category. Such increases are also necessary to offset the effects of inflation on the cost estimates used as a basis for the 1 billion IAU ceiling. The majority of the NATO countries support the need for the early mid-term review advocated by the US and the need for some increase.

The NATO long-term defence programme, initiated by the US in 1977 and approved by NATO leaders in Washington in 1978, adds a new dimension to NATO force planning. It provides a long-term, detailed programme of modernisation and other improvements in ten high-priority functional areas. Moreover, it was designed to provide rationalisation of alliance programmes through greater co-ordination and co-operation between national programmes. It contains many requirements for joint alliance action on the development of new, standardised equipment and families of weapons. This together with the NATO force goals represents a reasonable challenge to which the NATO nations have dedicated themselves.

In general, LTDP progress has been satisfactory, but implementation in certain areas has been disappointing A detailed look at performance in each of the ten programme areas is contained in the January 1981 DOD report on rationalisation/standardisation within NATO.

The LTDP is a long-term effort spanning this decade and into the 1990s. Sustained national efforts and wills are necessary to see the programme through. Not all alliance

members have sufficient financial resources to fulfil their requirements without external assistance. Others could make a greater effort more commensurate with their economic capabilities. Time and sustained resource commitments are necessary for successful completion of the agreed LTDP. But the ultimate result will be a stronger, more cohesive alliance and greater deterrence of aggression through a more capable defence posture.

NATO long-term defence programme (LTDP)

The LTDP calls for NATO nations to implement over 120 major defence measures in ten high-priority areas. US representatives, in various NATO fora and in bilateral discussions with allied officials, have urged our allies to accelerate implementation of the LTDP measures. US officials also have questioned our allies concerning gaps in their LTDP implementation throughout the annual defence review within NATO. The US was a leader in setting up the LTDP follow-through process which established high-level programme monitors to assess progress, identify problem areas and recommend remedial action in each programme area. An extensive reporting system including annual progress reports to ministers serves to measure implementation.

A major burden-sharing element of the LTDP is that of arms co-operation. Almost 40 potential or actual LTDP projects have been identified as having potential for co-operative research, development, testing and production. A major focus of our efforts in this regard has been to reduce the cost of research and development through joint development programmes and coproduction and to increase allied participation. A prime example of joint development is the multiple launch rocket system, developed by the US under an agreement whereby France and the UK contributed funding. A more ambitious approach has been the "family of weapons" concept, with an apportioning of responsibilities for development of specific systems between the US and the European allies. There are plans for a number of other families – air-to-air missiles, anti-tank guided weapons, air-to-ground munitions, advanced naval mines and mine countermeasures systems – all of which involve allied contributions. Greater allied participation and resource savings are also realised through licensed coproduction of existing systems, which provides modern equipment to alliance armies without duplicative development costs.

APPENDIX III

New Eurogroup equipment [1]

This statement describes some of the major equipment acquisitions and improvements planned for 1983 by Eurogroup countries participating in NATO's integrated military structure.

Land forces

1. Eurogroup countries have continuous programmes for introducing new equipment into their inventories, both to replace existing equipment and to add to their stocks. Among the land force equipment improvements in 1983 will be the introduction of nearly 550 main battle tanks, together with some 450 other armoured vehicles. The great majority of the new tanks will be the advanced Leopard II which continues to be introduced into the forces of a number of Eurogroup countries. The figure also includes the first deployment of the new Challenger tank.

2. In addition to these armoured vehicles, there is a wide range of qualitative improvements planned to the tank fleets of Eurogroup countries, including the introduction of night-firing devices and improved fire control systems.

3. A variety of forces is needed to counter the increasing armoured threat posed by the Warsaw Pact and, in addition to their own armoured vehicles, Eurogroup countries are continuing to expand other elements of their anti-armour inventory. Over 700 new Milan and Tow missile systems will be brought into service, two-thirds of which will be additional and not replacement equipment. There are also programmes to improve the effectiveness of the present Tow missiles and to give Milan and Swingfire missile systems an all-weather capability. 1983 will also see the introduction of over 50,000 new hand-held anti-tank rocket launchers in the forces of Eurogroup countries.

Maritime forces

4. The maritime capability of Eurogroup countries continues to improve. Plans for 1983 include the introduction of:

11 destroyers/escorts;
11 minelayers/sweepers/hunters;
8 fast patrol boats;
2 submarines (one nuclear-powered).

An aircraft carrier, HMS Illustrious, was due to enter service in 1983 but the programme was accelerated and the ship entered service during 1982.

5. Eurogroup countries have also undertaken a wide range of programmes to enhance weapons, sensors and communications systems on their vessels as well as improving facilities for electronic warfare and for protection against missile attack.

Air forces

6. In 1983, Eurogroup countries plan to bring into service over 270 combat aircraft. The majority of these will be the Tornado and the F-16. Three countries are introducing the all-weather swing-wing Tornado while a further four countries are continuing their joint introduction of the US-designed F-16. Among the other aircraft types are the first of the airborne early warning Nimrod fleet.

7. Qualitative improvements are planned in the airforces of many Eurogroup countries, particularly in the field of electronic countermeasures and radar warning systems. A range of chaff and flare dispensing systems are to be introduced as well as modernised weapons and weapon delivery systems.

8. In the field of air defence, a range of improvements is planned in a number of Eurogroup countries. For example, the Rapier air defence missile system will continue to be improved with further deployment of the Blind Fire radar guidance system.

9. In the maritime sphere, about 20 helicopters will be introduced into service, either at sea or on shore establishments, together with nearly 40 fixed-wing aircraft, most of which will be Tornado but 6 of which will be maritime patrol aircraft. Advanced electronic countermeasures will be incorporated into a number existing helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft and the new Searchwater radar will continue to be deployed.

1. Appendix to Eurogroup communiqué of 29th November 1982.

APPENDIX IV

IEPG and NATO armaments projects

IEPG

- tactical fighter aircraft;
- anti-tank mines;
- anti-tank guided and non-guided missiles;
- helicopters;
- surface-to-air missiles;
- mine-sweepers and mine-hunters;
- maritime patrol aircraft;
- drones;
- transport aircraft.

NATO

A. Dual production in the United States:

- Roland II air defence system;
- Mag-58 armoured machine gun;
- 120 mm tank gun;
- CFM engine (KC-135 re-engining);
- squad automatic weapon.

B. Dual production in Europe:

- F-16;
- MOD Flir;
- M-483 (munitions);
- improved conventional munition;
- Stinger manportable air defence system;
- AIM-9L improved short-range air-to-air missile;
- Patriot air defence missile.

C. Co-operative programmes:

- NATO-AWACS;
- multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS);
- rolling air frame (RAM);
- NATO small arms ammunition.

APPENDIX V

Department of Defence standardisation of equipment within NATO Ninth report, January 1983

Report to the United States Congress by Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defence

Within the Department of Defence a major study was completed on policies regarding codevelopment/coproduction and other international industrial participation arrangements. This study will serve as the basis for pursuing future multinational programmes more effectively. At the same time, the Defence Science Board has convened a task force to examine the obstacles to and incentives for greater industry-to-industry collaboration within the alliance. This task force recently met with a large number of key European company executives in Brussels and held detailed discussions with NATO parliamentarians on the two-way street [1]. Finally, in a major effort to improve our dialogue with leaders of American industry on defence trade and industrial base issues, the Department of Defence and United States trade representatives have chartered a new Defence Policy Advisory Committee on Trade (DPACT). The DPACT will, among other things, help focus the attention of American defence industry on the importance of our standardisation and interoperability objectives within NATO and elicit ideas on how best to achieve them.

Co-operation with NATO allies to develop and deploy common conventional defence equipment is an extensive process, one the present administration vigorously supports. In a related effort heads of state and government at the June 1982 NATO summit in Bonn agreed to urgently explore ways to take advantage of emerging technologies, both technically and economically, to improve NATO's conventional capability. The United States has introduced a paper on this subject into NATO as a step towards development of a programmatic plan of action.

Assessments and programmes

Progress toward the standardisation of equipment of the United States and NATO allies continues in many programmes. Narrative summaries of major weapons systems are discussed in detail later in this report, but of particular note are the F-16 multinational fighter programme and the NATO airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) programme.

F-16 multinational fighter programme

At the end of 1981, the United States had accepted 474 aircraft and the four European participating governments 235 aircraft. A multinational testing and tactics development agreement is currently being formulated to continue this co-operative effort in the development of F-16 tactical employment concepts.

NATO airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) programme

The acquisition phase, as well as initial operations and support activities, will continue through the scheduled delivery of the eighteenth NATO E-3A in 1985. The first four aircraft were delivered to NATO ahead of schedule, with the fourth delivery being made in November 1982. Follow-on operations and support are the subject of a separate MOU under negotiation.

Before 1979 common technical requirements for weapons systems were achieved on an ad hoc basis as a result of information exchange in the main armament groups of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD). Since then the CNAD has been using the periodic armaments planning system (PAPS).

The PAPS procedures call for decisions at various milestones in the development programme. The documentation associated with these milestones proceed from an initial mission need document (MND), through an outline NATO staff target (ONST), NATO staff target (NST), NATO staff requirement (NSR), etc.

Electronic warfare protection of army helicopters

Canada, France, United Kingdom and United States are participants.

1. The committee met with the task force of the Defence Science Board on industry-to-industry co-operation on 20th October 1982.

MK-60 Captor mine

Captor is a moored, influence-activated anti-submarine mine system employing a modified MK-46 torpedo as the payload. The Captor system is delivered by aircraft, surface ships and submarines and is designed to detect, classify, and attack the most advanced diesel and nuclear submarines. Captor is a prime United States contribution to the NATO family of mines under the NATO family of weapons concept and is NATO's only deep-water mine.

Medium-range air-to-surface missile (MRASM)

The medium-range air-to-surface missile is a conventional variant of the Tomahawk cruise missile being developed jointly by the United States air force and the United States navy. The NATO air force armaments group (NAFAG) has approved a NATO staff target (NST) for a long-range standoff missile (LRSOM). The NST for the long-range standoff missile identifies requirements for a weapon system with characteristics and capabilities similar to the MRASM. MOU negotiations for feasibility studies of the LRSOM have been conducted by the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany.

Advanced medium-range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM)

AMRAAM is an all-weather, all-aspect radar missile capable of engaging numerically superior aircraft forces before they close to within visual range. This missile will provide the capability for multiple launches beyond visual range and become autonomous soon after launch to permit the launch aircraft to manoeuvre and/or engage more targets quickly. AMRAAM will be compatible with the F-14, F-15, F-16 and F/A-18 aircraft, as well as applicable NATO air defence and air superiority aircraft of the late 1980s. The AMRAAM programme has completed the competitive validation phase, including a series of prototype missile launches. Hughes Aircraft Company was selected as the developer of the AMRAAM.

In August 1980, the United States signed a MOU with France, Germany and the United Kingdom for a co-operative programme for a family of air-to-air missile systems. Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States are full participants while France currently has a special observer status.

Rolling airframe missile (RAM)

The rolling airframe missile is designed to help meet the maritime self-defence requirements of the United States, Germany and Denmark through the mid-1990s by providing increased firepower and supplementing other point defence systems.

Infrared search and track (IRST) system

The United States is co-operating with Canada in the development of a shipboard infrared search and track (IRST) system. The United States has signed the agreement and Canada is expected to sign in the near future. The two countries will co-operate in full-scale engineering development and operational testing at sea.

NATO Seasparrow point defence missile system

The NATO Seasparrow surface missile system (NSSMS) provides ships with an effective short-range, quick-reaction, self-defence capability against a wide spectrum of threats, including very low altitude aircraft and missiles. Under a 1968 MOU for development and production, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and the United States have participated in this co-operative programme. Canada and Greece recently joined the consortium.

NATO Sea Gnat

This project is an international co-operative development programme for a new shipboard decoy system. All work is being accomplished in the United States under a memorandum of understanding signed in January 1977. The programme is developing three separate decoys to protect ships against missile attack. Participants include Denmark, the United Kingdom and the United States.

NATO forces sensor and weapon accuracy check sites in Europe (FORACS)

Based on a MOU signed by Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, three FORACS activities were authorised. These are the northern and southern FORACS ranges at Stavanger, Norway, and Souda Bay, Crete, and the NATO FORACS Office in Brussels, Belgium. The northern FORACS range began operations in August 1978. Civil works construction began for the southern FORACS range in October 1982. Target completion date is October 1983.

Harrier vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL)

The United Kingdom-developed AV-8A Harrier V/STOL aircraft has been operational in the United States Marine Corps since 1971. Based on this ten years of operational experience, the Marine Corps views the AV-8B advanced vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft as a vital element of the future USMC force projection capability in the mid-1980s as a replacement light-attack aircraft. Full-scale development of four aircraft commenced in July 1979 with first flight completed in November 1981. The United States and United Kingdom recently signed a memorandum of understanding for completion of development and collaborative production of the aircraft. The United Kingdom programme will consist of 60 aircraft for the Royal Air Force. Spain has expressed an interest in purchasing 12 aircraft.

NATO frigate replacement for the 1990s (NFR-90)

The NATO frigate project (NFR-90) is a multinational effort by NATO maritime nations to design and build a frigate capable of meeting the needs of NATO against the 1990s threat. A prefeasibility study was completed in late 1982 by the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) which is being evaluated by interested nations to determine whether the project will meet individual country's requirements for frigates in the 1990s. Decisions by nations to continue participation in the follow-on feasibility study will be made in early 1983. The project offers potential for cost savings to be achieved through a co-operative production effort.

Maritime electronic warfare support group (MEWSG)

MEWSG is an international project to develop and establish within NATO an organisation capable of providing regular and realistic training for NATO units in all aspects of electronic warfare (EW) with particular emphasis on the maritime environment. The United States is an active participant in the project group which includes Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. Phase I of the MEWSG project, fully funded through NATO common infrastructure funds, is progressing satisfactorily. Necessary EW equipment will be procured in 1983 and the MEWSG organisation will have an initial operating capability by early 1984. Follow-on phases to enhance the capabilities of MEWSG are in the planning stages.

Memorandum of understanding between the United States and France for a co-operative research project in titanium alloys

The United States and French Governments are each engaged in research in the field of titanium alloys for turboshaft engines and they have identified certain exploratory development areas where similar interests exist. This titanium project provides for a co-operative research programme in which complementary efforts will be performed by each participating government and the results thereto will be exchanged. It is intended that the co-ordination of efforts through this co-operative venture will benefit both countries by more effective utilisation of resources and by achievement of a broader coverage of the fundamental knowledge esssential to the advancement of titanium alloys. Specific titanium alloy objectives are to explore micromechanics and deformation at elevated temperatures, fatigue mechanisms and microstructural effect, creep-fatigue interactions, forging and process control, property characterisation and fabricability and non-destructive inspectability.

Memorandum of understanding between the United States and France concerning a joint study of icing cloud formation

This memorandum of understanding provides for a co-operative joint project to be conducted by both governments for testing and evaluation of water atomisers which are used to create an artificial cloud in simulated altitude test facilities.

Aircraft flight control concepts

Aircraft flight control systems have been used to augment airframe characteristics for improving flight qualities and reducing pilot workload. The combined effect of increased experience and confidence in the system, aided by the phenomenal growth in computer capabilities, has resulted in more functions and added authority being assigned to the active use of the primary flight control system

A memorandum of understanding to generate task-oriented flying qualities criteria acceptable to aircraft highly augmented with various advanced control concepts was entered into between the USAF and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1979 and a programme is currently ongoing. Under this programme, Germany is investigating task-oriented handling qualities of various direct force control modes, especially for precision flight path tracking tasks. The goal is to develop a technology data base from which handling qualities criteria can be defined for new control concepts.

Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields - Part II

AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3[1]

tabled by Mr. Worrell

1. In paragraph (*iii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after " European states ", leave out the remainder of the sentence.

2. In paragraph (*v*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " extensive " and insert " promising ".

3. In the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

" 4. Strongly support the need for co-operation within the Independent European Programme Group. "

Signed: Worrell

1. See 8th sitting, 30th November 1983 (amendments 1 and 3 negatived; amendment 2 agreed to).

Application of the Brussels Treaty
reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council

PREVIOUS QUESTION [1]

moved by Mr. Lagorce on behalf of the Socialist Group
under Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure

Mr. Lagorce moves the previous question on Document 948, Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council.

1. See 6th sitting, 29th November 1983 (previous question negatived).

Middle East crises and European security

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee [2]
by Lord Reay, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 2 with 3 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. *Michel* (Chairman); MM. *Hardy, van der Werff* (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. *Ahrens,* Mrs. *Baarveld-Schlaman, Sir Frederic Bennett,* MM. Berrier (Alternate: *Dreyfus-Schmidt*), *Bogaerts, Caro,* Conti Persini, De Poi, *Hill,* Lagneau (Alternate: *Pécriaux*), *Lagorce, Lord McNair,* MM. Müller, Prouvost, *Lord Reay,* MM. Reddemann (Alternate: *Böhm*), Ruet, Rumpf, *van der Sanden, Thoss,* Valiante (Alternate: *Cavaliere*), Vecchietti, Vogt, Zito.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on Middle East crises and European security

The Assembly,

(*i*) Recalling its Recommendations 341, 349, 361, 371, 386 and 389 ;

(*ii*) Considering that armed conflicts in the Middle East are a serious threat to Europe's security ;

(*iii*) Considering in particular that if the war between Iran and Iraq continues there is a grave threat of it spreading and further endangering stability in the Gulf area ;

(*iv*) Considering also that the present unstable situation in Lebanon with its multitude of warring local parties, military actions by countries in that area and the confrontation, through the intermediary of other countries, of the two superpowers, constitutes, the longer it continues, an ever-graver risk of provoking an international crisis ;

(*v*) Considering that it is important to avoid oversimplifying the nature of the situation in Lebanon in terms of East-West conflict ;

(*vi*) Believing it seems desirable for peace in Lebanon that the Lebanese Government reflect, as is the tradition in that country, the demographic balance of its composite parts ;

(*vii*) Deploring the heavy losses suffered by two units of the multinational buffer force on 23rd October 1983 and recognising the usefulness of its presence for assuring the protection of the population and for helping Lebanon to recover its integrity and sovereignty ;

(*viii*) Believing that all other foreign forces should leave Lebanese soil completely ;

(*ix*) Considering that the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East also requires neither a vicious circle of terrorism and repression nor the installation of settlements but recognition:

- by those who have not yet done so, including most Arab countries and the PLO, of the right of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers,
- by Israel that the PLO is still effectively representative of the Palestinian people and the right of the latter to its own national homeland,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine what measures could be taken by its members to help to terminate the war between Iraq and Iran and to avoid its extension;

2. Examine the policies of member countries towards the belligerents with a view to ensuring that actions are not taken by them which contribute to the continuation of the conflict;

3. Redefine the purposes of their peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, while giving every encouragement to the emergence of a generally-accepted settlement;

4. Insist on the complete withdrawal from Lebanon of all other foreign forces;

5. Provide food, medical and humanitarian assistance to the victims of the fighting in Lebanon;

6. Reaffirm that peace on the territory of former Palestine depends on the PLO and all nations recognising Israel and its rights and on Israel recognising the fact that the Palestinian people is at present represented only by the PLO and that Palestinians have the right to their own national homeland;

7. Repeat its condemnation of Israel's continued settlement policy on territories occupied since 1967 and condemn also the Syrian Government's policy of destabilisation in Lebanon.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Lord Reay, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1. It was only on 21st September 1983 that the Presidential Committee of the Assembly decided to include a report on the Middle East in the agenda of the November session.

2. Your Rapporteur, however, may lean on the results of far-reaching study and reflection accomplished in the General Affairs Committee in earlier years on matters relating to this important region. After Sir Frederic Bennett, who was Rapporteur in 1979, 1980 and 1981 (Documents 820, 844 and 871), your Rapporteur already presented a report on European security and the Middle East in December 1982 (Document 927) when he drew up a list of documents on the subject. Hence, the present document will not go back over past history but merely refer to developments in 1983 which are the reason for the Presidential Committee deciding to include this matter again in the agenda of the November session.

3. In fact, two quite separate matters have made events in the Middle East a subject of keen concern for Europe's security. One is the resumption of civil war in Lebanon during the summer, but in which foreign powers have been involved from the outset, including certain member countries of WEU or the Atlantic Alliance. The other is the continued fighting between Iraq and Iran and the risk of this war spreading, which Europe cannot disregard.

II. *The war between Iraq and Iran*

4. In the course of 1983 there seem to have been substantial shifts in the balance of power towards Iran which has been much more able to maintain its oil exports and therefore its oil revenue than Iraq. Moreover, Iraq has become heavily dependent on subsidies from Saudi Arabia and certain Gulf states which those countries are unlikely to be able and perhaps will not wish to maintain at the same level indefinitely. It is this which has induced a certain sense of desperation in Iraq to end the war as soon as possible. Iran has just managed to push the theatre of operations back over its frontier. However, as Iran has a larger population and abundant oil reserves, is capable of replacing its equipment, inter alia by procuring American weapons from Israel or directly from the United States, and has shown that Iraq is unable to break the Iranian national spirit, it seems to be better placed than its opponent.

5. At the present time Iran has still not dropped its demand for the removal of the present Iraqi Government as a precondition for peace. Obviously this demand cannot be accepted by the present Iraqi régime. However, the purchase of five Super-Etendard aircraft from France with sixty Exocet missiles can be seen as an attempt by Iraq to increase its leverage in order to bring about peace as soon as possible. For the past year Iraq has been calling for peace on the basis of the *status quo ante bello.* Thus, whatever opinion one may have of the respective responsibilities of the two governments at the beginning of the war, it is now quite clear that Iraq wants peace to be restored and it is Iran that is imposing unacceptable conditions for its enemy.

6. Western Europe's reasons for being interested in this matter are not quite the same as for the fighting in Lebanon. There is obviously a fear of internationalisation which would be particularly dangerous as Iran is a neighbour of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The Soviet Union is the main supplier of weapons to the Iraqi army while the United States, after a long crisis in relations with Khomeiny's Iran, has again begun to supply it with weapons.

7. But the Europeans are far more concerned about the oil question. In spite of a considerable drop in western oil supplies from the Middle East due on the one hand to reduced consumption and on the other to increased output in other regions – Africa, the Soviet Union, the North Sea, for instance – more than 12% of the world's oil consumption still comes from the Gulf. The shares produced by Iran and Iraq respectively have admittedly fallen to a very low level because of the war. But most of the output of Bahrein, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates still passes through the Gulf and it is now possible for Iran, which has taken control of the islands scattered in the Strait of Hormuz, to cut off oil shipments through this sole gateway to the Gulf. Any prolonged interruption of supplies would be enough to cause another oil crisis whose effects on the price of oil and on the whole world economy cannot be foreseen.

8. It is therefore essential for Western Europe to put an early end to the threats to this essential trade route, in other words, the war must be terminated.

9. So far, the only measures taken by the West to avert this danger have been to build up the naval forces of countries – mainly the United States, France and the United Kingdom – in the Indian Ocean and the formation of the United States rapid deployment force, which is still far from complete. Perhaps the concentration of these forces in the area of the Strait of Hormuz and the co-operation of the rather small naval forces of the Arab countries near the Gulf would be enough to stop any attempt by Iran to block traffic through the Strait. However this may be, the destruction of a few giant tankers in the Gulf would seriously perturb movement and cause severe damage through the resulting water pollution to the cost of the coastal countries.

10. France for its part has gone further than any other country in direct assistance to Iraq. It supplies it with large quantities of weapons plus, in October 1983, five Super-Etendard aircraft belonging to the French navy and equipped with Exocet air-to-sea missiles which could cause serious damage not only to Iranian ships but also, if necessary, to Iran's oil terminals in the Gulf.

11. The reasons given by French authorities for justifying this contract and those suggested by certain observers vary widely. Some of the explanations given by France are:

(*i*) France considers it must respect a contract which it signed nine months ago;

(*ii*) France considers that since the balance of forces has shifted in favour of Iran and in view of Iran's uncompromising attitude, peace cannot be restored unless Iraq is strengthened;

(*iii*) France insists that its support is limited;

(*iv*) France points out that if it failed to fulfil its commitments the Soviet Union would take advantage of this to increase Iraq's dependence on it, which would not facilitate the restoration of peace but increase the risk of the war becoming internationalised.

12. On the other hand, certain observers have pointed out:

(*i*) that Iraq is heavily in debt to France and that if it is defeated France would suffer a heavy financial loss;

(*ii*) that arms exports, which formed a large proportion of France's trade balance, fell by 28% in 1982 and it may be tempted to try to give new impetus to this aspect of its external trade.

13. In any event, the implementation of this contract has caused concern among France's partners, particularly because of Iran's repeated declarations that if Iraq used the Exocet missiles Iran would block the Strait of Hormuz. And it is hard not to draw the conclusion that the whole story illustrates the danger of any Western European country lending excessively to any third country.

14. The French Government's gamble that the mere threat of using these missiles might induce the Iranian Government to make a settlement is perhaps not unfounded. However, the great danger is that in the past Ayatollah Khomeiny's government has not been very responsive to rational arguments and careful not to appear to yield to external threats. Furthermore, it is regrettable that in a matter which is of such importance for joint security France did not feel, as far as the Assembly knows, that it should consult its partners which would suffer from the same inconvenience as France in the event of the outcome of this contract not being what France expects.

15. In expressing these reservations, your Rapporteur in no way wishes to dissociate himself from the precautionary measures taken by certain countries to ensure the continued movement of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, but he considers it risky to rely on military measures alone, to take sides too clearly in this matter and, a fortiori, to supply one of the parties with armaments, thus increasing the danger of the conflict spreading.

III. *The situation in Lebanon*

(a) The civil war

16. President Amin Gemayel, who was elected in Beirut in September 1982 at a time when part of the town was occupied by the Israelis and the assassination of his brother, President Bechir Gemayel, had raised the clashes between Lebanese communities to a new level, has not managed, in 1983, to impose his authority on Lebanon as a whole. The Syrians were invited to come to the assistance of the Lebanese Government in 1976 but this invitation was withdrawn on 2nd September 1983 by President Gemayel, who then called upon the Arab League to withdraw Syrian and Palestinian troops from Lebanon, while Israel occupied a strip along its frontier on 14th March 1978 but invaded a larger part of Lebanese territory in June 1982. The north and east of the country are still occupied by Syria, while Israel occupies the south. Under these two occupations, the communities protected by one country or another, particularly the Druzes, armed by Syria, and the Christians in the south under Com-

mander Haddad, armed by Israel, do not recognise the authority of the government in Beirut. President Gemayel admits that he controls only a tenth of Lebanese territory.

17. The latter came under strong criticism from many Christian groups and most Moslems in Lebanon. They all objected to his privileged relationship with Israel and with the United States and the collusion between the armed forces of the Lebanese state and the Christian Phalangists led by his father, Pierre Gemayel. In short, it seems difficult to claim that he can be a president capable of rallying the support of the entire Lebanese society and restoring civil peace.

18. In these circumstances, the decision by the Israeli Government on 4th September 1983 to evacuate the mountainous Chuf area between Beirut and the River Awali, where Christian and Druze populations are closely intermingled, could but lead to a resumption of the civil war, each of the communities being determined to do its utmost to control the area. Admittedly, Israel and the Lebanese Government signed a convention on 17th May on the evacuation of Lebanese territory, but this convention was not ratified and made the departure of the Israelis dependent on the Syrians leaving too. The United States asked the Israelis to postpone their evacuation until Lebanese armed forces were able to occupy the area effectively, but to no avail.

19. The result was a month of open warfare between the Druzes and their Syrian allies on the one hand and the Lebanese army and Christian Phalangists on the other, and the military operations brought the Druzes and Syrians to the outskirts of Beirut. The international buffer forces composed of American, British, French and Italian units have been under attack several times and there have been casualties. The Americans and French have retaliated by shooting or bombing.

20. Although another cease-fire put an end to military operations at the beginning of October, it solved none of the problems and it may be wondered whether it will ever be possible to restore the unity of the Lebanese state. On the Israeli side, there seem to be more efforts to consolidate the strength of the clans controlling southern Lebanon than to restore state sovereignty. During the autumn, Israeli weapons were distributed not only to Commander Haddad's militia, which associates Christians and Shiites, but also to the southern Lebanese Shiite community. The sharp reduction in the Israeli force in Lebanon, reportedly from 30,000 to 10,000 men after the evacuation of the Chuf, seems to confirm the Israelis' intention of taking advantage of the fighting between Lebanese communities to have their frontiers protected by dissident Lebanese forces, while Syria for its part refuses to consider any evacuation of the part of Lebanon which it controls, i.e. about two-thirds of the country. An attack on the Israeli forces' command post at Tyre on 5th November 1983 resulted in twenty-nine victims among the Israeli forces and 32 others including some of their prisoners. The retaliatory measures taken by the Israelis further helped to strain relations between the Israeli army and the population of the occupied area.

21. The attempt by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia at the beginning of October to convene a Lebanese national reconciliation congress led to the opening of a meeting in Geneva at the beginning of November. The refusal by several Lebanese heads of clans to take part had forced several postponements and changes in proposed meeting places and the idea of holding the congress in Lebanon had to be given up. Discussions in the Lebanese national congress in Geneva produced some results and they have now been suspended to allow President Gemayel to implement the first decisions which were first to recognise Lebanon as an Arab country, then to insist on the evacuation of Israeli troops, confirm the cease-fire which began in the Chuf and Lebanese mountains on 25th September and, finally, accept the principle of a discussion on reforms to be introduced in Lebanon. Furthermore, most of the leaders other than President Gemayel insisted on the denunciation of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement of 17th May 1983. He was finally instructed to consult with the capitals concerned in order to negate this agreement.

22. Certain steps by the clan leaders indicate that in any event several of them do not wish to revert to a state based on the national compromise of 1943. Thus, Mr. Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Druze community and of the Progressive Socialist Party, started to requisition land belonging to Christians in the Chuf, announced on 4th October the creation of a civil administration in that area and appealed to Lebanese soldiers and officers to show insubordination. Again, there is no indication that the Phalangists are prepared to accept anything less than a dominant place in a Lebanese state. Finally, the massacres perpetrated by all parties during ten years of civil war and quite recently during the occupation of the Chuf by the Druzes offer no hope of abatement. Many Lebanese have had to leave their homes to take refuge in sectors controlled by their political friends or co-religionists, particularly in certain quarters of Beirut, which makes it even more to be feared that this small country will be divided between the communities and the clans.

23. In any event, it seems most unlikely that Lebanese unity can ever be restored on the basis

of the 1943 national compromise. The numerical breakdown of the communities in Lebanon is no longer the same and the compromise failed to institute a true democracy but tipped the balance in favour of the Christian element, dividing the country between rival clans. If the unity of Lebanon can be restored, it will have to be on new political bases. It is not yet possible to say whether the Geneva congress has managed to define such bases satisfactorily, but it is to be hoped that a first step has been taken in this direction.

24. Nevertheless, even if the war in Lebanon is a civil one, it has assumed such international dimensions that agreement between the Lebanese parties, however necessary, cannot be expected to suffice to restore peace, which quite obviously depends on the withdrawal of the foreign armed forces occupying the country.

(b) Foreign intervention

25. The rivalry between Lebanese clans can certainly not be attributed to foreign intervention, but intervention considerably enhanced the effects of rivalry, particularly by helping to provide certain communities with large quantities of very sophisticated weaponry.

26. (*i*) Until 1982, the main foreign force involved in Lebanese affairs was Palestinian, expulsed from the territory which became Israel in 1949 and then from the territories occupied in 1967 and accepted into Lebanon as refugees. The revolt of the Palestinians in Jordan in September 1970 and the ensuing repression further increased the number of Palestinians in Lebanon, which they made the PLO centre. Forced to leave Lebanon in 1982 after the Israeli attack, some of them have returned. Yasser Arafat, after the split in the PLO in June 1982, had to leave Syria where dissident elements had the upper hand under the protection of the Syrian authorities. He has now taken refuge in Tripoli, in northern Lebanon, where the PLO exercises de facto control but is threatened by the Syrian army which surrounds the town and at the beginning of November 1983 was trying to force Yasser Arafat out.

27. (*ii*) The Syrian army controls most of Lebanon. It is powerfully equipped, thanks to military assistance from the Soviet Union which provides it with the latest weapons, particularly anti-aircraft missiles. Syria seems to have a twofold aim: first, to prepare a partial or total annexation of Lebanese territory which Syria has always considered to have been unfairly snatched from it after the first world war and, second, to obtain the complete submission of the Palestinian armed forces, perhaps with a view to using them to retrieve the Golan area, occupied by Israel since 1967.

28. (*iii*) The Israeli army, which had been in the frontier area to the south of the Litani since 1978, reached Beirut in 1982. The evacuation of the Chuf seems to indicate an evolution in Israeli policy: after trying to restore the unity of Lebanon round a government which was favourable to it and having managed to chase the Palestinians out of Lebanon, Israel now seems to have given up the first of these aims and is relying on the division of Lebanon to protect its frontier.

29. (*iv*) Most Arab countries still consider the unity of Lebanon to be necessary for the restoration of peace in the Middle East but they hardly have the means to carry this into effect.

30. (*v*) Although the United nations force in southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been unable to play its rôle since 1982 because of the limits imposed on it, this is not true for the multinational buffer force which first came to protect the refugee camps, and has to a certain extent been effective in preventing inter-community clashes from getting out of hand in the town of Beirut after the civil war flared up again in September 1983 before the Lebanese army was strong enough to take over. The very fact that it has been the target of Syrian and Druze shooting and perhaps also of other elements shows that its political rôle was not scorned by the belligerents.

31. However, this involvement of the buffer force has led the governments concerned to re-examine the true task of the force. At the outset, it was simply a matter of keeping the various factions apart, at the request of the legitimate Lebanese Government, but implying no intervention in Lebanese policy or possible fighting. When the force was attacked and bombed, the question then arose as to whether it would retaliate, remain without reacting in positions which were liable to become impossible to hold, or be evacuated. The countries concerned were not absolutely unanimous about the choice to be made.

32. The British and Italian units remained on the spot without reacting to attacks which, admittedly, mainly affected the French and American contingents. The question of evacuation was raised in Italy. Conversely, France and the United States sent large naval forces, now including an American battleship and three aircraft-carriers and a French aircraft-carrier. They reacted when attacks were perpetrated against the buffer force, the Americans with artillery and bombing and the French with an air attack on a Syrian artillery battery.

33. However, France and the United States do not appear to have had the same view of their rôle insofar as the United States equips the Lebanese army and seems to envisage the restoration of Lebanese unity only round

President Gemayel to whom it supplies strong political and military assistance, whereas France is far more reserved about the possible political aspect of restoring Lebanese unity and does not wish to appear to be supporting any particular party.

34. In the night of 22nd to 23rd October 1983, there were two extremely serious attacks which destroyed the buildings housing the United States and French forces in Beirut. There were 230 American and 58 French victims. These attacks were carried out with lorries loaded with explosives which were crashed into the buildings. Responsibility has been claimed by a hitherto unknown Islamic association, but the powerful means implemented seem to indicate that this association has the backing of a state seeking to whip up public opinion in the two countries contributing most troops to the buffer force against maintaining a contingent in Lebanon. The first American and French reactions indicate that the governments of both countries, in agreement with the Lebanese Government, have decided not to yield to terrorist pressure but to intensify their political and military action to promote the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty.

35. (*vi*) One may wonder to what extent the Soviet Union has refrained from direct intervention in the fighting, since some of the missiles used were in the hands of Soviet experts. It has, in any event, delivered arms to Syria where it has replaced the missiles destroyed by the Israelis in the Bekaa Valley. The new missiles have been deployed on Syrian territory in order to be less provocative to the Israelis. It has at least 6,000 " military advisers " in Syria, thus ensuring control over Syria's use of the weapons it has supplied. It has also protested at the American and French retaliation to attacks on the buffer force, but it seems anxious not to become too deeply involved in a matter beyond its control. It is at present impossible to know whether the Soviet Union played a part in these attacks but it has not condemned the one on 23rd October and its presence is being felt increasingly in the conflict.

36. The internationalisation of the Lebanese conflict has therefore become a fact which no longer concerns only neighbouring countries but in which European countries and the two great powers are playing a growing rôle. Henceforth this fact must no longer be disregarded.

(c) *Lebanon and European security*

37. The importance Western Europe attaches to restoring peace in Lebanon is evident, as is testified by the fact that at the present economic and political juncture three Western European countries, without any national objective, maintain and support contingents in Lebanon in face of strongly-armed opponents merely to form a buffer between the combatants.

38. (*i*) First and foremost it is a matter of preventing continued fighting in Lebanon from bringing the two great powers into direct confrontation, first in that country and then in the rest of the world. The very special nature of the Lebanese civil war signifies that no solution can be found by a compromise between the two great powers, whereas they both might leave Lebanese affairs alone if they were sure that lasting peace could be restored in the country. In this case, it is quite obviously a local conflict whose duration has led to the direct or indirect intervention of the United States and the Soviet Union, and not a local form of a worldwide conflict.

39. (*ii*) Nor does Western Europe have any interest in the further continuation in Lebanon or elsewhere of a regional conflict which in this instance has been smouldering for thirty-five years and which is always liable to flare up, provoking more widespread hostilities which might cut off the West's oil supply lines, as was the case in 1956 and 1973.

40. (*iii*) For historic reasons, the West is committed to ensuring acceptable living conditions for Christian minorities in the East. As far back as 1860, fighting between Druzes and Maronites was at the origin of a conflict between France and Turkey. Today, too, the disappearance of the Christian minorities from the Levant in an Arab-Islamic world in the grip of a fundamentalist revival would be difficult for certain sections of western public opinion to accept since it would appear to be a renunciation of the values upheld for two centuries.

41. This is in no way a call for some kind of crusade as Mr. Jumblatt claimed in an attack on Lebanese Christians, the United States and France. On the contrary, your Rapporteur feels the western countries should confine themselves to the application of a few principles:

(*i*) to spare human lives constantly threatened by the relentless nature of the fighting in which there is no hesitation about massacring civilians, particularly refugees in camps;

(*ii*) not to intervene in Lebanon's internal affairs, i.e. to leave it to the Lebanese themselves to decide what type of institutions should govern the restoration of peace in their country;

(*iii*) to obtain the total evacuation of the country by all foreign armed forces and the full restoration of its sovereignty, which would also imply the

withdrawal of the PLO's armed forces;

(*iv*) to consider that peace in Lebanon can be assured only with the agreement of the countries in the area and consequently with the establishment of peace throughout the Middle East on a sufficiently fair basis to inspire confidence that it will be lasting. This implies the re-establishment of fair peace between Israel and its neighbours and your Rapporteur considers that this can be achieved only through the application of the principles set out in Security Council Resolution 242. This is in any event what the General Affairs Committee has resolutely upheld since 1967.

42. For the immediate future, application of these principles implies:

(*i*) keeping the multinational buffer force in place to ensure the continuity of the West's support for the restoration of peace in Lebanon;

(*ii*) seeking a negotiated agreement between Lebanese groups with a view to drawing up a national pact based on new and more democratic bases than those of the 1943 compromise;

(*iii*) refusing to intervene in Lebanese internal affairs;

(*iv*) reaching agreement between all the Western European countries, particularly those involved in Lebanon, on the aims and the means which those countries might deploy to achieve them.

IV. *Palestine*

43. Although the Lebanese conflict is becoming increasingly international and is liable to worsen and spread not only to neighbouring countries but even to the great powers, it is evident that no lasting solution can be found as long as the Palestine question has not been solved. Some four million Palestinians are in fact now scattered throughout the Arab world. The map on page 74 of the brief on European security and the Middle East prepared by your Rapporteur in December 1982 showed their location at that time. They are still a factor of instability for the weaker states among those in which they are living and an instrument for action by others such as Libya and Syria.

44. Syria's attempt in 1983 to take control of the Palestinian organisations, first on its own territory and then in Lebanon, to the detriment of the PLO which it seems to wish to take over, might give that country possibilities of action, particularly terrorist action, throughout the world, but above all in Arab countries, whose extent it is difficult to assess.

45. Now even more than in the past, it therefore seems clear that peace cannot be restored in the Middle East through agreements between Israel and the neighbouring countries but only by guaranteeing Palestinians their right to a homeland and self-determination, at the same time of course guaranteeing Israel secure and recognised frontiers. Israel's illegal occupation of the West Bank since 1967 has prevented the restoration of any such peace. It is to be hoped however that the new Israeli Government, led by Mr. Shamir following the resignation of Mr. Begin in October 1983, will show greater understanding in the light of its composition and the serious internal problems it has to solve. The first measure one is entitled to expect is that settlements on the West Bank will be terminated.

46. These settlements, which multiplied under Mr. Begin's government, constitute hardly implicit threats to annex the West Bank and expulse the Arab section of the population which remained in that area. The very nature of the state of Israel in fact precludes acceptance of long-term cohabitation between a native Moslem and Arab population and an immigrant Jewish population. Jewish immigration in Israel now accounts for only a small proportion of a population whose rate of natural reproduction is very low, like that of the population of most industrialised countries. Conversely, the Arab population continues to have a very high birth rate, which means that in two decades it would be in the majority in a state of Israel to which the West Bank would be annexed. Israel is therefore condemned to accord true independence to the West Bank and its people or to annex it, in which case it would almost inevitably have to expel the Arab population which, because of its numbers, would make it impossible to maintain a religious and democratic state.

47. There is no need to emphasise that such measures would make it even more difficult to solve the Middle East problems, particularly the restoration of unity and sovereignty in Lebanon. It should also be recalled that the Palestinians are playing an increasingly important part in the public life of many Arab countries and consequently, just when Syria is seriously threatening the survival of the PLO leaders and their last armed forces in Lebanon, the influence of the Palestinians, the great majority of whom seem to be still loyal to Yasser Arafat, remains strong in the Arab world. Any policy which

sought to separate the Arab countries from the Palestinian cause would therefore have little future.

V. *Conclusions*

48. Your Rapporteur considers that developments in the Middle East in 1983 are unlikely to change significantly the conclusions he reached in December 1982, but they allow them to be completed and clarified in certain respects. He proposed to prepare a draft recommendation urging WEU member countries:

(*i*) for those concerned, to continue to take part in the multinational buffer force in Lebanon;

(*ii*) to set as a goal the restoration of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon through the evacuation of all foreign armed forces, and to intervene in no way in that country's internal rivalries, other than to avoid the massacre of civilians;

(*iii*) to pursue the search for peace in the Middle East on the basis of United Nations Resolution 242;

(*iv*) to help to maintain freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf;

(*v*) to consult each other prior to any action in the Levant or in regard to arms supplied to countries involved in armed conflicts.

Document 965
Amendment 1

30th November 1983

Middle East crises and European security

AMENDMENT 1 [1]

tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Hardy

1. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add " and equally do everything possible to discourage the sale of arms by non-member countries ".

Signed: Bennett, Hardy

1. See 10th sitting, 1st December 1983 (report referred back to committee).

Document 965 **30th November 1983**
Amendments 2, 3 and 4

Middle East crises and European security

AMENDMENTS 2, 3 and 4 [1]

tabled by Lord McNair

2. Leave out the second sub-paragraph of paragraph (*ix*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert " by Israel that the Palestinian people have a right to their own national homeland ".

3. In line 1 of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " the PLO and ".

4. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " is at present represented only by the PLO and that Palestinians ".

Signed: McNair

1. See 10th sitting, 1st December 1983 (report referred back to committee).

Middle East crises and European security

AMENDMENTS 5 and 6 [1]

tabled by Mr. Caro

5. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, after " its rights and " insert " , on that condition, ".

6. Leave out paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

" Condemn firmly any action calling in question the frontiers and sovereignty of the states in the area as recognised by the United Nations. "

Signed: Caro

1. See 10th sitting, 1st December 1983 (report referred back to committee).

Middle East crises and European security

AMENDMENTS 7, 8, 9 and 10 [1]

tabled by Mr. Stoffelen

7. In paragraph (*iv*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " and the confrontation " and insert " and the danger of confrontation, either directly or ".

8. In paragraph (*vi*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " seems ".

9. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add " based on the principle of self-determination ".

10. In paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " and condemn also the Syrian Government's policy of destabilisation in Lebanon ".

Signed: Stoffelen

1. See 10th sitting, 1st December 1983 (report referred back to committee).

Document 965 **1st December 1983**
Amendments 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15

Middle East crises and European security

AMENDMENTS 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 [1]

tabled by Mr. Gansel

11. In paragraph (*vii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out all the words after " population ".

12. In paragraph (*viii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " other " and, at the end, insert " unless they are there at the request of the Lebanese Government ".

13. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

" Give every encouragement to the emergence of a generally-accepted settlement ".

14. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " other " and, at the end, add " which are not in the country at the request of the Lebanese Government ".

15. Add a new paragraph at the end of the draft recommendation proper:

" Appeal to the Arab League, the Conference of Islamic States and the United Nations to shoulder the responsibility of bringing about a peaceful settlement of the various conflicts in the Middle East ".

Signed: Gansel

1. See 10th sitting, 1st December 1983 (report referred back to committee).

IMPRIMERIE ALENÇONNAISE
Rue Édouard-Belin 61002 ALENÇON
Dépôt légal : 1er trimestre 1984
N° d'ordre 99137

PRINTED IN FRANCE